RESEARCH REVIEW <NS) VOL. 14, NO. 1 (19ft)

BUREAUCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE EMERGING

NATIONS: AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH

Kwame Boakye-Sarpong

Introduction

Political and Economic Development cannot be achieved without a competent bureaucracy,
regardless of how popular its goals are because programs and policy decisions are not self -
enforcing. It is the bureaucracy, which puts policy decisions into practical results. However,
structural, and functional problems have plagued the effectiveness of the bureaucracy in toe
developing countries.

hi order to accomplish multidirectional ends of development, governments have embraced
aspects of development planning and administration efforts  that involve the reshaping of
the public and official  attitudes and behavior in accordance with national aspiration. The
administrator remains a vital cog in the achievement of social planning.

The bureaucracy determines the manner in which responsibilities and functions are distrib-
uted among various levels of administrative hierarchy, and the linkages and functional rela-
tionships among them. This confers on the officers  of the bureaucracies, formal and infor-
mal roles because of their high visibility.

In order to achieve the economic, social, cultural, political and administrative aspects of
development, modernity must be sought The process of modernization continues even hi
the most developed countries. Administrative Development, which is the increasing ability
of the political system to formulate and implement government decisions through the civil
service, is very crucial.

In the context of the emerging nations, development administration embraces the
tratkra of developmental programs designed to transform the quality of life of the people
and the manner in which planned changes are affected.  The underlying assumption in De-
velopment Administration is that there is a direct relationship between the levels of admin-
istrative development,  which embrace the beliefs and attitudes of the bureaucrats towards
modernizing values and me successful  formulation  and implementation  of  development
plans.

Administrative reform is needed, to artificially indiK* administrate transformation  m
der to address perceived problems. Lack of committed politicians has been a major factor
obstructirg administrative  cfcat^aiirirefirra

The bureaucratic culture in the developing systems is very complex, often ambivalent  and
contradictory.  The explanation  may be the interaction between the values of the bureauc-
racy and those of the rest of the larger society.

This study takes an ecological approach to the administrative analysis of the bureaucracy in
the emerging systems. Bureaucracies in the developing  countries, for fear of survival  tend
to resist  change. This paper intends to examine the support  systems as well as sources of
resistance which impact on the bureaucracies and the consequences of such mechanisms on
the administration of change and development.

The Ecology of  Administration

Various  systems of  administration  have been  transplanted  into  the  third  World  countries
mainly due to their colonial relationship prior to independence. It is obvious that this history
greatly affects the way  in which administration is carried out in these countries.

Public Administration operates in a dual environment because of its nature as a public body,
as well as a formal  organization.  Also, administration is intimately involved with a variety
of political acts and actors, involving complex processes of bargaining and negotiation.  We
conceive  of  the  administrative  structure  of  government  as  political,  not  only  because  it
makes decisions affecting  the authoritative allocation of values, but also because the man-
ner in which it goes about affecting  this allocation is political. This is obvious when agen-
cies bargain  for  their growth and survival  in the budgetary process. Public  administration
operates  in  a political  arena  and  therefore  must  adopt  political  methods.  The  social  and
economic systems of society place boundaries on actions of government, and more  specifi-
cally on public administration. The political culture is equally important in setting bounda-
ries of acceptable political actions.

The  effectiveness  and  inefficiency  of the administrative  systems lie in the kinds of  social
values internalized and practiced by the society. One aspect of societal  culture, which  im-
pacts on the performance of administrative system, is the level at which il is legitimized  as
an instrument of organization and  development.

Since bureaucracies are developed  in conformity  with the Weberian  ethos to provide  con-
sistency  and rationality  in the application  of rules, and to uphold fairness  in all  organiza-
tional practices, it becomes imperative that for a bureaucracy to function  effectively,  it must
be predictable and  impersonal.

Almond and Verba  speak of parochial, subject  and participant  cultures on the basis of  the
willingness of the  individual  to participate in politics. Political  culture alludes to the atti-
tudes, values and orientations of the governors (leaders) and the governed toward the politi-
cal system and particularly  what the role of the political  system should be in the develop-
ment process.

Good  development  plans need  an  effective  political  system  to translate  them  into  actual
output  programs.  On  the  same  token,  an  inadequate bureaucracy  can  corrupt  politicians.
Also,  inefficient  civil  servants  and  insensitive  and  apathetic  public  can  undermine  well-
articulated development plans. Political development, which is the process in which politi-
cal systems become more effective  and self-directing,  is always a prelude for a  meaningful
economic  development.

The amount of resources and the manner in which available resources are distributed,  the
size and competence of the administrative bureaucracy, the honesty of the participants, and
the nature of the culture influence the way in which the political systems  function.

Recalling problems of administration in Eastern Nigeria, David and Audrey Smoke (1972)
observe that the "dash" -  The practice of giving and receiving gifts has become a common
practice at all levels. Ministers and Permanent Secretaries, through kickbacks and  inflation
of contract fees have introduced bad habits into the civil service. By using public office  or
authority for private material gains, the endemic nature of public official  corruption  makes
people to view politics as a great market place in which people barter influence for material
assets. Hence, corruption inhibits the bureaucracies from becoming more effective  vehicles
for administration and development.

In many developing countries, the parochial political cultures tend to replace the participant
civic standards. Most civil servants, politicians and citizens view politics as a quick means
to accrue wealth. Thus, this becomes the motivational  tendency  for political  participation
and the basis for running for public office. Emphasis on resource allocation and distributive
functions  of government  is solely based on the expansion of social services and amenities,
which lack productive and parsimonial  benefits.

Political orientations harm rural development. Political consideration also, outweighs other
program evaluation techniques in siting projects. Even in some instances, civil servants, for
fear  of rebukes and retaliation from politicians sometimes  succumb to political pressures.
Hence,  resources  are  allocated  unfairly  among  competing  interests  and  groups.  Political
intimidation and pressure to extend services to select areas under a specific time table with
amounts of resources and skilled manpower not put into consideration make rural devel-

^  .uent projects to be carried out haphazardly.

The bureaucracy operates under political leadership. In the third world countries, where the
leadership is very monolithic, there is little or no choice for the bureaucratic manager. The
political  institutions:  legislature,  cabinet, political parties and  in  some  instances  pressure
groups, provide the framework  of purpose, goals, timetable and resources for  development
purposes within which the bureaucracy  must work.

The  bureaucracy  functions  in  a  largely  traditional  society  characterized  by  regional  and
communal  heterogeneity,  rural underdevelopment,  illiteracy, poverty  and economic  ineq-

uity. The interaction between society and flic bweaucnfcy is art abrays fimwnfcle to the
growth of effective administration and to any socio-economic change, or modernization.
The effectiveness of the bureaucracy as an instrument of development is influenced by its
culture -  its systems of values and the way it operates. In looking at the Indian bureaucracy,
Ramesh Arora (1974) observes mat the image of the power and prestige of its bureaucracy
is lessening. It is losing its paternalistic overtones and values, and is now becoming very
adaptive and accommodating. However, Arora (1974) identified  select salient features ex-
hibited by contemporary Indian bureaucracy to include adherence to formal rules and prec-
edents, frustration  for the officials,  rigidity and lack  of internal  communication,  lack of
initiative, responsibility, challenge and innovation.

Politics and Administrative Relationships: Patronage and Clientelism

The patron-client relationship develops between parties unequal in status, wealth and influ-
ence. The formation and maintenance of the relationship depends on reciprocity in the ex-
change of goods and services. The development and maintenance of a patron-client rela-
tionship rest heavily on face to face contact between the two parties.

A client-bureaucrat  within a patron-client  system is expected  to place the interest of his
patron above that of the organization. He distributes and withholds favours in keeping with
the needs of his patron, and breaking the rule, if he needs to. A person wishing to receive
from the government, a service due him under the law must develop a personal reciprocal
relationship  with  a  client-bureaucrat  through bribes  in  order  to receive  it;  otherwise  he
cannot  expect the  law  to  be  obeyed.  It  is  this  type  of  social  relationship  that  Edward
Schumacher (1975) observed in Senegal.

According to Schumacher (1975) clientage and patronage pervade the functioning of politi-
cal, social, economic and administrative structures of the new nations. He defined political
clientelism  as a personalized  relationship between actors  (patrons and  clients)  or sets of
actors commanding unequal wealth, status or influence based on conditional loyalties and
involving mutually beneficial transactions. Those transactions entail the reciprocal flow of
goods and services. The power figure provides short-run material rewards, political protec-
tion, or opportunities for  social mobility in exchange for his followers'  loyalty,  political
support and public esteem.

The "machine" has necessarily no political ideological underpinning. Its basic interest lies
in distributing  incomes to  those who run  it  and also  operate  under  its umbrella.  Public
institutions are indispensable elements of power in its arsenal. They are valued as the basic
and main sources of patronage.

Politics is viewed as a source of "give and take." It is looked upon as preoccupied  with
government jobs, contracts, licenses, subsidies, loans, scholarships, public works, payoffs,
sinecures and favours.

Clientelism creates vertical links between the leaders and die masses through the interven-
tion of middlemen or brokers whose mediating endeavours tend to enhance the legitimacy
of the regime, especially among groups and populations undergoing developmental changes.
Thus "machine" politics in this instance maintains a conservative attitude to change.

The public policy implications of this "machine" politics are that it encourages short-term
gains in lieu of long run transformation and development goals. Its ability to operate as an
institution within the political and administrative arrangements allows it to oppose changes,
which are perceived to work against the interests of political elites. Describing the attributes
and consequences of machine style clientelism to the operation of the ruling party in Sen-
egal; Schumacher (1975) postulates that expectations of short-run, concrete material payoffs
are paramount; the struggle over patronage is becoming an end in itself; and ethnic regional
groups are incorporated primarily through computation and the distribution of material ben-
efits.

Expectations for material payoffs are a part of a larger complex set of motivations. Material
incentives are used as a means of maximizing the symbols of affective  regard to which the
agents consider their entitlement. Leaders to cement their power-hold use machine form of
clientelism. It is parochial, divisive and inherently factional  in its allocation of goods and
services. It is obsessively concerned with patronage, prestige and personal aggrandizement.
It has damaging and corrupting impacts on administration and the use of authority. Hence,
its distorting effects  on government programs are consequential.

There is lack of public service orientation among civil service personnel at various levels of
administration. Widespread practice of politicized recruitment and delegation of tasks and
assignment  are  reported.  Promotions  disregard  merit-based  criteria.  Thus,  low  levels of
productivity  emanating from poor work habits, indiscipline,  corruption, and  over-staffing
threaten administrative  efficiency.

The structure and patterns of administrative behaviour discourage any meaningful  form of
popular participation in matters affecting the lives and welfare of the populace. Such levels
of alienation breed suspicion and distrust among the masses towards the agents of adminis-
tration.  With the apparatus of administration highly centralized poor coordination  of ad-
ministration activity result. There is lack of efficient public bureaucracy linking the urban
administration with the rural population. This negatively impacts on planning and imple-
mentation of rural economic development.

The administrative process presupposes a positive relationship between the administrator
and  his  clientele  members of the public who enjoy  his services. But,, according to Fred
Riggs (1964) relationships between administrator and clientele are structured in the "Pris-
matic Mode" in such a way that the weight of sanctions brought to bear upon the "sala"
official encourages violation of the kws and regulations guiding the professional conduct of
administrators.

Expectation of rewards activates the "sala" officials to devise procedural delays and other
forms of technical reasons and obstructions in order to induce clients to offer payment  for
what they are entitled to by right

In some cases, the "sala" official  may have a divided loyalty and interest. He may become
a trustee or manager of a business entity. Time devoted to his engagements is divided. He
finds himself devoting as much time to his extra curricula activities as to his bureaucratic
duties. Major conflicts of interest arise, since the rationale of his entrepreneurial role is his
ability, as an official  to provide contracts, perquisites,  and protection  for  his own  enter-
prises, in competition with those of his rivals. Fred Riggs (1964) further posits that in the
"prismatic" situation, the bureaucratic post in nominally public business provides opportu-
nities for diverting public funds into the pockets of officials.  This explains why a govern-
ment enterprise engaged in a potentially profitable undertaking appears to lose money. Hence,
it attempts to rely on increased tax revenues and possibly foreign aid. The recalcitrance of
prismatic clienteles effectively  obstructs administration in the sale model and contributes to
bureaucratic prodigality.

Structural and Institutional Problems of the  Bureaucracy

Colonial and imperial rules left new states after independence with Western forms of parlia-
mentary, legal and economic systems. These alien institutions were transplanted and super-
imposed upon their body politics. The developing bureaucracies unlike their Western coun-
terparts, which developed into "hard" state became less disciplined, and more corrupt.

Modem bureaucracies are based on Max Weber's "rational -  legal" model, where the ad-
ministrative units are structured to maximize efficiency  and where employees are recruited
on the basis of achievement.

As Monte Palmer (1978) observes, former colonial territories inherited bureaucratic struc-
tures patterned after those of the colonial systems. Such administrative arrangements may
have functioned well in their European settings and environment but failed in the emerging
nations because they were mainly designed to maintain internal security in the colonies, and
to control the masses rather than to mobilize them for the purposes of national development.
When the colonies  achieved  independence,  they  acquired  the full  burdens of  economic
development as well as responsibility  of a myriad  of administrative  activities previously
assumed by the pre-independence bureaucracies.

Ferrel Heady (1991) observes that the colonial  administrative heritage was suited  to the
requirements of colonial governments rather than those of the newly independent states. It
was more elitists, authoritarian, aloof and paternalistic. It is then, not surprising that some
of these bureaucracies characterize the new states. Also, the fact that precedents from out-
side have largely shaped the developing bureaucracies does not necessarily mean that they
are less suited than if they were indigenous. But, it does emphasize the importance of mak-
ing adaptations after independence as conditions change, in order to enhance the legitimacy

of these bureaucracies, and to point them towards the accomplishment of developmental
goals.

The bureaucracies are in short supply of skilled manpower necessary for development pro-
grams,  Their problems are not necessarily  lack of employable technical  manpower, but
under-employment -  people are not employed where their skills are utilized to the maxi-
mum. The aftermath of such venture is that the developing bureaucracies suffer from  staff-
ing problems as well as shortage for qualified administration personnel. When the develop-
ing countries nationalized their inherited bureaucracies, the expatriate personnel were re-
placed with limited indigenous skills and manpower. Thus, individuals of limited training
and experience filled upper level positions in several developing states.

The administrative vacuum created by the upward mobility of middle .level manpower to
high-ranking positions in the bureaucracy remained unfilled. So. crash programmes became
the only plausible approach. As Monte Palmer (1978) observes, new functions  were either
scattered  more or less indiscriminately  among existing units or were allocated to Jiastily
conceived  organizations bearing  little relationship to the needs of the total  system. The
frequent result was waste, inefficiency  and disenchantment.

In the face of manpower shortage, the new governments initiate new extensive development
programs,  thereby  stretching the available  supply of qualified  bureaucrats.  It sftouid  be
recalled  that  in the lower  eehelon of most of the developing bureaucracies,  there  is an
abundant pool of lower level manpower, most of whom lack the requisite administrative
skills, because of the practice of using the public service as a substitute for a social security
programme or as a way to relieve the problem of unemployment, and wkhomrqnestlon, «ne
of the reasons for mamtainmga surplus^rf rank and file employees-tin the public payroll. In
most cases, in-service training programmes seem to be futile since even the few who pos-
sess skills are not often used in areas relevant to their skiff.

In developing  countries, income-per  capita is low. Thus, personnel  problems have  been
aggravated by the substandard wages paid to lower and middle range bureaucrats, frequently
forcing them to seek additional employment  In some instances, they may be tempted to
compromise their integrity by taking bribes. This kind of practice is predictable in social
groups where the extended family system is the norm.

Most bureaucratic systems in developing countries provide very little incentive for indi-
vidual initiative and^ierfbrmance. Promotions are mostly based on factors of long service
records and conformity to the hierarchy, thereby reflecting Guy Peters' assertion that tradi-
tional societies recruit individuals to positions in society and administration on the basis of
ascriptive criteria -  status, language, religion, gender and ethnicity. Non-merit considera-
tions greatly influence promotions, assignment dismissals, and other personnel actions within
the service, as well as the conduct of business with agency clientele on the outside.

Public administration  in the developing countries suffers  from  technical and procedural

problems. Most equipment are inadequate, old, antiquated and obsolete. This hampers re-
cording and filing systems. Typewriter maintenance is a case in point

Planning puiposes require statistical data. Higher level bureaucrats are responsible for de-
signing and implementing development programs, which are frequently  complex There is
always lack of basic statistical information about resources and population. With shortage
of computers and adequate data, census figures where available are not accurate and as such
serve as little more than gross estimates. There are no reliable survey data regarding infant
mortality, birth  and death  statistic for rural development  and planning purposes without
which the ability of programme planners is hindered.

Bureaucracies as well as political institutions play  a crucial role in systems maintenance
and goal attainment functions in the society. In the third world countries, the administrative
Systems tend to be more developed than the political sector. The consequence is that  after
independence, the political sector is ill equipped to determine the appropriate goals of ad-
ministration. Hence, the weakness of the political institutions was exacerbated by the exces-
sive growth of the bureaucracy and government programs.

The concept of unequal administrative development provides an insight into the way the
developing bureaucracies behave under certain circumstances. Public bureaucracies in these
emerging nations tend to become powerful  as a result of the persisting legacy of colonial
bureaucratic rule and because of the deliberate efforts made by governing elites to expand
«nd fortify  the administrative arm of government as a primary  instrument for  promoting
planned economic growth.

The rapid expansion of the bureaucracy inhibitsJheiieyelopinent^f  effective political insti-
tutions like the legislature and the judiciary. In this way, the fundamental imbalance in the
relationships between administrative and political structure is maintained. Lack of moderat-
ing forces in the political system promotes non-merit standards hi the administrative proc-
ess.

Because of the absence of effective political control, the administration of public policy is
marked by pervasive practices of bribery, nepotism,  over-staffing,  self-enrichment,  con-
cealment of poor performance, and lack of commitment in the implementation of the pro-
grammes and the realization of development goals.

Organization of the  Bureaucracy

There is a direct relationship between  the organization  of the bureaucracy,  the political
system and the promotion of rural development and transformation.  In developing coun-
tries, the majority  of the population resides in the rural areas. The major  organizational
challenge facing the systems is the establishment of linkages between central decision mak-
ing institutions and the local communities.
It is necessary to have communication networks and strategies through which some tech-
niques for development projects like agricultural innovation methods can be communicated

to farmers,  coupled with technical assistance they  may require in order to implement  new
fanning  practices.  The  duplication  of  diverse  functions  within  ministries  often  threatens
development  programs. By  establishing  several  ministries concerned  with rural  develop-
ment,  the  government  encounters  a  new  set  of  problems  relating  to  competition  for  re-
sources,  conflicts  over  priorities  and programmes,  and  in  some  instances,  duplication  of
staff and coordination efforts. In some instances, such inteivministerial or intcragency rival-
ries have negative consequences on rural development  efforts.

In most cases, development coordination committees, comprising political and high-rank-
ing administrators and civil servants rarely work together because the representatives of the
ministries  often  reflect  the preferences  and prejudices  of their respective  ministries.  The
committee is led to formulate  broad policy guideline just to accommodate all  competing
interest, at the expense of a specific policy option to address development problems.

Over-centralization and poor coordination impede development programmes. It is  difficult
to carry out a constructive project  without the concurrence of many actors who may have
the power to block the eventual progress of the programmes. Top administrators sometimes
immerse in interagency conflicts while subordinates waste their energies waiting for requi-
site approvals.

Organizational deficiencies are responsible for the failure of bureaucracies in the develop-
ing countries to achieve development planning and administrative goals. These administra-
tive programmes, experience lack of adequate attention to middle and lower level adminis-
trative  needs, excessive  centralization  of authority  and control; insufficient  middle  level
personnel; inadequate contact between managers and subordinate employees, excessive paper
work, need for greater responsiveness to the citizen's needs, unnecessary secrecy, superflu-
ous  committees and  meetings, inconsistency  of promotions, lack  of incentive  and  initia-
tives, and inattention to production standards. These are problems affecting teamwork, lead-
ership, communication,  initiative, personnel management, definition of work, and author-
ity, in ways, usually considered dysfunctional  in the pursuit of organizational goals.

Line-staff conflicts exist in developing bureaucracies. The line official is the specialist while
staff officials  serve as the support system. A generalise as a public servant does not enjoy a
specialized background and thus can be an asset in interdepartmental  tasks. It is observed
that a  modern  administrator  cannot effectively  operate on the basis of broad  knowledge
alone. Technical knowledge  is important in managing a steel plant. He must  understand
how  the  steel  is manufactured.  Generalists have  no such professional  orientations.  The
generalists may need a specialist to interpret and translate technical data to a non-technical
audience to enhance comprehension of the language, for development implementation pur-
poses.

As Ramesh Arora (1974) observes in the Indian bureaucracy, the lengthy argument has been
presented to show the conflict, which exists, between the generalists in the civil service and

the technical personnel who are pressing their claim for recognition and power in the ad-
ministration. Bureaucratic decision making is concentrated at the center. People in the rural
areas have limited input in the policy formulation processes. There is little or no discussion
of plans it grass-root levels while public debate is missing. However, it appears that when-
ever there comes policy  implementation programme  designed for  the poor,  they  end  up
benefiting the elites. Public inputs and debates are very important exercises in policy-mak-
ing processes because they help to shape public policy.

Bureaucratic Attitudes and  Behaviour

Bureaucratic responsibility  requires that administrators  subscribe  to  ethical  professional-
ism, which places quality performance above the temptations of corruption and shady work.
Hence, they must be dedicated to the concept of doing away with the practices of nepotism
and parochialism and all their manifestations in the bureaucracy.

Most attitudes and behaviours of bureaucrats in the developing countries are not conducive
to either innovation or efficient  administration. They are pre-occupied with the security of
their positions. Since innovation involves risk-taking and a change in the way organizations
do things, their security is tied to the preservation and maintenance of organizational status
quo.

This attitude manifests itself in the way superiors delegate  and assume authority. Factors of
personal security  are largely  responsible for the reluctance to delegate authority. The di-
verse range of values and loyalty patterns which characterize transitional societies inhibit
the ability of superiors to place a great  deal of trust and confidence  in the organizational
members because both the goals of the regime and the position of the supervisor may be
jeopardized. Furthermore, ambitious subordinates to supplant the supervisor may utilize the
delegation of too much authority.

Bureaucrats are eager to command authority.  The greater the authority  in the hand of an
individual, the more other people must deal with him to receive their desired services. Such
symbols enhance the prestige of the bureaucrat and ensure that reciprocal favours would go
to him rather than his subjects.

Procedural devices designed to compensate for the tendencies towards petty graft and nepo-
tism have impeded delegation of authority. The authorization for the dispersal of funds and
similar operations frequently  requires the signatures of more than one person. Such opera-
tions, while having the potential to create opportunities for graft, increase red tapeism which
reduces the ability to get things done.

As a result of the super-ordinate and subordinate relationship which exist between various
cadres of bureaucrats, the subordinates are not keen to bear the burdens and risks of decision
making. Junior officers  always dodge responsibility  and therefore  pass on  administrative
matters to their superiors to act on. High level officials have to grapple with the problem of

10

attending to minor as well as major decisions with little time at their disposal. Less time is
then given to over-riding decision-making tasks in the bureaucracy.

Various heads of departments tend to see themselves in competitive relationship rather than
cooperation. This kind of relationship impedes the levels of coordination for programmes.
In some instances, they go as far as withholding crucial information from competing depart-
ments to insure favourable outcomes. They are more concerned with the growing size of
their department in order to attract more funds and other resource allocations that will en-
hance their status than with matters of efficiency, performance and economy.

The "don't dirty me" attitude still exists among bureaucrats in developing countries. They
are reluctant to get their hands dirty in a task perceived by them to be exclusively for the
lower classes. This problem of self-image has hampered efforts to disseminate the practical
applications of agricultural and mechanical technology to the masses in various areas.

Work habits and motivational levels of most bureaucrats are substandard. There is a drop in
their supervisory capacity. They carry out their functions  sluggishly. This practice is con-
sistent with the observations made in Ceylon where public servants stroll around after the
appointed  hour,  take  several  tea breaks and prolonged  lunch  intervals, go  through  non-
official  work at their desk, and leave office before the official  closing hour.

Role of Modernizing Elites

Modernizing elites play important roles in society. The future of any political system, de-
pends on the quality and creativity of its political, administrative and intellectual elite who
have access to political power and interact with each other in a bid to control the institutions
of the state bureaucracy. The intellectuals in the new nations constitute the planners of the
socio-economic development.

They have modernizing influences and so could exploit their access to power as an instru-
ment of national development. Usually, there are two main political elites — the local and
the intellectual  elites. The intellectual  elites are usually  Western educated.  Their knowl-
edge and experience tend to be far broader than those of the parochial political elites. The
intellectual  elites control the  machinery  of government  at the  central  level, which gives
them special prerogative to guide the natural plans for modernization. The parochial politi-
cal  elites with their agrarian values  constantly  strive to influence  national planning  and
bureaucracy, which really implements those plans. The division between the political elites
at  the local provinces  and those at the central  levels further  intensifies,  as the issues of
modernization become a dialogue between the contending forces. The orientation of the
administrative elites is geared towards large-scale modernization through social control and
mobilization.

The administrative elites are particularly responsible for sustaining a constitutional form of
government by checking the threatening action of anomic behaviour, lawlessness, and by

11

helping formulate and execute public policies designed to create political order, integration,
and decisions conducive to socio-political modernization. National commissions for plan-
ning, which provide elite forum, have justified social control under the official  state ideol-
ogy. The aim is to achieve mobilization and change. However, it activates inter-elite com-
petition and conflict, over whose ideologies will emerge to direct the cause of moderniza-
tion. The urge to exert influence sometimes forces the elites to run for public office.

Modernizing elites attempt to foster behavioral changes among groups of citizens to engage
in practices that will  enhance development  -  induce farmers  to use fertilizers,  persuade
rural women to practice birth control; provide incentives for manufacturers toproduce  for
export; and encourage teachers to revise classroom methods.

Elite recruitment in the bureaucracy has salient consequences for public administration, and
the "sala" official, InRigg's (1964) "prismatic" model, although selection is based on merit,
the characteristic result is nepotism, a mode of recruitment  in which ascriptive considera-
tions dominate appointments although  the formal  rules prescribed  otherwise.  Candidates
for office  are concerned with the power potential of a position  more than its professional
responsibilities, and hiring officers pay much attention to the impacts of appointments on
their own power position than on the administrative consequences.

Bureaucratic power and structure encourage the administrative elites to by-pass the formal
rules of merit system. Since there are no effective political controls over the organization,
nepotism tends to pervade the bureaucracy. The intellectual is far away from the rural envi-
ronment. He is an urbanite by orientation and develops an outlook, attitude and language,
which separates him culturally from the masses. The villagers cannot communicate with the
language of modernization in the same level  of shared  understanding and purpose as the
intellectual elites.

Even the professional  elites, like doctors and teachers refuse  to work in the rural villages
where their services are mostly needed. After retirement the urban professionals are reluc-
tant to return to the villages where modern  amenities are  lacking.  Even,  social  workers
whose services extend to the rural places choose either to operate from their headquarters in
the city or resign.

Conclusion

Modernization relies on the adoption of improved administrative techniques and their utili-
zation to achieve development goals. Another structural weakness of administration is the
absence of ready machinery for decisively resolving differences, lack of effective  coordina-
tion, resulting in delay, inaction, and lack of initiative and dilution of responsibility.

Such administrative realities, which are unsuited to dynamic decision making and  effective
coordination, discourage initiative, delegation and responsibility, thereby leading to delay,

12

inaction, confusion and lack of accountability. Development administration emphasizes the
appropriate  structural, functional  and value changes in the administration needed for the
implementation of the goals of modernization.

The developing systems face the problem of effective political control over public bureauc-
racies, which carry along with them, traditional attitude of mistrust of the independent ad-
ministrator. Deeply marked by social and cultural (ecological) forces, the effectiveness  of
public bureaucracies has been severely impaired by the self-serving influence over adminis-
trators enjoyed by outside groups.

Civil servants should be equipped to tackle the political, economic, social, scientific  and
technical problems. They have to be aware of interests and opinions throughout the country
and even of developments abroad. They must keep up with the rapid growth of knowledge
and acquire new techniques to apply it. The civil service has to be equipped to administer
change.

Personnel  management,  as it  obtains  in the developing bureaucracies  is out of date and
inadequate. Career planning constitutes a part of the problem. Civil servants are moved too
frequently  between  unrelated jobs,  with little or no regard  to personnel preferences  and
aptitude. There is not enough encouragement and reward for individual initiative and objec-
tive means of measuring performance. For many civil servants, especially in the lower and
middle echelons of the bureaucracy, promotions depend so much on seniority.

Economic  growth and political development tend to generate conflicts  among social,, re-
gional and ethnic groups at a faster rate than what the institutions of management can han-
dle. As regards the allocation of financial and symbolic resources, and the distribution of
cost and benefits of public policies, the administrators must calculate the long-term impli-
cations of "their actions. Policies and actions of government must be oriented to need and
fairness in order to avert the possibility of conflict.

Any effective  administration should attain popular participation and decentralization. De-
velopment  efforts  should be directed towards the rural areas. The professional  elites and
politicians should all extend their services: medical, legal, and fanning to the rural popula-
tion. Policy decentralization and popular grass-root participation are needed instead of empty
slogans and promises.

Before making progress in administering public programmes, the developing systems must
embark on large-scale enlistment and training of public administrators. Bureaucrats should
be selected on the basis of merit rather than ascriptive criteria

13

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Arora, Ramesh K.  1974  Administrative Change in India. Delhi: Aalekh Published

Bansal, Prem L. 

1974  Administrative  Development  in  India.  New  Delhi:  Sterling

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Gamer, Robert E. 

1972  The Developing Nations: A Comparative Perspective. Bos

ton: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.

Kaufsky, John H. 

1972  The Political Consequences of Modernization. New York:

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Khare, Brij. B. 

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Kothari, Rajai 

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1978  The Politics of Bureaucracy: A Comparative Perspective.

New York: Longman Inc.

14

Riggs, Fred W.

1964  Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory
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Schumacher, Edward J.

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