Afr. j . polit. sci. (2003), Vol 8 No. 1 
Public Service Accountability and 
Governance in Kenya Since Independence 
C. Odhiambo-Mbai* 
Abstract 
Bad governance is a major contributor to poor service delivery in Africa. In 
Kenya, the level of accountability in the management of public affairs has 
consistently declined since independence. This is in spite of various legal 
instruments and watchdog institutions established to regulate and monitor 
the ethical conduct of public officials. 
This paper argues that the pattern of consolidation of power embarked 
upon by Kenya's post-colonial rulers was a major underlying factor in the 
deterioration of ethical standards in the public service. The construction of 
patron-clientilist relations were quite pronounced in this regard. The same 
goes for the deliberate manipulation of ethnicity. The paper concludes by 
advocating the adoption of a number of measures in order to enhance 
accountability in the public service of Kenya. 
Introduction 
In Kenya, the level of accountability among public officials in the management 
of public affairs has consistently declined since independence. The 
rate of annual economic growth of the country has generally declined over 
the period. At the same time the efficient and effective delivery of public 
services to the ordinary citizen have continuously deteriorated. A combination 
of these two factors has resulted in widespread unemployment and 
poverty in the country. 
Since independence, Kenya has formulated various legal instruments and 
established a number of watchdog institutions for regulating and monitoring 
the ethical behaviour of its public officials. Besides, in the early 1990s, 
domestic opposition groups assisted by the international community 
demanded and eventually achieved the restoration of competitive party politics 
or multi-partysm in the country. The reason the majority of Kenyans 
*Dr. C. Odhiambo-Mbai is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science & Public 
Administration, University of Nairobi, Kenya. 
1027-0353 •'' 2003 African Association of Political Science
114 C. Odhiambo-Mbai 
demanded Liberal democracy was due to the belief that good governance 
could only be guaranteed through the system. 
However, despite the existence of a number of legal instruments and 
watchdogs institutions for regulating and monitoring the ethical standards 
of public officials, and the adoption of multipartysm, the management of 
public affairs and institutions by those who are entrusted with positions of 
authority in the country has not improved. For instance, according to 
Transparency International, since 1997, Kenya has remained among the top 
ten most corrupt countries in the world. During the period, the transparency 
index of the county has generally declined. Whereas in 2001 
Kenya's transparency rating was 2.0, in 2002 it dropped to 1.9. 
The continued deterioration of the level of accountability among public 
officials in the country shows that the adoption of multipartysm has not 
contributed to good governance. Given these facts, it is in order to raise the 
following pertinent questions: What have been the major causes of the lack 
of, or poor accountability among public official in the country? Why have 
the existing instruments and watchdog institutions for regulating and monitoring 
ethical standards of public officials failed to ensure accountability? 
What strategies need to be adopted in order to enhance accountability in 
governance among public officials? 
In mid-2001, Kenya commenced a comprehensive review of its constitution. 
On December 27, 2002, Kenyans voted overwhelmingly to elect a new 
government to replace President Moi who ruled the country for 24 years. The 
new government of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) led by Mwai 
Kibaki campaigned on the platform of eradication of corruption. These 
developments provide an opportunity for the issue of accountability in governance 
in the country to be effectively addressed. This study intends to 
make a contribution toward this endeavour by inquiring into the questions 
raised above and make some recommendations to address the problem. 
Accountability: The Concept and Theory 
According to Dele Olowu (1993) "public accountability is the requirement 
that those who hold public trust should account for the use of the trust to 
citizen or their representatives". He further observes that "public accountability 
signifies the superiority of the public will over private interests and 
tries to ensure that the former is supreme in every activity and conduct of a 
public official". Similarly according to Mouftau Laleye (1993), "public 
accountability refers to sanctions and procedures by which public officials 
may be held to account for their actions". 
From the two definitions, it can be observed that accountability refers to 
the notion that public officials should be held responsible for their actions 
while in office. But for public officials to be held responsible for their
Public Service Accountability and Governance in Kenya 115 
actions while in positions of authority, there must be certain norms and values 
that they shall be required to observe. At the same time, there must be 
clear sanctions by which they can be punished in case they fail to adhere to 
those norms and values. Similarly there should be specific benefits public 
officials may be rewarded with when they adhere to the acceptable norms 
and values. 
The required norms and values for regulating and monitoring unethical 
behavior of public officials comprise the written and unwritten codes of 
conduct. But whether written or unwritten, ethical codes of conduct for 
regulating accountability in the public service may be classified into four 
categories. The first category consists of personal self- imposed ethics. This 
category of ethical codes stem from personal beliefs and convictions on 
what is right and wrong way of conducting one self in respect of conducting 
public affairs. The second are the group of self-imposed ethics. This 
category of ethical codes are group-agreed right or wrong way which should 
be practiced by any member of the group (or profession) when serving society. 
The third category are the written ethical rules or conduct for public 
servants that are not enacted by the legislature, but do have administratively 
implemented sanction against offenders and machinery for imposing sanctions. 
They include civil servants codes of regulations, standing orders and 
standing instructions issued through circulars. The final category of ethical 
codes is of course the enacted statutes or Acts of the legislature or provision 
of a country's constitutions (Barlow 1993). 
Again whether written or unwritten, ethical codes of conduct generally 
promote the values of impartiality, objectivity, integrity, efficiency, effectiveness 
and discipline of public servants when acting in the public interest in 
general and when exercising discretionary powers in particular (Rasheed 
1993, 287). Thus, generally, ethical codes of conduct are aimed at checking 
"outright bribery and corruption; patronage; nepotism; embezzlement; influence 
peddling; use of one's position for self enrichment; bestowing of favours 
on relatives and friends; moonlighting; partiality; partisanships; absenteeism; 
late coming to work; abuse of public property; leaking and/or misuse of government 
information, all of which are currently widespread in a number of 
public service institutions in sub-Saharan Africa (Rasheed: 299). 
To ensure that ethical codes of conduct for public servants actually work, 
they must be entrusted to specially established institutions that can implement 
or administer them effectively. Such institutions include the supervisory 
or managerial positions in the executive arm of government; the agents 
of law and order, for example, the police and prisons; quasi-legal agents, for 
example, and Ombudsman or an anti-corruption authority; the judiciary; 
the legislative; and other constitutionally established offices, for example, 
the Auditor-General.
116 C. Odhiambo-Mbai 
Arising from its conceptualization, accountability is considered a key 
determinant of the state of governance. Thus, strict observation of accountability 
in the management of public affaires promotes good governance 
while the lack of it is the major course of bad governance (Polidano and 
Hulme, 1997) . 
Governance, according to the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) refers to "the exercise of political, economic and administrative 
authority in the management of a country's public affairs at all levels It 
incorporates the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions through 
which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences 
and exercise their legal rights and obligations" (UNDP 1997.) 
Goran Hyden (1999) finds this definition inadequate. This is because, 
from the definition, it is (a) "difficult to reign in what the concept really 
refers to, and (b) impossible to create a set of manageable measures. Given 
these "limitations", Hyden defines governance to mean "the conscious stewardship 
of regime structures (rules) with a view of regulating the public 
realm, i.e. the arena in which state and society actors operate and interact 
to make authoritative decisions... . It refers to the way a political system is 
constituted, the way fundamental values and norms are understood and 
acted upon at different levels in society". 
However, despite his criticism, it is quite apparent that there are no major 
differences between Hyden's definition of governance and that of the UNDP. 
Indeed, from the two definitions it can safely be concluded that the concept 
of governance refers to authoritative management of public affairs, at all 
levels and in all sectors, by those who are entrusted with positions of leadership 
in society. 
Governance can be good or bad; it is good when the governed can reap 
the positive benefits they expect from their government, but it is obviously 
bad when the opposite is the result. Towards the end of the 1980s, the international 
donor community together with the domestic opposition groups in 
a number of sub-Saharan African countries reached the conclusion that bad 
governance was the major cause of the inefficient and ineffective delivery of 
public services, and lack of development in the region. Bad governance was 
held to be characterised by an autocratic political system, abuse of human 
rights, corruption, and inefficient organisation and management of public 
institutions. 
Thus, from the early 1990s, in order to improve the efficient and effective 
public services delivery and promote economic development, domestic 
opposition groups, supported by the international community in a number 
of sub-Saharan African countries began to demand good governance. The 
notion of good governance that these groups demanded was characterised 
by competitive party politics (or liberal democracy), accountability and
Public Service Accountability and Governance in Kenya 117 
transparency in the management of public affairs, respect for human rights, 
privatization of non-performing public institutions, and organizational and 
structural reforms of the public service. 
Given this notion of good governance, a number of scholars (Jabbra and 
Dwivedi 1989; Polidano and Hulme 1997), the international donor community, 
and even the domestic opposition groups in sub-Saharan African 
countries began to assume that multipartysm is equal to accountability, 
and accountability equals good governance, which in turn equals development. 
Although there is a lot of merit in these assumptions, it is not 
always true that democratisation is equal to accountability, and that 
accountability is in turn equal to good governance. Indeed, if this were the 
case then the situation is sub-Saharan African after over ten years since the 
restoration of multipartysm raises a serious problem. The problem is that 
either sub-Saharan African countries have so far failed to democratize, or 
that democratisation does not equal accountability, which in turn does not 
equal good governance. This is because since the re-introduction of multipartysm 
in the region, the evidence on the ground indicates that widespread 
abuse of public office by public officials is still largely the norm. 
It is apparent that democratisation is not necessarily equal to accountability, 
and that accountability in turn does not equal good governance. 
According to Anyang Nyong'o (2002: 79), good governance "simply means 
good and competent management of public affairs, with or without encompassing 
all the major tenets of democracy". Thus, it is quite possible that an 
autocratic or undemocratic regime can generally promote good governance 
and thereby achieve rapid economic growth (and/or development) for a 
society. A number of scholars who subscribe to this view cite the cases of 
South East Asian Countries, namely Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
South Korea, to prove their point. (Although lately the success stories of 
these countries have been questioned.) 
Although it is possible for an undemocratic regime to promote good governance, 
it is almost impossible for a regime to be considered democratic 
when its leaders cannot be held accountable for their public actions by the 
governed. Moreover, any regime that is always accountable to the governed 
will as a matter of course promote good governance. Thus, the equation that 
is likely to hold in most of the cases is the one whereby democratisation 
equals accountability, and accountability equals good governance(Polidano 
and Hulme, ibid.) 
Democratisation guarantees accountability and hence good governance to 
the extent that the process empowers institutions instead of personalities to 
govern. The process also empowers the citizens on the other hand to demand 
accountability from their governors on how they manage public institutions. 
In a number of Sub-Saharan African countries, it can correctly be stated that
118 C. Odhiambo-Mbai 
the deterioration of efficient and effective public services delivery and decline 
of the economies began in earnest during the second decade of independence 
- in the early 1970s. But this period is also closely associated with the consolidation 
of one - party autocratic regimes and widespread military dictatorship 
in the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries. 
In the case of Kenya, the consolidation of the autocratic state and the 
beginning of the decline of economic growth can be traced to the early 
1970s. Although the decline of economic growth at the time was variously 
blamed on the rise of crude oil prices arising from the Middle East war of 
1973, the deterioration in ethical standards among public officials in the 
management of public affairs also began to be a problem at the time. Thus, 
in order to comprehensively understand the problem of accountability in 
governance in Kenya we must begin by an analysis of the background of the 
country's political economy. It is within this conceptual and theoretical 
framework that we intend to address the issue. 
The Political Economy of Public Service Accountability 
in Kenya Since Independence 
The immediate post-colonial public service that the first Kenyan independent 
government inherited from the British was modeled according to the 
Westminister-Whitehall tradition (Hyden 1970). This was a public service 
that was guided by the professional ethics of impartiality, effectiveness and 
discipline in the management of public affairs. Its primary function was to 
implement government policies efficiently and effectively. And in undertaking 
this function, it was expected to be non-partisan. 
This type of public service fitted appropriately in the immediate postcolonial 
political system that the country also adopted at independence. At 
independence, Kenya adopted a parliamentary system of government 
whereby the prime minister was the head of government; both the prime 
minister and his cabinet were answerable to parliament; the judiciary was 
independent; and the political process was based on competitive party politics 
involving more than one political party. Besides these arrangements, 
the constitution also comprehensively devolved state power into a three-tier 
system of government that comprised the central government at the 
national level, regional governments and local authorities at the local level. 
However, despite its impressive ethical standards, the immediate postcolonial 
public service suffered from three major weaknesses. First, It was 
racially constituted; its top echelon was reserved almost exclusively for the 
white population; the middle grades were predominately occupied by the 
Asian community while the lower and subordinate position were left for 
Africans. Secondly, salaries and other benefits were similarly discriminatory; 
the white employees earned abnormally higher salaries and enjoyed
Public Service Accountability and Governance in Kenya 119 
better benefits followed by the Asians, while Africans earned much lower 
salaries and were accorded generally poor benefits. Thirdly, due to its background 
as colonial machinery, the public service still emphasized the maintenance 
of law and order as its primary role even on the eve of independence. 
The independent government instead preferred a public service that 
would be more development oriented. 
The first Kenyan independent government also inherited a relatively liberal 
economy for the British colonial system. This was an economy in which 
the prices for industrial and farm inputs on the one hand and consumer 
goods on the other were largely determined by the market forces of supply 
and demand. But as in the public service, the economy was dominated by 
the white population in the country; the white population controlled most 
of the industries and other commercial firms and also owned most of the 
commercial agricultural farms. Meanwhile the majority of Africans merely 
provided cheap labour on the white owned farms. Moreover a significant 
number of them lived as squatters on the white owned farms where they 
also provided cheap labour (Swainson 1980). 
In an attempt to address the above mentioned anomalies in the public service 
and economy, the first independent government simply adopted the strategy 
of Africanisation or Kenyanisation. But the way in which the strategy was 
implemented eventually undermined accountability in the public service. 
To begin with, when the Africanisation of the public service began immediately 
after independence, it assumed an ethnic, nepotic and patrimonial 
dimensions. Indeed the first Africans that were appointed into the key position 
that were vacated by the departing senior white colonial public servants 
were predominantly drawn from the members of the Kikuyu community 
(Anyang Nyong'o, 1989). But even within the Kikuyu community, the 
positions were given mainly to those who had close relations with those 
who controlled the state power. Although it may be true that the majority 
of those who were appointed into the key positions had some experience in 
the areas in which they were appointed, it was generally acknowledged that 
a significant number of them were not the most qualified to fill those positions 
at the time they were appointed. 
Thus, from the very beginning, meritocracy as an objective principle for 
appointment and promotion in the public service began to be abused. It is 
only natural that when one is appointed into a high position in public service 
without due regard to merit, he or she is similarly likely to ignore meritocracy 
when appointing or recommending a junior officer for promotion. 
Given this fact, it can only be concluded that the wide-spread disregard for 
meritocracy as a key criterion in appointments and promotions that in the 
later years characterized the public service must have started when 
Africanisation began to be implemented.
120 C. Odhiambo-Mbai 
The beginning of Africanisation also coincided with certain drastic 
changes in the country's political system. As mentioned earlier, at independence 
in 1963, Kenya adopted a multiparty, parliamentary and federal 
system of government. The two political parties that contested the independence 
general elections were the Kenya African National Union (KANU) 
and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KANU won the elections 
and Jomo Kenyatta became the first Prime Minister and head of government. 
But after just one year the KANU government decided to abandon the 
parliamentary and federal systems of government, and to replace them with 
the presidential and unitary systems respectively. At the same time, the 
KANU leaders also managed to frustrate and/or convince the leaders of the 
opposition party - KADU to dissolve their party and join the government. 
Thus, from December 1964 Kenya became a de-facto one party state. 
Meanwhile between 1964 - 1968 the government began a systematic 
amendment of the country's constitution. Almost all the constitutional 
amendments carried out during the period were aimed at transferring state 
powers from the other branches of government, namely the legislature and 
the judiciary to the executive, especially the presidency (Gerzel 1970). 
The transformation of Kenya into a presidential and a unitary system of 
government under one political party, coupled with the systematic constitutional 
amendments between 1964 and 1968 resulted into the concentration 
of state powers in the executive, especially presidency. Most of the state 
powers concentrated in the executive were to be exercised by the senior officials 
of the central civil service and parastatal organisations. The consequence 
is that the senior members of the central civil service and parastatal 
organisations soon became more powerful than the members of the legislature 
and the judiciary. As such, from then onwards it became difficult for 
the legislature and the judiciary to control the civil service. In short, the 
Westminister - Whitehall tradition upon which the Kenya's public service 
was based at independence simply disappeared. 
It is apparent that the reason the KANU ruling elite Africanised the senior 
positions in the public service mainly with those who were related or 
close to them, and at the same time transferred most of the state power to 
the control of this category of public servants, was to ensure that state 
power was placed firmly in the hands of those who had direct loyalty to the 
person of the president and other individuals in ruling elite circles. The ultimate 
goal of this strategy was to establish a secure autocratic state. This goal 
was successfully achieved after the 1969 general elections. 
However, the control and exercise of authoritative power alone by this 
category of public servants was not a guarantee that their direct loyalty to 
the person of the president and other members of the ruling elite would be 
sustained permanently. In order to ensure that the loyalty of this new crop
Public Service Accountability and Governance in Kenya 121 
of public servants to the person of the president was guaranteed and the 
status-quo was maintained, it was necessary to also make them have a stake 
in the economy. The Africanisation of the economy provided the best opportunity 
for achieving this goal. 
Thus, in 1970 the president appointed a commission to investigate the 
appropriate structure and remuneration of the public service. The 
Commission was headed by the then governor of Central Bank, Duncan 
Ndegwa. After undertaking its task, the Commission submitted its report to 
the president in May 1971. One of the Key recommendations that the 
Commission made was that public servants could hence forth be allowed to 
own private property and run businesses. This recommendation was a 
major departure from the known universal principle that does not allow 
professional public servants to own private property or engage in business. 
This is because by owning private property or engaging in business, a public 
servant is likely to abuse his public position. 
True, The Ndegwa Commission Report gave very strict conditions under 
which a public servant could own a private property or run a business. The 
Report even recommended the establishment of the office of an 
Ombudsman that could investigate and monitor the performance of public 
servants. However, how the government was going to ensure that public 
servants did not abuse their positions in the process of trying to acquire private 
properties or run their own businesses became impossible, especially 
when the office of the Ombudsman also failed to be established. Be that as 
it may, permitting public servants to own private properties and run businesses 
obviously resulted into the widespread corruption and abuse of public 
office that have continued to plague the public service to date. For 
instance, in 1975 Habel Nyamu, the former principal of the Kenya Institute 
of Administration observed. 
Up to 1970 it was a necessary requirement that civil servants did not engage in 
trade or any other business. This requirement, which was inherited from the 
colonial government, seems to have been based on solid assumption such as that 
it was not possible for a civil servant to give of his very best if he was serving two 
masters, namely the public and his own material interests... . Since Ndegwa report 
broke this requirement and allowed civil servants to own any kind of property 
and take part in any kind of business, no one can stand up and argue that 
efficiency of individual civil servant who took uncontrolled advantage of this relaxation 
of tradition was not affected some what adversely (Nyamu, 1975). 
Four years later, a presidential committee chaired by S.N. Waruhiu to investigate 
the state of the public service confirmed Nyamu's fears when it stated 
in its report: 
We have received overwhelming evidence to the effect that some public servants 
utilize government facilities in order to benefit themselves. Some are
122 C. Odhiambo-Mbai 
said to tender for government supplies and to see to it that their tenders are 
always successful. Others are said to be in the habit of accepting rewards for 
work that they are paid to do by the government. We have been told that most 
salesmen particularly in the field of the now popular turn-key projects offer 
reward to public servants who thus become obliged to see that decisions are 
made in favour of those who offer rewards. It has also been suggested that in 
the field of purchasing, commission are paid into bank accounts maintained 
by Public Servants abroad. Reward for work that the public servant is already 
paid to do and receiving bribes are acts of wanton corruption (Gok, 1980: 
Waruhiu Committee Report, 1980, 103.) 
Nevertheless, this is the kind of public service that President Moi inherited 
when he took over power after Kenyatta's death in August 1978. Initially, 
when he assumed the presidency, president Moi promised that he would 
eradicate corruption and abuse of office in the public service (Kibwana et.al 
1996). However, he soon discovered that eradicating the vices was easier 
said that done. In August 1982, just four years into his presidency and 
before he could consolidate himself in power, a section of the army staged 
a coup attempt against the president's leadership. The uprising was swiftly 
crushed, but after the coup attempt, it dawned on Moi that his immediate 
priority was to consolidate himself in power. 
In order to consolidate himself in power, Moi resorted to the patron-client 
relations strategy that his predecessor, Jomo Kenyatta, had successfully used in 
the 1960s. As we have seen the strategy involved recruiting the key positions 
of the public service mostly from those who were either closely related to him 
personally or to his close confidants and turning a blind eye as they enrich 
themselves by abusing their public offices. However, in implementing this 
strategy, Moi lacked the overwhelming opportunities that Kenyatta enjoyed. 
In the first place, unlike Kenyatta who hailed from a more populous community 
that was also endowed with a large number of public servants that 
had been inherited from the colonial period, President Moi hails from the 
minority Tugen community that had also largely lagged behind during the 
colonial period. Secondly, when Kenyatta took over power, he had at his disposal 
a lot of public resources, especially the former white owned farms, 
that he could dish out to public officials in key positions in order to buy 
their loyalty. In the case of Moi, when he came to power most of such public 
resources had generally dwindled (Barkan, 1992). 
Given the circumstances, it meant that if Moi had to appoint those who 
were closely related to him into key positions in the public service, then he 
was bound to appoint people with lesser qualifications and experience than 
had been the case during Kenyatta's period. Secondly, if he had to continue 
to buy the loyalty of those he appointed into key positions in the public 
service, then he was bound to look for resources elsewhere. Moi solved the
Public Service Accountability and Governance in Kenya 123 
dilemma by resorting to appointing people with much more inferior qualifications 
and experience mostly from his wider Kalenjin community, into 
the key positions of the public service. He also turned a blind eye to the 
widespread culture whereby public officials found it quite normal to use 
their public positions to allocate themselves government land, commercial 
plots and houses, and to acquire easy loans from government controlled 
financial institutions without appropriate collateral. All these practices generally 
undermined accountability in governance in the country. 
Needless to say, the continued deterioration of accountability in governance 
led to the decline in the standard of provision of public services and 
economic growth. These in turn resulted in increased unemployment and 
general poverty in the country. In the late 1980s, tired of bad governance, 
domestic opposition groups, supported by the international community 
began to demand for the restoration of multipartysm in the country. The 
reason the domestic opposition groups and the international community 
demanded multipartysm was due to the belief that the restoration of the system 
was the surest way of democratising the state. By democratising the 
state it was possible to restore accountability in the management of public 
affairs. And by restoring accountability, good governance was bound to be 
achieved. 
In December 1991 the government finally bowed to pressure to restore 
multipartysm in the country. And in December 1992, the first multiparty 
general elections were again held in the country since the Mini elections of 
1966. However, since the restoration of multipartysm, it cannot be claimed 
that the levels of accountability in the management of public affairs have 
improved in the country. Widespread corruption and abuse of public office 
are still common. For instance, recently, the National Social Security Fund 
(NSSF) - a public institution lost Kshs 256 million shillings to a collapsing 
commercial bank in a clear case of corruption and abuse of office. 
The failure of Kenya to restore the high level of accountability similar to 
the one it boasted of immediately after independence despite the restoration 
of multipartysm more than a decade ago, shows that either the kind of 
multipartysm adopted has failed to democratise the country, or that democratisation 
is not a sine-qua non for accountability in governance. It is quite 
apparent that the former is the case. 
In December 1991 when President Moi finally bowed to persure to restore 
multipartysm, only Section 2 (A) of the Constitutions that disallowed the 
system was amended. All the other provisions of the Constitution upon 
which the existing autocratic state had been based were left intact. Given the 
circumstances, it is difficult to comprehend how the practice of miltipartysm 
alone was expected to democratise the state without enabling constitutional 
provisions. Immediately after the 1992 general elections, opposition groups
124 C. Odhiambo-Mbai 
in the country recognised this anomaly and began to demand for the comprehensive 
review of the country's Constitution to allow for a more democratic 
society. Again the ruling elite resisted these demands. Eventually in 
early 2001 the government bowed to pressure and allowed the start of the review 
of the Constitution. Since mid-2001, Kenya's Constitution has been 
under a comprehensive review process. Thus, it is anticipated that it is only 
after the successful review of the country's constitution that the genuine democratisation 
process of the state can effectively begin. It is only then that 
we can be certain that democratisation is truly a prerequisite for accountability 
in the management of public affairs. 
The State of Public Accountability in Kenya Since 
Independence: A Brief Anatomy 
Arguably, the most authoritative sources from which one can obtain evidence 
on the state of public accountability in Kenya are Public Account 
Committee and Public Investment Committee reports, the Controller and 
Auditor General reports, the Hansard, court proceeding, and other authoritative 
studies on the subject. However, due to logistical problems and the 
lack of adequate resources, we were unable to consult all the mentioned 
sources. Nevertheless, we did manage to consult the Controller and Auditor 
General reports and other authoritative studies on the subject. 
Generally, it is acknowledged that almost virtually all the unethical practices 
such as bribery and corruption, patronage, reposition, embezzlement, 
influence peddling, the use of ones position for self-enrichment, bestowing 
of favours on relatives and friends, moonlighting, late coming to work, 
abuse of public property, and the leakage and/or misuse of government 
information that constitute the lack of accountability in governance currently 
characterise the country's public service. Furthermore, during the last 
five years, the respected and authoritative Transparency International has 
consistently placed Kenya among the top ten most corrupt countries in the 
world that it has studied each year, during the period. 
Thus, there is really no debate as to whether Kenya suffers from the lack 
of/or low level of accountability in the management of public affairs. Given 
the problem, the critical questions should be: What are the causes of the 
low level of accountability in the country? Why has it become impossible or 
so difficult to inculcate or enforce accountability in the management of public 
affairs in the country? And how can the high levels of accountability be 
inculcated or enforced among public officials in the country? 
It is quit clear that since independence, the level of public accountability 
in Kenya has consistently deteriorated. To begin with, the last colonial 
Controller and Auditor General's Report for the financial year 1962/63 did 
not show any misuse of public funds. But immediately after independence
Public Service Accountability and Governance in Kenya 125 
the misuse of public funds began to be noticed. For instance, in his report 
for the year 1963/64, one year after the country had attained its independence, 
the Controller and Auditor General (C&AG), noted a decline in the 
accounting standards which in turn had resulted into the deterioration in 
financial control. He also reported many instances of petty frauds, thefts 
and evasion of the regulations. 
In the Report for 1965/66 financial year the C&AG again reported several 
cases of fraud, irregularities and theft. More specifically the Report noted 
that whereas in 1963 there had been 188 cases of theft by government servants 
involving £10,160, in the first eleven months of 1966 alone, there 
were 356 cases involving £34,720. Besides, these cases of theft by government 
servants, the Report also named several government ministries that 
had excess expenditure above the amounts they had been permitted to 
spend by parliament. The ministries and government departments that fell 
into this category were State House, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of 
Education, Voice of Kenya, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Ministry of 
Housing and Social Services. 
In the Report for 1966/67 financial year, the C&AG again reported the continued 
existence of cases of theft by government servants. His only consolation 
this time around was that the cases had not increased above the number 
reported in the previous year. However, in this Report, the C&AG noted the 
emergence of a new culture of misuse of public funds. In this case, the C&AG 
reported that the Ministry of Lands and Settlement had spent K£ 20 on official 
entertainment above the approved allocation of K£100. (One K£ is equivalent 
of 20 Kenya shillings.) The expenditure included !<£ 94 spent on two 
parties held at the Minister's residence and another K£13 spent by the 
Director of Survey without the prior approval of the Accounting Officer. At 
the same time, the C&AG reported that the Ministry had sold to the Minister, 
the Ministry's official car for a sum of K£ 450 after being in the road for less 
than 24 months. According to the C & AG the amount for which the vehicle 
was sold represented a depreciation rate of K& 920. 
In the Report for the 1967/68 financial year, the C&AG noted that the number 
of government ministries and departments involved in excess expenditure 
continued to grow. However, the most important revelation in the report was 
the extravagant use of public funds involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
In this case, the C&AG reported that the Ministry had been involved in the 
extravagant purchase of furniture for its embassies and official residences 
abroad. In one instance eleven sofa sets, one of which cost Kshs 11,142-85, 
were purchased for an embassy; in another, carpets costing Kshs 45,367-40 
were bought for four apartments, while Kshs 20,535-70 was spent in furnishing 
an officer's house. Besides these, the Ministry made further purchases 
valued at KshslO4, 126-20 without authority of the Central Tender Board.
126 C. Odhiambo-Mbai 
In the Report for the 1968/69 financial year, the C & AG again deplored 
the continued increase in the cases of misuse of public funds. He observed 
that the position regarding the control of expenditure had deteriorated considerably. 
During the financial year the number of government ministries 
and departments that had over-spent their votes increased from 11 to 12 
compared to the situation in the 1967/68 financial year. And the total excess 
amount that was spent without the authorization of parliament was K£ 
1,093,165-12-59 compared to K£ 136,827-7-59 during the previous year. 
The misuse of public funds continued during the 1969/70 financial year. 
According to the C &AG's Report for that year, although the number of government 
ministries and departments that over-spent their authorised votes 
remained the same as the previous year - 12 - the total excess amount spent 
increased significantly. During the 1969/70 financial year, the total sum 
spent without the authority of parliament was Kshs 1,159,212-0-56 compared 
to K& 1,093,165-12-59 that was spent in the 1968/69 financial year. 
During the 1970/71 financial year, the number of government ministries 
and departments that were involved in excess expenditure increased significantly. 
According to the C & AG's Report for that year, there were eighteen 
(18) excess votes compared with twelve (12) in the previous year. More significantly, 
the total amount spent in excess of that authorised by parliament 
was more than double that for the previous year. In fact the excess votes 
rose from K£ 1,159,21-0-56 during the 1969/70 financial year to K£ 
2,645,598-07-67 in 1970/71. Another revelation made by C & AG's Rreport 
from the same year was that of cases whereby accounting officers were 
involved in the purchase of stores without seeking authority from the 
Central Tender Board. For instance, in that year alone," a total of approximately 
K£ 40,442 was spent on the purchase of various items of store without 
authority from the Central Tender Board (CTB). At the Ministry of 
Health, officials bought a motor vehicle at a cost of Kshs 25,750 without 
authority of the Treasury and without tendering for the purchase with CTB. 
During the 1971/72 financial year several government ministries and 
departments continued with the over expenditure of their votes. This time 
the total amount in excess votes increased to Kshs 4,510,524 from K& 
2,645,598-07-67 in the previous year. In addition to this kind of misuse of 
public funds, the Report also highlighted several causes of irregularities and 
extravagance by various ministries especially in the purchase of stores. For 
instance, the Report noted that in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "an amount 
of Kshs 642,857.15 was paid to an individual in respect of the purchase of 
a plot at one mission but only a sum of Kshs 378,571.45 was receipted leaving 
a balance of Kshs.264,285.70 unaccounted for. Another payment of 
Kshs.571,428.55 was also made in respect of the purchase of the 
Ambassador's residence at the mission but only a receipt for 457,142.85
Public Service Accountability and Governance in Kenya 127 
was issued". A balance of Kshs. 114,285.70 could not be accounted for. In the 
same Ministry, thirteen carpets were purchased at a cost of Kshs 126,000 for 
six officer's residence in a mission. Curtains were also purchased for the residence 
of one officer in the same mission at a cost of Kshs 3,632.20. These 
expenditures were considered excessive. In the Ministry of Health, stores, 
drugs and equipment worth Kshs. 4,558,651.30 were purchased without the 
authority of the CTB. Some of the items were purchased from the non-government 
contracted supplies who charged high prices. The same Ministry 
also spent a sum of Kshs.54,300 on purchase of three non-standardized 
vehicles without authority. 
The 1973/74 C&AG Report also highlighted several cases of misuse of 
public funds, negligence and abuse of office. For instance, it revealed that a 
Mercedes Benz vehicle costing Kshs8,850 was bought for a head of department 
without authority and without provision having been made in 
the estimates for the purchase. It also revealed a case whereby a sum of 
Kshs.380,11.05 was still owing from various officers in respect of salary 
advances. Some of this money dated back to 1967/68 financial year. At the 
same time the report revealed that in the Ministry of Agriculture, due to lack 
of control over collection of revenue, an officer in-charge of an agricultural 
research station was able to misappropriate a total of Kshs.13,399.10 by collecting 
money from sub-collectors without issuing any form of receipts. 
These adverse reports about misuse of public funds, fraud and theft by servants 
by the C&AG continued throughout the 1970s. 
The situation did not improve in the 1980s. To begin with, the C&AG's 
Report for 1980/81 financial year revealed that in the year the government 
vehicle check unit reported 89 cases of misuse of government vehicles. At 
the same time in the Ministry of Health items worth Kshs 177,44 that were 
bought during 1977/78 financial year were still lying at the Central Medical 
Stores due to the fact that they had been found defective and of inferior 
quality and therefore could not be issued to hospitals. 
During the 1982/83 financial year, the C&AG's Report revealed that export 
compensation to the tune of Kshs 76,742 was paid in respect of goods that 
were not eligible for such compensation. The Report further revealed that payments 
of export compensation amounting to Kshs. 1,211,518.55 were made to 
six firms that did not comply with the local manufactures export compensation 
regulations. The C&AG also observed that the lack of effective financial 
control at the national assembly continued during the financial year. 
In the report for the 1986/87 financial year, the C&AG observed that the expenditure 
control which had shown an improvement during the 1985/86 deteriorated 
during the year under review. The C&AG also revealed that the accounting 
standards, especially for the year had remarkably deteriorated. For 
instance, in some cases, the accounts were prepared hurriedly and without
128 C. Odhiambo-Mbai 
due care, to beat the deadline for their submission. Consequently, they were 
found to contain numerous glaring errors such that, "the appropriation accounts 
were submitted unsigned and without the footnotes explaining material 
differences between the estimates and actual expenditure". 
Although the above cited cases do not specifically identify public officials 
that were responsible for such gross misuse of public funds, they do illustrate 
the extent of deterioration of public accountability in the country. 
According to the country's constitution, no public officer or institution is 
permitted to spend public funds without the authority of parliament. Yet 
from the cases cited, it became quite normal for various government ministries 
and departments to spend public fund without the approval of parliament. 
To make matters worse, parliament too, year-in-year-out religiously 
approved government budgets despite the lack accountability of how the 
previously approved funds were spent. 
It is apparent that by the end of 1980s, due to the failure of parliament to 
act on the repetitive misuse of public fund by the various government ministries 
and departments, public officials found it normal to misuse public 
funds with impunity. This is because in the 1990 the levels of misuse of 
public funds increased to alarming proportions. For example, in the 
1995/96 financial year, various government ministries and departments 
incurred excess expenditure to the tune of K£ 45,504,506 without the 
authority of parliament. This figure did not take into account the bill 
amounting to Kshs 181,994, 683 that was incurred by various ministries in 
the previous year and was carried forward to the following financial year. 
The C&AG observed that had the bills been paid in the 1995/96 financial 
year and charged to the respective votes, the excess expenditure of K& 
175,667,691 would have been incurred in that year alone without the 
authority of parliament. 
But besides the above-mentioned excess expenditure, the same report for 
1995/96 reported a legion of cases of irregular transactions. To sample a few 
cases: (a) payment of US$46,800,000 equivalent to K£ 123,228,256-04-00 at 
the ruling rate of exchange was made to an Aircraft manufacturing firm for 
purchase of a Jet Aircraft and then illegally charged for payment to the 
Consolidated fund in complete disregard of section 99 and 100 of the constitution, 
(b) Expenditure of K£ 133,987,464-14-10 relating to the construction 
of Eldoret International Airport was illegally charged directly on the 
consolidated fund in contravention of section 99 and 100 of the constitution, 
(c) Payments totaling K£ 133,987,465-14-10 were made on behalf of the 
Office of the President and illegally charged directly on the consolidated 
fund in complete disregard of the constitutional requirements (d) the government 
spent a total of K£ 29,737,633-14-00 to procure and install computers 
and other related stationery and spare parts that it eventually
Public Service Accountability and Governance in Kenya 129 
received little or no value from the expenditure, (e) In January 1996, 1,430 
used motor vehicles valued at approximately K£ 17,664,250 were gazetted 
for sale by public auction. However, on the date of auction, 1,178 units with 
an estimated reserve value of K£ 14,576,500 could neither be physically verified 
nor could their whereabouts be explained. 
From the above account, it is quite clear that the level of public accountability 
in Kenya continues to deteriorate. This is despite the liberalization of the 
political process and the expansion of the civil society. Given the circumstances, 
what then are the causes of low public accountability in the country? 
The Causes of Deterioration in Public Accountability in 
Kenya 
A number of scholars writing on ethics and accountability have advanced 
various reasons to explain the causes of the deterioration of ethical standards 
and accountability in African public services (Rasheed and Olowu; 
UNDESA 2001). However, in the case of Kenya the deterioration of public 
service accountability may be attributed to the following factors:- (a) The 
autocratic or patron-client relations political process (b) the involvement of 
public servants in private business (c) Poor terms and conditions of service, 
(d) Deterioration of professionalism in the public service (e) Ethnicity and 
nepotism. 
Autocracy or the Politics of Patron-clientilism 
One of the key characteristics of an autocratic system of government is personalized 
rule. The political leader often governs with little respect for the 
principles, regulations and laws that guide state institutions. He or she often 
rules by decrees and those who are supposed to implement these decrees 
also often do so without regard for the principles, regulations and laws that 
govern the operations of the institutions they manage. 
An autocratic system is also usually characterized by the patron - client 
relation political process. This is a political process in which the political 
leader (in this case, the president) recruits his/her close confidants who 
normally represent different constituencies (ethnic or racial communities 
and regions) and place them into key political , administrative and judicial 
positions. Since the close confidants owe their appointments into the key 
positions to the leader, their loyalties are also direct to the leader. In order 
to maintain the loyalty of his/her close confidants, (in this case the clients) 
the leader regularly extends to them certain favours. The favours are usually 
in the forms of financial rewards or other materials resources. Similarly, in 
order for the close confidants who are appointed into the key public positions 
to maintain their position, they have to ensure that the support of their 
respective constituencies to the president is sustained. In order to sustain
130 C. Odhiambo-Mbai 
this support the president's close confidants too have to recruit their own 
close confidants (or clients) whose duties are to regularly drum-up support 
for the president on behalf of their patrons at the local levels. These categories 
of clients are similarly extended favours by their respective patrons. 
The favours are also in the form of financial rewards or other materials 
resources. In both cases, the rewards are usually obtained through corrupt 
practices or abuse of public office. Thus, an autocratic state cannot function 
in an atmosphere where there is no corruption and where institutions are 
run on the basis of well defined principles, regulations and laws. 
As explained above, the establishment and consolidation of an autocratic 
regime in Kenya began in earnest in December 1964. It involved the abandonment 
of mulipartysm, and federalism, and the systematic amendment of 
the constitution to concentrate more powers in the presidency. Between 
1964 and 1969, there ensued a stiff struggle between the two factions of the 
ruling elite - one that opposed the establishment of the autocratic state and 
the other that promoted it (Oginga Odinga 1967). The faction that supported 
autocracy triumphed towards the end of 1969. From 1970 onwards Kenyatta 
had managed to successfully establish and consolidate his powers in 
Kenya's autocratic state. Kenayatta arguably presided over an efficient and 
effective autocratic regime which he eventually bequeathed to Moi in 
August 1987. Moi managed the same state, although not with similar talents 
and sophistication as Kenyatta, up to December 30, 2002. 
The autocratic state that Kenyatta established and consolidated, and Moi 
sustained resulted in the creation of a category of public servants that is overwhelmingly 
impervious to good ethical standards. It is public knowledge that 
it was this category of public servants that benefited from the Africanisation of 
the economy by dishing to themselves the former white owned farms, 
purchasing controlling shares in the national commercial firms, and unfairly 
advancing themselves easy loans from government controlled financial 
institutions. Similarly, it is the same category of public servants that fuelled the 
widespread corruption under Moi's regime. Thus, there is no doubt that autocracy 
and its patron-client relations tendencies have been the major causes of 
the deterioration of public accountability in Kenya. 
The Involvement in Private Business by Public Servants 
The second factor that has also greatly contributed to the deterioration of 
public accountability in Kenya is the involvement in private business by 
public servants. The factor is closely related to the first one. 
The permission to own private property and run business of any kind 
was first recommended by the Ndegwa Commission in its report of 1971. 
The Commission had been appointed by President Kenyatta to look into the 
structure and remuneration of civil servants in the country.
Public Service Accountability and Governance in Kenya 131 
Making its recommendations, the Ndegwa report listed strict conditions 
under which it could be possible for a public servant to own private property 
and run a business. The report stated: "We consider that all those who 
serve the Republic - 
(i) should give it their undivided loyalty whenever and wherever it has a 
claim on their services; 
(ii) should not subordinate their duties to their private interest nor put 
themselves in a position where there is conflict between their duty to 
the state and their private interests; 
(iii) should not outside their official duties be associated with any financial 
or other activities in circumstances where there could be suspicion 
that their official position or official information available to 
them was being turned to their private gain or that of their associates; 
(iv) should not engage in any occupation or business which might prejudice 
their status as member of a public service or bring any such service 
into disrepute; and finally, 
(v) should at all times maintain the professional and ethical standards 
which the nation expects of them in transacting government business 
with efficiency, integrity and impartiality. 
The Ndegwa Commission Report then concluded: 
So long as the above principles are observed and subject to the provisio which 
follows there ought in theory be no objection to the ownership of property or 
involvement in business by members of the public service to a part where 
their wealth is augmented perhaps substantially by such activities {Ndegwa 
Commission Report 1971, 13-14) 
Further in the report, the Ndegwa Commission also recommended the establishment 
of the office of an Ombudsman whose primary function was to investigate 
complaints against public servants and monitor their performance. 
Although this particular recommendation by the Ndegwa commission 
together with that one on the establishment of the office of an Ombudsman 
were among the ones that the government never officially approved for 
implementation (Nyamu 1975), after the release of the report public servants 
began to acquire private properties and run businesses of various 
kinds in large numbers. The government did not take any action to stop 
them from doing so despite the fact that it had never approved of the recommendation 
in the first place. 
But in acquiring private properties and running businesses public servants 
did not care to adhere to the condition that had been spelt out by the 
Ndegwa Commission. Indeed for the Ndegwa Commission to have expected 
that public servants would abide by the conditions they meted was to have 
expected too much. This is because according to Nyamu (1975):
132 C. Odhiambo-Mbai 
Human beings are basically selfish and are more able to look after their own 
interests than those of other people. Civil servants should not be encouraged 
to spend any public time and equipment looking after their natural interests 
during official hours. 
Involvement in private business by public servants coincided with the 
period when the Africanisation of the economy was still going on. Given the 
circumstances, a number of public servants in key positions took advantage 
of the programme to Africanise various businesses and properties to themselves. 
In the process, acquiring private property and running businesses of 
any kind became the norm in the civil service. There is absolutely no doubt 
that the involvement in private businesses by public servants has resulted 
in widespread corruption and abuse of office (Waruhiu Committee Report, 
1980: 103) 
Deterioration of Professionalism in the Pubic Service 
The third factor that is responsible for the deterioration of public accountability 
in the country is the decline of professional standards in the public 
service. As mentioned earlier, the Kenyan public service that was inherited 
from the British was modeled according to the Whitehall tradition. The tradition 
included the following key principles. Firstly, civil service job is a 
career, that is permanent and pensionable. Secondly, appointments and 
promotions are based on relevant qualification and experience. Thirdly, 
once employed one expected to rise in the ranks through promotions so 
long as one possess the required qualification and experience. Fourth, a permanent 
secretary is literally permanent as the term stipulate. 
However in the Kenya's public service these principles began to be 
ignored with impunity, especially from the early 1980s when president Moi 
began to consolidate himself in power. From the early 1980s, it became 
quite frequent to shuffle permanent secretaries and other senior civil servants 
from organizations to organizations without due regard to their suitability 
for the positions. It also became common for President Moi to recruit 
permanent secretaries and other senior public servants from outside the 
mainstream public service, including the private sector. 
Frequent shuffling of senior civil servants and bringing in people from 
outside the mainstream public service to fill key position grossly undermined 
the morale of civil servants who had worked diligently, marking time 
with the hope that one day they would rise to the top. Having been de-motivated, 
a number of public servants found it justified to use their positions 
while they still occupied them, to enrich themselves. This involved the abuse 
of office since one was no longer sure when he or she would be shuffled to 
another assignment or be dismissed from the public service altogether.
Public Service Accountability and Governance in Kenya 133 
Poor Terms and Conditions of Public Service 
The fourth group of factors that are similarly blamed for the decline of the 
standard of public accountability are the poor terms and conditions under 
which the country's public servants work. The key elements of the public 
service terms and conditions of employment are salaries, allowances and 
other benefits such as health and housing. 
It is widely acknowledged that Kenyan public servants are at no time paid 
a living wage. Employees in the private sector, some with inferior qualifications 
are usually paid much better. This fact was and still is claimed to be the 
main reason for higher efficiency and productivity in the private sector. 
There has been a lot of debate on what would represent a fair pay to public 
servants. Some scholars have even observed that to claim that poor terms 
and conditions of employment are among the causes of low standards of 
accountability is to stretch the argument too far (Wamalwa 1993: 44). 
Others have argued that public service is a calling; it is not a place where 
people should expect to enrich themselves (Nyamu, 1975). 
In 1967, a commission chaired by H. Millar-Craig was appointed by 
President Kenyatta to review the salaries of public servants. The Millar- 
Craig Commission considered three main criteria that were presented to 
them by various groups of public servants. The first criteria was called the 
'fair' or 'living wage'. According to this guideline which appealed mainly to 
the low-paid public servants, it was argued that the government should 
always pay all of its employees a wage sufficient to provide an acceptable 
minimum standard of living. The second criteria presented was the "market 
wage". According to this guideline which appealed mainly to professionals 
and technicians, it was represented that government should pay its employees 
according to their market value. The third criteria was called "equity of 
income distribution". This criteria had two aspects. In the first case it argued 
that there should be an equitable distribution of income between the rural 
non-wage-earning population and wage-earners. Second, it argued that 
within the wage sector, the "gap" between increase of those on the bottom 
of the skill ladder and those at the top, should not be "too great". 
After analyzing each of the criteria presented to them, the Millar-Craig 
Commission observed that the three wage policy criteria were obviously in 
conflict with one another. The Commission thus concluded that the only realistic 
approach that the government can use to arrive at an appropriate wage for 
public servants is to determine the amount that it can spare from its GNP without 
undermining its development goals and provision of essential services. 
Otherwise the government may end up paying for non-productive activities. 
From the above analysis, it is clear that determining sufficient wage for 
public servants in a country like Kenya can be quite a difficult task. Indeed,
134 C. Odhiambo-Mbai 
there appears to be too key factors which undermine wage earnings by public 
servants in Kenya. The first factor is the extended family syndrome. The 
second is the high social status syndrome; the extravagant or materialistic social 
status that the kith and kin expect from their relatives who are public 
servants. If the two factors were absent then the wages paid to public servant 
and which are regularly reviewed would well just be adequate. However, 
given the extended family factor and the kind of social status that the society 
expects from a public servant, the public servant is often forced to look for 
other sources of income to satisfy the social pressure. The other sources of income 
are normally likely to be private business or abuse of office. 
Ethnicity and Nepotism 
Ethnicity (or tribalism) involves a common consciousness of being one in 
relation to the other groups. Nepotism involves the use of friendship or 
blood relations criteria to distribute or dispense public services. 
As mentioned earlier, at the start of the Africnisation of key positions in 
the public service, the ruling elite in the Kenyatta regime used ethnicity and 
nepotism as the main criteria to appoint people into these position. 
Similarly, when president Moi decided to consolidate himself in power he 
too resorted to ethnicity and nepotism as the criteria for appointing his close 
confidants to the key positions in the public service. When one is appointed 
into position of authority in the public service on the basis of ethnicity and 
nepotism, it becomes almost impossible for such a person to see anything 
wrong in also using the same criteria to distribute public resources or dispense 
public services to the public. 
Factors that Undermine the Promotion of Public 
Accountability in Kenya 
Due to widespread corruption, abuse of office and the general deterioration 
of other ethical standards in the country, one is likely to assume that there 
is no control mechanism that could be used to enforce accountability. Yet 
this is not the case. Kenya has many legal and quasi-legal instruments and 
other watchdog institution specifically formulated and designed for controlling 
public service ethics. Despite this fact, public accountability constantly 
deteriorate as we have seen. 
Some of the legal and quasi-legal instrument and watchdog institutions 
for controlling public service ethics in the country are codes of regulations 
for public servants, the Public Service Commission Act, Cap 185, the Penal 
Code, Cap 63, the Prevention of Corruption Act Cap 65, Election Offences 
Act, Cap 66, Exchequer and Audit Act, Cap 412, Financial Regulation, the 
Public Account Committee, Public Investment Committee, the Inspector of 
State Corporation, the Monitoring Unit and the Public Anti-Corruption Unit.
Public Service Accountability and Governance in Kenya 135 
Besides these institutions, there is also the Judiciary. Thus, the lack of legal 
instruments and institutions cannot be the excuse for the deterioration of 
public accountability in the country. 
There are a number of factors that undermine the control of public service 
ethics in Kenya. These are (a) The ineffectiveness of watchdog institutions, 
(b) Outdated codes of Regulations (c) Poor dissemination of Codes of 
Regulations (d) the lack of National Code of Ethics (e) Lack of anti-corruption 
Authority (f) Selective application of sanctions (g) Lack of incentives 
for good performance (h) Lack of political will, (i) Lack of effective supervision 
of public servants. 
The Ineffectiveness of Watchdog of Institutions 
Basically, the watchdog institutions charged with the responsibilities of controlling 
public service ethics in Kenya are Parliament, Police, Anti- 
Corruption Unit, Monitoring Unit and the Judiciary. However, all these 
institutions have proved generally ineffective in controlling public service 
ethics in the country. 
To begin with, parliament is supposed to control public service ethics 
through its two key committees, namely, the Public Accounts Committee 
(PAC) and the Public Investment Committee (PIC). The procedure followed 
by the two committees is as follows: 
Once the offices of the Controller and Auditor-General and that of the 
Inspector of Corporations have completed auditing government ministries 
and parastatals organizations respectively, they hand over their reports to 
PAC and PIC respectively. The two committees are supposed to conduct their 
investigations on the irregularities reported and recommend appropriate 
action to parliament. Parliament on receiving the report from PAC and PIC 
debate them and resolve on the cause of action to take. In the circumstances, 
parliament may even order the arrest and prosecution of a public 
officer that is considered to have abused his office. But as we have shown 
above, the evidence in the misuse of public office by public servants have 
been so glaring since 1963, yet to date there are no known cases whereby 
parliament has taken action to order the arrest and prosecution of officers 
responsible. Instead, parliament has year after year approved government 
budgets quite faithfully. This weakness by parliament simply encourages 
public officers to continue misusing public resources with impunity. 
Secondly, the responsibility of the judiciary is to administer justice. In 
this respect it is expected to punish public officials who indulge in corrupt 
practices or abuse their offices. However, the judiciary in Kenya has not 
been able to undertake this responsibility effectively; its capacity is undermined 
by corruption, inefficiency and the general lack of adequate physical 
facilities and other amenities.
136 C. Odhiambo-Mbai 
In January 1998 the Chief Justice appointed a committee chaired by 
Justice Richard Otiento Kwach, to investigate the state of administration of 
justice in Kenya. In its Report the Committee confirmed that there existed 
corruption among court officials in the country. It also confirmed that the 
administration of justice in Kenya is generally inefficient due to the lack of 
adequate physical facilities and other amenities. It revealed: 
Broadly speaking there are two forms of corruption: (i) "Petty or 'survival' 
practiced by those who may be grossly under paid. (2) 'Grand practiced by 
high public officials who exercise discretionary powers. Representation 
received by the committee indicate that there exist both forms of corruption in 
the Judiciary, taking various patterns, generally to prevent the cause of justice 
(Republic of Kenya 1998, 9-10). 
Given this kind of weakness, the Judiciary cannot effectively promote pubic 
accountability in the country. 
Thirdly, the role of the Kenya Police Anti-corruption Unit and the 
Monitoring Unit are to investigate corrupt practices and cases of abuse of 
office by public servants and to prosecute those who are involved in the 
practices. The Monitoring Unit is based in the office of the President. 
However, the two organisations lack independence as they are not established 
by a constitutional Act. Due to this fact, they are often influenced by 
other authorities that are superior to them. Besides, the police in Kenya is 
generally known to be corrupt. Given the circumstances, the two units cannot 
effectively control public accountability in the country. 
Outdated Codes of Regulations 
The original code of regulations for civil servants was prepared during the 
colonial period. The current version in use was revised in 1992 - ten years 
ago. However, it is not when it was revised that is the problem. The issue is 
that certain rules of conduct in the code of regulations do not enhance public 
service ethics, but instead undermine them. For instance. Section G 15 
(I) of the Code of Regulation state: 
Presents from public personage which cannot be refused without giving 
offence will be handed over to the government, unless the government's prior 
permission has been obtained by an officer to retain the present. Application 
for permission to retain a present should be made to the Permanent 
Secretary/Director of Personnel Management with details of the present 
together with its estimated value. 
It is not clear why a public servant should accept a gift from the public at 
all, especially during the cause of his/her duties. The public already pays 
the public servant wages for his/her services. However, when a public servant 
hands over a gift received from the public to the government what is 
the government expected to do with the gift? In short, it does not make
Public Service Accountability and Governance in Kenya 137 
sense for a government to accept gifts from its citizens to dispense services 
for which they have paid through the authorized taxes. This kind of regulation 
does not enhance public accountability at all. 
Poor Dissemination of the Contents of Code of Regulations 
It is common knowledge that the contents of the Code of Regulations for 
civil servants are not effectively disseminated to civil servants. Often civil 
servants discover that they have breached sections of the Code of 
Regulations when addressed a discipline letter. If civil servants are not 
aware of the rules of conduct they are expected to obey. How would they 
adhere to these rules? At a meeting organized by the United Nations 
Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) in Nairobi, in 
September 2002, on public ethics, an Integrity Officer from the government 
acknowledged this weakness and informed the gathering that his office had 
started addressing the problem of effective dissemination of the contents of 
Code of Regulations. 
The Lack of a National Code of Ethics 
Currently, only civil servants have a code of regulations to control their conduct. 
Other public officials including politicians are not guided by any code 
of ethics in the course of their public duty. In the absence of such a code of 
ethics, it is almost impossible to control the ethical standards of public officials. 
In the past, attempts have been made to formulate and approve a 
national code of ethics for all public officials in the country, but attempts 
have always failed. 
The Absence or Weakness of an Anti-corruption Authority 
Currently, the only anti-corruption institution in the country is the Police 
Anti-corruption Unit. The Unit operates under the Police act. As such it is 
not an independent body that is constitutionally established. As we have 
seen, due to this fact it lacks the independence necessary for it to perform 
it task effectively. There is a need for an independent Anti-Corruption 
Authority or the office of an Ombudsman that can undertake its function 
without direction or influence from any quarters, including the president of 
the country. There have been two attempts to establish such anti-corruption 
authority without success. 
Selective Application of Sanctions 
In order to enhance public service ethics among public servants, there must 
be certain sanctions to be meted against a public servant who fails to obey
138 C. Odhiambo-Mbai 
the codes of ethics or break the relevant laws. Such sanctions must be 
applied impartially and uniformly to all public servants. But when they are 
applied selectively, then they are likely to have no effect. 
For instance, in early 2002, the Minister for Water and the Permanent 
Secretary in the Ministry of Works were arrested separately and charged 
with corrupt dealings. While their cases were still going on in court the 
President decided to terminate the services of the Permanent Secretary, but 
failed to take any action against his Minister. Later both were acquitted; but 
the Permanent Secretary was never reinstated in his employment. This was 
a clear case of selective application of sanctions. Any public servant who 
followed this case is left to wonder whether it is worth it to uphold public 
service ethics at all. This is because one is likely to be penalized anyway in 
case he or she does not enjoy the favour of the appointing or supervising 
officer. 
The Lack of Incentives for Good Performance 
Whereas it is important to apply sanctions uniformly and impartially 
against all public servants who break the codes of ethics, it also pays to 
extend incentives to the good performers. Incentives need not necessarily 
be material benefits or cash rewards; a letter of commendation, or a free 
holiday with pay could also suffice. In Kenya, good performers are never 
rewarded with incentives to boost their morale so that they could be encouraged 
to maintain their good conduct. When public servants realise that it 
does not really pay to be a good and disciplined worker, then they would 
have no motivation to maintain their good record. 
Lack of Effective Supervision of Public Servants 
Public servants in Kenya are managed and supervised by the Public Service 
Commission (PSC) and Directorate of Personnel Management (DPM) for 
civil servants; Teachers Service Commission (TSC) for teachers; Judicial 
Service Commission (JSC) for the members of Judiciary. The employees of 
various parastatal organization and local authorities are supervised independently 
by those institutions. 
The ways in which the PSC, TSC, and JSC are structured and staffed visa-
vis their respective total employees are such that they cannot provide 
effective supervision to their workers. For instance, the TSC caters for about 
240,000 teachers country-wide while the PSC is responsible for about 
160,000 civil servants. The two organizations are highly centralized, with 
their offices based in Nairobi, the capital City. Any of the officers with a discipline 
case will have their cases forwarded to the two bodies respectively. 
Due to the insufficient number of staff in the organizations, and their heavy
Public Service Accountability and Governance in Kenya 139 
workload, several disciplinary cases submitted to the two organizations 
from different parts of the country take too long to be finalized. In the end 
the officer may be reinstated without any penalties. 
In its report, the Waruhiu Committee revealed: 
We have received evidence which show that Public Service Commission 
delays decisions on promotion and disciplinary cases and that such delays 
affect individual Civil Servants detrimentally. We have been informed that the 
period between interdiction and the final decision by the Public Service 
Commission may last for a year or even two years. Many heads of departments 
have complained that even after such long delays, the officers so interdicted 
are subsequently reinstated on purely technical grounds... . We are convinced 
that when a person is reinstated on a technicality, the working relation 
between him and his head of department become strained. 
The Lack of Political Will 
For all the above to be achieved, there must be political will in the leadership 
of the country to set targets on public accountability and strive to 
achieve them. In Kenya, the conduct of political leadership have shown 
clearly that there is more of lip service rather than commitment to promote 
public accountability in the country. For instance, the failure for the country 
to have a good constitutional order, enact the crimes bill and establish 
an anti-corruption authority, as well as formulate the national code of ethics 
during the Moi regime could appropriately be attributed to the opposition 
by President Moi personally. With that type of conduct, it would be expecting 
too much for the general public servants to maintain public accountability 
in the management of public affairs. 
Towards the Enhancement of Public Accountability in 
Kenya 
Arising from the above analysis, it may be in order to make certain suggestions 
on how public accountability in Kenya could be enhanced. 
Abolition of Involvement in Private Business by Public 
Servants 
As observed earlier, there is no doubt, that permitting public servants to 
own private property and run businesses has undermined their ethical standards. 
The revised codes of regulations (1992) for civil servants permits 
public servants to own private property and run business under the conditions 
that had been spelt out by the Ndegwa Commission in its 1971 report. 
No matter the conditions under which the government is prepared to 
allow public servants to own private property and run business, it cannot 
prevent the inherent conflict of interest and high temptations among public
140 C. Odhiambo-Mbai 
servants to abuse their offices. It is our view, therefore, that owning private 
property and running any kind of business by public servants should be 
outlawed. One cannot serve two masters. As such any public servants who 
wish to own private property and run a business should simply be asked to 
resign from the service. 
Restoration of Professionalism in t h e Public Service 
As mentioned earlier, public service is a professional career. Those who join it 
should be made confident that if they uphold the principles, norms, and values 
of the profession then they are likely to advance to the highest limits of their 
capabilities. Thus, we propose that all the unprofessional tendencies such as 
ethnicity and nepotism in appointments and promotions, lack of security of 
tenure and appointment of non-career public servants into key positions in the 
public service should be stopped. This would discourage public servants who 
are tempted to abuse their public offices due to frustrations not to do so. 
Improvement of Terms and Conditions of Service for Public 
Servants 
It may continue to prove difficult for the government to pay its employees 
competitive salaries and wages that are closely or equally comparable to 
those offered by the private sector and international non-governmental 
organizations for a long time. This is due to the constant pressure on the 
government not to allocate too much percentage of its GNP to recurrent 
expenditure as compared to development. 
However, it is important for the government to offer terms and conditions 
of service to its employees that can enable them to enjoy a decent life, especially 
when public servants abandon ownership of private property and running 
of businesses. One way by which the government can achieve this goal 
without at the same time allocating too much of its GNP to payment of salaries 
and wages, is to reduce the current size of its work force so as to have the 
number of workers it can pay decently. The government could also adopt a 
wage policy whereby the more productive workers are rewarded better than 
the unproductive ones. The other way is for the government to eradicate the 
common wastage of public resources such as, water, electricity, telephones, 
stationery that is currently so rampant in the public service. The savings accruing 
from the efficient management of the public resources could be used to 
improve the pay and benefit packages for civil servant. 
Strengthening of Watchdog Institutions 
The watchdog institutions such as Parliament, the Judiciary and Police 
should be strengthened to undertake their roles effectively. For example,
Public Service Accountability and Governance in Kenya 141 
Parliament should take the lead in the supervision of the government's performance. 
It is scandalous for parliament to regularly approve public spending 
to a government that lacks the principle of expenditure control. 
Moreover, the parliamentary watchdog institutions such as PAC, PIC should 
be empowered to prosecute public servants that are involved in the misuse 
of public funds. But the monitoring of public accountability in the country 
should not be left to the public or government institutions per se. The civil 
society organizations and the media should also be encouraged to take an 
active role in the task. 
Constant Revision and Effective Dissemination of Codes of 
Regulations 
Codes of regulations for the public servants are only effective when they are 
relevant, and when their contents are aggressively disseminated to those 
concerned. Thus we proposed that current codes of regulations for public 
servants should be updated. The provisions such as those found in certain 
parts of Section G of the Code of Regulations for civil servants mentioned 
above should be removed, as they are out-dated. Attempts should also be 
made to disseminate the contents of the codes of regulations to all the newly 
recruited public servants, especially during their induction into the service. 
The Formulation and Implementation of a National Code of 
Ethics 
Although certain sections of the public service have codes of regulations 
that guide their conduct, currently there is no uniform national code of 
ethics for all public officials. Besides, the existing codes of regulations for 
certain sections of public servants are grossly inadequate. Thus, there is an 
urgent need to formulate a comprehensive national code of ethics for all 
public officials, including politicians in the country. The formulated code of 
ethics should reflect the country's national goals and aspirations. But the 
national codes of ethics should be practicable and enforceable, otherwise it 
could end up not contributing to the enhancement of public accountability. 
The Establishment of an Anti-corruption Body 
Although there are a number of watchdog institutions in the country for controlling 
public accountability, as we have seen none of these are independent 
and effective enough to undertake the task. The countries where anti-corruption 
bodies or the office of an Ombudsman have functioned effectively are 
those in which the organization is made completely independent from the authority 
and direction from any quarters in the course of conduct of its duties. 
This is the kind of an anti-corruption authority that Kenya needs. It should be
142 C. Odhiambo-Mbai 
well staffed with competent personnel and it should be provided sufficient resources 
to enable it perform its function efficiently and effectively. 
Uniform Application of Sanction and Extension Incentives 
Sanctions which are spelt out for punishing public servants who abuse their 
public offices can only be effective if they are uniformly and objectively 
applied. At the same time, extending incentive rewards to good workers is 
also another effective way of promoting public accountability in the public 
service. Thus, we propose that the widespread selective application of sanctions 
that is often driven by ethnicity and nepotism in the country should 
be stopped. Meanwhile, good workers who uphold public accountability 
should be encouraged by introducing a programme whereby such workers 
can be honoured annually. 
Effective Supervision of Pubic Servants 
As mentioned above, the current organizational arrangements for the management 
and supervision of public servants in the country is inefficient and ineffective. 
The highly centralized PSC, TSC and JSC are unable to effectively 
manage and supervise public servants. These bodies should be decentralized 
and staffed sufficiently to manage and supervise public servants effectively. 
Public Ethics as Part of the National Education Curriculum 
Public servants are part of Society. If the general ethical standards of a society 
are poor, then it would be foolhardy to expect a clean and disciplined 
public service from such a society. In order to create a good and disciplined 
public service, efforts must be made to inculcate good ethics in the youths 
from among whom future public officials are recruited. The process of 
inculcating good ethics into the youth is called socialization - formal and 
informal. That the promotion of good ethics in the country should be made 
a part of the national education programme; good ethics should be taught 
in schools from the lowest to the highest levels. 
The Democratisation of Society 
Ultimately, public accountability in Kenya will most likely be achieved 
through vigorous democratisation of the state. So long as autocracy and its 
patron-client relations tendencies remain the cornerstone of our political 
system, it will certainly be impossible to achieve public accountability in 
the management of public affairs in the country. Democracy ensures that 
institutions are managed according to principles, rules and laws by which 
they are established. The system also empowers the citizens to demand 
accountability from their public officials regularly. Thus, we propose that 
the on going democratisation process in Kenya should be invigorated.
Public Service Accountability and Governance in Kenya 143 
Concluding Remarks 
The widespread lack of public accountability in governance in Kenya certainly 
undermines provision of public services and economic development. 
The origins of this serious anomaly in our governance can be traced to the 
rise of the autocratic regime in the country in the early 1960s. The anomaly 
is still fuelled by the autocratic tendencies that have persisted in the country 
even after the restoration of multi-partysm. It is only through a vigorous 
democratisation process that public accountability in governance can be 
restored in the country. Thus, it is upon Kenyans to constantly demand 
accountability from their governments. 
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