RESEARCH REVIEW NS VOL.8, NOS.  1 & 2,1992.

NKRUMAH AND CONSTITUTIONAL  DEMOCRACY:

1949 -1966 REVISITED

F.K. Drah

PARTI

INTRODUCTION

What follows  is an exposition of the cluster of attitudes, both in thought and in
practice, which Nkrumah in particular and the leadership ofthe Convention People's Party
(CPP) in general adopted towards constitutional democracy in the period 1949 -1966. It
will be shown that during the period as a whole Nkrumah and his closest collaborators
were unfavourably disposed towards constitutional democracy and eventually opted for
its antithesis, radical democracy.

The academic and practical significance and relevance of the exercise undertaken
here cannot be over-emphasized.  For one thing, constitutional  democracy rather than
radical  democracy was the ideal to which a not insignificant number of Ghanaians aspired.
For another, the British imperial power made the practice, or more accurately the promise
of the practice, of constitutional democracy a cardinal condition of the transfer of power.
Equally important, the issue of constitutional  democracy has been invested with
contemporary relevance and resonance. For, as is well known, in the referendum held on
28 April, 1992, Ghanaians as whole decided to embark on the fourth enterprise of evolving
constitutional democracy, with the clear implication that they rejected the kind of arbitrary
rule they experienced under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) headed by
J.J. Rawlings. Paradoxically, such an enterprise is being presided over by the self-same
Rawlings who has declared openly his antipathy to political pluralism which is a very
crucial component of constitutional democracy.

As is common knowledge, although Rawlings and Nkrumah broadly share a similar
political outlook, they have a few important differences.  For example, while Nkrumah
accepted the inevitability of party politics but fiercely advocated and practised one-party
politics  and uncompromisingly  rejected  multi-party politics  especially  during  1960 -
1966, Rawlings, on the other hand, has objected to party politics of any kind in favour of
no-party politics. In which case one may ask: Will Ghana's fourth attemptat constitutional-
democratic governance not suffer a similar fate as the first attempt under Nkrumah during
1957-1960 did?

The  present  writer  must  confess,  then,  that  it  is  the  uncertain  circumstances
surrounding our current fourth experiment in constitutional democracy which have partly
inspired thisretrospectiveglanceat a highly crucial period in our political history. History,
it has been said, may offer no positive lessons; what it may offer are negative lessons. In
other words, even if we are unable to learn from history what precisely we must do in the
present, it may be possible for us to learn from it what we should bear in mind when we
act-It is, therefore, hoped that this piece contains a few negative historical lessons which
can
the Fourth Republic.

The res* ofthe<utkle» divided into su sections. Tbeflnt section deab broadly with
the constitutional and radical types of democracy. In section two the indigenous and
colonial  backgrounds  of  constitutional  democracy  are  examined  father  selectively.
Sections three, four and  five  are devoted to the attitudes  of Nkramah and the  CPP
leadership during 1949 -1957,1957 -1960 and 1960 -1966 respectively; while the final
section contains the conclusion.

I

THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND RADICAL TYPES OF DEMOCRACY1

These days, particularly in the Western world, democracy is most often used without
adjectives; it is simply: democracy. In reality, however, democracy to the Western mind
is constitutional or liberal or pluralist democracy - all of which are interchangeable terms.
In the African context, on the other hand, if confusion is to be avoided, it is important that
we specify the type of democracy we want. For, besides constitutional democracy, there
is radical democracy which also has its advocates in Africa and elsewhere. Therefore, for
the purposes of this article, the constitutional and radical types of democracy are broadly
explained. But, first, a word or two about democracy as such.

Etymologically democracy means  "the power of the people".  In ancient Greece
"the  people"  (or  demos)  referred  to  a  specific  section  of the  population.  Hence,  as
Aristotle correctly argued, classical democracy was a form of sectional government. In
modern times, however, the general tendency is to use' 'democracy' * to embrace the entire
population, and not only a section of it.

Thus, democracy without adjectives may be defined broadly as a form of government
in which the generality of eligible citizens participate in the governmental process. Such
participation may be unmediated or direct as Rousseau, for example, advocated. But in
a  large and complex  society  this  is  very  difficult  to  achieve.  So,  in  modern times,
democracy - whether constitutional or radical - is necessarily "representative" in one
form or the other. The two types of democracy are now discussed in turn.

Constitutional  democracy is obviously a combination of constitutionalism and

democracy(in the sense just indicated). The task now is to explain constitutionalism.

By constitutionalism is briefly meant the belief that the powers of government and
their  exercise  must  be  restricted  through  certain  rules, procedures,  and  institutional
arrangements  in order to  ensure, protect, and promote  individual  and group  liberty,
justice, and political stability. Therefore, the type of government constitutionalism entails
is  limited government.2  In the relevant  literature,  limited government  is also termed
moderate or constitutional government; and a state with this kind of government is called
a constitutional or free state.

To the advocates of constitutionalism, it is sheer stupidity to protest when absolute
power is abused, for the simple reason that, as the historical experience of mankind has
amply shown, absolute power exists to be abused by fallible human beings. Accordingly,
these advocates believe in only those rales, procedures, and institutional arrangements
which effectively discourage its emergence. It is evident, then, that constitutionalism is
diametrically opposed to arbitrary government; and it logically entails the fundamental
principles of the accountability of die rulers for their policies and actions to the ruled,
conciliation, compromise, and self-restraint

There are two major principles which define the limitsoflawful power and authority.

The first is "Constitutional  Limitation** whereby those things which are considered
unlawful for the government to do are more or lest elaborately s^  out ma documentary
constitutioiL The second is "Constitutional Criticism** whereby, uistead of liinitsbemg
set to lawful authority in a documentary constitution, the citizenry reserve the right to
criticize or question the decisions or actions  of the government and  its subordinate
officials  as  being  "unconstitutional"  or  "not  in accordance  with  the  spirit  of  the
constitution.**9 This principle is unique to the British Constitution. These two principles
of limiting governmental powers are not mutually exclusive. In the United States of
America (USA), for example, they operate side by side and reinforce each other. In some
African  countries, including Ghana in  1969, 1979, and  1992, where the principle of
"Constitutional Criticism** has very weak foundations, the principle of "Constitutional
Limitation** has been deliberately adopted in the expectation that the former may evolve
overtime.

There are a number of major mechanisms or institutional arrangements for ensuring
limited or constitutional government. One such mechanism is a written or documentary
constitution which sets out more or less clearly the legal limitations on governmental
powers. But the very fact that a constitution is documentary does not necessarily mean that
it upholds the idea of limited government.  Instead, it is possible for a  documentary
constitution  to  be  the  very  embodiment  of  arbitrariness.  Hence  in  modern  times,
especially, a documentary constitution can only be considered  "constitutional** if it
contains, at least in principle, some other crucial devices by which limited government can
be ensured in practice. Such devices include reasonable separation of powers, the rule of
law, the independence of the judiciary and judicial review, entrenched bill of rights and
amendment procedure, free and  fair  elections as well as popular representation and
participation.4 Since it is necessary to show the relationship between constitutional or
limited government and democracy, a few remarks are made on the last two devices.

In Western constitutional thought and practice, at least from the late eighteenth
century  onwards,  the  participation  of  eligible  adult  citizens  (however  restricted  in
number) in government through representatives came to be recognised as a vital element
of constitutionalism. This is underscored, for example, by the famous expression: "no
taxation without representation.** But representatives need notbechosenon the democratic
basis ofuniversal adult suffrage- "one-man, one-vote** (or these days "one-person, one-
vote' ')• This is because constitutional government does not logically imply democracy in
the sense indicated earlier on.5

Atthebeginningofthe nineteenth century, Britain, for instance, was a "constitutional
state** and not a "constitutional-democratic state**: for the franchise was not based on the
principle of "one-man, one-vote**. One reason forthis was the fear of the ruling elites that
if the franchise was too rapidly enlarged to include every normal adult citizen, then
constitutionalism would be endangered. Eventually, the British constitutional state was
democratized. And the transition to constitutional or liberal democracy was less painful
because constitutionalism had already struck deep roots in the British soil.

Today it is accepted that constitutionalism would be incomplete, if not insecure,
without the democratic representation of the citizenry as a whole in the governmental
process. Thus, the existence of abody representing the people (variously called parliament,
congress, or national assembly), elected on the basis ofuniversal adult suffrage, is also
now considered a significant component of constitutional democracy. Such a body is
vested with the main legislative power of the state. This power is itself limited to passing
only such laws and regulations as are not in conflict  with the spirit and letter of the

constitution; for example, the passing of retrospective laws is  forbidden.

Also important, such a body is expected to serve as the major forum whereby the
voice of the people as a whole can be heard; and its very existence, with the continual
opportunities for effective criticism, is a check on the government. But, for this body to
perform effectively the kind of functions expected of it, it is important that it is chosen in
periodic  free  and  fair  elections, with  more than  one political party competing  for  the
popular votes. Hence the significance of a competitive party system. However, periodic
free and fair elections are impossible in the absence of the fundamental civil and political
freedoms  of  the  person,  thought  and  expression,  association  and  assembly  etc.  And
periodic free and fair elections are a crucial way of ensuring the accountability of the rulers
to the ruled. Although in constitutional democracy election results are determined through
majority procedure, there is ample respect for minority views and dissent.

It is also worth noting that a virile, pluralist civil society is a crucial prerequisite of
the emergence and thriving of constitutional democracy. Briefly, civil society is a cluster
of the diverse intermediary organizations or associations that operate between the primary
units of society like individuals, families, clans and tribes on the one hand, and the state,
on the other. Civil society not only provides diverse counter-vailing centres of power vis-
a-vis  state-power,  but also affords  a number of organized  social  forces  the social and
political space to practise democratic  self-governance.6

It must be tolerably clear by now that the democracy in the system of rule called
constitutional democracy is only one, albeit important, element: it does not constitute the
whole system. Just as constitutionalism  is insecure without democracy,  so democracy
without constitutionalism  is inimical.

And this brings us to radical  democracy. By a pardonable abridgment of a long
story, it may be said that the doctrine of radical democracy crystallized approximately in
eighteenth  century  Europe  - specifically  in  revolutionary  France.  It  was  significantly
partly based on the political ideas of J-J. Rousseau.7

In Rousseau's view it was in unmediated or direct democracy alone that citizens
could  enjoy  freedom  and justice.  Freedom  was  obedience  to  self-imposed  laws  and
decisions; while justice was the equal protection of the rights of every individual. On this
reasoning, the legislative power of the state should be vested in a general assembly of all
normal adult citizens. The laws made by the assembly were the true expressions of the
general will. The latter simply meant the selfless, patriotic, and informed desire of every
normal adult citizen  for the common good,8 which,  in turn, consisted  in freedom and
justice  for  all.  The  general  will  was at  once  sovereign  and  always  right.  The task  of
government, the creature of the general assembly, was merely to execute the laws and
decisions of the assembly..

Rousseau  was  hostile  to  conflict,  dissent,  and  decisions  taken  through  simple
majority  procedure.  He  was  emphatic  that  the  assembly's  decisions  should  be  as
raianimous as possible. In the absence of unanimity the dissenting individuals (who might
be a minority) should, in his terrible words, be "forced to be free" - Le. be compelled to
see with the rest what was in the interest of ail and, therefore, in the best interest of the
Eiinority themselves. And that, for Rousseau, was how direct democracy "solved" forall
time the problem of political  obligation.

Moreover,  he  objected  in  principle  to  the  existence  of  a  diversity  of  political
groupings including political parties. The reason was that such groupings by definition not
only  artificially  generated,  sustained,  and  magnified  conflict;  they  also  distorted  the
general will of their members since each such grouping had its own partial will. On the

I-

other hand, if such groupings should be allowed at all, then there should be as many of
them as possible so that none would dominate the rest.9 Thus, in spite ofhimself, Rousseau
was forced to realize the inevitability of some kind of political pluralism.

Modern exponents of radical democracy,  including the Jacobins in  revolutionary
France (1789 -  1794), have as a whole accepted all except two of Rousseau's ideas just
summarized. They have rejected  his unmediated democracy as impractical  in anything
like a large and complex society; instead, they have accepted the idea of representation.
However, although they have embraced Rousseau's principled rejection of a diversity of
political groupings, they have steadfastly  ruled out as a possible alternative the sort of
political pluralism he was constrained to admit.

In the light of the foregoing remarks, the following major characteristics of radical

democracy are  identified:

i) 

It is the rule of "the majority". This majority may itself be a minority like "the
proletariaf'or "the workers" in some countries during certain periods of their
histories; or it may be "the peasantry" or "the common people" or just  "the
poor."  With the emphasis on "the majority "(however specified)  radical (or
majoritarian)  democracy  runs the  gravest  risk  of approximating  Aristotle's
characterization  of classical democracy as a form  of sectional rule.

ii)  The will of the majority must prevail at all costs and at all times, implying that

there should be no room for minority views or dissent.

iii)  It  upholds  the  "sovereignty  of  the  people".  According  to  the  French
revolutionaries in their August  1789 Declaration  of the Rights of Man  and
of the Citizen: "The source of all sovereignty is essentially in the nation; no
body, no individual, can exercise authority that  does not proceed  from  it in
plain  terms."  (For  "nation"  read  "the  people"  which  is  a  more  or  less
bloodless  abstraction.)

iv)  Radical democracy acknowledges only a single party (or something approaching
it). For, if the sovereign will of the people must be expressed clearly, then there
should be only one group of individuals whose patriotism, zeal, sincerity, and
ability to discern such as will, are not in doubt. Besides, if the people's will is
sovereign, then any opposition to it must be at best suspect and at worst sinister.
For, any  opposition  of whatever  description  can only  frustrate  the  people's
will. In that case, that group or party of the "saintly" or the "virtuous" or the
"incorruptible", who alone are purported to be able to discern and express the
people's sovereign will, must logically terrorize and suppress all opposition,
and concentrate all power (which is unchecked) in their hands on the people's
behalf. Obviously, not only is the "people's sovereign will" stolen; bat also
the "people's power"  is by logical extension  usurped.

v)  Unlike constitutional or liberal democracy which combines constitutionalism
and democracy, radical democracy recognizes no other elements. The democratic
element alone constitutes the whole system of rule. So, the issue is not more
or less  democracy combined  with other elements  (such as  in  constitutional
democracy) according as the circumstances of a particular society dictate. The
radical democrat, then, regards elementsiike  Constitutional  Limitation  m6

radical democrat, then, regards elements  like Constitutional Limitation and
Criticism, the right to dissent, respect for minority views, the rule of law, a
pluralist civil society, a competitive party system etc. - so much emphasized
by  the  constitutional  democrat  - as  obstructive  and  dangerous.  Indeed,  he
cannot see why any sane person should ever think of putting any obstacles in
the way of the people's sovereign will - implying, of course, his own will.

As modern experience has amply shown, radical (or majoritarian) democracy has the
built-in tendency to metamorphose into despotic or totalitarian democracy propped up by
a terroristic and repressive security apparatus.10 For instance, in justifying the "reign of
terror"  which  raged  from  July  1793  to  July  1794  during  the  French  Revolution,
Robespierre, the revolutionary leader, thundered: "The terror is nothing but justice... it
is less a particular principle than a consequence of the general principle of democracy
applied  to the pressing needs of the  country."11

Alexis  de  Tocqueville  vividly  described  what  he  identified  as  "Democratic
Despotism", which he considered a new phenomenon, in his work on the Ancien Regime
and the French Revolution as follows:

No gradations  in society,  no distinctions of classes,  no fixed  ranks -  a  people
composed of individuals nearly alike and entirely equal - this confused mass being
recognized as the only legitimate sovereign but carefully deprived of all the faculties
which could enable it either to direct or even to superintend its own government.
Above  this mass, a single officer, charged to do  everything in its  name without
consulting it. To control this officer, public opinion, deprived of its organs; to arrest
him, revolutions, but no laws. In principle a subordinate agent; in fact,  a  master}1

Alexis de Tocqueville's characterization of "Democratic Despotism" certainly has

a familiar  ring in the twentieth century.

Such, then, in outline are the perspectives on the constitutional and radical types of
democracy  which  form  the  basis  of the  exposition  that  follows.  We  now  turn  to  the
indigenous (i.e. pre-colonial) and colonial backgrounds of constitutional  democracy.

II

THE INDIGENOUS AND COLONIAL  BACKGROUNDS

The Indigenous  Roots

Before the advent of colonial rule, many African communities, including those in
what is now the territory of Ghana, had evolved their own systems of rule. And some of
the  defining  characteristics  of  these  systems  could  be  described  as  constitutional-
democratic.

Now, it has been aptly noted that not a few students of Africa  - both foreign and
African - have tended to think that because a special name for a phenomenon did not exist
previously, it follows that the phenomenon was equally non-existent.13 It is now generally
agreed  that  many  non-literate,  pre-colonial  African  societies  were  complex  in many
respects. However, being non-literate, they could not organise in writing their thoughts,
feelings  and actions into readily accessible concepts, which, in turn, would be used to

construct rigorous intellectual frameworks of a modern kind. But it does not mean that
those thoughts, feelings and actions did not exist Similarly, because no easily accessible
special names were given to, say, the defining characteristics of modern constitutional-
democratic systems, it hardly follows that some such characteristics were in theory and
practice unknown to some of the pre-colonial systems of rule.

Again, it is arguable that even if these features were not as manifest as they are in
modern constitutional-democratic systems, that is no good reason for believing that they
were not, at the very least, latent or intimated in some of the pre-colonial systems of rule.
It may be argued further that even if a great many of these systems of rule turned out in
practice to be autocratic, that also  is no warrant  for asserting that all of them were  in
principle also meant to operate that way.

These general remarks apply with special relevance to the political systems of pre-
colonial Ghana. Although these systems were different  in some respects, yet they shared
a few crucial features. We shall take the Akan system of rule as a representative example
and  consider  not the  whole  structure,  but  some  of the basic  features  relevant  for  our
purposes.

The chief or king was the central figure of the Akan system of rule. He combined in
his office the supreme legislative, executive, judicial, military, and religious powers of the
state.14 Thus, in principle, he would appear to be an autocrat; but his powers were not
absolute. For there were, also in principle, clearly-defined  checks and balances  which
constituted limitations on his powers.

First, any action he took in the exercise of his powers had to conform strictly to the
traditional laws and customs of the state; he was not a legislator in his own right. Secondly,
any crucial decisions he took had to reflect not his own wishes but those of his subjects.
These wishes had to be ascertained through constant consultation with a council of elders
and periodic consultation with the whole community. Indeed, the chief by custom had to
act only on the advice, and with the approval, of the council of elders which was itself a
representative organ. At a certain stage in the installation of a new chief, these and other
injunctions were forcefully  brought home to him, with the thinly veiled threat that if he
infringed  them he would be deposed.15

The threat of deposition was meant to serve as a constant reminder to the chief that
he  was  ultimately  accountable  for  his  actions  to  his  people  through  their  accredited
representatives, and that he should not act arbitrarily. The system also provided opportunities
for the  "commoners'* to express their views and criticisms, either through either their
lineage heads or an elected leader called the commoners'  spokesman.16

In view of all this, it could be maintained without much risk of error that the Akan
system  of rule as a whole contained some of the features  of constitutional  democracy.
Needless to say, autocracy  did  on occasions emerge; but this should be regarded  as a
violation of the system - an aberration. All that has been said here about the Akan system
of rule was, mutatis mutandis, also true of the systems of rule evolved by most of the
other ethnic groups in pre-colonial  Ghana.

The Colonial Roots

The  imposition  of  British  colonial  rule  had  the  effect  of changing,  and  indeed
distorting, the character and structure of the indigenous systems of rule. Before  dealing
with the relevant changes, it is necessary to indicate, if only briefly, the character of the
imposed system of rule.

f 

i-  i  ,  •»,  „ 
.Established institutions like the exwutive and legislative
civ»I service, Jie courts, the police, and the army. For most of the colonial
cou 
era a^ 
)se institutions were under the firm control of the governor. The executive
council consisted of members who were appointed, and who could be dismissed, by the
governor.  In other words, they were responsible to him. The permanent  officials  were
similarly  responsible to him, and not to the executive or legislative council.  Although
there were a few  liberal  elements within  it, the colonial  system of rule was as a whole
autocratic and paternalistic. Supreme power - executive, legislative, and judicial - rested
with the governor. He was himself accountable not to the people he governed, but to the
British government through the Secretary of State for the colonies.

The British government,  in theory, had formidable powers over their colonies. In
colonial  Ghana, for example, there were certain bills which could not come into  effect
without  its  specific  assent.  In  spite  of  the  existence  of  the  legislative  and  executive
councils, the governor possessed considerable discretionary powers. Under the various
colonial  constitutions,  including  those  of  1950 and  1954, there  was  provision  for  the
governor,  in the interests of public order or good government - and, of course, with the
approval of the Secretary of State for the colonies - to act against the advice of the executive
council, to veto bills passed by the legislative council, or to put into effect bills  rejected
by the  latter.

In respect of the judiciary, the chief justice and puisne judges (who comprised the
supreme court) and the inferior judicial officers  were appointed by the governor with the
British government's approval. These judicial officers could be dismissed at the instance
of the Secretary of State acting on behalf of the British government; and the Secretary of
State himself acted after consulting the governor. Which all meant that the judges enjoyed
no constitutional security of tenure as their counterparts in Britain. It was not until 1954
that this was provided.

Another aspect of the administration of justice was the predominance of the political
officers  - the district,  provincial,  and chief  commissioners.  There  was,  for  instance, a
protective law to the effect  that no action could be brought against any commissioner in
respect  of any act or order performed  in good faith  or made by him in the execution or
supposed  execution of the powers or jurisdiction vested in him. But, it has been shown
that even in the early years of colonial rule the judiciary insisted on respect for the rule of
law on the part of public officials, the ultimate objective being the protection of the civil
liberties  of  the  individual.17  Little  wonder  that  some  people,  especially  the  educated
Africans,  often  emphasized their belief in "British justice" and "fair play"18, although
this did not prevent them from  criticizing and opposing the colonial system of rale as a
whole.

s The stark point is that British autocracy in colonial Ghana was less harsh than that
of,  say, the  French  or  the  Portuguese  in  other parts  of  Africa,  or  even  of the  British
themselves in East and Central Africa. In view of this, the colonial subjects could, within
certain limits19, form voluntary associations, some of which were clearly political; they
could  establish  newspapers  in which  government  policies  and  actions  were  criticized
without necessarily always facing severe punitive measures by the government; and they
could send delegations or deputations of protest to Britain without considerable difficulty.
These constituted what we may call liberal elements in the British autocracy in colonial
Ghana; and the significance  of this fact  was not lost on the Western educated African
nationalists, as will be seen presently.

8

It is convenient at this point to consider one other significant aspect of colonial rule:
namely, the colonial policy on the indigenous political  institutions. Such a policy was
translated into practice through what came to be called the system of indirect rule. By this
system the colonial authorities sought to rule the people at the local  level through the
traditional political institutions. Various native ordinances gave the governor considerable
powers of suspending or deposing a chief, or confirming his enstoolment or destoolment
by his people. Besides, all his public actions were subject to the close supervision  and
control of a colonial official  - the district  commissioner.

Thus, the chiefs became less and less dependent on the will of the people; and there
was a progressive breakdown  of the traditional  processes  of consultation  between  the
chiefs and their people. The latter as a whole increasingly came to consider the chief as
a  servant, a willing tool, of the government;  he was, after  all, paid by the  government
which  could,  whenever  it  pleased,  remove  him  from,  or  retain  him  in,  office.  The
recognition  of  the  chiefs  and  their  councillors  as  "native  authorities"  also  tended  to
exclude the commoners and the better educated  members of the community  from  local
participation  in  decision-making.

Under the Guggisberg constitution of 1925 a system of provincial councils of chiefs
was established  in the  "Gold  Coast Colony".  Later a joint provincial council of chiefs
(JPC)  emerged.  Among  other  functions,  these  bodies  served  as  electoral  colleges  for
choosing a limited number of members for the legislative council; in this way the chiefs
were given institutional representation on the legislative council.20 In its total effect, then,
the system of indirect rule, such as it was, considerably weakened the powers of the chief
vis-a-vis the colonial government; while in relation to his people his powers were shored
up  simultaneously.

And  that  was  precisely  the  standpoint  of  a  section  of  the  politically  conscious
Western  educated  Africans  in the inter-war period such as Casely  Hayford,  Dr. Nanka
Bruce, K.A. Korsah, and J.B. Danquah. The latter asawhole were called the "intelligentsia";
but they may be more appropriately termed the'' nationalist constitutional progressives.''
They included lawyers, doctors, religious leaders, teachers, particularly  in the growing
number of secondary schools and teacher training colleges, literate wealthy merchants or
cocoa farmers, and so on. They had been exposed to Western ideas of constitutionalism,
democracy, nationalism, etc. Some of them had great reverence for the procedural rules
underlying the pre-colonial indigenous political  institutions as well as a masterly grasp
of Western  constitutional  ideas and  practices.  Not  surprisingly,  the  Western  educated
nationalists  as  a  whole  were  much  inclined  to  oppose  the  character  and  structure  of
colonial rale in general and indirect rule in particular on constitutional grounds.

First, they wanted free, representative institutions to replace the colonial autocracy.
The goal was not impossible to realise. After  all, the autocracy contained a few  liberal
elements including the principle of elective representation with regard to the legislative
council which the Guggisberg constitution had introduced on a limited scale. What was
needed was the williagness on the part of the colonial authorities to co-operate with the
constitutional progress! Yes to nourish the tender roots of constitutionalism. It is significant
to  note  that  these  nationalists  were  not  concerned  with  the  political  dimension  of
constitutional government only. They were also convinced that such a form of government
could  and  should  provide  a more suitable  framework  for  the country's  economic and,
social development. As Casely Hayford once put it: "If the Gold Coast were a country
with free Institutions, we should soon have good wharves and harbours, gas works, and
a  railway  communication  all  over the country.  Prosperous  cities  would  grow up, and

knowledge  would  spread  among  all  classes  of  the  people,  producing  a  willing  and
efficient body of workmen for the material development of the vast wealth and resources
of the country.'*21

Secondly, they agreed with some colonial officials,  especially Guggisberg, on the
need to renovate the traditional political institutions to meet the challenges of the times.
Nevertheless, they  strongly felt  that the native authorities  and provincial  councils, for
example,  established  by  the  colonial  regime  had  perverted  the  basic  features  of  the
indigenous systems of rule. Their contention was based on their belief that the pre-colonial
political systems contained certain basic features that ensured limitation of chiefly power,
as already seen. The only right thing to do was to so reform  the prevailing traditional
political  institutions, and indeed the whole colonial autocracy, as to accommodate the
principle of limitation of power and an ever-widening representative democracy.

In any case, as Casely Hayford22 argued, the task of renovating and developing the
"native  state system"  along  "aboriginal  lines and  on scientific  principles"  belonged
primarily,  not  to  the  colonial  authorities,  but  to  the  "educated  Native  if the  British
Government will trust him to do it." By denying the educated Africans as a whole a greater
voice in the legislative council and in the effective  administration of the whole country,
compared with the chiefs, the colonial government had shown its distrust in the ability of
the constitutional progressives to evolve a political system that would be homesprung,
democratically representative, and constitutional.23

And  yet,  it  can  be  argued,  of  all  the  groups  in  the  society  the  constitutional
progressives alone formed the nucleus of what has been termed "the constituent group"
of constitutionalism.  By this  is meant  "a  considerable  number  of the  more  vital  and
intelligent  men  who, animated  by  a  desire  for  freedom,  are  determined  to  organise a
constitutionalist regime".24  As already indicated, because of the attitudes of the colonial
officials as a whole, and especially of the policy of indirect rule, the growth in number of
such a group was arrested.

True, in the immediate post-World War II period, the colonial government gave the
surviving  nationalist  constitutional  progressives,  reinforced  by  a  few  new  ones,  the
opportunity to  participate  effectively  in shaping the type of  constitutional-democratic
system they had all along been advocating. This was the appointment in December 1948
of an all-African  Committee  on Constitutional  Reform  on the recommendation  of the
Watson Commission which enquired into the 1948 disturbances. (Its Chairman was Mr.
Justice J.H. Coussey - hence the popular name, the Coussey Committee.)

It  would  appear  that  the  colonial  government  responded  favourably  to  the
recommendation partly because it may have concluded, after the February 1948 riots, that,
for  the  sake  of  "good  government"  in  an  independent  Ghana,  there  should  be  a
partnership  between  the  chiefs  and  the  constitutionally-minded,  older  established
nationalists.25  But,  in the volatile  circumstances  of the immediate post-war years, the
concession would appear to have been rather belated. (See Section III below.)

Be that as it may, the Coussey Committee, within the limits imposed by its terms
of reference,  made certain recommendations  for constitutionalizing and  democratizing
the colonial political system to some extent. In its Report,26 the Committee stated that, in
embarking  on a new political order, it had chosen the British model of parliamentary
democracy and had sought to blend it with the country's traditional political institutions.
It believed with Martin Wight27 that there was no intrinsic disharmony between the two
systems.

10

On the position of chiefs in the new order, the Committee disagreed with the Watson
Commission that the star of rule through the chiefs was on the decline. It rather believed
that the whole institution of chieftaincy  was so closely bound up with the life of the
country's  communities  that  its  disappearance  would  be  disastrous,  politically  and
socially.2' On the other hand, it rejected the retention of chieftaincy in its old indirect rule
form. Since the complexity of modem life demanded more efficiency in local government,
the  "native  authorities4' should be replaced by  "local authorities.'* The Committee,
however, recommended the retention of the chiefs' councils.

But, in order to blend the old with the new, it proposed that at least one-third of the
seats of the new local councils should be reserved for representatives of the chiefly council
for the area concerned. This synthesis was designed to encourage the emergence  of a
system in which a predominantly illiterate population could gradually but steadily learn
to participate in, and shoulder the responsibilities of,  modern administration without in
the process losing the heritage of the past.

To prevent excessive centralization of government, the Committee  recommended
regional  administrations  under elected councils.  It believed  that these  councils  would
provide the needed guidance forthe considerable number of new and inexperienced local
councils; and they would offer  a greater  number of people the  opportunity  to  acquire
administrative  experience.  The  significance  of  the  recommendation  cannot  be  over-
emphasized, as subsequent events amply showed.

On the  legislature,  the  Committee  proposed a  largely  popularly  elected  body  to
replace  the  traditional  kind  of  colonial  legislative  council  of  nominated  and  elected
members.  There  were  two  proposals  for  a  unicameral  legislature  and  a  bicameral
legislature respectively.29 Under the latter there would be an upper chamber comprising
chiefs  and  non-chiefs  or  elder  statesmen.  The  unicameral  proposal  provided  for  a
legislative  assembly  with  a considerably  expanded  African  membership,  one-third  of
whom would be chiefs or their representatives. Besides, there would be three  ex-officio
members and two members elected by the chambers of mines and commerce.

The proposals on the executive council were equally significant. This council, which
had  hitherto  been  an  advisory  body  to  the  governor,  was  henceforth  to  be the  major
instrument of making policy; and this would mean the introduction of the cabinet system
of government. The council would consist of eight Africans chosen from the legislature,
three ex-officio  members, and the governor as its chairman. There was to be collective
responsibility of the council to the legislature ratherthan to the governor. This would mean
that  if the  legislature  voted  against  a major  policy  of the  government,  or  voted  "no-
confidence*'  in it, the latter should resign.

However,  the  Committee  recommended  the  retention  of  the  governor's  reserve
powers. Which would mean that he could still assent to bills rejected by the ministers and
the legislature if he considered that such bills were in the interest of "public order, good
faith  or good  government."

In respect of the issue of universal adult suffrage, the Committee recommended that
every tax/rate-payer,  male and female,  over twenty-five,  should have the right to vote.
Only in the municipalities, however, would the vote be direct; in the rural areas it would
be indirect.

The reasons for this recommendation are worth quoting in extenso: * 'In taking this
step [the Committee noted] we are fully aware of possible dangers as the country embarks
on the large-scale experiment  of responsible government. We are convinced,  however,
that it is through experience alone that a people can learn the proper use of their rights as

11

citizens, and that they must, at the same time, bear the responsibility for the misuse of
them. We feel  that we can rely on the general good sense of the large majority  of our
people, who are by no  means lacking in political understanding. Nevertheless, we have
weighed the risks involved most carefully and by recommending election in two stages,
except in the cases of the existing municipalities of Accra, Cape Coast, Sekondi-Takoradi
and Kumasi, we have provided a means for the exercise of responsible judgment, in two
stages,  in the  election  of  members  to  the  Assembly.  This process  of  election  should
minimize the dangers inherent in the wide and rapid extension of the franchise before the
development of that full political sense which is the true bulwark against the charlatan and
the demagogue."30

In  making  the  recommendation,  the  Committee  was aware  of the  "popular  cry
throughout the country for universal  adult suffrage."  But  it found  itself in a  situation
perhaps not very different  from  that of the nineteenth century British opponents of the
demand for the rapid extension of the franchise, as already indicated. That is, the members
of the Coussey Committee were convinced that, in the absence of a deeply-rooted tradition
of constitutionalism, the rapid  extension of the franchise would entail grave dangers for
the evolution of the constitutional-democratic order they envisaged for the country.

In  1950 the Constitution (Order-in-Council) was promulgated and came into force
on  1 January  1951. With respect to details, this  1951 Constitution was a watered-down
version  of  the  draft  Coussey  Constitution;  but  it  did  not  depart  radically  from  the
principles  underlying  the  latter.  And  it  was  expected  to  evolve  along  constitutional-
democratic lines.

The Constitution provided, inter alia, for an executive council comprising three ex-
officlo and eight African members, and the governor as chairman. The council would be
responsible both to the governor and to the unicameral legislature called the legislative
assembly. The latter would be composed as follows: a Speaker, three ex-officio members,
six  special  members  representing  commercial  and  mining  interests,  and  seventy-five
Africans  (thirty-seven  from  the  Colony as well as nineteen  each from Asante and the
Northern Territories). Only five of these Africans were to be elected directly; thirty-seven
were  to  be  elected  indirectly  through  electoral  colleges  in  the  rural  areas;  while  the
remaining thirty-three were to be selected by the territorial councils of chiefs.

The general election of February  1951, the first of its kind in the country, was held
under the Constitution. Although within limits the Constitution was patterned after the
British parliamentary system, it was designed for a pre-party political age.31 But because
two  major political parties contested the election, the Constitution became a  veritable
weapon of party political use. The two parties were the United Gold Coast Convention
(UGCC) and the Convention People's Party (CPP),

The UGCC was inaugurated  on 4 August  1947 by some leading members of the
nationalist intelligentsia including G.A. " P a" Grant (chairman) and J.B. Danquah (vice-
chairman). Its major aim was to ensure "that by all legitimate and constitutional means
the direction and control of government should pass into the hands of the people and chiefs
in the shortest possible time." As is common knowledge, at the invitation of the Working
Committee of the UGCC, Nkrumah (after an absence of twelve years) returned home in
December  1947 to assume the post of general secretary.

As a result of some personal and ideological differences with the rest of the Working
Committee, Nkrumah (not without some prodding from some radical youth) broke away
and  inaugurated  his own party, the CPP, on  12 June  1949. Its major aim was that of
"fighting  relentlessly  by  all  constitutional  means  for  the  achievement  of  full  self-

12

government  now  for  the  chiefs  and  people  of  the  Gold  Coast"  The  first  Central
Committee withNkramah as chairman includedKojo Botsio (Secretary), K. A. Gbedemah,
Kofi Baako and Krobo Edusei.

In the general election the CPP won thirty-four of the thirty-eight popularly elected
seats. Nkrumah, who stood as a candidate for Accra while in jail for three one-year terms
for his part in the 1950 "Positive Action" episode, became the "Leader of Government
Business" in 1951 (and prime minister in 1952) at the head of a government formed by
the CPP. Besides the significant question of independence and its timing, there was the
equally crucial issue of whether the constitutional democracy envisaged by the Coussey
Committee could become a reality under Nkrumah and the CPP. At this point, then, it is
necessary to outline the character of the political outlook ofNkrumah in particular and the
CPP in general

in

FIRST PHASE:  1949 -  1957

THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK OF NKRUMAH AND THE CPP

The diverse influences that shaped Nkmmah's political thinking and tactics have
been amply noted. Of these one may single out as, perhaps, the most decisive Marxism-
Leninism and Pan-African nationalism ofthe George Padmore and 1945 Manchester Pan-
African Congress variety.

The considerable influence of Marxism-Leninism on Nkrumah is underlined by, for
instance, his earliest work, Towards Colonial Freedom (at any rate at the level of ideas
and language).32 On his release from prison in February 1951, he declared at his first world
press  conference:  "I  am  a  Marxian  Socialist  and  an  undenominational  Christian",
apparently unaware ofthe contradiction between the two terms. But he also denied being
a "communist" and ever having been one.33 The denial may have been in response both
to the accusation by Sir Gerald Creasy's administration after the 1948 disturbances that
Nkrumah was a "communist" and to the Watson Commission's Conviction that while
abroad he had been "imbued with a communist ideology which only political expediency
[had] blurred."34

Not surprisingly, Nkrumah did not, in the pre-independence  period, openly and
seriously propagate "Marxian Socialism." In fact, for tactical reasons, he ensured that the
CPP and the government would not be identified with it, much less with "communism."
In respect ofthe latter, two ofthe important steps taken may be mentioned. The first was
the heavy-handed  expulsion of Anthony Woode and Turkson-Ocran from the party in
October  1953  for  their  alleged  connection  with  the  communist  -  controlled  World
Federation  of  Trade  Unions  (WFTU).35  The  other  was  Nkrumah's  statement  in  the
legislative assembly in February 1954 that the government would ban communists from
such sensitive areas ofthe public service as the army, police and labour. Interestingly, he
characterised communism as another type of imperialism, but added that the ban was a
strictly security, and not a political, measure.36 So, even though some ofthe  Marxist-
Leninist vocabulary kept cropping up in the party press and publications, and in some
contributions of a few party membersto legislative assembly debates, there was no serious
attempt at formulating a Marxist socialist ideology until well after independence.37

13

But the  Leninist  influence,  which  was  most  marked  in Nkrumah's  methods  of
organisation and propaganda, could not be disguised for long. For in 1953 he confided to
Bankole Timothy:3g '.'From Lenin I took ideas for the party's local organisation." As is
well known, Leninism sees politics in terms of elites and masses; and it emphasizes the
crucial role of a closely-knit and disciplined minority of individuals called the political
vanguard partly because it is sceptical of the organisational efficacy of "mass spontaneity.''
Nkrumah subscribed to this standpoint when he wrote: "Mass movements are well and
good  but they cannot  act with  purpose  unless they  are led and  guided by a  vanguard
political party.' '39 In 1949 the CPP, in a five-point programme, promised to become "the
vigorous conscious political vanguard  ..."40

Earlier  in  1948  after  the  February  riots  a  document,  The  Circle,  was  found  on
Nkrumah  which  was the constitution  of a  secret  organisation  he established  while  in
London.  The  organisation  comprised  individuals  who  were  "trained  and  engaged  in
political Revolution as a profession" and the aim of which was "to maintain ourselves
and 'The Circle' as the Revolutionary Vanguard of the struggle for West African Unity
and National  Independence."  Characterising  its enemies  in the abstract, it pledged to
make it "impossible... for demagogues, quislings, traitors, cowards and self-seekers to
lead astray any section of the masses of the African peoples."41 Moreover, its members
had to swear to the Leader, Nkrumah, an oath of loyalty of a personal and servile kind;
and possible disloyalty was discouraged with some disturbing threats.42

It has been aptly noted that the organisation bore striking influences of the secret
societies of "Young Italy", the cells of Russian revolutionaries and, most significantly,
of the Leninist organisation of communists befbjs. 1917.43 Indeed, The Circle may be
described as more Leninist than Marxist "because it was concerned with the technique
of  capturing  and  maintaining  power,"  which  was  Lenin's  singular  contribution  to
Marxism.44 The Watson Commission, then, was not imagining things when it concluded
that Nkrumah used such a technique to subvert the UGCC leadership.45

There were other influences besides the Leninist. For, if the Leninist influence alone
had prevailed, the CPP should,  in fact, have been a political  vanguard right from its
establishment. While in the United States of America and Britain Nkrumah was able "to
learn the technique  of  organisation"  of as  many political  parties and movements  as
possible.46 In addition there was a motley population in colonial Ghana with all sorts of
ideas and beliefs to be reckoned with. For all these reasons the CPP became "a mixture
of things", as Nkrumah further told Bankole Timothy47 or a "beweildering unity" of
Christianity, paganism, socialist rhetoric and nationalism.48

Be all this as it may, it is no straining of the evidence available to suggest that the
two key strands in the political-outlook ofNkrumah, the nationalist politician, and the CPP
in this period - and  long after -  were nationalism  and democracy.  Both strands were
intimately related and reinforced each other.

For Nkrumah, especially, nationalism was both territorial and Pan-African or West
African. But for reasons of political expedience the emphasis was placed on territorial, i.e.
Ghanaian, nationalism in this period. And the five-point programme the CPP issued in
August  1949 encapsulated the major ingredients of its nationalism.

First and foremost,  CPP nationalism meant the attainment of  "Self-Government
Now!" forthe chiefs and people of colonial Ghana through "constitutional means." But
the achievement of "self-government",  it was realised, did not exhaust the impetus of
nationalism. "Self-Government Now!" was not an end in itself; it was a means to further
ends like complete national unity as well as social and economic reconstruction along

14

"welfarist"  lines.

It was necessary  "to  secure... complete  [national] unity" because the " s e l f,  on
whose behalf political  independence  was claimed,  was  itself polyethnic.  And  without
nationa!  unity  it  would  be  almost  impossible  for  the  party  "to  work  for  a  proper
reconstruction of a better Gold Coast in which the people shall have the right to live and
govern themselves as free people", and on the basis of equality.49

As already indicated, for Nkrumah in particular, nationalism and democracy could
not be separated without serious distortion of the party's short- and long - term objectives.
As he put it later in  1963 : "In  our struggle for freedom, parliamentary democracy was
as vital an aim as independence. The two were inseparable. It was not our purpose to rid
the country of the colonial regime in order to substitute an African tyranny".50 It must be
emphasized here, though, that the kind of democracy Nkrumah and the CPP espoused in
even  the  pre-independence  period  contained  some  elements  of  "radical  majoritarian
democracy."  (See Section  I.)

In Nkrumah's view government derived its power and authority from' 'the masses"
or "the people", and was dependent  on their sovereign will. The success of a national
movement  ever  so  much  depended  on  "every  man  and  woman  of  goodwill"  being
"allowed  to play a part",  the  converse being that those  of "ill-will"  were out  on the
political  limb. "Freedom"  meant that  "power  [must] pass into the hands of the people
and... effectively  exercised by them... through the organs of government which are freely
elected by them... and responsible to them."51 Hence the CPP's impatient and persistent
demand  for  unqualified  universal  adult  suffrage  vis-a-vis  the  Coussey  Committee's
argument for the gradual extension of the  franchise.

Nkrumah  and  the  CPP  made  another  claim  which  became  a  refrain  in  CPP
utterances, and was converted later into a policy: "By forming the Convention People's
Party",  Nkrumah  wrote in his Autobiography,  "an  so introducing the party  political
system the foundation  stone of parliamentary democracy was laid."52  In fact,  he again
claimed, the CPP was established as "the democratic instrument of the people's will and
aspirations."53 For Nkrumah this was necessarily so because only he and his colleagues,
who "wished for genuine progress" and for an egalitarian society, had been able to talk
and hobnob "with the people and by so doing knew their feelings and grievances" as well
as  their  yearning  for  "Freedom"  and  social justice.54  Only  they,  that  is  to  say,  had
succeeded in establishing a symbiotic relationship with the disadvantaged, poor majority;
and they had "excluded no-one [ofgoodwill]". On the other side were the "reactionary",
"disgruntled"  and "opportunist"  nationalist intelligentsia of the UGCC and the chiefs
who sought to exclude "the  mass of the people"; no wonder they  "failed  to make any
headway with the ordinary people".55

Such an assessment of a complicated political situation conceals from view a highly
significant  but simple motivation of Nkrumah and his closest collaborators: namely, to
supplant the existing leadership of the nationalist movement, if only because they claimed
to offer the people the only acceptable' 'New Deal." In this respect, to adapt the pregnant
words of a critical admirer of Nkrumah,  "they  knew exactly what they were  doing,"
despite  "the  innumerable  twists,  turns,  accidents,  and  catastrophes,  large  and  small,
inevitable in all politics".56

However, they were somewhat realistic to have seen that the chiefs as a whole still
wielded a measure of power and authority to pose a threat to the commoners' party in the
rural areas generally.  Accordingly, the CPP was determined to destroy the position  of
power, authority, prestige and dignity that the chiefs still enjoyed in the society. It was not

15

for nothing, then, that Nkrumah, in a speech at the Arena during the "Positive Action**
episode, declared that * 'if the chiefs would not co-operate with the people in their struggle
for freedom then a day might come when they 'will run away and leave their sandals
behind them.***57 To which Nana Sir Tsibu Darku IX, atypical paramount chief, replied
in a speech  in the Legislative  Council  on  19 January  1950:  "Some  ...  grasshopper
leaders who tell us that they are fighting for Self-government  for the chiefs and people
of this country now tell us that the 'Chiefs  will run and leave their sandals behind*. We
all want Self-government, but we do not want Self-government  in a State in which all of
us shall be slaves.**58

Be that  as  it may,  their political  ambition,  reinforced  by their perception of the
prevalent  social and political  forces, induced Nkrumah and his colleagues to represent
themselves as the only "men of the people**, the only "progressives**, who had formed
a * 'People's party*' in which * 'the masses*' would of necessity play a more forthright and
crucial  role  at  even  the  leadership  level.  Opposed  to  them  were  "the  reactionary
intellectuals and chiefs" who were cast in the roles of "quislings'*, "traitors**, "political
acrobats" and "bribe-takers."59 So, given that the nationalist movement represented the
majority  of  the  people;  and  given  that  the  CPP  was  the  sole  organised  democratic
expression of that movement, it followed logically that the CPP represented the majority
of the people.

Thus, at its very inception, the CPP not only saw itself as a commoners* party; it also
came very close to claiming that there was at the time no rival group, nor was one ever
likely to emerge in the future,  which could also legitimately lay claim to the allegiance
of a sizeable portion of the population. The "radical-democratic** implications60 of this
self-image of the CPP were to unfold in the post-independence era, especially. Meanwhile,
again  for tactical  considerations, the CPP must give the impression  that  it was only a
dominant party which was willing and able to observe "the rules of the game.'*

As is common knowledge, the CPP leadership were hyper-critical of the Coussey
Report. Nkrumah, for example, asserted that the draft Coussey Constitution was nothing
short  of  a  "Trojan  gift  horse."  It was  "bogus  and  fraudulent"  for  two  main  related
reasons. The African  ministers in the executive council would have "portfolios  but no
power." For real power would still rest with the colonial officials, particularly the three
ex-officio ministers who would handle the most significant and sensitive aspects of the
administration and would not be subject to African control.61

Then,  on 20 November,  1949, the  CPP  and TUC  convened  a  "Ghana  People's
Representative Assembly" to "coalesce public opinion against the Coussey Report and
to urge the people into effective action." It comprised representatives of the CPP, TUC,
the Committee  on Youth Organization  (CYO), local youth  societies,  ex-servicemen's
union, farmers' associations and the like. The Assembly adopted a resolution demanding
"that the people of the Gold Coast be granted immediate self-government, that is, full
Dominion  status  within  the  Commonwealth  of  Nations  based  on  the  Statute  of
Westminster."62

It also approved a draft Constitution. This proposed a bicameral legislature of a
senate of chiefs and elders as well as a house of assembly of commoners. The senate would
comprise thirty-six members, nine to be elected by each of the four regions, and not less
than one-third  of whom would be non-chiefs  elected by the territoriat councils. The
assembly would consist of seventy-five members to be elected by unqualified universal
adult suffrage, with twenty-one as the minimum age of voters.

16

There would be aa executive council of twelve formed by members of the majority
party in the assembly, one minister without portfolio  from the senate, and only one ei-
offido  minister  of  defence  "approved  by  the  Secretary  of  State  with  the  advice  and
consent"  of  the  executive  council.  (A  youth  organisation,  the  "League  of  Ghana
Patriots", added a riderproposing the complete exclusion of ex-officio ministers from the
executive council) The governor would retain a power of certification  and  veto, to be
exercised on the advice and consent of the executive council. The senate could not reject,
amend or delay a money bill for longer than one month; but it could delay other bills for
one year.

One-third oflocal government councils wouldbe nominated by traditional authorities.
Although there would be "no property qualification" for the local government  franchise,
the payment oflocal taxes would be a condition for the right to vote. Besides, only a part
of the income of" stool lands'' would be given to elected councils for the provision oflocal
social services. Finally, the gathering called for a constituent assembly to debate and draft
a constitution based on the Coussey Report and the amendments made to it.

Apart from the radical insistence on immediate self-government and universal adult
suffrage, these proposals on the structure of central and local government were a relatively
moderate  and  tame  affair.  Obviously,  the  harsh  criticisms  of the  Coussey  Report  by
Nkrumah,  the  CPP  and  other  radical  groups  made  sense  largely  in  terms  of  their
propaganda value.63 For C.L.R. James64 "what really made the [Assembly's] constitution
remarkable was the place allotted in it to the chiefs and elders", which he believed was
in the right direction. But from what has been said earlier on, it must be reasonably clear
that, for Nkrumah at least, the sort of political role assigned to "the chiefs and elders" did
not derive from genuine political conviction.

It is now appropriate to indicate briefly the character of the CPP's popular base. As
is well known, this base was provided mainly by the' 'commoner young men'' of the rural
and urban areas. They comprised illiterates and the proverbial "standard VII boys", some
of  whom  were  engaged  in  various  occupations,  while  others  were  unemployed.65  A
dominant  characteristic  of these  people  as  a  whole  was  that  they  had  as  commoners
derived their experience of power and authority under autocratic colonial rule. As such,
they may not have recognised even the faint traces of liberalism within the interstices of
colonial rule. Instead, they may have seen and experienced  its despotic aspects mainly.
Even though they became the rank and file supporters of the UGCC, they were soon
bewitched by Nkrumah's militant demand for' 'Self-Government Now!'' compared to the
UGCC's  gradualist  demand  for  "Self-government  in  the  shortest  possible  time."
Considering themselves as the "marginalised"  of colonial society, they were extremely
impatient forthe rewards which the attainment of the political kingdom would bring. Thus
it  was  that,  with  the  flag  of  radical  democracy  of  some  sort  nailed  to  the  mast  of
nationalism, Nkrumah  and the  CPP  sought  the political  kingdom, the  "Free  -  dom",
where all other things would be added.

The CPP in Office  : the period  of Tactical  Action

Oa  account  of  their  harsh  criticisms  of  the  Coussey  Report,  one  should  have
expected  that  Nkrumah  and  the  CPP  would  have  neither  contested  the  195!  general
election not accepted the offer to form a government thereafter.  But they did both, as we
have  seen.  And  the  "dyarchy"  (the  partnership  between  the  CPP  and  the  colonial
officials)  was inaugurated; it lasted six years,

17

Nkrumah liked to describe the period as one of "tactical action" - as indeed it was.
He had to explain the move from "Positive Action" (launched in January 1950 to coerce
the British to grant immediate independence) to "tactical action" to allay the misgivings
of an influential radical faction in the pafyfe

One reasxif he gave was that to rejeft the offer to participate in government would
give the opportunity to others to come to power. And these others "in our view, though
not  possibly  in  theirs,  could  not  use  it  to  thetcountry's  best  advantage",  with  the
unmistakable implication that only the commoners' party could and would use power in
the country's best interest. The issue was not whether the CPP could and would rule better
than  other  groups.  Besides,  although Nkrumah  and  his  lieutenants  disliked  the  1951
constitution, they could achieve their objectives by proceeding according to plan. Finally,
their very presence in the legislative assembly and the executive council would enable the
party leadership to fight "both from within and [from] outside the Government for Self-
Government  now."*6

"Tactical  action"  was  a  shrewd  move.  For,  once  in the  government,  the  party
leadership  could  deploy  their position  of privilege  and patronage  to channel  "funds,
minds and people'' in the party's direction. In office the CPP would become the new pay-
master and thus attract support from other strata of society.67 Moreover, the colonial power
would become convinced that the CPP had become responsible and willing to operate
within the framework  of parliamentary government.

The CPP leaders quickly settled down to the business of ruling - and this, within only
two years of the party's establishment. From  1951 to  1953 everything - for them - was
proceeding  apace.  In  his  "Motion  of Destiny"  in  1953 Nkrumah  confidently  stated:
"There  is no conflict  that I can see between our claims and the professed  policy of all
parties and governments of the United Kingdom. We have here in our country a stable
society. Our economy is healthy, as good as any foracountry of oursize. In many respects,
we are much better off than many sovereign states. And our potentialities are large. Our
people are  fundamentally  homogeneous,  nor are we plagued  with religious and tribal
problems...."68

The calmness was deceptive, though. For there were already disturbing  stirrings
among not a few party members, especially in Asante, for greater regional representation
in  the  legislature.  While  the  party  radicals,  including  E.K.K.  Taylor,  J.C.  de  Graft-
Johnson, and J.E. Jantuah, demanded the acceleration of the pace towards independence.69
Perhaps  it was mainly because of this last factor that Nkrumah announced  in the
legislative assembly  in October  1952 that preparations  were afoot to  review the  1951
Constitution in certain respects. He invited the' 'chiefs and people'' to submit memoranda
to the Prime Minister's office. He singled out those aspects of the constitution that needed
review;  though  the  public  was  free  to  make  other  suggestions.  He  emphasized  the
government's determination not to formulate its constitutional proposals until the fullest
opportunity had been allowed for consultation with the public; and until the government
had studied the memoranda submitted.70

Eventually one hundred and thirty-one organisations submitted memoranda. These,
together with views expressed during discussions with some groups, constituted the basis
of the government's White Paper on proposals for constitutional reform published in June
1953,7! It is curious that the government rejected the demand of groups like the Ghana
Congress Party (GCP), the successor of the UGCC, the Ghana National Party (GNP), tie
TUC,  and  the territorial  councils  (JPC,  Asanteman  Council  and Northern Territories
Council) for a constituent assembly to draw up a constitution for the country; a demand

18

which the CPP and other groups had made in November 1949.

It is no exaggeration to suggest that the'People's Party and its representatives in
government aimed at controlling the form, substance, pace and direction of constitutional
change. This they could do with the help of some independents  in the old  legislative
assembly, as happened in 1953, and subsequently with their own majority in the newly
elected one after June 1954.

In their memoranda the chiefs and the nationalist intelligentsia demanded a second
chamber.  Among  other things,  it was  argued, a second  chamber  would check  hasty
legislation  by  the  lower chamber,  and  it  would  enable  experienced  elder  statesmen
(including chiefs), insulated from the "rough and tumble" of party politics, to contribute
their share to the national welfare where it was needed most.73 The reasons are not far to
seek.

The nationalist intelligentsia had been roundly trounced in the 1951 general election.
The chiefs as a whole were aggrieved because of the considerable erosion of their control
over the native authorities as a result of the Local Government Ordinance of 1951. Then,
even at this very early  stage, a great many  of the two  groups  could  see  evidence  of
"hooliganism",  violence,  leader -  worship,  increasing  corruption  in public  life,  and
intolerance of criticism on the part of the CPP and the government - in fine, of "creeping
dictatorship"." With independence not faraway, they looked for the devices of putting
the government on a short chain. And one such device was the second chamber.

But the CPP leaders were opposed to it. They felt that another chamber, filled with
elder statesmen  most  of whom  might turn out to be  "reactionary  intellectuals" and
"feudal elements", should not be allowed to obstruct and frustrate the sovereign will of
the people expressed through their elected representatives  in the legislature. It will be
recalled that in November 1949, the CPP had lent its considerable support to the demand
for just such a body. But this, as already intimated, was a tactical move to entice many
chiefs into the CPP fold. So that it is not a mistake to conclude that the CPP's  rejection
in 1953 of a second chamber of "chiefs and elders" was an exercise in selective amnesia.
If Nkrumah's Marxist-Leninist beliefs were muted in this period, his belief in  "majority
rule"  was always manifest;  a belief which must have been strengthened by the party's
victories in the  1951 general, and the  1952 local government council, elections. It was a
matter of course, then, that one cardinal change to the existing Constitution would be the
requirement that all members of the legislature should be elected on the basis of "one man,
one vote. "74 Therefore, the chiefs, like other citizens, had no right to political office except
through popular election.75

The change, which was embodied in the 1954 constitution, signified the victory of
the commoners  over the chiefs  whom they  regarded as their  "traditional  enemies." It
meant the disappearance of chiefly representation as such from the legislature for good,*"'
The commoners' party thus succeeded in neutralising a significant centre of power at the
national level. (In  1959 the chiefs would be removed completely from the local councils
as well.)

The Federalist  Agitation

Bat in the mid-1950s the nationalist intelligentsia and the chiefs as a whole again
joined  forces  to  pose  a  formidable  chalieage  to  the  CPP.  The  story  of  the  federalist
agitation has often been, told to bear repetition here.77 It is enough for the purpose here to
say that the National Liberation Movement (NLM) with its platform of a federal form of

19

government  for an independent Ghana was essentially- as already indicated - a fairly
reasonable reaction to what the opposition forces regarded as the tendency, during the  first
term of CPP rule, towards strong rule. Not unexpectedly, the federalist agitation let loose
a whole flood of resentment and frustration and anger. And it brought in its wake scenes
of intense violence in Asante especially, and in parts of Akyem Abuakwa, involving both
the NLM and the CPP.

Several independent observers have offered their own interpretations of the episode.
But, everything else apart, the essence of the federalist agitation must be seen for what it
was: namely, the necessity of constitutional and substantive limitations on the powers of
government to stem the' 'creeping dictatorship." Or, as David Apter78 would put it: * 'This
was not simply a problem of a unitary versus a federal form of constitutionalism.... Rather,
it was a question of the safeguards that could be created to preserve the parliamentary
system after the protective arm of residual British authority was gone." (As will be seen
presently, the federalists and their allies conceived "the parliamentary system*' differently
from what Apter may have had in mind.)

Thus, besides the demand for a division  of powers between the centre and the
constituent units, some other crucial devices of constitutionalism were insisted on. These
included the rule of law, a bill of rights, separation of powers, judicial independence and
review as well as an entrenched amendment procedure. When the federalists lost the battle
for strong federalism, they settled forthe devolution of fairly strong administrative powers
to  the  regions.  However,  they  knew  that  the  war  for  the  limitation  of  power,  for
constitutionalism, within the framework of parliamentary democracy, was yet to be won.
Hence their persistent insistence that such devices should be embodied in the independence
Constitution.79

The NLM-dominated opposition forces advanced several arguments in support of
their demand for "Constitutional  Limitation." (See Section I.) At the possible risk of
some distortion, it maybe said that the thrust of these arguments was the conviction that
"unlimited power" posed the gravest danger to individual and group liberty. Therefore,
in a very significant sense, the wholesale adoption of the British system of parliamentary
government without the benefit of its peculiar protective devices - such as was attempted
with the Nkrumah Constitution of 1954 - was inimical to the evolution of constitutional
democracy in Ghana.

Under the  British  system,  it  was  accurately  pointed  out,  parliament  is  legally
sovereign or supreme; and it can enact any laws whatsoever. But a government with a
parliamentary majority operates within the framework of certain traditions, conventions,
customs, precedents and political pluralism. Also, the government itself acts with as much
self-restraint  as possible.  In short, the British system is suffused  with the principle of
"Constitutional Criticism." (See Section I.) Without the widespread recognition of, and
respect  for, such a principle, the British type of parliamentary government cannot be
described as constitutional-democratic.

In  Ghana,  on the  other hand,  the  habits  of  "Constitutional  Criticism",  it  was
correctly seen, were yet to develop among the citizenry as a whole. Even more disturbing,
there was every reason to believe that the CPP government hardly recognised the need for
self-restraint in the manner it used its parliamentary majority to enact certain laws. Indeed,
it was added, its very political orientation precluded the CPP's recognising this need. In
which case, the future of constitutional democracy was very bleak as long as Nkrumah and
the  CPP  remained  in power.  Opposition  spokesmen  cited many  actions  of  the CPP
government to support this contention. A couple or so of these are mentioned below.

20

The opposition maintained that the government made little or no efforts to obtain
a measure of consensus on sensitive issues of intense interest to certain minorities; and it
did not forbear to act in the absence ofsuch a consensus. Thus, relying on its parliamentary
majority, the government passed with indecent haste the Cocoa Duty and Development
Fund (Amendment) Bill of 1954 and the State Councils (Amendment) Bill of 1955 in
complete  disregard  of  the  views  of the opposition and a sizeable  minority  of the
population.

Secondly, a crucial requirement of liberal democracy is the holding of periodic  free
and feir elections whereby the electorate decides who should constitute the government
of the day at both the national and local  levels. The CPP government completely
disregarded this requirement when it again deployed its parliamentary majority to prolong
arbitrarily the stipulated life ofCPP-controlled local councils, presumably until such time
as the electorate would be favourably disposed to re-elect CPP incumbents. This action
provided strong ground for the opposition's belief that the CPP leaders were determined
to extend, after independence, the constitutional term of the CPP-dominated legislature
for five more years. Such a move, according to M.K. Apaloo, would be nothing short of
"a danger to [liberal] democracy.'*10

For the opposition all this was, thirdly, an intimation of the CPP*s intention to
perpetuate itself in power by, among other things, rigging elections (ifthey would be held
at all), and by bringing minatory pressures of all kinds to bear on the opposition with a
view to its elimination. Some opposition leaders even claimed to have got wind of a CPP
plan to arrest and imprison prominent opposition members after independence. This
allegedly partly motivated some CPP members to resign from the parry to join the
opposition. And J.A. Brimah, who claimed to have been one of them, said in 1956 in the
legislative assembly: "We have had a look into the Doomsday Book.""

One could plausibly accuse the opposition of partisanship and special pleading in
its criticisms of Nkrumah and the CPP. For example, to say that in this period the CPP
government was totalitarian is to strain the evidence. On the whole, however, opposition
leaders correctly detected tendencies in CPP political beliefs and practices which were
anything but favourable to the evolution of constitutional  democracy  in Ghana. Put
another way, there were tendencies towards totalitarian control. Therefore, it is suggested
here, the opposition appropriately concluded that "Constitutional Limitation" should be
consciously adopted as the fundamental, guiding principle of the independence Constitution.
With time, the opposition hoped, a tradition of "Constitutional Criticism" might evolve
to complement "Constitutional Limitation."

Predictably,  Nkrumah  and  the  CPP  rejected  federalism  on  the  grounds  of  its
expensiveness and combersomeness as well as of the need for national unity and political
stability  to  provide the peaceful  milieu  for the  rapid and  even social  and  economic
development of all the regions. These were respectable, indeed acceptable, grounds. Even
so, the  CPP's  rejection  of  federalism,  and  its  grudging  acceptance  of a measure of
devolution of administrative powers to the regions, must not be confused with its attitude
to the very principle of limitation of power.

Nkrumah and the CPP clearly opted for a unitary, centralised form of parliamentary
government based on the sovereign will of the people: i.e. for "as workable and as simple
5 system of government as we could devise."82 Some indication of what this "simple
system of government" meant for them has been given already. But the crucial question
is whether, at the height of the federalist agitation, the attempt to reach a greater degree
of  accommodation  with  the  opposition  forces  involved  such  a  reconsideration  by

21

Nkramah and his closest associates of their approach to democracy as would incorporate
the principle of limitation of power as such.

For a possible-answer we now turn to the great speech Nkramah delivered  in the
legislative assembly on  12 November  1956 (hereafter cited as the November speech),83
In  this,speech  he  outlined  the  government's  revised  proposals  for  the  independence
Constitution. He dismissed as unnecessary the opposition's proposals on a council of state
and  bicameralism.  He  also  rejected  the  opposition's  proposed  amendment  procedure
which he criticized as too complicated and, therefore, unworkable, for the government's
own which was, indeed, less complicated (of which more in a later section). On the whole
the speech was conciliatory in tone and content. And in portions of it he rhapsodized on
some of the crucial ingredients of liberal democracy.

First, he touched on the rights of minorities generally. He believed that there should
be  respect  for  "the  rights  of  all  minorities."  And  he  acknowledged  the  value  of
constitutional opposition and a competitive party system. AccordingtoNkrumah,".... the
Opposition in the Assembly must have guaranteed opportunities of raising questions...
which seem to them to be in the national interest. The Opposition must have a guaranteed
proportion of representation on Standing... and Select Committees of the Assembly. In
matters  of great  national  importance  a tradition  should be  established that the  Prime
Minister of the day can consult with the Leader of the Opposition in order to secure, if
possible, a concerted national policy." However, he stated further, the issue of minority
rights  did not  affect  only the parliamentary  opposition.  The  regional  minorities  were
equally  important; and so it was the government's  duty to ensure that  "in the various
Regions of Crhana any minority Party'' was accorded'' fair consideration in the regional

h i ^f 
Secondly, a principle which he thought should be incorporated "in all Constitutions
and which indeed, in itself, contains the very essence of democracy is that there should
be guaranteed free elections." Besides, "if there is any one matter above all else which
I would  describe as the  first  essential  essence of democracy,  it  is the existence  of [a]
machinery to provide for impartial supervision of elections.'' Accurate registers of voters
were very essential for the conduct of elections "in a fair and non-Partisan spirit."

"

|^ 

g 

^

Thirdly, he underscored "the equal importance ofthe rights of individuals. "These

included:

i)  "freedom from arbitrary  arrest";

ii) 

the inviolability ofthe  individual's home and freedom from arbitrary search;

iii)  freedom  from  arbitrary confiscation  of property;

i v)  freedom  of speech, thought, conscience - and of association ("the Government
believes  that  any  individual  should  be  entitled  to join  any  Trade  Union,
Political Party or other association of his choice");

v)  freedom  of the press  "...  provision  should be made by law that any State
Broadcasting system is as free to put the Opposition's point of view as tint of
the Government"; and

22

vi)  the independence of the judiciary: "Above all... the Courts of Law should be
absolutely  independent  of the  Executive  and  should  be  a  bulwark  for  the
defence of the rights of the individuals.'*

It can be argued plausibly that this panegyric on some of the vital tenets of liberal
democracy is sufficient evidence ofNkrumah's acceptance of "Constitutional Criticism*'
and a measure of "Constitutional Limitation.*' But wasn't all this word-play, so much
rhetoric? It has been aptly remarked that political words are an integral part of political
action;  in  tact,  they  are political  action.84  Hence Nkrumah's  profession  of  belief  in
parliamentary government of the liberal-democratic kind, it is suggested, must be seen in
the context of the times and the audience to which the speech was addressed.

The promise of the transfer of power had been given by the British government; but
the instrument of independence was yet to be delivered into the outstreched, waiting hands
of Nkrumah and the CPP. As Nkrumah85 himself counselled his compatriots time and
again, nothing should be done to delay further the fulfilment  of that promise. On that score
alone, he must have been anxious to be manifestly seen to be upholding liberal-democratic
principles in order to conciliate theNLM-dominated opposition forces, the colonial office
and the British public.86 It may be held, then, that the November speech and other such
statements were an integral component of the grand affirmative flow of  'tactical action.''
To buttress this point, we consider, for example, how Nkrumah and his government
handled the issue of guaranteed fundamental rights - a vital device of constitutionalism.
He  explained  in  the  November  speech  why,  on  the  strength  of  a  dispatch  from  the
Secretary of State for the colonies, it was not feasible to include guaranteed rights in the
government's revised constitutional proposals, as the opposition demanded. As Nkrumah
had it, the Secretary of State wanted the post-independence  Ghana legislature itself to
decide issues of a certain kind which included that of the insertion of a bill of rights in the
Constitution.

Now, if Geoffrey  Bing87 is to be believed, the CPP government's draft constitution
did contain guaranteed rights. And, he correctly stated, the said CPP government's bill of
rights was tar wider in scope than the guaranteed rights which were eventually embodied
in the independence Constitution.

Granted this, one wonders why the CPP government failed to insert its full-blooded
bill of rights in the Constitution after  independence, as Nkrumah  had promised  in the
November  speech.  He  had  stated:  "...  for  reasons  which  I  shall  explain  later,  it  is
impossible to include fundamental  rights...  in the Independence Order in Council, but it
is the Government's intention to include these fundamental rights in the Constitution once
Independence has been granted.'m This was not done. Instead, within barely four months
of the attainment  of independence, Nkrumah and his colleagues mounted a  systematic
attack on the Constitution. Obviously, once the attack had been launched, the insertion of
a bill of rights would have amounted to trying to square the circle!

In Nkrumah's Autobiography, which was released on independence day, we read:
' 'even a system based on social justice and a democratic constitution may need backing
up by emergency measures of a totalitarian kind." This statement was no Freudian slip.
It accurately reflected Nkrumah's belief in a very strong unitary, centralised state, armed
with considerable powers, within the framework of which alone divisive tendencies, such
as were evident  in  1954 -  1956, could be  dealt with  firmly,  and social and  economic
development" 'jet-propelled.'" The rough outline of such astate emerged inl957-1960;
while its precise character crystallized  in  1960 -1966. And this takes us to a  selective

23

consideration of the independence Constitution and its subsequent fete.

Notes And  References

1)  This section draws heavily on F.K. Drah, "Democracy: Radical and Liberal"
in  K.A.  Ninsin  and  F.K.  Drah  (eds.), The  Search  For  Democracy  in  Ghana. Accra:
Asempa Publishers, 1987, and F.K. Drah, "Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: The
Bedrock of Constitutional Rule*' in K.A. Ninsin and F.K. Drah (eds.), Ghana's Transition
to Constitutional Rule. Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1991.

2)  See,  for  example,  C.H.  Mcllwain  Constitutionalism:  Ancient  and  Modern.

Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1947.

3)  For further elaboration of the two principles, see J.R. Lucas, The Principles of
i.  London: Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 34 - 41.
4)  Some would include federalism and bicameralism. It is arguable that federalism,
for instance, presupposes constitutionalism.  See C.J. Friedrich, "Some Reflections  on
Constitutionalism for Emergent Political Orders" in H.J. Spiro (ed.), Patterns of African
Development: Five Comparisons. New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1967, p. 28.

5)  John Plamenatz, On Alien Rule and  Self-Government.  London: Longmans,

1960, pp. 50-51 and 64.

6)  For a brief explanation of "Civil Society*', see F.K. Drah, "Civil Society and
the Transition to Pluralist Democracy'*  in K.A. Ninsin and F.K. Drah eds., Political
Parties and Democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic. Accra: Woeli Publishing Services,
1993.

7)  The most relevant work in this regard is The Social Contract translated by

Maurice Cranston. Penguin Classics, 1968.

8)  It is very important to note that, for Rousseau, the general will is an inherent
potential of the individual; it cannot, therefore, be manufactured outside the individual as
dictators relentlessly try to do.

If Rousseau had in mind political parties only, then the implementation of his

9) 

recommendation would certainly result in anarchy.

10)  See,  for  example,  J.L.  Talmon,  The  Origins  of  Totalitarian  Democracy.

London: Sphere Books Ltd., 1970.

11)  Quoted in B. Crick, In Defence of Politics. Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1964,
pp. 60-61; my emphasis. See also A. Cobban, A History of Modern France (Vol. I): 1715
-1799. Hammondsworth: Penguin,  1962, pp. 213-234.

12)  Quoted in B. Crick, op. cit, p.63.
13)  Ali A. Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition.

London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,  1967, pp.  3 - 4.

14)  K.A. Busia, Africa in Search of Democracy. London: Routledge and Kegan

Paul, 1967, p. 23.

1985, pp. 38-39 and  81-84.

15)  Kwame Arhin, Traditional Rule In Ghana: Past and Present. Accra: Sedco,

16)  K.A.  Busia, op. cit,  pp. 23 - 26.
17)  S.O. Gyandoh and J. Griffiths, A Sourcebook of the Constitutional LflW ftf
Ghana fVni. iir Part 2). Publications of the Faculty of Law, University of Ghana, No. 1,
1972, p. x.

18)  M. Wight, The Gold Coast Legislative Council. London: Faber and Fab«r,

1947, p. 173.

24

19)  The colonial government passed a number of laws that restricted freedom of
expression and movement. These included the Criminal Code (Amendment) Ordinance
(No. 21 of  1934) popularly called the Sedition Ordinance.

20)  Even though  the  Asante  Confederacy  Council  was restored  in  1935 as the
highest Native Authority for the whole of Asante, the Asante chiefs were not represented,
through the Confederacy  Council, on the central legislative body until  1946.

21)  0oiilC_ojst» Legislative Council Debates. 2 Nov.,  1918; my emphasis.
22) 
J. Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions. London, 1903,pp. 253-54.
23)  Guggisberg, for example, carried this distrust to the extent of impugning the
motives of the constitutional progressives when he said that the type of Constitution they
advocated was "... a mushroom constitution based on the ballot box and the eloquence
of  politicians  over  whom  the  people  have  no  control  except  at  election  time,"  G.
Guggisberg, The Gold Coast: A Review of the Events of  1920 -.192.6 and the Prospects
of  1.927-.28.  Accra,  1927, p. 23.

24)  C.J. Friedrich in H.J. Spiro (ed.), op. cit,  p. 24.
25)  Little wonder that the Committee comprised  only representatives of the two

groups, to the exclusion of the  "commoners."

26)  Gold  Coast:  Report to  His  Excellency  the  Governor  by the  Committee  on

Constitutional Reform.  Colonial No. 248,  1949 (or Cjajs^exRepoit)  par. 27, p. 8.

27)  M. Wight, op. cit., p. 34.
28)  Coussey Report, in par. 36, p. 9.
29) 

In the event, the Secretary of State for the colonies accepted the proposal  for
aunicameral legislature. See Gold Coast; Statement by His Majesty's Government on the
Report of the Committee on Constitutional Reform.  Colonial No. 250,1949, par.  18, p.
6.

30)  Coussey Report, par. 42, p. 10.
31)  D. Austin,  "The  Ghana Government"  in AFRICA SOUTH, Vol. 3, No. 3,
April  - June  1959, p. 92, and  Kwame Nkrumah,  Autobiography  of  Kwame Nkmmah.
London: Panaf Books Ltd.,  1973, p. 140.

32)  See B.D.G. Folson, "The Development of Socialist Ideology in Ghana,  1949
-1959 Part I"  in Ghana Social Science Journal. Vol. I, No.  1, May  1971, pp.  1 and  13 -
14.

33)  Bankole  Timothy,  Kwame Nkmmah:  His  Rise to  Power.  London:  George

Allen and Unwin,  1963, p. 104.

34)  Gold  Coast: Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the

£jMd_£fiast>  Colonial No. 231, 1948 (or the Watson Report), pars.  71-74.

3 5)  Anthony Woode was President of the Trade Union Congress and a member of
the Legislative Assembly; while Turkson-Ocran was the General Secretary of the TUC
and Secretary of the Parliamentary Committee of the CPP, See B.D.G. Folson, Ibid, pp.
8 - 9.

36)  G^M£MMj^gMstimAssfimMx£fibjtes  (GC, LAD), 25 Feb. 1954, No. 1,

Cols. 980 - 982.

' 37)  This was shortly after  his visit to the Soviet Union during  1961 - 62.
38)  Timothy, op. cit, p, 68,
39)  Kwame Nkrumah, op. cit, p. vii.
40)  See George Padmore, IMSpJdXojstEexoiMliM.  London: DobsoE, 1953, p.
72, and Kwame Nkmmah, op. cit., p. 83, where a sixth point on West African  Unity is
added

25

41)  K. Nkrumah, op. cit., p. 50.
42)  Watson Report, Appendix 11.
43)  K.R. Minogue, Nationalism.  London: B.T. Batsford,  1967, pp.  108 - 9.
44)  B.D.G. Folson, ibid., p.  14; emphasis added.
45)*  Watson Report, pars. 71-74.
46)  K. Nkrumah, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
47)  Timothy, op. cit., p. 68.
48)  Richard Wright, Black Power. London: Dobson,  1954, p. 164.
49)  GC. LAD. No. 2 10 July,  1953, p, 274, and K. Nkrumah, op. cit, pp. 82 - 83,
50)  Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite. London: Panaf Books Ltd., 1974 (first

published  in  1963), p. 66.

51)  K. Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 90.
52)  K. Nkrumah,  ibid., p. 89.
53)  K. Nkrumah,  ibid., p. vii; my emphasis.
54)  K. Nkrumah,  ibid., p. 90.
55)  K. Nkrumah,  Africa  Must Unite, p. 54.
56)  C.L.R  James,  Nkrumah  and  the  Ghana  Revolution.  London:  Allison  and

Busby,  1977, p. 82; emphasis added.

57)  K. Nkrumah  Autobiography  ..., p. 99.
58)  Gold  Coast  Legislative  Council  Dabates,  19 Jan.,  1950,  pp.  9  -  10;  my

67)  R.  Rathbone,  "Ghana"  in J.  Dunn (ed.), West  African  States: Failure and

Promise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1978, p. 23.

68)  GCf LAD. July  1953 No. 2, p. 268.
69)  D. Austin, Politics in Ghana, pp.  167 - 70.
70)  GC. LAD. Oct.  1952 No. 3, Cols. 500ff.
71)  The Government's Proposals for Constitutional Reform, June 1953.
72)  See,  for  example,  the  Memorandum  of  the  Joint  Provincial  Council  on

Constitutional  Reform,  1953.

73)  D. Austin, Politics in Ghana, pp. 171 - 194.
74)  See GC.  LAD.  10 July  1953, No. 2,  for  arguments  to this  effect  by CPP
members during the debate onNkrumah's "Motion of Destiny" on constitutional reform
tabled on  10 July, 1953.

26

emphasis.

59)  K. Nkrumah,  Autobiography,  passim
60)  See J.L. Talmon, op. cit., passim
61)  B. Timothy, op. cit., pp.  101 - 5.
62)  K. Nkrumah, Autobiography  ... p. 93.
63) 

Interestingly, J.B. Danquahand seven others, who wereamongthoseNkrumah
described as "reactionaries", in a Rider to the Coussey Report agreed with the "League
of Ghana Patriots" that there should be no ex-officio  members in the Executive Council;
they  were  equally  opposed  to the  Governor's  retention  of the  "Power  of Veto."  See
Coussey Report, pp. 70 - 74.

64)  C.L.R. James, op. cit., p. 96.
65)  See D. Austin, Politics  in Ghana,  1946 -1960. London: Oxford  University

66)  See  "Daily  Graphic"  Publication:  The  Gold  Coast  and  the  Constitution,

Press,  1964, pp.  13 - 28.

1952, p. 13.

•

75)  K. Nkrumah, AlMliQgffiSte»«  pp.  119 and 221 - 222.
76)  Under  the  QQM Coast .(Constitution)  QMer  in,,Council  1554,  s.  13, the
Legislative Assembly comprised the Speaker and 1 €4 members elected by tmiversal adult
suffrage.

77)  See, for example, D. Austin, op. cit., ch. vi.
78)  David E. Apter,' 'Nkrumah, Charisma, and the Coup'' Daedalus. Vol. 97, No.

3 (Summer),  1968, p. 780.

79)  See, for  example, Statement  by the National  Liberation  Movement  and  its
Allies  on  the  Gold  Coast  Government's  Constitutional  Proposals  for  Gold  Coast
Independence. Kumasi: Abura Printing Works,  1956; K.A. Busia, Judge for Yourself.
Kumasi: Abura Printing Works, 1955; J.B. Danquah, "New Slavery in Ghana" Ashaoii
Pioneer,  11 Sept.,  1954; H.K.  Akyeampong, The poyen  Speaks: Some of the Historic
Speeches bv Dr. J.B. Danquah. Accra: West African Graphic Co. Ltd.,  1956; GC. LAD.
1956 - 57, Vol. I, No.  1, passim, etc.

80)  GC. LAD.  1955 - 56, No. 4, col.  1261
81)  GC. LAD.  1956 - 57, First Series, Vol. 2, col. 83.
82)  K. Nkrumah, Autobiography... p. 230.
83)  GCr LAD.  1956-57, First Series, Vol 2, cols.  13-67.
84)  W.J.M. Mackenzie, Power, Violence. Decision. Hammondswoith:  Penguin,

1975, p. 9.

speech.

85)  See,  for  example,  Daily  Graphic.  11  Sept.,  1956, and  the  12 Nov.,  1956

86)  B.D.G. Folson, "The Development of Socialist Ideology in Ghana...", p. 7.
87)  Geoffrey  Bing,  Reap  thg  Whirlwind:  An  Account  of  Kwame  Nkrumah's

Ghana  1950-1966. London: McGibbon and Kee,  1968, pp.  177ff.