Afr. j . polit. set (20023, Vol 7 No. 1 
Corruption in sub-Saharan Africa: 
Towards a More Holistic Approach 
Munyae M. Mulinge and Gwen N. Lesetedi* 
Abstract 
The essay attempts to discuss the genesis and entrenchment of corruption in 
sub-Saharan Africa taking a holistic approach. By integrating the historical and 
international contexts of the problem, it links the origins and spread of corruption 
to the colonization of Africa, the lasting legacy of that colonization, and the 
actions and practices of international actors. A holistic approach, it is argued, is 
necessary if the vice is to be understood in its historical totality. This will not 
only offer a more encompassing explanation of corruption but also allow for the 
development of well rounded strategies for the alleviation of the problem. 
The paper concludes that corruption is a multifaceted, complex problem that 
requires a comprehensive approach that cuts across disciplines. Through such 
an approach the economic, social, legal, administrative and moral aspects of the 
problem can be targeted. The approach should also recognize the close linkages 
among these aspects of the problem and draw in the international dimension of 
the causes of the problem. While acknowledging that efforts have been 
expended at the national and international levels to combat corruption, the 
paper argues that there is still a lot of room for improvement. Much more can 
be, and needs to be, done. Of particular importance is the need for political 
goodwill and commitment from governments, bureaucracies and international 
agencies. This is a necessary condition if the fight against corruption is to be 
both effective and sustainable. 
Introduction 
The problem of corruption is both an endemic and a universal one which affects 
all world nations but in varying degrees and forms. To quote Alatas (1990: 11), 
the problem is "trans-systematic; that is, it inheres in all social systems - feudalism, 
capitalism, communism and socialism". In sub-Saharan Africa, the pandemic 
has reached cancerous proportions and become a matter of global con- 
* Department of Sociology, University of Botswana, Botswana. 
1027-0353 °2002 African Association of Political Science
52 Munyae M. Mulinge and Gwen N. Lesetedi 
cern (Hope, 2000). It has permeated virtually all institutions, both public and 
private, and governmental and non governmental, and become a way of life and 
a principal method for the accumulation of private property. The practice is not 
restricted to one particular group. It involves people from all levels of life including 
professionals for whom the vice has made it impossible for them to regulate 
themselves through their professional bodies. Despite the endemic and universal 
nature of corruption, there exists no single commonly accepted definition of 
the vice. Societies differ in their views as to what constitutes corruption and 
experts too differ on its meaning, causes and effects. However, defined normatively, 
corruption refers to the abuse or misuse of public power/position/ 
office/role of trust or resources for private benefit (Girling, 1997; Alatas, 1990; 
Thompson 1993, 1995; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 
For the purpose of this essay, corruption will be defined after Osoba (1996: 
372) as: 
... a form of antisocial behaviour by an individual or social group which confers unjust 
or fraudulent benefits on its perpetrators, is inconsistent with the established 
legal norms and prevailing moral ethos of the land and is likely to subvert or diminish 
the capacity of the legitimate authorities to provide fully for the material and spiritual 
well-being of all members of society in a just and equitable manner. 
The behaviour transcends acts such as the use of public authority, office, or official 
position with the deliberate intent of extracting personal/private monetary 
rewards or other privileges at the expense of public good and in violation of 
established rules and ethical considerations (United Nations, 1990). It also 
includes theft, embezzlement of public funds or other appropriation of state 
property and nepotism and/or granting of favours to personal acquaintances. 
The corrupt comprise both petty and major offenders. Petty offenders include 
individuals who demand bribes before they render services to clients (such as 
government file or record clerks and police officers) and account clerks who 
embezzle funds from accounts they are entrusted with by their employers, 
Major offenders incorporate individuals, such as senior corporate officials and 
government officers who cut secret deals involving huge sums of money witl 
local and international organisations, companies and individual businesses or 
who practice massive embezzlement of public or corporate funds. 
Corruption is one of the most written about topics (Hope, 1997). Academics 
have documented different aspects of this social ill, including its nature, extent 
causes and consequences. However, most previous efforts to diagnose the factors 
accounting for its genesis and persistence, and to prescribe solutions to it 
have failed to present a holistic approach that integrates its internal and external 
contexts and focuses on the totality of participants, that is, givers as well as 
takers. These have tended to emphasize the internal causes of corruption and to 
treat the receiver as the one who is corrupt. They have detailed the role played 
by African bureaucracies, private businesses and individuals at the expense of
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa 53 
causes rooted in Africa's colonial past and in external actors, such as international 
governments, donor and aid organizations and agencies, multinational 
corporations and private businesses and companies. This paper examines the 
origins and entrenchment of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa from both the 
internal and external dimensions. The internal context is rooted in Africa's colonial 
past and its associated legacy while the external context focuses on international 
actors. Guided by the factors identified and discussed in the essay, we 
propose ways for strengthening the war against corruption. 
There are four justifications for the adoption of a holistic approach to the origins 
and subsequent mushrooming of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. First, it 
enables us to understand the vice in its historical totality by tracing it from the 
colonial colouring of the pre-colonial sociocultural practices of gift giving, 
through the practices of colonial administrators, to the post colonial practices 
by African political and administrative bureaucrats. With regard to the post 
colonial period, we will emphasize the legacy of colonialism as having played 
a major role in aiding the perpetration of corrupt practices. Second, a holistic 
approach affords a more encompassing explanation of the vice by integrating 
both its internal and external causes. The third significance of a more holistic 
approach to the corruption pandemic is that it treats the practice as an exchange 
relationship characterized by two equally guilty parties, a giver and a taker. 
Previous discussions about the subject appear to overly treat the receivers of 
kickbacks as the ones who are corrupt. We consider both the giver and the 
receiver in a corrupt exchange to be equally corrupt. The taker may be blamed 
more for initiating the process that leads to the act itself but both the giver and 
the taker are equally responsible for the completion of the exchange. The final 
significance of a holistic approach is the implications it has for the alleviation 
of the problem itself. To be effective, efforts geared toward combating corruption 
must depart from the previous emphasis on internal causes of the problem 
io distinguish between, and focus on, the internal and external drivers of the 
svil. This is particularly so given the growing urgency to stamp out corruption 
;n sub-Saharan Africa. 
rhe Internal Bases of Corruption 
\n internal approach to the origins and subsequent entrenchment of corruption 
n sub-Saharan Africa must not only zero in on the historical event of colonialsm 
but also interrogate the legacy of colonialism as experienced during the post 
:olonial period. 
olonialism and the Origins of Corruption 
rhe industrial revolution of the nineteenth century appears to have been the 
rery initial historical basis for emergence of corruption (Robb, 1992). The finanial 
growth which accompanied this historical event is said to have been directly
54 Munyae M. Mulinge and Given N. Lesetedi 
responsible for the birth of white collar crime of which corruption is a part. 
According to Robb (1992), the industrial revolution gave birth to a complex 
economy characterized by an increasing dependence on finance and investment 
and, consequently, enormous banking networks, stocks and credit and a complicated 
legal system. These factors, coupled with the increase in lawyers, financiers 
and other professionals, greatly aided the expansion and the potential 
for white collar crime. For sub-Saharan Africa in particular, corruption appears 
to be a social phenomenon deeply rooted in the historical process of colonialism. 
Here the practice is viewed as a by product of traits of fraudulent antisocial 
behaviour derived from British, French and other colonial rulers (Osoba, 1996: 
372). Such behaviour infiltrated indigenous African peoples during the colonial 
period and was nurtured into the post colonial era. The credibility of this position 
is elevated further by the fact that the colonization of Africa was an extension 
of the new economic order resulting from the industrial revolution and its 
concomitant problems. The quest for economic gain, or "free trade imperialism" 
(Nabudere, 1981: 7), that accompanied the industrial revolution fuelled the 
scramble for Africa. This culminated in the partitioning of the continent into 
European spheres of influence and to its eventual colonization. 
There are three ways through which colonialism can be linked to the emergence 
of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. First, as implicit in Robb's (1992) 
jrgument that the new economic order resulting from the industrial revolution 
was responsible for the initial emergence of white collar crime in general, corruption 
requires a well developed monetary economy characterized by a clear 
lifferentiation of interests to thrive. A closer look at pre-colonial African 
economies reveals that emerging colonial powers did not find sizeable mone- 
:ary economies in their newly acquired territories (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1998, 
1999). The existent economies, therefore, lacked the potential necessary for the 
sustenance of corrupt practices. Thus, the new economies, fronted by the colonial 
governments, must have laid down the structural groundwork for the origins 
and sustenance of corrupt practices. 
Colonialism can also be linked to the origins of corrupt practices through the 
introduction of compulsory cash taxation in the forms of hut tax and, later, poll 
:ax. The arriving colonialists found no meaningful monetary economies in the 
newly acquired territories. Therefore, most colonial governments, and particularly 
those of British origin, introduced compulsory taxation payable in cash 
jnly with the objectives of meeting the cost of administration or acquiring 
:heap African labour necessary for the establishment of productive economic 
activities (Collier and Lai, 1986; Tlou and Campbell, 1984; Stichter,. 1982). It 
was the manner in which the tax itself was collected, rather than its introducion 
per se, that constituted the genesis of corrupt practices. The colonial governments 
mostly relied on local African leaders, and especially chiefs, to collect 
lie taxes. But these had to be motivated by being allowed to pocket a part of the
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa 55 
money collected as inducement. In Bechuanaland (now Botswana), for example, 
the dikgosi (chiefs or kings) were mandated to collect the taxation and 
retain 10 percent of the total tax collected in their area (Tlou and Campbell, 
1984). This practice amounted to the taking of kickbacks by African chiefs. It 
gave a new meaning to the practices of gift giving which had existed in different 
parts of Africa long before the coming of colonialism. Pre-colonial gift givjng 
did not constitute corrupt practice, as defined in this paper, because it was 
not carried out at the expense of public good and it did not constitute a violation 
of any established rules and ethical considerations (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 
1998, 1999). Unlike pre-colonial gift giving, the practice of rewarding tax collectors 
under colonial rule became a principal method for the accumulation of 
private property (Leonard, 1991), a way of life that was hard to give up and precipitated 
the abuse of office just as corruption today appears to have become. 
And, as Tlou and Campbell (1984) concluded, the financial gains accruing from 
the amount pocketed from taxes blinded the chiefs to the plight suffered by their 
people as a consequence of taxation. 
The methods employed by the colonial authorities to subdue and control native 
peoples in sub-Saharan Africa provide the third link between the birth of corrupt 
practices and colonialism. In particular, it is the technique of divide and rule 
adopted especially by colonies of British descent that can be associated with corrupt 
practices. The techniques involved the practice of favouring one tribe over 
jthers with the dual objective of securing loyalty of that group to the administraion 
and encouraging rivalry between different tribes to prevent a sense of unity 
:rom evolving and threatening colonial rule. It resulted in the creation of paranount 
(super-ordinate) and subordinate groups. While the former enjoyed considerable 
privileges from the colonial rulers, the latter did not. In British Uganda 
md Nigeria, for example, the Baganda and Ibo, respectively, enjoyed supremacy 
)ver other tribes (Roberts, 1962; Hunt and Walker, 1974). Elsewhere supremacy 
ivas also enjoyed by the Ngonde in North Nyasa District of British Nyasaland or 
oday's Malawi (Kalinga, 1985), the Tutsi in Belgian Rwanda and Burundi 
jMazrui and Tidy, 1984), and the Shona ki present day Zimbabwe (Day, 1980). 
The groups that enjoyed a favourable status from the colonial administration 
ivere rewarded through access to western (missionary) education (Kalinga, 
985) and government sponsored economic opportunities. As such, the policy 
if divide and rule created immense regional variations in the levels of educaional 
attainment and economic opportunities. At independence, those groups 
avoured by the colonial administration had an edge over those not favoured 
Xeonard, 1991). They would constitute the beginnings of an African elite class, 
rhis so called 'petty bourgeoisie' (Rodney, 1972) was to dominate the political 
ind economic life of most countries. Independence for this group solely meant 
he breaking of the monopoly of the colonial administrator's political power so 
hat they could further their own advancement and posterity (Leonard, 1991).
56 Munyae M. Mulinge and Given N. Lesetedi 
Unfortunately for Africa, most of these had been socialized into a corrupt culture 
that excluded the majority and favoured only a select few. These offered the 
•rtile grounds for the germination of corrupt practices such as tribalism and 
epotism which have become deeply entrenched in most African countries. 
Africa's Colonial Legacy and Corrupt Practices 
To provide a comprehensive explanation of the rampant corruption found in 
ndependent African nations requires a grasp of the integrative socioeconomic 
md political institutions that the colonisers established just before the granting 
>f self rule to facilitate the tightening of their grip on their former colonies. More 
specifically, three legacies of colonialism - the administrative technique of 
divide and rule, the administrative culture inherited from colonialism and the 
constitutional structures inherited at independence - are considered to have 
ided the entrenchment of corruption in post colonial Africa. 
'he Administrative Practice of Divide and Rule 
\s outlined earlier, the administrative technique of divide and rule was utilized 
jy some colonial governments as a tool for subduing and controlling indigenous 
populations. However, the practice outlasted active colonial rule to permeate the 
leocolonial state in the form of ethnicity (tribalism) and/or nepotism. like their 
:olonial counterparts, post colonial African political leaders, upon realizing the 
jolitical and economic utility inherent in the practice of divide and rule, have 
icted to create superior and inferior tribes (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1998,1999). 
["hey have tended to elevate their tribal group of origin to a 'superior' status by 
rearing them as the favourite tribe(s). Such ethnicity or tribalism has brought 
mtold economic decay in some countries due to nepotism and other corrupt 
iractices, such as embezzlement and economic mismanagement. 
In Kenya, for example, the effect of tribalism rooted in divide and rule pracices 
is evident through the adoption of what Mulinge and Lesetedi (1998,1999) 
efer to as a "pastoral model" of economic management. The Kenya African 
National Union (KANU) government, under arap Moi, has systematically 
mrged other groups from the most strategic economic positions in Kenya by 
eplacing them with unqualified but politically well connected individuals from 
Aoi's own, predominantly pastoral, Kalenjin tribe. The most common practice 
las been one in which an individual mismanages a particular organization to 
ts bankruptcy before being transferred to mismanage another one. This is conistent 
with pastoral practices in which an area is grazed to the bare soil before 
aoving to another area in the hope that the grass in the overgrazed area will 
egenerate naturally. The pastoral model of economic management in Kenya has 
atapulted the country into acute poverty, characterized by rampant unempw 
lent, declining education and health care services, and recurring food shortges, 
among others.
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa 57 
The Administrative Culture Inherited from Colonialism 
Another avenue through which the legacy of colonialism has been responsible 
for the perpetuation of corrupt practices, particularly among the higher echelons 
of political and administrative bureaucracies in sub-Saharan Africa, is the 
administrative culture inherited from colonialism (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1998, 
1999). The continuation of the 'African chief model' of administration, whose 
origin dates to the colonial period, is of particular significance in this regard. 
Colonialism, and especially British colonial rule, not only took advantage of the 
institution of chiefs but also created a particular legacy that was to accompany 
this institution. Colonial chiefs were expected to be authoritarian figures who 
could make quick, final decisions and keep order by commanding respect and 
even fear (Leonard, 1991). As Leonard (1991: 28) points out, they "were not 
notable for their respect for the niceties of law or due process, they were known 
instead for their decisiveness, courage, presence, and ability to hold a crowd". 
Unfortunately, for most of sub-Saharan Africa, the 'colonial chief model of 
administration did not disappear with the attainment of independence. After 
independence, African political leaders appear to have embraced and perfected 
this model. As Leonard (1991: 29) indicates, contemporary African politicians 
and administrators appear to have embraced the power structure associated 
with the colonial chief, despite its unpopularity during the colonial era, and 
adhere to "an only slightly softened version" of the colonial chief's role. Not 
only are these leaders associated with authoritarianism and a near total lack of 
respect for the law and due process, they also use their positions of power to 
amass illegal wealth just as the colonial chief did. The persistence of the colonial 
chief model of administration has facilitated the transfer and entrenchment 
of the corrupt practices associated with it into the post colonial period. 
The Independence Constitutions 
The constitutional structures inherited at independence reinforced the role of 
the colonial chief model of administration in the perpetuation of corruption in 
most of sub-Saharan Africa. Upon realizing that it was impossible to maximize 
economic benefits from colonies while retaining direct administrative control, 
most colonial powers negotiated a transition to self rule with nationalist leaders 
during the 1960s. Virtually all newly emerging African nations inherited constitutions 
drafted under the guidance of former colonial powers. These constitutions 
have tended to enhance corrupt practices through the centralization of 
power, impairment of participatory democracy and the facilitation of increased 
state control of economic activities. Also closely allied to the centralization of 
power is the persistent lack of political good will and commitment on the part 
of African leaders to fight corruption. It is to the discussion of these factors that 
we now turn.
58 Munyae M. Mulinge and Given N. Lesetedi 
1. Centralised Power. The new constitutions vested enormous (absolute) 
powers in the hands of a single office, institution or individual, usually the presidency. 
The colonialists may not be blamed for the way these laws have been 
interpreted and applied but it would be rather naive to overlook their role in the 
drafting of such laws, some of which became subject to abuse by emerging 
African leaders and thus created environments conducive for the entrenchment 
of corruption (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1998, 1999). As Mulinge and Lesetedi 
indicate, the outgoing 'strongmen' oversaw the emergence of laws that facilitated 
a continuation of the repressive practices they had subjected the colonized 
to only, this time, using a 'son of the soil' as their proxy. This gave birth to autocratic 
presidents and bureaucracies that are above the law; devoid of accountability, 
transparency, rule of law (Hope, 1997; Adedeji, 1991) and administrative 
predictability (Adamolekun and Bryant, 1994); and irresponsible (Adedeji, 
1995). The failure by the new constitutions to cap the length of time one individual 
could be President compounded this situation further by allowing for the 
existence of 'for life' presidents. Their lengthy and uninterrupted stints in power 
have been accompanied by increased corruption, often shielded through unconstitutional 
measures. The trend does not seem to have been reversed by the 
introduction of two term limits on the presidency that has been born out of the 
clamouring for multiparty democracy that has swept across the continent since 
the 1990s. If the lessons from the Kenyan and Zambian experiments are anything 
to go by, African presidents remain overly powerful despots who still act 
as though they were accountable only to themselves and their sycophants. 
The existence of overly powerful presidents has also been associated with the 
politicization of bureaucracies and the entrenchment of the use of personalism 
and patronage. To strengthen their grip on civil society, those occupying the 
presidency have tended to surround themselves with indispensable power brokers 
who are also not accountable to anyone. The 'President's men' are spread 
across the strategic institutions in the land and become trusted aides, wheeler 
dealers, political schemers and hatchetmen for high level corrupt deals that cost 
organizations, individuals and would be investors huge sums of money (Hope 
1997). As Hope indicates, these enjoy the same immunity as the President himself 
and this creates channels for the peddling of influence and authority and 
the abuse of public office for private and personal gain. Through favouritism 
and nepotism, they influence the hiring, promotion and firing of employees and 
determine who is awarded government contracts, who is allocated which piece 
of land and who is licensed to operate what business, to mention but a few. This 
generates overall inefficiency in the bureaucracy (Alatas, 1990) and paves the 
way for negligence protected through favouritism or other influences. 
2. Lack of Participatory Democracy. The concentration of power has failed 
to nurture the birth of a popular participatory democracy and to empower the 
press and civil society. According to Osoba (1996), participatory democracy is a
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa 59 
necessary requirement in combating corruption. It facilitates the monitoring 
and holding to account of those in charge of the state and treasury. These segments 
of our society are the ones that have proven to be the trickiest to police 
in the war against corruption. Almost immediately after independence, most 
African countries moved to amend their constitutions to either strengthen one 
party dictatorships or to undermine the processes that are necessary for true 
democracies to emerge. As Hope (1997) points out, on top of their immense 
powers, those occupying the presidency hijack most formal bureaucratic organizations, 
such as the civil service, the legislature and the judiciary, and use or 
interfere with the powers and functions of government for private gain. While 
the civil service has become an extension of ruling parties, parliament has been 
reduced to acting as the head of state's rubberstamp (or handmaid of the executive 
government). Its core function has become the legitimization of the decisions 
of the executive branch. Independence for most countries thus meant a 
movement from an autocratic colonial government to 'presidential authoritarianism', 
lacking in parliamentary democracy. Thus, despite being a key institution 
for good governance, the parliamentary system of government based on the 
theory of the sovereignty of the people has, in practice, been non existent in 
most African countries. In some instances, free and open debate in this institution 
has been equated to dissent and lack of patriotism. 
The judiciary, on the other hand, has lost both its independence and ability 
to prosecute and give deserving sentences to those involved in corrupt practices. 
According to Rose-Ackerman (1999:151), a "politically dependent judiciary can 
facilitate high-level corruption. When the judiciary is part of the corrupt system, 
the wealthy and the corrupt operate with impunity, confident that a well-placed 
payoff will deal with any legal problems". The judiciary lacks the capacity for 
the objective general application of the rule of law in all cases brought before 
the courts. In a majority of cases it has to await consent from the Attorney 
General's office to prosecute cases of corruption and this is where most of the 
cover up takes place. Indeed, in many countries, the Attorney General has the 
powers to terminate cases without having to give any explanation. Furthermore, 
it is not uncommon for those under prosecution or convicted of corrupt practices 
to be accorded presidential pardon (Makumbe, 1994). The impotence of 
parliament and the judiciary are evident even in cases where humble evidence 
points to rising corruption and graft. 
3. Expanded Role of the State in the Economy. The constitutions ushering 
African countries to independence also enhanced corrupt practices by facilitating 
the development of an expanded role for the state in economic activities 
(Hope, 1997). This was particularly so during the period immediately after independence 
up to the early 1990s when most countries embraced the privatization 
agenda, even though half heartedly. This involved both state participation 
in economic decision, making and the proliferation of public enterprises often
60 Munyae M. Mulinge and Gwen N. Lesetedi 
referred to as 'parastatals'. These dual roles of the state set the stage for (bureaucratic) 
corruption to thrive (Hope, 1997). The centralization of economic decision 
making, for example, culminated in an expanded bureaucracy vested with 
discretionary powers. In the wake of such power, corruption thrived with public 
enterprises becoming cheap targets. Increasingly, it became normal for bribes 
to be offered before a representative of the state bureaucracy could complete any 
transaction. The corruption emanating from expanded government involvement 
in the economy was compounded by the tendency, discussed earlier, for heads 
of state to surround themselves with influence peddlers (bureaucrats and politicians) 
who yearn for a share of and demanded kickbacks from any government 
contract (Makumbe, 1994). State involvement in the economy also created 
opportunities for embezzlement and unlawful accumulation of wealth. It is precisely 
because of this fact that many African leaders and government officials 
control wealth assets that are very disproportionate to their official earnings 
(Hope, 1997). 
4. Lack of Political Good Will. A final constitutionally allied factor responsi- 
C. 
ble for the entrenchment of corrupt practices in sub-Saharan Africa is the lack 
of political good will to fight the malaise. Although this may not be explicitly 
tied to the constitutional frameworks that govern most of Africa today, the association 
between the lack of political good will and the immense powers enjoyed 
by African political leaders and bureaucracies cannot be overlooked. We argue 
that the lack of commitment by these to end corrupt practices rests with the protection 
they are guaranteed by existing constitutional frameworks and practices 
The lack of political good will suggests that governments are not doing much to 
address the problem or are involved in half hearted measures that are not meant 
to seriously tackle it. As such, the vice has continued to mushroom in our institutions 
and other areas of the society. The lack of good will and political commitment 
to stamping out corruption is reflected through the failure or rehi 
tance on the part of governments to enforce existing statutes and to prosecute 
those involved in corrupt practices. It also manifests itself through government 
opposition to the passing of anti-corruption bills, the formation of independent 
agencies on corruption and economic crimes, and the freeing of important institutions 
particularly the legislature and judiciary. 
Kenya offers a good illustrative example of the lack of political good will and 
commitment to the eradication of corruption. The government of Kenya has 
been very reluctant to pass the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Bill It 
appears that such a bill would only get the government's blessing if it contained 
a clause offering amnesty to certain categories of offenders. This means that 
what the government would support is a weak legislation rather than an effective 
law that would provide the tool for addressing the problem of corruption 
The Kenyan government has also consistently fought any attempts to set up j 
formidable anti-corruption organization. Initially, it set up the Kenya
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa 61 
Anticorruption Authority (KACA), only for it to be killed through a decision of 
the government controlled High Court. Although the procedures used to declare 
KACA illegal were suspect and the Court's decision was not based on sound 
legal reasoning, the Attorney General was not eager to challenge the decision in 
the Court of Appeal. The constitutional challenge to, and demise of, KACA 
amounted to a significant setback in the fight against corruption. However, it is 
the apathetic stance adopted by the chief legal counsel of the government - the 
Attorney General - that testified to the lack of good will and commitment on the 
part of the Kenyan government to combat corruption. 
In place of the KACA the Government decided to set up the Anti-Corruption 
Police Unit (ACPU). The ability of the ACPU to fight corruption, and even the 
Kenya government's faith in it, remain in serious doubt. This is particularly so 
in light of the fact that the ACPU is fundamentally a 'police unit' in an environment 
where the police are fundamentally corrupt or largely associated with' 
the vice. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether the Attorney General's 
Office was ready to support ACPU in prosecuting those involved in corruption. 
Without being overly sceptical, therefore, one is bound to conclude that the 
ACPU is yet another pointer to the lack of commitment on the part of the 
Government of Kenya to effectively combat corruption. Most recently (January 
2002) the Kenya government commissioned a team from the Risk Advisory 
Group and Corporate Risk Services in the United Kingdom to undertake a strategic 
assessment of Kenya's progress in anti-corruption initiatives in the country. 
Following the British experts' report on graft, on 3 April 2002 the Kenya government 
published The Corruption Control Bill (2002). It provides for the seting 
up of an independent new Kenya Corruption Control Authority (KCCA) to 
replace the KACA which was disbanded in 2001. 
The new Bill is part of a major effort by the government to fulfil the condiionalities 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the resumption of 
lonor funding. These have insisted that the country must show evidence that it 
was committed to the fight against corruption through good governance, legisation 
and setting up of appropriate institutions to deal with corruption cases, 
fhe Bill provides for the appointment of a director to head KCCA who shall be 
lppointed by the President following recommendations of a special advisory 
)oard. The person appointed Director, however, must be approved by 
'arliament. This is a major departure from past practice for those appointed by 
he President. The KCCA's activities will be monitored by the Kenya Corruption 
Control Advisory Board whose membership will be drawn from professional 
)rganizations in the civil sector, including religious organizations. Like the 
lefunct KACA, the KCCA shall not undertake any prosecution before clearance 
vith the office of Attorney General. In our view, this signifies the Kenya government's 
reluctance to set up a truly independent anti-corruption agency. In 
Lddition, the Bill states that one cannot be prosecuted or held for a crime which
62 Munyae M. Mulinge and Gwen N. Lesetedi 
was not an offence at the time it was committed. This means that corruption 
crimes committed before the new law comes into effect will not be dealt with. 
This is another testimony of the Kenya government's attempts to protect powerful 
people who have enriched themselves through the plunder of public funds 
and to cover up very costly corruption cases. 
The Role of International Actors 
A comprehensive analysis of corruption must bring in its international dimension. 
The salience of this dimension has been elevated to new heights by the 
process of globalization. To analyse corruption in any one country, one has to 
understand the world system in which it functions. Globalization has been 
accompanied by the emergence of uncontrollable market forces and truly 
transnational corporations (TNCs) that dominate the basic dynamics of the 
world global economy, and by a worldwide spread of manufacturing and sales 
(Hirst and Thompson, 1996). According to Johnston (1998), increasing interdependence 
of economies and markets makes it possible for corrupt agents to 
extend their dealings across borders. For instance, it allows for the shifting of 
illicit profits out of poor countries into numbered bank accounts elsewhere. 
Corruption in sub-Saharan Africa is not a problem that is caused and sustained 
by internal factors alone. Rather, it is also a consequence of external factors 
manifested through the activities of foreign governments, aid organizations 
and private companies seeking to further their own (economic) interests 
through actions and practices that condone corrupt practices or that are corrupt 
in themselves (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1999). Most cases of grand corruption 
also have an international dimension: "the bribe giver might be a transnational 
corporation (TNC); a corrupt politician might seek refuge from prosecution 
abroad; and, most common of all, the proceeds of corruption can be secreted to 
numbered accounts in foreign destinations" (Galtung, 1998: 118). With respect 
to secreted accounts, tales abound of African leaders, such as dos Santos of 
Angola, Arap Moi of Kenya, Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, and Robert Mugabe of 
Zimbabwe, among others, who have stashed fortunes in Swiss banks at the 
expense of the economic development of their respective countries. 
International governments, organizations and agencies further the entrenchment 
of high level (major) as well as lower level (minor) corruption in various 
ways. Any discussion of the factors responsible for corruption in sub-Saharan 
Africa must feature international communities as accomplices in corrupt practices, 
either because their actions and policies fail to counter (or appear to 
encourage) the same or because they serve as givers in corrupt exchanges. 
While international governments and aid organizations may enhance corruption 
through their policies and responses that appear to condone and urge on 
the takers in corrupt exchanges, international corporations and other private 
businesses may participate directly in corrupt exchanges as givers. The analysis
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa 63 
presented in this section focuses on the provision of conditional loans and 
grants in aid, the desire to protect economic and strategic interests, and the 
acquisition of contracts and business licenses through kickbacks as practices 
that promote corruption. It also examines the role of Structural Adjustment 
Policies (SAPs). 
Conditional Loans and Grants in Aid 
International governments, development organizations, and aid agencies often 
attach certain conditions to loans and grants availed to developing countries. 
Some of these conditions approximate corrupt practices (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 
1999). For instance, an organization or agency may require the recipient of a 
loan or a grant in aid to draw from the donor country's technical capacity to 
implement the project for which funding is being sought without taking into 
consideration the availability of such technical capacity in the recipient nation. 
This constitutes a fraudulent act that may negatively affect the recipient nation 
concerned in two ways. First, where a recipient has the technical capacity being 
provided as part of a loan or grant in aid, this deprives it of a major benefit of 
investing in development projects - the creation of employment. Second, more 
often than not, aid organizations and donor agencies provide overpriced but 
unqualified, incompetent and inexperienced technical personnel as part of an 
aid packages to developing countries (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1999). While the 
demand to rely on technical personnel from a donor agency or government may 
hot itself constitute corruption, it would be naive to term the granting of incompetent 
technical personnel as anything else. This practice is responsible for substandard 
development projects such as poorly engineered roads. It furthers economic 
retardation and the general impoverishment of the people in the affected 
nations. 
Protection of Economic and Strategic Interests 
A second way through which corruption can be understood within an international 
context is the need for international governments to extend and protect 
their economic and/or strategic interests in former colonies at any cost. As 
Mulinge and Lesetedi (1999) point out, this has created an environment that is 
conducive to the emergence of policies and actions that appear to aid the 
entrenchment of corruption. Several illustrations testify to this fact. First, there 
is the tendency by international governments and donor organizations to disburse 
aid to developing countries even where it is very clear that a considerable 
fraction of that money is wasted on bribes and kickbacks or diverted to private 
use. This practice, which is tantamount to subsidizing corruption, has encouraged 
most African political leaders to view aid as a reward for their cooperation 
in the fulfilment of the economic interests of their former masters (Mulinge and 
Lesetedi, 1999). The United States government (and to some extent France), for
64 Munyae M. Mnlinge and Gwen N. Lesetedi 
instance, supported and subsidized, using tax payers money, a corrupt state in 
the former Zaire for over 30 years because it professed its opposition to communism. 
This support is pertinent to our understanding of the corruption that 
engulfed that country for decades. It gave Mobutu Sese Seko and his cronies 
greater immunity to practice their art of looting the country to the brink of economic 
collapse. The desire to protect economic interests could also be said to be 
responsible for the British government's continued support of corrupt regimes 
in her former colony, Kenya, including the current one of arap Moi. 
Economic and other interests have also aided the entrenchment of corruption 
in sub-Saharan Africa through the adoption of half hearted, and often unclear 
and inconsistent, stances toward corruption itself and corrupt regimes. The linking 
of aid to the control of corruption and good governance is a case in point. 
The enforcement of this policy has, to say the least, been inconsistent and lacking 
in the commitment that would be central to its success. This appears to have 
sent mixed signals to corrupt bureaucracies that have given them the courage to 
engage international governments and organisations in what amounts to hide 
and seek games. As an illustration, the Kenya government engaged the World 
Bank, the IMF, and the United States and other governments in a protracted wild 
goose chase.by promising to deliver on political and economic reforms as a condition 
for aid disbursement until around 1997 when these finally suspended aid 
to the country. Despite the suspension of funding, the Government of Kenya has 
continued to play truant in its negotiations with these world bodies for the total 
resumption of aid. Yet every once in a while a small dosage of aid will be 
released to the country. 
Acquisition of Contracts and Business Licenses 
Multinational firms are central actors in many large scale corrupt deals. According 
to Rose-Ackerman (1999), these firms face a dilemma when dealing with corrupt 
regimes that leads them to believe that they need to pay bribes. They feel obliged 
to pay kickbacks - sometimes amounting to 10 percent or otherwise of the total 
value of the contract - in exchange contracts. By indulging or acquiescing in practices 
such as these, the organizations play the role of givers in corrupt exchanges 
and thus fuel corruption in developing countries. In many countries, bribes paid 
to obtain foreign business are tax deductible (Rose Ackerman, 19991 
Unfortunately, this legal loophole encourages payoffs. The act of obtaining tenders 
through corrupt means also often breeds more corruption because tenders won 
this way are likely lead to poor quality projects that are an economic drain on the 
country affected (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1999). Some contractors who acquire 
projects through corrupt deals may lack the technical capacity necessary for the 
satisfactory completion of the job and hence produce substandard projects. Africa 
is crowded with roads that were constructed under the guidance of engineers who 
knew nothing about engineering.
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa 65 
In addition, private companies can offer bribes in exchange for licenses to 
operate in a particular country. Such an act defeats common logic in light of the 
high rate of unemployment and retarded economic development affecting most 
African nations. African governments desperately need foreign investments to 
create jobs for the populace and win some semblance of legitimacy from them. 
Companies that win tenders and/or acquire licenses corruptly, it should be 
noted, are also likely to purchase illegitimate immunity from prosecution for the 
underpayment of their workers and for maintaining poor working conditions 
(Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1999). 
Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) 
An understanding of declining or devalued wages in some sub-Saharan African 
countries, however, must bring in IMF and World Bank fronted Structural 
Adjustment Policies (SAPs). SAPs constitute another dimension in the international 
contextualization of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. Where operational, 
such policies have been associated with declining social services for the 
mass of the African population and the stagnation of wages (Vandermoortele, 
1994; Thompson, 1992). Although these policies are not solely responsible for 
wage stagnation - other factors such as deteriorating economic conditions 
(Hope, 1997) due to high level corruption also play a part - they have played a 
major role in accelerating this process. Thus, the IMF, World Bank and international 
governments that support and push for the implementation of the kind of 
austerity measures that SAPs prescribe are, to some extent, directly responsible 
for the entrenchment of lower level corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Diminishing salaries for lower cadre employees in most developing countries 
have been associated with lower level corruption (Lindauer, 1994; Hope, 1997). 
It has been argued that, while the desire to get rich quickly may be responsible 
for petty corruption, inadequate monthly incomes appear to be the major catalyst. 
As Hope (1997: 93) states, in a situation of declining incomes, public servants 
"disavow any sense of civic virtue and attempt to supplement their 
incomes by engaging in corrupt acts." As it becomes increasingly impossible for 
employees to meet their minimum monthly budgets, acts such as the taking 
bribes or embezzling funds from accounts they are responsible for acquire justification 
in their minds and are incorporated as part of the formal monthly 
budget. 
The Way Forward 
Although corruption can never be entirely eliminated, the practice needs to be 
"reduced to levels that are both tolerable and incidental" (Galtung, 1998: 106). 
In sub-Saharan Africa, the problem is a particular concern because of its adverse 
effects. Corruption creates innumerable forms of injustice which affect almost 
every aspect of daily life for ordinary citizens and no sector of the population is
66 MunyaeM.MulingeandGwenN.Lesetedi 
immune from it (Mates, 1990; Riley, 1998). There is mounting evidence that, in 
sub-Saharan Africa, corruption impairs political, economic and social development 
(Hope, 1997; Osoba, 1996; Makumbe, 1994; Ayittey, 1992). The practice 
is not a victimless crime (Galtung, 1998). Rather, it is a transaction which carries 
substantial social, political and economic costs. Corruption hinders administrative 
development and performance (Hope, 1997) by generating overall inefficiency 
in the bureaucracy (Alatas, 1990). It undermines political institutions 
by weakening the legitimacy of accountability of governments (Johnston, 
1998). 
Most importantly, corruption erodes economic growth and impairs economic 
efficiency (Rose-Ackerman, 1997, 1999 Mauro, 1997; World Bank, 1997; 
Robinson, 1998; Ayittey, 2000). This occurs through the stifling of local initiative 
and enterprise (Hope, 1997), the discouragement of foreign investment, the 
undermining of the effectiveness of aid funded development projects and the 
weakening of political support for development assistance in donor countries 
(IMF, 1995; Rauch, 1995; Johnston, 1998). The practice also breeds wastage, 
aggravates budget deficit problems, reduces resources available for infrastructure, 
public services and anti-poverty programmes and serves as a heavy tax 
upon investment (Robinson, 1998; Ayittey, 2000). Not to forget that corruption 
creates composite problems like 'brain drain' of educated people from developing 
countries (Alatas, 1990). This, coupled with nepotism and favouritism, 
makes it impossible for countries plagued with corruption to make the best use 
of their human resources. Yet, human resources are one of the primary inputs 
for development across most of Africa. Finally, corruption undermines the effective 
utilisation of natural resources leaving the affected countries vulnerable to 
and dependent on outside interests and markets. This, in turn, make it impossible 
for these countries to implement effective development strategies of their 
own (Johnston, 1998). 
There are several strategies that can be utilised to stem corruption in sub- 
Saharan Africa. For ease of presentation and maintaining consistency, these will 
be grouped into national interventions and international initiatives. 
National Strategies 
From the national context, the following strategies are explored: institutional 
reforms, formation of independent anti-corruption authorities, citizen empowerment, 
the establishment of codes of ethics for public servants, and other 
strategies. While most of these are not new, we argue that they need strengthening 
if they are going to produce the desired effects. 
Institutional Reforms 
As alluded to earlier, corruption flourishes where national institutions and 
guarantees of basic economic rights are weak (Knack and Keefer, 1995).
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa 67 
Institutional reforms are thus indispensable ingredients of any sustainable anticorruption 
strategy (Johnston, 1998). The reforms should be designed to 
enhance accountability and transparency in the operations of the state and 
major economic institutions. That is, they should facilitate the creation of more 
transparent procedures; the strengthening of internal and external accountability 
systems; improvement in recruitment, compensation and training for public 
and private sector officials; and the creation of channels of appeal for clients 
(Johnston, 1998). Although corrupt interests with a stake in the status quo may 
initially strongly oppose reform, reform advocates must sustain pressure on the 
political establishment to implement meaningful reforms. 
In the developing countries, the salience assumed by the problem of corruption 
in recent years has occurred hand in hand with the increasing push for 
democratization and economic liberalization. These processes entail the reform 
of major institutions of our society that have a bearing on corruption. Primary 
emphasis should be placed on the total separation of powers of the three arms 
of government. This can only occur through the total emancipation of the civil 
service, legislature and judiciary from the stifling grip of the executive. That is, 
through the creation of totally independent civil services, parliaments, and judiciaries 
which are above the manipulation and domination of the executive. With 
respect to the civil service, appointments to senior positions should be vetted by 
parliament. This will guarantee merit appointments and curtail corrupt practices 
during the term of such appointments. It will also put to an end the 
patronage that has shielded corrupt officials from prosecution. Empowering parliament, 
on the other hand, will make it possible for it to deal with those named 
in corruption reports by watchdog committees. 
Serious judicial reforms are imperative in most African countries for the 
effective combating of corruption. Having exemplary anti-corruption statutes is 
not adequate in the fight against corruption. These are irrelevant (Singh, 1997) 
unless an honest judicial system exists to support them by acting as a watchdog 
on constitutional values, monitoring the honesty of other branches of government, 
ensuring the rule of law and successfully investigating and prosecuting 
offenders (Muganda, 1999; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). According to Muganda, successful 
investigation and prosecution will encourage the public to report corrupt 
practices and also serve as a deterrent for members of the public. This 
applies to most sub-Saharan African countries since they are still struggling to 
establish democracy and the rule of law. Reforms should nevertheless go beyond 
the creation of independent judiciaries to incorporate the appointment of judicial 
officers after vetting by parliamentary committees. Vetting the candidates is 
likely to restore confidence among the public. It will ensure that people of questionable 
integrity (or tainted records) are not appointed judges, as has previously 
been the case. Vetting would also ensure that the process of appointing 
judicial personnel is itself free of corruption.
68 Munyae M. Mulinge and Gwen N. Lesetedi 
Reform should also give judicial officials security of tenure. This will 
empower them to discharge their duties without fear of intimidation by political 
leaders who hold their career destiny in their hands. Judicial reform should 
also include improvements in the professionalism, pay and working conditions 
of judges as efforts to reduce the incentive to accept bribes (Rose-Ackennan, 
1999). Finally, given the magnitude of the corruption problem, special corruption 
courts should be established to deal directly with economic crimes. This 
will speed up the prosecution process and the deterrent effects will be felt much 
more quickly than is currently the case. These courts should be provided with 
adequate staff and equipment, both in the lower courts and at the appellate levels, 
to ensure that they can deal with cases swiftly. 
Independent Anti-Corruption Agencies 
Conventionally, corruption has been fought through the use of penal statutes. 
However, the law alone has not proved to be an effective solution. For instance, 
the law can only apply after the fact and only where a corrupt practice has been 
unearthed (Muganda, 1999). Where an act has occurred but has not been 
exposed, the law remains impotent. The same may also apply when neither the 
giver nor the receiver is aggrieved. The creation of effective independent corruption 
fighting agencies operating under a strong statute is thus a necessary 
step in the war against corruption (Muganda, 1999; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 
Hong Kong through its Independent Commission Against Corruption is a testimony 
that the war against corruption can be won. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, a number of countries have embraced such agencies 
with varying degrees of success or setbacks. These include Botswana, Malawi, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Two major lessons can be drawn from the experience 
from these countries. First, that for anti-corruption commissions to be 
effective, they must be independent of the executive and imbued with all the 
necessary investigative powers. They must also have effective preventive and 
education programmes in support of the deterrent. Second, and most importantly, 
that the passing of anti-corruption laws and the constitution of anti-corruption 
agencies, while a necessary condition, may not be sufficient for the 
reduction of the vice. Political good will on the part of the state and the overall 
political leadership is critical to fight the problem for such laws and agencies to 
have an impact and play a meaningful role. To succeed, anti-corruption institutions 
need unqualified support and commitment by the political leadership. 
.rriiptionis actually i n the leadership and, if the leadership is firm, corruption 
naturally be reduced. For example, if stem action is taken in all corruption 
cases, nobody will want to be associated with corruption. Unfortunately, most 
f hfh § o v e r n m e n t s ^ck the political good will and serious commitment to 
rt h c o r r u p t i o n which has eaten into the fabric of their society. This suberts 
the endeavours of corruption fighting agencies and institutions and, in
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa 69 
some countries, reduces anti-corruption laws and agencies to avenues of cover 
up rather than pillars of the elimination of corruption. It also makes them vulnerable 
to abuse and misrepresentation by members of the executive, (state officials), 
the judiciary and the legislature. 
The Empowerment of Civil Society 
Corruption has been thriving in many countries because many people are unaware 
of their rights. As such, any long term anti-corruption strategy should incorporate 
citizen empowerment. It is the only way through which we can create citizens and 
organizations of civil society that are willing to confront the practice head on and 
take on the institutions that sustain it. Citizen empowerment should entail the 
strengthening of civil society by widening and protecting its political and economic 
resources "in order to enhance its political and economic vitality" 
(Johnston, 1998: 85). Empowerment should also provide the citizenry increased 
access to the state and lay down rules of interaction.between the state and society 
According to Johnston (1998), by reducing the economic and political vulnerability 
of grassroots communities and peoples we bequeath them more effective means 
of recourse. Empowerment reduces their vulnerability to exploitation and enhances 
their ability to participate effectively in politics and to check the self interested 
behaviour of official decision makers and each other (Johnston, 1998). Most 
importantly, it makes them effective watchdogs over corrupt public officials and 
also reduces their vulnerability to being corrupted or participating in corrupt deals. 
As Cooter (1997: 191) indicates, where social empowerment is effective, social 
groups and private interests can become, not the instigators or targets of corruption, 
but 'law merchants'. Citizen empowerment will bolster institutional reforms 
by enabling the citizenry to act as the watchdog over institutional practices. 
Deeply rooted ethnic divisions and conflicts tend to enhance corruption 
(Easterly and Levine, 1996). Thus, in sub-Saharan Africa, where rampant ethnicization 
of the allocation of scarce but important resources (Mulinge and 
Munyae, 2000) has created extensive ethnic divisions, the citizen empowerment 
anti-corruption strategy must incorporate mechanisms for the termination of 
such practices and for redressing the imbalances that such practices have created. 
In this regard, above all else, development strategies that are directed at 
previously excluded groups are necessary. 
Establishment of Codes of Ethics for Public Servants 
The lack of a code of ethics to guide public servants and the holders of other 
positions of responsibility in society is one of the major factors responsible for 
corrupt practices in Africa today. Logically, therefore, governments need to 
develop and, most importantly, enforce codes of conduct to govern the behaviour 
of their employees. Of significance are the conflicts of interest that most 
African bureaucrats seem not to pay attention to. This in itself creates condi-
70 Munyae M. Mulinge and Gwen N. Lesetedi 
tions for the peddling of corrupt practices such as a cabinet minister, a permanent 
secretary or any other senior bureaucrat awarding his or her company the 
(endev for a government project. The rule of the thumb should be that no civil 
s jrvants engage in private business while holding office. 
To promote ethics in the civil service, clear rules governing conflicts of interest, 
expected behaviour, and obligatory disclosure of assets should be enacted 
and enforced (Shihata, 1999]. All public servants, including the President, the 
Vice President, ministers, ordinary members of parliament and other high ranking 
civil servants should be made to declare their wealth every year. This should 
also apply to their spouses and any dependent children to circumvent attempts 
to hide stolen assets by registering them under a spouse or a child's name. At 
the beginning of every year, such officials should declare financial statements; 
income; assets, including land, buildings, vehicles, investments and any financial 
obligations owed to the person making the declaration; and any liabilities. 
Failure to comply with such requirements should lead to disciplinary action and 
possible prosecution. Those who give misleading information about their 
wealth should be liable for conviction and/or fine. The declaration of assets will 
also stem 'get rich quick' temptations among top public servants. 
Other Strategies 
Long term strategies in the war against graft should also incorporate the review 
of public salaries with a view to increasing them. Some African countries have 
very poorly paid civil servants. This creates conditions for corruption to thrive. 
As Rose-Ackerman (1999: 72) points out, "if public sector pay is low, corruption 
is a survival strategy". Also, where government pay scales are not capable 
of attracting those with specialized skills, a selection bias will operate. The 
review of salaries is particularly urgent for those departments connected to the 
administration of the criminal justice system, that is the police, the courts and 
prisons. These are pertinent to the success of legal strategies for the control of 
corruption (Mbaku, 2000). For instance, judges and their functionaries are 
likely to accept bribes if they are underpaid. 
International Initiatives 
For a long time, most anti-corruption activity focused exclusively on the use of 
national measures to control a national or local problem. A look at anti-corruption 
agencies or commissions across the continent, for example, reveals that 
most of them were formulated with the primary responsibility to deal with corruption 
from within. However, as demonstrated earlier, corruption has an international 
dimension that cannot be overlooked if the war against it is to bear 
ruit. As stated earlier, for example, multinational firms partake in large scale, 
corrupt deals and their inclusion in and support for the fight against corruption 
s imperative to its success.
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa 71 
The international community has not been completely silent and indifferent 
to the fight against corruption. As Rose-Ackerman (1999) notes, combating corruption 
is an emerging priority for the international community and some international 
tools are evolving to tackle the problem. The first such initiative 
appears to have been the US 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The Act 
was involved in fighting corruption outside US borders by prohibiting certain 
corrupt practices by US Corporations and unincorporated business entities. It 
was the first law to prohibit nationals of one country from bribing government 
officials in another country (Hermann, 1994). 
International organisations like the IMF, OECD and World Bank have also signalled 
their desire for governments to demonstrate intolerance for corrupt practices 
and deal with the menace. They have pledged to take action to eliminate 
corruption from their own aid programmes (Hope, 2000). Since the mid 1990s, 
a series of anti-corruption initiatives associated with such organizations have 
emerged (OECD, 1997; Kaufman, 1997). Key among these has been the new 
World Bank and IMF policies tying lending more closely to efforts to reduce corruption. 
Jointly with other donors, the World Bank and the IMF have been 
pushing for public integrity and democratic reforms in Africa, linking them to 
economic and political liberalization. In 1996, the World Bank revised its guidelines 
to state explicitly that corruption and fraud would be grounds for cancelling 
a contract if a borrower had not taken appropriate action (Rose- 
Ackerman, 1999: 182). Since then, the Bank, jointly with the IMF and other 
donor agencies, has insisted that governments must show commitment to tackling 
the problem of corruption as a condition for aid (Robinson, 1998). 
According to Rose-Ackerman (1999), the World Bank, the IMF, the UNDP, the 
bilateral aid agencies, and the regional development banks are all contemplating 
anti-corruption policies that go beyond guaranteeing the integrity of their 
projects to supporting more fundamental structural reforms that would reduce 
the levels of corruption. 
In 1996, the UN passed a Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in 
International Commercial Transactions in which it emphasized the need to promote 
social responsibility and appropriate standards of ethics on the part of private 
and public corporations, including transnational corporations (Hope, 
2000). Another international initiative to combat corruption is manifested in the 
efforts by the Council of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) to criminalize transnational bribery and the tax 
deductibility of bribes, and to establish transparency systems for competitive 
public procurement (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). More recently, the OECD Council 
passed an international convention that requires signatories to enact legislation 
ending the tax deductibility of bribes, to criminalize the bribing of foreign officials, 
to introduce specific corruption measures, and to make it illegal to use, 
deposit or transfer money acquired through corrupt practices (Hope, 2000). In
72 Munyae M. Mulinge and Gwen N. Lesetedi 
addition, countries like Switzerland have begun to cooperate with African governments 
in attempts to discourage the laundering of ill gotten or embezzled 
funds through their banks (Hope, 2000). 
Despite the above steps taken by the international community, we argue that 
much more could have been, and still needs to be, done. We are of the opinion 
that there has been much talk, coupled with some legislative measures, but very 
little action. Consistent with Rose-Ackerman (1999), we consider the efforts of 
the international organizations and agencies not to be sufficient and call for a 
further strengthening of the same. More specifically, the area of enforcement, 
particularly commitment to effective enforcement of anti-corruption strategies, 
needs to be strengthened further. To illustrate this, the IMF 'good governance' 
clause has been invoked in countries such as Argentina, Cambodia and Kenya, 
with demands for demonstrable anti-corruption measures (Galtung, 1998) hut 
the application of such measures has been rather half hearted and corrupt political 
leaders have seized the opportunity to play cat and mouse games with the 
IMF. Furthermore, as an 'operational directive' the clause is not a formal conditionality 
because of the fact that the IMF's Articles of Agreement stipulate that 
it should not deal in matters that are political in nature. 
The international community must move beyond rhetoric to moot new concrete 
programs and develop better strategies to enforce all its programs for the 
reduction of corruption. As Rose-Ackerman (1999) indicates, individual firms 
must consider their obligations as international actors in the war against corruption. 
Companies operating in corrupt environments must take a stand 
against corruption and report it to local authorities and to the outside world. 
"Keeping quiet is probably the worst option" (Rose-Ackerman, 1999: 188). 
Similarly, for African countries to extricate themselves from the corrupt clutches 
of foreign companies, they must identify and blacklist these, and relevant information 
should be relayed to all governments (Muganda, 1999). Most countries 
should not only ratify treaties, such as those passed by the OECD Council outlawing 
bribery of foreign officials and criminalising the tax deductibility of 
bribes, they should also pass conforming legislation. Steps like those taken by 
countries like Switzerland to discourage the laundering of ill gotten funds 
through their banks should be strengthened further. To this end, nations should 
enter into binding treaties with other nations pledging total support in the fight 
against corruption. These treaties should guarantee freezing of accounts created 
through corrupt practices and the repatriation of the proceeds of corruption. The 
establishment of an International Corruption Court or tribunal charged with the 
responsibility to try corrupt leaders who flee from their countries to seek refuge 
abroad, to rule on their extradition and to hear cases of corruption involving 
transnational corporations, should also be given some thought. 
With globalization, it is now becoming more feasible than ever before for 
professional bodies and associations to adopt universal codes of conduct such as
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa 73 
the application of a universal (uniform) code of conduct for all world engineers, 
lawyers, doctors and other professionals. Such a step would benefit the war 
against corruption tremendously. Its feasibility lies in the fact that some of these 
groups' already have global organizations or associations with clear codes of 
conduct. The World Federation of Engineers, for example, has a code of conduct 
designed to prohibit engineers from passing substandard work (Galtung, 1998). 
Other groups, like the International Bar Association, could follow suit. 
Inconsistent policies and practices on the part of international institutions 
and governments could be said to be partly responsible for the lack of political 
good will and commitment to the eradication of corruption on the part of most 
African bureaucracies. Without arguing that foreign governments and organizations 
should usurp the responsibility of policing African bureaucracies, we 
posit, that whenever they choose to get involved, they should do so consistently 
and persistently. Where the option adopted is to suspend aid, this should remain 
in force until the actual desired results are realised. Of course, there are those 
who argue that the suspension of aid hurts ordinary people and not corrupt 
bureaucrats but it is equally true that loans and grants in aid that have no economic 
benefits to people whose tax money is essential to service them hurt 
them (the people) more. 
Conclusion 
This paper presents a holistic analysis of the genesis and entrenchment of corruption 
in sub-Saharan Africa by integrating the historical and international 
contexts of the problem. We link the origins and spread of the problem to the 
colonization of Africa, the lasting legacy of that colonization and the actions 
and practices of international actors. The adoption of a holistic approach to corruption 
is pegged on three facts. That is, that it enables us to understand the 
vice in its historical totality; affords a more encompassing explanation of the 
vice by integrating both its internal and external causes; and allows for the 
development of well rounded strategies for the alleviation of the problem. 
Consistent with the last fact, our discussion culminates with the examination 
of broad based national and international strategies that can be utilized to 
address the problem of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa today. 
Certain basic conclusions derive from the discussion ensuing in the essay. 
First, that corruption is a multifaceted, complex problem. Any effort to combat 
it must recognize, from the onset, its complexity and the impossibility of eliminating 
it altogether (Shihata, 1999). It should also recognize the need for a 
comprehensive approach to the problem that cuts across disciplines. It is only 
though such an approach that the economic, social, legal, administrative and 
moral aspects of the problem can be targeted; the close linkages among these 
aspects recognized; and the international dimension of the causes of the problem 
drawn in. A second conclusion deriving from this essay is that, although
74 Munyae M. Mulinge and Gwen N. Lesetedi 
efforts have been expended at the national level to combat corruption, a lot of 
room remains for improvement. In fact, there is much more that can be, and 
needs to be, done. Within the national context, African countries have developed 
anti-corruption initiatives, such as anti-corruption agencies, inspector general 
systems, legal and quasi-legal trials, and public awareness campaigns 
(Doig, 1995; IRIS, 1996). However, the powerful have not been committed to 
act effectively to curb corruption (Kligaard, 1997) and most such initiatives 
have been ineffective and unsustainable. A reality check reveals a near total lack 
of commitment and political good will by political leaders and government officials 
to tackle the problem. In some countries, like Kenya and Nigeria, the lack 
of political good will to drastically reduce or stamp out corruption has been 
manifested through the initiation of what amount to cosmetic anti-corruption 
strategies. 
Similarly, efforts dating back particularly to the 1990s by the international 
governments, agencies and organizations, though appreciated, still fall short of 
the kind of potential these are imbued with. It is our view that there has been a 
lot of talk without much action, some legislation without effective enforcement, 
and a general lack of total commitment to eradicating the problem. By advocating 
a greater role for the international community in the war against corruption 
we are by no means suggesting that it should usurp the responsibility of policing 
African bureaucracies and stamping out corruption from the continent. The 
responsibility for stamping out corruption in sub-Saharan Africa rests overwhelmingly 
with African political leaders and bureaucracies themselves. 
However, the international governments, agencies and organizations, being 
among the perpetrators of the problem, must be part of the solution if the problem 
is to be minimized. Otherwise any strategies that fail to bring them in will 
remain a partial approach to corruption. In sum, concrete anti-corruption initiatives 
must be ones that effectively capture the national and international factors 
that sustain it. 
References 
Adamolekun, L. and C. Bryant, (1994), Governance Progress Report: The Africa Region 
Experience, Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Adedeji, O. (1995), "The Challenge of Pluralism, Democracy, Governance and 
Development", The Courier, No. 150 (March-April), 93-95. 
Adedeji, 0. (1991), "Role of Government in Bureaucratic Corruption: The Case of the 
Politicisan'on of the Civil Service", Quarterly Journal of Administration, 25 (2) 208- 
219. 
Alatas, S. H. (1990), Corruption: Its Nature, Causes and Functions, Aldershot: Avebury. 
Ayittey, G. B. N. (2000), "Combating Corruption in Africa: Analysis and Context", in K. 
R. Hope, Sr. and B. C. Chikulo (eds.), Corruption and Development in Africa: Lessons 
from Country Case Studies, London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Brass, P. (1985), "Ethnicity and the Colonial and Post-colonial Africa: Abstract" in P.
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa 75 
Brass, Ethnic Groups and the State, London: Croom Helm. 
Collier, P. and D. Lai (1986), Labor and Poverty in Kenya 1900-1980, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Cooter, R. D. (1997), "The Rule of State Law Versus the Rule-of-Law State: Economic 
Analysis of the Legal Foundations of Development", in M. Bruno and B. Pleskovic 
(eds.), Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1996, 
Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Day, J. (1980), "The Insignificance of the Tribe in the African Politics of Zimbabwe 
Rhodesia", in W. H. Morris-Jones (ed.), From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, London: Frank 
Cass and Company Ltd. 
Doig, R. A. (1995), "Good Government and Sustainable Anti-Corruption Strategies: A 
Role for Independent Anti-Corruption Agencies?", Public Administration and 
Development, 15 (2), 151-65. 
Easterly W. and R. Levine (1996), "Africa's Growth Strategy: Policies and Ethnic 
Divisions", unpublished Manuscript, Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Galtung, F. (1998), "Criteria for Sustainable Corruption Control", in K. A. Elliot (ed.), 
Corruption and the Global Economy, Washington, DC: Institute for International 
Economics. 
Girling, J. (1997), Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy, London: Routledge. 
Heimann, F. (1994), Should Foreign Bribery Be a Crime?, Berlin: Transparency 
Hirst, P. and G. Thompson (1996), Globalisation in Question: The International Economy 
Hope, K. R. Sr. (2000), "Corruption and Development in Africa" in K. R. Hope, Sr. and B. 
International. 
and the Possibilities of Governance, Cambridge, MA: Polity Press. 
C. Chikulo (eds.), Corruption and Development in Africa: Lessons from Country Case 
Studies, London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Hope, K. R. Sr. (1997), African Political Economy: Contemporary Issues in Development, 
London: M. E. Sharpe. 
Hope, K. R. Sr. (1996), Development in the Third World: From Policy Failure to Policy 
Reform, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
Hunt, C. L. and L. Walker (1974), Ethnic Dynamics: Pattern of Inter-group Relations in 
Various Societies, Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press. 
IMF (1995), "Unproductive Public Expenditures: A Pragmatic Approach to Policy 
Analysis", IMF Pamphlet Series 48, Washington, DC: IMF. 
IRIS (1996), "Governance and the Economy in Africa: Tools for Analysis and Reform of 
Corruption", University of Maryland: Center for Institutional Reform and the 
Informal Sector (IRIS). 
Johnston, M. (1998), "Fighting Systematic Corruption: Social Foundations for 
Institutional Reform", in M. Robinson (ed.), Corruption and Development, London: 
Frank Cass. 
Kalinga, O. J. M. (1985), "Colonial Rule, Missionaries and Ethnicity in the North Nyasa 
District, 1891-1938", African Studies Review, 28 (1), 57-72. 
Kaufmann, D. (1997), "Corruption: The Facts", Foreign Policy, No. 17, 114-131. 
Klitgaard, R. (1997), "Cleaning Up and Invigorating the Civil Service", A Report for the 
Operations Evaluation Department, Washington DC: The World Bank.
76 Munyae M. Mulinge and Gwen N. Lesetedi 
Knack, S. and P. Reefer, (1995), "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country 
Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures", Economics and Politics, 17 (3), 
207-227. 
Leonard, D. K. (1991), African Successes: Four Public Managers of Kenyan Rural 
Development, USA: University of California Press. 
Lindauer, D. L. (1994). "Government Pay and Employment Policies and Economic 
Performance." in D. L. Lindauer and B. Nunberg (eds.), Rehabilitating Government: 
Pay and Employment Reform in Africa, Washington DC: World Bank. 
Makumbe, J. (1994). "Bureaucratic Corruption in Zimbabwe: Causes and Magnitude of 
the Problem." Africa Development, 19 (3): 45-60. 
Mauro, P. (1997). "The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government 
Expenditure: A Cross-Country Analysis", in K. A. Elliot (ed), Corruption and the 
Global Economy, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. 
Mazrui, A. A. and M. Tidy (1984), Nationalism and New States in Africa From About 
193S to the Present, New Hampshire: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd. 
Mbaku, J. M. (2000), "Controlling Corruption in Africa: A Public Choice" in K. R. Hope, 
St. and B. C. Chikulo (eds.), Corruption and Development in Africa: Lessons from 
Country Case Studies, London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Muganda, A. A. (1999), "The Corruption Scourge in Africa: Its Causes, Impact and 
Control", in K. Frimpong and G. Jacques (eds.), Corruption, Democracy and Good 
Governance in Africa: Essays on Accountability and Ethical Behavior, Gaborone- 
Lentswe La Lesedi Publishers. 
Mulinge, M. M. and G. N. Lesetedi (1999), "The Genesis and Entrenchment of 
Corruption in sub-Saharan Africa: A Historical and International Contextualization" 
in K. Frimpong and G. Jacques (eds.), Corruption, Democracy and Good Governance 
in. Africa: Essays on Accountability and Ethical Behavior, Gaborone: Lentswe La 
Lesedi Publishers. 
Mulinge, M. M. and G. N. Lesetedi (1998), "Interrogating Our Past: Colonialism and the 
Birth and Entrenchment of Corruption in sub-Saharan Africa", African Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 3, No.2, 15-28. ' 
Mulinge, M. M. and M. M. Munyae (2000), "The Ethnicisation of the State and the Crisis 
of Development: The Kenyan Experience", Journal of Cultural Studies 2 fil 
141-159. ' UJ> 
Nabudere, D. (1981), Imperialism in East Africa: Imperialism and Exploitation, London- 
Zed Press. 
OECD (1997), OECD Actions to Fight Corruption, Paris: OECD. 
Osoba, S. O. (1996), "Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspectives", Review of African 
Political Economy, 69, 371-386. 
Rauch, J. (1995), "Bureaucracy, Infrastructure and Economic Growth: Evidence from US 
Cities during the Progressive Era", American Economic Review, 85 (4), 968-79, 
Riley, S. P. (1998), "The Political Economy of Anti-Corruption Strategies in Africa", in M 
Robinson (ed.), Corruption and Development, London: Frank Cass. 
Robb, G. (1992), White-collar Crime in Modern England, London: Cambridge University 
Press. y 
Roberts, C. (1962), "The Sub-Imperialism of the Baganda", Journal of African Historv i 
(3), 435-450. °^
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa 77 
Robinson, M. (1998), "Corruption and Development: An Introduction", in M. Robinson 
(ed.), Corruption and Development, London: Frank Cass. 
Rodney, W. (1972), How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, London: Bagle-L'ouverture 
Publications. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999), Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and 
Reform, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1997), "The Political Economy of Corruption", in K. A. Elliot (ed), 
Corruption and the Global Economy, Washington, DC: Institute for International 
Economics, [Ch. 2]. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. and A. Stone (1996), The Costs of Corruption for Private Business: 
Evidence from World Bank Surveys, Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Shihata, F. I. (1999), "Corruption - A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of 
the World Bank" in B. Rider (ed.), Corruption: The Enemy from within, London: 
Kluwer Law International. 
Singh, G. (1997), "Understanding Political Corruption in Contemporary Indian Politics", 
Political Studies, 45, 626-638. 
Stichter, S. (1982), Migrant Labour in Kenya: Capitalism and African Response, 
1895-1975, Harlow: Longman Group Limited. 
Thompson, C. (1992), Harvests Under Fire, London: Zed Books. 
Thompson, D. F. (1995), Ethics in Congress: From Individual to Institutional Corruption, 
Thompson, D. F. (1993), "Mediated Corruption: The Case of the Keating Five", American 
Tlou, T. and A. Campbell (1984), History of Botswana, Gaborone: Macmillan Botswana 
United Nations (1990), Practical Measures Against Corruption, New York: United 
Vandemoortele, J. (1994), "Austerity: Does it have a Human Face? A UNDP Note on 
World Bank (1997), The State in a Changing World: World Development Report 1997, 
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. 
Political Science Review, 87 (2), 369-381. 
Publishing Company 
Nations. 
Budgetary Expenditure and Recent Development in Malawi", mimeo. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.