Afr.j. polit. .wi. (2000) Vol. 5. No. 2.67-86 
Last Card: Can Nigeria Survive 
Another Political Transition? 
Cyril Obi* 
Abstract 
This article critically examines the depth of the reforms and elections that 
underpinned Nigeria's recently concluded political transition. It also analyses the 
important challenges confronting democratic consolidation in the face of the 
"imperfect" nature of the political transition, revolutionary pressures from below 
and factional struggles within the hegemonic elite—all of which have direct 
implications for the social contract and the national question. At the end it is argued 
that this transition is Nigeria's last chance—and except it transfers real power to 
the Nigerian people, the current struggles could signpost grave portends for the 
Nigerian Project. 
Introductory Background 
This article criticaily examines the challenges confronting Nigeria's most recent 
attempt at building a post-transition, democratic society. It also examines the 
prospects of the current democratization finally placing the lid on the scourge of 
"transition without end" (Diamond, Kirk-Greene and Oyediran, 1997). This, 
among others, involves investigating the depth of "democratic groundings" in the 
Abdulsalami-led transition, in order to capture the distance between the object and 
subject of the "last" transition. Did it for instance contain the institutions, attitudes 
and values to consolidate and deepen democracy in Nigeria, or viable safety valves 
to decompress the growing tensions associated with demands for political restructuring, 
social justice, self-determination and a new social-national contract? Is the 
military genie back in the lamp (of democracy) forever? What if the current 
democratic experiment collapses under the combined weight of its own contradictions, 
particularly the wranglings within the political class, would we be able to 
seriously deal with a viable Nigerian nation-state project? It is to this and other 
related issues, that this study is devoted. 
1027-0353 © 2000 African Association of Political Science
68 Cyril Obi 
On 27 May 1999, General Abdulsalami Abubakar the Nigerian military head of 
state, handed over power to Olusegun Obasanjo, a retired General, who twenty 
years before, as a military head of state, had similarly handed over power to the 
elected civilian government of Shehu Shagari. Obasanjo returned to power via 
elections, after several failed transitions—those of Generals Babangida and Abacha. 
From 1993 to 1998 a deep-seated political crisis exacerbated ethnic, regional, 
religious, and class cleavages, and was further compounded by the economic crisis 
that the country was immersed in. This, coupled with the attempt by a hegemonic 
bloc within the military to dominate state and society, through the personalization 
of power, the wilful manipulation and subversion of public institutions and the 
brutal repression (sometimes elimination) of opposition groups (and activists). The 
purported "national rescue mission" of the Abacha regime, and its drive against 
"unpatriotic elements" and "agents of foreign powers", assumed an acidic irony 
which ate deep into the state of siege, tension and anxiety. 
General Abacha's "beheading" of Babangida's transition, and its replacement 
by his own version of a "controlled" transition, primed for the eventual transfer of 
power to himself, especially after all the five official parties adopted him as their 
presidential candidate in 1998. Abacha, it seemed was set to replicate what other 
military rulers HkeRawlings, Derby, Mainasara and Jahmeh had successfully done 
in the sub-region. This was however not to be, and events after Abacha's death on 8 
June 1998, led to the decapitation and delegitimization of his transition by 
Abubakar. When he took office as Head of State, General Abubakar had two 
options: begin another self-succession plan and risk a national implosion, the 
destruction of the Nigerian military and face tougher international sanctions, or 
voluntarily hand over power to a democratically elected government, salvage what 
was left of the credibility, coherence and legitimacy of the military, and go down in 
history as a hero—the second military ruler in Nigerian history to hand over power 
to an elected government. 
Thus, Abubakar's transition was as much an attempt at securing the survival of 
the military as a national institution, as it was an act of self-preservation through the 
protection of the military faction of the Nigerian political class, which was clearly 
threatened by Abacha's self-succession plan as well as the revolutionary pressures 
emanating from sections of civil society. Furthermore, Nigeria's trading partners 
and creditors were increasingly becoming alarmed at the escalation of tension, 
corruption, and violence, which, if unresolved would put their substantial economic 
stakes in Nigeria in jeopardy. It became clear that the Nigerian logjam had to be 
unlocked through the "decompression of authoritarianism" (Nwokedi; 1997:261), 
and a new, broadly acceptable transition to democracy. 
The background of the delegitimization of military rule, the crisis at' the 
Nigerian state, and economic decline, and the high expectations—locally and 
externally, pose very serious challenges to the newly-won democracy, and the 
future of the country. Either way, democratic consolidation or regression carry very 
heavy costs which hinge on Nigeria's survival. This article is divided into five broad
Last Card: Can Nigeria Survive Another Transition ? 69 
parts: the introductory background, which puts the critical issues in context; 
followed by the conceptual issues, and historical perspectives. The third section is 
based on an analysis of the Abubakar Transition, while the fourth, evaluates 
political developments since the return of democratic rule in May 1999. This is 
followed by the conclusion, which captures the trends and the prospects for the 
future. 
Some Conceptual Issues in Nigerian Political Transitions 
Several issues revolve around the characterization of political transitions more in 
terms of changes in the form, rather than the content of politics. In the Nigerian 
context, the classic description of transitions as the orderly transfer of power or 
authority from military to elected (civilian) rulers captures apenchant for the formal 
and the legal-rational, while obscuring critical contradictions, complexities and 
conflicting interests that obviate.the liberal-democratic rationale on which "military 
disengagement's from power", are often justified and legitimized. 
It is therefore necessary to unravel the content of political transitions as a 
process, and the outcome of struggles between a hegemonic group and other groups 
contesting its control of power. Thus, beyond taking the need for the military to 
return power to the elected representatives of the people as given, there is a deeper 
sense in which a hegemonic bloc in the military creates, captures and controls the 
transition process, so that its democratic outcome is more apparent than real 
(resulting in an elected dictatorship). Transitions transcend multiparty elections and 
constitutions imposed from above. They are therefore value-laden, contested, and 
reflective of the balance of power between contending classes, or social forces. 
While some may view transitions as a teleological march from authoritarian to 
liberal-democratic modes of governance, it is more rewarding to adopt a perspective 
that gauges the extent to which the process expands political space, or constricts 
it, alongside its implications for the advance or regression of democracy. 
Nigerian Political Transition: A Conceptual Overview 
So much has been written on Nigerian Political Transitions, especially the postcolonial 
ones (Oyediran, 1981, 1997; Ayeni and Soremekan, 1988, Adamolekun, 
1985, Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985, Diamond etal, 1997, Amuwoetal: 1978,Joseph, 
1999). Many studies of Nigerian transitions have either been from the perspective of 
a liberal theory of democracy, or in the form of a radical critique. While the former 
places a lot of premium on "engineering of stability, checking the intrusion of the 
military and analysing the forms of liberal and authoritarian party systems" 
(Bangura, 1988), the latter critiques the contradictions within the political transitions, 
and how these subvert the democratic process (Agbese, 1998; Momoh and 
Adejumobi, 1999; Kwarteng, 1996; Olonisakin, 1999). More recently, however, 
this liberal perspective has become very critical of military rule and military-led 
transition, at times even co-opting radical rhetoric in either denouncing democratic 
regression, or drawing attention to the dangers or threats to democratic consolida-
70 Cyril Obi 
tion. The radical perspective on the other hand while continuing with an essentially 
materialist and class-based critique of Nigerian transitions, is increasingly coming 
round to the view that "bourgeois freedoms" are not irrelevant to the struggle for 
popular democratic transitions. This is because elements such as the rule of law, the 
guarantee of human rights and constitutionalism provide the political space within 
which the social forces can organize, negotiate and erect platforms for a project of 
popular democracy. 
Yet, there is a sense in which both perspectives accept that political transitions 
go beyond electoral competition, to address the issues of transition from what, for 
whom, and how. While some have done critiques of the personal rulership project 
or the charade of the civilianization of military elites, masquerading as transitions 
(Amuwo, 1995;Durotoyeand Griffith, 1997;Kwarteng, 1996;MbakuandIhonvbere, 
1998), others emphasize how military disengagement remains the greatest obstacle 
to democracy in Nigeria (Akinrinade, 1998; Ihonvbere. 1998; Ibrahim, 1997; 
Olonisakin, 1999; Reno, 1999). This has not precluded those who hinge their 
arguments on the need for the Nigerian transition to engage the issue of political 
restructuring, in which the highly centralized form of federalism, would be 
decentralized and demilitarized (Olukoshi and Agbu, 1996; Amuwo et. al, 1998, 
Olonisakin, 1999). 
In a recent article, Osaghae (1999:7) defines democratic transitions "as the 
process of establishing, strengthening, or extending the principles, mechanisms, 
and institutions that define a democratic regime". He further lists the referents of a 
democratic regime to include pluralism and multiparty ism, popular participation in 
the political process, rule of law, respect for human rights, equality of access of all 
citizens and groups to state power and resources, constitutionalism or respect for the 
"rules of the game" (Osaghae, 1999:9). This clearly moves the debate beyond the 
shadows of multiparty elections, the inauguration of new constitutions to the 
political process and events after the formal transfer of power, when transitions can 
either feed into the consolidation of democracy, or its reversal. Yet, it would seem 
that the notion of political transitions as an incremental process of democratization 
though attractive might not be an end in itself. Ibrahim (1995:120) had introduced 
a transformatory paradigm much earlier, that is most relevant to our context: 
The essential attributes of democratic transition would include formal aspects 
such as constitutional rule and the operation of a multiparty system, but also a more 
profound socio-political transformation that allows freely elected rulers and the 
majority of the civil population to impose their supremacy over the ruling oligarchies 
of the military, ethno-regional blocs and/or the nomenclature. 
Transitions, rightly became processes of transformation, in which the majority 
impose their will on the ruling elite: military and civilian, whose over-politicization 
of social life, and zero-sum struggles conspire to create a near-permanent paralysis 
of the democratic and nation-state project in Nigeria. Democratic transitions in 
Nigeria have so far been more apparent than real, more illusory than concrete. 
Various coalitions of the post-colonial hegemonic political class have more or less
Last Card: Can Nigeria Survive Another Transition ? 71 
violently claimed state power without regard to rules, considerations of equity or 
social justice, much less the will of the people. In the Hobbessian contest for power, 
nothing, except the fear that over-exertion would break the "pot of power" has kept 
these political wars from tripping the country down the deep chasm of disintegration. 
Transitions seem to provide breaks during which (he political networks of 
power take stock, revise their strategies, recruit fresh blood, form new coalitions 
and jostle for positions of advantage before launching themselves into new political 
battles for the monopoly of (state) power. 
The aforementioned considerations and the need to adjust to the reality of postcold 
war neo-liberal conditionalities of "multipartyism, human rights, transparency, 
accountability and good governance" made the hegemonic political class to 
seek the adoption of the democratic platform to legitimize its monopoly of power. 
The strategy of the hegemonic (Abacha) faction was to "civilianize" military 
dictatorship, by making the military president transfer power to himself, as an 
"elected" civilian president. This transformation from "uniform to suit" in the 
Nigerian context was justified by the regimes' spin-doctors as home-grown 
democracy. Abacha's attempt at the "democracy of the cloth", however, came to 
grief as he died suddenly on 8 June 1999, effectively bringing an end to a rather 
frightening chapter of personalized military rule in Nigeria. 
From a conceptual perspective, political transitions in Nigeria need to be 
deepened and widened to shed more light on its complex dynamics, and explore the 
challenges of its transformatory potential. Furthermore, it would enhance the 
differentiation between illusion and reality, and the alternative path towards 
democratizing Nigeria. Within this framework, transitions are either concrete 
processes directed at the transfer of power to the people, or at the very minimum an 
opening within which groups can effectively organize for a national project of 
democratic transformation. 
Nigerian Transitions: Historical Perspectives 
Nigeria has a rather long history of political transitions, which have become 
inextricably tied to the country's fortunes. Rather sadly, this perspective often 
reflects the many false starts and truncated hopes that have been the lot of attempts 
to transfer power. While some scholars have rightly focused on how distortions in 
political structures and processes and the refusal of political players to play 
according to the rules, coupled with military intervention have foiled several 
attempts at democracy, more recent studies are emphasizing the fact that such 
transitions did in fact lack democratic depth (Obodumu, 1992:5-6; Falola and 
Ihonvbere, 1985:5; Oyediran, 1997; Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999). It is from the 
latter perspective that a history of transition in Nigeria commends itself. Rather than 
a simple recounting of events, it would seek to glean how the seed of "transitions 
without end" was sown, and the political forces that seek to reproduce and benefit 
from this democratic deficit.
72 Cyril Obi 
The "First" Transition: From the Pre-Colonial to Colonial Nigeria 
The imposed transition by the British through the superior fire-power of the forces 
of the colonial state (West Africa Frontier Force) resulted in the "creation" of 
Nigeria. This forced transfer of power (sovereignty) from this hitherto diverse 
groups of kingdoms, empires, city-states, etc.; at varying stages of pre-capitalist 
modes of production and the state formation project, to Imperial Britain was done 
without consulting the people. It also did not make any pretensions about the 
exploitative and coercive character of the colonial state. Yet, for this interventionist 
state to function properly at the levels of governance, extraction and commerce, it 
had to establish rules and recruit local personnel. Colonial administration was done 
in such a way that piecemeal concessions were granted to the Nigerian elite in terms 
of the creation on an incremental scale of elective offices, which did not threaten 
colonial power and authority, or transfer real power to the colonial subjects. Kirk- 
Greene (1997) in discussing Nigeria's colonial frameworks (along with the postcolonial 
ones (1963-1989), introduces the model of "reward andremedy" (1997:33): 
In setting up this model of reward and remedy, it is necessary to qualify the 
former by stripping it of any element of charity by the imperial power and by 
subsuming it under the concept of metropolitan response to local pressure. 
Extending this logic further by citing Samuel Cookey's verdict (1987), Kirk- 
Greene agrees that: 
... a common feature of all these colonial constitutions was that they were 
not designed to build a Nigerian state, rather they were measures of 
administrative strategies for better administration of the colonial state 
although occasionally they bent to the realities of increasing political 
consciousness among the colonial elite. 
In the course of the pursuit of the colonial project, there emerged a class of 
educated Nigerians with links to the commercial trading networks, the professions, 
trade unions, students unions, the press, and the remnants of the traditional 
authorities, who were to form the core of the nationalist elite. Thus, after the second 
world war, when the constitutional process entered into the "remedy-decolonization" 
phase, this elite mobilized the masses in the struggle to grab power (independence) 
from the retreating imperial power. It could be argued that the process of 
decolonization marked the transfer of office (as exemplified by the control of 
"government") from the British colonizers to the colonized Nigerians. In spite of the 
divisions within the Nigerian political class: regional, ethnic, religious and class, 
and after some disagreements between the South and the North over the date for 
independence, a broad nationalist coalition was patched together, which after a 
series of constitution conferences in Britain "won" independence on a "platter of 
gold". Yet, this arrangement did not attend in any fundamental manner to some of 
the imperfections inherent in the Nigerian union: structural and regional imbalances, 
the minorities' question, revenue allocation, and economic underdevelopr 
ment. The obsession with capturing government power (as distinct from state
Last Card: Can Nigeria Survive Another Transition ? 73 
power) and resources by the political elite intensified against the background of a 
political transition in which economic power continued to reside outside the 
country. The Republican Constitution, which ushered in the first republic in 1963 
barely lasted three years before it was overthrown by the first military coup in 
January 1966. 
When General J. T. U. Aguyi Ironsi took the reins of power in January 1966, he 
made it clear that the stay of the military would be temporary, hinting at another 
transition. Ironsi's attempt to impose a military government on Nigeria turned out 
to be a disaster. A counter-coup in July 1966 toppled his government, cost him his 
life and was to set off a chain of events that worsened the national crisis. His 
adoption of unitarism with a strong centre and weak provinces was interpreted by 
other factions of the regionalized political class as a ploy to legitimize Igbo 
domination, considering that Igbo junior officers played a major role in the coup 
attempt that resulted in the death of some northern (Hausa, Fulani). officers and 
politicians, including the Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, and the Premier of the 
Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello. In what was interpreted as a northern 
backlash, the July counter-coup toppled Ironi's government. 
The second violent coup in 1966 threw up Colonel Yakubu Go won as the new 
head of state. The government attempted to tackle the crisis by organizing ad hoc 
constitutional talks which largely failed due to the mistrust and suspicions within 
the political class. Differences between Colonel Ojukwu, then military governor of 
the Eastern region and Colonel Gowon over a confederal arrangement that would 
guarantee the autonomy of the Eastern region sparked off a chain of events that 
culminated in the secession of the Eastern region from the Nigerian federation, and 
the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war in 1967. The war ended in January 1970, with 
the defeat of Eastern secessionist claims. 
At the end of the war, General Gowon in line with the tradition of military 
intervention in Nigerian politics being temporary, promised among other things to 
return the country to democratic rule in 1976. However, in his independence day 
speech on 1 October 1974, Gowon broke this promise and postponed the return to 
democracy indefinitely, on the pretext that the politicians had not learnt their 
lessons. This announcement drew a lot of criticism from civil society, the political 
class, and even within the military, especially by those who believed General 
Gowon ought to abide by his word of honour as a soldier, for the sake of protecting 
military professionalism. 
On 29 July 1975, while attending a summit of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), General Gowon wasoverthrown in yet another coup. His successor General 
Murtala Mohammed promised to hand over to a democratically elected government, 
and immediately started an anti-corruption drive. Even though he was 
assassinated in an abortive coup attempt on 13 February 1976, his deputy, General 
Olusegun Obasanjo, took over as head of state; and continued with the faithful 
implementation of the transition programme culminating in the transferof power to 
the elected government of Shehu Shagari on 1 October 1979.
74 Cyril Obi 
A lot has been written on the Murtala-Obasanjo political transition so it will not 
be treated in much detail here (Oyediran, 1981; Adamu and Ogunsanwo, 1982; 
AyeniandSoremekun, 1988;Ofonagoro, 1979;Kurfi, 1983). What is important is 
that it was the first successful attempt at a military-supervised transition to 
democratic rule in post-colonial Nigeria. Among others, it sought to institutionalize 
in an orderly fashion, the process for the transfer of power, from the military to 
elected civilian politicians: states creation and local government reforms, constituent 
assembly and the drafting of a constitution, political party formation and 
electoral guidelines, formation of the electoral body, election tribunal, the judiciary, 
the code of conduct bureau, etc. There was also an attempt to promote positive 
values, political behaviour and a political culture that was supportive of a liberaldemocratic 
system of government. The adoption of the American presidentialism in 
place of the Westminster parliamentary system of the first republic was also an 
attempt to avoid the divisiveness attendant with the politics of the opposition, and 
provide a "strong" chief executive that would be in aposition to reduce centrifugal 
pressures to a manageable level. 
The Murtala-Obasanjo transition excluded the radical forces of the left, and 
returned the reconstituted coalition of the "old" political class to power, based on the 
assumption that they "had learnt their lessons", and that the transition process itself 
had structured out destabilizing elements and tendencies within the political 
system. Shagari's civilian regime barely lasted four years before it was terminated 
in a coup; effectively signalling the end of the second republic. 
The "new" military helmsmen Generals Muharnmadu Buhari—the head of 
state, and his deputy, Tunde Idiagbon, promised no transition. They seemed to be 
more concerned with "hard" corrective approach towards resolving the Nigerian 
crisis. This included halting the economic slide, injecting a sense of patriotism and 
discipline into Nigerians, and punishing economic saboteurs and those who had 
looted the nation's treasury during the second republic. The regime's highhandedness, 
coupled with its repressive brand of nationalism alienated organized 
groups, the press and ordinary people. At the end of the day, when the regime was 
overthrown in a palace coup led by then army chief of staff, General Ibrahim 
Babangida, Nigerians did not loose any sleep over the change of guards. 
One of the earliest promises General Babaginda made after seizing power in 
August 1985 was that of another transition to democratic rule. This was followed by 
related pledges, the two most remarkable of which were that his administration 
"would not remain in power a day longer than necessary", and that his government 
would be "the last military regime in Nigeria". It was against this background that 
Babangida embarked on one of the most elaborate, complex, expensive and longest 
political transition programmes in the history of Nigeria. With the help of some of 
Nigeria's brilliant political scientists, his virtual personalization of power as the 
military president (which placed enormous resources at his disposal), Babangida, 
through a convoluted programme of military disengagement sought to wear out, 
discredit and delegitimize the political class in what was rationalized as "political
Last Card: Can Nigeria Survive Another Transition ? 75 
engineering". This "political engineering" was given intellectual justification by 
some political scientists, who felt strongly that the solution to the recurring cycles of 
transitions was "political crafting" directed at ensuring "that democratic breakdowns 
do not occur, and that democracy could be sustained". Beyond this the 
general was credited with the qualities of a great visionary (Olagunju, Jinadu and 
Oyovbaire, 1993). 
Rather unfortunately, in spite of the high hopes it inspired at the beginning, the 
Babangida transition tragically failed at the end. The constant shifting back of the 
hand over date, the banning and unbanning of politicians, interference in the official 
political parties, exclusion of radicals (labelled extremists), corruption and the final 
straw of cancelling the 12 June 1993 presidential election declared by local 
monitors and international observers as one of the fairest in Nigeria's history, 
sounded the death knell of Babangida's transition. A lot has been written on the rise 
and fall of the political transition programme of General Babangida (Obi, 1997, 
Campbell, 1996; Reno, 1999; Ihonvbere and Shaw; 1998, Momoh, 1996), but it 
would be apposite to recount how Rotimi Suberu (1999:296), sums the collapse of 
that transition: 
The sense of anguish evoked by the Third Republic's collapse should not 
detract, however, from the positive elements of the post-election crisis that 
culminated in Abacha's coup. The first was the apparent humiliation and 
ultimate defeat of Babangida's extraordinarily manipulative and cynical 
dictatorship by a disparate coalition of forces within and outside the military. 
The second is the survival of the Nigerian federation in spite of the sectarian 
tensions inflamed by the wanton annulment of the victory of the first 
southerner to be elected head of government in the nation's thirty-four year 
history. 
Yet, before Babangida "stepped aside" in August 1993, he handed power, not to 
an elected president, nor the (elected) President of the House of Senate. Rather he 
transferred power to a hand-picked and unelected Interim National Government 
(ING) which was also unrepresentative of the Nigerian people (even though it 
included elements from the official political parties—the Nigerian Republican 
Convention and the Social Democratic Party), and illegitimate, a fact confirmed by 
a high court ruling early in November 1993. Within the ING, General Sanni Abacha 
was made the defence minister, who upon the ING's chairman's "resignation" 
would become the new chairman. Thus, when Chief Ernest Sonekan the ING 
Chairman "resigned" on 19 November 1993, General Sanni Abacha became the 
new head of state. 
Like his predecessors who had terminated attempts at democracy, Abacha, 
attempted tojustify his coup by describing his government as a "child of necessity", 
and promised yet another completely new transition in spite of the non-conclusion 
of the one the ING had supplanted. Distancing his regime from that of Babangida (in 
which he had served in the highest ruling council from 1985-1993). Abacha 
claimed that the June 1993 annulment of the presidential elections "had been
76 Cyril Obi 
overtaken by events", thus legitimizing his own seizure of power and a new 
transition on a "clean slate". His arguments were further amplified by the propaganda 
machinery of his regime. In 1993 the Ministry of Information came out with 
a tome (Federal Ministry of Information and Culture), essentially devoted to the 
thesis that the 12 June 1993 crisis had been overtaken by events and the imperative 
was to move Nigeria forward (under Abacha' s leadership). The anonymous writers 
attempted a justification of the Abacha coup on four main points: 
• The 12 June election was held illegally. 
• The results of the elections was inconclusive as it was stopped by the order 
of an Abuja High Court on 16 June 1993. 
• That Nigeria needed an opportunity to make a fresh start and avoid chaos. 
• Abacha had consulted with both political parties and civil society groups 
(before seizing power) and all had agreed that 12 June should not be 
allowed to destroy the country. 
Yet, it would seem that the Abacha project was primed to pursue a transition 
without democracy, after terminating Babangida's still-born political transition. 
The logic behind the presentation of Abacha as a hero, who had stepped in the 
"avoid national chaos"—which in the first place was artificially created (by the 
activities of factions of the political class which had lost out, and pro-Babangida 
organizations like the Association for Better Nigeria (ABN), the manipulation of 
public institutions and the annulment of free and fair elections (without any avenue 
for redress), fell flat on its face when it became clear that Abacha had no intention of 
addressing the injustice perpetuated through the annulment of the June 1993 
elections. He did not also feel compelled to address issues revolving around 
demands for a power-shift (from North to the South), and the restructuring of the 
federation. 
As a part of the agenda of the victorious post-civil war (centralist) military 
faction of the Nigerian ruling class, the Abacha regime feared that allowing any 
democratic shift in the locus of power could destroy its power base, and expose its 
members to possible loss of access to state (oil) resources, and public humiliation by 
an in-coming government intent on punishing corruption and the violation of 
human rights. 
Thus, the subversion of democracy and democratic possibilities became for this 
power bloc within the Nigerian political class a matter of life or death. In the face of 
the democratic momentum from the civic associative movement deriving in part 
from the contradictions spun off from Babangida's transition, and a favourable 
global liberal-democracy moment, Abacha's regime turned out to be the most brutal 
in its repression of democratic opposition, and the most total in its personalization 
of power. Worse, power and resistance took the form of geo-strategic and political 
cleavages, which widened into two dangerous chasms: the north versus the south-
Last Card: Can Nigeria Survive Another Transition ? 77 
west, and the north versus the southern minorities (particularly the oil minorities of 
the Niger delta). The chasms became battle-lines, with the state firmly in Abacha's 
grip targeting the base of opposition in the south-west. Opposition groups such as 
the Civil Liberties Organization (CLO), Constitution Rights Project (CRP), Committee 
for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), National Association of Democratic 
Lawyers (NADL), National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), 
Campaign for Democracy (CD) and the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), 
were demonized in the government-owned media as being externally funded to 
destabilize Nigeria, while the independent press was similarly targeted for trying to 
destabilize the country. The use of the full might of state terror and coercion was 
visited on pro-democracy and opposition groups, critics and even those who fell out 
of favour, or were perceived as nursing ambitions for the position of head of state. 
This psychosis of power (Decalo, 1989) in which ruthlessness, vindictiveness, 
personalized rule and the corrupt manipulation of rules and public institutions 
reigned, did not spare even the political class. Indeed, a zero-sum series of contests 
took place within this class; involving the use of co-optation, blackmail, corruption, 
criminalization and elimination. This along with the insecurity of tenure and the 
possibility of falling out of favour with the head of state, kept ministers, top 
government and security officials in check, each trying to outdo the other in 
showing their loyalty, and retaining their privileged perch close to the throne of 
power. Under this context, the demarcation between the personal and the public 
became blurred and the rule of law was assaulted as the plot to block democratic 
possibilities thickened. 
When eventually the Constitutional Conference was inaugurated in 1994, and 
its report was handed to a Constitutional Review Committee and then a Constitutional 
Analysis Committee a year later, it became clear that the Nigerian people 
were mere spectators, excluded from the "new" transition which officially started in 
1995, and was expected to end on 1 October 1998. Yet, the 1995 draft constitution 
had two significant innovations: the division of Nigeria into six geo-political zones; 
and the acceptance of the principle of a rotational presidency (that would be moved 
around the six zones). 
Having commenced another transition in the midst of protests, resistance and 
repression, an electoral commission was set up, five political parties registered, and 
a gaggle of pro-Abacha groups with very good funding were established. The five 
parties, the United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP), Congress for National Consensus 
(CNC), Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), Grassroots Democratic Movement 
(GDM) and the National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN), had been described by 
one critic as the five leprous fingers of the same hand. By mid-1998, the pro-Abacha 
groups had stepped up the campaign to "persuade'" Abacha to run for the presidency 
under elections scheduled for the third quarter of 1998. Of these groups two stand 
out: Youths Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA) led by Daniel Kanu, and the 
National Council for Youth Associations in Nigeria (NACYAN) led by Kanu and 
Alhaji Ilya Ibrahim. They organized a "two million-man march" in Abuja in a two-
78 Cyril Obi 
day jamboree of mus;c, food, speeches and "pleadings" to Abacha to run for the 
presidency. Reports,. .timated that the jamboree cost about 500 million Naira, while 
the organizers denied any state support for the project. Yet a two-day public holiday 
was given in Abuja to allow workers to attend, "delegates" were bussed in from all 
the states and local governments across the country (over 600) and paid. The event 
was aired live on government-owned television and radio, while the Federal Road 
Safety Corps, the Police and Police Bomb disposal unit were on hand in Abuja to 
provide security and ensure that all went smoothly. 
In response, the UAD led by Olisa Agbakoba organized a five million-man 
march in Lagos to counter the Abuja march in March, demanding the termination of 
military rule, the release of all political prisoners (including the detained winner of 
12 June presidential election—M. K. O. Abiola), and the convening of a sovereign 
national conference. This was dispersed by the police and Agbakoba was arrested 
and detained. In nearby Ibadan, angry mobs descended on known pro-Abacha 
lobbyists, destroying their property. Many people lost their lives in the repression 
that followed, and leading opposition figures were arrested and detained as what the 
then state military administrator, Colonel Usman, described as "prisoners of war". 
With the opposition in jail, underground, or in exile, and Abacha adopted as the sole 
candidate of the five parties—just as it seemed that the way was open for him to reap 
the ultimate prize of his transition—a national referendum to confirm his presidency 
(with no one contesting against him), he died on 8 June 1998, bringing his political 
transition to an abrupt end. 
One aspect of Abacha's transition that is yet to receive full academic attention is 
the massive widening of the polarities in the military, the undermining of the esprit 
de corps, and the zero-sum contest between two broad factions within the military 
political class; those Adekanye (1993; 1999) once described as the hawks (hardliners) 
and the doves (soft-liners). While the hawks favoured an arrangement in 
which the military would rule through a pseudo-democratic arrangement, the doves 
favoured a measured form of liberal-democratic transition, in which the military 
would return to its professional calling (its constitutionally defined role) and give 
room to civilians and the elected representatives of the people. It is important to 
caution that this division was fluid, with individuals crossing from one side to the 
other, depending on personal calculations. There were also those wealthy retired 
military officers that wanted political power, but felt their chances would be brighter 
if entry and exit was not controlled by a single individual, but rather mediated by an 
open (free) form of (electoral) competition, which multipartyism could provide. In 
the context of personalized rule, the soft-liners in zero-sum terms were camped with 
the "opposition within" and marked for repression, and removal, as a threat to the 
security of the personalized rule. Abacha's sudden death on 8 June 1998, and the 
initial shock and confusion in his camp, where the thought of grooming a successor 
had never been brooked, gave the soft-liners the chance to seize power, and quickly 
organize another transition to democratic rule, led by General Abdulsalami Abubakar.
Last Card: Can Nigeria Survive Another Transition ? 79 
The Abubakar Transition: About Turn, Quick March 
The Abubakar transition was largely hinged on a reversal of the personalized 
transition mode of the Abacha years. Within one month of mounting the saddle as 
head of state, Abubakar, though badly shaken by the sudden death of M. K. O. 
Abiola in detention in July 1998 (who had still refused to give up his claims to the 
presidency) shortly before his release, moved quickly releasing political detainees, 
granting amnesty to those accused and found guilty of plotting to overthrow 
Abacha, and called on political exiles to return home. This human rights' posture 
reduced the tension which had pervaded the domestic scene while providing space, 
and hope (even with a great deal of scepticism) that the latest "transition" would lead 
to the enthronement of some form of democracy. 
Side-stepping four critical issues in Nigerian politics (demands for a government 
of national unity, a sovereign national conference and the restructuring of the 
federation, economic reform, and the resolution of the Niger Delta crisis) Abubakar's 
transition largely followed the pattern of past transitions to "liberal democracy" in 
Nigeria; except that there was no time for a constituent assembly, just a committee 
that studied the 1979 constitution and the 1995 draft constitution and made 
recommendations, and another committee that collated the views of Nigerians in 
the draft before submitting it to the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) which 
approved a draft, that was eventually promulgated into law in May 1999 (after all 
the transition elections had been lost or won). At the end of the day, the new electoral 
body the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), registered 3 political 
parties out of the 26 that applied. Those that scaled the registration hurdle were 
the People's Democratic Party (PDP) the All People's Party (APP) and the Alliance 
for Democracy (AD). Enemuo (1999:3) rightly observed that: 
With no significant ideological differences, the parties were agglomerations 
of Nigeria's notables, individuals who had been prominent in past civilian 
and military regimes and business, as well as a handful of young wealthy 
professionals and businessmen. 
In spite of the ideological poverty of the three political parties, they were 
seemingly agreed on two things: the necessity of a pact between the various factions 
of the hegemonic elite to repossess power from the military, and a geo-political 
power shift from the North to the South. Yet, the Alliance for Democracy stood out 
on two counts: its demand for the restructuring of the Nigeria federation, and the 
hegemonic profile of the south-west elite within the party. The PDP and APP were 
loose coalitions of centrists and conservatives—professional politicians, businessmen, 
retired military officers, and younger elements who were either rich, or had 
rich sponsors. This class character of the political elite meant that the transition was 
less about the transformation of power relations, and more about giving a fresh lease 
of life to, and stabilizing the hegemonic project of the Nigerian political elite. 
General Abdulsalami's transition started on July 1998 and terminated on May 
29, 1999—the shortest in Nigeria's political history. In more ways than one, it 
underscored the desperation of the soft-liners in the military to get out of the firing
80 Cyril Obi 
line as well as their calculation that a short and sharp transition would appeal to the 
International Community, while giving the democratic forces no time to interrogate 
the transition or insist on terms that could threaten the material and class interests of 
the Nigerian Establishment. From the local government elections on 5 December 
1998, the state governorship and assembly elections of 9 January 1999, and the 
senate and house of representatives elections at the federal level, a regular pattern of 
PDP predominance over the two other parties emerged. It was hardly surprising that 
in the 27 February 1999 presidential elections, the former military head of state and 
retired general (freed from jail haven being found guilty by a tribunal for plotting 
Abacha's overthrow) Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP, defeated his AD/APP rival 
Olu Falae (winning outrightly in 27 states compared to Falae's 9) to clinch the 
presidency. This concretely marked Obasanjo's second coming—as the broad 
choice of the pact patched up between the competing factions of the hegemonic 
elite, to the admiration of certain sections of the international community. 
General Abdulsalami's transition needs to be understood in its fundamental 
basis as a hegemonic project directed at giving the Nigerian ruling class its "last 
chance" to reach a "working agreement" that would guarantee capitalist accumulation, 
without endangering the system or losing the confidence of its global partners 
or "foreign investors". While this could be gleaned from the nature of the political 
parties, the structures and processes of the transition (initiated and controlled by the 
state) and the character of the political players, it came out clearly in the conduct and 
outcome of the elections. The elections elicited a lot of interest within and outside 
Nigeria because they were the essential vehicle for the transfer of power from the 
military to the civilians. Having been a pariah state since 1993, Nigeria was very 
keen to get global approval and legitimacy for its new democratic transition. Thus 
it opened the doors wide to local monitors and international observers to scrutinize 
its elections, and accord them credibility on the basis of such elections being free 
and fair. In this regard civil society groups in Nigeria formed the Transition 
Monitoring Group (TMG), while international observers came from organizations 
such as the European Union, the Commonwealth, the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the International 
Republican Institute (IRI), the United Nations (UN), the International Foundation 
for Electoral Systems (IFES). They were complemented by journalists and other 
"friends'* of Nigeria. At the end, it was clear that the elections were flawed, although 
it was conceded by international observers that they roughly reflected the will of the 
people. Even if the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) was less than satisfied with 
the conduct of the elections, it could not call for their cancellation, or a rerun, given 
the irreversibility of the process in the face of mounting domestic and international 
pressures for the quick return of Nigeria to democratic governance. At the end it 
could be argued that the will of the Nigerian people was largely subordinated to the 
power calculations of the Nigerian hegemonic elite (and its international partners). 
As Kew (1999:33) who observed the February 1999 elections in Nigeria recalls: 
No one had any illusions that anything but high-stakes bargaining within the 
military and the political class would determine the structures of power in
Last Card: Can Nigeria Survive Another Transition ? 81 
the civilian government. Elections would influence this process to the extent 
that the crowd influences a soccer match. 
While the foregoing may strongly suggest the democratic groundings of the pact 
that was legitimized through elections was thin, it should not in any way downplay 
the significance of the democratic openings offered by the conclusion of the 
Abdulsalami transition. When President Obasanjo took his oath of office at the 
Eagle Square in Abuja on 29 May 1999, it was not merely a ful filment of the promise 
of General Abdulsalami to return Nigeria to democratic rule on that day, but more 
fundamentally, it was the beginning of another beginning of Nigeria's attempt at 
building democracy. A beginning haunted as much by the past, as by the "imperfect" 
present. 
One Year After 29 May 1999: Towards an Elected Dictatorship 
or an Electoral Democracy? 
At the rally marking the first anniversary of Nigeria's return to democracy, the 
senate president and the speaker of the house of representatives—the leaders of the 
federal legislative house (National Assembly) were ironically absent. Rationalizing 
their boycott of "democracy day", then Senate President, Chuba Okadigbo argued 
that President Obasanjo's declaration of 29 May as democracy day was an illegal act 
as it did not have the approval of the National Assembly (Adeniyi, 2000). This, to a 
large extent, symbolized the throes of democratic rebirth that Nigeria has been 
immersed in, and the signposts of danger in the political minefields of the fourth 
republic. These minefields revolve around the persistence of a strong militaristic 
streak in politics and governance, the zero-sum approach to the struggle for power 
and public office, and the revolutionary pressures from an expectant Nigerian 
populace wary that the democratic dividend is not captured by the elite, or a section 
of the country. 
In the first months of Nigeria's newly-won democracy, a lot was done in the area 
of the "decompression of authoritarianism". Panels were set up to investigate 
contracts awarded in the dying days of the military government and human rights 
abuse, more political prisoners and convicts of the military (coup) tribunals were 
released, and investigations into Nigeria's stolen billions commenced. In addition 
those considered to be politicized military officers were retired from the Armed 
Forces, while command positions in the military were made to reflect a more 
equitable ethnic, and regional balancing. This balancing was also reflected in 
appointments into the executive, as well as top positions in the public sector. It was 
clear that the Obasanjo democracy was seeking a reform of the rules and practices 
of ruling class hegemony in Nigeria. This is a project that has depended as much on 
the personality and leadership qualities of President Obasanjo as on the quality, 
methods and determination of the "opposition" to deconstruct Obasanjo's newstyle 
democracy. Perhaps the greatest threat-within comes from the pact that "won" 
power through the Abdulsalami transition and the faction that "conceded" that
82 Cyril Obi 
power shifts to the South (West). These forces range from those who lost out in the 
race for power and office, those who feel "offended", others who are afraid that the 
power shift has cut off their (state) source of accumulation and relevance, and those 
who feel that the Nigerian state under Obasanjo remains unjust and undemocratic. 
The foregoing explains why the first year of Nigeria's newly-won democracy 
has been a bag of mixed fortunes. The democratic opening has provided a platform 
and space for the resurgence oflong-repressed demands for the restructuring of the 
Nigerian federation and the sharing of Nigeria's (oil) wealth on a more equitable 
basis and the emergence of ethnic militias—the O'odua People's Congress (OPC), 
Egbesu Boys of Africa (EB A), Arewa People's Congress (APC), to name but a few. 
While the first two are keen on the restructuring of the Nigerian federation (based on 
the outcome of a sovereign national conference) to allow for more local autonomy 
and control of resources, the third, the APC is keen on maintaining the status quo 
and preventing the marginalization of the North. Like its predecessor, the Obasanjo 
Presidency is not ready to brook any request for the convening of a sovereign 
national conference insisting that there cannot be two "sovereigns" in one polity. It 
further argues that being an elected government of the Nigerian people it has the sole 
legal authority to initiate and carry out constitutional reforms, and that anything 
done outside of the constitution is illegal. What this suggests, is that the Nigerian 
democratic space is a hotly contested terrain, which partly feeds into the interrogation 
of the hegemonic nation-state project, and the escalation of violent conflict 
across the country. 
Since the onset of Nigeria's latest attempt at democracy there has been an 
escalation of communal conflict and ethnic/sectarian strife (Mustapha, 2000). 
Hardly had the government settled down when the Itsekiri-Ijaw conflict exploded 
again in the troubled Niger Delta. Since then communal violence has reared its head 
in low-intensity conflicts in otherparts of the Niger Delta, the Middle-Belt, Sagamu, 
Kano, Ife-Modakeke, Kaduna and Aba. These conflicts have been further compounded 
by the Sharia crisis—starting from Kaduna in February 2000, over the 
quest of the majority Muslim community to adopt Islamic law in certain states of 
Northern Nigeria. The Sharia crisis pitched Christians against Muslims, and put to 
test the secularity of the Nigeria constitution, as well as the sensitive matter of the 
supremacy of federal law over state laws. Other conflicts have arisen from the 
tensions in the Niger Delta where the social movements of the Niger Delta continue 
to mount pressure on the Nigerian state and its partners—the oil multinationals for 
redress, and a greater share of the oil wealth produced from under their ancestral 
lands and waters (Obi, 1999). While the Nigerian state has acknowledged the 
neglect and marginal ization of the Niger Delta region, and taken some steps such as 
the increase in the derivation principle in the revenue allocation system (from 1 to 
13 per cent) and the passing of The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) 
Bill, it has also sustained the pattern of repressing local resistance and demands for 
local autonomy in the Niger Delta. A tragic instance is the destruction of Odi—a 
town in Bayelsa State in November 1999, by federal troops looking for a criminal
Last Card: Can Nigeria Survive Another Transition ? 83 
gang that had earlier on abducted and murdered some policemen. Similar tensions 
have arisen from the sudden increase in the prices of refined petroleum products 
early in June 2000 provoking a nation-wide labour strike, the high levels of violent 
crime resulting in a rash of vigilante groups seeking to curb crime with equally 
violent means, and the disagreements following the refusal of some state governors 
to accept, and pay the new national minimum wage announced by President 
Obasanjo. 
It would be necessary before bringing this section to a close to examine the 
uneasy relationship between the executive and legislative arms at the federal level, 
the subordination of the legislative arm to the executive arm of government in most 
of the states, and the low profile of the judiciary. It is clear that at the federal level, 
there is a struggle for supremacy between the executive and the legislature. As a 
result of this struggle forpower, the business of law-making has suffered, while a lot 
of executive power (and resources) have gone into "cutting down the legislature to 
size". Thus, it took the National Assembly six months to pass the 2000 Appropriation 
Bill, while the Anti-Corruption and NDDC bills were dogged by a lot of 
controversy, disputes and delay before they were eventually passed. The vortex of 
the conflict between the executive and the legislature lies in the issue of conflicting 
perspectives of areas of jurisdiction, powers, and the personality of the leadership of 
both arms. In this "war" between the arms of government, it would seem the 
legislature has suffered more casualties—two senate presidents have been impeached 
and one speaker of the house of representatives has been forced to resign 
from the house, within a spate of fifteen months. Yet, the judiciary has kept a rather 
low profile. In all, the business of democratic governance continues to suffer as the 
gulf between the winners and the losers continues to widen. 
Conclusion 
It would be quite instructive to capture one year of democracy in Nigeria in the 
conjuncture between an elected dictatorship and an electoral democracy. Although 
the government is an elected one, the executive and legislature at the various levels 
of governance continue to show strong streaks of authoritarianism. The executive 
sometimes issues orders or makes policy without consultation with the legislature, 
the legislature also sometimes seeks to hold the executive captive, by refusing to 
"co-operate", or pass certain bills into law. Worse, the local governments have been 
at the receiving end of the tyranny of certain state executives across the country. 
At the economic level, one year of democracy has not yielded much in terms of 
the democratic dividend as industrial capacity utilization remains low (30 per cent 
average) and the economy remains captive to the fluctuating fortunes of global oil. 
Even though a lot of energy and incentives have gone into the drive to attract foreign 
investors, the domestic situation has not provided a fertile ground for the influx of 
global capital: poor infrastructure, conflict and insecurity, etc. 
While it could be suggested that democracy has been "the only game in town" in 
Nigeria since 29 May 1999, the democratic ethos remains virtually captive to its
84 Cyril Obi 
imperfect moorings. Decades of military rule, the zero-sum politics of the ruling 
pact, and the crisis of oil-based accumulation continue to sap the sinews of 
democracy of much strength. At the current conjuncture the challenge of economic 
revival, and the politics of hegemonic external forces have direct implications for 
Nigeria's democratic fortunes. The ways the current government can effectively 
mediate divisions of ethnicity, religion, region and class within the post-Abacha 
hegemonic pact, and attend to demands for the redefinition of power relations, 
equity and the restructuring of the federation, would ultimately determine whether 
this transition would be Nigeria's last card, or not. 
Note 
*Dr Cyril Obi is a Senior Research Fellow at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 
Lagos, Nigeria. 
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