'How to $et Your House in Order':
Read All About It in Steyn  Commission II

Keyan  G Tomaselli  and  Ruth  Tomaselli

Commissions  of  Inquiry  have  become  an  increasingly  accepted  modus
operandi  in  the  South  African  political  arena  in  recent  years.
The  Steyn  Commission  into  the  mass  media1  is  yet  another  example
of  how the  government  uses  these  investigations  to  secure  i ts
political  objectives.  One  of  the  main  purposes  of  Commissions  is
to  avoid  the  enactment  of  legislation  by  deferring  it  to  some
future,  uspecified  date,  hoping  that  the  c r i s is  will  have  passed
by  that  time.

Several  points  emerge  from  this  observation:

1.  Legislation  which  the  government  is  unwilling  to  pass  can  be
delayed  almost  indefinitely.  The  rationale  for  such  procras-
tination  is  that  the  background  is  s t i ll  under  investigation
and  any  pre-emptive  action  on  the  part  of  Parliament  would  be
detrimental  to  the  national  interest.  Examples  include  the
proposed  labour  legislation  being  considered  in  the  wake  of
the  Riekert  and  Wiehahn  Commissions.  This  ploy  allows  the
government  to  maintain  a  progressive  stance  by  keeping  up  re-
formist  rhetoric  without  having  to  enact  firm 

legislation.

2.  The  government  is  able  to  utilize  the  findings  of  these  Inqu-
iries  to  rationalise  and  legitimize  r e s t r i c t i ve  measures  which
may  otherwise  have  difficulty  in  being  encoded  into  legis-
lation.  Similarly,  it  can  work  to  pave  the  way  for  the  accep-
tance  of  adaptive  legislation  which  has  the  function  of
bringing  social  reality 

into  line  with  economic  necessity.

3.  The  successful  passing  of  legislation  does  not  only  depend  on  its

ratification  by  a  majority  in  Parliament,  but  also  on  a  more
general  public  sympathy  within  the  broad
mass  of  government  supporters.  Commissions  of  Inquiry  and  the
consequent  publicity  which  surrounds  their  workings  and  find-
ings  act  to  create  an  ambience  of  public  consensus.  They  oil
the  wheels  of  legislation.  This  implies  that  these  investi-
gations  are  set  up  not  so  much  to  explore  the  factual  back-
grounds  surrounding  certain  issues,  but  rather  to  catalyse
a  conducive  climate  in  which  pre-formulated  solutions  (and

sometimes  legislation) can be enacted.  Simultaneously,- Com-
missions  perform  the function  of market  research, providing
a  guide to the reformulation of policies  in order to broaden
the base of their public  endorsement.  Judge  Steyn himself
states:

It  is very  rarely  that  the Government will  adopt  the
recommendations  of a report in toto.  A  Commission's

• task  is one of public  importance.  While  it reports  to
the  Government  it acts  in the  interest  of the public.2

4.  Commissions  are also used  to force  self-regulation  onto the

actors  they  are  investigating.

The above points  tend  to support  the view that the  stated objec-
tives of  commissions  of  inquiry  to  investigate  current  social
issues  are largely  a front  to disguise  the true intentions  of
the government,which  are to create an ideological  climate and
offer  rationalisations  for repressive  or adaptive measures con-
templated  by  the  state.  The  Steyn Commission  is  an example of
both  the  restrictive and adaptive functions of such enquiries.
Its massive  tomes were a precursor  to the most  restrictive legis-
lation  ever to be passed  in the country controlling  the mass
media.  At the same time it has  the function of accommodating  the
growing  business  call  for economic  reform which continues  to be
resisted by  reactionary  elements within the National Party and
those  to the right  of it.

THE APARTHEID BASE OF THE ''ORDERLY. HOUSE'

The Steyn  Commission  rests upon an ambivalence  regarding  the
necessity  for, and the rationalization  of, and  indeed, the very
existence  of apartheid.  Consider  the following  extract:
Although  isolated and  largely cast out of the  Inter-
national  Community, the  Inner Core of Southern African
States  (i.e. the RSA, the independent  states  recently
born  of  its substance, and SWA/Namibia) and  its  peoples
present a picture  of apparent paradox  - that of a
relatively  stable community  in a state of flux.

The newly independent  states of Transkei, Venda  and
Boputhatswana, all erstwhile  "apartheid Territory"
have now become "non-apartheid  areas", a development
urged  on South Africa  for  so long and so vehemently
by  the  international  community but which remains dis-
tressingly unrecognized  by  that selfsame  community
Cpp. 29-30, 185).

This statement, amongst other things, wilfully confuses process
with appearance, and  tries to suggest  that apartheid  is a fulfil-
lment of  international  prescriptions.  A second extract will
show that these "non-Apartheid  areas" are apparently needed  to
absorb  all  those blacks who cannot, because of sheer numbers, be
physically  repressed:

The objective  reality of  the South African situation is,
however, that there are too many Whites  for Blacks to
'chase them  into the sea' and there are so many  Blacks
that  they cannot be subjugated  forcibly by the Whites
Cpp. 96 & 720).

The reasons why whites  should want to dominate  blacks or  vice
versa  is submerged under the above cliche and  a "no-win" situa-
tion has  forced  South Africa to face "reality". 
community  of South Africa  is identified  as being synonomous with
the National  Party.  Non-conforming  groups are portrayed  as
prodigal  sons who have wandered away  from  the fold  and who  need
to be brought  to their  senses.  All are part of  the same  com-
munity which the Commission characterises  as a  "potentially
many-splendored  constellation  of Peoples"  (p. 99) :

The  'true1

The Commission  is  ... of the view  that the  South
African population, as heterogenious  and  divergent
in culture  as  it  is, does constitute  a community, -
a distinct and vigorous one with many common in-
terests, ableit  still  so sharply divided  on certain
cardinal  issues  as to move some of  its members  to
espouse alien  ideologies  and other  socio-political
and cultural creeds and methods  including  treason,
terror  and  subversion  in an effort  to effect  rapid
and drastic  change  in South Africa, or even  to over-
throw and destroy all the major  facets of  the
present order here pertaining  (pp. 29 & 182).

And  so the Report continues, the South African  reality  continu-
ously being  threatened  by a 'total onslaught' orchestrated  by
Soviets, Marxists, politicised  theologians, Black Consciousness,
far-left academics, who "go astray because  the criteria  they
seek to apply are not properly understood  by  them or are  in-
adequately  defined"  (p. 31), misguided  liberals  of  the John
Dugard  ilk and  'radicals' such as Bishop  Desmond  Tutu.

"CLIMATE-SETTING" OR HOW TO DISCREDIT YOUR  CRITICS

The Commission  accuses the press, particularly  the English  lan-
guage and captive black presses of "climate-setting" - that  is
of propagating  its own ideologies, policy  and philosophy.  The
Report, however, does much  the same thing  through  its  treatment
of critics of both  the South African  regime and  the first  Steyn
Commission.1*  On  the relatively  few occasions when  sources  are
quoted  the Commission constantly  tries  to reassure  the  reader
of the credibility  of those whom  they have enlisted  in their
favour.  The Inquiry  latches onto "knowledgeable  experts", "men
of standing", "justly  renowned  leaders", "noted  academics",
assorted "Doctors", "Professors" and even one "noble Lord"  Cp.
475).  Most of these  individuals  are nothing more  than  alarmist
academics given to gross over-generalizations  and  simplistic
descriptions.  The Commission  intimates  that they alone  know  the
truth and the reader  is subjected  to endless  extracts  of  their
questionable analyses which pronounce  rather than debate  (eg.
p. 324).  Where the Commission's argument  is too  thin to  stand
up to scrutiny, it resorts  to the slander of liberal authors,
described as "undoubtedly  potent  sources" (p. 240), who  are
nevertheless disqualified  for  inadequate curriculivitorum  and
supposed  lack of experience  in political  science  and  practical
politics.  Their arguments  do not appear to count at all  (eg.
pp. 35, 196, 226, 240).  Professor MHH Louw's opinion, for ex-
ample, is preferred because, unlike Dugard, he  is not a  jurist
"somewhat beyond  the bounds of his discipline  and whose  approach
/is7 more narrowly  judicial and theoretical".  No doubt  Louw's

sycophantic  appraisal  of the  first  Steyn Commission  (pp. 195-

97) also  adds credence  to his  "viewpoint".  As the  Commission
itself  states  in connection  with  two newspaper  reports:

The  importance  of utterances  ... is not whether  they
are  justified  or not, but  that  they are  'signs of the
times' which undoubtedly  indicate present  attitudes
and  are also protents  (sic) of possible  future
developments  (p. 865).

The Commission  is, however, quite clear  that only one  interpre-
tation  of  the  "signs  of the  times" will  qualify:  "Presenting  of
more  than  one possibility  or alternative" is akin  to "climate-
setting" which  confuses  readers  and casts doubt upon  the
credibility  of newspapers  (see p.  1278).

The Report  gleefully  quotes  page  after page of funkies  whose
ideas coincide closely with  that of the Commissioners.  That
at  least one of these scare mongers  has harsh words  for South
Africa  (pp. 342-3)  is all  the better, for even the enemies  of
South Africa  can be  shown by  implication  to believe  in the
'total onslaught', South Africa being  a "Target Area"5  and as-
sailed  by  the "existing means  device" and  "the Gramsci Approach"
(p. 402),  Readers  will, however, be relieved  to know  that  South
Africa  is only  the ninth  step  out of ten  in the Russian Master
Plan  (p. 351)5

While  few would  doubt  the  imperialist  intentions of Soviet  Russia,
the use  of  terms  such  as "target  area", the  already-occurring
"Third World  War", the Russian-conducted  "Symphony  of Terror"
(p. 361) and  other grossly  determinist  adjectives  and descrip-
tions  totally  over-simplifies  actual  processes  and situations.
We are  taken on a detailed  excursion  into the KGB  and  its "Dis-
information  Department" and  the Commission  tries  to suggest  that
schools, universities, technikons, information media, and  the
World  Council  of Churches  (WCC) and  the South African  Council
of Churches  (SACC)

are major  targets  to be  infiltrated  clandestinely  and
manipulated  covertly  so as  to advance  Soviet aims and
generate  the dry-rot  of mind  and  spirit which  is so
necessary  for the victory  of the Soviet Virus  in the
Body  Politic of a target  society  (p. 440).

Against  the  threat of  the KGB  and  reminding  the sceptical  reader
of the  intensity  of the  'total  onslaught', and connecting  hostile
external  organizations  with  local agents, the Commission  then
states  categorically  that there  is "no decisive  evidence of such
a worldwide conspiracy", only different  groups with  "similar
aims" but  "different  ultimate  objectives"  (p. 745).

THE FASTEST JARGUN  IN THE WEST

The most  striking  aspect of the  Steyn Report,  is an unparallelled
jargonizing  guaranteed  to  intimidate  the  already  punch-drunk
journalist  and the unsuspecting  lay public.

The Steyn jargon machine  thrives  on incorrect  assumptions, un-
researched  theses, non-words, nonsensical  headings and almost
drowns  itself  in a bog  of irrelevancies  and verbal  confusion
where  the distinction between  gibberish  and terminology  is

completely blurred.  Yet, for those readers whose own ideology
coincides with that of the Commissioners, the Report  will  appear
to make  sense on a superficial  level^because  it supports what is
taken for granted by the dominant  ideology  which  is itself co-
sistently  reinforced by both the Afrikaner  Nationalist, and to
a lesser  extent, the English  language media.7  This  becomes
especially  evident when one considers  its jargon.  Recurring
terms  like "practical  statecraft" (eg. p. 3 4 ), and phrases  like
mind-set and the upwelling of left-liberal  enmity"  (p. 62)

"the potentially  fatal Western mind-set" (p. 444) and non- exis-
tent words such as "tasked" Cp. 12  Vol 4 ), "thrombosed" (p
1340) and "Victimologies" (p. 608) all serve to add a spurious
scientific  credibility to the Report.

Syndromes  abound everywhere, particularly  the "stuck whistle"
variety  (pp. 109, 888, 1268) which was the term used on  Rad-fo
Today by some unfortunate visiting  professor  from the Columbia
University Journalism  School to describe  the intensity of poli-
tical haranguing which is supposedly  peculiar  to the South
African press.  The "Pariah  Syndrome" (pp. 96, 722ff, 728) is
contagious and mutates  into the "Pariah  status" (p. 30)  "nariah
state" (p. 144), the "pariah  fashion" (pp. 96, 102, 722ff)-  it
• w / hr! ? - Jn  "p a r i ah  m a k in g" (pp. 54, 96, 9 7 ), can be read'as
pariah  literature" (p. 732), or it can move us into the realm
812) » s u r r e al  ln  "Pariah making as Lunacy  Generator"  (pp.  735,

Sg^g 

8r o uPs>  Noughts,  ideas or actions which

J
£  ^e  s t a t us  q uo a re  s a id  to be  "lethal" (pp. 65  177
inn '  f a*al  -(?P- 2 5 3' 4 6 7' 9 6«  or at least, "near  fatal"  p
f a*al  -(?P- 2 5 3' 4 6 7' 9 6«  or at least, "near  fatal"  p
\
I k  ? °6f lalll  fatal" (PP- 444' 445) or Pitting South\fri
(PP- 4 4 4' 4 4 5) or  Pitting  South\frica
In kn  ? if 
to the r L h t3"8^f{P Pi  4?' 4 6 7K  "R a d i c a l"  describes  anybody
rieht hl}&  i 
right being  less dangerous  than those on the left.

? °6f lalll fatl" (  444 445)  i 

5ft °f t he C o l M l i s sion  politically,  those on the

l 

« 

t,  near  fatal  p

s5ijjTT

AllianceV-  f56  *  T^ ?S U ke  "Conflictual  matrices",  "Unholy
and  o?her  rr,1§"  P P;  4 H!  496«  7 6 4 )'  '""""eat  Factors"  (p. 892^

THE  GOSPEL  ACCORDING  TO THE STEYN  COMMISSION

logicaHerrSr  S l S ^ A fr 
association  tk«n  by hard  5  -5* 
variety  of  oriwizltio^  e vid e n c?' 
More h o r r f f M an  amusing^  S° "al 

- ,mPt to  ™1«*1> theo-
p e r«l v ed  enemies.  More  through
t he  "eport  tries  to  taint  a
l n o v e m e n t s-  The  results  are

The WCC's  "Council  Conduct" amounts  to "Clerics  of the
Councils  clad  in the Cloth", clutching  the  Reversed
Cross  and animated  by the percepts  of the "Theology  of
Liberation", entering  the Arena  of Mundane  Politics, and
employing  the Cross  in its  "Battle-Axe" role  to help
them  achieve  their  POLITICAL goals.  (Emphases, capi-
tals  and  quotation marks  in original!)  (pp. 82  & 582)

The contorted  logic which forms  the basis  of this theology  is  the
subject of a separate contribution  in this  issue, but  it is nece-
ssary to make  some futher observations  with regard  to  terminology.
Words like  "epilogue" are used  in place  of  "conclusion"  (p. 104),
"brethren"' for  'colleagues', "sinners" for  'perpetrators'  (p. 45)
and  "excommunication"  for  'sports boycotts'  (p. 297),further
support  the Commission's  politico-evangelical  goals.  Ministers
of religion  are referred  to as "gentlemen  of  the Cloth" who
should  take  care not  to be  infiltrated  by  the "Social Gospel":

The movement whereby  the Gospel  was  sought  to be secu-
larised  and collectivised  fandj was the seed whence
sprang  the thorny, and as to certain  of  its branches,
also poisonous  growth of Politicised  Theology, which has
has now  started  bearing  the sinister  and unhappy  fruits
of Theologised  Politics  (p. 499).

These horizontal  social  gospellers, or  those who  support  the  sports
isolation -- "clergymen  in the ruck of tour protests" (p. 300) --
are nothing  more than  Soviet proxies, liberal misfits  and  "fellow
travellers" who  are  (if unwittingly) aiding  the leftist press  in
the  "process  of socio-political  demolition"  (p. 125).  One of
these miscreants, Bishop Desmond  Tutu, even had  the temerity  to
accuse  "HIM", that  is PW Botha, "OF LYING"  (p. 568).  Even God
incarnate doesn't  get  that sort of treatment.

For a Commission whose concerns are so closely  tied to public
morality  this  lapse  into the blasphemous  is inexcusable.

"NEW MARXISM" MADE  SIMPLE

The use of one-sided  arguments  is a hallmark  of this  Report.
Apart  from  plagiarising  large amounts  of published  academic material
from  the liberal-humanist  school,10  it pointedly avoids the more
critical  studies, research and publications of a number of inter-
nationally  published  South African journalists  and academics.
Pertinent  examples  include Index on  censorship,  South  African
Labour Bulletin,  Work in Progress,  SASPV National,  and the work
of Les Switzer, amongst others.  Even where  they have  relied ex-
clusively  on conservative  journals  like Equid  Novi,  the  Commission
has  ignored  the more critical  contributions  to those publications.
The "dialectical  interaction" of ideas which were  supposedly
synthesised  in the first Steyn Report  are non-existent  in either
Report  (see p. 294).

Most glaring  of all, the Report,  which  apparently  offers authori-
tative criticisms  of "Victiaologies"  (p. 608) such as Marxism
(which has been disproved, p. 7 7 ), Leninism  (which has  failed,
p. 464), and  tries to correlate  these with everything  subversive,
references none  of the authors associated with  this school of
economic and  social analysis.  The Report's  interpretations  see*
to be largely based on the work  of Cornel West. 

It is clear

that  the  Commissioners  have  totally  misunderstood  West,  and  there-
by  the  postulates  of  Marx  and  Gramsci.  By  relying  only  on  West's
incomplete  descriptions,  which  interchange  class  with  culture
the  Commissioners  have  misunderstood  the  processes 
involved  and
which  are  implicit  in  West's  commentary.  Elsewhere,  the  Inquiry
relies  on  dubious  tertiary  sources  which  are  culled  from  l i t t l e-
known  right-wing  academics.  Since  the  writings  of  these  authors
coincide  with  the  Commission's  pre-existing  conceptions  and  inter-
cept  its  own  ideological  position,  their  validity  is  never
questioned: 

they  are  accepted  as  obvious  and  therefore  correct

Although  vociferous  in  its  criticism  of  Marxism,  the  Steyn  Com-
mission  is  not  above hi-jacking  some  of  i ts  formulations  to  fur-
ther  the  Report'8  arguments.  Three  examples  stand  out.

the

The  first  concerns 
the  Commission's  understanding,  or  rather
total  misunderstanding,  of  neo-Marxist  thought.  For  a  start 
Report got  its  spelling  wrong,  calling  it  "New  Marxist  Theory"
Cp.  1007),  a  misspelling  which  signals  a  clear  miscomprehension
and  trivialization  on  the  part  of  the  Commission  and  the  authors
it  has  relied  on.  The  choice  of  "New"  as  opposed  to  "neo"  seems
deliberate  since  the  latter  word  does  exist  in  Afrikaans.  The
Commission  buries  itself  under  an  eclectic  heap  of  ideologically
palatable  and  confused  tertiary  sources.  Murdock  and  Golding
for  example,  would  be  aghast  to  know  that  Marais  and  Engelbrecht
from  whom the  Commission  gets  i ts  misinformation,  attribute  the  '
neo-Marxist  approach  solely  to  these  authors.  Not  onlv  did  thev
develop  this  approach',  but  their  highly  rigorous  historical

materialist  terminology  has  been  substituted  by  orthodox  cate-
gories.  Marais  and  Englebrecht,  as  quoted  by  the  Report 
refer
to  'upper  class",  "capitalist  class",  "lower  class",  and'"social
structure  . 
It  seems,  furthermore,  that  the  Commission  is  un-
able  to  understand  the  relation  of  these  theorists  to  Marx  Lenin
and  Gramsci  and  barely  acknowledges  the  neo-Marxist  contribution
in  less  than  six  lines  of  improbable  description.

If  the  Commission's  understanding  of  the  neo-Marxist  position  had
been  more  comprehensive,  they  might  not  have  embarrassed  themselves
by 
caricaturing  two  further  materialist  concepts.  The  second
"conSi6  c°n c e r n s.w hat  is  interchangeably  termed  the  "doctrine"  of
(eg  pf  |fgefi?«f  cultures".or."counter  hegemonial  (sic)  cultures"
in  its  n 
? 
view 
view, 
in  an  explanation  which  would  make  Gramsci  r a t t le  his
that™ 

a nd  t 6 ar  Up  h is  n o t e b o o k s»  the  Commission  suggests

on  those  it  sees  as  disagreeing  with  i ts  point  of

\ 

h>,  he  C o i I l l s s l o n

h as  prostituted  this  concept

J

Closely  allied  to  the  sanctification  of  terror  as  a
theologically  legitimate  means  in  the  "liberation
struggle",  is  the  Marxist  concept  of  the  "counter-
hegenonic  culture",  adopted  by  radical  black  theo-
logy  and  politics  and  introduced  into  South  Africa
with  the  obvious  intent  of  completely  demolishing
the  prevailing  dispensation  (p.  91).

t a l ks

was  conspiratonally  able  to  create  a  "culture"  at

will.  The Report,  of course, does not  reference  the  origin of
the  terra --  they vaguely  describe  it as a  "Marxist  concept",
which was  plucked  from IVest.  Although  Gramsci  does  use  this cate-
gory  in both  an analytical  and  strategic  way,  the Commission  does
not  do justice  to cither position.

Arising  from  this misconception  the term  "organic  intellectual"
is misused  in a particularly  ironic way.  The  Commissioners  are
quick  to  label  the  leaders  of AZAPO, M'VASA, BC, radical  Black
Theology  and  certain  members  of the SACC as  "organic  intellec-
tuals" directly 'concerned  in the formulation  and development  of
a  Black  counter-hegemonic  radical  culture  in South  Africa" (p.
668).  This  convenient  and  theoretically  empty  categorization
allows  the  Commission  to conclude  that

Such  a counter-culture  is not  being  devised  for  the
sake  of beautifying  the spiritual  and  intellectual
environment, but  as a cudgel  of combat  - a truculent
but  fitting companion  for the reversed  cross  in the
armoury  of subversion  and disaffection  (.pp.  668-9).

This  is a singularly  determinist  view of how organic  intellectuals
operate.  Furthermore, the confusion of theoretical  positions
evidenced  in  the above  extract  seems  to have  bypassed  the Commis-
sion.  "Counter-culture"  is a term which was  applied  by  Theodore
Rozak  to account  for a specific  social movement  which  existed  in
the United  States during  the early  1960s.13  It  is not  a  'Marxist'
term.  Khat  the Commission  is groping  for,  it seems, is the con-
cept of  'counter  ideologies' which are articulated  by organic  in-
tellectuals  during  periods  of hegemonic  crisis.  These  intellec-
tuals are able  to exploit  the fissure until  such  time as  it is
identified  by  the hegemonic  bloc  and plugged  up.  The Pezort  is
correct, more by default  than by  logic, in classifying  some of
the practitioners  they  mention as organic  intellectuals.  They
fall  into this  category  only because of the context  and histori-
cal conjuncture in which they are operating.  That  context  is provided by
apartheid;  the historical  conjuncture of  the crisis  in capital.
Besides, a study of organic  intellectuals  can  only properly oc-
cur within  a class analysis, a level  of investigation which  is
completely  missed  by  the  Commissioners.

What  is perhaps  all  the more  fascinating  is that  the Commissioners,
in misunderstnding  the notion of organic  intellectual, have not
grasped  the  significance  of their  own roles, and  that  of the Com-
mission.  Just  as organic  intellectuals can be drawn  from the re-
pressed  and  subordinate  classes, so too, can  they be  spawned by
the hegemonic  alliance.  Afrikaans  journalists, for  instance,
have acted, and  continue  to perform  as organic  intellectuals  in
translating Afrikaner  Nationalist  political  philosophies  into
strategies  for economic  action and vice versa.  Steyn himself  is
an organic  intellectual  for he  is representing  the  interests of
his  class  in the Report.  He and his Commissioners, all part of
the hegemonic  bloc, have  intuitively  identified  the crisis  in
hegemony  in the existence  of  the English  language  and  captive
black presses  -- and have  sought means of closing  that fissure.
By curtailing  the scope of  these media, the Commission hoped  to
remove  the "hard, tangible  and exploitable  images" which  identify
the structural weaknesses  of apartheid.  The cement  to be used  in
this  image  repair job was  initially through  ideology  and propa-

ganda.  These  have  not  worked  so  the  mixture  is  to  be  strengthened
through  proposal*  legislating  against  the  propagation  of  nega-
tive  points  of  view.  Throughout  the  Report, 
that  South  Africa's  negative  overseas  image  is  largely  gleaned
from  the  pages  of  the  English  language  newspapers: 
"overseas
attacks  on  South  Africa,  including  the  South  African  (ANC)  pro-
paganda,  are  inspired  to  no  small  extent  by  reports  and  comment
emanating  from  the  English  language  newspapers"  (pp.  130-1,  151).
Thus,  if  this  press  was  'to  set  i ts  house  in  order1,  t h is  poor
image  would  cease  to  exist,  and  South  Africa's  apparent  stability
would  result  in  untold  benefits  for  the  hegemonic  bloc.

the  Commission  argues

The  method  used  by  the  state  to  enforce  t h is  compliance  is  dealt
with  in  the  last  section  of  this  paper.  We now  need  to
analyse  how  the  Commission  typifies  the  polar  opposites  into
which  it  has  divided  world  conflict.

THE  DUALISTS

The  Report  makes  use  of  numerous  binary  opposites,  for  instance,
"First  World-Third  World  dichotomy  of  rich  versus  poor,  or  White
North  versus  Black  South"  (pp.  66,  887).  On  a  simplistic  level
this  juxtaposition  of  "First  World"  with  "Third  World"  and  "North"
with  "South",  has  strong  parallels  with  the  dualist  studies  under-
'modernization:  t h e o r i s ts .1H Orthodox
taken  by  the  neo-colonial 
dualism  identifies  two  opposing  and  mutually  autonomous  poles
which  exist  alongside,  but  independently  of  one  another.  This
may  be  done  on  an  international  scale,  where  a  d i s t i n c t i on  is  made
between  developed  and  underdeveloped  countries,  usually  in  terms
of  the  Gross  National  Product.  The  Commission  is  replete  with
examples:  "Rich  North  -  Poor  South"  (p.  76),  "duel  between  East
and  West"  (p.  59),  "global  c r i s is  with  East-West,  North-South  and
First  World-Third  World  power  struggle"  (p.  105),  are  just  a  few.
The  necessity  of  portraying  each  pole  as  separate  from,  and  in-
dependent  of  one  another  arises  from  the  underlying  assumption
concerning  the  nature  of  the  developmental  process.

technologic-

For  these  theorists,  the  authors  of  the  Steyn  Report  included,
development  is  synonymous with  highly  c a p i t a l i s e d, 
ally  sophisticated  and  ' s t a b l e'  economies.  Conversely,  under-
development  is  seen  as  the  negative  image  of  development  -  char-
acterised  by  a  subsistence  economy,  the  use  of'backward'techniques
and  having  volatile  social  relations.  The  'answer'  to  the  'prob-  '
lem'  of  development  then,  is  a  diffusion  of  capital  and  technology
trom  the  one  sector  to  the  other,  chiefly  through  the  mechanism
oi  market  forces,  international 
' a i d ',  and  philanthropic  capita-
l i st  entrepeneurs.  While  such  a  model  may  be  descriptively  true
on  the  level  of  appearances,  it  ignores  the  active  process  of
underdevelopnent on  the  part  of  the  dominant  economy.  Under-
development,  far  fro»  being  an  original  s t a te  for  certain  socie-
t i e s,  has  historically  been  induced  through  the  expansion  of  neo-
colonial  relations.  The  wealth  of  the  ' F i r st  World'  is  largely
'Th-  Sa t ed  °"  t he  e* Pl o i t a t i°n  and  resultant  poverty  of  the
nurd  World'.  Nor  is  this  an  anachronistic  phenomena  confined
"™  Period  tdwn  the  Third  World  was  the  major  supplier  of  raw
materials  to  th«  industrialised  countries,  but  it  continues  today
change  *r a n sfction  of  consumer  goods,  in  a  process  of  unequal  ex-
change  for  strategic  • i n e r a l s,  cheap  labour  and  large  markets  onto

which  redundant  stock  surpluses can be dumped.  Underdevelopment
is thus dialectically  related  to development.  Dualist  theorists,
however, by  fetishising  the outward  characteristics  of different
societies,  are led  to derive dichotomies  rather  than connections,
and thus  to disguise  the complex  sets of  relations which  exist
between  these processes.  In this way, the whole process  of neo-
colonialism  is exonerated  from having  any part  in the  impoverish-
ment of  the world's poor.

In an analogousway,  a distinction  is made  between  two  apparently
separate  and  isolated  economies  or social  groups  existing  within
a  single  nation, in which  certain geographical  areas or ethnic/
racial  groups are juxtaposed  against  one another.  In South Africa,
the rhetoric  of  'separate  development' obfuscates  the reality  of
cheap  labour.  The Report  is at pains  to perpetuate  the notion  of
the  independence  of the "homeland' areas  --  implying  their  social
and economic viability:  "the newly independent  states of Transkei,
Venda and  Boputhatswana, all erstwhile  "Apartheid  Territory", have
now become  "non-Apartheid  areas" Cemphasis added;  pp. 29-30, 185).
According  to the myth  of  'independent  national  states', the home-
land areas  are able  to provide for the subsistance  of the  families
of migrant  workers, thus perpetuating  the payment  of  super-low
wages to industrial  workers, who, despite their origins  in "non-
Apartheid  areas", are forced  to work  in the  "Apartheid  Territory"
in order to survive.  It is however  the myth, and not  the  reality,
which  is uppermost  in the minds  of the writers  of this Report .

The crude way  in which  the dualist  framework  is utilised  in this
document  is apparent  in its analysis of South Africa's  'dilemma'.
Quoting  Sampie  Terreblance  as their authority,  the authors  submit

that  the South African  situation  ^"is onej of wealth
and prosperity  amongst  First World  People  (mostly
whites) and poverty  and backwardness  amongst  Third
World  People  (mainly people of colour) /and/ is a
reflection  of the situation world-wide"  (p. 803).

These apparent divisions within the South African population  are
used to justify  further  restrictive measures  against  the media
who are accused  of "extending  ... the ambit  and  intensity  of  the
conflict  situation and political  polarization":  the English  lan-
guage press by  reflecting  a "negativistic  destructive  approach" •
and  the Afrikaans press by perpetuating  a "hegemonic cause-
preserving" approach".  The Commission exhorts  the media to under-
take a "continuous  soul—searching  as to the possible  effect  that
comment, reporting  and  interpretation" can have  in a  "heterogenious
society":

that the

The media  apparently do not appreciate 
normal  First World  journalistic  approaches  and prac-
tices, designed  for application  in a homogeneous
country, are not  applicable  in their undiluted  or
unadjusted  form  in a heterogenious  country with a
First World  and Third World population, with a mas-
sive difference  in levels  of sophistication, where
First World  'advocacy  journalism' has a much  greater
impact upon the often unsophisticated,  half-illiterate
mind  than  in a homogeneous and  sophisticated  First
World  community  (p. 141).

10

a l f n t e r ?l f" 

l l li * * « e " as  opposed  to the alternative of

bias  in Ihll 
bias  in tho Report's  dualistic  conceptions 

is  revealing,  since  it  indicates  the underlying
'  g

iiiillilllile

i

as : ?£ r•  »

THE BLACK PRESS AND MWASA:  "SHOCK TROOPS OF THE REVOLUTION"

^ ^ °nS  °f t he Report 

c°ncerned  with the captive  black

seeTtohl?rba?k:ndfC?^ 

lllllllliilis;

-  tLopposingpoles

socio-political  climate" (p? 495) 

c r e a t l on of the necessary

t0

delivered

ta V 1cfn?r^ic^f^|Hr:?^i n a ry 
s t a t^ n t s,  the Report  proceeds
section  of  their  present^-I  c o n"s t e n?/  not found  in any other

tneir  presentation.  It  rationalises  government

restrictions  on the black press  in terms of methods  rather  than
principles.  On  the closure of Post  (Tvl),  for example, the
Report  claims  that  this  "does not necessarily  indicate  an aban-
donment  of the commitment  by the Government  to a "free press":

The manner  in which  the matter was handled  should
not be confused  with the principle  involved.  The
newspaper  is merely a neutral  instrument  ...  the
real perpetrator  of subversion  is the  journalist
who abuses  the paper  for his own ends  (p. 19).

Apart  from  this  contradiction  of the Commission's major conten-
tion  that  the English  press  is controlled  by Anglo  American media
monopoly which  imposes  a policy, not journalists, and which
"poses a grave  threat  to a truly  free, independent  and diversi-
fied press"  Cpp. 152, 157), the Commission makes  spurious cor-
relations  between  the supposed  revolutionary  black  press and  the
social  responses  of  the repressed  classes.  The Report, in justi-
fying government  action, claims  that  "It  is significant  that
Soweto  returned  to normal  after  the banning  of the World  and
other organizations  Cpp. 121,  1055).  No discussion  is offered
about other  repressive measures  such  as the brutal  action  of
police who killed  over  700 Deople, many  of them children, during
the riots, or what  exactly  is "normal" about  Soweto.  The  reader
is merely  given  a bland  description  which  totally  ignores all
the other processes  and variables  operating  at the  time.  The
Report  also does  its best  to misinterpret  the Cillie  Commission
which  absolved  the press  from  all blame  in the causation  of the
riots by means  of a semantic  contortion which  would  do justice
to The Gocn Show  (p. 121).

Having  discussed  the  'black press' on the level of the sublime,
we now move  into the  ridiculous.  The Commission  complains  that
there is no "truly  independent  black press" in South Africa.
This  is despite  the fact  that

there  is among  Blacks  a need  for a truly  independent
Black  press which  can express  the feelings and  aspi-
rations of Black  opinions  and perceptions,  especially
the moderate majority  (p. 130).

Such a press  is required because, amongst  other things, the Afri-
kaans press and  the SABC have "failed  to report adequately on the
hopes and aspirations, suffering  and  frustrations  of the Black
community"  (pp. 128, 1286, 1268).  Apart  from the loss of business
to Afrikaans  firms, "The political  cost of an uninformed  public
may be considerably higher"  (p. 128).

Notwithstanding  its vilification  of the English press as being
irresponsible, hiding behind  the skirts of the Afrikaans press  for
protection  from the government  (p. 148), of aiding Russian  imperi-
alism and so on, the Commission  (obviously  having  read  Elaine
Potter15)  then acknowledges  that "the English  language press has
rendered a very valuable  service to the South African  community
by  informing  it constantly  of Black opinion and aspirations"
(p.  139).  Furthermore, the English press has shown  (mainly with
the help of Potter and Broughton12 ) that  it is unable to  influence
the political  course of events  (p. 130).  If this press  is unable
to  influence  the course of events, how can  it be accused of working
towards  "socio-political  demolition" or  of  encouragfingj"revolutionary
forces which are at work  in this country"?  (p. 141).

12

In any event, the argument put  forward  by  scholars  of the  left
(who remain unread) is that this captive black press was not
radical,in  the more  rigorous  sense  of the word, in that  it  supports
a  continuance of capitalism and  its consequent  class structure,
modified  only by the removal of "hurtful  discrimination".  This
point  of view was  ignored by  the Commissioners.  But  then, when
people  like Bishop Tutu and Dr Motlana  are characterised  as
'radicals',  it becomes difficult  to persuade  the Commission  that
within the wider spectrum of black  thought such  individuals re-
present moderate political  opinion.  Thus, by calling  on  "The
moderate  Black community" to be  "encouraged  to establish  an inde-
pendent  Black press, truly  reflecting  actual  Black  opinion  Cp.
169) is merely  to accept  the existing  situation where  ideas  of
some of the emerging black middle  class  are already  being  aired
in, for example, The Sowe tan, and which were being  conveyed  in
World and Post.  The Report  does, however, exhibit  a certain
ambivalence:

Stifling  the messenger  does not  kill  the message  - the
message seeks an outlet  elsewhere.  And this  seems  to
present  a critical possibility  of polarization and  ten-
sion being aggravated.  On the one hand a channel  of
communication has been cut  off which could  serve  the
government  as an important barometer  of Black  emotions
and  thinking;  on the other hand  Black  frustration
might be exacerbated  to dangerously  near  flashpoint
(p. 1068.  Also see p. 126).

Elsewhere  the Report  calls  for a suppression of  radical  black
thought as evidenced  in MWASA but  simultaneously  acknowledges
that such "though  and action cannot  simply be  ignored  or suppres-
sed", but must be "fairly" and  "adequately" dealt with  (p. 887).
The Commission does not resolve this point but  it  is clear  that
only the "moderate majority" who  support  apartheid measures  will
be allowed  to express their aspirations  and grievences.

The Commission, by clearly planting  itself on the side of  'objec-
tivity',  'balance', and fairness' complains  that MWASA's  "'temper
is so radical" and "so different" to the fundamentals of "ortho-
dox Western liberal standards of journalism" that  the ordinary
Western  (and  liberal) approach would  founder at the outset" (p.
707).  Against  this observation we may juxtapose  the  Commission's
explanation  of the role played  by  the National  Party press  prior
to  1948.  It claims that the Afrikaans  press propounded Nationa-
lism on a lawful basis without  propagating  revolution or disaf-
fection.  While the Commission does  acknowledge  that  the  Afrikaner
had voting rights and that blacks are unable to attain  their
objectives  through  the ballot box:

this does not justify a journalism  advocating  re-
volution or aa undermining  of stability.  Advocacy
journalism which presses  issues at the expense  of
society and which polarises already delicate at-
titudes even  further has no justification  (p.  1144)"

This sort of comment  is the result  of  selective  reading, not only
of newspapers, but of critical commentaries.  To vindicate  the
Afrikaans press on these grounds  is  to smooth over  the role and
position of this press, particularly  during the  1930s and  '40s
when HF Verwoerd, as editor of Die  Transvaler,  for example,

13

wrote editorials  supporting  Hitler and Nazi Germany.  Furthermore,
the press of  this period was not  trammeled by the same plethora
of anti-press  laws  and other  legal  restrictions  as  is the case
now.  What was  considered  lawful  then, is now defined  as
subversive and  revolutionary.

Having  questioned  the  role of large shareholdings  in newspaper
companies, the Commission  concludes  that  the "establishment  of
a  free black  press  is not a matter  for  legislation  and must  be
left at  this  stage  to private  enterprise"  (Vol 4 ).  But  then  the
Report argues  that  this privately  financed  "authentic  Black  press
^should  not  be_7 tied  to the apron  strings  of an  ideologically
identified  mother  company"  (pp.  12S6-7).  Diversity  of opinion
in the black  readers' market  is said  to be non-existent  since  it
is totally  cornered  by  the English  press,and  special  efforts  are
needed  to ensure  a greater  range of opinion.  This would  help
blacks  "play  a  fundamental  role  in stimulating  a better  climate
of understanding  and  'bridge-building'  and creating  a positive
public  opinion"  (pp.  1279-80).  The need  for this  'neutral' and
'authentic' press  is  repeated  incessantly  by the authors of the
Report and needless  to say, they managed  to find at  least  one
black-skinned  ally, albeit  a highly critical  one, who has an in-
terest  in "orderly  change" and who has a "vested  interest  in the
stability  of  this country"  (p. 713) -- businessman  Sam Motsuen-
yane, who  is gleefully  held up  as an example  of the black
'moderate majority'  (see also pp.  1088-9).

THE PERCEPTUAL  CREDIBILITY GAP:  HOW TO MAKE REALITY WORK

Opponents  of  the government  are  labelled  "dissatisfied  target
audiences"  (p. 913) whose  perceptions  are  "incorrect" or "de-
fective and not  based  on  fact".  If so, "then the  misconceptions
on which  they  are  based  should  be  removed  with urgent  speed".
This  "faulty  image  of  reality"  is "due to  incorrect  information
being made available  to the public" by the media either because
of "malice  or  incapacity  or an  infelitious  blend of both"(p. 913).
This leads  to a credibility  gap between what  the media  report  and
"reality", that  objective  state of enduring  fact.  That  is to say,
there  is "a  substantial  credibility  gap /whic!j7 exists  between
the reflected  media  reality  and  the respondent's  own  'reality
world'"  (pp. 150, 1221).  Radio and  television are more positive
towards  government  than are "community perceptions", while white
readers  "consistently  perceive the press as having a more nega-
tive "reality  reflection"than  they  themselves have  (p. 149).
This perceptual  credibility  gap seems  to have some  relation to
climate setting.  Having  laid most of the  ills of South Africa  at
the press' door, we  are now told that climate setting  does not
flow from a void.  Apparently  certain  conditions must  be present
which  lend themselves  to exploitation.  We are not  told what  these
are, but we  are told  that  "This  is why  it  is vital  that  negative
'hard, tangible and  exploitable  images' in South Africa  should
be removed  as far as possible".  In a piece of prose which  totally
blurs the dividing  line between  'reality' and  'images of reality'
the Commission  calls  on "journalism  ...  (to) ... credit all
efforts  to  improve  or  remove such  images".  Thus, the looking
glass substitutes  for reality and  focus only  occurs at that point
where the "values and  ideologies" of journalism  correspond  to
"those of the community  it professes  to reflect" (p. 1278).  That
a  reality or  realities  independent  of the  images  (faulty or

14

or otherwise) exists, does not  seem  to have much  credence with
the Commission.  That  these  'facts' and  situations might  com-
municate  chemselves via other means  is accepted by  the Commis-
sion.  But that message can be  fixed  to reflect  reality  through
an adjustment of reality  itself since the message vehicle, as
we have been told, is neutral.

CONCLUSION TO PART I

The  inherent contradictions  contained  within  these  tomes make
for  irritating  reading, particularly  as the Commissioners  are
at great pains to tell  the reader  'who  is right' and  'who is
wrong', who  is radical or reactionary,  liberal, misguided, who
is moderate and who  is clear headed.

The Commission directs that  its critics would  'do well  to ponder'
the strictures of those  in the know.  Critics  of  the Report  can-
not be accused  of quoting out of context because  it has no con-
tinuity or logically progressive  development.  This  lack  of
apparent  order actually  disguises  its deeper  ideological  purpose.
The  1367 pages are clouded with repetition, eclecticism, illogi-
calities, unreferenced  misquotes and paraphrases, and  little
exerpts  from Dante's Lament  (p. 320).  It plays  metaphorical
games with Shakespeare  (p-.  319, 177, 301), Rudyard  Kipling  (p.
839) and TS Elliot  (p. 994), all  of which prove  that the Com-
mission has no idea of what they are  saying.  Recourse  to poetry,
or for that matter, Aristotle  (p, 965), again  is  intended  to
create a spurious  credibility.

Since the Commission  is for the most part unable  to  understand
most of the arguments put forward  by  critics  of apartheid  and
incapable of refuting  those arguments  they can comprehend, the
Commissioners have responded  in the only way they are able  —
that  is to wilfully  trivialise  and belittle  concepts, arguments,
organizations and individuals with which  it knows  intuitively  it
cannot agree.  It tries to mobilise  the terminology  of the  left
against  itself but  in the process  trivializes  its own position,
robbing such terms of their content and etiology.  The  Commission
then tries to use what  is merely  an empty shell  to pound non-
existent radical  theoretical  positions.  Its armoury  is  further
supported by a random and unstructured  selection  of polemics
emanting from a wide cross-section  of right wing  and  reactionary
authors.  Many of these are themselves unaware  of the complexi-
ties of the positions against which  they argue.  Even where  their
propositions have a semblance of logical  structure, they are al-
most  invariably quoted  out of context by the Commission.  It
would seem that the motto of the authors of the  Steyn  Commission
has been "If you can't convince  them, confuse  them".

The Report also seems to have  taken  it upon  itself  to defend  the
Afrikaner against his nasty critics.  Its repeated  indignation at
anti-Afrikaner  sentiment suggests  the fragility  of  its stance and
its own correlation of Afrikaners with  Nationalists  (p. 743). By
implication, therefore,  anyone who  criticises  the government  is
labelled as a racist  (also see pp.  655-6).

There is a fascinating drift of argument  against  the English press
or "perceptual Goliath", as the Commission calls  it  (p. 838).

15

This press  is  indirectly  accused  of forming  an "unholy  alliance"
aimed  at  a covert  takeover, but  not  of overt  subversion;  of
"orchestrating" but  not  of direct  conspiracy, and  of  negative
"climate-setting" while simultaneously profit-seek ing . 
accused  on  the one hand  of causing  irreparable  harm  to  inter-
group  relations  (p. 1179) but  congratulated  for  doing  a good
job  in articulating  black  aspirations  in the absence  of a "truly
independent  black press".

it is

In the  last  instance, it does  not  really matter  whether  or not
the Commission  is  logical  or  illogical, clear  or confused, accu-
rate or  inaccurate:  it has achieved  its purpose.  It set  the
climate  for  further  intervention  in the newspaper  industry  in
order  to  lubricate  a "new deal"  (pp. 161-2) where  "the  'watchdog'
watches  itself"  (p. 163) and  is shielded  against  'victimization'
(p.  164).  Either  the press will  'volunteer' further  regulatory
codes  (p.  160), submit  to  'professional!sation'  (or  "internal
control")  (p. 160) and  registration  of journalists, or  it will
have  forced  the government  to pass a "draconian  'media  law' ,
censorial  legislation  and  state  control" to ensure  and  protect
press  freedom  (with  "social  responsibility").  The  government  is
loath  to contemplate  such  a law because  legislation  is not  seen
as a "cure-all" for all  the  ills of society  and  "would be con-
trary  to  the dynamic  evolutionary  developments  in South  Africa"
(pp.  1S9,  1295),  If change  seekers  ignore  the  'facts', or an
unbridgeable  perceptual  gulf"  (p. 275) occurs  "when dealing  with
the SAME  FACTS", then  they will  be  legislated,  even  if only a
perception.  If self-evident  truths  are  criticised,  then  posi-
tive "hard,  tangible  and exploitable  images" will  be  enforced
through  the  rule of  law and  objectivity  supplied  by  a central
information  department  (pp. 165, 963).  If a credibility  gap
exists  between  the media  and  its readers/viewers,  it will  be
eliminated  through  enforced  'responsibility'.  If counter  ideo-
logies continue  to exist, they will only be due  to  the  newspapers
giving  subjects  a false reading  of reality  and  this will  be elimi-
nated by  breaking  up  the Anglo American  control  of  SAAN' and  Argus
and  redistributing  their  shares, no doubt  to the moderate
majority.

Facts, true  facts and  truth are not synonomous.  If we  try  to  trace
the connections, we get something  like  this:

facts=true  facts  = reality  =  order  of things  = authorita-
tive  story  = true  = truth  f Truth

Truth  is a negative  image concocted  by committed  journalists  and
muckrakers  who  aim  "to discover  truth, not merely  facts".
Thus  reality  is  'truth', but  truth  is not  reality.

The next  section, Part  II, deals with  legislation which was pas-
sed  in the wake of the Commission's Report,  and will  trace  the  links
between  Steyn's  ideological  position  and how the  "hard  tangible
and exploitable  images" are  to be  enforced. While  the state did
not have  to enact  a "dracionian  'media  law"' to equip it with
every weapon  it could want, it did pass  three other  laws which
have direct  implications  for the news gathering  and  reporting
processes.  Furthermore, they will create  a  'profesional' en-
vironment  so  intimidating, that  it  is unlikely  that  the press  or

16

PART II:  HOW THE "SAME FACTS" WILL BE LEGISLATED

tO  °f f er  alternative explana-

°f

edi^daritwentTeMh  ^V

Commission  has been
b

dards.  While  we do art™  ?V 
p r o p o s a l a n d ^ a r t i c n ^ r?  * ?e fhat  t he aPPlication  of the Steyn
S  l efl s l a t i° n.  would  be near  impos-
sible,  this  does  no? n ? iH 
Minister  describe  it T, IT/-?* 
slaught  against  „  I,  fP 
J "g "irrefutable  proof"  of the  on-

lVot  °n ly  d id t he  P r^e

°P  e v en  by  government  stan-

e"e C t' 

offences  are described in
Ss? i u h i r s . s ? s ^t^ r8  actions  could con-
l e«i s l^ i on  as it
affects  theSth«e°Sfythfse«ed 
l e«i s l^ i on  as it
affects  t h e t h « e S f t h f s« 
r e l a t es  l° the ideo-
S 
li 
logical  component of S 
tion to ban organisations  ?HFSfOVerning  t he Minister's  discre-
INTERNAL  SECURITY  A C T*

organizations,  individuals  and publications.

^S ¥ 
t h is 
f 8 C^S  ¥ 
t h is 
ft 
ff 
l
ff" 
f-r St 

satisfiedt'LHtis^servln*  ^ ^i n s t
communism, o  a  i  t  "M  I" 

an  organization  when he  is
7
\  " tO  f u r t h er  the ends  of

s srsf »•

^ ^ / ct 

L e n i"  and'Trotsky 

redefines  the description  of 'communis,.
t h e ^ M ^ V5  M aTx i an  social is»

tenets^f^frl  S a r x1 1^ ^ ^6-0^^ 
"»«  Tse-tung  or MV oth  "Ch  E n?e l s>  Vladimir  Lenin, or

frOm  Or is  r e l a t ed  to the

ng,  or any other  recognised  theorist  in connection

17

b) 

c) 

with or exponent  of  these  tenets, and which  aims at  the es-
tablishment  of any form of socialism  or collective  ownership;
which  aims  at  the establishment, by means  of a class  or
group polarisation  of the community  and  the subsequent  su-
assumption  of power by  a particular  class  or group, of a
despotic  form  of government under which  one political  party,
group  or organization  is recognised  and  all  others are  elim-
inated  or prohibited;  or
which aims  at bringing  about any political, economic, indus-
trial  or  social  change within  the  Republic  in accordance
with  the directions  of or  in co-operation with any  foreign
government  or any  foreign or  international 
organization
whose purpose or one or more of whose purposes  (whether pro-
fessed  or not)  it is to bring  about  the establishment  within
the Republic  of any  economic  or social  system as contemplated
in paragraph  (a) or government  as contemplated  in paragraph
(b).

Part  (a) widens  the old definition  of communism  by  extending  the
list of  forbidden  authorities  and by adding  the vague phrase  "any
other  recognised  theorist".  The Act  is silent on what, in fact,
constitutes  "recognition".  These clauses have  extensive  implic-
ations as  to how  one begins  to establish  who  is a  "recognised
theorist", in what  terms  and  by whom.  IVhereas the previous  Act
specified  who  these  theorists, the new one does not.  Hence  our
extensive  analysis  of  the Steyn Commission,which, we believe may
well  form  the background  to who and what  organizations might  be
considered  'communist'.  By conveniently  dividing  the world  up
into good  versus  bad, capitalist versus  communist, black  versus
white, Christianity  versus Marxism  etc., the extension of  these
associations  and  dualities  into  the country's  legislation  is ob-
vious"  That  is why  the Steyn  Commission  remains  so important.

The aim of the propagator of these clauses has also been broadened
and  rendered more  ambiguous.  Whereas  in the old Act  the aim  of the
propagator had  to be directed  inter alia  to the "establishment  of
a despotic  system  of government  based  on the dictatorship  of the
proletariat", the new Acts  forbids the aim of establishing  "any
form of socialism  or collective  ownership" -- objectives  which
could clearly be  included  in the programmes  of bodies who need
not accept  the political  structures of the Soviet  Communist
system.

Since there  is no conjunction between the  first two sections  of
the definition,  it appears  that  the "doctrine  ideology or scheme"
constituted  to achieve the end mentioned  in  (b) need not be con-
nected with  the writings  of authors mentioned  in section  (a).  In
other words, a right-wing  group would be  included  in the definition
of communism.

The distinguishing  characteristic  of section  (c) of the definition
is the sweeping  terms  in which  the types of change are enunciated.
The addition  of the parenthetic  phrase  "whether professed  or not"
adds to the subjectivity  of the question of whether  a particular
foreign government  or organization  in fact has such terms.

Section  5(1) grants  the Minister  the power to prohibit  either
permanently or for a  specified period not only those  publications

which profess  to propagate  the principles  of communism, but  also
those which sevoe inter alia  as a means  for  expressing  views  or
conveying  information  the publication  of which  is calculated  to
endanger state security, the maintenance  of law and  order, the
furtherance of the achievement  of any  of  the objects  of  communism
or any unlawful  organization, or which  are calculated  to cause,
encourage  or foment  feelings  of hostility between  different popu-
lation groups of parts of population  groups  in the  Republic.

From  this analysis  it becomes  clear that  from now  on, communism
could be seen  in a much wider  framework which could  penetrate  in-
to the entire publishing  industry  itself:  book  publishers,
academic  and  scientific  journals, as well  as other  areas  such as
lecturing:  in fact, the accepted  practice  of large  sections  of
English language universities.

The Minister  is also given  the power  to control  which  publications
may enter the market.  Section  15(1) empowers him  to demand  of any
applicant  for registration  of a newspaper  —  registration  being
necessary  for any publication  falling within  the definition  of
'newspaper' and appearing  at  intervals  of less  than  once  a month
—  a deposit of up to R40  000 whenever he  is not  satisfied  that a
prohibition  in terms of Section  5 "will  not at any  time be neces-
sary".  The section provides  also that  if a prohibition  is in
fact  imposed, as much of  the  amount  deposited  as  the Minister de-
cides shall be  forfeited  to  the state.  This  section, which  appears
to exclude the possibility  of court  review, has immense implica-
tions for less affluent  groups who may wish  to start  a newspaper.
This has serious  implications  for many  community  and  other alter-
native publications.

Section  50(1) of the Act may  also be used  to prevent  reporters
from gathering news during  situations  of civil  unrest  or distur-
bance on the widely held  theory  that  the presence  of  journalists
and television  tends on  occasion  to encourage violent  protest.

PROTECTION OF  INFORMATION  ACT

The Act deems certain categories  of  information  "protected".
These  include  "prohibited  places" whereby  it  is an offence  punish-
able by a maximum of  20 years  imprisonment  to approach,  inspect,
pass over, be  in the neighbourhood  of or enter  any  prohibited
place for any purpose prejudicial  to the security  or  interests
of the Republic.  This has  clear  implications  for  the news gath-
ering process.

A  second category relates  to  the activities of various branches of
state administration.  Section  4 outlaws  the retention  of  infor-
mation entrusted  in confidence  to the possessor  by a  government
servant or contractor.  This provision  could  cover disclosure  of
the most trivial of information, and any kind of  "leaked"  infor-
mation.

Section 3(b)iii) includes  any matter which  the communicator  "knows
or  reasonably should know may  directly  or  indirectly  be of use  to
any foreign State or hostile  organization" and which  should  not
be disclosed "for considerations  of  the security  or other  interests
of the Republic".  The intent  required  for  liability will  appar-
ently consist not of a constructive  desire to benefit  the

recipient  of the prohibited  information  to the detriment  of the
state, but merely  in knowledge  that the action will  lead  to dis-
closure.  It is to be noted  that  such disclosure  need not be to
an official  of  the  recipient  state, but  to any  inhabi-ant there-
of.  Thus, any journalist writing  for a journal  that  circulates
beyond  the borders  of the Republic must  be deemed  to have  the
requisite  purpose.

The Act does  not provide  assistance  to the journalist  on

how to judge  in advance whether  information would be likely  to
be of direct  use  to a  foreign  state.  The  addition  of the phrase
"indirect  use" casts  the journalist  into utter  uncertainty.

REGISTRATION  OF NEWSPAPERS AMENDMENT ACT

This amendment  offers  newspapers  a choice  of falling under  the
Publications  Act of  1974 and  thereby being  under  the direct con-
trol  of the Directorate  of Publications, or subjecting  themselves
to the code  of conduct  and disciplinary  powers of  the as yet un-
known and unconstituted  Media Council.  Although  the Act stipu-
lates  that  the Council  shall  be an  independent  and  voluntary
body, none  the  less  it will acquire  its power from  statutory re-
cognition.  For further  information  on  the possible  structure  of
this body,  see  Irwin Manoim's  "Preface" to this issue.

CONCLUSION

An analysis  of these  three Acts, all passed  in 1982, suggests
that  this year  represents  the watershed  for the newspaper  in-
dustry.  The  government  now has  just  about  every possible  law
with which  to curtail the press  in a manner never before experien-
ced  in this  country.  Whether  it will  use  these powers  to any
extent  remains  to be seen and will  probably  depend  on the  extent
and seriousness  of hegemonic  weaknesses  as they may occur  in the
future.

The Steyn  Commission  might  have  'gone over  the top', but  the
climate  it  set  to enable  the above legislation  to be passed  was
its most  important  function.  The proposals  set out by the  Steyn
Commission have been  achieved:  the facts will be  enforced  and
the same  reality  will  be  legislated.  In many  ways, these Acts
have gone  a lot  further  than the Commission  for the  sanctions
now faced  by newspapers  and journalists  are nothing  short  of
draconian.  Steyn was  right, a media  law was not necessary, but
three other Acts were.  And  the key to  it all  is contained  in the
Steyn Report  itself:

A professional  and  sophisticated  communications  system
is vital  for South  Africa, and  if  it  is to be  turned  to
its fullest  account  then all concerned  - Government, Opposi-
tion, press, broadcasting  media  and private  enterprise  will
have  to cooperate  in conveying  a true and  authoritative
'story' to the world.  This  story, which creates per-
ceptions on South Africa, primarily has  to be  pre-emptive
and anticipatory;  irot reactive  and  defensive.  This
does not mean that all have to speak with  one voice.
The art  of diplomacy  is to say  the same  thing in dif-
ferent  ways for  the benefit  of different  audiences,
but with  honest and sino&ee  intentions  (emphasis  added).

:o

Notes and  References

1. 

Republic  of South Africa.  Report  of  the Steyn  Commission of
Inquiry  into the Mass Media.  RP  89/1981

2. 

Band Daily Mail,  12 March  1981

3. 

4. 

Only on p. 721, is the phrase  "no-win" attributed  to  its ut-
terer, F van  Zyl Slabbert, leader  of the PFP  Opposition.

Republic of South Africa.  Report  of the Commission  of Inquiry
into Reporting of Security  Matters  regarding  the South  African
Defence Force and the South African  Police Force.  RP  52/1980

5.  Here  the Commission  is referring  to Crozier, B.  1978:  Strat-

egy of Survival.  Arlington House.  Elswhere  the  Commission
variously  describes  South  Africa  as a "target  state"  (p. 67),
a "target  society"  (pp. 69, 402, 461, 497), and  just a plain
"target"  (p. 71).

6. 

7. 

8. 

This  is the reported  opinion  of "Sir Walter", referenced  as
"Walker, Gen. Sir Walter, KCB, CBE, DSO:  The  sear at the
Back Door.  Valiant  Publishers, Sandton, 1978.  The Next
Domino?  Valiant House  Publishers, Sandton,  1980."  The  Com-
mission does not bother  to  inform  readers  that  Valiant  Pub-
lishers was one of the  front companies  spawned  by  the noto-
rious  Information Department  which was exposed  by  the  English
press and was  later to  lead  to  the downfall  of not only a
senior  Cabinet Minister, the Chief  of the Bureau  of State
Security, but the President  (ex-Prime Minister), John  Vorster
as well

This  is the argument  put  forward  by  a number  of scholars.
See, eg., Tomaselli, R.E. and  Tomaselli, K.G.  (Eds.):  1983
Culture,  Ideology and the South African Mass  y.edia.  Jonathan
Ball, Johannesburg  (forthcoming).  Also see  Doherty, C.  1981:
"The Wits-Koornhof  Debate:  Is there  really  a  difference
between  the English  and Agrikaans  Presses?"  Critical  Arts,
Vol.  2, No. 2, pp. 39-50

The term  "pariah" is used  in passing  by Adam, H. and Gilio-
mee, H.  1979:  The Rise and  Crisis of Afrikaner  Power.
David  Phillip, Cape Town.  Not  only has the  Commission
vitiated  its original application but they have  fetishized
it as well.  Davis, D.M.  1982:  Distrust in  Democracy,
Lawyers  for Human Rights, Cape Town/Stellenbosch, points  out
that the summary of the Report  p.  126ff closely  resembles
passages  from Adam  and Giliomee's book.  The  ideas of the
latter authors remain unreferenced.See  Davis, p. 30).

9. 

Within a short time of the  release of the Report,  many  of
Steyn's  sayings have been  repeated  and printed  in humourous
contexts.

10.  See note 8, above

11.  Marais, H.C. and Engelbrecht, H.J.  1980:  Aspekte  van  Massa-

kommunikasie.  PJ de Villiers, Bloemfontein, p. 96.  They  in

21

turn  r e f er  to  Murdock,  G. and Golding,  P.  1977:  " C a p i t a l-
ism,  Communication  and Class  R e l a t i o n s"  in  Curran,  J.  et
al 
London,  p.  12.  This  reference  is  given  on p.  1007 of t he
Report  and is  so  f u ll  of  typographical  e r r o r s, 

( e d s . ):  Mass  Communication  and Society. 

Edward  Arnold,

that  it  is  clear

t h at  t he  Commission  did not  consult  t he  o r i g i n a l.

12.  See Broughton,  M.  1961:  Press  & Politics 

Africa.
Purnell  & Sons,  Cape  Town;  P o t t e r,  E.  197S:  The Press  as
Opposition:  The Political  Role  of  South  African  Newspapers.
Rowman  and  Littlefield,  New Jersey.

of  South 

13.  The  Commission  states  that  "A very  good  example  of  'Pack

Journalism'  is  a  very  recently  published  book  written  with
the  obviously  prime  purpose  of  denigrating  the  whole  idea
of  t e r r i t o r i al  separation  on  the  basis  of  Peoples  in  South
Africa  and  of  demeaning  the  whole  Southern  African 
'Inner
Core'  by  dismissing  it  as  politically  fraudulent"  (p. 731-
2).  The  Report  is  referring  here  to  Streek,  B.  and  Wicksteed,
R.  1979:  Render  Unto  Kaiser:  A  Transkei  Dossier. 
Johannesburg.  Predictably,  this  book  does  not  appear  in
the  Report's  bibiography  because  it  was not  read.  The  in-
formation  was  derived  from  a  review  published  in  The
Sowetan,  19 August 1981.

Ravan,

14.  We are  heavily  indebted  to  John  Grogan  for  his  advice  on

this  section.  We reemphasise  the  tentativeness  of  our con-
clusions,  since  these  acts  remain  as  yet  untested  by  court
precedent.

15.  The  implicitness  of  these  dualities  is  not  new to  the 1982

Act.  This  connotative  link  is  implict  to  the  old  act  as  well.

o

AIBICi.  PERSPBOIIYB,  a  quarterly  Jtumal,
started  in  1974,  attempts  to  raise  the
l e v el  of  discussion  «n  African,  particularly
Southern  African  events,  through  a r t i c l es
that  are  both  theoretical  and  factual,  b*th
h i s t o r i c al  and  current.  Sane  of  these  have
been  about  resettleaent,vomen,state  and
labour funderdevelopment, Indus t r i al  c o n f l i c t,
the  role  of  the  reserves  in  S.A.  .local
p o l i t i c al  bodies,and  the  growth  ef
c a p i t a l i st  agriculture.
African  countries  which  have  been  leeked  at  are
Mozambique .Uganda, Tanzania, Angola, Namibia, and
Zaire.Issues  planned  will  focus  on  the  social
consequences  of  the  use  of  machinery  in  S.A.
Industry,and  on  the  Southern  African  state*.
IOCAZ StraSCRIMI0MS-»3,8O  K>H •  ISSUES.POSTAGB MCI,
OALL  MOHDAYS  9-1.0OPB,  7  SOOIH  COURT,  40  JOBRISOM  STJ  "

PERSPECTIVE

WRITS  T0:SO  BOX 3 2 2 8 7,  BRAAHK1HTBIH,  JOHUfHESBDBG, 2 0 1 7.

22