

MODERNIZATION AND ITS MALCONTENTS: KOBINA SEKYI OF GHANA
AND THE RE-STATEMENT OF AFRICAN POLITICAL THEORY
(1892-1956)

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Modernization and its malcontents or rather, critics - this is the general area of concern in this paper. Our main interest centres on one of the most original and uncompromising of the critics. William Essuman-Gwira Sekyi (popularly known as Kobina Sekyi), a radical conservative (or conservative radical?) Ghanaian nationalist who condemned not modernization whose benefits he praised and highlighted, but the particular character which that process assumed in his own country during the colonial era and up to the eve of independence. He would have preached the doctrines which he so consistently preached between 1912 and 1956 had he lived to see an independent Ghana. In fact he had always warned the new political class represented by Danquah and Nkrumah, of the dangers of copying foreign political institutions and ideas, and of the problems of nation-building as early as the 1940s. The enduring significance of the man for African political thought and practice is illustrated by the fact that as late as February 1969, after all the post-mortems and 'what went wrong in Ghana' lectures and broadcasts, opinion-makers of post-Nkrumah Ghana saw fit to reprint an article Sekyi had written in 1950 entitled "The best constitutions are born not made" in the Daily Graphic, with the caption: "A look at an historic document", warning Ghanaians on the eve of the return to civilian rule that the mere existence of a Western style constitution was no guarantee of stability and freedom.

Sekyi was an ideologue, so it is in the context of African ideological history that he has to be seen, i.e. in the tradition of Horton, Blyden, Sarbah, Casely-Hayford and even Kenyatta, although his criticism of colonialism, his analysis of the traditional African polity and his theory of what form the modern African state should take, as well as his theory of Pan-Africanism, differs radically and sub-

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stantially from the former. My hope is that this preliminary exercise will interest students of African history and also those who concern themselves with Ideology and social change in modernizing societies. It must be noted, however, that Sekyi, in spite of his uniqueness, was among the majority of African Ideologues for whom tradition - the inherited values of the remarkably durable Akan social system - played a role at least equally as decisive as Western Ideas in shaping attitudes towards modernization.

II.

Very few political scientists took any notice when Harold Lasswell wrote in 1935 that "political symbols and practices are so intimately intertwined with the larger array of symbols and practices in culture that it is necessary to extend the scope of political investigation to include the fundamental features of the culture setting".² Today, as Heinz Eulau has pointed out³ Lasswell's early work has assumed great significance in political science. It has had great impact on the development of psychological and sociological approaches to politics, and students of political behaviour in the West (and hopefully, in underdeveloped countries) have come to appreciate that purely formal and legalistic conceptual frameworks are inadequate to provide meaningful answers to such problems as socialization, political integration, persistence and change, and the complex bases of political authority and legitimacy. Indeed, the very notion of the political system has recently undergone a profound re-appraisal. I refer to David Easton's writings, particularly The Political System, to which I shall return later.

III.

There is a lot of talk nowadays about African political thought, as if this is a new thing. But as Professor Shepperson has pointed out as early as 1964, "African political thought is as old as human society in Africa. To believe otherwise is to presume that pre-literate peoples cannot

think politically or that, in spite of constant repetitions of Aristotle's dictum, man is no political animal. Such truisms ought to be constantly in mind....., otherwise it may too easily appear that, either in systematic or unsystematic forms... political thinking amongst the indigenous inhabitants of Africa south of the Sahara is nothing more than a by-product of European influences and the introduction of writing".⁴ Anthropologists, of course, have added to our knowledge of African political institutions, notably Fortes and Evans-Pritchard in African Political Systems, Nadel in Black Byzantium and Smith in Government in Zazzau, historians and political scientists have also written on certain themes in African political thinking and have related these themes to political concepts derived from the West.⁵ Recently Robert July has assembled an array of African political writing in his Origins of Modern African Thought, but none of these commentaries has dealt with any single African political thinker or ideologue with a systematic theory of politics, law or Pan-Africanism. Nowhere is any attempt made to show the existence of an African theory of political development written by an African without reference to Western political concepts. Instead (and this includes the writings of Nkrumah, Senghor and Nyerere) the assumption has always been that a written and systematic, ontologically grounded African political theory comparable to Western political theory, does not exist. It could only exist because of Western influences, or so it is argued. For example, Herbert Spiro, writing in 1967, asserted: "There is, however, a special difficulty in getting African interpretations on African events that have a reasonably high theoretical content. The reason is twofold: Africa's lack, until now, of a separate estate, caste, or profession of political philosophers, and the fact that, with few exceptions like Nkrumah and Senghor, few African politicians have had the time or inclination to write about political problems in a systematic and disciplined way".⁶ Spiro is, of course, referring to contemporary African politicians and 'political philosophers'; the former, he says, are "comparatively unideological and untheoretic", while the latter, trained in the West, may be so mesmerised by Western political theory that they may "overintellectualize or overideologize the operationally relevant thought of African politicians".⁷ Some of these African scholars, notably Ali Mazrui, seem to be too pre-occupied with the 'impact' of Western political theory on African political thought. They would have us believe that Africans would not have held different

political notions and practices had it not been for the 'European stimulation'.⁸ Even when token acknowledgments are made to the 'originality' of pre-colonial African political systems, the assumption seems to be that the ideas and symbols of these systems should not be accorded the status of political theory because there is an absence, or there is deemed to be an absence in these ideas of Western political concepts like State, Sovereignty, Law, Nation etc. Moreover, since the main interest of political scientists seems to lie in the study of current African ideology and the politics of modernization, it is usually implied that traditional African political systems and ideas are either irrelevant to the problems of nation-building and modernization or are obstacles to nation-building. In assuming this, they immediately postulate the now much criticised tradition-modernity dichotomy in the modernization process. A good example of this type of approach to the study of African ideology is to be found in Harvey Glickman's paper⁹ where he asserts that in Africa "often major ideological statements are circumstantially oriented rather than premeditated; African political theory is still in the era of the pamphlet, not the book... A major dilemma confronting those involved in the construction of ideology in Africa concerns the somewhat contradictory nature of the job. If the inhabitants of a territory are to develop citizenship ties to the state, the emergent civic culture must reflect some part of their social experiences, i.e. their traditions. Yet the residues of traditional culture pose serious obstacles to the creation of attitudes conducive to the growth of modern institutions.. At the same time as an African ideology must face towards tradition it must act as an agency of modernization. The paradox in this is that political modernization aims toward the construction of a democratic state; yet to encourage democracy, to solicit popular participation in public affairs, leaders must invoke attitudes still embedded in traditional loyalties and outlooks". Glickman further asserts that the handful of African political theorists get round this "paradox" by denying the existence of social conflicts and postulating the inherently democratic and egalitarian nature of traditional African polities. The point is Glickman and many others like him, expect an elaborate discussion of the "classic questions of political theory" (as they understand them)¹⁰ in these theorists, and when they cannot find them mutter something about African ideology or political theory being "eclectic" or "circumstantially oriented" or "emergent". Some like

Glickman cannot decide whether to approach Nyerere as a political theorist or as a ideologue so that when Nyerere asserts that Africa practised democracy and socialism before the coming of the Europeans they turn round and accuse him of evading conceptual difficulties! Yet others like the anthropologist W.J. Argyle bustle about as judges condemning here, giving absolution there, recommending what African ideology should be and resolutely denying African ideologues, particularly West African ideologues, who are Dr. Argyle's betes noirs, the privilege of theorising about what goals their societies ought to pursue. The reason they give is that socialism and centralized planning are bad for Africa and ideology is the business of "professional students of society"! Since when, may I ask, have ideologies been formulated by "professional students of society"? I raise these problems, not so much to solve them as to illustrate the muddled thinking that has characterised the study of African political thought and the undeveloped state of the discipline. A few of the commentators with more facile pens have even reached the stage where they are now theorising about miniskirts and nudity in African politics! Very soon, we may well be hearing about the influence of the Holy Ghost on African politics. I am, however, encouraged in this preliminary attempt at an "intellectual history" of a pre-colonial African society by scholars such as David Easton¹² and in particular by Thomas Hodgkin who has rightly argued that "it is important at the outset to avoid using the kind of conceptual framework which distinguishes sharply between the 'traditional' values of pre-colonial African societies - or of such contemporary societies as appear to have been relatively little affected by what we call 'Western' institutions and ideas - and the 'modern' values of societies which have been exposed to a marked degree to 'Western' influences. Given such an approach, an idea such as that of 'freedom' is usually included in the latter category. It is thus regarded as a 'Western importation'; and the image is created of a small minority of 'Western-educated' African intellectuals and politicians making use of concepts which have been borrowed, in varying modes and proportions, from Locke and Rousseau, Mazzini and Marx, and which are then diffused among their supporters. If this were indeed the case, the study of African political ideas would be extremely boring, since what we would be concerned with would be simply the reflections of 'Western' ideas in African thought and activity. But the image, fortunately, bears little relation to reality".¹³

In discussing the possibility of tracing the evolution of concepts like "freedom" in colonial and pre-colonial Africa Hodgkin acknowledges the lack of accessible data to make such an operation feasible, and concludes, significantly for this seminar: "It is only fairly recently that African pre-colonial history - in the limited sense, that is, of the history of the states and peoples of sub-Saharan Africa - has begun to be taken seriously. Within this very wide field what might be called 'intellectual history' has not yet attracted much attention. Social anthropologists have been more interested in the values of African societies than those working in other disciplines. But their findings, for the most part - except in the case of those who have been willing to function as historians - are only indirectly relevant to the study of pre-colonial societies. Such work as has been done on the rise of national movements during the present century has been more concerned with historical roots and forms of organisation than with ideas. Moreover, any adequate discussion of what, within a given African national movement, is meant by a term such as 'freedom' or 'liberté' clearly involves a thorough understanding of its African equivalents, and the range of contexts in which they occur. But few linguists or philosophers have as yet turned their attention to the study of African political language".¹⁴

The Ghanaian philosopher, Willie Abraham, has dealt partially with the question raised by Hodgkin in The Mind of Africa. In this paper I wish to draw attention to a twentieth century Ghanaian philosopher, William Essuman-Gwira Sekyi, Kobina Sekyi, (1892-1956) who addressed himself to the question of ideology and political development long before independence, and many of whose ideas can be said to have preshadowed the current concern with nation building. It is argued here that Sekyi's challenge to the accepted, and essentially Bodinian-Hobbesian and Austinian doctrines of law, sovereignty and nationhood (as defined and practised in Europe and in the colonial semi-state) remarkably presages Harold Lasswell's warning to heed the relevance of culture patterns to political processes, but also some of the themes that are discussed in contemporary socio-political theorizing about the new states of Africa. It seems to me remarkable that after studying Sekyi's legal and political writings which extend between 1914 and 1954, one should come across modern political anthropologists stating almost exactly what Sekyi had argued and advocated

before the coming of the new science of development. Lloyd Fallers, for example, suggested as recently as 1963 that "a primary task for political anthropology in the future is the detailed study of the ways in which the old societies, which must now be conceptualized as local ethnic units within the new national societies, relate to these new political institutions. Broadly speaking, it would appear that the traditional polities which in the colonial period were made to function.... as primarily administrative units, in the period of independence, are coming to function primarily as political units".¹⁵ Yet another anthropologist, addressing himself to contemporary problems of nation-building has observed that "one of the problems involved in the creation and federation of new states is essentially that of converting a political system of relations between once sovereign peoples within its boundaries into a more comprehensive political organization".¹⁶ Sekyi, in his criticism of colonial overrule, and in his search for an indigenous and viable political system that would replace the colonial administration, arrived at a similar conclusion, but from a typically Sekyian viewpoint. He adorned his outline of a polity for a self-governing and independent Ghana with a traditionalist ideology and an ethical system emphasising identity and loyalty which was based on the Akan social system. In this he was not making an entirely new departure: he was in a very real sense, resurrecting, restating, strengthening and providing an ethical basis for, the Asante Union and the Fanti Confederation, particularly the latter whose architects included nationalists like J.A.B. Horton, Brew, Sarbah etc. - Ghana's first modernizers who consciously tried to model their new polity on the principles of the Meiji Reformation in Japan¹⁷ in order to create what, had it not been suppressed by the British administration¹⁸ would have developed into a remarkably modern traditional polity in Africa, with the ability to preserve and a willingness to reform. Sekyi's political and ethical ideas, as we shall see, are rather similar, particularly his philosophy of loyalty, his theory of political obligation, his views on the instrumental nature of family upbringing and education, and in his conservatism, to the Japanese Kokutai No Hongi or Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan which ensured that "religion and education, community and family, found their natural and practical expression in the state, which could therefore contemplate change while continuing to

hold the loyalties of its members", and that "the primacy of political values and the emphasis on the polity allowed modification in social institutions, particularly economic ones, without dramatically rupturing the values and social beliefs of the Japanese".¹⁹

IV.

Ideology and the Colonial Situation: It is important to emphasise that Sekyi was both a conservative and a modernizer. His organizational base was the old Fanti Confederation and the Aborigines Rights Protection Society.²⁰ Intellectually and socially he can be identified with the intelligentsia which spearheaded these movements. Family ties and personal friendship (he was the nephew of H. Van Hein, successful Gold Coast merchant, lawyer and one of the leaders of the National Congress of British West Africa, step-son of the Rev. S.R.B. Attoh-Ahuma, author of Memoirs of West African Celebrities and The Gold Coast Nation and National Consciousness, grandson of Chief Kofi Sekyi, a distant relative of J. Mensah Sarbah, as well as an admirer of S. Brew whom he met during his student days in London, while the latter was in retirement in England, as well as his being a Fanti and Cape Coast intellectual, deeply influenced his conservative ideology. But important as these factors are, they do not fully explain the making of an ideologist and his intellectual confrontation with the political and ethical problems posed by the colonial transition. Sekyi's re-statement of traditional political thought was the product of an agonising search for identity by a young Anglo-Fanti in a period of cultural crisis, a search in which the quest for personal salvation could only be achieved in a scheme for national salvation by galvanizing the political corpse of the traditional political system whose values and institutions had been distorted or rendered ineffective by the economic, legal, religious and political forces of the colonial system. His solution was to reclaim the sovereignty of the Gold Coast, based on the Bond of 1844 (which he rather naively accused the British of usurping), then answer charges of unpreparedness for self-government by bringing all the states of the Gold Coast into a federation on the lines of the Fanti Confederation of the 1860s, with a King/President elected by the Executive of the G.C.A.R.P.S., stren-

gthen the traditional authority of Kings and Chiefs, resurrect traditional concepts of duty and social obligation, and Africanise the educational system to arrest the individualism and debilitating effects of excessive Westernization. In short, he was particularly concerned with the basic question: how to Westernize without being Westernized; how to preserve while modernizing.²¹ Just as contemporary problems of modernization have their roots in the colonial situation, so did Sekyi's cultural crisis. Georges Balandier has provided a useful definition of the colonial situation²² which is of particular interest here in that it enables us to understand Sekyi's reaction and the significance of that reaction for the study of nationalist ideology and political development. Colonialism, says Balandier, imposes on subject peoples a very peculiar type of situation which not only conditioned the reactions but is of great contemporary significance. Colonialism in the first place shattered the isolation of subject peoples and provided itself with an ideology justifying its spurious "role". It established its own administrative and economic systems to guarantee the "colonial peace", and made the colonial enterprise economically profitable. Political control is achieved by power imperialism and economic control by compromising the native aristocracy, encouraging population movements to serve the exigencies of the colonial economy and by alteration to or transformation of customary laws, particularly laws relating to land and resources. In short, colonialism literally became "an act of social surgery" resulting in social and cultural crisis. Reactions to this crisis varied: the "closed societies" of Far Eastern peoples opposed these intrusions in spite of outward appearances of Westernization; relations between the colonising Power and Islamic societies remained tense, with the latter exhibiting a sense of superiority and a "veiled and silent" hostility; and, of course, the Africans were said to be ready imitators who lacked confidence in the resources of their past. Internally, colonialism took the form of a "crude sociological experiment" with traditional society - colonial administration experiments with, modifies or destroys traditional political and legal systems and patterns of authority. The superiority of the white race is taken as given as well as the unfitness of subject peoples for self rule. The missionaries and the imperial economy add to the disintegration of the traditional order. The result is a precarious lumping together of radically heterogeneous social forms: things fall apart, and a

numerical majority becomes a sociological minority. Balandier has summarized the colonial situation as follows: "(1) the domination imposed by a foreign minority, racially (or ethnically) and culturally different, acting in the name of a racial (or ethnic) and cultural superiority dogmatically affirmed, and imposing itself on an indigenous population constituting a numerical majority but inferior to the dominant group from a material point of view; (2) this domination linking radically different civilizations into some form of relationship; (3) a mechanized, industrialized society with a powerful economy, a fast tempo of life, and a Christian background, imposing itself on a non-industrialized, 'backward' society in which the pace of living is much slower and religious institutions are most definitely 'non-Christian'; (4) the fundamentally antagonistic character of the relationship between these two societies resulting from the subservient role to which the colonial people are subjected as 'instruments' of the colonial power; (5) the need, in maintaining this domination, not only to resort to 'force', but also to a system of pseudo-justifications and stereotyped behaviours etc."²³ Four important aspects of the colonial situation are that (1) it is a dynamic total situation, (2) colonial societies are sick societies to the extent that the colonial Power opposes genuine solutions whereas "among colonial peoples the quest for norms coincides with the quest for autonomy", (3) the colonial situation creates "that peculiar state of ambiguity" wherein both traditionalist and modernist elements co-exist and interpenetrate, (4) the colonial situation is characterised by cultural crisis and ethnic conflict, and enables us to study the ways in which the conflicts are felt or resolved by the individuals involved. The rest of this paper will deal with Kobina Sekyi's ideological response to the crisis of the colonial situation and his attempt to resurrect and strengthen what most of his contemporaries regarded as a Paradise Lost - the Akan-Fanti state system - to meet the challenge of modernization and self-government.

IVb.

Morphology of the Ideology of Cultural Crisis: Because of the limited time available I shall not venture into any detailed analysis of the various definitions of ideology - that could form an essay by itself. For my present purpose I take Karl

Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia, as well as his essay "Conservative Thought" in Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology²⁴ as my starting points. Many and various are the different interpretations of ideology, generally of a hostile nature, ranging from the Marxian interest-power interpretation to interpretations that regard ideologies merely as conscious deception, intolerance, wilful intransigence, authoritarianism or irrationalism. As Clifford Geertz has observed, ideology has become the most ideologized of concepts. Judging by the way certain scholars write about African ideologies, one would be pardoned if one got the impression that these ideologies were either confused and crude versions of ideologies originating in Europe or (as Hobbes remarked about natural law theories) that they had been "built in the air". For the purpose of this paper, I shall adopt the "strain theory" approach to the study of the social determinants of ideology. The other, more familiar, approach is the "interest theory". The latter regards ideology as a mask or as a weapon, whereas the "strain theory" views ideology as a symptom and a remedy. According to Geertz, "In the interest theory, ideological pronouncements are seen against the background of a universal struggle for advantage; in the strain theory, against the background of a chronic effort to correct sociopsychological disequilibrium. In the one, men pursue power; in the other, they flee anxiety". For Geertz the strain theory, as opposed to the interest theory, is more penetrating, less simplistic and more comprehensive.²⁵ The strain theory systematically portrays both the motivational background and the social structural context and their relations with one another, i.e. it adds another dimension - a conception of personality systems and their interpenetration with social systems.²⁶ The strain theory of ideology concentrates principally on "the chronic malintegration of society. No social arrangement is or can be completely successful in coping with the functional problems it inevitably faces. All are riddled with insoluble antinomies; between liberty and political order, stability and change, efficiency and humanity, precision and flexibility... There are discontinuities between norms in different sectors of the society - the economy, the polity, the family... Further, this friction or social strain appears on the level of conflicting desires, archaic sentiments, and improvised defences - as psychological strain. What is viewed collectively as structural inconsistency is felt individually as personal insecurity, for it is in the experience of the social actor that the imperfections of society and contradictions of

character meet and exacerbate one another".²⁷ Ideological thought can therefore be seen as one type of response to this anxiety. "It provides a 'symbolic outlet' for emotional disturbances generated by social disequilibrium. As one can assume that such disturbances are, at least in a general way, common to all or most occupants of a given role or social position, so ideological reactions to the disturbances will tend to be similar, a similarity only reinforced by the presumed commonalities in 'basic personality structure' among members of a particular culture, class or occupational category".²⁸ As we have remarked earlier in connection with the dynamics of the colonial situation, cultural crisis is the phenomenon of the transition. Ideology is therefore a response to both psychological and cultural strain. To quote Geertz once more, "it is a loss of orientation that most directly gives rise to ideological activity, an inability, for lack of usable models, to comprehend the universe of civic rights and responsibilities in which one finds oneself located. The development of a differentiated polity (or of a greater internal differentiation within such a polity) may and commonly does bring with it severe social dislocation and psychological tension. But it also brings with it conceptual confusion, as the established images of political order fade into irrelevance or are driven into disrepute... It is the confluence of socio-psychological strain and an absence of cultural resources by means of which to make (political, moral, or economic) sense of that strain, each exacerbating the other, that sets the stage for the rise of systematic (political, moral, economic) ideologies".²⁹ Whether ideological programmes correspond to social reality or whether their attempts to create a collective consequence are creditable, is altogether a separate question.³⁰

Furthermore the ideology of cultural crisis not only diagnoses but has a teleological function i.e. it acts, as we shall see in Sekyi's conservative ideology as a mechanism, however unavailing, for coping with, or arresting the disturbances that have generated it. It could have cathartic, morale-boosting, solidarity or advocacy functions. In Sekyi's case, as in the case of Edmund Burke, when a traditional political system based on "ancient opinions and rules of life" or on "the standards and ideas of our forefathers" (Sekyi) is threatened with disintegration or is actually dis-

integrating, under the impact of an external revolutionary ideology or an external and more developed political system, these hallowed opinions and standards come into question, and the search for systematic ideological formulations, or "counter process" as Sekyi calls it,³¹ begins. Ideology, in this case, seeks "to make an autonomous politics possible by providing the authoritative concepts that render it meaningful, the suasive images by means of which it can be sensibly grasped".³² This ideological thought-style must be distinguished from mere traditionalism which has little political intention: it is conservative, and is always dependent on a concrete set of circumstances and closely bound up with the existence and fate of concrete human groups. It is not "static" in the sense of mere tradition or "retour aux sources" or "back to nature", but is dynamic to the extent that it seeks to meet the contemporary crisis by reinvigorating the past, or, to use Geertz's felicitous expression, by "ideological retraditionalization". As Mannheim has put it, "Conservatism is just such an historically, dynamic objective structural configuration. People experience, and act, in a 'conservative' way (as distinct from a merely 'traditionalist' way) in so far, and only in so far, as they incorporate themselves into one of the phases of development of this objective mental structure (usually into the contemporary phase), and behave in terms of the structure, either by simply reproducing it in whole or in part, or by developing it further by adopting it to a particular concrete situation... Traditionalist behaviour is almost purely reactive. Conservative is meaningful, and moreover is meaningful in relation to circumstances which change from epoch to epoch".³³ To take only one example of this thought-style listen to Sekyi in his attempt to seek the most effective means of counteracting or modifying the socio-psychological crisis in African society created by the modernizing process of the colonial system:

"Now Society is not a chance medley of institutions built up according to plan and external to one another; it is in the strictest sense an organism, which, as such, is of such nature that anything done to any part of it affects every other part... He (i.e. the European) went on destroying all that the African held dear, and tried to substitute therefore modifications of what he himself correspondingly held dear... The unsettling of the African's life, like the disease it was, passed through all the recognised stages of disease and tainted the organism

of African society in such a manner that its decaying effects were felt in every part of it. Consider how civilization so-called has spread from the coast towns to the interior, displacing African institutions wherever it reaches; consider how our countries have been flooded with a new type of African which understands neither what European teaching has left it as a heritage of subservience nor what ancestral Africans had bequeathed as the legitimate inheritance of sons of the soil; consider how our young men are, in many more cases than there could formerly be, dissolute and incline more to the lighter side of European life; consider finally how our young women are growing shameless and becoming demoralised in every sense of the term. This kind of general decline would not go on for a very long time without causing someone or other among us to pause and reflect on the tendencies of the times. It is this pausing and reflecting which was bound sooner or later to follow our social deterioration that has set afoot the counter process in the organism which will ultimately cure it of the disease with which it has been afflicted and cause it to be careful in future of that which brought its suffering about...

"From this failure we may derive the following lesson to guide us... We cannot expect to get into the way of continuous development while we are following a system of education which depends on the borrowing of an alien physiology, psychology and sociology, a system of education which is based upon the eschewing by us of the social institutions of our ancestors on the ground merely that our ancestors were uncivilized... for just as a condition of health in the individual is health in the society in which he is born, so a condition of self-respect in the individual is reverence for the institutions of his social groups..."³⁴

In fact, though Sekyi talked about modern education, including technical education, he was really more concerned with strengthening traditional educational institutions, such as the family which, of course, is the principal agency in the political socialization process:

"It should therefore be part of any future scheme of education... to see that home influence, which has recently become relaxed through a mistaken appreciation of the English method of allowing children very much licence at home, is

restored to its former degree of force. This can be done through the systematic and judicious encouragement of wholesome African ideas and institutions on a liberal scale, in order to counter-act directly and effectively the unwise system of discouraging African institutions, ideals and standards without due regard to the origins thereof. This is most important for it is a grave error to assume that education commences and ends with the school... That idea may work well elsewhere, especially in England, where the Communist system of life, if it ever existed, has long been eradicated by the influence of pure individualistic notions... but I am definitely convinced that it will not work well among Africans who may have to modify in the light of present modern intercommunication and contact with the rest of the world, but can never really abandon their ingrained communism. The first essential then, in any scheme of education of our young must be that of home influence...'35

Sekyi also vehemently attacked modernization for altering the role of women and attributed growing immorality to "progress": "...all that I have said applies with equal force to the education of women. Here, too, we must respect the old-time division of the duties of men and women established by our wise ancestors, and the aim of any scheme for the education of women among us, who have from time immemorial been given equal rights in political as distinguished from domestic matters, should be to fit our women to share and supplement our views and aspirations and still remain women, and not to evolve the hideous and unsexed abortions which the so-called higher education of women in Europe has produced...'36 More systematic exposition of Sekyi's correlation of immorality and disrespect for traditional values with "civilization" will be found in his satirical play The Blinkards (1915), The Anglo-Fanti (1918), his socio-political essay The Meaning of the Expression 'Thinking in English' (1937), A Comparison of English, Gold Coast and Akan-Fanti Laws Relating to the Absolute Rights of Individuals (1937) where he deals at length with the legal and socio-political position of women in the Akan-Fanti social system, comparing it unfavourable with the position of women in Europe, and in his celebrated essays, Thoughts for the Reflective (1947). He was particularly concerned about the social disruption and sex-war caused by the missionary inspired Marriage Ordinance of 1884, and his play, The Blinkards is a deliberate attempt to satirise the pathetic and ridiculous social consequences of 'Holy

Matrimony'. Max Assimeng's interesting article³⁷ would seem to bear out the points I have raised about the ideology of cultural crisis, and Sekyi would fit into his third personality type, although I am inclined, on the basis of my study of Sekyi, to doubt whether Sekyi was merely a revivalist. I would consider him a revolutionary conservative.³⁸ I am in agreement with Assimeng when he argues: 'The appeal of cultural revivalists is often to the usual targets of conservative and reactionary armoury and defence: religion, sex, women and morality...

'Sex has always been a barometer for determining ideological and psychological conservatism. While cultural revivalists may be prepared to see some slight modifications in the structure of society, they certainly detest any attempt to modify attitudes to what they think is the first principle or datum of humanness. Resolutions about sex, as in the case of those on racial purity, are often the first indications of social and political right-wingism... It is believed, therefore, that the sacredness of womanhood has been corrupted by civilization. Certainly in those African societies where the matrilineal kinship system persists, this erosion of woman's sacredness appears, to the cultural revivalists, more insidious. The reaction is, of course, not only against sex equality: it is deadly against the increasing filiocentric orientation of modern culture and its corresponding diminution of gerontocratic authority'.³⁹

I disagree with Assimeng's view, however, that cultural revivalists are so concerned with anthropolatry - the worship of man - 'that the fact that man or society can be studied according to vigorous methods of science, does not have much appeal for them. They tend, consequently, to be suspicious of psychology and sociology'.⁴⁰ This observation, while generally correct as regards unreflective conservatism,⁴¹ does not hold for Sekyi. As a matter of fact Sekyi always believed in the socio-political role of Plato's philosopher-kings; he had always claimed that political leadership must be based on the alliance of the Natural Rulers⁴² and the educated conservative class of lawyers and doctors, particularly lawyers who like him had added philosophy and sociology, together with a study of their traditional political system to their intellectual armoury.⁴³ The difference between the revolutionary conservatism of Sekyi and the

revivalism of Chief Etak Eto (Ukare division, former Eastern Nigeria) whom Assimeng quotes as lamenting the diminishing powers of Ekpo and other secret societies under colonial rule, lies in the qualitative content and the dogmatic conception of thought of the former, and the negative and static intention of the latter. When faced with the bureaucratic nationalism of colonialism, the chief's response is to pit primitive conservatism, or mere revivalism, against the equalizing tendencies of colonial bureaucracy; the revolutionary conservative, on the other hand, seeks to solve political problems by re-traditionalizing a static system and giving it a dynamic quality. This leads him, as I shall show in Sections V and VI, "to a fundamental methodological conception, the distinction between 'idea' and 'concept', as well as their correlation, as in Sekyi's concept of the state - dynamic thinking in terms of antitheses. It is most instructive to compare Mannheim's analysis of Adam Muller's system, particularly Muller's Theory of Antithesis (1804) and his organic theory of the state, with Sekyi's theory of cultural relativism and his organismic conception of state and society.⁴⁴ The difference between revivalism or traditionalism and revolutionary conservatism is that the philosophy of the latter involves "a method of thought which endeavours to reach some degree of mobility while remaining within the static framework".⁴⁵ The next two sections in this paper deal with Sekyi's ideological response to the problem of tradition and modernity, persistence and change.

V.

Political theorists from Plato to Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau have in their search for the best form of political organization to guarantee stability, equality, democracy etc. (or, in the case of Plato, to arrest undesirable socio-political developments) taken as their starting point either a theory of the good life, or a theory of history, human nature, or a theory of the origin and development of society, the nature of the state, and definitions of law and sovereignty. Sekyi's theory was no exception. He was particularly suited by training to engage in extensive and systematic political theorising. After preparation at Mfantsipim School in Cape Coast, he entered University College, London ("a cosmopolitan College of the most cosmopolitan University", he called it) in 1910 and became the second African to

graduate in the honours school in philosophy with a second class; he also read Sociology and Law at King's College, and in 1918 graduated M.A. in Philosophy in the same University,⁴⁶ becoming a member of the Aristotelian Society the same year. Between 1913 and 1915 he returned to Cape Coast and for two years "did no manner of work" but applied himself to first hand study of traditional socio-political institutions, learning the laws and customs from the Akyiami, ridiculing the Anglo-Fantis⁴⁷ and urging in several newspaper articles, a return to the healthy traditions of the past. After this "lucid interval", as he himself described it in a long poem entitled The Sojourner he returned to London on the S.S. Falaba, which was torpedoed by a German U-boat and nearly cost him his life,⁴⁸ to complete his legal studies so as to give him an independent profession enabling him to criticise the colonial administration and to read for the M.A. in Philosophy. The latter he saw as the intellectual training which would provide the philosophic anvil for the hammer of his new social passion.

The ethical basis of Sekyi's political theory can be found in his "Morality and Nature", a paper he read to the Philosophical Society of King's College⁴⁹ and in his ethics dissertation for the M.A. Degree in Philosophy entitled The Relations Between the State and the Individual Considered in the Light of its Bearing on the Conception of Duty which he wrote in 1918. Three earlier articles, "The Essentials of Race Manhood", "Education in British West Africa" and "The Future of Subject Peoples"⁵⁰ must be read alongside the 1918 ms. It must be noted, however, that at the time he wrote (1914-1918) much of sociology and ethics was written, in one form or the other, within the context of evolutionary naturalism, in spite of Moore's counterblast in Principia Ethica (1902). Indeed Darwin and Spencer continued to exercise a powerful influence on sociology and ethical theory. And, of course, as Hofstadter⁵¹ has shown, Darwinism was used to justify almost everything, including imperialism and "progress" - two things Sekyi sought to evaluate as they impinged on African society. His own statement of evolutionary naturalism in "Morality and Nature" must therefore be seen as his ideological attack on those aspects of evolutionary theory which tended to justify the suppression of Walter Bagehot's "unfit men and beaten races" and the imposition on them, in the name of progress, of ethical and political canons

derived from supposedly scientific facts. This first phase of his ideology can be said to constitute his scientific interest in evolutionary theory. The second phase, contained in the 1918 ms. and in the 1915-1917 articles, is the socio-political extension of, or corollary to, the first, and constitutes his moral interest i.e. his criterion as to what constitutes the standard of morality, the moral law, moral consciousness in relation to obligation or duty, and what from the African standpoint constitutes optimum political development and the relevance of culture to political development.⁵²

Sekyi's naturalistic ethics begin with the subjective view that "one can never be moral without conforming strictly to Nature". In this subjective sense "natural" is taken to mean the original or essential, as opposed to what is acquired, artificial, conventional or accidental. This meaning may be seen, for example, in the Stoic's search for positive rules of life in "conformity to nature" - the Stoic definition of morality as right reason in agreement with nature, the latter being a permanent and unchanging standard or norm by which the worth of positive law could be judged.⁵³ Nature he defined as the strictly logical contradictory of the term rational agent namely the whole totality of things not rational in the sense in which we speak of "the human animal as rational", as well as all rational agents in the cosmos.⁵⁴ Sekyi then proceeded to criticise J.S. Mill and T.H. Huxley for positing a gladiatorial theory of Nature - "ruthless self-assertion", "thrusting aside or treading down all competitors" etc. and accused Mill and Huxley of applying moral predicates to Nature, judging natural processes according to an ethical standard of right and wrong. If Mill and Huxley accepted that rational agents and their morality are the products of the cosmic process, he argued, then they were inconsistent in branding Nature criminal and non-moral.⁵⁵ They had failed to prove "the relation of the ethical order of rational agents to the ultra-ethical order of the cosmic process".⁵⁶ Having derived morality from Nature Sekyi denied that scientific man, whatever his achievements, had any claims to formulate a theory of morals independent of Nature. He singled out L.T. Hobhouse, then a Professor at London University, as an exponent of the latter view: "Recently a much more elaborate and refined representation of this view has appeared, at least, so I take it, in Professor Hobhouse's Theory of Development. Professor Hobhouse makes

man the turning-point of evolution. All before man has tended to establish his supremacy through his nationality, and all after him will depend to a large extent upon his all powerful, or at any rate, much accomplishing reason".⁵⁷ If, he asked, man merely represented a stage in evolution, "is it fair that he should insist upon judging all things by his standard? In the world of men the standards established by individuals, or particular parties or sects are subjective relatively to the possible standard recognisable by all men... Even where man seems to be aiding, or improving Nature, he always merely seems: he can never definitely know whether his efforts really improve, or impair Nature's handiwork. It is, of course, impossible to expect men to refrain from expressing opinions as to the worth of things in all parts of the universe; but it is undoubtedly wise to demand that such opinions should never be taken as absolute".⁵⁸ European man, he concluded, had committed the naturalistic fallacy of deriving ought from is; it was logically impossible for him to derive a Deuteronomy of ethico-political development from the Ten Commandments of general evolution: "The fallacy seems to me ultimately to rest upon the confusion of that which represents a moment, or the sum of a series of moments, in a stream of development or evolution with the process of development or evolution itself. It is, of course, absurd to expect similarity of any kind between a process as such, and a product of that process as such".⁵⁹ Sekyi's central argument is that it is one thing to talk about evolution in a neutral scientific manner and quite another to talk as if evolution necessarily tends in a direction one ought to rate as good. Even if, as a matter of contingent fact, evolution does make for progress, and is therefore good, it would be quite wrong to attempt to equate the evolved with the good or the good with the evolved. As Bertrand Russell put it even more forcefully over fifty years ago, "If evolutionary ethics were sound, we ought to be entirely indifferent as to what the course of evolution may be, since whatever it is is thereby proved to be the best. Yet if it should turn out that the Negro or the China man was able to oust the European, we should cease to have any admiration for evolution; for as a matter of fact our preference of the European to the Negro is wholly independent of the European's greater prowess with the Maxim gun".⁶⁰

Sekyi therefore accepted the premise of evolutionary theory but differed in his interpretation of the end of human conduct. Evolutionary theory prescribed as the end "preservation",

or "development" or "the health of society". According to the theory, the first condition of development, and even of life, is correspondence between an organism and its environment. The Positivist August Comte had defined the social organism and the medium suitable to it as the two "fundamental correlative conditions of life", while to Herbert Spencer this conformity was absolutely necessary between "the vital functions of any organism and the conditions in which it is placed", and "the completeness of life will be proportionate to the completeness of the correspondence". Imperfect adaptation, therefore, as Sekyi argued in relation to African society, tended to impede or distort social development. As Spencer put it in his Social Statics, "all evil results from the non-Adaptation of constitution to condition" - rather like the way contemporary political scientists assess the inputs and outputs of systems in terms of the relation of structures to functions. Added to this was the notion of the "preservation of the species", which Sekyi interpreted to mean not only physical preservation, but the assertion of race individuality. In political terms Sekyi was stating that pre-colonial African political systems, some of which had evolved after centuries of war, amalgamation or absorption, were viable systems and needed no further dilution or experimentation with foreign ideas or institutions. Any such dilution, he argued, or any uncritical imitation of Europe by Africa would lead to denationalisation, cultural chaos and political decay. Imperialism, in his view, had led directly to this crisis in African society: "One often hears much talk about a world-empire. What that term implies it is very difficult to make out, although it is to me clear that the realisation of such a scheme, especially in this present age, must involve a considerable amount of force, and much distortion of things in general... The Negro race, for example, stands in a peculiarly critical position in the world today".⁶¹ This was so, he said, not only because of slavery, but because "through the somewhat natural tendency to take all that glitters as gold, we Negroes are too prone to imitate the self-styled salt of the earth. Besides, we lend too eager listening ears to the prating of those whose only chance of arriving at conclusions is by jumping at them, and whose most elaborate comparisons are very badly and hastily drawn. In fact, we run the risk of ceasing to think for ourselves, just as we have almost forgotten how to satisfy our own needs - perhaps by making ourselves acquire tastes that are unnecessary, and distinctly white..."⁶² Imperialism, for him, was not to be

confused with "civilization" if by "civilization" one meant recklessly forcing change on cultures which were beginning to disintegrate under alien influence, and then claiming that "civilization is too strong an incentive to development for savages". Development must be gradual, "step by step must we mount Nature's ladder, lest we fail to reach a rung too far ahead, lose our balance thereby, and break limbs, possibly necks".⁶³ Underdevelopment and social chaos were the result of Africa's slavish imitation of Europe; true development, he said, lay in intelligent adaptation of European science and technology: "It is wise, therefore, for each assisted nation to try to qualify, as a possible foster-mother of Arts and Sciences, whilst at the same time retaining enough sense to discriminate in the adoption of customs and national ways of thought, and in the disparagement of its own social and other achievements, no matter how modest".⁶⁴ In a similar vein Sekyi explained that there were two types of education in West Africa - education in the sense of indiscriminate Westernization and increasing contempt for tradition, and education in the sense of adaptation and preservation. As Sekyi put it "Our children must also be taught to think. They must study science and its application in the arts and crafts... They require first to be proud of themselves, of their nation, of their race. The foundation of stability is self-respect - individual, national, racial. We can never respect ourselves while we borrow our point of view and our method from another race..."⁶⁵

Implicit in all this politico-ethical theorising were Sekyi's fundamental concerns: "When and why does the canker work of degeneration enter into the social organism that once was healthy? This is really one question",⁶⁶ and how can this socio-political decay be arrested? The first Sekyi answered in terms of the effect of imperialism and culture contact on African society; in particular he sought to explain British imperialism in terms of "national character" and "group morality", and like Herbert Spencer attributed imperialism to the evolution of the military-industrial state. Thereafter he sought to explain how the values institutions and religious beliefs of the imperial state were transplanted, in whole or in part, to the colonies, and how these subsequently affected pre-colonial social systems. The articles just referred to, together with the bulk of his unpublished manuscripts, parti-

cularly The Relation Between the State and the Individual... (1918), The Parting of the Ways (1925), Our White Friends (1927?) and Thoughts for the Reflective (1947) constantly return to this theme; as the later manuscripts are more systematic and detailed studies of imperialism and culture contact, it would be tedious to quote extensively from them in this paper.⁶⁷ The solution to the second problem, that of political development and political decay, which he related to the functional (modernising) and dysfunctional (crisis) impact of colonialism, he saw in terms of political socialisation - how non-Western societies can meet the challenge of a changed and rapidly changing political world. Certainly he did not use the modern concept of "political socialization"; he thought in terms of education, by which he meant what the authors of that classic Japanese educational document, the Kokutai No Hongi meant, "Western" education reinforced by traditional education based on the family and associated social institutions to inculcate solidarity, loyalty to traditional political authority, and acceptance of the organic conception of society.⁶⁸ This theory Sekyi developed first abstractly in The Relation Between the Individual and the State Considered in the Light of its Bearing on the Conception of Duty in his ethics dissertation in 1918. Perusal of that document without a knowledge of other Sekyi manuscripts would lead one to think it was merely an exercise in political theory for the purposes of an examination. Fortunately his papers contain the original draft of the dissertation, the flesh and blood, so to speak, of this seemingly abstract document. The original draft with identical title, however, includes several items which do not appear in the final draft. The chapter headings absent in the final draft, appear as "1. Conception of Duty before foundation of State. 2. Conception of Duty after foundation of State. 3. The State as opposed to Ethical Development..." There follows a sub-heading entitled "The Social System of the Peoples of the Gold Coast", and the rest of the draft is a detailed description of the Akan-Fanti political system - an actuality which the young candidate for the London M.A. in Philosophy had to describe in highly abstract and speculative terms in 1918. As Magnus Sampson, author of Gold Coast Men of Affairs later explained, the 1918 manuscript is a direct reflection of Sekyi's conservative nationalism: "Mr. Sekyi was a keen exponent of native institutions and as a conservative

he had strong belief in Chiefship as an institution to be cherished and preserved as the background and culture of this country... His whole outlook could be judged by the subject selected for his M.A. degree of the University of London...⁶⁹ Sekyi's concept of political socialisation was also developed in later manuscripts - The Parting of the Ways, Thoughts for the Reflective (where he clashed with Danquah over the latter's advocacy of the use of traditional institutions for colonial administrative purposes in his Epistle to the Youngmen of Akyem Abuakwa), The Meaning of the Expression "Thinking in English"; A Comparison of English, Gold Coast and Akan-Fanti Laws Relating to the Absolute Rights of the Individual, in The Study of Our Institutions and in several articles in the Gold Coast Press, notably his 1952 article in The Gold Coast Observer, November 10 1950, reprinted, interestingly enough in the Daily Graphic (Accra), February 1969. We must deal first with Sekyi's theory of political development and political decay and the relation of culture to progress before we conclude with a textual analysis of his theory of political process in the Akan-Fanti system.

VI.

Modernization and Culture: Science, technology and the modern nation state have come to be identified with 'world culture', 'progress' and 'civilisation'. Similarly, development, modernization and even 'democracy', said to characterise this historical development, have come to attain the status of evolutionary universals and cultural absolutes.⁷⁰ It is felt or assumed that the advanced members of this world culture are models worthy of emulation by underdeveloped areas. Indeed these models are frequently accepted, although the latter are not entirely unaware of the conflict between socio-cultural distinctiveness on the one hand, and modernization through the adoption of 'world culture' on the other. Yet, even this fear; that diffusion of scientific world culture might erode indigenous cultures in non-Western societies, tends to be ignored by the identification of 'world culture' with purely 'material' elements (science, technology, administration etc.) incapable of disrupting the 'spiritual' foundations of the underdeveloped society. Underlying this desire to fuse traditional cultures with the new goals of development

i.e. technological and material progress, is a great deal of confusion about what is to be consolidated and what negated, how much adaptation is necessary and how this fusion should be made. Instead of development, this has led to what Fred Riggs in his theory of prismatic society has called disequilibrium or negative development, and frustration. As Lucian Pye has correctly observed, "the seemingly easy formula of the distinction between 'technology' and 'culture' cannot satisfactorily resolve the profound problems of identity which are in fact its origins".⁷¹ In general, as observers such as Dumont have noted there is chaos, frustration and bewilderment instead of the new socio-political order it was hoped the fusion of modern science, technology and managerial techniques with indigenous cultures would bring about. As Fred Riggs has demonstrated⁷² the basis of this frustration and deadlock lies in a misconception of tradition and the falseness of the tradition/modernity dichotomy i.e. the naïve belief that the "spiritual" elements of culture are easily separable from the "material". As we shall discuss Sekyi's notion of the role of tradition in the socialization process in another section of this paper, let us first examine his treatment of the civilization-culture dichotomy i.e. the relationship between persistence and change. According to the distinction between "civilization" and "culture", civilization is identified with "improvement in Nature", with man's growing mastery over natural forces, while culture is identified with man's spiritual development which comprises moral, intellectual and artistic values. Sekyi's analysis of this distinction, similar to Alfred Weber's in Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie, 1935,⁷³ seems to accord with the culture diffusion theory expressed by some leaders of transitional societies. Like Alfred Weber, Sekyi distinguished between the social process, the civilization process and the culture process. By "social process" Sekyi had in mind the recurrence of certain societal sequences among all societies, for example the development of the pre-political group into family and kinship organizations, into the political community and the state. This Sekyi developed in detail in The Relation Between the State and the Individual (1918), showing the evolution of law and the state as the result of increased stratification. The state he describes as the result of growing artificiality, the creation of new economic and political classes, the development from customary law to law as command of the sovereign, and the sub-

sequent distinction between state and society and the inherent conflict of duties in that situation.⁷⁴ The "civilization process" consists in the accumulation of technical knowledge to exploit natural resources. This Sekyi equated with what he called "the progressive aggressiveness of European industry", with imperialism, and with European "perversion". Like Alfred Weber, Sekyi believed that such scientific knowledge was indeed transferable, but the "culture process" was not. Anticipating Weber he argued that culture was unique and incommunicable, bound to its real foundation, to its living carriers, and unlike science, incapable of universal validity. The causal laws of science, therefore, had no applicability to the realm of culture, for the latter did not follow any unilinear progression but defied the determinism of science and technology.

In a lengthy criticism of Duse Mohamed Ali's argument expressed in The African Times and Orient Review that the only way Africa could survive and develop was to repeat the historical experience of Europe⁷⁵ he stated: "On the one hand we have the progressive aggressiveness of European industry, and on the other hand we have the complacent decadence of the subject peoples, who believe that by imitating Europe they will raise their respective nations to a level of power, or of efficiency, similar to, if not the same as, that of Europe. The subject peoples of these days pride themselves on their efforts to acquire external qualities which they believe to be essential. What most appeals to them are the morbid excrescences that have grown out of the over-luxurious civilisation of Europe and contribute very largely towards the unhealthiness of the appearance of that overlauded culture... Hence in the scheme of intellectual and industrial training, for example, which Europe has established in her own home, any evil is universal in its effects... Now, the fault with those in Africa and elsewhere who are at present striving might and main to emulate Europe is that they are copying the habits of a diseased state of society. Herein lies the reason for the hankering after learned professions, which, since it is excessive, is showing itself to be unpropitious for the nations whose children are thus qualifying themselves... this menace will characterise the efforts made by the sons of Africa and other non-European parts of the world to attain proficiency in any other department of European enterprise... all these, whom the editor considers likely to help us to 'survive the 'develop-

ment" schemes that are very much in evidence now, will prove just as unsatisfactory as those who have secured the learned professions in acquiring the 'wealth' that, it is thought, will enable us to 'survive'; because the trouble is not the remunerativeness or otherwise... or professions and other forms of industry, but rather the perverted state of the minds and aspirations of those who learn the science, arts and crafts of Europe. This perversion was wrought by Europe, and cannot but be continued and intensified by persistence in following the lines laid by Europe in intellectual and industrial development. The evil is European civilisation, which consistently with its disruptive character, extends by denationalising peoples. Nationality is the backbone of the social organism as such; when it is destroyed nothing can support that organism: it must collapse in the manner natural to organisms - it must die and decay".⁷⁶

Sekyi did not deny that material development or modernization was a good thing: on the contrary no society could survive without it. But there was a difference, he said, between civilization and progress. There was such a thing as inner development, the actualisation of the particular, without which all attempts at 'catching up' would lead to frustration and disintegration: "Let us not induce ourselves to think and believe that the only way to 'survive' Europe's aggression is by organising on European (including American) lines... If we are to formulate any really sound and practicable scheme for our future, let us set before us, and try to understand, the ideal of living as men, and not seek the compromise of surviving as persecuted persons". To these trenchant criticisms of the theology of technology and development, Duse Mohamed Ali rejoined: "Mr. Kobina Sekyi's contributions are always interesting, and nonetheless so from their being calculated to provoke dissent", and invited readers to discuss the problems of development, suggesting that Sekyi "having stated what should not be done, should go on and inform us what he believes that we must do to be saved".⁷⁷

Sekyi continued his attack with a theory of cultural relativity and plurality of values to counter that universalism which views every variant as a deviant, and as a corrective to the tendency to underrate the problematic tension that characterises the relation between diverse human goals. Indeed

it can be argued that his emphasis on the immanent distinctiveness, even uniqueness, of socio-cultural entities have a direct bearing on problems of modernization and nation-building, for he was stressing a particular paradigm of development, that of internal development or growth. He did not deny the functional and dysfunctional aspects of external development; but for himself the essence of development was fulfillment, the realisation of that which is latent or germinal. This is what Nyerere's Ujamaa and Kaunda's Humanism are about. The burden of his argument is that the desire to "catch up" is often frustrated because of inadequate recognition of the problems involved in cultural diffusion, particularly the problem of reconciling external with indigenous cultures, and because of a reluctance to see political development as a problem sui generis related to, but different from, economic development.⁷⁸ As we have shown in Section V of this paper Sekyi had already argued the thesis of cultural relativism in "Morality and Nature" (1915). In an earlier article he had stated: "It is, I think, a very remarkable and very pregnant fact that whereas the Arts and Sciences have steadily grown from very small beginnings into mammoth stores of learning, yet the advance of social development is represented by a line that rises and wavers and flounders. Whilst with the Arts and Sciences even different nations, to say nothing of successive generations within each nation, can take up the thread where it was dropped, and carry it along much further, in the matter of the growth of societies, such continuation of, and building upon, previous acquisitions can only be effected by the generations that follow one another in each nation. If we take the progress of any of the nations of the past, we shall find that each starts from being primitive (or mythical, which is quite as primitive), reaches the barbarous state, advances thence to civilisation according to the standard mainly of economic culture, then enters upon the stages of senile decay... What is it that constitutes the marked difference between intellectual and social advance? This is a point worth labouring, since it is important. Unfortunately I can only briefly deal with it here. Obviously social advancement need not depend upon intellectual development; for it is evident that the relation must be the other way about: intellectual advance is clearly a product of society. Of course, there is such a thing as reciprocal influence... Yet it is undeniable that no one, by merely taking thought [i.e. borrowing science and technology]

can add one cubit to his stature... Hence, the circumstance that a certain nation has been able to take up some art or science, and has developed it till it has become absolutely wonderful, is no criterion of the genius of that nation...⁷⁹ Later he went on to analyse how the excessive individualism, social inequity and "degeneration" which he said characterised capitalist-imperialist societies had come, through colonialism, to erode non-European societies. The most dangerous for these influences, he said, was imperial commerce which had disrupted the organic conception of African society. For Sekyi 'man is capable of his utmost only when he lives in society: the individual as such is impossible except as a freak. Society is an organism of which the so-called individual members are so vitally connected, the one with the other, that to treat them as separate entities is to destroy... the integrity of that organism. The civilisation of the West is based on commerce or trade; and from this it follows that those who desire to set up such a civilisation must develop commerce or trade along Western lines... But since commerce depends on the acquisition of the most by the expenditure of the least, it stands upon a principle that is... inequitable. It will be seen that if in any social group commerce or trade is established, the latter necessarily involves the juxtaposition of excess and deficiency, of wealth and poverty in that social group...'⁸⁰ Imperial commerce creates the change from an essentially communistic society to one of individualism, inequality and alienation.⁸¹ Sekyi's conclusion was that this development was incompatible with the social ideals and immanent validity of traditional African systems. His organic cosmology and sociology emphasised diversity - that both nature and society consisted of inter-related and interacting processes each of which pertained to the whole in its most distinct individuality.⁸² While diversity united by creating the conditions of reciprocal activity, the existence of a plurality of values implied a certain degree of incompatibility. Conflict and contradiction, therefore, were implicit in the notion of diversity, and cannot be divorced from social and political development. Although Sekyi was particularly concerned with the problem of socio-political cohesion i.e. with eliciting the integrative elements of a particular socio-political culture such as Akan-Fanti state system, he recognized that diverse cultures exist side by side within the same nation⁸³ owing to differences in occupation, education etc.

His fear, as we shall see when we come to consider his views on political socialization (particularly in The Parting of the Ways and in Thoughts for the Reflective) was that the uncontrolled impact of Western economic activity and religious beliefs would create an imbalance by accentuating this stratification and eroding social cohesion.⁸⁴ This led Sekyi to adopt some rather utopian and extreme solutions such as economic autarky, barter (because like Blyden he held the rather romantic view that the African was basically a simple agriculturist who was in danger of being corrupted by the imperial cash nexus) and some form of temporary international apartheid.⁸⁵ His objective, however, was to arrest internal disequilibrium and instability as well as to minimise the impact of external influences after which one could safely talk about internationalism: "This, then, is the position to which I have been trying to lead. The unity which our worldly-wise advisers are urging us to effect will be possible only if we adopt the absolutely anti-social methods of Europe; for there are natural limits set to the intercourse, to say nothing of the union, of peoples who have developed for a long time in widely separated parts of the globe. Africans, Asiatics, Europeans, Americans, each group of peoples has its natural and normal environment, and within each large group there are smaller groups with distinct characteristics, and therefore different modes of life. Let each social group develop along the lines marked out for them by their unwesternised and therefore undemoralised ancestors, accepting from the West only such institutions as can be adapted to, and not such as cannot but alter, their national life... If any group by any chance vitally needs any of the products, natural or artificial, of any other group, the transactions should be regulated according to the principles of barter. Abolish group-morality altogether..."⁸⁶ The only way the African could solve the dilemmas of development, said Sekyi, was to anchor himself firmly in his traditions: "Let him be proud of his African soul, his black soul... Let him seek always to remain African, for that which makes him African, that which for convenience I will call Africanity, always has been, and always will be, the leaven with which the rude meal of humanity can be leavened."⁸⁷ Inner development, the balanced relationship of social institutions to individuals, he said, was a necessary prerequisite to modernization, otherwise all development would end in deadlock and disintegration. As he himself put it, "the foundation of stability is self-respect - individual, national, racial... If the other races

develop along these lines in the end there is sure to be a spontaneous humanity. There are higher unities than that: each belongs to its own time".⁸⁸

Of special interest to political scientists is Sekyi's argument that during the modernization process, whether colonial or post-independence, segmental cultures can develop at different rates and that this may result in disequilibrium capable of disintegrating a developing society. This view is reinforced by Sekyi's earlier criticism of unilinear development theory. His argument is relevant in the context of contemporary theories of modernization. It is true that not many contemporary development theorists have the old Darwinian notion of unilinear progress; yet some eminent social scientists theorize about political development as if they were correlating progress, say, in the consumption of T.V. sets, cars, telephones etc. with the achievement of a democratic system.⁸⁹ To employ Riggsian terminology, horizontal interaction, i.e. the conflict between interacting cultures and existing forms of development, leads to the emergence of prismatic society in which indigenous structures and behaviour patterns are juxtaposed with Western rational/legal socio-economic concepts and generally lead to a dysfunctional situation. For Sekyi, it was neither cultural divergence nor "progress" that was decisive for the social and political integration of a collectivity, but the balanced relationship of all its constituent parts. When certain forms of culture differ radically from other forms, particularly when "techniques" and "values" diverged, alienation ("denationalisation", "demoralisation" Sekyi would say) resulted. To borrow a phrase from Geertz, "retraditionalisation" and adaptation were the keys to the problem of breakdown.⁹⁰

VII.

Culture and Process: The origin and nature of the state has been the pre-occupation of political theorists from the most diverse backgrounds. Implicit in their theories is a qualitative distinction between the structure of primitive society and modern society, as well as a realisation of the contradictions involved in the transition from kinship or pre-political groupings to civil or political society. The

importance of this pre-occupation with the nature of the state in political theory is not without its ideological significance: "This momentous transition... this social and cultural trauma... has led to a passionate, and ancient, debate about the merits of primitive existence as opposed to civilization, to the state. Indeed, the debate has frequently been waged in utopian terms; some utopias face backwards to a sometimes fantastic image of the primitive, others face forward to the complete triumph of the rational state".⁹¹

We have already noted Sekyi's criticism of evolutionary theory, his cultural relativism and the social and ethical conclusions he reached, particularly his organic theory of society. His notion of what constitutes the political system and its processes, therefore, follows logically from his philosophy: "The white thinker on the theory of the state has hitherto based himself on the ground that the state can be created only by force, so that in the last resort force or war, or the prospect of force or war, is the only means to the end of creating and maintaining a state. On the other hand, when there are enough African thinkers to impress the world with their essentially African theory of the state, it will be found that they are seeking to get the world to accept the view that there is another kind of state, so-called patriarchal, which is not based on, or kept by, force in the artificial shape of war, and such states can be found to be the units in confederations such as the groups of small states in the Gold Coast, which in some cases, are based on mutual understanding, and in a few others, as in the old Ashanti state and the old Akwamu state, were based on force only as to the wider external sphere of the dominion of the central state".⁹² It may be noted in passing that S.R.B. Attoh-Ahuma had made a similar protest as early as 1911 when he asserted "We have a nation, and what is more, we have a Past... We own a Political Constitution, a concentric system of government, of one Race, born and bred upon our own soil". And as early as 1915 some young Gold Coast nationalists, including Sekyi, members of the Research Association, had passed a resolution to the effect that national respect and self-confidence could only be restored by observing native custom alone, and it was essential to reconstruct on paper the traditional state system "before the disintegrating foreign

element intruded, or insinuated itself, into it".⁹³ Lack of space prevents me from summarising in detail Sekyi's account of the origins of law and society in his Relation Between the State and the Individual... (1918). His account, however, is very similar to that found in classical political theory, but here the similarity ends; thereafter we detect echoes of Rousseau and Herder. Like Rousseau, Sekyi argued that before the advent of the rational state, political obligation was a simple matter as it was based on the moral law sanctioned by custom. Increased stratification and complexity led to the concept of law as command of the sovereign and to a conflict of the reactions constituting duty: "The pre-political group was ruled by morality and custom. Duty was in every case reducible in the last resort to instinct. Under the newly-formed state the reactions constituting duty acquired an enlarged sphere... Now the state is ruled by the will of the sovereign: the state is ruled by law, which henceforth, instead of supplementing custom and morality, openly opposes them. The maxim applicable to the relation of the sovereign, as the sole representative of the state, to the other members of the state, is now not so much 'Nobelsse oblige' as 'The King can do no wrong'..."⁹⁴ Like Rousseau⁹⁵ Sekyi believed that the rational state was the result of growing artificiality and was incompatible with individual moral autonomy and communal virtues. Like Rousseau, too, he believed in the inseparability of individual and social existence and in the absence of conflict between duty and interest. Both men believed that the more highly organised political society becomes, the more artificiality increases, to the extent that obedience to law now becomes a matter of rational calculation, not natural feeling. Like Rousseau Sekyi stressed "ideas most in accordance with nature", the importance of the family and of the "paterfamilias" as the basic political unit, an organic conception of society, and the state as a moral being. Sekyi's view had always been that the European notion of law and the nation-state was incompatible with the African idea of morality and social development.

"Since the development of the state means the development of artificiality, if it is conceived as involving the progress of man, the object of that progress must be to make him less and less a man... to make him entirely artificial...

Clearly the development of the state cannot be rightly conceived as involving the progress of man. If it involves the progress of anything at all, it is the progress of that class of persons created by law as distinct from morality, by the state in its later development... For the growing artificiality, which is sometimes referred to by those who do not see far enough as an 'improvement in Nature' is in reality nothing other than the supplementation of Nature made defective through human shortsightedness... Man can be said to develop only when at each stage he becomes more and more a man, when... both physically and socially he improves in humanity, becomes more mature and sound physically and morally".⁹⁶ For Sekyi legality alone was not the basis of legitimacy, and he would no doubt have rejected Dean Pound's humorous description of modern man's notion of the State - "Because of thy law I am content with thee, O State".⁹⁷ For him the very existence of the rational state based on "efficacy" and positive law alone "would result in the gradual diminution and ultimate elimination of the self-conscious purposiveness that would seem to be essential to what is known as morality".⁹⁸ Again it is instructive to compare Sekyi's organic theory of society based on the principle of social solidarity, interdependence of rule and ruled, the notion of the Chief or King as limited constitutional monarch, and his notion of customary law as common consciousness (rechtsüberzeugung) with Leon Duguit's similar theory wherein customary law is deemed morally superior to statute law. As a leading African jurist has observed "Duguit readily admits that customary law is law. Indeed, his sociological evaluation of human groupings as well as his theory of government are concepts which all the main types of African societies can claim for their very own. The king or chief and his council of elders are looked upon only as constitutional functionaries who must govern in strict accordance with the traditional norms of political and social behaviour. The chief is father of his people who, in their turn, are expected to maintain the social equilibrium by performing their civic duties. A recalcitrant and lawless chief, like any other member of the community, was in former days eliminated, sometimes by banishment, sometimes by being put to death. No one, not even the king or chief, was allowed to disturb the social solidarity of the group".⁹⁹ In the light of this argument it is easy to see how Sekyi came to see the existence of the colonial semi-state as incompatible with the balanced social

and political development of pre-colonial political systems - morally, politically, economically and legally, he said, the colonial system had resulted in maldevelopment and general crisis, due to the inability of the self-appointed custodians of civilisation to understand non-European concepts of law, sovereignty, individual rights etc. What follows is therefore a summary of Sekyi's restatement of the Akan-Fanti political system, particularly the concept of sovereignty.

For Sekyi, as for Herder, politics is not confined to the "state", but is an activity; the polity was merely an extension of the extended family or clan; "family" and "state" are therefore not differentiated in kind but only in degree. The Fanti designation for the family, or more properly, the clan is ebusua, and by family is meant "any distinguishable group of individuals descended from one common ancestress and having a recognised head"; such a group is called adanmba or "inmates of the house", similar to the Roman conception of the agnatic family as distinguished from the narrower conception of the cognatic family.¹⁰⁰ The Akan-Fanti family is not constituted when a man marries, as the wife and the children remain in the wife's family, although the children have rights in the father's family which include duties towards the father and his family. There is no conception of legal majority, so that the individual still remains in the family. Since the socio-political unit is the family, the individual is deemed insufficient in customary law in all important cases, especially in matters affecting his liberty as a subject. Each family in turn, as a unit in the socio-political group, is correspondingly bound to consider the existence of the other families with which it constitutes the tribe or state, since outside the family proper is the tribal family claiming descent from one ancestor, and since the head of each political group is regarded as the head of a family whose members are families, not individuals.¹⁰¹ The head of each family group is elected from the eligible male members of the family, but the person elected must possess qualities such as prudence, frugality etc. When elected he is expected to respect and carry out the will of the elders of the family. After the head are the elders, who because of age, experience, ability or wealth, are qualified to be advisers and directors of the policy of the family head. Following the elders are the less prominent adults, then the children or youngest members of the family. In the old days,

slaves took their position as members of the family, according to age and ability.

Among the various political groups, each higher group is wider than each lower group, and includes two or more of the lower groups, of which the heads are either heads of families or family chiefs or political chiefs. The highest group is the state, of which the head is the King or Ohin. The head of a political group is not necessarily also the head of a family, and vice versa. Each of these political groups is constructed on exactly the same lines as the family group, the difference being that the more complex in detail the higher group, the more complicated the relations of its component parts to one another;¹⁰³ but constitutionally, the political groups are only family groups writ large. Each group has its council, though the council of the political group is more important than that of a mere family council, but the functions are the same, and the position of the head of a family is the same as that of a political chief or a king divested of a good deal of the ceremonial that attaches to kingly office. One important difference, however, is that members of the family council of the head of each political group are not also members of the political councils of such political heads. Membership of the latter councils is either official, as in the case of sub-chiefs under the head of the political group, or unofficial, as in the case of members of the public nominated by the political head and his advisers or councillors. Under the constitution of the Akan-Fanti, each member of a political group forms part of the wider political group, and this applies even among friendly states between which exists an unwritten body of interstate customary law. (It would be interesting to see what modern international lawyers will say about this African diplomatic practice). Superimposed on all this is the tribal family (or clan) or ebusua, which based on descent from one of the traditional twelve clans, unites the various families, even in hostile states. Beyond the family council, there is public opinion, and in certain cases, the council of the King or Ohin, which no amount of family influence can sway.

The next unit above the family is the village, with its head, who is known as the odzikuro (odsi = he holds; kuro = town or village). He is the head of a family as well as the

village head. His family council selects out of its members and with the approval of the people, the successor of the odzikuro. The odzikuro, however, has a special village council, composed of important men of the village.

The unit above the village is the town with its head, known as the ohin (sometimes the occupant is referred to as Damfu, although there is some doubt about this). The ohin is head of a wider group, the village group, and has a number of odzikuro under him, and his official council is a powerful body. He is a political rather than a social functionary, and his dignity is that of a king. He administers his district with the assistance of his council and other state officials. He rules quandiu bene se gesserit otherwise he is destooled or deposed after he has been ineffectually warned. The town itself is divided into neighbourhoods belonging to the members of the various military units known as the asafu.¹⁰⁴ Each body of asafu is controlled by asafunhifu or captains who are under a safuhin or head-captain. The whole military organisation is under the control of the Tufuhin, the master of Arms or commander of all the military units of a town or district. The Tufuhin, who is next to the ohin, is the most important person in the town. The asafu also constitute the municipal organisation of the town, since they undertake all work of the nature of public works.¹⁰⁵

When the town is the capital of a state or Oman, its head is an Omanhin, who is really the first of the ahinfu of the state who are short of his equals, but he has been chosen paramount, or has made himself paramount by conquest. Omanhin must be distinguished from Ohin who may be simply the ruler of a single town. The foregoing sketch of the Akan-Fanti polity must be compared with Sekyi's more theoretical account in Thoughts for the Reflective (1947) where he makes use of Sarbah's Fanti National Constitution, Chapter 1: "Origin and Government of Akan Communities", particularly Sekyi's remarks on the military states of Denkyira and Ashanti, and his discussion of the various forms of federalism and republicanism and elective monarchical systems within such states.¹⁰⁶

The traditional concept of kingship did not accord with the European and Asiatic view of kings as absolute masters and arbiters over the lives and properties of their subjects. The Akan-Fanti conception was that the king was the highest public servant in the state (Oman). A king is an elected

constitutional functionary, not a legislator, who must govern in accordance with customary law. His relation to his 'subjects' was like that of a father to his children or grandchildren. In fact there is no corresponding word in Akan-Fanti usage to "subject". The people are sovereign, and the king is himself a "subject". Hence the use of the term nana or mba for both king and "subjects".

"In English law the King is not a subject, neither is he the sovereign: for the Parliament is sovereign. In our law the ruler is himself the subject because the people are sovereign; for the Oman, that is, the Council of the state is, in the last resort, subject to the Asafu or Companies. There is in that Council a perpetual opposition: on the one side is the Ohin (now called Omanhin), the head of the state with the groups that go with him, that is, his family and his Gyasi, not excluding the Ankobia or bodyguard, and on the other side is the ruler who holds the foot or the state, with the groups that go with him, that is the Oman proper. Hence the formula which is in use in Elmina state: Ehin no ni man.¹⁰⁷ The ruler is merely a representative of the sovereignty of the group, rather than the sovereign of the group: "It is a matter of convenience that there should be a single representative of the whole state and that such a representative, as the representative of the ruling power, should be higher in rank than the representatives of all the sub-divisions of the sovereignty."¹⁰⁸ Contrasting the positions of king and subject in England and the Gold Coast, Sekyi noted "one of the greatest legal doctrines among us is the doctrine that the ruler is the ancestor (grand relative) of the ruled or subject. The subject is therefore in our constitutional law, a relative of the ruler. This mutual relationship determines the attitude of the ruler to the subject and that of the subject to the ruler. It is clear that the English usage of the term 'subject', which erects the ruler into an autocrat and the subject into a serf, belongs to the days before the emancipation of the serf and the eradication of villeinage..."¹⁰⁹ There was indeed a traditional distinction between mpenyinfu and mbrentsie i.e. between those who were members of Oman or State Council and those who were not, but this did not correspond to the European distinction between commoners and peers. "Here the King is himself a subject of the State, a servant of the State who is created and can be deposed by the State without recourse to extra-

ordinary or revolutionary acts".¹¹⁰ The Fanti proverb Oman ye nsu na ehin ihin nyi adwin a edam, meaning "A State is, or is comparable to, a body of water, and the King is the fish (or gem) in it", is an apt illustration of the legal position of the king.¹¹¹ Moreover the king or chief is bound by his oath of office - the Ntamkesi - during his occupancy of the stool or throne. Paramountcy, Sekyi described as an "indefinable attribute of rulership", after noting that there was a difference between the paramountcy of the stool and paramountcy of the stool in relation to land. Blackstone's chapter on English tenures in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, he argued, did not apply to the Akan-Fanti doctrine of the king's paramountcy over land. Quoting Sarbah's Fanti National Constitution, Sekyi noted that whereas in the Fanti system allegiance is personal, it was both personal and territorial in Ashanti and that a ruler was not necessarily the owner of any land in his jurisdiction. It was unusual for the principal stool in a state to own all the land, for the ordinary state of affairs was one in which every family had its own land. Even in relation to common land, it could not be argued that they were owned by the stool, "for it is the people who own such lands, and the principal stool or its occupant is the trustee of such lands for the people..."¹¹²

On the question of sovereignty in the traditional political system Sekyi's view was that "our ideas of a State and of sovereignty differ fundamentally from those of people whose institutions are based on the Feudal system, and depend on loyalty to an individual, namely, a chief or a ruler, instead of being based, as our institutions are, on loyalty to the people as a whole".¹¹³ He was obliged to re-state the African conception of the legal status of the individual and as well as the traditional concept of sovereignty and representative government in reply to the theories of Blackstone and of Professors Dicey and Holland: "The interesting thing to observe is that... since every man thinks his own geese are swans, or, as we say, obi nfa ni nsa benkum nkyire n'egya fie kwan, 'no one points out the way to his father's house with his left hand', some English authorities, especially Professor Dicey, incline to the view that it is only under the English Constitution that the liberty of the subject and his other rights are secured to the fullest extent. It seems to me that this view is not correct..."¹¹⁴ For Sekyi the stool, i.e. all the principal stools originating from the

Golden Stool of Ashanti, symbolised not only Akan-Fanti sovereignty, but the living, unwritten constitution, the "plastic political theory"¹¹⁵ and personality of the Akan-Fanti state system. Indeed the only other visible expression of sovereignty and nationhood with which he could meaningfully compare the stool was the Holy Crown of St. Stephen of Hungary.

'Thinking 'in English' on the subject of modes of government would lead the loyal among us to believe that representative government was invented by the English. I wonder whether any of those who fondly call England "the Mother of Parliaments" has read about the Hungarian constitution and its institution of the Holy Crown of Hungary. I wonder if any of our people who have read of that interesting European institution can see in how many respects it is like our institution of the stool, which makes its occupant sacred to such an extent that his individuality is so completely merged in that of his predecessors that he can call "any of their acts his own, and any of their children his children, any offence against any of his official servitors from high grade ones like Akyiami and the Gyasihin to low grade ones like Ahinkwafu and Abrafu and Asen, is an offence against the sacredness or majesty of the stool, being punishable as such".¹¹⁶

The religious, legal and political significance of the stool, Sekyi argued, could be clearly understood when compared to Professor Akos de Timon's account of the Holy Crown of Hungary.¹¹⁷ The Hungarian nation regards the Crown which is the Crown of St. Stephen, as holy... 'National alliance formed the basis of the primitive Hungarian State, which was built up on the union of the tribes. A public and not a private alliance, it concerned itself not with individual will or with any private treaty, but existed as a necessity - by virtue of a higher law binding on the whole members of the nation. We must, therefore, in accordance with modern theories, pronounce the primitive Hungarian State to have been a legally constituted body... The primitive Hungarian State possessed in a decidedly superior form a legal public character, unlike the feudal states of the Middle Ages, whose feudal basis bound the individual in a relationship, not to the whole community, but to a person more powerful than himself... On the national alliance rested the national authority, or, as we should term it today, the highest executive power. It was represented by the people politically organised, i.e. the nation. The sovereignty was therefore the sovereignty of the people... The strong public

spirit and collectivist ideas... prevented the feudal system, based upon distinctly individualistic principles, from taking the place of the common union...

"The King was kept in check in a very important way by material limitations of his power... The conception of the State as a living organism, as a personality is the fundamental principle of modern statecraft. The mediaeval conception overlooked this, and especially the idea of the State in the abstract.

"The Hungarian nation saw the State embodied as an organic whole in the Holy Crown, in the interests of organised society. They regarded the Holy Crown as a mark and symbol of the sovereignty of Hungary, expressing the international independence of the Hungarian nation, even though to outside States it seemed in opposition to sovereignty. On the other hand, it personified it as the custodian of the common power, having its roots in the people..."

Sekyi attached great importance to the socio-political significance of the worship of the spirit of ancestors, especially of dead Chiefs, wrongly described as "ancestor worship". This practice, together with the annual assembly at the great Stool Festival in each state, was basically religious in form, but facilitated political stability and continuity, as well as legitimized political authority in a symbolic act of renewal and of transgenerational value transmission: "I am of the opinion that, according to the primitive idea, the new chief was believed to inherit not only the office, but also the personality of his predecessors. The chief is placed upon the stool which is the emblem of his office and in course of time he is identified with it, his spirit being believed to continue to dwell in it after his death, and so sacrifices are made at stated times to the stool and its immanent spirit. On his installation the spirit embodied in the stool enters into the new chief who thus continues the personality of his predecessor by a kind of apostolic succession".¹¹⁸ He illustrated this notion of authority transmission and legitimation by quoting from a letter from the proceedings in an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case between ex-Omanhene Ofori Kuma II and others v. Omanhene Yao Buafu IV, addressed to the District Commissioner of Mampong

by the Councillors of the Paramount Stool of Akwapim stating, inter alia, that "The Stool is our god which we worship in every six weeks regularly... The Stool we worship is the spirit of an Omanhene". To this, Sekyi added: "Evidently they mean that they worship the spirit of an Omanhene of which the stool is the outward and visible sign, the abode of the adored spirit. Installation in the chiefship, if I may make the comparison, is like induction into a bishopric; the important thing is the temporalities are mere appendages and outward adornments of the spirituality".¹¹⁹ Because of this transmission of authority, he said, the new chief could inherit his predecessor's wives, a practice Europeans concluded was revolting and legitimise his office: "'The King never dies' is, to primitive man, an indisputable fact; the outward semblance is changed from time to time, but the immanent chieftainship continues unchanged through all its incarnations. Therefore a chief can attribute to himself the achievements of his predecessors, and he also becomes the 'Father' or 'Grandfather', of all the members of the family group, irrespective of whether they are younger or older than himself... The primitive mind can only deal with the concrete; the human mind has reached a very high stage of development, and the environment has grown complex, before the mind begins to generalise and to grasp abstractions".¹²⁰

Sekyi also argued that European statute law and missionary interference had gravely imperilled social harmony, traditional political authority as well as the spiritual balance of the people by discouraging indigenous religious practices and the rites associated with the Stool Festival: "The value of the annual assembly, at the great Stool Festival in the headquarters of each state, of all the greater sub-chiefs, each with his subordinate chiefs and headmen, is incalculable. At these assemblies, which had each been preceded by smaller assemblies at the headquarters of each Division of the State, and at smaller gatherings of relatives at the Stool Festivals of each occupant of a stool, whether major or minor, revision of customs was often considered, and projects for improvement, abandonment, or discouragement of practices that did not conduce to the well-being of the State were put forward for the Paramount Chief and his Council to deal with. Again, funeral customs were always opportunities for the gathering together of relatives and close friends from all over the country, and from abroad; the musical groups... recounted deeds of dead (and living) great men,

which narration, in the mellow language of poetry, aided memory, and incited in the young a determination to do at least as their illustrious ancestors did...¹²¹ These politico-religious functions, he said, were vital aspects of political socialization, and had been rendered ineffective by missionaries who apparently believed that it was better to go to Heaven maimed spiritually and physically than to become a good citizen: "If a man is a good citizen, and takes full pride in the institutions of his country, I do not see how he can be shut out of Heaven by the recommendations of any body of priests or the anathema of any ecclesiastical college".¹²² For Sekyi worship of the spirit of the ancestors made for continuity, social renewal and accommodation of change. It meant the continued association of all that was good in the past with the present. As Mr. Quarcoo has correctly noted, the Stool Festival, particularly the ceremony of the "blackening" of the stool, "preserves" the personality of the ancestors, and by extension the latter, embodying the wisdom and usages of the past, are represented by the incumbent of the stool and "preserved" by it. The concept of the nation or collectivity as an organism represented by the stool, was institutionalized in the Golden Stool of Ashanti under Osei Tutu. The rites and festivities surrounding the stool are indeed religious, but the fact that their principal object is to explain man's relation to the cosmos, define his social relations, rights and obligations, provide for the present and plan for the future, as well as restate the past, means that their function is essentially ideological.¹²³ What abstract reason cannot grasp feeling can intuitively comprehend, as these customs and symbols embody Edmund Burke's "standing wisdom of the country". Abstract intellect, "cold hearts and muddy understandings" cannot grasp the excellence and subtlety of the Akan-Fanti moral fabric, the state wherein Nature and wisdom complemented each other. There, the higher reason, what for Sekyi constituted the moral law, was not grasped by Reason, but existed in a way of life, in a communal wisdom.¹²⁴ For him, as for Burke and Herder, tradition was not something to be deified, but was both a means of preserving and improving. Social stability and vitality therefore, consisted in the awareness of each generation of its inheritance which must be conserved and transmitted. This was not mere social replication but what modern socialization theory would call inter-generational value transmission.¹²⁵ To ignore the "wisdom of our ancestors" was dangerous: to reject it in

the name of "progress" would lead to the disintegration of the polity and to frustration. Uncritical and excessive imitation of foreign ideas and institutions in the name of progress was the first step to political and cultural servitude. Sekyi put it very succinctly when he quoted the Fanti proverb: Oman si ho na posuban sim which, rendered in English, means: "The company fence stands only so long as the state exists". Now the company system was the military backbone of the state. The company fence was the sacred enclosure, within which stood a sacred tree and other sacred objects symbolising the supreme importance of the military in ensuring the security of the State or Oman at all costs. Any military unit, therefore, which was negligent in its duty, or allowed itself to be diverted from its duty, was committing a treasonous act. The influence of foreign religions and of individualistic notions, said Sekyi, had seriously eroded this loyalty to the traditional system for "the companies were created to serve certain needs of the State or Oman, and no doubt in their turn react on the state; but they can never be greater than the state in which they are. And, of course, they would not exist at all if the state were not in being to form, as it were, a super-fence around them. Therefore our ancestors said: Oman si ho na posuban sim. The Oman was superior to, and more powerful than, any company or system of companies set up within or under it, and each member was bound to be loyal to the state or Oman... ..for even though it were proved that the Christian or any other foreign form of religion was better than our ancient religion, it could not be disputed that our ancient religion was our national religion, and functioned well as such in the development of our well-built constitution. The best of every institution is its utility as an organ aiding in the well-being of the organisation in which it appears; and where the organisation is a human social group, the moral law in its most abstract form is the ultimate test of tests. And religion that cannot admit that loyalty to one's national group...is vital to the healthy and useful development of any of its advocates is worthless and such loyalty is essentially moral...

"Therefore those among us who have adopted one or other of the two main foreign religions that have been established in our midst, have to consider that, if they would be true patriots useful to their generation and those who will follow, it behoves them to examine the principles of their adopted faiths as to whether they can stand the test of tests I have

indicated... Oman si ho na posuban sim. The person who would be loyal to a part and not to the whole, the person whose loyalty to his part of the whole does not cohere with his loyalty to the whole, is a dangerous person. If we would have our posuban we must first have our Oman safe... So long as the Oman is safe and sound we can have as many posuban as we like, within the Oman working with the Oman, and ever for the Oman.¹²⁶

The importance Sekyi attached to the integrative role of culture and tradition in the modernization process was at last given recognition in 1937 in a Memorandum on a Proposed Institute of West African Culture at Achimota College, composed by the Principal of Achimota College, together with H.V. Meyerowitz, E. Amu (Achimota College), Dr. Meyer Fortes (Institute of African Languages and Cultures, London), Professor F. Clarke and Dr. W.B. Mumford (University of London Institute of Education) with the blessing of the Colonial Office Advisory Committee on Education.¹²⁷ Like Sekyi, the chairman of Achimota Council spoke of the problem of adapting African education "to African traditions - political, economic, religious, cultural" in a period of transition; he even went so far as to state that "the whole question is so profound in its relation to the complicated situation in the Gold Coast that nothing short of an almost revolutionary approach to the subject will be of any real value". The authors of the Memorandum expressed their fear of the disintegrating effects on African society of culture contact and of modernization, and of the "premature desertion by the African of ancient practices and traditions which have not only served to give unity and cohesion to his society, but have also in them elements capable of indefinite development and of assimilation to those European ideas and usages which now exercise such a strong attraction".¹²⁸ One of the major functions of African culture in the future, they added, would be "to receive the historic institutions of Europe and after a period of assimilation, to return them with a new and vivid light upon their significance". In Chapter 3 of the Memorandum Dr. Meyer Fortes noted that in modern West Africa there could be observed two phenomena which at first appeared contradictory but were in fact related. There was, on the one hand, the energy, industry, pride of race and avidity for education; on the other hand, there was "a noticeable feeling of malaise, a sense of impending change, in the whole social system". There were the anxieties of modernization, the future of one's children, and

the political and social future of Africa: "These are the birth pangs of a new social order, the transition from a society which was entirely rural and economically self-contained, to one partly urbanized and mechanized with a westernized social division of labour and dependent on world markets and a money economy. Corresponding to this transition state is a transition mentality, eagerly reaching forward to the future, yet bound by the closest ties to the past". The old order was indeed changing; for example, formerly among the Fanti, inheritance of property and family responsibilities followed the matrilineal line, but under modern conditions, a man had to concentrate on the education of his own rather than his sister's children. In actual practice, most westernized Africans were supporting both their children and their sister's children, and were therefore under some financial strain, as well as a psychological one. Similar conflicts, as Sekyi argued as early as 1914, occurred in the area of religious and ethical ideas. Younger Africans were now questioning the unconditional rejection of all African religions and ethical traditions. Similar conflicts of duty, as Sekyi had always stated, also occurred in the political and social fields, and even within the family. According to the Memorandum, one of the causes of this malaise of modernization, this worrying transition mentality, was the fact that effective integrative mechanisms had either decayed or were absent. Consequently a reconciliation had not yet been effected between the economic and social system of Western Europe and the traditional culture and social systems of West Africa. Africans wanted the best of both worlds: they clung to the fundamentals of their traditional ways of life, while assimilating European ideas and techniques. Unless a satisfying cultural and emotional adjustment was worked out, unless there was some articulation of a new philosophy of the transition, the cultural malaise would remain: "A society must know itself if it is to progress"¹²⁹ or, as Sekyi put it as early as 1925 Oman si ho na posuban sim.

VIII.

Conclusion: Over three hundred years ago Thomas Hobbes regretfully observed¹³⁰ how difficult it was to arrive at infallible conclusions about men, for unlike lines and circles in mathematics, the comparison of men and of societies invariably involves a clash of truth and interest, as well as passion, particularly in a time of crisis. During certain periods of history the values on which people base their lives are undermined and the very principles of society itself are questioned. Values regarded as self-evident and beyond question are threatened by conflicting economic and other interests. The resulting condition is one of cultural crisis and chronic instability; "things fall apart", and the psychological shock of events is so bewildering and astonishing that individuals reflecting on the situation feel called upon to provide an explanation of these events within a wider context. This was what Kobina Sekyi and some of his contemporaries sought to do between 1910 and the 1950s. They sought to answer questions such as what constitutes a nation, the internal relations of its parts, the problem of values, the relation of the individual to society - questions on which there has been considerable divergence of opinion, even in Europe and America today. Whatever the logic of nationalism may be, it may not necessarily be concerned with the efficient allocation of resources or with administrative efficiency. As Nkrumah put it some years ago, the nationalist demands that he should be allowed the privilege to make mistakes and to choose. Political development, therefore, as Sekyi constantly argued, may not mean industrialisation development of military capability, or even "progress". Even if it is maintained that it does, it is arguable that all these aspirations can be met simultaneously. As Nyerere has observed recently¹³¹ the problem is one of choice. It is also a question of meaningful adaptation and will. Nation-building, involving as it does, the problem of integrating man to society and of ethnic minorities to a wider loyalty, is not simply a question of "catching up" and all the dangers that attitude involves. It is essentially a question of choice and will. Will, not force, is the basis of balanced political development. Modernization as Sekyi argued, if it is not guided by an imaginative and responsible leadership capable of manipulating the integrative elements of tradition and of formulating a social philosophy incorporating the wisdom of the past, may lead to alienation and

maldevelopment. Sekyi arrived at these conclusions decades before the emergence of the practitioners of "Dev. Speak" and modernization theorists. Had he been alive today, he would certainly be distressed by the seeming inability of intellectuals in Africa, especially political scientists, to orient their activities to political realities in the continent.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Daily Graphic, February 28, 1969, p.5.
2. World Politics and Personal Insecurity, N.Y., 1935, p.158.
3. "The Maddening Methods of Harold D. Lasswell: Some Philosophical Underpinnings", Journal of Politics, Vol.30, 1968.
4. G.A. Shepperson, "Abolitionism and African Political Thought", Transition, Vol.3, N.12, 1964, pp. 22-26.
5. See G.A. Shepperson, op.cit.; T. Hodgkin, "A Note on the Language of African Nationalism" in St. Antony's Papers, No.10, African Affairs No.1, ed. K. Kirkwood, Oxford 1961, pp. 22-40; Ali Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana; "Edmund Burke and Reflections on the Revolution in the Congo" in Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1962-63, Vol.5, pp. 121-133; "Kwame Nkrumah, Leninist Czar" in Transition, 1966, No.26, pp. 9-17; "Consent, Colonialism and Sovereignty" in Political Studies, Vol.XI, 1963, pp. 36-55. For details see K. Grundy, "Recent Contributions to the Study of African Political Thought", World Politics, Vol.18, 1965-66, pp. 675-689.
6. Herbert J. Spiro, "Repetition or Innovation?" in Patterns of African Development: Five Comparisons, ed. H.J. Spiro, Prentice Hall, Inc., New Jersey, 1967, p.142.

7. Ibid.
8. See Ali Mazrui, "Borrowed Theory and Original Practice In African Politics", Ibid., pp. 91-124.
9. "Dilemmas of Political Theory in an African Context: the Ideology of Julius Nyerere", Boston University Papers on Africa: Transition in African Politics, ed. Jeffrey Butler and A.A. Castagno, Praeger, 1967, pp.196-7.
10. Ibid., p.197.
11. See W.J. Argyle, "The Concept of African Collectivism", Mawazo, Vol.1, 1967-68, pp. 37-43. Note also I. Geiss, "Pan-Africanism", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.4, No.1, 1969, pp. 187-200, where he labels African Ideologues "irrational romantics" and condemns what he calls the "romantic and dangerous nonsense about preserving traditional African society..."
12. See Easton's useful "Political Anthropology" In B.J. Siegel: Biennial Review of Anthropology, Stanford University Press, 1959, pp. 210-262.
13. Thomas Hodgkin, "The Idea of Freedom In African National Movements" In David Lidney ed. The Concept of Freedom In Anthropology, Mouton and Co., The Hague 1963, p.208.
14. Ibid., p.209.
15. L.A. Fallers, "Political Sociology and the Anthropological Study of African Politics", Archiv. Europ. Sociol., 4, 1963, p.329, quoted in Joan Vincent, "Anthropology and Political Development", Colin Leys, ed. Politics and Change In Developing Countries, C.U.P., 1969, p.45.
16. G. Lienhardt, Social Anthropology, London, 1964, p.74, quoted ibid., p.44. See also S.N. Eisenstadt, "Some Reflections on Problems and Conditions of Ethnic Freedom", In David Bidney, op.cit., p.233-4.

17. Students of modernization such as Claude Welch, "Japan and Africa" in C. Welch, ed. Political Modernization, who have compared the modernization process in Japan with that of Africa have without exception failed to take account of the fact that the Gold Coast conservative nationalists and the founders of the Fanti Confederacy saw Japan's 'Aristocratic Revolution' as a good example of the uses of tradition in the modernizing process; see J. Mensah Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, Frank Cass edition, 1968 (First edition 1906), pp. 240-2, 253.
18. See documents in G. Metcalfe, Great Britain and Ghana: Documents of Ghana History, 1807-1957, Thomas Nelson and Son, 1964, pp. 335-46.
19. David E. Apter, Introduction, Ideology and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, pp. 24-25.
20. For the Gold Coast A.R.P.S. see David Kimble, Political History of Ghana, O.U.P., 1963, pp. 330-403, *passim*.
21. Time does not permit a fuller discussion of the question of youth, identity crisis and Ideology, or of the ideological role of the intelligentsia. In Sekyi's case, sufficient documentary material does exist for such an undertaking. Psychoanalytical studies by Erikson on Luther and Gandhi and Lewis Edinger on Kurt Schumacher clearly indicate the utility of the psychoanalytical approach to the study of ideology. See also David E. Apter's remarks at pp. 28-30 in Ideology and Discontent. On the social role of the intelligentsia see K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, London, Kegan Paul, 1940. On the intelligentsia as a separate sociological category and as a "phenomenon essentially connected with the transition" see Ernest Gellner's stimulating Thought and Change, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1964, pp. 168-172. In particular for the ideological make-up of "the assaulted intellectual" in transitional societies, see Mary Matossian, "Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization: some tensions and ambiguities", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.6, 1957-8, pp. 217-228.

22. G. Balandier, "La Situation Coloniale: Approche Theorique", Cahiers internationaux de sociologie, XI, 1951, pp. 44-79, reprinted in I. Wallerstein, ed. Social Change: the Colonial Situation, John Wiley and Sons, Inc. N.Y., 1966, pp. 34-61.
23. Balandier, op.cit., pp. 54-55.
24. Paul Keoekemeti ed., Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953.
25. Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System", D. Apter, ed. Ideology and Discontent, Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, p.52.
26. See Footnote 21 on youth, identity crisis and ideology; also Lucian Pye's review of Erik Erikson's Young Man Luther, "Personal Identity and Political Ideology" in Dwaine Marwick, ed. Political Decision-Makers, Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, pp. 290-313, esp. pp. 309-311.
27. Ibid., p.54.
28. Ibid., p.54.
29. Ibid., p.64.
30. Ibid.; see also E. Vogel in "The growth of the race idea", Review of Politics, Vol.11, July 1940, pp. 283-317 and D.G. MacRae, "Populism as an Ideology" in Populism, ed. G. Ionescu and E. Gellner, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1964, p.154.
31. "Education with Particular Reference to a West African University", 1920, p.10.
32. C. Geertz, op.cit., p.63.
33. Karl Mannheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology, op.cit., pp. 97-98.
34. Sekyi, "Education with Particular Reference to a West African University", Accra, March 1920, pp. 10-11.

35. Sekyi, *ibid.*, pp. 16-17.
36. Sekyi, *ibid.*, p.21.
37. "Status Anxiety and Cultural Revival: Pursuit of 'the Good Old Days'", Ghana Journal of Sociology, Vol.5, No.1, February 1969, pp. 8-14.
38. Assimeng, however, qualifies this when he states that "no social movement is ever interested in a wholesale restoration of things of the past", p.10.
39. Max Assimeng, *op.cit.*, pp. 10-11.
40. *Ibid.*, p.11.
41. See Karl Mannheim's comments on the nature of traditionalism and unreflective conservatism in Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology, *op.cit.*, pp. 94-116, and Mannheim's comparison of Justus Moser's 'primitive' conservatism and 'praise of the "good old days"' with the dynamic conservatism of Adam Muller on the one hand, and the 'objective dynamics' of Hegel on the other - pp. 138-164, *ibid.*
42. See Thoughts for the Reflective.
43. See Sections V and VI of this paper; also Sekyi's The Study of Our Institutions, Kumasi, 1943; also his Law and Custom in West Africa [n.d.].
44. Cf. Mannheim, *op.cit.*, pp. 147-153.
45. *Ibid.*, p.151.
46. I am reliably informed by contemporaries and friends I interviewed at Cape Coast, particularly C.H. Hayfron-Benjamin, former editor of The Gold Coast Observer, who completed degrees in law and philosophy at University College in 1926 that Sekyi excelled in his subject and was well thought of by Professor Dawes-Hicks, head of the philosophy department.
47. See his play The Blinkards, which was performed at Cape Coast in 1915.

48. In several interviews, friends of Sekyi attributed his intense nationalism and 'hostility to the white race' to this traumatic experience. They relate how, when the ship was torpedoed off the Irish Sea, Sekyi managed to climb into a life boat, but was told that a black man had no right to be alive when white men were drowning. Information supplied by Mr. W.S. Kwesi Johnson and Dr. J.E. de Graft Johnson, author of Towards Nationhood in West Africa, 1928, of Cape Coast.
49. Reprinted in The African Telegraph and Gold Coast Mirror, London, February 11 and 15, 1915, pp. 55-63.
50. The African Telegraph and Gold Coast Mirror, December 1914, p.26 and January 1915; "Education in British West Africa", The African Times and Orient Review, July 1917, pp. 33-35 and "The Future of Subject Peoples", *ibid.*, October-December 1917.
51. Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, The Beacon Press, Boston, 1965.
52. Letter from Sekyi's son, His Excellency H.V. Sekyi, Ghanaian High Commissioner to Australia on Sekyi's ideological system: "I have in my possession a collection of his manuscripts in prose and verse, and I have so far managed... to establish a chronology, thus making it possible to trace the development of his thinking from as far back as it can be traced, I think 1910. In so doing I have come to the conclusion - for instance, based on the evidence of some early verses and a master's thesis - that during his university career he developed a moral and political philosophy of the state and the individual which seems very strongly to have coloured all his later political ideas and ideology... It seems to me that the three strands - philosophy, politics and law - interweave and reinforce each other and cannot really be studied in isolation from each other". Personal communication, 18 December 1969.
53. One may not in fact agree with this equation of morality with nature or what is natural - See K. Baier, The Moral Point of View. Also Peter Winch, "Nature and Convention",

Proc. Aristot. Soc., 1960 and also Anthony Quinton, "Ethics and the Theory of Evolution", pp. 107-131 in I.T. Ramsey, ed. Biology and Personality, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1965, esp. pp. 125-130.

54. "Morality and Nature", p.55.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., Sekyi's criticism of Huxley seems to be supported in W.F. Quillian The Moral Theory of Evolutionary Naturalism Yale Univ. Press, 1945, pp. 90-92.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. B. Russell, Philosophical Essays, London 1966 edn., p.24, quoted in A.G.N. Flew, Evolutionary Ethics, Macmillan, 1967, p.44.

61. "The Essentials of Race Manhood", The African Telegraph and Gold Coast Mirror, December 1914, p.26.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. "Education in British West Africa", A.T.O.R., July 1917.

66. "The Essentials of Race Manhood", Ibid., p.26.

+ 67. See Our White Friends, pp. 22-167; The Parting of the Ways; condemnation of the social evils of colonialism is also found in his sonnets, particularly The Sojourner (1915-18), Concerning Man's World, and such poems as "Mirage". For a literary and psychological study of Sekyi's reaction to the colonial acculturation process see his essay "The Anglo-Fanti", serialised in West Africa,

- London, 25 May - 12 Sept. 1918 and reprinted in Nancy Cunard's Negro Anthology, 1932, and his satirical play significantly entitled "The Blinkards", 1915, depicting the Anglo-Fanti's of Cape Coast. It is particularly interesting to compare Sekyi's analysis of the internal aspects of the colonial situation with Balandier's paper, op.cit., R. Maunier's The Sociology of Colonies, 2 vols., London 1938.
68. See David E. Apter, Ideology and Discontent and Robert A. Scalapino, "Ideology and Modernization - the Japanese Case" in D. Apter, ed. Ideology and Discontent, Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, Introduction and Ch. 3.
69. Magnus Sampson, 'Kobina Sekyi as I knew him', Sekyi Papers, Ghana National Archives, Cape Coast.
70. See Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, Boston, 1966; S.N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.12, 1964, pp. 345-67 and Modernization, Protest and Change, Prentice Hall Inc., N.J., 1966; Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States, N.Y., 1964, pp. 7-8; also Ali A. Mazrui, "Social Darwinism and Political Development", World Politics, 1967.
71. Lucian W. Pye, op.cit., p.97.
72. F.W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, the theory of Prismatic Society, Boston, 1964.
73. See Raymond Aron, German Sociology, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, pp. 43-51.
74. Compare Sekyi, op.cit., pp. 12-33 with M. Fried, "On the Evolution of Social Stratification and the State", Stanley Diamond, ed. Culture in History, Columbia Univ. Press, N.Y. 1960, pp. 713-731 and M. Fried, "Anthropology and the Study of Politics" in Sol Tax ed. Horizons of Anthropology, Allen and Unwin, 1965, pp. 181-90.
75. See Sekyi, "The Future of Subject Peoples", African Times and Orient Review October-December 1917, p.78, 94, 109-110.

76. Sekyi, *op.cit.*, p.78.
77. *Ibid.*
78. Cf. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution, Primordial Sentiments and Civic Politics in the New States", Old Societies and New States; Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties", British Journal of Sociology, Vol.8, 1957, pp. 130-145; D. Brokensha, Social Change at Larteh Ghana, O.U.P., 1966.
79. Sekyi, "The Essentials of Race Manhood", *op.cit.*, p.26.
80. Sekyi, "The Future of Subject Peoples", *op.cit.*, p.109.
81. *Ibid.*, p.110.
82. See Our White Friends, p.32-33.
83. See The Relation Between the State and the Individual where he discusses the role of stratification in the evolution of the nation-state, and the origin of a new political and economic class. Cf. Morton Fried's useful discussion of this in his "On the Revolution of Social Stratification and the State", in Stanley Diamond, ed. Culture in History, Columbia University Press, N.Y. 1960, pp. 713-731, especially pp. 721-723, 728-729; see also Fried's "Anthropology and the Study of Politics" in Sol Tax, ed., Horizons of Anthropology, George Allen and Unwin, 1965, pp. 181-190, esp. pp. 187-188.
84. Our White Friends, pp. 82-85. As Clifford Geertz has observed, "It is a loss of orientation that most directly gives rise to ideological activity, an inability, for lack of usable models, to comprehend the universe of civic rights and responsibilities in which one finds oneself located. The development of a differentiated polity (or of greater internal differentiation within such a polity) may, and commonly does, bring with it severe social dislocation and psychological tension. But it also brings with it conceptual confusion, as the established images of political order fall into irrelevance or are driven into disrepute..." "Ideology as a cultural system", D.E. Apter, *op.cit.*, p.64.

85. See Our White Friends, pp. 175-6.
86. Sekyi, "The Future of Subject Peoples", op.cit., p.110.
87. Ibid., p.110.
88. Sekyi, "Education in British West Africa", A.T.O.R., op.cit.; also Sekyi, "Political Development in the Gold Coast since 1900", p.12 - talk given at the invitation of Dr. K.A. Busia, then Professor of Sociology, University College of the Gold Coast, 1952.
89. See, for example, W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist Manifesto, O.U.P., 1960, also Rostow's "Unsolved Problems of International Development", International Development Review, Vol.7, 1965 and Vol.8, 1966; S.M. Lipset, Political Man, N.Y., 1959, pp. 31-37; Max F. Millikan and D. Blackmer, The Emerging Nations, Boston, 1961.
90. See Sekyi's remarks in Our White Friends, pp. 115-116.
91. Stanley Diamond, "Plato and the Definition of the Primitive" in Stanley Diamond, ed., Culture in History, Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1960, p.118.
92. Sekyi, The Parting of the Ways, p.28.
93. See Kimble, op.cit., p.524-5.
94. Sekyi, The Relation Between the State and the Individual..., p.14, also pp. 15-16, 20-23.
95. Discourse on the Arts and Sciences and Essays on the Origin of Inequality.
96. Ibid., pp. 23-24.
97. See Alexander Passerin D'Entreves: The Notion of the State, O.U.P., 1967, p.144; it may be that D'Entreves is aware of the difference in interpretation, as between Western Europe and Afro-Asia, as to what constitutes the rule of law; the former argues in terms of 'ethical

neutrality' and 'efficacy' as the basis of political legitimacy, whereas the latter defines law as 'the realization of the appropriate conditions for the development of human dignity'. D'Entreves, like the legal positivists seems to dismiss all talk about 'moral legitimation' as mere ideology or personal opinion, and argues in terms of the state as an 'official system' - a concept Sekyi rejected. For a refreshing and original critique of the notion of the state as official system, see David Easton, The Political System, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1966, Ch.4, esp. pp. 106-115.

98. Sekyi, op.cit., p.28.
99. T.O. Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law, Manchester Univ. Press, 1956, pp. 41-42.
100. Sekyi, Our White Friends, p.53.
101. Ibid., p.55.
102. Sekyi later clarified the status of slaves in Custom and Law in West Africa, pp. 12-13, and The Meaning of the Expression 'Thinking in English', Lecture 6, pp. 3-4; cf. T.O. Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law, Manchester University Press, 1956, pp. 107-108.
103. Sekyi, op.cit., p.56.
104. For the significance of the asafu see J.C. de Graft Johnson, 'The Fanti Asafu', Africa, 1932, Vol.V, No.1, pp. 307-322.
105. Sekyi, 'The Social System of the Peoples of the Gold Coast', in draft of The Relation Between the State and the Individual..., p.6.
106. Thoughts for the Reflective, pp. 6-12.
107. Sekyi, ibid., p.9.
108. Sekyi, ibid., p.9.

109. Ibid., p.10; for Sekyi's discussion of the status of the individual in the Akan-Fanti polity see his A Comparison of English, Gold Coast and Akan-Fanti Laws Respecting the Absolute Rights of Individuals, Lecture I, p.10, Lecture II, pp. 1-3, 8, Lecture III, p.1, 6-8; on the law of succession and the status of women see Custom and Law in West Africa, pp. 9-12; on the individual and due process of law see Sekyi's discussion of the use of the oath (ntam and adasnam) as criminal summons or warrant in The Study of Our Institutions, pp. 5-6; compare with T.O. Elias, op.cit., p.82ff esp. pp. 89-90, p.222 and p.241.
110. Sekyi in The Gold Coast Observer, December 19, 1950.
111. Sekyi, The Study of Our Institutions, p.6.
112. Sekyi, Thoughts for the Reflective, p.14; both Casely Hayford, Gold Coast National Institutions, p.45 and J.B. Danquah, Akan Laws and Customs, pp. 214-215, had concurred that paramountcy did not carry with it ownership of any particular land.
113. Sekyi, The Gold Coast Observer, December 19, 1950.
114. Sekyi, A Comparison of English, Gold Coast and Akan-Fanti Laws Relating to the Absolute Rights of Individuals, Lecture VI, p.1.
115. I owe this expression to Mr. Quarcoo, Research Fellow of the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, who is currently completing a doctoral thesis on the Stool in Contemporary Ghana.
116. Sekyi, The Meaning of the Expression 'Thinking in English', Lecture 4, p.3; for the notion of the king's servants as an 'expression of his own personality' and the severity of the punishment attached to acts calculated to undermine the king's dignity and authority see J.N. Matson, 'The Supreme Court and the Customary Judicial Processes in the Gold Coast', The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.2, Pt.1, January 1953, p.48 and 50.

117. Akos de Timon, "Theory of the Holy Crown or the Development and Significance of the Conception of Public Rights of the Holy Crown in the Constitution", pp. 184-195, Papers on Inter-Racial Problems, ed. G. Spiller, London 1911. Since both Akos de Timon and Sekyi denied the existence of the European notion of feudalism in their respective countries it will be useful to consult in this connection Jack Goody, "Feudalism in Africa", Journal of African History, 1963, Vol.4, No.1, pp. 1-18.
118. Sekyi, Custom and Law in West Africa, p.16.
119. *Ibid.*, p.17.
120. *Ibid.*, p.17; for a provocative discussion, from a philosophical stand-point, of the problem raised by Sekyi, i.e. how to make intelligible, say, in European terms, institutions of a non-European culture whose standards of rationality and intelligibility differ from, or are opposed to, European standards, see Peter Winch's discussion of E.E. Evans-Pritchard's Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande and of Alasdair MacIntyre's Is Understanding Religion Compatible with Believing? in his "Understanding a Primitive Society", American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.1, No.4, October 1964, pp. 307-324, esp. p.323.
121. Sekyi, The Meaning of the Expression 'Thinking in English', pp. 9-10, Lecture 2.
122. *Ibid.*, p.10.
123. For a brief discussion of cultural symbol-systems as extrinsic sources of information - "templates for the organization of social and psychological processes" in societies where institutionalized guides for behaviour, feeling or thought are weak or absent, see Clifford Geertz, *op.cit.*, pp. 60-63.
124. See Sekyi's sonnets entitled "Concerning Man's World", which are really detailed criticism of the meaninglessness of European philosophy and of the disparity between scientific knowledge and social well-being.

125. In general see Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton Univ. Press, 1965; Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems", Journal of Politics, XVIII, 1956, and S.N. Eisenstadt, From Generation to Generation, Free Press of Glencoe, 1956.
126. Sekyi, The Parting of the Ways, pp. 54-57.
127. ADM.11/1746, 20 November 1937, Ghana National Archives.
128. Introduction to Memorandum, op.cit.
129. Meyer Fortes, p.16, Memorandum, op.cit.
130. The Epistle Dedicatory, Elements of Law, May 9, 1640.
131. Julius Nyerere, speech on Tanzania's Second Five-Year Development Plan, May 28, 1969, reprinted in East Africa Journal, October 1969, pp. 6-12.