

'How to Set Your House in Order': Read All About It in Steyn Commission II

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Commissions of Inquiry have become an increasingly accepted modus operandi in the South African political arena in recent years. The Steyn Commission into the mass media¹ is yet another example of how the government uses these investigations to secure its political objectives. One of the main purposes of Commissions is to avoid the enactment of legislation by deferring it to some future, unspecified date, hoping that the crisis will have passed by that time.

Several points emerge from this observation:

1. Legislation which the government is unwilling to pass can be delayed almost indefinitely. The rationale for such procrastination is that the background is still under investigation and any pre-emptive action on the part of Parliament would be detrimental to the national interest. Examples include the proposed labour legislation being considered in the wake of the Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions. This ploy allows the government to maintain a progressive stance by keeping up reformist rhetoric without having to enact firm legislation.
2. The government is able to utilize the findings of these Inquiries to rationalise and legitimize restrictive measures which may otherwise have difficulty in being encoded into legislation. Similarly, it can work to pave the way for the acceptance of adaptive legislation which has the function of bringing social reality into line with economic necessity.
3. The successful passing of legislation does not only depend on its ratification by a majority in Parliament, but also on a more general public sympathy within the broad mass of government supporters. Commissions of Inquiry and the consequent publicity which surrounds their workings and findings act to create an ambience of public consensus. They oil the wheels of legislation. This implies that these investigations are set up not so much to explore the factual backgrounds surrounding certain issues, but rather to catalyse a conducive climate in which pre-formulated solutions (and

sometimes legislation) can be enacted. Simultaneously, Commissions perform the function of market research, providing a guide to the reformulation of policies in order to broaden the base of their public endorsement. Judge Steyn himself states:

It is very rarely that the Government will adopt the recommendations of a report in toto. A Commission's task is one of public importance. While it reports to the Government it acts in the interest of the public.²

4. Commissions are also used to force self-regulation onto the actors they are investigating.

The above points tend to support the view that the stated objectives of commissions of inquiry to investigate current social issues are largely a front to disguise the true intentions of the government, which are to create an ideological climate and offer rationalisations for repressive or adaptive measures contemplated by the state. The Steyn Commission is an example of both the restrictive and adaptive functions of such enquiries. Its massive tomes were a precursor to the most restrictive legislation ever to be passed in the country controlling the mass media. At the same time it has the function of accommodating the growing business call for economic reform which continues to be resisted by reactionary elements within the National Party and those to the right of it.

THE APARTHEID BASE OF THE 'ORDERLY HOUSE'

The Steyn Commission rests upon an ambivalence regarding the necessity for, and the rationalization of, and indeed, the very existence of apartheid. Consider the following extract:

Although isolated and largely cast out of the International Community, the Inner Core of Southern African States (i.e. the RSA, the independent states recently born of its substance, and SWA/Namibia) and its peoples present a picture of apparent paradox - that of a relatively stable community in a state of flux.

The newly independent states of Transkei, Venda and Boputhatswana, all erstwhile "apartheid Territory" have now become "non-apartheid areas", a development urged on South Africa for so long and so vehemently by the international community but which remains distressingly unrecognized by that selfsame community (pp. 29-30, 185).

This statement, amongst other things, wilfully confuses process with appearance, and tries to suggest that apartheid is a fulfilment of international prescriptions. A second extract will show that these "non-Apartheid areas" are apparently needed to absorb all those blacks who cannot, because of sheer numbers, be physically repressed:

The objective reality of the South African situation is, however, that there are too many Whites for Blacks to 'chase them into the sea' and there are so many Blacks that they cannot be subjugated forcibly by the Whites (pp. 96 & 720).

The reasons why whites should want to dominate blacks or vice versa is submerged under the above cliché and a "no-win" situation has forced South Africa to face "reality".³ The 'true' community of South Africa is identified as being synonymous with the National Party. Non-conforming groups are portrayed as prodigal sons who have wandered away from the fold and who need to be brought to their senses. All are part of the same community which the Commission characterises as a "potentially many-splendored constellation of Peoples" (p. 99):

The Commission is ... of the view that the South African population, as heterogenous and divergent in culture as it is, does constitute a community, - a distinct and vigorous one with many common interests, albeit still so sharply divided on certain cardinal issues as to move some of its members to espouse alien ideologies and other socio-political and cultural creeds and methods including treason, terror and subversion in an effort to effect rapid and drastic change in South Africa, or even to overthrow and destroy all the major facets of the present order here pertaining (pp. 29 & 182).

And so the *Report* continues, the South African reality continuously being threatened by a 'total onslaught' orchestrated by Soviets, Marxists, politicised theologians, Black Consciousness, far-left academics, who "go astray because the criteria they seek to apply are not properly understood by them or are inadequately defined" (p. 31), misguided liberals of the John Dugard ilk and 'radicals' such as Bishop Desmond Tutu.

"CLIMATE-SETTING" OR HOW TO DISCREDIT YOUR CRITICS

The Commission accuses the press, particularly the English language and captive black presses of "climate-setting" - that is of propagating its own ideologies, policy and philosophy. The *Report*, however, does much the same thing through its treatment of critics of both the South African regime and the first Steyn Commission.⁴ On the relatively few occasions when sources are quoted the Commission constantly tries to reassure the reader of the credibility of those whom they have enlisted in their favour. The *Inquiry* latches onto "knowledgeable experts", "men of standing", "justly renowned leaders", "noted academics", assorted "Doctors", "Professors" and even one "noble Lord" (p. 475). Most of these individuals are nothing more than alarmist academics given to gross over-generalizations and simplistic descriptions. The Commission intimates that they alone know the truth and the reader is subjected to endless extracts of their questionable analyses which pronounce rather than debate (eg. p. 324). Where the Commission's argument is too thin to stand up to scrutiny, it resorts to the slander of liberal authors, described as "undoubtedly potent sources" (p. 240), who are nevertheless disqualified for inadequate curriculum vitae and supposed lack of experience in political science and practical politics. Their arguments do not appear to count at all (eg. pp. 35, 196, 226, 240). Professor M.H. Louw's opinion, for example, is preferred because, unlike Dugard, he is not a jurist "somewhat beyond the bounds of his discipline and whose approach [is] more narrowly judicial and theoretical". No doubt Louw's

sycophantic appraisal of the first Steyn Commission (pp. 195-97) also adds credence to his "viewpoint". As the Commission itself states in connection with two newspaper reports:

The importance of utterances ... is not whether they are justified or not, but that they are 'signs of the times' which undoubtedly indicate present attitudes and are also protents (sic) of possible future developments (p. 865).

The Commission is, however, quite clear that only one interpretation of the "signs of the times" will qualify: "Presenting of more than one possibility or alternative" is akin to "climate-setting" which confuses readers and casts doubt upon the credibility of newspapers (see p. 1278).

The *Report* gleefully quotes page after page of funkies whose ideas coincide closely with that of the Commissioners. That at least one of these scare mongers has harsh words for South Africa (pp. 342-3) is all the better, for even the enemies of South Africa can be shown by implication to believe in the 'total onslaught', South Africa being a "Target Area"⁵ and assailed by the "existing means device" and "the Gramsci Approach" (p. 402). Readers will, however, be relieved to know that South Africa is only the ninth step out of ten in the Russian Master Plan (p. 351):

While few would doubt the imperialist intentions of Soviet Russia, the use of terms such as "target area", the already-occurring "Third World War", the Russian-conducted "Symphony of Terror" (p. 361) and other grossly determinist adjectives and descriptions totally over-simplifies actual processes and situations. We are taken on a detailed excursion into the KGB and its "Dis-information Department" and the Commission tries to suggest that schools, universities, technicians, information media, and the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the South African Council of Churches (SACC)

are major targets to be infiltrated clandestinely and manipulated covertly so as to advance Soviet aims and generate the dry-rot of mind and spirit which is so necessary for the victory of the Soviet Virus in the Body Politic of a target society (p. 440).

Against the threat of the KGB and reminding the sceptical reader of the intensity of the 'total onslaught', and connecting hostile external organizations with local agents, the Commission then states categorically that there is "no decisive evidence of such a worldwide conspiracy", only different groups with "similar aims" but "different ultimate objectives" (p. 745).

THE FASTEST JARGUN IN THE WEST

The most striking aspect of the Steyn *Report*, is an unparalleled jargonizing guaranteed to intimidate the already punch-drunk journalist and the unsuspecting lay public.

The Steyn jargon machine thrives on incorrect assumptions, un-researched theses, non-words, nonsensical headings and almost drowns itself in a bog of irrelevancies and verbal confusion where the distinction between gibberish and terminology is

completely blurred. Yet, for those readers whose own ideology coincides with that of the Commissioners, the *Report* will appear to make sense on a superficial level, because it supports what is taken for granted by the dominant ideology which is itself consistently reinforced by both the Afrikaner Nationalist, and to a lesser extent, the English language media.⁷ This becomes especially evident when one considers its jargon. Recurring terms like "practical statecraft" (eg. p. 34), and phrases like "mind-set and the upwelling of left-liberal enmity" (p. 62), "the potentially fatal Western mind-set" (p. 444) and non-existent words such as "tasked" (p. 12 Vol 4), "thrombosed" (p. 1340) and "Victimologies" (p. 608) all serve to add a spurious scientific credibility to the *Report*.

Syndromes abound everywhere, particularly the "stuck whistle" variety (pp. 109, 888, 1268) which was the term used on *Radio Today* by some unfortunate visiting professor from the Columbia University Journalism School to describe the intensity of political haranguing which is supposedly peculiar to the South African press. The "Pariah Syndrome" (pp. 96, 722ff, 728) is contagious and mutates into the "Pariah status" (p. 30), "pariah state" (p. 144), the "pariah fashion" (pp. 96, 102, 722ff); it is a verb in "pariah making" (pp. 54, 96, 97), can be read as "pariah literature" (p. 732), or it can move us into the realm of the surreal in "pariah making as Lunacy Generator" (pp. 735, 812).⁸

Most things, dissenting groups, thoughts, ideas or actions which go counter the status quo are said to be "lethal" (pp. 65, 177, 815), "fatal" (pp. 253, 467, 966) or at least, "near fatal" (p. 100), "potentially fatal" (pp. 444, 445) or putting South Africa in "mortal danger" (pp. 40, 467). "Radical" describes anybody to the right or left of the Commission politically, those on the right being less dangerous than those on the left.

Numerous meaningless headings make a mockery of grammar and syntax, for example, "The Anglo-South Africa Politico-Financial Threat Sinister" (pp. 745, 764). Religious imagery seeps out: "The potentially lethal theo-political force" (p. 88) and "The Unctious Pariah-making Politico-Theological and Journalistic 'Fashion'" (p. 722). The list is endless.

By means of emotive phrases the Commission hopes to conceal the distinction between fact and ideology, myth and process and cause and effect. Terms like "Conflictual matrices", "Unholy Alliances" (eg. pp. 462, 496, 764), "Threat Factors" (p. 892) and other crude categories conveniently conceal actual conditions under discussion. Further semantic absurdities are provided through metaphorical engineering which forces strange and weird interpretations onto the English language.⁹

THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO THE STEYN COMMISSION

The Commission surpasses itself in its attempt to unleash theological terror on South Africa's perceived enemies. More through association than by hard evidence, the *Report* tries to taint a variety of organizations and social movements. The results are more horrific than amusing:

The WCC's "Council Conduct" amounts to "Clerics of the Councils clad in the Cloth", clutching the Reversed Cross and animated by the precepts of the "Theology of Liberation", entering the Arena of Mundane Politics, and employing the Cross in its "Battle-Axe" role to help them achieve their POLITICAL goals. (Emphases, capitals and quotation marks in original) (pp. 82 & 582)

The contorted logic which forms the basis of this theology is the subject of a separate contribution in this issue, but it is necessary to make some further observations with regard to terminology. Words like "epilogue" are used in place of "conclusion" (p. 104), "brethren" for 'colleagues', "sinners" for 'perpetrators' (p. 45) and "excommunication" for 'sports boycotts' (p. 297), further support the Commission's politico-evangelical goals. Ministers of religion are referred to as "gentlemen of the Cloth" who should take care not to be infiltrated by the "Social Gospel":

The movement whereby the Gospel was sought to be secularised and collectivised [and] was the seed whence sprang the thorny, and as to certain of its branches, also poisonous growth of Politicised Theology, which has now started bearing the sinister and unhappy fruits of Theologised Politics (p. 499).

These horizontal social gossellers, or those who support the sports isolation -- "clergymen in the ruck of tour protests" (p. 300) -- are nothing more than Soviet proxies, liberal misfits and "fellow travellers" who are (if unwittingly) aiding the leftist press in the "process of socio-political demolition" (p. 125). One of these miscreants, Bishop Desmond Tutu, even had the temerity to accuse "HIM", that is PW Botha, "OF LYING" (p. 568). Even God incarnate doesn't get *that* sort of treatment.

For a Commission whose concerns are so closely tied to public morality this lapse into the blasphemous is inexcusable.

"NEW MARXISM" MADE SIMPLE

The use of one-sided arguments is a hallmark of this *Report*. Apart from plagiarising large amounts of published academic material from the liberal-humanist school,¹⁹ it pointedly avoids the more critical studies, research and publications of a number of internationally published South African journalists and academics. Pertinent examples include *Index on Censorship*, *South African Labour Bulletin*, *Work in Progress*, *SASPU National*, and the work of Les Switzer, amongst others. Even where they have relied exclusively on conservative journals like *Equid Novi*, the Commission has ignored the more critical contributions to those publications. The "dialectical interaction" of ideas which were supposedly synthesised in the first Steyn *Report* are non-existent in either *Report* (see p. 294).

Most glaring of all, the *Report*, which apparently offers authoritative criticisms of "Victimologies" (p. 608) such as Marxism (which has been disproved, p. 77), Leninism (which has failed, p. 464), and tries to correlate these with everything subversive, references none of the authors associated with this school of economic and social analysis. The *Report's* interpretations seem to be largely based on the work of Cornel West. It is clear

that the Commissioners have totally misunderstood West, and thereby the postulates of Marx and Gramsci. By relying only on West's incomplete descriptions, which interchange class with culture, the Commissioners have misunderstood the *processes* involved and which are implicit in West's commentary. Elsewhere, the *Inquiry* relies on dubious tertiary sources which are culled from little-known right-wing academics. Since the writings of these authors coincide with the Commission's pre-existing conceptions and intercept its own ideological position, their validity is never questioned: they are accepted as obvious and therefore correct.

Although vociferous in its criticism of Marxism, the Steyn Commission is not above hi-jacking some of its formulations to further the *Report's* arguments. Three examples stand out.

The first concerns the Commission's understanding, or rather total misunderstanding, of neo-Marxist thought. For a start, the *Report* got its spelling wrong, calling it "New Marxist Theory" (p. 1007), a misspelling which signals a clear miscomprehension and trivialization on the part of the Commission and the authors it has relied on. The choice of "New" as opposed to "neo" seems deliberate since the latter word does exist in Afrikaans. The Commission buries itself under an eclectic heap of ideologically palatable and confused tertiary sources. Murdock and Golding, for example, would be aghast to know that Marais and Engelbrecht, from whom the Commission gets its misinformation, attribute the neo-Marxist approach solely to these authors. Not only did they 'develop this approach', but their highly rigorous historical materialist terminology has been substituted by orthodox categories. Marais and Engelbrecht, as quoted by the *Report*, refer to "upper class", "capitalist class", "lower class", and "social structure".¹¹ It seems, furthermore, that the Commission is unable to understand the relation of these theorists to Marx, Lenin and Gramsci and barely acknowledges the neo-Marxist contribution in less than six lines of improbable description.

If the Commission's understanding of the neo-Marxist position had been more comprehensive, they might not have embarrassed themselves by caricaturing two further materialist concepts. The second example concerns what is interchangeably termed the "doctrine" of "counter hegemonic cultures" or "counter hegemonial (sic) cultures" (eg. pp. 91, 618). The Commission has prostituted this concept in its attack on those it sees as disagreeing with its point of view. In an explanation which would make Gramsci rattle his prison bars and tear up his notebooks, the Commission suggests that:

Closely allied to the sanctification of terror as a theologically legitimate means in the "liberation struggle", is the Marxist concept of the "counter-hegemonic culture", adopted by radical black theology and politics and introduced into South Africa with the obvious intent of completely demolishing the prevailing dispensation (p. 91).

Towards the end of the *Report*, the Commission talks about "Mwasa's counter-hegemonic culture" as if, aided by Black Consciousness and the various branches of African/Black/Liberationist theology, this Association was conspiratorially able to create a "culture" at

will. The *Report*, of course, does not reference the origin of the term -- they vaguely describe it as a "Marxist concept", which was plucked from West. Although Gramsci does use this category in both an analytical and strategic way, the Commission does not do justice to either position.

Arising from this misconception the term "organic intellectual" is misused in a particularly ironic way. The Commissioners are quick to label the leaders of AZAPO, MKASA, BC, radical Black Theology and certain members of the SACC as "organic intellectuals" directly "concerned in the formulation and development of a Black counter-hegemonic radical culture in South Africa" (p. 668). This convenient and theoretically empty categorization allows the Commission to conclude that

Such a counter-culture is not being devised for the sake of beautifying the spiritual and intellectual environment, but as a cudgel of combat - a truculent but fitting companion for the reversed cross in the armoury of subversion and disaffection (pp. 668-9).

This is a singularly determinist view of how organic intellectuals operate. Furthermore, the confusion of theoretical positions evidenced in the above extract seems to have bypassed the Commission. "Counter-culture" is a term which was applied by Theodore Roszak to account for a specific social movement which existed in the United States during the early 1960s.¹³ It is not a 'Marxist' term. What the Commission is groping for, it seems, is the concept of 'counter ideologies' which are articulated by organic intellectuals during periods of hegemonic crisis. These intellectuals are able to exploit the fissure until such time as it is identified by the hegemonic bloc and plugged up. The *Report* is correct, more by default than by logic, in classifying some of the practitioners they mention as organic intellectuals. They fall into this category only because of the *context* and historical conjuncture in which they are operating. That context is provided by apartheid; the historical conjuncture of the crisis in capital. Besides, a study of organic intellectuals can only properly occur within a class analysis, a level of investigation which is completely missed by the Commissioners.

What is perhaps all the more fascinating is that the Commissioners, in misunderstanding the notion of organic intellectual, have not grasped the significance of their own roles, and that of the Commission. Just as organic intellectuals can be drawn from the repressed and subordinate classes, so too, can they be spawned by the hegemonic alliance. Afrikaans journalists, for instance, have acted, and continue to perform as organic intellectuals in translating Afrikaner Nationalist political philosophies into strategies for economic action and vice versa. Steyn himself is an organic intellectual for he is representing the interests of his class in the *Report*. He and his Commissioners, all part of the hegemonic bloc, have intuitively identified the crisis in hegemony in the existence of the English language and captive black presses -- and have sought means of closing that fissure. By curtailing the scope of these media, the Commission hoped to remove the "hard, tangible and exploitable images" which identify the structural weaknesses of apartheid. The cement to be used in this image repair job was initially through ideology and propa-

ganda. These have not worked so the mixture is to be strengthened through proposals legislating against the propagation of negative points of view. Throughout the *Report*, the Commission argues that South Africa's negative overseas image is largely gleaned from the pages of the English language newspapers: "overseas attacks on South Africa, including the South African (ANC) propaganda, are inspired to no small extent by reports and comment emanating from the English language newspapers" (pp. 130-1, 151). Thus, if this press was 'to set its house in order', this poor image would cease to exist, and South Africa's apparent stability would result in untold benefits for the hegemonic bloc.

The method used by the state to enforce this compliance is dealt with in the last section of this paper. We now need to analyse how the Commission typifies the polar opposites into which it has divided world conflict.

THE DUALISTS

The *Report* makes use of numerous binary opposites, for instance, "First World-Third World dichotomy of rich versus poor, or White North versus Black South" (pp. 66, 887). On a simplistic level, this juxtaposition of "First World" with "Third World" and "North" with "South", has strong parallels with the dualist studies undertaken by the neo-colonial 'modernization' theorists.¹⁴ Orthodox dualism identifies two opposing and mutually autonomous poles which exist alongside, but independently of one another. This may be done on an international scale, where a distinction is made between developed and underdeveloped countries, usually in terms of the Gross National Product. The Commission is replete with examples: "Rich North - Poor South" (p. 76), "duel between East and West" (p. 59), "global crisis with East-West, North-South and First World-Third World power struggle" (p. 105), are just a few. The necessity of portraying each pole as separate from, and independent of one another arises from the underlying assumption concerning the nature of the developmental process.

For these theorists, the authors of the Steyn *Report* included, development is synonymous with highly capitalised, technologically sophisticated and 'stable' economies. Conversely, underdevelopment is seen as the negative image of development - characterised by a subsistence economy, the use of 'backward' techniques, and having volatile social relations. The 'answer' to the 'problem' of development then, is a diffusion of capital and technology from the one sector to the other, chiefly through the mechanism of market forces, international 'aid', and philanthropic capitalist entrepreneurs. While such a model may be descriptively true on the level of appearances, it ignores the active process of underdevelopment on the part of the dominant economy. Underdevelopment, far from being an original state for certain societies, has historically been induced through the expansion of neo-colonial relations. The wealth of the 'First World' is largely predicated on the exploitation and resultant poverty of the 'Third World'. Nor is this an anachronistic phenomena confined to the period when the Third World was the major supplier of raw materials to the industrialised countries, but it continues today in the transaction of consumer goods, in a process of unequal exchange for strategic minerals, cheap labour and large markets onto

which redundant stock surpluses can be dumped. Underdevelopment is thus dialectically related to development. Dualist theorists, however, by fetishising the outward characteristics of different societies, are led to derive dichotomies rather than connections, and thus to disguise the complex sets of relations which exist between these processes. In this way, the whole process of neo-colonialism is exonerated from having any part in the impoverishment of the world's poor.

In an analogous way, a distinction is made between two apparently separate and isolated economies or social groups existing within a single nation, in which certain geographical areas or ethnic/racial groups are juxtaposed against one another. In South Africa, the rhetoric of 'separate development' obfuscates the reality of cheap labour. The *Report* is at pains to perpetuate the notion of the independence of the 'homeland' areas -- implying their social and economic viability: "the newly independent states of Transkei, Venda and Boputhatswana, all erstwhile "Apartheid Territory", have now become "non-Apartheid areas" (emphasis added; pp. 29-30, 185). According to the myth of 'independent national states', the homeland areas are able to provide for the subsistence of the families of migrant workers, thus perpetuating the payment of super-low wages to industrial workers, who, despite their origins in "non-Apartheid areas", are forced to work in the "Apartheid Territory" in order to survive. It is however the myth, and not the reality, which is uppermost in the minds of the writers of this *Report*.

The crude way in which the dualist framework is utilised in this document is apparent in its analysis of South Africa's 'dilemma'. Quoting Sample Terreblance as their authority, the authors submit

that the South African situation [is one] of wealth and prosperity amongst First World People (mostly whites) and poverty and backwardness amongst Third World People (mainly people of colour) [and] is a reflection of the situation world-wide" (p. 803).

These apparent divisions within the South African population are used to justify further restrictive measures against the media who are accused of "extending ... the ambit and intensity of the conflict situation and political polarization": the English language press by reflecting a "negativistic destructive approach" and the Afrikaans press by perpetuating a "hegemonic cause-preserving approach". The Commission exhorts the media to undertake a "continuous soul-searching as to the possible effect that comment, reporting and interpretation" can have in a "heterogenous society":

The media apparently do not appreciate ... that the normal First World journalistic approaches and practices, designed for application in a homogeneous country, are not applicable in their undiluted or unadjusted form in a heterogenous country with a First World and Third World population, with a massive difference in levels of sophistication, where First World 'advocacy journalism' has a much greater impact upon the often unsophisticated, half-illiterate mind than in a homogeneous and sophisticated First World community (p. 141).

The choice of "half-illiterate" as opposed to the alternative of 'half-literate' is revealing, since it indicates the underlying bias in the *Report's* dualistic conceptions.

On the one hand there are images of growth, dynamism and civilization, while on the other we are presented with poverty, stasis and backwardness. Overlaid on these conventional neo-colonialist expressions is an overtly racial content. This line of thought suggests a simple semantic step of equating whites with development and growth, and blacks with underdevelopment and backwardness. Not content with this defamation, the *Report* plays a juggling game with these and other categories to produce this tongue twisting conundrum, in which the Commission suggests that within South Africa there is "an irreversible anti-Black White racism, as well as an irreconcilable Afrikaner-English, Marxist-Capitalist and First World-Third World conflict as acknowledged complicating factors" (p. 174). Apart from the obvious sloganeering, this litany of dualities hides a deeper ideological purpose. Just as blacks were identified with "Third World People" in the Terreblanche thesis, the association is now extended.

This is not to suggest that these connections were consciously in the mind of the Commissioners -- far from it. What it does suggest, however, is that beneath the apparently random way in which the Commission attacks everyone to the left of their own standpoint, lurks a far more ominous ideological thread based on the fear of a racial and linguistic/cultural threat to the dominance of the Nationalist stronghold in South Africa.

THE BLACK PRESS AND MWASA: "SHOCK TROOPS OF THE REVOLUTION"

Those sections of the *Report* concerned with the captive black press evidence an underlying ambivalence where the opposing poles seem to shift back and forth in response to a perceived need for either two-way communication or unidirectional propaganda between the government and urban black inhabitants. The perpetrators of this revolution are AZAPO, who are the "policy makers", COSAS, who concentrate on "'conscientising' the student" and MWASA which "operates in the media field for the creation of the necessary socio-political climate" (p. 495).

Since MWASA, Bishop Tutu and Dr Motlana refused to submit their points of view to the Commission, which was also prevented from seeing Walter Sisulu, chairman of MWASA as he was in detention, the Commission audaciously does this for them (pp. 130, 587) and refers to the "writing" and "reported utterances" of these individuals and organizations" (p. 23, 710). The starting point for this discussion must proceed from the first Steyn Commission's conclusion that South Africa is a "dynamically developing and expanding democracy" (pp. 186, 188ff, 245). The present Commission moves from the premise that its mandate has little bearing on press freedom "for we must rely on the acceptance of this principle ... by the Prime Minister in his major policy statement on the press delivered to Parliament on 20 April 1979" (pp. 16, 138)

Having made these extraordinary statements, the *Report* proceeds to contradict itself with a consistency not found in any other section of their presentation. It rationalises government

restrictions on the black press in terms of methods rather than principles. On the closure of *Post* (Tvl), for example, the *Report* claims that this "does not necessarily indicate an abandonment of the commitment by the Government to a "free press":

The manner in which the matter was handled should not be confused with the principle involved. The newspaper is merely a neutral instrument ... the real perpetrator of subversion is the journalist who abuses the paper for his own ends (p. 19).

Apart from this contradiction of the Commission's major contention that the English press is controlled by Anglo American media monopoly which imposes a policy, not journalists, and which "poses a grave threat to a truly free, independent and diversified press" (pp. 152, 157), the Commission makes spurious correlations between the supposed revolutionary black press and the social responses of the repressed classes. The *Report*, in justifying government action, claims that "It is significant that Soweto returned to normal after the banning of the World and other organizations (pp. 121, 1055). No discussion is offered about other repressive measures such as the brutal action of police who killed over 700 people, many of them children, during the riots, or what exactly is "normal" about Soweto. The reader is merely given a bland description which totally ignores all the other processes and variables operating at the time. The *Report* also does its best to misinterpret the Cillie Commission which absolved the press from all blame in the causation of the riots by means of a semantic contortion which would do justice to *The Gooen Show* (p. 121).

Having discussed the 'black press' on the level of the sublime, we now move into the ridiculous. The Commission complains that there is no "truly independent black press" in South Africa. This is despite the fact that

there is among Blacks a need for a truly independent Black press which can express the feelings and aspirations of Black opinions and perceptions, especially the moderate majority (p. 130).

Such a press is required because, amongst other things, the Afrikaans press and the SABC have "failed to report adequately on the hopes and aspirations, suffering and frustrations of the Black community" (pp. 128, 1286, 1268). Apart from the loss of business to Afrikaans firms, "The political cost of an uninformed public may be considerably higher" (p. 128).

Notwithstanding its vilification of the English press as being irresponsible, hiding behind the skirts of the Afrikaans press for protection from the government (p. 148), of aiding Russian imperialism and so on, the Commission (obviously having read Elaine Potter¹¹) then acknowledges that "the English language press has rendered a very valuable service to the South African community by informing it constantly of Black opinion and aspirations" (p. 139). Furthermore, the English press has shown (mainly with the help of Potter and Broughton¹²) that it is unable to influence the political course of events (p. 130). If this press is unable to influence the course of events, how can it be accused of working towards "socio-political demolition" or of encouraging "revolutionary forces which are at work in this country"? (p. 141).

In any event, the argument put forward by scholars of the left (who remain unread) is that this captive black press was not radical, in the more rigorous sense of the word, in that it supports a continuance of capitalism and its consequent class structure, modified only by the removal of "hurtful discrimination". This point of view was ignored by the Commissioners. But then, when people like Bishop Tutu and Dr Motlana are characterised as 'radicals', it becomes difficult to persuade the Commission that within the wider spectrum of black thought such individuals represent moderate political opinion. Thus, by calling on "The moderate Black community" to be "encouraged to establish an independent Black press, truly reflecting actual Black opinion (p. 169) is merely to accept the existing situation where ideas of some of the emerging black middle class are already being aired in, for example, *The Sowetan*, and which were being conveyed in *World and Post*. The *Report* does, however, exhibit a certain ambivalence:

Stifling the messenger does not kill the message - the message seeks an outlet elsewhere. And this seems to present a critical possibility of polarization and tension being aggravated. On the one hand a channel of communication has been cut off which could serve the government as an important barometer of Black emotions and thinking; on the other hand Black frustration might be exacerbated to dangerously near flashpoint (p. 1068. Also see p. 126).

Elsewhere the *Report* calls for a suppression of radical black thought as evidenced in MWASA but simultaneously acknowledges that such "though and action cannot simply be ignored or suppressed", but must be "fairly" and "adequately" dealt with (p. 887). The Commission does not resolve this point but it is clear that only the "moderate majority" who support apartheid measures will be allowed to express their aspirations and grievances.

The Commission, by clearly planting itself on the side of 'objectivity', 'balance', and fairness' complains that MWASA's "'temper is so radical" and "so different" to the fundamentals of "orthodox Western liberal standards of journalism" that the ordinary Western (and liberal) approach would founder at the outset" (p. 707). Against this observation we may juxtapose the Commission's explanation of the role played by the National Party press prior to 1948. It claims that the Afrikaans press propounded Nationalism on a lawful basis without propagating revolution or disaffection. While the Commission does acknowledge that the Afrikaner had voting rights and that blacks are unable to attain their objectives through the ballot box:

this does not justify a journalism advocating revolution or an undermining of stability. Advocacy journalism which presses issues at the expense of society and which polarises already delicate attitudes even further has no justification (p. 1144)¹³

This sort of comment is the result of selective reading, not only of newspapers, but of critical commentaries. To vindicate the Afrikaans press on these grounds is to smooth over the role and position of this press, particularly during the 1930s and '40s when HF Verwoerd, as editor of *Die Transvaler*, for example,

wrote editorials supporting Hitler and Nazi Germany. Furthermore, the press of this period was not trammelled by the same plethora of anti-press laws and other legal restrictions as is the case now. What was considered lawful then, is now defined as subversive and revolutionary.

Having questioned the role of large shareholdings in newspaper companies, the Commission concludes that the "establishment of a free black press is not a matter for legislation and must be left at this stage to private enterprise" (Vol 4). But then the *Report* argues that this privately financed "authentic Black press [should not be] tied to the apron strings of an ideologically identified mother company" (pp. 1256-7). Diversity of opinion in the black readers' market is said to be non-existent since it is totally cornered by the English press, and special efforts are needed to ensure a greater range of opinion. This would help blacks "play a fundamental role in stimulating a better climate of understanding and 'bridge-building' and creating a positive public opinion" (pp. 1279-80). The need for this 'neutral' and 'authentic' press is repeated incessantly by the authors of the *Report* and needless to say, they managed to find at least one black-skinned ally, albeit a highly critical one, who has an interest in "orderly change" and who has a "vested interest in the stability of this country" (p. 713) -- businessman Sam Motsuenyane, who is gleefully held up as an example of the black 'moderate majority' (see also pp. 1088-9).

THE PERCEPTUAL CREDIBILITY GAP: HOW TO MAKE REALITY WORK

Opponents of the government are labelled "dissatisfied target audiences" (p. 913) whose perceptions are "incorrect" or "defective and not based on fact". If so, "then the misconceptions on which they are based should be removed with urgent speed". This "faulty image of reality" is "due to incorrect information being made available to the public" by the media either because of "malice or incapacity or an infelicitous blend of both" (p. 913). This leads to a credibility gap between what the media report and "reality", that objective state of enduring fact. That is to say, there is "a substantial credibility gap [which] exists between the reflected media reality and the respondent's own 'reality world'" (pp. 150, 1221). Radio and television are more positive towards government than are "community perceptions", while white readers "consistently perceive the press as having a more negative 'reality reflection' than they themselves have (p. 149). This perceptual credibility gap seems to have some relation to climate setting. Having laid most of the ills of South Africa at the press' door, we are now told that climate setting does not flow from a void. Apparently certain conditions must be present which lend themselves to exploitation. We are not told what these are, but we are told that "This is why it is vital that negative 'hard, tangible and exploitable images' in South Africa should be removed as far as possible". In a piece of prose which totally blurs the dividing line between 'reality' and 'images of reality' the Commission calls on "journalism ... (to) ... credit all efforts to improve or remove such images". Thus, the looking glass substitutes for reality and focus only occurs at that point where the "values and ideologies" of journalism correspond to "those of the community it professes to reflect" (p. 1278). That a reality or realities independent of the images (faulty or

or otherwise) exists, does not seem to have much credence with the Commission. That these 'facts' and situations might communicate themselves via other means is accepted by the Commission. But that message can be fixed to reflect reality through an adjustment of reality itself since the message vehicle, as we have been told, is neutral.

CONCLUSION TO PART I

The inherent contradictions contained within these tomes make for irritating reading, particularly as the Commissioners are at great pains to tell the reader 'who is right' and 'who is wrong', who is radical or reactionary, liberal, misguided, who is moderate and who is clear headed.

The Commission directs that its critics would 'do well to ponder' the strictures of those in the know. Critics of the *Report* cannot be accused of quoting out of context because it has no continuity or logically progressive development. This lack of apparent order actually disguises its deeper ideological purpose. The 1367 pages are clouded with repetition, eclecticism, illogicalities, unreferenced misquotes and paraphrases, and little excerpts from Dante's Lament (p. 320). It plays metaphorical games with Shakespeare (p. 319, 177, 301), Rudyard Kipling (p. 839) and TS Elliot (p. 994), all of which prove that the Commission has no idea of what they are saying. Recourse to poetry, or for that matter, Aristotle (p. 965), again is intended to create a spurious credibility.

Since the Commission is for the most part unable to understand most of the arguments put forward by critics of apartheid and incapable of refuting those arguments they can comprehend, the Commissioners have responded in the only way they are able -- that is to wilfully trivialise and belittle concepts, arguments, organizations and individuals with which it knows intuitively it cannot agree. It tries to mobilise the terminology of the left against itself but in the process trivializes its own position, robbing such terms of their content and etiology. The Commission then tries to use what is merely an empty shell to pound non-existent radical theoretical positions. Its armoury is further supported by a random and unstructured selection of polemics emanating from a wide cross-section of right wing and reactionary authors. Many of these are themselves unaware of the complexities of the positions against which they argue. Even where their propositions have a semblance of logical structure, they are almost invariably quoted out of context by the Commission. It would seem that the motto of the authors of the Steyn Commission has been "if you can't convince them, confuse them".

The *Report* also seems to have taken it upon itself to defend the Afrikaner against his nasty critics. Its repeated indignation at anti-Afrikaner sentiment suggests the fragility of its stance and its own correlation of Afrikaners with Nationalists (p. 743). By implication, therefore, anyone who criticises the government is labelled as a racist (also see pp. 655-6).

There is a fascinating drift of argument against the English press or "perceptual Goliath", as the Commission calls it (p. 838).

This press is indirectly accused of forming an "unholy alliance" aimed at a covert takeover, but not of overt subversion; of "orchestrating" but not of direct conspiracy, and of negative "climate-setting" while simultaneously profit-seeking. It is accused on the one hand of causing irreparable harm to inter-group relations (p. 1179) but congratulated for doing a good job in articulating black aspirations in the absence of a "truly independent black press".

In the last instance, it does not really matter whether or not the Commission is logical or illogical, clear or confused, accurate or inaccurate: it has achieved its purpose. It set the climate for further intervention in the newspaper industry in order to lubricate a "new deal" (pp. 161-2) where "the 'watchdog' watches itself" (p. 163) and is shielded against 'victimization' (p. 164). Either the press will 'volunteer' further regulatory codes (p. 160), submit to 'professionalisation' (or "internal control") (p. 160) and registration of journalists, or it will have forced the government to pass a "draconian 'media law', censorial legislation and state control" to ensure and protect press freedom (with "social responsibility"). The government is loath to contemplate such a law because legislation is not seen as a "cure-all" for all the ills of society and "would be contrary to the dynamic evolutionary developments in South Africa" (pp. 159, 1295). If change seekers ignore the 'facts', or an unbridgeable perceptual gulf" (p. 275) occurs "when dealing with the SAME FACTS", then they will be legislated, even if only a perception. If self-evident truths are criticised, then positive "hard, tangible and exploitable images" will be enforced through the rule of law and objectivity supplied by a central information department (pp. 165, 963). If a credibility gap exists between the media and its readers/viewers, it will be eliminated through enforced 'responsibility'. If counter ideologies continue to exist, they will only be due to the newspapers giving subjects a false reading of reality and this will be eliminated by breaking up the Anglo American control of SAAN and Argus and redistributing their shares, no doubt to the moderate majority.

Facts, true facts and truth are not synonymous. If we try to trace the connections, we get something like this:

facts=true facts = reality = order of things = authoritative story = true = truth ≠ Truth

Truth is a negative image concocted by committed journalists and muckrakers who aim "to discover truth, not merely facts". Thus reality is 'truth', but truth is not reality.

The next section, Part II, deals with legislation which was passed in the wake of the Commission's *Report*, and will trace the links between Steyn's ideological position and how the "hard tangible and exploitable images" are to be enforced. While the state did not have to enact a "draconian 'media law'" to equip it with every weapon it could want, it did pass three other laws which have direct implications for the news gathering and reporting processes. Furthermore, they will create a 'professional' environment so intimidating, that it is unlikely that the press or

journalists will be in a position to offer alternative explanations for the "SAME FACTS".

PART II: HOW THE "SAME FACTS" WILL BE LEGISLATED

One of the reasons for the late publication of this issue was the extraordinary difficulty we faced in trying to decode and assess the significance of three Acts of Parliament which were passed in the wake of the Steyn Report: the Internal Security Act (74 of 1982), the Protection of Information Act (84 of 1982) and the Registration of Newspapers Amendment Act (98 of 1982).

Conventional wisdom assumes that the Steyn Commission has been discredited as it 'went over the top' even by government standards. While we do acknowledge that the application of the Steyn proposals, and particularly its legislation, would be near impossible, this does not nullify its effect. Not only did the Prime Minister describe it as providing "irrefutable proof" of the onslaught against South Africa, but a close analysis of the first two Acts will show up certain conceptual connections with the rhetoric expounded by the Steyn Commission.

The analysis which follows is a tentative one, for the legislation examined proved extremely tortuous and difficult to assess without it having been tested in the courts. While the Act seems to have introduced some minimal reforms, these are cancelled by the obscurity and breadth of the language in which many of the sections are couched. In some instances, the offences are described in such vague terms that even apparently innocuous actions could conceivably be brought within the scope of the Act.

We will consider only selected facets of this legislation as it affects the theme of this paper. The first relates to the ideological component of the factors governing the Minister's discretion to ban organizations, individuals and publications.

INTERNAL SECURITY ACT¹⁴

The Minister may take action against an organization when he is satisfied that it is serving *inter alia* to further the ends of communism, or against publications where, in his opinion, they serve *inter alia* as a means for expressing views or conveying information the publication of which is calculated to further the achievements of any of the objectives of communism.

In addition, any individual who has "advocated, advised, defended, or encouraged ... any of the objects of communism" may be silenced by entering his name on a "consolidated list", or serving him with a restriction order which renders publication of his utterances by any other person an offence.

Significantly, this Act redefines the description of 'communism' contained in the old Act, viz., the doctrine of Marxian socialism as espoused by Lenin and Trotsky, the Third Communist Comintern or the Communist Information Bureau. The new Act includes any "doctrine, ideology or scheme -

a) which is based on, has developed from or is related to the tenets of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, or Mao Tse-tung, or any other recognised theorist in connection

with or exponent of these tenets, and which aims at the establishment of any form of socialism or collective ownership;

- b) which aims at the establishment, by means of a class or group polarisation of the community and the subsequent assumption of power by a particular class or group, of a despotic form of government under which one political party, group or organization is recognised and all others are eliminated or prohibited; or
- c) which aims at bringing about any political, economic, industrial or social change within the Republic in accordance with the directions of or in co-operation with any foreign government or any foreign or international organization whose purpose or one or more of whose purposes (whether professed or not) it is to bring about the establishment within the Republic of any economic or social system as contemplated in paragraph (a) or government as contemplated in paragraph (b).

Part (a) widens the old definition of communism by extending the list of forbidden authorities and by adding the vague phrase "any other recognised theorist". The Act is silent on what, in fact, constitutes "recognition". These clauses have extensive implications as to how one begins to establish who is a "recognised theorist", in what terms and by whom. Whereas the previous Act specified who these theorists, the new one does not. Hence our extensive analysis of the Steyn Commission, which, we believe may well form the background to who and what organizations might be considered 'communist'. By conveniently dividing the world up into good versus bad, capitalist versus communist, black versus white, Christianity versus Marxism etc., the extension of these associations and dualities into the country's legislation is obvious.¹⁵ That is why the Steyn Commission remains so important.

The aim of the propagator of these clauses has also been broadened and rendered more ambiguous. Whereas in the old Act the aim of the propagator had to be directed *inter alia* to the "establishment of a despotic system of government based on the dictatorship of the proletariat", the new Acts forbids the aim of establishing "any form of socialism or collective ownership" -- objectives which could clearly be included in the programmes of bodies who need not accept the political structures of the Soviet Communist system.

Since there is no conjunction between the first two sections of the definition, it appears that the "doctrine ideology or scheme" constituted to achieve the end mentioned in (b) need not be connected with the writings of authors mentioned in section (a). In other words, a right-wing group would be included in the definition of communism.

The distinguishing characteristic of section (c) of the definition is the sweeping terms in which the types of change are enunciated. The addition of the parenthetic phrase "whether professed or not" adds to the subjectivity of the question of whether a particular foreign government or organization in fact has such terms.

Section 5(1) grants the Minister the power to prohibit either permanently or for a specified period not only those publications

which profess to propagate the principles of communism, but also those which *serve inter alia as a means for* expressing views or conveying information the publication of which is calculated to endanger state security, the maintenance of law and order, the furtherance of the achievement of any of the objects of communism or any unlawful organization, or which are calculated to cause, encourage or foment feelings of hostility between different population groups of parts of population groups in the Republic.

From this analysis it becomes clear that from now on, communism could be seen in a much wider framework which could penetrate into the entire publishing industry itself: book publishers, academic and scientific journals, as well as other areas such as lecturing: in fact, the accepted practice of large sections of English language universities.

The Minister is also given the power to control which publications may enter the market. Section 15(1) empowers him to demand of any applicant for registration of a newspaper -- registration being necessary for any publication falling within the definition of 'newspaper' and appearing at intervals of less than once a month -- a deposit of up to R40 000 whenever he is not satisfied that a prohibition in terms of Section 5 "will not at any time be necessary". The section provides also that if a prohibition is in fact imposed, as much of the amount deposited as the Minister decides shall be forfeited to the state. This section, which appears to exclude the possibility of court review, has immense implications for less affluent groups who may wish to start a newspaper. This has serious implications for many community and other alternative publications.

Section 50(1) of the Act may also be used to prevent reporters from gathering news during situations of civil unrest or disturbance on the widely held theory that the presence of journalists and television tends on occasion to encourage violent protest.

PROTECTION OF INFORMATION ACT

The Act deems certain categories of information "protected". These include "prohibited places" whereby it is an offence punishable by a maximum of 20 years imprisonment to approach, inspect, pass over, be in the neighbourhood of or enter any prohibited place for any purpose prejudicial to the security or interests of the Republic. This has clear implications for the news gathering process.

A second category relates to the activities of various branches of state administration. Section 4 outlaws the retention of information entrusted in confidence to the possessor by a government servant or contractor. This provision could cover disclosure of the most trivial of information, and any kind of "leaked" information.

Section 3(b)iii) includes any matter which the communicator "knows or reasonably should know may directly or indirectly be of use to any foreign State or hostile organization" and which should not be disclosed "for considerations of the security or other interests of the Republic". The intent required for liability will apparently consist not of a constructive desire to benefit the

recipient of the prohibited information to the detriment of the state, but merely in knowledge that the action will lead to disclosure. It is to be noted that such disclosure need not be to an official of the recipient state, but to any *inhabitant* thereof. Thus, any journalist writing for a journal that circulates beyond the borders of the Republic must be deemed to have the requisite purpose.

The Act does not provide assistance to the journalist on how to judge in advance whether information would be likely to be of direct use to a foreign state. The addition of the phrase "indirect use" casts the journalist into utter uncertainty.

REGISTRATION OF NEWSPAPERS AMENDMENT ACT

This amendment offers newspapers a choice of falling under the Publications Act of 1974 and thereby being under the direct control of the Directorate of Publications, or subjecting themselves to the code of conduct and disciplinary powers of the as yet unknown and unconstituted Media Council. Although the Act stipulates that the Council shall be an independent and voluntary body, none the less it will acquire its power from statutory recognition. For further information on the possible structure of this body, see Irwin Manoim's "Preface" to this issue.

CONCLUSION

An analysis of these three Acts, all passed in 1982, suggests that this year represents the watershed for the newspaper industry. The government now has just about every possible law with which to curtail the press in a manner never before experienced in this country. Whether it will use these powers to any extent remains to be seen and will probably depend on the extent and seriousness of hegemonic weaknesses as they may occur in the future.

The Steyn Commission might have 'gone over the top', but the climate it set to enable the above legislation to be passed was its most important function. The proposals set out by the Steyn Commission have been achieved: the facts will be enforced and the same reality will be legislated. In many ways, these Acts have gone a lot further than the Commission for the sanctions now faced by newspapers and journalists are nothing short of draconian. Steyn was right, a media law was not necessary, but three other Acts were. And the key to it all is contained in the Steyn *Report* itself:

A professional and sophisticated communications system is vital for South Africa, and if it is to be turned to its fullest account then all concerned - Government, Opposition, press, broadcasting media and private enterprise will have to cooperate in conveying a true and authoritative 'story' to the world. This story, which creates perceptions on South Africa, primarily has to be pre-emptive and anticipatory; not reactive and defensive. This does not mean that all have to speak with one voice. *The art of diplomacy is to say the same thing in different ways for the benefit of different audiences, but with honest and sincere intentions* (emphasis added).

Notes and References

1. Republic of South Africa. *Report of the Steyn Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media*. RP 89/1981
2. *Rand Daily Mail*, 12 March 1981
3. Only on p. 721, is the phrase "no-win" attributed to its utterer, F van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the PFP Opposition.
4. Republic of South Africa. *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Reporting of Security Matters regarding the South African Defence Force and the South African Police Force*. RP 52/1980
5. Here the Commission is referring to Crozier, B. 1978: *Strategy of Survival*. Arlington House. Elsewhere the Commission variously describes South Africa as a "target state" (p. 67), a "target society" (pp. 69, 402, 461, 497), and just a plain "target" (p. 71).
6. This is the reported opinion of "Sir Walter", referenced as "Walker, Gen. Sir Walter, KCB, CBE, DSO: *The Fear at the Back Door*. Valiant Publishers, Sandton, 1978. *The Next Domino? Valiant House Publishers, Sandton, 1980.*" The Commission does not bother to inform readers that Valiant Publishers was one of the front companies spawned by the notorious Information Department which was exposed by the English press and was later to lead to the downfall of not only a senior Cabinet Minister, the Chief of the Bureau of State Security, but the President (ex-Prime Minister), John Vorster as well
7. This is the argument put forward by a number of scholars. See, eg., Tomaselli, R.E. and Tomaselli, K.G. (Eds.): 1983 *Culture, Ideology and the South African Mass Media*. Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg (forthcoming). Also see Doherty, C. 1981: "The Wits-Koornhof Debate: Is there really a difference between the English and Afrikaans Presses?" *Critical Arts*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 39-50
8. The term "pariah" is used in passing by Adam, H. and Giliomee, H. 1979: *The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power*. David Phillip, Cape Town. Not only has the Commission vitiated its original application but they have fetishized it as well. Davis, D.M. 1982: *Distrust in Democracy*, Lawyers for Human Rights, Cape Town/Stellenbosch, points out that the summary of the Report p. 126ff closely resembles passages from Adam and Giliomee's book. The ideas of the latter authors remain unreferenced. See Davis, p. 30).
9. Within a short time of the release of the Report, many of Steyn's sayings have been repeated and printed in humorous contexts.
10. See note 8, above
11. Marais, H.C. and Engelbrecht, H.J. 1980: *Aspekte van Massakommunikasie*. PJ de Villiers, Bloemfontein, p. 96. They in

turn refer to Murdock, G. and Golding, P. 1977: "Capitalism, Communication and Class Relations" in Curran, J. et al (eds.): *Mass Communication and Society*. Edward Arnold, London, p. 12. This reference is given on p. 1007 of the *Report* and is so full of typographical errors, that it is clear that the Commission did not consult the original.

12. See Broughton, M. 1961: *Press & Politics of South Africa*. Purnell & Sons, Cape Town; Potter, E. 1975: *The Press as Opposition: The Political Role of South African Newspapers*. Rowman and Littlefield, New Jersey.
13. The Commission states that "A very good example of 'Pack Journalism' is a very recently published book written with the obviously prime purpose of denigrating the whole idea of territorial separation on the basis of Peoples in South Africa and of demeaning the whole Southern African 'Inner Core' by dismissing it as politically fraudulent" (p. 731-2). The *Report* is referring here to Streek, B. and Wicksteed, R. 1979: *Render Unto Kaiser: A Transkei Dossier*. Ravan, Johannesburg. Predictably, this book does not appear in the *Report's* bibliography because it was not read. The information was derived from a review published in *The Sowetan*, 19 August 1981.
14. We are heavily indebted to John Grogan for his advice on this section. We reemphasise the tentativeness of our conclusions, since these acts remain as yet untested by court precedent.
15. The implicitness of these dualities is not new to the 1982 Act. This connotative link is implicit to the old act as well.

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