Conflicting Paradigms in the Development Process: An Assessment and an Alternative Berhanu Mengistu Introduction There is a widespread belief now that the Western development model for the industrialisation of Third World countries not only failed to advance development, but has reinforced the "development of underdevelopment". Powerful critiques of this model have been written. While there are differences among them, the logic and evidence of the structuralists, the dependency school and the Marxists' critiques in the aggregate, are devastating to the validity of the Western model. Yet, it is not quite clear as to where these critiques will take us. Therefore, what is most urgently needed at this point in time is a means of translating the insights of the critiques of the Western economic development models into concrete development policy guides. If this is to be achieved, two basic concepts of development policy must be reconceived. One is the meaning of development itself. By redefining the concept of development, new criteria are necessarily established against which the conditions within Third World countries can be judged in terms of their state of development. The second element concerns the role of urbanisation in national development. If it is to occur, development must be reconcieved within a spatial framework which integrates and balances the urban and rural sectors rather than the parallel thinking of urban and rural problems that were common in the last development decades. This paper argues for the redefinition of development so that it means a process of structural transformation that moves a society closer to conditions in which the basic needs of people are met. Hence, the concept of development must be expanded beyond simply considering growth in gross national product which fails to include such things as how the benefits are redistributed and social conditions are improved. Such development policy, however, will require that the concept of economic productivity be replaced by social productivity. Furthermore, any theoretical construct of development theory must have the specific objective conditions of underdeveloped countries as its parameter. Therefore, a theory of development ought to be a guide in the process of formulating a development strategy rather than a simple "philosophical" discourse that attempts to explain the historical development CONFLICTING PARADIGMS IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 51 of hitherto existing societies, particularly Western society whose historical experiences are radically different from most Third World countries. This must be also true with urbanisation and national development. Historically the Western development model has assumed a causal relationship between industrialisation and urbanisation. They are to move together, each supporting and facilitating the other in the development of underdeveloped countries. The way in which cities organise space in the Third World, however, supports and maintains their further underdevelopment. In fact, the very assumption that urbanisation and industrialisation are in a causal relationship cannot be sustained even in the Western context. First, cities have existed hi history, though smaller by today's standards, prior to the industrial revolution and the application of power-technology thereafter. Second, what is apparent, when one studies the historical development of cities, is that the precondition for the rise and growth of a city is not industrialisation perse, rather it is social surplus accumulation under varied and combined modes of production. Given this, it is plausible to state that there is a fundamental relationship between the development of the productive forces and the rate of increase in social surplus accumulation. In turn, there is a direct link between the geographic concentration of such accumulated social surplus and the formation and expansion of cities. In other words, if surplus derived from earlier accumulation is invested in the existing structures, it would be logical to expect growth both in terms of urbanisation and other economic indicators. Therefore, the analysis in spatial formation and its implication for national development must necessarily focus on social surplus appropriation. If these redefinitions of development and spatial orientation are used as starting points, it is possible to review what the Western model has contributed toward their achievement, consider alternative formulations for development policy and draw upon the experience of non-Western countries to consider issues in applying a non-Western development framework. The Western Development Model In examining the problematics in the development of UDCs, it is necessary to briefly analyse the major Western economic growth theories. We find that their approach is positivist and attempts to discover universal "laws" of development. Unsurprisingly, the models advanced for the development of UDCs look very much like the history of Western industrialisation. The "growth stage theories", the diffusionist, modernization approaches and the "big-push" industrialisation theses are all premised on a similar set of assumptions. The underlying assumption in all of them is that the process of development, which meant increases in gross national product, is to follow a series of successive stages through which all countries must pass. The development of underdeveloped countries, however, is assumed to have been impeded by such things as indigenous values such as traditionalism, a low level of technology, 52 BERHANU MENGISTU rapid population growth, lack of capital and political instability. According to this view, development could occur with industrialisation. However, these "barriers" would have to be overcome to achieve it. This would require a number of transformations: industrialisation requires high capital investment, capital formation through savings (deferred consumption) and foreign assistance. It also requires the development of a labour force with higher skills. Creating such a work force means a massive transfer of workers from rural farming and primary industries into processing and manufacturing industries. Some industries are associated with urban centres, this process will lead to social and physical concentrations and allow major economies of scale to be achieved. The role of the industrialised countries in this process, for altruistic purposes or for "enlightened self-interest" is to extend assistance in the form of technical expertise, training of local entrepreneurs, technicians, industrial workers, and to provide capital for investment. Three decades later, however, we find that the flow of capital is in the reverse direction. As Lever and Huhne observed: Until 1982 it was understood that there had to be, for a prolonged period, a one-way flow of resources from the advanced countries to the Third World to promote its development. The view went unchallenged in either official or private-sector circles and was supported by every school of economic thought, albeit for differing reasons. Since the debt crisis which broke in 1982, those flows have been reversed for each important group of countries in the Third World. International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates imply thatin 1985 there is to be a resource flow from the seven largest Third World borrowers to their more prosperous creditors worth $32 billion, or nearly one-fifth of their entire earnings from the sales of their exports of goods and services (Lever and Huhne, 1985:3). The theoretical underpinning of the model nonetheless is that social and. economic change takes place by a process of diffusion of innovation and technology transfer from the centre (industrialised countries) to the periphery (the Third World). Cultural (both material and social) artifacts are to be introduced into the cities of the Third World nations and from there diffused to the countryside. Therefore, according to the model, as Abu-Lughod and Hay observed:"... the cities of the less developed countries were to play an important creative role in integrating the country and in stimulating its parallel transformation." (Abu-Lughod and Hay, 1977:105). The Record of Development Under Western-dominated Policies Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, (excluding the State of South Africa) the specific focus of this paper, and in the Third World generally, has not occurred after decades of guidance from theories generated by the industrialised West. Even if the conditions of the Third World are judged against the Western model's own definition of development, rather than the one argued for here, development has not occurred. The gross national product (GNP), gross CONFLICTING PARADIGMS IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 53 domestic product (GDP), or other economic development indicators, show no substantial growth for Third World nations. For instance, growth of GNP per capita for low income African countries between 1965-1985 was 1,8% per year, which is lower than the population growth rate for the region. The growth rate for all low income countries, (excluding China and India), between 1965-1985 was 0,4% per capita (WorldDevelopment Report, 1987). For the low income countries of Africa, agricultural growth rate decreased on the average from 2,9% between 1965-1973 to 0,7% between 1973-1983 (Financing Adjustment With Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1986). It must be re-emphasised, however, that even if there were recorded growth in these economic indicators, the development of underdeveloped countries would not have been assured. Because, as Samir Amin precisely put it: As economic growth progresses, each of the characteristics by which the structure of the periphery is defined is not attenuated, but on the contrary, is accentuated. So at the centre, growth is development - that is, it integrates; at the periphery, growth based on integration in the world market is the development ofunderdevelopment (Amin, 1976:28-29). In effect, a simple look at what the main commodities of UDCs could buy in the 1980s as opposed to 1970s, (the decline is between 31-49%), substantiates dive Thomas' observation about Tanzania, . .. whatever may be the need for foreign exchange, and whatever are the short-run pressures on employment and income, primary export production in this historical era does not contain enough dynamic demand potential to transform agriculture ...In addition, substitutes always exist to stifle any threat of significantly upward rising prices. Moreover, insofar as primary export production is uncoordinated among the Third World countries, their individual pursuit of national advantages will always lead to frustrating price movement in the world commodity markets (Thomas, 1974:167). It is interesting to note, however, that in the face of this reality, export production is the main incentive for the "overspecialised" sector of agricultural production in Sub-Saharan Africa. The same predicament goes for other commodity production, such as base metals. It is true that Africa in general possesses significant proportions of the world's minerals, including 97% of chrome, 85% of platinum, 64% of manganese, 13% of copper, 75% of cobalt, 20% of the world's hydroelectric capacity as well as 20% of traded oil. These combined with 70% of cocoa, 50% of palm oil and 33% of coffee would suggest an excellent bargaining position for Africa. Reality, however, has dictated otherwise. For example, much of Africa's developed mineral and industrial production is controlled by non-Africans. It is estimated that at independence, 83% of Zimbabwe's mining and other industries were controlled and owned by transnational from outside the country (Arnold, 1981). How much room for national development planning, such conditions allow is anyone's guess. Even as national governments initiate plans for the exploitation of some of the known (but not foreign owned) minerals, there is serious doubt as to what 54 BERHANU MENGISTU benefits these governments derive from such an enterprise. Perhaps nothing illustrates this dilemma better than the Mauritanian experience. In order to open up new iron ore deposits at Guelb during the mid-1970s, Mauritania had to seek $500 million in capital. It obtained the money from Arab sources ($290 million), the World Bank, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the African Development Bank (ADB), France and Japan, but the price it had to pay was very high. Thus, in 1974, debt servicing cost Mauritania 3,8% of foreign earnings; four years later, when the finances for the new ore developments had been arranged, the debt servicing was taking20% of foreign earnings; the national debt had risen to $805 million, equivalent to one and a half times the GNP; 49% of the state mineral prospecting enterprises (SNIM) was theh't>wrte4by Arab financial interests; and effective control of the mining was no longer in Mauritanian hands. It is legitimate to ask how much real benefit yviH have occurred to Mauritania in 10 years time when the ore has been extracted (Arnold, 1981:58-9). Afriea's^harfc- of world output, in terms of industrial production, still remainsijjiiicuie and is dropping. For the low-income economies industrial producti^.growth rate, between 1965-1973 was 5,7%. Between 1973-1983, however, mb akriual growth rate for these economies was 1,6%, a decline of 4,1%. Tha. annftal. growth rate for all Sub-Saharan Africa is 14,6 between 1965-1973 "an4*i$4% between 1973-1983. Furthermore, such industrial produetfott.lb •QMJ an aspect of enclave "development" which spatially manifdstt.^sfetf-m what the dependency and the Marxist theorists call a dependent