ANALYSIS OF THE LABELING DISCOURSE BETWEEN THE
JAMAAT UD DAWA AND ITS CRITICS
SEEN THROUGH THE PAKISTANI PRINT MEDIA
By
Mohammad V. Ali

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Criminal Justice
2012

ABSTRACT
ANALYSIS OF THE LABELING DISCOURSE BETWEEN THE
JAMAAT UD DAWA AND ITS CRITICS
SEEN THROUGH THE PAKISTANI PRINT MEDIA
By
Mohammad V. Ali
Very little is known about the impact of the blame discourse between organizations
accused of terrorism and the accusing allies in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In
particular, there is a gap in knowledge about the effects within societies in which the accused
organizations have acquired social acceptance. This dissertation presents research on the
dynamics of such discourses within the context of a sympathetic society that provides support to
an allegedly terrorist organization. Firstly, it reveals whether the GWOT alliances’ public
messages declaring that an organization is terrorist are culturally resonant in Pakistan, where the
organization has its social base. Secondly, it shows how an organization accused of terrorism
counters the ‘terrorism’ label and in turn negatively labels the GWOT alliance. Thirdly, it unveils
the role of the newspaper media as a stakeholder in and mediator of such discourses.
The present study in an inductive analysis of Pakistani newspaper content pertinent to the
‘labeling discourse’ between the Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD) and member states of the GWOT
alliance. The JuD is a Pakistani Islamic Revivalist relief and welfare organization that the UN
has accused of being part of the Al Qaeda network and the Government of Pakistan has banned.
Results of the study showed that newspapers published in Urdu, the national language of
Pakistan, were more likely to concentrate on the JuD’s relief and welfare activities while the
Pakistani English newspapers concentrated more on the organization’s alleged role as a terrorist
organization. Members of the GWOT alliance reflected their respective strategic interests in
.

ii

defining the terrorist threat of the JuD. Lastly, the JuD messages printed in the Pakistani
newspapers in which they countered the ‘terrorism’ label or criticized their accusers reflected the
organizational goal of mobilizing its local support to regain its legal status and maintain its social
base in Pakistan. Overall, compared to the communiqués sent out by its critics, the JuD’s
messages were found more culturally resonant in the Pakistani context. The empirical evidence
suggests that the GWOT allies need to rethink both the way they make sense of allegedly
‘terrorist organizations,’ and how they present these organizations to the public through the mass
media.

.
iii
.

Copyright by
MOHAMMAD V. ALI
2012

. iv

DEDICATION
I dedicate my dissertation to Abba Jee, Amma Jee and the rest of my family.

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to individually thank my committee members Dr. Steve Chermak, Dr. Timothy
Levine and Dr. Soma Chaudhuri for their invaluable help and support throughout this project. A
special thanks to my dissertation chair and mentor, Dr. Merry Morash. Her professionalism,
passion for research and generosity towards her students are an inspiration to me.
I thank and acknowledge Dr. Edmund McGarrell and Dr. Mahesh Nalla for their
guidance and encouragement.
I feel indebted to my friends at the Reference Wing of the Human Rights Commission of
Pakistan, for allowing me to use their reference library and helping me to collect data.
Lastly, I wish to acknowledge Dr. Vincent Hoffman. He was a true scholar and one of the
best human beings I have ever met. It was a privilege knowing him.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................... ix
CHAPTER 1
THE INITIAL STUDY FOCUS AND RESEARCH PLAN ........................................................1
Central Research Question ......................................................................................................4
Sub-Questions .....................................................................................................................4
Literature Review ....................................................................................................................5
The Initial Research Plan.........................................................................................................7
Research Design ..................................................................................................................7
Research Site .......................................................................................................................8
Initial Entry and Data Sources .............................................................................................9
Sampling, Data Collection and Data Analysis ....................................................................10
An Unexpected Turn of Events and the New Research Plan ..................................................14
CHAPTER 2
HUMAN SUBJECT PROTECTION, FIELDWORK, AND POLITICAL REALITIES
LEAD TO A NEW PLAN .........................................................................................................16
Discovery of the Newspaper Data and What it Consisted of ..................................................19
Questions that could be Answered with the Newspaper Data .................................................21
Main Research Question ....................................................................................................21
Sub-Questions ...................................................................................................................21
Method for Analyzing the News Data....................................................................................22
CHAPTER 3
OVERVIEW OF NEWS COVERAGE .....................................................................................27
Distribution of Stories across Phases and Languages .............................................................30
Reports of Negative and Positive Actions Towards the Group ...............................................34
Negative Actions ...............................................................................................................34
Positive Actions ................................................................................................................35
Reports of Negative or Positive Labels on JuD ......................................................................36
Negative Labels .................................................................................................................36
Positive Labels ..................................................................................................................37
Reports of Negative Labels, Positive Labels and Self Labeling by JuD ..................................38
Negative Labels .................................................................................................................38
Positive Labels ..................................................................................................................39
Self Labeling .....................................................................................................................40
Reports on JuD’s Relief and Welfare Role ............................................................................41
Releif and Welfare Activities .............................................................................................42
Statement Issuing Call for Help in Releif Activities ...........................................................47
Stories with Negative or Positive Slant ..................................................................................51
Presenting Selected Facts ..................................................................................................52
Presenting Opinions ..........................................................................................................53
vii

Using Charged Language ..................................................................................................54
Use of Emphasis ................................................................................................................55
Analysis of Stories with Slant ................................................................................................56
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................57
CHAPTER 4
NEGATIVE LABELING OF JUD AND THE JUD’S RESPONSE...........................................59
Statements Negatively Labeling the JuD ...............................................................................59
Negative Labels by the UN ................................................................................................64
Negative Labels by the US ................................................................................................68
Negative Labels by India ...................................................................................................70
Negative Labels by the Federal Government of Pakistan ...................................................72
Concluding Remarks .........................................................................................................78
Negative Labels Challenged by JuD ......................................................................................79
Counter Labeling Strategies ...............................................................................................81
Counter Labeling Frames ..................................................................................................86
Connection between the Approaches to Counter Labeling and the Labeler ........................90
CHAPTER 5
NEGATIVE LABELS BY JUD ................................................................................................96
Analysis of JuD’s Construction of Negative Labels ............................................................. 100
Negative Labels Imposed on the Government of Pakistan................................................ 100
Negative Label Imposed on the UN ................................................................................. 112
JuD’s Conceptualization of the ‘Enemy’ and Ummah .......................................................... 115
Negative Label Imposed on India .................................................................................... 118
Negative Labeling of the US as the Premier ‘Enemy of the Ummah’ ............................... 131
Labeling ‘Israel’ the Enemy of the Ummah...................................................................... 135
Analysis of Strategic Content in JuD’s Negatively Labeling Messages ................................ 138
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 146
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................... 161

viii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1

Number and percent of all stories about JuD by language and phase ........................30

Table 2

Number and percent of stories about JuD in English and Urdu by phase ..................31

Table 3

Standardized Residual of the coverage given to JuD in English and Urdu stories by
phases ......................................................................................................................31

Table 4

Number and percent of all stories in each phase and language that reported actions
taken against the JuD ...............................................................................................34

Table 5

Number and percent of all stories in each phase and language that reported actions
supportive to the JuD ...............................................................................................35

Table 6

Number and percent of all stories in each phase and language that reported negative
labels on JuD ...........................................................................................................36

Table 7

Number and percent of all stories in each phase and language that reported positive
labels on JuD ...........................................................................................................37

Table 8

Number and percent of all stories in each phase and language that reported negative
labels by JuD ...........................................................................................................39

Table 9

Number and percent of all stories in each phase and language that reported positive
labels by JuD ...........................................................................................................40

Table 10 Number and percent of all stories in each phase and language that reported statement
in which JuD members self-labeled their organization .............................................41
Table 11 Number and percent of all stories in each phase and language that reported JuD’s
relief and welfare activities ......................................................................................46
Table 12 Number and percent stories that had a negative slant, by language and phase ........... 56
Table 13 Number and percent stories that had a positive slant, by language and phase ............57

ix

CHAPTER 1: THE INITIAL STUDY FOCUS AND RESEARCH PLAN
In the aftermath of 9/11, the role of Pakistan in the ensuing ‘Global War on Terror’ has
been a cause of concern to the US Government. Despite the Pakistani Government’s support of
the US led initiative against terrorism, some Islamic revivalist groups that are labeled as ‘terrorist
organizations’ have reportedly managed to find a safe haven in Pakistan from a global onslaught
(Fair, 2004; Taimoor, 2006). Islamic revivalism is defined as “an ideology that demands the
restoration of the traditional or original Islamic order, through strict adherence to the Quran and
the traditions of the prophet Mohammad” (Taimoor, 2006, p. 34). Demographically, Pakistan
holds a Sunni majority however the Islamic revivalist movement, in its various forms, represents
a popular sub-culture that is rapidly spreading across the entire country (Taimoor, 2006).
In his article, ‘Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,’ Atran (2003) emphasizes the need to study
the impact of US policies on the radicalization of Muslim societies and the actions of the groups
labeled as terrorists. The present conditions in Pakistan provide an ideal setting for such an
analysis. To reinforce its image as an active partner in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT),
the Pakistani Government has been consistently implementing domestic policies that criminalize,
and socially and economically marginalize revivalist Muslim groups, that its GWOT allies have
labeled as ‘terrorists,’ ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘extremists’ (Semler, 2002; Fair, 2004; Taimoor,
2006). Despite such policies, these groups exist and enjoy a habitable level of social acceptability
in Pakistan (Fair, 2004). Furthermore, the social support networks of these groups are likely to
widen with the steadily increasing popularity of Islamic revivalism in Pakistan. From a research
perspective, Pakistan furnishes appropriate settings for studying the impact of policies that
stigmatize and criminalize revivalist groups accused of terrorism on group members by

1

examining (1) their socially constructed perceptions of the Pakistani Government, the US and the
GWOT, and (2) the influence of these perceptions on their actions.
According to Prus (2005), to study groups that are labeled as ‘terrorists,’ scholars need to
first cognitively purge themselves from the ‘mysticism’ of these labels and understand how the
individuals and groups being labeled construct reality. Prus (2005) recommended that the
Symbolic Interactionism perspective provided the appropriate theoretical and methodological
base for studying the perceptions of the individuals and groups labeled as ‘terrorists’ and the
impact of perceptions on their actions. Symbolic Interactionism (SI) is a theoretical perspective,
which assumes that people construct a perception of self, society and reality through social and
mediated interaction (Prus, 2005; Charmaz, 2006). Following the SI perspective, the originally
proposed ethnography aimed at developing a theory based understanding of how members of an
Islamic revivalist organization, through interaction with other group members in the daily course
of their lives, made sense of their lived experiences as members of a group locally and globally
labeled as ‘extremist’ and ‘terrorist,’ and how such sense making affected their actions (Prus,
2005; Charmaz, 2006).
For this study, I chose an organization called ‘Jamaat ud Dawa’ (JuD) which is the largest
Islamic revivalist group in Pakistan (Taimoor, 2006). The basic ideology of the organization is
that a Muslim should spend his or her life in strict adherence to the principles laid down in Quran
and Hadith (traditions of the Prophet), deny all sectarian ideologies, and spread Islam in the
world either through Dawah (invitation) or through Jihad (fighting) (Taimoor, 2006). The
organization was created during the Afghan-Russian war and was allegedly involved in the
Afghan Jihad and later in the Kashmir Jihad (Taimoor, 2006). Predissertation research conducted
for this study and other scholars (Taimoor, 2006) revealed that on a communal level, Jamaat ud

2

Dawa (JuD) runs and provides free education in the one hundred and seventy three educational
institutes in Pakistan (including seminaries, schools, colleges and universities) and is actively
involved in social work throughout the country. The organization was originally called the
Markus ud Dawa and was banned by the Pakistani Government in 2002 because of its
involvement in jihadi activities, and subsequently resurfaced as a legitimate organization when
the leaders of the organization renamed it as Jamaat ud Dawa and publically dissociated the
organization from its jihadi wing, known as the Lashkar e Taiba (Taimoor, 2006). The fact that
the organization was once banned by the government and was still under strict scrutiny of the
government made it an ideal case for study. The intent was to use multiple data sources
(including field observations, intensive interviews, and analysis of organizational documents,
audio CDs and artwork) to understand the impact of constant state scrutiny, restrictive
government policies and the terrorist/extremist label on JuD (Jamaat ud Dawa) members’
perception of reality, self, and the enemy. I was also going to study the influence of these
perceptions on members’ attitudes and actions towards the enemy.
The research as it was initially designed would have been the first attempt to study the
impact of social stigmatization and aggressive state policies on members of a revivalist group.
The information generated by the research could have potentially helped US policy makers to
understand the effects of universally declaring revivalist groups, that are socially accepted in
various parts of the world, as ‘terrorists.’ The results of the study as initially designed might also
have informed the US policy makers for devising peaceful and culture specific long-term
policies to counter political violence and terrorism globally. Presented below are the central
research question of the initial study plan and the sub questions that were derived out of the
central question.

3

Central Research Question
What is the Jamaat ud Dawa culture that Dawa scholars, leaders and members have
constructed, signified, and symbolized through the intersubjective interpretations (defined by
Prus,1996, p. 15, as shared meanings constructed by people in their interactions with each other)
of Quran, Hadith (the traditions of the Prophet Mohammad) and the Islamic revivalist ideology?
While engaging in intra-group interactions and activities; how do Jamaat ud Dawa members, as
proponents of a strict religious order and as members of group that is socially marginalized both
in Pakistan and globally, collectively construct shared meanings and shared subjective reality
from their lived experiences with the Pakistani Government, the Pakistani society, and the West;
and how does such socially constructed perception of reality subsequently impact their behavior?
Sub-Questions
1. What are the core values and principles of the Dawa ideology as explained by Dawa
members, leaders, scholars and the Jamaat ud Dawa literature?
2. How do Jamaat ud Dawa members, leaders, and scholars legitimize the Dawa ideology in
the light of the Quran, Hadith and the revivalist ideology?
3. How does the Dawa ideology translate into the Dawa culture, as it is experienced by
members in their daily lives through language, symbols, customs and daily rituals?
4. How is the Dawa identity constructed on an individual and group level, and how do
members perceive that identity as unique from that of other Muslim or non-Muslim
groups?
5. Who is perceived as the enemy and how is the persona and threat of the enemy
constructed in the Dawa culture? How do individual members perceive the threat of the
enemy and how do they react to that threat?
4

6. How do the members perceive and react to the actions and polices of the Pakistani
Government?
7. How do the members perceive and react to the social stigma attached to the ‘terrorist’ or
‘extremist’ label imposed on their groups.

Literature Review
In this section, studies that have generated theory to describe and explain the process of
radicalization and the effects of the “intersubjective creation and perception of the enemy” (Prus,
2005) are reviewed. Scholars state that individuals join extremist or terrorist groups to satisfy the
inherent need to acquire solidarity within group settings and subsequently develop a strong self
identity (della Porta, 1988; Zaman, 1998; Ezekiel, 2002; Hamm, 2002; Kirby, 2007). Prior belief
in a radical ideology also predisposes people towards joining radical groups (Zaman, 1998; Aho,
1990; Wintrobe, 2005). To recruit individuals, extremist or terrorist groups must convince them
of two things, 1) the superiority of the group ideology and 2) the malevolence of the group’s
enemy and the immediacy of the enemy’s threat (della Porta, 1988; Aho, 1994; Zaman, 1998;
Hamm, 2002). After recruitment, the groups must bring the values and beliefs of their new
members in line with the groups’ extreme ideology and further convince them of the immediacy
of the enemy’s threat and the necessity of taking violent defensive measures (Aho, 1990; Zaman,
1998; Hamm, 2002; Ezekiel, 2002). These goals are usually achieved by dispensing the new
recruits into small groups and training them in isolated settings (Hamm, 2002; Ezekiel, 2002).
The ‘small group dynamics’ (Ezekiel, 2002; Hamm, 2002; Silber & Bhatt, 2007) in isolated
conditions lead to the development of ‘groupthink,’ which occurs “when members’ striving for
unanimity override the motivations to realistically appraise alternative courses of action”

5

(George & Wilcox, 1996); and the ‘polarization’ of the new members, which is the “tendency for
group members to adopt more extreme positions than would have been predicted based on
knowledge of individual member positions” (Post & Ruby, 2002). The processes of ‘groupthink’
and ‘polarization’ lead to the 1) internalization of the group ideology, 2) the demonization of the
enemy, and 3) the acceptance of the necessity of defensive violent action (della Porta, 1988;
Aho, 1994; Zaman, 1998; Hamm, 2002; Kirby, 2007). This is known as the process of
radicalization (della Porta; 1988; Aho, 1990; Hamm, 2002; Ezekiel, 2002).
Aho’s (1994) ethnographic study of the ‘Identity Christians’ (a white supremacist group)
revealed that extremist groups socially create and perpetuate the enemy’s persona and threat
through a “process of reification” which is composed of five stages. According to Aho (1994) the
process is initiated by attaching derogatory labels to the enemy (naming) and then making those
labels ‘stick’ by publically reiterating them (legitimization). The labels are then validated
(mythmaking) by presenting real or invented evidence against the enemy (Aho, 1994). As this
knowledge passes from generation to generation (sedimentation) the group begins to invent
‘rituals’ and ‘symbols’ to remind members of the enemy’s evil and threat (Aho, 1994).
Radicalization scholars also emphasize the importance of enigmatic leaders, and propaganda in
spreading the message of the extremist group (Aho, 1994; Wictorowicz, 2005).
A majority of the reviewed radicalization studies suffered from what Prus (2005) calls the
‘deviant mysticism’ or the labeling of the study subjects as deviant (in this case terrorist or
extremist) and thus, the theoretical principles generated from these studies may be biased (Prus,
2005). In order to make sense of the participants’ life worlds, researchers must think beyond
pejorative labels and try to present the viewpoint of the individuals and groups being studied
(Prus, 2005). Furthermore, the impact of being labeled and treated as a ‘terrorist’ or ‘extremist’

6

on the perceptions and behaviors of the members of a stigmatized group, has not yet been
empirically studied (Atran, 2003). Thus, in a context specific manner, the original dissertation
was designed to study how members of a socially stigmatized group subjectively interpreted
their daily experiences with their critics and enemies, how they attributed these interpretations to
the overall persona and threat of the enemy, and how such attribution affected their behavior.

The Initial Research Plan
Research Design
Prus (1996 & 2003) stated that ethnographies are best suited for a study of cultures or
subcultures in the symbolic interaction tradition. Ethnography allows researchers to develop an
intimate familiarity with research participants and allows them to observe how participants
fashion their actions based on their intersubective (in communal or group settings) perceptions of
reality (Charmaz, 2006). Furthermore, for conducing exploratory studies of previously
unexplored cultures, scholars recommend the “grounded theory” ethnography (Charmaz, 2006).
A combination of two methods of qualitative inquiry (grounded theory and ethnography),
“grounded theory ethnographies” signify “ethnographies that give priority to studying
phenomenon or processes rather than the setting itself” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 22), and enable
researchers to gather theory focused data by requiring them to simultaneously engage in data
collection and data analysis.
The proposed grounded theory ethnography was to be conducted mainly at the Jamaat ud
Dawa’s Markus Qadsia (a community center), in Lahore, Pakistan. The data collection methods
were to include participant observation, intensive interviews of Dawa members, review of the
Jamaat ud Dawa literature, review of the audio CDs of lectures by Dawa scholars, and analysis

7

of Jamaat ud Dawa artwork. The duration of the data collection period was expected to be from
four to six months depending upon conditions at the research site, availability of the data, the
theoretical intricacies in the data and the multiplicity of themes generated from the data while in
the field. A theoretical sampling strategy (described below) was to be employed in the selection
of the times and places for participant observational sessions, interview subjects and Dawa
literature, CDs and artwork.
Research Site
The Markus Qadsia is one of the three main Jamaat ud Dawa community centers in
Pakistan (Taimoor, 2006). The Markus Qadsia is an enclosed area which houses a mosque, the
offices of important Mosools (Secondary heads appointed by the country head or Ameer as
representatives of various geographical areas), the head office of the student wing of the
organization, temporary lodgings for Mosools and traveling members, a cafeteria and a large
kitchen, a book store, and a clothes/CD store. The organization owns its own printing press and
produces a wide variety of literature ranging from ideological books, instructional books (that
explain the revivalist way of life), school books (that are used in the schools and seminaries
operated by the organization), monthly and weekly magazines, a daily newspaper, and other
publications. Almost all these materials are available at the Markus Qadsia bookstore. Audio
CDs of the lectures and sermons of famous revivalist scholars are available at the CD/clothes
store, along with various printed items of clothing (e.g. T Shirts and Jackets with the Jamaat ud
Dawa flag printed on them). All through the week, the Markus Qadsia is the hub of group
activities like daily prayers, religious lectures, general meetings, group meetings and religious
get-togethers.

8

Initial Entry and Data Sources
During funded predissertation fieldwork, I made contact with and intensively interviewed
five members of Jamaat ud Dawa including three Mosools (secondary heads). I was able to foster
a friendly relationship with one of the members, who later took on the role of a key informant.
He gave me a guided tour of the Markus Qadsia. At my request, he had contacted Markus
Qadsia administration and secured permission for me to visit the Markus Qadsia on a daily basis
and interview group members. However, they only allowed me to record my observations and
interviews by hand and did not permit me use any audio and visual recording devices. He also
secured permission for me to participate in one or two of the Jamaat ud Dawa’s social service
projects for a couple of weeks.
During field research, my plan was to collect four types of data: participant observation,
intensive interviews, analysis of Jamaat ud Dawa literature and audio CDs, and analysis of the
Dawa artworks and symbols. The participant observation sessions would mainly be conducted in
the Markus Qadsia mosque. Apart from the daily prayers (held five times every day) and the
Friday prayers, the mosque also served as a venue for religious lectures, special prayer sessions
and other activities. My hope was that participating with members in prayer sessions would help
me to establish a participant-observer role (Adler & Adler, 1987). According to Adler and Adler,
(1987), a “participant-observer” is a researcher who maintains his outsider status in the field yet
joins the members of groups and cultures understudy in some group-based activities. This level
of participation allows researchers to share some of the participants’ lived experiences and in
communal or group setting observe the participants make sense of their lived-experiences. I
planned to observe JuD members’ group based activities by participate in one or two of Dawa’s
social service projects. I also planned to conduct intensive interviews with members,
organizational leaders and Dawa scholars. Dawa scholars were expected to play a key role in
9

recommending and explaining the relevant Dawa literature and audio CDs. Lastly, the Jamaat ud
Dawa relies heavily on symbols. The Dawa artwork is extensively displayed on the
organizational flag, t-shirts, book covers, badges etc. Symbols take on a manifest value in the
daily lives of members, and were seen as an essential component of the planned study.
Sampling, Data Collection and Data Analysis
Theoretical sampling is the method recommended for purposive case selection by
scholars in grounded theory studies that utilize ethnographic methodology (Prus, 2003; Charmaz,
2006). Theoretical sampling requires that researchers develop codes, themes and categories by
analyzing the data collected in the first stage of the study (Charmaz, 2006; Creswell, 2007).
Then, the researcher reanalyzes the data and generates theoretical connections between themes
and categories (Charmaz, 2006; Creswell, 2007). The researcher then generates concept maps
that arrange the themes and categories into an overall theory and identifies explanatory gaps
between themes and themes that require further clarifications (Charmaz, 2006; Creswell, 2007).
These concept maps and the analytical memos that explain the maps serve guides for sampling in
the second stage of the study (Charmaz, 2006; Creswell, 2007). In the second stage of data
collection, the researcher’s objective in choosing a sample and collecting data is to fill out the
theoretical or explanatory gaps identified in the concept maps and analytical memos earlier
(Charmaz, 2006; Creswell, 2007). Several cycles of data collection, data analysis and theorybased sampling may follow, until the researcher reaches the point of theoretical saturation, i.e.
“the point at which gathering more data about a theoretical category reveals no new properties
nor yields any theoretical insight about the emerging grounded theory” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 189).
According to Charmaz (2006), to initiate the process of theoretical sampling, researchers
need reliable “anchor points” to collect data in the first stage of analysis. For the proposed study
10

these anchor points were provided by the seven research questions presented above, which
guided construction of a preliminary interview instrument. Upon arriving in the field, my plan
was to spend the first week conducting preliminary participant observation at the JuD’s complex
in Lahore complex, introduce myself to the Mosools, senior members, and JuD scholars at the
complex. My goal for this stage was to 1) develop a familiarity with the field setting and 2) get
an idea of the organization’s context. To achieve this second goal, I planned to choose
knowledgeable scholars and ask them to recommend literature on Dawa ideology and the history
of the Dawa movement in Pakistan. The plan was to spend the next couple of weeks reading this
literature and holding short interview sessions with the chosen scholars and ask them to clarify or
explain the major ideological concepts in the Dawa literature. Examining the text in the light of
the Dawa scholars’ interpretation was expected to enable me develop a thick (or context based)
understanding of the organization’s ideology (Creswell, 2007). During this period, I also planned
to conduct short participant observation sessions at the Markus mosque. Field jottings taken
during these sessions would later be fleshed out in the form of field notes mainly from memory.
As recommended by scholars, I was going to write up my field notes right after each observation
or interview sessions (Warren & Karner, 2005; Creswell, 2007). The field notes taken during this
period were expected to include description of incidents and behavior observed in the field
setting and my reflections regarding the setting as an outsider. I recognized that hunches about
the interpretation of behavior and connections between incident and behavior should be kept to a
minimum at this stage, to avoid making ‘half baked’ inferences that may bias the theoretical
sampling process in the second wave of data collection (Charmaz, 2006; Creswell, 2007). During
preliminary observational sessions, I expected I would also identify members who regularly pray
at the mosque. Next, I planned to approach these people, explain the purpose of my research, and

11

ask them if they would consent to grant me an interview. Restricting the number of hours that I
was planning to spend in the setting, arranging multiple short meetings with the scholars, and
making social contact with regular visitors are all strategies that ethnographic researchers use to
allow the setting inhabitants to gradually get accustomed to the researcher’s presence within
their milieu (Rossman & Rallis, 2003; Warren & Karner, 2005).. My primary goal in the first
stage of analysis was to gain a rudimentary context based understanding of the Dawa ideology.
Then, I was going to intensively interview the identified scholars and regular members, using the
interview instrument constructed out of the main research questions and sub-questions. At this
stage, I planned to interview 10 or fewer participants. These interviews would mark the end of
the first stage of data collection.
I planned to use NVivo software for analyzing the data in four stages. In stage one, I was
going to extensively code the data sentence by sentence (Charmaz, 2006). In stage two, I was
going to recode the data by using the “focused coding” technique (Charmaz, 2006), whereby
preliminary codes are reduced to broader codes based on their conceptual congruence. In the
third stage, I was going to use the seven research questions as my guide, and rearrange codes and
themes based on their relevance to a particular sub-question or the main research question. Then,
I was going to analyze each theme and begin to make conceptual connections and concept maps,
and look for gaps in theoretical reasoning within and between concepts (Charmaz, 2006). Lastly,
I would write analytical memos about the conceptual connections and theoretical patterns
emergent in the data, ambiguous information that should be reconfirmed, and strategies to fill in
the conceptual gaps. I would discuss the results of my analysis with dissertation committee
members and get reactions regarding the credibility of my analysis. Creswell (2007) and
Charmaz (2006) further state that another way to enhance credibility of a researcher’s

12

conclusions is to share them with the key informants and record their reactions and comments
(Consensual Validation). I was also planning to use this technique by sharing the results of the
data collected in the first stage of the study with my key informant. Finally, I was going to
reconfigure my interview instrument, reset protocols for the other methods of data collection
based on the type of information I needed to collect and head back to the setting. Following
standard grounded theory methods, I planned make a stage-by-stage progression towards
developing a context specific theory about how JuD members perceived the ‘self,’ the ‘enemy’
and the ‘terrorism’ label. Based on the input of the Committee members and my experiences in
the field, when I reached the point of theoretical saturation, I would leave the field and begin the
final data analysis (Charmaz, 2006). Charmaz (2006) identifies theoretical saturation as a point
in the analysis when all data driven theoretical concepts, trends and propositions are explained
by a single theory.
For the final analysis of the data, I was planning to use the ‘deductive inductive’ method
(Rossman & Rallis, 2003; Charmaz, 2006). This process allows researchers to first deconstruct
and then reconstruct their grounded theory (Rossman and Rallis, 2003; Warren & Karner, 2005;
Charmaz, 2006). Thus, in the first stage of this analysis, I planned to deductively retrace my
logical reasoning from theory to theoretical propositions (does the theory integrate all theoretical
propositions?), to themes (do the theoretical propositions holistically explain the themes?), to the
codes (do the themes represent the codes?) to the raw data (do the codes represent the data?).
Upon reaching this stage, I was planning to reconstruct the theory inductively by first analyzing
the raw data, then reevaluating the codes and the themes, redeveloping the theoretical
propositions and the concept maps, and finally reconstructing the theory. I was also going to

13

write analytical memos to analyze and explain any discrepancies in the initial theory making
process and any new themes emergent in the data.
Enhancing credibility of the study remained a major concern in designing this study. The
use of multiple data sources (triangulation), theoretical sampling, multiple investigators, the
grounded theory approach and the deductive-inductive analysis, are all methodological steps that
are aimed at enhancing credibility. Conversely, I realized that in ethnographies the researcher is
the vessel through which data flows (Creswell, 2007), and thus cannot be devoid of bias.
However, barring any unforeseen eventualities in the field, the level of researcher bias was
anticipated to be minimal. Regarding reliability or cross contextual consistency, since the focus
of the grounded theory approach is inherently context based, I anticipated that the theory would
have had limited generalizability. However, the review of empirical literature on radicalization
and extremism revealed that certain outcomes like groupthink, need for solidarity, polarization
etc. were observed cross contextually in the reviewed studies. Hence, the possibility exists that
the general principles derived from this study may have had cross-contextual value, but an
empirical evaluation of this assertion can only be made after similar studies have been conducted
in other settings.

An Unexpected Turn of Events and the New Research Plan
In the next chapter, I will narrate how certain IRB (Institutional Review Board)
constraints, regarding the use of my data, and an unexpected turn of events precluded me from
using my field notes and the interviews of the JuD members in Pakistan. The circumstances
forced me to look for alternate data sources. Under the circumstance, I found the analysis of the
news coverage that JuD received in the Pakistani newspapers, as a suitable and viable alternate.

14

However, using the newspaper data to explore the research question outlined above presented
several methodological and credibility concerns. To avoid the fallacy of fitting the data to
predefined research question in an inductive analysis, I performed a preliminary analysis of the
new data. Based on this analysis, I fashioned new research questions and methodology that best
fitted the data. In the next chapter, I will narrate the unforeseen circumstances that compelled me
to search for another data source and resultantly changed my research focus and methodology.
After a brief description of the data, I will state the new research questions and describe the
methodology used to analyze the newspaper data. I will present the findings of the analysis in
Chapters 3 and 4. In the concluding chapter, I will reflect back on what has been learned through
this study and what remains to be studied.

15

CHAPTER 2: HUMAN SUBJECT PROTECTION, FIELDWORK, AND POLITICAL
REALITIES LEAD TO A NEW PLAN
The literature on field research warns researchers of not losing their objectivity while trying
to make sense of the milieu of the people they are studying (Charmaz, 2006; Creswell, 2007).
However, some scholars believe that researchers studying oppressed groups or carrying out field
research in potentially dangerous settings cannot be reasonable expected to maintain mental or
behavioral neutrality (Sluka, 1990; Gilmore; 1991; Lee, 1995). They believe that the
circumstances in the field or the state of the study participants, may force the researcher to get
involved in their study settings or carry out the analysis with an acknowledged bias in favor or
against the study participants (Bourgoise, 1990; Sluka, 1990; Gilmore; 1991; Lee, 1995).
However, in my case, the experience of being negatively profiled by members of the JuD and the
US Department of Homeland Security changed how I viewed myself as a Pakistani Muslim
studying in the US.
From a methodological viewpoint, my field experiences also revealed the importance of
‘flexibility’ in field research (Hay-Mitchell, 2001). In dangerous or challenging field settings,
conditions are often highly sensitive to contextual changes (Sluka, 2001; Hay-Mitchell, 2001).
Researchers may need to alter and adjust their methodology and research focus to fit the
changing field conditions and their impact on the perceptions of the study participants, especially
their image of the researcher as an outsider (Hay-Mitchell, 2001). Furthermore, the IRB
institutions operate on pre-determined universal standards of research ethics and human subject
protection (Hay-Mitchell, 2001; Steinert, 2002). Reconciling the field specific requirements of
adjustment in methodology and research focus with IRB’s pre-fixed standards is often
challenging and at times impossible (Hay-Mitchell, 2001; Steinert, 2002).
16

After my dissertation committee approved my proposal, I submitted it to the MSU’s IRB
(Internal Review Board). The IRB, after a full review, conditionally approved my proposal. The
IRB required that to ensure the safety of human subjects involved in my study, I must not keep
the data or any record of the data in Pakistan. According to the IRB set protocol, after every field
session I had to type up my field notes or interviews on my laptop and electronically send them
to my dissertation chair in the US. Then I had to delete the field notes from my laptop and
destroy my field jottings without any delay.
Following the IRB approved protocol presented a methodological problem. I proposed to
use theoretical sampling in my original research plan. To follow a theory-based sampling
strategy, I needed access to my data after the completion of each stage of data collection. I
discussed this problem with my dissertation chair and we made a slight alteration in the original
research plan. I was not going to keep my data in Pakistan. However, after the completion of
each stage of data collection my chair was going to analyze the data in the US, discuss her
observations with me over the phone and together we would devise the sampling strategy for the
next stage of data collection.
After reaching Pakistan, I got in touch with my key informant and asked him if he would
be willing to introduce me to the person in-charge of the JuD complex in Lahore. He informed
me that the government had shut down a majority of the JuD buildings and relief camps,
including the JuD complex at Lahore. According to him, the JuD was at the time the target of a
nationwide crackdown operation. He believed that the crackdown was only temporary and the
government was going to allow the JuD to resurface in a month or so. I asked my key informant
if the organization leaders would allow me to collect observation-based data after the
organization reemerged. In his opinion after the government’s ban, the JuD members were

17

extremely suspicious of strangers. He believed JuD leaders would probably never allow a
“student from America” to observe or interview JuD members. He said that he would still be
willing to introduce me to his friends in the JuD and I could explain my project to them and ask
if they would be willing to grant me an interview. Later, I put the same question to another JuD
acquaintance and he shared the key-informant’s reservations about collecting observation-based
data.
To carry out my research under the given circumstances, I decided to take the key
informant’s advice and revise my methodology. The revised project was an availability samplebased intensive interview study into the perceptions of JuD members. Almost three months after
my arrival in Pakistan, my key informant took me to a religious seminary to interview a JuD
member who was a student there. The members consented to the interview. After the interview,
in a friendly conversation over a cup of tea, the member offered to take me to his classroom and
introduce me to his fellow students. He said that majority of his class fellows were associated
with the JuD and, provided their class teacher allowed I could introduce my study to the students
and leave behind my contact information for students wanting to participate in my study to
voluntarily get in touch with me.
In the classroom, around thirty students were sitting on a carpeted floor in a rectangular
formation. The student I had just interviewed introduced me to his teacher and the teacher
allowed me to talk to the class for five minutes. I introduced myself and my research project to
the students, responded to the student’s questions and concerns and left my calling card with
them. That night I received a call from my key informant. He informed me that after I left the
seminary, the students in his friend’s class asked for their teacher’s advice about participating in
my study. According to the key informant, the teacher strictly forbade them from contacting me

18

because he believed that I was a “FBI agent.” We decided that I should proceed with caution and
wait for a few weeks before the next interview.
I collected twenty interviews of JuD members in the next one and a half year. At this point,
at the advice of my chair, I decided to stop collecting data, go back to the US and start analyzing
the interviews. I boarded a connecting flight to US on 12/26/2010. My connection was in
London at the Heathrow airport. At Heathrow, while I was in a queue to board my plane to the
US, a man who introduced himself as a Homeland Security agent asked for my passport. After
reviewing my papers, he made a couple of phone calls and informed me that my visa had been
cancelled. He ordered me to take to the next flight back to Pakistan.
After I was sent back to Pakistan, the IRB requirement of not keeping a copy of the data
in Pakistan precluded me from analyzing the interviews. Therefore, I had to look for an
alternative data source to complete my dissertation. After considering various options, I decided
that the analysis of the statements of JuD members in the Pakistani newspapers was the best
alternative data source for studying JuD’s perceptions.

Discovery of the Newspaper Data and What it Consisted of
The reference wing of an NGO called the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
(HRCP) originally collected the data that were used for this study. The data were stored in
reference files. Two individuals operated the reference wing of the HRCP. These individuals
were responsible for maintaining about 50 newspaper reference files on various topics. They
maintained the files by selecting relevant news items out 15 nationwide newspapers in Pakistan
and pasting them in their respective reference files on a daily basis. One of the reference files
labeled “Jamaat ud Dawa” contained all the news coverage the organization received since 2007

19

in the 15 newspapers that the HRCP referenced daily. I used this reference file to create the
qualitative and quantitative datasets used for this study.
The process through which the HRCP reference staff selected the stories was subject to
three limitations. Firstly, there is a possibility that while maintaining the JuD reference file, the
reference section staff may have missed some JuD related news items due to human error.
Secondly, according to the reference staff, if more than one newspaper covered the same JuD
related event, then they did not paste all the stories that covered the event in the JuD reference
file. Instead, they selected the news story that “covered the facts best” for referencing. This bias
in the process of selection precluded comparisons between the news coverage given to same
events by different newspapers. Furthermore, while selecting the story that best covered the
facts, they may have introduced a systemic bias by selecting more stories of the newspapers they
personally liked.
I made photocopies of all JuD related news items published between 11/01/2007 to
09/23/2010 out of the JuD reference file. The reference file contained three hundred and eighty
two (382) JuD related news stories that were published between these dates. Then I recorded the
headline, name of the reporter, name and language of the newspaper, the basic facts of the story
and the pro or anti-JuD reporter bias reflected in the story, for each of the three hundred and
eighty two stories, in a template that I created in Microsoft Word. I also recorded all statements
and paraphrases in which an entity negatively labeled the JuD, the JuD countered a negative
label and the JuD negatively labeled an entity, in the word templates. Lastly, I made a story-wise
record of all information about the JuD’s relief and welfare activities in the word templates.
Later, I imported the word template into NVIVO 9.

20

My preliminary analysis of the data revealed that the statements contained in the news
represented how entities presented reality and that I could not take these quotes to signify
entities’ perceptions of reality. Furthermore, I found that the statements and paraphrases
contained in the news stories made better sense if viewed within the context of the overall
labeling discourse between the JuD and its critics in the Pakistani newspapers. Therefore, I
decided to change my research focus from the JuD’s perception of ‘self’ and ‘enemy’ to the
JuD’s discourse with their ‘enemy’ and JuD’s presentation of ‘self’ and ‘enemy’ over the
Pakistani print media.
In the next section, I will formally state the new research questions of this study.

Questions that could be Answered with the Newspaper Data
Main Research Question
What were the dynamics of the labeling discourse between the JuD and its accusers as
presented through the Pakistani print media? How did the JuD present itself over the
Pakistani print media?
Sub-Questions
Research Question 1
Did a quantitative comparison between the news coverage the JuD received in the Urdu
and English newspapers reflect any differences? Did the English and Urdu news coverage
of JuD display consistent pro or anti-JuD reporter biases?

21

Research Question 2
How did entities negatively label the JuD? Who were the labelers and what negative
labels did they use for JuD? How did they construct the negative labels? Did the
statements that negatively labeled JuD reflect the labelers’ strategic interests?
Research Question 3
How did the JuD counter negative labels? How did the JuD construct their responses to
negative labels? Did the counter labeling statements reflect JuD’s strategic interests?
Research Question 4
How did the JuD negatively label entities? Who did they label and what negative labels
did they use? How did they construct the negative labels? Did the JuD’s statements that
negatively label entities reflect the organization’s strategic interests?

Method for Analyzing the News Data
The word templates that I imported into NVivo were categorized into the following
headings: the date of publication of the story, name and language of newspaper the story was
published in, the headline and name of the author of the story, and the observable pro-JuD, antiJuD or neutral stance of the author. Under these headings, I recorded the descriptive information
about each story. The word templates also contained headings under which I recorded passages
that reported statements in which JuD was negatively labeled, the JuD countered negative labels
and the JuD negatively labeled someone. Lastly, I also recorded all information about actions
taken in favor or against JuD by someone, JuD’s political activism and JuD’s relief and welfare
activities, in the word template for each story. Using the NVivo “External Data Document

22

Import” feature, I imported the three hundred and eighty two word templates as individual files
in a single NVIVO project. Within each file, the headings from the templates were imported as
nodes and the information typed under the headings as data categorized within their respective
nodes.
Then, I arranged the stories in a chronological order in NVivo and reviewed the data
several times. The analysis revealed that the discourse between JuD and its critics followed time
ordered trends. Changes in the context had an impact on the nature and subject matter of the
discourse. To understand the impact of these trends on the exchange of negative labels between
entities over the Pakistani print media, I classified the data into six phases. In the following
paragraphs, I will define the time span of these phases and identify the issues that dominated the
discourse in each phase.
Phase 1 lasted from 11/01/2007 to 12/01/2008. During this period, reports of the public
statements made by the head of JuD dominated the news coverage. Twenty six (6.8%) out of the
three hundred and eighty two stories were published in this timeframe.
Phase 2, 12/02/2008 to 12/31/2008, was dominated by news coverage related to the
Pakistani Government’s crackdown on the JuD. The Government of Pakistan banned the JuD, on
12/11/2008, after the UN placed restrictions on the organization and declared that JuD was part
of the Al Qaeda network. The data contained a hundred and eighteen (30.9%) stories that were
published in this phase.
The news coverage during phase 3, 01/01/2009 to 06/19/2009, was dominated by reports
of the protest movement launched by the JuD and its allies against the government’s ban, and the

23

court hearing and release of the house arrested head of the organization, Hafiz Saeed. Eighty two
(21.5%) out of the three hundred and eighty two stories were published during phase 3.
In phase 4, 06/20/2009 to 02/05/2010, the news coverage mainly followed the discourse
related to the re-arrest and subsequent release of Hafiz Saeed, the head of the JuD. The data
contained forty two (11%) stories that were published in this time span.
The news coverage in phase 5, 06/02/2010 to 07/24/2010, marked the reemergence of the
organization in the public sphere and mainly contained politically charged public statements by
the leaders of the organization and reactions and responses by the Pakistani Government, India
and the US. Out of the three hundred and eighty two stories, forty eight (12.6%) were published
during phase 5.
Finally, the news coverage in phase 6, 07/25/2010 to 09/23/2010, follows the JuD’s relief
efforts during the 2010 floods in Pakistan, and reactions from various interest groups including
the US, the UN, India and the Government of Pakistan. Sixty six (17.3%) stories in the data were
published during phase 6.
Next, I separately analyzed the news stories in each phase. This analysis allowed me to
observe the context specific construction and sense making of negative labels by entities. Entities
responded to the context and continuously gave meaning to occurring events using ‘frames’ to
construct negative labels or responses to negative labels. Based on the review of empirical
literature (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Hagan, 2008; Hagan, 2010), for the present study the term
‘frames’ signifies commonly held beliefs, ideas and values in Pakistan or by representatives of
the Pakistan Government or foreign governments or entities. The term ‘framing’ signifies an
entity’s use of frames (or commonly held values in that group) to give meaning to events over
the Pakistani print media. Thus, entities constructed negative labels or responses to negative

24

labels by actively providing subjective import to events and issues. Based on the analysis of the
data, for the purpose of this study I have defined the term negative labels as “a statement or
certain words of phrases in a statement that attach negative attribute(s) to an entity or entities
either in general or with reference to specific issues or events.” Overall, the analysis of entities’
negatively labeling statements consistently showed each entity’s self-interest reflected through
its negative labeling of others. I will further explain this observation in chapter 4, while
presenting findings of the qualitative analysis.
Following the above-mentioned definition of frames, framing and negative labels, I
coded all relevant statements in each story first by the frame(s) used to interpret events in the
statement and then by the negative labels generated in the statement. Next, I analyzed how JuD
and other entities provided subjective import to events by using frames and labels, and whether
entities were guided by self-interest in projecting subjective interpretations of reality through the
Pakistani newspapers. I performed a three-staged analyses of the stories published in each phase.
First, I analyzed the data after arranging it in chronological order. Then, I analyzed the data in
each phase categorized by nodes. Specifically, I analyzed entities’ use of frames and labels in the
statements contained in each node. Lastly, I looked at entities’ use of frames and labels in their
statements within the chronological order of events that occurred in each phase, to understand
the context specific import that entities communicated through messages containing negative
labels or responses to negative labels. I wrote analytical memos at each stage of the analysis and
later used the memos to write up the findings of the phase-wise analysis of the data.
This analysis allowed me to understand the import of frames and labels in context by
observing how entities projected reality in the print media by consistently providing subjective
interpretations to occurring events. After developing a context specific understanding of the use

25

of frames and labels, I analyzed the entire data categorized by frames and labels to unearth the
overall trends reflected in entities’ use of frames and labels to interpret reality and to understand
how entities’ self-interest reflected through their interpretation of reality. I will present the
findings of this analysis in chapter 4.
In the following chapter, I will present the descriptive statistics and analysis of the
quantitative data that I generated out of the NVivo file. The procedure of creating the
quantitative file was as follows. I used the matrix query function to create a contingency table in
which the rows represented the three hundred and eighty two stories and the columns represented
the frequency count of the data contained in the nodes for each story. For example, if story 10
reported two statements in which JuD negatively labeled an entities and one statement in which
an entity negatively labeled the JuD, then the corresponding frequency in the row representing
story 10 for the columns “Negative Labels by JuD” and “Negative Labels on JuD” was 2 and 1,
respectively.
I exported this contingency table as an EXCEL file and later imported the EXCEL file
into SPSS. In the SPSS file, the stories that represented the rows in the contingency table were
imported as cases and the nodes that represented the columns in the contingency table were
imported as variables. Then I reviewed the raw data and recorded the story wise count of 1)
reports of JuD’s actions taken in favor or against other entities, and 2) statements in which the
JuD labeled itself. I later added these as separate variables in the SPSS file by hand. The results
of the quantitative analysis of this SPSS file are presented in the next chapter.

26

CHAPTER 3: OVERVIEW OF NEWS COVERAGE
Prus (1996) defined symbolic interactionism as the “study of the ways in which people
make sense of their life-situations and the ways in which they go about their activities in
conjunction with others, on a day to day basis.” The original intent of the present study was to
explore how members of JuD shared their lived experiences with other group members and how
they intersubjetively developed a perception of reality. Specifically, the study was designed to
develop understanding of JuD members’ perception of self, enemy and negative labels imposed
on their group.
Early at the pre-dissertation stage, I discovered that in sharing their perspective about the
‘enemy,’ JuD members explained their subjective interpretation of experiences (generated
through the process of intesubjective sense making) that were mediated and not lived. In other
words, their knowledge of the enemy was not based on personal experiences, but was passed on
to them through some audio, visual or textual medium. The pre-dissertation data and the
interviews of JuD members collected later, revealed that when members were asked to identify
the enemies of Muslims or the JuD, they consistently named foreign entities like the US, India,
and Israel. Most of the individuals I interviewed did not narrate any instances of personal or
lived experiences with the entities they perceived as the ‘enemy.’ They constructed a perception
of the enemy through the intersubjective interpretation of mediated experiences. For example, in
the pre-dissertation data, two members identified the “Jews and the Christians” as the enemies of
Islam and the JuD. However, they did not share any anecdotes or personal experiences with the
“Jews and Christians.” Their experiences with the “Jews and Christians” were based on the
Quranic Verse 5:51 “O you who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians as Auliya, they are
but Auliya' of one another….” The term Auliya however can mean friend, protector or helper
27

when translated into English or Urdu. Depending on which of three meanings is attributed to the
term Auliya in the verse, it conveys different messages. Merriam Webster dictionary defines the
word “Friend” as “one attached to another by affection or esteem,” “Protector” as “one who
protects or defends,” and “Helper” as “one that provides assistance” (Marian-Webster, n.d.).
However, the interviewed members all believed that the term meant ‘friend,’ and that the Quran
had declared that the Jews and Christians could never be the friends of the Muslims. These
members further believed that if the “Jews and Christians” could never be the friends of the
Muslims, and the opposite of the word ‘friend’ is ‘enemy,’ then the Quranic verse declared the
“Jews and Christians” as enemies of the Muslims. Asking the participants why they believed that
the term Auliya specifically meant “friend.” revealed the influence of Dawa Scholars on the how
the members inter-subjectively interpreted the Quran and Sunnah.
During a casual conversation with my key informant, I asked him about why almost all
the members of the JuD that I had interviewed believed that the term Auliya in Quranic verse
5:51 meant friend and not protector or helper. He answered, “Our (Salfi) scholars have
interpreted it so…” Thus, members’ did not directly make sense of their mediated experience
with the “Jews and Christians” as provided through verse 5:51 of the Quran. They relied on the
Dawa Scholars’ interpretation of Quran to understand the verse.
This example was important to present here because it shows that lived experiences
usually do not have any meaning attached to them (Prus, 1996). They acquire meaning when
individuals share experiences with others by reduce experiences or events into words and groups
intersubjectively give meaning to events (Prus, 1996). However, mediated experiences usually
have some meaning attached to them as they are not directly perceived and are communicated
through a medium. In the example described above, the Quranic verse has given some meaning
28

to the relationship between the Muslims and the “Jews and Christians.” The verse communicates
that Muslims cannot have “Jews and Christians” as friends, allies or protectors.
Similarly, the newspaper stories about the JuD signify readers’ mediated experiences
with the group. Therefore, the selection of JuD related events for reporting and the words used to
report events in the Pakistani newspapers not only provide information but also convey meaning
to the readers. For the purpose of this study, understanding the news coverage that the JuD
received in the Pakistani Urdu and English newspapers raises the following questions: How was
the JuD portrayed in the Pakistani newspapers and did the English and Urdu print media in
Pakistan portrayed the JuD differently? An affirmative answer to the second question would
show the need to analyze data from both news sources, to obtain the full scope of news coverage,
to confirm (or disconfirm) findings across sources, and the potential impact of JuD’s news
coverage on readers.
To answer the two questions about the news, I will first describe the distribution of news
items over the six phases that I inductively identified from the data. I will also describe and
compare the distribution of stories in the English and Urdu newspapers separately. Then I will
look at the language-based distribution of news stories related to four specific labeling-related
themes across the phases. These themes are: 1) actions taken in favor of or against the JuD by
entities not affiliated to JuD; 2) negative and positive labels attached to the group by entities not
affiliated to JuD; 3) JuD members’ negative or positive labeling of entities not affiliated to JuD,
and members’ perception about their organization; and 4) JuD’s relief and welfare activities.
The analysis of the theme specific distributions of stories across the six phases reveals
differences in how the English and Urdu newspapers in Pakistan portray the JuD.

29

Distribution of Stories across Phases and Languages
Table 1 shows the distribution of three hundred and eighty two English and Urdu stories
by the 6 phases of coverage. Each cell includes the number of stories for a language and phase,
and the percent that the number in each cell is of the three hundred and eighty two stories.
English newspapers provided almost three quarters (72%) of the total JuD news coverage
(Table 1). Coverage was concentrated in phases 2 (30.9 % of the stories) and 3 (21.5% of the
stories. Contextual factors explain the disproportionately high news coverage JuD received in
Pakistani newspapers during phases 2 and 3. In phase 2, the Pakistani Government started a
nationwide crackdown operation against the JuD, which received extensive news coverage.
Similarly, in phase 3 the proceedings of Hafiz Saeed’s petition in the Lahore High Court
challenging his house arrest and reaction of local and foreign entities on Hafiz Saeed’s
subsequent release, received extensive news coverage.
In the remaining four phases (phases 1, 4, 5 and 6), the JuD received the most news
coverage in Phase 6. In phase 6, the news focused on the group’s relief efforts after the July
2010 floods in Pakistan.
Table 1

Number and percent of all stories about JuD by language and phase

Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3 Phase 4
% (n)
% (n)
% (n)
% (n)
English Stories 3.9 %
23.3%
17.5%
11.0%
(15)
(89)
(67)
(42)
Urdu Stories
2.9%
7.6%
3.9%
0.00%
(11)
(29)
(15)
(0)
Total (N)
6.8%
30.9%
21.5%
11.0%
(26)
(118)
(82)
(42)
Chi Square = 86.1
Degrees of Freedom = 5
P Value = 0.00* (significant 95% confidence Interval)

30

Phase 5 Phase 6
% (n)
% (n)
11.0%
5.2%
(42)
(20)
1.6% (6) 12.0%
(46)
12.6%
17.3%
(48)
(66)

Total
% (N)
72.0%
(275)
28.0%
(107)
100.0%
(382)

Table 2

Number and percent of stories about JuD in English and Urdu by phase

Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3 Phase 4
(%) n
(%) n
(%) n
(%) n
English Stories 57.7%
75.4%
81.7%
100.0%
(15)
(89)
(67)
(42)
Urdu Stories
42.3%
24.6%
18.3%
0.0%
(11)
(29)
(15)
(0)
Total (N)
100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0%
(26)
(118)
(82)
(42)
Chi Square = 86.1
Degrees of Freedom = 5
P Value = 0.00* (significant 95% confidence Interval)
Table 3

Phase 5
(%) n
87.5%
(42)
12.5%
(6)
100.0%
(48)

Phase 6
(%) n
30.3%
(20)
69.7%
(46)
100.0%
(66)

Total
% (N)
72.0%
(275)
28.0%
(107)
100.0%
(382)

Standardized Residual of the coverage given to JuD in English and Urdu stories
by phases

English Stories
Urdu Stories

Phase 1
SR
-0.9
1.4

Phase 2
SR
0.4
-0.7

Phase 3
SR
1.0
-1.7

Phase 4
SR
2.1
-3.4

Phase 5
SR
1.3
-2.0

Phase 6
SR
-4.0
6.4

Table 2 shows the percentage distribution of the English and Urdu news coverage that the
JuD received within each phase. The percentages in this table were calculated by dividing the
frequency in each cell by its column total. In phase 1, just over half (57.5%) of the stories were
in English papers. The proportion of stories in English papers steadily increased to 75.4% in
phase 2, 81.7% in phase 3, and 100% of the stories in phase 4. Then, the English news coverage
of JuD tapered down to 87.5 % of all stories published in phase 5. The general trend of news
coverage displayed in the first 5 phases was completely reversed in phase 6, when the English
newspapers only published 30.3% of the total JuD related stories.
Table 3 presents the standardized residuals, which are the standardized values of the
differences between the observed and expected values, for the Chi-square analysis. Since the
values are standardized, any value that is greater than ± 1.96 is significant at the 0.05 level.
31

These values are used to determine which cells in the contingency table significantly contributed
to the overall relationship between the dependent (language of the stories) and the independent
(phases) variable. The standardized residual for the Urdu news coverage in phase 3 is quite close
to being statistically significant (-1.7). The negative sign of the standardized values denotes that
the observed number of Urdu stories in the phase was less than expected. In phase 4, the residual
values for both the English and Urdu news coverage are statistically significant (2.1 and -3.4
respectively). The positive sign of the standardized residual of the English news coverage
signifies that the observed number of English stories was significantly more than the expected
number. Similarly, the negative sign of the standardized residuals for the Urdu news coverage in
phase 4 signifies that the observed number of Urdu stories was significantly less that the
expected number. In phase 5, the standardized residual for the English news coverage tapers
down from being statistically significant at 2.1 in phase 4 to the insignificant 1.3; however, the
standardized residual for the Urdu news coverage is still statistically significant at -2.0, meaning
that the observed Urdu news coverage given to the JuD was significantly less than expected.
Lastly, the reversal of trends of news coverage in phase 6 is statistically significant. The
standardized residual of -4.0 for the English news coverage means that fewer than expected JuDrelated English news stories were published in phase 6. Alternatively, the statistically significant
standardized residual value of 6.4 for the Urdu news coverage of JuD in phase 6 denotes that
significantly more JuD related Urdu stories were published in this phase than expected. A
comparison of standardized residuals for the English and Urdu news coverage shows that
between phases 3 to 5 the English newspapers consistently provided more coverage to the JuD,
however in Phase 6, compared to English newspapers, the JuD received significantly more news
coverage in Urdu newspapers.

32

Recall that the phases reflect significant events or chains of events covered in the news.
For example, during phase 2 (12/02/2008 to 12/31/2008), almost the entire news coverage was
related to the UN sanctioning of the JuD followed by the Pakistan Government’s crackdown on
JuD. The variation in the proportion of English and Urdu stories by phase meant that the types of
events or incidents occurring in the phases affected the relative degree of attention paid to the
JuD by English and Urdu newspapers. Thus, to further explore the language based trends in the
news coverage of the group, the stories were further classified into four labeling related
categories. Results are summarized in several contingency tables, each of which presents a
phase-wise breakdown of the English and Urdu news stories for four specific aspect of labeling:
(1) actions taken against and in favor of the group by some individual, group, the government or
some foreign (non-Pakistani) entity (Tables 4 and 5); (2) negative and positive labels put on JuD
by some individual, group, the government or some foreign entity (Tables 6 and 7); (3) negative
and positive labels placed by members or leaders of the JuD on some individual, group,
government or foreign entity, and self labeling by members or leaders of the group (Tables 8, 9
and 10); and (4) coverage of the JuD’s relief and welfare activities, and statements made by
leaders or members of the group asking the people of Pakistan to donate money for charity or
participate in relief and welfare activities (Table 11).
Chi square values are not presented for any of the following contingency tables. The chi
square test can only be applied when the expected frequency in each cell in the contingency table
is not less than five, and this was not the case for these tables (Singleton and Straits, 1999). In the
tables that follow, the percentages were calculated by dividing the phase and language specific
frequencies of stories (e.g., the number of Urdu stories in phase 1) for each of the five labeling
related themes by their corresponding total number of stories, shown in table 1. In other words,
33

the cell frequencies in table 1 were used as denominators. Percentages reflect the proportion of
stories in a particular phase and language that had a certain type of content, for example
information about negative labeling or relief work.

Reports of Negative and Positive Actions Towards the Group
Negative Actions
Sixty-one news stories described some individual, group, the government or some foreign
entity taking a negative action against the JuD (Table 4). These stories reported incidents like the
UN ban on the JuD (story 35), the government crackdown against the organization (a total of
thirty stories ranging between story numbers 35 and 118), the Indian government requesting that
the UNSC ban the JuD (story 35) or that Interpol issue a red corner notice against the leader of
the group (story 245), the Interpol issuing the red corner notice (story 248) or the Government of
Punjab’s takeover of the JuD central office and complex in Muredke (story 165).
Table 4

Number and percent of all stories in each phase and language that reported actions
taken against the JuD

Actions Against
JuD
English
Stories
Urdu
Stories
Total (N)

Phase 1
% (n)
6.7%
(1/15)
0.0%
(0/11)
3.8%
(1/26)

Phase 2
% (n)
29.2%
(26/89)
20.7%
(6/29)
27.1%
(32/118)

Phase 3
% (n)

Phase 4
% (n)

Phase 5
% (n)

Phase 6
% (n)

13.4%
(9/67)
33.3%
(5/15)
17.1%
(14/82)

9.5%
(4/42)
0.0%
(0/0)
9.5%
(4/42)

11.9%
(5/42)
0.0
(0/6)
10.4%
(5/48)

10.0%
(2/20)
6.5%
(3/46)
6.5%
(5/66)

Total
% (N)
17.1%
(47/275)
13.1%
(14/107)
16.0%
(61/382)

The English newspapers, regardless of the phase, provide more attention to actions
against JuD. Specifically in phase 2, almost one-third of the English news stories reported
34

negative actions against the group. For the Urdu newspapers, in two phases none of the stories
mentioned this issue. However, in phase 2 and phase 3, one-fifth and one-thrid of Urdu stories
covered this theme. More Urdu stories were found in phase 6 compared to the other phases, but
only a small proportion of them mention actions against the JuD.
Positive Actions
Fifteen stories reported some action by a JuD non-member taken in favor or support of
the JuD (Table 5). These stories covered such events as some local religious organization
protesting against the government decision to crackdown on the JuD (e.g., stories 107, 110 and
131), similar protests launched by the recipients of the JuD relief and welfare services and
ordinary citizens of Pakistan (stories 92, 107, 114, 164, 167 and 168), a decision of the High
Court of Pakistan ordering the release of the leader of the group from the protective custody of
the state (story 252) and the Pakistani Government’s refusal of the FBI’s request to visit the JuD
complex in Muredke (285).
Table 5

Number and percent of all stories in each phase and language that reported actions
supportive to the JuD

Actions Supporting
JuD
English
Stories
Urdu
Stories
Total (N)

Phase 1
% (n)

Phase 2
% (n)

Phase 3
% (n)

Phase 4
% (n)

Phase 5
% (n)

Phase 6
% (n)

0.0%
(0/15)
0.0%
(0/11)
0.0%
(0/26)

2.2%
(2/89)
17.2%
(5/29)
5.9%
(7/118)

1.5%
(1/67)
13.3%
(2/15)
3.7%
(3/82)

2.4%
(1/42)
0.0%
(0/0)
2.4%
(1/42)

7.1%
(3/42)
0.0%
(0/6)
6.3%
(3/48)

0.0%
(0/20)
2.2%
(1/46)
1.5%
(1/66)

Total
% (N)
2.5%
(7/275)
7.5%
(8/107)
3.9%
(15/382)

A slightly higher proportion of the Urdu than the English news stories contained
information about pro-JuD incidents. In phases 2 and 3, 17.2% and 13.3% of all Urdu stories
35

reported pro-JuD actions. Review of the stories in these phases showed that most of the Urdu
stories published in phases 2 and 3 that reported pro-JuD actions covered the protest movement
that was launched against the government’s crackdown on the JuD by the organization’s
supporters, allies and clients.
Tables 4 and 5 cumulatively suggest that English news stories tended to concentrate more
on actions taken against the group. In contrast, a higher proportion of the Urdu news stories
covered taken in favor of JuD.

Reports of Negative or Positive Labels on JuD
Negative Labels
Fifty one stories reported negative labels imposed on the JuD by non-members (Table 6).
The negative labelers included the governments of Pakistan, India and the United States. English
newspapers published the majority of stories that reported negative labels, especially in phase 2,
when the largest number of English stories came out, and 20.2% of them reported negative labels
on JuD. Overall, compared to Urdu newspapers, English newspapers consistently published more
stories that reported negative labels on JuD in all phases.
Table 6

Number and percent of all stories in each phase and language that reported
negative labels on JuD

Negative Labels
on JuD
English
Stories
Urdu
Stories
Total (N)

Phase 1
% (n)
13.3%
(2/15)
0.0%
(0/11)
7.7%
(2/26)

Phase 2
% (n)
20.2%
(18/89)
6.9%
(2/29)
16.9%
(20/118)

Phase 3
% (n)

Phase 4
% (n)

Phase 5
% (n)

Phase 6
% (n)

11.9%
(8/67)
6.7%
(1/15)
9.8%
(8/82)

13.0%
(8/42)
0.0%
(0/0)
13.0%
(8/42)

14.3%
(6/42)
0.0%
(0/6)
12.5%
(6/48)

20.0%
(4/20)
4.3%
(2/46)
9.1%
(6/66)

36

Total
% (N)
16.7%
(46/275)
4.7%
(5/107)
13.3%
(51/382)

Positive Labels
Only eighteen stories described an entity’s positive labeling of JuD (Table 7). In most
cases, the positive labeling was attributed to members of local religious and political parties,
recipients of the JuD relief and welfare services and ordinary citizens. These are the same groups
that launched a pro-JuD protest movement in phases 2 and 3. English newspapers reported more
statements in which JuD was positively labeled in all six phases, however proportion-wise 17.2%
and 13.3% of the Urdu stories published in phases 2 and 3 reported positive labels (Table 7). As
mentioned earlier, during these phases the JuD allies launched a protest movement in response to
the government’s crackdown on the organization. These allies mainly included the local religious
parties and the recipients of the JuD relief and welfare.
Table 7

Number and percent of all stories in each phase and language that reported
positive labels on JuD

Positive Labels
on JuD
English
Stories
Urdu
Stories
Total (N)

Phase 1
% (n)
0.0%
(0/15)
0.0%
(0/11)
0.0%
(0/26)

Phase 2
% (n)
9.0%
(8/89)
17.2%
(5/29)
11.0%
(13/118)

Phase 3
% (n)

Phase 4
% (n)

Phase 5
% (n)

Phase 6
% (n)

4.5%
(3/67)
13.3%
(2/15)
6.1%
(5/82)

2.4%
(1/42)
0.0%
(0/0)
2.4%
(1/42)

2.4%
(1/42)
0.0%
(0/6)
2.1%
(1/48)

15.0%
(3/20)
2.2%
(1/46)
6.1%
(4/66)

Total
% (N)
5.8%
(16/275)
7.5%
(8/107)
6.3%
(24/382)

As a point of comparison, overall, a higher proportion of the English news stories
provided information on negative labeling that were attached to the JuD (16.7% of all the
English stories versus just 4.7% of all the Urdu stories) by non-JuD affiliates. In a different
pattern, small and relatively comparable proportions of English and Urdu stories (5.8% of
37

English and 7.5% of Urdu stories) reported statements in which a non-member positively labeled
the JuD.

Reports of Negative Labels, Positive Labels and Self Labeling by JuD
This section examines the news coverage of JuD members’ perspective on other entities
and of their own organization. Particularly, the analysis focuses on stories that reported
statements in which JuD members negatively labeled someone, positively labeled someone, or
self labeled their organization. Qualitative analysis of members’ statements that negatively
labeled someone, or self labeled the JuD will be presented later in the next chapter.
Negative Labels
Nearly one in five (18.1%) of stories presented statements by JuD members that
negatively labeled someone (Table 8). In the news accounts, group members consistently
negatively labeled the governments of Pakistan, India, the United States, Israel and the UN.
Hafiz Saeed, the head of the group, made a majority of these statements.
In phase 1, regardless of the language, just under half of the stories included accounts of
JuD members negatively labeling people, groups, or nations (Table 8). In phases 2 through 4, a
smaller proportion, between approximately one-tenth and one-quarter of the English stories,
recounted negative labeling by JuD, and with the exception of phase 5, few or none of the Urdu
stories did this. However, in phase 5, five of the six Urdu stories contained information about
JuD members negatively labeling someone. Also, the frequency of stories containing negative
labels by JuD members in phase 5 (sixteen stories) is greater than in any other phase. I
mentioned earlier that Phase 5 marked JuD’s comeback in the public sphere after being banned
in phase 2. The JuD’s reemergence was marked by succession of stories in which Hafiz Saeed
38

aggressively criticized India, Israel, the US, the UN and the Pakistani Government on various
issues.
Table 8

Number and percent of all stories in each phase and language that reported
negative labels by JuD

Negative Labels
by JuD
English
Stories
Urdu
Stories
Total (N)

Phase 1
% (n)
46.7%
(7/15)
45.4%
(5/11)
46.1%
(12/26)

Phase 2
% (n)
10.1%
(9/89)
6.9%
(2/29)
3.3%
(11/118)

Phase 3
% (n)

Phase 4
% (n)

Phase 5
% (n)

Phase 6
% (n)

14.9%
(10/67)
0.0%
(0/15)
12.2%
(10/82)

21.4%
(9/42)
0.0%
(0/0)
21.4%
(9/42)

26.2%
(11/42)
83.3%
(5/6)
33.3%
(16/48)

20.0%
(4/20)
15.2%
(7/46)
16.7%
(11/66)

Total
% (N)
18.1%
(50/275)
17.8%
(19/107)
18.1%
(69/382)

Positive Labels
The analysis of the pre-dissertation data and the newspaper data provide corroborating
evidence that the JuD publically supports the Kashmir separation movement against India. In the
news, JuD members consistently positively labeled the Muslims living in the Indian part of
Kashmir and the Kashmiri-Muslim separatist movement in India. For example, in story 356
Hafiz Saeed, the head of JuD, stated to the media, “Kashmiri Muslims are facing the worst
possible state terrorism of India… like an unmovable mountain.” In another story, Hafiz Saeed
was quoted as follows: “What is our (JuD’s) relationship to Kashmir? The relationship of belief”
(story 268). In this quote, Hafiz Saeed conveys that as a Muslim, he considered helping the
Kashmiri Muslims as a religious obligation. JuD members also positively labeled the local
religious organizations, Saudi Arabia (because the group traces its revivalist root from Saudi
Arabia) and the Lahore High Court for ordering the Pakistani Government to release Hafiz Saeed
from protective custody.
39

Only eighteen stories presented JuD members as positively labeling another group. None,
one or two stories appeared in the English or the Urdu papers through the first four phases. In
phases 5 and 6, a small proportion of stories in both languages contained such information.
Breaking this pattern, half of the six Urdu stories in phase 5 contained JuD affiliates’ statements
that positively labeled someone.
Table 9

Number and percent of all stories in each phase and language that reported
positive labels by JuD

Positive Labels
by JuD
English
Stories
Urdu
Stories
Total (N)

Phase 1
% (n)
6.7%
(1/15)
9.1%
(1/11)
7.7%
(2/26)

Phase 2
% (n)
0.0%
(0/89)
0.0%
(0/29)
0.0%
(0/118)

Phase 3
% (n)

Phase 4
% (n)

Phase 5
% (n)

Phase 6
% (n)

3.0%
(2/67)
0.0%
(1/15)
3.7%
(3/82)

0.0%
(0/42)
0.0%
(0/0)
0.0%
(0/42)

9.5%
(4/42)
50.0%
(3/6)
14.6%
(7/48)

15.0%
(3/20)
6.5%
(3/46)
9.1%
(6/66)

Total
% (N)
3.6%
(10/275)
7.5%
(8/107)
4.7%
(18/382)

Self Labeling
The data contained thirty eight (9.9%) stories in which JuD affiliates positively labeled
their organization. Overall, JuD members projected their organization as a lawful Muslim relief
and welfare organization that believed in a unified Muslim Ummah (nation) and fought for the
rights of oppressed Muslims all over the world.
Table 10 shows that English newspapers published thirty three out of the thirty eight
stories that reported statements in which JuD affiliates associated labels to their organization.
Urdu newspapers only reported self-labeling statements in the last two phases. Thus, English
newspapers consistently provided more coverage to statements in which JuD representatives
self-labeled.
40

.
Table 10

Number and percent of all stories in each phase and language that reported
statement in which JuD members self-labeled their organization

Self-labeling
Statements
English
Stories
Urdu
Stories
Total (N)

Phase 1
% (n)
6.7%
(1/15)
0.0%
(0/11)
3.8%
(1/26)

Phase 2
% (n)
11.2%
(10/89)
0.0%
(0/29)
8.5%
(10/118)

Phase 3
% (n)

Phase 4
% (n)

Phase 5
% (n)

Phase 6
% (n)

10.4%
(7/67)
0.0%
(0/15)
8.5%
(7/82)

4.8%
(2/42)
0.0%
(0/0)
4.8%
(2/42)

19.0%
(8/42)
16.7%
(1/6)
18.8%
(9/48)

25.0%
(5/20)
8.7%
(4/46)
13.6%
(9/66)

Total
% (N)
12.0%
(33/275)
4.7%
(5/107)
9.9%
(38/382)

Overall, Tables 8, 9 and 10 convey that higher proportion of English than Urdu news
stories provided coverage of the perspective of the JuD members about others and about the JuD.
Specifically, compared to Urdu newspapers, the English newspapers were more likely to report
statements by leader, representatives and members of the JuD that negatively labeled someone or
positively label the JuD. English and Urdu newspapers were equally likely to report statements
by JuD affiliates that attributed positive labels to an entity or entities.

Reports on JuD’s Relief and Welfare Role
The data also contained a small number of stories that highlighted the JuD’s role as a
relief and welfare organization in Pakistan. Two types of stories fall in this category: 1) stories
that reported details about JuD’s relief and welfare efforts in Pakistan; and 2) stories that
contained statements from JuD leaders in which they requested group members or the Pakistani
people to participate in or financially support the JuD’s welfare and relief projects.

41

Relief and Welfare Activities
Only the stories that were published during phases 1 and 6, reported details of JuD’s
relief and welfare efforts. The stories are not evenly distributed between the two phases and
twenty seven out of the thirty stories that detailed JuD relief and welfare efforts were published in
phase 6 and only three were published in phase 1. Content wise, the stories about JuD’s charitable
endeavors published in phase 1 were different from the stories that Pakistani newspapers
published in phase 6. The stories published in phase 1 presented an overview of the JuD’s relief
efforts in the year 2009, while the stories in phase 6 only described the JuD relief efforts in the
context 2010 floods. Below I will present excerpts out of two stories from phase 1 that detailed
JuD’s relief effort in 2009 in phase 1.
Story 3
“…JuD has dug 87 water-wells in (the province of) Sindh and Baluchistan…Their
(JuD’s) project of digging wells in backward areas continues.”
Story 4
“…this year the JuD opened 20 new free (medical) dispensaries in the country, in which
150,000 patients were treated. (Medical) Dispensaries were opened in those
neighborhoods and villages where people do not have access to medical facilities.”
One common theme in both reports is JuD bringing relief to those that do not have access
to basic necessities like water and medical care. Story 3 reports that the JuD is conducting its
water-well digging operation in the provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan. This information is
important because JuD is primarily based in the Punjab province. The impression conveyed in
story 3 however, is that the group does not provided welfare and relief services in any particular
42

area or province but reaches out to people in need of help all across Pakistan. This portrayal of
JuD may explain why the recipients of JuD relief and welfare services and other citizens
organized pro-JuD protests against the government’s ban on the organization all across Pakistan,
which were reported in 6 stories during phase 2 (Stories 92, 107, 114, 164, 167 and 168).
According to the reports, these incidents occurred in the provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan
and territories of Azad Kashmir. Thus, if people living in areas all across Pakistan organized proJuD protests during the government’s crackdown on the group, then it becomes probable that the
group had earned goodwill in those areas through their charitable endeavors prior to the
crackdown. This observation is very important for policy makers because it reveals that labeling
indigenous Muslim charity organizations as ‘terrorist’ groups without making public the
evidence against such groups, may stir up anti state sentiments and mobilize the banned
organizations’ supporters against the state. Such policies thus may generate the blowback effect
of popularizing and organizing the groups being labeled as ‘terrorist.’ Future research should
further explore the impact of policies that criminalize indigenous religious groups that have
gained social capital locally through their charitable endeavors.
In phase 6, the twenty seven stories were published that covered the JuD’s relief efforts
during the 2010 floods. A brief overview of these stories follows.
According to the news reports, JuD got involved in the relief process immediately after
the floods started. The first report of JuD’s participation in the relief efforts was published in
07/25/2010. From this period onwards, the reports of JuD’s flood relief activities appeared
consistently throughout phase 6. From 07/25/2010 to 08/20/2010, nine stories reported incidents
of JuD’s flood relief efforts. Specifically, these stories informed readers that JuD was
contributing resources and manpower to ongoing efforts in 1) rescuing flood victims, 2) sending
43

food and other necessities to refugees, and 3) providing medical care to refugees. The following
excerpts out of the news stories published between 07/25/2010 to 08/20/2010 how the JuD’s
flood relief efforts were publicized in the Pakistani newspapers.
Story 321
“According to the JuD spokesman more that 2,000 Jamaat ud Dawa volunteers were
participating in [flood] relief activities…”
Story 324
“…everyday 20,000 flood victims are being provided medicines and food [by JuD].”
Story 331
“…the Jamaat ud Dawa has up till now distributed food among 250,000 flood victims.
Jamaat ud Dawa relief workers are providing food to stranded victims on cars, tractors,
trawlers and motor boats.”
Story 337
“The Jamaat ud Dawa volunteers have transported thousands of flood victims to safety.
The organization is operating 6 motor boats in the flood affected areas for transporting
victims to safety and bringing food to victims.”
These excerpts were chosen for three reasons. Firstly, they show that according to the
reports published at the time, the JuD was involved in the three main flood relief activities being
conducted — rescuing victims, providing food and other necessities to refugees, and providing
medical services to the refugees. Secondly, the numbers mentioned in the excerpts convey the
44

magnitude of the organization’s relief and rescue efforts to the readers. This point will be taken
up later during the analysis of overall coverage of JuD’s flood relief efforts by the English and
Urdu print media. Thirdly, the excerpts made no mention of the illegal status of the organization
in Pakistan at the time.
At the time of the floods, only a few stories presented information about JuD’s legal
status. For example, story 324 mentioned that the ambassadors of some “Western countries”
raised their concerns in Islamabad (the capital of Pakistan) regarding JuD’s participation in the
relief efforts, because they viewed JuD as a banned terrorist organization. Furthermore, story 320
reported that the Punjab police closed down a JuD donation center because “banned organization
were not allowed to collect funds or donations from the public.” Both these stories covey the
impression that the JuD was legally considered a banned organization in Pakistan at the time.
However, with the exception of these two stories, the stories that reported JuD’s flood relief
efforts made no mention of the controversy regarding the organization’s legal status.
Along with the regular coverage of the JuD’s relief efforts, on 08/20/2010 two stories
reported that the JuD had started constructing its own relief camp (stories 339 and 340). Later, an
article published on 09/07/2010 indicated that the JuD had established ten tent cities near the
flood affected areas (story 371). Both reports are significant because they convey that the JuD
provided temporary housing to the flood refugees. Lastly, story 378 (09/18/2010) explained that
as the water level in the flood affected areas fell, the JuD had started rebuilding destroyed and
damaged houses in the cities of Naushehra and Charsadda. Thus, according to the news reports
the JuD not only carried out rescue and relief operations at the time of the floods, but also played
an important role in the resettlement of the flood victims.

45

Parallel to the news coverage of the JuD’s expansive recovery and resettlement work
during the 2010 floods, five more stories published in phase 6 challenged the legality of the
group. Stories 342 and 354 reported two press statements by the federal government (Ministry of
Interior). In these statements, the federal government ordered the provincial government to stop
the JuD, a banned organization, from collecting donations and participating in flood relief
activities. Furthermore, story 350 provided an account of how the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa law
enforcement agencies closing down sixteen JuD run relief camps. In story 375, the federal
government (Ministry of Interior) issued a statement ordering the JuD and other “banned
religious organization” involved in the flood relief process to desist. Later, story 381 cited a
federal minister criticizing the Punjab government for allowing the JuD to “openly” collect
donations and participate in relief activities. In phase 6, five out of the seven stories that
challenged the group’s legality were published in English newspapers. Furthermore, this figure
does not include the facts and opinions presented in English editorials, articles, opinions and
magazine articles, which challenged the JuD’s legal status in Pakistan.
Table 11

Number and percent of all stories in each phase and language that reported JuD’s
relief and welfare activities

JuD R. & W.
Activities
English
Stories
Urdu
Stories
Total (N)

Phase 1
% (n)
0.0%
(0/15)
27.3%
(3/11)
11.5%
(3/26)

Phase 2
% (n)
0.0%
(0/89)
0.0%
(0/29)
0.0%
(0/118)

Phase 3
% (n)

Phase 4
% (n)

Phase 5
% (n)

Phase 6
% (n)

Total
% (N)

0.0%
(0/67)
0.0%
(0/15)
0.0%
(0/82)

0.0%
(0/42)
0.0%
(0/0)
0.0%
(0/42)

0.0%
(0/42)
0.0%
(0/6)
0.0%
(0/48)

5.0%
(1/20)
56.5%
(26/46)
40.9%
(27/66)

0.4%
(1/275)
27.1%
(29/107)
7.8%
(30/382)

46

Conversely, Urdu newspapers printed twenty nine out of thirty stories that mentioned
JuD’s relief and welfare activities in Phases 1 and 6 (Table 11). Thus, Urdu news stories paid
considerably more attention to the group’s flood relief endeavors, while the English news stories
more often reported incidents and statements that labeled JuD’s relief activities as illegal acts
committed by a banned terrorist organization.
Statement Issuing Call for Help in Relief Activities
Sixteen stories that presented JuD affiliates’ appeals to the general public to donate to or
participate in the group’s charitable projects further highlighted JuD’s relief and welfare role. All
of these stories came out in phase 6. The head of the group, Hafiz Saeed, made fourteen out of
sixteen such statements observed in the news stories.
Following the trend of providing greater coverage to the JuD’s relief and welfare work,
Urdu papers printed twelve out of the sixteen stories that reported JuD’s calls for help to the
people of Pakistan for participating in flood relief efforts. Interestingly, JuD’s call for help
statements that the Pakistani newspapers published contained minimal politically charged or
controversial content. Generally, the JuD’s call for help statements conveyed three interrelated
messages. Firstly, the statements conveyed details of the devastation caused by the floods.
Secondly, the statements used Islam as a frame of reference to depict the floods as God’s
punishment for the transgressions of the entire Pakistani nation. These statements asked the
audience to share the blame for this devastation and ask God for forgiveness. Thirdly, the
statements asked the audience to get involved in the relief process in the spirit of
humanitarianism, religion and patriotism.

47

The following statement by Hafiz Saeed draws attention to the desperate condition of the
flood victims.
Story 356
“…the devastation caused by the flood continues and the homes of hundreds of
thousands of people have been destroyed. Sitting under an open sky hundreds of
thousands of people are facing an adverse fate because of food shortage. Children,
women and old people are rapidly falling victim to epidemic diseases.”
According to Mr. Saeed, the victims after being forced out of their houses and communities by
the destruction caused by the floods were stranded under an “open sky” without any protection.
Saeed believed that under the circumstances the victims were facing the eminent dangers of
starvation and disease. In the subtext, the immediacy of the dangers faced by the victims
conveyed the urgency of the situation and the need for prompt measures. The statement also
contained affective language or charged language like “sitting under an open sky” or “facing an
adverse fate” to give the impression that without immediate help the victims might perish.
The details of the devastation caused by the floods were attached to almost every call for
help issued by group leaders and appeared as part of their overall media strategy for soliciting
help in their relief and welfare projects. The following statement made by the head of the group
corroborates this observation: “The electronic and print media should present in detail the
problems faced by the victims of the floods to the nation” (Story 333). Hafiz Saeed is suggesting
to the national media that in order to get people involved in the flood relief process, they must be
informed of the devastation and destruction caused by the calamity.

48

Hafiz Saeed’s understanding of the flood within an Islamic framework appears in these
quotes:
Story 332
“It is impossible to estimate the extent of the damage done by the rains and floods, the
entire nation should bow in front of Allah, and should collectively ask God for forgiving
us our transgressions.”
Story 353
“…if we do not help the flood victims and do not ask for God’s forgiveness for our
transgressions, the fury of God will be unleashed on us.”
In both statements, the phrase “ask God’s forgiveness for our transgressions” can be understood
in the context of the following Quranic references.
“And (all) those Townships! We destroyed them when they did wrong, and We appointed
a fixed time for their destruction” (al Quran 18:59).
“How many did We destroy before them of the generations, then they cried while the
time of escaping had passed away” (al Quran 38:3).
Both these references (and others not mentioned here) are basis for the ideological belief that
God, who is Omnipotent, may destroy groups and nations through natural disasters as collective
punishment for their transgressions. Hafiz Saeed evokes this belief as a frame of reference to
suggest to the audience that the floods were a punishment from God for the collective
transgressions of the Pakistani nation. Thus, he elicits empathy and involvement in the relief
efforts from his audience by implying that they are indirectly responsible for the calamity that
49

befell the flood victims.
The following statements provide examples of the JuD’s appeals to the Pakistani people
for joining the relief efforts:
Story 332
“The entire nation will have to embrace the spirit of sacrifice and step up to help the
flood victims” (Hafiz Saeed).
Story 333
“…the nation needs to revive the spirit it displayed at the time of the creation of Pakistan
and help their flood stricken brethren…” (Hafiz Saeed).
Story 355
“Hundreds of thousands of flood stricken Muslims are looking at us expectantly. Under
these conditions it is necessary that we help out flood stricken brothers with open hearts,
so that they can be helped to go back to their normal lives” (A JuD official).
In the first quote (Story 332), Hafiz Saeed is appealing to the people of Pakistan to get
involved in the relief process by evoking the humanitarianism. He is conveying the belief that as
human beings, after witnessing the devastation caused by the floods, it is the duty of the people
of Pakistan to embrace self sacrifice and provide relief to the victims. In the second quote, Hafiz
Saeed is conveying the same message however is using commonly held values of about
patriotism as a reference. . Similarly, in the last quote the JuD official is sending out the same
message and is bolstering his message by evoking commonly held Muslim values.

50

On the whole, the sixteen quotes of JuD members soliciting help from the Pakistani
people sent messages designed to create interest and empathy within the audience. Recall, that
the English newspapers only published four of these statements.
Conclusion
English newspapers printed more stories about the group. Thematic analysis of the stories
revealed that English print media generally paid more attention to anti-JuD actions. In most
periods, the English print media also paid more attention to the group’s negative labeling of
others. In all periods, a greater proportion of English than Urdu papers reflected self-labeling by
members. Lastly, the Urdu print media paid considerably more attention to the JuD’s apolitical
role as a relief and welfare organization working in Pakistan.

Stories with Negative or Positive Slant
Initial reviews of the newspaper data clarified that some news reports, most editorials and
articles, and all opinions had a “slant” (Birk and Birk, 1997). The term “slant” is defined as “the
process of selecting knowledge – (1) factual or attitudinal; (2) words; and (3) emphasis, to
achieve the intention of the communicator” (Birk and Birk, 1997). There are two important
components to this definition. Firstly, the authors have a certain intent or goal, other that
providing information to the reader, in constructing the message (Birk and Birk, 1997).
Secondly, the writers achieve their goals using the following techniques: 1) presenting selected
facts, 2) directly presenting their opinion, 3) emphasizing certain facts, and 4) using charged
language (Birk and Birk, 1997). Note that a document or news story that has a slant can never be
neutral (objective); it therefore conveys some subjective meaning directly or in the sub-text
creating a positive or a negative attitude about someone or something. In the newspaper data, the
51

stories with slant were either negatively or positively biased towards JuD. After discovering the
slanted stories in the first step of coding, the four criterion named above were used to identify
stories that had a positive or a negative slant towards the JuD. Below, I will explain each method
of creating a slant with examples from the newspaper data.
Presenting Selected Facts
An author of a text can show bias or intent by only presenting facts that support his or her
viewpoint. There were stories in the data in which reporters presented only those facts about an
incident that supported a negative or a positive impression of the group. Two examples clarify
this statement.
Story 273
“…Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the founding Ameer [head] of Lashkar e Taiba (LeT),
wanted by India for his alleged involvement in the Mumbai attacks, has suddenly
resumed his activities by taking to the streets, holding a chain of public meeting….”
This statement is a report on the activities of Hafiz Saeed after High Court of Lahore
ordered his release from protective custody on 06/02/09. However, in making this report, the
writer only presents those facts about Hafiz Saeed that construct a negative image. He first
introduced Hafiz Saeed as the head of the LeT. The LeT is a militant organization that has been
banned in Pakistan since 2002. Later analysis will show that the allegations of Hafiz Saeed’s
connection with LeT were the basis of the UN ban imposed on the group and the government
crackdown. However, the Pakistani Government was unable to prove this allegation in the
Lahore High Court. Conversely, Hafiz Saeed is undisputedly the Ameer of the JuD. The author
instead of introducing Hafiz Saeed as the head of JuD, which is an acknowledged fact,
52

introduces him as the “Ameer of the LeT.” Similarly, while stating that Hafiz Saeed was “wanted
by the Indian Government,” the author could have also mentioned that the Lahore High Court on
grounds of lack of evidence had just released him. Thus through selective reporting the author is
depicting a negative image of Hafiz Saeed.
In another story, the reporter introduced the JuD as, “Jamaat ud Dawa is a religious
organization that conducts daawat (preaching or inviting people to Islam). The organization has
always been in the front lines whenever the calamity stricken people of Pakistan needed help”
(Story 345). This introduction of the organization does not make any mention of the controversy
regarding the legal status of the organization within Pakistan and the UN ban on the
organization. The statement only presents facts linked to JuD’s relief, welfare and religious
activities that create a positive image of the JuD.
Presenting Opinions
Writers can also directly convey a negative or positive impression by sharing their
opinion about the subject of the text. For example, in story 288 the author offered his negative
opinion about the Supreme Court’s decision, confirming the Lahore High Court’s decision of
releasing Hafiz Saeed from protective custody. He wrote that “Hafiz Saeed’s acquittal has not
surprised many people but there is disappointment over Supreme Court’s verdict….terrorism
cannot be combated if terrorists are allowed to go scot free on the basis of insufficient evidence.
These barbarians are threatening the very foundation of the state.” Conversely, in the following
statement from story 111, the writer gives his opinion about the UN ban on JuD, in favor of the
group:
“The JuD was banned (by the UNSC) on the basis of Indian accusation made against the
group. India did not give the reasons for their accusation on Pakistan. The UN did not
53

even make the effort of asking India that why did the not try to resolve this directly (by
holding talks to Pakistan) before bringing their accusations to the UNSC? Not even a
pretense of following procedure was made by allowing the accused party to defend
themselves (against the Indian accusations)... In the history of justice this was a strange
case where the accused was declared guilty without ever being given a chance to present
a defense.”
Using Charged Language
Charged words are specific words with subjective import (Birk and Birk, 1997). These
words are used in slanted texts to obtain a certain (negative or positive) reaction from the reader
(Birk and Birk, 1997). For example, in story 335 the author described the JuD’s flood relief
activities in the following words: “So bold is the Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD) aka Lashkar e Taiba
(LeT) that after the recent floods in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the LeT is openly working in
the area under the umbrella of rehabilitation of flood victims and is collecting funds.... ” Notice
the significance of words and phrases like “so bold,” “openly” and “under the umbrella of.” They
create the impression that the JuD is using the floods as an opportunity to contravene the ban and
reemerge unhindered within the Pakistani society. Notice also the interchanging use of names
(JuD and LeT) to convey to the reader that both organizations are the same. The author’s use of
charged language has turned the description of the JuD’s flood relief activities into a warning
about the re-emergence of a banned terrorist organization in Pakistan.
Conversely, in the following example the news writer is using positively charged
language while reporting an incident about JuD’s flood relief activities: “A woman and a child,
who had been starving for three days and who sitting on top of a tree to save their lives, were
rescued by JuD volunteers out of deep waters at the risk of their own lives” (Story 368). In this
54

report of a rescue incident, the use of charged language (“starving,” “hanging on to save their
lives,” “deep waters’ and “at the risk of their own lives”) portrays the JuD rescuers as altruistic
saviors of the two stranded victims.
Use of Emphasis
Emphasis is “…giving stress to subject matter, and so indicating what is more important
and what is less important” (Birk and Birk, 1997). Two examples of the use of emphasis are
presented from the newspaper data. In the following sentence from story 207, the author presents
a positive and a negative fact about the JuD’s relief efforts during the 2005 earthquake in
Pakistan and emphasizes the negative fact:
“The Musharraf government had praised it (JuD) for doing great work in the rescue and
rehabilitation of the affected population after the Kashmir-NWFP earthquake of 2005
despite the fact that it (JuD) reportedly expelled NGOs and women workers in the area on
the basis of religion.”
The statement informs the readers of two contradicting facts, that 1) the JuD was praised by the
Pakistani Government for their relief activates after the 2005 earthquake, and 2) the JuD
allegedly forcibly expelled some women and NGO workers “on the basis of religion.” However,
by using the phrase “despite the fact,” the author has placed emphasis on the negative fact.
In story 111, the author described proceedings of the UNSC session in which the
resolution for banning the JuD was passed: “When this resolution (to ban JuD) was passed by the
Security Council Committee, the Pakistan representative (at the UN) was probably not even
present.” This statement communicates two facts: 1) a resolution passed at a UNSC session
declared the JuD a terrorist organization and 2) the Pakistani representative at the UN was
“probably” not present at the time. The first fact suggests that the JuD is a terrorist organization
55

and the second fact suggests that the JuD was labeled as such by the UNSC without getting any
input from the Pakistani Government. However, the latter part of the sentence is emphasized by
using the word “even,” creating the overall impression that the JuD, a Pakistan basedorganization, was condemned at a time when its representative in the UNSC was not present.

Analysis of Stories with Slant
Using the four criteria of “slant” described above, I identified fifty four stories that had a
negative slant and sixteen stories that had a positive slant towards JuD (Tables 12 and 13).
Table 12

Number and percent stories that had a negative slant, by language and phase

Stories with
Negative Slant
English
Stories
Urdu
Stories
Total (N)

Phase 1
% (n)
13.3%
(2/15)
0.0%
(0/11)
7.7%
(2/26)

Phase 2
% (n)
15.7.0%
(14/89)
6.9%
(2/29)
13.6%
(16/118)

Phase 3
% (n)

Phase 4
% (n)

Phase 5
% (n)

Phase 6
% (n)

22.4%
(15/67)
0.0%
(0/15)
18.3%
(15/82)

4.8%
(1/42)
0.0%
(0/0)
4.8%
(2/42)

28.6%
(12/42)
0.0%
(0/6)
25.0%
(12/48)

30.0%
(6/20)
2.2%
(1/46)
10.6%
(7/66)

Total
% (N)
18.6%
(51/275)
2.8%
(3/107)
14.1%
(54/382)

Almost all the stories with negative slant were published in English newspapers (Table
12). In phases 5 and 6, 28.6% and 30% of the English stories had a negative slant. Recall that in
phase 5 the JuD made an aggressive comeback in the public sphere after being banned in Phase
2. Specifically, Hafiz Saeed, who had just been released from his second protective custody in
phase 4, reappeared in the stories published in phase 5 with aggressive statements against India,
Israel, the US and the UN. Data analysis also revealed that a series of articles, editorials, and
opinions were published in the English newspapers at the time criticizing Hafiz Saeed for his
controversial views and the government for allowing the head of a banned organization to make
56

public appearances and statements. In phase 6, when the Urdu newspapers were consistently
highlighting JuD’s flood relief activities (Table 11), some English editorials and articles labeled
JuD as a banned terrorist organization and criticized the government for allowing them to
participate in flood relief activities.

Table 13

Number and percent stories that had a positive slant, by language and phase

Stories with
positive slant
English
Stories
Urdu
Stories
Total (N)

Phase 1
% (n)
0.0%
(0/15)
0.0%
(0/11)
0.0%
(0/26)

Phase 2
% (n)
2.2%
(2/89)
3.4%
(1/29)
2.5%
(3/118)

Phase 3
% (n)

Phase 4
% (n)

Phase 5
% (n)

Phase 6
% (n)

Total
% (N)

1.5%
(1/67)
0.0%
(0/15)
1.2%
(1/82)

2.4%
(1/42)
0.0%
(0/0)
2.4%
(1/42)

0.0%
(0/42)
0.0%
(0/6)
0.0%
(0/48)

0.0%
(0/20)
32.6%
(15/46)
22.7%
(15/66)

1.4%
(4/275)
15.0%
(16/107)
5.2%
(20/382)

Alternatively, Urdu newspapers published the majority of stories with a positive slant
(Table 13). Most of these stories appeared in phase 6 (Table 13). Thus, in phase 6 Urdu papers
were not only providing more information about JuD relief activities (Table 11), but also
conveying a comparatively positive impression of the group (Table 13) to their readers.
Conclusion
Were there any language based differences in how the print media of Pakistan presented
the JuD to their readers? The analysis of the almost two and half years of the news coverage the
JuD received in the Pakistani print media showed that there were observable differences in how
the English and Urdu print media presented the group. I compared the quantity, themes, and slant
of English and Urdu news coverage provided to the JuD in this section. The English news stories
more often presented facts, statements and opinions related to the terrorist or extremist label on
57

the JuD. In contrast Urdu news articles more often paid attention to the relief and welfare side of
the organization. Furthermore, English newspapers printed the majority of negative slant stories
and Urdu newspapers published majority of positive slant stories.
In the beginning of this chapter, it was explained that biases conveyed through mediated
experiences could have a significant impact on the process of sense making. From the finding
presented above, it is clear that the mediated experiences of English and Urdu newspapers
readers with JuD are different. English readers are more likely to be informed of the political and
controversial aspect of the group, because English newspapers give more attention to the
‘terrorism’ label imposed on the group or the radical political views of the group. Conversely,
Urdu readers are more likely to be informed of the apolitical and non-controversial side of the
group, because Urdu newspapers concentrate more on the relief and welfare role of the group.
Furthermore, the English readers are more likely to encounter stories with a negative slant
towards the group and Urdu readers are more likely to encounter a positive slant towards the
group. The implication of these finding will be discussed in the conclusion section.

58

CHAPTER 4: NEGATIVE LABELING OF JUD AND THE JUD’S RESPONSE
In the next two chapters, I present the findings of a qualitative analysis of the newspaper
data. In this chapter, I discuss the findings of the analysis of statements in which an entity
negatively labeled the JuD, and the JuD countered a negative label. In the first section of the
chapter, I analyze the statements in which the JuD’s main critics, the US, the UN, India and
Pakistani Government, negatively labeled the JuD. Analysis shows that even though all of these
entities labeled the JuD as a terrorist organization, their specific use of the terrorism label was
different. Moreover, the entities’ unique use of the terrorism label reflected their specific
strategic interests in negatively labeling the organization. In the second section of this chapter, I
analyze the statement in which the JuD countered the terrorism label. I present a detailed
discussion on JuD’s use of frames and specific counter labeling strategies to dispel the terrorism
label. I conclude this section by showing how an overall analysis of JuD’s counter labeling
statements showed that the JuD’s strategic goals in countering the terrorism label were to regain
their legal and operational status in Pakistan and maintain their social status as one of the largest
relief and welfare organization in Pakistan. In the next chapter (Chapter 5), I explain the findings
of the qualitative analysis of the JuD statements, reported in the Pakistani print media, in which
negatively labeled entities.

Statements Negatively Labeling the JuD
In this section, I will present the analysis of the statements in which individuals and
groups not affiliated with the Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD) negatively labeled the organization.
Particularly, I will examine 1) who negatively labeled the JuD, 2) what negative labels were
associated the group and 3) how the labelers constructed the negative labels.
59

I maintained in the previous chapter that news coverage of the JuD represents mediated
experience that the readers have with the group via the print media. Following this line of
reasoning, statements printed in news stories by non-JuD affiliates that negatively labeled the
JuD, were constructed twice. First, the labelers created the negative labels in their original
statements that the newspapers later reported. Second, the reporters or writers of the stories
reshaped the negative labels in the process of reporting. Alternately, the reporters, advertently or
inadvertently, may have refashioned the negative labels in the process of packaging the
negatively labeling statements into news stories. In the process of packaging, the reporter may
have reported parts of a complete statement that did not convey the overall message contained in
the original statement. Reporters may also have reported excerpts of the original statement out of
context, altered the original message in the process of translation and paraphrasing, or added
subjective content by sharing their explanation or interpretation of the reported statement. On a
higher level of analysis, if one considers the entire story as a unit of analysis, then the reporters
also had the choice of presenting further information and opinions along with original
statement(s) that either confirmed or denied the negative label. Only the analysis of the news
story as a whole can reveal how the print media created a negative or positive image of the JuD.
In this analysis, I will only look at the anti-JuD quotes and paraphrases made by someone
other than the reporter or author of the story. The resulting analysis will describe and interpret
the consistent patterns found in the negatively labeling statements made by non-JuD affiliates
that the Pakistani print media reported. Consistent reports across multiple news stories in
different papers and languages that a certain label was placed by a particular entity are assumed
to allow for credible inferences that a particular type of negative label is associated with the
entity’s communications. To improve the strength credibility of the inferences, I will also
60

attempt to corroborate these connections by presenting additional evidence from sources other
than the news.
The qualitative analysis of the statements that associated negative labels with JuD
showed that the UN, India, the US and the Federal Government of Pakistan were the four key
labelers. ‘Terrorism’ emerged as the main negative label that the four key labelers attributed to
the group. The key labelers used the ‘terrorism label’ in three ways against the JuD. They 1)
directly applied the ‘terrorism’ label to the JuD, 2) indirectly associated the JuD with terrorism,
3) or used the ‘terrorism’ label to convey a negative image of the JuD’s social services in
Pakistan. In the first type of usage, the labelers maintained or gave the impression that the JuD,
its leaders or members were directly involved in terrorism. In the second case the labelers
associated the organization with terrorism by alleging its connection to a terrorist group called
the Lashkar e Taiba (LeT). The use of the terrorism label in this sense implied that the JuD
indirectly supported or facilitated terrorism through its association with the LeT. In the third
case, the labelers treated the ‘terrorism’ label on the JuD as a commonly held value to suggest
that since the JuD was a terrorist organization, the social services that the group provided were
part of JuD’s organizational strategy to attain social legitimacy in Pakistan and to acquire the
resources necessary to carry out or support cross-border terrorism.
The key labelers’ overall construction of the negative labels reflected how they saw JuD
as an impediment in achieving their respective strategic interests. The negative labels given to
JuD by the US government, the US media and the UN all presented the Jamaat as a “difficult
case.” The term signifies that the social legitimacy JuD has earned through its charitable
activities blankets its “real activities,” the support and financing of terrorism, and makes it
difficult for the Government of Pakistan to close the organization down. Interestingly, in
61

negatively labeling the organization, both the US and the UN linked the JuD’s activities to a
global terrorist network or at least gave a global dimension to the alleged threat that the JuD
represented. The review of the news coverage and scholarly literature confirms that both the US
and the UN are globally involved in the GWOT, an initiative to weed out terrorism throughout
the world. Both the representatives of the UN and the US have pointed out the necessity of
dismantling the global terrorist support networks to achieve their main goal of destroying
terrorism (Congressional Research Service [CRS], 2005). Thus in line with their primary interest
of winning the GWOT, the US and the UN tended to convey the threat of the JuD from a global
perspective.
Conversely, the reported Indian government’s and media’s negative labeling of the JuD
tended to focus on the threat posed by the organization from a local or India-specific perspective.
Even though India is also a member of the GWOT initiative, its expression of the perceived
threat of the JuD did not project a global perspective, but a local or India specific view. Scholarly
literature by Indian authors on the issue of terrorism in India identifies LeT as a terrorist
organization that is mainly active in the Indian part of Jammu and Kashmir area and attracts
membership from both Indian nationals (mainly originating from Kashmir) and Pakistani
nationals (Singh, 2002; Trehan, 2002). Furthermore, Indian scholars also trace the financial and
logistic support structure necessary for the survival of the LeT to Pakistan (Singh, 2002; Trehan,
2002).
In summary, analysis of the data showed that the Indian government’s negative labeling
of the JuD reflected this view or belief. The US and the UN tended to define the threat of the JuD
in global terms (the global terrorism support network), but the Indian government and media
were more likely to define its threat in regional terms (the organization that provided support to a
62

terrorist group operating in India). In all three cases (i.e., the US, the UN, and India), the
labelers’ negative labeling of the JuD was in line with their respective strategic goals in the war
against terrorism.
Lastly, in their reported negatively labeling statements, the Federal Government of
Pakistan tended to frame the threat of the JuD and justify their proscriptive actions against the
JuD by referring to the UN’s decision to declare the JuD as an associate of the Al Qaeda and the
Taliban (United Nations Security Council [UNSC] Committee concerning Al Qaeda and
associated individuals and entities). The Federal Government of Pakistan did not project the JuD
as a local or global threat (like the US, UN or India), but as an organization that had been
declared as terrorist by the UN and, therefore, which the federal government was bound to close
down under international law. The federal government’s reported negative labeling statements
consistently conveyed the following two messages across the newspaper data: 1) Pakistan was a
responsible member of the UN and a voluntary partner in the GWOT; and 2) the federal
government was legally bound to ban and shut down the JuD after the UN’s decision to sanction
the organization. An analysis of the media discourse between Pakistan and foreign entities like
the US, UN and India in relation to the JuD revealed that foreign entities, especially India, often
questioned Pakistan’s sincerity in its campaign to shut down the JuD. Thus, Pakistan’s
proscriptive efforts against the JuD were being monitored at the international level as a gauge of
their dedication to the GWOT initiative. The news coverage also showed that various Pakistanbased religious parties, recipients of the JuD’s relief and welfare services and some concerned
private citizens criticized the Pakistani Government’s actions against the JuD. These local
entities accused the government of succumbing to Indian and American pressure to shut down a
legitimate and one of the largest welfare organizations in the country. In view of this context, the
63

above-described federal government strategy for labeling the JuD appears to serve a dual
purpose. By employing the labeling strategy, the federal government reinforced its volunteer
status in the GWOT initiative at the international level, while at the national level it countered
allegation of acting under foreign pressure by legitimizing its decision to crack down on JuD
under international law. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the nature and construction of
the terrorism label against JuD by each of the key labelers.
Negative Labels by the UN
The UNSC’s decision to declare the JuD an alias of the LeT (which the UNSC had
already declared as an associate of the Al Qaeda and Taliban) was the most significant event in
the newspaper data, because it entailed the imposition of certain national and international
sanctions on the group. On the national level, the UNSC’s decision to declare JuD a terrorist
outfit obligated the Government of Pakistan under international law to seize the JuD accounts,
restrict movements of certain JuD officials and impose an arms embargo on the organization
(story 65). By declaring the JuD as a terrorist organization, the UNSC not only negatively
labeled the JuD but also provided the Pakistani Government with a frame of reference to further
negatively label the organization within Pakistan. I will further discuss the Pakistani
Government’s use of the UNSC’s label as a frame for connecting JuD to terrorism later in this
analysis. Presently, I will focus on the reported statements by representatives of the UNSC about
the JuD.
Story 175 carried the following excerpt from a statement made by the UNSC’s Al Qaeda
Sanction’s Committee’s spokesperson:

64

“…there is no separate ban on JuD, but the LeT and JuD are the same organizations…by
opening schools and hospitals the organization has created problems for the government
to curb their real activities. However it is not necessary that all those who donate to this
organization support its terrorist activities and it is possible that these donations are made
for social welfare.”
Two different but interrelated messages are discernible in this statement. Firstly, the
UNSC Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee spokesperson indirectly associated the JuD with terrorism
by declaring that JuD and LeT were the same organizations. As mentioned earlier, prior to this
decision, the UNSC had already declared the LeT as an associate of the Al Qaeda and the
Taliban (UNSC Committee concerning Al Qaeda and associated individuals and entities)
Secondly, the spokesperson classified the JuD as a “difficult case” because its charitable
endeavors cloaked its alleged terrorist activities. To understand this statement, first it is
necessary to understand the background of how the Security Council constructed the ‘terrorism’
label in the context of the GWOT.
Post 9/11, the Security Council did not define the term terrorism until 2004 (Saul, 2005).
This definition is non-binding under international law (Saul, 2005). Thus, member states must
individually construct a legally binding definition of terrorism through their state legislatures,
even though as members of the UN they are all involved in a Global War on Terrorism (Saul,
2005). In the context of the GWOT, the Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee is especially empowered
by the UNSC to create a list (i.e., the Consolidated List) of individuals and entities that are
members, associates or affiliates of the global terrorist network called the Al Qaeda (UNSC
Committee concerning Al Qaeda and associated individuals and entities). The Committee is
further empowered to impose three specific sanctions on the listed individuals and entities
65

(“assets ban,” “travel ban” and “arms embargo”) and to require member states to impose these
sanctions on the listed individuals or groups in their respective jurisdictions (UNSC Committee
concerning Al Qaeda and associated individuals and entities).
Scholarly literature and the newspapers stories allege that the group LeT was specifically
involved in organizing and conducting terrorist activities in the Indian part of Kashmir (Singh
2002; Trehan, 2002). In 2005, the UNSC Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee added the name of LeT
to the Consolidated List. By connecting the LeT to Al Qaeda, the Committee not only labeled the
organization as terrorist but also 1) elevated the level of its alleged threat from the Southeast
Asia region to a global level and 2) implicated it into the GWOT initiative. In the absence of a
unanimously endorsed definition of terrorism, it is not clear whether the UNSC imposed the
terrorism label on the LeT because they believed the LeT was responsible for terrorism in India,
or was a member of the Al Qaeda, or both. Scholars and experts in the field of terrorism and
international law further need to study the complexities emerging from the UN’s declaration of
war against a phenomenon (terrorism) without first unanimously agreeing on its definition. For
the purpose of the present study, it is important to note that the UN connected the LeT to
terrorism by declaring it as an associate of Al Qaeda (UNSC Committee concerning Al Qaeda
and associated individuals and entities). On 12/10/2008, when the Committee declared that JuD
was an alias of the LeT, it extended the ‘terrorism’ label that it had previously imposed on the
LeT to the JuD. The UNSC’s Al Qaeda Sanction’s Committee spokesperson reinforces this point
in the first sentence of his statement (“there is no separate ban on JuD, but the LeT and JuD are
the same organizations”). Resultantly, the Al Qaeda Sanction’s Committee labeled the JuD, a
group that is indigenous to Pakistan, as a terrorist group associated with the global threat of Al
Qaeda.
66

In the later part of his statement, the Committee spokesperson presents the JuD as a
“difficult case.” Prior to the inclusion of the JuD in the Consolidated List, its legal status in
Pakistan was that of a legitimate social welfare organization. Furthermore, various pro-JuD and
anti-JuD sources in the news coverage consistently acknowledged JuD’s substantial contribution
in the fields of relief and welfare in Pakistan. The Committee spokesperson’s comment that “by
opening schools and hospitals the organization has created problems for the government to curb
its real activities” frames the relief and welfare efforts of the JuD as part of an overall
organizational strategy to facilitate their “real” or terrorist activities. According to him, the JuD’s
charitable endeavors are part of a strategy to gain social legitimacy in Pakistan that provides the
organization with a fail-safe protection against the Pakistani Government’s efforts to stop its
terrorist activities. Moreover, in his view, the social legitimacy achieved through charity also
allows the organization to collect funds and donations from the people of Pakistan, which they
may be using to finance their terrorist operations.
The overall analysis of the published statements made by UN representatives regarding
JuD showed that even though they imposed the terrorist label on the organization, they seemed to
focus less on the terrorist activities of the group and more on the financial and social support
network that JuD managed to establish in Pakistan. Review of the literature shows that one of the
main objectives of the GWOT, a UN and the US led initiative, was to destroy the terrorist
sanctuaries and financial support networks that were the backbone of terrorist organizations
(Basile, 2004). The UN statements suggest that it perceived the JuD’s alleged terrorist social
support and financial networks in Pakistan as a greater challenge to its strategic interests as
leader of the GWOT initiative than JuD’s ostensible Southeast Asia based militant threat. Thus,

67

their focus was more on the JuD’s perceived global threat and less on their perceived regional
threat.
Negative Labels by the US
Data analysis revealed a similarity in the pattern of negatively labeling the JuD between
the UN and the US. The negative statements issued by the US Government and media labeled
the JuD as a terrorist organization and interpreted the group’s charitable endeavors as part of an
organizational strategy to support and protect their terrorist activities. These statements also
presented the Jamaat as a “difficult case” because they had achieved the status of a legitimate
relief and welfare organization within Pakistan. Their legitimate status allowed the JuD to collect
donations for relief and welfare and use the funds for financing terrorism. Furthermore, the US
Government and media identified the social support that the JuD had mustered through charity
work as a possible problem for the Pakistan Government in carrying out their task of closing
down the JuD. Interestingly, like the UN, the representatives of the US government and media
refrained in their statements from focusing on JuD’s alleged militant threat in South East Asia
region.
These observations are illustrated in the following statement made by the US Secretary of
State at the time, Condoleezza Rice, in story 104 (printed a couple of days after UN’s decision to
add JuD to the Consolidated List): “Pakistan is going to have to untangle the difficult
circumstances that the Jamaat (JuD) offers – because I understand there are so called charitable
activities. But we learned – the United States learned the hard way – that sometimes these are too
intertwined with organizations that have terrorist ties.”
In this statement, the US Secretary of State is not only presenting the Jamaat as a difficult
68

case but as an immediate threat that “the Pakistani Government will have to untangle.” Words
like “tangle” and “intertwined” covey to the reader that the difficulty of discerning the JuD role
as a charity from its role as a terrorist organization necessitated a complete shutdown of all JuD
operations. The US Secretary of State’s construction of the terrorist label is also noteworthy. She
did not offer any proof or refer to any particular incident(s) to justify the ‘terrorist’ label on JuD,
but merely referred to the experiences of the American government with similar groups that
played the dual role of performing charitable services publically and supporting terrorism
clandestinely. Thus, she is using the American Government’s previous experiences with terrorist
organizations that engaged in charitable activities as a frame to interpret the JuD’s charitable
activities. However, in her statement she does not explain why the US government believed that
JuD was such an organization.
Another consistent feature in the negatively labeling statements by representatives of the
US government and the US media was the projection of JuD’s social and financial network as
part of a global threat. For example, the following excerpt from an article published in the Wall
Street Journal was printed in story 138:
“Jamaat is a difficult case. Its substantial social services and humanitarian efforts within
Pakistan have given it a deep base of local support and funds. The group also raises
money around the world including from mosques in the UK and charities in the Saudi
Arabia… Jamaat (has) ties to a network of mosques in Europe that are frequented by
many ordinary Muslims with no connection to violence.”
The focus of this statement is not on the terrorist activities that the Jamaat may have been
involved in, but uses the terrorism label of the organization as a frame to warn the reader that

69

through charity work, the organization established a “deep base” in Pakistan and a global
financial network. Again the Jamaat is presented as a “difficult case” by classifying it as a
terrorist group that has managed to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the Pakistani people
through their charity work and has leveraged its legitimate status to establish a global network of
Muslim donors.
The US and the UN similarly perceived and projected the alleged threat of the JuD at a
global level and not just within the South East Asia region. Furthermore, both the US and the UN
concentrated on the JuD’s social and financial network and its relation to global terrorism
financing, but not on the Indian allegation (analyzed in the next section) that JuD organized,
planned and supported terrorism in India. Lastly, both entities believed that under the cover of
their charitable activities, the JuD managed at some level to dupe their donors into believing that
their donations would be spent only on relief and welfare projects. These similarities corroborate
the proposition presented in the previous sub-section: consistent with the US and the UN focus
on the GWOT, Jamaat’s social support and global financial network presented the greatest threat
to US’s and UN’s strategic interests.
Negative Labels by India
The statements of the Indian Government and the Indian media about the JuD that the
Pakistani newspapers printed during the six phases of data collection often focused on the link of
the JuD, a charitable organization, to the LeT a terrorist organization. The US and the UN
labeled the JuD as ‘terrorist’ by connecting it to LeT primarily to make sense of JuD’s relief and
welfare activities. Conversely, representatives of the Indian Government and media concentrated
more on constructing a connection between the JuD and LeT and the implications of the
connection for security from terrorism in India.
70

The Indian Government and media connected JuD to LeT in various ways. Most
commonly, they established a link though the Ameer (head) of the JuD, Hafiz Saeed, who they
consistently portrayed as also heading up the LeT. The Indian Government established this link
either generally or in the specific context of the Mumbai terrorist attack. For example, when the
Punjab Police arrested Hafiz Saeed for allegedly raising money for “Jihad,” the Indian Home
Minister’s reactions to this incident were quoted in story 258 as follows: “Jihad against what?
Surely not Jihad against Pakistan Government. It must be Jihad against some other
establishment. And I suspect in this case it is India.” A context based analysis of this statement
shows that the Indian Home Minister is suggesting that Hafiz Saeed raised money in Pakistan
from the platform of the JuD and was siphoning it off to the LeT for carrying out terrorist attacks
in India. Similarly, the Indian External Affairs Minister was quoted in story 247 as saying “…he
(Hafiz Saeed) heads a terrorist organization (LeT) that is basically inimical to India’s interests.”
Both of these statements present Hafiz Saeed as a link between the JuD and the LeT in
general terms but not in the context of some specific event. However, in some stories Indian
spokespersons connected Hafiz Saeed to both the JuD and LeT specifically with reference to the
Mumbai terror attack. For instance, in stories 288 and 289, the Indian Minister for External
Affairs and the Indian Home Minister claimed Hafiz Saeed was the “mastermind” of the
terrorism carried out by LeT members.
In addition to establishing cadre-based links between the JuD and LeT, the Indian
Government and media representatives established functional links between the two
organizations. In story 23 (published a few days after the Mumbai attacks), the Indian
Government accused the JuD of hiding the LeT operatives responsible for planning the Mumbai
attacks in their Muredke center. In other stories, Indian officials were quoted as labeling the JuD
71

as the “humanitarian wing” (story 225) and “front organization” (story 9) of LeT. In another
story an India Journalist, who had previously interviewed some members of the JuD, recounted
an incident in which a JuD member revealed to him that his organization “collected funds” for
the LeT and “looked after their publicity.”
These statements create the overall impression that LeT and the JuD are functional
prongs of a single terrorist organization. The LeT carries out the main organizational goal of
conducting terrorist attacks in India, while JuD acts as a front for the organization and leverages
its “humanitarian organization” status to cover and support its militant wing. Unlike the US and
the UN, Indian official and media representatives did not portray the JuD’s social and financial
network as a global threat. By specifically connecting them to LeT, they emphasized the direct
threat that the group represented to India. According to some Indian scholars (Singh, 2002;
Trehan, 2002), the LeT is one of the largest and deadliest militant groups that received financial
and logistic support from Pakistan to support the Kashmir separatist movement in India.
According to the news, Indian Government officials and media experts traced the LeT support
structure in Pakistan to the JuD, which thereby justified the view that JuD threatened their
national interest. Thus, in line with their national interest, the Indian official and media
representatives made statements that focused more on the perceived regional threat posed by the
JuD and less on their alleged global threat.
Negative Labels by the Federal Government of Pakistan
An event-based analysis of the data showed that the UN, the US and India all reinforced
the terrorism label they had affixed to JuD by taking action against the group. At the beginning
of phase 2, the UNSC (12/10/2008, story 35) declared JuD an alias of the LeT. Previously the
UN had already declared the LeT as an “associate” of the Al Qaeda and Taliban (UNSC
72

Committee concerning Al Qaeda and associated individuals and entities). Under international
law, the declaration obliged all member states to enforce an assets ban, travel ban and arms
embargo on the JuD within their respective territories (UNSC Committee concerning Al Qaeda
and associated individuals and entities). Similarly in phase 1, the US reportedly imposed
financial, travel and business restriction on Hafiz Saeed, the head of the JuD, within the territory
of the US 05/27/2008 (Story 17). In addition, according to a story in Phase 5, the FBI agent
responsible for the investigation of the Faisal Shehzad car bomb case in New York tried to get
the Pakistani Government’s permission to search the JuD’s Muredke complex (story 285).
Lastly, the Indian Government requested that the UNSC declare the JuD as a terrorist
organization (story 35). Furthermore, during Phases 2 to 4, the Indian Government reportedly
sent six dossiers allegedly containing evidence showing Hafiz Saeed’s involvement in the
Mumbai attacks (Story 218). In Phase 4, a story reported that the Indian Government requested
that Interpol issue a red corner notice against Hafiz Saeed (Story 245). Apart from these specific
actions, various stories published during phases 3 to 5 revealed that the Indian Government
repeatedly pressured the Pakistani Government to take decisive action against the JuD and Hafiz
Saeed. On at least two occasions, the Indian Government introduced this demand as a precondition for holding Pakistan-India bilateral dialogues (stories 254 and 312).
In summary, the above-mentioned actions had the following two outcomes for JuD: 1)
internationally, the JuD was labeled a terrorist organization, 2) within Pakistan, the government
was obligated under international law and pressured by India and the US to take action against
the JuD. The first of the two outcomes was of little significance, since JuD is an indigenous
Pakistani organization. However, the negative impact of the second outcome solely depended on
the Federal Government of Pakistan’s willingness to follow the dictates of international law and
73

its willingness to appease India and the US. In short, the Pakistani Government was solely
responsible for imposing the terrorism label on JuD and closing down the organization in
Pakistan. As mentioned earlier, the Pakistani Government started taking action against the JuD a
couple of days before the UNSC’s decision, and after the decision, the government formally
commenced a crackdown.
Turning now to the Pakistan’s major actions against the JuD, in phase 2, the Federal
Government of Pakistan ordered the provincial governments to shut down all JuD operations
within their jurisdictions. This resulted in a nationwide crackdown on JuD including the closure
of all the medical, educational, welfare and relief institutions run by the organization. In the same
phase, the Punjab government, at the request of the federal government, arrested Hafiz Saeed.
Lastly, in phase 6, on the orders of the federal government, the provincial governments raided
and closed some of the relief camps and donation centers that the JuD had established for the
2010 flood victims.
News coverage revealed that the government initiative to shut down the JuD was met
with criticism from some quarters at the national level. During phases 2 and 3, at least nine
protest rallies against the government ban on the JuD were reported in various cities in Pakistan.
Mainly mainstream local religious parties and the recipients of JuD’s various relief and welfare
services led this protest movement. These facts reveal the contravening national and international
level pressures under which the Pakistani Government conducted its operation against the JuD.
Most statements by the federal government that affixed the terrorism label to the JuD,
justified the government’s crackdown on the organization under international law. The
statements consistently used the argument that after the UNSC’s Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions

74

Committee’s decision, the government was obligated to label the JuD as a terrorist group and
close down all its operations in Pakistan. Even though the message contained in these statements
was essentially the same, there were three variants.
In a majority of statements, the government explained their action in a noncommittal
manner. Representatives of the federal government who made noncommittal statements
conveyed the message that the government banned the JuD merely to fulfill the requirements of
international law. They refrained from sharing the federal government’s official or unofficial
stance on whether it believed that JuD was a terrorist organization or not. A statement by the
spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides an example (story 127):
“Action against JuD and certain individuals was initiated following their designation by
the UN Sanctions Committee established pursuant to UN SC resolution 1267, on the
Consolidated List of individuals and entities associated with al-Qaeda and
Taliban…Since this resolution was adopted under chapter VII of the UN Charter, it is
obligatory on Pakistan to fully implement its provisions. Pakistan as a responsible
member of the UN has fulfilled its international obligation.”
The spokesperson did not reveal whether the Pakistan Government believed that that JuD was
involved in conducting, financing or supporting terrorism in Pakistan or abroad. He only refers to
the UNSC Sanction’s Committee’s decision to justify the Pakistani Government’s actions against
the JuD. Furthermore, the use of non-affective or neutral language in the statement does not
allow the reader to discern the government’s ideological stance towards JuD.
In the second type of statement, representatives of the federal government conveyed the
impression that the government banned the JuD to carry out the sanctions that UNSC had
75

imposed on the group; however, it also endorsed the belief that the JuD was involved in
terrorism. For example, in story 42 the Foreign Minister of Pakistan was quoted as follows:
“…the state has banned the JuD… under international law. Under no circumstances will the state
let its territory be used for terrorist purposes.” In this statement the Foreign Minister of Pakistan
is legitimizing the proscription of JuD in Pakistan under international law; however he is also
conveying the impression that the “we” or the state believed that the JuD was using the territory
of Pakistan for “terrorist purposes.”
The third type of statement created the impression that the JuD was proscribed merely to
satisfy the requirements of international law and the state did not consider the JuD as a terrorist
organization. The following quote from the Minister for Religious Affairs provides an example:
“… the ban on JuD was imposed by the UN. If we had not acted now (by starting a crackdown
operation against the organization) then we would have been left standing alone in the
International community. So we have not accepted the allegations (on the JuD) but the
circumstances were such that we had to act.”
Overall, most members of the government adopted a noncommittal attitude by simply
shifting the onus of the government’s actions against the JuD onto the UNSC’s decision and did
not clarify the government’s affective stance on the issue. A few representatives however
conveyed the same message but also indicated the government’s pro or anit-JuD ideological
stance on the issue. By remaining vague and non-committal in sharing their beliefs about the
validity of the terrorism allegations, the government representatives, like the other three key
labelers, guarded their strategic interests. The government’s decision to ban the JuD under
international law politically placed it on a slippery slope. Internationally, Pakistan’s commitment
to shutting down JuD in particular and to the GWOT in general was consistently being put to
76

question by India, by the pro-Western elements in Pakistan and at times by the US. For example,
when Hafiz Saeed was released from protective custody of the state by order of the Lahore High
Court, the following reaction from the Indian Minister for External Affairs appeared in story
247: “We want that such elements should be tackled by Pakistan so that India can be convinced
of the seriousness of the Government of Pakistan in going after these terrorists.”
Conversely, local religious parties and the citizens who benefitted from the JuD’s various
relief and welfare services severely criticized the government for banning and dismantling the
organization. The main allegation leveled against the government from these quarters was that
they had given in to foreign pressure and banned one of the largest relief and welfare
organizations operating in the country even though the organization had not broken any laws in
Pakistan. For example, the head of Jamaat e Islami (JI), the largest religio-political party, stated
that, “A ban against the JuD has been enforced (by the government) under Indian and American
pressure and the future of thousands of students has been ruined by closing down its (JuD’s)
educational institution” (story 72). The same organization later filed an adjournment motion in
the Senate of Pakistan against the government’s decision to ban JuD (story 73). In presenting that
motion a JI senator said “… the Government of Pakistan has …opted to ban this (JuD) one of the
most committed and highly professional charity organizations… Dozens (of JuD members) have
been arrested without any evidence or even specific accusations” (story 73). Similarly, in a report
of a protest rally organized by students from the JuD run schools that the state had closed down,
one of the protesters was quoted as follows: “We want to ask the government and the UN, what
is the crime of Jamaat ud Dawa? Is educating us a crime? Education is our right; do not take it
away from us” (story 109). In another report of a pro-JuD protest, the perspective of the
protesters was paraphrased as follows: “They (the protesters) said that, after the ban, the ovens in
77

hundreds of houses have been extinguished. The protesters said that an organization that helps
hundreds of people, and that operates eight free medical centers in a city like Karachi, where the
poor are treated for free, cannot be a terrorist organization.”
Under such circumstances, if the government had maintained a rigid pro or anti-JuD
stance then they would have either jeopardized their status as a committed member of the
GWOT within the international community or incurred the disapproval of the local religious
parties and the thousands of Pakistanis that the JuD served through their charity work. Thus, as
an overall strategy the Pakistani Government maintained a noncommittal attitude and justified
their actions within the frame of the UNSC’s decision. This strategy reinforced their status as a
responsible member of the UN and a committed member of the GWOT initiative at the
international level. At the domestic level, it established their status as a strong democratic
government that banned the JuD to carry out their obligations under International law, but that
did not allow foreign powers like India or the US to dictate domestic policy in Pakistan.
Furthermore, this noncommittal strategy allowed the government the flexibility to assume a
slightly pro or anti-JuD stance when the circumstances required, without permanently
committing themselves to any particular side. Overall, the government’s strategy allowed it to
maintain and reinforce the legitimacy of their regime at the national and international level.
Concluding Remarks
The key entities that attached the terrorist label to the JuD used or constructed the
terrorist label in different ways. Each of the key labelers constructed the terrorist label to
highlight that aspect of the JuD’s alleged threat that contravened with their particular strategic
and political interests. The US and the UN were more likely to focus on the ostensible global
threat that the JuD’s financial and social network presented, because they are both spearheading
78

the GWOT initiative. India focused more on the professed danger caused by the organization’s
financial and instrumental support to the LeT, because the LeT was carrying out terrorist attacks
in India, especially the Indian part of Kashmir. Lastly, the federal government, the entity
responsible for banning and shutting down the JuD, remained noncommittal in assuming
responsibility for labeling the JuD. Instead, the government maintained that it was obligated
under international law to ban and dismantle the JuD. The federal government used this strategy
to propitiate entities exerting counteracting pressures at both the international and national level,
and to legitimize its status as a democratic regime and a faithful ally in the GWOT initiative.

Negative Labels Challenged by JuD
In this section, I review the stories that contained both a negative label imposed on JuD
by one of the four key labelers (UN, US, India and the federal government) and a challenge to
the negative label by the JuD. Data analysis revealed that most stories in which one of the four
key labelers negatively labeled JuD presented no rejection of a label by the JuD. The small
number of stories that contained a labeling statement by one of the key labelers and JuD’s
challenge to labels did not specify whether or not the response specifically addressed the labeling
statement previously quoted in the story. Without this information, I cannot be sure whether the
labeling statement and the response were connected, or whether the reporter was shaping reality
by presenting contextually unconnected labels and counter labels in the same story. This
potential bias in the reporting style precludes a precise study of the JuD’s approach to counter
labeling. However, as an exploratory study, the data serves as a proxy that allows development
of a preliminary blueprint of the organization’s overall approach to counter labeling. Later, using
different types of data and other methodologies, these findings can be corroborated and refined.

79

For example, in the interviews of the members of the JuD that I collected earlier, I specifically
asked the respondents about their reaction to the terrorism label that was associated with their
organization by the US and the Pakistani Government. The members’ responses to this question
provide an alternative data source for studying counter labeling by JuD. In a future study, I will
analyze responses of the JuD members to this question to test the credibility of the findings
presented in this section. The dissonance between the labels and counter labels that the data left
unresolved, also limited the possibility of finding connections between different approaches to
counter labeling that JuD used for responding to specific labelers. Since the stories did not
specify whether a particular counter label was directly in response to the negative label imposed
by one of the key labelers presented earlier in the same story, it was difficult to discern if the JuD
used different counter labeling approaches to respond to negative labels by the US, India, the UN
or the Federal Government of Pakistan. However, I did find a few such connections in the data
that made contextual and logical sense. I will present these findings in the concluding part of this
sub section. Bearing these limitations in mind, I will now present the results of the analysis of the
JuD’s counter labeling statements.
The JuD responded to the key labelers’ statements by using seven counter labeling
strategies. These strategies are: 1) denying the label, 2) challenging the rational of the label, 3)
labeling the labeler, 4) challenging the labeler, 5) labeling oneself, 6) highlighting the label’s
repercussions, and 7) proposing to take de-labeling actions. In addition, the JuD used four
distinct frames in counter labeling. These are 1) Islam, 2) justice, 3) sovereignty of Pakistan, and
4) welfare of the Pakistani people. I also found some connections between the use of specific
counter labeling strategies and frames, and the identity of the labeler. The representatives of JuD
recurrently used the ‘justice’ and ‘welfare of the Pakistani people’ frames to counter negative
80

labels by the Federal Government of Pakistan. They were also more likely ‘to label themselves’
when countering the federal government’s negative labels. Lastly, they generally used the
‘justice’ frame in responses to the UN’s negative labels.
As a final part of this analysis, I examined these findings within the context that
surrounded the JuD at the time the story was published to look for connections that could give
me an insight into JuD members’ motivations for countering the terrorism label. The analysis
revealed that the JuD had the following two goals in countering the terrorism label: 1)
reinforcing their identity as an Islamic welfare organization, and 2) distancing themselves from
the terrorism label and regaining their legal and operational status in Pakistan.
In the two next sections, I will briefly explain each of the labeling strategies and frames
named above. Then I will explain the connection between frames and labeling strategies, and the
identity of the labeler. Lastly, I will connect these finding to the two motivations for counter
labeling presented in the previous paragraph.
Counter Labeling Strategies
For the purpose of this study, the term ‘counter labeling strategies’ represents the
classification of techniques used by JuD members to respond to the negative labels placed on
their organization. In other words, the term denoted strategies for constructing a counter label.
Seven such strategies emerged from the data.
Denying the Label
In some cases, the representatives of the JuD countered a label by denying its veracity or
authenticity. For example, story 330 presented a statement by an “independent analyst” in which
he accused the JuD of having a militant wing. The story also presented the response of a JuD
81

official as follows: “We do not have a militant wing.” The JuD official is simply rejecting the
label by declaring it as untrue. Another, technique of denying the label observable in the data
was to first declare the label as false and then provide some fact(s) to reinforce the falsehood of
the label. For instance, story 215 reported that the Lahore High Court released Hafiz Saeed from
protective custody of the state. The same story also reported the Attorney General of Pakistan’s
statement that declared Hafiz Saeed’s detention by the state as legal because he was a threat to
“public order,” to which Hafiz Saeed’s legal counsel reportedly retorted, “Hafiz Saeed’s
detention was illegal, so the Lahore High Court released him.” Hafiz Saeed’s legal counsel
presented the Lahore High Court decision as evidence to support his denial of the label.
Challenging the Rationale of the Label
In some statements, the representatives of the JuD questioned the rationale of the labeler
in negatively labeling the JuD. They did this by reminding the labeler and the audience that the
labeler had previously positively labeled the JuD or taken some action that contradicted the
negative label. For example, a story reported the following statement by a JuD official in
response to the UNSC’s decision to sanction the JuD, “It is strange that the UN which
acknowledged our humanitarian services at the time (of the 2005 earthquake) has called for a ban
on our activities” (story 138). Story 328 mentioned that the JuD received acknowledgement from
the Government of Pakistan and the UN for their relief services to the victims of the 2005
earthquake in Pakistan. By juxtaposing the UNSC’s previous acknowledgement of their services
with the UNSC’s decision to sanction the JuD, the JuD official creates the impression that the
UN had now banned the same activities that it had appreciated earlier. At the same time, he
indirectly asserts that all JuD activities are charity related and the organization is not associated

82

with terrorist activities. Thus, a ban on all JuD activities is in reality a ban on their charity work,
and the UN had previously acknowledged them for performing valued charity work.
Labeling the Labeler
JuD affiliates also responded to negative labels by negatively labeling the labeler. In the
previous section, I reported that the main label imposed on the JuD by the four key labelers was
‘terrorism.’ Statements by JuD representatives that counter labeled by ‘labeling the labeler’
constructed the negative label in a manner that explained or presented an insight into why the
labeler falsely accused the JuD of terrorism. In the next paragraph, I present a relevant example.
Story 165 reported that the Punjab government under the orders of the Federal
Government of Pakistan raided and took over the JuD’s complex in Muredke. The story further
reported that the government representatives justified their action by saying that there were
carrying out the sanctions imposed by the UNSC. The story reported the following response by
the administrator of the Muredke complex: “…if the operation (in the Muredke complex) is
being carried out in the name of adherence to UN resolution merely to please America and India
then under no circumstances will it be allowed to continue.” Firstly, the JuD official is labeling
the government for allowing foreign powers like the US and India to dictate domestic policy in
Pakistan. Secondly, his construction of the label suggests that the government’s real motivation
for raiding the complex was to “please India and America” and not to fulfill the UNSC’s
requirements.
Challenging the Labeler
In some statements, the JuD representatives challenged the labelers to, in front of a
recognized judicial body, provide evidence or prove the authenticity of the negative label they
83

imposed on the JuD. For example, story 35 reported that India not only accused the JuD of being
involved in the Mumbai attack, but also voiced these allegations in the UNSC session, ultimately
leading to the sanctioning of the JuD. The story also reported the following counter label by
Hafiz Seed, “India has not given any proof of party’s (JuD’s) involvement in the Mumbai
incident….I challenge India to produce proof in any court of the world…” (story 35).
Labeling Oneself
Representatives of the JuD also countered the negative labels, the terrorism label in
particular, by reinforcing their identity as a lawful Islamic welfare organization. For example,
story 138 reported the statement printed in the Wall Street Journal that depicted JuD as a terrorist
organization that legitimized its illegal activities through charitable activities. The same story set
forth the following response by the JuD official: “It (JuD) is providing services to the people (of
Pakistan) where they need them that made us popular with the masses. Our hospital at the
Muredke center provides medical services to sixty six villages in the area. Unfortunately, there is
not a single government heath unit or government facility in this area.” The JuD official is
advocating that the JuD’s charitable endeavors are not a front for conducting terrorist activities,
but are a manifestation of the organizational goal of providing welfare and relief services to
marginalized sections of the society that have been ignored by the state and other welfare
organizations. The official is reinforcing the JuD’s identity as a committed and altruistic charity,
and in the process falsifying the terrorism label. He is also alleging that the people of Pakistan
are aware of the truth about his organization, and for this reasons the JuD is popular among the
masses.

84

Highlighting the Repercussions of the Label
In the few statements by JuD affiliates in the newspaper that provided glimpses into JuD
‘self-identity’ (which I will analyze and triangulate with intensive interviews of group members
in a future study), they usually presented the JuD’s charitable services as unique and invaluable.
They claimed this distinction for their organization by asserting that the JuD catered to a section
of the society that otherwise did not have access to basic services and necessities through the
state or delivered by some other organization. The statement quoted in the previous paragraph
provides an example of this argument.
The representatives of the JuD used this portrayal of the group to counter labels. They
maintained that since the organization was performing a unique service, its proscription would
irreparably victimize their already marginalized clientele. For example, story 53 reported that
under the orders of the federal government, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa arrested one hundred and
eighty one Dawa workers and closed down forty six Dawa offices. The story cited a JuD
spokesperson’s response to the government’s action against the organization: “…the
government’s actions would deprive over 400,000 people displaced by the military operation in
Bajaur agency of food medicine and other items” (story 53). The JuD spokesperson makes three
points in this statement. Firstly, the government’s military action had turned the local population
into refugees by forcing them out of their homes. This claim rested on the JuD’s publicly held
stance that the Pakistan Government should not have participated in the GWOT and should have
opted for negotiations with the Taliban instead of fighting them in the territory of Pakistan, and
thereby forcing citizens to flee their homes (story 11). In this context, the JuD spokesperson is
alleging that the state had victimized the local population of the Bajaur area by declaring war
against the Talibans taking refuge in Pakistan. Secondly, he suggested that the state has been
85

unable to provide basic food and health facilities to all Bajaur refugees. Lastly, he claimed that
the JuD was catering to the basic needs of 400,000 refugees who were not receiving help from
the state. The state’s decision to shut down JuD’s operations would deprive these refugees of
these services. Thus, the government was victimizing these people for the second time by
proscribing the JuD.
Proposing to Take De-Labeling Action
In a few statements, the JuD representatives countered the terrorism label by revealing
that JuD was planning or had taken some lawful de-labeling action. These statements conveyed
the message that the JuD was innocent of terrorism and was confident that any impartial national
or international level judicial body could not find them guilty. For example, story 35 reported
Hafiz Saeed’s response to the UNSC decision against JuD and the government’s crackdown on
the organization: “We are moving Pakistani courts against the ban for seeking justice and our
rights, and also intend to move the International Court of Justice later. Besides we are also
writing a letter to the UNSC for clarification and proof.”
Counter Labeling Frames
I also observed in the data that regardless of the strategy for counter labeling, the JuD
representatives packaged their messages in four specific frames. These frames were the JuD’s
commonly held beliefs about Islam, justice, the sovereignty of Pakistan and the welfare of the
Pakistani people presented in a way that is “culturally resonant” (Chakravarty and Chaudhuri,
2012) to the Pakistani newsreaders. . This practice of framing allowed JuD members to identify
themselves with the people of Pakistan and imply that an attack on the JuD was an attack on
Pakistani people or their socially shared values and principles.

86

Islam
Islam and its revivalist interpretation are the founding stone of the JuD. However,
Pakistan is also a Muslims country, and most Pakistanis share a similar interpretation of some
basic Islamic principles. They share principles regardless of whether they are revivalist Muslims
or sectarian Muslims. These universal principles represent a shared identity among Muslims
from all groups and sects within Pakistan. For example, every Muslim must believe that there is
one God and Mohammad is the last prophet. There is no sect-based or group-based difference in
interpretation among the Muslims on this point. JuD’s counter labeling messages evoked such
commonly shared Islamic values as frames 1) to gain legitimacy in the minds of the audience by
identifying with them, and 2) to convey the message that those who negatively label or take
aggressive actions against the JuD’s are the audience’s common enemy.
The JuD representatives particularly concentrated in their messages on the commonly
held value that a ‘good Muslim’ is ‘altruistic’ or helps people for Allah’s favor and not for any
material gain. They evoked the ‘Muslim altruism’ frame to identify themselves as good Muslims
in the eyes of the audience by asserting that the JuD helped people for the sole purpose of
pleasing Allah and did not demand any material gains for their endeavors. For example, story
365 reported a statement originally published in the New York Times that labeled the JuD as a
terrorist organization and warned the reader that the JuD’s participation in flood relief efforts
during the 2010 floods could intensify their terrorism support and finance network in Pakistan.
The story further reported the following response by a JuD official: “to work for humanity is the
true spirit of Islam, we do not expect anything in return (for our flood relief activities).” In this
statement, the JuD official is rejecting the terrorism label on his organization by creating an
image of the JuD as a group of ‘good Muslims’ in the mind of the audience, by evoking the
socially shared interpretation of ‘Muslim altruism’ as a frame.
87

Another commonly held value among Muslims is the existence of a single Muslim
Ummah or nation. Even though different sects interpret this principle differently, it is a
fundamental and widely acknowledged principle of Islam that all Muslims are part of one united
nation that transcends all territorial, ethnic or racial boundaries. The JuD representatives’ used
the concept of Muslim Ummah to create empathy among the audience and later emphasized that
by affixing the terrorism label on the JuD the enemies of Islam had vicariously negatively
labeled all Muslims. For example, story 35 reported the UNSC had decided to put JuD’s name on
the Consolidated List and the federal government had commenced a nationwide crackdown
against the group. The story reported the following rejoinder from Hafiz Saeed: “I condemn the
UN Security Council’s decision to ban our organization… it (the UNSC’s decision) is …an
attack on Islam (story 35).”
Justice
The JuD representatives also recurrently used the universally recognized concept of
justice, especially the rights of the accused to defend oneself in a court of law and the principle
that one is innocent until proven guilty, to frame their counter labeling messages. They used
these principles as frames to challenge the legitimacy of the terrorism label and sanctions that the
UN and federal government had imposed on their group without showing them the evidence
against their group or giving them the chance to defend themselves in a national or international
court of law. For example, in response to the UNSC’s decision to sanction the JuD, Hafiz Saeed
retorted that, “The UNSC banned it (JuD) hastily, unilaterally, or without verifying the proof or
hearing the other side, which was a violation of the norms of justice” (story 35).

88

Sovereignty of Pakistan
It is a commonly acknowledged principle that a sovereign state is solely and
independently responsible for shaping its domestic policy. In addition, any foreign state that
forcibly attempts to influence the domestic policy of another country is compromising the
sovereignty of that country. The JuD affiliates used these principles to frame the tactics used by
the Indian government to pressure the Pakistan government to proscribe and shut down JuD, as a
foreign entity’s attempt to impose indirect control over Pakistan’s domestic policy, and thus an
attack on the sovereignty of Pakistan. For example, story 25 (published a week after the Mumbai
attack and before the UNSC’s decision to sanction the JuD) reported a statement by an Indian
official in which he claimed that the terrorists responsible for Mumbai attack were hiding out in
JuD’s Muredke complex. He also threatened that a failure on the part of the Pakistan
Government to apprehend these fugitives would force India to step in and carry out an air strike
on the Muredke complex. The story also reported the following rejoinder by the JuD
spokesperson: “An attack on the complex is an attack on the sovereignty of Pakistan” (story 25).
The JuD affiliates also used this frame to allege that the Federal Government of Pakistan
had compromised the sovereignty of Pakistan by succumbed to foreign pressure and deciding to
ban the JuD. The following counter labeling statement by a JuD official provides an example of
this: “if this operation is being carried out in the name of adherence to the UN resolution merely
to please America and India then under no condition will it be allowed to continue” (story 165).
Welfare of the Pakistani People
The JuD representative also used the commonly acknowledged principle that a
democratic state regards the welfare of its citizens as a matter of top priority as a frame
specifically to counter the federal government’s negative labels. As mentioned previously, the
89

JuD presented itself as an organization that served those marginalized sections of the society that
the state was unable or unwilling to help. Using this frame, the JuD representatives countered the
Pakistani Government’s negative labeling of their organization by alleging that the government
had banned an organization that voluntarily helped the state to fulfill a neglected obligation.
Thus, they implied that the state did not hold the welfare of the Pakistani people as its primary
goal. The following statement, presented in the previous sub-section, also provides an example
of how the JuD used the ‘welfare of the people’ frame: “…the Government’s actions would
deprive over 400,000 people displaced by the military operation in Bajaur agency of food
medicine and other items” (story 53).
Connection between the Approaches to Counter Labeling and the Labeler
The findings that I have presented thus far in this section are of a descriptive nature.
Analysis of the different strategies and frames used for counter labeling provide an insight into
‘how’ the JuD defended itself against the terrorist label in the Pakistani print media. The next
step in the analysis was to determine whether there were any connections between the strategies
and frames of counter labeling, and the labelers. A search for connections between the strategy
and frame of counter label and the labeler would firstly reveal whether JuD’s overall approach to
counter labeling was different for different key labelers. Secondly, these connections when
viewed within the Pakistani context at the time could also help in understanding the motivations
or interests of the JuD in countering the key labelers’ negative labels. The analysis only revealed
a few significant connections between how the JuD constructed and framed counter labels, and
the labeler. I found that compared to the other key labelers the JuD used the ‘justice’ and
‘welfare of the Pakistani people’ frames more often to counter the negative labels of the federal
government. They also tended to ‘label themselves’ more in response to the federal
90

government’s negative labels. Lastly, JuD also frequently used the ‘justice’ frame with reference
to the UN’s negative labels.
The JuD’s representatives generally used the ‘justice’ frame in countering the terrorism
label imposed by the Federal Government of Pakistan to infer that the government had
proscribed their organization without following due process of law. For example, story 35 (two
days after the UNSC’s decision to sanction the JuD) presented the Interior Minister of Pakistan’s
statement that declared that the federal government had decided to proscribe the JuD to fulfill its
obligation under international law and had ordered the provincial governments to shut down all
JuD operations within their territories. The same story paraphrased Hafiz Saeed’s response that
the federal government had itself violated local and international law by commencing the
crackdown on JuD on 08/12/08, two days before the UN had sanctioned the JuD. In the news
coverage the JuD received after Hafiz Saeed’s release from house arrest by the Lahore High
Court, I observed that the JuD also used the ‘justice’ frame to profess the legality of their
organization. For example, story 290 reported that a senior federal minister labeled the JuD a
banned terrorist organization, to which the JuD spokesperson responded, “…our organization is
not banned and our Ameer has been acquitted by a court of law.” The newspaper data confirmed
that the Government of Pakistan had to date not issued any federal directive or notification that
specifically declared JuD a banned or terrorist organization in Pakistan. A senior official at the
Ministry of Interior on behalf of the federal government explained the reason for not issuing such
orders as follows: “There is no need to issue any such notification (by the Pakistani Government)
against the organization once it is banned by the UN” (story 78). To establish the lawful status of
the organization in Pakistan, the JuD spokesperson, in the statement presented above, is
leveraging the federal government’s decision not to issue a notification banning JuD. In addition,
91

he is using the Lahore High Court’s decision to release Hafiz Saeed as evidence to refute JuD’s
connection to terrorism.
I have already explained earlier in the analysis that JuD respondents used the ‘welfare of
Pakistani people’ frame specifically to counter the federal government’s negative labels. They
used this frame to establish that 1) the JuD was helping those marginalized sections of the
society that the state’s social welfare system had neglected and 2) the state was re-victimizing
these people by proscribing the JuD. The JuD representatives also used this counter labeling
frame to claim that their organization had achieved a greater level of legitimacy in Pakistan as a
relief and welfare organization than the Government of Pakistan. For example, story 138
reported the following statement by a JuD official in response to Interior Minister’s allegation
that JuD was a front organization for a terrorist group: “…most donors (of JuD) give Zakat and
alms (to the JuD) as a religious duty. They do not want the government to deduct Zakat from
their bank accounts but prefer to give it to Jamaat ud Dawa.” In Pakistan, all Muslims are
required to pay a religious tax called Zakat. The state automatically deducts Zakat out of the
wages of government employees and the private citizens’ bank accounts. However, under
Pakistani law, Muslim citizens can also choose to pay this amount to a charity of the choice.
Within this context, the JuD official is asserting that because of JuD’s past services the people of
Pakistan prefer to trust the JuD with their Zakat instead of the state.
This statement is also an example how the JuD representatives ‘labeled themselves’ to
respond to the federal government’s negative labels. They often employed this strategy to
counter federal government’s terrorism label by emphasizing JuD’s identity as a law abiding
Islamic welfare organization. The JuD representatives used this strategy by presenting specific
quantified details about the JuD’s contribution to the society through its relief and welfare
92

efforts. For example, story 300 contained a statement made by an “independent political analyst”
that compared the JuD to the Hizbullah. The analyst said that, “It seems they (JuD) are following
the pattern of Hizbullah in Lebanon by simultaneously running their relief and military wing….
This is also to create goodwill for themselves and gain sympathies and strength for their fighting
group” (story 330). The same story contained the following response by the JuD spokesperson:
“We (JuD) also have camps in Noshehra, Swat, Multan, Gilgit and Pakistani Kashmir…
Thousands of people are getting free food from the JuD in the flood hit areas where we have 13
major camps, 9 medical teams and 39 ambulances….We don’t have any fighting wing and it is
the relief work of JuD which has made it popular” (story 330).
The JuD spokesperson is countering the terrorism label in this statement by first
constructing an image of his organization in the minds of the readers. He is giving shape to this
image by specifying and quantifying the JuD’s flood relief services. According to him, the JuD
was providing flood relief services in six different flood affected cities. He also illustrates the
extent of JuD’s relief efforts to the readers by giving numeric values to the flood victims that his
organization helped and the different types of relief services that his organization provided. In
the later part of his statement, he used this self-created image of the JuD to distance his
organization from the terrorism label. He denied the allegation that his organization had a
fighting wing and asserted that JuD was popular among the Pakistani masses because of its
unique and invaluable charitable services.
Lastly, I observed that the JuD repeatedly used the ‘justice’ frame to counter the UN’s
negative labels on their organization. The JuD often responded to the UN’s negative labels by
contending that the UN had sanctioned the JuD without providing proof against their
organization or providing JuD the opportunity to prove their innocence. The JuD also frequently
93

employed the ‘justice’ frame in countering the UN’s ‘terrorist’ label to raise concerns about
UN’s impartiality as a world forum. Specifically, they alleged that the UNSC had declared JuD
as part of the Al Qaeda network, without first properly evaluating the evidence against them and
providing JuD the opportunity to defend itself, because of the Indian pressure on it to take action
against the JuD. Thus, they implied that political influence and not the dictates of justice swayed
the UN to impose the terrorist label on the JuD. For example, story 160 presented the following
response from a JuD official addressing the UN’s label that JuD was an associate of the Al
Qaeda, “the sanctions on the JuD have been imposed without justification, merely on the basis of
the allegations leveled by India.” In the next section, I will further discuss the JuD’s use of the
‘justice’ frame to question the impartiality of the UN.
Overall, I found that the observed connections between the counter labeling frame and
strategies, and the labelers were all reflective of the JuD’s strategic interests at the time, which
was to regain their legal and operational status in Pakistan. The UN and the federal government,
in comparison to India and the US, were both directly responsible for JuD’s loss of legal and
operational status. I suggest that the JuD, in using the ‘justice’ frame to counter the UN and the
State imposed terrorism label, was sending a communiqué to the Pakistani readers that their
organization had been victimized in violation of commonly held principles and values of justice.
Thus, they used these commonly held values of justice to profess their innocence to the public.
Similarly, the JuD used the ‘welfare of the people’ frame and ‘labeled themselves’ to
counter the federal government’s negative labels by reminding the public of JuD’s invaluable
services and the irreparable loss that JuD’s proscription caused those marginalized sections of
the society that the JuD served through its relief and welfare services. My field experiences in
Pakistan and the newspaper data both show that the JuD garners a strong support among the
94

Pakistani public especially in the Punjab region. The JuD’s approach to counter label the UN and
federal government imposed ‘terrorist’ label points towards a policy of salvaging their public
image in Pakistan and leveraging their public support to pressurize the federal government into
reinstating their legal and operational status.

95

CHAPTER 5: NEGATIVE LABELS BY JUD
This chapter focuses on the statements in which JuD negatively labeled some entity. It
shows how negative labels by the JuD are connected to the group’s strategic interests. In the
preliminary analysis of the statements in which the JuD negatively labeled someone, I observed
two trends. Firstly, the JuD consistently negatively labeled the Government of Pakistan, the UN,
the US, India and Israel. Four out of these five entities that the JuD labeled (with the exception of
Israel) were the key negative labelers who imposed the ‘terrorism’ labels on the JuD. Secondly,
the JuD mainly negatively labeled these entities in relation to the following six issues: 1) the ban
on JuD; 2) the GWOT initiative; 3) destabilization and terrorism in Pakistan; 4) water shortages
in Pakistan; 5) the Kashmir insurgency; and 6) the 2010 floods in Pakistan.
Although the JuD tended to label more than one entity in relation to a particular issue, the
rationale behind the labels varied by which group they were labeling. For example, the JuD
negatively labeled the Pakistani Government, the UN, the US, Israel and India over the Kashmir
Insurgency. They negatively labeled the Pakistani Government for not providing diplomatic and
military support to the “Kashmir cause.” They negatively labeled the UN and the US for
declaring the Kashmiri “freedom struggle” to be a domestic issue for India, and thus impeding
Pakistan and other Muslim countries’ call for a resolution of the Kashmir issue at an impartial
international forum like the UN. They also rebuked the UN for not taking notice of the Indian
army’s alleged atrocious victimization of the Kashmiri people. They blamed Israel for covertly
helping India in suppressing the Kashmir insurgency. Lastly, they labeled the actions of the
Indian army in Kashmir as “war crimes.” They interpreted Indian’s continued “occupation” of
Kashmir as a sign of the State’s marginalization of Muslim minorities in India. Furthermore, they
connected the Kashmir issue to the water shortage issue in Pakistan and construed India’s
96

“illegal” control over Kashmir as a sign of hostility towards Pakistan. Thus, the JuD connected
different entities to the same issues and negatively labeled more than one entity over the same
issue. This observation led to further investigation into how and why the JuD connected various
entities to specific issues when they attached negative labels.
My analysis revealed the JuD used frames for interpreting events (incidents, actions or
statement) that involved the Pakistani Government, the UN, the US, Israel or India in ways that,
within their negatively labeling statements, connected incidents to the issues specified above.
The frames also provided the negative affective content, or a negative interpretation of events,
that the JuD used to justify the negative labels. To clarify this pattern I provide examples of the
JuD’s overall strategy for negatively labeling an entity. Presented below are two statements by
two different JuD leaders about two separate incidents, both related to the UN.
Story 160
“The ban on JuD has been imposed without justification and based merely on allegations
leveled by India.”
Story 280
“The UN Security Council imposed sanctions against JuD, but now it is silent on
controversial Indian plans in (Indian) held Kashmir.”
In story 160, a JuD official comments on the UNSC’s decision to declare the JuD an affiliate of
Al Qaeda and Taliban and to impose sanctions on the organization. In story 280, Hafiz Saeed,
the head of the JuD, condemns the UN’s silence over the Indian plans to build dams on rivers

97

that originate from the Indian part of Kashmir and flow into Pakistan. According to him, such
acts violated the Indus Water Treaty, signed between India and Pakistan in 1960 (Singh, 2002).
In the first statement, the JuD constructed the negative label the UN’s sanctioning of the
JuD by framing the UN as a biased world forum that favors the anti-Islam forces (India) and
victimizes Muslim groups. In the second statement, the JuD head constructed a similar negative
label by conveying that the UN sanctioned the JuD unjustly (without presenting any evidence
against the JuD or providing JuD a chance to defend itself) and contrasting it to the UN’s
decision to overlook India’s self evident violation of the Indus Water treaty. Again, the speaker
used the ‘biased or anti-Muslim’ disposition of the UN frame to make sense of the incident.
Thus, in both cases the JuD officials conveyed the same label, that the UN unjustly victimized
the JuD, even though the second incident (India’s alleged violation of the Indus Water Treaty)
has no bearing on UNSC decision sanctioning the JuD. The cited speaker framed both events
similarly to convey the overall message that both events had some bearing on the same issue,
that is, the UN’s unjust victimization of the JuD.
As in the above example, in other JuD negative labeling statements, I found two types of
contents packaged together in the same message, but each type of content required a separate
interpretation. The JuD’s repeated negative labeling of the same parties over specific issues
provided the strategic content. Analysis of the strategic content provides insight into why the
JuD negatively labeled various entities. Why did the JuD consistently negatively label the same
parties over the same issues? How was this trend reflective of the organization’s strategic
interests? The JuD connected specific events, issues and labeled entities through frames. They
also used frames to give meaning to the connection between events, issues and the labeled entity
in a desired affective direction, in this case a negative meaning. The negative labels that the JuD
98

created were an outcome of the negative meanings that the frames provided to the connection
among the events, issues, and the labeled entities. Thus, the frames and labels signify the
affective content in the JuD’s negatively labeling statements. Analysis of the affective content in
the JuD’s negatively labeling messages can reveal the opinions, beliefs, and related negative
feelings that the organization wanted to propagate about events, issues, and the labeled entities.
In other words, a study of frames and labels shows how the JuD wanted their audience to
perceive and feel about the issues and the parties that they negatively labeled in the context of
specific events (incidents, actions or statements involving the labeled entities). For the purpose
of this analysis, I concentrate mainly on how JuD propagated negative impressions of the ‘other,’
in this case the Pakistani Government, the UN, the US, India and Israel.
In negatively labeling the Pakistan Government, the JuD consistently questioned
officials’ legitimacy as rulers of an Islamic democratic republic and guardians of the sovereignty
of Pakistan. Similarly, they questioned the legitimacy of the UN as a just and impartial world
forum, and alleged that the enemies of Islam were using the UN as an instrument for globally
marginalizing Muslim countries and groups in the world. Lastly, they presented the US, India
and Israel as the ‘enemies’ of Muslims and specifically of Pakistanis. Furthermore, they
professed that JuD’s stance on the seven issues mentioned above was pro-Muslim and proPakistan, and contrasted JuD from the ‘others’ (those that the JuD negatively labeled) who were
portrayed as either directly or indirectly undermining the interests of the Muslims and Pakistanis.
To use a metaphor, the organization used these issues as battlefields on which domineering and
united enemies of Islam and Pakistan (India, the US and Israel) were oppressing the weak and
divided Muslims, especially Pakistani Muslims. The Pakistan Government and the UN, the
entities that were obligated to protect the interest of the Muslims and Pakistanis, had forsaken
99

them. JuD presented itself as a group of true Muslims that was voluntarily fighting for the rights
of Muslims and Pakistan and against the domination of their common enemies.
The overall analysis of the strategic content in the JuD statements revealed that the JuD’s
negative labeling statements justified the organization’s ‘volunteer status’ among audience
members (the people of Pakistan) – and more immediately the readership of the newspapers. The
JuD’s self-projected ‘volunteer’ persona emerged as an integral part of its ideological identity
and an essential feature of its continued social existence within the Pakistani society. I discuss
the importance of the JuD’s ‘volunteer’ persona in the concluding remarks of this section.

Analysis of JuD’s Construction of Negative Labels
This section presents analysis of the negative labels that the JuD imposed on the
Government of Pakistan, the UN, the US, India and Israel. JuD statements gave meaning to
events by connecting them to specific issues through frames and through these connections, by
constructing negative labels. The analysis focused on the statements from JuD’s leaders and
representatives in which they negatively labeled these entities. I discuss the negative labels
imposed on each of the entities in separate sections but in relation to the six specific issues
(named earlier). At the conclusion of this chapter, I explain the connection between the negative
labeling and the strategic nature of JuD’s framing of events, issues, and labeled entities.
Negative Labels Imposed on the Government of Pakistan
The JuD affiliates mainly used five frames for negatively labeling the government. All
five frames challenge the Pakistani Government’s legitimacy as ‘rulers of an Islamic democratic
republic.’ These frames originated from the JuD’s perception or vision of a legitimate ‘Islamic’
and ‘democratic’ regime. I first briefly explain the conceptualization of a legitimate ‘Islamic’ and
100

‘democratic’ government that the JuD used to derive the five specific frames for negatively
labeling the government. I base this explanation mainly on analysis of my field notes taken
during my various encounters with JuD members at the pre-dissertation stage and also
recollection of the dissertation data, which is not available for analysis.
My field observations revealed that the JuD members did not consider Islam and
democracy as incompatible ideologies. They considered democracy as an essential component
of an Islamic state. A few members even shared the belief that the modern concept of democracy
germinated from basic Islamic principles, and the Muslims had established the first democratic
state centuries before the emergence of democracy in the West. They bolstered this argument by
presenting the example of the Abu Bakar, the first Caliph of the Muslim nation after the death of
the Prophet Mohammad; they believed Abu Bakar was elected at a public meeting through
consensus in 632 A.D. (Afsaruddin, 2006). The JuD members’ incorporation of democratic
principles within their conceptualization of the Islamic state signified to them that Islam was
“spiritually and logically the best and complete system of life” (a remark made by a JuD member
I interviewed during the pre-dissertation stage). During my pre-dissertation trip, one JuD
member that I met at the JuD’s Lahore complex told me that, “…they (the West) want the world
to accept democracy. I say that if they (the West) truly want democracy in this world then they
(the West) should accept Islam.”
The JuD’s concept of a legitimate ruler of an Islamic state was someone who
implemented the principles of revivalist Islam and the doctrine of democracy, since the latter was
simply a part of the former in an Islamic state. Following this logic, some JuD members believed
that concepts such as human rights, justice and rule of law which are the fundamental
components of Western democratic ideology, were also the driving force in a true Islamic state.
101

For example in an article about the Islamic conception of equality and human rights, which I
read in a JuD monthly magazine, the author presented the following quote by the Prophet
Mohammad: “There is no superiority of an Arab over a non-Arab, nor of a non-Arab over an
Arab except in whoever fears Allah the most.” Based on this saying of the Prophet Mohammad,
the author made the argument that the West could never create a truly egalitarian society, which
would be consistent with a democracy, because only those societies that strive for spiritual purity
rather than material gain can achieve true egalitarianism.
JuD also conceptualized a legitimate Muslim ruler as having duties and obligations
beyond the realm of a state that extended to the entire Muslim Ummah (nation). I have outlined
the JuD’s concept of a unified Muslim Ummah earlier in this dissertation. In the context of the
JuD’s vision of a legitimate Muslim ruler, since all Muslims in the world constitute one nation, it
is the duty of all Muslims rulers as legitimate representatives of Muslims nations to help the
oppressed and marginalized Muslims all over the world.
The JuD’s conceptualization of a Muslim ruler connected these seemingly worldly duties
to the spiritual goal of winning the favor of Allah, which JuD members believed is the aspiration
of all Muslims. To sum up, I found that the JuD conceptualized the Muslim ruler combined
attributes of spirituality (the will to please Allah) and good intentions (the will to serve and
protect national and Ummah interests) with actions (the implementation of Quran and Sunnah in
domestic and foreign matters).
Keeping this context in mind, I found that the JuD used five distinct frames to label the
government negatively. All five frames challenged the government’s legitimacy by contrasting
specific aspects of the extant Pakistani Government to the JuD’s perception of the ‘true ruler’ of

102

a Muslim state. By using these frames, the JuD not only undermined the legitimacy of the
Pakistani Government, but also propagated to the people of Pakistan their beliefs about what an
Islamic state and Islamic ruler should be. These frames are: 1) the government is unwilling or
incompetent to perform its duties; 2) the government failed to implement Shariat (Islamic Law)
in Pakistan; 3) the government is unjust; 4) the government has compromised the sovereignty of
Pakistan; and 5) the government has undermined the interests of the Ummah. The first frame
(government is incompetent and unwilling) discredits the government’s spirituality (serving and
protecting Muslims to win the favor of Allah) or its motivations for ruling. The remaining four
frames point toward the Pakistan Government’s failure in fulfilling its responsibilities as the
guardian and caretaker of an Islamic democratic republic. I will now analyze how the JuD used
the five frames to construct negative labels against the JuD.
When reading the analysis the reader should bear in mind that the JuD used these frames
to portray the government as ‘the other’ but not as ‘the enemy.’ This means that the JuD’s
overall use of negative frames and negative labels against the government indicated an effort to
differentiate the government from itself, and those whose interests the JuD volunteered to
represent (the people of Pakistan). However, they never declared the government as their enemy
or the enemy of Pakistan or the Ummah. The JuD portrayed them as misguided or as Muslims
who had wavered from the path of spiritual purity, and whose materialism had made them the
willing or unwilling instrument of ‘the enemy.’ A JuD member that I interviewed during the predissertation stage explained as follows: “We do not criticize the government. Those poor people
(the government) are slaves of their greed and of their western masters. They cannot do anything
(to protect the interests of Pakistan). Their hands may be tied, but our (the JuD) hands are free
and we will carry on our struggle for (the sake of) Islam.”
103

Pakistani Government as Incompetent or Unwilling to Perform
The JuD used the ‘incompetent or unwilling’ frame to negatively label the Pakistani
Government’s behavior in relation to two issues: 1) terrorism in Pakistan and 2) the GWOT.
Terrorism in Pakistan
Throughout the Pakistani newspaper coverage of JuD, the JuD maintained that foreign
forces like the US, India and Israel were responsible for terrorism in Pakistan. They made this
claim in response to the government’s claim that the Taliban and other Muslim militant
organization were carrying out terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The JuD used the ‘incompetent or
unwilling’ frame to blame the government for not publically accusing or taking any action
against the foreign enemies guilty of conducting terrorism in Pakistan. For example, story 266
quoted Hafiz Saeed as follows: “…India and (the) US through their agencies like the Black
Water are responsible for terrorist activities in Pakistan, while our rulers were silent for reasons
best known to them.” Hafiz Saeed’s use of the phrase “for reasons best known to them (the
government)” indicates that, in the eyes of the JuD leader, the government knows that foreign
powers are responsible for terrorism in Pakistan and are still publically silent over the matter.
Study of the news coverage of the government’s response to particular major terrorist incidents
revealed that they rarely blamed any foreign forces for terrorism in Pakistan, but instead usually
blamed banned Muslim militant and terrorist groups. Since, they did not share the belief that
foreign powers held responsibility for terrorism in Pakistan, the government had no reason to
initiate any actions against these alleged foreign entities. However, Hafiz Saeed by using the
‘incompetent or unwilling’ frame suggests that the government’s inaction against “India and
(the) US” is a cover up and deliberate omission that works against the interest of Pakistan.

104

The GWOT Leading to Military Operations in Pakistan
Throughout the news coverage of JuD, the organization maintained a consistent public
anti-GWOT stance. JuD members frequently expressed the opinion in the print media that the
GWOT was not a war on terrorism, but a US led global initiative to marginalize Muslims in the
world. The JuD also severely criticized the Pakistan Government for taking part in the GWOT,
especially through the Pakistan army led operations in the Sawat and Waziristan areas of
Pakistan. The news coverage further revealed that in the months of June and July, 2010, the
Pakistan Government, under pressure from the US, the UN and India, started considering taking
military action against a group called the ‘Punjabi Taliban,’ a group that was allegedly active in
the south of the Punjab province. I mentioned earlier in this dissertation that Punjab is JuD’s
main base of operations. The JuD had a very strong response to this government action. In the
following statement, Hafiz Saeed used the ‘incompetent and unwilling’ frame to negatively label
the Pakistan government’s deliberations to commence a military operation in south Punjab as a
naive reaction prompted by the pressure mounted by the US and India (Story 292):
“... the bogey of Punjab Taliban is being invoked by America and India to justify an army
operation in southern Punjab and the Pakistani Government is foolishly complying…
beware these operations will not be allowed to continue.”
An overall analysis of all the statement in which the JuD negatively labeled the
government revealed that, with the exception of this comment about the possible government-led
military operation in Punjab, the JuD never made any threats against the Pakistan government or
army. This observation suggests that since Punjab was JuD’s main base of operations in
Pakistan, JuD members perceived a military operation against the Punjab Taliban as a direct

105

threat to their organization and therefore publically conveyed their intentions of retaliation
against such military action.
Pakistani Government’s Failure to Enforce an Islamic System
The JuD also challenged the legitimacy of the government by pointing to its inability to
implement Islamic law in Pakistan. In some cases, they pointed out this failure while speaking
about seemingly unrelated issues, such as the Pakistan Government’s role in the GWOT.
In the newspaper data, the JuD used the ‘failure to enforce Islamic system’ frame to
negatively label the government’s military action as members of the US led GWOT initiative in
Sawat and Waziristan. Story 15 presented the following quote by Hafiz Saeed: “(President)
Musharraf is busy following the orders of US and its allies (under the GWOT) but he cannot
implement Quran and Sunnah.”
In this statement, Saeed criticizes the government’s decision to commence military
operations in Sawat and Waziristan. He interprets the government’s military action, taken under
a US led initiative, within the frame that the Musharraf regime had failed or had not even tried to
implement principles of Quran and Sunnah in Pakistan. Saeed’s interpretation conveys to the
reader that Musharraf, as the ruler of Pakistan, lacked spiritual motivation to serve and protect
Pakistanis and the Muslim Ummah by following Islamic principles for winning the Allah’s favor.
The interpretation further suggests that the decision to join the GWOT and commence military
operations within the territory of Pakistan was made to please the US, not God.
Pakistani Government’s Failure to Enforce Principles of Justice
As another way to label the government negatively, JuD affiliates framed the Pakistani
Government as failing to enforce and follow basic principles of justice. They used the justice
106

frame mainly to impose two labels on the government, both related to this same issue, the
proscription of JuD in Pakistan.
Firstly, the JuD affiliates negatively labeled the government for declaring JuD a terrorist
organization without providing the organization a chance to face the charges and question the
evidence against it. Later, in the news coverage after Hafiz Saeed’s release from protective
custody by the Lahore High Court due to lack of evidence, JuD members reinforced this label by
claiming their organization’s innocence of the terrorism charges leveled against it. Hafiz Saeed
made the following statement on his release: “The government tried its level best to prove that
JuD was a terrorist group by establishing its links with Al Qaeda. All these charges are baseless
and Dawa has been targeted merely under the influence of Indian propaganda” (story 203). In
this statement, the term “baseless” signifies JuD’s view that the government initiated
proceedings against the group in order to appease the Indian pressure and propaganda against the
government for not bringing charges against Hafiz Saeed (who the Indian labeled as the
“mastermind” of the Mumbai attacks). According to Hafiz Saeed, the government’s decision to
detain him was politically motivated and not based on evidence against him, as the principles of
justice would dictate.
Secondly, the JuD negatively labeled the government for exceeding the requirements of
the UNSC’s sanctions against JuD in its crackdown operation against the organization. For
example, almost a month after the crackdown began, a JuD official commented, “The UN
demanded only three sanctions but the Pakistani Government went way ahead of these actions.
The government arrested dozens of our workers, closed all offices and house arrested out top 10
leaders. So what the Pakistani Government is doing was not demanded by the UN or US” (story
145). In this statement, the JuD official used the justice frame to allege that the government did
107

not judiciously implement the sanctions that the UNSC imposed on the organization and
reinforced his claim by presenting proof of the government’s excesses against his organization.
Pakistani Government’s Compromise of the Nation’s Sovereignty
The JuD’s use of the ‘government compromised the sovereignty of Pakistan’ frame was
mainly associated with their allegation of the influence of foreign pressure on government’s
domestic and foreign policies. The JuD spokespersons generated this frame by making explicit or
subliminal comparisons between the government and their idealized version of a Muslim ruler,
who is guided by Islamic principles in setting state policy for the sole purpose of gaining God’s
favor by serving and protecting the citizens and the Ummah in general. Following this argument,
the JuD’s accusation that the foreign elements influenced the government in policymaking
conveyed the impression that the state had renounced the fundamental goal of serving Muslims
and God. Furthermore, analysis of the JuD’s statements in which they used the ‘sovereignty’
frame revealed that they invariably projected the foreign powers that exercised an unwarranted
influence over policy setting in Pakistan as the ‘enemies’ of Pakistan and the Ummah. Hence, the
JuD’s use of the ‘sovereignty’ frame provided the premise to generate negative labels that both
contested the government’s allegiance to Pakistan, the Ummah, and God, and portrayed it as the
witting or unwitting instrument of the ‘enemy.’
The JuD representatives who imposed negative labels on the state using the ‘government
compromises the sovereignty of Pakistan’ frame often accused the government for allowing
foreign powers to exercise influence in Pakistan. They portrayed the government as too weak to
resist foreign pressure because of its continual dependence on foreign aid to perform their stately
functions. As Hafiz Saeed remarked, “… the rulers depend on aid from US, UK and World Bank
to run the country” (story 255). The JuD specifically used the ‘sovereignty’ frame to criticize the
108

government’s policies regarding the ban on JuD and other religious organizations in Pakistan,
Pakistan’s role in the GWOT and the Kashmir and water shortage issue.
Ban on JuD and Other Religious Organizations in Pakistan
Throughout the news stories, the JuD affiliates consistently interpreted the Pakistan
Government’s aggressive policies towards controversial indigenous religious organizations,
especially their own organization, as a product of foreign pressure. They identified India and the
US as the foreign forces that caused the marginalization of religious organization in Pakistan
through their influence on the obsequious Pakistan Government. For example, before the
proscription of JuD in Pakistan, Hafiz Saeed made the following comment about President
Musharraf’s 2001 decision to declare various Pakistan-based religious organization, including
the LeT, the JuD’s alleged militant wing, as terrorist groups: “The ban was a step that the
General (Musharraf) only took to please America” (story11). Later, a JuD representative
described the JuD’s prescription as the government’s attempt to “extend an olive branch to
India” (story 179). Similarly, a JuD leader made the following comment about the Pakistan
Government led crackdown operation against the JuD: “… action against the Jamaat us Dawa is
being taken to please India and America” (story 70). Lastly, when the Punjab police registered
two FIRs (First Information Reports) against Hafiz Saeed under the Anti Terrorism Act for
propagating Jihad on 09/17/09 (story 257), Hafiz Saeed’s legal counsel retorted, “… all these
charges are baseless and Jamaat ud Dawa has been targeted merely on the basis of Indian
propaganda” (story 261) .
I will discuss the JuD’s perceptions about India and the US as the ‘enemy’ later in this
section; however, the JuD’s portrayal of the government as a ‘weak state’ and an ‘instrument of
the enemy’ is evident in all the statements presented above.
109

Pakistan’s Role in the GWOT
JuD leaders also used the ‘sovereignty’ frame to criticize the government’s role as a
partner in the GWOT. The JuD leadership criticized the government’s military operations in
Sawat and Waziristan. They labeled the government’s decision to “bring the GOWT to Pakistan”
as an act of a weak regime that had victimized its own citizens by succumbing to foreign
influences. Hafiz Saeed commented: “Bad policies of the rulers have brought Afghan war to
Sawat and Waziristan. It is not right to lift arms against our own people due to international
pressure” (story 7). In this statement, Hafiz Saeed labels the government’s decision to order the
Pakistan Army to carry out military operations in Sawat and Waziristan under the GWOT
initiative as “lifting arms against our (Pakistani) people.” In the last part of his statement, he
alleges that the government did not make this decision on its own accord or because the area
represented a genuine terrorist threat and was merely complying with ‘international pressures.’
The overall connotation of the statement is that the government was so susceptible to foreign
influences that it could order the Pakistan Army, which it commanded under the people’s
mandate for protecting Pakistan, to attack and victimize innocent Pakistani citizens.
Kashmir Issue and Water Shortage Issue
The JuD also evoked the ‘sovereignty’ frame to merge the Kashmir insurgency issue and
the water shortage issue in Pakistan to depict the government as withholding diplomatic and
military support from the Kashmiri insurgents. For example, story 322 quoted Hafiz Saeed as
follows: “The rules instead of playing the role of silent spectator to please Indians and
Americans should extend all out support to the Kashmiris… India… was continuing the
construction of dams on Pakistani rivers, while our rulers were keeping mum on the serious issue
110

to please India.” Hafiz Saeed used the ‘sovereignty’ frame to convey that Pakistan’s national
interest was interlocked with the Kashmir insurgency in India because of Pakistan’s water
dependency on the rivers that flow into Pakistan from the Indian part of Kashmir. He interpreted
Pakistan Government’s inaction over Kashmir as detrimental to Pakistan, and alleged that the
government was compromising national interest to ‘please’ India and its powerful ally, the US.
In the analysis of the statements in which the JuD negatively labeled someone, I observed
that the JuD frequently connected the water shortage issue with the Kashmir insurgency. This
merging of issues allowed the JuD to suggest that Pakistan’s religious interests, as part of the
Muslim Ummah, and national interest in essential natural resources, converged on the Kashmir
issue.
Pakistani Government’s Undermining of the Interests of Muslim Ummah
The JuD used the idea of ‘Ummah’ to negatively label the government on only one issue,
the Kashmir insurgency. As mentioned earlier in this section, according to the JuD affiliates, a
legitimate Muslim ruler had duties that extended beyond national, racial or ethnic boundaries to
encompass the entire Muslim Ummah. Following this ideology, the JuD generated the frame that
the Pakistan Government was negligent in its duty to the Muslims of the world, especially
Muslims that were facing adversity or oppression. Statements attributed to JuD members
presented the Kashmir issue as an example and labeled the Pakistan Government’s remissive
attitude towards India in the matter as insulting to the Kashmiri struggle and in violation of the
collective interest of the Muslim Ummah. Hafiz Saeed’s statement illustrated such sentiments,
“When pro-Indian politicians go to India and talk of bilateral trade between India and Pakistan,
they mock the sacrifices of a 100,000 Kashmiris that died for the Kashmir struggle” (story 10).

111

This statement exemplifies how the JuD evoked the collective Muslim identity to portray
India as an enemy of Ummah by highlighting India’s alleged cruelty towards the Kashmiri
Muslims. I discuss the JuD’s projection of India as the ‘enemy’ of Ummah and Pakistan later in
this section. With reference to the government, Hafiz Saeed labeled the state’s attempts to
establish bilateral trade between Pakistan and India as a “mockery” of the Kashmir struggle,
because all Muslims share a collective identity. According to Saeed, the government’s attempts
to foster friendly relationships with India, symbolizing its abandonment of the collective identity.
The word “mockery” signifies that bilateral trade between Pakistan and India would convey
Pakistan’s indifference towards Indian government’s victimization of the Kashmiri Muslims to
the world, which Hafiz Saeed construes as an insult to the Kashmiri people and the Ummah.
Negative Label Imposed on the UN
JuD representatives’ negative labeling of the UN challenged the UN’s legitimacy, but did
not identify the UN as the ‘enemy.’ The JuD’s general pattern of labeling the UN is similar to
their approach to labeling the Government of Pakistan. Specifically, they used the UN’s status as
an impartial world forum for adjudicating international disputes and upholding human rights in
the world as a frame to interpret the organization’s actions negatively in relation to one issue, the
imposition of the terrorism label and the resultant sanctioning of the JuD. The JuD
representatives also compared the UN’s imposition of the terrorist label on their organization to
its inaction on the Kashmir issue, to convey the message that the UN displayed a bias in favor of
anti-Muslim forces and against Muslims. In the following paragraph, I will explain how the JuD
affiliates used the ‘justice’ and ‘impartiality’ frames to negatively label the UN’s sanctioning of
the JuD.

112

The UN as Unjustly Sanctioning JuD
The UNSC, the group responsible for sanctioning the JuD, is not a judicial body. It is a
world forum, in which representatives of the member states engage in consensus-based decisionmaking (United Nations). In the newspaper data, a UNSC spokesperson (story 105) and a
Pakistani expert in International law (story 165) shared the opinion that the UNSC’s decision to
sanction the JuD was in accordance with the UNSC’s administrative procedures. According to
these experts, only representatives of the member states were allowed to attend the sessions of
UNSC or its subordinate committees, and the UNSC was not required to inform or give JuD a
chance to prove its innocence before sanctioning the organization. However, JuD representatives
interpreted the UNSC’s decision within the frame of judicial justice and negatively labeled the
UN for not following proper legal procedures before sanctioning them. Story 173 printed the
following excerpt from a letter the JuD allegedly sent to the UN and simultaneously released to
the press: “The embargo (on JuD)… is… highly unjustified under international law of human
dignity and freedom… the ban was one sided.” In this statement, the JuD interprets the UNSC
decision within the frame of judicial justice by claiming that the UNSC sanctioned the
organization without providing it a chance to present a defense, which JuD viewed as a violation
of its fundamental rights as a legal entity governed under international law. The JuD
representatives frequently employed the ‘justice’ frame to send out the message that the UNSC
did not give their organization a chance to mount a defense because the UN had no real evidence
could link the JuD to Al Qaeda and Taliban or to terrorism. Connected to the JuD’s use of the
‘justice’ frame was their use of the ‘impartiality’ frame. The JuD affiliates employed this frame
to suggest that the UNSC’s victimization of the JuD was a reflection of overall anti-Muslim bias
within the UN.

113

The UN as Biased against Muslims
Throughout the newspaper coverage of JuD, the JuD representative maintained that
the UN sanctioned their organization because India succeeded in having its false accusations
against the JuD endorsed in the UNSC by leveraging its political influence. For example, in story
160, a JuD spokesperson claimed, “The ban (on JuD) was imposed without justification and
merely on allegations leveled by India.” Similarly, story 166 presented the following quote by
Hafiz Saeed: “…the Committee of UNSC, blurred by India propaganda had imposed ban on the
Jamaat (JuD).”
The JuD’s allegation that in deciding to sanction the JuD the UNSC was unduly
influenced by India, attacked the very basis of UN’s legitimacy as an impartial body that
consolidated all free nations of the world. A JuD’s spokesperson opined, “…by banning the
JuD… the UN has marred the reputation of the Security Council” (story 113).
JuD representatives also questioned the impartiality of the UN by juxtaposing the
UN’s ‘unjustified’ action against the JuD with the UN’s ‘unjustified’ silence over the Kashmir
issue. They alleged that the UN’s biased handling of both issues signified a general prejudice
within the UN against the Muslims. For example, in story 280, Hafiz Saeed was quoted, “The
UN Security Council imposed sanctions against the JuD, but now it is silent over Indian
brutalities in Kashmir.” The overall message in this statement is that the UN moved against the
JuD without presenting any evidence against the group, while it chose to ignore the ‘self evident’
brutalities against the Kashmiri Muslims. According to Saeed, in both cases, the UN is
marginalizing Muslims to favor an anti-Muslim force, India.

114

JuD’s Conceptualization of the ‘Enemy’ and Ummah
Different from their views of the Government of Pakistan and the UN, JuD members
viewed the US, India, and Israel as ‘the enemy.’ Thus, before discussing how JuD used frames
to construct negative labels of the US, India and Israel, I present theory and findings relevant to
JuD’s conceptualization of ‘the enemy,’ and the connection of this conceptualization to Ummah.
Aho (1994) stated that basic psychological processes compel human beings to create an
image or portrait of ‘good’ and construct a self-image that matches that image to fulfill the
human psychological necessity of ‘feeling good’ about themselves. Thus, the basic human need
to create a ‘feel good’ self-image necessitates a self-specific definition of ‘good,’ and the
conceptualization of ‘good’ necessitates an understanding of what is not good (Aho, 1994).
‘Evil,’ according to Aho (1994), is all that is not good and the ‘enemy’ is the personification of
evil. The ‘enemy’ is the embodiment of the anti-self -- the entity that individuals believe
represents the opposite pole and a threat to the ‘self’ and the self-identifying conceptualization of
‘good’ (Aho, 1994).
My field experience with the JuD revealed that the JuD members possessed a very strong
sense of ‘self’ as Muslims and shared the belief that Islam represented the epitome of ‘good.’
Conversely, their conceptualization of the enemy also emerged from Islam. Thus, while
identifying the ‘enemy,’ the members often narrated references from Quran and Hadith (the
recorded sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) to endorse their views. Based on my field
experiences and the analysis of the newspaper data, the JuD members and representatives
consistently identified the US, Israel and India as their enemies and the enemies of the Muslim
Ummah. They authenticated their views by narrating certain Quran or Hadith references about
the enemies of the Ummah and connecting those verses to the US, India and Israel. For example,
115

one member of the JuD that I interviewed for the predissertation narrated a Quran verse which he
believed identified the “Jews and the Christians” as the enemies of Muslims (Quran, Verse 5:51).
He proceeded to argue that since the verse came from an eternal source (Quran), the truth it
contained was undisputable and timeless. He concluded by claiming that in modern times ‘Israel
and America’ represent the Jews and the Christians referred to in the Quranic reference. The
following statement by Hafiz Saeed presents a similar argument, “Bad policies of the
government have brought the Afghan war to Swat and Waziristan… Rulers should read history
and not become part of the conspiracy of the Jews and Christians against the Muslims” (story 7).
Hafiz Saeed evoked the same Quran reference about the Jews and Christians mentioned above
(Quran, 5:51) as a frame to interpret the US led GWOT initiative, and indirectly declared the US
as the enemy of the Ummah, and the GWOT as a global conspiracy against the Muslims.
Similarly, most of the JuD members I talked to during the predissertation phase shared
the belief that India was the irreconcilable enemy of the Ummah. One of the members explained
that JuD scholars authenticated this belief through Hadith (sayings of the Prophet Mohammad).
He then narrated a Hadith to support his argument. I am quoting the same Hadith from a recently
published English translation of the Sunan Al-Nasa’i Al-Mujtaba, one of the six major
collections of the Hadith of the Prophet Mohammad compiled after the Prophet’s death: “ Two
groups amongst My (Prophet Mohammad’s) Ummah would be such, to whom Allah has freed
from fire (of Hell); One group would attack Hindh and the Second would be that who would
accompany Isa Ibn-e-Maryam (Jesus, son of Mariam)” (An-Nasa’i, 2007). The JuD member
further explained that the word ‘Hind’ meant modern day ‘Hindsutan,’ and that in the Hindi and
Urdu languages Hindu means someone who believes in the Hindu religion and Hindustan means
‘the land of the Hindus.’ He said that after the partition of the unified India or the sub-continent
116

in 1947 into India and Pakistan, the term Hindustan signifies India in the Urdu language.
According to him, the Prophet’s use of the word Hind meant the modern day India. Therefore,
the JuD member believed that Prophet Mohammad prophesized the coming of a final and
decisive battle between the Muslims and Hindus of India (Ghazwa e Hindh). He also believed
that the Kashmir ‘freedom struggle’ was a precursor of that war. In summing up, I found that for
JuD members, religion provided the originating point for the identity of the ‘self’ and the
‘enemy.’
The JuD members and leaders also presented ‘patriotism’ as a fundamental attribute of
their self-image. According to the JuD members (that I talked with during the predissertation
stage) and leaders (whose statements in the print media I analyzed), Pakistan is a Muslim country
and a part of the Muslim Ummah. JuD members believed that a true Muslim’s first duty was to
voluntarily assist the Muslims in his community, society or country. Since the JuD is an
indigenous Pakistani group, members believed that conceptualization of patriotism emerged
from religion. Thus, they considered unconditional allegiance to Pakistan as their religious duty.
Furthermore, they believed that Islam was under constant threat from its enemies, and in the
absence of a unified Muslim Ummah, the Muslim’s survival depended on unity within and
cooperation between Muslim countries. Thus, through Islam the members and leader of JuD
harmonized their religious identity with nationalism. The JuD’s incorporation of patriotism into
their religious identity correspondingly ideologically synthesized the enemy’s identity. My
analysis revealed that the JuD perceived the enemy of the Ummah as the enemy of Pakistan and
vice versa. In the section that follows, I present various statements by JuD affiliates in which
they describe India, Israel and the US as both the enemy of the Muslim Ummah and of Pakistan.

117

Negative Label Imposed on India
An analysis of the news coverage in which the JuD representatives attached a negative
label to someone revealed that JuD presented India as the main antagonist that posed an
immediate threat to Pakistan’s domestic and foreign interests. JuD representatives framed India
as both the enemy of Muslims and the enemy of Pakistan. Their use of the two frames was
connected to JuD’s identification of the ‘victim’ in the message. The JuD used the ‘enemy of
Pakistan’ frame in messages that informed the readers of Indian actions that were harmful to
Pakistan’s interests, and they used the ‘enemy of Ummah’ frame in messages that highlighted the
Indian victimization of the Kashmiri people. In contrast, the JuD presented the US and Israel
mainly as the enemies of the Ummah; group members framed alleged US and Israeli oppression
and hostility towards Pakistan as reflective of their hatred of the entire Muslim Ummah.
However, the geographical proximity and the shared tremulous history between India and
Pakistan added a regional dimension to the war between Hindus and Muslims. Furthermore, in
comparison to the negative labeling of US and Israel, the JuD affiliates also presented India as
the enemy of their organization.
The JuD used the following three frames in their statements, for attributing negative
labels to India: 1) enemy of Pakistan; 2) enemy of Ummah; and 3) enemy of the JuD. The JuD
labeled India negatively over a wide variety of issues including the Kashmir insurgency, the
water shortage issue in Pakistan, terrorism in Pakistan, the 2010 floods in Pakistan and the
imposition of the terrorism label on JuD. The following subsection includes description of the
negative labels that the JuD attached to India, categorized by frames and issues.

118

India as the Enemy of Pakistan
The JuD employed the enemy of Pakistan frame to label India negatively in relation to
the national water shortage and terrorism in Pakistan. In addition, the JuD also used the enemy of
Pakistan frame to link the water shortage with the 2010 floods and the Kashmir issue. Read
together, these statements conveyed the impression that oppressive Indian occupation of Kashmir
was a part of an Indian conspiracy to destabilize Pakistan. Since Pakistan relies heavily on rivers
flowing from the India Kashmir, the JuD construed India’s occupation of Kashmir as an Indian
conspiracy to control Pakistani water by building dams in Kashmir. According to the JuD, these
dams were India’s weapons for destabilizing Pakistan by cutting off the country’s water supply.
The Water Shortage Issue: Relating the Water Shortage to the 2010 floods and the
Kashmir Issue
Pakistan’s economy is heavily reliant on the country’s agricultural produce and
hydroelectric power. The rivers Indus, Chenab and Jhelum are Pakistan’s three main water
sources (Malik, 2005). All three rivers flow out of the Indian part of Kashmir into Pakistan
(Malik, 2005). Under the Indus Water Treaty brokered by the World Bank and signed by India
and Pakistan in 1960 (Malik, 2005), Pakistan has exclusive rights over the water flowing in these
rivers. This treaty prohibits India from building any ‘works’ that restrict the flow of these rivers
into Pakistan, but allows India to generate Hydroelectric power from these rivers if there is no
disruption to the flow of the water into Pakistan (Indus Water Treaty, 1960; Malik, 2005). In the
1990s, India started building dams on the rivers Chenab and Jhelum for generating hydroelectric
power, which created a fear in Pakistan that after the completion of these dams India could cut
Pakistan’s water supply (Malik, 2005). JuD labeled the construction of these dams as an illegal
act of aggression tantamount to a declaration of war against Pakistan. For example, story 280

119

reported the following excerpt from a speech that Hafiz Saeed made at a protest rally against the
“water theft of India.”
“…by constructing illegal dams and diverging water of Pakistani river India has imposed
war on Pakistan… Water is a matter of life and death for Pakistan. We (JuD) vow to
stage protests across the country against Indian water aggression…Delhi wants to
disintegrate Pakistan by using the water card.”
Hafiz Saeed’s use of the ‘enemy of Pakistan’ frame (“disintegrate Pakistan”) and emotionally
charged words and phrases (“matter of life and death” and “imposed war”) to convey the
immediacy of the threat caused by India’s alleged illegal actions (building the dams). In other
words, Hafiz Saeed is giving negative meaning to India’s construction of dams on the Pakistani
rivers for generating hydroelectric power by using the ‘enemy frame’ and affective language, and
generating negative labels like ‘water aggression’ and ‘using the water card.’ In other statements,
JuD affiliates used a similar approach to label India’s construction of the dams on the Jhelum and
Chenab Rivers as “water theft” (story 280) and “water terrorism” (story 322).
At the time of the 2010 flood, the JuD also used the ‘India as the enemy of Pakistan’
frame to connect the floods to the general water shortage issue in Pakistan. Story 319 contained
the following statement by Hafiz Saeed: “…heavy rains and India releasing water in (Pakistani)
rivers at the same time caused the floods.” Hafiz Saeed’s use of the phrase “releasing water in
(Pakistani) rivers” conveys the impression that India acted willfully and maliciously to aggravate
the devastating effect of a natural calamity. The statement further implies that, prior to the
floods, India blocked the flow of water into Pakistan before they released it to aggravate the
floods. Hafiz Saeed used the ‘enemy of Pakistan’ frame to connect the seemingly unrelated

120

occurrence of a natural disaster in Pakistan to the water shortage issue and shifted the overall
blame to India. He therefore prompted the Pakistani readers to blame India for the devastation
caused by the floods as well as the prior water shortage.
After the Mumbai incident, the representatives of Indian and Pakistani Governments met
five times. However, the print media categorized only two out of the five meetings as ‘bilateral
talks.’ The term ‘bilateral talks’ signifies planned talks between the representatives of the Indian
and Pakistani Governments to discuss and resolve issues listed on an agenda that was made
public prior to the talks. On both occasions, the JuD made several public statements that
conveyed their skepticism about the success of these talks. The JuD used the ‘India an enemy of
Pakistan’ frame to challenge India’s sincerity in resolving important bilateral issues between the
two countries. For example, story 274 reported that Hafiz Saeed said: “India has never had a
sincere interest in opening dialogue (with Pakistan)… If India wants to restore confidence in
opening dialogue with Pakistan [sic], then India must accept Kashmir as a core issue… By
building dams on the rivers of Pakistan, India has made Pakistan barren…(there is) no use (in)
taking to India under these circumstances.” By employing the ‘enemy of Pakistan’ frame, Hafiz
Saeed is a) labeling India for not being sincere in beginning a constructive dialogue with
Pakistan and b) asserting that the Kashmir issue was the sole determinant of future peaceful ties
between India and Pakistan. Hafiz Saeed’s main contention is that India’s illegal attempts to
control Pakistan’s water reflected its continuing antagonism towards Pakistan. Thus, Pakistani’s
should skeptically construe any Indian bid to stabilize ties between the two countries as part of
an anti-Pakistan conspiracy.

121

Terrorism in Pakistan
The JuD repeatedly used the ‘enemy of Pakistan’ frame to blame India, the US and Israel
for conspiring to destabilize Pakistan by instigating terrorism in the country. The JuD
constructed the ‘terrorism’ label either in reference to a particular terrorist incident or as a
general warning to the people of Pakistan or the Pakistani Government.
An examination of the newspaper reports showed that the occurrence of a major terrorist
incident in Pakistan triggered a blame discourse. Local political, conservative and liberal interest
groups, the Pakistani Government and at times foreign powers like the US and India usually
blamed different terrorist groups or each other for conducting the terrorist attack. Antigovernment interest groups typically blamed the government for lapses in security, while the
government supported by its allies attempted to dispel such views. The dynamics of this
discourse are context specific, complex and beyond the scope of this study. Thus, I will only
present one aspect of this blame discourse. I observed in the newspaper stories that immediately
after a major terrorist incident in Pakistan, the government usually blamed some Islamist or
sectarian terrorist group, especially the Taliban and the Punjabi Taliban, as responsible for
carrying out the attack. The response to these allegations often came from the local religious
parties and groups, who in turn shifted the blame to foreign powers like India, Israel or the US.
Thus, the JuD’s statements that blamed some foreign powers for carrying out a particular
terrorist attack were often part of the overall blame discourse that followed the attack. For
example, on 07/01/2010 two unidentified terrorists carried out two consecutive suicide attacks
during a public gather at the Data Darbar sufi shrine in Lahore. On 07/05/2010, a government
representative revealed that the Punjabi Taliban might be responsible for the attacks. The next
day, on 07/06/2010, Hafiz Saeed stated, “India and its supporters are involved in the Data Darbar

122

incident” (story 308). Interestingly, during this discourse, the participants rarely authenticated
their accusations against an entity by sharing corroborating evidence with the public. In most
cases, the blame discourse in the media ended or died down without reaching any plausible
conclusion as to who was responsible for the terrorist incident in question.
The JuD also used the ‘enemy of Pakistan’ frame to generally warn the people or the
Government of Pakistan that India was responsible for terrorism in Pakistan. Statements that
contained such warnings usually criticized the government for failing to suppress foreign
conspiracies to destabilize Pakistan and prompted the people and the government to mount a
defense against the ‘enemy’s’ threat. For example, story 220 reported the following statement by
Hafiz Saeed, “…Indian army officials sitting in Afghanistan are hatching conspiracies against
Pakistan, but no official from Pakistan is raising his voice against such terrorist threat.” Hafiz
Saeed is accusing the Indian government for using its army to infiltrate Pakistan via the porous
Durand line (the Afghan-Pakistan border) to carry out terrorist attacks in Pakistan.
India blames Pakistan for terrorism in India
The JuD mainly used this frame in the few months that followed the Mumbai terrorist
attack. In a previous section, I have already analyzed the Indian allegation that LeT was
responsible for carrying out the Mumbai attacks and was the militant wing of the JuD. The JuD
responded to this allegation in two ways. They used the ‘enemy of Pakistan’ frame to convey the
message that the Mumbai attacks were an outcome of domestic disputes within India, but the
Indian government had accused a Pakistani religious organization, the JuD, to shift blame to
Pakistan. For example, story 27, published a few days after the Mumbai attack, reported the
following statement by Hafiz Saeed, “…Mumbai attacks are a result of an internal strife within
India…” The JuD also used the ‘enemy of JuD’ frame to allege that local Indian terrorist groups
123

carried out the Mumbai attacks and India shifted the blame to the JuD because the organization
supported the Kashmiri Muslims in their “freedom struggle” against India. I will discuss the
JuD’s use of the ‘enemy of JuD’ frame later in this chapter.
India as the Enemy of Ummah
The JuD specifically employed the ‘enemy of the Ummah’ frame for India with reference
to the Kashmir issue. In such statements, the JuD connected the Indian “atrocities” in Kashmir to
the eternal conflict between Muslims and Hindus. Generally, in their comments about entities
that the JuD classified as the ‘enemies of the Ummah,’ the JuD affiliates conveyed a sense of
finality with reference to the enemy threat. My analysis suggests that this sense of finality
emerges from a shared belief that the divine sources (Quran and Sunnah) revealed the identity of
Ummah’s enemies. Since, according to the JuD divine prophecies are unconditionally and always
true, the threat posed by the enemies of the Ummah that the divine texts identified is also
perpetual. The JuD often conveyed that reconciliation was not possible with the Ummah’s
enemies, and the Ummah must destroy them in direct confrontation to terminate their constant
threat.
The JuD statements that used the ‘enemy of Ummah frame’ to condemn the Indian
atrocities in Kashmir and attributed a perpetual malicious intent towards the Kashmiris Muslims
to India. In the context of the Kashmir issue, the JuD’s use of the Ummah frame communicates
to the Muslim readers that India is a perpetual enemy of the Kashmiri Muslims and will continue
victimizing them as long as India has control over the territory of Kashmir. Thus, the only
possible way to provide relief to the Kashmiri Muslims is for the Ummah to help them win their
freedom from India.

124

The JuD affiliates consistently employed the Ummah frame to negatively label India’s
attempts to peacefully resolve the Kashmir issue through negotiations with the Kashmiri
Muslims as fake or as a ‘conspiracy against the Kashmir struggle’ (story 376). For example,
story 224 reported, that the Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minster of India, invited all local
Kashmiri political and religious groups to an All Parties Conference as a first step towards a
negotiated peace. The same story attributes a comment to Hafiz Saeed: “Manmohan Singh has
extended an offer of dialogue to the Kashmiri leadership to stop them from continuing the
(liberation) struggle… India should withdraw troops from Kashmir if it is sincere about holding
negotiations with Kashmiri leaders… No one can accept dialogue at the point of a gun” (story
224). Thus, Hafiz Saeed labeled the Indian Government’s invitation to engage in negotiations
with the Kashmiri leadership as a ploy to stall the Kashmir freedom struggle and as an offer of
dialogue ‘under the point of a gun.’ He interpreted the presence of Indian troops in the Kashmir
region as evidence of India’s mal intentions. Three days after the All Parties Conference on
09/15/2011, Hafiz Saeed said that, “The All Parties Conference was not called in for solving the
Kashmir issue but to formulate a strategy for quashing the Kashmir struggle” (story, 376).
Overall, he used the ‘enemy of the Ummah’ frame to question the sincerity of India’s efforts to
resolve the Kashmir issue peacefully; in the subtext, he conveyed the message that the Kashmiri
people should carry on the freedom ‘struggle’ unabated.
The two statements that I presented above were both messages directed at the Kashmiri
Muslims. The bulk of the JuD statements that framed the Kashmir issue within the ‘enemy of the
Ummah’ frame to attach negative labels to India mainly addressed the people and government of
Pakistan. The following two types of messages emerge out of these statements: 1) messages
aimed at evoking empathy, and 2) messages aimed at prompting action.
125

The statements that evoked empathy usually provided narratives of the Indian atrocities
in Indian held Kashmir. Emotionally charged language characterized these narratives:
“…the cruelty of India is in front of the world” (Hafiz Saeed, story 315).
“India forces are spraying bullets on unarmed Kashmiris” (Hafiz Saeed, story 379).
“…Hindu soldier... raped Kashmiri a Muslim women” (Advertisement originally
published in a JuD magazine, story 137).
“…terrorists in uniform (the Indian peace Keeping forces in Kashmir) should be
expelled from Kashmir” (Protesters in a Kashmir rally, story 270).
The JuD characterized Indian army personnel stationed in Kashmir as “terrorist in
uniform” who are “raping” “Kashmiri Muslim women” and “spraying bullets” on innocent
Kashmiris. Conversely, the statements present the Kashmiri people as oppressed Muslims and
victims of “state terrorism” (Story 273). All these statements present India as the ‘enemy.’ The
JuD attempts to create a negative persona in the minds of the receivers of the messages by
presenting Indian officials as ‘cruel’ and as ‘terrorists in uniforms.’ Both terms (cruel and
terrorists in uniform) suggests that within the context of the Kashmir issue, the JuD are depicting
the ‘enemy’ as powerful and oppressive. Conversely, the JuD statements present the Kashmiri
people as weak (“woman.” story 137) and helpless (“unarmed.” story 379). The JuD further
characterize the oppressor as the ‘Hindu’ and the victim as ‘Muslim.’ This suggests that the JuD
is evoking collective Muslim identity in their statements by associating Islam with the helpless
and weak victims and by associating Hinduism with the oppressive and powerful enemy. They
are linking the Kashmir issue to the eternal battle between the Hindus and the Muslims that,
according to them, the divine texts prophesize. The statements create a connection between the
126

oppressor and victim. The nature of the offenses – “rape” and “spraying bullets” – convey that
the Kashmiri people are being subjugated to irreparable loss of life and honor by an eternal and
powerful enemy of the Muslims. Overall, the message attempts to generate empathy in the minds
of the audience by presenting propositions or hypothetical situations that affront their moral and
religious identity.
The second type of JuD statements that addressed the Pakistani people or Government
use either direct or indirect suggestions to prompt the Pakistanis to get involved in the Kashmir
“freedom struggle.” Story 137 republished a JuD advertisement for donations that according to
the author was originally printed in a JuD monthly magazine. It provides an example of JuD’s
directly entreating the Pakistanis to help the Kashmiri Muslims. According to the story, the JuD
printed the advertisement to prompt the readers to donate funds needed to support the Kashmir
“mujahedeen.” An excerpt from the advertisement reads: “If you give Rs. 25 as charity to a road
side beggar, it is not as rewarding as the charity used to buy the bullet that will hit the chest and
forehead of a Hindu soldier who raped a Kashmiri Muslim woman” (story 137). The
advertisement presents the reader with a hypothetical symbolic crime, the rape of a Muslim
woman by a Hindu soldier. The strong (soldier) antagonist (Hindu) is victimizing innocent and
weak (woman) member of the Ummah (Muslim). The crime is rape, a type of crime that would
offend the reader’s religious and paternalistic instincts. As an organization that engaged in Dawa
(the preaching of Islam), the JuD consistently propagated conservative and paternalistic social
values. For example, story 14 presented excerpts from one of Hafiz Saeed’s Friday sermons in
which he condemned the West for destroying the family structure by “driving” their women out
of their homes and turning them into “commodities.” This statement provides the context in
which the reader can understand the intensity of the hypothetical crime of rape for the JuD. After
127

presenting the heinous hypothetical crime in vivid detail to evoke the collective Muslim identity
in the readers’ minds, the advertisement proposes a retributive course of action to the readers. It
offers the readers satisfaction after the collective violation of Muslim honor in return for a small
donation, an amount normally given to a “roadside beggar.” The JuD advertisement explains that
the organization would use the small amount to buy the one bullet needed to kill this hypothetical
enemy guilty of raping a Kashmiri Muslim woman. The JuD’s detail about where the bullet
would hit the “Hindu soldier” (the chest and head) conveys the promise of a favorable and
decisive conclusion to the hypothetical problem. This message is communicating in the subtext
that direct confrontation with the Indian army presented the quickest and permanent solution to
the Kashmir issue.
The JuD also propagated the belief that the Kashmir movement was quickly coming to a
favorable conclusion. Such messages indirectly communicated that help from Pakistan would
accelerate the momentum of the movement. In story 365 Hafiz Saeed’s statement illustrates this
technique: “India is being forced to give up its inseparable limb (Kashmir) and is now ready to
conduct all types of dialogues (with Pakistan) relating to Kashmir.” In this statement, Hafiz
Saeed remarks on the possibility of Indo-Pak dialogues about the Kashmir issue. He expresses
his opinion that India is about to lose Kashmir and would at this point be willing to hold talks
with “all types of dialogue” with Pakistan on the matter. He suggests to the government and the
people of Pakistan that they should reject dialogues with India to facilitate the eminent prospect
of freeing the Kashmiri people from India.
Some JuD statements that utilized the Ummah frame also attempted to mobilize the
Pakistani people by using collective nouns. Specifically, when talking about his organization’s
agenda for Kashmir, Hafiz Saeed used collective nouns like “we” or “us” that created the
128

impression that the audience or readers were with him. By propagating that, his organization and
its pro-Kashmir insurgency initiatives garnered popular support in Pakistan, Hafiz Saeed
attempted to generate a “bandwagon effect” (McAdam, 2003). For example, story 270 reported
Hafiz Saeed’s comments about the Pakistan Government’s attempts to improve political and
economic relationships with India: “…we will not allow … friendship with India at the cost of
Kashmiri blood.” The use of the word “we” creates the impression that the people of Pakistan
were with him in his initiative of not allowing the government to normalize ties with India. By
generating this view that a majority of the Pakistani people supported his organization’s stance
on the Kashmir issue, Hafiz Saeed indirectly prompted the audience or readers to mobilize
themselves and join the JuD’s Kashmir campaign.
The JuD also implored the UN and the international community to take action against
Indian atrocities in some of the statements that negatively labeled India for victimizing the
Kashmiri people. I present two statements by Hafiz Saeed as examples.
“We demand for the trial of the Indian army in the International Court of Justice for war
crimes” (Hafiz Saeed, story 270).
“The cruelty of India in held Kashmir is in front of the world. The world should stop this
barbarianism” (Hafiz Saeed, story 315).
In both statements, Hafiz Saeed asks the world community to save the Kashmiri people
from Indian atrocities. In the first statement, consistent with other JuD statements, he projects the
Kashmir insurgency as a war, thereby expanding its regional and political scope and appending it
to the larger conflict between the Muslims and their enemies, the Hindus. The JuD’s portrayal of
the Kashmir insurgency as a war between the Muslims and Hindus, or between the believers and
129

non-believers, conveys the impossibility of a peaceful resolution of the dispute to their reader. I
will discuss the JuD’s possible strategic interests in generating this impression later in this
section.
India as Enemy of JuD
JuD statements also portrayed India as an enemy working specifically against JuD.
Across several news stories, JuD representatives and members condemned India as responsible
for their labeling –internationally and nationally – as a terrorist group. They attributed this to a
general Indian antagonism towards the JuD. They presented the fact that India publically
released no evidence that linked JuD to terrorism, as proof of its animosity towards the JuD. For
example, story 166 contains Hafiz Saeed’s interpretation of the UN’s decision to ban the JuD,
“The Committee of the UN council, blurred by India propaganda, had imposed a ban on the
Jamaat (the JuD) without giving ear to our viewpoint.” Hafiz Saeed alleges in this statement that
India falsely accused the JuD and used its political influence in the UNSC to have the JuD
sanctioned. Similarly, when the Punjab police registered two cases against Hafiz Saeed
(mentioned earlier), he declared to the news media that the cases were “baseless” and registered
“under the influence of India propaganda.”
In a few statements, JuD affiliates also explained why India had specifically targeted the
JuD. Story 202 printed the following comment by Hafiz Saeed, “We (the JuD) have raised the
issue of the human rights violations of the India army in Kashmir. This angered Delhi (the
capitol of India) and it started propaganda against the Jamaat (the JuD).” Thus, according to
Hafiz Saeed, the JuD’s voluntarily assumed public stance against India and in favor of the
Kashmiri Muslims had incurred Indian disapproval and animosity. This statement is
representative of not only why the JuD affiliates believed that India was specifically against the
130

JuD, but reinforced their identity as ‘volunteer Muslims’ which corresponds to their
conceptualization of the ‘true Muslim.’ I will analyze these concepts later when discussing the
strategic aspect of the JuD’s negative labeling of the ‘other.’
Negative Labeling of the US as the Premier ‘Enemy of the Ummah’
The JuD characterized the US as the foremost and the most dangerous enemy of the
Muslims. It projected this image in relation to the impact of the US foreign policy on the world,
especially on Muslim dominated countries. The US foreign policy’s direct or indirect
implications for almost every major region in the world, especially after the fall of the USSR,
created and reinforced the US’s global status as a superpower in a uni-polar world (Michalowski,
2009). My analysis revealed that the JuD combined the US’s superpower status with the ‘enemy
of the Ummah’ frame to generate a new frame that portrayed the US as the ‘strongest enemy of
the Ummah.’ The following statement illustrates the creation of this frame: “…America should
review its…shameful history which is laden with innocent blood. The baseless attack and
occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, which resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of
Muslims is a recent example of this” (story 113). In another statement Hafiz Saeed said,
“America and its partners Israel and India are the biggest terrorist in the world. They are
responsible for all the death and destruction in the world” (story, 365). Read together, these
statements characterize the US as the imperial power (Michalowski, 2009), historically guilty of
tyrannizing the weaker nations of the world and now the chief conspirator in a global drive to
marginalize the Muslims of the world.
The analysis of the statements in which the JuD negatively labeled the US in relation to
specific issues revealed that they employed the portrayal of the US as the ‘enemy of the Ummah’
as an overall frame of reference. The JuD mainly imposed negative labels on the US in reaction
131

to three issues: 1) the GWOT; 2) destabilization of and terrorism in Pakistan; and 3) the
imposition of the terrorist label on the Islamic religious organizations in the world, specifically
the ban on JuD. In the following subsection, I analyze the JuD’s issue based use of the ‘enemy of
the Ummah’ frame to construct negative labels against the US.
The GWOT
In statements imposing negative labels on the US, JuD representatives repeatedly
emphasized that the GWOT was a global conspiracy instigated by the US against the Muslim
Ummah. Hafiz Saeed’s comments that were published in story 113 (presented in the previous
paragraph) labeled the US led “invasion and occupation” of Afghanistan and Iraq as “baseless.”
The academic and media discourse on the GWOT identifies the US rational for initiating the
GWOT as the eradication of terrorism through elimination of global terrorist organizations and
networks, and through installing democracy in countries that shelter such organizations
(Freeman, 2008). The primary target of this global initiative was the terrorist network known as
the Al Qaeda (Freeman, 2008). Hence, by labeling the GWOT initiative as “baseless.” (story
113), the JuD affiliates imply that the US’s justifications for declaring a war on terrorism and
invading Iraq and Afghanistan were based on lies. In the following statement, Hafiz Saeed
clearly presents the stance: “I can say with certainty that there is no organization named Al
Qaeda in this world. This is all US propaganda to defame the Muslims” (story, 365). Later in the
statement, Hafiz Saeed also alleged that the US initiated the GWOT to “victimize” the Muslims
of the world (story 365). The meaning of the “baseless” label becomes clear when read within
the context of this statement. Hafiz Saeed begins the statement by claiming that the US
fabricated the existence of Al Qaeda and duped the world into initiating a global initiative
against a non-existent enemy. Later in the statement, Hafiz Saeed connects this proposition
132

within the ‘US as the strongest enemy of Ummah’ frame to generate the label that the GWOT
was a US led conspiracy to globally “defame” Islam and “victimize” Muslims.
The present study reveals that JuD’s perceptions of the GWOT corroborates with the
organization’s contention that by participating in the GWOT, the Pakistan Government has
become the advertent or inadvertent instrument of the enemies of the Ummah. The actual effect
of JuD’s (and other Pakistani conservative religious groups’) propagation of such beliefs on the
perceptions of the Pakistani people needs to be studied. Media coverage of these beliefs as well
as other ways they are disseminated may be an important influence on growing anti-US
sentiment in Pakistan and on criticisms of the Pakistan Government by Pakistani citizens.
Terrorism and Destabilization of Pakistan
“US… (was) responsible for terrorist activities in Pakistan” (Hafiz Saeed, story 266).
The JuD affiliates frequently accused the US of clandestinely carrying out and financing
terrorism in Pakistan. The analysis of the JuD’s negative labeling statements shows that they
made similar accusation about India and Israel. The JuD labeled the US, India and Israel as
“terrorists” either in general terms or in the context of some specific terrorist incident. I already
explained that JuD often labeled the ‘enemy’ as the instigator of terrorism in Pakistan in
connection to a larger terrorism related blame discourse in Pakistan. In this discourse, the
government, and some pro-government groups blamed Islamic militant groups for terrorism in
Pakistan, and the conservative religious bloc took the opposite position by blaming foreign
powers. However, in the case of the US, the JuD specifically explained why the US was trying to
destabilize Pakistan by instigating terrorism within its borders. Story 254 reported the following
statements by Hafiz Saeed: “Washington has made Pakistan’s disintegration its foremost
133

target… They (The US) want to do this (disintegrate Pakistan) because Pakistan is the only
Muslim country that is a nuclear power...” Framing the US as the enemy of the Ummah, Hafiz
Saeed describes the US conspiracy to “disintegrate Pakistan” as part of their plan to weaken the
leading Muslim countries in the world. According to Saeed, Pakistan was the primary target
because the US perceived Pakistan’s status as a nuclear power as a direct threat to their
imperialistic goals.
A common feature in JuD’s negative labeling is that India, Israel and the US posed a
permanent and unalterable threat to Muslims. In the news, the JuD affiliates always present the
extreme position against their enemies, thereby precluding the possibility of a peaceful resolution
of differences between the Muslims and their enemies. Another message that emerges out of this
conception of the enemy is ‘never to trust the enemy.’ Thus, when the Indian government
attempted to negotiate peace with the Kashmir representatives, the JuD labeled it as a conspiracy
to stall the Kashmir liberation movement. Similarly, they construed the US’s war against
terrorism as a conspiracy to defame Islam and destroy the Muslims. I further develop this point
in the last section of this chapter, where I discuss the strategic aspects in JuD’s negative labeling
of the ‘enemy.’
The Ban on JuD
In the Negative Labels on JuD section, I discussed US labeling of JuD as a terrorist
organization and US requests that the Government of Pakistan investigate JuD links to the
Mumbai attacks and close down all JuD operations in Pakistan. The JuD’s strategy for
responding to the US allegation about the Mumbai attacks was to place this event within the ‘US
the strongest enemy of the Ummah’ frame and label the US as the helper and ally of antiMuslims forces like India. Story 113 contained the following statement by a JuD spokesperson:
134

“America is trying to protect the interests of India. In its attempt to favor India, America is
sowing the seeds of hatred in South East Asia.” The spokesperson alleged that the US was
pressuring the Pakistan Government to shut down the JuD to ‘favor India.’ The last sentence of
the statement explains how the US leads the global anti-Muslim allegiance by helping other antiIslam forces like India.
I previously noted that the JuD also framed India as an enemy of the Muslims.
Furthermore, the JuD shared the belief that India presented a more immediate threat to Pakistan
than did the US and Israel, because Pakistan’s dispute with India went beyond an ideological
clash between Muslims and Hindus, and included cultural, political and strategic conflicts
existing between two hostile neighbors. As mentioned above, the JuD projected the belief that
India presented an unceasing and constant threat to the Muslims, especially the Pakistani and
Kashmiri Muslims. The JuD rooted this belief in their interpretation of divine texts. This belief
bolstered JuD’s messages that 1) any attempt by Muslims (Pakistan or Kashmir) to establish
peace with India was futile, and 2) any offer of peace by India was not to be trusted. The reader
should understand the sentence, “In its attempt to favor India, America is sowing the seeds of
hatred in South East Asia” (story 113) within this context. According to the JuD representative,
by helping India, the US facilitates marginalization of the Muslims in the South East Asia region
and thus hastens the advent of an open war between the Muslims and Hindus in the region.
Labeling ‘Israel’ the Enemy of the Ummah
The JuD negatively labeled Israel in only a few statements. However, these statements
are pertinent to this study, because the JuD framed Israel alongside India and the US as one of
the major enemies of the Muslim Ummah in the world. In addition, the JuD’s presentation of
Israel to the Pakistani newspaper readers had the potential of creating empathy within the
135

readership by projecting the scope of Israel’s perceived threat to Muslims beyond the Middle
East region, specifically in the South East Asia region. For example, stories 292 and 295
presented two statements by Hafiz Saeed about Israel and both statements began with a similar
premise,
“Israeli aggression was not confined to Gaza…” (story 292).
“The aggression of Israel is not limited to Palestine and Gaza…” (story 295).
Both sentences may prime the audience to view Israel’s hostility towards the Muslims as
exceeding the regional bounds of Palestine and Gaza. Later in both statements, Hafiz Saeed
negatively labeled Israel for clandestinely assisting India against Pakistan and the Kashmiri
Muslims.
The JuD negatively labeled Israel in connection with three issues: the Kashmir
insurgency and water shortages in Pakistan and terrorism in Pakistan. Concerning all three
issues, the JuD utilized the ‘enemy of Ummah’ frame to accuse Israel for collaborating with
India against the Kashmiri Muslims and Pakistan.
The Kashmir and Water Shortage Issue
“The aggression of Israel is not limited to Palestine and Gaza. Mosad has established
offices and other centers in Kashmir, Jammu and Siri Nagar where they are training the
Indian army to quash the Kashmiri freedom struggle…” (Hafiz Saeed, story 295).
The JuD’s negative comments about Israel’s role in the South East Asia always presented
Israel as a clandestine player in the Indian conspiracies against Kashmir and Pakistan. Hafiz
Saeed made a similar insinuation in his statement by depicting Mosad (the secret service of
136

Israel) as the central figure responsible for training and helping the Indian army to “quash the
Kashmiri freedom struggle.” By naming Mosad instead of the Israel government, Hafiz Saeed is
subliminally highlighting the surreptitiousness of Israel’s alleged presence in Kashmir. The use
of the ‘enemy of Ummah’ frame is also noteworthy because it provides evidence to support
Hafiz Saeed’s proposition. Hafiz Saeed’s declaration in the beginning of the statement that
Israel’s “aggression” against the Muslims reached beyond Palestine provides a context to the
accusation he leveled in the latter part of the statement. He presents enmity towards the Muslims
as Israel’s motivation for oppressing the Muslims in Palestine and helping the Indian army to
oppress the Kashmiri Muslims. Conversely, he also implies that the Israel’s purported aggression
towards Palestine illustrates the nation’s hatred for Muslims.
Hafiz Saeed is thus suggesting that Israeli actions in relation to Palestine reflected the
Jews’ hatred for the Muslims, which according to the JuD’s interpretation of Quran’s verse 5:51,
was eternal. Thus, Hafiz Saeed’s explanation transcends all historical, political or contextual
dynamics of the Israel-Palestine conflict and connects it to the ongoing war between the Jews
and the Muslims. By connecting Israel (the personification of the Jews mentioned in verse 5:15)
to India, Hafiz Saeed is further implying that the two eternal enemies of the Muslims were united
in their oppression of the Muslims. Following Aho’s (1994) understanding of the enemy, JuD’s
consistent claim of unity between the all the enemies of the Ummah, indirectly conveys the
message that all Muslims should also unite against their multiple and cooperating enemies.
The JuD also related their claim of Israel’s presence in Kashmir to the water issue. For
example, story 292 contained the following quote by Hafiz Saeed: “The Israeli secret service
has… setup offices in occupied Kashmir. Pakistan is under siege and attempts are being made
with the connivance of Israel to convert it into a barren land by constructing dams on its rivers.”
137

Similar, to the JuD’s allegation against Israel regarding Kashmir, Hafiz Saeed suggests that
Israel’s alleged presence in Kashmir is a sign of Israel’s secret involved in the Indian conspiracy
to deprive Pakistan of water. The statement reinforces the notion that the enemies of Ummah
were united against Pakistan or the Muslims in general.
Terrorism in Pakistan
As illustrated in a quote from story 293, in a couple of statements, Hafiz Saeed also
accused Israel of instigating terrorism in Pakistan: “Mosad has established numerous terrorist
centers, from where she [sic] was planning to monitor all terrorist attacks on Pakistan” (Hafiz
Saeed). Again, Saeed’s use of the name Mosad suggests Israel’s clandestine participation in the
conspiracy to destabilize Pakistan through terrorism. By suggesting that Mosad was
“monitoring” all terrorist attacks in Pakistan, Hafiz Saeed is depicting Israel as the main
instigator of terrorism in Pakistan.

Analysis of Strategic Content in JuD’s Negatively Labeling Messages
In this section, I draw from the descriptive analysis of the affective content in JuD’s
negatively labeling messages, to make sense of JuD’s strategy in labeling specific entities with
respect to particular issues. I will also try to link the JuD’s overall strategy in negatively labeling
entities to their ideology and the way they presented themselves to the Pakistani people.
Following the principles of inductive reasoning, I will separately analyze the JuD’s negative
labeling of each of the five entities over specific issues. Then I will try to consolidate the
resulting findings to present an informed insight into the JuD’s overall strategic goal for
negatively labeling entities.

138

The JuD’s accusations and negative labels that it leveled on the Government of Pakistan
consistently challenged the government’s legitimacy. As mentioned earlier, the JuD’s
combination of specific frames and labels in relation to the government formed the impression
that the government’s behavior did not match the JuD’s perception a true Muslim ruler of an
Islamic Democratic Republic. In addition, the JuD generalized their perception to all Muslims in
their statements by claiming that their perception of a Muslim ruler emerged from the Quran and
Sunnah. To quote a sentence from the beginning of this section, the JuD’s idea of a Muslim ruler
combined attributes of spirituality (the will to please Allah) and good intentions (the will to serve
and protect national and Ummah interests) with actions (the implementation of Quran and
Sunnah in domestic and foreign matters). The JuD fashioned an image of the government of
Pakistan from this general framework that the ‘illegitimacy’ frame provided, by filling in details
about the government’s deficient management of specific issues. These issues were the GWOT,
the Kashmir issue, the water shortage, the ban on JuD and terrorism in Pakistan. Only one of
these issues, the ban on JuD, directly concerned the organization. The rest of the issues did not
directly concern the JuD. The organization volunteered its opinion on these matters and justified
their interest and authority by evoking frames of collective religious or national identity. I will
come back to this point at the end of this discussion, at the present I ask the reader to keep the
JuD’s use of collective identity to link themselves to specific issues in mind.
Another common feature in JuD’s negative labeling of the government was that the JuD
constantly challenged the legitimacy of the government but refrained from rousing their JuD
members or the people of Pakistan against the government. In line with this observation, the JuD
while challenging the government’s legitimacy never depicted it as an enemy. To make sense of
these findings I draw on my field experiences with the JuD members during the pre-dissertation
139

stage. The JuD member’s responses to my inquiries about their perception of the state and the
system of governance in Pakistan were more or less similar. They shared the belief that the
system of governance in Pakistan was not Islamic. Their organization as a policy demanded a
new system based entirely on Shariat (Islamic Law). However, in explaining their relationship
with the state, JuD members invariably presented their organization as a law-abiding entity that
had never broken any laws if the land (Pakistan). Keeping these findings in mind, the JuD’s
consistent challenges to the state’s legitimacy reflected their organizational goal of demanding a
system change in Pakistan. However, the JuD refrained from inciting its members and the people
of Pakistan and presented itself as a law-abiding entity, because the organization required
legitimate social space in Pakistan. Even when the organization was banned, its leaders always
talked about taking legal steps to have the ban lifted and never expressed any intentions to
contravene the law. The JuD is an indigenous Pakistani organization. Its infrastructure, including
assets and public works projects, are all in Pakistan. To survive, the JuD requires legitimate
space in Pakistan, and therefore must maintain and publicize a law-abiding status. The JuD
challenged the legitimacy of the government and publically reinforced their law-abidingness to
strike a balance between achieving their organizational goal of the implementation of a Shariat
based system in Pakistan and their practical requirement for social space in Pakistan.
These findings also provide the premise for the JuD’s labeling strategy against the
Pakistan Government’s ban on the organization. The JuD consistently challenged the
government for enforcing the UN sanctions unjustly and excessively but at the same time
conveyed that they would fight the ban within the bounds of law. The newspaper data,
corroborated by my personal observations, revealed that the JuD is still operational in Pakistan.
Thus, the JuD has occupied social space in Pakistan without interruption. However, this fact has
140

not precluded their attempts to gain back their legal status in Pakistan. Thus, acquisition and
maintenance of legitimate social space emerges as an important organizational goal of the JuD.
The JuD’s negative labeling of the UN was similar to its negative portrayal of the
Pakistan government. The JuD affiliates primarily negatively labeled the UN for sanctioning
their organization. They challenged the UN’s legitimacy as a world forum, but in their statements
did not incite their members or the people of Pakistan to disregard the UN imposed restrictions.
Rather, the JuD reinforced its law-abiding status by presenting itself as a charity and declaring its
intention to adopt legal remedies for having the UN sanctions lifted. Pakistan is a member of the
UN and all UN resolutions are binding for the Pakistan government under international law.
Specifically, in the case of JuD, the government commenced a nationwide crackdown on the
organization to comply with the UN sanctions and to fulfill its obligations under international
law. In this context, it would have been against the JuD’s strategic interest to incite its members
to take any action against the UN or publically declare non-compliance with the UN sanction.
Such initiatives by JuD would be tantamount to non-compliance with Pakistani law (since
Pakistan is a member of the UN) and could threaten the legitimate social space in Pakistan that
the JuD was and presently is trying to regain.
The JuD presented India as the enemy of the JuD, Pakistan and all Muslims. They
negatively labeled India over all six issues. Comparative analysis of the statements in which
Indian government spokespersons labeled the JuD together with the statements in which JuD
negatively labeled India shows that both entities perceived the other as a threat. As mentioned
earlier, India saw JuD as a threat to their national interest. They blamed JuD for inciting
terrorism in Pakistan especially in the Kashmir region. Furthermore, India actively pursued the
UN to sanction the JuD and pressured the government of Pakistan to shut down the JuD.
141

Conversely, the JuD maintained that India had specifically targeted the JuD because the
organization, as a member of the Muslims Ummah, performed its duty to publically support the
Kashmir “freedom struggle” and voiced its concerns over the Indian atrocities in Kashmir. The
JuD also declared India as the enemy of Pakistan by connecting the Kashmir insurgency to the
water shortage issue and the 2010 floods in Pakistan. This suggests that Kashmir was the focal
point of JuD’s negative labeling of India.
The review of the news coverage has revealed the JuD shared their view of the US as an
imperial power and leader of the enemies of Islam with reference to the GWOT, with some other
key religious organizations in Pakistan. For example, Munawar Hussain, the head of Jamaat e
Islami, one of the largest religious organizations in Pakistan, held a joint press statement with
Hafiz Saeed on 05/04/2009 (story 213). In this statement, Munawar Hussain said that, “As long
as NATO forces are in the (Afghanistan) region terrorism and unrest (in Pakistan) cannot be
controlled. I ask all… religious parties to get united on a single point agenda of driving the UN
out of this (Afghan-Pakistan) region” (story 104). Similarly, story 122 reported the following
statement by Sajjad Mir, the head of Jamiat Ahl e Hadith, which is another of the largest
religious parties in Pakistan: “Like a slave the Government has brought the America’s war (the
GWOT) to Pakistan (in Sawat and Waziristan) merely to win the approval of the American
Government.” These observations suggest that the JuD stance towards the US and the GWOT
was part of a larger strategy adopted by some of the major religious and religio-political parties
in Pakistan. As suggested earlier, the stance of the Pakistani religious organizations and religiopolitical towards the US and the GWOT and its impact on the perceptions of the Pakistani people
should be studies further. The results of such research could provide valuable information to
guide the US government in improving its public image in Pakistan.
142

The JuD counted Israel among the enemies of the Ummah and maintained that Israel
presented a direct threat to Pakistan because of its alleged clandestine role in inciting terrorism in
Pakistan. The number of statements in which JuD negatively labeled the Israel was not large
enough to allow any insight into JuD’s strategic interests in negatively labeling the country. Only
one observation sheds some light on this point. The JuD negatively labeled Israel JuD in five
stories. Two out of the five stories were reports of joint anti-Israel rallies that were had been
organize by JuD and three other major religious parties in Pakistan; namely the Jamaat e Islami,
the Jamaat Ahl e Sunnat and Jamiat Ulema Islam-F. This observation suggests that like the US,
the JuD’s public stance regarding Israel was part of a joint strategy that some of the major
religious groups in Pakistan formulated in relation to Israel. The JuD’s concurrence in views of
the US and Israel with the views of representatives from some other large religious groups in the
country, hints of an alignment of frames (McAadam, 2003; Wictorowicz, 2005) within the
religious right wing in Pakistan over certain issues. Future research should explore whether such
a concurrence of views exists within the religious right wing in Pakistan and on which issues.
Furthermore, future studies should also look at the impact on public opinion in Pakistan on issues
on which the major religious organizations in Pakistan jointly share an affective stance.
The JuD’s overall presentation of the enemies of the Ummah revealed a tendency to unify
the enemies. In other words, the JuD mentioned on various occasions that the US, Israel and
India had joined forces against the Muslims and Pakistan, especially in relation to the Kashmir
issue and to terrorism in Pakistan. Following Aho’s (1994) reasoning, I submit that the JuD
projected the enemy as united to promote the idea of a unified Muslim Ummah. On several
instances in the data, the JuD suggested that the Muslims should unite against the common threat

143

that the enemies of Islam posed to the Ummah. By creating an impression of a unified enemy the
JuD attempted to encourage the development of a collective Muslim identity among the readers.
Lastly, the JuD negatively labeled entities over issues that did not directly affect them.
The one exception to this observation is the issue of JuD’s proscription, however even that was
an outcome of the JuD’s controversial public stance and accusations of organizing illegal
activates in relation to issues that did not concern the JuD directly. Especially, the JuD’s
involvement in the Kashmir issue was a cause of major concern for India, the UN and even the
Government of Pakistan. The JuD voluntarily involved themselves in the issues that they
believed concerned the Muslims or Pakistan. They justified their volunteerism mainly through
promoting collective Muslim identity as a fundamental principle of Islam and a unified Ummah
as necessity for the survival of the Muslims in a world with allied anti-Muslim forces.
In terms of strategic interests in negative labeling, the present data does not provide an
insight into why JuD evoked its collective Muslims identity to voluntarily involve itself in five
specific issues, especially the Kashmir issue. However, the findings in this section reflect the
fundamental importance of JuD’s self-imposed ‘volunteerism,’ based in its conception of the
collective Muslim identity in Islamic ideology, for JuD’s existence or its justifiable occupation of
social space in Pakistan. The JuD’s self-projected itself in the Pakistani society as a relief and
welfare organization, a religious organization that preaches Islam and Muslim activist group. Its
self portrayal rests on their Islam-based idea of ‘volunteerism’ and collective Muslim identity.
Strategically, the JuD justifies its social existence by propagating collective Muslim identity as a
fundamental feature of the Islamic ideology and volunteerism, or a Muslim’s duty to help all
Muslims in need. The organization also establishes and reinforces its volunteer status in
Pakistan through its various charitable endeavors within the country. In the context of JuD’s self
144

promulgated religious identity and substantiated by its charity work in Pakistan, the organization
enmeshed its purportedly pro-Muslim and allegedly controversial stance on specific issues and
against specific entities with ‘volunteerism.’ Thus, the volunteerism embedded in collective
Muslim identity provides the very basis of the JuD’s legitimate social existence. However, my
pre-dissertation experiences revealed that ‘volunteerism’ and ‘collective Muslim identity’ were
also deeply rooted in the members’ conceptualization of the ‘self.’ I will analyze the JuD’s
conceptualization of the ‘self’ and its impact on their social existence in a future study.

145

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
In this section, I discuss the implications of major findings of this study and their
relevance to the context of Pakistan and the post 9/11 ‘terrorism’ label related global discourse. I
note connections between the findings of this study with the extant empirical literature and make
suggestions for future research. I also discuss how the limitations of this study qualify the
theoretical and practical import of the findings. Discussing the general implications of this study,
I will submit that policy makers and scholars need to develop a deeper humanistic understanding
of groups like the JuD. They need to look beyond pre-determined labels like ‘terrorist,’ regard
such organizations within the entire ambit of their activities and understand their ideological
underpinnings motivating their actions. I follow this discussion with a brief note on the overall
policy and research implications of this study.
The quantitative analysis revealed that there were language specific differences in the
type of news coverage that the JuD received in the Pakistani newspapers. The English
newspapers provided greater coverage to actions or statements related to the discourse
surrounding the imposition of the ‘terrorist’ label on the JuD. English newspapers also provided
greater coverage to the JuD’s expression of allegedly controversial political views. Conversely,
the Urdu newspapers concentrated more on the apolitical relief and welfare role of the JuD in
Pakistan. I also found that the almost all the stories that contained a negative reporter bias or
slant against the JuD were published in English newspapers, but a majority of stories that were
biased in favor of the group were published in Urdu newspapers.
The findings imply that the English and Urdu newsreaders are receiving variant
worldviews about the JuD. The mediated experiences of the English newsreaders with the JuD
146

are more likely to depict the group as a controversial religious organization that has terrorist ties.
In contrast, the mediated experiences of the Urdu newsreaders with the JuD are more likely to
present the JuD as a legitimate and active Islamic charity. Empirical exploration of the impact of
this finding on the perception of newspapers consumers in Pakistan about the JuD and other
similar groups is required. Such studies will also inform research on the overall influence of the
Pakistani print media on the public opinion in Pakistan. Scholars should also study the
determinants of the observed language-based disparity in the representation of the JuD in the
Pakistani print media. Such studies will allow the researchers to understand the effect of the
interaction between various pro and anti-state interest groups and the media on shaping news in
Pakistan. Lastly, keeping in mind the possibility of a systematic selection bias in the newspaper
data (mentioned earlier in the methods section), the observed language based discordance in the
news coverage that groups like JuD receive in the print media requires further empirical
validation.
Three major theoretically important findings emerged from the qualitative analysis of the
newspaper data. Firstly, the JuD’s key negative labelers, as presented by the Pakistani print
media, used the ‘terrorism’ label against the JuD in ways that reflected the labelers’ strategic
interests and how they perceived JuD as an impediment in pursuance of their respective interests.
Also, the entities that recurrently associated negative labels with the JuD were either state level
actors like the Government of Pakistan, the US and India, or the UN, which is an organization
representing all independent nations in the world. Deconstructing the terrorist label associated
with the JuD revealed that although JuD was mainly accused of supporting, facilitating and
conducting terrorism in India (especially the Indian part of Kashmir), under national and

147

international law the JuD was labeled as a terrorist organization because of its alleged and
indirect link to the Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Harb and Leenders (2005) believes that in the post 9/11 terrorism discourse, policy
makers and researchers, due to lack of authentic historical and factual data, use incorrect and
unsubstantiated facts to label certain groups as terrorist with an “uninformed certainty” (Harb &
Leenders, 2005). In their statements, none of the four key labelers of JuD explained why they
believed that the JuD was involved in terrorism or presented proof to justify this claim to the
reader. Scholarly literature also points out that the rhetoric surrounding the GWOT has depleted
the term “terrorism” of its objective (and/or consensus-based) meaning (Peteet, 2005; Nadarajah
& Sriskandaraja, 2005; Horsman, 2005). The term now conveys strong subjective connotations,
and the US and its allies in the GWOT wield it as a weapon or tool to facilitate the pursuit of
their respective geo-political interests (Peteet, 2005). In the case of the JuD, the UNSC declared
the JuD as an ‘associate of the Al Qaeda and Taliban’ (Security Council Committee pursuant to
resolutions 1267 and 1989 concerning al Qaeda and associated individuals and entities, n.d.).
However, I did not find a single statement in the data, by the UN or any other entity that
explained how these organizations were connected or that provided reference to any proof
corroborating this assertion. The confusion regarding why the UN and the Government of
Pakistan labeled the JuD as a terrorist organization was also observable in the data. After the
proscription of JuD, several stories in the data contained claims that the UN had banned the JuD
because of its alleged involvement in the Mumbai terrorist attack and made no reference to the
JuD’s connection to the Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Future research must gauge the unexplored
impact of the ambiguity shrouding the term ‘terrorism’ on public opinion regarding the
legitimacy of the GWOT initiative, especially in places like Pakistan. Unlike the US, Pakistan is
148

both an ally and a target in the GWOT. Even though, the Pakistan government supports the
GWOT initiative, some of the alleged ‘terrorist’ groups that the US and its allies in the GWOT
have declared as the ‘enemy’ have managed to generate support within the recesses of the
Pakistani society. Lastly, this finding supports Hagan’s (2010) thesis that entities (including
states) tend to utilize their social and political power to realign frames, or in the words used by
Hagan (2010), change the “conception of the good and the bad” to achieve their strategic goals.
Secondly, the JuD’s responses to the ‘terrorism’ label in the print media consistently
reflected two Pakistan specific organizational goals: 1) preservation of its public image as a
legitimate relief and welfare organization, and 2) restoration of its legal and operational status.
To achieve these goals, the JuD innovatively employed various counter labeling strategies and
frames to convey that the UN and the Government of Pakistan, instigated by the US and India,
had unjustly and illegally victimized the organization. Furthermore, through its counter labeling
statements, the JuD tried to capitalize on the public support it had acquired through social work
by connecting the organization’s proscription to the victimization of its poverty-stricken and
socially marginalized clientele in Pakistan. Newspaper data and my field experiences confirm
that even though its legal status is still dubious in Pakistan, the JuD has thus far been successful
in saving its public image and maintaining its operational status. Studies that have looked at
similar cases of indigenous organizations that perform a wide variety of social and welfare
service in other countries and that face accusations of fomenting or conducting terrorism confirm
that such organizations characteristically manage to successfully dispel the ‘terrorist’ label in
their countries of origin (Harb & Leenders, 2005). These findings indicate that future research
must explore how such organizations confront the ‘terrorist’ label by using the media to

149

simultaneously 1) engage in a labeling and counter-labeling discourse with their accusers, and 2)
leverage their social capital to mobilize their followers, supporters and allies.
Thirdly, JuD’s negatively labeling messages melded affective with strategic content. The
organization employed frames and labels (affective content) to interpret events as connected to
the causes that it actively supported. It negatively labeled its opponents in the pursuit of its
organizational goals (strategic content). The JuD rationalized their presentation or construction
of the ‘other’ through religion. They divided the ‘other’ into the ‘enemy’ (the US, Israel and
India) and the ‘instrument of the enemy’ (the Pakistan Government and the UN). They
embedded their conceptualization of the ‘enemy’ in divine texts to convey that these entities
were the natural and irreconcilable adversaries of the Muslims. They presented the enemies as
unified against the Muslims and recurrently associated their individual and collective actions
with six specific issues (the ban on the JuD, the GWOT, terrorism in Pakistan, the water issue,
the Kashmir issue and the 2010 floods) to convey the immediacy of the enemy’s threat. Thus, the
JuD’s overall message to the readers was that the united natural enemies of the Muslims, with
the help of their witting or unwitting instruments, were marginalizing the Muslims, especially
Pakistani Muslims. Strategically, the JuD’s negatively labeling messages promoted the concept
of the unified Muslims ‘Ummah’ and were fashioned to mobilize Muslims against the perceived
consolidated threat of the enemy vis-à-vis the six issues mentioned earlier. Deeply rooted in the
JuD’s conceptualization of the Ummah was the notion of ‘Muslim volunteerism’— an idea the
group used to legitimize its existence to the Pakistani people. The JuD leaders, especially its
Ameer, frequently proclaimed social volunteerism as the duty of a ‘true Muslim.’ Presenting
itself as a ‘true Muslim’ organization, the JuD reinforced its volunteer status by framing its relief
and welfare work in Pakistan as performance of a religious obligation. Resultantly, the JuD
150

created the ideological base that allowed the organization to involve itself in any political,
economic or social issue that concerned Pakistani Muslim or the Muslims in general.
Harb and Leenders (2005) studied the media-based discourse between the Lebanese
organization called Hizbullah and the governments of the US and Israel. Although the US and
Israel have declared the Hizbullah as a terrorist organization, the group holds the status of a
legitimate Shiaite charity and political party within Lebanon. Harb and Leenders (2005) found
that the US and Israel’s presentation of the Hizbullah as a terrorist organization was
“unidimensional” and did not explain the factors that motivated Hizbullah to engage in political
violence (Also Peteet, 2005; Ivie, 2005). According to Harb and Leenders (2005), the West
presents terrorists as the “ultimate alien” that “cannot be known” and that poses an immediate
threat to the democratic way of life. In contrast, Harb and Leenders (2005) found the Hizbullah’s
conceptualization and presentation of the enemy was demystified and multidimensional.
Couched in religion, the Hizbullah’s presentation of the enemy was more issue based and
qualified (e.g., the group declared that it only considered the US government as its enemy and
not the American people). I observed a similar trend in the present study. The entities that
branded JuD as a terrorist organization rarely explained why the JuD was involved in terrorism.
Conversely, in its negatively labeling statements the JuD frequently explained why the certain
entities were the enemies of the Ummah. By employing frames to connect the enemies’ actions
to specific issues that concerned the Muslims, JuD spokespersons provided illustrations of ‘the
enemy’s’ animosity towards the Ummah. These findings raise many important questions which
future research should address. How do the US and its allies in the GWOT construct the
‘terrorist’ label against groups like the JuD? How do groups like the JuD associate the ‘enemy of
the Ummah’ label against the US and its allies in the GWOT? How are peoples’ perception
151

affected after being simultaneously bombarded by both types of contravening messages through
the media, especially within societies where the groups being labeled as ‘terrorist’ organizations
under the GWOT initiative have managed to acquire some degree of social acceptability? One
cannot understate the importance of such studies, as dismantling the social and financial support
structure of allegedly ‘terrorist’ organization is presently one of the major areas of concern for
the global allies in the War on Terror (Neidhardt, 2011).
In this study, I analyzed 1) messages in which entities labeled JuD as a terrorist
organization, 2) messages in which JuD negatively labeled entities, as communicated through the
Pakistani print media and 3) JuD’s counter-labeling messages. Through a process of
deconstruction, I looked at how the senders of the messages conveyed meaning to the readers by
interpreting reality through frames to construct or debunk negative labels. The process of
deconstruction, informed by an understanding of the context developed though the analysis of
the newspaper data and field experiences, also allowed me to discern the strategic interest of the
parties (or senders of the messages) that reflected through the affect-based content of the
messages.
The present study was not a frame analysis. I did not look at how the Pakistani print
media shaped reality, but instead examined the JuD’s and anti-JuD entities’ interpretation of
reality that permeated through their statements published in Pakistani newspapers. To remove
reporter bias, I only selected direct quotes and paraphrases out of each story for analysis.
However, this selection process only partially removed the bias. The reporters of the stories had
selected and reported parts out of original statements, and it is highly unlikely that the selected
part of the statements conveyed the complete message contained in the original statement.
Moreover, in the process of paraphrasing, the reporters may have modified or altered the
152

message contained in the quote that they had selected to report out of the original statement.
Thus, the results of this study are qualified. They present an analysis of the JuD’s and its
labelers’ construction of reality as reported in the Pakistani newspapers. The credibility of the
results was also reduced by a limitation introduced during the data collection process. Two
individuals selected the news storied contained in the data by physically cutting and pasting
stories about JuD in a reference. They found the stories in fifteen Pakistani newspapers
published on a daily basis between 11/01/07 and 10/01/10. Thus, there is a possibility that the
individuals may have missed stories or may have introduced a systematic bias in the selection of
the stories.
Even though the data and methodology I used for study was subject to the above
mentioned limitations, I submit that using newspaper quotes and paraphrases to understand how
state level actors impose the terrorism label on groups and how such groups counter the label and
in turn negatively label their labelers, brings more insight that using other open-source data.
Researchers can collect statements made by state level actors about ‘terrorist’ groups from
various sources but collecting the statements made by groups branded as terrorists presents a
methodological difficulty. At the data collection stage, I faced a similar conundrum and had to
choose between selecting newspaper data and open source data (JuD blogs, JuD affiliate run
websites etc.) for a representation of JuD’s views. Juxtaposing a small sample of both types of
data revealed that the newspaper data was more suited for the purpose of the present analysis.
Firstly, although it is difficult to extricate reporter bias form the quotes and paraphrases found in
the news stories, newspapers as a policy usually confirm the authenticity of the statements that
they quote. Conversely, it is normally very difficult to verify the authenticity of the data
extracted from sources such as blogs. Secondly, newspaper data is naturally arranged in a
153

chronological order, and therefore it allowed me to study statements within the context of the
overall labeling discourse between the JuD and its accusers. I found that arranging open source
data in chronological order presented a difficult since these statements were usually undated.
Alternately, I found that the JuD weekly newspaper provided a more viable data source,
in comparison to the newspaper data I used, that covered the JuD’s perspective on issues
extensively. Using these newspapers to understand the JuD’s presentation of reality would have
increased the credibility of this study. However, I was unable to find archived copies of the JuD
weekly newspaper between 11/01/07 and 10/01/10. I am presently collecting the JuD newspapers
on a weekly basis. In a future study, I am planning to replicate this methodology to study the
labeling discourse in the news coverage that the JuD received in Pakistani print media in the
years 2011 and 2012. The study will use both mainstream newspapers and the JuD weekly
newspaper as data sources. The study will also include a frame analysis, to explore two queries:
1) how did the JuD frame issues in their weekly newspaper, and 2) how did the JuD frames differ
from the frames constructed by in mainstream Urdu and English newspapers in Pakistan?
The JuD newspapers also provide insight into the JuD’s perception of reality, self and the
enemy. In the present study, the newspaper data only allowed me to analyze the JuD’s
presentation of self and enemy sieved out of the Pakistani newspapers. Although psychologically
the difference between ‘presentation’ and ‘perception’ of self and enemy is to some extent
indiscernible, a preliminary analysis of the JuD newspapers revealed that there was an
observable difference in the JuD statements printed in the mainstream Pakistani newspapers and
the JuD newspaper. I found that the statements contained in the JuD newspaper are primarily
fashioned for JuD members and followers, and better explained the JuD ideology and the
ideology of the JuD’s enemy. I will come back to this point later in this section.
154

The analysis of the JuD’s messages that ‘presented’ reality revealed the JuD’s
organizational policy of labeling certain entities and mustering social support in favor of certain
causes that the organization tenaciously pursued. The study also showed how the JuD attempted
to align frames with its audience so that they would accept the JuD’s presentation of ‘self’ and
reality. For example, the JuD consistently used the Ummah frame with reference to the six issues
mentioned above (especially the Kashmir issue). Analysis showed that such statements conveyed
three messages to the readers: 1) that true Muslims are duty bound to voluntarily help all
Muslims in need; 2) as a true Muslims organization the JuD was actively pursuing these causes
to help marginalized and suppressed Muslims; and 3) to become better Muslims the audience
must voluntarily join the JuD in its righteous pursuits. However, these findings do not explain
why the JuD actively pursued these causes as an organizational policy and whether the JuD’s
presentation of ‘self’ and the Islamic ideology actually coincided with its perception of ‘self’ and
Islam. Furthermore, the JuD’s voluntary participation in these causes was only one aspect of its
social existence in Pakistan. The newspaper data and my field experiences showed that in
conjunction with its political activism, the JuD was also voluntarily conducting relief and welfare
activities all across Pakistan. These observations suggest that the JuD’s political activism and its
alleged connection to terrorism must be understood by studying the organization as a whole.
Such studies should examine the entire field of the organization’s activities and the connection
between its ideological beliefs and actions.
Immediately after the completion of this study, I plan to conduct an inductive
examination into 1) the construction of the JuD’s identity, 2) the JuD’s perception of reality, self
and the enemy, and 3) the impact of ideology on members’ actions. I will use the statements of
JuD leaders and scholars taken out of the JuD weekly newspaper and intensive interviews of the
155

JuD members as data for this study. I will also compare the leaders’ and members’ perspectives
to assess vision transfer, that is, the extent to which the members internalize the values projected
by the JuD leaders.
Ivie (2005) in his article titled “Savagery in Democracy’s empire” made the following
comment on how, after 9/11 and the beginning of the GWOT, the Bush administration created
frames about terrorism that changed the American people:
“A people reduced by the dichotomous language of good versus evil … could not debate
the character of terror without sounding supportive of terrorists, could not distinguish
between explaining terrorism and siding with terrorists,… could not contemplate
variations within the discourse of Islamism, and could not recognize the terror of their
own indiscriminate war on terrorism.”
I submit that the effects of the Bush administration generated frames extended far beyond the
American society. The rhetoric surrounding the War on Terror initiated a reflexive process of
sense making that consequently polarized the entire world. According to scholars the new
meaning of the term ‘terrorist’ signifies an alien and clandestine enemy whose actions defied
reason and could only be morally rationalized as evil (Ivie, 2005; Neidhardt, 2011). However, in
places like Pakistan this ‘enemy’ was neither alien nor clandestine, especially with reference to
organizations like the JuD. The Pakistani Government and media imported the GWOT rhetoric
in Pakistan and started taking staunch measures against religious groups that its GWOT allies
were labeling as terrorists. On the one hand, the Pakistani Government and its foreign GOWT
allies were labeling these groups as terrorists in the national and international media. On the
other hand, the same groups had, to varying degrees, managed to acquire social acceptability in
Pakistan. In the case of JuD, the organization had thousands of members and served more than a
156

hundred thousand people in Pakistan through its relief and welfare services. The UNSC’s
sanctioning and the Pakistani Government’s proscription of JuD was bound to gather criticism
from JuD’s members, clients, allies and sympathizers. However, the UN’s and the Pakistani
Government’s position would have been relatively justifiable if at some point they had shared
proof of JuD’s association with the Al Qaeda or its involvement in the Mumbai terrorist attack
with the Pakistani people. Instead, they relied on the post 9/11 unidemensional terrorist label
(Harb & Leenders, 2005) and dichotomous language (Ivie 2005) to legitimize their actions,
which may have increased the level of criticism the government and the UN had to face for
banning the JuD. If they did not have admissible proof of JuD’s involvement in terrorism, then
proscribing the JuD should have been the second line of action. The UN, Pakistani Government,
US and India should have tried to settle their concerns about the organization by talking and
negotiating with the JuD leadership. Presently, the US Government is already contemplating
negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan after over 11 years of war (Shinn & Dobbins,
2011). If the US and its GWOT allies are moving away from a policy of direct confrontation,
then they should first engage in a discourse with the groups that they believe to be involved in
terrorism and political violence before declaring them ‘terrorists.’
The global alliance against terrorism’s move towards a discourse-based approach to deal
with terrorism requires re-conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ from a label to a crime. These nations
should work through the UN to develop consensus-based definitions of ‘terrorism’ as a crime
and ‘terrorists’ as criminals. Furthermore, the UN should mandate all member states to endorse
and incorporate this definition into their local criminal or terrorism-related laws. Furthermore,
the UN should provide member states with guidelines to develop standardized substantive and
procedural laws for proving and punishing terrorism. However, in developing the definition of
157

terrorism and substantive and procedural standards for dealing with terrorism, the UN and the
nations involved in the GWOT must be willing to surrender the authority to label entities without
legitimizing the label by making public the proof against such entities. Instead, they should
invest this power into legalized and transparent standard procedures for identifying and
punishing terrorists based on a globally recognized definition of terrorism and universally
acknowledged principles of justice. These principles of justice include the inalienable right of all
individuals to hear the charges against them and defend themselves. Criminalization and
standardization of ‘terrorism’ will serve the dual purpose of demystifying the terrorism label and
legitimizing the War on Terror alliance’s stance against terrorism and terrorists.
The perception of terrorism as a ‘crime’ should also reflect in the statements and
messages that the UN and the GWOT alliance send out to the terrorist organizations and to
civilian populations around the world through the media. The UN and the nations involved in the
War on Terror must avoid the ‘language of war’ that projects ‘terrorists’ as enemies and
terrorism as ‘evil,’ and instead should acquire a legal lexicon that categorizes terrorism as a
crime and terrorists as criminals. They need to share convincing proof with the people that the
global alliance against terrorism is only proscribing and sanctioning organizations and
individuals found guilty under law. Moreover, they should allow the suspected terrorist
organizations to defend the charges brought against them. Only through consistent public
discussions on motivations and culpability of groups and individuals accused of terrorism, can
they help generate a sense of what terrorism is and who the terrorists are.
The media and researchers can facilitate the process of the demystification of the
‘terrorist’ label. The media has the responsibility of conveying the messages from the GWOT
alliance and the organizations labeled as ‘terrorist’ to the public. However, in reporting and
158

explaining such statements the media should present the perspective of the senders of the
messages. Most importantly, the media’s use of the terrorism label should be more sensitive to
cultural and contextual realities. For example, I noticed in the news coverage that the JuD
received in the Pakistani print media, especially in the English newspapers, that the authors of
articles, opinions and new stories often attributed the ‘terrorism’ label to the JuD. In Pakistan, the
JuD has thousands of members and the organization’s relief and welfare activities have acquired
it socially visibility (Clifford, 1963). The media’s unqualified association of the ‘terrorist’ label
to the JuD indiscriminately stigmatized thousands of JuD members, who may only be involved
in the organization’s relief and welfare projects, and may have no link to the organization’s
alleged involvement in terrorism and/or connections with the Al Qaeda network. Such messages
may contribute to creating polarities within the Pakistani societies between JuD members and
supporters, and groups that favored the UN’s and the Pakistani Government’s decision to ban the
organizations. A qualified and legalistic use of the term ‘terrorism’ that reflects contextual
sensitivity may produce a more harmonizing effect.
Lastly, terrorism researchers need to think beyond the ‘terrorism’ label and explore the
humanistic reality of terrorism. To develop an insight into the human aspect of terrorism
researcher must study organizations accused of terrorism within the context of how members of
such organizations identify themselves and how their self identity motivates their actions.
Researchers must individually study the allegedly ‘terrorist’ organizations as whole
organizations (Harb & Leenders, 2005) that may also be concurrently involved in a wide variety
of other, legitimate activities. As whole organizations, these groups reflect their ideological
beliefs, their perception of ‘self’ and the ‘enemy,’ and the relationship between their ideological
beliefs and strategic interests, through words and deeds. To understand the organizations that the
159

GWOT alliance has labeled as ‘terrorists’ and their connection to political violence, researchers
must develop a context specific understanding of the organizations’ behavioral and linguistic
interactions with other social entities, especially their friends and enemies.

160

BIBLIOGRAPHY

161

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adler, P.A., & Adler, P. (1987). Membership Roles in the Field. Newbury Park, CA:
Sage Publications.
Afsaruddin, A. (2006). The ‘Islamic State’: Genealogy, Facts, and Myths. Journal of
Church and State, 48 (1), 153 - 73.
Aho, J. (1990). Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism. Seattle, WA:
University of Washington Press.
Aho, J. (1994). Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism. Seattle, WA:
University of Washington Press.
An-Nasa’i, I. (2007). Sunnan An-Nassa’i (N. Al-Khattab Trans.). London, United
Kingdom: Dar-us-Salam. (Original work published 829 – 915 AD)
Atran, S. (2003). Genesis of Suicide Terrorism. Science, 299, 1534 - 1539.
Basile, M. (2004). Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda’s Financial Network is Likely to
Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 27, 169 –
185.
Birk, N., & Birk, G. (1997). Selection, Slanting, and Charged Language. In C. Logan
(Ed.) Counterbalance: Gendered Perspective for writing and Language (pp. 184 – 192).
Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press.
Bourgoise, P. (1990). Confronting Anthropological Ethics. Journal of Peace Research, 27
(1), 43 – 54.
Chakravarty, A., & Chaudhuri, S. (in press). Strategic Framing Work(s): How
Microcredit Loans Facilitate Anti-Witch Hunt Movements. Mobilization An International
Journal.
Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through
Qualitative Analysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007). Framing Theory. Annual Review of Political
Science, 10, 103 – 126.
Clifford, E. (1968). Social Visibility. Child Development, 34 (3), 799 – 808.
Congressional Research Service. (2005). Removing Terrorist Sanctuaries: The
9/11Commission Recommendations and U.S. Policy (Order Code RL32518). Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32518.pdf
162

Creswell, J. W. (2007). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five
Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Della Porta, D. (1988). Recruitment Process in Clandestine Political Organizations:
Italian Left-Wing Terrorism. International Social Movement Research, 1, 155 – 169.
Ezekiel, R. (1996). Racist Mind: Portraits of American Neo-Nazis and Klansmen. New
York: Penguin Books.
Ezekiel, R. (2002). An Ethnographer’s look at the Neo-Nazi and Klan Groups. The Racist
Mind revisited. American Behavioral Scientist, 46(1), 51 – 71.
Fair, C.C., (2004). Militant Recruitment on Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and
Other Organizations. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27, 489 – 504.
Freeman, M. (2008). Democracy, Al Qaeda, and the Causes of Terrorism: A Strategic
Analysis of U.S. Policy. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31 (1), 40 – 59.
George, J. (1992). Nazis, Communists, Klansmen, and Others on the Fringe: Political
Extremism in America. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.
George, J., & Wilcox, L. (1996). American Extremism: Militants, Supremacists,
Klansman, Communists, Others. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.
Gilmore, D. D. (1991). Subjectivity and Subjugation: Fieldwork in the Stratifies
Community. Human Organization, 50 (3), 215 – 224.
Hagan, J. (2008). The Collective Dynamics of Racial Dehumanization and Genocidal
Victimization in Dafur. American Sociological Review, 73(6), 875 – 902.
Hagan, J. (2010). Who Are the Criminals? The Politics of Crime Policy from the Age of
Roosevelt to the Age of Reagan. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Hamm, M. S. (2002). In Bad Company: America's Terrorist Underground. Boston, MA:
Northeastern University Press.
Harb, M. & Leenders, R. (2005). Know thy Enemy: Hizbullah, ‘Terrorism’ and the
Politics of Perception. Third World Quarterly, 26 (1), 173 – 197.
Hays-Mitchell, M. (2001). Danger Fulfillment and Responsibility in a Violence Plagued
Society. Geographical Review, 91 (1), 311 – 321.
Horsman, S. (2005). Themes in Official Discourses on Terrorism in Central Asia. Third
World Quarterly, 26 (1), 199 – 213.

163

Indus Water Treaty, Pakistan – India, April 1, 1960.
65.

Ivie, R. L. (2005). Savagery in Democracy’s Empire. Third World Quarterly, 26 (1), 55 –

Kirby, A. (2007). London Bombers as “Self Starters”: A Case Study in Indigenous
Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
30, 415 – 428.
Lee, R. M. (1995). Dangerous Fieldwork. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.
Malik, B.A. (2005). Indus Water Treaty in Retrospect. Lahore, Pakistan: Shareef Printers.
McAdam, D., (2003). Beyond Structural Analysis: Towards a More Dynamic
Understanding of Social Movements. In Diani, M, and McAdam, D., Eds. .Social Movement
Analysis: The Network Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press.
Michalowski, R. (2009). Power, Crime and Criminology in the New Imperial Age. Crime
Law Soc Change, 51 (3-4), 303–325.
Nadarajah, S., & Sriskandaraja, D. (2005). Liberation Struggle or Terrorism? The Politics
of Naming the LTTE. World Quarterly, 26 (1), 87 – 100.
Neidhardt, F. (2011). Terrorism. Conditions and Limits of Control. In W. Heitmeyer, H.
Haupt, S. Malthaner & A. Kirschner (Eds.), Control of Violence (pp. 431 – 444). New York:
Springer.
Peteet, J. (2005). Words as Interventions: Naming in the Palestine – Israel Conflict. Third
World Quarterly, 26 (1), 153 – 172.
Post, J. M., & Ruby, K. G. (2002). The Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated
Analysis for Group Risk in Terrorism. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25(2), 73 – 100.
Post, J. M., Ruby, K. G., & Shae, E.D. (2002). The Radical Group in Context: 2.
Elements in the Analysis of Riskfor Terrorism by Radical Group Type. Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 25(2), 101 – 126.
Prus, R. (1996). Symbolic Interaction and Ethnographic Research: Intersubjectivity and
the study of Human Lived Experiences. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Prus, R. (2005). Terrorism, Tyranny, and Religious Extremism as Collective Activity:
Beyond the Deviant, Psychological, and Power Mystiques. The American Sociologist, 36 (1), 47
– 74.
Richardson, L. (2006). What Terrorists Want. Understanding the Enemy, Containing the
Threat. NY: Random House.
164

Rossman, G., & Rallis, S. F. (2003). Learning in the Field: An Introduction to Qualitative
Research 2nd ed. New York, NY: Sage Publications.
Saul, B. (2005). Defining “Terrorism” in UN Security Council: 1984 – 2004. Chinese
Journal of International Law, 4 (1), 141 – 166.
Silber, M.D., & Bhatt, A. (2007). Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat
(New York Police Department Report). New York, NY: NYPD. Retrieved from
http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_ReportRadicalization_in_the_West.pdf
Singh, J. (2002). Kashmir, Pakistan and the War by Terror. Small Wars & Insurgencies.
13 (2), 81 – 94.
Singleton, R. A., & Straits, B. C. (1999). Approaches to Social Science Research. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Sluka, J. A. (1990). Participant Observation in Violent Social Contexts. Human
Organization, 49 (2): 114 – 126.
Smelser, N. J. (2002). Terrorism: Perspectives from the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
Panel on Behavioral, Social, and Institutional Issues. Washington, DC: National Academies
Press.
Steinert, B. W. (2002). Protection of Human Subjects. A Primer of the National
Administrator. Journal of Research Administration, 32(2), 67 – 74.
Taimoor M.R. (2006). Islamic Revivalism in Pakistan: A case study of Markaz-udDa’wah wal-Irshad. Unpublished master’s thesis, University of Punjab, Lahore, Punjab,
Pakistan.
Trehan, J. (2002). Terrorism and Funding of Terrorism in Kashmir. Journal of Financial
Crime, 9 (3), 201 – 211.
United Nations. Charter of the United Nations. Retrieved from
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml
United Nations Security Council Committee concerning AlQaeda and associated
individuals and entities. Al Qaeda Sanctions List. Retrieved from
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/AQList.htm
Warren, C.A.B., & Karner, T.X. (2005). Discovering Qualitative Methods: Field
Research, Interviews and Analysis. Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company.

165

Wiktorowicz, Q. (2005). Radical Islam Rising. Muslim Extremism in the West. Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Wintrobe, R. (2006). Rational Extremism: The Political Economy of Radicalism. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Wintrobe, R. (2006). Extremism, Suicide Terror, and authoritarianism. Public Choice,
128, 169 – 195.
Zaman, M. Q. (1998). Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi`i and Sunni
Identities. Modern Asian Studies 32 (3), 689 - 716.

166