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**THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURE ON APPLICANT JUSTICE PERCEPTIONS IN
RESPONSE TO ADMINISTRATIVE CONSISTENCY AND INTERPERSONAL
SENSITIVITY**

By

Smriti Shivpuri

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ABSTRACT

THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURE ON APPLICANT JUSTICE PERCEPTIONS IN RESPONSE TO ADMINISTRATIVE CONSISTENCY AND INTERPERSONAL SENSITIVITY

**By
Smriti Shivpuri**

A framework for modeling applicant fairness perceptions during the selection process has been established by Gilliland (1993); however, little work has examined how individual differences affect reactions to the violation and satisfaction of procedural rules presented in this framework. In particular, how applicants' cultural orientations influence their reactions to procedural rules has been largely ignored. This study examined whether applicants' cultural orientations, specifically, their individualism (IND) and collectivism (COL) orientations serve as moderators of the relationship between the violation/satisfaction of procedural rules and subsequent fairness perceptions. Three procedural rules, namely, consistency of administration, interpersonal sensitivity of administrator, and explanation provision were manipulated in a simulated application context. Results indicated that IND or COL orientation moderated the relationship between some procedural rules and process fairness as well as other outcomes. Results suggest that organizations should consider the cultural orientations of their applicant pool when developing and structuring selection processes.

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INTRODUCTION

“No man has the right to dictate what other men should perceive, create or produce, but all should be encouraged to reveal themselves, their perceptions and emotions...”

- Ansel Adams (1902-1984)

In the past decade, applicant reactions during and after the process of selection have received greater and more focused attention. There are many factors that contribute to this increased interest in reactions. Until recently, low unemployment rates and an increasing demand for labor had resulted in greater competition between organizations for qualified applicants (Greenstein, Jaffe, & Kayatin, 1999). This increased degree of competition led organizations to reevaluate their systems of selection in order to determine what aspects could most positively influence applicants' attraction to the organization (Ryan & Ployhart, 2000). In addition, many organizations have recently adopted a total quality focus of management, in which applicants are viewed as “customers” of a selection process because of their potential to be users and beneficiaries of this process (Gilliland & Cherry, 2000). As a result, these organizations are attempting to determine applicant preferences in terms of selection tools and processes, in order to attract and satisfy more applicants.

Because many outcomes relevant to organizations have been shown to be related to applicant reactions to selection systems, organizations' concerns are not without merit. Applicant attitudes toward the selection system, such as perceived fairness, have been shown in numerous studies as well as a recent meta-analysis to be related to applicant attitudes towards the organization, such as organizational attractiveness, intentions to recommend the organization to others, intentions to use the organization's products, and

job acceptance intentions (Fiaschetti, 1998; Gilliland, 1994; Hausknecht, Day, & Thomas, 2004; Macan, Avedon, Paese, & Smith, 1994; Truxillo & Bauer, 1999).

Because of how important many of these outcomes are to an organization, it is no surprise that researchers have begun looking into what factors affect applicant reactions in a selection context. Gilliland (1993), gaining inspiration from the organizational justice literature, has created a model of applicant reactions in response to fairness perceptions in a selection context. This includes both reactions to the fairness of the selection process by which the hiring decision was made (procedural fairness), and the fairness of the actual hiring decision (distributive fairness). Gilliland proposes that there are certain procedural rules that are present during a selection process, and that the violation of these rules leads to perceptions of procedural unfairness and subsequent negative outcomes, such as a decreased likelihood of job acceptance intentions. However, although much research has focused on the relationship between the procedural rules and applicant perceptions of procedural fairness (Bauer, Truxillo, Sanchez & Craig, 2001; Gilliland, 1994; Macan et al., 1994; Truxillo & Bauer, 1999; Fiaschetti, 1998), very little has looked at how *individual differences* may affect this relationship.

An alternative approach in determining what factors affect applicant reactions during selection has been to look at the use of explanations in the selection context. Much research in the organizational justice literature has shown that the use of explanations can mitigate the negative affects of an undesirable outcome on the receiver of that outcome (Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2001; Greenberg, 1993, 1994; Shapiro, Buttner, & Barry, 1994; Shaw, Wild, & Colquitt, 2003). It is inevitable in a selection context that some applicants will receive undesirable outcomes, because it is very rare that every

applicant is offered a job. In fact, studies have shown that providing an explanation for rejecting an applicant can decrease the applicant's perceptions of unfairness (Gilliland, 1994; Gilliland, Groth, & Baker, 2001; Horvath, Ryan, & Stierwalt, 2000; Ployhart, Ryan, & Bennett, 1999). However, applicants not only react to what decision was made, but *how* the decision was made. Therefore, though many studies have looked at how explanations for the *hiring decision* affect fairness perceptions, few studies have examined how explanations for the *procedure* used in hiring affect perceptions of fairness (for exceptions see Gilliland, 1994, and Horvath et al., 2000). In addition, even fewer studies have explored how *individual differences* may affect this relationship.

This paper extends previous research by taking both these approaches and applying a new lens through which one can view both these perspectives: that lens is culture. The assumption that both these approaches are making is that everyone will react to a stimulus, be it the violation of a procedural rule or the explanation of why a procedure was used, in *very similar ways*. These approaches both do not take into account the fact that applicants come from different backgrounds and have different experiences, and that this can cause them to react to the same stimulus differently.

The reason why culture is so important to consider, especially in an organizational selection context, is that we are rapidly moving toward becoming a global community. Multi-national corporations are becoming more common, and companies are expanding their markets and adding overseas branches daily (Skarlicki, 2001). In addition, the minority and immigrant population in the United States is continually growing (Schmidley & Gibson, 1999). All these factors result in long-term, increased contact between people of different cultures in an organizational setting. Therefore, in the same

way that it is important for American companies to understand how American applicants will react to their particular selection systems (i.e., because it affects significant outcomes such as recommendation intentions, acceptance intentions, and re-application intentions), it is also important for multinational companies to understand how their applicants of different cultures will react, and if and why they will react differently. In fact, it is important for *any* company that has a diverse pool of applicants to understand this.

This paper is an attempt to begin to answer some of these questions. In this paper, I will examine how cultural orientations, in particular the cultural dimensions of Individual and Collectivism, affect the relationship between the violation of certain procedural rules and fairness during the selection process and how it alters (if at all) how explanations for a selection process affect fairness perceptions of that process. The paper will open with a general review of the literature on applicant reactions, and then will focus on certain procedural elements of Gilliland's (1993) model of applicant reactions to selection systems. It will then move on to provide background on literature pertaining to explanations, and their effect on fairness perceptions in the organizational justice literature. More specific details will be provided on findings relevant to explanations utilized in a selection context. The cultural dimensions of individualism and collectivism (IND and COL) will then be presented, and literature linking these dimensions to fairness perceptions and the selection context will be discussed. After the general background of these concepts has been relayed, specific hypotheses pertaining to the relationship between IND and COL, procedural rules, explanations, and applicant reactions, and the rationale for these hypotheses will be put forth. Finally, the method by which these hypotheses will be tested will be presented.

APPLICANT REACTIONS

Basic Background

One of the first records of attention to applicant reactions to selection systems in the psychological literature occurred during the late 1930's. However, at this time, applicants' emotional reactions were not being considered for the purpose of changing selection systems to elicit more favorable reactions, but instead, reactions were being used as selection criteria to determine if the applicant was fit for the job (National Institute of Industrial Psychology [NIIP], 1938). For example, if an applicant responded in a cool manner to a highly stressful selection situation, then he/she might have been considered as fulfilling one of the criteria (i.e. having a calm temperament) in order to become an airline pilot. Towards the late 1940's and early 1950's researchers became more concerned about the "face validity" of tests, and mention is made about whether tests were well-received, and whether tests made examinees tense (Fields, 1950; Mosier, 1947; Peterson, 1949). In the 1960's, a book, The Brainwatchers, increased interest in applicant reactions by addressing the personnel selection industry's use of personality tests and describing how applicants reacted to these types of tests by responding in socially desirable ways and faking answers (Gross, 1962). Shortly after, the subject of applicants' reactions to employment tests (in particular, personality tests) in terms of invasion of privacy came to the foreground in a congressional hearing. In 1965, the House Special Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the House Special Subcommittee on invasion of privacy, held a hearing to determine whether pre-employment psychological tests were an unjustified invasion of applicants' privacy; this

was as a result of negative reactions from applicants and the media concerning some of the questions on the tests (U.S. Congress, 1990).

Although, as can be seen, the topic of applicant reactions to selection systems was a concern at certain times in the past, it has only been in the past 20 years that interest and research has really burgeoned in this area. Starting in the late 1980's and early 1990's researchers began to realize that most of the research on selection had been viewing it from the organization's perspective, and completely neglecting the fact that applicants' attitudes and perceptions were involved in the process as well (Martin & Nagao, 1989; Rynes, 1993; Singer, 1990). Consequently, a call went out for elaboration and advancement of research and thought in this area, and the result came in the form of theoretical exploration and empirical inquiry into applicant reactions.

Though a few empirical studies had been done on the topic of applicant reactions to specific selection tools before (e.g. Cunningham, 1989; Lounsbury, Bobrow, & Jensen, 1989; Martin & Nagao, 1989; Ryan & Sackett, 1987), the study that was integral in sparking interest in applicant reactions was conducted by Arvey, Strickland, Drauden, and Martin in 1990. This study did not look at fairness reactions, but it is included in this review because it is a seminal study in the applicant reactions literature, and it was the starting point for a great deal of subsequent research on the topic (Ryan & Ployhart, 2000). In the first phase of this study, a scale, the Test Attitude Survey (TAS) was developed to measure the attitudes and opinions of applicants towards tests they recently took. There were nine factors developed that assessed test-takers' motivation, lack of concentration, belief in tests, comparative anxiety, test ease, external attribution, general need for achievement, future effects, and preparation. The survey was validated using

several studies. The second phase was designed to test various propositions and hypotheses posited in the first phase. One study in the second phase found that applicants reported more positive attitudes, higher effort and motivation on tests than incumbents. Another study had a significant finding that test-taking attitudes are related to test performance, and that racial differences in test scores diminished significantly when attitudes were controlled. Finally, there was limited evidence in a third study that found that test motivation moderates test validity (Arvey et al., 1990).

Although Arvey et al. (1990) were the first to put the limelight on applicant reactions, Singer (1990) was the first researcher to suggest the application of a specific theoretical perspective to applicant reactions in a selection context. Singer suggested that applicant perceptions of fairness in selection situations be examined from an organizational justice perspective. Organizational justice theory states that when organizations make decisions about the allocation of outcomes, two forms of fairness, or justice, are considered: distributive justice and procedural justice (Greenberg, 1990). Distributive justice refers to the fairness of organizational outcome distributions, while procedural justice refers to the fairness of procedures used to determine this distribution of outcomes (Greenberg, 1990). Singer reviewed a large body of literature on this perspective, and identified the six criteria used in evaluating procedural justice that were most thoroughly empirically validated. These six criteria, which were taken from Leventhal's (1980) justice judgment model, were consistency in applying rules, bias avoidance, accuracy of information, correctability of the decision, opportunities to select the decision-making agent, and maintenance of ethical and moral standards. Singer, using a sample of entry-level job applicants and professionals from New Zealand,

identified five major determinants of perceived fairness in selection through the use of an open-ended questionnaire and factor analysis. Singer found that the determinants in common between Leventhal's model and her own analysis were consistency, bias avoidance and choice of selectors. The two criteria that both samples in Singer's study reported to be key determinants, but were not represented in Leventhal's model, were information soliciting and ethicality.

Though Singer's (1990) study was a good starting point for investigating fairness in selection, it was too simplistic and did not fully address how applicant perceptions of fairness could affect future outcomes. Schmitt and Gilliland (1992) and Gilliland (1993) also explored perceptions of fairness in selection from an organizational justice perspective, along the same vein as Singer, but the result was a broader perspective and more comprehensive theory that looked at not only determinants of procedural fairness but also determinants of distributive fairness, and their relation to various outcomes. Schmitt and Gilliland (1992) reviewed research related to applicants' reactions to selection while focusing on six different selection procedures: interviews, computerized testing, integrity testing, drug testing, assessment centers and work samples.

In relation to interviews, Schmitt and Gilliland (1992) concluded that the evidence showing a relation between interviewer behavior and interviewee intentions was mixed, but instead of focusing on intentions, they suggested that two-way communication during the actual interviewing process as well as the degree of structure of the interview should be examined, as these aspects could affect the interviewee's fairness perceptions. Regarding computer testing, the authors presented mixed evidence about the nature of reactions to this type of selection tool, though they indicated that getting direct feedback

was a factor that contributed to positive feelings towards this process. According to the authors, both integrity testing and drug testing required more research, because if used for selection, fairness of such tests is a great concern. As relates to both work-sample tests and assessment centers, the authors stated that the high face validity of both procedures of selection make them more likely to elicit positive reactions from applicants.

Based on their review of different selection tools and justice literature, Schmitt and Gilliland (1992) proposed a list of procedural issues that could affect applicant reactions to organizations' selection practices. The list consisted of feedback regarding performance, knowledge of how tests are used to make decisions, standardization of test administration, face validity of procedures, information regarding validation of procedures, possibility of retest, knowledge of how tests are scored, personalization of process, and privacy and confidentiality of safeguards. They then composed a table of each selection procedure and predicted whether on each issue the procedure would result in a positive or negative reaction from the applicant. They discussed the types of outcomes resulting from employee reactions to selection procedures. The authors stated that organizational attractiveness and reputation, organizational HR practices, and applicant's motivation to do well on the test could be affected by perceived fairness of the selection procedure.

Facund Findings

Around the time that theories of the relevance of applicant reactions to various outcomes were being postulated, research had already begun to test whether or not many of these relationships actually did exist. Smither, Reilly, Millsap, Pearlman and Stoffey (1993) conducted a study in which they asked applicants for a wide range of civil service

positions to react to the selection tests they were given both prior to and after they were notified of their test scores. They gave applicants questionnaires that were meant to assess many of the outcomes proposed by Schuler (1993) including their perceptions concerning the face validity and predictive validity of the exam, knowledge of results, likelihood of improving their test scores, affective reaction to taking the test, and organizational attractiveness prior to notification of their scores, and procedural and distributive justice and recommendation intentions after they were notified. The researchers found that *applicants' reactions* to the selection test were positively related to procedural and distributive justice perceptions, organizational attractiveness, and recommendation intentions, while *actual test scores* were weakly related to procedural justice, and unrelated to organizational attractiveness or willingness to recommend the employer to others.

In addition to Smither et al. (1993), other studies also found a relation between applicant reactions to selection and their attitudes toward the organization. Macan, Avedon, Paese, and Smith (1994) found that applicants who perceived the selection process favorably were also more satisfied with the job and the organization, and had greater intentions of accepting the job. Gilliland (1994) found a relation between applicants' perceptions of fairness and their intentions to recommend the company to others, as did Bauer, Truxillo, Sanchez, Craig, et al. (2001). Truxillo and Bauer (1999) found positive relations between perceptions of process and outcome fairness and attraction to the organization as well as perceived positive employee relations. In a study done by Fiaschetti (1998), an individual's general reaction to the selection process was found to be a strong predictor of that individual's intentions to accept the job offer, use or

buy the company's products, and tell others about the company. These relationships between reactions and organizational attractiveness, intention to recommend the organization to others, and intentions to buy an organization's products have been found cross-culturally as well (Stinglhamber, Vandenberghe, & Brancart, 1999).

The relation of outcomes other than just organizationally-focused outcomes to applicant reactions have been assessed. Several studies have found that reactions or attitudes towards certain selection procedures, such as tests used for selection, can affect an applicant's performance on that procedure (Arvey, Strickland, Drauden, & Martin, 1990; Chan, Schmitt, DeShon, Clause, & Delbridge, 1997; Ryan, Ployhart, Greguras, & Schmitt, 1998). The validity of a selection procedure has also been found to be related to applicants' reactions to that procedure (Schmitt & Ryan, 1992; Hunthausen, 2000). An applicant's expectations for being hired, perceived performance, test-taking self-efficacy, and general self-efficacy have all been found to be related to his/her attitudes towards the selection process (Bauer, Maertz, Dolen, & Campion, 1998; Chan, Schmitt, Jennings, Clause, & Delbridge, 1998; Gilliland, 1994; Hausknecht et al., 2004; Ployhart & Ryan, 1997; Ryan, Greguras, & Ployhart, 1996).

Momentous Model

Inasmuch as a great deal of this research established that applicant reactions did affect many outcomes that were important to both organizations (i.e. recommendation intentions, job acceptance intentions) and the applicants themselves (i.e. performance in selection, self-efficacy), it was no surprise that a model was developed to explicate how characteristics of a selection process and outcome can affect applicant reactions and what consequences can result from these reactions. Using ideas from Schuler (1993), Arvey

and Sackett (1993), and Schmitt and Gilliland (1992), Gilliland (1993) created a model of how situational and personal conditions influence the degree to which procedural and distributive rules are perceived as satisfied or violated within selection contexts.

Perceptions of the degree to which each of the rules are satisfied or violated combine to form overall perceptions of fairness of the selection system. The situational and personal conditions that Gilliland referred to are aspects of the selection process such as test type, HR policy, and behavior of HR personnel, and aspects of the distribution of outcomes such as hiring decision, performance expectations, salience of discrimination and locus of special needs. The procedural justice rules corresponding to these conditions are grouped into three categories: formal characteristics of the selection system, explanations given during the selection process, and interpersonal treatment.

Rules under formal characteristics are job relatedness, opportunity to perform, reconsideration opportunity, and consistency. Rules included in explanation are feedback (timeliness and informativeness of), selection information (justification for decision), and honesty. Interpersonal treatment rules are interpersonal effectiveness, two-way communication, and propriety of questions. Gilliland stated that the weighting and salience of these rules will depend on type of selection procedure used, whether the rule is violated (more salient and weighted) or satisfied (less salient and weighted), and time in selection process when perceived fairness is assessed.

The procedural justice rules Gilliland (1993) identified mirror the rules of distribution in the organizational justice literature. These rules are equity, equality, and special needs. An assessment of equity is made by comparing the outcome of the hiring decision to the performance expectations of the applicant. Gilliland hypothesized that

applicants will perceive a selection decision as unfair or inequitable when they expect to get the job and do not receive it or when they do not expect the job and do receive it. Equality in a selection decision is met when all individuals have an equal chance of getting the position. Gilliland stressed that this rule may be more significant in terms of its violation (i.e. adverse impact) than its satisfaction. He stated that when this rule is violated based on job-relevant differentiating characteristics, it will not affect fairness perceptions, but when it is violated on the base of differentiating characteristics not relevant to the job, it will lead to perceptions of unfairness. Special needs is assessed by the degree to which hiring is distributed based on the individual needs of others. This would refer to preferential selection of a disadvantaged subgroup (i.e. handicapped, racial minorities). Gilliland hypothesized that the degree to which the reason for the special needs consideration is made salient to job applicants will affect the dominance of the rule in fairness evaluations, which will affect fairness perceptions. The more salient the reason is, the less unfair the applicants will evaluate it. Gilliland acknowledged that satisfaction of one rule may lead to the violation of another, but reasoned that satisfaction of the most salient rule is most important in increasing fairness perceptions.

Other aspects of the model include moderators of the rule-fairness relationship and outcomes of perceptions of fairness of the process and outcome. Gilliland (1993) proposed that applicants' prior experiences with selection and the stage of the selection process the applicant is in will moderate the relationship between satisfaction of justice rules and fairness perceptions. The outcomes of fairness perceptions are grouped into three categories: reactions during hiring, reactions after hiring, and self-perceptions.

Reactions during hiring include job application and acceptance decisions, application recommendations, test motivation, and legal battles. Performance, organizational citizenship behavior, job satisfaction, and organizational climate belong to the category of reactions after hiring. Finally self-perceptions include self-esteem, self-efficacy, and future job-search intentions. Gilliland made several propositions in regards to the relationship between these outcomes and fairness perceptions, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss them all, and therefore the reader is referred to Gilliland (1993) for further details. However, many of the propositions Gilliland has made have remained empirically untested.

Relevant Rule

One of the procedural rules in Gilliland's (1993) model that this paper will focus on is the consistency rule, regarded in the model as a formal characteristic of the selection process. Consistency refers to "ensuring that decision procedures are consistent across people and over time" (pg. 705; Gilliland, 1993). The reason why this particular rule is of interest is because it is both relevant to issues in research as well as practice. In terms of research, from the very beginning, consistency has been considered one of the main rules used in determining fairness of a selection process (Leventhal, 1980; Schmitt & Gilliland, 1992). In fact, in her survey of entry-level job applicants and professionals from New Zealand, Singer (1990) found that consistency was rated the most important of the six factors that were determined to affect fairness perceptions in the selection context (others included bias avoidance, honest communication, and information soliciting). Leventhal (1980) stated that it is important to have safeguards to ensure objectivity in the decision process in order to ensure procedural fairness, and having a selection process

that is consistent is one way to do this in a selection context. As Schmitt and Gilliland (1992) have stated, consistency in the selection process is important so “that personal biases or self interests [do] not influence the allocation process” (pg. 36).

In addition to rational arguments for the importance of consistency during selection, there is empirical evidence that supports this notion. There have been countless studies showing a strong positive relation between consistency and process fairness perceptions (Bauer, Maertz, Dolan & Campion, 1998; Oliver, 1998; Ployhart & Ryan, 1998; Ryan & Chan, 1999; Ryan, Greguras, & Ployhart, 1996), as well as a meta-analysis (Hausknecht et al., 2004). Perceptions of consistency have been shown to vary depending upon what selection procedure is used. For instance, Truxillo, Bauer, and Sanchez (2001), using a sample of 379 applicants for an entry-level law enforcement position, found that a written test was considered as more fair in terms of consistency than a video-based test was. Structured interviews, which ensure a greater degree of consistency than unstructured interviews, have yielded higher ratings of fairness than unstructured interviews (Janz & Mooney, 1993; Seijts & Jackson, 2001).

Consistency is an important process rule to examine in terms of practical interests as well. Several studies have demonstrated that consistency is viewed as an issue of importance to real applicants in field settings, not just to those simulating applicants in a lab setting. Sheppard and Lewicki (1987) asked a sample of managers to give examples of unfair organizational actions and to state what justice rule they felt was being violated in these examples. Results indicated that consistency in applying rules across people and settings was rated as a key predictor for perceptions of process fairness. As mentioned previously, Singer (1990) collected statements from students who had all in the past

applied for at least one entry-level job. They were asked to list the one most important factor they believed would make a selection process fair. The authors then factor analyzed and refined the responses. One factor that emerged in this group as well as a validation group of managers was consistency of administration. In particular, statements about “equal opportunity regardless of age, sex, or race” and using the “same selection procedure for every applicant” were mentioned. Along a different vein, Truxillo and Bauer (1999) distributed a survey to a large group of candidates for an entry-level police position in an organization where banding was being used to increase diversity. Results showed that applicants’ race interacted with their affirmative action perceptions to affect their fairness reactions to banding. The authors proposed that this may be due to the phenomenon that those less likely to benefit from banding (usually Whites) may view it as causing inconsistent treatment of applicants, whereas those more likely to benefit from it (in this case African-Americans) may focus on how the company may be compensating for past discrimination, not on inconsistent treatment.

Although a strong link has been found between consistency and fairness perceptions, research indicates that many organizations are still using inconsistent selection practices (Neuman, 1996; Novey, Kopel, & Swank, 1996; Novick & Ellis, 1977). Bauer et al. (1998) conducted a study where they surveyed applicants for an office position in an accounting department. They found that procedural consistency ratings predicted procedural fairness perceptions both after the test, but before feedback, and after the test, after feedback (when some applicants were selected for the job while others were not and procedural fairness ratings were expected to vary). In a recent meta-analysis of the applicant reactions literature, Hausknecht, Day and Thomas (2004) found

that although the mean observed correlation between consistency perceptions and procedural justice perceptions were higher in “hypothetical” or lab contexts ($r=.44$), it was still moderate in “authentic” or field settings ($r=.17$). Consequently, it is evident that consistency is an issue that determines fairness perceptions in the real world, not only in contrived settings.

In addition, consistency may be easy to establish when using very basic selection tools such as tests, but it is more difficult to establish when using more complex selection techniques (i.e. interviews, letters of recommendation, essays), which are more prone to subjectivity and personal biases (Cesare, 1996; Schalm, 2001; Williamson, Campion, Malos, Roehling, Campion, 1997). Therefore, in real-life, there are many situations in which establishing perfect consistency in selection will be difficult. Thus, in light of these circumstances, it is interesting to explore what variables could affect the relation between consistency and fairness. One step in this direction is a study by Ployhart and Ryan (1998), which found that inconsistency only affected fairness perceptions negatively when the applicant was somehow put at a disadvantage by the consistency. However, when the applicant was actually favored due to the inconsistency, the result on fairness was the same as if no rule had been violated at all (Ployhart & Ryan, 1998)! In addition, others have noted that there has been very little research on the effect of individual moderators on justice perceptions (Gilland & Beckstein, 1996; Greenberg, 1990). Therefore, in the interest of furthering knowledge in the research area and possibly providing some insight to practitioners, this paper will further explore two potential moderators of the relationship between consistency and fairness perceptions, individualism and collectivism.

In addition to consistency, there are other rules that can have a strong effect on the fairness perceptions of applicants during the selection process. The impact of one of these rules, explanation, is discussed in the following section.

EXPLANATIONS

Exploring Explanations

In a selection context it is almost inevitable that some individuals will leave with a negative outcome (i.e. not getting the job offer), so it is natural that researchers have turned to examining ways to somehow mitigate the negative effects a negative outcome or rejection can produce on an applicant's view of the organization, the selection process, or perceptions of fairness in general (Gilliland, 1994; Gilliland, Groth & Baker, 2001; Horvath, Ryan, & Stierwalt, 2000; Ployhart, Ryan, & Bennett, 1999). Therefore, in recent years, a topic that has gained considerable attention is the use of explanations or social accounts.

The use of explanations in order to mitigate the negative effects of an undesirable outcome and change fairness perceptions in an organizational context was first addressed in the organizational justice literature (Bies & Moag, 1986; Bies & Shapiro, 1988; Bies, Shapiro, & Cummings, 1988; Greenberg, 1991; Greenberg, 1993). Explanations were initially seen as a valuable tool in order to increase perceptions of a type of justice separate from procedural and distributive justice, called *interactional justice*. The term interactional justice was first coined by Bies and Moag (1986) to describe the quality of interpersonal treatment one receives during the implementation of a procedure. Bies and Moag (1986) posited, based on anecdotal evidence and some previous studies, that even if an individual perceives the outcome he/she received as being fair, and the procedure as

having no unfair aspects to it, that individual can still have negative general fairness perceptions if the interpersonal interaction required to come to the outcome distribution was undesirable.

Based on interviews conducted earlier with MBA job candidates (Bies, 1985) concerning critical incidents of fair and unfair recruiting practices, Bies and Moag (1986) identified four criteria that were necessary for an encounter to be considered fair. These four criteria were 1) truthfulness, which was the expectation that recruiters would be open and honest, 2) respect, which was the expectation that recruiters would avoid being purposefully rude or personally attacking the candidate, 3) propriety of questions, which was the expectation that no question based on race, religion, sex, or age would be asked, and 4) justification, which was the expectation that when a rejection was given, there would be adequate justification for the rejection. Bies and Moag (1986) suggested that these are criteria used to judge the fairness of interpersonal communication during the selection process, and that these criteria refer to *interactional* aspects of the situation, not procedural aspects. The researchers urged further research in the area of interactional justice, and how it distinct it is from procedural justice, as well as research on how justifications used for allocating an outcome or using a procedure by the allocator can affect the fairness perceptions of the receiver.

Taking his own advice, Bies (1987) explored the area of justifications further and pointed out inadequacies in the research in the area of organizational justice. He explained that theories in organizational justice had ignored 1) that when an injustice occurs, the harmdoer is caught in a “social” predicament because he/she has violated a social norm, and 2) that individuals like to know the reasons behind allocation decisions.

The implication of taking account of the first issue, according to Bies, is that attention can then be focused on how the harmdoer defends him/herself when caught in the social predicament. This is where social accounts come into play. Bies (1987) states that employing a social account allows “the harmdoer to defend his or her social identity before he or she, too, becomes a ‘victim’” (pg. 294). The implication of not ignoring the second issue is a new view of how people determine fairness. This will allow a shift from viewing people as determining fairness through a input versus outcome model (as equity theory relays), to viewing people as determining fairness by also analyzing the reasons for which an injustice occurred in order to judge whether these reasons are adequate.

After presenting this argument, Bies (1987) then proposes a typology for characterizing various types of social accounts. The first type is the causal account (known in layman’s terms as an excuse) and is an explanation that mitigates the harmdoer’s responsibility for the harm by asserting that the harmdoer’s actions were compelled by external circumstances. The second type of account, the ideological account, redefines the action so that the behavior no longer goes against moral principles. This can be done by appealing to receivers’ moral convictions by accepting responsibility for the action, but stressing the role of superordinate goals in the decision, thereby placing the action in a broader framework that legitimates the action (Bies, 1987). It can also be done by relabeling the action or outcome in more positive terms. The third type of account is the referential account, which minimizes the impact of the harm by providing a more favorable referent standard by which to evaluate it. For example, if a 10% pay cut is in store for members of the claims department, and a 25% pay cut is in

store for members of the HR department, a referential account would state “you folks in the claims department are actually really well off, your coworkers in the HR department are getting more than twice the pay cut you are!” This would lessen the impact or undesirability of the outcome.

Soon after Bies (1987) characterization of the different types of explanations, Bies, Shapiro, and Cummings (1988) came out with another treatise stating that just using an explanation (whether it be causal, referential, or ideological) is not enough to mitigate the negative affects of an undesirable outcome, but two other factors contribute to whether the explanation will have the intended effects: adequacy and interpersonal sensitivity. The researchers surveyed evening business students and asked them to recount recent episodes where they had made a request of their boss, and that request had been denied. Whether the boss claimed mitigating circumstances was measured, as well the boss’s interpersonal sensitivity in communicating the reason for rejection and the adequacy of the account. The reactions that were measured were the degree of anger the participant felt, how much the participant disapproved of his/her boss, the participant’s procedural justice perceptions, and whether the participant complained to superiors. The results showed that the perceived sincerity of boss was significantly negatively associated with all the reactions and that adequacy of the account was significantly negatively associated with all reactions except complaints. Whether or not the boss claimed mitigating circumstances alone was not significantly related to any of the reactions, which was contrary to what previous research had indicated (Bies & Shapiro, 1988).

Shapiro (1991) then argued that more than just the characteristics of the explanation and the explainer are involved in determining whether an explanation will

have a mitigating effect on negative reactions. She found that there are “boundary” conditions involved when an explanation is being used, and whether or not an explanation will mitigate negative reactions is contingent upon how many and which of these conditions are at play. In addition to the perceived adequacy of the explanation and the perceived honesty of the explainer, Shapiro found that the outcome severity and the type of negative reaction experienced by the receiver (injustice, disapproval, punitiveness, or unforgiveness) were boundary conditions. Type of explanation (altruistic or selfish) influenced negative reactions, but when adequacy of explanation was accounted for, this relationship disappeared. Outcome severity moderated the effect of explanations on negative reactions, such that no matter what explanation was given, negative reactions were greatest when participants received the harshest outcomes, and less negative the less severe the outcome. Perceived adequacy and honesty mediated the mitigating effects of explanation on feelings of disapproval and punitiveness, but not unforgiveness and injustice, and therefore, type of reaction was considered a contingency factor.

Greenberg came out with a series of studies that examined the relationship between characteristics of explainers and explanations for outcomes, and how these affected not only negative reactions in general, but fairness reactions. Greenberg (1991) found that in a performance appraisal context, those explanations for decisions which were considered to be most fair were those that enhanced the receiver’s self-image. This supported the idea of the self-serving bias or the egocentric bias, which is the notion that what an individual considers to be fair is whatever benefits him/her (Greenberg, 1987). In another study, Greenberg (1993) found that when participants were underpaid for

participating in an experiment, they stole more money from the experimenter than when they were paid equitably. However, when the explanation for the underpayment was highly informationally valid (i.e. from an expert source, directly acquired, publicly revealed, & double checked) and delivered in an interpersonally sensitive manner, participants stole less than when the information was not highly valid or delivered sensitively. Validity was positively related to procedural justice perceptions, and sensitivity was positively related to interactional justice perceptions. In a subsequent study (Greenberg, 1994) the researcher found similar effects of interpersonal sensitivity and informational thoroughness on increasing acceptance of a work-site smoking ban, and increasing procedural justice perceptions of the ban.

Because so much attention had been paid to how the perceived adequacy of an explanation determined whether or not it mitigated negative consequences of an undesirable outcome, Shapiro, Buttner, and Barry (1994) conducted a study in order to determine which factors caused an explanation to be perceived as adequate. The researchers discovered that both the specificity of the content of the explanation as well as the sincerity of its delivery influenced perceptions of adequacy, although the former had more of an influence than the latter. They also found that the effect of these two factors was additive when outcome severity was low, but had more of a complex, interactive effect when outcomes were very severe. The moderating effects of outcome characteristics were also explored by Colquitt and Chertkoff (2001). These researchers found that individual's outcome expectations and the favorability of the outcome both moderated the relationship between explanation for an outcome and procedural fairness perceptions as well as task motivation. An explanation produced the highest process

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fairness ratings and task motivation when used to explain an unexpected, unfavorable outcome.

In order to make sense of the various findings on the beneficial effects of using explanations to promote fairness and other outcomes throughout the years, Shaw, Wild, and Colquitt (2003) recently conducted a meta-analysis. The researchers' hypotheses centered around the use of fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998) in explaining how and when explanations will have beneficial effects. Fairness theory focuses on how receivers of the explanation interpret the information they are being given in terms of different counterfactuals. A *could counterfactual* comes into play when the receiver feels that the explainer or harmdoer *could* have done something different in order to avoid the harm. A *should counterfactual* is activated when the receiver feels that the explainer *should* have done something different to avoid the harm. Finally a *would counterfactual* is activated when the receiver can imagine how his/her life *would* have been different if the explainer had employed other means. According to Folger and Cropanzano (1998), all these counterfactuals have to be activated in order for an injustice to be perceived. Explanations work to reduce one or more of the activation of these counterfactuals.

Basing their rationale on this theory, the researchers posited that both explanation provision and explanation adequacy would have beneficial effects, that is, positive effects on procedural justice, distributive justice, and cooperation, but negative effects on withdrawal and retaliation (Shaw, Wild, & Colquitt, 2003). The meta-analysis supported both these hypotheses. Another hypothesis which was supported was one that stated that explanations in the form of excuses have more beneficial effects than in the form of justifications. The last two hypotheses tested dealt with which moderators influence the

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beneficial effects of explanations. The authors found support for the notion that both outcome favorability and context affect whether explanations have beneficial effects. They found that explanations had more beneficial effects when outcome favorability was low versus when it varied, and that they were more beneficial in contexts where the instrumental, relational, and moral virtue implications were high rather than low.

Specifically Selection

Based on the above findings, one could argue that the selection context is a very useful context in which to explore the use of explanations since 1) outcome favorability has a good chance of being low (especially when unemployment is high, as is currently the case), and 2) it is a context that has a high instrumental impact, that is, the outcome of the context has important economic consequences for the individual. In spite of the extensive research supporting the beneficial effects of explanation use on fairness perceptions, as well as numerous studies indicating the importance of favorable applicant reactions in the selection context to various outcomes, relatively few studies have been done on the use of explanations in the selection context. There are a few noteworthy exceptions, however, and these will be discussed presently.

The studies done on the use of explanations in selection contexts look mainly at two types of explanations: explanations given for the *selection process*, and explanations given for the *selection outcome*. Gilliland (1994) looked at how an explanation given for the validity of the selection test being used affected applicants' fairness perceptions. Participants in the study were asked to complete either a work sample test, cognitive ability test, or overt integrity test (depending on what condition they were in) in order to determine whether they would be "selected" to complete a paid coding task the following

week. Before completing the test, they were given a written explanation that detailed why the particular test that was being used was a valid means of selecting individuals for the coding task. Participants were then selected for the coding task randomly, and both “selected” and “rejected” individuals completed questionnaires regarding fairness perceptions, recommendation intentions, and their self-efficacy. The “selected” individuals were then called back to complete two separate coding sessions. The results showed that explanation for the procedure had no effect on fairness perceptions, but had an interactive effect with selection decision on recommendation intentions. That is, explanations led to higher recommendation intentions for individuals who were rejected, but did not have an effect on this relationship for individuals who were selected.

Horvath, Ryan, and Stierwalt (2000) also looked at explanations for procedure. Horvath et al. (2000) manipulated the type of explanation that was given for using the selection instrument (i.e. causal, ideological, or referential) and the outcome favorability (hired or not hired). The researchers found that participants’ self-efficacy interacted with both type of explanation and outcome favorability to determine fairness perceptions. In terms of type of explanation, specifically, there was no difference in fairness perceptions between high and low self-efficacy participants when some sort of explanation was given, however, when no explanation was given (control) participants with lower self-efficacy perceived procedures as being less fair than those with higher self-efficacy.

Ployhart, Ryan, and Bennett (1999) and Gilliland, Groth, and Baker (2001) both examined how explanation for selection decision affected various outcomes. Ployhart et al. (1999) conducted a study in which they asked undergraduates at a large university to react to various scenarios. The participants were told to imagine that they had just

applied for a desirable job and had taken a cognitive ability and job knowledge test as part of the selection process, and were about to receive the decision telling them whether they were hired or not. The selection decision was revealed in the scenarios, which were structured as letters given by the employer to the prospective employee. In these scenarios, informational and sensitivity facets of explanations were manipulated. The informational manipulation concerned whether the information in the explanation was procedural information, justification information, or personal information, and the sensitivity manipulation dealt with whether the information was given in a sensitive manner or in a regular fashion. The results indicated that there was a main effect of both sensitivity and information on process fairness perceptions, and that there was also an interaction between the two. The fairest perceptions occurred in the personal information, sensitive group, and the least fair in the control group, which received no explanation. Gilliland et al. (2001) also looked at type of explanation, but their explanation “types” followed from fairness theory. Therefore, they looked at the effects of could, would, and should reducing explanations on fairness. They found that both would and could reducing explanation significantly positively affected fairness perceptions, but the results for should reducing explanations were equivocal.

Although these studies provide valuable insights on the utility of explanations in the selection context, there is still a great deal that needs to be examined. Only two (Gilliland, 1994; Horvath et al., 2000) of the four studies on the use of explanations in selection have looked at explanations for procedure. The first study (i.e. Gilliland) found that explanation had no effect on fairness perceptions but did have an effect on recommendation intentions for rejected participants, while the second study (i.e. Horvath

et al.) found that type of explanation had an effect on fairness, but there was no control condition in this study, so there could be no comparison made between fairness perceptions of those who received no information and those who received information. In addition, all of these studies look at explanations for why a certain *type* of procedure is used, but there is no study that the author knows of that looks at explanations for why a *procedural rule was violated*. The meta-analysis found that the use of explanations was positively related to procedural justice perceptions ($\rho = .17$), however, this finding was for explanations in the selection context in general, it did not indicate the usefulness of any particular type of explanation (Hausknecht et al., 2004).

According to Gilliland's (1993) model, the violation of procedural rules during selection can lead to many negative consequences, and this has been demonstrated in the literature (Bauer et al., 2001; Gilliland, 1994; Hausknecht et al., 2004; Ployhart et al., 1999; Truxillo et al., 2001). In addition, these rules often do get violated during the selection process, ergo the variability that has been found in studies looking at the impact of these rules on fairness in the field where no manipulation was present (Bauer et al., 2001; Gilliland & Beckstein, 1996). Therefore, it would be valuable for another study to look at whether the explanation for the process being used in selection affects process fairness perceptions. This is important for both theoretical and practical purposes. Theoretically, it will help expand knowledge on how explanations for process function in improving or not improving fairness perceptions, because only two studies investigated this topic, and those studies show conflicting results. It would also be an expansion of Gilliland's (1993) model if explanation is shown to be a moderator of the relationship between procedural rule violation and fairness perceptions. In terms of practical

purposes it would also be useful, for example, in cases where procedural rules are somehow violated either purposefully or by mistake. Explanations could be used in order to mitigate the negative consequences on fairness of these violations. This, of course, would be beneficial to organizations, since explanations are easy and economical to use, and due to the fact that outcomes such as organizational attractiveness, recommendation intentions, and job acceptance intentions are related to fairness (Bauer et al., 2001; Macon et al., 1994; Smither et al., 1993; Truxillo & Bauer, 2001), it is in an organization's best interest to preserve positive fairness perceptions whenever possible.

In addition, although interpersonal sensitivity in delivering explanations has been examined in numerous studies within the organizational justice literature (Bies et al., 1988; Gilliland & Beckstein, 1996; Greenberg, 1993; Greenberg, 1994; Shapiro et al., 1994), it has only been examined in one study in the applicant reactions literature (Ployhart et al., 1999). In fact, Gilliland and Beckstein (1995) remark that "a consistent theme that has emerged is the importance of interpersonal and explanation dimensions of procedural justice" (pg. 685). Shaw et al.'s (2003) meta-analysis did not examine the effects of interpersonal sensitivity, however, it did find explanation adequacy to be a determining factor in the beneficial effects of explanations on fairness and other outcomes. Therefore, because the adequacy of an explanation has been found to be a determining factor in the effectiveness of an explanation, and interpersonal sensitivity has been found to be a main factor contributing to the perceived adequacy of an explanation, the interpersonal sensitivity of an explanation is a very important aspect to study (Shapiro et al., 1994). In addition, no study has examined the effects of interpersonal sensitivity on explanations for *rule violations* within a selection context. It is interesting to explore

whether interpersonal sensitivity will mitigate negative fairness perceptions when used in explanations for *procedures* in selection, and not just outcomes, which has been studied in the past (Ployhart et al., 1999). For instance, interpersonal sensitivity of explanations could function differently when being used to explain violation of a procedural rule versus a definite distributive outcome. This may be the case because according to Shaw et al.'s (2003) meta-analysis, explanations function differently depending upon the implications of the context in which the explanation is being used. For example, instrumental impact (e.g., impact on economic circumstances) might be higher under outcome contexts than procedural contexts. This is because in the case of an outcome distribution, the outcome decision has already been made and is binding, and therefore, its instrumental impact is clear (e.g. not getting a job) and very likely to be high. However, the violation of a procedural rule (e.g. getting less time to complete a test) will not definitively lead to a negative or positive outcome, and thus, is less likely to have as great of a direct instrumental impact. Therefore, it may be likely that interpersonal sensitivity of explanations will function differently when related to procedures versus the distribution of outcomes.

Another aspect of explanations, which has not been very extensively explored in the justice literature, is the receiver's characteristics. Receivers' perceptions of various facets of the explanation as well as the explainer have been explored extensively, but actual individual differences between receivers has very rarely been explored. The test-taking self-efficacy of the receiver was explored in one study (i.e., Horvath et al., 2000), and that study *did* find that self-efficacy moderated the relationship between type of explanation and fairness perceptions. In addition, Gilliland and Beckstein (1996)

surveyed authors on their fairness perceptions who had sent in submissions to journals and received notification of acceptance or rejection of their manuscript. The results showed that explanation for rejection or acceptance was strongly related to intentions to submit another manuscript to the journal for *experienced* authors, but not for *inexperienced* authors. Both these studies are important because they may be an indication that there are other “boundary characteristics” (Shapiro, 1991) that determine the effectiveness of an explanation under certain circumstances. For example, it is possible that in addition to self-efficacy and experience, other individual difference variables, such as cultural orientation, could determine how explanations are received, and this paper will be exploring that possibility.

Strategic Summary

In summary, past research has linked applicants’ fairness perceptions of an organization’s selection process to various pertinent outcomes such as organizational attractiveness, intention to recommend the organization to others, satisfaction with the organization, intentions to accept a job offer from the organization, intentions to buy products manufactured by the organization, applicant’s self-perceptions, and perceptions of organizational climate (Bauer et al., 2001; Fiaschetti, 1998; Gilliland, 1994; Hausknecht et al., 2004; Macon et al., 1994; Smither et al., 1993; Stinglhamber, Vandenberghe, & Brancart, 1999; Truxillo & Bauer, 1999, Truxillo et al., 2001). In fact, researchers have suggested that perceptions of process fairness are more influential in determining “institutional attitudes” such as recommendation intentions, than are perceptions of distributive fairness (Gilliland & Beckstein, 1996; Lind & Tyler, 1988). In addition, research has shown that the satisfaction and violation of procedural rules during

the selection process influence fairness perceptions of that process. One rule in particular, consistency of administration, has repeatedly been shown to have relations to process fairness perceptions (Avery & Quinones, 2002; Bauer et al., 1998; Cohn, White, & Sanders, 2000; Douthitt & Aiello, 2001; Oliver, 1998; Ployhart & Ryan, 1998; Ryan & Chan, 1999; Ryan et al., 1996; Truxillo et al., 2001). In spite of the fact that such a strong link has been made between consistency and fairness perceptions, the literature indicates that many organizations are still using inconsistent selection practices (Neuman, 1996; Novey, Kopel, & Swank, 1996; Novick & Ellis, 1977). In addition, sometimes inconsistencies are inherent in a selection process (i.e., unstructured interviews). Therefore, it is important to explore, in the interest of both science and practice, whether individualism and collectivism could moderate the relationship between the violation and satisfaction of the consistency rule and fairness perceptions.

Explanations have been shown to be powerful tools for organizations to use in order to increase perceptions of fairness in situations where outcomes may not be desirable. Although the selection context is certainly one of these situations, not very much research has looked at how explanations can be used in a selection context. Even more importantly, only a handful of studies have looked at how explanations used during the actual selection process can affect fairness perceptions, even though Gilliland (1993) has proposed, and the literature has supported, the notion that what occurs during the selection process influences both procedural and distributive justice judgments (Bauer et al., 1998; Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Gilliland, 1994; Gilliland & Beckstein, 1996; Ployhart & Ryan, 1998). Furthermore, although interpersonal sensitivity has been noted as an important factor influencing procedural justice perceptions (Gilliland & Beckstein,

1995), only one study in the applicant reactions literature has explored this variable (Ployhart et al., 1999). The Ployhart et al. (1999) study, however, only examined interpersonal sensitivity when used to explain aspects of the outcome, but it is possible that interpersonal sensitivity functions differently when used to explain aspects of the procedure, and this should be explored. Additionally, with the exception of one study (Horvath et al., 2000), no studies in the selection context have looked at what *receiver* characteristics could influence the relationship between explanations and fairness perceptions. This is important to study because it will help us better understand the “boundary” conditions under which explanations operate most effectively.

The individual difference factor that has hitherto been mentioned, and will be of importance to this paper is cultural orientation, and specifically, the cultural factors of individualism (IND) and collectivism (COL). Culture is an integral variable to study in the context of applicant reactions because of a few reasons. One reason is that as businesses became globalized and expand and establish offices overseas, it is in their vested interest to be aware of the cultural dynamics of their local environments. There are countless stories about businesses that have not succeeded because they failed to take cultural differences into account (Martinko & Douglas, 1999; Soochan, 2003). In fact, one study found that the degree of similarity between national cultures is one factor that influences how well multinational companies cooperate, with greater similarity leading to better cooperation (Van Oudenhoven & Van Der Zee, 2002). In addition, not only are cultural differences between countries important, but in some countries that have diverse populations, such as the United States, even cultural differences between groups within a country are important to study. According to the latest reports of the U.S. Census

Bureau Latinos are one of the fastest growing minority groups within the United States, and the African-American population is also growing steadily. Although cultural differences at the community level may not seem as obvious as those at the national level, they still exist and affect group members' perceptions.

Furthermore, culture is important to study not only in the general sense of how companies adapt to their environment, but also specifically as it relates to reactions of applicants to the selection process. One aspect in Gilliland's model of fairness during the selection process that he believed would moderate the effect of the violation of procedural rules on fairness perceptions was the expectations individuals brought into the selection context based on prior application experiences. Bell, Ryan, and Wiechmann (2004) developed a model of the antecedents and outcomes of justice expectations. Among the antecedents they proposed affect expectations are existing beliefs, direct experiences, and indirect experiences, all of which are affected by personal and environmental characteristics. IND and COL are cultural orientations related to beliefs about how an individual relates to the collective in terms of definition of self, goals, and affiliations. Consequently, it is very possible that these prior-held beliefs can either directly affect expectations, or affect individuals' experiences, which in turn affect their justice expectations, and ultimately, their justice perceptions and behavior. Steiner and Gilliland (2001) also argue for the importance of culture when considering applicant reactions. They state that organizational justice is concerned with what people think is fair, and what is fair is based on one's expectations. Culture determines these expectations in part by its affect on interpretations of events, and its role in defining normative and appropriate behavior. Therefore, based on these arguments, it is probable

that culture has a powerful influence on individuals' expectations when entering a selection context, and consequently, reactions to the context.

Although several cultural variables could conceivably affect individuals' reactions to selection procedures, individualism (IND) and collectivism (COL) appear to be the most promising cultural factors to examine for a variety of reasons. One reason is that IND and COL have a strong base in the literature. An individual's relation to the collective and how it affects human interaction within organizations has been studied since the 1950's (Earley & Gibson, 1998). Scales of IND and COL have been refined for the past 20 years (Oyserman et al., 2002), and the dimensions have emerged consistently in various studies across diverse samples and contexts (Smith et al., 1996). Furthermore, Hofstede's initial identification of IND-COL came from a multinational survey of work values, so it has a basis in the work domain, unlike other cultural variables such as Confucian dynamism or view of the goodness of human nature. Moreover, IND-COL, in addition to power distance, accounted for most of the variance in an ecological factor analysis of Hofstede's (1980) value data. In an individual factor analysis of work values Mezei (1974) found that IND-COL was the most important dimension.

In an examination of cultural variables that seemed most applicable to applicant justice perceptions during the selection context, Steiner and Gilliland (2001) chose IND-COL as one of the cultural variables likely to affect perceptions of several structural aspects of the selection procedure, as well as the distributive process. They also state that "it is likely that cultural dimensions that are important for social relations and relations to authority will contribute most to determining the salience of these [information-sharing and interpersonal treatment procedural] rules" (pg.132), and IND and COL fall under this

categorization. Finally, Lytle et al. (1995) identified six categories under which cultural dimensions relevant to organizational contexts and used by organizational researchers fall. “Definitions of Self and Others” and “Relations between Societal Members” composed two of these six categories, both of which are central aspects of IND-COL. Thus, IND-COL has a history linking it to work-related contexts, was identified early on as a variable relevant to work processes, has shown to emerge across samples and contexts, and was posited to directly relate to formal, information-sharing, and interpersonal aspects of the selection environment.

Individualism and collectivism were originally conceptualized as two ends of one cultural dimension by Hofstede (1980). He labeled this dimension “individualism” and the characteristics that are thought of presently as making up the dimension of collectivism, were at that time included as characteristics that made up the low end of the individualism scale. Hofstede’s dimension of individualism was one of four cultural dimensions he introduced (the others being power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity/femininity). Hofstede (1980) originally defined individualism as a country-level phenomenon, however, subsequent studies of IND and COL have examined these dimensions at the individual level (Carpenter & Radhakrishnan, 2000; Choi, 2001; Ramamoorthy & Carroll, 1998; Triandis & Bhawuk, 1997; Triandis & Singelis, 1998) and a scale that measures IND and COL in individuals has been developed (Triandis, 1995).

This paper will be treating IND and COL as an individual-level variable influenced by culture, rather than how it was originally conceptualized, as a cultural-level variable. Culture has been defined by Hofstede (1980) as “the collective programming of

the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from another” or “the interactive aggregate of common characteristics that influence a human group’s response to its environment” (pg. 25). In other words, culture, which is shaped through geographic, ecological, historical, genetic, economic, demographic and other influences, creates a pattern of societal norms which consist of value systems shared by the group that exists within the culture. Culture therefore affects the molding of the “mental model” each individual uses to interpret the world and guide behavior. It does this to a certain extent by influencing learning such that individuals in the same culture often go through a similar learning process. As Triandis (1995) states “people who have been raised in collectivist cultures tend to ‘cognitively construct’ situations into collectivist settings; people who have been raised in individualistic cultures tend to convert situations into individualistic settings.” Thus, there is a common rubric of expectations, assumptions, interpretations, and associations that individuals of a particular culture share due to its influence that affect how these individuals interact with the world.

Although culture generally influences how individuals brought up in that culture view and influence the world, it does not influence *all individuals to the same extent*, and this is why it is important to measure some cultural variables at the individual level. For instance, although many people in Japan are of a high collectivist orientation, this is by no means the orientation that every Japanese person holds. For IND and COL in particular, Triandis (1980) has asserted that there are factors other than national culture that influence whether an individual will have a high individualistic and/or collectivistic orientation. These include the person’s age, their social class, and the way they have been reared as a child. Moreover, Schwartz (1992) states that individuals within a given

culture can deviate substantially in the personal values they hold compared to those endorsed by their culture and Earley and Gibson (1998) state that “individualistic and collectivistic tendencies can be found within any given culture at different levels of analysis” (pg. 270). Singelis and Brown’s (1995) model of the effect of cultural collectivism on an individual’s behavior operates through the mediating effects of that individuals’ self-concept. That is, national collectivism is positively related to an interdependent self-construal and negatively related to an independent self-construal. Ultimately, however, he found that it was self-construal that was directly linked to communication behavior, not the individual’s culture’s collectivism. Thus it was the *individual-level* IND and COL that was directly related to behavior (interdependent and independent self-construals are treated as synonymous with individual-level IND and COL and will be discussed at length later on in this paper). Empirical analyses also support the measurement of IND and COL at the individual level. Several studies have found significant within-nation cultural variation in IND and COL (e.g., Coon & Kemmelmeir, 2001; Mastumoto et al, 1997; Oyserman et al, 2002) indicating that even within countries, individuals significantly differ on their degree of IND and COL. To assume, then, that because individuals originate from a particular country, they have the level of IND or COL of that country is erroneous, and to make behavioral predictions based on that assumption is additionally flawed.

Therefore, this paper will be looking at IND and COL as individual difference variables. The following section will review the definitions of IND and COL, and the work that has been done on these dimensions thus far. Specific hypotheses in reference

to how IND and COL affect relationships between procedural rules, explanations and fairness will then be presented.

IND and COL

Individualism and collectivism were first “discovered” by Hofstede (1980) in his landmark study of culture entitled *Cultures Consequences*. The concept of “individualism” was developed out of a study of employees’ responses to work goal questions in 40 countries. The degree of individualism of a certain country was determined by how employees responded to the importance they give to six work goals in particular: personal time, freedom, challenge, use of skills, physical conditions, and training. Giving a great deal of importance to the first three goals indicated higher individualism, while finding the last three goals to be more important indicated a higher degree of collectivism. Western countries such as the United States, Great Britain, and Canada generally scored high on this index, while eastern and South American countries such as Pakistan, Taiwan, Colombia, and Venezuela scored low on this Individualism Index.

Although Hofstede (1980) was the first to coin the terms *individualism* and *collectivism* to describe the constructs involving the individuals’ relation to the collective (he introduced *individualism* in his original work, and later added the term *collectivism* to represent the low end of the individualism continuum, see Hofstede and Spangenberg, 1987), other scholars had been studying the same phenomena under different labels years earlier. Emile Durkheim, also a social scientist, studied the characteristics of ingroups and classified the mechanisms by which they exist (Earley & Gibson, 1998). One of these was the concept of mechanical solidarity versus organic solidarity. Mechanical

solidarity, which is often found in very tight groups, such as clans, is existence based on common bonds among group members, and a sense of obligation to the group. The goal of existence was to fulfill the needs of the group and minimize conflicts among group members. Organic solidarity was used to describe existence of an ingroup based on a structured system, such as a hierarchy, which represents increasing levels of specialized labor, and binds people together in order to utilize the system to pursue personal goals. The former was representative of a collectivist orientation, and the latter of an individualistic orientation. Other scholars such as Max Weber, Verlin F. Tonnies, and Confucius have also remarked on the nature of the struggle of influence between the individual and the collective (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002).

After Hofstede labeled the cultural dimensions of IND and COL, many attempts were made to appropriately define the constructs. Hofstede (1980) himself saw individualism as the construct of interest and collectivism as its polar opposite. He defined it in terms of how the individual relates to the collective in any given society. He also stated that its influence can be noted in the values people hold in a particular society, and the way people live in that society (i.e. in nuclear families, extended families, kibbutzes, etc...). Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) extended this classification to values in general, not just work values as Hofstede had done, and indicated which values they thought were representative of individualistic tendencies and which were representative of collectivist tendencies. Those values which Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) felt primarily served the interests of the individual such as sense of accomplishment and social recognition fell under the motivational domains (i.e. broader value categories) of enjoyment, achievement, and self-direction, while those values which reflected the needs

of the collective such as obedient and helpful, fell under the prosocial and restrictive conformity motivational domains. He found support for this classification from both an Israeli sample and a German sample.

Triandis became very interested in exploring the dichotomy of what Hofstede referred to as individualism and collectivism at the individual level. Because individualism and collectivism were terms used to describe these cultural phenomena at the national level, Triandis adopted the terms idiocentrism and allocentrism to describe the same phenomena at the individual level. Idiocentrists were primarily defined by tendencies to give priority to personal goals over ingroup goals, while allocentrists tended to see ingroup goals as superordinate to personal goals. Therefore, idiocentrists were likely to give importance to those values that serve themselves solely, such as independence and personal recognition, while allocentrists gave more importance to values that promoted the well-being of the ingroup, such as harmony and interdependence (Triandis et al., 1985; Triandis et al., 1988).

Triandis (1995), in his landmark book, *Individualism and Collectivism*, came to more clearly define what the dimensions of idiocentrism and allocentrism meant, as well as their cultural counterparts, individualism and collectivism. He stipulated that there were four dimensions on which individualists and collectivists differed. These were 1) the definition of self, 2) alignment of goals, 3) focus on norms vs. attitudes, and 4) emphasis on rationality versus relatedness. Collectivists define themselves in terms of the groups they belong to, so they have an interdependent definition of self, while individualists define themselves as individuals separate from the groups to which they belong, indicating an independent definition of self. For collectivists, individual and

group goals are closely aligned, and group goals often take precedence over individual goals. In the case of individualists, individual goals are disconnected and often incompatible with group goals, and individual goals take priority over group goals. Norms are very important for collectivists, and behavior and cognitions are guided by obligations and duties stipulated by the culture. In contrast, behavior in individualist cultures is guided by individual needs, attitudes, and rights, and norms are not given much importance. Finally, for collectivists, maintaining relationships and having a connection with others regardless of costs or benefits is very important, while individualists tend to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of having a relationship before they decide to pursue one.

Triandis (1985) also argued early on for a further distinction of IND and COL that reflected how individuals viewed themselves, similar to the interdependent-independent view of self discussed earlier, but this time referring to sameness versus distinctiveness. He termed this dimension of IND and COL as horizontal versus vertical individualism and collectivism. Horizontal IND and COL refers to the view that everyone is similar and should be treated similarly. Horizontal collectivists and individualists do not tolerate being treated differentially based on status or other attributes. In contrast, vertical collectivists and individualists do recognize that there are differences between individuals and do see rank and status as a legitimate means of making distinctions between people. People who support the horizontal view do not like to be viewed as different, or separate from everyone else, while those who support the vertical view, do accept that they will be treated differently and do recognize and often wish to attain the privileges of higher rank.

Other researchers such as Schwartz (1990, 1992) and Erez and Earley (1993) have also done work pertaining to the use of IND and COL as cultural dimensions. Schwartz (1992) created a list of 56 values which he deemed represented the values of most cultures. Each of these values was then rated according to how important it was in the lives of individuals. From these ratings, Schwartz found that the values can be organized into 10 separate clusters. Three of these clusters reflected hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction reflected individualist values, while another three—traditionalism, conformity, and security—reflected collectivist values. Triandis, McCusker, and Hui (1990) found that out of the six clusters, self-direction was most central to IND, while conformity was most strongly related to COL. Erez and Earley (1993) developed a model of cognitive functioning in a cross-cultural, organizational context. This model included aspects of culture, self motives, and management practices, which they postulated interacted to influence work behaviors. Based on their review of the extant literature, they argued that IND and COL were core characteristics of culture that influenced people's motives for action, their self-identity, and consequently, the way they responded to situations at work.

Singelis and Brown (1995) developed a theory on the nature of culture, the self, and communication involving IND and COL. They proposed that IND and COL orientation affect an individual's self-construals such that high individualists have an *independent* self-construal, while high collectivists have a more *interdependent* self-construal. Thus, in a conceptualization similar to Triandis' (1995), those who have an independent self-construal (i.e. individualists) define themselves in terms of their individual attributes and unique characteristics. These internal attributes are seen as

stable, and they are viewed as the primary forces that govern an individual's behavior. Those with independent self-construals also see themselves as autonomous and independent of those who surround them in their social environment. Their individual entity, although connected with those in their family and social circle, is not intertwined or greatly shaped by those influences. In contrast, those with an interdependent self-construal (i.e. collectivists) see themselves embedded in a larger social network and define themselves in terms of their social relationships. They do not view themselves as clearly separated or differentiated, as do those with independent self-construals, but as more connected with others. It is thus, very important for them to find ways to fit in with others and form meaningful interpersonal relationships with those surrounding them. Although they do realize that they have individual personality characteristics and attributes, they perceive these as being more malleable and situation-specific than do those with independent self-construals. Thus, for those with interdependent self-construals, these personality characteristics can and should be controlled and regulated in order to express the proper behavior called for in a particular situation, instead of themselves being the primary cause of the behavior. Consequently, to assert oneself, which is considered natural and self-affirming to those with independent self-construals, is considered weak and immature to those with interdependent self-construals. Independent self-construal is considered synonymous with the terms individualist, autonomous, and idiocentric, while interdependent self-construal is synonymous with the terms collective, contextualist, and allocentric (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

Despite the extensive work that has been done investigating the nature of the cultural dimensions of IND and COL, there is still a great deal of inconsistency in how

the constructs are currently being conceptualized and studied. In Hofstede's (1980) original work, IND and COL were envisioned as value systems that reflected polar ends of one continuum. Therefore, IND and COL at the cultural level were considered a unidimensional construct. Consequently, if a culture was high on IND that meant that it had to be low on COL. This view persisted throughout the 1980's, and researchers, instead of measuring IND and COL directly, instead employed Hofstede's country classification in order to group people by nationality into either an "individualist" or "collectivist" category. When cultural researchers became more interested in how this cultural dimension of IND/COL was expressed at the individual level, they realized that they needed to develop instruments to measure this construct. Triandis, Hui, and colleagues (Hui, 1984; Hui, 1988; Hui & Triandis, 1985; Triandis et al., 1986; Triandis et al., 1988; Triandis, 1995) undertook this endeavour and interviewed over 50 social scientists in several countries in order to develop a list of values that spanned various cultures. The result of further analysis and refinement of this list was a 63-item measure labeled INDCOL that measured individuals' levels of IND/COL. The assumption in creating the scale, however, was still that this was a *unidimensional* construct, and that IND and COL were opposite ends of the dimension.

Upon further examination and refinement of the scale, Triandis and colleagues (1988) discovered that the IND/COL construct at the *individual* level was in fact, *multidimensional*. This was a revolutionary finding and led Triandis (1988) to remark "one point can be made quite generally: in both the ecological and the within-culture analyses and those done in all the cultures so far, the emphases on individualistic and collectivist themes are orthogonal...if one studies a broad range of values (as did

Hofstede, 1980) then in that context individualism-collectivism is one dimension. If one focuses only on *self-ingroup* relationships (as we did in the present studies), then a *multidimensional* structure emerges [emphases added]” (pg. 336). He also pointed out that because IND and COL were independent, treating them as polar opposites was not only oversimplified but also inaccurate.

Triandis’ findings were replicated by Bontempo (1993) who used IRT techniques to conduct a modified parallel analysis on the INDCOL measure. He also asserted that IND and COL should be conceptualized as orthogonal factors and consequently, measured separately. He cautioned against the common practice of reverse scoring responses to collectivist items and assuming that they were psychologically equivalent to individualist items. Yamaguchi, Kuhlman, and Sugimori (1992), using a separate scale of IND/COL, also found a two factor model fit their items the best. In addition, their results indicated that in their U.S. sample, the subscales were not correlated ($r=.04$, *n.s.*), and that IND and COL related differently to different characteristics. For example, affiliative tendency was positively correlated with collectivism but not correlated with individualism, while need for uniqueness was positively related to individualism, but not to collectivism. Trafimow, Triandis, and Goto (1991), in several experiments designed to explore the cognitive structure of the self, demonstrated that cognitions related to the individual and private aspects of the self and those related to the collective and connected aspects are encoded separately in memory. Their results seem to indicate that the IND and COL aspects of ourselves are compartmentalized and stored as distinct, unique factors in our mental schemas.

Empirical findings on the multidimensional nature of IND and COL at the individual level led to further conceptual and theoretical development on the dimensionality and orthogonal characteristics of the constructs. Schwartz (1990) criticized the then dominant view of IND/COL as a dichotomy on several bases. One argument he presented was that the dichotomy did not account for values that inherently were of interest to both individualists and collectivists such as maturity values that promoted the appreciation, understanding, and acceptance of oneself, of others, and of the surrounding world. Another flaw he saw was that the dichotomy wrongly assumed that individualist and collectivist values each grouped onto separate poles that were diametrically opposed to each other. He argued that the subtypes of individualist and collectivist values such as prosocial values and self-direction sometimes did not vary together and were sometimes *not* opposed.

Triandis (1995) put forth a similar argument in his major theoretical work, *Individualism and Collectivism*. When he introduced idiocentrism and allocentrism into the lexicon as representations of IND and COL at the individual level, he described them as orthogonal constructs that could be simultaneously present in one individual. He stated that “in short, which elements are sampled is an important determinant of social behavior. Individuals have *both* individualistic and collectivist cognitive elements. Therefore, a person considered allocentric is one who is simply more likely than a person considered idiocentric to sample collectivist elements and use them to construct the meaning of a social situation.” (pg. 8). Thus, a person can be both high or low on allocentrism and hi or low on idiocentrism at the same time. However, across most settings, being brought up or living in a collectivist culture will make one more likely to

access one's allocentric self while being brought up or living in an individualistic culture will make one's individualistic self more salient. Coon and Kemmelmeier (2001) state that ample evidence from experimental and observational studies as well as analyses of individual-level measures of IND and COL supports this orthogonal, two factor view of IND and COL.

In spite of ample evidence, both empirical and theoretical, indicating that IND and COL should be considered as two separate factors, a great deal of research on IND and COL still treats these dimensions as opposite ends of a unidimensional, bipolar construct (Matsumoto et al., 1997; Smith, Dugan, & Trompenaars, 1996). Oyserman, Koon, and Kemmelmeir (2002) conducted a meta-analysis of the IND and COL literature and found that out of the 170 studies that examined psychological implications of IND and COL, only 36 studies (21 %) assessed both IND and COL. They noted that the bipolar, single dimension approach was by far most popular with researchers studying psychological implications. The INDCOL measure (Hui, 1988) in its entirety continues to be used as unidimensional measure of IND or COL with its items reverse scored (Goregenli, 1997; Ramamoorthy & Carroll, 1998), despite Bontempo's (1993) warnings. In fact, several researchers have emphasized the need to measure these cultural factors as two separate dimensions (Gelfand, Triandis, & Chan, 1996; Kashima et al., 1995; Oyserman, 1993; Rhee et al., 1996; Singelis, 1994).

Furthermore, even when studies do utilize the two factor structure of IND and COL in their methods, they still treat these constructs as if they are non-orthogonal. Comparisons across these constructs are frequently being made, and conclusions are often labeled in terms of IND *versus* COL or idiocentrism *versus* allocentrism (Earley &

Gibson, 1998). In fact, the vast majority of research employs comparisons between these constructs, rather than between *levels* of each construct (Carpenter & Radhakrishnan, 2000; Triandis et al., 1988; Yetim, 2003). This view perpetuates the notion that if one is high on one dimension, one must be low on the other dimension. It also assumes that individuals cannot both be idiocentric and allocentric, because they would then have to act in opposing ways simultaneously. As Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, and Coon (2002) aptly state "...the initial framing of individualism and collectivism as opposing social frameworks left a residue of dichotomizing in the field's theorizing about these cultural models—as if social institutions, practices, and situations created fixed cultural minds that make sense of the world through either an individualistic or a collectivistic lens" (pg. 111).

Nevertheless, there have been a few studies that have examined these factors separately. Coon and Kemmelmeier (2001) found that different ethnic groups had varying levels of IND and COL. While Asian Americans and African Americans scored higher on the COL scale than did Caucasian Americans, only African Americans scored higher than Caucasian Americans on the IND scale. Consequently, Asian Americans and Latinos scored as high on the IND as did Caucasian Americans. In the case of Asian Americans, this demonstrates that individuals can be both idiocentric and allocentric at the same time. In addition, the researchers found a nonsubstantive correlation between IND and COL across most groups ($r=.12$ to $r=-.01$). The only study this author knows of that actually examined high and low levels of both IND and COL was conducted with a sample of Hispanic and Caucasian MBA students. The study found a .04 correlation between COL and IND, and also that the acculturation of Hispanics was negatively

related to collectivism, but unrelated to individualism. What was most interesting, however, was that individuals' preference for task-related versus contextual job attributes differed depending on what subgroup of the combination of high and low IND and COL they were in. Those with high individualistic values (both low and high on collectivism) had a significantly higher preference for task-related job attributes than those with low individualist values. However, only those with low collectivist values *and* high individualistic values had a significantly lower preference for contextual job attributes than those with high collectivist values. This demonstrates that examining the constructs separately, and even pairing them in different combinations can yield unexpected and interesting results.

In sum, although the literature clearly supports a two-factor, orthogonal structure to IND and COL, the majority of research in this area is not consistent with this conceptualization. Nevertheless, due to the extensive empirical and theoretical support of the two factor model, I will be examining IND and COL in terms of within factor comparisons. Thus, I will be comparing the behavior of high versus low collectivists and high versus low individualists. However, the rationale for my hypotheses will be coming from a large base of literature that views IND and COL as dichotomous, opposing constructs. Consequently, based on the majority of the research conducted up until the present, I expect to see low collectivism functioning similarly to individualism and low individualism functioning similarly to collectivism.

In addition, although Triandis (1995) has argued for a four factor structure of IND and COL, assessing IND and COL based on both horizontal/vertical and IND/COL dimensions, and has provided preliminary evidence in support of this conceptualization

(cf. Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), this study will not employ Triandis's conceptual structure. This is due in part to the fact that others have failed to replicate the findings of Triandis and Gelfand (1998) concerning the vertical/horizontal distinction of IND and COL (see Lewis, 1996), and furthermore, as has been presented, several studies in this domain have found ample support for the two-factor version of IND and COL (Oyserman et al., 2002; Wagner, 1995).

IND/COL and Justice

Many researchers have argued that aspects of culture, such as IND and COL, can largely determine variance in perceptions of organizational justice, or fairness, across cultures. In their framework for examining influences of various variables on the relation between justice information gathered and reaction to the decision-making event, Colquitt and Greenberg (2003) present national culture as being a major player. They include culture as a contextual variable (as opposed to an individual variable) in the model, that influences justice expectations, and therefore, moderates the impact of the justice information gathered on the both the justice judgment reached, and the reaction to the decisionmaking event. Choi (2001) also proposed that culture, specifically the cultural dimensions of IND and COL, would moderate the effect of certain variables on procedural fairness judgments. He hypothesized that IND and COL would moderate the effect of different types of participation on justice perceptions, such that collectivists would see representative participation as more fair, and individualists would see individual participation as more fair. Choi also suggested that whether group or individual outcome favorability was seen as more fair would depend on IND and COL,

such that collectivists would favor group outcome favorability, while individualists would favor individual outcome favorability.

Lind, Tyler, and Huo (1997) also suggested that culture could be a moderator of associations they proposed in their relational model of procedural justice. They argued that procedural fairness judgments are defined in relational terms, and that there are three relational variables that people consider when making procedural justice judgments. These variables were trust in benevolence, status recognition, and neutrality. They conducted a study of students from the United States and Japan. They found, in fact, that culture did moderate the relation of status recognition to procedural justice perceptions, such that the American participants placed much greater emphasis on status recognition than did the Japanese participants. Other studies have found similar proof of culture as a moderator of various variables and justice perceptions (Blader, Chang, & Tyler, 2001; Pillai, Williams, & Tan, 2001; Rahim, Magner, Antonioni, & Rahman, 2001).

In addition, a great deal of empirical work has been done looking at how cultural orientation affects justice perceptions in many different organizational contexts (Kabanoff, 1997). Studies have examined how culture affects fairness perceptions in negotiation contexts (Buchan, 1998; Gelfand, Higgins, & Nishii et al., 2002; Leung & Lind, 1986; Leung, Au, Fernandez-Dols & Iwawaki, 1992; Tyler, Lind & Huo, 2000). Gelfand et al. (2002) found that those in individualist cultures were more likely to view an offer by their counterpart in a negotiation context as unfair than those in a collectivist culture. They also found that individualists tend to have a stronger self-serving bias in fairness perceptions during negotiation, in that they view their offers as more fair than their counterparts', and they view feedback that is self-serving as more fair than feedback

that is critical, whereas collectivists tend to have the opposite reaction. Leung et al. (1992) found that collectivists tend to view conflict processes that give them process control and reduce animosity between participants as more favorable than confrontational procedures, while individualists are more accepting of confrontational procedures than collectivists. Tyler, Lind, and Huo (2000) found that in conflict situations between authorities and subordinates, interpersonal treatment by authorities is more important in determining favorable reactions to the situation in people from low power distance cultures versus high power distance cultures. Culture has also been shown to affect justice perceptions in simple allocation contexts (Choi, 2001; Hui, Triandis, & Yee, 1991; Hundley & Kim, 1997; Krishnan, 1998; Milliman, Nason, Gallagher, et al., 1998; Murphy-Berman & Berman, 2002), performance appraisal contexts (Leung, Su, & Morris, 1998; Li & Karakowski, 2001; Ramamoorthy & Carroll, 1998), and contexts in which work-related attitudes are being ascertained (Farh, Earley, & Lin, 1997; Jackson, 2001; Leung, Smith, Wang, & Sun, 1996; Pillai, Williams, & Tan, 2001).

Despite the fact that culture and justice have been explored extensively in many other organizational contexts, the effect of cultural orientation on justice perceptions in the selection context has largely been ignored. There are only a handful of studies that have looked at the influence of cultural orientation on justice perceptions during the selection process, even though many have argued, as do Lincoln, Hanada, and Olson (1981) that "...cultural factors shape organizations and the responses individuals make to them..." (pg. 114). Steiner and Gilliland (2001) have created a model of cultural influences on procedural justice reactions during the selection process. They posit that there are certain cultural dimensions which are likely to have more of an influence on

reactions during the selection process than other dimensions. Using Hofstede's (1980) classification, as well work done by Triandis (1995), Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961), Parsons and Shils (1951), and others, the researchers developed a list of cultural dimensions that they felt would be relevant in a selection context. In addition to Hofstede's four dimensions of individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance, locus of control, time perspective, Confucian dynamism, and five other variables were examined. Although masculinity-femininity, and beliefs about human nature were hypothesized to influence perceptions of fairness across all categories of procedural rules (i.e. structural aspects, information sharing, and interpersonal treatment), IND/COL was posited to have a strong influence on structural aspects of the selection process including job relatedness, opportunity to perform, and consistency of treatment. The authors address the need for further research to be done in the area in order to test their model and clarify the role of cultural orientation on applicant reactions during selection.

Only a few studies have addressed Steiner and Gilliland's (2001) concern, however. Nevertheless, those studies that have been done on the topic do find that cultural orientation influences applicant reactions and justice perceptions. Phillips and Gully (2002), conducted a study involving working adults in Singapore and the United States. They found that Singaporeans were more accepting of graphology and ethnicity/nationality based selection methods than were Americans. They also found that Singaporeans did not perceive work-sample tests to be as fair as Americans did. They attributed this finding to the notion that for people from individualist cultures, it is important that they get a chance to demonstrate their skills, or "sell" themselves, and that

including this aspect into the selection process makes them feel a greater sense of fairness, while the same is not true for collectivists. Therefore, a method such as a work-sample, where one's skills are openly exposed would not be as favorable to a collectivist as it would to an individualist. Phillips and Gully's (2002) study was partly an extension of a study done earlier by Steiner and Gilliland (1996), in which they examined how undergraduates in France and the U.S. reacted to ten different selection techniques. They found that graphology and the use of biodata was found to be fairer and more acceptable to French students, while the use of personality tests was more accepted by American students than French students.

Along a similar vein, Ryan, McFarland, Baron, and Page (1999) surveyed a sample of over 900 organizations in 20 countries in order to determine whether culture or nation affected the use of certain selection practices. They found that nation itself accounted for a significant amount of variability in selection practices across countries, and that uncertainty avoidance, and to a lesser extent, power distance accounted for variance in the use of certain selection practices in particular. Specifically, uncertainty avoidance explained variance in amount of verification methods used, the degree of verification done, and the numbers of interviews conducted, such that the greater the uncertainty avoidance, the greater the levels of these variables. Ramamoorthy and Carroll (1998) also looked at how culture affected preference for selection practices, and examined how IND/COL specifically influenced reactions to alternative human resource management practices using a sample of senior undergraduate business students. They found support for their hypothesis that individuals with a higher collectivist orientation show less preference for selection practices that are based on performance on ability tests.

They explained that cognitive ability test based selection only reflects ability to perform well on the job, and this should not be the sole criterion employed, according to collectivists, in order to be selected for a job. Collectivists see organizations almost as an extended portion of one's family, and therefore, such characteristics as employee loyalty and person-organization fit are considered very important criteria for selection, and they often cannot be ascertained through the use of simple test-based selection.

Each one of these studies, however, only examines how culture influences reactions to one method of selection over another method; they do not specifically examine the procedural rules posited in Gilliland's (1993) model of justice reactions in a selection context. Therefore, they are not able to truly test Steiner and Gilliland's (2001) propositions about how certain cultural dimensions, such as IND and COL, affect the salience of particular procedural rules over others during the selection process. This study is an attempt to address this question and bridge the gap in research linking cultural dimensions to justice issues in the selection context.

HYPOTHESES

Thus far, this paper has described the importance of the study of applicant reactions to selection for both the organization (e.g. future recommendation intentions) and the applicant (self-efficacy, job satisfaction). It has detailed a specific model, Gilliland's (1993) model of fairness in selection, that addresses how certain aspects of the selection process (i.e. "rules") affect an individual's judgment of fairness of that process. From this model, one rule, consistency of administration, has been selected as the variable of greatest interest. A shift from procedural rules during the selection process to the importance of explanations used during the selection process was then made. The

role of interpersonal sensitivity in the process of selection was discussed as well. The lack of research on the influence of individual differences on both reactions to the violation of procedural rules as well as reactions to the use of explanations in the selection context was then demonstrated. Finally, two very salient individual difference variables, specifically, the cultural dimensions of IND and COL were then introduced. A review of the literature linking culture to justice reactions and the selection context was then conducted. This next section is structured to introduce multiple hypotheses on the nature of the relations between procedural rules, explanations, and procedural justice perceptions, and how IND and COL moderate these relations in the selection context. The hypotheses to be presented are based on the following model presented in Figure 1:




Figure 1. Model of the Interaction between IND/COL Orientation and Consistency, Interpersonal Sensitivity, and Explanation Provision on Procedural Fairness Perceptions

HYPOTHESIS 1: *IND and COL orientation will moderate the effect of consistency of administration on procedural fairness reactions such that:*

- 1a. *Those who are high on collectivism will perceive procedures as less fair when consistency is violated than those who are low on collectivism*

1b. *Those who are low on individualism will perceive procedures as less fair when consistency is violated than those who are high on individualism.*

Consistency of administration, at its heart, has to do with equality of treatment (Steiner & Gilliland, 2001). When procedures are conducted in a consistent manner, everyone who receives the procedure will receive it in the same way and by the same means as everyone else. When this does not occur, and some people are treated differentially, this is when inconsistency becomes an issue (Ployhart & Ryan, 1998). There is ample evidence to show that for collectivists, equality of treatment is of great importance. Therefore, it will have more of an impact on high collectivists if the consistency rule is violated than it will have low collectivists.

Hui, Triandis and Yee (1991) conducted a study involving Chinese and American students, where they asked them to make a hypothetical monetary allocation decision for themselves and their partner. They measured IND/COL orientation for all the students, and found that cultural variance on IND/COL accounted for use of the equality rule. The researchers found that those high on collectivism used the equality rule much more than those high on individualism. Individualists tended to rely more on the equity rule when making allocation decisions. Therefore, the collectivist participants were much more likely to distribute the money equally than the individualists were.

In their review of the influence of culture and personality, Triandis and Suh (2002) point out many personality characteristics of individuals from collectivist versus individualist cultures. They indicate that in terms of ethics, collectivists prefer equality to equity. They explain that this is because collectivists are very concerned with harmony, solidarity, and cohesion, and equal distribution promotes these values. They also detail

that those in individualist cultures prefer equity because it is more reflective of values such as competition and productivity, which are of more consequence to individualists.

Triandis (1989) in an earlier paper also details how collectivists base their relations with others much more on communal relations than exchange relations. Consequently, they rely to a greater extent on characteristics that define communal relationships such as 1) lack of clarity about what is to be exchanged, 2) concern for the other person's needs over concern for equity, 3) importance of maintaining equality of affect, and 4) equality of benefits exchanged. Therefore, he goes on to say that the applicability of exchange theory to collectivist cultures will not be very strong, since individuals from these cultures are used to communal relations. Other research has demonstrated similar results, that the equality rule and not the equity rule is much more salient for collectivists than it is for individualists (Bond, Leung, & Wan, 1982; James, 1993; Miles & Greenberg, 1993; Steiner & Gilliland, 2001).

In addition to the importance of equality of treatment for collectivists, another reason why consistency of administration will be more important to high collectivists is because they have a stronger external locus of control (Triandis & Suh, 2002), and therefore, will give much more importance to elements of the context, such as how a procedure is administered, than will low collectivists. That is, during the selection procedure, collectivists will be likely to perceive they have little personal control over the situation, and that control lies largely in the hands of others, such as those who administer the procedure. Therefore, they will be more dependent on these others, and the context (i.e. aspects of the process external to them), in order to derive meaning from the

situation. Consequently, they will be much more affected by any changes that occur during the process.

There is much research to suggest that collectivists feel that control lies more in aspects of the situation than aspects of themselves, and therefore, pay greater attention to aspects of the situation. Triandis and Suh (2002) explain that collectivists see aspects of themselves as variable, pliable to the needs of the situation, and aspects of the situation as more or less fixed. In contrast, individualists see aspects of the situation as being variable, while aspects of the self such as personality or attitudes are relatively fixed. So “situational determinants of behavior are important universally, but more so in collectivist than in individualist cultures” (pg. 137). Wagner (1995), in his study of the effect of IND/COL orientation on cooperation in groups, found that collectivists tend to be much more reliant and dependent on others when determining how to act in a situation, rather than relying on their own internal volition. Church (2000) created a model of culture and personality in which he asserted that personal traits account for behavior much less in collectivist than in individualist cultures. Triandis (1989) also found that collectivists attribute events much more to external causes than individualists do.

Singelis and Brown’s (1995) theory on the nature of culture, the self, and communication proposes that IND and COL orientations affects individuals’ self-construals, so that collectivists have a much more interdependent self-construal, while individualists have a more independent self-construal. As a consequence, collectivists depend much more on aspects of the context or other people in order to regulate their behavior than they do on themselves. They also attribute more behavior to contextual

factors than they do to personal factors, and use descriptions that concern contextual information rather than dispositional information. In addition, Markus and Kitayama (1991) state that those with an interdependent view of self tend to see their internal attributes, such as personality and attitudes, as situation-specific, and “as such, they are unlikely to assume a powerful role in regulating overt behavior” (pg. 227). Earley and Gibson (1998) in their review of IND and COL, also found ample support for the notion that collectivists place a great deal of emphasis on the context of the situation in determining meaning.

Steiner and Gilliland (2001) put forth a similar argument as to why consistency will be more important in collectivist cultures. They argued that those who have more of an external locus of control rely on others to determine their fate, and therefore, will be more concerned with aspects of the situation, such as receiving equal treatment, than those who feel more of a sense of control themselves. Markus and Kitayama (1991) also state that for those with an interdependent construal of self, “a relatively greater proportion of all inferences will be contingent on the *pragmatic implications of a given situation*, such as the perceived demands of the interviewer, the *convention of the situation*, and the rules of the conversation” [emphasis added] (pg. 234). Gudykunst, Gao, Schmidt, Nishida, Bond, Leung, Wang, and Barraclough, (1992) also found that because collectivists rely so much on external forces to determine their fate, predictability is very important to them because they know what to expect from the environment. Similarly, Schwartz (1990) found that restrictive conformity, or following rules and norms, is a stressed value for collectivists. By following rules and regulations,

collectivists are increasing the predictability of the situation, and forming expectations as to what should occur.

Consequently, consistency of administration will be of more consequence to high collectivists than to low collectivists for many reasons. One is that high collectivists value harmony, and therefore prefer to use the equality rule of distribution. When there is inconsistency of administration, and people are being treated differentially, then the equality rule is being violated. Secondly, high collectivists have more of an external locus of control than low collectivists. Therefore, they depend much more on external factors in determining their fate. Thus, in a selection situation, aspects of the situation, such as consistency of test administration will be much more salient to them. They will accordingly be much more affected by inconsistencies in the situation, because they feel that they have no control over these inconsistencies. In addition, since they are very aware of the norms and rules of a situation, they will be more likely to notice any deviation from these norms.

Note that in this study, my primary hypothesis concerns how collectivists of varying degree will respond differently to rule violations. Thus, H1a, comparing high and low collectivists is my primary hypothesis, while H1b, comparing high and low individualists is meant more to explore whether different levels of individualism operate in a similar manner. Therefore, the majority of my rationale is in reference to the behavior of collectivists, not individualists.

HYPOTHESIS 2: IND and COL orientation will moderate the effect of explainer's interpersonal sensitivity on procedural fairness reactions such that:

2a. *The effect will be stronger for those who are high on collectivism than for those low on collectivism.*

2b. *The effect will be stronger for those who are low on individualism than for those who are high on individualism.*

Interpersonal sensitivity has to do with the relational aspects of a situation (Greenberg, 1990). Being more sensitive in a situation means acknowledging that one is taking account of the other person's cognitions and/or affect during that situation. Being interpersonally sensitive when delivering an explanation is an attempt to lessen the negative impact the consequences of the explanation may have on another individual, and thereby maintaining good relations with that individual. The basis for why this would be of greater consequence to high collectivists than for low collectivists is that for collectivists, maintaining good relations and harmony between people is integral, because their sense of self is defined by those relations (Triandis, 1995). For individualists, good relations are not as essential because their sense of self is relatively independent from their relations with others.

Research has repeatedly demonstrated that for collectivists, relations with others are critical to their sense of being. One of the main attributes of a collectivist has to do with his/her interconnectedness with others (Triandis, 1995). In fact, placing others' desires and goals before one's own goals and desires in order to maintain interpersonal harmony is a common theme. Identity, for collectivists, is defined by the groups to which they belong and the relationships that they maintain. In the conflict resolution literature, it has repeatedly been shown that collectivists prefer dispute resolution procedures that

minimize confrontation, and promote harmony and good relations (Bond et al., 1985; Leung, 1997; Leung & Lind, 1986; Leung et al., 1992; Tyler, Lind, & Huo, 2000). While in individualist countries such as America, an ideal person is considered one who has many accomplishments, in collectivist countries such as Japan, an ideal person is one who has many successful relationships with others (Triandis, 1995).

Noesjirwan (1978) surveyed a mixed sample of students, middle-class dwellers, and laymen from both Australia and Indonesia in order to determine their main value orientations. She found that there was a marked difference between the two cultures in that in Indonesia, a collectivist culture, sociability and community were the major value orientations, while for Australia, these relational value orientations did not hold. The author deduces from the results that for Indonesians much more than for Australians, it is important to have good relations with everyone. Schwartz (1990) also conducted a value-based analysis, and found that for collectivists, or those from communal cultures, interpersonal prosocial values are some of the main values governing their life. In addition, research has found that those from collectivist cultures prefer bosses that are more caring to those that are more task-oriented, even if the more caring boss is more demanding (Hayashi, 1988; Lincoln, Hanada, & Olson, 1981).

There are many collectivist cultures in which interpersonal harmony is considered a key aspect of relations with others. For instance, in the Hispanic culture, the notion of *simpatico*, or kindness and sympathy is a crucial one (Triandis, Marin, Lisansky, & Betancourt, 1984), and in the Filipino culture the value of having smooth relations with others is stressed, and being sensitive and adjusting oneself in order to help alleviate difficult situations is also valued (Church, 1987). The Thais relay the import of trying to

maintain the peace and not disturbing others, while the Japanese put emphasis on a similar notion of keeping interpersonal relations agreeable and amicable, and not straining them in any way (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

In addition to the fact that high collectivists are more sensitive to disturbing the feelings of others, and weigh smooth interpersonal relations more heavily than low collectivists or individualists do, another reason for why interpersonal sensitivity of explanation would have more of an impact on them is because they are already sensitive to it due to their frequent use of it in communication. Triandis (1995) argues that concern for others and sensitivity is very important in collectivist communication. Triandis and Suh (2002) note that collectivists use more face-saving communication, in order to spare the feelings of others, and remain sensitive to their situation. Other research has shown that those with interdependent self-construals will communicate emotions that are more other-focused (such as sympathy) so that the other person's viewpoint will be taken into account (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In addition, when communicating, collectivists show a great deal of sensitivity to the feelings and responses of the other party (Singelis & Brown, 1995). When in conflict situations specifically, collectivists are very likely to consider the feelings of their adversaries, and take them into account while communicating (Doucet & Jehn, 1997). They are also more sensitive to the expressions and reactions of others, and often take these into account before communicating (Gudykunst et al., 1992).

Therefore, there are various reasons why high collectivists will be more affected by the interpersonal sensitivity of an explainer when delivering an explanation than will low collectivists. Collectivists are more interconnected with others, and their relations

with others are of great significance to them, so they will be more receptive to the interpersonal aspects of situation. Steiner and Gilliland (2001) also state that “it is likely that cultural dimensions that are important for social relations...will contribute most to determining the salience of these [interpersonal] rules” (pg. 132). In addition, those with a collectivist orientation will be more receptive to interpersonal sensitivity when an explanation is given because they are very familiar with the use of sensitive language during communication and are very receptive to the use of this language.

Similar to H1a, H2a is my primary hypothesis in this set. Consequently, my main argument concerns how high collectivists versus low collectivists will react to the interpersonal sensitivity of the explainer in a situation. The second part of the hypothesis, H2b, concerning how high versus low individualists will react to interpersonal sensitivity is an exploratory one, meant to assess whether individualism operates in a similar way (albeit in the opposite direction) to collectivism.

HYPOTHESIS 3:

3a. Those who receive an explanation for the procedural process will perceive procedures as more fair than those who do not receive an explanation

3b. This effect will be mediated by the perceived adequacy of the explanation.

As stated previously, research has demonstrated that explanations can mitigate the effects of negative outcomes on fairness perceptions (Bies & Moag, 1986; Bies & Shapiro, 1988; Bies, Shapiro, & Cummings, 1988; Greenberg, 1991; Greenberg, 1993). However, as Shapiro (1991) discovered, the mitigating effect of explanations on negative reactions can be determined by “boundary conditions”. One of these “boundary

conditions” is the perceived adequacy of the explanation. Shapiro (1991) found that the perceived adequacy of the explanation mediated the effect of explanation provision on feelings of disapproval and punitiveness for those who received a negative outcome, but not their feelings of unforgiveness or injustice. Others, however, have found that the perceived adequacy of an explanation for a negative outcome does affect perceptions of justice. Bies et al. (1988) found that the perceived adequacy of an explanation was negatively associated with participants’ negative reactions at having a request denied by their boss. These included participants’ anger at their boss and disapproval of their boss. They also found that adequacy was positively related to participants’ perceptions of procedural justice. Similarly, in their meta-analysis on the effects of explanations, Shaw et al., (2003), found that perceived adequacy of an explanation for a negative outcome had beneficial effects on both procedural and distributive justice perceptions, as well as cooperation. These effects were greater than that of explanation provision, leading the authors to suggest that inadequate explanations could lead to greater perceptions of unfairness than providing no explanation at all. Therefore, this hypothesis is an attempt to re-address the findings of Shapiro (1991) in order to determine whether simply providing an explanation is enough to mitigate the negative effects of rule violations on procedural justice perceptions, or whether the mitigating effects work through perceptions of explanation adequacy.

Note that in this study, the nature of the interaction between consistency, sensitivity of explanation, and explanation provision will only be examined for situations in which *outcome favorability is low*, that is, when individuals are rejected for a job. There are both theoretical and practical reasons for why situations of high outcome

favorability will not be examined in the current study. Theoretically, it has been posited that procedural rules will not be of as great import when a favorable outcome is given, and this has been supported empirically. Gilliland (1993) states “It is predicted that procedural rules will have the greatest impact on system fairness in situations in which distributive rules have been violated. Thus, if job applicants receive job offers that they think they deserve, they will *not be as concerned* about the fairness of the *selection process* as if they did not receive a job offer [emphasis added]” (pg.721). Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996), in their review of 45 independent samples, came to a similar conclusion. Their results demonstrated that level of procedural justice is not strongly related to individuals’ reactions when outcome fairness is high (which is usually the case when individuals are hired), but is strongly related when outcome fairness is low (as is often the case when individuals are rejected). In support of this notion, Leung and Li (1990) found that process control (procedural justice) effects on procedural and distributive justice were strong when the outcome was negative, but were eliminated when the outcome was positive.

Similar results have been found in relation to the effect of explanations on process fairness perceptions. Shaw, Wild, and Colquitt (2003) in a meta-analysis of the effects of explanations on justice perceptions, found that explanations were most strongly positively related to procedural justice perceptions, and therefore most beneficial, when the favorability of the outcome was low. Authors whose manuscripts were accepted by journal review boards did not alter their perceptions of organizational justice when an explanation was given versus when no explanation was given, but for those whose manuscripts were rejected, perceptions of justice were greatly increased when an

explanation was given (Gilliland & Beckstein, 1996). Similarly, those workers who were positively affected by a work-site smoking ban in Greenberg's (1994) study displayed the same level of acceptance for the ban regardless of whether the explanation for the ban was given in a sensitive or neutral manner, but those workers who were negatively affected by the ban reacted much more favorably when the explanation was given in a sensitive manner. Additionally, in a study by Colquitt and Chertkoff (2002), outcome favorability was shown to moderate the effects of explanation on fairness perceptions such that explanation had a negligible effect on perceptions when the outcome was positive, but had a strong, positive effect when outcome was negative.

In short, based on previous research, it is unlikely that either consistency of administration or explanation sensitivity would significantly influence procedural justice perceptions in a context where outcome favorability is high, such as when applicants are selected for a job. Furthermore, in addition to the aforementioned theoretical and empirical reasons for excluding a high outcome favorability condition in the present study, there are practical reasons for doing so as well. The design being employed is a 3 (consistency, inconsistency no explanation, inconsistency explanation) x 2 (sensitive, insensitive) between subjects design, and therefore, will result in six different conditions. Individualism and collectivism levels will also be measured. If outcome favorability is also manipulated, that will add two more levels, which will lead to a design with 12 conditions. Therefore for reasons based on both theory and practicality, this study will be limited to looking at the relationship between IND and COL, explanation sensitivity, consistency, and procedural fairness in a situation where the favorability of the outcome is low.

Furthermore, although no specific hypotheses will be presented in reference to these outcomes, several other outcome measures such as performance, recommendation intentions, reapplication intentions will be examined, as these have shown to be affected by fairness perceptions in the procedural justice and applicant reactions literature (Bauer et al., 2001; Gilliland, 1994; Hausknecht et al., 2004; Macon et al., 1994; Smither et al., 1993). Therefore, to remain consistent with the procedural justice literature, those variables will be measured in this study.

METHOD

Sample

Participants were recruited from the undergraduate and graduate population of a large Midwestern university. In order to obtain enough variance on the IND and COL measures, attempts were made to recruit as many participants from the international student population as possible. This was done through multiple methods. The author contacted several student organizations that had an international or multicultural student base and announced the purpose of the study (generically) and need for international student participation. The author attended several student organization meetings and events in order to recruit students, including movie nights and coffee hours. Emails were circulated in student organization listservs and a table was set up outside of the cafeteria of an international student dormitory in order to recruit students.

Three hundred and thirty-nine students participated in the study. However, due to random and off-scale responding as well as incomplete data, 23 participants had to be dropped from analyses, resulting in a total sample of 316 students. Despite several recruiting efforts, international students comprised only 8% of the total experimental sample, although a greater number, 25.3%, were members of a minority subgroup. Of this 25.3%, 2.6% were Hispanic, 8.9% were Asian, 8.2% were African-American, and 4.7% were other. Participants were also recruited from the introductory psychology subject pool. The sample therefore had a greater number of females (72.5%) than males, and was relatively young, with a mean age of 19.5 years.

Measures

All measures used are listed in Appendix A. Reliabilities of all measures are presented in Table 1.

Manipulation Checks. Six items were used to measure *perceived consistency*. These include three items from the consistency measure of the Selection Procedural Justice Scale developed by Bauer et al. (2001). The other three items to be used were developed specifically for this study. These items were meant to assess whether participants acknowledged that they had less time than others to take the test, if this were the case.

Interpersonal sensitivity was measured using five items, also taken from Bauer et al.'s (2001) Selection Procedural Justice Scale. In order to determine whether participants recognized that an explanation for the procedural violation was given or not, two items were developed to measure *explanation provision*. In order for participants to react to the manipulations, it was necessary that they be at least somewhat motivated to do well on the test; therefore, a ten-item scale developed by Sanchez, Truxillo, and Bauer (2000) was used to measure participants' *test-taking motivation*.

IND and COL. In order to measure *IND* and *COL* at the individual level, Singelis' (1994) measure of interdependent and independent self-construals was used. This measure consists of 30 items. Self-construals are central to the concepts of *IND* and *COL*, and interdependent and independent self-construals are often considered synonymous with idiocentrism and allocentrism (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In fact, in Triandis' (1995) discussion of the defining aspects of *IND* and *COL* he states "the definition of the self is interdependent in collectivism and independent in individualism. This is reflected in various aspects of daily life, including the extent to which individuals

share resources with group members and conform to the norms of the group. Scales for the measurement of this aspect have been developed by Singelis (1994)” (pg. 43). Indeed, research has shown that COL is positively related to interdependent self-construals and unrelated to independent self-construals (Singelis & Brown, 1995). Interdependent and independent self-construals are also considered orthogonal (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). This measure has also been shown to produce results consistent with other measures of IND and COL (Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2001), and its construct and predictive validity have been demonstrated (Singelis, 1994). Several studies have employed this scale to measure IND and COL (Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2001; Okazaki, 2000; Oishi et al., 1998; Sharkey & Singelis, 1995; Singelis & Sharkey, 1995; Singelis et al., 1999). In addition, although some caution against using self-construal scales to measure cultural IND and COL, because they are too constrained to the psychological level of analysis (Earley & Gibson, 1998), this is exactly the level of analysis that is of interest to this study. Because this study is exploring how IND and COL at the *individual level*, or idiocentrism and allocentrism, relate to psychological processes, this measure is ideal, because it is focused at the psychological level rather than capturing too broad of a cultural frame. Originally, for validation purposes, a supplemental measure of IND and COL developed by Triandis et al. (1988) was going to be used as well. However, the factor structure of the Triandis measure was different than that of the Singelis measure, and there was ample evidence in support of the Singelis scale as a measure of IND and COL to warrant its use as the sole indicator of IND and COL (Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2001). Therefore, results from the Triandis measure will not be discussed. For the

purpose of simplification, heretofore, Singelis' (1994) independent dimension will be referred to as IND, and the interdependent dimension will be referred to as COL.

In the current study, all scales had reliabilities greater than .80, with the exception of the distributive justice and IND and COL scales. Scales of individualism and collectivism in past studies have not evidenced very high reliabilities in general (Triandis et al., 1995). In fact, the 95% confidence intervals around the alpha estimates from the current sample for both the IND (.58 to .70) and COL (.66 to .72) subscales of the Singelis (1994) measure included alpha values Singelis himself has reported for these scales in both his original validation study and subsequent studies utilizing the measure (Singelis, 1994; Singelis et al., 1999). The low reliabilities often witnessed in measures of IND and COL may be due to the fact that each of these cultural variables by definition, is made up of several aspects, including definition of one's self in relation to the group, tendency to follow norms or be governed by attitudes, subordination or superordination of personal goals to collective goals, emphasis on cost-benefit versus purely relational approaches to relationships, et cetera (Triandis, 1995). Although these aspects in combination comprise a general construct, because they are quite varied, this may not come through in the alpha reliability statistic (see Triandis et al., 1995 for a discussion on low reliability of IND and COL measures). Nevertheless, as Guion (1998) states "evidence of internal *consistency* may be less relevant than evidence of internal completeness or relevance in domain sampling" (pg. 245).

In terms of the factor structure of the Singelis (1994) scales of IND and COL, several past studies have verified its two-factor structure (Sharkey & Singelis, 1995; Singelis, 1994; Singelis, 1995). One recent study has suggested that the two main factors

have subfactors, but this finding is new, and has not yet been replicated with any other samples, whereas the two-factor structure has (Hardin, Leong, & Bhagwat, 2004). Moreover, the low reliabilities evidenced in this sample are similar to reliabilities evidenced in other samples involving the self-construal scales (Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2001; Okazaki, 2000; Singelis et al., 1991). A certain amount of the discrepancy could be due to error evidenced in reliability estimates in general. In fact, in a recent paper, Duhachek and Iacobucci (2004) have suggested that researchers should include confidence interval or standard error estimates around their alpha coefficient, as was done for this study, to better inform others of the error around that reliability estimate. Nevertheless, in order to examine the factor structure of the self-construal scale with the current sample, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted.

The CFA was conducted using AMOS version 4.0. The two-factor model of IND and COL was tested to see how well this model fit data from the current sample. Listwise deletion resulted in the elimination of six cases. In order to reduce the number of indicators for each factor to a manageable size, three item parcels were created out of the 15 indicators for each factor. The items to be included in the parcel were chosen based on a systematic process, in an attempt to obtain equal item representation in each parcel. An exploratory factor analysis was conducted for both IND and COL. The item that loaded highest on the factor was included in the first parcel, the next highest item was included on the second parcel, and the item with the third highest loading was included in the third parcel. This method was followed until five items were assigned to each parcel. The items included in each parcel were then summed to create one indicator. Thus, each factor had three modeled indicators. The values of a few relevant fit indices

were as follows: $\chi^2(9) = 19.98, p < .05$, RMSEA=.063, NFI=.929, CFI=.959, SRMR=.066. Based on the indices, the two-factor model appeared to fit the data well. A comparison between this model and a proposed alternative model (Hardin et al., 2004) will be addressed in the section on future research.

Explanation Adequacy. *Explanation adequacy* was assessed using four items from a scale employed by Wiechmann and Ryan (2001). The items were altered to reflect the change in experimental context.

Justice. Both *procedural* and *distributive justice* were measured using items adopted from Gilliland's (1994) measure of process and outcome fairness. Procedural justice was assessed using eight items, distributive justice was assessed with four items.

Outcome variables. Participants' intentions to recommend the organization to others, or *recommendation intentions* was measured using Gilliland's (1994) scale composed of four items. Two scales adopted from Ployhart and Ryan (1998) were used to assess participants' *job acceptance intentions* and *future experiment intentions*. Job acceptance intentions, or the likelihood that the participant would accept the job if offered, was measured both prior to when the decision to hire or reject was made and also after this decision was made, each time by a one-item scale. The likelihood that participants' would participate in similar experiments, or future experiment intentions, was determined by a four-item measure. This measure was created to simulate job re-application intentions in an experimental context. Due to the high correlations between these intentions measures ($r = .70-.80, p < .05$), they were combined to produce one "intention towards organization" scale. Participants' *test performance* during the selection process was assessed using their scores on the Wonderlic Personnel Selection Test, which is a

cognitive ability test composed of 50 items. Test performance was standardized within consistency condition, due to the fact that individuals in the inconsistent conditions received less time to complete the test.

Demographics. Participants' gender, number of years in the United States, race, GPA, and year in school were the descriptive variables assessed. Self rated English proficiency, citizenship, whether participants have had work experience in the United States, and how many times they have gone on an interview or taken a test in order to get a job were included as well (see Appendix F).

Procedure

Participants entered the experimental room and signed their name on a sign-in sheet on which they were assigned a random experimental ID number, which they were asked to remember. They were then instructed to sit one seat apart whenever possible. Five minutes after the experiment was scheduled to begin, participants were given an informed consent form to fill out (see Appendix B). Signed consent forms were then collected, and participants were told that they will be taking an established personnel selection test in order to see how the instrument performs with people of various age groups (protocol is listed in Appendix C). This excuse was given so that participants would be more likely to take the test seriously and was a viable explanation for both the subject pool participants as well as the international participants. They were also told that this test has been used in the past by various companies, and some of the names of these companies were listed in order to emphasize the credibility of the test. The selection test given to participants was the Wonderlic Personnel Selection Test, a standard cognitive ability test.

Participants were given a survey packet (see Appendix D), and located on the first page of this survey packet was a description of four internship positions being offered by Company XYZ. These positions were selected to represent four different domains (journalism, business, science, and social services) that would be attractive to undergraduate students. These domains were selected based on an informal survey of several undergraduates. Participants were asked to imagine that they were applicants seeking an internship position with Company XYZ and to choose the internship position they found most desirable. They were asked to write down the internship they selected and why they would like to have the internship, in order to increase the salience of the desirability to them. They were instructed to consider the environment as a simulated job environment and the test administrator as a representative from the company to which they are applying. Participants were told that they would have to take a job selection test and that their performance on the test would determine whether they would or would not be hired as an intern. They were also informed that those participants who score highest on the test would be rewarded by having their names entered into a lottery to win free movie tickets. Therefore, the participant who scored the best in each session would be entered into this lottery. In addition, everyone had their names entered into a lottery for a chance to win a cash prize of \$25, \$50, \$75, or \$100, and the top six scorers from every three sessions will have their names entered in two additional times. The reason why two levels of prizes were included was to motivate both those who aspired to be the top scorer in each session, as well as those who wished to do well, but did not feel like they would be the top scorer, and so would be discouraged if only the top-scorer prize was offered.

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The test administrator notified the participants that they would be told whether they were hired for the job or not at the end of the session.

After this explanation was given, the test administrator then instructed participants to turn the next page in the survey packet. Participants were told that the questionnaire on the following pages assessed general attitudes and preferences. They were asked to write their name and assigned ID numbers on the scantrons, so that the test administrator could keep a record of their answers and “match” their feedback to their responses (see section on feedback). This questionnaire sheet contained measures of IND and COL and test-taking motivation. The survey packets were then collected.

Manipulations

Depending on what condition they were in, participants were then given a combination of the following three manipulations.

Consistency Manipulation:

The consistency manipulation was a variation of one employed by Ployhart and Ryan (1998). Participants were told that they were going to be handed test packets and that they would have 12 minutes to complete the test. The proctor then wrote the total amount of time participants had left to complete the test on the board, so that participants would be aware of the amount of time that had passed. In the inconsistent conditions, when the proctor began to pass out the forms, she appeared confused and began to whisper to her assistant. She then excused herself and left the room, while her assistant stayed in the room. If participants asked why the proctor left, the assistant replied with the standard response—“I don’t know, but she said she’ll be right back.” After exactly five minutes, the proctor then re-entered the room and in the inconsistent conditions, she

changed the time on the board to reflect the remaining amount of time participants had to complete the test. Depending on the explanation condition, the proctor told the participants different things (this will be detailed in the explanation section). She announced that participants now had only 7 minutes to complete the test packet. Participants were then asked to begin, and were warned when 2 minutes were left in the testing period and stopped after 7 minutes had passed. In the consistent conditions, participants were given the full 12 minutes to complete the test packet.

Interpersonal Sensitivity Manipulation:

The sensitivity manipulation involved two parts. In general, the test proctor attempted to smile more and appear more friendly in her interactions with the participants in the sensitive conditions, and attempted to maintain a stoic, unfriendly expression in the insensitive conditions. After the proctor passed out the first questionnaire, a confederate impersonating a participant raised her hand and asked a question. In the sensitive conditions, the proctor answered the confederate's question in a polite way, in the insensitive conditions, the proctor answered the confederate's question in a rude manner (see Appendix C). In addition, when the proctor re-entered the room after leaving for five minutes, she explained how much time the participants had left in either a sensitive or insensitive manner.

Explanation Manipulation:

The explanation manipulation involved giving an explanation for aspects of the procedure. In the consistent conditions, participants were given explanations regarding the consistency of the procedure (e.g., you will be given the same amount of time as others were given), and in the inconsistent conditions participants were either given or

not given an explanation for the inconsistency in procedure (see Appendix C). Thus, in the no explanation condition, after re-entering the room, the test administrator gave *no explanation* for the inconsistency. In the explanation condition, the proctor told the participants that she had mistakenly brought the wrong forms of the test and had left the room to obtain the proper forms of the test.

Outcome Favorability Manipulation:

After all participants had been given the allotted time to complete the Wonderlic, the test forms were collected and participants were given an additional survey to complete. This “Applicant Experiences” survey included measures of IND and COL (Triandis’s measure), process fairness, pre-decision job acceptance intentions, recommendation intentions, and future experiment intentions (see Appendix E). Participants were told that while they were completing the surveys, the research assistant was going to manually score their responses to the Wonderlic test. The research assistant then left the room with the tests. In the hall, the assistant assigned the participants’ ID numbers to pre-filled feedback sheets. All participants were informed that they had not been selected to be in the lottery and that they had not been selected for the simulated job. The message given to them on the feedback sheet was as follows:

Your results indicate that you ☐ did ☐ did not score well enough on the exam to be included in the lottery for the increased chance to win the money or the free movie tickets. You also ☐ did ☐ did not score well enough in order to be selected for the job for which you applied. You ☐ would ☐ would not be offered the position at this time.

In all conditions, the boxes next to *did not* and *would not* were checked. The options were presented so that participants felt that they *could* have performed well or received the prize, although this was not the case.

After participants had completed the first survey, the proctor called the administrative assistant back in the room. The proctor called out participants' ID numbers when passing out the feedback forms, so that they felt the feedback was personalized. After they were given some time to read the feedback sheets, the participants were told to fill out the last portion of the survey which included questions on their post-feedback perceptions of procedural and distributive justice, explanation adequacy, post-feedback job acceptance intentions, recommendation intentions, and future experiment intentions, demographics as well as consistency, sensitivity, and explanation provision manipulation checks. The manipulation check measures were placed at the end of the survey so that they would not reveal the nature of the manipulations and influence participants' answers to other questions.

Debriefing

When the participants finished filling out the second survey, they brought their survey packet and scantron to the proctor in the front of the room, and were handed a debriefing form (Appendix F). In the form they were informed that the selection test was not administered to them in order to see how it applied to individuals of various age groups, but in order to see how the violation of procedural rules affected their performance on the test. They were told that their performance on the test was not actually scored on the spot, and the results were therefore not accurate. The debriefing form also indicated that all participants will have their names entered into the lottery three times, not just the top six scorers, but that the top scorer in each session will still be entered into the lottery for the movie tickets (the tests will be scored later).

Pilot Testing

Pilot testing was conducted in order to determine appropriate timing of measures, clarity of measures, and efficacy of manipulations. The main focus of the pilot testing was to compare two different manipulations of consistency, in order to see which one functioned better. The two manipulations that were piloted consisted of one involving a time consistency manipulation and another one involving a question consistency manipulation. For the first consistency manipulation, participants were told that the administrator had the wrong version of a cognitive ability test that they had to take, and so had to wait five minutes for the administrator to return with the “correct” versions of the test, and therefore, were given less time than others to complete the test. The second consistency manipulation involved the participation of two confederates pretending to be test-takers. During the course of the test administration, one confederate asked a question and was answered while the other confederate asked a question that the administrator refused to answer, after which the confederate points out that the administrator answered the other participant’s question.

Subjects were recruited during summer semester from various psychology classes. About 15 students participated in each manipulation, resulting in a total N of 31. Two participants’ data had to be removed because of random responding. Results from analyses showed that the mean for the time manipulation ($M=3.06$, $SD=.88$) was about a quarter of a standard deviation lower than the mean for the question manipulation ($M=3.26$, $SD=.80$). The consistency scale consisted of values ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 signifying that the participant strongly disagreed that the procedures were consistent, and 5 signifying that the participant strongly agreed that the procedures were consistent.

Thus, participants in the time manipulation felt the procedures were more inconsistent than participants in the question manipulation. Consequently, the time manipulation, which was stronger, was employed as the manipulation of consistency for further data collection. The sensitivity manipulation was also tested, and the mean for the sensitive condition ($M=2.92$, $SD=1.13$) was about one standard deviation higher than the mean for the insensitive condition ($M=1.84$, $SD=.99$). In addition, when the sensitivity manipulation was employed during the pilot session, and the administrator answered a confederate's question insensitively, there was an audible "gasp" heard, and one participant was heard to mumble "that's harsh". Although in an absolute sense, even in the sensitive condition, the mean rating for sensitivity was not that high (3="neither agree nor disagree"), this could have been due to a possible confound with the consistency manipulation, so that participants could have felt the administrator was being insensitive by not treating all participants equally, and this could have affected their ratings of sensitivity. Unfortunately, the interplay of these rules cannot be avoided, and therefore, it is important to point out that even despite this, the sensitivity manipulation seemed to have a strong effect.

RESULTS

Scale descriptives, intercorrelations, and reliabilities are presented in Table 1.

The means of the fairness scales were all below the midpoint of the scale. The means for fairness and intention scales post-feedback were lower than means pre-feedback, which is likely the effect of negative feedback. The ranges of the COL and IND scales are relatively small. For example, the mean of COL, is 4.86, and the standard deviation is .57. Therefore, the majority of individuals in this study lie between values of 4.29 and 5.43 on the COL scale, which is a seven point scale. Therefore, this sample is restricted to mid to high levels of COL, and consequently, some of the predicted interaction effects may be attenuated due to a lack of variance on the COL measure. The same is true for the IND measure, which has an even higher mean, and a similar standard deviation. This will be explored further in the discussion section.

Although the IND and COL scales are supposed to be independent, they were negatively correlated, however, this correlation was small ($r = -.13, p < .05$). The measures of IND and COL were generally only significantly related to themselves and test-taking motivation, with the exception of COL which was also related, albeit a small correlation, to intentions pre-feedback ($r = .12, p < .05$). This may reflect collectivists need to maintain good relations and harmony with others, in that they are more likely to display good intentions towards others to gain their favor, as long as they themselves are not being treated unjustly. In contrast to the IND and COL measures, the procedural justice measures were significantly related to almost all variables, with the exception of the IND and COL measures and standardized performance. This is to be expected, because past studies have shown justice perceptions to be related to each other and the intention

Table 1. Scale Descriptives, Reliabilities, and Intercorrelations

	M	S.D.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Individualism	4.94	.57	(.64)											
2. Collectivism	4.86	.56	-.13	(.66)										
3. Test-taking Motivation	4.51	.79	.14	.15	(.93)									
4. Consistency (manipulation check)	3.93	.81	.01	.04	.14	(.86)								
5. Sensitivity (manipulation check)	3.31	1.11	.06	.04	.04	.54	(.93)							
6. Explanation Adequacy	2.82	1.09	-.02	.01	.03	.24	.33	(.86)						
7. Explanation Provision (manipulation check)	2.22	1.18	-.02	.05	-.13	-.01	.19	.26	(.89)					
8. Procedural Justice Pre-Feedback	2.74	1.03	.08	.09	.11	.13	.19	.36	.14	(.84)				
9. Procedural Justice Post-Feedback	2.43	1.00	-.06	.02	.04	.13	.22	.41	.17	.69	(.86)			
10. Distributive Justice	2.73	.61	-.08	.02	.03	.13	.14	.34	.04	.44	.60	(.73)		
11. Intentions towards Organization Pre-Feedback	3.22	.92	.07	.12	.13	.19	.35	.30	.03	.39	.31	.20	(.96)	
12. Intentions towards Organization Post-Feedback	2.97	1.05	.04	.08	.04	.16	.29	.36	.12	.35	.43	.28	.82	(.97)
13. Performance (standardized)	0.00	1.00	-.03	.01	.00	-.08	-.01	-.10	-.03	.10	.03	-.04	.02	-.01

Note. Reliabilities are in parentheses. *N*'s range from 303 to 316. Bolded correlations have significance levels less than .05. All scales range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) with the exception of the test-taking motivation and individualism-collectivism scales which range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

measures included in this study. Procedural justice pre-feedback was related to test-taking motivation ($r=.11, p<.05$), although this correlation was very small, while procedural justice post-feedback was not. Ratings of procedural justice pre and post-feedback were highly correlated ($r=.69, p<.05$), although the pattern of correlations of these variables with other variables was different.

In general, procedural justice perceptions pre-feedback were more highly correlated with intentions pre-feedback, while procedural justice perceptions post-feedback were more highly correlated with intentions post-feedback, which is to be expected. Additionally, procedural justice perceptions both pre and post feedback were significantly related to participants' perceptions of consistency, interpersonal sensitivity, and explanation provisions. Distributive justice perceptions were related to procedural justice perceptions both pre ($r=.44, p<.05$), and post ($r=.60, p<.05$) feedback.

Interestingly, post-feedback measures of intentions were more strongly related to procedural justice perceptions post-feedback than distributive justice perceptions. Test performance standardized, however, was unrelated to all of the measures. This is consistent with other findings; for example, Smither et al. (1993) found a very weak relation between actual test scores and procedural fairness, and no relation to recommendation intentions or organizational attractiveness. The meta-analysis by Hausknecht et al. (2004) also showed a correlation of only .13 between procedural justice perceptions and actual procedural performance.

Correlations between scale scores and several demographic variables as well as variables related to selection experience are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Correlation Between Demographics and Scale Scores

	Age	Gender	Year in School	U.S. Citizenship	English First Language	Years in U.S.	Cum. GPA	Prior Work Experience	Prior Interview Experience	Selection Test Experience
Individualism	.02	-.01	.05	.05	.04	-.02	-.05	-.09	.11	.07
Collectivism	-.10	.01	-.12	.15	.09	-.09	-.02	.09	-.28	-.05
Test-taking Motivation	-.05	-.02	-.07	.05	-.01	-.01	-.09	.04	-.01	.04
Consistency (manipulation check)	-.10	.03	-.08	.11	.07	-.10	.00	.06	-.09	-.05
Sensitivity (manipulation check)	-.06	-.08	-.11	.15	.09	-.16	-.04	.15	-.10	-.05
Explanation Adequacy	.08	-.15	.01	.19	.14	-.16	-.11	.16	-.05	.09
Explanation Provision (manipulation check)	.05	-.02	.04	.00	.07	.01	-.06	.09	.00	.08
Procedural Justice Pre-Feedback	.07	-.15	.05	.12	.09	-.10	.00	.17	.00	.10
Procedural Justice Post-Feedback	.17	-.20	.13	.22	.15	-.20	-.01	.23	.04	.16
Distributive Justice Intentions towards Organization	.06	-.10	-.01	.15	.06	-.14	-.02	.10	.02	.13
Pre-Feedback Intentions towards Organization	.14	-.15	.10	.16	.11	-.12	-.07	.14	.01	.06
Pre-Feedback Intentions towards Organization	.21	-.13	.17	.16	.11	-.11	-.10	.11	.01	.14
Post-Feedback Performance (standardized)	-.14	-.09	-.11	-.20	-.26	.20	.21	-.08	.01	-.13

Note. *N*'s range from 303 to 316. Bolded correlations have significance levels less than .05. Please refer to Appendix E for scale ranges.

Relationships in this correlation matrix are similar to the previous one in that IND was not related to any variables, while COL was significantly related to only a few of the demographic variables. COL was moderately negatively related to prior interview experience ($r=.28, p<.05$), indicating that those who scored higher on COL were less likely to have participated in a job interview previously. The other variables however, with the exception of the explanation provision and consistency manipulation checks were significantly related to several of the demographic variables.

Age was related to both procedural justice and intentions post-feedback, as well as intentions pre-feedback. All these relations were positive, indicating that older individuals were more likely to have higher scores on these scales than younger individuals. Age was negatively related, however, to standardized test performance ($r=-.14, p<.05$), indicating that older people were also likely to score worse on the cognitive ability test. Gender was related to procedural justice and intentions pre and post-feedback, and explanation adequacy post-feedback. All these correlations were negative, indicating that men were more likely to rate these items higher than women.

Some other correlations of note are between U.S. citizenship and procedural justice post-feedback ($r=.22, p<.05$), explanation adequacy ($r=.19, p<.05$), and test performance ($r=-.20, p<.05$). The directions of these relationships suggested that those who were non U.S. citizens gave higher ratings of procedural justice post feedback, and explanation adequacy, but scored lower on the test of cognitive ability. Those individuals who were non U.S. citizens were most likely international students, and thus, may not have been as proficient with English, causing them to score lower on the test. In fact, there is a moderate negative correlation between English proficiency and test

performance ($r=-.26, p<.05$), indicating that those who did not identify English as their primary language performed worse. The relation between citizenship and procedural justice post-feedback and explanation adequacy could be that those who have not lived in the U.S. for very long could not be familiar with common selection practices here, and could therefore have lower expectations for fairness than those who are used to the customs of the United States. Further support is evidenced in the moderate, positive correlation between prior work experience in the U.S. and procedural justice perceptions post-feedback ($r=.23, p<.05$), which indicates that those who have not had work experience in the U.S. had higher procedural justice perceptions post-feedback than those who had obtained work experience. In addition, the longer individuals had been in the U.S., the lower their procedural justice perceptions after feedback ($r=-.20, p<.05$).

Manipulation Checks

In order to determine whether the three manipulations conducted in the present study were effective, separate t-tests were conducted on each of the consistency, interpersonal sensitivity, and explanation provision measures. Results of these t-tests are located in Table 3 below. The results indicate that the manipulations worked as intended. All t-values were negative and significant, indicating that in the consistent conditions individuals gave higher consistency ratings, in the sensitive conditions, individuals gave higher sensitivity ratings, and in the conditions in which an explanation was given, individuals were more likely to rate that an explanation was given to them. Test-taking motivation was also included as a manipulation check, in order to determine whether the reward offered to participants was sufficient to motivate them to perform well on the selection test. Mean motivation was 4.51 on a seven-point scale, indicating that mean

levels of motivation were greater than the midpoint on the scale, however, motivation to perform well was not high. This will be discussed further later in the paper.

Table 3. Mean Differences on Manipulation Checks.

Manipulation Check	Condition	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>T</i>
Consistency	Consistent	4.25	.59	310	-4.65*
	Inconsistent	3.79	.85		
Sensitivity	Sensitive	3.96	.66	308	-11.80*
	Not Sensitive	2.72	1.11		
Explanation	Explanation	2.58	1.20	309	-7.96*
	No Explanation	1.57	.79		

Note. * $p < .01$

Hypothesis Testing

Hierarchical multiple linear regression was used to test hypotheses 1 and 2. The categorical variables of consistency and interpersonal sensitivity were dummy coded, with the consistent and interpersonally sensitive conditions being coded 1 and the inconsistent and interpersonally insensitive conditions being coded 0. Explanation was coded in a similar manner; when an explanation was given, the condition was coded 1, when an explanation was not given, the condition was coded 0. Thus higher codes reflect more “procedurally fair” conditions.

In the current study, several outcomes, including procedural justice perceptions were investigated at two time points: before participants received information about their performance on the selection test and their selection for the simulated job, and after they received this feedback. Justice perceptions post-feedback are of greatest interest, because these are the justice perceptions applicants leave the selection context holding, and the perceptions which presumably have the greatest effect on their subsequent behavior. However, both time periods were examined because fairness of procedural consistency,

and thus other variables related to fairness, could be viewed differently depending on when in the selection process the fairness measure is given. It is possible that participants scrutinize the procedural process much more after they learn their outcome than when the selection process is still underway (Ployhart & Ryan, 1998). Therefore, the relationship between consistency, sensitivity, explanation, and procedural justice pre and post-feedback could differ. Consequently, the results for the hypotheses for dependent variables both pre and post feedback are presented in one table.

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesized Effects of Consistency

Hypothesis 1 involves the relationship between consistency and procedural justice perceptions. Results are displayed in Table 4. There were no significant relationships to procedural justice perceptions pre-feedback. There was a main effect of consistency on procedural justice post-feedback ($b=.33, p<.05$). Collectivism did not show a main effect on procedural justice perceptions post-feedback ($b=-.10, n.s.$). Thus, it seems that neither consistency of procedural processes nor collectivist orientation by itself was enough to cause a change in procedural justice perceptions pre-feedback. However, consistency did affect notions of procedural justice post-feedback, such that those individuals in the consistent conditions rated the selection procedure as being fairer than those in the inconsistent conditions. Nevertheless, this main effect should be interpreted in light of the interaction presented in the following paragraph.

Hypothesis 1a states that collectivism will be a moderator of the consistency-procedural justice relationship. This hypothesis was not supported for procedural justice

Table 4. Moderated Regressions of Procedural Justice Perceptions on Consistency, Collectivism, and Individualism

Model	b	β	R^2	ΔR^2
<u>Procedural Justice Percep</u>				
<u>Pre</u>				
Step 1				
Consistency	.23	.10		
Collectivism	.17	.09	.02	
Step 2				
Consis x Collect	-.41	-.90	.03	.011
Step 1				
Consistency	.24	.11		
Individualism	.14	.08	.02	
Step 2				
Consis x Indiv	-.29	-.63	.02	.005
<u>Procedural Justice Percep</u>				
<u>Post</u>				
Step 1				
Consistency	.33*	.15**		
Collectivism	.02	.01	.02	
Step 2				
Consis x Collect	-.23	-.52	.03	.004
Step 1				
Consistency	.33**	.15**		
Individualism	-.10	-.06	.03	
Step 2				
Consis x Indiv	.47*	1.06*	.04	.014*

Note. $N = 303$. 0=Inconsistent, 1=Consistent. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.




Figure 2. Interaction Between Consistency and Individualism on Procedural Justice Post

perceptions either pre or post-feedback. Part b of the first hypothesis involving the relationship between consistency and procedural justice perceptions states that individualism will be a moderator of this relationship. Individualism was a moderator for procedural justice perceptions post feedback ($b=.47, p<.05$), but was not for procedural justice perceptions pre-feedback ($b=-.29, n.s.$). However, the nature of the interaction on post-feedback perceptions, which is presented in Figure 2, was not consistent with the predicted direction of the hypothesis. Therefore, Hypothesis 1b was not supported. In fact, this interaction shows that in inconsistent conditions, those who are high on individualism are more likely to have lower procedural justice perceptions than those who are low on individualism, while the hypothesis predicted the opposite effect. By contrast, in consistent conditions, the opposite effect is found in that those who are high on individualism actual have higher procedural justice perceptions post-feedback than those who are lower on individualism. These effects were relatively small, however.

One explanation for this finding may be that those who are high on IND are more attune to the need for equity in distribution than those low on IND. Because they were given less time in the inconsistent condition, they knew they were at a disadvantage in terms of performing on the test, and thus were not likely to get scores that were in line with their true ability. Therefore, in the inconsistent conditions, they may have felt “cheated out” of their true score by not being treated equitably. Those low on IND, in contrast, may be more aware of the need for equality, and thus they felt that as long as they were being treated the same as everyone else in their experimental group, it did not matter to them whether they

received less time. In essence, they may not have been as concerned about whether their score reflected their ability, as long as they were treated the same as others in their condition.

Non-hypothesized Effects of Consistency

There were several other relationships examined in this study for which there were no *a priori* hypotheses, but were of interest due to their importance both in previous research and to those in applied settings. These variables included distributive justice perceptions, future experiment intentions, recommendation intentions, and job acceptance intentions (which were combined) and selection test performance. Results from these analyses are presented in Tables 5 and 6. Note that results for test performance are not included in these tables, because none of the relationships between the independent variables or their interactions and test performance were significant.

Although there was no main effect of consistency, IND, or COL on distributive justice perceptions, the interaction between consistency and COL was significant ($b = -.26, p < .01$). The nature of the interaction is represented in Figure 3. The graph indicates that in inconsistent conditions, those individuals with a higher collectivist orientation actually had higher distributive justice perceptions than those with lower collectivist orientations, yet in the consistent conditions, they had lower distributive justice perceptions. This is the opposite of what one would expect based on the hypotheses involving procedural justice, because distributive and procedural justice are often correlated, as they are in this case as well (pre-feedback, $r = .44, p < .05$; post-feedback, $r = .60, p < .05$). The individuals who were high on COL

[illegible]

Table 5. Moderated Regressions of Distributive Justice Perceptions on Consistency, Collectivism, and Individualism

Model	b	β	R^2	ΔR^2
<u>Distributive Justice Percep</u>				
Step 1				
Consistency	.06	.05		
Collectivism	.02	.01	.00	
Step 2				
Consis x Collect	-.26*	-.95*	.02	.012*
Step 1				
Consistency	.06	.05		
Individualism	-.08	-.08	.01	
Step 2				
Consis x Indiv	-.07	-.25	.01	.001

Note. $N=303$. 0=Inconsistent, 1=Consistent. * $p<.05$. ** $p<.01$.

Table 6. Moderated Regressions of Intentions towards the Organization on Consistency, Collectivism, and Individualism

Model	b	β	R^2	ΔR^2
<u>Intentions Pre</u>				
Step 1				
Consistency	.29*	.14*		
Collectivism	.19*	.11*	.04	
Step 2				
Consis x Collect	-.09	-.22	.04	.001
Step 1				
Consistency	.30**	.15**		
Individualism	.11	.07	.03	
Step 2				
Consis x Indiv	-.28	-.68	.03	.006
<u>Intentions Post</u>				
Step 1				
Consistency	.32*	.14*		
Collectivism	.13	.07	.03	
Step 2				
Consis x Collect	-.32	-.68	.03	.006
Step 1				
Consistency	.33*	.14*		
Individualism	.08	.04	.02	
Step 2				
Consis x Indiv	-.13	-.27	.02	.001

Note. N= 303. 0=Inconsistent, 1=Consistent. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.




Figure 3. Interaction Between Consistency and Collectivism on Distributive Justice

may have responded in this way because they are more aware of external factors that can affect situations than are those who are lower on COL, and they are also less concerned about the need for equity in distribution. Thus, they may have been more understanding in the inconsistent conditions and attributed the inconsistency to uncontrollable external factors rather than blame it on the administrator, and thus, been more lenient when it came to their distributive justice ratings. Whereas, for those with a low COL orientation, the lack of equity in the distribution of rewards could have more salient, resulting in lower distributive justice ratings from this group. It may be also that those who are high on COL are driven less by pure competitiveness than those low on COL, because they are less concerned about “being the best” and so consistency did not matter to them as much because they did not care about the outcome. This may have been enhanced by the fact that this was not a high-stakes situation where the outcome was important to the individuals.

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesized Effects of Sensitivity

The second hypothesis refers to the relationship between the interpersonal sensitivity of the selection process administrator, individuals’ levels of IND and COL, and their perceptions of procedural justice. As Table 7 shows, there was no main effect of sensitivity on procedural justice either pre or post-feedback. Levels of IND and COL were also unrelated to procedural justice perceptions at both measurement periods. Therefore, the sensitivity of the administrator and participants’ levels of IND and COL had no direct main effect on procedural justice perceptions.

Table 7. Moderated Regressions of Procedural Justice Perceptions on Sensitivity, Collectivism, and Individualism

Model	b	β	R^2	ΔR^2
<u>Procedural Justice Percep</u>				
<u>Pre</u>				
Step 1				
Sensitivity	.06	.03		
Collectivism	.18	.10	.01	
Step 2				
Sensit x Collect	.04	.09	.02	.008
Step 1				
Sensitivity	.05	.03		
Individualism	.14	.08	.01	
Step 2				
Sensit x Indiv	.32	.78	.01	.008
<u>Procedural Justice Percep</u>				
<u>Post</u>				
Step 1				
Sensitivity	-.10	-.05		
Collectivism	.03	.01	.00	
Step 2				
Sensit x Collect	.07**	.15**	.03	.022**
Step 1				
Sensitivity	-.11	-.05		
Individualism	-.10	-.06	.01	
Step 2				
Sensit x Indiv	.14	.34	.01	.001

Note. $N=303$. 0=Insensitive, 1=Sensitive. * $p<.05$. ** $p<.01$.




Figure 4. Interaction Between Sensitivity and Collectivism on Procedural Justice Post

Hypothesis 2a states that individuals' levels of COL will moderate the relationship between sensitivity and procedural justice perceptions. While this was not true of procedural justice perceptions pre-feedback ($b=.04$, n.s.), it was true of procedural justice perceptions post-feedback ($b=.07$, $p<.05$). Figure 4 displays the interaction between these variables. The graphs shows that in the insensitive conditions, those with higher collectivist orientations had slightly lower procedural justice perceptions than did those with lower collectivist orientations. In the sensitive conditions, the opposite pattern is seen, in that those who report higher procedural justice perceptions are higher on collectivism than those who report lower procedural justice perceptions. Thus, Hypothesis 2a, which stated that collectivism would moderate the relationship between sensitivity and procedural justice perceptions was supported for perceptions post-feedback.

Hypothesis 2b states that IND will moderate the relationship between sensitivity and procedural justice perceptions. As Table 7 shows, there was no significant relationship between the interaction of sensitivity and IND and procedural justice perceptions.

Non-hypothesized Effects of Sensitivity

Regarding the relationship between sensitivity, IND and COL, and the non-hypothesized variables, there were no main effects of sensitivity or IND on any of the dependent variables, however there was a main effect of COL on intentions toward the organization pre-feedback ($b=.20$, $p<.05$). This main effect indicates that those individuals that were higher on collectivism were more likely to indicate that they would

Table 8. Moderated Regressions of Distributive Justice Perceptions on Sensitivity, Collectivism, and Individualism

Model	b	β	R^2	ΔR^2
<u>Distributive Justice Percep</u>				
Step 1				
Sensitivity	-.04	-.03		
Collectivism	.02	.02	.00	
Step 2				
Sensit x Collect	.01	.04	.00	.001
Step 1				
Sensitivity	-.04	-.03		
Individualism	-.08	-.08	.01	
Step 2				
Sensit x Indiv	-.04	-.15	.01	.000
<i>Note. N=303. 0=Insensitive, 1=Sensitive. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.</i>				

Table 9. Moderated Regressions of Intentions towards the Organization on Sensitivity, Collectivism and Individualism

Model	b	β	R^2	ΔR^2
<u>Intentions Pre</u>				
Step 1				
Sensitivity	.10	.05		
Collectivism	.20*	.12*	.02	
Step 2				
Sensit x Collect	.06*	.13*	.04	.018*
Step 1				
Sensitivity	.10	.05		
Individualism	.11	.07	.01	
Step 2				
Sensit x Indiv	-.11	-.29	.01	.001
<u>Intentions Post</u>				
Step 1				
Sensitivity	.02	.01		
Collectivism	.14	.08	.01	
Step 2				
Sensit x Collect	.06*	.13*	.01	.016*
Step 1				
Sensitivity	.01	.01		
Individualism	.08	.04	.00	
Step 2				
Sensit x Indiv	-.30	-.70	.01	.006

Note. N=303. 0=Insensitive, 1=Sensitive. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.




Figure 5. Interaction Between Sensitivity and Collectivism on Intentions Post

accept the job if offered to them, participate in a similar experiment to this one in the future, and recommend the experiment to others.

In addition to the main effect of COL, there were a few interactions involving COL and sensitivity that were significant. All the significant interactions are presented in Table 9, as they all involved effects on intentions. Sensitivity and COL interacted to affect intentions both pre ($b=.06, p<.05$), and post ($b=.07, p<.05$) feedback. Because the nature of these interactions are nearly identical, Figure 5, which presents the interaction on intentions toward the organization post-feedback, is also representing the interaction on intentions pre-feedback. In Figure 5, the sensitive and insensitive lines look almost parallel, but this is due to the small range of responses on COL for this sample. One is able to see that the difference in recommendation intentions post-feedback for sensitive versus insensitive conditions is greater for those who are high on COL versus those low on COL. Although in both conditions, those high on COL have higher recommendation intentions than those low on COL, those high on COL are more likely to have a greater drop in scores when conditions are insensitive, than those low on COL. This result follows a similar trend to results for procedural justice perceptions, in that it shows those high on COL are more sensitive to changes in interpersonal treatment. They are more aware of the condition of their relationship with the test administrator and respond to differences in this relationship more strongly than those low on COL, who do not care as much.

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesized Relationships of Explanation

The third hypothesis deals with how giving an explanation for the procedural process can increase procedural justice perceptions, and how this effect occurs through perceived explanation adequacy.

In order to test for the mediation, the Baron and Kenny (1986) method was used. According to this method, the mediator should be regressed on the independent variable, the dependent variable should be regressed on the independent variable, and the dependent variable should be regressed on both the mediator and the independent variable. To conclude that there is mediation, the independent variable must affect the mediator (first regression), the independent variable must affect the dependent variable (second regression), and, in the third regression, the mediator must affect the dependent variable. If the independent variable has no effect on the dependent variable when the mediator is controlled for, then complete mediation can be established (Baron & Kenny, 1986).

Results of these analyses are presented in Table 10. The first regression, regression 1, involved the regression of explanation adequacy on explanation, and this regression was significant ($b = .51, p < .05$). The second regression, regression 2, involved the regression of the IV, explanation, on the DV, in this case procedural justice both pre (regression 2a) and post (regression 2b) feedback. Both these regressions were significant ($b = .31, p < .05$; $b = .27, p < .05$, respectively), and had positive regression slopes, indicating that

Table 10. Test of Mediation of Explanation Adequacy

Model	B	B	R ²
1. <u>Explanation Adequacy</u>			
Explanation	.51**	.22**	.05
2a. <u>Procedural Justice Pre</u>			
Explanation	.31*	.14*	.02
3a. <u>Procedural Justice Pre</u>			
Explanation	.09	.04	
Explanation Adequacy	.32	.35**	.13
2b. <u>Procedural Justice Post</u>			
Explanation	.27*	.13*	.02
3b. <u>Procedural Justice Post</u>			
Explanation	.05	.02	
Explanation Adequacy	.37**	.40**	.17

Note. N= 303 * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

hypothesis 3a, which stated that those individuals who received explanations for the selection procedure would have higher procedural justice perceptions, was supported. In order to test for mediation, the third regression, involving the addition of the mediator into the equation, had to show that when the mediator was added into the equation, the IV no longer was significant. This, in fact, was what occurred for both procedural justice perceptions pre- (explanation, $b = .09$, n.s.; explanation adequacy, $b = .32$, $p < .05$), and post-feedback (explanation, $b = .05$, n.s.; explanation adequacy, $b = .37$, $p < .05$).

Therefore, explanation adequacy was a full mediator of the effect of explanation on procedural justice perceptions, and hypothesis 3b was also supported.

Non-hypothesized Effects of Explanation

Although the moderating effects of IND and COL on the relationship between explanation and process outcomes were not hypothesized, there is reason to investigate

these relationships. Explanation may function similarly to sensitivity, in that it is a way for employers to show applicants that they care about applicants and are aware of their concerns. Giving an explanation for the selection process may relay a message to applicants that the organization is trying to make applicants feel as comfortable as possible with the process that they are undergoing. This may be especially important for those with a high collectivist orientation, because they are very aware of external cues and situational factors that may convey messages (Triandis, 1995). They are also very cognizant of the need to “save face” in front of others and the importance of maintaining good relations, and therefore, may be more receptive to organizations’ attempts to explain their selection processes. Those who are high on individualistic orientation may be more attuned to internal cues, and care more about the effect the procedural processes have on them, rather than any messages the explanation for the procedural processes may be relaying. Consequently, based on the above rationale, one would expect explanation to function similarly to sensitivity in how it relates to IND, COL, and selection process outcomes such as justice perceptions and recommendation intentions.

Thus, for exploratory purposes, the same relationships that were examined for interpersonal sensitivity were tested for explanation. Thus, the effects of explanation and the cultural orientation variables on distributive justice and intentions toward the organization are presented in Tables 12 and 13, respectively. Aside from procedural justice perceptions (Table 11), explanation had no main effect on any selection process outcome variables. The main effects of IND and COL on these variables have been explained in earlier sections as well, therefore only results from the interactions will be presented.

Table 11. Moderated Regressions of Procedural Justice Perceptions on Explanation, Collectivism, and Individualism

Model	b	B	R^2	ΔR^2
<u>Procedural Justice Percep</u>				
<u>Pre</u>				
Step 1				
Explanation	.30*	.14*		
Collectivism	.17	.09	.03	
Step 2				
Explan x Collect	-.18	-.41	.03	.002
Step 1				
Explanation	.30*	.14*		
Individualism	.13	.07	.03	
Step 2				
Explan x Indiv	-.27	-.63	.03	.005
<u>Procedural Justice Percep</u>				
<u>Post</u>				
Step 1				
Explanation	.27*	.13*		
Collectivism	.03	.01	.02	
Step 2				
Explan x Collect	-.075	-.18	.02	.001
Step 1				
Explanation	.27*	.13*		
Individualism	-.11	-.06	.02	
Step 2				
Explan x Indiv	-.04	-.10	.02	.000

Note. $N=303$. 0=No Explanation, 1=Explanation. * $p<.05$. ** $p<.01$.

Table 12. Moderated Regressions of Distributive Justice Perceptions on Explanation, Collectivism, and Individualism

Model	b	B	R^2	ΔR^2
<u>Distributive Justice Percep</u>				
Step 1				
Explanation	.03	.03		
Collectivism	.02	.02	.01	
Step 2				
Explan x Collect	-.14	-.53	.04	.003
Step 1				
Explanation	.04	.03		
Individualism	-.08	-.08	.01	
Step 2				
Explan x Indiv	-.24	-.95	.02	.012

Note. $N=303$. 0=No Explanation, 1=Explanation. * $p<.05$. ** $p<.01$.

Table 13. Moderated Regressions of Intentions towards the Organization on Explanation, Collectivism, and Individualism

Model	b	B	R ²	ΔR ²
<u>Intentions Pre</u>				
Step 1				
Explanation	.12	.06		
Collectivism	.20*	.12*	.02	
Step 2				
Explan x Collect	.14	.35	.02	.001
Step 1				
Explanation	.12	.06		
Individualism	.11	.07	.01	
Step 2				
Explan x Indiv	-.40*	-1.02*	.02	.014*
<u>Intentions Post</u>				
Step 1				
Explanation	.06	.03		
Collectivism	.14	.08	.00	
Step 2				
Explan x Collect	.06	.15	.00	.000
Step 1				
Explanation	.06	.03		
Individualism	.08	.04	.00	
Step 2				
Explan x Indiv	-.52*	-1.21*	.02	.02*

Note. N=303. 0=No Explanation, 1=Explanation. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.




Figure 6. Interaction Between Explanation and Individualism on Intentions Pre




Figure 7. Interaction Between Explanation and Individualism on Intentions Post

Although there were no significant interactions involving COL, IND interacted with explanation to affect intentions, both pre-feedback ($b = -.39, p < .01$), and post-feedback ($b = -.53, p < .05$). These interactions are displayed in Figures 6 and 7. In the interaction on intentions pre-feedback, the difference in intentions between those low and high on IND was greater in the no explanation condition than in the explanation condition. In the no explanation conditions, those low on IND were less likely to intend to support the organization than those higher on IND, and in the explanation conditions, they were slightly more likely to support the organization. In the interaction on intentions post-feedback, the differences were much more equal. Those low on IND may behave similarly in some ways to those high on COL in that they may be more aware of needs of others around them, and be more empathetic to the importance for others to “save face”. They also may be more appreciative of the attempt of the organization to inform its applicants, and the signals that that sends. In the no explanation conditions, it is possible that those low on IND behaved more like those high on COL, in that they saw the lack of explanation as a signal to them that the organization was not trying to maintain good relations, and therefore, reacted more negatively than those who were high on IND, who were not reading into the meaning of the lack of explanation in the same way.

By contrast, individuals high on IND were more likely to accept the job offer, recommend the experiment to others, and participate in a similar experiment when no explanation was given for the selection process versus when there was an explanation given for the selection process. It is possible that for those high on IND, the attempt at giving an explanation may have backfired. They could have seen the explanation as a

way to attempt to cover up problems and impression manage, rather than a real attempt to inform applicants. In addition, they may have seen the explanation as an attempt by the organization to advance its own objectives. This may be true because those high on IND may have a view of others' motivations as similar to their own, in that they may feel that others' action are guided by their need to get ahead, not by their concern for others. Thus, they were in a sense penalizing the organization for "faking".

DISCUSSION

The main purpose of the current study was to explore how an applicant's cultural orientation can affect how he/she responds to different aspects of the selection process. Two procedural justice rules from Gilliland's (1993) model were selected for their relevance to both procedural fairness perceptions during the selection process and for the potential differences in reaction due to individualism and collectivism orientation the violation of these rules could elicit. In addition, a third variable, explanation, was examined for its relevance in regards to increasing procedural justice perceptions both in cases where procedural rules were being violated, and in cases in which procedural rules were being followed. A few other variables that were relevant to intentions following the selection process were also examined as outcomes.

Consistency Effects

Results for all hypotheses are summarized in Table 14. Results indicated that consistency, the first rule contained in Gilliland's (1993) model that was examined, had differing main effects depending on the time at which procedural justice ratings were obtained. Although there was no main effect on consistency for procedural justice perceptions *pre*-feedback, there was an effect for these perceptions *post*-feedback. One of the possible reasons for this difference is that participants could have become more critical and analytical in general when responding to the procedural fairness questions *post*-feedback because at that time, unlike *pre*-feedback, they knew that the outcome was negative. Thus, they may just not have been as concerned about justice *pre*-feedback. This notion is lent credence by findings from Bauer et al. (1998) that procedural justice perceptions both *pre* and *post*-feedback were related to consistency. In the Bauer et al.

Table 14. Summary of Results for Hypotheses

<u>Hypothesis</u>	<u>Result</u>
H1a: Collectivism will moderate the relationship between consistency and procedural fairness perceptions such that the relationship will be stronger for those who are high on collectivism than those who are low on collectivism	Not Supported
H1b: Individualism will moderate the relationship between consistency and procedural fairness perceptions such that the relationship will be stronger for those who are low on individualism than those who are high on individualism	Not Supported
H2a: Collectivism will moderate the relationship between sensitivity and procedural fairness perceptions such that the relationship will be stronger for those who are high on collectivism than those who are low on collectivism	Supported
H2b: Individualism will moderate the relationship between sensitivity and procedural fairness perceptions such that the relationship will be stronger for those who are low on individualism than those who are high on individualism	Not Supported
H3a: Those who receive an explanation for the procedural process will perceive procedures as more fair than those who do not receive an explanation	Supported
H3b: The explanation effect will be mediated by the perceived adequacy of the explanation	Supported

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(1998) study, participants were actual applicants for an office position at an accounting department, and consequently, had reason to care about fairness throughout the process, whereas in this study, participants did not have much to lose if the process was unfair, and thus had less of a reason to care throughout the process.

It also may have been the case that the participants were attending to different aspects of the selection process when evaluating fairness pre versus post-feedback. Before learning their outcome, they could have been focusing on the more consistent aspects of the process when making their ratings, while after the outcome, in part to explain their rejection, they may have focused on the more inconsistent aspects. Indeed, the mean procedural justice rating pre-feedback ($M=2.74$) was a third of a standard deviation higher than the mean rating post-feedback ($M=2.43$). In addition, Gilliland (1993) states that procedural rules become much more vital in determining justice perceptions when the outcome is negative than when positive. Pre-feedback, the outcome was unknown, and so could have been assumed by participants to be positive at that point, whereas post-feedback, the outcome was known to be negative.

Although effects on justice perceptions pre-feedback are interesting, it is really effects on perceptions post-feedback that are of greater import, due to their influence on subsequent actions and long-term outcomes. The main effect for consistency was evidenced on procedural justice post-feedback, however, which replicates several other findings (Bauer et al., 1998; Oliver, 1998; Ryan & Chan, 1999), including one by Ployhart and Ryan (1998) that inconsistency only affects procedural justice ratings when the applicant is somehow put at a disadvantage by the inconsistency. This finding is unique, however, in that it was found that this effect was moderated (moderation effects will be

addressed below). There was also a main effect of consistency on intentions toward the organization both pre-feedback and post-feedback. This is an interesting finding considering that previous studies have generally related these types of intention variables to procedural rules through perceptions of procedural justice (Macan et al., 1994; Truxillo & Bauer, 1999; Fiaschetti, 1998). The main effect indicated, as expected, that those in the consistent conditions were more likely to accept a job offer, recommend the experiment to others, and participate in future experiments than those in the inconsistent conditions.

Even more interesting than the main effects of consistency on procedural justice were the interactions. Hypothesis 1a, which stated that COL would be a moderator of the relationship, and hypothesis 1b, which stated that IND would be a moderator, were not supported. However, there was an interaction found between IND and consistency, but not in the hypothesized direction. Why there was no interaction found between COL and consistency could relate to many factors. One is that it is difficult to find significant interactions in general. In a recent article, Aguinis, Beatty, Boik, & Pearce (2005) reviewed 30 years of moderating effects, and found that the median observed effect size was only .002. It is also possible that potential interactions could not be detected within the range of COL that was represented by this sample. As was mentioned earlier, the mean of COL was 4.86 with a standard deviation of .56, meaning that 68% of the sample fell between the values of 4.30 and 5.42 on a seven-point scale. This is not a large range, and therefore, much of the scale is left unrepresented. In addition, because it seems that it is the middle point of the scale that is represented, and not more of the extreme ends, this may have made it even more difficult to see how high and low COL contrast,

because it was really only “slightly high” and “slightly low” COL that was being contrasted.

Despite the lack of finding COL as a moderator, IND was found to be a moderator of the consistency-procedural justice perception relationship post-feedback. Instead of those who were high on IND having higher procedural justice perceptions than those lower on IND in the inconsistent conditions as hypothesis 1b stated, the opposite occurred. Those who were high on IND actually had lower perceptions of procedural justice in the inconsistent conditions than did those low on IND. A reason for this could be that the high individualist’s need for equity in a situation overshadows his/her lack of a need for convention or reliance on others for fairness. Ample evidence indicates that those high on IND prefer merit-based hiring to hiring based on equality (e.g., Hui et al., 1991; Ramamoorthy & Carroll, 1998; Triandis & Suh, 2002). Moreover, it has also been found that individualists tend to prefer feedback that is self-serving, and rate it as being more fair than feedback that is critical (Gelfand et al., 2002). Although there was no main effect of IND on procedural justice perceptions, this may have been somewhat of a contributing factor, because all the feedback was negative. In addition, if those lower on IND function similarly to those higher on COL, then perhaps they were less likely to criticize the process because they were more understanding of the inconsistency. Research has shown that those high on COL pay a great deal of attention to external factors when considering causes for a situation, and are less likely to commit the fundamental attribution error of blaming circumstances on the internal characteristics of the person rather than the external characteristics of the circumstance (Earley & Gibson, 1998; Triandis, 1989; Triandis & Suh, 2002; Wagner, 1995). Thus, they may have been

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more likely to feel that the inconsistency was the result of unforeseen circumstances rather than the ineptitude of the administrator, and consequently, were less likely to indicate that there was unfairness in the process, because saying this would be blaming the administrator.

Although COL was not a moderator for the consistency-procedural justice relationship, it was a moderator of the relationship between consistency and *distributive justice*. The direction of the moderation indicated that in the inconsistent conditions, those high on COL had higher distributive justice perceptions than those low on COL. In addition, in the consistent conditions, those high on COL had lower distributive justice perceptions than those low on COL. This may be because those high on COL are more likely to focus on blaming themselves for poor performance rather than the distribution process. Research has shown that those who are high on IND are more likely to attribute cause to external factors when the outcome is negative, whereas those who are higher on COL are more likely to attribute negative outcomes to internal factors (Bond, Leung & Wan, 1982). Their ratings of distributive justice in the consistent conditions could have been lower because one aspect of the distributive justice questionnaire has to do with being satisfied with the outcome. They may have been even more dissatisfied with the outcome in the consistent conditions because they were given the full time, and they still did not perform well. Studies have indicated that those who are high on COL are more likely to show a decrease in self-esteem and feel embarrassed after a failure than those high on IND (Singelis & Sharkey, 1995; Singelis et al., 1999). Consequently, they could have been feeling worse about the outcome and themselves after learning they performed poorly than those low on COL, and thus had lower distributive justice perceptions.

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Overall, it seems that, unlike originally hypothesized, consistency is a rule that has greater impact for those high on IND than for those high on COL. Taking into account that someone can, in theory, be high on both characteristics, it is possible that their high IND would come into play more when reacting to inconsistency than their high COL. There are several reasons why this may be the case. One is that those who are high on IND are more likely to be concerned about equity, and lack of consistency often precludes equity. If one is disadvantaged due to an inconsistent process, one's performance will not reflect one's ability or effort, and thus, the outcome will not either. Another reason is the attributions those high COL are likely to make for inconsistent processes. Those who are high on COL are very in tune with the power and influence of external factors in a situation. Thus, they may be less likely to blame the individuals conducting the process by stating that the process was unfair, because they realize that these individuals very likely may not have had any control over the inconsistency. Consequently, consistency may be less strongly tied to their procedural justice perceptions. Third, it is possible that those who are high on IND tend to be more competitive in situations, because achieving personal recognition and accomplishing personal goals are very important to them, whereas those high on COL are less so, because they often have to sacrifice their personal goals for the goals of their group (Triandis et al., 1985). Although the effect sizes for the interactions were not large, ($\Delta R^2 = .012-.014$) they did represent a significant increase in the variance accounted for.

Sensitivity Effects

Similar to consistency, the effects of sensitivity were significant for procedural justice perceptions post-feedback. Although there was no main effect of sensitivity or

IND and COL on procedural justice perceptions, there was a significant interaction. Sensitivity interacted with COL to affect procedural justice perceptions post-feedback. The nature of the interaction was in support of hypothesis 2a. In other words, in the insensitive conditions, those who were higher on COL had lower procedural justice perceptions than those low on COL. In addition, in the sensitive conditions, those high on COL had higher procedural justice perceptions. This confirms the notion that interpersonal relations and maintaining harmony is very important to those high on COL, and therefore, they react negatively when harmony is disrupted due to rudeness and positively when extra effort is being made to maintain it. Moreover, collectivists are more familiar with the use of sensitivity in face-saving communication, in order to spare the feelings of others and to remain considerate of others' circumstances (Triandis & Suh, 2002). They are also, in fact, much less comfortable with the type of overt hostility portrayed in the insensitive conditions than they are with more passive hostility (Doucet & Jehn, 1997). Those who are low on COL, however, may not be as aware of the interpersonal context and thus, are not as reactive to it. There was no moderating effect of IND on procedural justice perceptions, however, which meant that hypothesis 2b was not supported. This may be because those who are high on IND are not necessarily less aware of the interpersonal context than those who are low on IND, but at both levels, they are not especially sensitive to the need for interpersonal harmony.

In terms of other outcomes related to procedural justice, there were a few effects of note. For instance, there was a main effect of COL on intentions toward the organization pre-feedback. Those who were higher on COL were more likely to intend to accept the job offer, recommend the experiment to others, and re-participate than those

low on COL. This again could be related to collectivists desire to maintain harmony and avoid conflict by endorsing items that refer to recommending the experiment to others, re-participating in the experiment, and accepting the potential job offer. In addition to the main effect, COL also interacted with sensitivity to affect intentions both pre and post-feedback. Similar to the interaction on procedural justice perceptions post-feedback, these interactions indicated that, although at both levels of COL intentions were higher in the sensitive than insensitive conditions, those who were higher on COL had a bigger difference in their ratings between the conditions than those who were lower on COL. This follows the general pattern of collectivists need for good interpersonal relations and harmony, and their feelings of dissatisfaction when this need is not fulfilled. In addition, it supports the notion that those who are high on COL are also more sensitive to the expressions and reactions of others, and often take these into account (Gudykunst et al., 1992).

In sum, it seems that those who are high on COL respond more positively to sensitivity than those who low on COL. These interactions provided incremental variance over main effects ranging from $\Delta R^2 = .016-.022$. The heightened responsiveness of those high on COL may be due to their heightened awareness of nonverbal interpersonal signals, and their need for interpersonal harmony. It is likely that they view rudeness as a message from the organization that it is not willing to be considerate of applicants, and that it is not concerned with maintaining respect and good interpersonal relations. On the other hand, they are more receptive to politeness and kindness, because they see this as an implicit sign that the organization is truly considerate, and not just as an attempt by the organization to make itself appear considerate.

Explanation Effects

The effectiveness of explanations in mitigating negative effects of poor outcomes and the mechanisms by which they do so was also tested in this study. Results were consistent with past research in that providing an explanation helped to mitigate the negative effects of poor performance, which was in support of hypothesis 3a. However this study was unique in that it examined providing explanations both in terms of explaining the violation of a procedural justice rule, and, when the rule was not violated, explaining the intent of the rule (in this case consistency). Thus, explanations were provided for the experimental process, whether that be following a certain procedural rule, or not following it. In addition, the Shapiro's "boundary condition" notion of explanation adequacy was confirmed, supporting hypothesis 3b. That is, explanation adequacy was a full mediator of the explanation provision-procedural justice relationship. The more adequate the explanation was perceived to be, the higher the procedural justice ratings. Consequently, organizations should focus on providing explanations for the process when something goes wrong, but also when everything goes right, to inform the participants of the nature of the process. It is also important that they focus on giving participants explanations that are useful and well-thought out, because how adequate the explanation is perceived to be makes a huge difference in how fair the process will be judged. In fact, other studies have shown that giving an inadequate explanation can be worse than giving no explanation at all (Shapiro, 1991). The results in this study may have been stronger, however, because the outcome was always negative. Shaw et al. (2003) and Colquitt and Chertkoff (2001) found that explanations are most effective

when outcomes are consistently negative and when they are unexpected. Therefore, it is possible that when the outcome is positive, this explanation effect may not be as strong.

In addition to the hypothesized effects, other effects involving explanations were examined in an exploratory capacity. Although there were no main effects of explanation on any of the other outcome variables, there were two interactions that provided an increase in variance accounted for ($\Delta R^2 = .014-.02$) that was significant. Both of these interactions involved IND. The interaction of IND and explanation on intentions toward the organization was significant both pre and post-feedback. Those higher in IND were much more likely to participate in a similar experiment, recommend the organization, and accept a potential job offer than those lower on IND when there was no explanation given for the process. In addition, the effect was opposite for the explanation conditions—those lower in IND were more likely to indicate that they would participate in actions related recommending, re-participating, and accepting an offer from the organization than those higher in IND. The reasoning behind this effect could involve differences in how these individuals viewed the explanation. Those who are low on IND may operate similarly to those high on COL, in that they may be more familiar with the concept of “saving face”, and see explanations as an attempt to assure others that they are being considered and informed of any changes or concerns during the selection process. Those who are high on IND, however, may just view explanations as extra information, that is good, but not necessarily expected. Thus, when no explanation was given, those low on IND may have reacted to it much more negatively, because they felt this was a signal to them by the organization or experimental administrator that she did not care about their concerns. In essence, they may have taken the lack of explanation much more personally

than did those who were high on IND. Accordingly, it has been shown that those who are high on COL are more familiar with, and are more likely to respond positively to apologies and excuses, than are those who are high on IND (Tata, 2000; Hui & Au, 2001). Thus, according to Folger and Cropanzano's (1998) fairness theory, those low on IND had more of a likelihood of applying the could, should, and would counterfactuals indicating how the situation could have been conducted differently, than did those high on IND.

Implications

Taken as a whole, the results from this study present very interesting findings. The main finding was that for every procedural intervention including consistency, sensitivity, and explanation, there were significant interactions with IND and/or COL. Although these interactions did not always involve effects on procedural fairness, they did often involve effects on the actions that result from fairness perceptions, such as recommendation and future participation intentions. Thus, an individual's cultural orientation *does* make a difference when considering their reaction to procedural rules. Although the effects do not appear to be large as represented by the range of IND and COL presented in the graphs in this paper (i.e., +1 and -1 *SDs* from the mean), if the range is expanded to include within +2 and -2 standard deviations on the IND and COL variables, the differences would be much greater. In addition, even if not large, the effects are important in terms of the organization's standing. These are aspects of the selection process the organization can actually control, and therefore, even being able to control 2% of the variance can be beneficial. In addition, the effects found in this study are probably quite a bit smaller than the effects one would find in a real selection

situation, where the stakes are increased ten-fold. Even though participants had relatively little to gain or lose through this simulated selection situation, there was still an interactive effect detected on the outcome variables. In addition, the range of responses on both the IND and COL measures were restricted to the middle of the scale, and thus, there were not many people representing more of the extremes of each factor. If replicated with a more diverse sample, effects may be stronger.

This is an indication that it is important not to assume that individuals will react in generally the same way to actions that take place during the selection process. Specifically, in terms of Gilliland's model, one should be aware that the violation of procedural rules can produce differing reactions depending on who is a part of the applicant pool. In several cases, the interactions between cultural orientation and procedural interventions were significant, but there was no main effect. Thus, often people at one end of IND or COL reacted in the opposite manner to people on the other end. This indicates that just simply applying the same intervention to everyone uniformly (for instance, giving an explanation for a rule violation during the selection process) will not necessarily increase everyone's intentions to recommend the company to others, and can be detrimental. Thus, the impact of potential remedies for rule violations, such as the use of explanations, or general behavior during the process, such as sensitivity needs to be considered based on the applicant population with which the organization is dealing.

An interesting finding in terms of the usefulness of the two factors of IND and COL involves their differential relationship with outcomes. It seems that for some rules, being high or low on IND is more important, for others, being high or low on COL is more important, and for still others, one's levels of both are important. For example,

consistency interacted with both COL and IND to affect different outcomes, sensitivity interacted mainly with COL, and explanations mainly with IND. It is possible, then, that when considering what rule to emphasize in the selection process, organizations should consider the mean levels of both factors in their applicant population, and then reference the levels for the factor that is most important for that rule. Based on these findings, then, an individual's levels on one factor, either IND or COL, may be more important than their levels of the other factor, depending on what relationship is being moderated. Because many of the studies on IND and COL do not treat them as separate factors, very little work has been done thus far on distinguishing which of the two factors are more important for predicting certain outcomes. This is an area that could yield useful findings and that deserves future research.

Different aspects of the procedure also functioned differently in their relationship with procedural justice. None of the manipulated variables had main effects on procedural justice pre-feedback, but both consistency and explanation affected procedural justice post-feedback. Although procedural justice perceptions pre-feedback are interesting, it is really procedural justice perceptions post-feedback that are impactful, because the applicant leaves the selection context with these fairness perceptions. The lack of any relationship pre-feedback could be due to a lack of criticality in evaluating procedural fairness pre-feedback, whereas, post-feedback, participants may have been more attentive due to increased motivation because they were aware of the negative outcome, and so they evaluated the process more critically. In fact, Gilliland's (1993) model states that the stage of the selection process is a possible moderator of the relationship between the satisfaction of procedural rules and fairness perceptions, and

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Hausknecht et al. (2004) provide empirical support for this assertion, in that they found **that** average correlations were higher between procedural rules and process fairness when **measured** simultaneously than when separated in time.

More intriguing, however, is why both consistency and explanation affected **procedural** justice perceptions, but sensitivity did not. It could be that sensitivity is more **related** to interactional justice than it is to procedural justice, because it has more to do **with** interpersonal issues than the other process variables do. It is also possible that in a **relative** sense, sensitivity may be a weaker rule than both consistency and explanations. **In** a meta-analysis, Hausknecht et al. (2004) found that certain procedural rules have **stronger** effects than others on procedural justice and other outcomes. The effect of **interpersonal** treatment on procedural justice perceptions was not examined in their study, **however**. This is useful to know for organizations, so they can decide which rule to **emphasize** over others in the selection context, if the use of one rule precludes the use of **another**.

It may also be that the way in which the sensitivity manipulation was **operationalized** led to its lack of a main effect. In this study, the main sensitivity **manipulation** involved the experimental administrator kindly or rudely responding to a **question** from a confederate who represented another participant. Thus, the administrator **was** not outrightly rude to participants themselves as in other experiments (e.g. **Greenberg, 1993; Greenberg, 1994**), but she was rude to a fellow participant. Research **has** indicated that in some conditions, how others are treated can be as impactful in **influencing** an individual's procedural justice judgments as how he himself is treated (**Van Den Bos & Lind, 2001**). Nevertheless, it is also possible that certain conditions this

“bystander” sensitivity effect on procedural justice may be qualitatively or quantitatively different than a direct sensitivity effect. It would seem that this type of effect would be most noticeable to those who are more “sensitive” to the interpersonal aspects of a situation. Indeed, this was confirmed in the significant interaction between sensitivity and COL on procedural justice post-feedback. Therefore, sensitivity could be a more nuanced rule that can have differing effects based on its operationalization and the cultural orientation of the individuals responding to it.

The results for explanation were interesting in that explanations seemed to be valued more for the signal that they gave rather than their actual content. This may be due to the type of explanation given in this study, which was solely either a two sentence reason for why the inconsistency occurred or how the procedures were consistent. Very little was conveyed in terms of actual content, and none of the three types of social accounts (i.e. justifications, referential, ideological; Bies, 1987) reflected the nature of this explanation. In addition, this study was unique in that it involved an explanation for the violation or satisfaction of a procedural rule, not an explanation for why a type of procedure was used in contrast to other work in applicant reactions (e.g., Gilliland, 1994; Horvath et al., 2000), and not an explanation for why outcomes were distributed in a certain way in contrast to other work in the justice literature (Greenberg, 1991; Greenberg, 1993; Greenberg, 1994). These aspects of the explanation may explain why those who were low on IND responded more favorably to the use of explanations than those high on IND. Those high on IND are very focused on their own goals and opportunities for them to perform well and demonstrate their skills, so when they are given explanations that are not useful in the sense that they are not able to help them

advance their goals, the explanations are meaningless to them. Therefore having an explanation is more of a distraction than anything else. However, for those low on IND, who are less self-focused and more aware of interpersonal messages, an explanation would be a message to them that the organization is attempting to be informative and take applicants' needs into consideration. Perhaps if there was more helpful content in the explanation in Greenberg's (1991) sense of "self-image enhancing" content, high IND individuals would have responded to the explanation differently. Consequently, employers must recognize the cultural value orientation of their applicant pool and if it is important for them to convey a more symbolic message or a concrete informational message through the use of an explanation.

Although there were no hypotheses about interactions between the procedural justice rules, very few studies have examined the violation of multiple rules in combination, and researcher have stressed the importance of doing so in order to increase the external validity of findings (Chan & Schmitt, 2004). Therefore, the interactions among the procedural rules were examined for their effect on procedural justice pre and post feedback. Results from the regressions are presented in Tables 15 and 16.

Surprisingly, none of the interactions between the three main procedural rules were significant. The total model with all of the manipulation variables, the IND and COL variables, and their interactions accounted for about 12% of the variance in procedural fairness pre-feedback, and about 7% of the variance in procedural fairness post-feedback. The difference in amount of variance accounted for pre versus post-feedback is most likely due to the effect of outcome favorability. In addition, if other fairness reactions such as interpersonal and information fairness perceptions were included, perhaps the

percent of “fairness” variance accounted for would increase substantially, because some of the manipulations may have more of a direct relevance to these variables.

Table 15. Moderated Regressions of Procedural Justice Perceptions Pre on Consistency, Sensitivity, Explanation, Collectivism, and Individualism

Model	R^2	ΔR^2
<u>Step 1</u>		
Consistency		
Sensitivity		
Explanation	.022	
<u>Step 2</u>		
Consistency x Sensitivity		
Consistency x Explanation		
Sensitivity x Explanation		
Consistency x Sensitivity x Explanation	.024	.001
<u>Step 3</u>		
Individualism		
Collectivism	.039	.016
<u>Step 4</u>		
Individualism x Consistency		
Collectivism x Consistency		
Individualism x Sensitivity		
Collectivism x Sensitivity		
Individualism x Explanation		
Collectivism x Explanation	.120	.080**

Note. $N=303$. * $p<.05$. ** $p<.01$.

Table 16. Moderated Regressions of Procedural Justice Perceptions Post on Consistency, Sensitivity, Explanation, Collectivism, and Individualism

Model	R^2	ΔR^2
<u>Step 1</u>		
Consistency		
Sensitivity		
Explanation	.032	
<u>Step 2</u>		
Consistency x Sensitivity		
Consistency x Explanation		
Sensitivity x Explanation		
Consistency x Sensitivity x Explanation	.039	.007
<u>Step 3</u>		
Individualism		
Collectivism	.042	.003
<u>Step 4</u>		
Individualism x Consistency		
Collectivism x Consistency		
Individualism x Sensitivity		
Collectivism x Sensitivity		
Individualism x Explanation		
Collectivism x Explanation	.068	.026

Note. $N=303$. * $p<.05$ ** $p<.01$.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Although there were several interesting findings that emerged from this study, there were also limitations of the study that should be considered and suggestions for future research to address these issues.

Sample Issues

One limitation involved the sample that was used. It was composed entirely of college students, mainly undergraduate, but also some graduate students. Thus, this population may not have been as experienced in participating in a selection process as the general population may be, although the majority (96.5%) cited having had prior work experience and only 8% had never participated in a job interview before. Nevertheless, the majority (65%) stated that they had never had to take a test in order to get a job. Consequently their expectations for procedural rules such as consistency or sensitivity during the application process may be different than that of individuals who have participated in several job selection experiences. However, many organizations also employ recent college graduates, and this sample may be more representative of that population. In addition, because the psychology subject pool was utilized to recruit participants, the percentage of females in the sample (72.5%) was more than double that of males. Therefore, males were underrepresented in the sample. In this study, gender was negatively correlated with procedural justice perceptions both pre ($r = -.15, p < .05$) and post ($r = -.20, p < .05$) feedback, however, the meta-analysis on applicant reactions showed no correlation between gender and procedural justice perceptions (Hausknecht et al., 2004). Additionally, there were no gender differences on the IND and COL measures, which was consistent with past studies (Coon & Kimmelmeier, 2001; Triandis

et al., 1995). Nevertheless, future research should include a more representative sample of males.

Despite the fact that there were several attempts made to recruit individuals from different countries to increase variance on the IND and COL scales, the vast majority of participants were still from the U.S. (92.4%). Out of a possible range of responses from 1-7 on the IND and COL scales, 68% of the sample fell between the values of 4.30 and 5.42 on the COL scale, and 4.37 and 5.51 on the IND scale. This may be an indication of a possible restriction of range of the scale which may have attenuated some of the moderating relationships between these cultural variables and justice outcomes. This range is smaller than that of other studies that have utilized Singelis' (1994) scales of IND and COL (e.g. Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2001; Okazaki, 2000; Singelis & Sharkey, 1995; Singelis et al., 1999), which seems to indicate that this sample was more homogeneous culturally than other samples.

However, a broader issue is that the majority of studies utilizing this measure had scale scores with standard deviations of less than 1.00, indicating that perhaps the measure itself is not sensitive to differences in IND and COL levels. Nevertheless, it is important to note that all of the previous studies examined by this author utilized samples of college students, not broader samples of the general population. Youn (2000) found differences in levels of IND and COL in an American sample of graduate and undergraduate students, in that the level of IND of graduate students was significantly greater, and the level of COL was significantly less than that of undergraduates. Youn suggested that this was an indication that American's students' educational experiences are related to a progression of their independent self and a retrogression of their

dependent selves, and that this result was in support of Markus and Kitayama's theoretical assertion that those in individualistic cultures tend to hold a more independent world-view. Thus, even by broadening a sample by including graduate students, one can find significant differences in levels of IND and COL, which could possibly related to educational level or age. Although graduate students were also recruited for this study, the vast majority of participants (98%) were from the undergraduate population. Therefore, it is very important in future research to attempt to obtain samples that are more diverse in terms of ethnicity, education, age, and other variables in order to get better population indices of IND and COL using Singelis' (1994) measure, and so that more variance can be obtained. With more variance, effects that were previously attenuated could emerge.

Another possible avenue to take in the study of IND and COL, is to purposefully select a particular sample to study, instead of attempting to capture the general population. For instance, since many of the IND-COL studies to date have utilized samples that score in the mid-range on IND and COL, it may be useful for the sake of comparison to select a sample that contains people closer to the extremes of both scales. This would allow one to best see the differences in behavior that occur between individuals who are truly "high" or "low" on these measures. Another alternative would be to select a homogeneous sample in terms of culture (America in general is more heterogeneous than other countries), and then examine differences in IND and COL orientation in this culture. The assumption would be that individuals within the culture would be generally equal in terms of other cultural influences, so differences would be due to individual differences in IND and COL. This is the approach Gomez (2003) took

when examining IND and COL differences amongst a Hispanic population living in the U.S.. She was able to find differences in preferences according to IND and COL even amongst this relatively homogenous sample.

Context & Manipulation Issues

The environment in which the study was conducted is another limitation that should be addressed. This was a lab study using psychology 101 subjects who simulated being job applicants. Thus, the environment was rather artificial, though an attempt was made to make the manipulations in the study as natural as possible. However, the type of motivation that exists to perform to the best of one's ability as well as the stakes involved in the selection outcome were not present to the degree that they would have been in an actual selection situation. The reward for participants performing well on the test was not directly tied to their performance in that even if they performed well, their selection to win the prize money would be random, because it was being determined by a lottery. There was an attempt to make participants feel that they had more control over their outcome by telling them that they would have an increased chance of winning if they performed well, but this may only have increased motivation for some participants. In addition, there is a possibility that the individual reward may not have been as motivating for those who were low on IND or high on COL; perhaps a collective or team award may have been more motivating. Yet, in a true selection context, participants are rewarded individually.

There was an additional problem concerning group size which was not anticipated. The number of participants in each session varied substantially from a low of 4 to a high of 45. It was remarked upon by both this author and her research assistants

that it seemed that the manipulations were less effective in the larger sessions. When there were greater numbers of participants, more comments of incredulity in response to manipulations were heard than when there were fewer participants. In addition, although attempts were made to stress the importance to participants of keeping one's score on oneself, more participants seemed to audibly discuss their feedback scores in the larger sessions, which made it more likely that they would discover that every participant obtained negative feedback. However, out of 19 sessions only 2 had more than 25 participants.

In addition, there were a few issues regarding the effectiveness of the manipulations. For instance, the effectiveness of the sensitivity manipulation may have varied depending on the acting ability of the experimental administrator and the confederate. If the interaction did not appear to be real, then the manipulation would not have worked as well. In general, though, it seemed that sensitivity manipulation worked rather well, both anecdotally and based on results from the manipulation check. Only 7% of the variance in the consistency manipulation check, however, was predicted by the consistency manipulation. This may be due to the ineffectiveness of the manipulation, but it also may be due in large part to the location of the measure. The consistency manipulation check was the last measure in the survey, and participants could have been fatigued by the time they arrived at this measure, resulting in inaccurate ratings. In addition, several of the experimental sessions came close to or exceeded slightly the allotted time for the experiment, and therefore, participants may have been in a rush to leave, and thus been more careless when answering these items.

It also possible that the type of explanation used in this study could have influenced the effectiveness of the manipulation as well. The explanation used was very neutral, and did not contain much information regarding for instance, who was to blame for the inconsistency (the administrator indicated they had the wrong forms of the test, but not how that occurred), or how much effort went into making the process a consistent process. If the explanation had been a type of social account assigning blame to an outside force (causal), changing the referent standard for the action (referential), reframing the action (ideological), or even just an apology, effects could have been stronger (Bies, 1987). However, the advantage of having an ambiguous explanation that does not fit into any one category is that the findings are no longer restricted to a particular type of explanation. Moreover, the fact that the content of the explanation did not matter so much as the presence of an explanation lends credence to the assertion that an explanation can be valued as a symbol of the organization's concern, and not simply for its informational content. Nevertheless, there has been some research to suggest that for instance, those high on COL respond more favorably to apologies than those lower on COL (Hui & Au, 2001). Consequently, future research should explore further whether certain types of explanations are more effective for those high on IND or those high on COL.

Another area to explore regarding context issues is whether the selection context itself has an effect on the expression of IND versus COL. In the personality literature, some have argued for a person by situation interactionist view of personality influences on behavior (Endler & Magnusson, 1976). This view holds that situational factors can affect what aspects of one's personality are expressed at a give moment in time.

Moreover, it is when a situation is trait relevant that it exerts the most “pressure” on the expression of the trait (Tett & Burnett, 2003). In addition to this situationally-influenced view of traits in the personality literature, Triandis has also stressed the importance of situations in influencing the expression of IND and/or COL. For instance, Triandis (1995) states that there are several situational elements that can increase the likelihood that one’s COL cognitive system will be activated. These include aspects such as if others in the situation are known to be collectivists, if the situation calls for the assembly of a collective (e.g. family, team) at the time, if the situation contains symbols that emphasize the collective (e.g. uniforms, jerseys, hats), and if the situation involves a cooperative task.

Thus, it is possible that there are elements in the selection situation that are more likely to activate the individualistic part of an individual’s cognitive system. In fact, the selection context possesses characteristics that are the antithesis of many of the collectivism-inducing characteristics just described. It is generally a competitive situation in which one is aware that other individuals present are rivals, vying for the same or a similar position. It is a situation where uniqueness is valued (i.e., in an interview), and one is encouraged to identify the skills, experience, or characteristics that make one “stand out”. This has interesting consequences for the utilization of IND and COL measures during the selection process. It could mean that the applicants’ trait levels of IND and COL do not reflect the levels of IND and COL they express during the selection context. For example, they could be reporting their general levels of IND and COL, but the experimental context, because it is a competitive, non-cooperative process, could be “priming” their IND self to be expressed more strongly. Therefore, the levels of

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IND and COL affecting reactions during the selection process could be different than the overall, context-independent levels of IND and COL reported on the measure. Therefore, the stability IND and COL levels between non-selection and selection contexts should be explored further, as this could greatly affect the study of these cultural variables across situations.

IND and COL Measure Issues

Individualism-Collectivism is one of the most widely-studied cultural variables that emerged from Hofstede's (1980) categorization of cultural value dimensions. It has been the subject of several reviews and empirical studies throughout the years (Earley & Gibson, 1998; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Despite the considerable amount of attention that has been paid to this dimension, a consistently reliable and valid measure of IND-COL at the individual level has not yet been established. As was evidenced in this study, the reliability of the subscales of Singelis' (1994) measure of IND and COL did not meet standard levels of good reliability, although in general, IND-COL scales have produced relatively low reliabilities. Even when utilizing his own measure, Singelis reported levels of reliability ranging from .58 to .70 for the IND subscale, and .53 to .73 for the COL subscale (Singelis, 1994; Singelis et al., 1999; Singelis & Sharkey, 1995). He argued that the low reliabilities were a result of the bandwidth versus fidelity dilemma (Singelis & Brown, 1995). In other words, in the interest of capturing the broad nature of the construct as comprehensively as possible, one sacrifices some of the precision or consistency of information obtained.

Although Singelis and Brown (1995) argue that capturing the broader construct is more useful for prediction, it is possible that defining subfactors within the larger

construct may be useful as well. Other research has found value and increased validity in the use of subdimensions of constructs (e.g., Avery, 2003; Griffin & Hesketh, 2004; Judge & Bono, 2001). It is possible that subdimensions of IND and COL could be more internally consistent than the higher order factors, as well as possess differential predictive validities in relation to various outcomes, such as procedural, interactional, and distributive justice reactions. Therefore, an alternative model of IND and COL that included subfactors was tested.

A group of researchers have recently suggested that Singelis' (1994) scale of IND and COL is better represented by a six-factor model than a two factor model of IND and COL (Hardin, Leong, & Bhagwat, 2004). Thus, for exploratory purposes, the six factor model proposed by Hardin et al. (2004) for the Singelis scale was compared to the two-factor model of the scale generally accepted. The six factors in the Hardin et al. (2004) model include four factors that represent the IND construct, and two factors that represent the COL construct. The four IND factors include Autonomy, Individualism, Behavioral Consistency, and Primacy of Self, while the two COL factors include Esteem for Group and Relational Interdependence. The six factor model places two items that were originally included under COL, item 3 and item 30, under the Autonomy factor, and thus, the six factor model is not nested within the two-factor model. Therefore, comparisons between the two-factor and six-factor models were conducted based on overall model fit. Item parcels were created in the manner described earlier for factors that had greater than five indicators. The values of a few relevant fit indices for the six factor model were as follows: $\chi^2(113) = 282.104, p < .01$, RMSEA=.070, NFI=.570, CFI=.675, SRMR=.076. The values for the two factor model were: $\chi^2(9) = 19.98, p < .05$, RMSEA=.063,

NFI=.929, CFI=.959, SRMR=.066. Thus, overall, it seemed that the two-factor model was a better fit to the data than the six factor model for this sample. However, other multidimensional models of IND and COL should be explored and evaluated.

Future research should focus on establishing a valid scale of IND and COL with reliable subdimensions based on a consideration of the definitional roots of the constructs. In fact, in Triandis' (1995) conceptualization of the definition of IND and COL at the individual level, he describes four components, or subdimensions, that comprise the constructs. These include the definition of self, alignment of goals, focus on norms and duties versus attitudes and personal needs, and emphasis on relational versus rational aspects of relationships. Although Triandis (1995) has developed his own four factor measure of IND and COL at the individual level, the subfactors that comprise his scale refer to horizontal versus vertical IND and COL orientations, not the subdimensions just described. Singelis' (1994) measure, which is one of the most widely used measures in the literature, was itself developed through an amalgamation of items from four different scales to capture breadth, and not through an a priori consideration of focused subcomponent representation. In addition, measures of IND and COL with subfactors do exist, however they are either not widely used, suffer from low overall or subdimension reliabilities, refer to the country-level IND-COL constructs, or are not valid (Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2001; Oyserman et al., 2002; Singelis, 1994). Therefore, another option for future research is to work on refining or supplementing existing scales (i.e., Hardin, Leong, & Bhagwat, 2004). In general, future research should concentrate effort on developing theoretically-based, focused measures of IND and COL, so as to, as

Oyserman et al. (2002) so aptly state, “avoid becoming so content packed as to be theoretically empty” (pg.44).

Another issue to consider is whether IND and COL measures should be tailored to reflect the context in which they are being used. For example, if they are to be used to predict organizationally relevant outcomes, such as organizational justice perceptions, perhaps items should reflect content related to organizational issues. Robie, Schmit, Ryan and Zickar (2000) conducted a study in which they examined differences in the psychometric characteristics of a personality measure when items were contextualized (i.e. put in the context of work) versus non-contextualized. Although the results of the study were mixed, the error variances for the contextualized measure were less than that for the noncontextualized measure. In addition, intuitively it seems plausible that relationships would be stronger if the context of the items in the predictor matched the context of the criterion measure (although one has to be reasonable when determining the level of specificity of the context). In fact, Schmit, Ryan, Stierwalt, and Powell (1995) found that the validity of the Conscientious scale on the NEO-PI-R in predicting college GPA was higher when context or work-specific items were used instead of the original items. Another study also concluded that a common behavioral frame of reference represented in items on a questionnaire measure of personality may have resulted in the greater validity of it over a bipolar inventory of personality (Cellar, Miller, Doverspike, & Klawnsky, 1996). Thus, perhaps future research should test the utility of using items in IND-COL scales relating to one’s attitudes towards work structure, work relationships, work rewards, one’s behavior and preferences at work, et cetera, to predict work-related outcomes, versus using current broad and general IND-COL measures.

Issues Involving Individual-Level IND and COL

A separate but related issue warranting future research attention concerns the meaning of IND and COL at the individual level. As has been discussed previously in this paper, IND and COL was first conceptualized as a cultural level phenomenon, where IND and COL were polar ends of a continuum. Thus, being high on one resulted in being low on the other. Although this cultural level construct was interesting, researchers soon realized the usefulness of capturing this phenomenon at a more micro-level for the prediction of individual behaviors, because of variance within country. When they extrapolated the concept to the individual level, however, the measures they developed indicated that the variables were independent and that individuals could be high or low on both variables (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1986). Yet, there was no clear indication what the combination of these levels really signified, and there still is no clear indication.

The way that the variables are defined currently seems to imply that they are opposites, nonetheless, people can theoretically be high or low on both. However, there has been little discussion on what it means theoretically to be high on both factors or low on both factors and how one would expect an individual to act. Some recent research has indicated that individuals with different combinations of levels react differently, but this is still preliminary (Gomez, 2003). What is the difference between being low on IND versus being high on COL? It is also unclear whether IND and COL are considered trait variables or state variables. Although most of the literature seems to lean toward identifying them as stable traits, some recent research has indicated that IND and COL values can be primed (Oyserman et al., 2001; Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991). The

answers to both these questions have strong implications for future research in several areas, including selection. For example, will one's reactions during the selection context based on one's context-dependent cultural orientation be different than long-term reactions to the process based on one's trait-level cultural orientation?

Applicant Reactions Cross-Culturally

Although this study is a step towards understanding the influence of cultural factors on reactions to the selection process, there are several avenues still left to explore. It would be interesting to conduct a similar study to this one examining other rules relevant to applicant justice perceptions. Rules such as two way communication and opportunity to perform could have differential impacts on individuals depending on their IND and COL cultural orientation. If subdimensions of IND and COL are established, one should examine which subdimension has the greatest moderating effect on reactions to a specific procedural rule. In addition, cultural variables other than IND and COL have been posited to effect individuals' reactions to procedural rules including confucian dynamism, masculinity-femininity, and uncertainty avoidance. These variables should be examined further.

Chan and Schmitt (2004) emphasized the need to match level of specificity of predictors to criteria levels of specificity in research involving applicant reactions in order to increase predictive validity. Thus, rather than asking for global procedural fairness reactions, one could possibly ask for more specific fairness reactions such as reactions to the test, the interpersonal atmosphere, or the explanation given. Other than fairness, reactions such as anger, skepticism, and disappointment, which have been examined in the literature on explanations (e.g. Shapiro, 1991) could also be used as

possible outcomes of the violation of procedural rules, as well as predictors of behavioral outcomes. It would be interesting to see if these reactions mediate the fairness perception-outcome link, and if so, what individual difference moderators (e.g., perhaps cultural orientation) could moderate this relationship.

Bell, Ryan, and Wiechmann (2004) recently created a model involving the role of justice expectations in the applicant reaction process. They argued that the justice expectations that individuals bring into encounters with the organization (e.g. during the selection process) in large part shape their reactions, including their subsequent affect, behavior, and justice perceptions. Three of the antecedents of justice expectations in their model are direct experiences, existing beliefs, and indirect experiences. One could argue, as Bell et al. do, that an individual's cultural orientation can influence all of these factors. Thus, another avenue for future studies to explore would be to test whether the effect of cultural orientation on justice expectations is mediated by existing beliefs, direct experiences, or indirect experiences, and if so, what the relative strength of these mediators are. In addition, whether individuals' fairness perceptions are more influenced by their expectations versus the events that actually occur during the selection process could possibly vary depending on their cultural orientation. For instance, if those high on COL pay more attention to context, perhaps they would be more likely to rely on events occurring during the actual selection process to form their justice perceptions, rather than their justice expectations. Consequently, the area of justice expectations and culture provides intriguing new areas for research to explore.

CONCLUSION

The area of applicant reactions during the selection process has recently gained attention as a valuable stream of research due to the demonstration of its importance for several organizationally-relevant outcomes. Because it is a relatively new area of research, however, several aspects regarding how applicants' perceptions are formed and how they affect subsequent outcomes are left to be examined and explained. This study is an attempt to shed light on one of these aspects, namely, how an applicant's cultural orientation can affect how he/she perceives the violation of fairness rules during the selection process. Chan and Schmitt (2004) in their critique of work on applicant reactions, recommend that future work should examine applicant traits as possible moderators of the effect of procedures on reactions. They also recommend that rather than only looking at the influence of one procedural rule, studies should focus on examining the effects of multiple procedural rules in concert in order to increase the external validity of findings. This study in part addresses both of these concerns. The results from this study provide some insight on the relationship between applicant characteristics, procedural justice rules, and perceptions of procedural fairness; in addition, however, they also spark interesting questions for future study and reveal the great value of further research in this promising area. In the words of the great John Steinbeck: "Ideas are like rabbits. You get a couple and learn how to handle them, and then pretty soon you have a dozen."

APPENDIX A

Measures

Manipulation Checks

NOTE: All statements are scored on a five point Likert scale except the test-taking motivation, and IND and COL measures, which are scored on a seven point Likert scale.

Consistency

Bauer et al. (2001)

1. The test was administered to all applicants in the same way.
2. There were no differences in the way the test was administered to different applicants.
3. The test administrator made no distinction in how he/she treated applicants.

Additional items

4. I received the same amount of time as other people when taking the test.
5. I received less time than other people when taking the test. (R)
6. I was treated differently than others who have taken this test. (R)

Interpersonal Sensitivity

Bauer et al. (2001)

1. I was treated politely during the testing process.
2. Test administrators were considerate during the test.
3. Test administrators answered procedural questions in a straightforward and sincere manner.
4. The testing staff put me at ease when I took the test.
5. I was satisfied with my treatment at the test site.

Explanation Provision

1. I received an explanation for why I was given the amount of time I had to complete the test.
2. It was made very clear to me why I was given the amount of time I had to complete the test.

Test-Taking Motivation ("Motivation Check")

Sanchez, R. J., Truxillo, D. M., & Bauer, T. N. (2000)

1. I would like to be hired for this job.
2. It would be good to have this type of a job. (altered)
3. I want to get a job with this company. (altered)
4. If you do well on this test, you have a good chance of being hired.
5. I think you will be hired if you get a high test score.
6. How well you do on this test will affect whether you are hired.
7. The higher your test score, the better your chance of getting hired.

8. If you try to do your best on this test, you can get a high score.
9. If you concentrate and try hard you can get a high test score.
10. You can get a good score on this test if you put some effort into it.

Justice Measures

Procedural Justice

Gilliland (1994)

PRE

1. Whether or not I get the job, I feel the selection process was fair.
2. Whether or not I get the job, the procedures used to select people for this job are fair.
3. Whether or not I get the job, I am satisfied with the selection process.
4. Overall, I feel dissatisfied with the way people will be selected for the job. (R)

POST (Altered)

1. I feel the selection process was fair.
2. The procedures used to select people for this job are fair.
3. I am satisfied with the selection process.
4. Overall, I feel dissatisfied with the way people were selected for the job. (R)

Distributive Justice

Gilliland (1994)

1. Overall, I feel the results of the selection process were unfair. (R)
2. I feel the hiring decision (accept/reject) was fair.
3. Overall, I am satisfied with the hiring decision.
4. I am dissatisfied with the test administrator's decision about whether or not to hire me. (R)

Other Measures

Interdependent and Independent Self-Construals

Singelis (1994)

1. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects. (IND)
2. I feel comfortable using someone's first name soon after I meet them, even when they are much older than I am. (IND)
3. Even when I strongly disagree with group members, I avoid an argument. (INTER)
4. I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact. (INTER)
5. I do my own thing, regardless of what others think. (IND)
6. I respect people who are modest about themselves. (INTER)
7. I feel it is important for me to act as an independent person. (IND)
8. I will sacrifice my self interest for the benefit of the group I am in. (INTER)
9. I'd rather say "No" directly, than risk being misunderstood. (IND)
10. Having a lively imagination is important to me. (IND)
11. I should take into consideration my parents' advice when making education/career plans. (INTER)
12. I feel my fate is intertwined with the fate of those around me. (INTER)
13. I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people I've just met. (IND)

14. I feel good when I cooperate with others. (INTER)
15. I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards. (IND)
16. If my brother or sister fails, I feel responsible. (INTER)
17. I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my own accomplishments. (INTER)
18. Speaking up during a class (or a meeting) is not a problem for me. (IND)
19. I would offer my seat in a bus to my professor (or my boss). (INTER)
20. I act the same way no matter who I am with. (IND)
21. My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me. (INTER)
22. I value being in good health over everything. (IND)
23. I will stay in a group if they need me, even when I am not happy with the group. (INTER)
24. I try to do what is best for me, regardless of how that might affect others. (IND)
25. Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me. (IND)
26. It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group. (INTER)
27. My person identity, independent of others, is very important to me. (IND)
28. It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group. (INTER)
29. I act the same way at home that I do at school. (IND)
30. I usually go along with what others want to do, even when I would rather do something different. (INTER)

Adequacy of Explanation

Wiechmann & Ryan (2001); altered for context

1. The explanation given for any problems during the selection process was adequate.
2. I was satisfied receiving this explanation for a problem during the selection process.
3. I was given an inadequate explanation for a problem during the selection process. (R)
4. Everyone should at least be given this type of explanation for a problem during the selection process.

Job Acceptance Intentions

Ployhart & Ryan (1998)

1. Pre-decision: I would accept the job if it was offered to me.
2. Post-decision: Even if I was now offered the job, I would not accept it.

Recommendation Intentions

Gilliland (1994)

1. I would recommend this experiment to my friends.
2. I would tell my friends to participate in this experiment.
3. I would tell others this is a good experiment in which to participate.
4. I think other people should know this is a good experiment.

Additional items

5. I would tell others that I enjoyed participating in this experiment.
6. I would tell others that this was a good experience for me.

Future Experiment Intentions

Ployhart & Ryan (1998)

1. I would not like to participate in future experiments like this one.
2. If I was offered the opportunity, I would take part in another experiment like this one.
3. I will continue to volunteer for experiments similar to this one.
4. If I hear about other projects like this, I would be interested in applying for them.

APPENDIX B

Informed Consent Form

Informed Consent for Reactions in a Selection Context Study

Primary Researchers:

Smriti Shivpuri

Dr. Ann Marie Ryan, Professor of Psychology

Description of Experiment:

In this experiment, you are to take on the role of an applicant during the hiring process. You will hypothetically be applying for a job that you consider to be highly desirable. In this process, you will be asked questions about yourself, and various aspects of the process, and you will be asked to take a test that has been designed to assess your basic skills.

The experiment is meant to look at your performance on the test and general impressions of the application process.

Estimated Time Required:

45 minutes

Risks and Benefits:

You gain exposure to questions that could be used in a real-world setting for selecting applicants for a position. This can be valuable if you are currently on the job market, or will be in the future. You will also be introduced to the process of conducting research in an experimental setting, if you have never participated in an experiment before. In addition, you have the chance of being awarded with multiple prizes for your participation.

You have been fully informed of the above-described procedure with its possible benefits and risks. The investigators will be available to answer any questions you may have. If, at any time, you feel your questions have not been adequately answered or you want to discuss the research, please contact the investigators (Smriti Shivpuri, shivpuri@msu.edu , #517-355-2171, or Dr. Ann Marie Ryan, ryanam@msu.edu, #517-353-8855). If you have questions or concerns regarding your rights as a study participant, or are dissatisfied at any time with any aspect of this study, you may contact – anonymously if you wish – Peter Vasilenko, Ph.D., Chair of the University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects (UCRIHS) by phone: 517-355-2180 or email: ucrihs@msu.edu. You are free to withdraw this consent and discontinue participation in this project at any time without penalty. If you choose not to participate in this study, alternatives are available (for those participating from the Psychology Subject Pool) from the subject pool for you to earn credit. If you choose to withdraw from the study prior to its completion, you will receive credit for the time you have spent in the study.

If you agree to participate, please sign your name at the bottom of this form. We also ask for your e-mail address and phone number so that we can contact you if you win a prize. It is important to recognize that you will be given a subject number for this experiment. The purpose of this subject number is to keep track of the various materials you will complete during the experiment. Please be assured that **all information you give us will be kept confidential**. Your privacy will be protected to the maximum extent allowable by law.

Your signature below indicates your voluntary agreement to participate in this study.

Name: _____

Date: _____

Signature: _____

Email: _____

Phone: _____

APPENDIX C

Protocol for Study

PROTOCOL FOR REACTIONS IN A SELECTION CONTEXT STUDY

BEFORE SESSION

Procedure:

Call and email subjects the day before their session is scheduled to remind them of location and time of session. Determine what condition will be run for that session.

Materials:

Make sure to bring these materials to test site:

- ☐ List of participants attending session/ sign-in sheet
- ☐ #2 Pencils
- ☐ Informed Consent Forms
- ☐ Debriefing Forms
- ☐ Scantrons (2)
- ☐ Experimental Packets (check for correct condition)
 - 1st Survey
 - Test
 - 2nd Survey
 - Feedback Form & 3rd Survey
- ☐ Timer (if necessary)

DURING SESSION

Greet participants as they enter and have them sign the sign-in sheet. Then ask them to sit one seat apart. Wait till **5 minutes** after scheduled session time to begin reading the protocol sheet.

“Hello, my name is _____, and I will be your proctor for today’s session. You all should be here for the study “Reactions in a Selection Context”, if you are not here for this study please leave at this time.”

LOOK UP AND PAUSE

“You will need a number 2 pencil during this session, please raise your hand if you do not have one.”

LOOK UP AND GIVE PENCILS TO THOSE WHO NEED IT

“We will now be passing out an informed consent form to you. Please read this form and sign at the bottom. Signing this form indicates that you agree to participate in the study today. Please look up when you have finished signing the form and we will collect it from you.”

PASS OUT INFORMED CONSENT FORMS AND COLLECT

“We will be passing out the first section of the experimental packet and a scantron to you at this time. The packet will be placed face down on your desk. Please do not turn it over until I tell you to do so.”

PASS OUT EXPERIMENTAL PACKET AND SCANTRON

“When you signed in for this study, you were given an experimental ID number. Please fill in this ID number on the scantron, and fill in the corresponding bubbles. If you have lost the paper that had your ID number on it and do not remember your ID number, please raise your hand. (PAUSE FOR PARTICIPANTS TO FILL IN INFO). Please turn to page one of the packet. On this page there is a list of four jobs and their descriptions. We would like you to now pick the job that you would like to have the most if you had to choose to take one for one year. Now, on the second page of your experimental packet, write down on the lines indicated, why you would choose this job over the other jobs. When you are done, please put your pencil down, and do not turn to other pages in the experimental packet.”

PAUSE FOR PARTICIPANTS TO FILL IN INFORMATION

“Now, we would like you to imagine that you are an applicant for the job that you just wrote down, and all the other people in this room are applying for the same job. Imagine that I am a representative of the company to which you are applying, and you have come

here today to take a selection test. Those who score well on this test will be hired, those who do not will be rejected for the position. This test is an established selection test used to measure cognitive ability, or intelligence. It is or has been used in the past by numerous companies including Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Stevenson & Associates, CEO International, and the National Football League. Therefore, there is a chance you have seen it before, or will see it again in the future.

After you take the test, you will receive feedback on whether you are hired or rejected for the position. While everyone will have their names entered into a lottery for the chance to win cash prizes of \$25, \$50, \$75, or \$100, only the top six scorers from every **three** sessions will have their names put into the lottery three times, for an increased chance to win. Therefore, you will be competing against people in other sessions. In addition, those who are the top scorers from each session will have their names put into a lottery for a chance to win a pair of free movie tickets, so you will also be competing against those in your own session. So, if you are not hired, chances are you did not score well on the exam, and so you are not likely to be entered into the other lottery or have an increased chance of winning. Does anyone have any questions?"

LOOK UP FOR QUESTIONS

"Before you take the test, please fill out the questionnaire we have passed out to you. This questionnaire begins on page 3 of the packet we have handed out to you. The questionnaire asks you questions about your general attitudes and preferences. Your responses will be kept confidential, so please answer as truthfully as possible. Mark your responses on the scantron provided, and raise your hand when you have finished filling out the responses. You may begin."

COLLECT QUESTIONNAIRES WHEN PARTICIPANTS ARE FINISHED, LEAVE SCANTRONS

"Now we will pass out the selection test to you. You will have 12 minutes to complete this test. I will mark the time remaining on the chalkboard, and will warn you when you have 2 minutes left. We will begin passing out the tests now, please keep them face down until I tell you to turn them over."

WRITE 12 MINUTES ON CHALKBOARD. IF RUNNING CONSISTENT CONDITIONS **SKIP** NEXT PARAGRAPH.

IF RUNNING INCONSISTENT CONDITIONS:

PICK UP TESTS, LOOK AT TESTS, APPEAR TO BE CONFUSED AND WHISPER TO ASSISTANT, THEN LEAVE ROOM WITH TESTS. RETURN 5 MINUTES LATER. IF PARTICIPANTS QUESTION THE ASSISTANT, THE ASSISTANT MUST ONLY SAY THAT THE EXPERIMENTER SAID SHE'LL BE RIGHT BACK AND TO STAY IN YOUR SEATS.

EXPERIMENTER SHOULD COME BACK WITH TESTS, AND SAY THE FOLLOWING **WITHOUT READING** DEPENDING ON WHAT CONDITION IS BEING RUN:

No Explanation/Consistent:

Pass out the tests. Then state “You will have 12 minutes to complete the test. Please start marking your answers on question number ____ on the scantron. Stop working when you have reached the end of the test, which will be marked by a STOP on a page in the packet. I will give you a 2 minute warning and let you know when time is over.”

No Explanation/Inconsistent:

Do not say anything, just erase the 12 minutes written on the chalkboard, write 7 minutes and tell them “You will now have 7 minutes to complete the test. Please start marking your answers on question number ____ on the scantron. Stop working when you have reached the end of the test, which will be marked by a STOP on a page in the packet. I will give you a 2 minute warning and let you know when time is over.” Then pass out test forms.

Neutral Explanation/Consistent:

“You will be given the 12 minutes to complete this test like the other groups have been given. We will let you know when you have 2 minutes left. You all should have the right form of the test. Please start marking your answers on question number ____ on the scantron. Stop working when you have reached the end of the test, which will be marked by a STOP on a page in the packet. This is an individual task, so please work on this independently. You may begin.”

Neutral Explanation/Inconsistent:

Erase the 12 minutes and write 7 minutes on the board. “Although the other groups were given 12 minutes to complete this test, you will not be. We mistakenly had the wrong forms for the test, so you will now have 7 minutes to complete the test. We will let you know when you have 2 minutes left. We cannot allow you to make up for the lost time, because then we will not have enough time for the rest of the measures. You all should have the right form of the test now. Please start marking your answers on question number ____ on the scantron. Stop working when you have reached the end of the test, which will be marked by a STOP on a page in the packet. This is an individual task, so please work on this independently. You may begin.”

Sensitive Explanation/Consistent:

“You will be given the 12 minutes to complete this test like the other groups have been given. We will let you know when you have 2 minutes left. We know that you have taken time out of your busy schedule to help us out, and please know that we really appreciate that. Thank you. You all should the right form of the test. Please start marking your answers on question number ____ on the scantron. Stop working when you have reached the end of the test, which will be marked by a STOP on a page in the

packet. This is an individual task, so please work on this independently. You may begin.”

Sensitive Explanation/Inconsistent:

Erase the 12 minutes and write 7 minutes on the board. “Although the other groups were given 12 minutes to complete this test, you will not be. We mistakenly had the wrong forms for the test, so you will now have 7 minutes to complete the test. We will let you know when you have 2 minutes left. We cannot allow you to make up for the lost time, because then we will not have enough time for the rest of the measures. We understand that this may be frustrating to you, and we sincerely hope this will not be a problem for you. We know that you have taken time out of your busy schedule to help us out, and please know that we really appreciate that. Thank you. You all should have the right form of the test now. Please start marking your answers on question number ___ on the scantron. Stop working when you have reached the end of the test, which will be marked by a STOP on a page in the packet. This is an individual task, so please work on this independently. You may begin.”

GIVE SUBJECTS A TWO MINUTE WARNING, AND TELL THEM TO STOP ONCE TIME IS OVER.

“Please stop. Make sure your name is written on the first page of the exam, and pass your exams to the front of the row. We now have some additional short questionnaires for you to fill out while we grade your exams. Please start marking your answers on scantron 2.”

PASS OUT QUESTIONNAIRES. FEIGN TO GRADE EXAMS WITH ASSISTANT. WRITE PARTICIPANTS NAMES ON FEEDBACK FORMS. WAIT UNTIL PARTICIPANTS FINISH FILLING OUT QUESTIONNAIRE.

“We have marked your exams, and will now pass you back feedback sheets letting you know how you did. After the feedback statement, there are a final set of questions to answer. You should begin answering these question on question number ___ on the scantron sheet. Once you are finished answering these questions, bring your scantron and your feedback form up to the front. PASS OUT FEEDBACK FORMS, AND CALL OUT NAMES WHEN HANDING BACK.

COLLECT SCANTRONS FROM THOSE WHO HAVE FINISHED AND THANK THEM FOR THEIR TIME. GIVE THEM DEBRIEFING SHEET.

APPENDIX D

Survey One

Company XYZ Application Form

Dear Applicant:

We have been informed that you are interested in applying for a position as an intern in our company. Because we have several partner organizations that are actively involved in our internship program, we have a variety of internship opportunities available for you if you are hired as an intern. Currently, there are four areas that have open positions available and we would like you to specify exactly which you would like to be considered for, so that we can best suit your preferences if you are hired. The four positions along with their descriptions are listed below.

Position 1:

Intern at WKYM Channel 5 News:

WKYM is a well-known news station that has had a successful internship program for many years. As an intern at this station, you would be involved in researching news developments, drafting news stories, and producing various segments in the program. Some interns have even had the opportunity of being a guest anchor for the morning show! Interns are currently needed in the entertainment and local events areas.

Intern at Magnetika Inc.:

Magnetika Inc. is a major Fortune 500 corporation that is well-respected nationwide. Working as an intern in this organization would be a great introduction into the business world. This company will give you the flexibility of choosing from a variety of business areas to work in including sales, marketing, human resources, accounting, etc. You would also have the opportunity to periodically sit in on executive board meetings.

Intern at Zephyr Org.:

Zephyr Org. is a research and development firm specializing in pharmaceutical and environmental work. As an intern at this organization, you would be an active participant in various activities, from researching the impact of various drugs, to traveling on-site to investigate environmental issues, drafting up reports of research results, and presenting information with your research group to top management. You will be exposed to various aspects of the research process as well as cutting-edge research that is being conducted in the areas of medicine and the environment.

Intern at GACW (Group for the Advocacy of Children's Welfare):

GACW is a non-profit organization that focuses on promoting the welfare of children in inner-city neighborhoods. As an intern with GACW you will gain experience in


community outreach programs, child welfare workshops, abuse counseling and educational initiatives. You will also learn how to draft reports and referendums to alter and improve current child welfare policy, and even have the chance to meet with some of the major political players in Congress who are actively involved in child welfare policy formation.

In order to better gauge your fit for the job, we would like you to list 1) the internship position you are seeking out of the list of four and 2) the reasons why you would like this job.

Position for which you are applying:

Why would you like to have this job over the other jobs?

STOP: PLEASE WAIT FOR INSTRUCTIONS TO BEGIN NEXT SECTION.



ATTITUDE AND PREFERENCES SURVEY

This survey is designed to measure your attitudes and preferences concerning various aspects of your life. All your answers on this survey will be kept strictly confidential, so please answer the following questions *as truthfully as possible*. If you have any questions, raise your hand and the test administrator will help you.

Mark your answers on the scantron provided. Please read the following statements as if they referred to *you*. Indicate your level of agreement with the statements listed below according to the following scale:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Don't Agree or Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects.
2. I feel comfortable using someone's first name soon after I meet them, even when they are much older than I am.
3. Even when I strongly disagree with group members, I avoid an argument.
4. I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact.
5. I do my own thing, regardless of what others think.
6. I respect people who are modest about themselves.
7. I feel it is important for me to act as an independent person.
8. I will sacrifice my self interest for the benefit of the group I am in.
9. I'd rather say "No" directly, than risk being misunderstood.
10. Having a lively imagination is important to me.
11. I should take into consideration my parents' advice when making education/career plans.
12. I feel my fate is intertwined with the fate of those around me.
13. I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people I've just met.
14. I feel good when I cooperate with others.
15. I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards.
16. If my brother or sister fails, I feel responsible.

TURN TO NEXT PAGE

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Don't Agree or Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree


17. I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my own accomplishments.
18. Speaking up during a class (or a meeting) is not a problem for me.
19. I would offer my seat in a bus to my professor (or my boss).
20. I act the same way no matter who I am with.
21. My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me.
22. I value being in good health over everything.
23. I will stay in a group if they need me, even when I am not happy with the group.
24. I try to do what is best for me, regardless of how that might affect others
25. Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me.
26. It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group.
27. My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me.
28. It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group.
29. I act the same way at home as I do at school.
30. I usually go along with what others want to do, even when I would rather do something different.

TURN TO NEXT PAGE

The following statements are related to the ability test you will be taking shortly. The “job” that is being referred to in these statements is the job that you listed on the first page of this packet, in other words, the internship position that you are applying for. Again, all your answers will be kept confidential, so please answer *as truthfully as possible*. Please indicate your agreement with the statements listed below according to the following scale:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Don't Agree or Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

31. I would like to be hired for this job.
32. It would be good to have this type of a job.
33. I want to get a job with this company.
34. If I do well on this test, I have a good chance of being hired.
35. I think I will be hired if I get a high test score.
36. How well I do on this test will affect whether I am hired.
37. The higher my test score, the better my chance of getting hired.
38. If I try to do my best on this test, I can get a high score.
39. If I concentrate and try hard I can get a high test score.
40. I can get a good score on this test if I put some effort into it.



APPENDIX E

Survey Two

APPLICANT EXPERIENCES SURVEY

Now that you've taken the test, we would like to know about your application experiences. Please indicate your agreement with the statements listed below according to the following scales. Please be as honest as possible.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Don't Agree or Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Not Applicable

IMPORTANT: PLEASE BEGIN MARKING ON QUESTION # 41 ON SCANTRON

41. Whether or not I get the job, I feel the selection process was fair.
42. Whether or not I get the job, the procedures used to select people for this job are fair.
43. Whether or not I get the job, I am satisfied with the selection process.
44. Overall, I feel dissatisfied with the way people will be selected for the job.
45. I would accept the job if it was offered to me.
46. I would not like to participate in future experiments like this one.
47. If I was offered the opportunity, I would take part in another experiment like this one.
48. I will continue to volunteer for experiments similar to this one.
49. If I hear about other projects like this, I would be interested in applying for them.
50. I would recommend this experiment to my friends.
51. I would tell my friends to participate in this experiment.
52. I would tell others this is a good experiment in which to participate.
53. I think other people should know this is a good experiment.
54. I would tell others that I enjoyed participating in this experiment.
55. I would tell others that this was a good experience for me.

TURN TO NEXT PAGE

Before you receive feedback on your performance on the selection test, we have a few more questions concerning your background, personality and preferences. As always, all your answers on this survey will be kept strictly confidential, so please answer the following questions *as truthfully as possible*. If you have any questions, raise your hand and the test administrator will help you.

Mark your answers on the scantron provided. Please read the following statements as if they referred to *you*. Indicate your level of agreement with the statements listed below according to the following scale:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Don't Agree or Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

31. When faced with a difficult personal problem, it is better to decide what to do myself, rather than follow the advice of others.
32. I enjoy meeting and talking to my neighbors everyday.
33. I can count on my relatives for help if I find myself in any kind of trouble.
34. What happens to me is my own doing.
35. If the group is slowing me down, it is better to leave it and work alone.
36. Even if their child won the Nobel prize, parents should not feel honored in anyway.
37. In most cases, to cooperate with someone whose ability is lower than oneself is not as desirable as doing the thing on one's own.
38. People at higher levels of an organization must look after those below them.
39. People at lower levels in a group or organization should carry out the decisions of people at higher levels.
40. The hierarchy of groups in a society should remain consistent over time.
41. People at higher levels should expect to have more privileges than those at lower levels.
42. People at lower levels in an organization should not expect to have much power.
43. One should live one's life independently of others as much as possible.
44. I would help, within my means, if a relative told me that he (she) is in financial difficulty. (In this questionnaire, "relatives" refer to those relatives who are *not* your next of kin. Uncles, cousins, grandmother fall into this category).


TURN TO NEXT PAGE

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Don't Agree or Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

45. I would rather struggle through a personal problem by myself than discuss it with my friends.
46. I like to live close to my good friends.
47. The most important thing in my life is to make myself happy.
48. I tend to do my own things, and most people in my family do the same.
49. Aging parents should live at home with their children.
50. What I look for in a job is a friendly group of coworkers.
51. One does better working alone than in a group.
52. Individuals should be judged on their own merits, not on the company they keep.
53. Organizations work best with clear and formal hierarchies.
79. What is your age?
- a. 18
 - b. 19
 - c. 20
 - d. 21
 - e. 22
 - f. 23
 - g. 24+
80. What is your gender?
- a. male
 - b. female
81. What is your year in school?
- a. freshman
 - b. sophomore
 - c. junior
 - d. senior
 - e. 5th year +
 - f. graduate
82. Which of the following best characterizes you?
- a. U.S. Citizen
 - b. Non-citizen – Canadian
 - c. Non-citizen – other

TURN TO NEXT PAGE

83. Is English your primary language?
- a. yes
 - b. no
84. What ethnicity do you consider yourself to be?
- a. Mexican American
 - b. Puerto Rican
 - c. Other Hispanic
 - d. American Indian or Alaskan native
 - e. Asian
 - f. Black/African American
 - g. Caucasian/White/Not of Hispanic origin
 - h. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
 - i. Other
85. How many years have you been in the United States?
- a. <1 year
 - b. 1-3 years
 - c. 3-5 years
 - d. 5-10 years
 - e. >10 years
86. What is your current cumulative GPA (grade point average)?
- a. less than 1.00
 - b. 1.00 to 1.49
 - c. 1.50 to 1.99
 - d. 2.00 to 2.49
 - e. 2.50 to 2.99
 - f. 3.00 to 3.49
 - g. 3.50 or greater
87. Have you had any work experience within the United States?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
88. How many times have you participated in a job interview?
- a. never
 - b. 1-2 times
 - c. 3-4 times
 - d. 5-6 times
 - e. more than 6 times
89. How many times have you had to take a test in order to get a job?
- a. never
 - b. 1-2 times
 - c. 3-4 times
 - d. 5-6 times
 - e. more than 6 times



**STOP: PLEASE WAIT FOR INSTRUCTIONS TO BEGIN NEXT SECTION. DO NOT
TURN THE PAGE.**

Now that you have received feedback on your performance, there are a few more questions we would like you to answer. You may see some of the same questions you have answered before, but please answer these according to how you feel currently. Again, please reply as honestly as possible because your answers will be kept confidential. Indicate your agreement with the statements below according to the following scale:

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Don't Agree or Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Not Applicable

90. I feel the selection process was fair.
91. The procedures used to select people for this job are fair.
92. I am satisfied with the selection process.
93. Overall, I feel dissatisfied with the way people were selected for the job.
94. Overall, I feel the results of the selection process were unfair.
95. I feel the hiring decision (accept/reject) was fair.
96. Overall, I am satisfied with the hiring decision.
97. I am dissatisfied with the test administrator's decision about whether or not to hire me.
98. Even if I was now offered the job, I would not accept it.
99. I would not like to participate in future experiments like this one.
100. If I was offered the opportunity, I would take part in another experiment like this one.
101. I will continue to volunteer for experiments similar to this one.
102. If I hear about other projects like this, I would be interested in applying for them.
103. I would recommend this experiment to my friends.
104. I would tell my friends to participate in this experiment.
105. I would tell others this is a good experiment in which to participate.
106. I think other people should know this is a good experiment.
107. I would tell others that I enjoyed participating in this experiment.
108. I would tell others that this was a good experience for me.
109. The explanation given for any problems during the selection process was adequate.

TURN TO NEXT PAGE

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Don't Agree or Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Not Applicable

110. I was satisfied with the explanation I received for a problem during the selection process.
111. I was given an *inadequate* explanation for a problem during the selection process.
112. I received an explanation for why I was given the amount of time I had to complete the test.
113. It was made very clear to me why I was given the amount of time I had to complete the test.
114. The test administrator(s) treated everyone politely during the testing process.
115. Test administrator(s) were considerate during the test.
116. Test administrator(s) answered questions in a straightforward and polite manner.
117. The testing administrator put everyone at ease during the test.
118. I was satisfied with the way everyone was treated at the test site.
119. The test administrators *did not* treat any applicants in an impolite manner.
120. The test was administered to all applicants in the same way.
121. There were *no differences* in the way the test was administered to different applicants.
122. The test administrator made no distinction in how he/she treated applicants.
123. I received the same amount of time as other people when taking the test.
124. I received less time than other people when taking the test.
125. I was treated differently than others who have taken this test.
126. The test administrator treated all applicants equally.

You have now completed the survey. Please give this booklet, your pencil (if borrowed from administrator) and your scantron to the test administrator. Thank you for your time!

APPENDIX F

Debriefing Form

Debriefing Form for Reactions in a Selection Context Study

Thank you very much for your participation in this study. The main purpose of this study was to examine how different cultural orientations affect how people perceive a selection process. Research has shown that there are certain “rules” that people expect to be upheld during a selection process, and if these rules are violated, people do not react as favorably to the selection process (Gilliland, 1993). This negative reaction can affect many of the individual’s behavioral intentions, including intentions to accept the job, intentions to recommend the company to others, and attractiveness of the organization (Macon, Avedon, Paese, & Smith, 1994; Smither, Reilly, Millsap, Pearlman, & Stoffey, 1993). What we wished to examine was how people’s cultural orientation affected whether they perceived the violation of certain rules to be negative or not.

Therefore, the selection test was given to you, not in order to see how it performed with individuals of different ages, but to see how your performance changed when rules were violated. Therefore, we gave individuals in certain conditions less time to take the test than others purposefully. If you were in one of these conditions, contrary to what we presented, we did not possess the wrong exam initially, this was used as an excuse to reduce the amount of time you had to complete the exam. We are sorry for this deception, but we felt it was necessary in order to present a realistic and believable situation in which some individuals received more time than others. You may have also experienced an instance when the test administrator was rude to a fellow test taker. This was also done to see how you would react to this situation, not because the test administrator was naturally short of temper. You also may have been told that you did not do well on the test you took. We actually did not score individuals’ performance on the exam during the experimental period, we simply presented negative feedback to all participants. Therefore, if you received negative feedback on your performance telling you that you would not be hired or entered into the lottery to win the prize, this was **FALSE, and NOT reflective of your TRUE performance on the test**. The reasoning behind giving everyone negative feedback was that we determined both through research and deduction, that it in situations where people are accepted for a job, they are much more likely to react positively, and other aspects of the application process will not be as important to them (Ployhart & Ryan, 1998). Consequently, we felt it would be more interesting and insightful to look at how individuals would react differently when they were rejected for a position. We are genuinely sorry for any distress this may have caused you.

Due to the nature of the manipulation, **ALL** individuals, not just the top six scorers, will have their names put into the lottery for the monetary prize **THREE** times. Also, we will score your performance on the test at a later date, and the **top scorers from each session** will have their names entered into the lottery for the free movie tickets. Therefore, you will be awarded for scoring well, and those of you who had less time will **NOT** be at a disadvantage, because you will be compared **ONLY** to those people who were in the same session as you. You will be informed at the end of data collection if you are a prize recipient or not through email.

Thank you again for your participation, and we please ask you to **PLEASE NOT** mention the nature of the manipulations or deceptions in the experiment to others who may participate in this experiment in the future. Sharing this information with others can bias the way they respond to the questions, and threaten the validity of the study we worked so hard to design. In addition, this could lead to the need for us to collect additional data, thereby reducing your odds of winning the prizes. We appreciate your help, and if you have further questions about this study in particular, or Industrial/Organizational Psychology in general, please do not hesitate to contact us (Smriti Shivpuri, shivpuri@msu.edu, or Dr. Ann Marie Ryan, ryan@msu.edu).

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