Afr.j. polit. sci. (2000) Vol. 5, No. 2,45-65 
Ethnicity and Transition to 
Democracy in Nigeria: Explaining 
the Passing of Authoritarian Rule in 
a Multi-ethnic Society 
Okechukwu Ibeanu* 
Abstract 
This essay addresses an important variable in Nigerian politics, namely, ethnicity 
and the ways in which it affects the conduct of national affairs. It represents an 
effort at theorizing the role andplace of ethnicity inthe transitionfrom authoritarianism 
in a multi-ethnic setting such as that represented by Nigeria. Drawing on 
historical evidence on the ways in which ethnicity was constructed in colonial and 
post-colonial Nigeria as well as the wide literature on the subject, an attempt is 
made to demonstrate the centrality of the variable to Nigerian politics but without 
suggestion that it is the sole or most important determinant of political outcomes. 
Indeed, it is argued that there are other important variables, such as class, which 
not only affect the political process but also impinge on ethnicity. The ways in 
which ethnicity influences the different phases of the transitionfrom authoritarianism 
are discussed drawing on the Nigerian experience. 
Introduction 
In the recent past, there has been a burgeoning of literature on transition from 
authoritarian to democratic rule. Two major intellectual strands are deducible from 
this development. One strand interprets the Latin American transition as a logical 
outcome of forces released by unique experiences with authoritarian rule in each 
country. As such, each transition unfolds under specific conditions from which it is 
arduous to deduce general features (Lechner, 1991; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 
1986). But the difficulty in making generalization notwithstanding, Lechner suggests 
that democratization in Latin America is a reaction to social disintegration 
wrought by capital. Modernization, defined as capitalist efficiency or rationality, 
has become the unavoidable path to economic development. But this hegemony of 
modernization is leading to social disintegration, hence new demands for community 
(1991:542-543). 
] 027-0353 © 2000 African Association of Political Science
46 Okechukwu Ibeanu 
The second strant roots the current wave of democratization in the end of the 
cold war and the "< ;tory" of the West. This set of writings, usually by Anglo- 
American and Eurojiean scholars, form an extension of a long pedigree which, 
tacitly and overtly, have portrayed East-West relations as a struggle between 
authoritarianism and democracy {see Moore, 1966; Arendt, 1973). By extension, 
the victory of the West in the cold war is a triumph of democracy over authoritarianism. 
Consequently, we have witnessed the resurgence of Tocquevillean and 
Schumpeterian notions that associate democracy with institutional political arrangements 
originating from the West and spreading to the rest of the world 
(Modelski, 1992; Dahl, 1989; Schumpeter, 1987; Tocqueville, 1969). Thus in 
Modelski's estimation, democratization is 
... a technology, that is, a means to an end, a technique of collective choice 
or a form of macro decision making, [then] its dissemination may be subject 
to patterns observed in the diffusion of technological and other innovations. 
For societies unfamiliar with such practices, democracy is indeed a bundle 
of innovations (1992:1361). 
It is not difficult to see that in this reincarnation of "modernization", Africa is 
one of those areas that are "unfamiliar" with democratic practices to which 
democracy will inevitably spread by diffusion. It is true that global factors, for 
instance, the end of the cold war, the resurgence of liberal democracy in the former 
Soviet bloc countries and demands of political conditionalities by the Bretton 
Woods institutions, have had an effect on democratization in Africa. However, they 
have only served as a fillip to popular discontent with economic stagnation and 
political repression that had become pervasive on the continent. Calls for a second 
independence (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987) encapsulates this long-standing discontent, 
which ironically was fuelled, in many cases, by the same external forces. 
To be sure, democratization in African countries has its own internal logic quite 
apart from the thaw in East-West relations. Unfortunately, the limits of democratization 
in Africa have been set prematurely by the West as liberal, multiparty 
democracy. Consequently, as with modernization, liberal democratic theory has 
guillotined the mass-based intellectual ferment and political struggles in which 
Africa's democratization was initially being shaped. 
Today, a majority of African countries have either adopted liberal, multiparty 
democracy or are transiting to it. According to records, in 1992, only nine countries, 
Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Gambia, Mauritius, Sao Tome' and Principe, 
Senega] and Zambia, were regarded as democratic. In the same year, 28 other 
countries were said to be in the process of transition to democracy. But in 1995,15 
countries were classified as democratic, representing a 66 per cent increase, while 
14 were transiting (Diouf, n.d.: 9). Presently, following the mass revolt that ended 
military rule and brought Mr Gbagbo to power in Cote d'lvoire, virtually the entire 
African continent has transited to liberal democracy with varying degrees of 
pretension.
Ethnicity and Transition to Democracy in Nigeria 47 
Conceptualizing African Transitions: Orthodoxies and Paradoxes 
Early studies of what Huntington (1991) has described as the "third wave of 
democracy" were on Eastern Europe and Latin America (Pastor, 1989; Przeworski, 
1991; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Malloy and Seligson, 1987). African 
situations were treated as marginal, and analysed on the basis of conceptual tools 
distilled from the experiences of Eastern Europe and Latin America. However, in 
recent times, African experiences with democracy and transitions from authoritarian 
rule have been attracting more attention (Ake, 1991; 1992; Anyang' Nyong'o, 
1987; Olagunju, et al, 1993). 
A number of salient ideas, concepts and theories about African transitions are 
now discernible. Some of them are quite original, while others are strongly 
influenced by writings on other parts of the world. There is need to critically reexamine 
these orthodoxies. 
A. Transition as Democracy 
The link between transitions and democracy is one that is commonly made in the 
literature. A dominant way in which this link is posited is that transitions in Africa, 
as elsewhere, represent a diffusion of democracy from the West to the rest of the 
world. The "third wave of democracy" (Huntington, 1991) or the third democratic 
transformation (Dahl, 1989) is "the process by which democracy spreads across the 
world" (Modelski, 1992: 1353). Democratization has emerged as the modernization 
of the 1990s, aprocess in which non-Western societies that are not familiar with 
democracy are sucked in by its "irresistible and universal" movement (Tocqueville, 
1969). 
Liberal democratic theory, as most forcefully argued by Schumpeter, has now 
re-emerged as the alter ego of transitions. The essence of this theory, as Schumpeter 
stated over fifty years ago, is to make the power of "the people" in deciding political 
issues secondary to the election of men who are to do the deciding. 
... the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire power to decide by means of 
a competitive struggle for the people's vote (Schumpeter, 1987:269). 
But for a few attempts to argue an African perspective, for instance, Anyang' 
Nyong'o (1987), Ake (1992; 1993) and various projects and Working Groups of 
CODESRIA, the Tocquevillean and Schumpeterian notions of democracy are the 
orthodoxies, even for African researchers. 
We do not think that democracy is the preserve of any one people, culture or part 
of the world which is spread by proselytizing others. Therefore, while Africa's 
democratization may be influenced by extra-African experiences, is not a bequeathal 
from the West. Africa's democratization is first and foremost the product of the 
internal logic of relationships among social forces in various African countries, 
though linked in complex ways with extra-continental forces. 
Still, are transitions from authoritarian rule necessarily transitions to democ-
48 Okechukwu Ibeanu 
racy? Leaving aside the meaning and content of the democracy on offer, to say 
speak of transitions from authoritarian rule as if they necessarily end up in 
democracy is incorrect. The African experience so far amply illustrates this. Many 
African countries saw a rapid demise of democratic institutions and practice only a 
few years after the transition from colonial rule to self-rule in Africa. Of about forty 
African countries which became independent under democratically elected governments 
in the 1950s and 1960s, only seven were classified as democratic in 1992 
(Diouf, n.d.). Even in the current "wave of democracy", the rate of recline into 
authoritarianism has been high. In Benin, President Soglo dissolved parliament a 
few years after transition, and almost plunged the country into crisis by refusing to 
hand over to Kerekou after he lost the presidential election of 1996. President 
Ousmane of Niger dissolved parliament, and when his party lost the ensuing 
parliamentary election he decided to obstruct the opposition prime minister in 
performing his duties. And in Zambia, barely 18 months after his election, President 
Chiluba declared a state of emergency and arrested many opposition leaders. He has 
since followed these up by trying to stop former President Kaunda from contesting 
the next election. 
Surely, the mere transfer of power to an elected government is not enough for 
democracy. It is what happens after power has been transferred that determines 
whether a democratic transition has taken place. What is critical is consolidation of 
democracy, the acid test of which is the first post-transition election. We cannot 
determine a priori that democracy will follow transition. Democracy may be the 
expectation from transition, but transition is not a warranty for democracy. 
B. Transition as Transfer of Power 
There is a broad agreement that transitions involve power transfers. But what is less 
unanimous is whether all transitions, both from and to democracy, should be 
studied. One approach sees transition as an aspect of military/authoritarian rule. By 
this approach, transition is both a movement from democracy to military/authoritarian 
rule and from military/authoritarian rule to democracy. Thus, Olagunju, et al, 
argue that 
... when applied to the politics of Africa and Latin America, the concept of 
transition is a specific generic reference to the cycle of democratization, 
authoritarian or one-party rule and of redemocratization that has characterized 
the politics of many countries in the two continents since the 1960s 
Sometimes, it is set in motion by military intervention to prevent the national 
descent into chaos and anarchy At other times, the cycle is triggered off 
by the long stay in power or "overrule" by authoritarian or even pseudodemocratic 
regimes (1993:9-10). 
Edmond Keller then suggests that what needs to be studied is the general process 
of regime change in Africa as a means of understanding of ongoing transitions 
(cited in Olagunju, et al, 1993:18).
Ethnicity and Transition to Democracy in Nigeria 49 
By making transitions a post-independence phenomenon dating to the 1960s, 
this approach does not account for the very first wave of democratic transitions in 
Africa, namely decolonization. Moreover, in defining transition as a phase in a 
vicious circle of authoritarianism-democratization, this approach is bound to wind 
up in one of two enervating conditions. At one level, even though it speaks of 
democracy and the general process of regime change in Africa, it banishes 
transitions involving statutory transfers of power between constitutional governments, 
and non-statutory transfers between authoritarian governments. And even if 
it limits itself to changes between authoritarian and democratic governments, it is 
likely to end up, at another level, analysing all forms of regime change, thereby 
emptying the term transition of parsimony, which is so crucial to conceptual clarity. 
For example, changes may be from unelected civilians to elected civilians, from 
elected civilians to the military, from military to elected civilians, from elected 
civilians to unelected civilians, from "pseudo-democratic" military regimes to 
democratic civilian regimes, etc. In addition, there is the case of transfer from an 
authoritarian regime to itself, following a manipulated transition process. Moi in 
Kenya, Rawlings in Ghana and Biya in Cameroon promptly come to mind. 
A different approach limits the concept of transition to change from authoritarian 
rule to democratic government through elections. This is the dominant usage of 
transition in the literature, and it explains why transition is usually linked with 
democracy. But it does not account for cases of truncated transition to democracy, 
for instance where an authoritarian regime democratizes at some levels of government 
but retains overall control. This was common in transitions from colonial rule 
to independence in Africa. For instance in Ghana, following the Aiken Watson 
Report, the Justice Henley Coussey Committee Report and the 1951 Constitution, 
an election was held for the Legislative Assembly in 1951. Still, even though that 
election put Nkrumah and other members of the CPP into the Executive Council, 
colonial control persisted under a Governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke. 
The same experience of elected governments without overall sovereign power 
is common in both colonial and post-colonial transitions. A theory of transition 
should be capable of accounting for these conditions. While it is true that transfer of 
power from unelected to elected governments is central to the concept of transition, 
for transition to have duly occurred such elected governments must be capable of 
making and implementing sovereign national decisions. 
C. Transition as the Relationship between Economic Reform and Democratization 
Perhaps the most frequently examined issue in the literature on transition is the link 
between economic reform and democratization (Anyang* Nyong'o, 1987; Malloy, 
1987; Przeworski, 1991; Olufemi, 1992; Olagunju, et al, 1993). About Latin 
American transitions, Lechner writes: 
Looking back at Latin America in the decade of the 1980s one sees a 
situation of contrast: democratic governments are taking over throughout 
the region, while at the same time a profound economic crisis is shaking the 
structures of society (1991:541).
50 Okechukwu Ibeanu 
To be sure, this is an old issue making a second coming. In the first appearance 
of this question during colonial rule and the immediate post-colonial period, it was 
posed as the relationship between the pace of democratization and the requirements 
of economic development. Then it was set in the context of demands of popular 
demands on the colonial and post-colonial African governments for better economic 
conditions. Such demands were at thecore of the first independence struggles 
against the colonial state, and the "second independence" struggles against the postcolonial 
state in parts of Africa (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987). In both cases, the 
people's demand and object of struggle was clear: that there is an organic unity 
between economic well being and democracy. The struggle for one is the struggle 
for the other. And this is where their position diverged from that of the petty 
bourgeoisie, their allies in the first independence struggle. The latter had admonished 
the need to seek first the kingdom of political independence and everything 
will be added. But when this did not materialize, the people declared the first 
independence struggle a failure. Writing on Zaire, Nzongola-Ntalaja aptly observes: 
For the people, independence was meaningless without a better standard of 
living, greater civil liberties, and the promise of a better life for their 
children. Instead of making these promised benefits available to the masses, 
the politicians who inherited state power from the Belgians lived in much 
greater luxury than most of their European predecessors and used violence 
and arbitrary force against the people. For the latter, the first or nominal 
independence had failed. Their discontent with the neo-colonial state served 
as a basis for an aspiration towards a new and genuine independence, one 
that the 1964 insurrections were to incarnate (1987:113). 
In its current incarnation, the issue is posed as the relationship between marketoriented 
structural adjustments and democracy. Its context is the so-called political 
conditionality (political liberalization) for aid demanded by the Western governments 
and international financial institutions from Africa's authoritarian regimes 
since the end of the cold war. For instance, between 1990 and 1992, the United 
States suspended military and/or other aid to some of its abiding dictator-friends in 
Africa like Mobutu, Moi and Doe, over political liberalization. 
The relationship between democracy and economic progress in Africa has been 
argued in two distinct ways since colonial times. First, for authoritarian regimes, 
both colonial and post-colonial, democracy and economic development are separate 
and should be pursued consecutively, with democracy only coming after 
economic development. The position adopted by some African scholars in reaction 
to this position is also that they are separate and consecutive, but in a reversed order. 
So that Anyang' Nyong'o (1987: 20) argues that "... political liberties and the 
accountability of the state to the people (in particular the popular classes) is a 
precondition for material progress". 
Second, for the IMF, World Bank and many social scientists on the right, the two 
are separate, but should be pursued concurrently. In reaction to the common charge
Ethnicity and Transition to Democracy in Nigeria 51 
that there is link between SAP and political repression (Ibeanu and Nwosu, 1988; 
Oyediran and Agbaje, 1991; Przeworski, 1991), the position is that SAP is not 
necessarily antagonistic to democratization. It may give rise to social and political 
tension, but that does not mean that it must result in political repression or 
undermine the democratic transition process. The furthest they go is to accept that 
economic reform is a burden on democratization (Olagunju, et al, 1993: 14). 
But, the consistent democratic position lies in returning to the position of the 
masses of Africa, which they so clearly stated in their struggles against the 
economic exploitation and political repression of the colonial state, and have 
maintained in their struggles against the post-colonial state and global capital. That 
position is that material well being and political freedom express an organic unity. 
They cannot be separated either in a consecutive or a concurrent sense. Strictly 
speaking, the issue is not whether SAP coheres with liberal democracy or not: it 
may. Instead the issue is whether SAP is the path to popular economic well being: 
it is not. Therefore, the people's struggle for democracy is also a struggle against 
SAP. 
D. Transition as Political and Social Engineering 
This perspective presents transition to democracy as a constructionistproject. Here, 
democratization is a process of engineered political and socio-economic change; it 
is a "design project" (Olagunju, et al, 1993:20). In this "design project", constitution-
making occupies a central place. As the bedrock of democracy, the constitution 
must embody the best and most enlightened ideas, set up effective structures and 
processes, and be capable of channelling political behaviour in desired, predetermined 
directions. Indeed, ideas are so important in this perspective on transitions 
that they constitute autonomous social forces (Olangunju, et al, 1993:21). Armed 
with the requisite constitution, what is left to consummate the original design is 
political will among the leadership to construct and ultimately realize it. 
This view of transition to democracy is patently idealistic and subjectivist. The 
problematique underlying it is that of the subject—the historic role of concrete 
individuals and creative persons who exercise their free will, reason and capacity 
for choice. This problematique of historic individuals as the origin of social action, 
leads research into a wild search for finalist explanations founded on the motivations 
of conduct of individual actors, rather than to objective conditions that determine 
the distribution of individual social agents into contradictory classes (Poulantzas, 
1972: 242). 
We need to emphasize that ideas are not social forces. Ideas are only products of 
struggles among social forces, notably classes, being the outcome of the endeavours 
of organic intellectuals to elaborate the interests of social forces (Gramsci, 1971). 
This explains why ideas never enjoy autonomy from social struggles. They 
invariably respond to the rhythms of the contradictory relations of social forces. At 
the same time, political will is meaningless except in the context of the relations 
among social forces. Without over-flogging this issue, let us state simply that
52 Okechukwu lbeanu 
democracy is nothing to be socially engineered by rational individuals, however 
well-meaning they may be. The best ideas embodied in the most enlightened 
constitutions lay useless before the force of the dynamic relations among social 
forces. Social forces shape history, ideas and constitutions only reflect it. It is this 
fact that also explains why many constitutions, including the 1989 Nigerian 
Constitution, which ostensibly was well thought through, never saw the light of day. 
E. Transition as a Phased Process 
There are as yet very few studies that have theorized the phases of the transition 
process in Africa. An exploratory taxonomy has been provided in the Carter 
Centre's Quality of Democracy Index (QDI) (Diouf, n.d.: 23-24). It speaks of the 
phases of decay, mobilization, decision, formulation, electoral contestation, hand 
over, legitimization and consolidation. 
While this is quite useful, it should be borne in mind that a theory of transition is 
not simply a genealogy of stages of the process but, more importantly, a theory of 
beginnings. Therefore, a theory of transition should incorporate answers to at least 
four questions: 
(a) What is transition? 
(b) How do transitions begin? 
(c) What are the stages of transition? 
(d) How do transitions end? 
To say that transitions begin with decay, that is government's decline, economic 
stagnation, political fraud, etc., does not go very far. What is important in theorizing 
transitions is an understanding of the social forces at play and the articulation of 
their interests. 
Transition: Meaning, Causes, Stages and Telos 
Transition, as we understand it, has a specific meaning, which has to do with transfer 
of power from unelected to elected government, the latter being capable of making 
and implementing sovereign decisions. This definition avoids the sticky wicket of 
meaning and content of democracy. Transition is the progressive opening up of the 
political space, culminating in a change from unelected to elected government. 
Without doubt, only very few will contest that this process has a democratic 
connotation. At the same time, it is clear that democracy involves a much deeper 
theoretical and empirical discourse than political liberalization or an elected 
government. 
Democratization is a phased process of decentralizing state power and promoting 
appropriate values and attitudes that enable justice and equity to be institutionalized 
in political relations. There are various aspects of the decentralization of state
Ethnicity and Transition to Democracy in Nigeria 53 
power. One involves the transfer of certain powers from the authoritarian state to an 
emerging civil society. Another involves the decentralization of power within civil 
society. And yet another involves the decentralization of power within the state 
system itself (Nnoli, 1995). 
Thus, democratization includes but goes beyond political liberalization. The 
latter refers to the relaxation of government controls on the political activities of 
citizens through the reduction of government intervention in politics and the 
permission of greater pluralism of opinions and associations. It occurs when the 
state grants previously denied civil and political liberties to individuals and groups 
in society (Nnoli, 1995; Bratton, 1993). 
By linking transitions to the constitution of national governments capable of 
making and implementing sovereign decisions, the transition from colonial rule can 
be correctly inserted in this formulation. In addition, it accounts for situations 
involving transitions from unelected to elected government, but in which the 
elected government is not sovereign. Those often tend to be transitions within a 
transition. 
Transitions reflect the character of social forces in struggle. These are not 
necessarily or exclusively class forces, even though in each concrete transition there 
is always a class element which articulates with the struggles of other social forces 
in complex ways. A central task of studying transitions is an exposition of these 
struggles. 
Transitions begin when there is a relative balance or equilibrium of power 
between social forces pushing for democratization on one hand, and an authoritarian 
regime and its social supports on the other. This equilibrium may or may not be 
catastrophic, in the Gramscian sense, for the authoritarian regime (Gramsci, 1971: 
219-223). Catastrophic balance exists where further attempt not to open up the 
political space will most likely lead to the complete destruction of the authoritarian 
regime. When this point is reached, the authoritarian regime invariably begins a 
programme of political liberalization. However, a Caesarist third force may emerge 
to either start the process of transition or to block it. This is most likely to be a regime 
resulting from the military regime. Like in all Caesarist situations, the third force 
could be progressive or reactionary (Gramsci, 1971: 219). It is progressive if it 
embarks on transition, but reactionary if it does not. In Mali, it required a Caesarist 
military intervention to get the transition process properly under way. But in Sierra 
Leone, the Strasser coup apparently obstructed the victory of pro-transition forces 
over Momoh. Subsequently, the uncertainty over Strasser's willingness to push 
through a transition was resolved with the intervention of the army in 1995. 
Transition is necessarily a phased process. Generally it is a composite of four 
major stages (Nnoli, 1995a): (1) the phase of pressure on the authoritarian regime by 
pro-democracy forces; (2) phase of formulating a programme of transition to 
democracy; (3) phase of implementation of the programme; and (4) phase of 
institutionalization of democracy, including the first post-transition election.
54 Okechukwu Ibeunu 
The Link between Ethnicity and the Transition to Democracy in Nigeria 
Discussion of ethnic identity and its interface with politics in Nigeria is an old one, 
dating to the published works of anthropologists who worked in the country during 
the colonial period (Smith, 1965; 1960; Meek, 1937; Perham, 1937; Green, 1948; 
Forde and Jones, 1950; Lloyd, 1954; 1960). Many of these studies tended to 
romanticize ethnic identities and the cultural, social and political systems of the 
various ethnic groups. Colonial administrators often drew the flak for being 
insensitive to the culture, history and language of the local people (Perham, 1937). 
Increased autonomy for colonized peoples, especially in the cultural sphere, was 
widely advocated. In lime, it was accepted in colonial circles that colonial rule by 
proxy, that is indirect rule through local chiefs, was not only cheap and effective, but 
also good for the colonized (Lugard, 1929). It has been noted that this policy 
contributed immensely to the emergence of ethnic politics in countries like Nigeria 
(Nnoli, 1995b: 45-47; Mamdani, 1996). 
The next generation of studies emphasized the political mobilization role of 
etnnicity in Nigeria's march to nationhood. Nigerian nationalists and expatriate 
writers influenced by them came to emphasize the positive contributions of the 
various ethnic identities to the independence movement and the social and political 
development of Nigeria (Awolowo, 1947; Coleman, 1958; Sklar, I960; Levine, 
1971). This went against the grain of mainstream modernization school that was 
dominant among Anglo-American writers in the 1950s and 1960s, which viewed 
communalism (religious and ethnic) as a pre-modern phenomenon that is bound to 
decline with technological and economic development. However, the persistence 
of communalism in "modernizing societies" like Nigeria led later modernization 
writers to suggest that communalism may not be transitory and anachronistic, but a 
permanent feature of social change in Africa (Melson and Wolpe, 1971:1). What is 
put forward is an "inevitability thesis" linking communalism and politics in 
"modernizing" societies. According to Melson and Wolpe, "in a culturally plural 
society, the competition engendered by social mobilization will tend to be defined 
in communal terms" (1971:5). Therefore, what is needed is a political strategy for 
managing conflicts arising from communalism (Smock and Smock, 1975). 
Later studies challenged this portrayal of ethnicity and communalism as 
inherent and permanent in the African way of life. From the early 1980s, a near 
consensus was emerging that ethnicity is a historically contingent, fluid and flexible 
social form, which was "manufactured" or invented by colonial administrators and 
constantly reinvented by the post-colonial African elite to serve political purposes 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Ranger, 1994; Doombos, 1982). Specifically, 
writers on the left of the ideological spectrum saw ethnicity as the creature of the 
exploitative project of colonialism and the manipulative politics of the petty 
bourgeoisie. In both cases, ethnicity served a class project (Nnoli, 1978; 1995b 
Mafeje, 1995). It is this class purpose that assures the persistent politicization of 
ethnicity in Nigeria (Nnoli, 1978).
Ethnicity and Transition to Democracy in Nigeria 55 
Apart from the general link between ethnicity and politics, the more specific 
interface between ethnicity and democracy has also been a prominent theme in the 
research literature. Studies have focused principally on the reciprocal impact of 
ethnicity and multi-party democracy (Nnoli, 1992; Egwu. 1995). Some argue that 
multi-party democracy reinforces ethnicity,'and therefore tiiere is a negative impact 
of multi-partism on ethnicity (Wolfinger, 1965; Parenti, 1967). But others insist that 
ethnicity has a positive link with multi-party democracy, and that democracy offers 
an auspicious context for the management of ethnicity, particularly through a policy 
of equalitarian pluralism (Marger, 1992; Osaghae, 1986; Schwarz, 1979). These 
differences point to divergences in theoretical foundations (Nnoli, 1992:7-18). But 
perhaps as crucial, they point to the need to study the link between ethnicity and 
democracy concretely, based on the historical experiences of multi-ethnic societies. 
It is by so doing that we can understand the seeming Janiform association between 
democracy and ethnicity, whereby their reciprocal impact is sometimes complementary, 
and at other times opposing. 
Still, discussions of the link between democracy and ethnicity only make sense 
in their conceptual contextualization of democracy. Eg wu (1995:12-13) points out 
that discussions do not seriously address the kind of democracy on offer. The 
tendency is to assume democracy as a settled matter, namely its liberal/multi-party 
form. Certainly, the dominant inclination among academics, policy-makers and the 
general public in Nigeria is to think of democracy in terms of its multi-party form. 
Thus, implicitly and explicitly, democracy is portrayed as a once-and-for-all thing, 
having to do with setting-up and operating those procedures and institutions of 
governance associated with developed capitalist countries (Inkeles, 1969). This 
outlook has a lot to do with the resurgence, since the end of the cold war, of 
Tocquevillean and Schumpeterian notions that associate democracy with institutional 
political arrangements originating from the West and spreading to the rest of 
the world (Modelski, 1992; Dahl, 1989;Schumpeter, 1987;Tocqueville, 1969). 
It is not difficult to see that this is a reincarnation of "modernization". But more 
importantly, this conception of democracy is predominantly institutional. It only 
tangentially recognizes the actions of social forces in the constitution and operation 
of "democratic" institutions. When Western democratic institutions are merely 
transplanted into Africa, a dangerous gap often develops between them and the 
democratic struggles of the people. This gap is often filled by various undemocratic 
and anti-democratic forces, such as ethnic, religious and other millenarian and 
pseudo-political organizations that manipulate and feed on the fears and deprivations 
of the people. In time, "democratic" institutions become distorted and 
converted into instruments of authoritarianism. However, this is not an acceptance 
of the opposing argument that cultural and civilizational traits of non-Western 
societies make Western values like democracy a source of conflict both within such 
societies, and between them and the West (Huntington, 1996). 
Still, even in the context of the liberal democratic project, what remains largely 
lacking in existing studies is analysis of ethnicity in the recent and on-going
56 Okechukwu Ibeanu 
democratic transitions in Africa. Nnoli (1995a) has tried to fill this gap. He identifies 
four phases of the current wave of transition to democracy in Africa, namely 
pressure on the authoritarian regime, formulation of a programme of transition, 
implementation of the programme and post-election consolidation. He also analyses 
the character, dynamics and significance of ethnic conflicts during each of the 
phases. According to him, at each of these phases the character of ethnic conflicts 
differ. 
There remains a paucity of analyses of the role of ethnic organizations in 
Nigerian politics generally, and in the just concluded transition to democracy in 
particular. To be sure, a number of studies have recorded the social and political 
roles played by ethnic associations in parts of West Africa (Wallerstein, 1964; 
Gluckman, 1966). Likewise, the role of ethnic associations in important political 
developments in Nigeria, especially in the colonial period, has been noted by 
various studies (Coleman, 1958; Sklar, 1960; 1963; Nnoli, 1978; 1995b). These 
associations, which arose in the colonial urban setting, provided a network of 
communication for information flow between the urban and rural areas (Hodgkin, 
1956: 87) which has been very essential in maintaining ethnic solidarity and giving 
pan-ethnic organizations a high profile in national politics. 
The growth of ethnic associations has also been linked to the character of the 
colonial urban setting. It has been argued that the high incidence of socio-economic 
frustration is a central element in the motivational complex that leads to ethnic 
identity (Nnoli, 1992:15). Moreover, competition for scarce resources and opportunities 
among people of different ethnic identities in a contact situation is at the 
heart of ethnic conflicts (Nnoli, 1978: 71-72). Above all, the pattern of spatial 
concentration of ethnic groups in a contact situation has a profound bearing on not 
only ethnic conflicts, but also on the emergence of ethnic associations. It has been 
shown, for instance, that the segregation of blacks in American urban areas was 
important in the rise of the Black Power Movement (Carmichael and Hamilton, 
1968). 
The colonial urban centres of Nigeria were, therefore, the cradles of ethnic 
associations for at least two reasons. First, they offered little socio-economic 
security to the teeming population that migrated from the rural areas (Nnoli, 1978: 
72; Furnivall, 1942: 452). In addition, the scarcity that characterized life in the 
colonial urban setting led to fierce socio-economic competition. According to 
Nnoli, 
The net effect of the intense socio-economic competition arising from 
scarcity and inequality in colonial Nigeria, was the insecurity of individuals 
regarding their outcome. First, there was insecurity resulting from the search 
for limited job opportunities and social services.... Once the members of a 
particular group gained access to the best jobs and other resources, they used 
their positions to find jobs for others or at least to pass on news of job 
opportunities to them. The repercussions were felt in unequal levels of 
unemployment, income and in differing degrees of social status among the
Ethnicity and Transition to Democracy in Nigeria 57 
communal groups. Attempts by each group to escape the negative consequences 
of this phenomenon led to the further strengthening of communal 
associations (1995b: 40). 
Second, the character of ethnic residential settlements in Nigeria's colonial 
urban centres fostered ethnic associations. A policy of keeping the ethnic groups 
divided and separated became a hallmark of colonial administration. The emergence 
of "sabon garis" (strangers' quarters) in the colonial urban centres of 
Northern Nigeria, ostensibly to "protect" Hausa-Fulani culture from the destabilizing 
incursions of other "tribes", epitomized this policy (Melson and Wolpe, 1971; 
Nnoli, 1978: 115-116). 
The net effect of these two conditions is the celeritous growth of ethnic 
associations. For one thing, these associations provided members of the ethnic 
group the much needed social security and welfare services, generally denied them 
by the colonial state, and equipped them to compete with members of other ethnic 
groups. In this regard, education was particularly important. Both Coleman (1958) 
and Sklar (1963), among others, have recorded in details the commitment of ethnic 
associations to providing education for young Nigerians from the 1940s. For 
another thing, segregated residential areas assured ethnic associations a recruitment 
and power base. In time, the rapid growth in the membership and activities of these 
associations made it possible for them to coalesce into pan-ethnic, national 
organizations such as the Igbo Federal Union (later Igbo State Union), Egbe Omo 
Oduduwa (Organization of the descendants of Oduduwa, the mythical founder of 
the Yoruba nation) and Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa (Northern Congress), and 
therefore potential national political actors. 
The politicization of ethnicity and of pan-ethnic organizations has sometimes 
been explained in terms of personal rivalries among the emergent elites of Nigeria's 
ethnic groups, especially the three dominant ethnic groups—Hausa-Fulani, Igbo 
and Yoruba—from the 1940s. The relationship between Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe and 
Chief Obafemi Awolowo is widely cited in this regard (Coleman, 1958:319-352; 
Sklar, 1963: 88-93). However, rivalry among individuals for political power, 
though relevant, is perhaps too voluntaristic to constitute a fundamental explanation 
of the insertion of ethnic organizations in the Nigerian state and politics. For 
one thing, rivalry did not always run along ethnic lines. For another, individual 
rivalry cannot explain the persistence and importance of pan-ethnic organizations 
in Nigerian politics long after specific personalities have left the scene. 
Apart from individual rivalries, another secondary, but relevant, factor accounting 
for the significance of ethnic interests in Nigerian politics is the expression of 
these interests in political parties. Indeed, a very profound expression of the 
politicization of ethnic organizations in Nigeria is to be found in party formation. 
Some studies of Nigeria's political history have argued the point that in an attempt 
by the various ethnic elites to take over political power, they transformed ethnic 
organizations into political parties, converted ethnic organizations into a recruitment 
base for party loyalists and split existing national parties into ethnic factions.
58 Okechukwu Ibeanu 
The histories of the three dominant political parties in Nigerian politics in the 1950s 
and 1960s, namely, the Northern People's Congress (NFC), National Council of 
Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and Action Group (AG) are particularly illustrative 
(Coleman, !958;Sklar, 1963). 
We also think that the type and structure of political parties are important in 
understanding the link between ethnic organizations and party politics in Nigeria. It 
seems that the tradition of Nigerian political parties, which is not unconnected with 
their antecedents in the nationalist movement, is that of mass, socialist parties of the 
continental-European type. This type is "directed to organizing as large a proportion 
of the masses as possible" (Duverger, 1964: 1), they tend to favour indirect 
membership through primary organizations, even though direct membership is not 
abandoned, and nation-wide branches replace the caucuses. Zucarelli has shown the 
emphasis on collective party membership to be true also for Senegal, as has R. 
Molteno for Zambia (both cited in Gonidec, 1981: 187). In fact, Gonidec generalizes 
indirect party membership to the whole of Africa: 
... as in the case of elections, membership is rarely an individual act, 
maturely deliberated. Allowance must be made for the structures of African 
societies, particularly in the traditional environment, which is quantitatively 
the most important. As in the past, the social group in which the individual is 
most closely integrated, that is to say the family, the ethnic group, sometimes 
the religious organization, plays a role of capital importance and exerts a 
pressure on those who might be tempted to adopt a political standpoint 
different from that of the group. In fact, it is the group much more than the 
individual which belongs to the party.... To a certain extent, we may even 
say that African politicians favour this tendency, because it allows a 
manipulation of votes destined to facilitate their political ascension (1981: 
187). 
However, we think that the most important gap in existing knowledge about the 
link between ethnicity and democracy in Nigeria is the under-articulation of the 
character of the Nigerian state. The salience of ethnicity in the recent transition from 
authoritarian rule to elected government in Nigeria has to be located at two related 
levels: one remote, fundamental and primary, and the other immediate, exterior and 
secondary. 
The fundamental explanation has to be sought in the character of the postcolonial 
state in Nigeria. First of all, this state emerged at the stage of extensive 
(rather than intensive) growth of capital. This is the stage of internationalization of 
capital. At this stage, there is really no need for the complete dissolution of precapitalist 
social forces, symbols and institutions, as in the stage of intensive growth 
of capitalism (Ibeanu, 1993). Consequently, there was a great deal of preservation 
effect on these social forces, symbols and institutions in a new symbiosis with 
capitalism, especially where they made it possible for capital accumulation to 
proceed without hindrance. As a result, the emergence and hegemony of the marketoriented, 
formally free and autonomous individual as the subject of economic and
Ethnicity and Transition to Democracy in Nigeria 59 
political organization was either blocked completely, or impeded and limited to a 
tew urban centres. The net effect of this is that the vast majority of Nigerians still 
exist as agents of precapitalist social forces, principally ethnic groups. 
Secondly, the history of that state also shows that it is has been utterly unable to 
stand above and balance social antagonisms, like the state that emerged from the 
establishmentofcapitalisminEurope(Ibeanu, 1993). Rather, it isastate constituted 
by colonialism principally for conquering and holding down a restive people. As 
such, ab initio, there was no question of evolving and routinizing principles for the 
non-arbitrary use of the state by its controllers. When in the post-colonial era it 
passed into the hands of an upstart local bourgeoisie, which the colonialist had 
raised around its ideology of the native-subject, the state became for its controllers 
and their co-ethnics a veritable instrument for pursuing private and sectional 
interests to the exclusion of others. 
Two deductions could be made from the preceding points. One, the postcolonial 
state in Nigeria principally deals with its members as social agents of ethnic 
groups, rather than as free, individual and equal citizens. In effect, state power exists 
as prebends parcelled out to ethnic groups, instead of a unified, objective and 
independent force standing above society and expressing the corporate existence of 
the people-nation. As such, this state is pitifully unable to autonomize class 
domination, which is a requisite condition for the smooth practice of bourgeois 
(democratic) rule. Inability to actualize autonomous class rule creates a vacuum 
which is then filled by ethnic groups and their organizations (Ibeanu, 1997). 
Consequently, ethnic groups and organizations become autonomous political 
actors, inserted as the solidarity and collective interests of members of the ethnic 
homeland. Still, behind this unity of interests and solidarity are three interconnected 
matrices: 
• Class domination, that is the domination of the working people by bourgeois 
and petty bourgeois interests (the power bloc). 
• Rivalries among different ethnic factions of the power bloc for hegemony. 
• Politically pertinent pursuit of purely individual-private interests portrayed as 
the collective interests of ethnic groups and the power bloc. 
Two, being the exclusive tool of those in power (who are agents of ethnic 
groups), defence of prebends becomes a very fundamental and charged issue. 
Politics becomes an overriding and war-like exercise waged among ethnic groups to 
increase and consolidate access to state resources. Pan-ethnic organizations are the 
phalanxes in this war; their leaders are the generals. 
Organically linked to the character of the Nigerian state is a second, but less 
fundamental explanation of the importance of ethnic groups and their organizations 
in the transition from authoritarian rule to elected government in Nigeria. Authoritarian 
rule is marked by many years of ban on political parties and muzzling of 
independent organizations and power centres in society. This leaves pan-ethnic 
organizations as the most potentially effective organizations that could emerge 
quickly and with minimal prompting as political liberal ization is embarked on by an
60 Okechukwu Ibeanu 
authoritarian regime. This is so for two reasons. For one thing, their recruitment 
base exists, fixed and exclusive to them. For another thing, the catalyst for them to 
emerge is readily present: an elite that preys on the fears and anxieties of ordinary 
people mobilizing them by raising the spectre of ethnic domination. 
Ethnicity and the Phases of Transition: Some Hypotheses 
The role of ethnicity varies with different phases of the transition process. Even in 
the same phase, its role could differ depending on the course of events. The period 
of equilibrium of power between pro-transition forces and the authoritarian regime 
marks the beginning of the transition process. We shall call this early stage the 
pressure phase. In this phase, the authoritarian regime is subjected to pressure from 
domestic and foreign forces which demand democratic political change. Depending 
on the extent of the pressure and the prevailing political atmosphere, the regime may 
successfully resist the pressure or succumb to it. Therefore, there are two major 
concerns here. One, an analysis of the forces that compel the authoritarian regime to 
embark on democratic change. The other is an understanding of the forces that make 
the regime to either successfully resist pressure or to succumb to it. In these two 
regards, in the Nigerian context, ethnicity is central. Ethnicity will shape both the 
sources of pressure for democratization and whether authoritarian regimes are able 
to resist this pressure or not. Political alliances will show extensive traits of division 
between ethnic groups of the authoritarian regime, that is those ethnic groups that 
are or are perceived to be the principal beneficiaries of the policies of the regime (the 
in-group), and those of the opposition (the out-group). 
The second and third phases are those of formulation and implementation of a 
detailed programme of transition from the authoritarian situation. The formulation 
phase concerns the decision processes leading to the vision of democratic society, 
including the constitution-making programme. This process takes a number of 
forms. They include the (1) sovereign national conference, (2) constitutional 
conference, (3) amendment of the constitution by the incumbent authoritarian 
regime, and (4) agreement between an armed opposition and the authoritarian 
regime in a situation of contested sovereignty. 
What determines the course followed? To be sure, each specific transition has its 
own unique logic. But two matrices are strongly suggested. First, if the history of 
anti-authoritarian struggles in a country is elitist, as in most of British-ruled Africa, 
then constitutional conference or constitutional amendment path is likely to be 
followed. But if the history of anti-authoritarian struggles is one characterized by 
mass political movements or armed struggle, then the sovereign national conference 
or armed opposition is likely to be adopted. Obviously, Nigeria falls into this 
category. 
Second, if the balance between the authoritarian regime and pro-transition 
forces is catastrophic, then the sovereign national conference is likely to result. This 
is because a catastrophic equilibrium reflects a deep-seated weakness in the 
authoritarian regime. As such, the pro-transition forces will be capable of exacting
Ethnicity and Transition to Democracy in Nigeria 61 
from it a sovereign national conference. However, this equilibrium is not a onceand-
for-all situation. It is rather a shifting equilibrium. As the relative strengths of 
the regime and opposition shift, consequences could be any of these: dismissal of 
the sovereign national conference, reversal to a constitutional conference, precipitate 
overthrow of the authoritarian regime, emergence of a third force which may 
support either or none of the sides, etc. 
Obviously, Nigeria falls into the "constitutional matrix" rather than the "sovereign 
matrix". Still, in both cases, ethnicity will be an important factor where multiethnic 
societies are involved. It is difficult to explore all the possible consequences 
of ethnicity in either case. But, it is safe to say that generally in the "constitutional 
matrix" ethnicity will tend to play a reactionary role, while in the "sovereign matrix" 
it is likely to play a reactionary role. However, the specific impact of ethnicity will 
be mediated by a number of factors. Among the crucial ones are: 
1. The history of inter-ethnic relations in the country, particularly if inter-ethnic 
conflict has crossed a threshold of irreversibility (Nnoli, 1992; 1995a). If this 
threshold has been crossed, then ethnicity wouldplay areactionary role irrespective 
of whether the constitutional path or sovereign path obtains. 
2. The depth of ethnic feeling. If ethnic feelings are deep-seated, then ethnicity 
tends to be reactionary. 
3. The capacity of the authoritarian regime to manipulate ethnic feelings against 
democratizing forces. 
The implementation phase has to do with the execution of the programmes 
worked out during the previous phase. It includes the conduct of free and fair 
elections as the final phase of implementing the programmes. At this phase, 
ethnicity will be particularly marked in the sensitization of the public to the need to 
protect the interests of the ethnic homeland. In addition, during this phase, 
particularly during elections, ethnic groups and their organizations will emphasize 
mobilization. The message is usually the need to vote massively for the chosen party 
and candidates that will protect the interests of members of the ethnic group and the 
ethnic homeland. Ethic groups will also target specific structures of the state during 
this phase. Generally the most important targets will include (a) The government/ 
regime; (b) other ethno-political movements; (c) pro-democracy organizations; (d) 
members of the constitutional conference; (e) co-ethnics in the ethnic homeland; (f) 
co-ethnics outside the ethnic homeland; (g) members of adjacent ethnic homelands; 
(h) members of non-adjacent ethnic homelands; (i) political parties and candidates. 
In line with a specific centrality of "sharing" of resources to politics in a 
peripheral capitalist, post-colonial state like Nigeria, ethnicity will be of most 
significant in the transition process at those phases involving power sharing. These 
are mainly the formulation and implementation (second and third) phases. During 
these phases of the transition, the attention of ethnic groups and their organizations 
shift from the authoritarian regime (its overthrow or maintenance) to one another. 
Once the transition process moves into phases involving the sharing of economic 
and, particularly, political power, ethnic groups are bound to become very active,
62 Okechukwu Ibeanu 
raising the tempo of''Oth conflicts and co-operation among them. If those phases 
dovetail into periods f national economic difficulties, ethnicity will be even more 
marked because of scarcity and consequent competition. 
Finally, the last phase of the transition is that of consolidation. It concerns the 
early period of the new democratic order up to and including the first election to be 
conducted by the incumbent elected government. In the main, this phase represents 
the litmus test for the new democratic order. Again, ethnicity is bound to play a 
crucial role here. New ethnic alliances will evolve and old ones consolidate. How 
well the new order is able to contain the mobilization and counter-mobilization of 
ethnic sentiments will depend largely on the following factors: 
(a) Extent of ethnic divisiveness involved in the disposal of the authoritarian 
regime, especially during the first three phases of the process; (b) Extent to which 
the incumbent elected regime has been able to draw in all ethnic groups during its 
first term; (c) Extent to which political parties are able to mobilize across ethnic 
boundaries; (d) The economic performance of the incumbent regime. 
Conclusion 
Theorizing transitions to democracy in countries like Nigeria constitutes a very 
complex presentation. This is not just because these countries do not have a long 
history of democratic practice, but also because the factors involved are enormous 
thereby presenting stochastic and unstable contexts. It may well be an oversimplification 
of reality to isolate ethnicity for analysis, which may give the impression 
that it is the most important variable in theorizing transitions in Nigeria. Still, it 
remains a very important variable. More importantly, the exploration of ethnicity 
provides us a good context to evaluate other important variables like class that 
impinge profoundly on ethnicity. 
Finally, the phases of transition that we have conceptualized should imply 
neither a genealogy nor a linear process that necessarily ends up in an elected 
government. To the contrary, transition is a reversible process. The most common 
threat being an anti-transition, ethnic coup. However, whether the transition pulls 
through or is reversed should not be attributed to the will of coup plotters, that would 
be too voluntaristic to be fundamental. Instead, it depends in the last analysis on the 
struggles among social forces at all stages of the transition. In Nigeria, ethnic groups 
and their organizations remain central players. 
Note 
* Dr Ibeanu is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of 
Nigeria, Nsukka, Enugu State, Nigeria. 
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