Afr. j . polil. sci. (1999), Vol. 4 No. 1,40-62 
Globalization and Environmental 
Conflict in Africa 
Cyril I. Obi* 
Introduction 
This paper examines the relationship between the processes of globalisation, 
mineral/resource extraction in Africa, and the deepening of en vironmental conflict 
on the continent since the late 1970s, and especially with the onset of structural 
adjustment which imposed the hegemony of the free market on the African 
ecology. It is based on a case study of the interface between global oil capital and 
the intensification of environmental conflict in Nigeria's oil-producing communities 
mainly located in the Niger Delta. Specifically, it examines the ways the social 
contradictions and scarcities of resources spawned by global conglomerates 
operating in the Nigerian oil industry, provoke conflict. The subordination of the 
rights of the populations of the oil producing areas in Nigeria by oil multinationals 
and their partner the state, in the quest for profit is thus a critical, explosive element 
in the linkage between politics and the ecology. 
Environmental conflict in the Nigerian oil industry, particularly in the oil-rich 
region of the Niger Delta, is "globalised" in the sense of the presence of global 
actors in the local communities; the integration of the communities via oil 
production into the global economic system and the connections being forged by 
local social movements to the global human rights agenda; and international 
human and environmental rights groups in the fight against the state-global oil 
alliance. At another level, it reflects how globalisation defined as "a process of 
global integration in which diverse peoples, economies, cultures, and political 
processes are increasingly subjected to international influences, and people are 
made aware of the role of these influences in their everyday lives" (Midgeley, 
1997), finds expression in the identities, constituents, and modalities of the various 
social forces immersed in the environmental conflicts in the Niger Delta. For 
example, the hanging of nine Ogoni (MOSOP) leaders in November 1995 on 
1027-0353 © 1999 African Association of Political Science
Globalisation and Environmental Conflict in Africa 41 
grounds of inciting a mob to murder four prominent Ogoni citizens, in spite of pleas 
for clemency from all parts of the world, led to virtual isolation of Nigeria in 
international circles. The country was suspended from the Commonwealth; the 
European Union recalled its ambassadors; while sanctions aimed at the military 
and top government officials were imposed on the country by the United States, the 
EU, and Canada. In addition, several international organisations sent teams to the 
Niger Delta to investigate the abuse of rights of the oil minorities by Shell, and the 
Nigerian state (Project Underground, 1997). World bodies such as the United 
Nations, the Commonwealth of Nations, the British House of Lords, the US 
Congress and even the Shell AGM, have hosted lobby groups on both sides on the 
environmental conflict in the Niger Delta. The struggles have also been waged in 
cyberspace, on television networks, and in countless press releases and briefings, 
involving the lobbies of parliamentary groups, international human and environmental 
rights groups, journalists, PR consultants, oil multinationals, politicians, 
social movements of the Niger Delta, and even the clergy. Globalization has not 
merely deepened environmental crises in the Niger Delta, it has provided a global 
canvass for the local environmental conflicts. Thus, while the physical site of the 
oil production and conflict is in the Niger Delta, the struggles have been waged 
across the world. 
For the first time in the recent history of Africa, the Ogoni struggle for selfdetermination 
and their environmental rights, and their conflict with Shell has 
become a major global issue. In spite of the huge effort of the Nigerian state to put 
a lid on the resistance in the Niger Delta, it has not succeeded, neither has its partner, 
Shell, been able to re-commence operations halted in Ogoniland in 1993 at the 
height of the Ogoni resistance, despite an estimated daily loss of N9.9 million in 
oil revenue to Shell. This, to some extent underscores the success of a local group 
in using the global approach of rights to construct social networks of resistance. 
This paper dwells on the Ogoni resistance - the case of the Movement For the 
Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) versus Shell and the Nigerian state. It does not 
however deny the equally relevant struggles of other minority ethnic groups living 
in the Niger Delta, who in some cases suffer worse deprivations and pollution than 
the Ogoni, and who are in some cases also beginning to "globalise" their resistance 
to global oil capital. The focus on the Ogoni is based on MOSOP's successful use 
of the global discourse on rights to empower its case at the international level, 
particularly the United Nations. In the course of the globalisation of this local 
resistance, the Ogoni have emulated a whole range of strategies and tactics from 
the similar struggles of indigenous peoples in other parts of the (fourth) world. The 
(Unrepresented Peoples and Nations Organisation) UNPO, which MOSOPjoined 
in the early 1990s had a catalytic effect on the internationalisation of its struggle. 
From such forums, the organisation gathered experiences which proved strategic 
to the positive use of the label of a "persecuted" ethnic minority group threatened
42 Cyril Obi 
with genocide by Shell and the Nigerian state, as an important device of local 
resistance. 
The Niger Delta and Oil 
The Niger Delta is the "gold mine" of the Nigerian oil industry. It accounts for over 
70% of Nigeria's on shore oil and upstream operations. According to Khan (1994: 
40) "Since oil was discovered at Oloibiri, the Niger Delta basin has proved to be 
the most prolific producing area in Nigeria, containing seventy eight oil fields, 
including the largest, Forcados and Yorki". In a region where land scarcity is 
rampant the exploration, production and transportation of oil means that oil 
installations and operations occupy a lot of physical space (at the expense of the 
indigenous land owners), and has had a pronounced impact on the environment. 
Also because the Niger Delta has been subjected to both onshore and offshore 
operations for over four decades, the social relations of oil production has 
penetrated the social structure of the local communities and defined their place, 
largely as the "excluded, the alienated, and the exploited" in the larger Nigerian 
society. The critical issues therefore are: what is the social impact of oil production 
in the Niger Delta, and how does this "produce" resource scarcities, and conflict; 
who controls, and has access to, the resources being produced from this area; and 
who bears the environmental costs of oil production? These issues define the 
conflictual relations prevailing in Nigeria's oil industry today. 
The major players in this saga are the oil multinationals (which mine and 
produce the oil), the Nigerian state (which depends on oil for 80% of its revenue, 
and over 95% of the country's foreign exchange earnings), and the communities 
(and social movements) of the oil producing communities of the Niger Delta. 
However, the central role of oil multinationals in the global economy as suppliers 
of very cheap source energy, makes them a central player not only in the global 
accumulation of capital. They are even more strategically so in the context of a 
global political economy that "simultaneously concentrates wealth and energy 
both in certain locales and at certain social levels by extracting and dispossessing 
from other locales and social levels" (Saurin, 1996a: 87). It is this globally 
structured social relation of production that defines the Niger Delta as "a locale and 
social level of dispossession", and dialectically, a site of local resistance. 
What constitutes the "global context remains an empty abstraction unless 
mediated, translated towards concrete settings where we can discern concrete 
actors" (Binsbergen: 1997). Therefore, this paper analysises the concrete situation 
in the Niger Delta, the "golden goose" of the Nigerian oil industry. It focuses on 
the various contending interests/social forces in the Niger Delta as a source of 
"discrimination, exploitation, degradation and abuse of rights." 
Globalization itself has to be understood not just within the context of the 
restructuring of global capitalism and the shrinking of time and space through the
Globalisation and Environmental Conflict in Africa 43 
use of technology, but within the context of the deepening economic crisis in Africa 
and its pervasive adverse political and social ramifications. Applied to the situation 
of the Niger Delta, we are faced with an interesting situation in which " both forces 
of extraction and resistance connect the local to the global, and assume complex 
forms in which social networks/coalitions can be located within, or connect with 
two or more levels" (Obi, 1998a). As such the conflicts are waged, not just in the 
oil communities, but beyond - at the national and global levels. It is important to 
capture the role of the oil-dependent state in mediating such conflicts, in which it 
is itself an active protagonists. The immersion of Nigeria in an economic and 
external debt crisis since the mid 1980s has weakened the state vis a vis global 
capital. At the same time, the heavy demands of economic adjustment and debt 
servicing have committed the state to promoting the expansion of investments in 
the oil industry and the intensification of oil extraction (and consequently far 
greater environmental degradation of the oil producing communities of the Niger 
Delta). The state is therefore compelled to mediate the attendant conflicts at all 
three levels: the global, national and local in a manner that is broadly protective of 
the interests of global capital, and safeguards its own interest in a manner that will 
secures the balance of social forces within the ruling class, as well as the 
reproduction of its hegemonic bloc. At stake is not only the issue of power and 
control of the environment for oil production and capital accumulation, the 
distribution of oil rents or surplus in favour of the ruling class and related interests 
but also the critical one of equation of state to oil power. Thus, the social forces of 
local resistance in the Niger Delta seeking to block extraction from, expropriation 
and degradation of their environment have had to contend, not just with the might 
of the transnational global oil interests, but also with the power of the state itself. 
In the rest of this paper, we first deal with some conceptual issues. This section 
is followed by a section on the Nigerian oil industry in which we discuss the history 
of the industry and what has defined its present structure. We then examine the 
relationship between globalisation and environmental conflict in the Niger Delta. 
The final section sums up the arguments, and examines the prospects for resolving 
environmental conflicts in the oil producing communities of the Niger Delta. 
Conceptual Issues 
In this section we examine the interface between globalisation, environmental 
conflict and the oil industry, and how they relate to the "processes of accumulation, 
production and reproduction central to capitalism" (William, 1996:41), and to the 
processes of local resistance. 
Globalisation 
Globalisation is a complex process. According to Aina, (1996:5), globalisation has 
" created new conditions of proximity, intensity, and even intimacy with what used
44 Cyril Obi 
to be distant faraway worlds". Yet, it is possible to isolate different perspectives 
regarding this process. From an "economic" perspective, globalisation is a process 
of "the transformation of the capitalist world system", within an expansionist logic 
that drives it to further exploitation and accumulation (Wilkin: 1996: 229). This 
view has been criticized on the basis of its linearity. While admitting that in a sense, 
"the global capitalist system has evidently become more structurally interlocked", 
Marshall (1996: 894 895) asserts that, "it is not enough to argue that global 
capitalism is undergoing an epochal shift. Capitalist accumulation was globalist in 
its expression long before the changeover from machino- to systemo facturing" 
(.«f). In the same manner, the assumption that globalisation is "dissolving" 
international borders, and rendering the nation state and traditional concepts of 
sovereignty irrelevant or obsolete (Ohmae, 1995, 1996; Drezner, 1998: 209), has 
been rejected by those insisting that globalisation is still far from a linear, uniform 
or homogenising process (Boyer and Drache, 1996;Zyman, 1996;Saurin, 1996b). 
Of late, there is even talk of a globalisation "model" in crisis (Bello, 1998: 10 17). 
There are others, who see globalisation as being emblematic of an "unfinished 
project" hinged on "enduring national foundations and emerging regional realities" 
and more of a label "that points at expanding market interconnections in the 
form of investments, financial networks and trade" (Zyman, 1996: 157). Another 
important contribution to the ongoing debate is that by Mittleman (1995:275), who 
interprets global restructuring as a "market driven and multidimensional process, 
[in which] globalisation renders obsolete invented divisions of the world into 
developed and developing countries, industrialised and industrialising nations, 
and core and periphery." (Cited in Saurin, 1996b: 679). 
But clearly recent global transformations are not uniform in their reach or 
impact. Nor would the same forces operate in all areas of globalisation. Indeed, 
globalisation is as complex as it is ideological, and great care must be taken to 
address its specifics. As such, the focus here will be more on the social response 
to "economic" globalisation and its implications for Africa. The issue of how 
Africans are responding to "the production and reproduction of their own lives, 
including the global structuring of production and reproduction"(Saurin, 1996b: 
661), is addressed, based on a case study of the local resistance of the Ogoni, and 
how they have formed social networks connecting "the local" to "the global". 
Environmental Conflict 
The question of "scarcity" of resources, resulting from the interaction of economic 
modes/forces and the ecosystem, or as a result of the pressures of overpopulation 
on shrinking resources and the implications for global (western) security, has 
dominated the discourse on environmental conflict in recent times (Obi, 
1997c: 2-3). In this section, the focus is on the causal links between environmental/ 
resource scarcity and conflict, and on a critique of the orthodox environmental
Globalisation and Environmental Conflict in Africa 45 
security analysis (and the neo-Malthusian perspective which fetishizes the 
"demographic trap"). 
Environmental conflict in recent times has been associated with how struggles 
over shrinking environmental resources-as a result of overuse, unfair distribution, 
misuse or degradation - build up the stresses which trigger conflict. According to 
Homer-Dixon (1996: 359): 
Scarcities of environmental resources - in particular cropland, fresh water, 
and forest - are contributing to mass violence in several areas of the world. 
While these "environmental scarcities" do not cause wars between countries, 
they do sometimes aggregate stresses within countries, helping stimulate 
ethnic clashes, urban unrest, and insurgencies. 
The other strand of the environmental scarcity thesis is neo-Malthusian, which 
links conflict to situations in which population growth overwhelms the local 
resource base. Rapid population growth beyond the limits of the carrying capacity 
of the ecosystem or "resource threshold", feeds into stresses which directly, or 
indirectly provoke conflict (Brown and Jacobson, 1986; Klare, 1996; Homer- 
Dixon, 1994). As a strategy for ensuring that less stress is placed on renewable 
resources and constructing a potential framework of global security, population 
growth control, especially fertility reduction in the developing world, is seen as an 
important part of the solution to the problem of environmental threats to (western) 
global security. 
A social perspective on the environment (Redclift, 1989; Redclift and Benton, 
1995, Saurin, 1996a), exposes some of the limitations of the thesis of environmental 
scarcities. Rather than seeing environmental crises or scarcities as natural 
(Bush, 1997: 503-513), or the outcome of natural population increase (as if 
everyone had equal access to resources) it is useful to perceive the environment as 
being " socially constructed", as a " process rather than a form, as the result of a 
set of relationships between physical space, natural resources and a constantly 
changing pattern of economic forces" (Redclift, 1989: 79). This draws attention to 
the relationship between man and the ecology as resource base, and locates 
environmental conflict as the outcome of struggles between socio-economically 
defined groups for the control of resource(s) for profit, use, or distribution 
(Bookchin: 1992). In this way it is possible for a tiny fraction of the population (as 
is the case in all capitalist societies) to control a disportionately large share of 
resources to the exclusion of the majority who have to struggle for the crumbs, or 
challenge the "hegemonic minority", in order to force through a project of 
redistribution. 
How then can environmental conflict in Africa be located within the social 
theory of global environmental change? The answer lies in how the processes of
46 Cyril Obi 
globalisation have defined theconflictual "social" relations between the "possessors" 
and the "dispossessed". It also can be found in the situation in which smaller 
populations in the "highly" industrialised world enjoy the benefits of the transformation 
of, and transfer of Africa's resources through "globalised" structures of 
production and exchange, leaving behind resource scarcities and the intense 
struggles for larger chunks of fast shrinking resources waged at local, national and 
global levels (Obi, 1997). The situation in Africa has become desperate in view of 
the failure of structural adjustment and the deepening of environmental conflict in 
the continent (Bush, 1997: 504). If anything, adjustment has devalued Africa's 
resources in the global market place and in the process exposed most Africans to 
greater exploitation, poverty and alienation from the state. 
The ways in which "globalised oil production and exchange" defines "resource 
scarcities", and sharpens social contradictions have played a significant role in the 
environmental conflicts still ravaging the Niger Delta. It is thus more analytically 
rewarding to focus on the environment as a contested terrain - an arena of local 
resistance in the oil producing communities against the exploitative and polluting 
activities of global oil capital. 
The Nigerian Oil Industry 
A lot has been written on the Nigerian oil industry, and its political economy 
(Shatzl, 1969; Turner, 1980; Amu, 1982; Edogun, 1985; Hutchful, 1985; Onoh, 
1993; Ikein, 1990; Soremekun and Obi, 1993, Ihonvbere and Shaw, 1988, Khan, 
l994;Obi. 1994; 1997,1998), therefore there will be no attempt to replicate it here. 
Therefore the following discussion merely expounds on the structure of the oil 
industry, the state-oil nexus, and the global interface. 
The Structure of the Oil Industry 
The structure of the Nigerian oil industry cannot be fully grasped without adequate 
knowledge of its background and evolution. Its main characteristics are extraversion, 
state dependence and multinational control. 
The Concessionaire Era (1914-1969) 
The Nigerian oil industry has its roots in the colonial state which, through the 1914 
Colonial Minerals Ordinance, granted the monopoly of oil concessions in Nigeria 
to "British or British-allied capital" (Lolomari: 1976: 14). This provided the legal 
framework for the exclusion of Nigerians from any meaningful participation in the 
industry, and in 1938 served as the basis for the granting of an oil exploration 
licence to Shell (Shell D'Arcy and later Shell-BP) covering the entire mainland of 
Nigeria, an area of 367,000 square miles (Shatzl, 1969: 24-26). From 1957, a few 
years to Nigeria's independence, Shell surrendered some of its oil acreage to other 
oil multinationals and the state, leaving it with a total land area of 16,000 square
Globalisation and Environmental Conflict in Africa 47 
miles. This way, other oil multinationals such as Mobil, Gulf (now Chevron), Agip, 
Safrap (now Elf), Texaco and others gained a foothold in the Nigerian oil industry. 
At this point the oil industry, had no linkages with the rest of the Nigerian economy, 
save for the 50-50 profit sharing arrangement with the state under the rubric of the 
1959 Petroleum Profits Tax Ordinance. As Amu (1982: 5), a former NNPC 
director, notes "under the concessionaire era, the oil industry was dominated by the 
oil multinationals, (and) government's role was limited to collecting rents and 
royalties from oil companies, and making laws to regulate the activities of the 
industry". 
State Participation and State Capitalism (1970-1985) 
In 1969 the Federal government of Nigeria, abrogated the 1914 Ordinance, and 
transferred the "control" and "ownership" of oil to the state. It similarly imposed 
OPEC terms on all companies operating in the Nigerian oil industry, and formally 
joined OPEC in 1971. From the early 1970s, the state set up its own oil corporation 
(1971) and acquired majority equity participation in the industry by entering into 
joint venture agreements with the oil multinationals operating in Nigeria. It took 
up 60 per cent equity ownership in all the operating companies ( Elf, Agip/Philips, 
Gulf (Chevron), Mobil, Texaco, Pan Ocean) except Shell, of which it acquired 80 
percent with the nationalisation of BP in 1979. The state later reduced its interest 
in BP to about 55 per cent, surrendering the remainder to Elf (10 percent), Agip (5 
per cent) and Shell (30 per cent). These joint ventures have continued to account 
for the bulk of Nigeria's oil production and export. In the downstream sector, the 
state took over some oil marketing companies: Unipetrol (Esso), AP (BP), and 
National (the marketing arm of Shell). But this was not enough to displace the 
foreign giants of the domestic market ( Mobil, Total, Agip, and Texaco). 
The "arm" of state capitalism in the Nigerian oil industry, the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC, established in 1977), could not match the sophistication 
and monopoly of oil technology, as well as knowledge of global oil 
markets of the oil multinationals. Inevitably, therefore, the Nigerian state became 
dependent on the oil multinationals - its joint venture partners. This powerlcssness 
was further compounded by intra-elite squabbles for access to oil wealth. 
Post-State Capitalism, Market led Era ( 1986 - Present) 
Despite the efforts of adjustment to "roll back the state", diversify the oil industry 
from the export of crude oil, and commercialise the NNPC, the structure of the oil 
industry has not changed from its extractive, dependent, and foreign dominated 
structure (Obi, 1997). The removal of "oil subsidies", ratherthan freeing resources 
for development, fed into corruption, inflation, immense social misery and 
widespread poverty. The industry itself deteriorated, as the state reinforced, rather 
than loosened its grip on the oil in the face of shrinking oil revenues. Its offer of
48 Cyril Obi 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) to oil multinationals in 1986 and 1991, 
attracted fresh investments in the industry, but by 1997 the state was in arrears in 
the payment of its share under the joint venture agreements to the tune of hundreds 
of millions of naira. At the same time the NNPC lacked the will or means to 
"regulate, participate or compete" in the oil industry. The 1990s have been a period 
of unprecedented state dependence on oil multinationals to increase oil exploitation 
and provide more revenue for resolving the national crisis. 
As pointed out below, the state's total dependence on a commodity (oil) it did 
not control, its vulnerability to the oil multinationals (particularly Shell, which 
produced roughly half of Nigeria's oil), and the volatile global oil market were to 
have dire implications for the environmental conflicts that swept across the oil 
producing communities of the Niger Delta in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The State - Oil Nexus 
The linkage between oil and the Nigerian state has received considerable scholarly 
attention (Ihonvberc and Shaw, 1988; Graf, 1988, Obi, 1997d: 11-14). A lot of 
emphasis has been placed on the rentier context of this linkage in which the state, 
excluded from production, is reduced to a mere collector of rent from the oil 
multinationals. This formulation captures just the form of the state-oil linkage; it 
fails to address its content. While states are important as "primary mechanisms for 
securing specific social, economic and political orders in particular geographic 
domains,... (they) are best seen as a site of conflict between these conflicting social 
forces, rather than the coherent and homogenous representative of nations as 
collective entities". (Wilkin, 1996: 231) The starting point of any fruitful analysis 
of the state-oil nexus should therefore regard the state as a source of class struggle, 
as well as a mediator of class struggle. While the state-oil nexus captures the 
dependence of the Nigerian state on the oil surplus (and its integration into global 
oil relations), it recognises that its role of mediation is not linear, but rather reflects 
the divisions within the ranks of the domestic ruling class and the balance of social 
forces in society generally (Obi, 1997b: 141). It is this heterogeneous national 
ruling class (Lubeck and Watts, 1995: 210), and its global partners, that have 
privatised the Nigerian "oil-rich" state. 
Forcxample, within the national ruling class are factions from the oil minorities 
who find themselves always marginalised by the factions from the larger ethnic 
groups. They are often co-opted into the power and patronage networks of the 
ruling class but in general they are excluded from the direct exercise of power, as 
well as control of and access to the oil wealth. The factions from the oil minorities 
divide into two main groups: those who are willing to continue in their traditional 
"place" as appendages of the ruling class in exchange for a share of the "oil pie"; 
and those who seek a radical re-negotiation of this role on the ground that the rich 
oil resources of Nigeriaare located in their home "territory". It is the second faction
Globalisation and Environmental Conflict in Africa 49 
that has successfully mobilized and transformed the social forces in the Niger Delta 
into a potent weapon for challenging the social relations that have formed in the oil 
economy. It is in this sense that we would define the Nigerian state as contested 
terrain - "the sum total of relations arising from the global character of oil 
production, a site of constant struggles for access to power and primitive 
accumulation"(Obi, 1997b: 142). The "unity" (which is formal) and the reproduction 
of this state depends, to a large extent, on the oil multinationals (especially. 
Shell which accounts for 51 per cent of Nigeria's total oil production) that produce 
oil-the very life-blood of the state and one of the critical sinews in global capital 
accumulation. 
An important point to note is that the centralisation of oil power has itself 
become a contested issue. On the one hand, it has become a contentious issue 
between those who seek to maintain the status quo and those who seek its 
decentralisation in order to address issues of equity and social justice. On other 
hand, it is an issue between the pressure to maintain the status quo and the social 
forces which seek a larger share of federal (oil) revenues on the basis of derivation 
(Soremekun and Obi, 1993: 209-231; Obi, 1998). The challenge to "distributive 
inequities" thus constitutes a critical element in the struggles of the oil minorities 
who seek greater access to a larger share of the oil wealth.. 
The Global Interface 
The Nigerian oil industry is dominated by oil multinationals in what is a classic 
case of an unequal partnership. Three multinationals account for more than 65 per 
cent of Nigeria's oil production: Shell (Anglo-Dutch), Chevron (American), and 
Mobil (American). And they have taken full advantage of the unequal partnership. 
Shell, which alone accounts for 51 percent of Nigeria's oil production and provides 
Shell International with about 14 percent of its oil, is not only a big global player 
but also a strategic domestic player in Nigeria. The situation of Nigeria's dependency 
(and desperation) becomes clearer if one considers its huge external debt 
(estimated at $32 billion) in the face of the absence of any real growth in the nonoil 
sectors, and the crisis in which the oil industry in Nigeria itself is immersed. This 
desperation of the state has many adverse implications for "balance of power" 
between it and the oil multinationals. 
The industrialised world also needs oil because it is the most viable and cheapest 
source of energy, a strategic commodity in global capitalist production. This makes 
the oil monopolies central to the fortunes of global capitalist accumulation. In 
accordance with the logic of capitalist accumulation therefore production relations 
in the oil industry are based on a division of labour that ensures maximum profit 
to capital. In spite of the serious contradictions inherent in those production 
relations, the oil multinationals have embarked on a policy of expanding their 
control over the world's oil and gas reserves through the use of more efficient and
50 Cyril Obi 
cost-effective technologies in the entire process of oil production. Apart from new 
"oil treasures" being pried open, old finds are optimally exploited, while an 
increasing share of the global oil market is being regained in the face of the waning 
OPEC clout, and the opening up of the oil reserves of the former Soviet Union and 
the Pacific Rim to the global oil market. In the case of Nigeria, Shell has recently 
announced a colossal investment and expansion programme. It plans to develop 
fourbig offshore oil fields as part of an US$8.5 billion investment to raise Nigeria's 
oil and gas reserves. It will also construct a third liquefied natural gas train at Bonny 
Island worth US$4 billion. Shell expects 70 percent of the funding from private oil 
companies and 30 percent from the Nigerian government. The three parties 
involved in this huge in vestment programme are: (i) Shell Petroleum Development 
Company (comprising Shell - 30%, Agip - 5%, Elf - 10% and the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation - 55%); (ii) The Nigerian Liquefield Natural Gas 
Company (which comprises Shell Gas - 25.6%, Elf - 15%, Agip - 10.4%, NNPC 
- 49%; and (iii) Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (SNEPCO). 
[EIU CRN, 1999: 30] The result is that the oil multinationals have increased their 
command over the economic resources and power with which to deal with their 
"partners" in the crisis-ridden, dependent oil exporting economies such as Nigeria. 
They are at the same time asserting greater control and domination of the 
environment. From this position of total dominance, they are able to pursue a policy 
of exploration, extraction, processing and distribution regardless of the effects on 
the environment and the rights and interests of the oil communities. 
Globalisation and Environmental Conflict in the Niger Delta 
The environmental conflicts in the oil-rich Niger Delta find expression at various 
levels: the struggles for "scarce land", those for profitable returns on investments 
and revenues for economic development and those for environmental and human 
rights. They take the form of the push and pull of social movements intent on 
blocking continued oil extraction (and degradation/pollution) and impoverishment 
of the environment, and those seeking to demobilize and suppress the forces 
of local resistance in order to ensure the uninterrupted exploitation of oil. As such 
wanton exploitation of the environment continues, backed by state repression, the 
conflict over oil resources and the land, (and waters) from which oil is mined is 
exacerbated and transformed into into a struggle for power over oil production and 
the distribution of the benefits accruing from it. 
The Struggle For Land 
The Niger Delta area has one of the world's largest wetlands, supporting a wide 
ranging bio-diversity, including salt-water and fresh-water mangrove, and forest 
vegetation. For the communities in the Niger Delta area, land is therefore very 
scarce; and the little that is arable or can be exploited for their livelihood is
Globalisation and Environmental Conflict in Africa 51 
treasured. It forms the very basis - spiritual and material - of life in the peasant 
communities of the Niger Delta. Yet, land is scarce. In an account to the UNCED 
1992 meeting, a delegation of chiefs from the Rivers State described the delta area 
thus: 
The Niger Delta is in Southern Nigeria and has a catchment area of over 20 
river systems. Six million people depend on the Niger Delta's fertile fishing 
grounds and agricultural land. As only 30 per cent of the delta is unaffected 
by heavy flooding, the remaining land has to support a concentrated 
population. There is heavy competition for land in the Niger Delta that, 
unfortunately for the local community is rich in oil. 
The scarcity of land is due partly to the high population density of the area. More 
especially, it is the direct result of the uncontrolled appropriation of land by the oil 
companies worsened by the continued degradation of existing land by the same oil 
multinationals. At the moment six oil fields, two large refineries, a huge fertiliser 
complex, an ocean port, a petrochemical complex and numerous pipelines crisscrossing 
farmlands and homes have been established in the delta area which 
symbolize the threat posed to the livelihoods of the local population. The gravity 
of the situation is underscored by the fact that the land and waters, as well as the 
plant and fauna of the Niger Delta are exposed to toxic waste and other harmful 
substances discharged by the oil industry. In fact, there is abundant empirical 
evidence to this effect even though Shell has continued to deny responsibility; its 
denials fly in the face of the facts. According to Rowell ( 1994: 12), about 40 
percent of Shel 1's spills world-wide were concentrated in the delta. While Shell has 
blamed the high incidence on sabotage by aggrieved villagers (Obi, 1997a: 14), a 
study by the Nigerian Ministry of Petroleum Resources puts "the largest cause of 
spill as equipment malfunction" (38 percent), and "corrosion of equipment" (21 
per cent) (Oyekan, 1991). According to a World Bank Study - Defining an 
Environmental Development Strategy For the Niger Delta, "concentrations of 
dissolved petroleum hydrocarbons in bodies of water near oil terminals and 
refineries have been measured at levels ranging from 11.2 to 53.9 mg/litrc. These 
concentrations are up to fifty times greater than European and US standards tor safe 
drinking/domestic water". The report further observes that "as much as 76 per cent 
of all the natural gas from petroleum production in Nigeria is flared compared to 
0.6 in the United States, 4.3 in the UK, 21 percent in Libya. The flaring is a serious 
hazard. At temperatures of 1,300 to 1,400 degrees centigrade, the multitude of 
flares heat up every thing, causing noise pollution, and producing CO,, VOC, CO. 
NOx and particulatcs around the clock. The emission of CO, from gas flaring in 
Nigeria releases 35 million tons of CO, a year and 12 million tons of methane, 
which means that Nigerian oil fields contribute more to global warming than the 
rest of the world put together" (World Bank Industry and Energy Operations.
52 Cyril Obi 
1995). For the Ogoni, with a population of 500,000 squeezed into 404 square miles, 
and an estimated population density of 1,250 persons per square mile, issues of 
control of and access to land become very sensitive issues. These as well as 
environmental degradation are therefore at the very heart of the struggle of the oil 
producing communities in this area. 
Yet the people appeared weak and helpless in the face of the overwhelming 
power of the oil companies supported by the state. They were either ignorant of the 
procedure for reclaiming their rights, or they could not afford the prohibitive cost 
oflitigation against the oil companies (Adewale, 1989;Hutchful, 1985: 121). This 
is why they opted for environmental activism as a way of drawing attention to their 
plight and resorted to radical protests and the disruption of oil operations in their 
communities when their demands were not met. In most cases, the state has met 
such protests with repression (Crow, '995; Robinson, 1996;Ibeanu, 1997: 14-21) 
as in the case of Umuechem (1990) ai'd the Ogoni (1993) where life and property 
were lost. But such brutalities have not stemmed the tide of protest and resistance 
by the communities in the Niger Delta (Obi, 1998). 
Struggles for Environmental and Human Rights: The Ogoni v 
Global Oil Capital 
The resistance of the Ogoni (MOSOP) to the forces of global oil capital is one of 
the most creative efforts by ordinary people to secure their rights against one of the 
worlds' most powerful multinationals - Shell. For the Ogoni, advancing the 
environmental and human rights agenda is a continuation of a long standing 
struggle for self-determination in the context of Nigerian federalism. It is also an 
example of the universalisation and legitimation of the global rights agenda in the 
post-cold war era (the struggle for democracy, civil rights, minority rights and 
environmental rights generally) and the de-legitimation of military rule on a global 
scale. These struggles hit their peak in the 1990s as a result of the conjuncture of 
domestic struggles for democracy against the background of military 
authoritarianism and economic crisis, and the resurgence of civil societies worldwide 
which promote and defend fundamental human rights. The Ogoni succeeded 
because their leadership was able to insert the Ogoni movement into the global 
rights discourse on the universality of human rights and freedom, and thereby won 
the attention and support of significant sections of global civil society to the cause 
of local resistance. But also, they succeeded because their movement was a solid 
project ot local popular empowerment and mass mobilisation under a highly 
conscious leadership. What then were the strategies of popular empowerment used 
in the Ogoni movement? 
The Strategies of Local Empowerment 
MOSOP was the culmination of the historical struggles of the Ogoni, one of the
Globalisation and Environmental Conflict in Africa 53 
smallest ethnic groups in a region of ethnic minorities. Through its strategies of 
local empowerment it was able to transcend the limitations of size and grab global 
attention. Initially, MOSOP in drawing up the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) in 1990 
had gone through extensive grassroots and elite consultations and defined the 
moral "correctness" and justness of the Ogoni people's struggle. The Bill was 
translated into the local dialects and given wide publicity in Ogoniland. It was later 
presented to the Nigerian government and circulated both locally and among the 
international community. At the local level, it was endorsed by most of the 
traditional leaders and clan heads, and was instilled in the popular consciousness 
as the creed of resistance and Ogoni freedom. 
Mass support was cultivated and tested in rallies, demonstrations against Shell 
and the state were held, and structures of mass participation that included all 
sections of Ogoni society (Professionals, Women, Peasants, Youth, Traditional 
Rulers, Students, Teachers, and the Church) were devised. This gave MOSOP the 
legitimacy and power to make demands on Shell and the state, demands that were 
consistent with the quest of the people for their right to control their land and the 
oil, and be compensated for bearing the environmental cost of oil production. For 
example, in 1992 MOSOP gave Shell, Chevron, and the NNPC a list of demands 
to be met in 30 days, or leave Ogoniland. The success of that mass mobilization 
project is that ordinary Ogoni citizens agreed to contribute to the MOSOP special 
one naira Ogoni survival fund (ONESUF) in 1993, accruing a sum of N700,000.00. 
Later in the year, MOSOP set up the Ogoni relief and rehabilitation fund and agency 
(ORAREF), to cater for distressed Ogoni who were either victims of military 
repression, or had been displaced or injured in the wave of communal clashes between 
the Ogoni and their neighbours in 1993 and 1994 (Ndoni, Okrika and Ndoki). 
Strategies For Connecting the "Global" 
With such solid local support and the non-response of Shell and the state to the 
Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR), MOSOP took its struggle to the "global" level as a 
strategy of exposing Shell in its own "home", Europe, as a violator of human rights, 
especially of a minority group. Shell was picked because of its vulnerability as the 
largest and most visible operator in the delta area, its strategic role as "provider" 
for the state, and the likely domino effect its capitulation would have on the other 
operators. The first port of call was the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
Organisation (UNPO) in The Hague, Netherlands, a second home of the Royal- 
Dutch Group. UNPO afforded the Ogoni leadership the opportunity to network 
with other groups from different parts of the world involved in struggles for the 
rights of indigenous peoples, to establish strong contacts with the INGO rights 
community (Saro-Wiwa, 1995). The UNPO was a first step in giving global 
legitimacy to the Ogoni struggle, and immersing it in the discourse of the global 
rights movement. In 1992, another opportunity came for the Ogoni to present their
54 Cyril Obi 
case to the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples. This was 
quickly followed up by a television documentary (Heat of the Moment) on the 
devastation of the Ogoni environment by Shell and the repression of the Ogoni to 
shocked audiences in the UK (the other home of Shell), Europe, and other parts of 
the western world. This was followed by lecture tours, seminars, more films 
(Megaforce), invitations to INGO's and others to witness the "genocide of an 
indigenous people - the Ogoni", The picture of the Ogoni as the victim, a tiny 
ethnic group discriminated against, and confronted by the combined might of Shell 
and the state, empowered MOSOP's appeals and complaints to the international 
community. It also formed the basis for networking with "global" rights movements 
based in the west, who adopted the Ogoni struggle, connecting the global to 
the local, and thereby globalising the local Ogoni resistance. 
While Shell was initially able to deny responsibility by arguing that the rights 
question was not part of its business of "searching for, and winning oil" .and that 
after paying its taxes to the state it was not its lot to interfere in governments' 
business, MOSOP's sustained exposure of Shell's culpability in Ogoniland, at 
numerous global forums caused considerable discomfort within this global conglomerate. 
MOSOP's case was well packaged for global impact with the help of 
international human and environmental rights NGO's, including: Amnesty International, 
FI AN International, Human Rights Watch Africa, Article 19, InterRights, 
the Body Shop, Greenpeace, and the Friends of the Earth (Skogly, 1997: 51). 
Others include the Sierra Club, Rainforest Action Network, Project Underground, 
Delta, Trocaire, World Council of Churches, Book Aid International, and the 
Netherlands Committee of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
(Obi: 1998a: 14). Furthermore, the Ogoni Campaign was promoted through widely 
circulated reports, and through television documentaries which beamed the 
"ecological terror" against the Ogoni to shocked audiences across the world. In one 
of such programmes "World in Action" shown on Granada Television, on May, 13, 
! 996, Bop van Dcssel. Shell's former head of Environmental Studies in Nigeria, 
confirmed that the oil industry was damaging the environment, and that Shell had 
ignored warnings and denied mistakes: "they were not meeting their own standards, 
they were not meeting international standards. Any Shell site I saw was 
polluted. Any terminal that I saw was polluted. It is clear to me that Shell was 
devastating the area" (Clothier and O'Conner, 1996). 
The Internet, fax machines, lectures, lobbying, personal contacts, institutional 
affiliation, visits to Ogoniland by researchers and western activists, and interviews 
with strategic actors, picketing of Shell offices and stations, and boycotts were used 
to facilitate the globalisation of the Ogoni campaign against Shell and the Nigerian 
state. These struggles peaked after the execution of the "Ogoni Nine", an act widely 
condemned across the world for falling far below internationally recognised 
standards for a fair trial (Birnbaum, 1995; CLO, 1996; Skogley, 1997).
Globalisation and Environmental Conflict in Africa 55 
With such support at home and abroad, MOSOP was able to stop Shell 
operations in Ogoniland in 1993. It put Shell and the state in the global dock, 
contributing to the isolation of Nigeria under the Abacha military regime on the 
ground of its poor human rights record. Other groups in the delta, particularly 
Chicoco, ERA and Niger-Delta Human and Environmental Rescue Organization 
(ND-HERO), have emerged to join MOSOP in waging the struggle locally and in 
the global arena. 
The Global-State Backlash 
In response to the challenge posed by the "globalisation" of local resistance in the 
Niger Delta, the state militarised the conflict. As in the case of Umueehem in 1990, 
when a demonstration against Shell by an aggrieved oil community was violently 
put down with considerable human casualties (80 dead, 485 houses destroyed), the 
Ogoni paid a heavy price through military occupation and reprisals by the Internal 
Security Task Force (Robinson, 1997: 58-80). According to Robinson, state 
repression of Ogoni resistance went through five phases: harassment and "justified" 
violence; covert operations; overt military operations; crushing the spirit; 
crisis management and the repression of the church and church leaders. Many 
Ogoni villages were attacked, thousands of Ogoni were killed or internally 
displaced, and some were forced into exile between 1993 and 1996. 
The militant youth of the Ogoni were clearly no match for these forces, which 
also wanted to set up the Ogoni as an "example" to deter other oil communities 
from following the "Ogoni separatist path" or threatening global and state access 
to oil. In fact, MOSOP's activities were seen as subversive of state security as they 
struck at the heart of oil economy and threatened Shell, the "breadwinner" of the 
Nigerian state. To slop such popular resistance from becoming widespread, the 
federal government of Nigeria enacted the Treason and Treasonable Offences 
Decree in May, 1993. This decree made minority agitation for self-determination 
an offence punishable by death. The primary target was the Ogoni who are noted 
for a history of separatist agitation. The state hit hard at what, in sonic sections, was 
interpreted as the early stages of a secessionist movement in the heart of the 
country's gold-mine. 
Clearly, this has been one of the most bitter environmental conflicts fought 
between a state and a group of its citizens in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The state deployed the fullest complement of its coercive apparatus and its 
connections with traditional authority structures, as well as factions of the elite to 
frustrate the MOSOP and similar struggles in the delta. In 1992, it set up the Oil 
Mineral Producing Areas Development Council (OMPADEC) to develop the 
communities ot the delta with the new 3 percent oil derivation fund. The Ogoni 
were visited by government delegations and the leadership was invited to Abuja tor 
discussions with officials at the highest levels of government. When OMPADEC
56 Cyril Obi 
got consumed in its own internal contradictions and the state could not co-opt the 
MOSOP leadership, subversion and deconstruction were considered the next 
option. How this was achieved can be gleaned from the factional politics that 
ravaged MOSOP before and after the 1993 Presidential elections, and the communal 
clashes between the Ogoni and the neighbouring Ndoki, Okrika and Andoni 
between 1993 and 1994, which led to the death and displacement of many Ogoni 
people (Crow, 1995: 12; Boele, 1995: 24-26; Ake, 1994: 6). At the international 
level, the Nigerian state felt betrayed by the West. To repair the damage and redeem 
its image, the government spent a lot of money in explaining how the Ogoni 
resistance had threatened national security, and western interests (FMIC, 1996) as 
a mode of image polishing, and diplomatic "damage control". Shell had taken the 
need for a positive public image and friendly environmental practices more 
seriously, even if the former is to cover up the poor state of the latter. Through press 
conferences, the release of Briefing Notes, the use of sophisticated public relations 
consultants, and the sponsoring of trips for sympathetic interests and journalists to 
the Niger Delta, it has continued to deny responsibility for, and been insensitive to 
the poor ecological and human rights situation in the delta, except in ways that 
doing better can help polish its battered image. Public relations had become its 
greatest refuge and tool for placing profits before the interests and rights of the 
Ogoni (Ake, 1995, 1996). It had also penetrated local classes, and strengthened 
alliances across classes including local chiefs, the elite, youth and professional 
groups, the media and civil society organizations. 
After the 1995 hangings. Shell announced in 1996, that it was going ahead with 
the joint venture $3.8 billion Nigeria Liquefied Gas Project (NLNG). This was 
after the Chairman of Royal Dutch Shell, Cor Herkstroeter, was reported to have 
said that Shell improved on its profits record in spite of the undue media attention, 
following the execution of the "Ogoni Nine" (Europe Information Service, 1996). 
Some evidence of Shell's logistical and material support to the Nigerian state, and 
the state's protection of Shell's interests, has been produced (Kretzman, 1995; 
Ghazi and Doudu. 1996; Rowell, 1996a, 1996b; Robinson, 1997), the reason for 
this is not far to seek. It lies in the symbiotic relationship between the state and 
Shell; between the gatekeeper and the benefactor. What is also important is how 
the political economy of the oil industry has rigidly defined as domestic the 
boundaries of issues of security and human rights in a context where the local 
clearly overlaps with the global. This probably accounts for the ambivalent attitude 
of certain western nations who claim to be champions of rights within the ambience 
of post cold war liberalism on the one hand, and recoil into inertia or indiffere je 
when this consideration collides with their national interest in securing acces > t( 
sources of cheap oil, and huge profits for their investments. This perhaps explains 
the refusal of Britain and the Netherlands (the joint owners of Shell), and th i United 
States of America (which imports half of Nigeria's oil), to support the in'. • national
Globalisation and Environmental Conflict in Africa 57 
campaign for the imposition olcomprehensive oil sanctions on Nigeria in order to 
force the military regime to respect human rights and demands for democracy. 
The sophistication and scale of violence deployed in Ogoniland have served to 
worsen tensions and protests in the oil producing communities of the Niger Delta. 
Cases of the spread of local resistance across the delta are well documented. Rowell 
(1994), captures this in relation to Umuechem, 1990; Ogbia, 1992; Igbide, 1992; 
Uzere, 1992; Diebu, 1992; Burutu, 1992; Bomadi, 1992 and Irri, 1993. In a more 
recent Human Rights Watch Africa study, Crow (1995), documents the sacking of 
four oil producing communities in the Niger Delta: Obagi, Brass, Nembe Creek, 
and Rumuobiokani by the mobile police force (Ibeanu, 1997: 17). Clearly, neither 
the militarisation of the conflict nor the globalisation of local resistance have 
brought outright victory for either side. As it is, the balance of power of social 
forces is in favour of those operating at the behest of globalisation for now. Yet, 
the persistence of contradictions in the contested oil-rich environment and the 
dynamics within the social forces themselves, strongly suggests that these struggles 
must continue. 
Conclusion and Prospects 
It is clear that the attempt to suppress the Ogoni resistance by the state and petrobusiness 
interests operating in Nigeria has rather spread the culture of resistance 
in the delta, and led to the globalisation of local resistance movements. Since 1995 
other resistance groups have emerged in the delta. These include, Chicoco 
(Chicoco, 1997), Environmental Rights Action (ERA), and the Niger Delta Human 
and Environmental Rescue Organisation (NDHERO). There is no doubt that 
lessons have been learned on the strategies for combining global and local 
resistance; more perhaps will be learnt in the course of the struggle. But, there is 
a recognition at the local level of the limitations, as well as merits of adopting global 
platforms vis a vis the hegemonic designs of the "industrialised democracies" for 
Nigeria's oil. 
In the short to medium term, the prospects suggest that low intensity environmental 
conflicts will continue in the oil producing communities of the Niger Delta. 
There are also possibilities for the emergence of pan-delta militant youth groups 
which will seek to militarise local resistance based on, their frustration with nonviolent 
protest, perceived betrayal of the cause by the older elite and their mastery 
of the swampy delta terrain, which will pose problems for a conventional military 
force in case of open warefare. 
It would not be possible to disconnect the struggles of the oil minorities from the 
larger national-democratic project in Nigeria. The reverses suffered by MOSOP 
partly lay in its isolation, and the lack of inter-communal, inter-regional linkages. 
Creative modalities need to be exploited to bridge this gap, without draining local 
resistance of its essential elements. The end must be a people-centred democratic
58 Cyril Obi 
project. 
As long as the processes of globalisation continue to deepen contradictions in 
the Niger Delta and the oil multinationals continue "with business as usual", 
depending on a Nigerian state torn by factional politics with its legitimacy fragile 
as ever, the likelihood of peace and sustainable environmental practices are 
remote. Peace will have to be built on an emancipating project that must objectively 
respect the rights of the oil producing communities. The oil multinationals must 
begin to work out in consultation with the genuine representatives of the oil 
communities, new local-specific business ethics based on company sensitivity to, 
and respect for equity and social justice as well as the rights of the local 
communities, and the fragile ecosystem of the Niger Delta. Hiding behind the 
screen of state repression, weakness and non-accountability in the oil nexus, might 
prove too costly in the long run. 
At the global level, the INGO's can be more effective if they have a unified 
campaign with the social movements of the Niger Delta (hopefully they would 
resolve the leadership crises plaguing them), and develop a firm focus on the 
struggle for justice and equity. On the part of the oil multinationals, it would be 
good business to cut their political costs by taking on more of the environmental 
costs of oil production, and contributing more meaningfully to local empowerment 
and development. 
Notes 
* Research Fellow, Nigerian Institute Of International Affairs, Lagos, 
Nigeria. 
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