RACE BELIEF AND INTERPERSONAL ATTRACTION Thesis for the Degree of M. A. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY IAVDN JACKSON 1971 (I LIB R A f: Y MiChigan State niversity \ h E: BIN‘DING By “5" IIIIAB & WW :1 RIIIIK BRIBERY INC. i 1: SINGERS t . -.,.! meme“. I LIL ABSTRACT RACE, BELIEF AND INTERPERSONAL ATTRACTION BY JAVON JACKSON In an experiment purporting to study student opinion on social issues, a Black or White accomplice presented either a prepared "Radical" or AConservative" viewpoint to the causes and solutions of big city racial problems in the United States to White male gs who were all from introductory psychology clases. The 80 gs were all randomly assigned to one of four experiment conditions: Black Radical, Black Conservative, White Radical, and White Conservative. The scripts of the accomplices sounded spontaneous and were rehearsed by all the accomplices so that their vocal inflections and body movements were similar. After the discussion, the gs in each of the four conditions rated themselves and the actors on an Interpersonal Check List. In order to find out how favorably or unfavorably the gs rated each actor, Javon Jackson comparison ratings of the actors to other variables were examined. Seven comparative ratings were rated for mean discrepancy scores. They were: 1. 2. 'The (S) self' compared to 'The ideal-self' 'The (§)' compared to 'How the g viewed the actor' 'The ideal-self' compared to 'How the_§ viewed the actor' 'How the g viewed the actor' compared to 'How the §_viewed the average college student' 'How the § rated how the actor viewed himself' compared to 'How the S rated how the actor viewed the s' 'The S‘s perception of himself' compared to 'How the S thinks that the actor viewed the g' The pooled results of the summation discrepancy SCOIGS If the gs were, indeed, prejudiced, they should have preferred the Conservative Speech to the Radical Speech, and the White Race to the Black Race, and there should be a Speech X Race interaction in which the gs most preferred Javon Jackson the White Conservative, followed by the White Radical followed by the Black Conservative and, lastly, the Black Radical as being most different. Analyses of variance for the comparative ratings were computed. Only on one comparative rating-—when the 'Ss compared how they felt the actors viewed themselves compared to the gs rating how they felt the actors viewed the Ss--were the results due to the Race of the accomplice statistically significant. Contrary to expectations, no results of the Speech variable reached statistical significance. Thus, Radical or Conservative Speech had no effect on the gs View of the actors. Only on one comparative rating——when the SS compared the actors to their ideal—self--were the results due to the interaction of Race X Speech of the accomplice statistically significant. The gs identified most with the Black Conservatives followed closely by White Radicals and least with White Conservatives and Black Radicals as ideal people. The hypothesis that the Black Radical would be seen as most significantly different from the Ss' perception of themselves followed by the Black Conservative, White Radical, and White Conservative was not supported. Javon Jackson The pooled results of the §s showed that the White Radical not the White Conservative was most preferred followed by the White Conservative, Black Conservative, and, lastly, the Black Radical. H0wever, these differences between rankings did not reach statistical significance. One possible interpretation is that the gs rated the White Radicals in terms of the way the gs would like to become. DEDICATTON This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Equal Opportunity Programs, and to better racial understanding. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First, I would like to thank Dr. Stollak, my committee chairman, for his guidance and great perseverance in helping me with my thesis. I would, also, like to thank Dr. MeSse who aided me. greatly in the analyses of the data. And, I would like to thank Dr. Thorton for his scrutiny and perusal of this thesis which were of invaluable service to me. Lastly, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Phillips, and Dr. Allen for their kindness and understanding which made it possible for me to accomplish this goal. in TABLE or CONTENTS Page ztkaoWLEDerENTS . . . . . .‘ . . . . . . . . . :AAA TEST or TABLES . . . I. . . . . . . . . g . . . v IJST OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . -. . . . . 1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Statement of problem . . . . . . . . 58 2 ° IqETI‘IOD o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 62 Subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Accomplices . . . . . . . . . . . ' 63 Setting . . . . . . . . - . . . . ' 63 Des jugll 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O 63 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . '. . 65 I 4. ADISCUSSION . . . .‘ . - . - - -. L . - 77 5 o S Ub'lbm lax, o o o o o o o o o '0 o o o 84 BIBLIOGRAPY . . . . . . .A . ‘. . . . . . . . . 37 APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . 97 iv LIST OI.“ 'I‘x'aiiLllS Table - Page 1. E:-:pcri.r:=.-;m‘al Design . . . . . . . . . 64 2. List of Comparative Ratings.- . , , , Appendix A. B0 C. Scripts Instructions Table 10 LIST OF APPENDICB Analyses of Variance vi Page 97 110 112 RACE, BELIEF AND INTERPERSONAL ATTRACTION BY I: r. ‘.,3 -, VI ‘ \ JAVON‘JACKSON A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Psychology 1971 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION This study was conducted in order to evaluate the effects of Race and Belief on interpersonal attraction. In the Race Congruency Theory, gs are attracted to people of the same Race. In the Belief Congruency Theory, SS are attracted to people with similar Beliefs. In this study, a Black and a White actor gave both a Conservative Speech and a Radical Speech so that four conditions were tested--the White Conservative, White Radical, Black Conservative, and Black Radical. A Race X Belief interaction was predicted. History Social Distance Social Distance Scales Racial or ethnic membership has been emphasized as the major determinant of interpersonal rejection and social distance in previous theories of racial discrimination (Adorno, Frenkel—Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford, 1950). For instance, Bogardus (1928) pioneered work with an ordinal scale of social distance, in which a subject indicated zero social distance by stating that he was willing to marry a member of a particular ethnic group, and maximum social distance by stating that he would exclude such a person from the country, social distances scales have been used in a large number of studies. After Bogardus' (l928)use of the social distance scale with ethnic groups it was used by a number of researchers with other groups. For instance, Wilkinson (1929) used it with occupations, and religions. Sartain and Bell (1949) published equal appearing interval scale values. Melikaian and Prothro (1952) obtained the social distance of Leganese students towards national and religious groups and found greater social distance towards certain national groups than tOwards certain religious groups. The reverse result had been obtained by Prothro in 1935. Prothro and Miles (1953) used the Sartain and Bell (1949) scale in the deep South. Ansari (1956) used the scale in India and found a relationship between social distance and stereotypes similar to that obtained by Katz and Braly (1933) in the United States. Hunt (1956) used the scale in the Philippines and found that his §s showed little social distance towards Americans, Christians, and whites, but very much social distance towards Jewish, Moslem and Buddhist groups. Kirsh (1957) used the scale in connection with voting behavior. Best and Sohner (1956) used it with political, economic, racial, religious, and nationality groups. They found very large social distances towards fascists, anarchists, and communists, large distances towards racial groups, small distances towards religious groups, and very small distances towards national groups. Hill (1953) has criticized the concept of social distance and presented arguments in favor of the usage of interviews and projective techniques for the determination of prejudice, rather than objective indices of social dis- tance, such as the Bogardus scale. Triandis and Triandis (1960) found that in a study of social distance of college students with respect to f'“\ r \*/ /‘\ various social objects, a factorial design with two levels of value of race, social class, religion, and nationality was employed and analyses of variance were computed on social distance scores. For white gs race and social class were found to be more important determinants of social distance than religion or nationality. The relative importance of the various factors, however, varied from group to group. Race according to Triandis and Triandis (1960) was the most important determinant of social distance for white lgs. Most of the prejudice towards Negroes was racial and not social class prejudice. Negro gs do not experience social distance towards whites, or persons with lower class occupations, or persons of different religion, but if the person in question has a combination of these "undesirable" characteristics, e.g., he is a “white, Jewish, Portuguese, unskilled worker," then Negro gs feel some social distance as manifested in a refusal to accept such a person as a close kin by marriage, or as an intimate friend. Triandis and Triandis (1960) also found that race was by far the most important factor determining social distance. Furthermore, social class was a much more significant determinant of social distance than was religion or nationality. White gs were found to show more social distance than Negro gs: high F score gs more than low F score gs, women more than men, Catholics more than Protestants because it seems that certain features of the socialization practices of Catholic parents, partic- ularly the clarity of their approach towards the Divine Law, predispose their children to intolerance of ambiguity, which in turn is correlated with prejudice, and both faiths more than Jews, lower-class §s more than lower middle— class gs (because it seems that certain lower-class child rearing practices are likely to produce insecurity and insecure persons are more likely to be prejudiced than secure persons) and these more than upper middle-class gs, and §s from Northern and Northeastern Europe more than gs with ethnic backgrounds from Sbuthern and Eastern Europe. The data are interpreted in terms of a theory of prejudice that employed conformity, cognitive dissonance, and insecurity as its main constructs. Social Distance §§_a Function g£.Attitudina1 Dissimilarity Contrary to this Race Congruency Theory position, however, Rokeach (1960a) postulated that social distance is a function of attitudinal dissimilarity. According to his hypothesis, interpersonal attraction and choice occur across racial lines when persons share similar beliefs, attitudes, and opinions: on the other hand, rejection occurs when there are differences in opinions, attitudes, and beliefs. For Rokeach (1960a), belief congruence, insofar as psychological processes are involved, is more important than ethnic or racial membership in determining social discrimination. Other researchers testing determinants of interpersonal attitudes found a number of lawful relationships between the characteristics of a person and the behavioral in- tentions and evaluations of this person by subjects. These judgments are largely determined by cultural factors (Triandis, 1964a: Triandis, Davis, & Takezawa, 1965: Triandis & Triandis, 1960, 1962). A multidimensional instrument which measures the behavioral component of attitudes, called the behavioral differential (Triandis, 1964b) may be used to measure the behavioral intentions toward the stimuli, while the semantic differential (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) may be used to measure the evaluation, potency, and preceived activity of the stimulus persons. With American subjects, race was found to be a powerful determinant of variance in social distance judgments: with Greek subjects religion was very important: with German and Japanese subjects occupation was the important determinant of variance. Triandis, Fishbein, and Hall (1964) found high correlations between the admiration (social acceptance) factor of the behavioral differential and the evaluative factor of the semantic differential in person perception. In the Triandis, Loh & Levin (1966) study, 94_§s were shown slides of either a Negro or a white young man, who was either well dressed or poorly dressed and simultane- ously heard a tape-recorded statement which was either in favor or opposed to integrated housing and which was spoken either in excellent or in ungrammatical English. The stimuli formed a 2x2x2x2 factorial design. The evaluation of the stimulus person was measured by the evaluative factor of the semantic differential: the behavioral in- tentions of SS toward the stimulus persons were measured by 3 factors of the behavioral differential. It was shown that liberal §s differed from nonliberal §s in the relative weights they employed for the character- istics race, dress, English, and opinion. Race was a more important factor in the determination of the social distance of prejudiced than in the determination of the social distance judgment of unprejudiced subjects. Furthermore, English and belief were the determinants of the evaluation judgments, as well as the social acceptance judgments on the behavioral differential. In the case of admiration, English was the primary determinant for all subjects, but the weight given to it differed be- tween the subgroups. Prejudiced subjects gave some weight to race and belief. English, race, and dress, in that order, were important in the determination of the judgments on the friendship factor. 'The tolerant subjects gave no weight to race and the prejudiced ones gave a substantial weight to that characteristic as a determinant of their judgments. These findings confirm previous research which demonstrated that different aspects of the behavioral intentions of subjects toward stimulus persons are determined by different combinations of the characteristics of these stimulus persons. To understand prejudice in its full complexity, it is necessary to think of a matrix, the rows of which are defined by various "undesirable“ characteristics. In addition to those determinant examined in this study, subjects responded to stimulus persons who differed from them in religion, age, sex, nationality, competence in doing a job, degree of sociability, etc. Rickard, Triandis, & Patterson, (1963): Triandis, (1963) all investigated the social distance factors of 'undesirable characteristics in a stimulus person. In summation, the studies showed that when all of the information collected in these studies is placed together, it becomes clear that the classes of behavioral intentions mentioned above are distinct, and influenced by different combinations of "undesirable" characteristics. “Admire the ideas of“ is most sensitive to characteristics indicative of status-—for example, kind of English spoken, occupation-—and also to the opinions of the stimulus persons: marital acceptance is sensitive to English, but also to race and age: friendship acceptance is sensitive to age, sex, religion, English, race, dress, and skin color: subordination is likely when the stimulus person is of a high status occupation: exclusion from the neighborhood is primarily sensitive to race and English, and slightly to religion: acceptance as an employee is 10 primarily sensitive to competence and disability, and secondarily to race and sociability. gggjudiced Attitudes that Q9 Not Lead E9 Prejudiced Behavior According to Berg (1966), attitudes may not necessarily lead to predicted behavior. In his study, a social context was arranged in which verbal measures were expected to predict behavior. A white g was placed in a conflict between agreeing with a Negro confederate or a white con- federate on autokinetic judgments. The results indicated that the E Scale Negro items, F Scale items, and the Social Distance Negro item did not relate to social agreement with the Negro in either of 2 conditions of importance. The Jewish gs were significantly less prejudiced than the Protestant-Catholic gs on the E Scale Negro items. Jewish gs disagreed more than Protestant-CathOlic §s with the Negro confederate on autokinetic judgments. Therefore, it seems that the common verbal measures of attitudes toward Negro people maynot be good predictors of particular social behavior toward a given Negro person. This may be espe- cially true when the Negro person is not perceived as being a representative member of his ethnic group. For example, 11 in Berg's (1966) study, a Negro who has the status of a student at a major university may not be perceived as similar to the category of people who are the object of prejudice. In such social circumstances, increasing the instrumental value of social rejection may not lead to the expression of prejudice. A further speculation is that the predicted social behavior has to be relevant to the content and structure of the attitudes. For example, agreement on autokinetic judgments may not represent social behavior that is generally related to the cognitive and affective aspects of attitudes toward Negroes. Social and political opinions that are more central to personality structure could be expected to be more relevant when the prejudiced person is confronted with the issue of agreeing or disagreeing with a Negro person. Similarly, it may be that the verbal scales did not measure an aspect of attitudes toward Negroes that is central to personality structure. Evidence Supporting Rokeach's Position Other studies that support Rokeach's (1960) position on attitude similarity—dissimilarity are Byrne (1969) and 12 Byrne, Nelson, & Reeves (1966) who found that the effect of attitudinal material on attraction has been interpreted in terms of effectance motivation. In these studies, effectance is defined as a motive to cope effectively with the environment by means of accurate perception, logical thought processes, consistency, correct interpretation of reality, etc. The similar attitudes of others serve to satisfy this motive by providing consensual validation, while the dissimilar attitudes of others frustrate this motive via consensual invalidation. It has been found that the steepness of the attitude-attraction function increases as the subject's motivational level increases. When effectance arousal is extremely high, however, there is a reverse effect, and the slope is actually less steep and the Y intercept higher than in a neutral situation. This latter effect has been interpreted in terms of the disorienting and differentiating qualities of high effectance arousal, a condition also characteristic of schizophrenia. In the Byrne, Griffitt, Hudgins, & Reeves (1969) study, this was investigated further. The results showed that since schizophrenics were functioning at a high level of effectance arousal, they should have made less differ- entiation between similar and dissimilar strangers than do /\ l3 nonschizophrenics, but this finding was only partially supported. That is, schizophrenic patients yielded a linear attitude-attraction function which differed significantly from that found with college undergraduates. The divergence between these subjects and students is meaningful, of course, only because the surgical patients, alcoholic patients, and job corpsmen did not differ from college students. The results also showed that the clearest finding is that the linear relationship between proportion of similar attitudes and attraction is a phenomenon generalizable beyond the college student. The tendency to make a positive response to a stranger who expresses attitudes similar to one's own and a negative response to one Who expresses dissimilar attitudes is obviously relatively general in the American population. This supports previous studies which have shown that the empirical law describing attraction toward a stranger as a positive linear function of the proportion of the stranger's attitudes which are similar to those of the subject is well established in samples of undergraduate students (Byrne and Clore, 1966: and Byrne and Nelson, 14 1965). This same empirical relationship has been found among elementary and secondary school children (Byrne and Griffitt, 1966). There is also evidence that female clerical employees of the Bell Telephone Laboratories respond differentially to two points along the similarity continuum (Krauss, 1966). Therefore, in samples unlike college undergraduates in age, education, socioeconomic level, intelligence, and adjustment, not only does a linear function hold between the two variables, but the specific responses of the subjects are predictable on the basis of a formula derived on college students. In summary, most studies of the past used social distance scales to measure prejudicial attitudes of Whites toward Blacks such that the greater the prejudiced at— titudes of the Whites, the greater the distance these Whites rated Blacks on social distance scales. But, Rokeach (1960) believed that social distance was a function of dissimilarity of attitudes. He argued that belief was more important than race in rating people on social distance scales while Triandis argued that race was more important than belief in rating people on social distance scales. 15 V'But, some studies of social distance have shown that prejudiced attitudes do not lead to prejudiced behavior if the content and structure of the attitudes for rating are irrelevant to the gs. In the present study, we also examined social distance. We felt that prejudiced gs would show more social distance toward Blacks than toward Whites even though both Blacks and Whites may express the same attitudes to the SS. Effects 9f Interpersonal Attraction The accurate prediction of interpersonal attraction and repulsion in dyadic relationships will undoubtedly require that knowledge about several classes of independent variables is obtained. It has been suggested (Byrne, 1961a) that the degree of attraction between two individuals is determined by four classes of variables: the structural properties of the environment which act to vary propinquity, the strength of the characteristic affiliation motive of each individual, generalization from previous learning with respect to the overt stimulus properties of one another, and the number of reciprocal rewards and punishments which occur during their interactions. 16 Studies on the effect of interpersonal attraction (1) on attitude similarity, (2) on propinquity, (3) on socioeconomic similarity, (4) on threat reduction, (5) race attraction, (6) on racial prejudice and assumed dissimilarity of attitudes, are outlined below. Attitude Similarity A number of studies have found greater similarity among friends than among nonfriends with respect to a variety of issues (Bonney, 1946: Loomis, 1946: Newcomb, 1956: Precker, 1952: Richardson, 1940: Winslow, 1937). A few studies of a more experimental nature also support the notion of a relationship between attitude similarity and interpersonal attraction (Jones and Daugherty, 1959: Smith, 1957). In the Byrne (1961a) study one group of Se received attitude scales filled out exactly the same as theirs had been, one received scales with exactly Opposite views expressed, one received scales with similar opinions on the most important issues and dissimilar on the least important, and the fourth received scales with similar opinions on the least important issues and dissimilar l7 opinions on the most important. He found that (a) a stranger who is known to have attitudes similar to those of the subject is better liked than a stranger with attitudes dissimilar to those of the subject, (b) a stranger who is known to have attitudes similar to those of the subject is judged to be more intelligent, better informed, more moral, and better adjusted than a stranger with attitudes dissimilar to those of the subject, (c) but a stranger who is known to have similar attitudes on issues important to the subject and dissimilar attitudes on unimportant issues is not better liked and is not evaluated more positively on the other four variables which are the other student's intelligence, knowledge of current events, morality, and adjustment than a stranger for whom the reverse is true. In fact, the Similar on Important Attitudes Group (SIA) rated the “stranger" significantly more positively than did the Similar on Unimportant Attitudes Group (SUA) with respect to their personal feelings about him, his morality, and his adjustment. On the other three variables, which were desirability as a work partner, intelligence, and knowledge of current events, the two /"\ /~"\. \J 18 groups did not differ as predicted. The results suggest that the Personal Feelings scale is the most sensitive measure of interpersonal attraction. With the other five interpersonal judgment scales, additional factors apparently contribute to the variance. In summary, gs judged people who shared the Ss' similar attitudes as being more attractive and more intelligent than people who did not share the Ss' similar attitudes. In our study, we predicted that §s would like the actors delivering the Conservative Speech better than the actors delivering the Radical Speech. Propinquity Many studies in a diverse array of situations have suggested that propinquity is of overwhelming importance in determining who will interact with whom. Distance and spatial arrangements have been found to influence friend- ship choices in university housing projects for married veterans (Caplow and Forman, 1950: Festinger, Schachter, and Back, 1950), in the planned communities of American suburbia (Whyte, 1956), among college undergraduates 19 (Lundberg and Beaxley, 1948: Lundberg, Hertzler, and Dickson, 1949), in a college dormitory (Evans and Wilson, 1949: Newcomb, 1956), and within a college classroom (Maisonneure, Palmade, and Fourment, 1952: Byrne and Buehler, 1955). Byrne (1961c) found that students became acquainted with a greater proportion of 'seat neighbors' (those who occupy neighboring seats in the same row) than of 'non- neighbors' (all remaining students), if the contacts lasted 7 or 14 weeks, but not in 3.5 weeks of contact: (b) Students did not become acquainted with a greater proportion of 'cross—row neighbors' (those occupying neighboring seats in adjacent rows) than of non—neighbors: It is clear that the two types of neighboring seatshave very different effects on their occupants: their physical distance is quite different. It could be that the ease with which a student can converse with his seat neighbor lessens the probability that he will go through the motions necessary to converse with cross—row neighbors and non—neighbors: (c) The intensity of the seat-neighbor relationships ex- ceeded that of the non-neighbor relationships in the 14-week condition, there was no difference in the 7-week condition, and the reverse was true in the 3.5-week \J /\ 1“\ 20 condition: (d) The number of relationships per student did not increase as the number of seat neighbors was increased. In summary, §s tended to interact with people near them although people at equidistances may have served different functions in the relationship. Time seemed to strengthen these interactions. In our study, we predicted that the gs would rate feeling closer to the White actors than the Black actors because the SS would feel more relaxed and more familiar around White people. Status Similarity There are sociometric data which suggest that friendship choices within a group tend to be between members of the same general socio—economic status (Bonney, 1949: Dahlke, 1953: Longmore, 1948: Lundberg and Beazley, 1948: Lundberg and Steel, 1938). One possible explanation for such findings comes from Festinger's (1950, 1954) theory of social comparison process which is not incom— patible with reinforcement theory. He suggests that individuals are attracted to others who are similar to themselves with respect to both opinions and abilities. /\\ 21 Thus, groups are formed on the basis of such similarities, and communication and comparison with those who are divergent may be avoided. Festinger (1954) goes on to say: "The segmentation into groups which are relatively alike with respect to abilities also gives rise to status in a society. And it seems clear that when such status dis- tinctions are firmly maintained, it is not only members of the higher status who maintain them. It is also important to the members of the lower status to maintain them for it is in this way that they can relatively ignore the differences and compare themselves with their own group. Comparisons with members of a different status group, either higher or lower, may sometimes be made on a phantasy level, but very rarely in reality.“ A number of investigations lend support to Festinger's position. For example, Zander and Havelin (1960) found that subjects in a group situation were most attracted to others whose competence with respect to an experimental task was closest to their own. In addition, many of the affiliation studies indicate that subjects choose to be with others similar to themselves in emotional state (Zimbardo and Formica, 1963). 22 Both the sociometric findings and the social comparison theory suggest the possibility that the effect of attitude similarity-dissimilarity on attraction may be a much more general phenomenon in that various other types of similarity-dissimilarity also affect attraction. Economic Similarity The theory of social comparison processes suggests that individuals are attracted to each other on the basis of similarity in opinions, abilities, and emotional state. Generalizing further in the present investigation, attraction was hypothesized by Byrne, Clore, & Worchel (1966) to be a function of similarity—dissimilarity in economic status. In their study, a total of 84 gs was divided into high and low economic status on the basis of their responses to items dealing with spending money. Three experimental conditions were devised in which gs evaluated a stranger on the basis Of his or her responses to the economic items and some attitudinal items. In 1 condition, low-status gs responded to a high-status stranger, in a 2nd condition, high status gs responded to a lowestatus stranger, and in a 3rd condition, high- 23 and lowestatusigs responded to strangers similar to themselves. As hypothesized, attraction was signifif cantly affected by similarity—dissimilarity of economic status. It was found that the specific responses of §s could be predicted on the basis of a law of attraction formula derived in earlier work on attitude similarity- dissimilarity. Such that when Individual A receives positive reinforcement from Individual B, A's attraction toward B increases. Individual B constitutes a conditioned stimulus for the positive affect evoked by the rein- forcement. In the same general way, negative reinforcement from Individual B results in negative affect and hence dislike for B. As in above mentioned studies, attitude similarity and attitude dissimilarity are assumed to constitute consensual validation and invalidation: such information acts as positive and negative reinforcement with respect to the need to be logical and accurate in interpreting the stimulus world (Golightly and Byrne, 1964). The rationale for attributing positive and negative rein- forcement properties to information concerning economic /'\ 24 similarity—dissimilarity suggests a broader generalization. It seems quite possible that in any type of social com- parison with other human beings (e.g., Opinions, attitudes, beliefs, values, abilities, traits, taste, income, overt behavior, etc.) similarity is preferable to dissimilarity. Consensual validation as evidence of one's accuracy and reasonableness in dealing with one's environment may extend to all behavior. In summary, the gs rated people on their same socio—economic status as being most attractive. In our study, we predicted that the gs would rate the White Conservative as most similar to themselves in beliefs followed by the WR, BC, and BR as most dissimilar to the SS. Threat Reduction In a study by Pepitone and Kleiner (1957), it was shown that low threat (i.e., low probability of a group losing status) produces a greater increase in sociometric attraction within the group than high threat (i.e., high probability of a group losing status). The data suggested the hypothesis that a reduction in threat would lead to an increase in mutual attractiveness of group members for having "improved" an existing state of affairs. 25 Groups of students were given two parts of a “test battery," presumably for the purpose of comparison with supervisory personnel in industry in group problem- solving situations (Kleiner, 1960). After the first part, the groups experienced one of two estimates of the prob- ability of losing comparability with industrial personnel and peer groups. After the second part, all groups experienced one of two reductions in the probability of loss due to improved performance through the contribution of a confederate place in each group. The results of the degree of threat reduction and interpersonal attraction showed that the change in attraction was greater in the large-reduction condition regardless of the threat baseline from which the reduction in threat occurred. There was a greater increase in the attraction of the confederate in the large—reduction condition, and this again was regardless of the baseline from which the reduction occurred. The data on the §s' reflected the effects of the threat conditions on their liking for each other as well. The effect of threat reduction from different baselines showed that the change in attraction was larger when the reduction was from the 26 high threat baseline. There was a greater increase in the social attraction of the confederate when the reduction in threat was made from the high-threat baseline. In testing the effectiveness of the confederate's role, the effect of the magnitude of the threat reduction is reflected, not in the increased importance of the confederate, but in the gs' depreciation of each other in the small—reduction condition. Apparently, the §s in the small—reduction condition were holding each other responsible for the relatively small improvement. There was also a greater increase in the perceived importance of the confederate when the threat reduction is made from the high baseline than when it is made from the low baseline. The generalized results have shown that (1) In all conditions the confederate was perceived to be highly important to the group performance: (2) "importance“ provided evidence for the effectiveness of the experi- mental treatments: (3) The level of aspiration reflected only the effect of the initial threat treatment, since the level of aspiration measure failed to differentiate between the large and small threat-reduction conditions, but did differentiate between the high and low initial- threat conditions: (4) The increment of perceived 27 attraction for the confederate varied directly with the degree to which probability of loss was reduced: (5) The increment of perceived attraction varied directly with the initial level of probability of loss. In summary, the gs rated people that reduced a great deal of threat as being more attractive than a person reducing a small amount of threat. In our study, the gs should like the Conservative Speech better than the Radical Speech because in the Conservative Speech a great deal of threat is reduced. Race Attraction It has been reported in a number of investigations that friendship choices or attraction ratings are influenced by race. White gs of various ages in various settings are found to be more attracted to other whites than to Negroes when asked to make friendship choices (Berkun and Meeland, 1958: Koch, 1946: Mann, 1958). The importance of the interaction between race and racial prejudice was recently demonstrated by Wong (1961). He found that on the basis of minimal background data, 73 gs were asked to make several judgments about a stranger. 28 Attraction was measured by means of two scales of the Interpersonal Judgment Scale (Byrne, 1961a). On this instrument, gs indicated their personal feelings of liking and disliking with respect to a stranger and also rate his desirability as a work partner. As hypothesized, highly prejudiced gs responded more negatively to a Negro stranger than to one identified as white. The prediction that'gs low in prejudice would not, respond differentially on the basis of race was supported with respect to Personal Feelings. On the WOrk Partner variable, they actually responded more positively to a Negro than to a white stranger. In Summary, prejudiced gs responded more positively to a White stranger than to a Black stranger even though both parties' attitudes were unknown to the gs. in our study, we predict that White actors would be rated more positively than Black actors on traits unknown to prejudiced gs. Racial Prejudice and Assumed Dissimilarity g§_Attitudes Both the balance throry of Heider (1958) and the strain-toward-symmetry formulations of Newcomb (1953) would predict that an individual who dislikes Negroes 'r or o. I». 1 0-. .p-~v— - 29 should assume that they hold attitudes dissimilar from himself. In Newcomb's terminology, if A (highly pre- judiced S) has negative feelings toward B (Negro stranger) and positive feelings toward X (e.g., classical music), symmetry can be obtained by A if he assumes that B dislikes classical music. Similarly, if a S low in prejudice has positive feelings toward a Negro stranger and positive feelings toward classical music, he achieves symmetry by assuming that the Negro stranger also likes classical music. Rokeach and Rothman (1965), who reported supportive evidence for Heider and Newcomb, compared and contrasted the belief congruence model with the Osgood and Tannenbaum's congruity principle. The belief congruence model was compared and contrasted with Osgood and Tannenbaum's congruity principle, the main difference between the 2 principles being that the former asserts that the outcome of cognitive inter- action cannot be accurately predicted from a knowledge of the evaluative meaning of the 2 elements judged in isolation, while the latter asserts that it can. Quantitative predictions generated by the 2 models were compared with obtained results showing that the average absolute error 30 of the congruity model was 1.07 and the average absolute error for the belief congruence model was .34, thus suggesting that the latter model's predictions were about 3 times as accurate as the congruity model's predictions. Congruence can be defined both in terms of similarity and importance. Given two beliefs or subsystems of belief equal in importance, the one more similar to our own is the more congruent: conversely, given two beliefs or subsystems perceived to be equally similar to our own, the one judged as more important is the more congruent with our own belief system. There is some experimental support for the general proposition. It has been found that individuals assume greater similarity between themselves and liked others than between themselves and disliked others (even in the absence of actual differences) with respect to personality traits (Fiedler, Warrington, & Blaisdell, 1952) and values (Precker, 1953). In addition, Muraskin and Iverson (1958) reported that as the social distance of a minority group increased, subjects assumed greater dissimilarity between themselves and members of that group with respect to attributed social distance ratings. 31 Once interaction has begun, reciprocal reward and punishment is proposed as the crucial determining factor. It has been suggested (Newcomb, 1956) that attraction between persons is a function of the extent to which reciprocal punishments. A Special subclass of this variable would be preceived similarity and dissimilarity of the attitudes of two individuals. It can be assumed that persons in our culture have well established learned drives to be logical and to make a correct report of the environment. Those who seem deficient in this respect are generally categorized as being uninformed, of low intelligence, immoral, and/Or as being out of contact with reality. It is primarily through consensual validation that people determine whether they or anyone else is logical or correct in interpreting environmental events. Hence, any time that another person offers one validation by indicating that his percepts and concepts are congruent with his, it constitutes a rewarding inter- action and, hence, one element in forming a positive relationship. Any time that another person indicates dissimilarity between ones two notions, it constitutes a punishing interaction and thus one element in forming 32 a negative relationship. Disagreement raises the unpleasant possibility that one is to some degree stupid, uninformed, immoral, or insane. An alternative possi- bility is that it is the other person who is deficient in one or more of these characteristics. Probably other variables, such as the importance of the issue to each individual, contribute to the effect (Byrne 1961). As would be prediCted from Newcomb's (1953) A-B—X model, prejudiced subjects not only dislike Negroes but they erroneously assume attitudinal differences between themselves and Negro strangers (Byrne and Wong, 1962). Thus, symmetrical A-B—X relationships are formed, in which those who dislike Negroes assume dissimilarity and those who like Negroes assume similarity of attitudes. In a further investigation, Byrne and‘Wong (1962) created non-symmetrical conditions by presenting gs with in- formation indicating that a stranger was either completely similar to or completely dissimilar from themselves in responding to a 26-item attitude scale. It was found that attraction was primarily a function of attitude similarity. That is, gs responded positively to similar strangers and negatively to dissimilar /‘\ 33 strangers regardless of the race of the stranger or the degree of prejudice of the g, This finding was interpreted in terms of a reward and punishment framework. Agreement about attitudes has been interpreted as reward via consensual validation and disagreement as punishment via consensual invalidation (Byrne, 1961a: Byrne, 1961b: Byrne, 1962). As a high- prejudiced g reads through an attitude questionnaire in which a Negro stranger expresses views similar to his own on 26 assorted items, it is assumed that this experience functions as the administration of 26 rewards. As a consequence, at least for a limited time-period and with respect to one particular Negro, high-prejudiced gs in the Byrne and Wong (1962) experiment indicated that they liked the Negro stranger and would enjoy working with him as a partner in an experiment. Therefore, if prejudiced individuals were provided with experiences in which equal status interactions with Negroes involved interpersonal rewards rather than the expected punishments, their expectancies and hence their prejudiced beliefs should be altered. It is hypothesized that interracial contact is effective in reducing prejudice as a function of the 34 frequency of interpersonal rewards which occur in that contact and of the proportion of rewarding interactions in relation to punishing and neutral ones. Without isolating the reward variables, several studies have nevertheless, found that equal status contacts with Negroes resulted in more positive interracial attitudes among housewives dwelling in federal housing projects (Deutsch and Collins, 1951: Wilner, Walkley, and Cook, 1952), students participating in a special seminar experience (Smith, 1943), graduate seminar in leaderless discussion groups (Mann, 1959), officers and enlisted men in infantry platoons (United States War Department, 1947), merchant seamen (Brophy, 1956), and workers in var- ious settings (Gundlach, 1956: Palmore, 1955). In building a theory of interpersonal attraction, the most inclusive independent variable is almost certainly that of reciprocal reward and punishment. Actually, the other three classes of variables appear to be relevant only as they relate to reward and punishment. Propinquity is important in determining attraction because environmental variables can facilitate or inhibit interaction, and without interaction, rewards cannot be /\ 35 given or received. The strong desire to form affiliative relationships suggests that the expectancy of reward in an interpersonal context is high. Similarly, attraction or repulsion based on overt stimulus properties would seem indicative of expectancies for rewards or for punishments in the interaction (Byrne and Wong, 1962). Therefore, interracial contact may be effective in reducing prejudice because Negro-white interactions involve rewards given directly by Negroes or rewards administered by other individuals as a consequence of interaction. In addition to the effects of attitude similarity, acceptance of Negroes is brought about by such rewarding interactions as judgmental support in an Asch conformity situation (Malof and Lott, 1962). Contrary to the previous finding, prejudice and race did interact in influencing attraction (Byrne and McGraw, 1964). Both lows and high-prejudiced gs responded to white strangers on the basis of similarity of attitudes, and loweprejudiced gs responded to Negro strangers on the same basis. However, by those high in prejudice, the Negro strangers were rated in a uniform manner no matter what their attitudes. The reason for 36 the difference between this finding and that of Byrne and Wong, (1962) was sought in a second experiment. It was hypothesized that with the utilization of 26 similar and 26 dissimilar attitudes, as in the Byrne and Wong, (1962) investigation, the original results would be replicated. It was also hypothesized that the use of photographs in Experiment I exerted a negative influence on the ratings of Negro strangers by high-prejudiced gs. It was found that a stranger with 26 similar attitudes evoked positive ratings and one with 26 dissimilar attitudes evoked negative ratings from gs at each extreme of the prejudice scale. However, those low in prejudice were more positive toward Negroes than were those high in prejudice. Contrary to expectations, ratings of a stranger by both prejudice groups were more positive when a photograph was present. It was concluded that a.§ low in prejudice responds toward a Negro stranger as toward a white stranger: attraction ratings vary as a linear function of the proportion of similar to dissimilar attitudes. A g high in prejudice, on the other hand, will respond positively to a Negro stranger providing that this stranger is completely similar to 37 himself concerning attitudes about a relatively large number of topics: he will respond with indifference or dislike toward a Negro stranger who departs from total similarity. In summary, prejudice gs also falsely assumed that their attitudes are dissimilar to the attitudes that Black people have. In our study, we felt that the prejudice gs would rate the Black actors' attitudes as being more dissimilar to the ‘gs' than those of the White actors. The Belief Versus Race Controvergy Which is more important a person's belief or a person's race? Rokeach's (1960) position supports a Belief Congruence Theory whereas Triandis's (1961) position supports a Race Congruence Theory. Both positions are explored below. Rokeach, Smith, and Evans (1960) stated that “insofar as psychological processes are involved, belief is more important than ethnic or racial membership as a determinant of social discrimination" (p. 135). They argued that true racial discrimination implies that the outgroup is discriminated against, but that at the same time, the ingroup is favored, and they provided evidence supporting 38 a belief-congruence theory of prejudice, which subsumes racial and ethnic prejudice as a special case under belief prejudice. They asked gs to respond to a nine-point scale ranging from "I can't see myself being friends with such a person” to "I can very easily see myself being friends with such a person." The stimulus persons used were persons of the same or different race or religion as the gs, who had the same or different beliefs as the gs. All possible combinations of race and belief were used. The beliefs dealt with God, communism, labor unions, socialized medicine, etc. The writers stated that in the first of two studies white gs making hypothetical choices were more accepting of Negroes who agreed with them on important issues than they were of whites disagreeing with them. This was true both for a northern and a southern sample. In a second study, they showed that Jewish children accepted Gentiles agreeing with them to a greater extent than they did Jews disagreeing with them. Most of the time the gs discrim- inated on the basis of belief and not on the basis of racial or ethnic group when they were given the oppor- tunity to react to social stimuli differing simultaneously on both characteristics. 39 Triandis (1961) rejected these findings on the friendship variable because he felt that Rokeach's own experimental confirmation of his hypothesis was due to an artifact of his method of measuring prejudice. Had Rokeach considered something more than friendship he would not have Obtained his results. Triandis argued that prejudice involved more than nonacceptance as a friend because it involved negative behaviors as well. A concept more general than prejudice is the concept of social distance. Since Rokeach's research technique used friendship as the variable under investigation, and so inevitably dealt only with a relationship involving small social distance, prejudice and discrimination are much more relevant to acceptance or rejection of a relationship involving relatively large social distance, such as acceptance of a person as a neighbor or as a student in one's university. People do not exclude other people from their neighborhood, for instance, because the other people have different belief systems, but they do exclude them because they are Negroes. 4O Triandis (1961) felt that race rather than belief congruence was the critical determinant. In his study, belief congruence was measured by Morris' (1956) ”13 ways to live." Stimulus individuals in the study were varied either has the same or different in race, religion, occupational status and philosophy. The results showed that race accounted for about four times as much of the variance in social distance judgments as did belief congruence, although all four main effects were highly significant. Rokeach (1961) replied to Triandis with the objection that the long and involved passages of Morris' ways to live were too vague and not sufficiently salient for the .gs. He added that Triandis did not tell what his gs remembered of these two paragraphs (not to speak of the 13). He doubts if Triandis's paragraphs were ego-involving. Rokeach felt that the belief variable pitted against race was vague, abstract, overintellectual, and complicated: hence weak: And the polarities, "same“ and "different philosophy," were nOt really Opposites, just different. They were not Ways producing social conflict in everyday life. They represent ideals by which "people say they l“\ 41 would like to live, and not how they do live" (Morris and Jones, 1955). Thus, the difference between “same" and "different philoSOphy" is a difference which, psychologically and sociologically, makes little difference. According to Rokeach, the major difference in method was that Triandis had used vague descriptions of stimulus persons, such as "Negro, same philOSOphy of life": while Rokeach had used stimulus persons with specific beliefs, such as "Negro who believes in God“ or "white atheist." To make sure that his results were nor artifacts, Rokeach repeated his research with eight widely differing issues: God, communism, desegregation, etc. These issues were socially salient and controversial, though not equally so. On all eight issues, he found friendship ratings to be more a function of belief than race, though not equally so. These results hold in the South as well as in the North. He concluded that his position—that the more salient a belief, the more will belief congruence override racial or ethnic congruence as a determinant of social distance- had not actually been challenged by Triandis' data. 42 Reconciliation g: the Belief Versus Race Controversy Stein, Hardyck, and Smith (1965) presented a study designed to reconcile these differences. In a test of Rokeach's contention that prejudice is the result of perceived dissimilarity of belief systems, 44 white California 9th graders completed a "teenage social distance scale" for 4 “stimulus teenagers,“ presented as, respectively, white or Negro, and like or unlike the respondent in values, in relation to gs' own responses 2 months earlier. .gs also indicated how friendly they would feel toward each. The results showed that gs felt most friendly towards the white—like teenager, followed by the Negro-like, white-unlike, and Negro-unlike. When white gs were given no information at all about a Negro teenager, they apparently assume that he is different from them in values and react towards him accordingly. With belief similarity held constant, the gs perceived that the white stimulus teenagers were more like them, given identical information about the whites and Negroes. Strong “race effects" were obtained on "sensitive" or controversial items by prevailing cultural standards 43 on the social distance scale, perhaps reflecting institutionalized areas of prejudice, and on total social distance scores when information concerning belief system was not provided. They added that institutionalized norms and large race effects exist in situations in which there is both intimacy of contact and pressure of others. Therefore, when gs are forced to evaluate stimulus individuals in terms of their beliefs, then belief congruence is more important than race. But when the belief component is not provided, spelled out in con— siderable detail, gs will react in racial terms on the basis of assumptions concerning the belief system of others, and of emotional or institutionalized factors. The practical implications of these results are obvious. If people of different races encounter one another under conditions favoring the perception of belief congruence (as, for example, in equal—status contacts), then racial prejudice should be substantially reduced. Although Stein et a1. obtained a strong effect on belief congruence and a lesser race effect, their scale was limited to positive items such as "invite home to dinner,“ "have as member of social group,“ "work on committee with,“ etc. Triandis' criticism of Rokeach 44 applies equally to Stein et a1. Prejudice involves negative behaviors as well as the lack of positive behaviors. Part of the confusion in previous discussions stems from the assumption that prejudice is a unidiminsional construct. Triandis (1964b) challenged this assumption and presented the results of several factor analyses which indicated that social acceptance (assumed here to be the opposite of prejudice) is a multidimensional construct. Triandis' (1964b) basic factors were obtained from factor analyses of behavioral differential scales, and were as follows: Factor I. Formal Social Acceptance with Subordination versus Formal Social Rejection, defined by high loadings on items such as ”I would admire the ideas of," “I would admire the character of,“ "I would cooperate in a political campaign with,“ etc. Factor II. Friendship Acceptance versus Friendship Rejection defined by high loadings on "I would accept as an intimate friend," "I would eat with," etc. Factor III. Friendship Acceptance versus Friendship Rejection defined by high loadings on "I would accept as an intimate friend 45 Factor IV. Social Distance, defined by high loadings on “I would exclude from my neighborhood,“ "I would exclude from my country,“ etc. Factor V. Subordination, defined by high loadings on “I would obey,“ “I would not treat as a subordinate,“ etc. Triandis' (1964b) analysis permitted the computation of the relative variance accounted for by the race, age, occupation, sex, and religion of the stimulus person as determinants of responses on each of these factors. It was found that occupation was, by far, the most important determinant for Formal Social Rejection and for Subordination. Incongruence of sex and age, followed by race and religion were the primary determinants of variance for Friendship Rejection. For Social Distance, the variance was almost completely determined by race. Thus, the findings of the studies described above can be reconciled. Rokeach's (1961) data involved the friend- ship factor: so did those of Stein et a1. (1965), Byrne and Wong (1962), and other studies in which belief dissimilarity emerged as the major variable. Triandis' (1961) data were more general, since his Social Distance scale included both friendship and negative behaviors. 46 His data were primarily determined by responses to the item “exclude from the neighborhood," which about 55% of his gs indicated they would do when the stimulus person was a Negro. As a result, race explained most of the variance. Triandis and Davis (1965) offered additional data on the influence of both belief and race dissimilarity in determining social perception of stimulus persons. Three hundred gs responded, on 12 semantic and 15 be- havioral differential scales, to 8 stimulus persons generated by all possible combinations of the characteristics Negro—white, male-female, pro- or con-civil-rights legislation. They also rated 35 political and civil rights issues on semantic differen- tials. A factor analysis of gs, based on the covariances of their responses to variables, defined 11 types of gs. Two of these types were strongly prejudiced. One type of‘g showed “conventional“ prejudice: they were extremely sensitive to the race component when responding to the stimulus persons. “gs of the other type showed “belief" prejudice: they were particularly sensitive to the beliefs of the stimulus person. 47 On the Formal Social Rejection factor, belief is quite clearly the element which orders the pattern. In contrast, the Friendship Rejection factor showed a clear ordering by race, followed by belief. For the Marital Rejection factor, the most important element is sex, but the next most important element is race. For the Social Distance factor, the most important element is race, followed by belief. For Subordination, it is also race, followed by belief. Thus, although both race and belief are important, race is more important for most of the factors of behavioral intentions, expecially those behaviors that are more intimate: belief becomes more important in the less intimate behaviors of the Formal Social Rejection factor. .gs high on Marital Acceptance versus Marital Rejection rejected people primarily on the basis of race: they also consider civil rights and many political issues as quite unimportant. gs high on Subordination showed belief prejudice and considered most issues as very important. Thus, the gs' behavioral intentions were a function of both personality and the type of behavioral intentions involved. 48 The race and belief characteristics of stimulus persons acquire different weights depending upon both the nature of the items to which the gs are responding and the type of g making the response. Specifically, the Social Distance and Marital Rejection factors were responded to in the manner described by Triandis (1961), and Triandis and Triandis (1960, 1962). The Evaluative and Formal Social Rejection Factors were responded to more in the manner described by Rokeach et a1. (1960): this was particularly true in the case of unprejudiced gs. The Friendship Rejection and Subordination cluster of behavior was responded to either on the basis of race, or on the basis of belief, depending upon whether the gs were high or low on general prejudice. Those gs who were prejudiced responded to the race component. Data show that both race and belief were important in the case of highly prejudiced gs responding to the Formal Social Rejection factor, but that belief becomes less important in the other response continua. This finding is consistent with the arguments of Stein et a1. (1965). 49 Examination of the three clusters of behaviors which were responded to differently revealed that the Social Distance-Marital Rejection cluster included the most intimate behaviors: the Friendship Rejection and Subordination behaviors appearred to be intermediate in intimacy and social commitment: Formal Social Rejection included the least intimate behaviors, and this factor, together with the semantic differential evaluative factor, involved a minimum of social commitment. In the case of the most intimate behaviors, all gs, regardless of whether they were classified as prejudiced or unprejudiced, gave social distance responses. In the case of the least intimate behaviors, most gs gave unprejudiced re5ponses. In the case of the behaviors that were intermediate in intimacy, there was a clear separation of the prejudiced from the unprejudiced gs, as well as of the conventionally prejudiced from the belief prejudiced gs. In the case of intimate behaviors, Triandis' arguments appear correct: in the case of nonintimate behaviors, Rokeach's arguments appear correct: in the case of behaviors intermediate in intimacy, both race 50 and belief are important. However, some gs behave more as described by Triandis, and other gs more as described by Rokeach. The first type, the conventionally prejudiced, is distinguished from the second type, the belief prejudiced, particularly on those behaviors that are intermediate in intimacy because norms may play a smaller role in the case of nonintimate behaviors. In this latter case, personality and previous experience, as well as the total attitude structure of the individual, may control most of the variance of social rejection or acceptance. According to Insko and Robinson (1967) there were, however, at least two problems with Triandis and Davis' (1965) study. First, the various items in several of the factors appear fairly heterogeneous in implied intimacy or social distance. (E.G., consider “admit as a tourist in my country" and "accept as a close kin by marriage," both contained in Factor IV.) Second, only one belief or attitude (favorability toward civil rights) was manipulated. A more adequate or thorough manipulation of belief possibly would have produced a greater belief effect in Triandis and Davis' (1965) college population. 51 Insko and Robinson (1967) attempted in two ways to increase the generality of the evidence relating to the belief versus race issue. First, the manipulation of similarity-dissimilarity involved unselected beliefs as well as beliefs about which of the gs perceived Negroes as feeling strongly. In one condition.these latter beliefs were selected on an individual §rbY<§ybaSiS: in another condition,they were selected on a group basis so as to represent the white conception or stereotype of strongly held Negro beliefs. Second, the study was conducted with southern junior high school students. Since no one has previously reported a test of Rokeach's theory with southern non- college gs, the authors thought that it would be of some interest to examine the race versus belief issue with gs of this type. One scale Which Triandis and DaVid (1965) interpreted as being more influenced by belief (semantic differential assessment of attitude toward Negroes), one scale influenced by both belief and race (Factor III), and one scale more influenced by race (Factor IV) were used for dependent variables. The results indicated that both belief and race had large significant effects on all three dependent variables \., 52 and that belief had a significant greater effect than did race on the semantic differential assessment of attitude, and that race had a nonsignificant greater effect than did belief on the two factor scales. The Belief X Race interactiOn on the two factor scales, however, indicates that belief similarity is of somewhat greater importance in determining reactions to white persons than to Negroes. In addition, belief similarity was just as important for beliefs that Negroes were perceived as holding strongly as for unselected beliefs. The semantic differential items obviously entail minimal presence of norm-enforcing whites, while accepting Negroes as close kin by marriage and eating with Negroes involve both of these variables to a high degree. There are, however, some difficulties with these variables as ordering concepts. "Accept this person as an intimate friend" would seem almost by definition to involve more intimacy of contact than “eat with this persOn," and yet "eat with this person“ has a more negative belief minus race score. Perhaps this reflects the fact that traditional southern culture tolerates friendship between Negroes and whites, as long as Negroes stay in ”their place," but does not tolerate eating with Negroes. This shows that 53‘ contact intimacy and presence of others may not be completely adequate as operational criteria for speci- fying the presence of norms. Since institutionalized norms may override individual psychological propensities to respond in terms of belief similarity, the results infer that prejudicial reactions to race are still very much a part of southern whites. Pettigrew (1958) further has reported some data indicating that conformity to norms has an effect on the maintenance of prejudice in the south but not in the north. Smith, Williams, & Willis (1967) confirmed Insko and Robinson's (1967) findings. In the Smith et a1. (1967), six samples (total N=307) of white and Negro gs from northern, border, and southern states rates the friend- ship acceptance of stimulus persons of specified race, sex,and belief on 1 of 8 general or Negro-white issues. For all samples except 1, belief cOngruence was more important for acceptance than similarity of race: race, in turn, was more important than similarity of sex. For the southernmost white sample (Louisiana), race was the most important factor by a slight margin due to the institutionalized mores of the deep South, while sex \F/ \ I 54 was again least important. Interactions were negligible, except for a renegade effect observed in all three Negro samples--members of the racial ingroup were consistently penalized more for disagreeing than were members of the outgroup. None of the samples exhibited "true“ discrimination (negative correlation between acceptance of ingroup and outgroup), although the southern white sample exhibited a significant tendency towards true racial discrimination, while all three Negro samples showed significant tendencies towards true belief discrimination. McGrew (1969) also confirmed the Belief Congruency Hypothesis. In his study, there were four independent variables, each consisting of two levels: (a) Authoritarian orientation (Left Authoritarian, liberal opinions vs. Right Authoritarian, conservative opinions): (b) Sex (Males vs. Females): (c) Debate Condition (Liberal vs. Conservative): (d) Mode of Presentation (Television vs. Audio-Only). The single dependent variable was the extent to which gs agreed with either the liberal or conservative position, as rated on a Semantic Differential- Type Scale. The major hypotheses were tested by means of two debate situations which occurred between a Negro and 55 White male confederate. Eight issues were debated by the speaker, four of which dealt with American foreign policies and four with domestic policies. It was hypothesized that Left and Right Authoritarians, as measured by Rokeach's Opinionation Scale, would agree with liberal and conservative positions respectively, regardless of the ethnic membership or the person eSpousing such views. Although the data supported Rokeach's hypothesis that interpersonal attraction is a function of attitudinal similarity, it was suggested that the degree of intimacy and the social proscriptions governing it limit the generality of the hypothesis. If interpersonal attraction implies closeness sanctioned by social custom, then the Belief Congruency Hypothesis appears valid, but if such attraction implies a relationship Which is socially taboo, then the Triandis and Davis (1965) position appears valid. The study by Willis and Bulatao (1967) suggests that Triandis and Davis (1965) are right in a relative sense but wrong in an absolute sense. In the Willis et a1. (1967) study, the belief congruence theory of prejudice was tested with friendship and marriage acceptance ratings made by 160 Filipino college students. gs indicated opinions 56 on 10 issues and rated hypothetical friendship and marriage candidates varying with regard to belief congruence (agreement/disagreement with g) and ethnicity (Filipino, Chinese, etc.). Anova revealed belief congruence to account for over 20 times as much variance as ethnicity. However, ethnicity too was significant in 17/20 instances, with the remaining cases lending trend support. The renegade effect was consistently observed and was sub- stantially correlated (rho=.60, .64) with issue importance. Generalization from these findings was, however, severely limited by the fact that in all these studies the social stimuli were “paper-and—pencil“ stimuli and the discriminatory responses elicited were "paper—and- pencil" responses. To overcome this limitation, Rokeach and Mezei (1966) conducted three experiments in which gs were given the opportunity to discriminate on the basis of race or belief, or both, in real-life situations. These experiments were all alike in basic design. A naive g engaged four strangers, confederates of the experimenter, in a group discussion about an important or situationally relevant topic. Two of the confederates were white and two were Negro. One white and one Negro 57 agreed with the gJ and one white and one Negro disagreed with him. The g was then asked to state a preference for two of the four confederates. Two of these experiments again used college students, but the third included as gs job applicants for positions of janitor, laundry worker, and attendant in mental hospitals. In all experiments,the choices, which were made following a group discussion, were cognitively real for the gs. In each of the campus studies, 60 percent apparently preferred partners differing from one another in both race and belief. But, this was so of only 24 percent of the gs in the field study: 60 percent in the field study chose two partners with beliefs congruent with their own, one white and one Negro. The results also showed that (a) similarity of belief is a considerably more frequent basis of choice than dissimilarity of belief: (b) similarity of race is rarely a basis of choice--considerably less often even than chance, and no more frequently than dissimilarity of race: and (c) similarity of belief is a considerably more frequent basis of choice than similarity of race. Thus, the Belief 58 Congruence Principle was consistently the best predictor of choices in all three experiments. In summary, it appears that white gs like Blacks who have many similar beliefs to themselves provided that the Blacks do not share intimate behaviors with Whites, especially where institutionalized norms prohibit such interpersonal interactions. Most Whites who do not know the beliefs of Blacks tended to judge Blacks negatively and attributed dissimilar beliefs to the Blacks. In our study, we predicted that the prejudice gs would rate the Black Conservative more favorably than the Black Radical: and, prejudiced gs would rate negatively the Black Radical because the gs would feel that the Black Radical holds dissimilar beliefs. Statement 9; Problem This study was conducted in order to evaluate the effects of Race and Belief on interpersonal attraction. In the Race Congruency Theory, gs are attracted to people of the same Race. In the Belief Congruency Theory, gs are attracted to people with similar Beliefs. In this study, a Black and a White actor gave both a Conservative 59 Speech and a Radical Speech so that four conditions were tested--the White Conservative, White Radical, Black Conservative, and Black Radical. A Race X Belief inter- action was predicted. gs in each of the four conditions rated the actors on an Interpersonal Check List. In order to find out how favorably or unfavorably the gs rated each actor, comparison ratings of the actors to other variables were examined. If the gs were, indeed, prejudiced, they should prefer the Conservative Speech to the Radical Speech, and the White Race to the Black Race, and there should be a Speech X Race interaction. If the gs showed true racial discrimination, then Race of actor should be significant regardless of Belief of actor. Therefore, the gs should prefer the White Race. If the gs showed true belief discrimination, then Speech of actor should be significant regardless of Race of actor. Therefore, gs should prefer the Conservative Speech. If the gs showed bOth true racial and belief discrimination, then Race and Speech of actor should predict a significant difference in preferences. 60 Therefore, the gs should prefer the White Conservative followed by the White Radical, Black Conservative, and Black Radical last. In order to explore the possible effects of racial or belief prejudice, the following hypotheses were tested: Hypothesis I. gs will rate the Black Radical actor most significantly different from the gs, themselves, on the Interpersonal Check List Scores with Black Conservative, White Radical, and White Conservative actors increasingly like themselves in a race X Speech interaction. Hypothesis II. gs will rate the Black actors more significantly different from the gs, themselves, in the Interpersonal Check List scores than the White actors. Hypothesis III. gs will rate those who made a Radical Speech more significantly different from themselves than those Who made a Conservative Speech. Hypothesis IV. The Black Radical actor will be seen as significantly different from the gs' perception of the average college student and the BC, WR, and WC as increasingly closer to the gs' perception of the average college student. Hypothesis V. .§S will rate the Black Radical actor viewing the gs as significantly different from the gs' 61 self—rating, i.e. the gs will view the BR as seeing the gs as significantly different from the gs' perception of themselves. The gs will also see the BC, WR, and WC as increasingly perceiving them more like themselves. Hypothesis VI. gs will rate the Black Radical actor as significantly farther from the ideal-self of the gs and the BC, WR, and WC as increasingly closer to the gs' ideal-selves. CHAPTER 2 METHOD gubjects The gs were 80 Caucasian males obtained from the introductory psychology classes at Michigan State University in April of 1969.2 The students received psychology credit for their services. 1The data from this study were also used by Perlman (1969) and Evans (1970) in analyses of the non-verbal and verbal behaviors of the gs, respectively. ng were only male Caucasians since the g_was not interested, at this time, in the interaction effects between a female g and a male accomplice. 62 63 Accomplices Four male accomplices,3 two Black and two Caucasian were hired from the theater department at Michigan State University. ggtting A small room with a one way mirror, two chairs, and a low table provided the experimental setting. The chairs were soft backed and had arms. The chairs were placed facing each other on a slight angle towards the one way mirror approximately five feet apart. .gesign All accomplices learned both a Radical and Conservative script. A copy of the scripts can be found in Appendix A. One script presented a Radical vieWpoint about the causes and solutions of racial disorders, the other script 3The two Black actors were Alan Smith and Donald Trammel. The two Caucasian actors were Ray Price and Glen Sussman. I would like to thank them all for their time and splendid service. 64 was a Conservative viewpoint about the same topic. The scripts were written so that each could be said by a Black or Caucasian accomplice. The actors worked together in learning the scripts and added pauses, “You know," “I think,“ tone of voice, postural and gestural cues, etc. As reported by the raters, in agreement with the E's expectations, all scripts sounded spontaneous and almost identical, no matter who was saying them. gs were randomly assrgned to one of the two races of accomplice, giving the Radical or Conservative viewpoint. Therefore, there were four experimental conditions with twenty gs to each condition. The experimental design is diagrammed in Table 1. TABLE 1 EXPERIMENTAL DES IGN Viewpoint Race of Accomplice Black Caucasian Radical 20 20 Conservative 20 20 65 Instruction (see Appendix B) were read by one of two Caucasian gs in a uniform manner so as to aVOid any test effects. The use of the selection of a number and letter to determine the topic of discussion avoided giving the g any insight into the true nature of the experiment. It was feared that if the g was told directly that his opinions to the causes and solutions of racial problems were being studied, and if the g was in a dyad with a Black accomplice, that the g may have correCtly surmised that the Black g_is not a subject at all. A small box containing 80 pieces of paper each listing a number and letter was used for the supposed random selection of topic and speaking order. Procedure That gs were told that the g was interested in studying undergraduate opinions concerning social issues in the United States. All accomplices were informally but neatly dressed for the experimental sessions. The accomplice and g were seated. The g did not know that the accomplice was working for the E. Care was taken 66 to treat the accomplice at all times just as it he was any other subject. For example, when reading instructions, the E'lOOKed at both the g_and accomplice with equal frequency. The g and accomplice were told that they were to discuss one of several social issues the g had chosen. One of them was asked to pick a piece of paper from the small box. The g_then looked at a list of numbers and told the g and accomplice that according to the letter picked, they were to discuss the causes and solutions of racial problems in the United States: specifically causes and solutions of racial disorders in the big city, and that according to the number picked, the accomplice was to speak firSt. The fig" (actually the accomplice) was asked to talk for up to ten minutes (actually he talked for the length of his script): then the real S talked for up to ten minutes giving his opinions: finally they discussed their views for an additional ten minutes. It was made clear that the firSt time each spoke, that the other was not to interrupt. To further insure that the accomplice's talk did not appear prepared, the g and accomplice were given about three minutes to think about what they wanted to say fl. .1 I. .1 . pr r1 _ I. Dr . \ , 1 . a. . . ) i a i L . u L . , \l/ i It 1 . , «C . . Ir .1 -. un. . . ._ . x _ x r) L. l . _ a _ uv ) a — I _ . FL I. .I4 L _ i T. c 67 before the accomplice began. If the experimental session lasted over 35 minutes, the E re-entered the room and informed the pair that their time was up. The g_was not present in the room during the actual session. ‘When the discussion was over, each g was led into a small office by the g, Another g_then gave instructions to each g on how to fill out the Interpersonal Check List, and he was always nearby if alg had any questions. The Interpersonal Check List were then scored and, the results of the comparative ratings are found in Chapter 3. The gs were asked to complete the Interpersonal Check List under the following procedure: In column 1, the g described himself. In column 2, the g described his perfect or ideal self, how he would like to be. In column 3, the g.described how he felt about the actor. In column 4, the g described how he feels the actor feels about himself (the actor). In column 5, the g_described the average, typical college student. In column 6, the g described how the actor felt about his partner (the _s__). Seven ratings were compared for discrepancy scores: /‘\ \v/ 68 'The (g) self' compared to 'The ideal—self' 'The (g)' compared to ‘How the g viewed the actor' 'The ideal-self' compared to 'How the g viewed the actor' 'How the g viewed the actor' compared to 'How the g viewed the average college student' 'How the g rated how the actor viewed himself' compared to 'How the g rated how the actor viewed the g} 'The g's perception of himself' compared to 'How the g thinks that the actor viewed the g' The pooled results of the summation discrepancy scores CHAPTER 3 RESULTS The results of the discrepancy scores of the seven comparative ratings are shown in the following Tables and include the mean frequency of occurrence, standard deviations, and mean totals: 69 70 Table 2 Discrepancy scores of the g.rating how the actor viewed himself compared to the g's rating how the actor viewed the g. Behavior Speech Race Mean Totals Comparison Black Caucasian of Speech (4&6) Radical 37 .9543?) 27 .oo 32 .48 16.01=(S.D.) 15.52 15.76 Conservative 34.60 22.45 28.53 14.96 9.79 12.37 Mean Totals of Race 36.28 24.73 15.49 12.65 An analysis of variance conducted on the data in Table 2 indicated tht the effect of Race reached statistical significance (F=12 .41, p < .01). See Appendix C for a complete analysis of variance for the data in Table 2. 71 Table 3 Discrepancy scores of the ideal-self compared to how the g Viewed the actor. Behavior Speech Race Mean Totals Comparison . Black Caucasian of Speech (2&3) Radical 40.50432) 34.65 37.58 12.17=(S.D.) 12.48 12.32 Conservative 34.60 40.45 37.53 9.90 13.02 12.74 Mean Totals of Race 37.55 37.55 11.03 12.75 An analysis of the variance conducted on the data in Table 3 indicated that the interaction of Race X Speech reached statistical significance (F=4.55, p