PgSSUFPOSll"" 

: 

Lit  ATT  Y  OJ  ,  "  IC.'iN  SOCIAL

u  ^ 0 1 1 1 ^ 1.  ThOtKUT*

Max  /.scimeng**

_Int£Oducrt_ioii

The essay  seeks to initiate  large-scale  concern and-'

discussion among scholars of social and political- theory on : !  » i

an as yet insufficiently  acknowledged problem in African

intellectual history., 

•• 

v  "•:•

African students of sociology, history, economics, -.  •••

political  science, and philosophy are introduced to sets of.-:-.-

names and theoretical propositions oh the nature of human

society and the direction of social development. BUT THEY FIND

.THAT~iiEPJGAN/.NA^a/.AMD_.JDJlAa...ARE; .SC.4RCELY....INCL0DH) IN" ANY, SUCH

DISCUSSIONS. VJhy is this so? Might it be that Africans have not

contributed to the world's stock of what  Chambliss  (1981-^26)

calls meaningful social knowledge.

It may well be granted that African students appear unsure

about which African names and ideas they wish to see incorporated

in the study of social and political thought, .although some have

their own idols on the intellectual and political fields (such

as Nkrumah, Nyerere, Azikiwe, Senghor, Cafaral, Fanon,  etc.),

they remain vague and unclear as to the theoretical status of

- 167 -

- 168 -

the works of--such favourites. If indeed Africans have offered thoughts

on the nature of social arrangements, then perhaps in searching for

suoh thoughts for systematic codification and evaluation, we might ask

the following questions: (a) what have been the objects of their ,

speculation, and what questions have been asked? (b) What methods have

been employed to answer those questions? (c) What sorts of answers have

been; given?

It is generally .that, in any serious ! study of philosophers and

agreed

philosophies, these are the central questions for critical analysis

(cf. Russell 1961; Klapp 1973; Chambliss 195*0« 

. ..

The inability of students to point to any African thinkers of.

significance in the history of social theorizing, seems to me to be

related to a number of factors integral to the nature of African

social structure and traditional -systemsof thought. These factors

include the tradition of oral communication by which men of wisdom

in traditional society usually expressed their ideas. This assertion

is itself subject to considerable debate, as we shall see in a

subsequent section of this paper. Nevertheless, literacy has usually

been seen as a pre-requisite for the systematic collation and analysis

of thought systems.on the nature of society: 'The record of human

though awaited the development of the written word, and wise men with

the truth on their lips have died and been forgotten, simply because

they left nothing tangible that endured' (Chambliss 195^:8)= Thus,

Chambliss finds it imperative to begin his study of social thought

with Babylonia, 'because of first hand, not hearsay, information

about that civilization1  (Charabliss, or.. cito, po 8).

There was also the absence, in traditional -ifrican society,

of a serious sense of long-term historical perspective and

imagination from which, for instance, optimistic notions of progress

and development could emerge as conceptual data in social thinking.

One should additionally mention the fact that several interpretations

of aspects of social structure were often provided in the form of

hallowed mythology and legends; the authenticity and logical

coherence of such interpretations were not only doubtful, but also

difficult to analyse empirically»

Thus, when it is claimed in some (nationalistically inspired)

quarters that it is Africans who pioneered the progress of

intellectual development  in the world (cf. the discussion of Mazrui,

1966), other Africans do not share such claims. The late Ghanaian

eminent scientist and medical practitioner, Raphael Armattoe (1973:95)1

could thus poetically present what appeared to him to be features of

the African mind:

Deep down the black man's mind there is nothing new
Orbright, save midnight darkness and despair;
We tell you this, we are the ones who dare
For we:-have learnt the magic spells, that,.few
Have heard or known« There's horror stacked for you
Behind the •blackmail's mind, The brain• that!s, there
The cruel homicidal sun flays bone bare,
Then chars the simple' drjeg on ashen* hu^..;-
OhI if ours be the calm before the storm,
Them-tliis dark sullen cloud may break with; sun..

- 170 -

But not in our days* No, not in our days!
No mortal .wit may change his: shape" or form,'
Or make the blackman1s thoughtless life of fun
Fit him to breed aught but a servile- face.

Againj Orrin Klapp (1975:150), recalling Robert Hedfield's model

of the folk society  (T94I), has noted of traditional, folk societies:

Almost everything is organized by kinship,
"a constellation of familial, relationships"*
Hence all relationships are personal - there
is no objectivityo The society is sacred and
its world is also sacred* In such a x^orld,
of course, there is no scientific thinking
nor secular values of the market place.

Of course not ail-African scholars would agree 'with  ^ ^ J^

Armattoe's characterization of the African mind and its,consents,

a topic which deserves more lengthy and serious treatment tha^..has

hitherto been done.

African students are not saying that the names and ideas that

are encountered in the history of philosophy and the social sciences

in the West are not great names* Due acknowledgement is given to

such writers as Plato, Aristotle, Roger and Francis Bacon, Rousseau,

Locke; and modern social thinkers such as Comto, Spencer, Marx, Weber,

Pareto, Durkheim, Parsons, and Elias- And, for what they are worth,

attempts are made in lectures and class discussions in African

universities to cogitate on those aspects or models of society in

the writings of these thinkers which might provide useful analytical

perspectives for the study of African social and political structures.

71

The  worry  of  African  students  appears  to  be  this:  might  it

not  be  the  case  that  there  have  been  African  thinkers  also  who have

contributed  to  the  progress  of  intellectual  development  in  the  realm

of  social  thinking?  In  what  respects  might  one  contend,  with  James

Conyers  (1972:173) j  for  instance,  that  'Ibn  Khaldhun  (the  Tunis-born

Maghreb  philosqher  of  history,  who lived  between  1332  and  1^+06)  has

as  much  claim  as  any  other  one, person  to  be  called  the  father  of

sociology1,  and  that

'Despite  the  tendency  to  associate  the  development
of  sociology  with  western  phenomena  and  European
scholars,  many  scholars  feel  that  this  bias  has
prompted  us  to  "look  away!i  from  Africa  and  Asia,
thereby  further  encouraging  an  error  which  is
generally  prevalent  :ih  western  culture1*

Perhaps,  touch  of  the  controversymight  be  located  in  the  often

unclear  senses  in  which  'intellectual  development1  and  'social

thought'  are  conceptualized  and  understood.  But  more  of  this  later.

On one hand,  it  might  tJePpossible  to  respond  to  such  query  of

African  students^  by  asserting  simply  that  such  students  (and  some

of-their  enthusiastic  lecturers,  not  to  mention  self-assertive

politicians  of  newly  independent  countries)  are  indulging  in  cultural

nationalism  in  their  quest  for  the  inclusion  of  Africans  -  and  their

ideas  -  in  global  intellectual  history  and  comparative  social  theory.

We might  perhaps  say  then  that  parading  in  traditional  toga  and'

other  attire  and  symbols  in  the  corridors  of  the  United  Nations  and

other  ijiI^rnitfibrrfal  gatherings',  is  different,  and  should  be  so

- 172 -

distinguished, from securing a place on the world map of intellectual

history* The corollary might then be to say that membership in the

republic of letters is not achieved by head counting or majority

votes* Or, as Inkeles and Smith (197^3) note in connection with

modernization process in the '^hird World, 'diplomatic recognition and

membership in the United Nations do not create a nation state'.

On the other hand, it might be seriously argued that perhaps

such exclusion of African thinking from the analysis of mainstream

social thought derives from the fact that, for a very long time,

there were really no known, i.e. documented, African disquisitions

of theoretical value that might be incorporated in the serious study

of social or political theory. Recently, however, attempts have been

made to examine what there is that might -- or might not - be said to

pass for African systems of social thinking (cf. Otite 1978; Echeruo

197^; J- O'Connell 1963; Marais 1972; Afari-Gyan 1976; Mends 1976;

Clapham 1968; Shepperson 196*f; Twumasi 1978; Agbeko 1977; Anaman

1977).1

There is another factor that should be recognized in explaining

the neglect of African social thought in worldwide social and

intellectual analysis. This is to the effect that perhaps no

intellectual atmosphere was created in African social .and psycholo-

gical structures that might be regarded as conducive to the dis-

interested use of reason for speculating on social issues. Such an

atmosphere is itself dependent upon certain social and cultural

- 173 -

situationso

Basically, attention is drawn to these problems in the hope

that the data that scholars have now begun to collect and assemble

on African social and political ideas, might be subjected to giore

rigorous examination according to some criteria. Rigour and method

are essential if ideas are to be^ studied in terms of possible

philosophical propositions on the nature of man and of. human societyo

Such criteria as a community of social analysts come to share and to

examine, could then meaningfully serve as a fr,?jnework for classifice.-

tion, categorization and critical evaluation of such data., As at

present, the various studies of African social and political ideas

Geem not to hnn£ appreciably on any generalisable conceptual pegs»

Lately, however, we have begun to encounter isolated examples of this

awareness- &uch awareness, for instance, informs the study by J.

01Cornell  (1963:77-93), in which he mentions that 'Senghor and Azikiwe

write with conscious awareness of the use of concepts in political,

science' whereas 'Mkruciah, inspite of a certain conceptual poverty,

has better understanding of what £>. modern state is than some political

scientists'o Another  / 

has written: 'Nkrumah could not depend

commentator

upon reasons of logic to fight colonialism' (Dzirasa 1962:28), Tucker

(1978) has examined Michiavelli and Fanon as political philosophers

who grappled, at different times, with the basic problems of freedom,

legitimacy, and the moral basis of political action; whereas Michael

fiogin (1963) has sought parallelisms between African ideas of social

development and iousseau's view concerning the  'noble  savage'„

There  still remains an issue that  should be clarified, and that

issue is this: what  should  students do when they discover that  analysis

ox thought  systems differ as to whether a particular thinker is

'systematic' or not? Clearly, this is a problem which  the  student

should be helped  to examine and  to resolve«  It is a matter of regret,

therefore, that  in their  otherwise very  useful collection Readings in

A£S-c,aiLZ.9-ty;i£S3- J?^2HS£ii (^975), Mutiso and Roh Rohio acknowledge

that their volume  'is not intended  to provide an analysis of African

thought. If it were  such an analysis, we  should be concerned with the

logical consistency  and empirical verification  of African political

thought9  (p. xi)° However, even when such  studies are undertaken with

the principal aim  'to explicate  the analyse his political ideas as

they  are revealed  in his writings and  speeches', as Afari-Gyan  (1976:

13) attempts to do on the  ideas of Kwaae  Nkrumah, no  specific

conceptual and  methodological mapping is provided  as a guide for

students who might also wish to evaluate  ideas of Nkrumah, as of other

leaders of thought  in Africao

I believe  that none of the foregoing responses and  explanations

should be regarded as wholly  adequate  because  there are  still some

unexamined  questions, namely: 

.

(a)  what is social thought?  and

(b)  what are people, doing when it is said or claimed that

they are thinking about  society?

-.175  -

i'or  our  purposes  these  questions  on  the: essential  nature  of  social

thought  must  be.regarded  as  first~_qrder  .questi.ons0  When ;they  have

been  grappled  with,  perhaps  the  sec_ond_-*order ..questions  might. then

h:ui,e  ujjon  the  following  points;

(a)  have  there  .indeed  been  African  social  .thought?

(b), 

if  there  have,  what  have  been  the  nature,  essence,  and

typifications  of  such  social  thoughts?,  and

(c)  what, possible  reasons  might  be.adduced  for  the  relative

neglect  of. African  thoughts  (such  as  they  have; been);  in

. global,  i.n|:ell,e,ctu^al.,^^h.^stpry.  and  sociological  analyses^

; The| way., these...•questions  h.ave  been, posed  in  this  essay,  might, be;

regarded  as ;%gp,* ele.mentary.o. Bu^,,  to  my mind,  the  yardstick  for

measuring,the  level;. Pf. development. of  a  discipline  is  the  extent  to

viiiQi),..t.lie^discipline's  basic  and  elementary  questions  are  posed,and

examinedo

^t is necessary to set out the general area of social thought,

and the properties that all social thoughts have in common, in order

to see the sense in which the term might be used in this study of the

African situation., ^he field of social thought has engaged the

attention of competent authorities for some time now; we might

implicitly try to discover the nature of African thoughts on social

structure and cultural arrangements, on the basis.of foundations

which have been laid for the field of studyo We might then compare

176

mode and. content

/>.fflean social 'thought v.ith those  that have

animated  thinkers in Western  social and political history<>

To Eollin Charnbliss (l95^+:^) social thought  is ''concerned  with

human beings in their relations with  their fellows. Man's thoughts

about his relations to others whether expressed, in folk literature

or in the compositions of individual writers1'- Another  foremost

author!ty  on the history  of social thought, Harry Barnes  (i98^:vii),

saw the field in terms of "what  social philosophers and  sociologists

have  said about  the origin of human  society, the ways of group life,

the development  and expression of social interests 1 '~nd the modes of

both cultural lag and  social progress'.

As the above contention of Barnes indicates, social thoutht  is

often studied  solely with  respect to the philosophical  systerasof great

• 

• . - . : . ..  .<•• 

•--.-: .  . 

• : - : . n i v . i : b n . i: 

.:'i;»'!  ' r :v 

g  • 

..  •  • •'•  ' •

writerso  But Africa produced  no' writers until recent times. " Yet it

seems obvious that, before'great writers emerged, Africans jthjojight

about their' society, and this thought was embedded  in the  collective

phenomena of social structure0  In probing the objects of social

theorizing, several significant  questions should serve as guidelines

of such introduction.. Borne of such questions may be posed in the

following manner: what have been the causes of widespread failing in

social structure, as these  failings are §een and experienced by the

thinkers" of architects of programmes and suggestions for  social

reform? And what institutional  solutions are offered as capable  of

returning society to a state of social, economic and political health?

- 177 -

In probing responses to the foregoing questions, it would be

necessary for the student of social thought in Africa to analyse

the traditional folklore, proverbs, and customary beliefs and

conduct. This is because tliese serve as the standard  formulations

for the explanation and understanding, by traditional people, of

their social world and its direction... 

• .: :.••.

Clearly .this is but one of a number of possible approaches to-

social thought; but I believe that a sociological study of social

thought entails the analysis of the context of social structure.

We may then define  social thought  of this type as responses to the

challenges that arise in everyday life; and. we must identify the

points at which, these challenges arise. What are the- social problems

that they have had  to resolve;1 where possible, -we- should- also try-to

identify the actual individuals whose, thoughts have been':stirred. • :

When an;/" such individuals are located, it .would be found that,'

unlike  thinkers in JL'urope (cf.» Qruickshark, 1969) and the United "-•

States, the medium  of expression for Africans has been active rather

than discursiveo  But is the medium of expression significant .in the

definition of social thougSO? 

.. 

,. 

.  ..-

There appears to be a constant  confusion in the- use of the

terms  'social theory' and  fsocial thought'„  I have therefore found

it necessary to analytically distinguish  between these terms. This

way, it should  be possible to identify where on,the scale of social

analysis the thinkers might be located„

By social theory, one has in mind a more or less logically

interconnected set of propositions which purport to explain aspects

of social experience * Ideally social theories should,give rise to

hypotheseso These hypotheses, in turn, ought zo servers research

tools in further conceptualization and identification of empirical

facts. Thus, social theory is seen, as a- s^et of scientific postulates:

social knowledge should grow through constant processes of explication

and validationo

Social thought, on^ the,; Qth er • hand, sh.ould be.seen much more

broadly and inclusively as: reflections, or^ the nature of social a^eality

or of collective social experience^ .Thua jviewe'd, ^.Oisaal-.thought can be

-•••'•"•!::• •:  i '  X 

s'

of pro positional potential for scientific! rease&rch. Ah example of this

I:I • ...  .•.'.',:-'•. \  /-"' 

existing

kind of social thought is the :relationship '^that has been posited as /

between 'relative deprivation1 and the emergence of social movements.

This is theory in support of which scholarly data have been assembled* ;;

Of course the actual content of the social thought itself might be of

the nature of social dreaming„ Here, too, an example is the wish/

fulfilment entailed  in the assumption that were socialism instituted - .

or a certain type of social and political arrangement, 'Union Government1,

for example, as expounded by the late General Acheampong of Ghana -

everybody would be happy, and free from social and political disruption.

Social thought of this type is the product mainly of visionaries and

Utopians; but such people are also concerned about the nature and direction

of  human  society,  and  much  of  the  thought  that  should  occupy  the

study  of  African  social  reflection,  should  be  of  such  peopleo

Let  us  now look  at  the  two  sides  of  social  thought  that  we have

tried  to  portray,  and  the  manner  in  which  they  are  generally  differen-

tiated  from  one  another»

Social  Theory  /

I Social  Thought x

Social MythJ

General  Characteristics
Rigorous
Sxact
Objective
Scientific
Systematic  & Tentative
Te stable Ae r if iable/Fals if iable
Critical  open-mindedness

Impressionistic and vague
Bizarre  ,
Emotionally involved
Dogmatic, unchallengeable
Closed
Unscientific
Ideological

It can be seen that while all social theories count as social

thought, not all social thought constitutes social theory- In Black

Africa, the available documentary and oral evidence indicates that

social thought has involved more of wish fulfilment than of systematic

attempts to construct scientific theories, especially theories on the

basis of careful and systematically observed relationships of data in

the social universe. Wish fulfilment is characterised by the conscious

and unconscious distortion of facts and values, and we may therefore

assume that such distortion, in the service of community interest and

- i8o -

survival, is related  to social .and environmental insecurity  as a whole.

A feature  that underlines the logical structure of such analysis

is that  social and political thought  should  be seen in the context of

'challenge1  and  'response'. Thus, an appropriate  starting point in our.

endeavour involves (a) delineation'of  those areas of social, culturalt.

and psychological challenge, and  (b) specification  of the ways in  ... .

which people  experience  these challenges and have  responded to  them.

This approach  is not essentially  new; in his major work The__Social.

Philosophers (1973) Nisbet stresses  'responses to crisis' as the  ,,;

central leitmotif of western  social philosophy:

•  The history  of Western  social philosophy is 'basically

the history of men's ideas and ideals of community,
o.o  Closely  related to the idea of community, forming 
its negative backdrop, as it were, is the idea of
anti-community. There are- many ways in which this 
idea can be expressed, given vivid manifestation, and
all of them are current  in our own time.- There  is the
fear of the social void, of alienation, or enstrange-
ment from other, even from  one's own self, of loss of
identity, of great open spaces of impersonality  and
rejection  (pp. 1* 2 ). 

..;. >

• 

••

• .-:^

,,.,. 

... . 

Nisbet then adds (p.  9 ) :'

Without the perception of deep crises that recur in
Western European history,; there would  be very  little.  ;-: '; • •'•;r'
indeed of what we call social philosophy.

CONTEXT OF SOCIAL THOUGHT  : 

. 

. , 

.; 

.

When it is said.-that social thought  is a universal enterprise, it

becomes necessary then to:.; examine the context of such thought, In. this

section, I discuss what societal living entails, and what social

- 181 -

problems are j.ikely to engage the attention of those who reflect,

however  casually, on their own  societies. The  stress, throughout, is

on how one eight elicit  the meanings which  individuals  themselves

attach to their  actions in the course  of social relationships. One

would need  to stress that the fact that members of a society  formulate

their  own interpretations of the social order of which they are a part,

is no substitute'for the more sustained  reflection of the philosopher

and the sociologist; but then it needs to be clarified  as to how the

sociologist  and the philosopher d_if_fer_fjrom those  who merely partake in

what Berger and Luckisann (1966) call the  'recipe knowledge' of society.

Social. thought has become:ian -academic object  of study; it is

studied  in part in several disciplines'. Among these disciplines are

intellectual history  or the history of ideas; politics; 'sociology;

anthropology; and "-social and moral philosophy. Africa, has not given

rise traditionally 'to 'anything like these divisions, and it is' therefore

not easy to distinguish  the African thinkers, 'particularly  those  of pre-

coionial and pre-literate times. The whole ethos of thinking in African '-

society was not one of individual debate; and  - until fairly recently  -

conditions have not> been suchr"as'to-facilitate  independent debate*

In western histories of social and political thought, the procedure-

is normally to go from thinker to thinker - Plato, Aristotlev  Eoger

Bacon, Hobbes, Locke., Adara Smith, and  so on° They we re thinkers about

society. Africa does not offer exact-equivalents; nonetheless there

-  1 8 2- •

\<tere  social, arrangements, social values, and social sentiments.

Whether one wants to say  'social conscience5, is perhaps a more

disputable  matter; but  there was obviously  a pattern of apprehensions

about  sofciety, and this was a widely  shared  interpretation  of the

social'world. Some of the features of that social apprehension were:

a  cosmology  (of one sort or another); an awareness of evil, and the

idea of theodicy, an idea of rights and duties; of social justice; of

authority;-of the" relation'"of economic to political power; of law and

customs;'.'.of necessary  religious-obligations; of correct  relations

between males and  females, and between age grades.

In this regard, ;we may  say that social thought as an exercise  is

a universal enterprise. Of no people can it be denied  that they have

the capacity  to accumulate an intellectual cipital, however small,

that embodies the group's -fears, aspirations, and  some conceptions of

the  social good. Probably  it is in a context  such as this, that

Shepperson  (196^:22) notes that

'African Political Thought  is as old as human society
in Africa. To believe  otherwise  is to presume  that
pre-literate  peoples cannot think politically, or that,
inspite ;of constant repetitions of Aristotle's dictum,
man is no political animal..1 

. .

But, no less pertinent is the fact that the universality of

reflections on social order notwithstanding, not all people in human .

society, and not all societies in the world, have  manifested an equal

- 183 -

degree of seriousness, ecnce-n,' and effort in engaging in such an

exercise* Nevertheless^ at hov/ever 'minimal a level, it should be

granted that the1 conceptions that are held of social structure and

social progress,; aiictlit suggestions'that are offered for effdSliing

changes in society, mgy be embodied in several media of communication.

Some of such media of communication or expression are paintings,

sculpture, architecture, music and ritual instruments* These

conceptions may also be found in the folklore of the society, as for

instance in the famous proverbs and ananse (spider) story telling of

the people of Ghana,,

Or such conceptions may form the basis of periodic pronouncements

of social ^grtoups. Such/ for instance, are the various end-of-year

traditional'rituals in which the communion and mutual inter-dependence

that are believed to subsist between the dead, the living, and the

unborn, are ritually acknowledged and reinforced. The life cycle, in

particular, represents the public dramatisation of changes in the

fortune of man and of society„

The contingencies that create the opportunity for social thought

should be viewed in the light of human nature. In particular, the

specific aspect of human nature which should be our concern here is

the universal imperative of societal living. Students need to be made

aware, as a fundamental a ;iom, that the distinction between human

beings and animals is the capacity of human beings for self-refleetion,

and the consequent  ability  to store  up information for  future

memorizing and  usage. Thus, the basic" problem  that confronts the

student  of social thought  might  be posed' in the  following 'manners

• ;'':' 

What are the natural concerns of individuals and

groups with regard to interpersonal, and group life,

and what  sets of reflections are likely to emanate

from  such natural concerns'?

It is important  to point  out that all human societies are

confronted  with  circumstances and  conditions that call  forth

individual and group effort  for  their amelioration. Human beings

experience  constant  shifts in their  social interaction as a result

of modification in life experience; social structures may  therefore

be saia to reflect  the constant  grappling of the  dialectical

relationship between social being and  social becoming.

»

But we know also that the need for a social system gives rise

to the emergence  and existence of regularized  patterns of behaviour,

which  sociologists call institutions»  Institutions develop in response

to distinct  experiences.. But  it may be asked; how are the goals of a

society  to be attained, and what  is the yardstick  for measuring  the

appropriateness  of the  instruments chosen by the society for attaining

its basic  goals of survival, harmony  and peace?

In traditional  societies in Africa, such questions v/ere perhaps

never consciously  asked. However, responses were inherent  in the

customary practices and proverbs that emerged  from the  socialisation

patterns, and which  took the appropriateness of the ongoing social

structure for granted,, While  societies lived  in the context of a harsh

natural environment,' the '• most pressing need was the efficient adapta-

bility of men in groups to the harsh realities of their world. In such

a  situation,-what''probably'existed  was a relative  sameness of needs

and aspirations; correla'tively, the means for attaining such  goals

were easily  defined. Conflict of Opinion could"scarcely  be tolerated

in such circumstances, 'except within  the basic  framework of traditio-

nally  sanctioned understanding of the structure  of the community.

llhere were,' therefore, no-institutionalized  sets of opposing

camps .as such, -either in thought  formulations or in behaviour, on the

determination'-of the -end ' purposes of ''social' action",' and on the means

for attaining -such-endsi: Nor: was there  any considerable  and  widespread

power of self-criticism.-''  '••-'•

It may be that in traditional  societies "questions about  society's

ends--anti-the ueans-'for attaining them were usually  answered by  socially

recognized individuals in groups who, in earlier phases of social and

cultural development, were assigned  the  role of nature's spokesmen. In

Africa, these were  fetish priests, or- shamans,' or magicians, or other

specialists'-who claimed  - or were imbued with  -

the capacity  for being  'possessed'»  These people  became  instruments

through-whom-messages from gods-to men, and vice versa, were communi-

cated. In a limited-way, these agencies, if they were  specially

committed  to societal concerns, such as local and territorial mediums,

- 186 -

might"be  'productive of societal critique in the sense of a formal

evaluation of received values, norms, and institutions' (Schofellers,

jDhrough the process of socialization, human beings who operate in

any particular society have some ideas of when  'affairs of the society

are going on well'- Now, what might people mean by such an expression

with regard to their personal and collective experience in society?

As far as African societies are concerned, 1 believe that affairs of the

society would be eaid to be '• gding"on well1  wlien the following conditions,

among'.others, are acknowledged jt6'obtain in the social collectivity as a

(a)  When the;'principal natural resources on which man depends for

sustenance and survival continue to be available for men to draw

•upon;

(b)  when the rrelationship between the living and the dead (and other

unseen, but-influential forces in nature)1 is on ritually  smooth

footing, 'because of the need for an ontblogical balance between

God and man, the spirits and man, jj&$  ih& departed and' the

living* (Mbitii^59);

(c)  when man's connection with, and integration in, the social bond

is such that he continues to draw upon this communal network for

psychological, emotional, and spiritual assistance and comfort;

- 187 -

(d)  \fnen the ordered  arrangements of  social hierarchy, as evidenced

in the social, economic, and political division of labour,

performance  of roles, and reward  structure  arising  therefrom,

function towards the satisfaction  of the different  knit mutually

complementary  segments of the population; and

(e)  when the dignity and integrity  of the communal bond are honoured

and inviolate.

When any of the above-listed  conditions of societal survival is

disturbed, it is contended  in the society  that  'affairs are bad', or,

as  the Akan  of Ghana would say,  'the world has gone sour'„  Questions

ariro about the situation. Concern or apprehension  is neither extensive,

nor is it evenly  distributed, and certainly  there is no extensive

abstract exercise of theorising. As William Abraham  (1962:12) puts it, .

•participation  in the theory, as distinct  from the practice, of the

culture, is made  their preoccupation  by only a minority of the people'„

One is reminded here  of what Adam Smith, too, wrote about the differen-

tial distribution  of concern  (1776:115), namely, that  'In the  progress

of society, philosophy  or speculation becomes, like every  other

employment, the principal or sole trade  and occupation of a particular

class of citizens'c

But might  it be appropriate  to describe  such thinkers in tradi-

tional African society  as  'philosophers?' I think here it is appropriate

to recall some of the debates on the extent to which philosophy, for

- T88 - -

instance, or social thought, is dependent  solely upon literacy. There,;

inirjnt be a sense  in which .one car  say that any person who.has the

capacity  for d e a r, constructive  ;,r;.d consistent thinking is a philo-  . •

sopher. In this regard, .philosophy, becomes .an -intellectual characteris-

tic that  is widespread in distribution in time and in spaceo

Some of the problems entailed in according to the .accolade • • '  -.;

'phijloaaphy' to. particular thinkers are probably  entirely definitional,

and seen to me to be reducible ultimately t.o the question of-what .one-.

means by philosophy; and the degree of abstraction, disinterestedness*<:

and. generalizabiiity  of specific  conceptual apparatuses, that one is-;: ^

prepared to grant  for claims to philosophical disquisition. Indeed,  •• :

according to Parratt  (1976:6?),  'to claim that a people has no 

•

philosophers because  it has no writing is nonsense'. 

..••••:'•

It is worth  mentioning, however, that net all writers might

permit such ;liberal use of the term philosophy: the;re are people who

see philosophy  as entailing some  specific characteristics such as

abstraction, generalization, and classification. They might stress

what they,see, as the incapability  of the, African for abstract thought

forms,.• as...we 11 :as..the inability to comprehend  generalizing procedures.

It may. well be, ;that conceptualization as. :such .does not appear as a  -,,

v/ideq"pre:ad capacity, among.,even modern-day: African scholars. This, is .in

spite of the relatively  long history  of literacy  and western education

in Africa*-.For. instance, it is maintained that concern with definition,-

typolqfg';*: .classification,.and  generalization hawe been less: evident in.

t-189 -

the work of black scholars', than the concern to locate phenomena in

specific visual contexts. But are Africans alone in this regard? Is

one not dealing with a universal phenomenon here?

Perhaps there is another facet to this debate;" Concrete ways of

thought may be all that are necessary'in relatively small-communities

in which literacy has not developed. As theuscale of social organization

extends, and as literacy becomes iiart of the items of cultural tradition,

so one would expect the need for abstract generalization to become

pressing. One would then expect the tendency towards it" (or the capacity

for it) to develop  but sucli a situation is obviously different froro the

assertion that the African is exclusively dominated try a  •concreteness

disposition', and that he is, consequently, 'unable to detatch himself

from the uniqueness of the object and fails to see it as a representa-

tive of a class; (and that) the dependency results in rigidity and

"lack of shifting'" (Ireson 1975:58). In fact, there was a time when

the charge against the cognitive structure of^Africans was rather that

it made Africans flippantly and unpredictably shifting.

Be that as it may, these debates on the cognitive framework and

development of traditional peoples, and on'the applicability of.the

term philosophy to discourses in traditional society, point to the

relationship between certain structures of thought and the level of

social development, social ideas, and political complexity. Even if

literacy is not a prerequisite for social and political theorizing,

there is no doubt that literacy enhances the chances for objectifica-

-  190  - 

-

tjo-  o 

'rou  ht  -u.c1  c^  a-p-un^f 

(Cf.  Goody  and  Watt,  1963)=  In  t h is

f-!  "•  r  N^U  ^i-"- 

' ^ ' 'i  cx'uct  certain  social  and  p o l i t i c al  institutions

to  duvujoj,  au<.  oper-ite  m  ?  community  before  men  in  that  community  can

re.  I;cl  oc  ,-i.clr  -_i slit-utlono.  t.t  l a t er  stages  of  such  reflections,  the

^"v  '" j- 

'  •cliou  *<£ out  ioi"  LTi  institutionalization  of  contention  and

re^-.,ai  i~,  -oc- -J.  and  p o l i t i c al  ideas  about  the  institutions  in  the

comraunity.  Organized  and  systematic  social  and  p o l i t i c al  ideas,  in

ei'icct,  dc  not  operate  ir  -,< vacuum  of  social  and  psychological  r e a l i t y.

It  ic  ODVXOUS  th  >t  bi-veral  jiom^s  need  to  be  analysed  in  a  paper

thai  "xaiuinc-s  t'.u  nrt  r  ppopxtione  of  social  thoughts.  But  any  essay

runs  th<  ri'Ji  ol  "t oonim£  an  unwxelay  volume  if  It  presumes  to  touch

on  al~  the  (idr

je&  c f  it  ^  ruijt-C"  % 11  r.  For  t h is  reason,  only  the

Cwrtrc>l  IHiuft  o^  tin  sr^j  iM  > K  be^n  highlighted.  The  sum  of  our

di._c

&oTe

\ih-\c

h\

i  ~ar  <r ,  r»^-,  1 >e put  Iii  the  following  manner*

u 

,r

r  ji  IJ 

r  ^  , _,  Africans  to  seek  and  to  construct

t  't 

-^1  ri'4_o>u  *  UL.  v at ure  and  development  of  human  society,

l, 

lif 

jocac  u/  t  ^4  -f,  ^a.raliar  to  them.  We even  get  people  in

~>">  cla.ir>  tii  ;  ^ i r i ' a r-  I^.AV^  dore,  in  social  theory  consturctions,

T.bO  V.^u  (K'l o  in  ir4  <<  1 o But  1  think  it  is  fair  to  assert  t h a t,

sct  with  tho  r1  c.  - t u is  m  the  V/est,  Africans  are  barely  making

ai*  ox  ort  ii  n  gard  eF  de-crip+iou,  analysis,  and  generalization.  This

assertion  ifo  not  even  related  to  an>  conviction  about  the  originality  or

- 191 ~

otherwise of arguments in the philosophical jt.-nse  of the term* Instead,

it seei/ie an honest position to take that  AFSICAJVS  H/.VJ£ NOT Y'i,T GC  DOvffl

TO TIE ACTUAL ROOT OF SOCIAL SCimCE  TdEORY CCI^/IRUCTION, OR ZiVEN SOCIAL

SCIENCE ENTERPRISE,  U N L U DS  IS CHANT THAT hV£HY CULTURE HAS ITS OWN

SOCIAL SCIENCE  (SOCIOLOGY, FOB  INSTANCE), WITH ITS OWN CONTENT AND

MJTIIOD., It Is probably  for this reason that Armattoe  (1973-2), whose

views on the blackman's mind we have encountered earlier in this paper,

says elsewhere in a discussion of the African "Between the Forest and the

Sea5':

To express himself culturally, he  (the African) must
go back to the roots, not of Greece and Rome, but of
Africa South of the Sahara and north of the Zambezi.
He must eschew self pity and the attitude of always
being on guard against imaginary insults or social
affronts. He must invest his life with a new meaning,
a new mission, even if it Is nerely a passing phase.

Such enterprise in social theorizing, that Is to say, in seriously

reflecting on society and making analytical classification of categories

of ideas thereon, and on methods for the acquisition of the ideas,

requires a social, cultural and intellectual framework for It to emerge

and .be sustained. The background and  framework for such  intellectual

activity have generally been traced  to the social, cultural, and

intellectual climate of Athens that produced Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato,

Aristotle, etc. It is in this regard that one finds it a pity that  some

African statesmen regard the  study of the classics and other humanities

as bourgeois activity. Certainly, if we want to probe the origins and

"  1 92  - 

••  •

cultural  background  of  philosophical  enterprise.,  as  of  sociological

discourse,  then  we  need  to. study  for  instance,  how:.it  is  that 

.-••:••.:"-. •

in  the  sixth  century  BC,  there  came  about  a  striking- 
development  in  the  history  of  Greek  thought  when,  in
the  Ionian  city  of  Miletus,  a ll  mythopoeic-forms  of 
thought  were  abandoned  by  certain  thinkers  who  sought
to  explain  the  world.'about..them  in  terms  of  visible1
constituents,  instead  of  .having  recourse  to  theistic  ;

•••••'-"'>•'• •<•

•  • 

-''•"••

explanations  (James  Longrings,  1972-73%  p.  307).

Clearly T. if  one  examined'African,  social  and  political  ideas  for

purposes;.of.  consistency  and  error v. coherence  and  logic;, csndi  the

perennial  dissemination  of  doubt,  then  perhaps  one  might  modestly

conclude  that  this  has  not  been  the  principal  supposition  upon  which

'thinking  about  society'  has  been  established  and  canvassed  in  Africa*

Herein  l i e s,  I  think,  one  of  the  major  differences  between  western

traditions  of  social  thought  -  in  which  thought  is  seen  basically  in

terras  of  disinterested  speculation,  logic,  and  system  -  and  African

social  thought,  which  seems  to  me  to  be  concerned  essentially  with

knowledge  for  action.  A& Nathan  Hare  (i969^&3)  puts  the  case  with

respect  to  what  he  calls  'the  taboo  against  taking  a  stand  on  matters

of  right  and  wrong*:

.:  .. 

The  black  scholar  can  no  longer  afford  to  ape  the  allegedly
"Value-free''5  approach  of  white'  scholarship.'  He  must  reject
absolutely  the  notion  that  it  is  "not  professional"  ever  to

'  becomeile'motidiial,  that  it  is  somehow  improper  to  be  "bitter"

as  a  black  man,  that  emotion  and  reason  are  mutually
exclusive. :1io „ "'the  scholar's  main  task  is  to  cleanse  his  mind
-  and  the  minds  of  his  people  -  of  the  white  colonial  attitudes
towards  scholarship  and  people  as  well.  This  includes  the  icons
of  objectivity,  amoral  knowledge  and  i ts  methodology,  and  the
t o t al  demolition  of  the  anti-social  attitudes  of  Ivory-Towerism.
Such  is  the  challenge  facing  the  black  scholar-.

The basically  activist  posture  of African scholarship, as

evidenced  in Nathan Haress foregoing statement, is not entirely-

surprising. S.P. Aiyer  (1972:401).has noted of Indian political

thought* quoting B.B«  Majuindar: 

, .  •

political treaties like Plato's Republic, Aristotle's
P^litic_s_, Hobbe's Leviathan or Montesquieu's Spirit of
_the___Lawsi, cannot be produced by a people groaning under
the heels of foreign rulers. The proper climate necessary
for propounding political philosophy was totally absent
in India«  Intellectual leaders who had the courage to
speak on political affairs lent their voice mainly to the
clamour of political controversy.

The allusion to Indian social and political thought, at a

comparable period, is illuminating in terms of the light it throws

upon the nature of thought in communities operating under alien

domination, and while  searching for cultxrral renewal. But what one

wants to stress in this connection is that any talk about a possible

creative period of African Social and political thought, as also in

India, must be premised upon a certain set of favourable  social and

cultural circumstances^. In this regard, I should like to end by

suggesting a few such features for black Africa:

(a)  breakdown of the extended  family  system;

(b)  radical shifts in what I have chosen to call the  'traditional

African personality  structure', with its essential  characteristics

(i)  conformity, and the blantant eschewing of individual

speculation

Cii)  unquestioning acquiescence

(iii)  lack of self-reliance

(iv)  fetish worship of authority, of charismatic leaders,

:. .•  . . and things ' coming from above !

(v)  hatred of -criticism.

(c)  criticism and intellectual disputation should become institutio-

nalized, widespread, and accepted as a preoccupation.

But the relationship between impersonality of discourse on social

questions and the development of intellectual development, needs

s t r e s s i n g. 

• • • , - ••

When I reflect on the essentially activist and  'involved* stance

of scholarship -in -African intellectual history, I cannot help but

observe, that the postulate of value-free social science seems highly

regarded,.-.in, western societies, but not to the same degree in developing

societies-.'Jo,the best of my knowledge, the sociology department of the.

University of Leicester is one such place where 'value-freedom seems

quite established,.For instance, in 1964, Professor Neustadt decried

what he. identified as 'the confusion between the role of the sociolo-

gist,, as,,a.;• scientist and'his possible roles as an advocate of a

particular set of social and moral values and principles' (1965:8).

And in 1971, Professor J.A. Banks, also in an inaugural lecture, raised

doubts about those who might have a vision of sociology  'as some kind

of secular religion' (Banks 1971:19). To be sure, though, neither

Professor Neustadt, nor Professor Banks, nor even Professor Norbert

Elias who stresses this position most emphatically in his What is

* 195 -

Sociology? (1979)5  ignores the subjective  dimension in scholarship.

But we should not underrate their admirable  efforts to differentiate

sociology  from what one might call  'pastoral  theology1.

' "X know that this paper appears'too' programmatic, and less than  '

systematic  - and  I know also that  some' might 'perhaps have liked more

•of~ the substantive  analysis  of African'social thought. This is because

purely methodological prescriptions about, and abstract  sensitization

to, what ought  to be done  or might be done, become at times too

speculative^- Thus, :-1 acknowledge  that i't might in future "be useful, for

instance,' t& provide  concrete  evidence on" what''Africans have  actually

thought  on'-social-issues* If such thoughts were'embodied  in written

:£orcis-as- in the  case especially  in West 'African history, it might be

necessaryt'o'examine  suctr early publications-'"It might also be

instructive 'If ',"on: the rol'e of, for instance, the professions one

acquired information::6n how many  lawyers and doctors and ordained

clergy  there were in various countries at"'various times and what it

Is that  they said - and meant - concerning the nature and direction of

social and political arrangements-

-  196 -

2. 

j. 

It

Lr 
jv
uc  of

or;  bh~  n .tw->
.iour1 o 
\;L. ch

,  in  this  respect,  that  virtually  every

j\T^^d_jOLi5lti£e_,  the  semi-annual  journal  of  the
.iS'-ociation  of  Kenya,  contains  welcome  discussions
aid  implications  of  'African  Thought' „ Another
-jlu^eivfcs  might  consult  with  considerable  benefit,
il'  ''  '"ourR9-l  of  African  Fhilooophy  (Ife,  Nigeria).

.esults  of  none  of  -the  researches  into  these  religious  themes,
r-xe available  m  ..ssimeng  (1968;  1970;  1977;  1979) .

'i\ie  ditcudsionFj  tli£.+  follow,  are  based  mainly  on  the  present
writer's  already  cited  African  Socjial  and  Political
Introductory  Analysis  for__ Students  (now  in  manuscript  form)»

Or,  there  might  be  iDeriodical  festivals  during  which,  as  among
the  Akan  of  Ghana,  citizens  were  'privileged'  to  "insult1  and-  to
criticize  the  chief  and  his  administration  on  some  of  the
shortcomings  in  society<>

It  may  well  be  that,  in  this  connection,  sociology  has  not  really
succeeded  in  demystifying  the  social  world  of  Africans,  as
Professor  John  Rex  (197*0  might  perhaps  wish.  For,  University
Gvlucatioii,  science,  arid  technology,  do  s t i ll  operate  in  an  African
context  where  charms  and  talismans  and.  incences  are  used  avidly
with  the  aim  of  influencing  the  course  of  social  relations  and
social  events  (cf.  Assimeng,  1977/•  Clearly,  the  undue  personali-
zation  and  the  investment  of  emotion  in  debates  on  social  questions
do  raise  several  problems  for  systematic  social  analysis.,

The  outline  of  this  essay,  was  originally  presented  at  a  staff
seminar  in  the  Department  of  Sociology,  University  of  Leicester
(U.K.),  on  hay  18,  1979«  The  critical  comments  of  participants
of  the  seminar  group,  especially  those  of  Professors  I.  Neustadt
and  J.A.  Banks,  are  hereby  gratefully  acknowledged,,  This  paper  is
informed  by  the  theoretical  framework  of  my African  Soc:ial_jand
PoJH.tt^cal^TiojJLgh^^ 
manuscript  form).

(nowin

Associate  Professor  of  Sociology,  University  of  Ghana,  Legon.

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