RESEARCH REVIEW NS 4.2 1988 COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA: PATTERNS AND SIGNIFICANCE Afolabi Ayeni-Akeke Introduction Since the early 1950's various forms of collective violence have proliferated in Nigeria. By collective violence is meant riotous conflicts which engender deaths, injury and destruction of property. In recent times there have been some years when waves of such cataclysms have followed one another successively. Given the popular expression of surprise, anger and righteous indignation whenever a new eruption occurs, it can be inferred that most Nigerians do not realise that the society they live in is essentially prone to such carnage. The country's perennial domestic disorder is not due to some destructive instinct inherent in the people's psyche. Rather, it stems from a complex, cleavage ridden socio-political system which our received «»«««•<»» -~* --•- — conceal. StS: large social agg^g' t£ ^^ ethnic\ZtZl S T S "' T™ cxass formations. These, however, do not exhaiiRt +K~ within the society violent c t n f ^ T68 °f C O l l e c^e violence other cleavages such ^ religious affinities. Generallv t h t !^ inadvertently or otherwiTeTto Ybe o v e r L S ^ V ? * ?8 thoSf ^ i ^ r^ "^ ^^ "* c o n t m u n al a nd h a V 6 t e n d e d' J The subject of this paper is to a^aly^e t he b »T a na forms of collective violence in Nigeria Vin JZ* ™ The nature of the cleavages in t ^ ^ ^ Ul the next section, incidences of collective violence T the basic linkage among these l l i ^i be profered. examined in !t important if c o n o l u d ing section, seemingly disparate upsurges will followed by analVBVL * ^ S o me ^V 9 Cleavages In Nigeria «H , a i r t d e8 i B to m B u l t l p l i o i ty o£ 28 interlocking cleavages. These cleavages are based on ethnic, communal, class, religious and regional commonalities. The contemporary salience of conflict among these cleavages is tied up with socio-political changes which have accompanied the emergence of the Nigerian state as the locus of economic and political power (Nnoli; 1978). In broad outline, I will describe the various social cleavages and how they are inter-connected. We begin with ethnic groups, by which we refer to a very large human collectivity whose members share a more or less distinct culture and language which is used to 'sustain and enhance identity and to establish social networks and communicative patterns that are important for the group's optimisation of its socio-economic position in society'. (Patterson, 1975: 306). The exact number of ethnic groups in Nigeria is unknown. Estimates range between 250 and 400. With the increasing penetration of the state into more areas of the society, new ethnic formations are either being created or discovered. Some "new" formations have emerged through the fission of groups that were formerly regarded as genealogically and culturally related. Some others have just been discovered as exemplified by the Koma people of Gongola state who were discovered in 1985 (African Concord, March 12, 1985). Each of these groups occupies a definite geographical area, and they vary considerably in terms of demographic size. According to the last census figures, for example, the Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo have approximately fourteen, thirteen and eight million population respectively, while Urhobo, Nupe and Edo have less than a million each (Awolowo 1966: 100). All of these groups are further characterised by internal fragmentation into sub-ethnic and communal units. The Yoruba, for instance, is an agglomeration of sub-ethnic formations like Ekiti, Ijebu, Oyo, Zjesa, Ikale, Akoko, Ondo and so on. These again subdivide into small, spatially discrete and dialectally differentiated communities (Mabogunje 1986; Dudley 1982: 36). Partly reinforcing and partly transcending these ethnic and communal cleavages is religion (Onaiyekan 1985: 360-362). There are many religious sects in Nigeria, ranging from traditional worshippers to minor groups like Bahai and Mashad Bouse. However Islam and Christianity predominate in terms of followership and socio-political significance. Islam was introduced to the Northern part of Nigeria about the 9th century. Its spread was given impetus by the Pulani jihad early in the 19th century, and it is today the hegemonic religion among the Hausa, Pulani, Nupe, Kanuri and a few other ethnic groups in the north. Christianity came with colonialism. The early converts were logically the southern, coastal ethnic groups and their neighbours. Hence the Ijaws, Urhobos, Ibo, Ibibio, Efik are predominantly Christians. Among other groups like the Yoruba, 29 and Edo of the south Western area, and Tiv, igala, Idoma of the middle belt, both Christianity and Islam have strong followership. m short each of these religions reinforces the fj u , h o m o9e n e i ty of some ethnic groups and creates Christian and Moslem cleavages within others. Even then, both religions have not completely obliterated traditional religions. In fact the latter are being reinvigorated as part of the cultural fr their ^ OOU"tlry'S C O l° "i al — l od »• 5 =5£S£S&iS3f f ° °f t he ea*t being regarded 30 At the time Nigeria attained 1 nI ethnic boundaries, was divided into threebTa 1"d ePe n d e n ce ln " 6 0, the country N°r t h e r n' » - * •» •»« Eastern1. The two south -Eastern ^ fw ~ r e g l°nS h ad t he Ibo a^d Yoruba as the politicallv Z economically dominant ethnic groups respectively while If in the North, ^ s o u t h e rn 'part,^ p a r t i c u l a r l f ^t "" ^^ generally regarded as more d e v e l cW t h/ tt Y O W ba "^ ±S p a r tS (Anusionwo 1980: Diejomaoh, llsi 1nd " ^ M o rfs on 1981). The socxo-economic development of this•'ariT »* ^^ * h e ad S t a rt by the early acquisition of wester techniques of social organisation h R a t i o n, skills and 1985). This initial headsXrt ha s? J? «** in the development of these arfa provided bureaucrats, earlv ™ intermediaries and industrial personnel. Other f a c tT the south to the sea and consequent ?? **'' t he nearness of °f pOrts' the location of the federal oaZT abundant availability of revenue ^ • t he S o u t h^ st area; like cocoa, palm-oil, rubber^ and ^ "^ a g r i c ul ^ al resources petroleum and so on, have combing ^ t Ht ffS O U r c es "ke coal, and markets to facilitate g r e a t e r^ a v a l l a bi H ty of .manpower persistence of ethnoregional s o c i o^ ^ T' T he r e s u lt *•« ^ the Yoruba of the southlest and ibo ^ S^ dif£«*»»™«< « !* P e°P le «*>***•' e n96^ered multiplier effects * ,WSS t h e se 9r o uP8 t h at LlT^^^ O t h er as dominating other groups. The other related consequence of the differential socio- economic development of the various ethnic and communal groups derives from the three regional governments. Each regional government was the main engine of development in its area of jurisdiction, and the main employer of labour. Realising its relative disadvantage, the Northern regional government initiated a policy of catching up with the other regions. Given the convergence of ethnic and regional boundaries, it devised the policy of restricting employment opportunities in the region to northern ethnics. As articulated by the then Premier of the region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the general policy of the government was to: Northernise the Northern Region Public Service as soon as possible to ensure for Northerners a reasonable proportion of posts in the public services; to secure for Northerners a reasonable proportion of all posts in all statutory corporations; to increase the number of Northerners in commercial, industrial, banking and trading concerns in the region. (Ankpe 1987). The Eastern and Western regions soon followed suit. The upshot of this was the mutual insulation of the educated and otherwise mobile elements of the various ethno-regional groups in the country. Even though these regions have been abrogated and replaced with a twenty-one state administrative structure, the tripartite system remains real in the consciousness of most Nigerians. This is because the economic structures on which the regions were founded are still largely intact and have continued to influence contemporary thinking and events. Witness, for example, the establishment by the states created out of the former Western and Northern Regions of Odua Group and Northern Nigeria Development Corporation, respectively, as the holding companies of the industries and economic assets of the former regions. In relation to cleavage formation, the most important consequence of this policy has been the regionalisation of the socio-economic stratification process. The variation in the level of ethno-regional development has meant differential degree of stratification, and the regionalisation of economic and employment opportunities has tended to confine the process of class formation within each ethno-regional group. In other words there is no linkage among elements or individuals who, by their means and station in life, should normally belong to the same class. This is the point Madunagu (The Guardian, June 4th, 1987, p.11) recently noted when he wrote that 'the divisions within the Nigerian ruling class are as deep as ever1. This observation is no more than an admission of the non-existence of national classes whose membership cuts across all other 31 cleavages in Nigeria today. economic and Our analysis so far has been concerned with the nature and basis of social cleavages in Nigeria today. As Young (1982: 73) has pointed out, these cleavages were created by the intersection of socio-economic classes by units of social affinity based on commonalities of language, ethnicity, religion and region. Individuals tend to hold class, ethnic, communal, religious, identities simultaneously. Hence, neither simple economic nor cultural determinism separately, solely and permanently accounts for political attitudes and nature of political conflict as Marxist and pluralist analysts, respectively, would make us believe. All these identities are inter-twined and reciprocally influence one another. But that does not imply that each cannot be activated independently or in combination with other factors depending on the situational exigency. In conflict situations, for example, religion can be activated for the purposes of promoting the political hegemony of an ethnic group. sectional other In short, those who view collective conflicts as either ethnic or class fail to take into cognizance the various lines of division along which disagreements can occur. Moreover, ethnic and class membership is not a question of either/or, such that commitment to one precludes the consideration of the other as a determinant of attitude and behaviour. The crux of this argument is that the situational exigency in any society determines the lines along which conflicts occur. Thus collective violence can occur along several lines of social cleavage. In the following section an analysis and classification of collective violence will be done with a view to explaining the nature of the cleavages and issues involved in each case. In the concluding section the relationship among the different types of collective violence will be explained. Varieties of Collective Violence On the twenty-seventh independence anniversary of Nigeria, the country's leading newspaper, The Guardian (1st October, 1987s 16), commented on the country's turbulent political life and noted that: Before and since we won independence, Nigeria has remained a hopelessly divided country with centrifugal forces rooted in seemingly irreconcilable ethnic, religious and social differences. The political formations that saw us into independence were rooted in diverse aspirations, diverse hopes and diverse interests. The resultant tangle of endeavours by the various cleavages whose interests and aspirations cross each other in various directions has meant that every group is in the way of the other; and each stands in covert or overt struggle with every 32 other group. These have led to many violent incidents at both local and national levels. Some of the notable cataclysms have occurred in areas often regarded as old ethno-political trouble spots. These include the south-western areas, (Dudley, 1970) the Benue/Flateau area of Nigeria's middle belt, (Anifowose, 1982) and the Kano-Zaria axis of the far north. Since the early fifties, each of these areas has witnessed at least three waves of collective violence. The Kano riots of 1953 wera -tne first. In that year, the Yoruba-dominated Action Group, which was one of the three dominant parties in the House of Representatives, moved a motion calling for the independence of Nigeria in 1956. The Ibo-dominated National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) sympathised with this motion, while the Hausa/Fulani-led Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) was against it. With the active support of the colonial authorities, parliamentary procedure was manipulated in favour of the NPC to kill the motion. Dissatisfied with the position of NPC leaders and the outcome of the debate, the Action Group sent a delegation to the North to explain to the people and get them to prevail on their leaders. On getting to Kano the delegation was met by an irate mob which had obviously been mobilised by northern political leaders who were displeased with the treatment meted out to them by southerners in Lagos. As Sir Ahmadu Bello, the leader of the party, explained to northerners, members of his party - the NPC were harassed and molested by a band of hooligans, who were organised by unscrupulous politicians to abuse anyone seen to be wearing Northern dress who appeared to be a member of the House of Representatives' (Araune 1986s 6 ). The mobilised crowd went on a rampage against southerners and their property. When peace was finally restored 36 people had been killed and property worth several thousands of naira destroyed (Sklar 1963: 131). The Ibos who constituted a greater number of southern ethnics and whose pervasive socio-economic presence in the city could have been an added source of northerners' disaffection, suffered the greatest casualty. But the riot was politically motivated despite the seeming ethnic nature of confrontation. Even though Ibos suffered more, other southern ethnics were not spared. And it is noteworthy that the Hausa/Fulani were divided into NPC supporters who attacked, and supporters of the NEPO who defended the southerners. The southerners were attacked not because of their ethnic identities but because of their presumed political identification with the southern based Action Group and NCNC. The fit between the boundaries of ethnic, party and regional cleavages greatly facilitated the upsurge {Sklar 1963: 131). These same factors again converged about a decade later in the mayhem which followed the 1966 coup d'etat. This time, however, the scope and intensity of violence was greater, the target and 33 objective more defined. Between May and October three waves of violent riots followed one another successively. In May and October the riots were carried out by northern civilians against Tbos, while that of July resulted from the attack of soldiers of northern origin against Ibo civilians and military officers. The July event is classified as a military riot because of the general, indiscriminate and extreme violence soldiers visited against civilians in a non-war situation. The ostensible causes of these riots centred on the January coup d'etat and certain events associated with it which the dominant Hausa-Fulani ruling class in the North interpreted as portending danger. Given the larger population, land area and hegemonic Islamic influence which characterised the north, the dominant class there assured of their political control of not only the north but the whole country. This was due to the constitutional arrangement which allocated more than half of the seats in the central legislature to the north. The January coup d'etat was seen as an attempt by the predominantly Ibo officers, who led it, to snatch power and foist Ibo rule over the whole country. The pattern of killing and some policies enunciated by the successor military regime of General Ironsi tended to lend credence to this fear. Apart from one Ibo military officer, who was allegedly killed by mistake, all the other casualties were either Hausa-Fulani political or military leaders and Yoruba politicians or officers presumed to be sympathetic to the north (Dudley 1973: 105; First 1970:22). In addition to this were a series of policy initiatives which a lot of people in the north and south-western areas felt were intended to consolidate Ibo political dominance in the country (Dudley 1973). These include the promotion of some military officers of Ibo origin, dismissal of some Air Force Cadets of Northern origin, promulgation of the regional and federal civil services and the unification decree which changed the constitutional status of the country from Federal to a unitary state. Even if these policies would have been accepted by the generality of the people, the incautious haste with which they were made, coupled with the pre-existing resentment of Ibo economic dominance in the North alarmed the northerners. The result was the first wave of riots in May. it was spearheaded by students of Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria. From Zaria the riots spread to other northern towns. Thousands of Ibos were killed and their property destroyed. As First (1970: 311) argues, the basic motive of northerners was to retaliate against their humiliation and the death of their leaders and thereafter secede. On this, she argued, all northerners irrespective of ethnic religious and political differences, were agreed- The cry of the killings was 'Araba' (Let m part).* Northern secessxon was the watchword... The May killings showed that 34 the old order in the North was ready to fight back. And by then it was also clear that the Ironsi regime had thrown together in the North forces previously incompatible, even hostile, to another. Northerners, whether NPC or NEPU, Hausa/Fulani ruling class or Middle-Belt, closed ranks... The July and September-October upsurges were informed by the same motivations, and participation was on the basis of the north against the Ibos. The only difference was that they were more organised, and the July anti-Ibo violence was more widespread, covering the whole northern and western areas. Apart from hurtling the country towards the civil war, one of the consequences of these waves of riots was the healing of the wounds of another type of ethno-political confrontation which raged in the north between 1960 and 1965. This was the series of riots in the Tiv area against what the people perceived as the economic exploitation, excessive coercion, victimisation and denial of fundamental human rights by the Hausa-Fulani- dominated Northern region government and their local Native Authority quislings (Anifowose 1982: 110-163). Several other factors reinforced the ethno-cultural cleavage between the dominant Hausa-Fulani and Tivs. The latter were predominantly Christians, relatively more educated than most other ethnic groups in the north, and supported the United Middle Belt Congress (DMBC) then agitating for the creation of a new region out of the lower north. The sporadic riots occurred in two waves between 1960 and 1965 all over Tiviand. The intensity of violence and extensive disruption of social life which followed the riots compelled the deployment of men of the Nigerian Army to restore order (Sunday Tines 19 July, 1964) when detachments of the Nigerian Police and its para-military mobile wing could not cope. Yet the riots did not subside, and the government was forced to set up a commission of inquiry into the grievances of the people. The report of the commission confirmed the allegations of oppression, victimisation, and discrimination against the Tivs by the Hausa-Fulani-dominated regional government. The report was not officially released due to its scathing criticism of the government. The Yoruba of south western Nigeria are regarded by some scholars as the most prone to collective violence. Beer (1976: 160), for example, has observed that a 'periodic resort to violence is a relatively long standing feature of Western Nigerian political life'. In recent times there have been many occurrences of collective violence in this area which Dudley (1970) once described as the cockpit of Nigerian politics. In this paper three of such incidents will be used to illustrate the various types of collective violence in the area. Two, the post election riots of 1965 and 1983, will be analysed in this 35 section while the Agbekoya riots of 1968 will be used to illustrate class oriented forms of collective violence in the appropriate section later. All outbreaks of collective violence in this area share certain commonalities which tend to imbue turmoil among the Yoruba with a certain uniqueness. These features include: the tendency for collective violence to be intra-ethnic specific, that is, for violence to be precipitated by Yoruba elements and directed against fellow ethnics; the tendency for participation to be pervasive; and the tendency for these socio-political explosions to be periodic, sporadic and local in scope. Lastly, the most extensive outbreaks have tended to occur in times of intense political activity, such as during elections. In 1965 and 1983, the Yoruba speaking area was engulfed in extensive political violence. The circumstances and origins of these incidents were similar in some respects and differed in others. In 1965, for example, nearly all the Yoruba speaking people were grouped together under the administration of Western Nigeria. By 1983 this region had been divided into Ondo, Oyo, Ogun and a substantial part of Lagos state as separate politico- administrative units. However, as in 1965 when the Action Group (A6) was the ruling party in Western Nigeria, the Unity Party of Nicraria which was the off-shoot of the AG, was the ruling party in all the four Yoruba dominated states in 1983. The riots which occurred during the two periods had their origin in intra-leadership conflict within the ruling parties which led to the split of these parties and re-alignment of their members. The Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP) which broke away from the Action Group in 1962 formed an alliance with the Hausa/Fulani dominated Northern People's Congress (NPC) while the members of the DPN who decamped in 1983 joined the National Party of Nigeria which was the off-shoot of the NPC. There are other similarities in the background to these convulsions. Following the split of the AG in the sixties, the party was edged out of power and replaced by the NNDP as the ruling party in Western Nigeria, through judicial jobbery Uwolovo 1986). In 1983 the former DPN party men who decamped and contested on the platform of the NPN were, similarly, declared winners in elections generally regarded as the most rigged ever. B«£ore commenting on the violent response of the people to tneee outcomes, it is pertinent to point that even though all elections in the area - local, regional and federal - were generally contentious and acrimonious, only the regional or state elections resulted in extensive mayhem and carnage. It is also worth noting in 1983, extensive violence broke out in Ondo and Oyo States, where NPN gubernatorial candidates were declared winners and not in Ogun and Lagos states where OPN candidates 36 I won. It is very obvious that ethno^-political considerations have been the most important factor promoting violence in the area. Each eruption has always centred on the question of political leadership -and control of Yoruba dominated states. On the 1965 riots, for example, a traditional ruler was quoted as saying that at least nine out of every ten Yoruba supported what was happening, i.e. the violence, because every Yoruba regarded it as Operation Salvation. And in 1983 The Sunday Sketch (15 April 1983) reported chief Awolowo as saying the Yoruba would never be slaves or play second fiddle to any other group in Nigeria. Given the level, scope and targets of violence it would appear that the majority of Yoruba shared these sentiments. Participation in these riots was widespread, cutting across economic, communal and religious cleavages. In terms of scope these circumstances occurred in all the sixteen divisions of the Western Region in 1965 and all part of Ondo and Oyo states in 1983. It was however, less pervasive in Lagos and Ogun States where the DPN won. There are no accurate records of the number of people killed and amount of property destroyed. While the official estimate of recorded deaths in 1965 is 150, the unofficial estimate is as high as 2,000 deaths. More destruction of property took place during the 1983 riots. However, at least about one hundred people were estimated to have lost their lives in Ondo State alone (The Guardian 8 September 1983). Large-scale arson and looting occurred during both riots. The targets of attach were mostly NNDP and NPN stalwarts in 1965 and 1983 respectively. However, electoral officers, AG and DPN supporters were also attacked in retaliatory attacks by policemen and party thugs. Another form of perennial collective violence in Nigeria is communal violence. Communities in Nigeria's rural areas are still very primary and traditional in the sense that they tend to be spatially discrete, and relatively, socio-culturally distinct. Membership in them is determined by birth, and intra community relations tend to be characterised by intense attachment and identification. About 80% of Nigeria's population live in around 95,000 rural communities. Even though the socio-cultural differences among these communities create conditions conducive to inter-communal violence, the main causes are often economic and political. This type of collective violence is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. In recent times, however, there has been a marked increase not only in its frequency but, particularly in the degree of violence and devastation attending it (lenwtch 21 September, 1987). Examples of recent upsurges will be cited from different parts of the country in order to reflect the diversity of circumstances, causes and partisans of communal collective violence. 37 The clash between Emede and Egbide (The Guardian 2nd July 1986) communities in Bendel State epitomises the changing nature of inter-communal violence in Nigeria. The two communities, separated by two kilometres, have been in a state of hostility for a long time over the ownership and the right to use of a farmland and a fishing lake lying between them. Even though this disagreement had been on for many years, it did not escalate into overt conflict until word got round that the government wanted to acquire the land for purposes of industrial development. Since then the relations between the two communities became characterised by intermittent skirmishes. It eventually exploded into unprecedented inter-communal violence between May 16 and 19, 1986. During the four days of violence and destruction, sophisticated military hardware like rockets, rocket launchers, machine guns and so on were reportedly used (The Guardian 3 July 1986: 7; 6 June 1986: 1 9 ). The resultant carnage in both communities, which are genealogically related, is unprecedented in the area. A similar cataclysm occurred between Onubi and Umuze-Uga communities in Anambra state. The history of conflict between the two communities dates back to early this century. Attempts to resolve the conflict have been undertaken at various levels of government, including the Supreme Court. Yet peace has not been achieved, in the last upsurge of violence members of the Umuze-Uga community attacked Unubi people, killed and maimed many people, destroyed their homes, farms, and drove them into exile. As the Guardian (28 May 1986: 7) reported- Today Unubi lies in ruins. And for about five kilometres stretch are remnants of a once thriving community: destroyed ^ ^ " " V f f ^' "* ravaged »^«i*he of yam barns. T e h o ld i t e ms "tter the whole place.. .while the 6 "* f e 8 t e r i n9' i ts « * •» continue in agony ^ °U S as refuges 1 As in the Emede-Igbide cast> *h~ on olai, «a «omt.r-el,iTf ^ Z * 1J\ '5* C° "£ 1 1 Ot °"" * Kafanchan, Kaduna state Ji °O}mt** l n t° chaos, occurred in unique in the sense that it i C o n f l a9r«tion in Kafanchan 1" overlapping identities can c l e a r lv exemplifies how different, riots. The population of ®l n u l t a n e o«sly come into play during native Kaje-Fantsuwam maiow* e t h n l c a l*y divides into the KajeFantsuwam maiow* "** t he settler Bau&a-Folani minority who invaded d T minority who invaded and sMh-T,, ."** t he settler Bau&a the Islamic jihad fomented b y T a ^ l ! !? i n d l9e n o«« P«°pl« their new o v ld their new overlords and sui-rL!^ °d l° in 1 8 0 3- *« defiance * the natives embraced C h r i8 ti ^f f Powerful Moslem neighboox*' the educational opportunities 1 * *, *** a l so * ** a<*rant«§« rf and have thus achieved relate ^ "^ by t h« «l.»ion •chool», jihad fomented byTa^l!!? d l9e n o«« P«°pl« dur a l*y div L !^ °d l° in 1 8 03 d fi natively moxm socio-economic progress 38 L than their Hausa/Fulani rulers. They are well educated and have many sons in top places in the array, the universities, business and public service. Yet the Hausa/Fulani have maintained a firm grip on the lever of political power in the locality. They have provided all the rulers (emirs) for the community since 1810, and all of them have been Moslems. Among the native Kaje-Fantsuwam, therefore, Islam is not just the religion of the door neighbour, but the symbol of Bausa-Fulani hegemony. The political dominance of the Hausa-Fulani has, for long, been viewed with resentment and irritation by the Fantsuwams. This uneasy coexistence burst into violence in March 1987. Violence was ignited by a religious scuffle between Christian and Moslem students of the College of Education located in Kafanchan. A group of Moslem students led by a young lady started the conflict. According to reports (Newswatch 30 March 1987) trouble began when they went to disrupt a meeting of Christian students being addressed by an itinerant reverend who converted from Islam to Christianity. The Moslem students accused the reverend of denigrating Islam and blaspheming the holy name of Prophet Mohammed in order to illustrate the superiority of Christianity over Islam. The Christian students who were in the majority chased the Moslems out of the campus. The latter regrouped and returned to the campus to confront the Christians. In the ensuing conflict a few buildings and vehicles were destroyed and several students injured. This incident occurred on Friday March 6th, 1987. When the news of this incident reached Kafanchan town on Sunday it ignited the age-long hostility between the native, Christian Fantsuwan and politically dominant Hausa-Fulani Moslems. On that day, about nine people were killed and several mosques and churches destroyed. In the resultant melee ethnic, political and religious resentments became intertwined. The other Kaje communities in the neighbourhood of Kafanchan trooped out to aid their kin against the Moslem Hausa-Fulani (The Guardian, Sunday Supplement, 3 May 1987s Bl). News of the riot in Kafanchan first reached most people in the state and the country in general through the regular bulletin of Radio Nigeria, Kaduna. Its reports that Christians were killing Moslems and destroying mosques in Kafanchan galvanised people in the other predominantly Moslem cities of Kaduna state into action. In towns like Kaduna, Funtua, Zaria, Katsina, Ikara and Kania, the target was broadened. Apart from Christians and their churches, business establishments like hotels, offices, shops, private houses, petrol stations and vehicles belonging to non-Hausa/Fulani ethnics, regardless of whether they were Moslem and Christians were attacked. No sooner had the riots gained momentum than other interested cleavages hiding under the cover of religion took over to 39 achieve their selfish ends. In Zaria, for example, the greater number of vehicles were burnt for reasons unconnected with the religious aspect of the riot. There had been tension among commercial motor drivers in town due to the claim of precedence over members from the southern and other northern, non-Hausa- Fulani, states like Niger, Kwara, Benue, Plateau, Gongola and Borno, by indigenous Hausa-Fulani drivers of Zaria. They seized the opportunity offered by the riots to burn and destroy the commercial vehicles of their opponents. In the same manner, various other groups used the chance to visit violence on their enemies. The riot which took a heavy toll of lives and property was not religious in its totality. As President Babangida said in his address to the nation: the rioting which lasted for about a week on a sporadic basis....might have been religious in origin, the wanton destruction of lives and property in Kaduna, Zaria, Katsina, Funtua, and other places in Kaduna state were carefully planned and master-minded by evil men with sinister motives, who saw the incident in Kafanchan as an opportunity to subvert the Federal Government and the Nigerian nation. What we are dealing with therefore, is not just a religious crisis but rather a civilian equivalent of an attempted coup d'etat. The riots meant different things to different people because of the diversity of issues and cleavages that became involved in it. As Governor Abubakar Dmar of Kaduna state, where the riot occurred, has explained (Quality Magazine, November 1987: 36) the riot was simultaneously economic, religious, political and communal. A more defined and less confusing collective riot, in terms of the religious cleavage involved, was the Maitatsine riots which ravaged different cities in the north between 1980 and 1984. The moving spirit behind these riots was a Cameroonlan emigre, Mohammed Marwa Maitatsine, who settled in Yan Awaki quarter of KanO<.,f,!, 3n Js l a m ic P^acher. He was a fanatic who preached an 7 Sn 10,000 highly mobilised and fanatical fOlloierB.MmtomtB were predominantly recruited from among the large lumpen-proletariat were divided *i , ^^ ^^^ 8tU ~ * »^ of violence. These w h i ch t e n d e «™ mobilisation of the people, Pa r^c u^r i* 2. x - x l, Diamond unemployed and lumpen elements COsman 1982. x^ ^ ^ ^ 1983: 56). The purported cause of the rio£ ^ police, was an alleged attempt by the govern f l o uting harass the emir. The *<^™J^J?j£~»***r.. ^e laws regulating traditional i n^ i a te storm which erupted into query, purportedly, caused an J ^ - ^ %^ violence two days after it was s» killed in the riots and property w destroyed. The rioters c afe f u lj£ . K a n o, headquarters of the included the state secretariat, " " J j^ of t he state owned PRP, state House of Assembly, the premi 12 people were m i l l l on ^ ^^ targets which n u m b er of ^^ m QQ 43 Tritaph newspapers s t i ll under construction and several private buildings of key governmental officials (Nigerian Tribune 21 July 1986; Higerian Standard July 1986). There was evidence of police connivance with the rioters. Throughout the period of riot, and two days after, no arrests were made. Thus it has beet impossible to interview the rioters on the reasons why they went on rampage. However, there is agreement among scholars (Usau 1982 s Diamond 1983« 59) that the real causes centred cm the struggle for control of the state by the conservative forces seeking to preserve the traditional socio-economic structure and their privileged position within i t, and radicals committed to i ts transformation. The last type of collective violence we want to consider i« police or military riot. An event can be described as police riot (Stark 1974: 311-2) when a band of policemen or soWiexs inflict indiscriminate violence which is either excessive for the maintenance of law and order or on non-provocative persons or property. This form of riot can be grouped into "spontaneous" and a u t ho r i t y_i n 8 t l g a t ed Qr s a n c t i o n ed £1,™ 1985j Odeyemi 1982; targets of v i o l e n c e l n t h ?, * *• G u a r t U""»' 12 ^ who were protesting, , 1, and shell petroled Bello 1986 riots and R.?^*1 1 1®8 8t t wo examples were rural 9 a i n 8t t he a c t i v i t i es of Impreeit r e sP«ctively. Only two - Bakolori is a - B ^ TT rl *«8sacre - will be discussed state, it w as o n7™i p e a s«nt agricultural village in t he 1 9 81 University of If« 1 5"" ' «op8 destr™^. ^ !, " "y villages whose aiW« a substantial portion 44 J*J of firm. Instead (Odeyemi corruption Limited, a Impresit-Bakolori by construction expropriated by the government due to the construction of a dam joint in the area Nigerian-Italian P *^ compensation for the land appropriated and crops destroyed, the Federal Government decided to pay for crops destroyed and relocate the farmers on new land. Administrative ineptitude and official compensation of all farmers. Some were paid while the greater majority got nothing. Even then the land provided for the farmers was infertile. Apart from its infertility its distribution was standardised such that all farmers got the same size of land, regardless of the differences in the sizes of individual land expropriated. In addition to these was the farmers disagreement with the authorities on cropping. The agricultural development scheme of which the dam was a part, was primarily designed for growing wheat in the dry harmattan season. The project's management, therefore, insisted that the land allocated to farmers should be used for wheat cultivation only as against guinea corn, the staple food of the people. 1982; 83) V******* All representations to the government to ameliorate their grievances were rebuffed. The project management, for instance, ordered the destruction of the guinea corn planted by the farmers instead of wheat. Thus the farmers were forced to resort to direct action by blocking the access roads to their farms, the dam and the project's powerhouse. Tension heightened and on 26th April the mobile para-military police was let loose on the villages, their farms, animals, grain storages and other properties. About 150 persons were killed and incalculable damage inflicted on property. (Odeyemi 1982* 88-94). As Beckman (1985: 17) explains: . . The brutality and destructiveness of the Police ri ot contrast sharply against the organised and ^ i p l i n ed manner in which the farmers had pursued their campaign... There is no evidence of any rioting by the farmers of mhtm*. the 1986 police onslaught on Bakolori. ^ _ .. This much can also be said about tne i wo *> the students of Ahmadu Bello University (ABU). « oasis of knowledge in the comparatively least developed part of Nigeria, has had more than "f riots and police brutality compared to s i m i l a r/ ? o c c u r r ed the country" The latest in the series of carnage there occurred ^* 4 « s S sa killed students demonstrations against withdrawal of the iooa m my ABU lO 8t six students in that crisis, and * * Z ^ * * * *£ reason to commemorate it. Students made a peaceful procession, o£ the food subsidy in 1978 by P<>licei»en 45 — that day, carrying a mock coffin through all male and female on halls of residence in the university. A majority of the students, male and female, participated in the procession. Mo student was injured or molested, university life was not disrupted and no- property was destroyed (Wum W.$*rian 26 Hay 1987; tbm Cnartt— 24-30 Nay 1987; Badly Sketch 25 May 1987; Africa* Caartttaa June 12 1987K However, the- student's union leadership wa* «mried fez takiag tile pxoee**io&- through the Amina Ball, aa act which oaatraic—ed the university'* regulation forbidding tb*- entrance a£ 'vaX** into fmml» hall a. They were threatened with eapulsion i* tftagp failed to offer satisfactory explanation. In their, reply, they pleaded that th» decision to go round all hall* of residence was take* by the student , congress, and asked for leniency. They also approached ! individual* and organisations within and outside ABU to plead \ with the authorities. Despite these efforts the chairman of the ; student union was rusticated and others given various forms of I punishment. Angexad by tha action of the Vice-chancellor, all students began to boycott lectures, and went round chanting that Ango Abdullahi, the Vice-chancellor (VC) must go. They proceeded to the Vice-Chancellor's house and offices and disorganised the books and furniture in the latter. Even at this stage the demonstration was still peaceful until the police were invited by the VC. The police threw teargas at the students who ran in all directions, in the ensuing melee three police vehicles were burnt. The police returned the next day with live ammunition, and gave the students one hour to leave the campus. HZ t TP i r a t i on of tte * »» they locked the gates and 4 students a d , i n d l s c r l*l n* * * Y' killing and making the a n y°ne ln Slght' Students were beaten, raped lit Z • n 3 * rd ^ f0*8 W6re anashed' ^dents' properties like blks People w f o U n ? !; * ?e v i 8 i o n' b° «s and clothes destroyed. K1P WOUnd6d °r dead stuae»t« * «• «hot at« Of flc±&TB ZT X acco^ replied th^Bv ZJT* ** fOUr' bUt *» ^ ^^ make an ~ffr>l7 * * ? S a t u r d aY morning, when we went back to tSen z^r;x f:;i^jz sawe±9htdeadb t h at ***' ***** "' l a t er Of discovered who h a d ^ —- escape, they 19). Conclusion ea^ ££%££ Z r^ »* \ collective violence in Nigeria fl u 8*rft ed the various types of s o c i a l ^r t\f all fit religious violence by L Z -^ i n t o ne or the Lh t h* diversity of *ln «nd«*y*"9 »»"? aaoog iu ^tectable. They t h# folloi'i*19 categoric' g r a t l°n oy groups threateaed by the spread of 46 secularism, heresy and competition with another faith; violence by low ranked rural peasant groups threatened by the spread of capitalism and urban elite exploitation; riots by communal or ethno-political competing for or advocating a redistribution of values and resources; and repressive state-directed violence by the political class threatened by articulate groups, like students. groups None of these forms of collective violence can be described as revolutionary or creative. They were precipitated to preserve or to restore certain socio-political relations. In this sense they can all be classified as one or the other form of vigilantism (Rosenbaum and Sederberg 1976: 3-29). The fact that these conflagrations began in the early fifties and have been proliferating ever since is, largely, due to the increasing penetration or incorporative drive of the Nigerian state which has been integrating the various cleavages into the mainstream of the country's socio-economic and political life. This process which began, in earnest, with the Mcpherson and Lyttleton constitutions of 1951 and 1954 respectively, had proceeded so far in 1982 that Claude Ake (1983 s 24) could write that 'the Nigerian state appears to intervene everywhere and to own everything'. The incorporative drive has engendered modifications in socio-economic structure and transformation in cultural values which are in harmony with them. In fact one of its consequences has been the unprecedented proliferation of new groups - religious, economic, political, cultural and so on; all of them responding to the dynamics of state directed socio-economic forces. 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