The Violence of Periphery States

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The period since the end of the Second World War has been characterised by an important paradox: on the one hand the growing solidity and non-repressiveness on the whole of bourgeois rule at the centre, and on the other the fragility and violence of class rule in the periphery. The capitalist state in Europe, America and Japan has assumed its logical form as the bourgeois democratic republic, with the extension of a wide range of civil and political liberties and, simultaneously, of social and economic benefits to the working classes. In addition, these states have shown consistent ability to weather various crises: prolonged economic recession, urban terrorism, militant protests, the dissolution of colonial empires, expansion of world socialism, and sharp growth in the military power of socialism. On the other hand, the state in the periphery has assumed a progressively more precarious and outrightly repressive character, with frequent violent ovethrow and rearrangement of ruling coalitions, constant constitutional revisions, the suppression of political and civil rights and basic democratic freedoms, brutal repression of the working classes, and internal wars and foreign armed interventions. The international bourgeoisie has not been innocent in these developments, but rather has been deeply implicated in them. Why does contemporary bourgeois rule assume this double face - democratic and consensual in the centre, brutal and repressive in the periphery?

In response to these developments two different sets of theories of the state - one of the capitalist state in the centre, the other of the peripheral state, but both tracing their inspiration to Marx - have arisen, independently of and - potentially hostile to each other. No single Marxist theory of the state corresponding to the international character of capital (i.e. a theory of the state in the imperialist phase) has emerged from the recent debates. A consideration of the recent theories on the nature of bourgeois rule requires a return to some aspects of Marx's writings on the capitalist state.

The Capitalist State

Marx makes two important comments regarding the form and function of the political in capitalist society. The first is the separation that characterises the level of economic domination and the exercise of political functions within the bourgeois order. Marx attributes this 'separation' both to the class constitution of the bourgeoisie (which renders it unable to rule directly as a class) and the conditions of the class struggle, which demand that the bourgeoisie sacrifice its 'political' interests in order to safeguard its economic interests. It is this that makes possible the co-existence of capitalism with various state forms. The second point is that the capital relations, founded on the separation of the producer from his means of production, does not, once established, require the direct presence of force as a condition for its reproduction. This fundamentally distinguishes the function of the political in capitalist society not only from feudalism and other forms of pre-capitalist society, but also from the formative stages of capitalism. The laws of value in capitalist production, by their blind objective operation, reproduce both the immediate conditions of production and the social relations that correspond to them, without the direct intervention of force. It is this that allows the bourgeoisie to renounce direct political rule without, at the same time, prejudicing the rule of property.

Marx makes the first point in the context of the discussion about bourgeois 'society' and the bourgeois 'state':

> *'Present-day society' is capitalist society, which exists in all civilised countries, more or less free from medieval admixture, more or less modified by the special historical development of each country, more or less developed. On the other hand, the 'present-day state' changes with a country's frontier. It is different in the Prusso-German Empire from what it is in Switzerland, it is different in England from what it is in the United States. The 'present-day state' is therefore a fiction.*
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> *Nevertheless the different states of the different civilised countries, in spite of their manifold diversity of form, all have this in common, that they are based on modern bourgeois society, only one more or less capitalistically developed. They have, therefore, certain essential features in common. In this sense it is possible to speak of the 'present-day state'. (Marx 1962 (1): 32).*

In the European countries in Marx's day, only in France was there established the "un-alloyed rule" of the bourgeoisie, in a "classical purity unequalled by any other European land".[1] Here the "gigantic broom of the French Revolution" swept away "all manner of medieval rubbish, seigniorial rights, local privileges, municipal and guild monopolies and provincial con-

stitutions" which had clogged the development of bourgeois society. (Marx 1962: 516). Elsewhere in Europe, monarchy remained "the normal incumbrance and indispensable cloak of (bourgeois) class rule" (Ibid: 522). Under this cloak, one fraction or other of the bourgeoisie exercised its rule. However, to Marx, only the *bourgeois* or *constitutional* republic constituted the specific or logical form of bourgeois rule. Since the bourgeois parliamentary republic has become the generalised form of bourgeois rule in the West, Marx's analysis of this form is of particular importance. In contrast with the other historical forms of capitalist state, in which one fraction of the bourgeoisie ruled to the exclusion of other fractions, in the bourgeois republic the bourgeoisie as a whole is elevated to the position of ruling class. The bourgeois republic was "the general regime of the bourgeois class", the "perfected and clearly expressed rule of the whole bourgeois class" and the "only possible form of their united power". Consequently it is also the "most potent and complete form of their class rule" (Marx 1962 (1): 80). The democratic republic is the "best political shell for capitalism"; under this shell the bourgeoisie "established its power so securely, so firmly, that no change, either of persons, institutions or persons ... can shake it" (Lenin, 1965:15).

In this republic, however, "wealth exercises its power indirectly" (Engels), in the form of a separation between its economic and political power. Marx and Engels return again and again (particularly in the context of France) to the question of the political inability of the bourgeoisie why the bourgeoisie, unlike other historically dominant classes, is unable to rule directly.[2] Owing to its class constitution and the rivalry between its own fractions, the bourgeoisie, once in power, "at every turn sacrificed their common class interests to narrow and dirty private interests", bringing the bourgeois to the threshold of common ruin. The unified party of all the bourgeois fractions, the Party of Order, eventually pronounced the political rule of the bourgeoisie "irreconcilable with the safety and interests of the bourgeoisie". (Marx 1962: 286). Marx is able to put his finger on precisely why it is that the bourgeoisie must renounce its own political rule: it is to avoid that "dangerous turn that transforms every struggle against the state power into a struggle against capital" (Ibid:287). On the basis of the experience with its own government the French bourgeoisie admitted that "its own interests dictate that it should be delivered from the danger of its *own rule* ;... that in order to preserve its social power intact, its political power must be broken; that the individual bourgeoisie can continue to exploit the other classes ... only on condition that their class be condemned along with the other classes to like political nullity ..." (Ibid 288). The bourgeoisie, consigned by itself to political nullity, is obliged to constantly contest with the exploited classes for control of its own state, to "so regulate the suffrage ... that it wills the reasonable, its rule" (Marx 1965: 199).

Marx explains why it is not only (politically) necessary but also possible for the bourgeoisie to separate its economic from its political power, without sacrificing the rule of property. The foundation of this separation he discovers precisely in the divorce of the producer from his means of production. The process of implantation of the capitalist mode of production is one of violent and bloody suppression of the producer and forcible separation from his conditions of production; the state acts here as a brutal instrument of repression against wage - labour. However, once established, the normal operation of the capitalist mode of production makes unnecessary the application of force to production. The 'dull compulsion of economic relations' ensures the subjection of the wage-labourer to capital:

The advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by education, tradition (and) habit, looks upon the conditions of that mode of production as self-evident laws of nature. The organisation of the capitalist process of production, once fully developed, breaks down all resistance ... The dull compulsion of economic relations completes the subjection of the labourer to the capitalist. Direct force, outside economic conditions, is of course still used, but only exceptionally. In the ordinary course of things, the labourer can be left to the "natural laws of production" i.e., to his dependence on capital, a dependence springing from, and guaranteed in perpetuity by, the conditions of production themselves. (Marx 1977: 689)

Marx shows here how the capital relation, through the blind operation of the law of value, is able to perpetuate and reproduce its own conditions, hiding from the producers themselves the relations of force. The appropriation of surplus takes place in the immediate act of production, without the exertion of extra-economic coercion. The wage-relation appears to the labourer as a necessary, unalterable law. The expulsion of direct force from the process of production in turn conditions a specific conception of the political. The change in the political form of social relation under capitalism is itself a function of the capital relation, for as Marx argues, it is not merely at the immediate level of production that capitalism appears to reproduce itself in this way, but in its basic social relations as a whole:

It is not just the objective conditions of the process of production that appear as its result. The same thing is true also of its specific social character. The social relations and therefore the social position of the agents of production in relation to each other, i.e., the relations of production are themselves produced: they are also the constantly renewed result of the process (Marx, quoted in Hirsch, 1978: 61).

The 'dependence on capital', characteristic not only of the class of wage-labourers but of all of capitalist society including those classes - such as state

officials - who constitute a tax on surplus, has its material basis in:

(a) the monopolisation by the bourgeois of the instruments of material and mental production, including the sources of revenue of the state apparatus;

(b) socialisation of production on an ever increasing scale, and subjection of large masses of producers to the direct rule of the bourgeoisie;

(c) the discipline inherent in capitalist production, which imposes itself doubly: on the capitalist in the form of a law to constantly revolutionise his means of production, and on the wage-labourer in the form of regimentation in the field of production. This regimentation confronts the labourer as a negation of his theoretical freedoms in the political and civil fields. The "veritable despotism" of large-scale industry, which occurring "independent of all social organisation" (Engeles) is nevertheless perfected by capitalism, for "in no other system of production is work so thoroughly organised and disciplined" (Wood 1981: 91). And not for nothing did Marx compare the bourgeois' "command on the field of production" with that of the general on the field of battle", (Marx 1977: 313);[3]

(d) finally the constant revolutionisation of the productive forces and of the basis of capitalist production as a whole, which though forced on the individual capitalist by the anarchy of production and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, nevertheless gives bourgeois rule the appearance of conformity with scientific laws.

The 'dependence' of the labourer is not represented and does not appear to him as such. On the contrary the dissolution of feudal bonds and privileges (in the maintenance of which the feudal state had been implicated) makes possible the equalisation of social conditions for all men - 'men' as 'homo economicus', stripped of all other social and human attributes, owners of property or sources of revenue. The wage relation (which is a relation between two forms of property, capital and labour-power) and the formal freedom of the wage-labourer create the impression that all work is rewarded and shifts on to the labourer himself responsibility for his condition. Both capital and labour relate to the state in their objectivity as forms of property, in their bourgeois 'equality' as owners of property or sources of revenue: it is this that allows the state to assume its (illusory) position as a neutral instance and impartial force standing 'outside and alongside society'. This 'equality' of property is reflected onto the political and registered there in the formal juridical equality of the 'citizen' - although the capitalist state appears subsequently as the condition and the embodiment of this equalisation, through the juridical rights of the citizen and the form of the law. Again this 'equality' and the (illusory) dissolution, not just of feudal particularisms

but of *class distinctions* as such, are the condition for the emergence of officialdom and the rule of law.[4] (Hence the bourgeoisie, to whom their own state appears as a mystery, is the only historically dominant class that *denies* the reality of classes). 'Law' here expresses nothing more than the logic and rules of capitalist discourse, as the law of property, competition, commodity production and exchange; once these rules are established and accepted as the only natural or rational form of discourse, the possibility for the state to separate itself from production arises. By the same process, government is reduced in appearance to a *technical process* ('administration') devoid of class content, consisting in the interpretation, enforcement and adjudication of law by paid officials, functions performed irrespective of the class origin of the bureaucratic officials. The state structure itself appears as no longer the privileged monopoly of a particular class, but as open to recruitment from all classes. Bourgeois rule thus assumes its distinctive character as domination on the basis of officialdom, by and through rules, as *rational domination* (Weber).

The revived debate on the Marxist theory of the state arose as a critique of the 'state monopoly' thesis and in response to important developments in the West - the extension of democratic liberties and economic rights etc., which appeared to transform both the phenomenal form of the state and its class content, the decline of militance on the part of the political organisations of the working classes, etc. Gramsci was the first revolutionary theoretician to devote himself to a systematic analysis of the new directions taken by the bourgeois state. His theory was founded on a critique of the 'reductionism' implicit in the 'dogmatic' or 'state-monopoly' thesis, which reduced the state to the ruling class and traced all developments in the superstructure to their 'causes' in the base or structure. Gramsci argued that the superstructures had a life and rhythm of their own and to an extent developed in accordance with their own rules and logic, autonomously of the structure. On this basis Gramsci insisted on the 'relative autonomy of the political' and on the possibility of a specific 'science of the political'. Gramsci also proposed to bridge the conventional structure/ superstructure topography by inserting an intervening level ('civil society') which, while belonging to neither structure nor superstructure, played important roles in the reproduction of both levels.

It was partly against the background of these general theoretical revisions that Gramsci developed his concepts of the specificity of bourgeois rule. He distinguished between two forms of rule: 'domination', which he identified with force, and 'hegemony' in which political rule is based more or less on the willing consent of the governed. The state and its organs were the site of domination and force while 'civil society' was the site of hegemony. Bourgeois rule was based on hegemony, rather than on simple coercion; it is this that distinguished it from other existing forms of class rule, from Russian ab-

solutism and the forms of rule in the backward and colonial countries. Bourgeois rule and Russian absolutism were based on a contrasting relationship between the state (as 'domination') and civil society (as 'consent'):

> *In Russia, the state was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West there was a proper relationship between state and civil society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The state was only an outer ditch, behind which was a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks... (Gramsci, 1973: 238)*

These 'fortresses and earthworks' were not uniformly developed in all states in the West and were "more or less numerous from one state to the next"; nevertheless they characterised, and were specific to, the developed capitalist formations in the West. Gramsci identified in those formations not one but two major superstructural levels - one that may be called "civil society", that is, the ensemble of organisms called "private", and the other that of "political society" or the state. These two levels correspond, on the one hand, to the function of "hegemony" which the dominant group exercises throughout society and, on the other hand, to that of "direct domination" or command exercised through the state and "juridical government". (Gramsci 1973: 12)

Because of shifts in usage it is difficult to attach a consistent meaning to the concepts of 'hegemony' and 'civil society' and their relation to the state apparatus as conceptualised by Gramsci; on balance, however, it is clear that by 'civil society' he denotes an intermediary sphere located between, but separate from, both structure and superstructure and constituted (formally by private associations - the press, the church, schools, trade unions, political parties and so on. The proliferation of these private associations, conditioned by bourgeois political and civil freedoms, was itself a distinctive development of the bourgeois order and the foundation, to Gramsci, of hegemony.

The key to hegemony is the ideology of the dominant class - 'ideology' not necessarily in terms of a systematic body of rationalisation but of common sense notions, of the unquestioned assumptions that inform the world-view of the dominated. Gramscis's concept of hegemony furnishes an answer to the problem raised by Marx as to how the bourgeoisie is able "so to regulate the suffrage ... that it wills the reasonable, its rule". The cultural\ideological domination of the bourgeoisie, operating alongside its material substratum, the 'dull compulsion of economic relations',[5] serves to secure the more or less peaceful reproduction of the capitalist order and bourgeois class domination. The organisations of civil society not only perform important functions of propagation and socialisation relative to the dominant ideology but also operate to refract and absorb class contradicitons which would

otherwise have focused directly on the state.[6]

Gramsci's categories (particularly his concepts of 'hegemony' and 'relative autonomy') have had an important influence on the subsequent discourse on the Marxist theory of the state, although with significant shifts in usage and different lessons for praxis.[7] Particular emphasis has also been placed by neo-Gramscians on the so-called 'separation between the political and the economic', not to demonstrate (as in Marx and Engels) the problematic rule of the bourgeoisie, but to explain the apparent solidity of the bourgeois state.[8] These recent contributions have yielded many significant insights, particularly into the complexity of the advanced capitalist state and the role of ideological conditioning in maintaining the bourgeois power structure. But these analyses of the state have also raised a number of important theoretical problems in relation to the Marxist theory of the state. The first has been the tendency to displace force and repression, and even class struggle, from the centre of analysis of the capitalist state. This tendency is, in some ways, more clearly present in the various formulations of "functionalist Marxism", where the capitalist state is seen as "not a class instrument, but rather the state of a society divided into classes" and as the "factor of cohesion between the levels of a social formation ... the regulating factor of its global equilibrium as a system". (Poulantzas 1978: 191, 44-5)[9]

The (unspoken but also unqualified) assumption about the 'democratic' or 'consensual' nature of the contemporary bourgeois state results in part from lack of appreciation of the contradictory movements underlying this assumption: the extension of democratic liberties simultaneously with the development of the most fearsome war machine and apparatus of physical repression ever seen in history,[10] and the fostering by the bourgeoisie of social harmony at home, but militarism and repression as the basis of its rule abroad. The tendency to see bourgeois rule only in its civilised aspects is derived from a particular reading of the terrain of bourgeois domination, which views capital, not in its internationality, but as 'closed' national units. Consequently, bourgeois democracy (at home) and repression (abroad) are not seen as different faces of the international rule of the bourgoisie. In this sense, these recent concepts of the capitalist state lose the most penetrating insight of the state monopoly thesis, which was precisely a theory of the bourgeois state in the imperialist epoch.

Secondly these theories commence from an acceptance of the surface fragmentation of bourgeois society and its division into 'separate' economic, political and ideological spheres, and seek, within the 'autonomy' of spheres that characterise the totality of capitalist society, to develop a specifically political theory. The assumption is that Marx's *Capital* is essentially an analysis of the economic sphere of capitalist society that requires to be complemented by a theory of the political instance. The critique of the

'economic' is regarded as complete: what is required is a corresponding critique of the 'political', as an autonomous area of study. Although it is accepted that within this separation of spheres the economic is somehow 'determinant in the last instance', it is not considered necessary to examine the question further, i.e. to examine concretely the nature of the relation between the economic and the political and in what sense, if any, the economic 'determines' the political in capitalism. By assuming the possibility and indeed the necessity of a specific "science of the political", these theories detach the analysis of the political in capitalism from the laws of motion of the economic, and in particular from the most fundamental of these laws: accumulation and its contradictions.[11]

It is in accumulation, and the barriers to accumulation inherent in capitalist production, represented particularly in Marx's analysis of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, that the dynamic force behind the development of the capitalist state must be located.

Each phase of the self-expansion of capital has been characterised by specific barriers to accumulation and mode of mobilisation of counter-tendencies, the role of the foreign market in this process, and (derived from this) the function of the state in the periphery. The consistent feature that characterises all phases of the expansion of capital however, is that it is specifically on this basis, i.e. as an element in the ensemble of counter-balancing effects to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall on the home market, that the pre-capitalist formations are integrated into the capitalist world market. This is crucial for understanding both the subsequent development of the formation ('development of underdevelopment') and the form and function of the peripheral state. The form of integration, under these conditions, had certain specific results, which may be noted briefly as follows:

(a) the one-sided transfer of masses of value from the periphery to the centre, within the framework of structural distortion;
(b) the subsumption of the labour process in the periphery and the peripheral reproduction process as a whole, to that of the centre. For this reason accumulation in the periphery cannot occur autonomously, but must be conditioned and determined by the self-valorisation of international capital and must, moreover, occur as purely secondary results of this process;
(c) specifically, the peripheral production process absorbs and 'cushions' the consequences of the falling rate of profit on the markets of the advanced capitalist nations. Hence the periodic crises to which the barriers to accumulation give rise (recession, falling prices etc.) are manifested here in particularly acute form;
(d) the exogenous origin of this crisis, and the limited adjustment

mechanisms available to the peripheral capitalist economy, mean that the process of re-organisation of the social conditions of production must occur in particularly 'crisis-ridden' form, with the peripheral state playing a central and openly repressive role.

The Specificity of the Peripheral State

Before considering the implications of these remarks, it is necessary to make a number of preliminary observations towards situating the form and function of the peripheral state:

(a) An obvious but fundamental point of difference between the state in the advanced capitalist formation and the peripheral state is that, in the one case, capitalist production relations have been established and universalised, while in the other, these production relations are in the process of extension. Marx sees a fundamental difference in the function of the state in the two situations, a difference determined by the degree of development of the capital relation. In the quotation from *Capital* where he argues that the capital relation, once fully established, dispenses with the direct intervention of force in production, Marx notes: "it is otherwise during the historic genesis of capitalistic production". Here force is required to regulate wages at a level consistent with the realisation of surplus-value, and in general to "keep the labourer himself in the normal degree of dependence". The application of state power to production is thus "an essential element of the so-called primitive accumulation" (Marx 1977: 689).

The course of primitive accumulation in the colonies and former colonies must, however, be grasped in their specificity, as accumulation under the conditions of imperialism. While violence is the historical vehicle everywhere for the initial subsumption of pre-capitalist modes to the rule of capital, Marx notes that the process of penetration of capital into the backward, non-European lands was characterised by a particular level of violence, unmediated by the claim of capital to "natural reason". The "chief momenta of primitive accumulation", its most bloody moments, were played out in the colonies (Marx 1977: 703).

But the particularity of this violence (which Marx noted in his writings on India) is due rather to the fact that the process of accumulation which occurs in the periphery is not identical with, or a duplicate of, the original transition to capitalism in Europe, but historically and structurally unique. It has the following features which are specific to it:

(b) Exogenous determination of this process and of the social formation

as a whole, expressed in the relationship to the world market and in foreign ownership of the primary means of production and exchange. Marx notes the 'dual nature' of the world market in relation to the origin and development of European capitalism, first as its basis in its stages of infancy, and then as its product in its latter stages. In the periphery the development of the world market was not the result but the origin of capitalism, and furthermore of a very particular form of capitalism. The peripheral economy confronts the world market not as its product but as a specific, already existing division of labour, which imparts to the internal economy its specific character. Further the 'world market' here is a fundamentally different reality than the world market of the 17th-19th centuries, being constituted, not by many small national producers in relatively free competion, but by concentration and monopoly;

(c) the expression of the external determination of the form of the internal economy is the lack of linkage ('disarticulation') among the elements of this economy and, in particular, the absence of heavy (and also light) industry. This means that expanded reproduction is possible within the peripheral economy only in a partial and limited way, since, as Marx reminds us, "productive capital (is) the only function in which capital-value generates value". The circuit of commodity production and exchange can be completed only via the centre i.e. with the world market as a condition (for means of production as well as sale of the product), and involves, as central to its logic, the 'export' of multiplier effects (profits, R. and D., industrial development, etc). Similarly only large-scale industry provides the basis (through expanded reproduction) both for the 'natural' dissolution of archaic modes and petty commodity forms, and extensive proletarianisation. What does occur in the peripheral situation is extensive marginalisation, the effect of the constant expulsion and attraction of the surplus agricultural labour off the land without its transformation, on the basis of industry, into a proletariat. The effect of 'primitive' accumulation, thus appears in the form of intensifying 'unemployment' and growth of a large and potentially revolutionary surplus population in towns, sporadically repressed by the state apparatus. While in Europe the state acted as an agent of capital to further (but also occasionally to oppose) this process of dissolution of previous modes, in this case the state plays a more directly interventionist role as a principal in the process and in many ways as a 'substitute' for capital (e.g. in the organisation of labour supplies to industry). Hence direct state violence (forced labour, etc) is a prominent ingredient of this dissolution. However the state does not

act exclusively or consistently to extend the capital relation, but also to contain the social dislocation arising from the contradictory encounter of modes and to establish a new social and structural equilibrium. Hence the apparently contradictory policy of dissolution\preservation of the pre-capitalist modes;

(d) As the state of a 'transitional situation', the peripheral state presides over a specific articulation of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes, an articulation characterised by relations of hierarchy, dominance and contradiction between the modes that constitute the social formation. The articulation imposes on the state particular functions of management and cohesion - arising from the decomposition and resistance to decomposition of the pre-capitalist modes - which are characteristically different from the state in those formations where the dominance of capital is already complete and capitalist relations fully established. The fluidity of this situation also endows the state with considerable leeway to mould social structures and revolutionalise economic relations. The form of this articulation is important in determining the path of transition to capitalism, and in the (exogenously derived) process of re-organising the social conditions of production, which involves the subsumption of wider areas of non-capitalist social production;

(e) In the occident, feudalism, characterised by an advanced development both of the institution of private property and of the structures of class domination, had been generalised as the dominant pre-capitalist mode. In addition to specific economic attributes congenial to the development of capitalism, (accumulation of monetary wealth from trade and usury, development or urban crafts and a rural social structure that facilitate the expulsion of the peasantry) feudalism made possible certain class alliances crucial to the process of the establishment of the ascendency of capitalism. The re-constituted feudal state, the absolutist monarchy, incorporating the joint but unequal interests of the emergent bourgeoisie and of an aristocracy 'bourgeoisified' by the capitalisation of ground rent, fixed the political preconditions for the incubation of the capitalist order: the breakdown of feudal particularism, the development of the institutions of the national state, codification of the law etc. These conditions were completed prior to, and as a condition for, the universalisation of the capital relation and the assumption by the state of its specifically bourgeois form. In the periphery, however, capital encounters many different forms of pre-capitalist social economy at different levels of development and complexity; in Africa, with few exceptions, communal forms with a relatively weak development of the institution of

private property and of structures of class domination more or less predominated. This makes unlikely the reproduction of precisely the most germane political aspects of the European transition, in particular the complicity of a strongly entrenched pre-capitalist ruling class in the destruction of its own previous basis of domination. The key to the whole situation will of course lie in the form of penetration of capitalism into agriculture: in this case, this will not take the form, as a natural result of this process, of the capitalisation of ground rent on an extensive scale and the expulsion of the peasantry. The penetration of capitalism will result less in the destruction of communal landholding than in the development typically of commodity production on the basis of the peasant small holding, accompanied by a significant degree of differentiation within the ranks of the peasantry. The separation of the producer from his land, and the realisation of "free labour", if they are to occur, must occur through some other means than the 'natural action' of capital usually the direct coercive action of the state (forced labour, settler land legislation etc.)

Unlike the feudal situation, the various pre-capitalist dominant classes do not tend to have a uniform basis for alliances with capitalism, situated as they are in modes with different capacities for adaptation or resistance to capitalism and different levels of development of state structures. This uniform basis for alliances had to be created by the colonial state, by putting all pre-capitalist state structures on a more or less common basis, including the introduction of the elements of a state structure where none previously existed. Second, any alliance could be created only on the basis of the institution of private property, by driving a wedge between the communal property of the tribal collectivity and the purely private property of tribal rulers and elders. Colonialism transforms tribal chieftaincy, first by destroying, and then placing increasingly on a bourgeois basis, its sources of revenue, either in the form of the stipend of a petty public official (plus the benefit of fines and fees from the administration of 'justice' etc.) and\or by allowing the tribal chieftain, like the chief of the Highland clans, to transform his 'nominal rights' as the titular owner of clan land and property, into a real 'right' of private property.[12] The grafting of the political institutions of village society onto the institutions of the colonial state appears in the existence, side by side, of dual forms of law and politico - administrative structure, and the incorporation of traditional ideologies into the ideological framework of the state;

(f) Given the nature of peripheral capitalism, the peripheral formation is

characterised by a specific underdevelopment and distortion of its class structure, by the dominant presence of what Marx calls 'transitional classes' - peasants, the petty - bourgeois (small traders, artisans, petty intelligentsia etc.), and lumpen proletariat, as well as a relatively large state bureaucracy. On the other hand, the two fundamental classes of capitalism, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, exist only in marginal form. In the conditions of peripheral capitalism, these classes are not in fact 'transitional'; on the contrary, they tend to be reproduced on a more and more extensive scale by the logic of this mode. In Europe these classes have never, by their very nature, constituted a significant factor in the political equation (except in brief and extraordinary periods, as under Bonapartism), let alone exercise state power; in the periphery, however, it is directly from their ranks that the governing classes are recruited at independence. Taken together with the structural logic of the peripheral situation, this imparts a particular stamp to the form of politics and the state, expressed for instance in the fact that (a) class rule cannot take a hegemonic direction, but must be constituted directly on the basis of the state apparatus; (b) the state's economic interventionism appears, at the same time, as the condition for the ascent of this class from "nominal property" to real property; (c) the state bureaucracy enjoys pronounced autonomy from the nominal ruling class, and (d) the peripheral state presents a paradoxical double face: strong in relation to domestic classes, weak in relation to imperialism;

(g) At the same time, the peripheral situation produces a particular complexity and volatility of social and class struggles, due (1) to the intersection at complex points, of the capital-labour contradiction with contradictions emanating from the pre-capitalist modes. The penetration of capitalism into these modes typically transforms and 'ignites' previously non-antagonistic contradictions within and between these modes, resulting for instance, in the phenomena viewed as 're-tribalisation', 'politicisation of primordial sentiments' etc., which are often nothing but the result of the process of decomposition of these modes and their resistance to this process. With the subordination of these modes to capitalism, their contradictions also lose their autonomy to the main contradiction between labour and capital, a process seen for instance, in how capitalism foments the 'nationalities' question;[13] (2) the non-contiguity between the geographical terrain of the 'national' state and that of the class struggles, which coincide, in extent, with the world market as a whole. The peripheral state thus cannot, by definition, influence the class struggle adequately by acting on all the classes effectively represented in

it. This non-correspondence between the geography of the state and that of the class struggles explains why foreign interventions become such a feature of the politics of these formations. These struggles draw upon and are deeply influenced by the international class struggles also in the ideological sphere; as witnessed by the presence in these struggles of bourgeois republican, welfarist, and socialist ideologies which have no objective correspondence to the level of development of class structure or productive forces within the formation itself, (although these may be, and usualy are, commigled with traditionalist and populist ideologies).

Capitalist Crisis and Reorganisation

The current world capitalist crisis has posed, with particular urgency, the need for the fundamental re-organisation of the social conditions of production in the capitalist countries. It is obvious that this re-organisation is proceeding, and can only proceed, under conditions of anarchy brought about by fundamental developments in world capitalism. These developments have eroded the capacity of the main capitalist states, acting through the traditional instruments of intervention, to manage this crisis and underlined the necessity for re-organisation on a global scale. (Hawley and Noble 1982). The internationalisation of the capitalist productive unit in the form of the Multinational Corporation (MNC) has diminished the ability of the state to intervene by influencing and structuring markets. The internalisation of markets through intrafirm trade renders the multinational company relatively immune to such macro-economic policies. Secondly, the internationalisation of finance, seen in the growth of international commercial banking and the emergence of the Euro-currency system, has weakened the ability of central banks to monitor and supervise the lending activities of national banks and, in particular, the ability of the state to control the expansion and contraction of credit. Thirdly, the collapse of Keynesianism, which had constituted the core of counter-cyclical policies since the end of the Second World War. These policies had assumed that the state could influence the price, employment and production levels in the economy indirectly through the manipulation of fiscal and monetary instruments (interest rates, monetary growth rates, state deficits and surpluses, and tax policy) without the need for more direct intervention into production and distribution. Owing largely to the development in the capitalist economics outlined above, these policies no longer have the intended effect: Fourthly, and simultaneously with the need for a supranational mechanism to deal with the effects of these developments, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system,

based on fixed gold-dollar parity and managed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in conjunction with the financial institutions of the American state. This has intensified anarchic tendencies in the world capitalist economy with the adoption of flexible\floating exchange rates, protectionist policies, mounting US state deficits and runaway interest rates. (ibid: 113-7).

Particular emphasis is being put in this crisis on, re-organisation in the Third World, in part because of the severity of the crisis there, but more because 'slow growth' and the explosion of Third World debt particularly threaten 'recovery' in the metropolitan countries. The origin and form of this crisis, as a product of the current imperialist conjecture and of the 'developmentalist' policies, indicate in themselves, why the re-organisation of the periphery is accorded such emphasis. After 1972[14] , the imperialist economies were characterised by recession and a 'glut' of capital (OPEC surpluses and industrial spare capacity). These surpluses were recycled in loans by multinational banks to underdeveloped countries, and recycled back to the imperialist economies in imports of means of production and current consumption needs, and export of higher rates of profit and interest. Stagnation in the underdeveloped countries (since value generated by massive "investment" tended to be retained within the networks of multinational banks and companies), protectionism, higher interest rates and continued recession in the imperialist countries have given the global crisis its typical form in the periphery of a debt and balance of payments' crisis. This debt crisis threatens the profitability of the large multinational banks and the collapse of dozens of smaller banks. At the same time, the sharp contraction in international trade resulting from the debt squeeze, is deepening the recession in key export industries.

Politically, on the other hand, the same crisis has provided the balance of forces necessary for a rigorous re-organisation of the social conditions of production in the peripheral countries in a manner dominated almost exclusively by the interests of the financial and corporate monopolies. This reorganisation can only proceed in more repressive and anarchic fashion in the peripheral countries, given the greater depth of the crisis and the difference in structural situation. In a sense, however, this process of re-organisation in the periphery is anything but anarchic; in some ways the ideal of a 'supranational state' as an anti-recessionary instrument is closer to realisation in Third World conditions than among the advanced capitalist countries. The function of re-organising the peripheral conditions of production in this crisis has devolved on the Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank (i.e. IBRD). The peculiar mode of organisation of this function, and the particular level of

violence which it is generating, can be understood only through an analysis of these institutions and how they work in relation to the Third World. The Bretton Woods system was essentially a response to the problems posed by the "growing territorial non-coincidence between extending capital and its domestic state" (Murray 1975: 129). It was intended to mediate and reconcile the contending interests of rival national capitals on the world market, consistent with the hegemony of US capital as the most powerful national fraction. The basis of this mediation was that the two institutions embody the purely economic logic of capital, abstracted from its nationality. The IMF embodied a set of compromises whereby, without dissolving the capitalist state as a national unit or establishing in its place a 'world state', capital expansion would be liberated from the constraints imposed on its motion by national particularism; the IMF would guarantee 'free trade' by taking away from individual states the power (through their policies) to arbitrarily reduce the borders of the world market or to impose discriminatory monetary policies in favour of their national capitals. The key to this of course was the system of fixed exchange rates. In the Articles of the IMF, therefore, capital was abstracted from its political determinations and grasped simply as an economic category i.e. in terms of the 'laws' of accumulation and the rationalisation of the conditions of accumulation. The IMF appears, therefore, as a force exclusively for economic rationality, the representative (for this reason) of the universal rather than national interests of capital (although institutionally this takes the form of an American dominated 'hierarchy of capitals'). 'Rationalisation', both of the general conditions of accumulation on th world market and of the form of competition between nationally-based capitals, was a function central to the Bretton Woods institutions. Their appearance occurred when it was already becoming obvious that with the new phase of development of the world market - the phase of international monopolies - the task of re-organising the social conditions of production could not be carried out on a national basis but on the basis of the world market as a whole.

The logic of capital governs in these institutions in another way. A system of quotas directly determines voting shares in decision-making within the institutions; the share of the collective power is determined by the share of the collective capital. The qouta system is thus rule-constituted entirely at the financial level i.e., the 'unalloyed rule' of capital. The weaker nations (weaker both in terms of the share of organisational capital they dispose, as well as absolutely weak) are allowed no role other than that of legitimation, conferred by the appearance of participation and occasionally of a 'moral consensus'.

It is clear, however, that the IMF does not deal with 'economic' or 'financial' questions to the exclusion of the 'political'. What was embodied in

the IMF was not 'financial' functions as such, but specifically those financial functions associated with states, state functions. These include the power to fix the exchange rate of national currencies and to determine (more or less directly) tariff policy and the movement of capital and goods across national borders. Both the IMF and the World Bank have expanded enormously on their original powers. Those of the IMF include the power within the context of its 'adjustment programmes' to fix interest rates, wage and salary policies, price levels, and the level and composition of government expenditure - in effect, to determine the planning process of the (client) state.

Coincident with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in relation to the main capitalist economies, the two institutions have achieved unprecedented influence over the underdeveloped countries as instruments of "financial discipline", exercised on behalf of finance capital. The power of the multilateral institutions is embodied in the practice of "conditionality". "Conditionality", and the "adjustment programme" with which it is associated,[15] have become in the era of multilateral imperialism the main avenue for forcing, through drastic re-organisations of the social conditions of production in the peripheral countries.

Both the monetarist orthodoxy behind the IMF adjustment programme and the usual content and results of the programme are well-known and will not detain us here. The main and immediate objective is the restoration of 'free trade' ('liberalisation') and a free market economy. The path to this, however, requires severe cuts in real wages and consumption by the poorest strata of the population, large retrenchments in the workforce, substantial cuts in such 'unproductive' state expenditures as health, welfare schemes, and food subsidies, privatisation of state sector industries, and the abolition of state protectionism and regulationism. To support these measures, extensive "reforms" in other economic and social sectors are necessary, usually undertaken by the World Bank and a plethora of 'multilateral' and 'bilateral' institutions. These measures may stimulate productivity in key (export-oriented) sectors and slow down temporarily the pace of inflation, but at the same time they raise sharply the level of foreign ownership and the average rate of profit and its export by the dominant foreign interests. All this is at the cost of considerable unemployment, fall in living standards of the poorest strata of the population, and deflation of the local economy.[16]

Reorganisation and Repression

The adoption of 'adjustment' programmes dictated from outside by more and more underdeveloped countries as a condition of their 'recovery' from the present crisis of capitalism has been a crucial factor in the generalisation

of the brutal forms of internal repression as well as popular violence throughout these countries. The usual political pre-condition for 'adjustment' is the reconstitution of the existing regime (in a more repressive direction) or its violent overthrow. The authoritarian military regime has emerged as the typical vehicle of this re-organisation. Associated with this is the abolition or suspension of democratic liberties and civil rights, the suppression of dissent and arrest of labour militants, and the imposition of severe restrictions on trade unions, political parties, and other popular organisations. Forcible foreign intervention is also frequently a feature of this process.

In *Indonesia* the preliminary groundwork for the adoption of the adjustment programme in 1960-67 included the overthrow of President Sukarno, the installation of General Suharto as President, and the slaughter of 500,000 members of the Indonesian Communist Party by the army. The Indonesian adjustment programme was judged particularly successful in that period, although the local economy was to remain under successive stabilisation for at least another decade. The connection between the 'success' of the IMF-led re-organisation and the horrendous events in Indonesia is exposed in this assessment of the Indonesian programme:

> *The political upheaval of 1965-66 created a power structure favourable (my emphasis - E.H.) to full implementation of the stabilisation programme. It brought to office a government which successfully consolidated its power between September 1965 and March 1966. Thereafter, Indonesia had a strong government committed to economic stabilisation and rehabilitation. Economic policies encountered minimum opposition, the groups that might have been in opposition having been silenced. The political parties were in disarray and effective pressure groups either did not exist or were re-grouping and adopting to the greatly altered politico- economic environment. The business community was virtually the only interest groups outside government which succeeded in exerting any influence on the programme. (Sutton 1984: 99-100)*

The connection between repression and re-organisation of the social conditions of production in the periphery was apparent also in Argentina . In March 1976, the *Argentine* military overthrew President Isabel Peron. The economic programme adopted by the Finance Minister in the military regime, Martinez de Hoz, included "making Argentina safe for private enterprise, both national and international, preparing the ground for "productive investments" to be reactivated, and developing appropriate conditions for an increased inflow of foreign capital into the national economy". (Toledo, 1977: 14) This programme, inspired by the IMF, did not differ essentially from the policies pursued during 1975. However, as a contemporary

observer commented: 'what has changed in Argentina since March 1976 is the political and institutional contest, which has probably been the major factor giving Martinez de Hoz's program a much greater "coherence" (ibid). This 'political and institutional context' included the prohibition of all political and trade union activity, the suspension of wage-bargaining between labour and capital, the dismissal (as a 'threat to the security of the state') of numerous technicians, professionals, and scientists, and later the abduction and murder of thousands of left-wing students and political activists. Particularly significant is Toledo's conclusion regarding the Argentine experience: "Overall, what is specially noteworthy is the toughness of the Martinez de Hoz economic program which, due to the nature of the Argentine economy and society, can only be applied in the context of a wholly repressive institutional and political setting" (ibid: 18).

This conclusion is being confirmed by the current events in *Turkey* , where the government of Turgut Ozal (heir to the military regime which came to power in September 1980) is trying to impose its "energetic vision of the unbridled market place: denationalisation, an end to protectionism, export stimulation, wage controls, the abandonment of ailing industries, and tolerance for high unemployment in the effort to quash inflation" (Bordwich 1984: 44) - in other words, a typical monetarist\IMF programme. A necessary preconditon for the Turkish programme was the brutal military takeover of 1980, without which Ozal's plans "couldn't have worked" (ibid: 46). When it came to power the Turkish army:

> *undertook a draconian reformation (sic) of the body politic. All existing political parties were banned: some of their leaders were arrested and others were ordered out of politics for a decade. Labour activities were suppressed, the universities were purged, and alleged terrorists were swept up en masse. In all, some 200,000 arrests were made ... (ibid: 50)*

"Solitary confinement, beatings, and the application of electric shocks" to the genitals - these are the political vehicles of the Turkish programme. Common to all these regimes - apart from "the confidence of the IMF and the (international) banks" (Bordewich) - was their function of disciplining labour. In all three case foreign (American) intervention was also involved, primarily but not exclusively military (e.g. US military transfers to Turkey have increased 300% since Sept. 1980). In the three instances, precisely because the class struggles were so advanced, the process of re-organising the social conditions of production had to take a correspondingly violent and "crisis-ridden" form. But the repressive nature of the process, and the tendency to the intensification of class struggles as a result of this re-organisation, were not exceptional.[17] The intensification of social contradictions has shown itself not only in the growing repressiveness of the state apparatus and

its imperialist supports, but also in spontaneous acts of popular violence and resistance to these developments. In the last few years there have been food riots in Santo Domingo, Sao Paulo, Khartoum, and Peru, and popular demonstrations and labour marches in Argentina, Jamaica, and other cities and coutries of the Third World, all in protest against the increasingly brutal rule of capital.

Why does the re-organisation process in the underdeveloped countries assume this particularly 'crisis-ridden' character? First, although it assumes a more severe form in the peripheral countries, neither the origin of the crisis nor the mechanisms for its mediation exist in these dependent formations. Marx makes this point in relation to the capitalist crises that produced the revolutions of 1848 on the European continent: "While, therefore, the crises first produce revolutions on the Continent, the foundation for these is, nevertheless, always laid in England. Violent outbreaks must naturally occur in the extremities of the bourgeois body than in its heart, since the possibility of adjustment is greater here than there" (Marx 1965: 123). The illusion sustained by the particalur form of the 'adjustment' applied to the peripheral countries is that a purely internal solution can be found to the crisis. To the extent that the real objective in this 'solution' is to mobilize within these formations counterbalancing effects to the falling rate of profit in the advanced capitalist economies - in other words to deepen their exploitation by finance capital - it can only aggravate the crisis.

Secondly, this re-organisation involves measures that directly intensify the class struggle. This is because, on one level, it is based on the ability of capital to extract an increase in absolute rather than relative surplus-value, at least in the short term. Re-organisation cannot proceed, as in the advanced countries, by creating conditions favourable to technological transformations in the labour process, but by lowering the average wage-rate (Hence Toledo (1977: 15) was right in identifying real wages as the 'basic "adjustment" variable' in the Argentine programme). This requires direct suppression of the working class in favour of capital. On a second level, it necessitates the acceleration of the expansion of the capitalist mode into the 'pre-capitalist' economic regions. The typical export-orientation of the adjustment programme entails the annexation of more peasant land for the production of export crops, a process accompanied by an increase in the organic composition of capital in agriculture and in the domination of 'Kulak' elements. On yet another level, reorganisation occurs at the expense of a deterioration in the position of the "marginalised" masses and of petty producers and traders. A typical aspect of the "rationalisation" of the domestic economy is the forcible relocation or shut-down of 'illegal' or 'blackmarket' businesses and the throwing of their proprietors onto the labour market,[18] eliminating these intermediary strata and reducing the conflict more and more to one

between capital and wage-labour. As a rule, of course, adjustment programmes focus heavily on the so-called 'formal sector' firms which are preponderantly foreign or multinational and either ignore the purely local 'informal sector' activities (which are, by their very nature, outside the direct influence of monetary or fiscal measures) or attempt to transfer these activities to 'formal sector' firms where direct competition is involved.

Finally the political context within which this re-organisation is carried out makes impossible peaceful mediation of the class struggle. In the peripheral situation, the functions of re-organisation are actually taken over by external agencies, although the local state apparatus retains the formal political 'authority', as well as responsibility for the management of social conflicts (although these too may be partly taken over at a certain stage by the metropolitan state). Although these agencies claim to represent an exclusively economic rationality, we have seen that their so-called 'economic' functions, in reality political functions, to the extent that their functions are exercised by the capitalist state. However these (political) functions are exercised, in their guise as economic objectivity, in abstraction from the conditions of class struggle which would normally condition the exercise of such power. Hence the reputation of the 'multilateral' institutions for forcing on client governments 'suicidal' measures. At the same time, finance capital, hiding behind these institutions, deprives the peripheral state of any possibility of mediation of the class struggle by reduction or abolition of precisely those categories of state expenditure which benefited the poor (food subsidies, educational, health and social welfare spending) and reversal of the historical gains of the working classes in the areas of wage-negotiations and social security. This assumes the existence of a state structure with an entirely repressive approach to the class struggle.[19]

Although the monetarist objective of adjustment is the removal of 'political interference' from the process of valorisation of capital - precisely because the political constitutes the pre-condition for any restructuring of the economy in these formations - this objective can be achieved only in a contradictory fashion, by 'elevating' the peripheral state to a position of superintendence over the formation as a whole. In this crisis the state apparatus acts as the authoritative representative of peripheral society vis-a-vis finance capital. This is not a diplomatic fiction: the state negotiates the peonage status of peripheral society as a whole and superintends the execution of commitments, a process which presumes the ability of the state apparatus to coerce all of society. The preponderant role of the peripheral state in the present phase is due precisely to its role in the 'global crisis management'. The authoritarian military regime, which focuses the executive power to the highest degree, and which claims to be above classes, constitutes the logical political form of this situation.[20]

Conclusion

It is in the reorganisation of the general social conditions of production to remove the barriers to accumulation - seen most immediately in the mobilisation of counterbalancing factors to the falling rate of profit in the centre - that defines the states of the world market as capitalist states and, as states of the bourgeoisie, their external form notwithstanding. It is through this function that the world market imposes its unity on the plurality of states embedded in it. The fundamental historical function of the state in the peripheral formations (colonial as well as post-colonial) may be seen in precisely this light. However there are necessary differences in the forms of and .pproaches to this function. In the advanced capitalist countries where the capital relation is fully established, it was (and still is, to an extent) historically possible for capitalist relations of production to reproduce themselves in a structured and coherent way, in and through the workings of the law of value itself. Here too the capitalist state is enabled to assume its logical form as the bourgeois-democratic republic. The form of the state, increasingly necessary and extensive under monopoly capitalism, takes the form of indirect measures to influence and structure the market, rather than direct intervention in production as such. Nevertheless the task of re-organising the complex of social conditions of production in the advanced capitalist formations takes place in increasingly anarchic and 'crisis-ridden' forms, with the worst recession in fifty years, the emergence of monetarist governments in the key capitalist states, and decisive challenge to 'traditional' interventionist policies. This anarchy and crisis are necessarily in semi- capitalist countries. Here the partial establishment of the capital relation (which materialises itself in the fragmented and multiform nature of the social formation), the weak basis of class rule, - and - above all - the 'double reproduction' hidden in the peripheral production process, lend particular violence to the process of re-organisation, expressed in the generalisation within the contemporary Third World of repressive, militarist regimes.

This is so because capital cannot deepen or rationalise its exploitation without advancing the national democratic revolution in these countries. It is this struggle that, within these neo-colonies, arouses the "mass of the nation, peasants and petty - bourgeois, standing between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie ... against the rule of capital" and forces it increasingly to "attach itself to the proletariat as their protagonists" (Marx, 1965: 37-38); that converts even elements of the repressive forces (armies, police etc.) to revolutionary democracy. The complex correlation of class forces that focus on the state in this struggle is what gives the state in the periphery its unsteady and repressive character. But history is showing as certainly that this struggle for national democracy cannot be conducted or won on the basis of the old state

structures.

It is from this standpoint that one may also view the vexed question of the class character of the peripheral state. It is not enough to declare the international bourgeoisie as the 'ruling class' in the neo-colony or the peripheral state as simply another case of 'separation'[21] positions which either imply that 'independence' is a sham or leave unclear in what sense, if any, this 'rule' differs from bourgeois rule at the centre. If both the international and neo-colonial bourgeoisies have a joint, objective interest in the extension of the institution of private property and of the sphere of expanded reproduction, an interest conceptualised in terms of the ideology of 'development', there is also an objective, though not necessarily a fundamental limit to this joint interest, situated in the contradiciton between the bases of reproduction of the two classes. In general the international bourgeoisie reproduced and must reproduce itself on the basis of the continuous extension of the world market and the destruction of national particularisms. For this purpose it is irrelevent whether the 'local discourse' is based on 'socialism' or some form of 'national' capitalism. The neo-colonial bourgeoisie on the other hand seeks to barricade itself behind the walls of the home market. It cannot do otherwise.

It is this difference which is posed in the struggles over terms of re-organisation of the peripheral economies (the bitter battles presently being waged over "conditionality"). In their present form these terms seek to 'free' the market and the economy from state controls, and simultaneously to dissolve the 'national' market and absorb it into the world market. These measures threaten to destroy the material basis of the most powerful fractions of the neo-colonial bourgeoisie and produce revolutionary conditions in its backyard. The fitful interventions of the international bourgeoisie and the successive reconstitution of the governing coalitions in the peripheral state - which devolve power on a narrower and more repressive basis - are precisely to discover an appropriate agent for this task of re-organisation.

Footnotes:

1. F. Engels, Preface to the third German edition of Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works (MESW), Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1962, Vol.1 p.246.
2. "It is a peculiarity of the bourgeoisie, in contrast to all former ruling classes, that there is a turning point in its development after which every further expansion of its agencies ... only tends to make it more and more unfit for political rule ... From that moment on, it loses the strength required for exclusive political rule ... it looks around for allies with whom to share its rule, or to whom it can cede the whole of its rule, as circumstances may require". Engels, Preface to Peasant Wars in Germany .
3. Weber was probably the first to theorise systematically on discipline as a fun-

damental and pervasive characteristic of capitalism, embodied in the bureaucratic forms of organisation of the capitalist enterprise as well as the state, church etc., and furthest developed in the military.

4. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York 1958, p.234.
5. Gramsci indentifies this willing consent as "caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production". Gramsci 1973: 12.
6. It is clear that to Gramsci the efficacy of civil society and its organisations is derived at least partly from the fact that they do not directly express the relations of power. Thus, in contrast to those who (like Althusser) summarily collapse civil society and state in the form of "ideological state apparatuses", the 'autonomy' of civil society from both state and production is crucial to its 'ideological' effectiveness.
7. E.g. Perry Anderson and Nicos Poulantzas, both of whom, are influenced critically by Gramsci. Anderson quibbles as to whether 'hegemony' is located in civil society as suggested by Gramsci or in the institutions of the parliamentary state itself, but accepts hegemony as the peculiar basis of bourgeois rule and "the most salient immediate difference between Western parliamentarism and Russian absolutism". "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci", *New Left Review*, 100, Nov. 1976–Jan. 1979. Poulantzas follows Gramsci in confining the use of the concept of 'hegemony' to the practices of the capitalist ruling class but then endows the hegemonic class with a 'double function', that, on the one hand, of 'representing the general interest of the people\nation', and on the other, of "maintaining a specific dominance among the dominating classes and fractions". *Political Power and Social Classes* : London: Verso 1978.
8. Thus Wood (1981: 67) sees this 'separation as "the most effective defense mechanism available to capital". According to her, "the paradoxical effect of capitalism's differentiation of the economic and the political is that militancy and political consciousness have become separate issues" (p.94).
9. Thus the chapter on "The Capitalist State and Force" is the briefest (4 pages) in Poulantzas' entire work on the capitalist state although this deficiency is made up in his other works (*The Crisis of the Dictatorships, Fascism and Dictatorship*). For a critique of Poulantzas' use of the concept of "structure" which lies at the basis of his theoretical difficulties, see Simon Clarke, 'Marxism, Sociology and Poulantzas' Theory of the State. *Capital and Class* 2, Summer 1977.
10. The development of overwhelming repressive capacity by the bourgeois state and the introduction of democratic liberties have historically been *conjoint* developments. Engels noted this – and the transformation of the conditions of class struggle as a result of it – as far back as 1895. Introduction to *The Class Struggles in France MESW*. pp. 130–138.
11. These criticisms were advanced in the context of the so-called "state derivation" debate, Cf. John Holloway and Sol Picciotto 'eds). *State and Capital: A Marxist Debate*. London: Edward Arnold 1978. This thesis arose in West Germany as a critique of the descriptive bias of the 'separation' argument. The 'State derivation' analysis was essentially concerned with the bourgeois state in the Federal Republic under the conditions of German Social Democracy. Although it seeks to return with Marx to the capital relation as the determinant of the phenomenal form of the bourgeois state, in some of its forms, derivation amounts to little more than a more sophisticated restatement and naive acceptance of bourgeois theories of the state. In particular the state is hardly ever seen as an instrument of class repression.
12. As among the highland clans (see Marx 1977: 681) this was the source of the considerable struggles against the chief by his subjects. The ready alliance of many chiefs with colonialism was evidence of the increasing dissolution of clan organisation and its internal class-like struggles.
13. Cf. O.Nnoli, *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria*, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Press 1980.
14. For much of the Third World the basic outline of the crisis of course appeared much earlier, for instance in the commodities slump of the 1960s.
15. "Conditionality" is becoming more and more a standard feature in the dealings of

Western governments and aid agencies with Third World governments, particularly the poorest. Although the IMF is concerned with emergency, short-term restructuring, it is really the World Bank and allied agencies which are responsible for the more comprehensive programmes of 'adjustment' and change.

16. There are many critical assessments of IMF adjustment policies. One of the most authoritative (if not critical) is Tony Killick (ed). *The IMF Stabilisation; Developing Country Experiences*, London: ODI and Heinemann, 1984.
17. For instance in Ghana, where the introduction of a 'stabilisation' programme in 1966 was preceded by the military overthrow of President Nkrumah. In 1972 the introduction of a similar programme *led* to the immediate overthrow of the government of Prime Minister Busia. See also the recent coup in the Sudan.
18. Cf. the recent campaign by the "corrective" military government in Nigeria against 'illegal structures' involving the destruction nationwide of thousands of small business premises.
19. Hence it is not surprising that what the state saves on social welfare expenditures it usually spends on military weapons. This 'investment' may not appear on the books because it is derived from (U.S.) military aid (cf. Turkey since Sept., 1980).
20. For this reason, Marx's analysis of Bonapartism appears particularly appropriate here. Bonapartism is characterised by the autonomy of the state from the contending classes, by its 'enormous bureaucracy' and extensive controls, and by the 'preponderance of the army'. Bonapartism may be seen in a certain light as the political form of under-developed capitalism. Significantly, bourgeois industry and commerce flowered under the repressive rule of Louis Bonaparte. Nevertheless, the different social and historical conditions in France limit the application of this model.
21. There are several versions of the first argument, including Michael von Freyhold, "The Post-Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version". *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 8: and Yash Tandon, "Whose Capital and Whose State?". University of Dar-es-Salaam, *Debate on Imperialism, State and Class*, Tanzanian Publishing House 1982. On 'Separation' see Peter Anyang Nyongo. "Soldiers and Counter-Revolution in Liberia", *Journal of African Marxists*, 3, 1983. For a critical view, Issa. Shivji, "The State in the Dominated Social Formations of Africa: Some Theoretical Issues", in University of Dar-es-Salaam, *Debate on Imperialism, State and Class*.

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