Afr. j . polit. sci. (2000), Vol. 5 No. 1,146-162 
Patrimonialism and Military Regimes 
in Nigeria 
Ukana B. Ikpe* 
Abstract 
Military regimes in Nigeria exhibit patrimonial characteristics such as personal 
rule, absence of separation between the public and private realms, patron-client 
administrative networks, veneration of the ruler, massive corruption, ethnic/ 
sectional-based support, and repression of opposition and violation of human 
rights. Most of the dangers posed by military rule to democracy is not really 
because of its intrinsic authoritarian posture, although it is the most perceptible. 
It is the patrimonial tendency in military rule that creates the most transcendent 
and pernicious effect on democracy because of unconcealed ethnic/sectional 
alignment of regimes. This generates inter-ethnic acrimony and rivalry, in effect, 
delegitimizes the state and state power, and consequently, engenders a hostile 
environment to the growth of democracy. 
Introduction 
Military rule in general is antithetical to democracy. There are numerous 
reasons for this. Firstly, the military structure and mode of operation are not 
consistent with democratic norms and procedure. Secondly, the frequent 
intervention of the military in civilian politics disrupts the democratic process 
and prevents the stabilization and institutionalization of democratic culture. 
But these and similar arguments against military rule focus only on the tangible 
aspects of military regimes and their direct impact on democratic rule. They do 
not consider the derivational effects. Derivational effects refer to the impact that 
military rule has in reinforcing other socio-political factors such as ethnicity, 
religion, regionalism, and so on, which have deleterious consequences for 
democratic rule. One factor that has combined consummately, yet unobtrusively, 
with military regime in Nigeria is patrimonialism. The effect of the 
1027-0353 © 2000 African Association of Political Science
Patrimonialism and Military Regimes in Nigeria 147 
patrimonialization of the Nigerian army and military rule will be the major focus 
of this essay. 
The argument of this paper is that Nigeria's military regimes operate a 
patrimonial system to a very large extent. Military rulers are personal rulers who 
depend, for support, on the distribution of state largesse to favourites and kinsmen. 
State offices are used to generate resources for the incumbent officers and their 
dependents and clients. As the Nigerian army is dominated by a particular group 
in the population, state patronage also favours elites of this group more than others. 
This produces three grave consequences for democracy. First, the pursuit of 
hegemonic politics by a section of the population engenders ethnonationalism and 
ethnic politics which is unhealthy for democracy. Second, the privatization of state 
offices and obliteration of the dividing line between private and public realms 
engender uncontrollable corruption. This is because the state becomes a viable 
source of private accumulation, and therefore political competition to occupy state 
offices, of necessity, becomes normless, ferocious and stormy. Under such 
conditions, democracy has a tenuous existence because compromise, the flavour 
of democracy, becomes impossible. 
Third, there is a sharp decline in the legitimacy of the Nigerian state because 
sectional dominance through military regimes has generated a sense of injustice 
and alienation among other groups. Hence, many groups are today questioning the 
basis of a united Nigeria, and are calling for a sovereign national conference to 
discuss the future of the Nigerian state. Others see the major issue in the ongoing 
transition politics as the necessity of a power shift from the North to the South. 
These are the major consequences of the patrimonialization of state power by 
successive military regimes. 
The Conceptual Framework 
Patrimonialism was developed by Max Weber to describe a system of personal rule 
in which the ruler dispenses offices and benefits to subordinates in return for 
loyalty,supportandservices(Weber, 1978:1031).Initspresentform, patrimonialism 
refers to a political system in which state officers appropriate their offices for 
personal benefits and those of their supporters (Theobald, 1982: 248). Political 
offices are regarded as fiefdoms by the official and the exercise of public authority 
is utilised to serve their interest. However, in view of the numerous forms that 
personal rule in contemporary state, manifests itself, it appears that the Weberian 
conception of patrimonialism represents the ideal model. No existing state can 
exhibit the five Weberian characteristics of a patrimonial state in its pure forms: 
1. government based on a personal ruler; 
2. lack of separation between the public and private realms for state officials; 
3. political offices are regarded as fiefdoms and patronage by state officials;
148 Ukana B. Ikpe 
4. the system operates primarily through numerous patron-client networks; and 
5. the exercise of public authority is utilized to serve the rulers and officials on 
which the offices are bestowed. 
That some political systems exhibit some of these characteristics more than 
others and in different circumstances has led to sub-classifications of the patrimonial 
state in this category — such as clientelism, prebendalism and neopatrimonialism. 
For example, clientelism is used to describe a political system that displays 
patron-client relationships in the exercise of public authority and distribution of 
benefits. It is defined as a personalised relationship between actors (i.e. patrons and 
clients), or a set of actors commanding unequal wealth, status or influence, based 
on conditional loyalties and involving mutually beneficial transactions (Lemarchard, 
1972: 69). In the political system, clientelism is a system in which state officers 
(patrons) distribute benefits to strategically placed individuals lower than themselves 
(clients) in return for support, service and loyalty, and to those higher than 
themselves (patrons), for the continuous protection of their positions and tenures. 
This means that a patron at one level may be a client to a superior other, and so on. 
This linkage could be at the individual or group level (Lemarchard, 1972; 
Sandbook, 1985). 
But when state officials regard political offices as inherited estates to be used for 
their private accumulation and those of their supporters within a legal-formal, 
constitutional order, most especially in a pseudo-democratic regime, the system is 
referred to as prebendalism. Prebendalism is a hybrid of authority patterns: 
(On) the one hand, there are legal rules stipulating the purview of offices, 
how they are to be staffed, the required technical training and material 
entitlements for office holders. On the other hand, however, personal 
loyalties and communal identities, the private appropriation of the means 
of administration and, finally, the transformation of office from their 
stipulated administrative purpose into a direct or indirect economic resource, 
are factors which have equal weight in determining the nature and 
exercise of public power (Joseph, 1987: 64-65). 
The significant difference between prebendalism and patrimonialism, according 
to Richard Joseph, lies in the absence of the authority of the personal ruler. Or 
even when a personal ruler exists in a prebendal state, he/she does not last long 
enough compared with patrimonialism. Nevertheless, to say that both systems 
depend on "the treatment of state power as a congeries of office which can be 
competed for, appropriated, and then administered for the benefit of individual 
occupants and their support groups" (Joseph, 1987: 63).
Patrimonialism and Military Regimes in Nigeria 149 
Numerous African states exhibit some traits of the Weberian model of patrimonial 
state, and therefore attract the label of neo-patrimonialism or retain the 
patrimonial tag. For instance, Nigeria under Generals Babangida and Abacha, 
Togo under Eyadema, Omah Bongo's Gabon, Nguema's Equatorial Guinea, 
Gaddafi's Libya, and the archtypical patrimonial state, Zaire under the late 
Mobutu Sese Seko. In all these states, the patrimonial characteristics operate in 
spite of the constitution and are crucial in determining government decisions 
within the formal-legal administrative and political structure. The patrimonial 
characteristics are generally adapted to, and deeply embeded in a constitutional 
framework, yet their structures and consequences are clearly distinguishable, 
which suggests why some scholars prefer to use the term neo-patrimonialism to 
describe a wide range of regimes in Africa. In essence, neo-patrimonialism 
describes how patrimonialism operates in contemporary African context (Bratton 
and Van de Walle, 1994; O'Donnel, 1996: 40-41). Like the ideal patrimonial 
model, neo-patrimonialism is also a composite of specifics with as "hierarchical 
particularistic (sic) exchanges, patronage, nepotism, and favours to action that, 
under the formal rules of the institutional package of polyarchy, would be 
considered corrupt" (O' Donnell, 1996:42; see also Rose-Ackerman, 1996). 
What we have done in the preceding section is to show that different concepts 
have been used to describe the regimes in which support is maintained or generated 
through the distribution of state resources such as offices, contracts, grants, 
licences and other means (Ergas, 1987: l-17);Callaghy, 1987:89; Theobald, 1990, 
1982:242-159). These concepts may differ but they refer to the same phenomenonthat 
is, the privatisation of state offices. It is for this reason that all such concepts 
will be subsumed under the umbrella of patrimonialism. 
I would in this framework, describe most African states as having a patrimonial 
regime. I would further argue that military rule facilitates the establishment of 
patrimonial rule more than any other system of government. The hierarchical 
nature of the military command structure and the centralised control of instruments 
of physical violence are key factors which dispose military regimes to 
patrimonialism. According to Richard Sandbrook, patrimonial rale develops from 
a situation where the ruler lacks constitutional, charismatic - revolutionary or 
traditional legitimacy. A strong man emerges and rules on the basis of material 
incentives and personal control of his administration and armed forces. Under 
circumstances, that are devoid of traditional or modern constitutional limitations, 
fear and personal loyalty become the outstanding feature of the prevailing regime 
(Sandbook, 1985: 89). A large number of African states are controlled by such 
authoritarian regimes that have emerged from military or one party dictatorships; 
each of them having a strong man who occupies the centre of political life. 
Due to uncertain or fragile legitimacy, the patrimonial ruler demands extreme 
obedience and unqualified veneration.
150 Ukana B. Ikpe 
He surrounds himself with followers who constantly, reaffirm their faith in 
his exceptional wisdom and generosity. All or the bulk of strategic positions 
in the political, bureaucratic, police and military hierarchies are filled with 
personal loyal individuals. These include relatives especially close ones 
such as brothers and cousins, friends and classmates, kinsmen and tribesmen. 
For these and other followers, the expectation of sharing in the spoils 
of office reinforces the personal link to the chief (Sandbrook, 1985:90-91). 
Every socio-political and economic activity in the state must be geared toward 
the strengthening of his power and economic position. This is why "in many 
African countries, welfare oriented development policies are discussed at great 
length, but development policies that augment state and ruler power are the primary 
focus of implementation efforts" (Callaghy, 1983: 83). 
Patrimonialism, especially when seen from the perspective of clientelism 
as an analytic variable of Nigerian politics is important for two main 
reasons. First, it can operate expediently on both the individual and group 
levels simultaneously. Second, it combines easily with ethnicity, another 
important analytic variable, in a mutually reinforcing manner. This relationship 
has been lucidly and convincingly stated by Rene Lamarchard: 
It is less obvious, however that clientelism and ethnicity (sic) have seldom 
operated independently of each other... Just as ethnicity (sic) has sometimes 
been created with integrati ve properties that really belong to the realm 
of clientelism, so clientelism as an integrative mechanism has often 
developed out of the exigencies or ethnic fragmentation (Lemarchard, 
1972:69). 
Furthermore, ethnonationalism and clientelism "may have overlapping memberships, 
with some individuals solidly anchored in the ethnic sub-structure, and 
others acting as intermediary links between this sub-structure and the higher 
reaches of the clientelist pyramid". Accordingly, "what may be taken for a clear 
example of ethnicity (sic) at one level may be nothing more than the lower 
reticulations of a more extensive clientelistic network" (Lemarchard, 1972: 69). 
Ethnonationalism is a phenomenon which is produced by interrelationships 
between different ethnic groups within a political society comprising diverse 
ethnic groups (Nnoli, 1978: 6). It is very easy for ethnicity to be politicised in a 
multi-ethnic state because of the conflicting interest of ethnic-based elites as they 
engage in power struggles and as groups compete generally for scarce state 
resources and largesse such as employment, education, election, representation, 
and most of all, the control of state power (Rothchild, 1986; Osaghae, 1992:49).
Patrimonialism and Military Regimes in Nigeria 151 
What makes ethnonationalism a dangerous factor is its nature. That is, it usually 
involves unequal contestants - some advanced, others backward, some dominant, 
others dominated. And because it is a zero-sum strategy in which the winner 
sweeps the stakes, conflict arising from it tends to be ferocious with the persistent 
danger of violence (Osaghae, 1992:49). Thus, whether it is under a democratic or 
military regime, the political elite and their respective groups will always be 
involved in a power struggle and competition for scarce national resources. When 
the state is partial, because of being dominated by sectional interests, most 
especially under military regimes, the contest for resources will be regarded as 
unfair by other groups not favoured by the power balance, and this could create 
political instability. 
Ethnic politics compared to patrimonialism, is atrociously debilitating to 
democracy and the democratization process. Many old and contemporary studies 
have shown that a stable democracy is very difficult to achieve in plural and most 
especially, ethnically divided societies because ethnicity becomes the primary 
basis of political relations and participation (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Lijphart, 
1996: 106, Osaghae, 1992: 50). In such societies, ethnic identities, according to 
Donald Horowitz (1996:184-186), provide clear lines for determing who will be 
included and who will be excluded, and since the lines appear unalterable, being 
in and being out may appear to many as a permanent prize. As such, ethnicity poses 
an obstacle at the threshold of democratization and an obstacle after this threshold 
has been crossed. Even the military, no matter how much it tries to be natural, 
cannot be insulated from the problem of ethnonationalism and the distribution of 
state largesse especially when there is the general feeling that the military 
leadership is ethnic-based. 
The Military and Patrimonial Politics in Nigeria 
The Nigerian army was politicized quite early in the country' s history as an 
independent nation. As early as 1960, the Northern elite had demanded 50 percent 
of the officer corps to reflect the size of the region, which was said to be twice as 
large as the two Southern regions together (Luckham, 1971; Miners, 1971; 
Ademoyega, 1981). Consequently, being an officer, to a great extent, came to 
depend on one's ethnic identity. Today, the states are accorded equal quota in army 
recruitment. But rather than eliminate the feeling of ethnic domination in the army, 
the quota system has heightened it. In the first place, some ethnic groups have more 
states than others, which means that they would have a larger number of military 
officers compared to others. Second, while recruitment is equal for all states, only 
few officers of southern origin ever rise to become Army Chief of Staff {Tempo, 
October 8,1998).1 This means that ultimately the same northern ethnic combinations 
that dominate civil politics also dominate the military, and invariably military 
governments. But northern domination is usually more glaring under a military
152 Ukana B. Ikpe 
than civilian rule. The reason is that, although ethnically dominated, the military 
can use brute force to secure compliance from all sections and groups, but any 
civilian rule whether ethnically dominated or not, must be in some form of alliance 
with other groups to secure adequate control. 
The Nigerian military came to power for the first time January 15, 1966, in a 
coup that was widely described as Igbo master-minded (Dudley, 1973:106-109), 
even though there are other contrary opinions (Ademoyega, 1981; Obasanjo, 
1987). There is, however, little dispute about the high degree of corruption, 
ineptitude and repression in Sir Abubakar Tarfawa Balewa's government. Law and 
order had broken down in the country, especially in the Western Region, following 
the extensive rigging of the 1965 regional election of that region by the Nigerian 
National Alliance (NNA) government. This political disorder precipitated this first 
military takeover of power. 
The absence of northern officers in this putsch evoked the criticism of sectionalism 
and ethnic motivation. But then, one could understand why northern officers 
were not involved in the plan. They enjoyed reasonable material comfort in the 
army as most of them were beneficiaries of patronage from their political kinsmen 
in government. Above all, the military was part of Nigerian society, and, in a 
situation in which ethnic groups competed for power and national resources, and 
the North was dominant in this contest, northern officers were compelled to support 
their political elite in return for favours. The counter-coup of July 29,1966, which 
was regarded as a retaliation by northern soldiers (clients), who were still 
emotionally deranged by the sudden loss of their political and military leaders 
(patrons) in the January 1966 coup (Dudley, 1973), was intended to restore this 
status quo. 
How patrimonial was this and successive military regimes? The first military 
government of General Ironsi did not last long, but the traces of patrimonial politics 
were evident. General Ironsi was accused of surrounding himself with advisers 
who were his kinsmen. In addition to this, his policy of unification was a disaster 
as it was seen by the North as an attempt to promote Igbo/Southern ascendancy and 
domination in Nigerian politics. In fairness to the North, the General appeared 
insensitive to the fears of the Northern elites about prospects of Southern domination 
in the unitary system he had established by decree. The counter-coup of July 
1966 was to restore Northern domination in Nigerian politics and to avenge the 
death of their civilian and military leaders. The crisis that followed this countercoup 
led to the civil war between the Eastern Region and the rest of the Nigerian 
Federation. 
It was after the civil war, when the Gowon-led military government settled 
down, that a pattern of patrimonialism became evident. Gowon was reluctant in 
disciplining state officers, and as such corruption became rampant (Joseph, 1987: 
72). This was clearly demonstrated by the zeal with which General Gowon
Patrimonialism and Military Regimes in Nigeria 153 
defended Joseph Gomwalk, a state governor, who had been accused of extensive 
corruption. Despite the fact that his accuser, Aper Aku, had filed affidavits in the 
court to this effect, Gowon, rather than call for an investigation, ordered Aper 
Aku's detention followed by a public statement that Gomwalk was not guilty (Ojo, 
1987: 507). In the case of his commissioner, Joseph Tarkar, though he (Tarkar) 
resigned after his corrupt activities were exposed, Gowon did not prosecute him. 
Meanwhile, in the states, governors used wanton force to silence public protests 
about the ways in which public officials appropriated public property or allowed 
others to do so. The governors "acted as if they were provincial chiefs in a 
decentralised patrimonial order". In fact, the entire administration condoned 
corruption as Gowon came to rely upon the disposition of offices, and distributed 
material rewards to obtain the support of people within and outside the military 
whom he thought he needed in order to stay in power (Ojo, 1987: 157). 
It was in Gowon's regime that the state started expanding into the economic and 
social sectors. This expansion was aided by abundant revenue from petroleum. 
There were numerous post-war contracts for which local and foreign businessmen 
contested, with huge kickbacks to the strategically placed elite. It was the Gowon 
regime that initiated the indigenization policy which blossomed under the Obasanjo 
regime. This policy gave power to the state to determine who would own shares in 
the numerous enterprises that had been acquired in the process, and who would 
serve as directors and board members in these state enterprises. For state leaders, 
this increased the avenues for rewarding loyal supporters, patronizing kinsmen, 
personal accumulation of wealth and buying support from potential opponents. 
Corruption blossomed, enabling officers of his administration to effectively 
pursue their private, ethnic and communal interests, especially in respect of the 
location of government projects and award of contracts. In those circumstances, 
"Any dividing line between public and private had disappeared, the very best of 
prebendalism was stretched by the excesses, since they obliterated the notion of a 
public office subject to personal and communal manipulations by office-holders" 
(Joseph, 1987: 83). State officers were seen by their communities as their 
representative in government, and government projects in such communities were 
somehow attributed to their efforts. Following this, communities without such 
representatives complained of government neglect. 
Gowon's rule terminated on July 29,1975 in a bloodless coup led by Murtala 
Muhammad. Muhammad himself was a product of the political patronage of the 
First Republic and Gowon's regime. In fact, he was one of the principal executors 
of the July 1966 coup/aimed at restoring Northern dominance in Nigerian politics; 
and the initial intention of Muhammad in the 1966 coup was to withdraw the North 
from the Nigerian federation (Kurfi, A., 1983: 38). In the early days of Gowon's 
rule, he was the power behind the throne, but the loss of this position and privilege 
after the civil war estranged him from Gowon. It was even widely known that, as
154 Ukana B. Ikpe 
a Division Commander during the civil war, Muhammad was involved in some 
corrupt practices to accumulate private wealth. These notwithstanding, Murtala 
Muhammad came to power as a crusading reformer and patriot, who led an anticorruption 
crusade. However, his rule lasted for only six months, so his sincerity 
and capacity to sustain the momentum of his crusade could not be ascertained. But 
his close association with such business tycoons as Chief M.K.O Abiola and the 
scandalous ITT contract, as well as the tainted contracts for the Abuja Federal 
Capital Projects, make it highly probable that it would not have been long before 
the forces of patrimonialism and their characteristical effects caught up with his 
administration. The appointment of his friend, Alhaji Adamu Ciroma, a historian, 
as the Governor of the Central Bank is a pointer to this suspicion. Besides, Murtala 
Muhammad was more or less a charismatic leader, and such leaders are extremely 
susceptible to patrimonial forms of administration (Callaghy, 1987: 110). 
His successor, General Olusegun Obasanjo continued with the policies of the 
Murtala Muhammad regime and for this reason the administration came to be 
known as "Muhammad-Obasanjo regime". This regime continued the expansion 
of the state into the economic arena and brought the state more intimately into 
contact with society. While the various economic activities were presented in^he 
context of national development, they in reality expanded the patrimonial privileges 
of the state by opening up more avenues for patronage. For instance, the 
federal government initiated the Universal Primary Education (UPE) which meant 
funding of primary school education, including the construction of several thousands 
of classroom blocks, training of teachers and providing books and other 
learning materials. This policy entailed the expenditure of huge sums of money and 
the award of several contracts to favourites, supporters and kinsmen by state 
officials. There was state patronage in the award of other projects such as the 
Festival of Black and African Arts (FESTAC 77); the first Lagos International 
Trade Fair; the construction of permanent barracks for thousands of soldiers; 
Operation Feed the Nation (OFN), which involved the procurement of farmlands, 
machines and other fanning equipment, fertilizer and seedlings; and the building 
of the new Federal Capital at Abuja. All these projects meant the award of several 
billion naira contracts. The momentum for private accumulation was further 
increased with the enactment of the Land Use Decree. This decree permitted state 
officers to acquire lands and houses anywhere in the country without hindrance. 
Furthermore, there were several projects pertaining to the transition programme, 
especially those related to the electoral process - namely, the procurement of 
voters cards, ballot papers and boxes, registration of voters and compilation of 
voters register, construction of polling stations and recruitment of electoral 
officers. As observed by Joseph (1987: 75) while the "Muhammad-Obasanjo" 
regime was seeking to lay down the basic infrastructure of a stable political order, 
it was at the same time adding more fuel to prebendal politics in Nigeria. Political
Patrimonialism and Military Regimes in Nigeria 155 
power was used to appropriate material benefits in the public domain for 
private benefit, including one's acknowledged communal and ethnic friends and 
supporters. 
The nextmilitary regime of relevance to this study is the Babangida regime. This 
regime can be described aptly as patrimonialism par excellence. Babangida came 
to power in 1985 following a palace coup. Typically of such coups, the interest of 
members of the incumbent regime is a key causal factor. It was particularly easy 
for Babangida to mobilize the support of the army for very flimsy reasons because 
he was the Chief of Army Staff in the ousted regime. He capitalised on the grave 
violations of human rights by the Buhari's government to win public sympathy. 
Like all military regimes that want to buy time, Babangida embarked on a transition 
programme which he never intended to complete. In the process, he set up several 
agencies such as the Political B ureau, Constitution Drafting Committee, the Centre 
for Democratic Studies (CDS), Directorate for Mass Mobilization (MAMSER), 
and two political parties, namely, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the 
National Republican Convention (NRC). As the people began to participate in 
these agencies, direct attention was shifted from the government, and the regime 
dug in gradually. 
When Babangida felt secured enough, he began to undermine and destabilize 
the transition programme which he had extravagantly planned. It was obvious that 
he had a hidden agenda, which was to perpetuate himself in power through 
dexterous manipulations. His most favourite strategy was dispensing largesse to 
powerful groups and individuals to buy their support. In the local parlance, this 
came to be known as "settlement". The politics of settlement was a combination 
of patrimonialism and incorporation. The rationale for this strategy was the 
conviction that the average Nigerian has an insatiable appetite for material 
aggrandisement and is under pressure to accumulate wealth. As such he/she was 
ready to support any regime that offers attractive patronage. In pursuit of personal 
power therefore many groups and individuals were settled in exchange for political 
support. 
For Babangida, the incorporation process started with his primary constituency, 
the army, which was transformed into what Joseph would have aptly described as 
"a 'prebendalized army"'. The first act was to retire all officers of doubtful loyalty. 
These were usually those who were senior to him, and capable of questioning the 
credentials of his government. This was followed by the appointment of his 
favourites to political and command positions, and a complex network of patronclient 
relationships came to dominate the army. Loyalty and sychophancy were the 
criteria, not efficiency and proficiency. Field commanders were given huge sums 
of money disguised as security votes, which they were not required to account for. 
And all military officers from the rank of captain were given a new car which cost 
the nation several millions of naira.
156 Ukana B. Ikpe 
As he was still suspicious of the army, Babangida attempted to establish the 
National Guard as an elite force that would be under his direct command. Indeed, 
any arm of the military that the President could not control was subjected to severe 
deprivation. This was the plight of the Air Force, especially after many of its 
officers were involved in a coup plot against his regime. The Air Force was starved 
of funds for the purchase of new aircraft, equipment, spare parts and general 
maintenance (The African Guardian, October 12, 1992). 
The President and some members of his family and top military officers also 
embarked on unbridled private accumulation at the expense of the nation. His wife, 
Miriam is said to be worth about 8 billion US dollars (Dapo, 1993) while 
Babangida himself is reported to be worth 30 million French francs (L'Evenement 
du Jeudi, May 1997). This excludes the money and numerous properties he is 
reported to have accumulated in Nigeria (Useh, 1993:7-13; Adekanmbi, 1998:14). 
Some top officers of the regime were involved in corrupt practices, and illegal 
business deals, most especially, large scale smuggling of petroleum products into 
neighbouring countries. These are in addition to numerous licences given to the 
President's clients to export crude oil (Mumuni, 1995: 16; Abimboye, 1993: 14). 
Babangida was simply munificent, responsible for the infrastructural transformation 
of his home state, Niger State. With a population of less than two million 
and of almost no economic importance to the nation. Niger State became a model 
in terms of infrastructural development during the regime of Babangida. And the 
people of Niger State showed their appreciation by giving him a heroic reception 
on his retirement which was aptly described by Tell magazine as "Babangida's 
triumphant entry into Minna". To date, the people of Niger State regard Babangida 
as their grand patron (The Guardian, November 5, 1998). 
The regime also embarked on extensive incorporation of influential civil 
society beginning with individuals and groups capable of enhancing the public 
image and credibility of his regime. For instance, academics and intellectuals 
were offered lucrative political appointments. These included persons like Wole 
Soyinka, Eme Awa, Humphray Nwosu, Adele Jinadu, Sam Oyovbaire, Omo 
Omoruyi, John Ayoade, and a host of others (Kunle Amuwo, 1990). As Julius 
Ihonvbere has suggested, the numerous directorates and agencies created by the 
Babangida regime were actually meant for "settling" people of this category 
(Ihonvbere, 1991: 120). 
Similarly, labour unions were infiltrated, so enticed and balkanized that union 
leaders openly solicited government patronage. In fact, the then president of the 
Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) Mr. Paschal Bafyau, vociferously campaigned 
for the extension of Babangida's tenure from 1993 to 1996. Even more clamorous 
were traditional rulers, who because of declining relevance in the modern state 
always support military regimes in exchange for status and material income. Even 
the newly elected members of the National Assembly fell for Babangida's
Patrimonialism and Military Regimes in Nigeria 157 
patrimonial politics when they supported the annulment of the June 12 presidential 
election. 
Although Babangida recruited clients and supporters all over Nigeria, his 
primary support came from the North. This is because he was such an ardent 
believer in Northern dominance of Nigerian politics and government that he 
actually used his regime to foster this project. His annulment of the June 12 
Presidential election which gave Chief M.K.O. Abiola of the SDP, a Southerner, 
an undisputed lead, forcefully demonstrates this commitment. Every available 
evidence indicate that any power shift from the North to the South was unacceptable 
to the Northern military ... by Babangida, and political elites who have 
dominated power since I960.2 
Abacha came to power after overthrowing the Interim Government set up by 
Babangida before his exit. The Abacha regime could be said to have been more 
patrimonial than Babangida's. His regime closely fitted Sandbrooks description of 
a typical patrimonial rule (op. tit). He surrounded himself with only very trusted 
loyalists and clients. Very few of his ministers could meet with him face to face to 
discuss state policies while a host of others had to approach the President through 
favourite ministers and Abacha's own close business partners. His major project 
as head of state was the accumulation of wealth for himself and for members of his 
immediate family and closest associates. Several major state contracts were 
awarded to his children and other relatives who reaped huge incomes when, in most 
cases, they did not execute the contracts (Adekanmbi, 1998:14-24). He indiscriminately 
transferred state funds into private accounts (Muhammad, 1998), acquired 
extensive property, and had business interests in virtually all the states of the 
federation (Fraud Incorporated, 1998: 3-7, Tempo, Oct. 15, 1998). His close 
friends were not left out of this game of looting public coffers. The most notable 
are General Jerry Useni, Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, who is 
allegedly worth more than 3 billion US dollars in cash with several billion naira 
worth of property in the country. Another close ally is Alhaji Ismaili Gwarzo, 
Abacha's Security Adviser whose fortune is valued at more than 4 billion US 
dollars (Fraud Incorporated, 1998: 13-14; Dare, S., 1998: 16-21). Millions of 
dollars were recovered from some of such associates after the death of Abacha. 
Very large sums of money were also discovered at the presidential villa, Aso Rock. 
Abacha's wife, Maryam was also caught trying to flee the country with huge sums 
of money in various foreign currencies (Post Express, August 2, 1998; Tempo, 
October 15,1998). 
Like a typical patrimonial ruler, Abacha did not tolerate any manner of 
opposition to his regime including activities that could affect the regular inflow of 
revenue into the state coffers (Arinze, 1995: 10). His instrument of terror was 
controlled by major Hamza El Mustapha, the Chief Security Officer. According to 
Fraud Incorporated, Mustapha set up several security outfits to protect Abacha.
158 Ukana B. Ikpe 
One of them was the strike force commandos made up of 3,000 members. They 
were drawn mainly from the ranks of sergeant and below. Their education did not 
exceed secondary school. The force patrolled the streets of Abuja and its environs. 
The second special task force was headed by a special police officer. Its duty was 
to frame people for detention and subject them to intensive torture. Journalists, 
campaigners for democracy and supporters of the annuled June 12 Presidential 
election were the major target. The third group was the killer squad, headed by one 
Jabila whose code name was Pharaoh. The work of this group was to exterminate 
tough opposition members whose detention might cause vehement condemnation 
worldwide. Their victims, included Kudirat Abiola, wife of the winner of the June 
12, 1993 presidential election, and Pa Alfred Rewane, a democracy activist (Tell, 
Oct. 5, 1998: 10-15; Fraud Incorporated 1998: 14). 
Like Babangida, Abacha was an avid supporter of Northern domination during 
the July 1966 coup. He was responsible for the killing of officers of Igbo origin in 
Kaduna and Zaria during the July 1966 coup (Obasanjo in Africa, September 1998: 
12). His closest advisers were mostly Northerners and at the time of his death, the 
first six senior military officers in the line of succession were all Northerners. Most 
of the eligible Southern officers, such as General Diya, Abacha's lieutenant, were 
detained for an alleged coup plot. In summing up Abacha's rule, General Olusegun 
Obansanjo said: 
Abacha used everything against the Nigerian interest, against the Nigerian 
people, and only for himself, his family and his cohort. Not just the 
security apparatus, even the political system, the economic system, 
everything that was there was used for him, his family and accomplices 
(Obasanjo, 1998: 10). 
Conclusion: Patrimonialism and Democratic Society 
Patrimonialism when combined with military regimes in Nigeria amplify the antidemocratic 
characteristic of military dictatorship. Patrimonialism itself is perilous 
to democratic stability but its dialect effect is adumbrated by the unconcealed 
antagonism between democracy and military dictatorship. Thus, the effects of 
patrimonialism on democracy within the parameters of military rule are secondary, 
derivational and covert. However, when the characteristics of patrimonialism are 
extracted from military regimes, its (patrimonialism's) damaging effects are 
glaring and momentous. For instance, personal rale, ethnic - based loyalty and 
support, state-society relations based on patron-client networks, absence of separation 
between public and private realms, unrestricted accumulation of private 
wealth from state resources, repression of opposition and human rights abuses, and 
inveterate corruption, are all detrimental to democratic stability. The relationship 
between military, regime and patrimonialism is symbiotic and congruous. This
Patrimonialism and Military Regimes in Nigeria 159 
explains why both patterns can easily fuse together. The prevalence of patrimonialism 
as a form of rule by military regimes in Nigeria has hindered the latter's capacity 
to legitimize and institutionalize state authority which is a necessary condition for 
democratic stability and consolidation. In this regard, therefore, the impact of 
patrimonialism on democracy is tremendous. Military despots and their juntas in 
Nigeria are usually sectionally constituted and dominated in which the national 
aspect is only a fagade. Consequently, the structure of military regimes promote 
ethnic rivalry and acrimony rather than national integration. Military despots such 
as Babangida, Abacha and others who see themselves primarily as ethnic patrons 
cannot create stable polities necessary for democracy out of a multi-ethnic society 
like Nigeria. 
Notes 
* Department of Political Science/Public Administration, University of Uyo, 
Uyo Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria. 
1. Apart from the six months (January 1966-July 166) rule by General Ironsi 
and the three and a halfyears (February 1976-October 1979) rule by General 
Olasegun Obasanjo between 1960 and present day (1998), only the Northern 
civilian or military Heads of State have ruled Nigeria, and there have been 
eight (8) of them. All but two of Army Chiefs of Staff have been Northerners 
{Tell, July 15,1995). 
2. After falling from power, Babangida openly admitted that he was under 
pressure from Northern military and political elite to annul the June 12 
Presidential election. Sani Kontagora, a frontline publisher in the North in 
interviews presents what can be described as a typical Northern position 
"Southerners can't rule us", Tell, July 8,1996 No. 28, "The North would go 
to war if Abiola becomes President," Tell, July 5,1993. Alhaji Uman Dikko, 
a prominent member of Northern political elite—minister in the 1st and 2nd 
republics, just before the 1993 election said "The North will never allow a 
Southerner to rule Nigeria," furthermore, "The North will never allow the 
future of their children to be determined by the Southerners" (Quoted by 
Wole Soyinka in The Punch, October 21, 1998). Babangida's Chief of 
Intelligence and Security, Brigadier Halilu Akilu said after the June 12,1993 
election, "Abiola would be President over my dead body" {African Concord, 
July 5,1993, Quoting from the Guardian of London. 
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