The Violence of Periphery States

EboHutehjM

The period since the end of the Second World War has been  characterised
by an  important  paradox:  on  the  one  hand  the  growing  solidity  and  non-
repressiveness on the whole of bourgeois rule at the centre, and on the other
the fragility and violence of class rule in the periphery. The capitalist state in
Europe, America  and Japan  has  assumed  its logical form  as the  bourgeois
democratic republic, with the extension of a wide range of civil and  political
liberties and, simultaneously, of social and economic benefits to the working
classes. In  addition,  these  states  have  shown  consistent  ability  to  weather
various  crises:  prolonged  economic  recession,  urban  terrorism,  militant
protests, the  dissolution  of  colonial empires, expansion  of  world  socialism,
and sharp growth in the military power of socialism. On the other  hand, the
state in the periphery has assumed a progressively more precarious and  out-
rightry repressive  character, with frequent  violent ovethrow and  rearrange-
ment of ruling coalitions, constant  constitutional revisions, the  suppression
of political and civil rights and basic democratic freedoms, brutal  repression
of the working classes, and  internal wars and  foreign  armed  interventions.
The international bourgeoisie has not been innocent in these developments,
but  rather  has  been  deeply  implicated  in  them.  Why  does  contemporary
bourgeois rule assume this double face - democratic and  consensual in  the
centre, brutal and repressive in the periphery?

In  response  to  these  developments  two different  sets  of  theories  of  the
state -  one of the capitalist state in the centre, the other  of the  peripheral
state, but both tracing their inspiration to Marx - have arisen, independently
of and  - potentially hostile to  each  other. No  single Marxist  theory  of  the
state corresponding to the international character of capital (Le. a theory of
the state in the imperialist phase)  has emerged from  the recent  debates.  A
consideration of the recent theories on the nature of bourgeois rule requires
a return to some aspects of Marx's writings on the capitalist state.

T HE VIOLENCE OF PERIPHERY  STATES  49

The Capitalist State
Marx makes two important comments regarding the form and function of the
political in capitalist society. The first is the separation that characterises the
level of  economic domination  and  the  exercise of political  functions  within
the bourgeois order. Marx attributes this 'separation' both to the class con-
stitution  of  the  bourgeoisie  (which  renders  it  unable  to  rule  directly  as  a
class) and the conditions of the class struggle, which demand that the bour-
geoisie sacrifice its 'political' interests in order to safeguard  its economic in-
terests.  It  is  this  that  makes  possible  the  co-existence  of  capitalism  with
various state forms. The  second point  is that  the capital relations,  founded
on the separation  of the producer from  his means of production, does not,
once established,  require the direct presence of force  as a condition for  its
reproduction. This fundamentally  distinguishes the function  of the political
in capitalist society not only from feudalism and other forms of pre-capitalist
society, but also from the formative stages of capitalism. The laws of value in
capitalist production, by their blind objective operation, reproduce both  the
immediate conditions of production and the social relations that  correspond
to  them,  without  the  direct  intervention  of  force.  It  is this  that  allows  the
bourgeoisie  to  renounce  direct  political  rule  without,  at  the  same  time,
prejudicing the rule of property.

Marx makes the fifst point in the context of the discussion about bourgeois

'society* and the .bourgeois 'state':

'Present-day society' is capitalist society, which exists in all civilised countries,
more or less free from medieval admixture, more or less modified by the spe-
cial historical development of each country, more or less developed. On the
other hand, the  'present-day state' changes with a country's frontier. It is dif-
ferent in the Prusso-German Empire from  what it is in Switzerland, it is dif-
ferent in England from what it is in the United States. The 'present-day state'
is therefore a fiction.

Nevertheless the different states of the different civilised countries, in spite of
their manifold diversity of form,  all have this in common, that they are based
on modem  bourgeois society, only one more or less capitalisticalfy developed.
They have, therefore, certain essential features in common. In this sense it is
possible to speak of the 'present-day state'. (Marx 1962 (1): 32).

In the European  countries in Marx's day, only in France was there estab-
lished  the  "un-alloyed  rule"  of  the  bourgeoisie,  in  a  "classical  purity  une-
qualled  by  any  other  European  land*.1  Here  the  "gigantic  broom  of  the
French Revolution" swept away "all manner of medieval rubbish, scignorial
rights, local privileges, municipal and guild monopolies and provincial con-

50  EBOHUTCHFUL

stitutions" which had  dogged  the development  of bourgeois  sodety.  (Marx
1962:  516).  Elsewhere  in  Europe,  monarchy  remained  "the  normal  in-
cumbrance  and  indispensable  cloak  of  (bourgeois)  class  rule"  (Ibid:  522).
Under this cloak, one fraction  or other of the bourgeoisie exercised its rule.
However, to Marx, only the bourgeois or constitutional republic  constituted
the specific or logical form of bourgeois rule. Since the bourgeois parliamen-
tary republic has become the generalised form of bourgeois rule in the West,
Marx's analysis of this form is of particular importance. In contrast with  the
other historical  forms  of  capitalist state, in which one fraction  of  the  bour-
geoisie ruled to the exclusion of other fractions, in the bourgeois republic the
bourgeoisie as a whole is elevated to the position of ruling class. The bour-
geois republic was "the general regime of the bourgeois class", the  "perfected
and dearly expressed rule of the whole bourgeois class" and  the  "only pos-
sible form  of their  united power".  Consequently  it is also the  "most  potent
and complete form of their class rule" (Marx 1962 (1): 80). The  democratic
republic is the "best political shell for  capitalism"; under this shell the bour-
geoisie "established its power so securely, so firmly, that no change, either of
persons, institutions or persons... can shake it" (Lenin, 1965:15).

In this republic, however, "wealth exercises its power indirectly" (Engels),
in the form of a separation between its economic and political power. Marx
and Engels return again and again (particularly in the context of France)  to
the question of the political inability of the bourgeoisie why the bourgeoisie,
unlike other historically dominant classes, is unable to rule directly.  Owing
to its class constitution  and the rivalry between  its own fractions,  the  bour-
geoisie, once in power, "at every turn sacrificed  their common class interests
to narrow and dirty private interests", bringing the bourgeois to the threshold
of common ruin. The unified party of all the bourgeois fractions, the Party of
Order, eventually pronounced  the political rule of the bourgeoisie  "irrecon-
cilable with the safety  and  interests  of  the bourgeoisie". (Marx  1962: 286).
Marx is able to put his finger on precisely why it is that the bourgeoisie must
renounce its own political rule: it is to avoid that "dangerous turn that trans-
forms every struggle against the state power into a struggle  against  capital*
(Ibid:287).  On  the  basis  of  the  experience  with  its  own  government  the
French bourgeoisie admitted that "its own interests dictate that it should  be
delivered from the danger of its own rule ;... that in order to preserve its so-
cial  power  intact,  its  political  power  must  be  broken;  that  the  individual
bourgeoisie can continue to exploit the other classes... only on condition that
their class be condemned along with the other classes to like political nullity
..." (Ibid  288). The  bourgeoisie,  consigned  by  itself  to  political  nullity,  is
obliged to constantly contest with the exploited classes for control of its own
state, to  "so regulate  the  suffrage  ... that  it  wills  the  reasonable,  its  rule"
(Marx 1965:199).

T HE VIOLENCE OF PERIPHERY  STATES  51

Marx explains why it is not only (politically) necessary but also possible for
the  bourgeoisie  to  separate  its  economic  from  its political  power,  without
sacrificing  the  rule  of  property.  The  foundation  of  this separation  he  dis-
covers precisely in the  divorce of the producer  from  his means  of  produc-
tion. The process of implantation of the capitalist mode of production is one
of violent  and  bloody suppression  of  the  producer  and  forcible  separation
from  his conditions of production; the state acts here as a brutal instrument
of repression  against wage - labour. However, once established, the normal
operation  of  the  capitalist  mode  of  production  makes  unnecessary  the  ap-
plication of force to production. The 'dull compulsion of economic relations'
ensures the subjection of the wage-labourer to capital:

The  advance  of  capitalist production  develops  a  working class  which  by
education, tradition (and) habit, looks  upon the conditions of  that mode  of
production  as self-evident laws of  nature.  The organisation of  the capitalist
process  of production,  once fully  developed, breaks down  all resistance ...
The dull compulsion  of  economic relations completes the subjection of  the
labourer to  the  capitalist. Direct force,  outside economic  conditions, is  of
course still used, but only exceptionally. In the ordinary course of things, the
labourer can be left to the "natural laws of production" i.e, to his dependence
on capital, a dependence springing from,  and guaranteed in perpetuity by, the
conditions of production themselves. (Marx 1977:689)

Marx shows here how the capital relation, through the blind operation of
the  law  of value, is  able  to  perpetuate  and  reproduce  its own  conditions,
hiding from the producers themselves the relations of force. The appropria-
tion of  surplus takes place in the immediate act of production, without  the
exertion  of  extra-economic  coercion.  The  wage-relation  appears  to  the
labourer as a necessary, unalterable law. The expulsion of direct force  from
the  process  of  production  in  turn  conditions  a  specific  conception  of  the
political. The change in the political form of social relation under capitalism
is itself a function  of the capital relation, for as Marx argues, it is not merer/
at the immediate level of production that capitalism appears to reproduce it-
self in this way, but in its basic social relations as a whole:

It is not just the objective conditions of the process of production that appear
as its result. The same  thing is true also of its specific social character.  The
social relations and therefore the social position of  the agents of production
in  relation  to  each  other,  Le., the  relations of  production  are themselves
produced: they are also the constantly renewed result of the process  (Man,
quoted in Hirsch, 1978: 61).

The 'dependence  on capital', characteristic not only of the class of wage-
labourers but of all of capitalist society including those classes - such as state

52  EBOHUTCHFUL

officials - who constitute a tax on surplus, has its material basis in:

(a)  the monopolisation by the  bourgeois of  the instruments  of  material
and mental production, including the sources of revenue of the state
apparatus;

(b)  socialisation  of  production  on  an ever  increasing scale, and  subjec-
tion  of  large  masses  of  producers  to  the  direct  rule  of  the  bour-
geoisie;

(c)  the discipline inherent in  capitalist production, which imposes itself
doubly:  on  the  capitalist  in  the  form  of  a  law  to  constantly
revolutionise his means of  production,  and on the wage-labourer  in
the form of regimentation in the field of production. This regimenta-
tion confronts  the labourer  as a negation of his theoretical  freedoms
in  the  political  and  civil fields.  The  "veritable  despotism"  of  large-
scale industry, which occurring  "independent  of  all  social  organisa-
tion"  (Engeles)  is  nevertheless  perfected  by  capitalism,  for  "in  no
other system of production is work so thoroughly organised  and dis-
ciplined" (Wood  1981: 91). And  not for  nothing did  Marx  compare
the bourgeois' "command on the field  of production" with that of the
general on the field of battle", (Marx 1977:313);3

(d)  finally the constant revolutionisation  of the productive forces  and of
the basis of capitalist production as a whole, which though forced  on
the individual capitalist by the anarchy of production and the tenden-
cy of the rate of profit  to fall, nevertherless gives bourgeois rule  the
appearance of conformity with scientific laws.

The 'dependence* of the labourer is not represented and does not  appear
to  him  as  such.  On  the  contrary  the  dissolution  of  feudal  bonds  and
privileges (in the maintenance of which the feudal state had been implicated)
makes possible the  equalisation  of social conditions for  all men  -  'men'  as
'homo economicus', stripped of all other social and human attributes, owners
of property or sources of revenue. The wage relation (which is a relation be-
tween  two  forms  of  property,  capital  and  labour-power)  and  the  formal
freedom  of  the  wage-labourer  create  the  impression  that  all  work  is
rewarded and  shifts  on to the labourer  himself  responsibility for  his condi-
tion. Both capital and labour relate to the state in their objectivity as forms of
property, in their  bourgeois  'equality3 as owners of property  or  sources of
revenue: it is this that  allows the state to assume  its (illusory) position  as  a
neutral instance and impartial force standing 'outside and alongside society1.
This 'equality* of property is reflected  onto the political and registered there
in the formal juridical equality of the 'citizen' - although the capitalist  state
appears subsequently as. the condition and the embodiment of this equalisa-
tion, through the juridical rights of the citizen and the form of the law. Again
this 'equality1 and the (illusory) dissolution, not just of feudal  particularisms

THE VIOLENCE OF PERIPHERY STATES  53

but of  class distinctions as such, are the condition for the emergence of  of-
ficialdom  and the rule of law.4 (Hence the bourgeoisie, to whom their own
state appears as a mystery, is the only historically dominant class that denies
the reality of classes). 'Law* here expresses nothing more than the logic and
rules of capitalist discourse, as the law of property, competition, commodity
production and exchange; once these rules are established and accepted as
the only natural or rational form of discourse, the possibility for the state to
separate itself from production arises. By the same process, government is
reduced  in  appearance  to  a  technical process  ('administration')  devoid  of
class content, consisting in the interpretation, enforcement and adjudication
of law by paid officials,  functions performed irrespective of the class origin
of the bureaucratic officials. The state structure itself appears 'as no longer
the  privileged  monopoly  of  a particular  class, but  as open  to  recruitment
from  all  classes.  Bourgeois  rule  thus  assumes  its  distinctive  character  as
domination  on  the basis  of  officialdom,  by and  through rules,  as rational
domination (Weber).

The revived debate on the Marxist theory of the state arose as a critique of
the 'state monopoly' thesis and in response to important developments in the
West - the extension of democratic liberties and economic rights eta, which
appeared to transform both the phenomenal form of the state and its class
content, the decline of militance on the part of the political organisations of
the working classes, etc. Gramsci was the first revolutionary theoretician to
devote himself  to  a systematic analysis of  the new directions taken by the
bourgeois state. His theory was founded on a critique of the 'reductionism'
implicit in the 'dogmatic' or 'state-monopoly' thesis, which reduced the state
to the ruling class and traced all developments in the superstructure to their
'causes' in the base  or structure. Gramsci argued that the  superstructures
had a life and rhythm of their own and to an extent developed in accordance
with their own rules and logic, autonomously of the structure. On this basis
Gramsci insisted on the 'relative autonomy of the political* and on the pos-
sibility  of  a  specific  'science  of  the  political'.  Gramsci  also  proposed  to
bridge the conventional structure/ superstructure topography by inserting an
intervening level ('civil society*) which, while belonging to neither structure
nor superstructure, played important roles in the reproduction of both levels.
It was partly against the background of these general theoretical revisions
that Gramsci developed his concepts of the specificity of bourgeois role. He
distinguished between two forms of rule: 'domination', which he  identified
with force, and 'hegemony' in which political rule is based more or less on
the willing consent of the governed. The state and its organs were the skc of
domination and force while 'civil society' was the site of hegemony. Bour-
geois rule was based on hegemony, rather than on simple coercion; it is this
that distinguished it from other «nsrii?g forms of class rule, from Russian ab-

54  EBO HUTCHFUL

solutism and the forms of rule in the backward and colonial countries. Bour-
geois rule and Russian absolutism were based on a contrasting relationship
between the state (as 'domination') and civil society (as 'consent'):

In  Russia,  (he  state  was  everything  civil  society  was  primordial  and
gelatinous; in the West there was a proper relationship between state and civil
society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at
once revealed.  The state was only an outer ditch, behind which was a power-
fill system of fortresses and earthworks... (Gramsci, 1973:238)
These  'fortresses  and  earthworks'  were  not  uniformly  developed  in  all
states in the West and were "more or less numerous from one state to the
next"; nevertheless  they characterised, and were specific  to, the  developed
capitalist formations in the West. Gramsci identified in those formations not
one  but  two  major  superstructure  levels  -  one  that  may be  called  "civil
society", that is, the ensemble  of  organisms called  "private", and the  other
that of  "political society" or the state. These two levels correspond,  on the
one hand, to the function of "hegemony" which the dominant group exercises
throughout society and, on the other hand, to that of "direct domination" or
command exercised through the state and "juridical government'1. (Gramsci
1973:12)

Because of shifts in usage it is difficult  to attach a consistent meaning to
the concepts of 'hegemony' and 'civil society' and their relation to the state
apparatus as conceptualised by Gramsci; on balance, however, it is clear that
by 'civil  society" he  denotes  an  intermediary  sphere  located  between,  but
separate from, both structure and superstructure and constituted  (formally
by private associations - the press, the church, schools, trade unions, political
parties  and so  on.  The  proliferation  of  these  private  associations,  condi-
tioned  by  bourgeois  political  and  civil  freedoms,  was  itself  a  distinctive
development  of  the  bourgeois  order  and  the  foundation,  to  Gramsci,  of
hegemony.

The key to hegemony is the ideology of the dominant class - 'ideology7 not
necessarily in terms of a systematic body of rationalisation but of  common
sense notions, of the unquestioned assumptions that inform the world-view
of the dominated. Gramscis's concept of hegemony furnishes an answer to
the problem raised by Marx as to how the bourgeoisie is able "so to regulate
the suffrage... that it wills the reasonable, its rule". The cuUural\ideological
domination of the bourgeoisie, operating alongside its material substratum,
the 'dull compulsion of economic relations',5  serves to secure the more or
less  peaceful  reproduction  of  the  capitalist  order  and  bourgeois  class
domination. The organisations  of  civil society not only perform  important
functions of propagation and socialisation relative to the dominant ideology
but  also  operate  to  refract  and  absorb  class  contradicitons  which  would

T HE VIOLENCE OF PERIPHERY  STATES  55

otherwise have focused directly on the state.6

Gramsci's categories (particularly his concepts of 'hegemony' and 'relative
autonomy') have had an important influence on the subsequent discourse on
the Marxist  theory of the state, although with significant  shifts  in usage  and
different  lessons  for  praxis.7 Particular  emphasis  has  also been  placed  by
neo-Gramscians  on  the  so-called  'separation  between  the  political and  the
economic', not to demonstrate (as in Marx and Engels) the problematic rule
of  the  bourgeoisie,  but  to  explain  the  apparent  solidity  of  the  bourgeois
state.8  These  recent  contributions  have  yielded  many  significant  insights,
particularly into the complexity of the advanced capitalist state and the role
of  ideological  conditioning  in  maintaining  the  bourgeois  power  structure.
But  these  analyses  of  the  state  have  also  raised  a  number  of  important
theoretical problems in relation to the Marxist theory of the state. The  first
has been the tendency to displace force and repression, and even class strug-
gle, from  the  centre  of  analysis of  the  capitalist  state. This tendency  is, in
some ways, more clearly present in the various formulations of  "functionalist
Marxism", where  the  capitalist  state  is seen as "not  a  class instrument,  but
rather  the  state  of  a  society  divided  into  classes"  and  as  the  "factor  of
cohesion between the levels of a social formation  ... the regulating factor  of
its global equilibrium as a system". (Poulantzas 1978:191,44-5)9

The (unspoken but also unqualified)  assumption about the 'democratic* or
'consensual' nature of the contemporary bourgeois state results in part  from
lack of appreciation of the contradictory movements underlying this assump-
tion: the extension of  democratic liberties simultaneously with the develop-
ment  of the  most  fearsome  war machine and  apparatus  of physical repres-
sion ever seen in history,10 and the fostering by the bourgeoisie of social har-
mony at home, but militarism and repression as the basis of its rule abroad.
The  tendency  to  see  bourgeois  rule  only in  its civilised  aspects  is  derived
from  a  particular  reading  of  the  terrain  of  bourgeois  domination,  which
views capital, not in its intemationality, but as 'closed' national units. Conse-
quently, bourgeois  democracy  (at  home)  and  repression  (abroad)  are  not
seen  as  different  faces  of  the  international  rule  of  the  bourgoisic.  In  this
sense, these recent concepts of the capitalist state lose the most  penetrating
insight  of  the  state  monopoly  thesis, which  was  precisely  a  theory  of  the
bourgeois state in the imperialist epoch.

Secondly these theories commence from an acceptance of the surface frag-
mentation  of  bourgeois  society  and  its  division  into  'separate'  economic,
political and ideological spheres, and seek, within the 'autonomy' of spheres
that  characterise  the  totality  of  capitalist  society,  to  develop  a  specifically
political  theory.  The  assumption  is  that  Marx's  Capital a  essentially  an
analysis of the economic sphere of capitalist society that requires to be com-
plemented  by  a  theory  of  the  political  instance.  The  critique  of  the

56  EBO  HUTCHFUL

'economic'  is  regarded  as  complete:  what  is  required  is  a  corresponding
critique of the 'political', as an autonomous area of study. Although  it is ac-
cepted  that  within  this  separation  of  spheres  the  economic  is  somehow
'determinant  in the last instance', it is not considered  necessary  to  examine
the question further, i.e. to examine concretely the nature of the relation be-
tween the economic and the political and in what sense, if any, the economic
'determines' the political  in  capitalism. By assuming the  possibility  and  in-
deed  the  necessity  of  a  specific  "science  of  the  political",  these  theories
detach the analysis of the political in capitalism from  the laws of motion of
the economic, and in particular from the most fundamental of these laws: ac-
cumulation and its contradictions.11

It  is  in  accumulation,  and  the  barriers  to  accumulation  inherent  in
capitalist production, represented  particularly in Marx's analysis of the  ten-
dency of the rate of profit to fall, that the dynamic force behind the develop-
ment of the capitalist state must be located.

Each  phase  of  the  self-expansion  of  capital  has  been  characterised  by
specific barriers to accumulation  and mode of mobilisation of  counter-ten-
dencies, the  role  of  the foreign  market  in  this  process,  and  (derived  from
this) the function  of  the state in the  periphery. The consistent  feature  that
characterises  all  phases  of  the  expansion  of  capital  however,  is  that  it  is
specifically  on  this  basis,  i.e.  as  an  element  in  the  ensemble  of  counter-
balancing effects  to  the tendency of  the rate  of  profit  to  fall  on  the  home
market, that  the  pre-capitalist  formations  are  integrated  into  the  capitalist
world  market.  This  is  crucial  for  understanding  both  the  subsequent
development of the formation ('development  of underdevelopment')  and the
form  and  function  of  the  peripheral  state. The  form  of  integration,  under
these conditions, had certain specific results, which may be noted briefly  as
follows:

(a)  the one-sided  transfer  of masses of value from  the periphery to  the

centre, within the framework of structural distortion;

(b) the  subsumption  of  the  labour  process  in  the  periphery  and  the
peripheral reproduction process as a whole, to that of the centre. For
this reason accumulation in the periphery cannot occur  autonomous-
ly, but must be conditioned and determined by the self-valorisation of
international capital and must, moreover, occur  as purely secondary
results of this process;

(c)  specifically, the peripheral production process absorbs and 'cushions'
the consequences of the falling  rate  of profit  on the markets  of  the
advanced  capitalist  nations. Hence  the  periodic crises  to which  the
barriers to  accumulation give rise (recession, falling  prices etc)  are
manifested here in particularly acute form;

(d) the  exogenous  origin  of  this  crisis,  and  the  limited  adjustment

T HE VIOLENCE OF PERIPHERY  STATES  57

mechanisms available to the peripheral capitalist economy, mean that
the process of re-organisation  of the social conditions of  production
must  occur  in  particularly  'crisis-ridden'  form,  with  the  peripheral
state playing a central and openly repressive role.

The Specificity of the Peripheral State
Before considering the implications of these remarks, it is necessary to make
a  number  of preliminary observations towards situating the form  and  func-
tion of the peripheral state:

(a)  An obvious but fundamental  point of difference  between the state in
the advanced capitalist  formation  and the peripheral state is that, in
the  one  case, capitalist  production  relations  have been  established
and universalised, while in the  other, these production  relations  are
in  the  process  of  extension. Marx sees a  fundamental  difference  in
the  function  of  the  state  in  the  two  situations, a  difference  deter-
mined  by the  degree  of  development  of the  capital relation. In  the
quotation  from  Capital where  he  argues  that  the  capital  relation,
once fully established, dispenses with the direct intervention of force
in production, Marx notes: "it is otherwise during the historic genesis
of capitalistic production". Here force  is required  to regulate wages
at  a  level  consistent  with  the  realisation  of  surplus-value,  and  in
general  to  "keep  the  labourer  himself  in  the  normal  degree  of  de-
pendence". The application of state power to production is thus "an
essential  element  of  the  so-called  primitive  accumulation"  (Marx
1977:689).

The course of primitive accumulation in the colonies and former  colonies
must,  however,  be  grasped  in  their  specificity,  as  accumulation  under  the
conditions of imperialism. While violence is the historical vehicle everywhere
for  the  initial  subsumption  of  pre-capitalist  modes  to  the  rale  of  capital,
Marx notes that the process of penetration of capital into the backward, non-
European  lands  was  characterised  by  a  particular  level  of  violence,  un-
mediated by the claim of capital to "natural reason". The "chief momenta of
primitive  accumulation",  its most bloody  moments, were played  out  in  the
colonies (Marx 1977:703).

But the particularity of this violence (which Marx noted in his writings on
India) is due rather to the fact that the process of accumulation which occurs
in the periphery is not identical with, or a duplicate of, the original transition
to  capitalism in Europe, but historically and  structurally unique. It has  the
following features which are specific to it

(b)  Exogenous determination of this process and of the social formation

58  EBOHUTCHFUL

as a whole, expressed in the relationship to the world market  and  in
foreign ownership of the primary means of production and exchange.
Marx notes the 'dual  nature' of the world  market  in  relation  to  the
origin and development of European capitalism, first as its basis in its
stages of infancy,  and  then  as its product  in its latter  stages. In  the
periphery the development of the world market was not the result but
the origin of capitalism, and furthermore  of a very particular form of
capitalism. The peripheral  economy confronts  the world market  not
as its  product  but  as a  specific,  already  existing division  of  labour,
which imparts to the internal economy its specific character.  Further
the 'world market' here is a fundamentally  different  reality than  the
world  market  of  the  17th-19th  centuries,  being  constituted,  not  by
many small national  producers  in relatively  free  competion,  but  by
concentration and monopoly;

(c)  the expression of the external determination of the form of the inter-
nal economy is the lack of  linkage fdisarticulation')  among the ele-
ments of this economy and, in particular, the absence of heavy (and
also light) industry. This means that  expanded  reproduction  is pos-
sible within the peripheral economy only in a partial and limited way,
since, as Marx reminds us, "productive capital (is)  the only  function
in  which  capital-value  generates  value". The  circuit  of  commodity
production  and  exchange can be  completed  only via  the  centre  i.e.
with  the world  market  as  a  condition  (for  means  of  production  as
well as sale of the product), and involves, as central to its logic, the
'export' of multiplier  effects  (profits,  R.  and D., industrial  develop-
ment,  etc).  Similarly  only  large-scale  industry  provides  the  basis
(through expanded reproduction) both for the 'natural' dissolution of
archaic  modes  and  petty  commodity  forms,  and  extensive
proletarianisation. What does occur in the peripheral situation is ex-
tensive marginalisation,  the  effect  of the  constant  expulsion  and  at-
traction  of  the  surplus  agricultural  labour  off  the  land  without  its
transformation, on the basis of industry, into a proletariat. The  effect
of 'primitive' accumulation, thus appears in the  form  of  intensifying
'unemployment'  and growth of a large  and potentially  revolutionary
surplus population in towns, sporadically repressed  by the state  ap-
paratus. While in Europe the state acted as an agent of capital to fur-
ther  (but also occasionally to oppose)  this process  of  dissolution of
previous modes, in the case the state plays a more directly interven-
tionist  role  as  a  principal  in  the  process  and  in  many  ways  as  a
'substitute' for  capital (eg. in the organisation  of labour  supplies  to
industry).  Hence  direct  state  violence  (forced  labour,  etc)  is  a
prominent ingredient of this dissolution. However the state does not

T HE VIOLENCE OF PERIPHERY  STATES  59

act exclusively or  consistently to extend the capital relation, but also
to  contain  the  social  dislocation  arising from  the  contradictory  en-
counter  of modes and to establish a new social and structural equi-
librium.  Hence  the  apparently  contradictory  policy  of  dissolu-
tion\preservation of the pre-capitalist modes;

(d)  As the state of a 'transitional situation', the peripheral state presides
over a specific  articulation of capitalist  and pre-capitalist  modes, an
articulation  characterised  by relations  of  hierarchy,  dominance  and
contradiction between the modes that constitute the social formation.
The articulation imposes on the state particular functions of manage-
ment  and  cohesion  - arising from  the decomposition  and  resistance
to decomposition of the pre-capitalist modes - which are characteris-
tically  different  from  the  state  in  those  formations  where  the
dominance of capital is already complete and capitalist relations fully
established. The  fluidity  of  this situation  also endows the state with
considerable  leeway  to  mould  social  structures  and  revolutionalise
economic  relations.  The  form  of  this  articulation  is  important  in
determining  the  path  of  transition  to  capitalism,  and  in  the  (ex-
ogenously derived)  process  of re-organising the social conditions of
production, which involves the  subsumption  of wider  areas of  non-
capitalist social production;

(e)  In  the  Occident,  feudalism,  characterised  by  an  advanced  develop-
ment both of the institution of private property and of the structures
of  class  domination,  had  been  generalised  as  the  dominant  pre-
capitalist mode. In addition to specific economic attributes congenial
to the development of capitalism, (accumulation of monetary wealth
from trade and usury, development or urban crafts and a rural social
structure  that  facilitate  the  expulsion  of  the  peasantry)  feudalism
made possible certain class alliances crucial to the process of the es-
tablishment  of  the  ascendency  of  capitalism.  The  re-constituted
feudal state, the absolutist monarchy, incorporating the joint but une-
qual  interests  of  the  emergent  bourgeoisie  and  of  an  aristrocracy
txmrgeoisified'  by the capitalisation  of ground rent, fixed the politi-
cal preconditions for the incubation of the capitalist order the break-
down of feudal  particularism, the development  of the institutions of
the national state, codification  of the law etc. These conditions were
completed prior to, and as a condition for, the universausatioo of the
capital  relation  and  the  assumption  by the  state  of  its  specifically
bourgeois form. In the periphery, however, capital encounters many
different  forms  of pre-capitalist social economy at different  levels of
development  and  complexity;  in  Africa,  with  few  exceptions,  com-
munal forms with a relatively weak development of the institution of

60  EBOHUTCHFUL

private property and  of structures of  class domination  more or  less
predominated. This makes unlikely the reproduction of precisely the
most  germane  political  aspects  of  the  European  transition,  in  par-
ticular  the  complicity of  a  strongly entrenched  pre-capitalist  ruling
class in the destruction of its own previous basis of domination. The
key to the whole situation will of course lie in the form of penetration
of capitalism into agriculture: in this case, this will not take the  form,
as a natural result of this process, of the capitalisation of ground  rent
on  an  extensive  scale  and  the  expulsion  of  the  peasantry.  The
penetration  of  capitalism will result  less in  the  destruction  of  com-
munal landholding than  in  the development  typically of  commodity
production  on  the basis of  the peasant  small holding,  accompanied
by  a  significant  degree  of  differentiation  within  the  ranks  of  the
peasantry. The  separation  of  the  producer  from  his  land,  and  the
realisation of "free labour", if they are to occur, must  occur  through
some  other  means  than  the  'natural  action'  of  capital  usually  the
direct coercive action of the state (forced labour, settler land legisla-
tion etc)
Unlike the feudal situation, the various pre-capitalist  dominant  clas-
ses do not tend to have a uniform basis for alliances with  capitalism,
situated as they are in modes with different  capacities for  adaptation
or  resistance  to  capitalism  and  different  levels  of  development  of
state structures. This uniform basis for alliances had to be created by
the  colonial  state, by putting all pre-capitalist  state structures  on  a
more  or  less  common  basis, including  the  introduction  of  the  ele-
ments of a state structure where none previously existed. Second, any
alliance could be created only on the basis of the institution of private
property, by driving a wedge between the communal property of the
tribal collectivity and the purely private property of tribal rulers  and
elders. Colonialism transforms  tribal chieftaincy,  first  by destroying,
and  then  placing  increasingly  on  a  bourgeois  basis,  its  sources  of
revenue, either  in the  form  of the  stipend  of  a  petty public  official
(plus the benefit  of fines and fees from the administration of 'justice'
etc.)  and\or  by  allowing  the  tribal  chieftain,  like  the  chief  of  the
Highland clans, to transform  his 'nominal rights' as the titular  owner
of clan land and property, into a real 'right' of private property.12 The
grafting of the political institutions of village society onto the institu-
tions of the  colonial  state  appears in the  existence, side by side, of
dual forms of law and politico - administrative structure, and  the in-
corporation  of traditional ideologies into the ideological  framework
of the state;

(f)  Given the nature of peripheral capitalism, the peripheral formation is

T HE  VIOLENCE OF PERIPHERY STATES  61

characterised  by  a  specific  underdevelopment  and  distortion  of  its
class  structure,  by  the  dominant  presence  of  what  Marx  calls
'transitional classes' - peasants, the petty - bourgeois (small traders,
artisans, petty intelligentsia etc.), and lumpen proletariat, as well as a
relatively  large  state  bureaucracy.  On  the  other  hand,  the  two  fun-
damental  classes  of  capitalism,  the bourgeoisie  and  the  proletariat,
exist  only  in  marginal  form.  In  the  conditions  of  peripheral
capitalism, these classes are not in fact 'transitional'; on the contrary,
they tend  to be  reproduced  on  a  more and  more  extensive scale by
the logic of this mode. In Europe  these classes have never, by their
very nature, constituted  a. significant  factor  in the political  equation
(except  in brief  and  extraordinary periods,  as under  Bonapartism),
let alone exercise state power; in the periphery, however, it is directly
from  their  ranks  that  the  governing  classes  are  recruited  at  inde-
pendence. Taken together with the structural logic of the peripheral
situation, this imparts a particular  stamp to the form  of politics and
the state, expressed for instance in the fact that (a) class rule cannot
take a  hegemonic direction, but must be constituted  directly on  the
basis of the state apparatus; (b) the state's economic interventionism
appears, at the same time, as the condition for the ascent of this class
from  "nominal property" to real property;  (c)  the state  bureaucracy
enjoys pronounced  autonomy from  the nominal ruling class, and  (d)
the  peripheral  state  presents  a  paradoxical  double  face:  strong  in
relation to domestic classes, weak in relation to imperialism;

(g)  At the same time, the peripheral situation produces a particular com-
plexity and volatility of social and class struggles, due (1) to the inter-
section  at  complex  points, of  the  capital-labour  contradiction  with
contradictions  emanating  from 
the.  pre-capitalist  modes.  The
penetration  of capitalism into  these modes typically transforms  and
'ignites'  previously  non-antagonistic  contradictions  within  and  be-
tween these modes, resulting for instance, in the phenomena viewed
as  're-tribalisation',  'politidsation  of  primordial  sentiments'  eta,
which are  often  nothing but  the result of the process of decomposi-
tion of these modes and their resistance to this process. With the sub-
ordination of these modes to capitalism, their contradictions also lose
their autonomy to the main contradiction between labour and capital,
instance,  in  how  capitalism  foments  the
a  process  seen  for 
'nationalities'  question;13  (2) 
the
geographical terrain of die 'national' state and that of the class strug-
gles, which coincide, in extent, with the world market as a whole. The
peripheral state thus cannot, by definition, influence the class strug-
gle adequately by acting on all the classes effectively represented  in

the  non-contiguity  between 

62  EBO  HUTCHFUL

it. This non-correspondence between the geography of the state  and
that of the class struggles explains why foreign  interventions  become
such  a  feature  of  the  politics  of  these  formations.  These  struggles
draw upon and are deeply influenced by the international class strug-
gles also in the ideological  sphere; as witnessed  by the  presence  in
these  struggles  of  bourgeois  republican,  welfarist,  and  socialist
ideologies  which  have  no  objective  correspondence  to  the  level  of
development of class structure or productive forces within the forma-
tion itself,  (although  these  may be, and  usualy  are, commigled  with
traditionalist and populist ideologies).

Capitalist Crisis and Reorganisation
The  current  world  capitalist  crisis has posed, with  particular  urgency,  the
need for the fundamental  re-organisation of the social conditions of produc-
tion  in  the  capitalist  countries.  It  is  obvious  that  this  re-organisation  is
proceeding,  and  can  only  proceed,  under  conditions  of  anarchy  brought
about  by  fundamental  developments  in  world  capitalism.  These  develop-
ments have eroded the capacity of the main capitalist states, acting through
the traditional instruments of intervention, to manage this crisis and  under-
lined the necessity for re-organisation on a global scale. (Hawley and Noble
1982). The internationalisation of the capitalist productive unit in the form of
the Multinational Corporation (MNC) has diminished the ability of the state
to intervene by influencing  and  structuring  markets. The  internalisation  of
markets through intrafirm trade renders the multinational company relative-
ly immune to such macro-economic policies. Secondly, the  internationalisa-
tion of finance, seen in the growth of international commercial banking and
the  emergence  of  the  Euro-currency-system,  has  weakened  the  ability  of
central  banks  to  monitor  and  supervise  the  lending  activities  of  national
banks and, in particular, the ability of the state to control the expansion and
contraction of credit. Thirdly, the collapse of Keynesianism, which had con-
stituted  the  core  of  counter-cyclical  policies  since the  end  of  the  Second
World War. These policies had  assumed  that  the state  could influence  the
price, employment and production levels in the economy indirectly through
the  manipulation  of  fiscal  and  monetary  instruments  (interest  rates,
monetary growth rates, state  deficits and surpluses, and  tax policy) without
the  need  for  more  direct  intervention  into  production  and  distribution.
Owing largely to the development in the capitalist economics outlined above,
these  policies  no  longer  have  the  intended  effect:  Fourthly,  and  simul-
taneously with the need for  a  supranational mechanism  to deal with the  ef-
fects  of  these  developments,  the  collapse  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system,

THE VIOLENCE OF PERIPHERY  STATES  63

based  on  fixed  gold-dollar  parity  and  managed  by  the  International
Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and  the  International  Bank  of  Reconstruction  and
Development  (IBRD)  in  conjunction  with  the  financial  institutions  of  the
American  state.  This  has  intensified  anarchic  tendencies  in  the  world
capitalist  economy  with  the  adoption  of  flexible\floating  exchange  rates,
protectionist policies, mounting US state deficits and runaway interest rates,
(ibid: 113-7).

Particular  emphasis  is being  put  in  this  crisis  on,  re-organisation  in  the
Third World, in part because of the severity of the crisis there, but more be-
cause  'slow  growth'  and  the  explosion  of  Third  World  debt  particularly
threaten 'recovery1 in the metropolitan countries. The origin and form of this
crisis,  as  a  product  of  the  current  imperialist  conjecture  and  of  the
'developmentalist' policies, indicate in themselves, why the re-organisation of
the  periphery  is  accorded  such  emphasis.  After  19721* ,  the  imperialist
economies  were  characterised  by recession  and  a  'glut'  of  capital  (OPEC
surpluses  and  industrial  spare  capacity). These  surpluses  were  recycled  in
loans  by  multinational  banks  to  underdeveloped  countries,  and  recycled
back  to- the  imperialist  economies  in  imports  of  means  of  production  and
current consumption needs, and export of higher rates of profit and interest.
Stagnation  in the underdeveloped  countries  (since value generated by mas-
sive "investment" tended  to be retained within the networks of multinational
banks  and  companies),  protectionism,  higher  interest  rates  and  continued
recession in  the  imperialist  countries have given the global crisis its typical
form  in the periphery  of  a debt  and  balance of payments' crisis. This  debt
crisis threatens the profitability of the large multinational banks and the col-
lapse of dozens of smaller banks. At the same time, the sharp contraction in
international trade resulting from  the debt squeeze, is deepening the reces-
sion in key export industries.

Politically, on the other hand, the same crisis has provided the balance of
forces  necessary  for  a  rigorous  re-organisation  of  the  social  conditions  of
production  in  the  peripheral  countries  in  a  manner  dominated  almost  ex-
clusively by the interests of the financial and corporate monopolies. This re-
organisation can only proceed in more repressive and anarchic fashion in the
peripheral countries, given the greater depth of the crisis and the  difference
in structural situation. In a sense,-however, this process of re-organisation in
the  periphery  is  anything  but  anarchic;  in  some  ways  the  ideal  of  a
'supranational  state' as  an  anti-recessionary  instrument  is closer  to realisa-
tion  in  Third  World  conditions  than  among  the  advanced  capitalist
countries. The function  of re-organising the peripheral conditions of produc-
tion in this crisis has devolved  on the  Bretton Woods institutions, the  IMF
(International  Monetary  Fund)  and  the  World  Bank  (i.e.  IBRD).  The
peculiar  mode  of  organisation  of  this  function,  and  the particular  level of  .

64  EBOHUTCHFUL

violence which it is generating, can be understood only through an analysis of
these  institutions  and  how  they work  in  relation  to  the  Third  World.  The
Bretton Woods system was essentially a response to the problems posed by
the  "growing territorial  non-coincidence  between  extending  capital  and  its
domestic state" (Murray 1975:129). It was intended to mediate and reconcile
the contending interests of rival national capitals on the world market,  con-
sistent with the hegemony of US capital as the most powerful  national  frac-
tion. The basis  of  this  mediation was that  the two institutions  embody  the
purely  economic  logic of  capital, abstracted  from  its  nationality. The  IMF
embodied  a  set  of  compromises  whereby, without  dissolving  the  capitalist
state as a national unit or establishing in its place a 'world state', capital ex-
pansion  would  be liberated  from  the  constraints imposed  on its  motion by
national particularism; the IMF would guarantee 'free  trade' by taking away
from individual states the power (through their policies) to arbitrarily reduce
the  borders  of  the  world  market  or  to  impose  discrimmatory  monetary
policies in favour of their national capitals. The key to this of course was the
system of fixed  exchange rates. In the Articles of the IMF, therefore,  capital
was abstracted  from  its political  determinations  and  grasped  simply  as  an
economic  category  i.e.  in  terms  of  the  'laws'  of  accumulation  and  the
rationalisation  of the conditions  of accumulation. The IMF appears,, there-
fore, as a force  exclusively for  economic rationality, the representative  (for
this  reason)  of  the  universal  rather  than  national  interests  of  capital  (al-
though  institutionally  this  takes  the  form  of  an  American  dominated
'hierarchy of  capitals'). 'Rationalisation',  both  of  the general  conditions of
accumulation  on  th world market  and  of the  form  of  competition  between
nationally-based  capitals, was  a  function  central  to the  Bretton  Woods  in-
stitutions. Their appearance occurred when it was already becoming obvious
that with the new phase of development of the world market - the phase of
international monopolies - the task of re-organising the social conditions of
production could  not be carried out on a national basis but  on  the basis of
the world market as a whole.

The logic of capital governs in these institutions in another way. A  system
of quotas directly determines voting shares in decision-making within die in-
stitutions; the share of the collective power is determined by the share of the
collective  capital. The  qouta  system is thus rule-constituted  entirely  at  the
financial  level  i.e.,  the  'unalloyed  rule'  of  capital.  The  weaker  nations
(weaker both in terms of the share of organisational capital they 'dispose, as
well as absolutely weak) are allowed no role other than that of legitimation,
conferred  by the  appearance  of participation  and  occasionally  of  a  'moral
consensus'.

It  is  clear,  however,  that  the  IMF  does  not  deal  with  'economic'  or
'financial' questions to the. exclusion of the 'political'. What was embodied in

T HE  VIOLENCE OF PERIPHERY  STATES  65

the IMF was not 'financial' functions  as such, but specifically those  financial
functions  associated  with states, state functions. These include the power  to
fix the exchange rate of national currencies and  to determine  (more or  less
directly) tariff  policy and the movement of capital and goods across national
borders. Both the IMF and the World Bank have expanded enormously on
their original powers. Those of the IMF include the power within the context
of its 'adjustment  programmes' to fix interest rates, wage and salary policies,
price  levels, and  the  level  and  composition  of government  expenditure  - in
effect, to determine the planning process of the (client) state.

Coincident  with the  collapse of  the Bretton Woods system in relation  to
the  main  capitalist  economies,  the  two institutions have achieved  unprece-
dented  influence  over  the  underdeveloped  countries  as  instruments  of
"financial discipline", exercised on behalf of finance capital. The power of the
multilateral institutions is embodied in the practice of "conditionality". "Con-
ditionality",  and  the  "adjustment  programme" with which it is  associated,15
have become in the era of multilateral imperialism the main avenue for  forc-
ing, through drastic re-organisations of the social conditions of production in
the peripheral countries;

Both  the  monetarist  orthodoxy  behind  the  IMF  adjustment  programme
and the usual content and results of the programme are well-known and will
not  detain  us here. The main  and immediate objective is the restoration  of
'free  trade'  ('liberalisation')  and  a free  market  economy. The  path  to  this,
however, requires severe cuts in real wages and consumption by the poorest
strata  of  the  population,  large  retrenchments  in the workforce,  substantial
cuts  in  such  'unproductive'  state  expenditures  as  health, welfare  schemes,
and food  subsidies, privatisation of state sector industries, and the abolition
of state protectionism and regulationism. To support these measures, exten-
sive "reforms" in other economic and social sectors are necessary, usually un-
dertaken  by the World  Bank  and  a  plethora  of  'multilateral' and  'bilateral'
institutions.  These  measures  may  stimulate  productivity  in  key  (export-
oriented) sectors and slow down temporarily the pace of inflation, but at the
same time they raise sharply the level of foreign  ownership and the average
rate of profit  and its export by the dominant foreign  interests. All this is at
the cost of considerable unemployment, fall in living standards of the poorest
strata of the population, and deflation of the local economy.16

Reorganisation and Repression
The  adoption  of  'adjustment'  programmes  dictated  from  outside  by  more
and more  underdeveloped  countries as a condition  of their  'recovery'  from
the present crisis of papitalism has been a crucial factor in the generalisation

66  EBOHUTCHFUL

these  countries.  The  usual  political  pre-condition 

of  the  brutal  forms  of  internal  repression  as  well  as  popular  violence
throughout 
for
'adjustment' is the reconstitution of the existing regime (in a more repressive
direction)  or  its  violent  overthrow.  The  authoritarian  military  regime  has
emerged as the typical vehicle of this re-organisation. Associated with this is
the abolition or suspension of democratic liberties and  civil rights, the  sup-
pression  of  dissent  and  arrest  of  labour  militants,  and  the  imposition  of
severe restrictions  on trade unions, political  parties, and  other  popular  or-
ganisations. Forcible foreign  intervention is also frequently  a feature  of  this
process.

In Indonesia the  preliminary groundwork  for  the adoption  of  the  adjust-
ment programme in  1960-67 included  the  overthrow of  President  Sukarno,
the installation of General Suharto as President, and the slaughter of 500,000
members of the Indonesian  Communist Party by the  army. The  Indonesian
adjustment programme was judged particularly successful  in that period, al-
though the local economy was to remain under successive stabilisation for  at
least another decade. The connection between the 'success' of the  IMF-led
re-organisation and the horrendous events in Indonesia is exposed in this as-
sessment of the Indonesian programme:

The political upheaval of  1965-66 created a power structure favourable  (my
emphasis - E.H.)  to full  implementation of  the stabilisation programme.  It
brought to office a government which successfully consolidated its power  be-
tween September 1965 and March 1966. Thereafter,  Indonesia  had  a strong
government  committed 
to  economic  stabilisation  and  rehabilitation.
Economic policies encountered minimum  opposition, the groups that migfat
have been in opposition having been silenced. The political parties  were in
disarray and effective pressure groups either did not exist or were re-grouping
and adopting to the greatly altered politico- economic environment. The busi-
ness community  was virtually the  only interest groups outside  government
which succeeded in exerting any influence on the programme.  (Sutton 1984:
99-100)

The connection between repression and re-organisation of the social con-
ditions of production  in the  periphery was apparent  also in Argentina  .  In
March  1976, the Argentine military  overthrew  President  Isabel  Peron.  The
economic  programme  adopted  by  the  Finance  Minister  in  the  military
. regime,  Martinez  de  Hoz,  included  "making  Argentina  safe  for  private
enterprise,  both  national  and  international,  preparing  the  ground  for
"productive investments" to be reactivated, and developing appropriate  con-
ditions for an increased inflow of foreign capital into the national economy".
(Toledo, 1977:14) This programme, inspired by the IMF, did  not differ  es-
sentially from the policies pursued during 1975. However, as a contemporary

T HE VIOLENCE OF PERIPHERY  STATES  67

observer  commented:  'what  has  changed  in Argentina  since March  1976 is
the political and institutional contest, which has probably been the major fac-
tor  giving  Martinez  de  Hoz's  program  a  much  greater  "coherence"  (ibid).
This 'political and institutional context' included the prohibition of all politi-
cal  and  trade  union  activity,  the  suspension  of  wage-bargaining  between
labour and capital, the dismissal (as a 'threat  to the security of the state') of
numerous  technicians, professionals,  and  scientists, and later  the abduction
and  murder  of  thousands  of  left-wing  students  and  political  activists.  Par-
ticularly  significant  is  Toledo's  conclusion  regarding  the  Argentine  ex-
perience: "Overall, what is specially noteworthy is the toughness of the Mar-
tinez de Hoz economic program which, due to the nature of the  Argentine
economy and  society, can only be  applied in the context of a wholly repres-
sive institutional and political setting" (ibid: 18).

This conclusion is being confirmed by the current events in Turkey,  where'
the government  of Turgut  Ozal  (heir  to the  military regime which  came  to
power in September  1980) is trying to impose its "energetic vision of the un-
bridled  market  place:  denationalisation,  an  end  to  protectionism,  export
stimulation,  wage  controls,  the  abandonment  of  ailing  industries,  and
tolerance for  high unemployment in the effort  to quash inflation"  (Bordwich
1984: 44) - in other words, a typical monetarist\IMF programme. A neces-
sary preconditon for the Turkish programme was the brutal military takeover
of 1980, without which Ozal's plans "couldn't have worked" (ibid: 46). When
it came to power the Turkish army:

undertook  a  draconian reformation  (sic)  of  the  body politic. All  existing
political parties were banned: some  of their leaders were arrested and others
were ordered out of politics for  a decade. Labour activities were suppressed,
the universities were purged, and alleged terrorists were swept up en masse. In
all, some 200,000 arrests were made...  (ibid: 50)

"Solitary confinement,  beatings, and  the application of electric shocks" to
the  genitals  -  these  are  the  political  vehicles  of  the  Turkish  programme.
Common to all these regimes -  apart from  "the confidence  of the IMF and
the  (international)  banks"  (Bordewich)  - was  their  function  of  disciplining
labour. In  all three case foreign  (American)  intervention was also involved,
primarily but  not  exclusively military  (e.g. US  military transfers  to  Turkey
have increased 300% since Sept. 1980). In the three instances, precisely be-
cause the class struggles were so advanced, the process of re-organising the
social  conditions  of  production  had  to  take  a  correspondingly  violent  and
"crisis-ridden" form.  But  the repressive nature  of the process,  and  the  ten-
dency to the intensification  of class struggles as a result of this re-organisa-
tion, were not exceptional17 The intensification  of social contradictions has
shown itself not only in the growing represstveness of the state apparatus and

• 68  EBO  HUTCHFUL

its imperialist supports, but also in spontaneous acts of popular violence and
resistance to these developments. In the last few years there have been  food
riots  in  Santo  Domingo,  Sao  Paulo,  Khartoum,  and  Peru,  and  popular
demonstrations and labour  marches in Argentina, Jamaica,  and  other  cities
and coutries of the Third World, all in protest against the increasingly brutal
rule of capital.

Why does the re-organisation process in the underdeveloped  countries as-
sume this particularly 'crisis-ridden'  character?  First, although  it assumes a
more severe form  in the peripheral countries, neither the  origin of the  crisis
nor the  mechanisms for  its mediation  exist  in these  dependent  formations.
Marx makes this point  in relation  to the capitalist  crises  that  produced  the
revolutions of 1848 on the European continent: "While, therefore,  the crises
first produce revolutions on the Continent, the foundation  for these is, never-
theless, always laid in England. Violent outbreaks must naturally occur in the
extremities of the bourgeois body than in its heart, since the possibility of ad-
justment is greater here than there" (Marx 1965: J23). The illusion sustained
by the particalur form of the 'adjustment' applied to the peripheral countries
is that a purely internal solution can be found to the crisis. To the extent that
the  real  objective  in  this  'solution'  is  to  mobilize  within  these  formations
counterbalancing  effects  to  the  falling  rate  of  profit  in  the  advanced
capitalist economies - in other words to deepen their exploitation by  finance
capital - it can only aggravate the crisis.

Secondly, this re-organisation  involves measures that directly intensify  the
class struggle. This is because, on one level, it is based on the ability of capi-
tal to  extract  an  increase  in  absolute  rather  than  relative  surplus-value,  at
-least in the short term. Re-organisation  cannot proceed, as in the  advanced
countries, by creating conditions favourable to technological  transformations
in the labour process, but by lowering the average wage-rate (Hence Toledo
(1977:  15)  was  right  in  identifying  real  wages  as  the  'basic  "adjustment"
variable' in the Argentine programme). This requires direct  suppression  of
the working class in favour of capital. On a second  level, it necessitates  the
acceleration  of the expansion of the capitalist  mode into the  'pre-capitalist'
economic  regions.  The  typical  export-orientation  of 
the  adjustment
programme entails the annexation of more peasant land for  the  production
of export  crops, a process accompanied by an increase in the organic com-
position of capital in agriculture and in the domination of 'Kulak* elements.
On yet another level, reorganisation occurs at the expense of a deterioration
in  the  position  of  the  "marginalised"  masses  and  of  petty  producers  and
traders. A. typical aspect of the "rationalisation" of the domestic economy is
the forcible  relocation  or shut-down  of 'illegal' or  'blackmarket'  businesses
and the throwing of their proprietors onto the labour market,18  eliminating
these intermediary strata  and  reducing the  conflict  more  and  more  to  one

T HE VIOLENCE OF PERIPHERY  STATES  69

between capital and wage-labour. As a rule, of course, adjustment  program-
mes  focus  heavily  on  the.  so-called 
'formal  sector'  firms  which  are
preponderantly  foreign  or  multinational  and  either  ignore  the  purely local
'informal sector' activities (which are, by their very nature, outside the direct
influence  of  monetary  or  fiscal  measures)  or  attempt  to transfer  these  ac-
tivities to 'formal sector' firms where direct competition is involved.

Finally the political context within which this re-organisation is carried out
makes impossible peaceful  mediation of the class struggle. In the  peripheral
situation, the functions  of re-organisation are actually taken over by external
agencies,  although  the  local  state  apparatus  retains  the  formal  political
'authority1,  as well as  responsibility  for  the  management  of  social  conflicts
(although  these  too  may  be  partly  taken  over  at  a  certain  stage  by  the
metropolitan state). Although these agencies claim to represent an exclusive-
ly economic  rationality,  we have seen  that  their  so-called  'economic'  func-
tions, in reality political functions, to the extent that their functions are exer-
cised  by  the  capitalist  state. However  these  (political)  functions  are  exer-
cised, in their  guise as economic objectivity,  in abstraction  from  the  condi-
tions  of  class struggle which would normally condition the  exercise of  such
power. Hence the reputation  of the 'multilateral' institutions for  forcing  on
client  governments  'suicidal'  measures. At  the  same  time, finance  capital,
hiding  behind  these  institutions,  deprives  the  peripheral  state  of  any pos-
sibility of mediation of the class struggle by reduction or abolition of precise-
ly those categories of state expenditure which benefited  the poor (food sub-
sidies, educational, health  and social welfare  spending)  and reversal of  the
historical gains of the working classes in the areas of wage-negotiations  and
social security. This assumes the existence of a state structure with an entire-
ty repressive approach to the class struggle.19

Although the monetarist objective of adjustment is the removal of 'political
interference'  from  the process of valorisation  of  capital - precisely because
the  political  constitutes  the  pre-condition  for  any  restructuring  of  the
economy in these formations  - this objective can be  achieved only in a con-
tradictory fashion, by 'elevating' the peripheral state to a position of superin-
tendence over the formation as a whole. In this crisis the state apparatus acts
as  the  authoritative  representative  of  peripheral  society  vis-a-vis  finance
capital.  This  is  not  a  diplomatic  fiction:  the  state  negotiates  the  peonage
status  of  peripheral  society  as  a  whole  and  superintends  the  execution  of
commitments, a process which presumes the ability of the state apparatus to
coerce  all of  society. The  preponderant  role  of  the  peripheral  state in  the
present  phase is due  precisely to its role in the 'global  crisis  management'.
The authoritarian military regime, which focuses the executive power to the
highest degree, and which claims to be above classes, constitutes the logical
political form of this situation.20

70  EBO HUTCHFUL

Conclusion
It is in the reorganisation  of  the general  social conditions  of production  to
remove  the  barriers  to  accumulation  -  seen  most  immediately  in  the
mobilisation  of  counterbalancing  factors  to the  falling  rate  of  profit  in  the
centre - that defines the states of the world market as capitalist states and, as
states of the bourgeoisie, their  external form notwithstanding. It  is through
this function  that the world market imposes its unity on the plurality of states
embedded  in  it.  The  fundamental  historical  function  of  the  state  in  the
peripheral  formations  (colonial  as  well  as  post-colonial)  may  be  seen  in
precisely this light. However there are necessary differences  in the forms of
and  .pproaches to this function.  In the advanced  capitalist  countries where
the capital relation is fully established, it was (and  still is, to an  extent) his-
torically possible for capitalist relations of production to reproduce themsel-
ves in a structured and coherent way, in and through the workings of the law
of value itself. Here  too the  capitalist  state is enabled  to  assume  its logical
form  as the bourgeois-democratic republic. The  form  of the state, increas-
ingly necessary and extensive under monopoly capitalism, takes the form of
indirect  measures  to influence  and structure  the  market, rather  than  direct
intervention in production as such. Nevertheless the task of re-organising the
complex of social conditions of production in the advanced capitalist  forma-
tions takes place in increasingly anarchic and 'crisis-ridden'  forms, with  the
worst recession  in fifty  years, the  emergence  of monetarist  governments  in
the key capitalist states, and decisive challenge to 'traditional' interventionist
policies. This anarchy and crisis are necessarily in semi- capitalist  countries.
Here the partial establishment  of the capital relation  (which materialises it-
self in  the  fragmented  and  multiform  nature  of  the  social  formation),  the
weak basis of class rule, - and - above all - the 'double reproduction' hidden
in the peripheral production process, lend particular violence to the process
of re-organisation,  expressed  in the generalisation  within the  contemporary
Third World of repressive, militarist regimes.

This  is  so  because  capital  cannot  deepen  or  rationalise  its  exploitation
without advancing the national democratic revolution in these countries. It is
this struggle that, within these neo-colonies, arouses the "mass of the nation,
peasants  and  petty  -  bourgeois,  standing  between  the  proletariat  and  the
bourgeoisie... against the rule of capital" and forces it increasingly to "attach
itself to the proletariat  as their protagonists" (Marx, 1965: 37-38); that  con-
verts even elements of the repressive forces  (armies, police  etc.) to revolu-
tionary democracy. The complex correlation of class forces that focus on the
state in this struggle is what gives the state in the periphery its unsteady and
repressive character. But history is showing as certainly that this struggle for
national democracy cannot be conducted or won on the basis of the old state

THE VIOLENCE OF PERIPHERY  STATES  71

structures.

It is from  this standpoint that  one may also view the vexed question of the
class character  of the peripheral state. It is not enough to declare the inter-
national bourgeoisie  as the 'ruling class' in the neo-colony or the peripheral
state  as  simply another  case  of  'separation'"^1 positions which  either  imply
that 'independence' is a sham or leave unclear in what sense, if any, this 'rule'
differs  from  bourgeois rule at the centre. If both the international and neo-
colonial bourgeoisies have a joint, objective  interest  in the  extension of  the
institution of private property and of the sphere of expanded  reproduction,
an interest conceptualised in terms of the ideology of 'development', there is
also an objective, though not necessarily a fundamental  limit to this joint in-
terest, situated in the contradiciton between the bases of reproduction of the
two classes. In  general  the  international  bourgeoisie  reproduced  and  must
reproduce itself on the basis of the continuous extension of the world market
and  the  destruction  of  national  particularisms.  For  this  purpose  it  is  ir-
relevent whether the 'local discourse' is based on 'socialism' or some form of
'national' capitalism. The neo-colonial bourgeoisie on the other hand  seeks
to barricade  itself behind the walls of the home market. It cannot  do other-
wise.

It  is this  difference  which  is posed  in  the  struggles  over  terms  of  re-or-
ganisation  of  the  peripheral  economies  (the  bitter  battles  presently  being
waged over "conditionality"). In their present form these terms seek to  'free'
the market  and the economy from  state controls, and simultaneously to dis-
solve  the  'national'  market  and  absorb  it  into  the  world  market.  These
measures  threaten  to  destroy the material basis of  the most powerful  frac-
tions of  the  neo-colonial bourgeoisie  and  produce revolutionary  conditions
in its backyard. The fitful  interventions of the  international bourgeoisie  and
the  successive  reconstitution  of  the  governing  coalitions  in  the  peripheral
state - which devolve power  on  a narrower  and  more repressive basis - are
precisely to discover an appropriate agent for this task of re-organisation.

Footnotes:

1.  F.  Engels,  Preface  to  the  third  German  edition  of  Karl  Marx,  The  Eighteenth
Brumaire  of  Louii  Bonaparte.  Karl  Marx  and  Frederick  Engels,  Selected  Works
(MESW),  Peking:  Foreign  Langnagei  PrcM,  1962,  VoLl  p.346.

2.  "It  is  a  peculiarity  of  the  bourgeoisie,  in  contrast  to  all  former  ruling  classes,  that
there  is  a  turning  point  in  its  development  after  which  every  further  expansion  of
its  agencies  ...  only  tends  to  make  it  more  and  more  unfit  for  political  rule  _
From  that  moment  on,  it  loses  the  strength  required  for  exclusive  political  role  ...
it  looks  around  for  allies  with  whom  to  share  Us  role,  or  to  whom  it  can  cade
the  whole  of  its  rule,  as  circumstances  may  require".  Bngels,  Preface  to  Peasant
Wars  in  Germany  .

3.  Weber  was  probably  the  first  to  theorise  systematically  on  discipline  as  a  fun-

72  E BO HUTCHFUL

damental  and pervasive  characteristic  of  capitalism,  embodied  in  tht  bureaucratic
formi  of  organisation  of  the capitalkt  enterprise  at  well  a»  the  sUte,  church etc.,
and  furthest  developed  in the military.

4.  H.H.  Geith  and  C.W.  Milk,  Frtm  tits  Wtktr:  Etttgt 

in  S»dtltn,  New  York

1958,  p.234.

5.  Gramsci  indentifies  thk willing  consent  a* "caused  by the prestige  (and consequent
confidence)  which  the  dominant  group  enjoys  because  of  its  position  and  function
in  the world  of production".  Granssci  1973:  12.

6.  It  is  clear  that  to  Gramsci  the  efficacy  of  civil  society  and  its  organisation*  k
derived  at  least  partly  from  the  fact  that  they  do  not  directly  express  the  rela-
tions  of  power.  Thai,  in  contrast  to  those  who (like  Atthusser)  summarily  collapse
civil  society  and  state  in  the  form  of  "ideological  state  apparatuses",  the
'autonomy'  of  civil  society  from  both  state  and  production  k  crucial  to  its
Ideological'  effectiveness.

7.  K.g. Perry  Anderson  and Nkos  Poulaatias,  both  of  whom,  an  influenced  critically
by  GramscL  Anderson  quibbles  as  to  whether  "hegemony'  k  located  in  civil  society
as  suggested  by  Gramsei  or  in  the  institntions  of  the  parliamentary  state  itself,
but  accepts  hegemony  as  the  peculiar  bask  of  bourgeok  rob  and  "the  most
salient  immediate  difference  between  Western  parliamentarism  and  Russian  a b-
sohtkm".  "The  Antinomies  of  Antonio  Gramsci",  Ntm  Ltfi  Rnitu,  100, Nov.
1976-Jan.  1979. Poalaatias  follows  Gramsci  in confining  the use of the concept  of
'hegemony'  to  the  practices  of  the - capitalkt  ruling  class  bat  then  endows  the
hegemonic  class  with  a  'doable  function*,  that,  on the  one-hand,  of  'representing
the  general  interest  of  the  people\nation',  and  on  the  other,  of  "maintaining  a
specific  dominance  among  the  dominating  classes  and  fractions".  Pttitifi 
Ptwtr
uU  Stciii  CUtttt  : London:  Verso 1978.

8.  Thus  Wood  (1981:  67)  sees  thk  separation  as  "the  most  effective  defense
mechanism  available  to  capital".  According  to  her,  "the  paradoxical  effect  of
capitaHsm's  differentiation  of  the  economic  and the political  k  that  militancy and
political  consciousness  have  become  separate  issues"  (p.94).

9.  Thus  the chapter  on "The Capitalkt  State  and Force"  k  the briefest  (4  pages)  is
Poulantias'  entire  work  on the capitalkt  state  although  thk  deficiency  k  made up
In  hk  other  works  (Tkt  Critit  •/  tkt  Dictattnkift,  Fucitrn  *»4  Ditttt»rMr).
For  a  critique  of  Poulantus'  use  of  the  concept  of  "structure"  which  Be* at the
bask  of  hk  theoretical  difficulties,  see  Simon  Clarke,  'Marxism,  Sociology  and
Poulantias'  Theory  of the State.  Ctptttl  uU  CUti  2,  Summer 1977.

10. The development  of  overwhelming  repressive  capacity  by  the  bourgeok.  state  and
the  introduction  of  democratic  Bberties  have  historically  been  eca/ctui  develop-
ments.  Bngeks  noted  thk  -  and  the  transformation  of  the  conditions  of  class
struggle  as a  result  of it  — as far back  as 1895. Introduction  to  Tkt  d an Strug—
•to  m Frmnt* USSW.  pp. 130-138.

11. These  criticisms  were  advanced  in  the  context  of  the so-called  "state  derivation"
debate,  Of.  John  Holloway  and Sol  Picciotto  'eds).  Sttit  *nd  CtpUtU: A  Mtnitt
Vtktt*.  London:  Edward  Arnold  1978. Thk  thesk  arose  i>  West  Germany  as  a
critique  of the descriptive  bias  of the 'separation'  argument.  The >8tate  derivation'
analysk  was essentially  concerned  with  the bougeok  state  in  the Federal  Republic
under  the  conditions  of  German  Social  Democracy.  Although  it  seeks  to  return
with  Marx  to  the  capital  relation  as  the  determinant  of  the  phenomenal  form  of
the  bourgeok  state,  in  some  of its forms, derivation  amounts  to  Httlt  more  than  a
more  sophisticated  restatement  and  naive  acceptance  of  bourgeok  theories  of the
state. In  particular  the state  k  hardly  ever  seem as an instrument  of class  repres-
sion.

12. As  among  the  highland  clans  (tee  Marx  1977: 681)  thk  was  the  source  of the
eonsiderabk  struggles  against  the  chief  by  hk  subjects.  The  ready  alBaace  of
many  chieni  with  coloniaHsm  was evidence  of the increasing  dissolution  of dan o r-
ganisation  and Us internal  class-like  struggles.

13. Cf.  OJtaoB,  StkmU Pttiti*  m NiftU,  Enugu: Fourth  Dimension  Press  IStO.
14. For  much  of  the  Third  World  the  basic  outQne  of  the  crkk  of  course  appeared

much  earikr, for instance  in the commodities  slump  of the 1960s.

15. "CondttknaBty"  k  becoming  more  and more  a  standard  feature  in  the deaBugs  of

THE  VIOLENCE OF PERIPHERY  STATES  73

Western  government!  and  aid  agencies  with  Third  World  governments,  particularly
the  poorest.  Although  the  IMF  it  concerned  with  emergency,  short—term  restruc-
turing,  it  is  really  the  World  Bank  and  allied  agencies  which  are  responsible  for
the  more  comprehensive  programmes  of  'adjustment'  and  change.

16. There  are  many  critical  assessments  of  IMF  adjustment  policies.  One  of  the  most
authoritative  (if  not  critical)  is  Tony  Killick  (ed).  Tkt  IMF  StaUHtatian;  Dnttip-
int  (7»«n(ry  Ezftrienec;  London:  ODI  and  Heinemann,  14*4.

17. For  instance  in  Ghana,  where  the  introduction  of  a  'stabilisation'  programme  In
1966  was  preceded  by  the  military  overthrow  of  President  Nkrumah.  In  1973  the
introduction  of  a  similar  programme 
immediate  overthrow  of  the
government  of  Prime  Minister  Busia.  See  also  the  recent  coup  in  the  Sudan.

ltd  to  the 

18. Of.  the  recent  campaign  by  the  "corrective"  military  government  In  Nigeria
against  *iliegal  structures'  involving  the  destruction  nationwide  of  thousands  of
small  business  premises.

19. Hence  it  is  not  surprising  that  what  the  state  saves  on  social  welfare  expenditures
it  usually  spends  on  military  weapons.  This  Investment'  may  not  appear  on  the
books  because  it  is  derived  from  (U.S.)  military  aid  (cf.  Turkey  since  Sept.,  1980).
20. For  this  reason,  Marx's  analysis  of  Bonapartism  appears  particularly  appropriate
here.  Bonapartism  is  characterised  by  the  autonomy  of  the  state  from  the  con-
tending  classes,  by  its  'enormous  bureaucracy'  and  extensive  controls,  and  by  the
'preponderance  of  the  army*.  Bonapartism  may  be  seen  in  a  certain  light  as  the
political  form  of  under-developed  capitalism.  Significantly,  bourgeois  industry  and
commerce  flowered  under  the  repressive  rule  of  Louis  Bonaparte.  Nevertheless,  the
different  social  and  historical  conditions  in  France  limit  the  application  of  this
model.

21.  There  are  several  versions  of  the  first  argument,  including  Michael  von  Freyhold,
"The  Post-Colonial  State  and  its  Tancanian  Version".  Rtwitw  •/  African  PtBtieal
Ectntm*  No.  8:  and  Yash  Tandon,  "Whose  Capital  and  Whose  State?".  Univer-
sity  of  Dar—es-Salaam,  Dttatt 
•«  Imperitlitm,  Statt  and  CUt$,  Tantanian
Publishing  House  1982.  On  'Separation'  see  Peter  Anyang  Nyongo.  "Soldiers  and
Counter-Revolution 
3,  1983.  For  a
critical  view,  Issa.  Shivji,  "The  State  in  the  Dominated  Social  Formations  of
Africa:  Some  Theoretical  Issues",  in  University  of  Dar-es-Salaam,  Dtiatt  »•  Jut—
peritlitm,  Statt  and  Gift.

in  Liberia",  Jnrnal 

•/  African  Manitt; 

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