83 THE HUZA AS AN INDIGENOUS CO-OPERATIVE INSTITUTION AND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION WORK IN SOMANYA DISTRICT by E .E.K. Dumor** In this paper 'I propose to make a case for the Huza farming system of the Krobo of Eastern Ghana* as a basis for agricultural'co-operative development and extension work. The argument here will be that the Krobo Huza system* as an indigenous institutional form (which as will be shown later, provided the outlet for change in Krobo agricultural economy) can become the full- crum for a rural agricultural co-operative system and extension work. What I will attempt to do therefore is to discuss the elements in the Huza farming system that can serve as a useful start- ing point in agricultural co-operative development and extension work. In discussing the main issue of this paper I should first like to draw your attention to the point made by the Director of I.L.O. in hitf 1969 annual report. He argued that where modern forms of co-operatives are not immediately appropriate, there are several advantages in having recourse to less complicated forms. The report further stated that attempts could be made tb adjust traditional forms of group action to the requirements of progress "• It seems to me that results will be negligi- ble if agricultural co-operatives in our countries * Lecturer in Sociology,- University ' We here, needn't recount the whole history of the Krobo, particularly in this short paper. This has been extensively documented by various writers particularly Hugo Huber, OdonkorH Fleld6 Sutherland12 and Nene Mate Kole8 to mention only a few. It suffices to mention that between 1450 and the first decade of the twentieth century, the Krobos had made extensive and continuous outright purchases of land from their immediate neighbours the Akims, Akwapims, etc. under the guidance of three strong-willed Konors. By 1911 the Krobos had effectively reduced their frewly acquired lands into agricultural lands which, as will be shown, provided the main source of rural income. The newly acquired area/ by the Krobo falls mainly within the closed forest belt and the food crop belt of Ghana. This quest for agricultural deve- lopment and expansion therefore led to emergence of a tenurial arrangement and a farming system which is perhaps unique in rural Ghana. This farm- ing system - or system of land purchase and organi- zation brought about a measure of commercial agri- culture and extensive food production. By 1922, therefore, it was estimated that by this form of farming organization, the Krobos had reduced about three hundred miles of land into their possession 85 and were undertaking farm operations on an exten- sive scale. With the development of this farming system was the simultaneous emergence of agricul- tural leaders and rural markets,15 So successful was agricultural operations in this area that in the annual report of the Direc- tor of Agriculture, it was stated that the area "showed an excellent example of the industry of the Natives. For miles and miles you pass through oil palm plantations where all the palms have been planted at suitable distances apart. .. cocoa plantations are also being multiplied, and rubber is being enquired after, plants of other economic crops and fruit trees are also found here and there throughout the country, which goes to show that the Krobos are alive to the fact that, it is better to have more than one string to the bow". (16,17,18) Another factor apart from the astuteness of Krobo chiefs and the Industriousness- of the Krobo, was the impetus they received from European mission- aries. This was an important factor in the ; shift from subsistence to a commercial agriculture. La Anyane^ pointed out that the Europeans caused tracts of land to be cleared in the form of plantation farming - either large scale farming production of plantation crops. This, La Anyane considered to have stimula- ted farming in the neighbourhood of Akwapim and Krobo. He argued that "in 1843, the Basel Mission began its second invasion of the Gold Coast and were sponsored by the Danish Government, This association brought them into close contact with effort by the Danes to introduce agriculture of an exporting character in the Gold Coast. It was they who inherited the plantations started by the Danes at the foothills in the neighbourhood of Bodowa. They inherited something more which? became of immediate benefit to Akwapim and Krobo, and later the whole country. They inherited the spirit to encourage local agricultural development by example 86 and demonstration by experimenting Vkith new crops....9 The question to ask here is - and it is a funda- mental question - what iLndigenous • institutional form provided the basis for change in the rural economy of Krobo? Related to this question, of course, is the question of whether this indigenous institutional form exhibits any co-operative elements which can be harnessed for''the development; of "modern agricultural co-operative"? The Huza in Krobo country is a domestic organiza- tions as well as a tonurinl arrangement. The huza which is quite often referred to as an "agricultural company" is a traditional co-operative system in which a group of people who may not, but often are kinsmen, purchase and organize land for purposes of expanding their land holding and productivity. The huza is formed when the leader of the purchasing group - huza- tse - completes negotiations and acquires the land on behalf of the group. When the huza land is acquired it is sub-divided into "zugbas" or farm strip within the acquired block of land. Each member in the pur- chasing group receives an equivalent of what he has contributed in .cash. But the process of purchase in the past did not provide sufficient security for the purchasing group. It was realized that the Akims and the Begoros had made land sales to the Krobo farmers a cheating business. Sometimes when land was sold by one chief, another would come to say the chief who disposed of the land was not the rightful chief. This led to litigation and heavy debts to the huza groups. Furthermore it was impossible in the circum- stances to invest in such lands. Therefore in 1883 under the instrument of the Gold Coast Native Juris- diction Ordinance, Sir Emmanuel Mate Kole, Konor of Manya Krobo passed the following bye-laws: (a) Mo person had the right to move out of Manya Krobo to purchase forest land or lands connected with the Begoro stool at Eastern Akim or any other part of Akim except by the special permission of the Konor in Council. This law was applicable to all those who already possessed land or intended to purchase one. (b) That if permission was granted, such a person can enter any land transaction only when he B7 was accompanied by the Konor's accredited repre- sentatives . '9 What these bye-laws were intended for was to provide a form of security to Krobo land purchasers. These bye-laws did encourage Krobo farmers there- after t^ increase their investment in agricultural land. it was with this sense of security and in- crease in investment in agricultural land that Field said "a Krobo man's land means more to him than his life, for it is not unusual for a man whose money troubles have lost him his farm to commit suicide".5 What is of fundamental importance in the develop- ment of the huza which the bye-laws achieved was the issue of security for land as a basis for investment. There is one aspect of the huza which might tend to undermine the basis tt the initial spirit of co- operation which lead group members to purchase these lands and build their settlements thereon. This as- pect is the parcelling out of farm strips to members according to the amount each has contributed. It is argued that each member after receiving his parcel of land retains fmll control over his share and could sell it if he so desires. This would seem to imply that after the parcelling of strips, the initial co- operative .element\lapses. Furthermore the view is held that after the distribution the various strips tend to be too small for any further agricultural expansion. This of course, it is believed belies the efforts of members of one huza to own strips in other huzas. There is some truth in these arguments. But as will be shown presently, the co-operative spirit still permeates the huza and the process of individualization of possessory rights of huza strips does not of necessity negate the effect of the initial corporate spirit. From a general position it could be argued that since most members of huza ten* to be kinsmen* the predominance of kinship relations, with its multiplex obligations and loyalties will continue to reinforce the corporate spirit of the huza. The A -•if- 88 huza came into being through corporate action and therefore it is not presumptuous to argue that even though each member has possessory rights over his portion, this possessory right is derivative from the corporate action that brought the huza into being in the first place. This explains why in inter hu2a boundary disputes, the Huzatse enters the case as a co-defendant or co-plaintiff as the case may be. Furthermore, it would seem settled law that in certain circumstances the huza leader acting in the spirit of the body corporate can take action in the form of alienating certain parts of the huza to defray huza debts. Let us draw on some examples to illustrate this point. In a matter between Kofi Baah acting as Husa leader, versus Sackitey and Anor (1950) (see Appendix I for full judgement) Justice Coussey held that (a) when a Manya Krobo huza purchased land, they acted through a huzatse .(headman) , In boundary disputes with neighbouring groups, the huaatse represented his huza. The position of huzatse sometimes passed from father to son, but the huza could appoint someone else* (b) even if Ahulu was not successor to the original huzatse, the question was whether the group put him forward a£ their champion. The presumption that he was acting for the group was not rebutted, and therefore the sale of the land of the whole huza was valid. In this ease therefore Justice Coussey decided that win Manya Krobo, members of a land own- ing group know who their leader is and when he embarks on litigation to extend their common boundary, they are jointly liable and know that they are jointly lia- ble if he loses and in case he succeeds in enlarging thair land the accretion is shared out according to their contribution to the litigation".13 In Kwao vrs. Coker, Chief Justice Deane noted in his judge- ment the following* "In this colony, cases of land being bought by companies or syndicates in the name of one of the members* who is referred to as the leader and the land being then divided up among the members, are fairly common. In such cases it is well recognized that the title of one is the title of all, and if the title of one member of the syndicate is 89 challenged, the others at once come forward and support him knowing well that the land has been acquired by all of them at the same time by a single act of purchase".13 What these decisions therefore confirm is that the huza as a collectivity has a corporate title and even though individuals within it have possessory rights, suoh rights are derived from such a corporate £itle. It is therefore, not tenable to argue that individualization of possessory rights over strips in a huza completely undermines co-operative spirit. The next point to consider is the issue of size of the farm strips iji the huza. It is often argued that'land tenure arrangements in Ghana presents a . serious problem for agricultural expansion. It is estimated that "nearly 55 per cent of all holdings in Ghana are less than four acres in size. Approxi- mately 18 per cent of all holdings are mote than 10 acres in size", - And it is the general view that the system of land holding and the size contribute significantly to the defectiveness of Ghana's agri- culture, because each tenure arrangement is highly difficient in the ability to fulfil "the basic requirements of good tenure conditions".1^ But like Field,6 La Anyane10 argued that the huza system of the Krobo is perhaps the most efficient farming organization in the forest belt of Ghana. The Huza has several advantages and Dickson and Benneh appear quite informative on these. They state thatt (1) By coming together and selecting a well-known and respected person as their leader or spokesman, the farmers increase their bargaining power when negotia- ting for the purchase of land. They can thus obtain land at a cheaper price than if they bargained individually. (2) The huaa system also ensures that each farm has as many as possible of the different types of soils on the huza* This is important since well drained upland soils for example, tend to be more suitable than the wetter valley soils for the cultivation of cocoa, the main cash crop. Thus a farmer with upland soiils alone would be more V --*-> VS. 90 advantageous from1 the point of view of cocoa culti- vation. (3) After the land is shared, each farmer has absolute control over his zugba (strip)* so that he does not hesitate to improve the farm if he so wishes."3 Besides these advantages, the huza provides an opportunity for Ca) block or group farm development* (b) the development of agricultural leaders for extent sion work; (o) linking rural markets with urban centres. (This point will be illustrated presently). Field in her study of two huzas came to the conclusion that one was about 550 acres with farms averaging about 10 acres: the second was over 3,000 acres and she said that most Krobo huzas are somewhere between these two .*> La Anyane in two surveys of Aweso Huza in 1956 and 1961 pointed out that this huza is nearly seven miles long and about one mile in width with 42 farms rip* He stated that although relatively large acreages are held individually, being nearly 10 acres on the gene*ft| average, only a proportion of the zugba or strip i.e.. about 30 - 55 per cent is cultivated at any one time. He estimated that the average size of food farm is about 3.5 acres and this cropped area is supported by some six acres of secondary bush or fallow. From the above it is evident that any argument that the parcelling of strips tend to make investment diffi- cult is untenable. The size of zugbas in the huzas tend, generally to fall in the 18 per cent of holdings in Ghana which is about 10 acres. Let us start with the question of block or group farming, As part of the Ministry of Agriculture's policy, their Extension Work involves a spontaneous grouping of and settlement of farmers in new land areas where Government undertakes land development and/or improvement including land clearing, provision of irrigation facilities and land drainage. This strategy to extension work was conceived for the Ministry felt that under the "communal land tenure system the bulk of the country's crops is produced - _ 91 especially in the forested southern sector - by a large number of small farmers who are scattered over a wide geographical area and who operate in isolation far from the reach of agricultural extension services.21 It was felt that in the present traditional system of farming, tt*e farm size, in terms of land acreage, is small and the small farmer uses very little or no purchased inputs. Tius in this "new farming organi- sation" - i.e. block or group farming - a block of land is acquired by a rural community or by the Ministry of Agriculture and it is. developed and allocated in economic units to small farmers. "Farm families in the block cultivate separate farms under the supervision of extension field agents. Small farmers organised in this way are provided with ex- tension services and credit facilities as well as processing and storage facilities... The system thus provides favourable conditions for organizing small farmers into production and marketing co-operative groups".21 It follows from the foregoing, that the avenues that the huza offers and the advantages it already has should offer a starting point in this new experi- ment in extension work and the development of agricul- tural co-operatives. It is reasonable to argue that since it is not easy to predict the success of the new experiment, it stands to reason to adapt a traditional institution - in this case the huza - which has cer- tainly shown results for introducing innovation at least in the Krobo area where this system exists. The next advantage which the huza provides is the avenue for the development of agricultural leaders. It was noted earlier in this paper what role the husa leader plays in organizing the huza. Apart from the huzatse, there is another leader called Dadematse - chief of is a fair statement although it is the defendant's statement. We are brought into con- tact with a relationship which may have no clear counterpart in English Law as neither the term part- ner nor principal, agent or coparcener will strictly apply but I am satisfied that in Hanya Krobo members of a land owning group know who their leader is and that when he embarks 6n litigation to extend their common boundary they are jointly liable and know that they are jointly liable if he loses and in case he succeeds in enlarging their land the accretion is shared out according to their contributions to the litigation. In this case Ahulu was the leader. 1 find that the whole Bus a was rightly sold. The conduct of some of the plaintiffs after the sale supports this finding but it is unnecessary to en- large upon those acts nor upon the plaintiffs assumed ignorance of any survey of the land and. even of Ahulu's cases. On what I regard as the main issue the evidence is «trongly against the plaintiffs and that disposes of the action. There will be judgement accordingly for the defendant with costs to be taxed. Counsel's costs are allowed at 40 guineas. It is perhaps unfortunate that the 2nd defendant* a member of the Native Authority should have bought in the land. By his Counsel he states however that he is willing to resell it to the plaintiffs at £5 per rope which is not unreasonable as he purchased at £4 per rope <*?• • • >- 'lit +"-.* • « *• •it, 'V _ 105 There should be a considerable sum of money to the credit of the suit in the Native Court after the costs of £103. 19s. 6d are paid out of the net proceeds of sale of £233 1s. so it is hoped that the plaintiffs will avail themselves of this offer which the defendant has made under some pressure of the Court.