STEYN COMMISSION 1:
THE PRESS AND TOTAL STRATEGY

Les Switzer1
The press,- in particular, the survlv1ng 'opposition' newspapers - is to be
Publications which fail to promote the in-
co-opted 1nto Total Strategy.
terests,of the State - and it is abundantly clear that the ruling National
Party w111 continue to define these interests - will be silenced.
This is
th~ re~l message embedded in the obfuscations of the 1980 Commission of In-
qUlry 1nto security news reporting (Steyn Commission I).
The p~ess is to be upgraded from a passive chronicler to an active partici-
pant 1n the new strategies for change envisioned by Prime Minister P W Botha
and his c?l1ea~ues. ,Furthermore the guidelines to be followed in the process
of Co-opt1on w111 undoubtedly be detailed by Steyn Commission II when its
report is -tabled in Parliament later this year.
The key proposal in the report of Steyn Commission I is the formulation of a
"national communication policy" which, in turn, will be "determined and con-
trolled by the national strategy" (Qaras. 231, 233):
The State and the media need each other .•, because the State is one of
the media's chief sources of information and conversely, because the
State is largely dependent on the media to inform the population.
In
the case of conflict between State and media interests, State interests
in respect of national security are paramount
The commissioners
clearly regard the flow of information as hierarchical -
from the State to the people (e g. para. 229) - and legitimate news is de-
rived essentially from official sources provided by the State.
ly, non-official sources of information, ideas and attitudes - particularly
those concerned with the grievances and aspirations of individuals and in-
stitutions deemed prejudiCial to the security of the State - are seen as
potentially
The assumptions held by the commissioners as to who (or what) constitutes an
"enemy" of the State reveal much about the normative framework within which
the press is to be evaluated.
The State's external enemies are "Marxism and
certain Western countries" - led by Russia and the United States - which aim
"to replace the present order in South Africa with one that is radically
different" (e g. paras. 47-55, 447,458-459).
These twi~ ~ogies ren~er s~p-
port to the State's internal enemies who, while not speclf1cally def1ned 1n
the report (but note paras. 68-74), are seen to be anything ~h~ch undermines
or subverts "knowingly or unknowingly" (para. 226) the prevalllng status quo.
The commissioners devote much space to the "psychological onslaught" (e g.
paras. 235, 346-347) from withi n and without which ~s se~n ?,Sa "propaganda
campaign" that "cannot be neutralised solely ~y legls~atlon
(para. ~291. "
enemy
Hence the importance of a national communicatlonS POllCY to counter

(if not actually) illegitimate sources of news.

(para. 469).

More ominous-

41

its ambit"
to the South African

were concerned

of police and military

coverage of security news in this context.

and to promote the policy of Total Strategy.

the role of the foreign and domestic

press in
While they favoured great-
it is clear

in South Africa2,

mainly with the South African press

operating

news.
in a conmunication
to

in the interests of South Africa"
erected an elaborate

(para. 235
facade which appeared

recOlll11endedthat the Official Secrets Act of
(para. 514), for example, and vari-
118 which dealt
Defence Force (SADF), be revised to

propaganda
The commissioners
its
er control over foreign journalists
that the commissioners
and its role in the reporting
that
action~
11Iits efforts to get the press "involved
the
my emphasis),
wHl
aperate
support many of
comm5ssioners
'watchdog' role - "media must enjoy
tlle ideals of a free press.
on the part of officials
or poli-
the r}ght to make public any irregularities
for example, and ~hegovern-
tic;aas. {~ 9. paras. 11f, 513) -was
in denying the press access to
against
ment vas cautioned
"oversensitivity"
information which might be embarrassing
urged "a greater and more ef-
secUl'ity (e g. para. 233).
The commissioners
(para. 232) and reCOlTll1endeda narrowing
fective flow of information"
of the
focus of censorship
of and reporting
so that "only disclosures
ation or facts be prohibited
which are ••• in fact detrimental
fence or survival
industry"
(paras. 281, 502).
ThecOlllllissioners specifically
1956 be amended "to restrict
ous sections of the Defence Act of ~957. including Section
with news relating
make available more information
As Tony Matthew~ Dean of the Law Faculty at the University
the changes
pointed out in a letter to the author,
Secrets Act were not specified
revision of Section
was nullified
apparently
recommendation
lication of information
ulation groups
(para. 404). Prof Matthews
section in the Armaments
recOIlI11endedby the commissioners
practices
commissioners
to information was counterbalanced
The supremacy
missioners
press was "free" and "independent"
destruction
destruction
to prejudice
The commissioners
untouched
restricting
ities" (para. 58a) and suqges ted that "voluntary co-operation
press and the security forces
by appropriate
(para. 512).
and effective
ssioners disclairr~d any attempt at converting
medium for the State (para. 288) or for the "political
507), the effect of their recommendations
As "the principal

of Natal (Durban)
in the Official
that the pub-
to cause erunity between any of the pop-
that a new anti-disclosure
Act of 1968 (para. 417)
of mal-
Thus the carrot offered by the
on access

to be sacrosanct
of the present orderly dispensation
of the free press ••• Press freedom
or harm the national
also maintained

is only fruitful and successful
Although
party in power" (para.

the press into a propaganda
would amount to the same thing.
to

(letter to author 22 July 1980).

would prohibit even the disclosure
in the 9uise of easing a few of the many restrictions
by appeals for more censorship.

They maintained

rights was held by the com-
that South Africa's
(para. 11a) but warned "that any possible
..• will also result in the
.•• does not imply licence

however,
and the suggested
by the commissioners'
.calcu1ated

... in the Republic and the Defence force" be prohibited

arsenal"
by the author-
between the
if backed
the commi-

security
interests"
that the "formidable

(paras. 238, 428).
legislative

instrument"

(para. 452) for transmitting

information

of State interests over individual

(para. 28).

was also of the opinion
and Production

Development

security news reporting was "virtually

on its activities

(para. 515).

118

considered

The media's

affirmed,

but would not prejudic~

nationa1

of the State ••. its security forces

on inform-
to the de-
••, its armaments

'"
legislation"

42

(para. 450).

developmental action successfully"

syndrome' must be avoided" (para. 457).

(i e. the implementation of
"Governmental credibil ity must at all
In effect. the press

the public on security and defence matters. the press .had a duty to inform
the publ ic "of the nature and ambit of the threat. of the necessity for sus-
taining their own will to resist and to carry through their own internal and
peaceful
separate development)
costs be maintained and strengthened and the extremely dangerous 'unfulfilled
expectations
was to avoid any news that might give credence to the interests and needs of
the vast majority of South Africa's citizens who rejected apartheid.
In a bid to pinpoint the kind of news which was not in the interests of the
State. the commissioners offered an anlysis of the content of press reports on
selected items of police and military news.
Three studies were commissioned.
SADF news stories in 27 newspapers from May 1978 to December 1979 and again
in January 1980 were collected to ascertain the "attitudes" of the press to
the SADF and its "influence on the morale" of the defence force.
A sample of these stories (24% of the total or 3 403 stories) was then anal-
ysed on the basis of whether the language used was "positive" (pro SADF).
"neutral"("strong
objective and factual reporting") or "negative" (anti SADF).
The third study focussed on press coverage of the Silverton siege (25-31 Jan-
uary 1980) to ascertain press attitudes towards "the continued maintenance
of the constitutional
Again.
the stories were analysed on the basis of whether the language used was "pos-
itive" (i~ favour of the "constitutional system"). "neutral" or "negative",
The results are summarised below (for details. see paras. 209-226):

system of State security and of public order".

Positive

(%)

Neutral
(%)

Ne9a~ive

(%)

12

20

20

73

72

80

8

8

7

~ADF News
May - December 1979
SADF News
January 1980
Silverton Siege News
25 - 31 January 1980
However much one might query the value judgments implicit ~n the categorie~
the criteria allegedly tested and the methodology wh1Ch was employed.
used
it i~ significant that these content analyses actually offered further support
scene: ,the _
for a view long held by observers of the South African.~di~
press. including the so-called ~nglish-language
Oppos1t10n
press. 1n rea
lity is not critical of the rUllng status quo.
f the SADF and 'white' press coverage of the Silverton siege
ress coverage 0
the only signi-
P
was regarded by the commissioner~ as "f~voura
a-
ficant 'opposition' newspaper WhlCh reglstere~ a .nega~lve
r~tln~lwastag~acks
rently the Sunday Post - the Argus-owned p'ubl~c~t1~n a1m~d p~l~;.l ~da50%
in Soweto.
'ban-
"negative" rating for its coverage of the Sllverton Slege4•
~he recent
nin ' of Post did not come as a surprise to those who read rhl~ rep~r~ ~are-
ful~Y. since-the commissioners concluded,tha~ the newspap~r s
as well as its loyalty towards the constltutlonal system 1S suspec
•
216c).
In a qualitative analysis of the major topics discussed in these reports.

This newspaper received a 0%

1ft
n. ac,,'.

p~slt1ve~ 4~%

cre~~b(~~;~

neu ra

bl"

e;.

a

43

however, the commissioners
found that too much space was devoted to "ideolo-
logical and conscientious objections" against the SADF (para. 213d) and the
"negative" image of the police in the Silverton siege stories revealed "a
potentially unacceptable alienation of the public from the police force"
(para. 216e).
in
The use of "gunmen", "freedom fighters" and "guerrillas"
place of "terrorists" was also deemed questionable
by the cOlllllissioners
(para. 216a) who suggested that these "semantic matters" should be resolved
in briefing sessions with security and defence officials
Finally, the placement of stories in~
March 1980) was considered prejudiciaf to State interests:
ample indicates the need for heart-searching
garding their independence,

issue of the Rand Daily Mail (24
in the ranks of the media re-
(!)(para. 239d)5.

freedom and responsibility"

"This single ex-

(para. 234).

* * *

As envisaged in the report of Steyn COlllllissionI, then, the press in South
Africa will have to assume three additional functions if it is to survive as
a "free" and "independent" medium of mass cOlllllunication:
The press must censor the activities of the State's internal and exter-
a.
(This implies a shift in em-
nal "enemies" as ~
phasis in the press's 'watchdog' role from the State to the "enemies"
of the State.)
The press must sustain and promote a positive image of the State's se-
curity and defence agencies.
Above all, the press must mobilise public opinion in pursuance of the
campaign for Total Strategy.

by the State.

b.
c.

In reality, of course, the voluntary co-option of the press means the elimi-
nation of the last vestiges of opposition.to
government policy.
seem that this ;s the ultimate rationale behind the deliberations
COIIlIIissionsI and II.

It would
of Steyn

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

of foreign journalists
including the fin-
in South Africa (paras. 196, 237, 361-373,

Prof Switzer gave evidence before the first Steyn COlllllissionin Pretoria
last year.
The cOlllllissionersrecolllllendedthe registration
and a more effective monitoring of their activities,
ancing of these activities,
486. 508).
For example. the reader isn't told how the SADF samples were actually
obtained (para. 211). the criterion that the SADF had "symbolic and
sentimental significance
••• for all race groups" (para. 212) is highly
contentious. and the arbitrary categorisation
of SADF stories as "nega-
tive" if they recorded negative events like desertions, assaults, pay
and postal delays and even heat exhaustion
(paras. 212.213) is falla-
cious.
During this period. news content in the Sunday Post was apparently the
responsibility of a small group of white staffers who were generally at
loggerheads with editor Percy Qoboza.
In the example cited, an SADF expos~ story merited page 1 treatment while

44

a "potentially
memorate

extremely dangerous"

story on a meeting in Soweto to com-

incident was placed on page 4 (para. 239).

the Sharpvi11e

Reference
~eport of the Co~ission
lng the South Afrlcan Defence Force and the South African Police Force
52/1980 ..

of Inquiry into reporting of security matters regard-

RP

FORTHCOMING ISSUES
1

Vol

No

2

1981

IN SOUTH AFRICA

PERFORMANCE
This is the working
sub-title
the interests
The working
fr~
unstructured
socla1 behaviour
music, dance and festival).
All enquiries
Critical" Arts,
Johannesburg,

and submissions
South Africa.

title endeavours

An expansion,
and rationale for the subject will emerge once init a1 response and

title for the fifth issue of Critical Artt.

of potential contributors

are measured.

to cast a broad net which embraces performance
in an ethnographic sense which includes

forms (performance
and work activity) to structured forms (performance in theatre,

University

should be directed to:

of Witwatersrand,

Ian Steadman, Guest Editor,

1 Jan Smuts Avenue, 2001,

* * *
Vol
2

2

No

1981
IN AFRICA
title embraces the study of broadcasting

BROADCASTING
The working
in its widest sense ranging
from specifiC case studies of, for example, gatekeeping mechanisms in the news
room to the role and function of broadcasting
Other areas of
interest would include the history of broadcasting
in Africa, its neo-colonia1
origins,
ownership
All enquiries
~,
~12rahamst9wn

its role as an ideological agency, its structure of

Journalism and Media Studies, Rhodes Universlty,

and submissions
c/o Deptof
6140

Keyan Tomaselli, Jt ~dftor,

may be directed to:

functions,
and so on.

in development.

* * *Vol

2

No

Arts, University

3
and submissions may ~e directed to:

MASS MEDIA AND POPULAR CULTURE
All enquiries
Critical
Johannesburg.
It should be noted that the board of referees to whom a~tic1es wi~l be submitted
will assess the paper in terms of the critical perspectlve establ1~hed by the
Journal
is contextual, stUd~l~g ~he ~rts
and the media in terms of social history, popular culture and SOCla

1981
John van Zy1, Jt Editor,

1 Jan Smuts Avenue, 2001

of the Wltwatersrand,

That perspective

in previous

s ruc ures.

* * *

issues.

45