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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND ITS APPLICATIONS

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DEVELOPMENT ETHICS AS RECOGNITION: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND ITS APPLICATIONS

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ABSTRACT

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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND ITS APPLICATIONS

By

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Since the Second World War, developed countries have tried to improve the miserable plight of developing countries through development practices and theories, but these practices seem to aggravate the plight of developing countries, rather than improving them. In this reality, post-development theorists claim that development practices by developed countries should be abandoned. If this critique is interpreted appropriately, the claim of post-development theorists is to emphasize the respect deserved by developing countries as agents as well as recipients in the process of development. This emphasis on respect is one of the old themes that theories of distributive justice have tried to but failed to address, as seen in John Rawls's project to include self-respect and Nancy Fraser's perspectival dualism.

In order to examine whether established theories can subsume problems of respect or recognition, I critically analyze the Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth's redistribution-recognition debate in connection with Amartya Sen's capability approach. In my analysis, Sen's capability approach, which is today the most popular and influential theory of development ethics, may cause unintended results such as stigmatization because Sen's theory tends to value each person's degree of capabilities hierarchically and, on the basis of this hierarchical valuation, to distribute instrumental capabilities to the person directly. Fraser and Honneth also fail to subsume problems of recognition because Fraser's concept of recognition is so narrow that it cannot include other forms of misrecognition

and her dualism cannot escape the unintended result of stigmatization in her theory of redistribution. Although a framework of recognition seems to be appropriate in addressing the post-development critique, namely, subsuming problems of recognition in that this framework has reciprocal features of recognition, Honneth does not realize these reciprocal features fully in his theory because his theory depends on the struggle model exclusively and incorrectly.

In order to reveal reciprocal features of recognition more correctly, I try to reinterpret Hegel's idea of recognition, focusing on Hegel's later works—*Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), *Philosophy of Right* (1821), and *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Sprit* (1817/1830). Unlike Jürgen Habermas' and Honneth's interpretations, I argue that Hegel's later works are important and necessary in understanding Hegel's reciprocal recognition in that they show reciprocal features of recognition correctly. In my analysis of these three works, I argue that thanks to his later works, Hegel's idea of recognition can be understood in his social ontology of interdependence, in his substantial freedom, and in the cooperation of recognitive attitudes with recognition-favoring institutions. I call this interpretation of Hegel's recognition "development ethics as recognition" (DER) from a perspective of development ethics. I argue that DER not only effectively responds to the post-development critique, namely, subsume problems of recognition, but also is theoretically superior to other theories of development ethics. In addition, I argue that through its applications to four development issues—immigration, extreme poverty, education, and unresolved past wrongs, DER is superior to other theories such as rights-based theories, responsibility-based theories, and Sen's capability approach.

To Eunhye, Jungjin, Minjung, mother in law, and my parents

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Introduction

Development ethics: interdisciplinary and wide/narrow

Development ethics is a relatively new field.[1] It consists of ethical reflection on the moral issues that arise in the course of social, economic, political, and cultural development, since the Second World War.[2] In the relationship of development practice, the main tasks of development ethics are "to diagnose vital problems facing human societies, to guide public policy choices, and to clarify value dilemmas surrounding these problems and policies."[3] In these tasks, development ethics has two features.

First, development ethics consists of interdisciplinary research between development studies and philosophy/ethics. This is because development issues (e.g. poverty, violence, genocide, etc.) are economic, political, cultural, religious, etc., phenomena, requiring ethical examination. The focus of development theory and practice at an earlier period was on economic growth, particularly as measured by Gross National Product (GNP per capita) and, later, on the "Human Development Index," which includes social and cultural variables, and the "Human Development Freedom Index," which takes political participation and the rule of law into account.[4] For this reason, Denis Goulet

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[1] According to Denis Goulet, the systematic *ex professo* study of development ethics, except by a few philosophers such as L.J. Lebret working in isolation, had to await the 1987 birth of IDEA (International Development Ethics Association) in San Jose, Costa Rica. (1995, p. 5).

[2] Goulet defines development ethics as the examination of "the ethical and value questions posed by development theory, planning, and practice" (1977, p. 5). In the same vein, David Crocker defines it as "the normative or ethical assessment of the ends and means of Third World and global development" (1991, p. 457).

[3] Goulet, 1995, p. 6. Des Gasper says "development ethics looks at meaning given to societal 'development' in the broad sense of progress or desirable change, at the types, distributes and significance of the costs and gains from major socio-economic change, and at value conscious ways of thinking about and choosing between alternative paths and destinations. It aims to help in identifying, considering, and making ethical choices about societal 'development,' and in identifying and assessing the explicit and implicit ethical theories" (2004, p. xi).

[4] McCarthy, 2007.

claims, "development ethics borrows freely from the work of economists, political scientists, planners, agronomists, and specialists of other disciplines. Ethics places each discipline's concept of development in a broad evaluative framework wherein development ultimately means the quality of life and the progress of societies toward values expressed in various cultures."[5] Thus, development ethics without the help of other development studies is empty in that it has no practical purpose, while development studies without development ethics are blind in that they have no ethical guidance.

The second feature relates to the scope of development ethics. It is true that development ethics originates from a concern about the miserable plight of developing countries, but it is controversial that the scope of development ethics should be limited to only developing countries.[6] Some scholars argue that development ethicists should criticize human deprivation wherever it exists. For example, Amartya Sen argues, "the extent of deprivation for particular groups in very rich countries can be comparable to that in the so-called third world."[7] Others worry that if development ethics grew to be identical with all social ethics the result might be that insufficient attention would be paid to addressing development issues such as severe poverty in developing countries. However, both positions are not only closely related to each other in the context of globalization but also are not controversial anymore.[8] For example, in the context of

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[5] Goulet, 1995, p. 7.

[6] Crocker, 2005, p. 16; Gasper, 2004, p. 22.

[7] Sen, 1999, p. 21.

[8] The term "globalization" has only become commonplace since the late 20th Century. Although people frequently use this term in ordinary life, this term has been highly controversial in the academic arena. For example, scholars cannot agree whether globalization exists. According to David Held's analysis, the present debate concerning the definition of globalization can be classified into three groups: the skeptics, the globalists, and the transformationists. The skeptics argue that today's phenomenon of globalization is not at all new because, statistically speaking, the past, especially the period of 1890-1914, showed greater flows of capital and labor across borders. For skeptics, the nation-state still plays an important role in global society and, for this reason, the concept of globalization is only "a convenient myth" through which

globalization "Northern and Southern poverty reduction are linked; migrants from the South making money in the North send valuable remittances to their families back home but may also drain the South of able workers and displace workers in the North."[9] Thus, in the context of globalization, development ethics may have two senses: "wide" development ethics as global ethics, which criticizes human deprivation wherever it exists, and "narrow" development ethics, which addresses only the issues in developing countries.

A short history of development: economic development and human development

The age of development began with Harry Truman's inaugural address on January 20, 1949 when he presented the new "developed"/"undeveloped" dichotomy. Truman said, "we must embark on a bold new program for ... the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery ... they are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to areas that are more

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politicians and governments discipline their citizens to meet the requirements of the global marketplace in order to justify and legitimize the neo-liberal global project (Held and Anthony, 2003, p. 5). In contrast of the skeptics, the globalists claim that today's phenomenon is unique in history, because the width, the depth, and the strength of globalization are tremendous. In addition, they argue that, in this trend, transnational forces have weakened the nation-state and, instead, transnational agents such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) play an important role in global society. However, this debate between skeptics and globalists may not end because their contrast results from their different interpretation of agents in global society. In other words, the skeptics consider transnational agents as representatives of the nation state but the globalists believe that transnational agents are independent. For this reason, some scholars claim that there are the transformationists who seek to steer a middle way between the globalists and the skeptics. Transformationists argue that "it is not the case, on the one hand, that we have entered a completely new, unrecognizable era of transformation in the direction of a global economics, culture, and politics. Neither, though is it the case that nothing has changed" (Hayden and el-Ojeili, 2006, p. 15). This position seems to be the most persuasive among three positions: contemporary world interconnectedness is best viewed as something different from the globalization of previous periods, but we need to remain sober in our analysis of this specificity. However, this position is only an attempt to delay the analysis, rather than suggesting a critical assessment of globalization.

[9] Crocker, 2005, p. 10.

prosperous. For the first time in history humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the sufferings of these people."[10] The Truman doctrine initiated an age of new economic development. Since then, the goal of growth-oriented economic development theories has been to develop countries by generating and sustaining an increase in the country's gross national product (GNP). The experience of the 1950s and 1960s, when many developing countries realized their economic growth-targets but the standard of living of the populace remained for the most part unchanged, signaled that something was very wrong with this narrow definition of development.[11] During the 1960s and 1970s, many developing countries experienced relatively high rates of growth of per capita income but showed little or no improvement, or even an actual decline, in employment, equality, and the real incomes of the bottom 40% of their populations.[12] Finally, during the 1970s, economic development came to be redefined in terms of the reduction or elimination of poverty, inequality, and unemployment within the context of a growing economy. Despite giving some attention to inequality and making some commitment to resource redistribution, the economic growth paradigm policies introduced in the 1970s did not succeed in bringing about relatively rapid and large-scale improvements to the lives of the poor. The situation in the 1980s and early 1990s worsened further as GNP growth rates turned negative for many developing countries ,which, when facing mounting foreign-debt problems, were forced to cut back on their already limited social and economic programs.[13]

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[10] Truman [1949] 1964. (http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres53.html)
[11] Todaro and Smith, 2000, p. 14.
[12] Todaro and Smith, 2000, p. 15
[13] Todaro and Smith, 2000, p. 15.

In the mainstream of economic development, there was the gradual evolution of development concepts toward a "human development" conception, which includes the aspects of a decent human life, and away from a central focus on the growth of monetized activity. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) marked this idea of human development in the 1990 *Human Development Report.* In this human development paradigm, economic growth is at best a means towards human development. The 1996 report says, "human development can be expressed as a process of enlarging people's choices."[14] By the late 1990s, some of this idea was officially proclaimed by international organizations such as the World Bank.[15] This human development paradigm has been theoretically supported by Amartya Sen's capability approach, which offers one way of building on the strengths in basic needs discourse and extending its scope while avoiding its dangers.[16] Sen's capability approach has grown into a major focus in development ethics, including through research programmes in the United Nations' World Institute for Development Economics Research and the UNDP's annual *Human Development Report.*[17] Furthermore, the United Nations Millennium Project, the latest plan to end poverty, is also theoretically based on Sen' capability approach.[18]

In the current history of development, despite the contribution of development ethics to the human development paradigm, development policies do not improve the plight of developing countries. Since Truman's doctrine, developed countries spent $ 2.3 trillion on foreign aid over the last five decades and "still had not managed to get twelve-

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[14] The United Nations Development Program, 1996, p. 49.
[15] Gasper, 2004, p. 164.
[16] Gasper, 2004, p. 164. See Gasper (2004) chapters 6 and 7 and Fukuda-Parr (2003), for more information about the relationship between Sen's capability approach and basic needs approach.
[17] Gasper, 2004, p. 17.
[18] The relationship between Millennium Project and Sen's capability approach is seen in Gasper (2007).

cent medicines to children to prevent half of all malaria deaths ... to get four-dollar bed nets to poor families ... to get three dollars to each new mother to prevent five million child deaths." [19] In addition, the plight of developing countries seems to be aggravated more and more, rather than being improved. According to *World Development Report 2000*, worldwide poverty rose from 1.2 billion people in 1987 to 1.5 billion in 2000 and, if recent trends persist, will reach 1.9 billion by 2015. Whatever their diagnostic value may be, in this history of failure, established theories of development ethics such as Sen's capability approach seem to be powerless in effectively addressing development problems such as poverty. For this reason, post-development theorists such as Wolfgang Sachs declare that the era of development is "ripe to write its obituary."[20] Post-development theories argue that the project of development necessarily results in tragedy for developing countries, rather than bringing the prosperity that the project of development promises. In this tragic situation, a new approach or framework is called for to shed some light on the limitations of these other practico-ethical approaches.

Overview of the project

In my project, I have two purposes: one is negative and the other is positive. My negative purpose is to examine why established theories of development ethics are powerless in effectively addressing development problems. This examination could contribute to established theories of development ethics through adequately suggesting a way to respond to post-development theorists' critiques. My positive purpose is to

[19] Easterly, 2006, p. 4.
[20] Sachs, 1992, p. 1.

construct a theory of development ethics that can take these post-development theorists' critiques seriously.

In Part One, I theoretically propose a new framework of development ethics, "Development Ethics as Recognition" (DER), which is based on Hegel's idea of recognition. In my interpretation, I argue that post-development theorists claim that established development theories and practices necessarily result in psychological harms such as stigmatization, as well as material harms such as oppression, because they do not respect developing countries. Although this emphasis on respect is not a new topic, but one of the old themes in the category of distributive justice as seen in John Rawls's theory and the Axel Honneth-Nancy Fraser debate, it has not been fully realized in the history of distributive justice. Although the idea of recognition has reciprocal features, which are expected to address the post-development critique effectively, Honneth does not realize them fully in his theory because his theory depends on the struggle model exclusively and incorrectly. Thus, I reinterpret Hegel's idea of recognition in order to reveal reciprocal features of recognition more correctly. On the basis of my analysis of Hegel's later works, I propose development ethics as recognition (DER), which considers developing and developed countries as interdependent, and recommends fostering recognitive attitudes and establishing recognition-favoring institutions.

In Part Two, I examine whether DER can address development issues effectively from a practical perspective. I have chosen four issues, which directly arise in developing countries and are indirectly related to issues of global ethics: immigration, extreme poverty, education, and unresolved past wrongs. Dealing with each issue in the

framework of DER, I show that DER is superior to other theories such as right-based theories, responsibility-based theories, and Sen's capability approach.

Part One

Theoretical Framework of Development Ethics as Recognition

In Part One, I propose "Development Ethics as Recognition" (DER), which is based on Hegel's idea of recognition. In Chapter One, I show how significant the post-development critique of development is and how deep it is located in the tradition of distributive justice through examining John Rawls's idea of self-respect. I argue that the post-development critique is to claim that developing countries should be respected and it is not a new topic, but one of the old themes in the category of distributive justice, as seen in John Rawls's theory.

In Chapter Two, I argue that the post-development critique is not addressed in Nancy Fraser's perspectival dualism and Amartya Sen's capability approach. I also argue that Axel Honneth's theory of recognition, which is today the most popular and influential among theories of recognition, does not fully realize reciprocal features of recognition, which are expected to address the post-development critique effectively.

In Chapter Three and Four, I reinterpret Hegel's idea of recognition in order to reveal reciprocal features of recognition more correctly, focusing on his later works. I argue that development ethics as recognition (DER), which is based on this interpretation, does not only effectively respond to the post-development critique, but also it is theoretically superior to other theories of development ethics such as Sen's capability approach and Thomas Pogge's "Rawlsian resourcism."

Chapter One

Post-Development Critique and John Rawls's concept of Self-Respect

> "Development grew to be so important ... that many in the Third World began to think of themselves as inferior, underdeveloped and ignorant and to doubt the value of their own culture." [21]

1. Introduction

Post-development theorists such as Wolfgang Sachs declare that the age of development is "ripe to write its obituary."[22] They make the radical claim that the project of development, which has been practiced over 60 years, should be abandoned. According to their analysis, the theory and practice of imperialism in the 19th Century reappeared as the logic of development after the breakdown of the European colonial powers. Thus, the project of development necessarily results in tragedy for developing countries, rather than bringing the prosperity that the project of development promises. Sachs proclaims, "it is not the failure of development which has to be feared, but its success."[23] However, development ethicists and practitioners do not seem to hear post-development voices. This is because the post-development (PD) critique is interpreted as radical and contradictory. It does not suggest a positive program and it rhetorically

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[21] Escobar, 1995, p. 52.

[22] Sachs, 1992, p. 1. According to Jan Nederveen Pieterse, post-development theories have taken "the form of a position of total rejection of development, crystallizing in the 1980s around the journal *Development: Seeds for Change* and among intellectuals in Latin America (Esteva, Escovar), India (Nandy, Vishvananthan, Rahnema, Shiva, Alvares), Malaysis, France (Latouche, Vachon), Switzerland (Rist), Germany (Sachs), England (Seabrook). It has becomes prominent since it coaleseces with ecological critiques, in books such as Sach's Development Dictionary, and has since become a postmodern development genre" (1998, p. 361).

[23] Sachs, 1992, p. 3.

criticizes the overall concept of development. Although this neglect partially results from PD theories themselves, it would be unwise to ignore the PD critique without careful examination. This is because most PD theorists are from developing countries, which are the recipients, and it is useful to reflect upon recipients' opinions. Thus, it is necessary and important to examine the PD critique thoroughly and, if it is significant, to address it effectively in the area of development ethics.

In this chapter, I have two purposes. The first is to examine what the PD critique of development exactly means and in what sense it is significant. I argue that the PD critique should be understood to deny only economic goals and managerialistic means for development rather than denying development in itself. The second purpose is to show that the PD critique is closely related to a traditional theme of distributive justice. For this second purpose, I examine John Rawls's concept of self-respect, which responds to the PD critique but is not fully realized in his theory. This examination shows that the attempts to address the critique raised by PD theories are embedded in the tradition of distributive justice, although the critique has not been fully paid attention to.

2. Analyzing the Post-Development Critique

Post-development (PD) theories attempt to explain why previous development projects do not work and why they are not ethically desirable. They claim that previous development theories, including alternative development theories,[24] are based on Western values, which are not compatible with the values of developing countries. For PD

[24] Alternative development theories criticize the mainstream development paradigms such as economic development, but retain the belief in, and accordingly redefine the concept of development, privileging local and grassroots autonomy. Serge Latouche argues that "the three principal planks of 'alternative development': food self-sufficiency; basic needs; and appropriate technologies" (1993, p. 161).

theorists, alternative development theories, suggested in order to reform mainstream development theories, should also be abandoned although they are more participatory and people-centered because they also broadly share the same goals as the mainstream development theories have. PD theorists argue that alternative development theories are also based on "the same worldview which has produced the mainstream concept of science, liberation and development."[25] Although the line between alternative development and PD theories is "quite thin" in that both radically criticize the mainstream development theories, PD theories can be distinguished from alternative development theories by its insistence that development should be rejected entirely, rather than better implemented or reformed in specific ways.[26]

Specifically, PD theories claim that development practices have resulted in environmental destruction through the exploitation of natural resources, the destruction of indigenous culture through Westernization, and anti-democracy through managerialism that "involves telling other people what to do—in the name of modernization, nation building, progress, mobilization, sustainable development, human rights, poverty alleviation and even empowerment and participation (participatory management)."[27] In addition, in the process of development "millions of men and women were thus mortally wounded in their bodies and souls, falling *en masse* into a destitution for which they had never been culturally prepared ... [and] the famous economic gap between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' continues to reach ever more intolerable proportions."[28] PD theories

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[25] Pieterse, 2000, p. 181.
[26] Pieterse, 2000, p. 181.
[27] Pieterse, 2000, p. 182. I understand that managerialism is a position that forces others to do something without respecting their own autonomy and, thus, it is closely related to paternalism. According to PD theories, in this chapter I will use the term "managerialism."
[28] Rahnema, 1997, p. x.

argue for abandoning the project of development because it has resulted in both material and mental harms to developing countries and, instead, some propose "alternatives to development" as a positive program.

2.1 Two Interpretations of the Post-development Critique

PD claims may be meaningful, but if PD arguments are strongly interpreted—all development theories and practices should be abandoned— then, they can be criticized for two reasons. First, in the strong interpretation, PD arguments fall into self-contradiction. This is because alternatives to development, proposed as a positive program by PD theorists also implicitly include the overall concept of development that they criticize. Although PD theorists argue that development should be abandoned, they sometimes show their enthusiasm regarding the so-called New Social Movements and other grassroots organizations aiming to bring about change in their communities. According to Arturo Escobar, PD theorists "have hinted at the existence of a more or less coherent body of work that highlights the role of grassroots movements, local knowledge, and popular power in transforming Development."[29] On the one hand, PD theories support the project of improving people's lives, which can be understood in the concept of development. On the other hand, they criticize the overall concept of development. Thus, in the strong interpretation PD arguments are self-contradictory. Despite their rhetorical rejection, PD theorists' rejection cannot mean to reject the desirability of positive change, or ethical development, when they call for an abandonment of development.

[29] Escobar, 1992, p. 417.

Second, in the strong interpretation, PD theories are destructive rather than constructive. It is politically irresponsible that PD theorists do not suggest a more detailed description of what they mean by alternatives to development as their positive program.[30] Although PD theories do not suggest concrete alternatives to development, they seem to have in mind some life-styles, such as Gandhi's life-style or some natural adapted life-styles before the age of colonialism. For this reason, PD theories are often considered "romantic and nostalgic strands."[31] However, these life-styles are inappropriate as alternatives to development. This is because these life-styles are not possible in the era of globalization in which a society cannot be closed to others and in the situation of post-colonialism in which economical and psychological damages of ex-colonies have not been restored. Thus, this strong interpretation seems to be merely rhetorical and seems anachronistic.

If PD arguments are weakly interpreted—not all development theories should be abandoned—development problems may be able to be addressed within some development theories which can escape the PD critique. For example, Sally Matthews distinguishes post World-War II Development (PWWII D) and alternative development from the overall concept of development and attempts to reject only PWWII D, which is based on economic development by managerialism.[32] PWWII D has been criticized by both alternative development and PD theories because its method of managerialism does not respect local particularity and local autonomy. Thus, Matthews argues that alternative

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[30] Blaikie, 2000, pp. 1038-1039. See Nederveen Pieterse (1998, p. 364 and 2000, p. 88).
[31] Pieterse, 2000, p. 187.
[32] Matthews, 2004.

development theories, which are distinct from PWWII D theories, are not vulnerable to the PD critique.

Although Matthews's arguments can make PD theories escape from self-contradiction, I doubt that Matthews's support for all alternative development theories is justifiable because alternative development theories are not one homogeneous category and some alternative development theories could be vulnerable to the PD critique. Alternative development theories include all alternatives to the goals or the means of mainstream development. These theories could be logically categorized into three groups: the first group is alternative development theories, which are based on the same goals and different means of the mainstream development; the second group is those, which are based on different goals and the same means; and the third group is those, which are based on different goals and different means. The first group has been criticized by PD theories because their means finally come to be managerial and paternalistic under the influence of their economic goals. Although alternative development theories in this group claim that they are people-centered and NGOs-based, because their goals are not changed, then their means are eventually managerial. Jan Nederveen Pieterse's following quotation show wells this reality: "nowadays development managerialism not only involves states but also international financial institutions and the 'new managerialism' of NGOs."[33] The second group is also criticized by PD theories because of their paternalistic means. According to this weak interpretation, the main critiques of PD theories are about the economic goals of development and the method of managerialism. In other words, the PD critique means to deny both economic goals and managerialistic means for

[33] Pieterse, 2000, p. 182.

development. Thus, if there is an alternative theory to respond to the PD critique, it can be found in the third group of alternative development theories, based on both non-economic goals and non-managerialistic means. In the weak interpretation, the PD critique can be both significant and constructive.

2.2 Revisit the Post-development Critique

According to the weak interpretation of the PD critique, the PD critique does not fall into self-contradiction and also suggests guidance for an alternative theory, which can respond to the PD critique. That is, this alternative theory should be based on both non-economic goals and non-managerialistic means for development. To put their rhetorical critique differently, PD theorists may claim that developing countries[34] should be "subjects" in the process of development, deciding the goal and the means of development according to their own customs and culture. In other words, the PD critique is to emphasize the respect deserved by developing countries as agents as well as recipients. This corresponds with many PD theorists' intention, as seen in the afterward of *The Post-Development Reader*: "the contributors [to *The Post-Development Reader*] generally agree that the people whose lives have often been traumatized by development changes do not refuse to accept change. Yet what they seek is of a quite different nature. They want change that would enable them to blossom 'like a flower from the bud' ... that

[34] In my dissertation, I prefer the term "country," rather than the term "nation," "government," or "state" because I consider a country as an aggregation of persons, which should be understood not purely endogenously and not purely exogenously. This position involves continuous interaction between an exogenously representative government and an endogenously responsive citizenry. Thus, a country as an aggregation of persons can be considered an ethical subject, while a state or a government as an artificial body cannot be considered an ethical subject (Rawls, 1999b). It would be discussed again when explaining Hegel's social ontology in Chapter Four.

could leave them free to *change the rules and the contents of change*, according to their own culturally defined ethics and aspirations."[35]

Many development theorists and practitioners from developed countries have a strong moral commitment to helping developing countries, believing that they should transfer many things to the countries such as resources, knowledge, and money. In their strong commitment, they consider themselves the lone provider and consider the recipients the only needy ones, and their activities reveal these attitudes. The problem here is that their asymmetric attitude at the epistemic level as well as at the practical level necessarily results in psychological harms such as stigmatization or damage to recipients' self-respect. This is because recipients are excluded from addressing their own problems, and it makes them feel helpless and inferior. In addition, it results in material harms such as political and economic dependency. Recipients, in the loss of their self-determination, come to depend completely on providers' help in the process of development and to follow providers' guidance without criticism. A recent article in *Time* magazine, "Among the Starting in Ethiopia," shows how foreign aid, based on asymmetric attitudes, has made recipients dependent and powerless in Ethiopia, and the article shows how these psychological harms result in material harms.[36] According to this article, because of food aid Ethiopians did not try to develop local farming and came to depend completely on foreign aid for their survival. Thus, if a theory of development ethics would be ethically desirable to overcome the problems of asymmetric attitudes at the psychological level as well as at the material level, that theory should not damage the self-respect of developing countries and should take the recognition of developing countries seriously.

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[35] Rahnema, 1997, p. 384 (Original italics).

[36] *Time* (Aug 06, 2008). (http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1829996,00.html?xid=feed-cnn-topics)

3. John Rawls's concept of Self-Respect and the Post-Development Critique

I interpret that the PD critique is an emphasis on respect or recognition, which does not result in stigmatization (the violation of self-respect)—oppression/dependence (unequal power relation).[37] This interpretation shows how important a reciprocal relationship is in the process of development. This emphasis on respect or recognition seems to be not new or innovative, but one of the old themes as seen in the history of political philosophy, especially traditional theories of distributive justice. This is because some scholars have attempted to develop an overarching theory of distributive justice that is also sensitive to the harms of misrecognition and emphasizes the respect. To show the PD critique can be understood in connection with other political theories rather than as an isolated claim, I now examine how John Rawls, leader of the 1970s' normative ethics and justice revival,[38] paid attention to a theme of respect, or recognition, in distributive justice, and how his concept of respect relates to the PD critique.

3.1 Rawls's Confusion about and Explication of Self-Respect

In *A Theory of Justice*, several times Rawls expresses the importance of self-respect or the social bases of self-respect, as seen in his remarks such as "perhaps the

[37] In my dissertation, I consider stigmatization as a psychological harms and oppression/dependence as a material harm. Although some scholars argue that oppression has psychological aspects as well as material aspects (Cudd, 2006), in my discussion I understand oppression only as one of material harms, which results in economic and political dependence to distort poor people's choice or preference; employment discrimination; destruction or exploitation; segregation, and so on. According to Cudd's distinction, psychological oppression occurs when one is oppressed through one's mental states, emotionally or by manipulation of one's belief states, so that one is psychologically stressed, reduced in one's own self-image, or otherwise psychologically harmed. On the other hand, material oppression occurs when one's physical being is harmed by oppression, or one's material resources, including wealth, income, access to health care, or rights to inhabit physical space, are reduced by oppression. In addition, Cudd claims that psychological and material oppression mutually cause and exacerbate the effects of each other (2006, p. 24). Because I want not only to emphasize material harms but also to show the causal relationships between psychological and material harms, I use the term "oppression" from a material perspective.

[38] About his influence, Rawls's critic, Robert Nozick says "political philosophers must not either work within Rawls's theory or explain why not" (1974, p.183).

most important primary good," "a very important primary good," and "without it [self-respect] nothing may seem worth doing."[39] In spite of the emphasis in Rawls's theory, it is not clear whether he identifies primary goods as self-respect or the social bases of self-respect. In some parts, Rawls considers "self-respect" as one of the primary goods[40] and, furthermore, he describes it as "perhaps the most important primary good" or "a very important primary good."[41] In other parts, Rawls mentions the "social bases of self-respect" as one of the primary goods.[42] Nancy Fraser points out Rawls's confusion well: "John Rawls ... at times conceives 'primary goods' such as income and jobs as 'social bases of self-respect,' while also speaking of self-respect itself as an especially important primary good whose distribution is a matter of justice."[43]

In *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, Rawls admits his confusion: "[My] theory [of justice in *A Theory of Justice*] is ambiguous on this point. It fails to distinguish between self-respect as an attitude, the preserving of which is a fundamental interest, and the social bases that help to support that attitude."[44] Then, Rawls attempts to correct this confusion: "To highlight the objective character of primary goods, note that it is not self-respect as an attitude toward oneself but the social bases of self-respect that count as a

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[39] Rawls, 1999a, p. 386, p. 79, and p. 386.

[40] Rawls distinguishes five kinds of primary goods: (1) The basic rights and liberties, (2) Freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities, (3) Powers and prerogatives of offices positions of authority and responsibility, (4) Income and wealth, (5) "The social bases of self-respect, understood as those aspects of basic institutions normally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their worth as persons and to be able to advance their ends with self-confidence" (2001, p.59). Henry Shue classifies them into "the most important three general types of which he maintains to be self-respect, the basic liberties, and material wealth (62)" (1974, p.196).

[41] Rawls, 1999a, p. 386 and p. 79.

[42] Rawls, 1999a, p.54; 1993, p.82, 106, 180f; 2001, p.59.

[43] Fraser and Honneth, 2003, pp. 99-100 n34.

[44] Rawls, 2001, p. 60.

primary good."[45] Thanks to Rawls's explication, it is now clear that the social bases of self-respect are one of the primary goods, but self-respect is not a primary good. Still, Rawls's explication is not satisfactory in that he does not explain how self-respect as an attitude toward oneself is related to his theory and what role it plays in his theory of justice. On closer examination, it is doubtful that the social bases of self-respect are appropriate for being one of the primary goods in Rawls's theory.

3.2 Attitude to preserve a Fundamental Interest: Self-Respect

In spite of his explication, Rawls does not explain how self-respect as an attitude toward oneself relates to his theory and what role it plays in his theory of justice. Thus, in this section I limit my discussion to examine what sense and what feature Rawls's self-respect has in *A Theory of Justice*. Through this discussion, I will show that Rawls's idea of self-respect is understood as a Hegelian rather than a Kantian idea. In the next section, this understanding will be a basis for my arguments to claim that the social bases of self-respect are not appropriate for being one of the primary goods in Rawls's theory.

3.2.1 Two Senses of Rawls's Self-Respect in *A Theory of Justice*

In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls's self-respect seems to include at least two senses: the Kantian sense and self-respect as self-esteem.[46] First, Rawls mentions that self-respect is "a sense of one's own worth."[47] This remark seems to allude to respect in the Kantian sense, roughly as a confidence in one's dignity as a person and in one's status as

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[45] Rawls, 2001, p. 60.

[46] Rawls's identification of self-respect with self-esteem is distinct from other philosophers' distinction. For example, Avishai Margalit claims that "respect constitutes a ground for treating people equally, while esteem forms a basis for ranking people" (1996, p. 44)

[47] Rawls, 1999a, p. 79.

an end in oneself.[48] In his earlier paper, "Distributive Justice: Some Addenda (1968)," Rawls claims that the Rawlsian political system's tendency to support the social bases of self-respect acknowledge "the stronger variant of the Kantian idea, that is, the idea of always treating persons solely as ends and never in any way as means."[49] However, in *A Theory of Justice* does not emphasize this sense.

Second, in *A Theory of Justice* Rawls sometimes identifies "self-respect" with "self-esteem." After mentioning self-respect, Rawls claims that "the fact that justice as fairness gives more support to self-esteem than other principles is a strong reason for them to adopt it." [50] In addition, Rawls explains that "we may define self-respect ... to have two aspects. First of all ... it includes a person's sense of his own value [understood as] his secure conviction that his conception of the good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out. And second, self-respect implies a confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's power, to fulfill one's intentions. When we feel that our plans are of little value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure or take delight in their execution."[51] In other words, two aspects of Rawls's self-respect are confidence in one's determinate plans and capacities. This confidence is closer to self-esteem, rather than to self-respect in the Kantian sense.

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[48] It is controversial to explicate what Kant's respect really means. According to Stephen Darwall, some things Kant says must be interpreted in terms of appraisal respect and other things involve recognitive respect. According to Darwall's distinction of respect (1977, 2006, 2008), appraisal respect is grounded in an appraisal of the particular merits, virtues, values, capabilities, accomplishments, etc. of individuals, while recognitive respect is grounded in the recognition and appreciation of capacities, traits, or powers normally possessed by all persons. Still, there is a rough consensus about the "Kantian sense" of respect, which is considered as a confidence in one's dignity as a person and in one's status as an end in oneself. Thus, in this discussion I use the "Kantian sense" of respect, rather than "Kant's sense."

[49] Rawls, 1999c, p. 171.

[50] Rawls, 1999a, p. 386. Rawls says "the basis for self-respect in a just society is not then one's income share but the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and liberties" (1999a, p. 477). In this important quote, the term "self-respect" in the 1999 revisited version was the term "self-esteem" in the 1971 version. It would be an example to show that for Rawls two terms are exchangeable.

[51] Rawls, 1999a, p. 386.

Although Rawls's concept of self-respect includes at least two senses as seen above, Rawls's self-respect in *A Theory of Justice* is closer to the sense of self-esteem, rather than the Kantian sense. As will be argued in the next section, this sense of self-esteem closely relates to a communitarian or social feature of Rawls's self-respect.

3.2.2 Formation of Self-Respect

Rawls's self-respect has a communitarian or social feature. Jeanne S. Zaino argues that "self-respect is a communitarian aspect of Rawlsian justice in that one's sense of worth depends on validation from others in the community."[52] For this reason, self-respect relates to the respect of others. Rawls notes "our self-respect normally depends upon the respect of others. If we do not feel that our endeavors are honored by them, it is difficult for us to maintain the conviction that our ends are worth advancing."[53] However, by "others" Rawls does not mean everyone in the community at large, but our "associates" in voluntary associations, which he calls "social unions." Associations are made up of persons of similar abilities, natural assets, interests, and socio-economic status. In essence, they are made up of relative equals because the "internal life of these associations is suitably adjusted to the abilities and wants" of its members.[54] Thus, Rawls argues that "Justice as fairness has a central place for the value of community ... [and] we must eventually explain the value of community ... [and] to accomplish this we shall need an account of the primary good of self-respect."[55] This formative feature of Rawls's

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[52] Zaino, 1998, p. 745.
[53] Rawls, 1999a, p. 155.
[54] Rawls, 1999a, p. 388.
[55] Rawls, 1999a, pp. 233-234.

self-respect by the respect of others shows that his sense of self-respect is not limited to the traditional Kantian sense, based on human intrinsic value, i.e. human dignity.

As will be argued in Chapter Three, Rawls's self-respect with this communitarian feature is similar to Hegel's concept of recognition in that his self-respect relies on others' respect and includes the meaning of self-esteem. Still, Rawls's explanation of self-respect is limited to only one inter-human relationship of "universal egoism" while Hegel's recognition can apply to the three inter-human relationships: particular altruism, universal egoism, and universal altruism.[56]

3.3 Social bases of Self-Respect as a Primary Good

Although the social bases of self-respect are considered one of the primary goods according to Rawls's explication, this explication faces four problems. The first problem concerns the scope of social bases of self-respect. Because Rawls did not mention clearly what the social bases of self-respect are included in primary goods, the scope of the social bases of self-respect is controversial. Some argue that the basic liberties alone can be included in the social bases of self-respect. This position could be supported by the relationship between the basic liberties and the social bases of self-respect: "the basis for self-respect in a just society is not then one's income share but the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and liberties."[57] However, Rawls does not explain why

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[56] As will be argued in Chapter Three, recognition has three specific senses according to three different human relationships. Rawls's limitation of self-respect to one human relationship is necessary in his theory because Rawls's theory of justice is suggested to address only some problems among people who are rational and reasonable. This human relationship, to which Rawls's theory is applied, is similar to Hegel's "civil society," which is based on the principles of mutual exploitation and utility.

[57] Rawls, 1999a, p. 477. Interestingly, in this quote "self-respect" in the 1999 revisited version was "self-esteem" in the 1971 version. This is an example to show that Rawls's self-respect is exchangeable with self-esteem.

material wealth should be excluded from the scope of the social bases of self-respect.[58] Furthermore, it is doubtful that basic liberties without support of material resource can guarantee self-respect. Nir Eyal argues that "As noted by Gerard Doppelt, Joshua Cohen, and Catriona McKinnon, Rawls says that the basic liberties constitute social bases for citizens' self-respect in two ways: both by virtue of what the liberties 'affirm' about citizens and by virtue of the possibilities that the liberties 'guarantee' citizens."[59] If so, as suggested by Norman Daniels, material resources such as income and wealth could also affirm citizens' confidence in their own plans and capacities.[60] Eyal also claims that "Wealth as well as income and their equal distribution can convey the public's trust in the worth of all citizens' particular conceptions of the good and in their feasibility for those citizens—not invariably worse than do the basic liberties and their equality."[61] In the same vein, Rawls says, "men's sense of their own worth may hinge on their institutional position and their income share."[62] In addition, Rawls may implicitly open a possibility to include other primary goods in the scope of social bases of self-respect when he mentions "self-respect is most effectively encouraged and supported by the two principles of justice."[63] By limiting the scope to the basic liberties alone, Rawls does not have to mention the two principles of justice. For this reason, many scholars interpret the social

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[58] Henry Shue mentions that, because Rawls believes the incentive value of inequalities of wealth is beneficial to all, especially the least wealthy, he tries to break the psychological connection between wealth and self-respect although, because wealth is unequal, self-respect based on relative wealth is also unequal in existing societies (1974, p. 201). According to Shue, this is one of Rawls's assumptions.

[59] Eyal, 2005, p. 207. Rawls's this distinction is echoed in Doppelt's distinction between the 'formal content' and the 'material content' of the social bases of self-respect; in Cohen's distinction between 'recognitional' and 'resource bases of self-respect' in Rawls; and in McKinnon's distinction between the 'egalitarian' and the 'meritocratic' aspects of self-respect. See Doppelt (1981, p. 274); Cohen (1989, p. 737); Catriona Mckinnon (2000, p. 491-505).

[60] Daniels, 1975, pp. 275-276.

[61] Eyal, 2005, p. 208.

[62] Rawls, 1999a, p. 478.

[63] Rawls, 1993, p. 318.

bases of self-respect in connection with other primary goods. For example, Thomas Pogge claims that the social bases of self-respect include the basic rights and liberties, powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility, income and wealth, education, and so on.[64] In other words, the social bases of self-respect seem to be able to include other primary goods and more goods. This overlapping between other primary goods and the social bases of self-respect would be a problem in Rawls's theory in that it makes Rawls's arguments superfluous and it could result in many other problems, examined below.

The following problem is how the social bases of self-respect should be distributed in Rawls' theory. Someone may argue that the social bases should be distributed relevantly in the "Two Principles"[65] because Rawls sometimes mentions the relationships between the social bases of self-respect and the Two Principles although he does not suggest a concrete guideline for distributing the social bases of self-respect: "self-respect is most effectively encouraged and supported by the two principles of justice."[66] In some parts, Rawls seems to argue that the social bases of self-respect should be distributed according to the first principle when he emphasizes the relationship between the basic liberties and the social bases of self-respect. However, the first principle—the equal distribution of rights and liberties—alone does not affirm the worth of an individual's life-span. That is to say, the knowledge that one is free to pursue one's plan of life, whatever its end may be, is not sufficient for one to have the conviction that

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[64] Pogge, 1989, pp.161-164. See Michelman (1975).

[65] The first principle is, "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberties for all." The second principle is "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the great benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity" (Rawls, 1999a, p. 266).

[66] Rawls, 1993, p. 318.

one's plan of life is worthwhile. Material wealth is necessary and important for supporting self-respect. Rawls also admits that "self-respect is further strengthened and supported by ... the difference principle."[67] Thus, it is evident that the difference principle—"social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are ... to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged"—also helps to secure self-respect.[68] If this understanding is reasonable, it would be a problem for Rawls that he does not explain how the Two Principles work for distributing the social bases because Rawls's neglect or silence has resulted in scholars' confusion. For example, Pogge argues that the difference principle governs the distribution of the social bases of self-respect, while Michelman argues that the liberty principle, the opportunity principle, and the difference principle—each separately and all in their convergent impact—do.[69]

The more serious problem is that material resources for the social bases of self-respect seem to be distributed by another principle rather than the difference principle. I doubt that parties in the original position would agree on the difference principle for the distribution of the material bases of self-respect. Parties in the original position may agree on the equal distribution of the social bases of self-respect rather than the difference principle, because "without it [self-respect] nothing may seem worth doing ... [and] the parties in the original position would wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect."[70] As seen in this quote, if self-respect is too important and it should be supported by material distribution there is no reason to choose the difference principle, and it would be reasonable to agree on the equal distribution of

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[67] Rawls, 1993, p. 318 and p. 326.
[68] Rawls, 1999a, p. 266.
[69] Pogge, 1989, p. 162; Michelman, 1975, p. 346.
[70] Rawls, 1999a, p. 386.

material bases for self-respect because the material bases of self-respect are as important as liberty. If this critique is reasonable, it means that Rawls' theory needs an additional principle such as equal distribution of material resources. If so, it would be a fatal weakness for Rawls's justice as fairness.

The last problem is about the role of the social bases of self-respect in Rawls's theory. In the preface of *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls mentions that he "eventually included an account of self-respect as a primary good to try to deal with ... the priority of liberty" in his lexical ordering (1971, p. x; 1999a, p. xix). This quote means that without the social bases of self-respect, for example, the lexical priority of liberty could not be guaranteed. However, based on his careful interpretation on the section 82 of *A Theory of Justice*, Robert S. Taylor argues that the social bases of self-respect make a strong case for assigning the basic liberties a high priority, but not a lexical priority.[71] This is because Rawls does not explain why very small restrictions on the basic liberties would threaten the social basis of self-respect so long as they were equally applied to all citizens. Such restrictions would involve no subordination and, being very small, would be unlikely to jeopardize the central importance of equal citizenship as a determinant of status. Thus, the social bases of self-respect do not guarantee a lexical priority of liberty. For this reason, the role of the social bases of self-respect is doubtful.

In summary, according to Rawls's explication, the social bases of self-respect are considered one of the primary goods. However, this interpretation has four problems: first, the scope of social bases overlap with other primary goods; second, Rawls does not suggest a concrete guideline for distributing the social bases of self-respect; third, the

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[71] Taylor, 2003, p. 250.

social bases of self-respect need an additional principle for equal distribution of material resources; and fourth, the social bases of self-respect do not guarantee a lexical priority of liberty. These are respectively against the economy of Rawls's arguments, the role of Rawls's Two Principles, the division of labor in Rawls's Two Principles, and his role of social bases of self-respect. Therefore, in spite of Rawls's explication in *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (2001) Rawls's social bases of self-respect is problematic as one of primary goods.

3.4 Implications

In spite of Rawls's explication in *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (2001), as examined above, it is not clear how Rawls's self-respect as an attitude to preserve a fundamental interest is related to Rawls's theory. Moreover, Rawls's social bases of self-respect are problematic if they are one of primary goods. For this reason, it seems to be more logically consistent to abandon the concept of self-respect in Rawls's theory. Still, Rawls does not abandon this concept, but tries to support it. In this section, I hypothesize two reasons why Rawls does not abandon the concept of self-respect although this concept is not in harmony with his other ideas.

The first reason is that the concept of self-respect is the vital idea to ordinary people. Ironically, when this strict distinction between self-respect and the social bases of self-respect are not taken seriously, Rawls's rhetorical expressions about self-respect or the social bases of self-respect are more persuasive and understandable. This is because ordinary people intuitively agree that self-respect is very important in their lives and social resources should be distributed to guarantee self-respect. People would agree that

"without it [self-respect] nothing may seem worth doing" (1999a, p. 386). To ordinary people, this idea may suggest that Rawls's distributive justice must support self-respect and social bases should be arranged to support self-respect. In the same vein, Michelman argues that confirmation and nurture of self-respect are the end and objective of all the principles of justice taken together in Rawls's theory.[72]

The second reason Rawls does not abandon the concept of self-respect is that the concept of self-respect is expected to resolve some unintended results that Rawls's distributive justice could cause. For example, in Rawls's theory "the least advantaged" could be stigmatized when they are singled out as recipients of material compensation. As Elizabeth Anderson admits, "merely noticing that someone is being unjustly treated can be wounding to the victim" and "this is a difficulty with all theories of justice," whether a theory of distributive justice is based on the principle of compensation or not.[73] Rawls expects that an account of self-respect could deal with the relevance of status and other questions, including those of society as a social union of social unions and the priority of liberty.[74] This expectation implies that with the concept of self-respect Rawls may want to address unintended results such as stigmatization, which his theory could cause: "in applying the difference principle we wish to include in the prospects of the least advantaged the primary good of self-respect."[75]

These implications show that Rawls's distributive justice should support citizens' self-respect because the concept of self-respect is not only a vital idea for ordinary people, but also can address some unintended results, which Rawls's theory may cause. Although

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[72] Michelman, 1975, p. 346.
[73] Anderson (forthcoming).
[74] Rawls, 1999a, p. xix.
[75] Rawls, 1999a, p. 318.

Rawls might have known that self-respect is intuitively significant, Rawls does not realize this intuition in his well-organized distributive justice because there may be no room for a new intuition of self-respect in his theory or it may be impossible to realize his intuition about the significance of self-respect in the framework of distributive justice.[76] Although Rawls's concept of self-respect fails to be fully realized in his theory, it shows that Rawls paid attention to the idea of self-respect, or recognition in his distributive justice, and might have attempted to address a kind of the PD critique. This is because as examined above, the PD critique is to emphasize the respect deserved by developing countries as agents as well as recipients, as Rawls considers self-respect the most important one.

4. Conclusion

I have argued that in my weak interpretation, the PD critique means to deny the economic goals and the managerial means for development, which result in stigmatization (the violation of self-respect)—oppression/dependence (unequal power relation). To put it differently, the PD critique is to emphasize the respect deserved by developing countries as agents as well as recipients. Thus, an ethically desirable theory of development ethics should be able to address the PD critique and should respect developing countries as agents as well as recipients.

I have also argued through examining Rawls's concept of self-respect that Rawls might realize the significance of respect and attempt to include this concept in his theory, but he did not fully realize this attempt in his work. Through this discussion, I show that

[76] This issue will be indirectly discussed in Chapter Two, through examining the Honneth-Fraser debate about redistribution and recognition in connection with Sen's capability approach.

the PD critique is not isolated because the PD critique can be placed in the established theories of distributive justice. In other words, the emphasis on self-respect that the PD critique strives for is one of the old themes that theories of distributive justice have tried to address but they have failed as seen in my analysis of Rawls's concept of self-respect. In Chapter Two I will examine how the PD critique has been discussed among contemporary political philosophers.

Chapter Two

"Redistribution vs. Recognition" and Capability Approach

"Recognition ... is a vital human need."[77]
"Each sees and loves himself in the others so that all will be better united"[78]

1. Introduction

In Chapter One, I examined how the post-development (PD) critique is related to John Rawls's work, *A Theory of Justice*, which has been considered as the primary work for modern distributive justice. I argued that the PD critique is to emphasize the respect deserved by developing countries as agents as well as recipients and this emphasis is also seen in Rawls's concept of self-respect. Rawls's concern of self-respect shows that the PD critique can be placed in the traditional theory of distributive justice rather than being an isolated voice. After that, however, the concern of self-respect/respect or recognition[79] has been neglected, or at least has not been issued or explicit, for a long time in the area of political and moral philosophy.[80] Recently the issue of recognition has been added to discussions of redistribution in the area of political philosophy and, in this tendency,

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[77] Taylor, 1995, p. 226.

[78] Rousseau, "Letter to M. D' Alembert" 126.

[79] As seen in Chapter One, Rawls's concept of self-respect is similar to a Hegelian idea of recognition, rather than a Kantian idea. This is because Rawls's self-respect is necessarily related to other-regarding respect, rather than being based on human dignity. In order to emphasize this Hegelian feature of Rawls's self-respect and to connect Rawls's self-respect/respect to contemporary debates, from now on I will use the term "recognition" instead of the term "self-respect/respect."

[80] Fraser argues that their attempts fail although "many distributive theorists [such as Rawls, Ronald Dwork, and Sen] appreciate the importance of status [as one example of respect or recognition] over and above material well-being and seek to accommodate it in their accounts" (2003, pp 99-100).

someone such as Fraser claims in haste that a "cultural turn" of recognition from redistribution has begun.[81] This is because in real life, recognition has been emphasized, as seen in many social movements for the respect of difference concerning cultural identity, national identity, race, gender, and so on. These social movements have happened during a lot of cultural conflicts, which have arisen revolving around sexual orientations, racial categories, national identities, ethnic group identifications, and religious movements, in the disintegration of Soviet Communism and the breakdown of the European colonial powers. Within these movements, Fraser and Honneth have debated about the relationship between redistribution and recognition in the area of philosophy.[82] From a broader perspective, more philosophers as well as scholars in other areas have attended this debate.[83] Thanks to these debates and social movements, most people now agree to take recognition seriously in the same manner as redistribution.

In this chapter, I examine how the PD critique is related to the contemporary discussion of justice. Specifically, the purpose of this chapter is to examine whether Amartya Sen's capability approach, Nancy Fraser's perspectival dualism, and Axel Honneth's monism, which lead the contemporary debate between redistribution and recognition, take recognition (or respect) seriously, which seems to respond to the PD critique. For this purpose, I examine whether Fraser's and Thomas Pogge's critique against Sen's capability approach is relevant. Then, I examine which one can suggest a framework to address the PD critique, overcoming stigmatization—oppression, among Fraser's perspectival dualism and Honneth's monism.

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[81] Fraser, 1997.

[82] Fraser and Honneth, 2003.

[83] In the area of philosophy, they are Iris Marion Young (1990), Brian Barry (2000), Judith Butler (1998), Charles Taylor (1992/1995), Will Kymlicka (2007), etc. *Culture and Economy After the Cultural Turn* (1999) shows that many social scientists are interested in this debate.

2. Amartya Sen's Capability Approach and Recognition

Amartya Sen's capability approach (CA) is a broad normative framework for the evaluation of individual well-being and social arrangements.[84] The core characteristic of Sen's CA is its focus on what people are effectively able to do and to be, that is, on their capabilities.

Sen argues that development should not be understood ultimately as economic growth, industrialization, or modernization, which are at best means for the expansion of people's valuable capabilities and functionings. This is because people need different amounts and different kinds of goods to reach the same levels of well-being or advantage, because differences in age, gender, special talents, disability, proneness to illness, and the like can make different people have quite divergent substantive opportunities even when they have the very same amount of resources or goods. For this reason, in Sen's CA goods should be differently distributed in order to reach equality according to people's human diversity, different from other theories which argue that equality can be guaranteed by equal distribution of resources or goods.

2.1 Nancy Fraser's and Thomas Pogge's critique against Capability Approach

In a footnote, Fraser claims that standard theories of distributive justice, including Sen's capability approach (CA), cannot adequately subsume problems of recognition, although they seek to accommodate problems of recognition in their accounts.[85] This is

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[84] This brief introduction of Sen's capability approach is based on Robeyns' 2005 article.

[85] Fraser and Honneth, 2003, p. 100 n34. I limit my discussion to Amartya Sen's capability approach, rather than dealing with other capability approaches such as Martha Nussbaum's. This is because Fraser's critique is not only limited to Sen's capability approach, but also I believe that Sen's capability approach is better than Nussbaum's. Nussbaum's capability approach is controversial in that, while Sen does not suggest a

because Fraser says, Sen wrongly believes that "a just distribution of resources and rights is sufficient to preclude misrecognition"[86] although he "considers both a 'sense of self' and the capacity 'to appear in public without shame' as relevant to the 'capability to function,' hence as falling within the scope of an account of justice that enjoins the equal distribution of basic capabilities."[87] Although Fraser's remark is insightful, she does not explain why Sen's CA does not subsume problems of recognition.

Pogge's critique of Sen's CA may illuminate Fraser because of Pogge's attention to detail.[88] Pogge criticizes Sen's CA, questioning its ability to specify a plausible criterion of distributive justice that avoids stigmatizing recipients of the naturally less well-endowed.[89] This is because, while other resourcist theories are supported by the conception of natural inequality as "horizontal," Sen's capability approach requires that natural inequality be conceived as "vertical" or hierarchical in that recipients are naturally endowed with deficient and inferior traits.[90] For example, although a claimant has a naturally disadvantaged endowment and other advantaged endowments, she is made to say that overall she is more disadvantageously endowed than others, in order to justify her claim in justice. In other words, the claimant should claim that her endowments are

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specific list of capabilities, she suggests her list through her overlapping consensus, which is based on controversial Aristotelian assumptions such as human dignity. My doubt is well seen in Sharath Srinivasan's remark: "Nussbaum's list and her approach, however much she qualifies it as intentionally vague and open to revision, has been the subject of criticism on philosophical and political grounds as being, variously, unavoidably based on fundamental metaphysical assumptions and of contestable prioritization (Fabre and Miller 2003), western-liberal-centric (Stewart 2001), undemocratic in genesis (Peter 2004), and lacking legitimacy (Robeyns 2004)" (p. 5).

[86] Fraser and Honneth, 2003, p. 34.

[87] Fraser and Honneth, 2003, p. 100 n34.

[88] Pogge, 2002a. Pogge and Fraser take the same position to criticize Sen's CA, while they differ in evaluating other resourcist theories, especially Rawls's justice as fairness.

[89] Pogge, 2002a, p. 206.

[90] Pogge, 2002a, p. 205. A horizontal conception of human natural diversity is based on a belief that human beings differ from one another in countless ways in their mental and physical features and this diversity makes all our lives enriched. Thus, in this horizontal conception, human natural inequality is characterized not as inferior or deficient, but as diversity.

inferior, overall, to those of most others and she should be officially singled out by her society for special compensatory benefits reserved for the disadvantageously endowed. Thus, Pogge argues that Sen's CA does not pay attention to recognition and necessarily results in stigmatization-oppression.

2.2 Capability Approach Responses

Fraser and Pogge claim that Sen's CA does not subsume problems of recognition and, furthermore, results in stigmatization—oppression. Capability theorists respond to Fraser's and Pogge's critique, arguing that it misunderstands CA. In addition, capability theorists argue that thanks to CA's goal to foster agency and CA's concern of human diversity, CA can subsume problems of recognition.

2.2.1 The first response using intrinsic value of capabilities

Pogge claims that CA results in stigmatization—oppression because CA is concerned only with institutional distribution of resources. However, capability theorists may argue that it is a misunderstanding because capabilities are not only instrumental but also intrinsic.[91] Instrumental value in the CA sense holds that institutions should provide individuals with the resources they need in order to achieve a certain level of functionings according to their diversity. Although many capabilities have this value, capability theorists argue that capabilities are not all instrumental values. This is because capabilities are a type of freedom, and as such they are intrinsically valuable. According to Sen, "capabilities are ... the substantive freedom to achieve alternate functioning

[91] For example, in her dissertation Lori Keleher (2007) claims that Pogge misunderstands the capability approach because he ignores the central idea of capability approach, agency.

combinations."[92] Capabilities consist of both intrinsic and instrumental values. While the latter is institutionally distributed, the former is not distributed, but is empowered for promoting "agency."[93] In this understanding, to respond to Pogge's critique against Sen's CA, capability theorists may argue that the main goal of CA is to foster agency through distribution of instrumental capabilities and through empowerment of intrinsic capabilities. While Pogge and Fraser consider CA to be only one of the standard theories of distributive justice, capability theorists may claim that CA has a dualistic strategy to foster agency through distribution and empowerment and in this dualistic strategy, unintended side-effects such as stigmatization can be resolved. This is because capability theorists believe that by fostering agency CA empowers people and makes it less possible to negatively stereotype them. For example, Kevin Olsen claims that public policy can empower intrinsic capabilities without stigmatization: "supporting the agency of disadvantaged people can counteract public perceptions of them as lazy, dependent, or incompetent. Regardless of whether these stereotypes are accurate or not, they are harder to hang on to if public policy works actively to falsify them."[94]

At first glance, this response seems plausible because Pogge does not notice the role of intrinsic value and empowerment, which could resolve unintended side-effects such as stigmatization. On close examination, however, this response is not relevant for

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[92] Sen, 1999a, p. 75.

[93] I deal with Sen's agency as the intrinsic value of capability. Sen says that "I am using the term 'agent' ... in its older – and 'grander' – sense as someone who acts and brings about change" (1999, pp. 14-15). Crocker explains Sen's concept of agency in detail: "we exercise agency or control not when our goals are merely realized but when, in addition, we *intentionally* realize or contribute directly or indirectly to the realization of our goods" (2008, p. 156). Although Martha Nussbaum does not follow Sen's distinction between agency and well-being and does not use the term "agency" in her works, I consider Nussbaum's capability approach also has the meaning of agency because her list of "central human functional capabilities" includes "practical reasoning" (2000, pp. 78-80). Thus, I will not deal with Nussbaum's concept of agency separately.

[94] Olsen, 2001, p. 22.

three reasons. First, I wonder whether it is possible to promote agency through distribution of instrumental capabilities without stigmatization. If agency as intrinsic capability is to be promoted through distributing instrumental capabilities, I think that distributing instrumental capabilities may result in unintended stigmatization in that they should consider recipients deficient for distribution. As Pogge pointed out, in order to decide who will be a recipient, CA should vertically or hierarchically evaluate people's natural endowments and select out a person for special compensatory benefits reserved for the disadvantageously endowed. In this process, the recipient necessarily would be stigmatized as deficient and inferior.

Olsen may respond to this critique, arguing that this kind of stigmatization is "only a transitory evil, one aimed at its own termination. So we should not expect the same kind of backlash that results from the chronic end-state redistributions of the liberal-democratic welfare state. Capability distributions are different, because they use short-term, targeted distribution in the service of long-term equality and solidarity."[95] Olsen's response is based on his optimistic belief that this kind of evil is only temporary and insignificant, rather than relying on any persuasive arguments. Regretfully, there is historical evidence that this belief is wrong. Even a small evil not only has a great influence on the current generation, but also transmits its negative influence to future generations, as will be shown in Chapter Eight. For example, many dictators in developing countries claim that their dictatorship is indispensible to achieve some goals of democracy and prosperity as a transitory evil, but developing countries experience how profoundly this evil causes damage to society. Therefore, I do not believe that it is

[95] Olsen, 2001, p. 29.

possible to promote agency through distribution of instrumental capabilities without stigmatization.

Second, capability theorists do not take how to promote agency through empowerment seriously. Despite their emphasis on agency, many capability theorists do not explain in detail how to promote agency through empowerment and how public policy promotes this type of agency. Although some theorists may allude to education as a way to promote agency, even those capability theorists do not explain how education promotes agency in detail.[96] They may assume that education in itself is the absolute good and education can automatically promote agency through empowerment. However, as will be examined in Chapter Seven, education can result in side- and negative effects as seen in colonial education and, for this reason, educational policies should be carefully implemented. Thus, to allude to education as a way to promote agency, without explanation, is not enough to respond to the claim that capability theorists do not take seriously how to promote agency through empowerment.

On the other hand, someone may claim that Sen's recent emphasis on democracy could be a way to foster agency through empowerment. David Crocker claims that "Sen has appropriately supplemented his earlier emphasis on capability and functioning with his more recent underscoring of agency and public discussion [democracy]."[97] However, it is doubtful that public discussions or democracy can automatically work in developing countries without a prior establishment of a minimum level of social foundation. Although Sen's concern is that society should choose its values, capabilities, and

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[96] Lori Keleher mentions education as a way of empowerment but she does not explain it in detail (2007). Recently, some capability theorists began to investigate the topic of education from a perspective of CA (Unterhalter and Walker, 2007). Their views will be critically examined in Chapter Seven.
[97] Crocker, 2008, p. 283.

standards of justice for itself, he concedes that the very act of participating effectively in such choice should be guaranteed by a prior condition of adequate and fair protection. Otherwise, people may make a politically disadvantaged choice according to their "adaptive preference," a disadvantaged choice that results from the disadvantaged circumstances.[98] In the same vein, Sen also admits that "since participation requires knowledge and basic educational skills, denying the opportunity of schooling to any group – say, female children – is immediately contrary to the basic conditions of participatory freedom."[99] Public discussions or democracy could be inhibited by the lack of protection of key entitlements required for equality of political capability. It is not hard to see that the underfed, undereducated, and socially oppressed might find it hard to take democratic opportunities let alone fully reason their desires and then have a reasonable expectation of influencing social policies. Still, Sen does not deal with democracy in detail, especially how to establish a minimum level of social foundation for democracy in the context of developing countries.

Someone may respond to this critique, arguing that a minimum level could be achieved through redistribution of resources or capabilities. However, as seen above, if redistribution is applied to people directly, it could result in psychological harms such as stigmatization, and for this reason, a policy for redistribution should be carefully implemented. However, CA does not distinguish this point in its redistribution of resources; furthermore, CA tends to prefer redistribution to a person, rather than to an institution, as will be examined in the next section, because of its emphasis on human diversity. Thus, democracy without detail strategies cannot be a response to my critique

[98] Sen, 1999a, pp. 62-63.
[99] Sen, 1999a, p. 32.

that capability approaches do not take seriously the way to promote agency through empowerment.

Third, I doubt that even if agency is enhanced, stigmatization by redistribution can be offset. Capability theorists claim that within the capability approach, the people empowered as agents are not only recipients of resources, but are also active critics and shapers of formal institutional policies as well as informal institutional cultural practices and social values.[100] Capability theorists may believe that stigmatizations, in which distribution of instrumental capabilities results, can be removed through empowerment of intrinsic capabilities. However, this belief is too optimistic because it is also possible that enhanced agency is offset by stigmatization as seen in many colonial policies to control people's agency by redistribution. For example, during the period of colonialism, many educated Koreans, who had an opportunity to enhance their agency through education, gave up their agency in order to receive some economic benefits from the Japanese government, although they felt ashamed or humiliated. Many educated Koreans passively served the Japanese government, whether their service was direct or indirect, rather than criticizing colonial policies or shaping cultural practices.

For these reasons, I argue that CA's dualistic strategy does not respond to Pogge's and Fraser's critique effectively. Someone may try to respond to these critiques, arguing that it is possible for CA to distribute resources without resulting in psychological harms such as stigmatization because of CA's core feature of human diversity. This response will be examined in the next section.

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[100] Keleher, 2007, Chapter Two.

2.2.2 The second response using CA's feature of human diversity

The second response is related to the main feature of CA, human diversity. Ingrid Robeyns argues that "the capability approach's intrinsic attention to human diversity, and the impact of social, environmental, and individual conversion factors on a person's well-being, allow us to incorporate aspects of distributive justice as well as issues of recognition."[101] She may believe that CA can incorporate the issues of recognition in that it sufficiently pays attention to human diversity.

CA criticizes equal distribution of resources, because this equal distribution can still leave much inequality in our ability to do what we would value doing. For example, a disabled person cannot function in the way an able-bodied person can, even if both have exactly the same resources such as income. According to CA, in order to achieve equality in the space of functioning ability or well-being, each person's different ability to convert resources to achievements should be carefully considered. Although CA's attention to human diversity seems to incorporate the issues of recognition, it is not so. Furthermore, CA's attention to diversity may cause unintended results such as stigmatization. The problem here is that CA's attention to human diversity is used only for material redistribution, rather than being used for other aspects such as recognitive attitudes. For this reason, CA's attention to diversity makes Pogge's critique plausible. As Pogge pointed out, in order to decide who will be a recipient, CA should vertically evaluate people's natural endowments and select persons for special compensatory benefits reserved for the disadvantaged and distribute instrumental capabilities to the recipients

[101] Robeyns, 2003, p. 545. Although Robeyns mentions the five distinct sources of variation between our real incomes and the advantages we get out of them—personal heterogeneities, environmental diversities, variations in social climate, differences in relational perspectives, and distribution within the family, in this section I deal with personal heterogeneities, namely the main feature of CA. In my discussions, I prefer the term "human diversity" to the term "personal heterogeneities" although they are interchangeable.

directly. Ironically, CA's human diversity contributes to this process of vertical evaluation and leads to a distributive way to give materials to persons directly, which necessarily results in psychological harms such as stigmatization. Although CA's attention to human diversity gives some opportunities to incorporate recognitive features, CA is misleading when it focuses on material distribution.

As seen above, CA does not respond to Fraser's and Pogge's critique effectively. This is because although the goal of CA is to foster agency and CA pays attention to human diversity, CA has no choice but to use the distribution of instrumental capabilities to the needy, which results in stigmatization—oppression. Thus, while it is wrong for Fraser and Pogge to analyze CA as only one of the standard theories of distributive justice, it is not wrong to claim that CA does not address issues of recognition.

3. "Redistribution or Recognition" Debate

Fraser and Honneth, who have led the redistribution-recognition debate, agree that "recognition has become a keyword of our time" and they reject "the economistic view that would reduce recognition to a mere epiphenomenon of distribution." [102] In spite of their agreement on this issue, they disagree how recognition should be taken in their theories. In this section, I examine which framework can address the issues of recognition and redistribution effectively, among Fraser's dualism and Honneth's monism.

[102] Fraser and Honneth, 2003, pp. 1-2.

3.1 Examination of Nancy Fraser's Perspectival Dualism

3.1.1 Fraser's Perspectival Dualism

Fraser has developed "perspectival dualism" of redistribution and recognition.[103] Fraser claims that standard theories of distributive justice cannot adequately subsume the issues of recognition, while theoretical accounts of recognition do not pay attention to the issues of redistribution, such as economic inequality. According to her analysis, all oppressions are complex. For example, "exploited classes" do not only suffer from economic injustice but also experience a lack of recognition, or misrecognition. In the same vein, "despised sexualities" such as gays and lesbians do not only experience misrecognition but also suffer from economical disadvantages such as job insecurity.[104] Thus, economic class and social status are two analytically distinct, but factually intertwined, forms of injustice, for which the remedy is always some combination of redistribution and recognition. In other words, since each form of injustice has different causal roots, different types of remedies are recommended.

For Fraser, her perspectival dualism should be theoretically and practically supported for two reasons. The first is that redistribution and recognition are analytically distinct and cannot be reduced to the one side, although both are practically connected with each other. Misrecognition is rooted primarily in cultural patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication, while maldistribution is rooted primarily in the political-economic structures of society.[105] Thus, misrecognition occurs when oppressive, exclusionary, disrespectful and denigrating cultural patterns of values are institutionally

[103] Fraser and Honneth, 2003, p. 3.
[104] Fraser and Honneth, 2003.
[105] Zurn, 2005, p.99.

anchored in such a way as to deny some people the ability to participate in social relations on a par with others, while maldistribution occurs when economic mechanisms and structures deny some people the material resources and opportunities they need in order to participate in social relations on a par with others. The second reason is that this dualism can make us alert to the potentially negative unintended side-effects of one-sided remedies for injustice. For example, although welfare redistributive measures are designed to redress economic inequality it can unexpectedly result in the lack of recognition to recipients because they tend to become stigmatized. Thus, Fraser claims that what is needed is not a new grand framework that would embrace both misrecognition and maldistribution but a bifocal analysis of every situation, combined with democratic debate and the pragmatic evaluation of the probable effects of every effort at redistribution and recognition.

3.1.2 Fraser's narrow Interpretation of Recognition

The basic difference between Fraser and Honneth results from their different interpretation of recognition. In her theory, Fraser uses two models of recognition: "the identity model" and "the status model."[106] In this section, I critically examine whether each of Fraser's models is justifiable.

3.1.2.1 Fraser's "Identity Model" of Recognition

Although Fraser notes that there are a lot of different accounts of recognition, she insists that "it is not necessary here to settle on a particular theoretical account [of

[106] Fraser, 2001, p. 24.

recognition]. We need only subscribe to a general and rough understanding of cultural injustice, as distinct from socioeconomic injustice."[107] In other words, when she criticizes theories of recognition, Fraser reduces all established models into one model—the identity model, which she believes that Charles Taylor suggests.

For Taylor, recognition is ordered around the pursuit of equal cultural evaluation and, thus, the problem of recognition pertains to that of publicly affirming cultural particularity and collective identities. Fraser names Taylor's discussion of recognition the identity model,[108] and criticizes that the identity model tends to displace struggles for redistribution because it is silent on the subject of economic inequality; it tends to reify identity because it puts moral pressure on individual members to conform to a given group culture; and it tends to deny its own Hegelian premises because it ends by valorizing monologizm although it has begun by assuming that identity is dialogical.[109] Whether Fraser's critiques are justifiable or not, her critiques exhibit the Straw Man fallacy, rather than an appropriate critique against recognition theories. This is because the object of Fraser's critiques, Taylor's model of recognition, is only one of many theories of recognition. Thus, it is a mistake for Fraser to consider her critique of identity model applicable to all theories of recognition.

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[107] Fraser, 1997, p. 14.

[108] Taylor, 1995. Fraser, 2000. I wonder whether it is appropriate to name Taylor's recognition the "identity model" as Fraser does. This is because although Fraser considers Taylor's discussion of recognition to be one of normative models, as will be mentioned in Chapter Three, Taylor's article, "the politics of recognition," was to look for an understanding why recognition has become so important in the modern world, rather than suggesting a normative model or framework. For this reason, I think that Taylor's recognition should be considered an explanation, rather than a model or framework, which seems to be related to a normative feature.

[109] Fraser (2000).

3.1.2.2 Fraser's "Status Model" of Recognition

After criticizing the identity model of recognition, Fraser proposes a model of recognition for her perspectival dualism. In her other narrow interpretation of recognition, the status model, Fraser may meet two critiques. First, Fraser's attempt to support the status model cannot escape from the fallacy of begging-the-question because, through her narrow definition of recognition, Fraser has already assumed a distinction between the economical area and the cultural area and presupposed that her narrow account of recognition is necessarily with the latter. In Fraser's narrow interpretation of recognition, it is natural and necessary that her uses of recognition and redistribution are concepts that are analytically distinct and cannot be reduced to each other because she has already assumed it. This is only a question-begging argument rather than a well-organized argument.

Second, as a result of her narrow interpretation, Fraser ignores the other forms of misrecognition. From the perspective of Honneth's multi-axial theorization of recognition,[110] for example, Fraser's status model corresponds only to the third of these dimensions—that of "esteem" for a particular way of life—and excludes the other two dimensions. If the concept of recognition is much more broadly interpreted than Fraser's, it is possible that distribution claims have the recognitive characters. For example, terms of exploitation, marginalization, deprivation, etc., are used as a criterion in order to express situations of maldistribution. When these terms of criterion are used as the moral basis of a claim upon others, these terms invoke normative concepts which are based on specific self-understandings about what kinds of beings we are, what our worth is, and

[110] As will be explained in the next section, Honneth's model of recognition consists for three specific senses of recognition: love, right, and esteem (1996).

what kind of treatment we properly deserve from others. Thus, Fraser's narrow interpretation ignores other forms of recognition, which can include some distribution claims.

3.1.3 Unintended Results of Fraser's Perspectival Dualism

In addition to the above mentioned problems of her narrow interpretation, Fraser may permit the possibility of misrecognition in her dualism. Fraser's strategy to address each injustice may provide different types of remedies simultaneously—both redistributive and recognitive remedies. Although Fraser's perspectival dualism is effective in discovering and responding to different causal roots of each injustice, I wonder whether Fraser can address stigmatization that happens as side effects in the process of redistributive remedy.

Fraser also mentions misrecognition backlash occurring from many mainstream policies of social welfare distribution.[111] In order to address these side-effects, Fraser prefers "transformative strategies" such as socialism or deconstruction, rather than "affirmative strategies" such as the liberal welfare state or mainstream multiculturalism that may result in unintended side-effects.[112] Although Fraser notes that redistribution could result in unintended side-effects such as stigmatization in affirmative strategies, she does not note that her transformative strategy of socialism also can result in stigmatization for "the haves," rather than for "the have-nots," in the process of deep restructuring of relations of production. This is because socialism also needs a revolutionary policy of redistribution to transfer the-haves' wealth to the have-nots, on

[111] Fraser, 1989, 1994.
[112] Fraser and Honneth, 2003.

the basis that the wealth of the haves is not justified. Therefore, I claim that Fraser's strategy to address the issues of recognition and redistribution causes unintended results such as stigmatization.

3.2 Examination of Axel Honnet's Monism

3.2.1 Honneth's Monism

In contrast to Fraser's perspectival dualism, Honneth tries to suggest a new "normative monism" of recognition that would embrace both misrecognition and maldistribution.[113] This is because Honneth believes that redistribution is considered as a limited instance of recognition and Honneth criticizes Fraser's dualism in that it simplifies the idea of recognition struggle and ignores "the legal form of recognition," namely Honneth's second form of recognition.[114] Honneth claims that "the conceptual framework of recognition is of central importance today not because it expresses the objectives of a new type of social movement, but because it has proven to be the appropriate tool for categorically unlocking social experiences of injustice as a whole."[115] This is because, according to Honneth, the variety of recognition struggle forms cannot be reduced only to the one of an identity politics of difference that Fraser mentions. Honneth proposes three forms of recognition: primary relationships (love, friendship), legal relations (rights), and community of value (solidarity).[116] The first and most basic form of recognition is achieved in intimate relations of love and friendship. The second form of recognition is achieved through the acknowledgement of one's formal capacity

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[113] Fraser and Honneth, 2003, p. 3
[114] Fraser and Honneth, 2003, p. 136.
[115] Fraser and Honneth, 2003, p. 133.
[116] Honneth, 1996, p. 129.

for autonomous moral action. In this form, legal relations must recognize the abstract characteristics of moral autonomy in all citizens. The third form of recognition occurs through one's valued participation in, and positive contributions to, a shared way of life that expresses distinctive, communally held values.

According to Honneth, demands for material redistribution arise out of the normative implications of equality before the law and the normative idea—each member of a democratic society must have the chance to be socially esteemed for his or her individual achievements.[117] Thus, Honneth believes that a struggle for a fairer distribution of goods and resources should be thought of as a recognition struggle. In other words, distributive justice is a prerequisite for one form of recognition, namely for an equal opportunity for social esteem for all citizens, and this equal opportunity for esteem is required for productive democratic social cooperation and problem-solving. Thus, Honneth's framework of recognition involves referring to the unified root of both demands for economic redistribution and claims for recognition such as legal equality.

3.2.2 Honneth's Strategy of Anti-Foundationalism

I favor a recognition-based theory from a general perspective because this framework of recognition is reciprocal in nature. Still, I do not agree with Honneth's theory of recognition for two reasons. The first reason is that Honneth's theory of recognition depends on moral psychological approaches, which focus on emotions or feelings, in order to avoid foundationalism and essentialism. Although it is hard to deny that recognition includes a psychological feature, it is problematic to consider recognition

[117] Honneth, 2001a, p. 53.

totally psychological as Honneth does. Honneth claims that "what motivates individuals or social groups to call the prevailing social order into question and to engage in practical resistance is the moral conviction that, with respect to their own situations or particularities, the recognition principles considered legitimate are incorrectly or inadequately applied."[118] In other words, in Honneth's theory, the motivational basis of social conflicts is emotional experience. However, "emotions without normative reason" and "misrecognition without motivation" are possible in the real world.[119] For example, a person may have moral feelings of misrecognition, which are not based on factual and evaluative belief, while women in a traditionally patriarchal society may not have moral feelings of misrecognition in spite of factual and objective discriminations, as seen in Sen's "adaptive preference."[120] Thus, it is problematic for Honneth to judge misrecognition totally based on psychological emotions and to rely on emotions as the motivational basis of social conflicts.

The second reason I disagree is that Honneth's theory of recognition depends on the struggle model exclusively and incorrectly. Honneth "aims to make the struggle for recognition the point of reference for a theoretical construction in terms of which the moral development of society is to be explained."[121] However, all social injustices cannot be reduced to Honneth's struggle model. In addition, I doubt that reciprocal recognition can be achieved through Honneth's model of struggle. This is because reciprocal recognition in nature is not something that can be demanded of a person. If recognition is forcefully demanded of a person, even if the person attempts to recognize the demander,

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[118] Fraser and Honneth, 2003, p. 157.
[119] Kauppinen, 2002, p. 489.
[120] Sen, 1999a. pp. 62-63.
[121] Honneth, 1996, p. 71.

then it is not reciprocal recognition anymore. Instead, because it is a forceful claim, it necessarily falls into a corrupted recognition as seen in Hegel's master-slave dialectic. This critique is not to deny the struggle model in itself. While it is a mistake to understand all human interaction on the struggle model, it is surely questionable to think that liberation for the dominated and oppressed will emerge without some kind of struggle. This critique is only to deny that portion of the struggle model that exists between individuals. In order to escape from falling into a corrupted recognition, the struggle model should not be applied to individuals. However, Honneth uses the struggle model incorrectly because he focuses on a struggle "between subjects" or "a struggle of 'person' against 'a person.'"[122] Thus, Honneth's struggle model is problematic.

4. Conclusion

I have argued that Sen's CA, which is today the most popular and influential theory of development ethics, may cause unintended results such as stigmatization because Sen's CA tends to value each person's degree of capabilities hierarchically and, on the basis of this hierarchical valuation, to distribute instrumental capabilities to the person directly. I have also argued that Fraser's perspective dualism is not appropriate in dealing with misrecognition and maldistribution because Fraser's recognition is so narrow that it cannot include other forms of misrecognition and her dualism cannot escape unintended results such as stigmatization in her theory of redistribution.

A framework of recognition seems to be reciprocal in nature. However, I have argued that Honneth's recognition appears inappropriate for being a normative theory

[122] Honneth, 1996, p. 17 and p. 21.

because it is based on moral emotions and depends on the struggle model exclusively and incorrectly. Thus, it is necessary to search for a normative theory that is included in the framework of recognition but can overcome Honneth's weaknesses, in order not to result in both psychological and material harms.

Chapter Three

Hegel's Idea of Recognition and Hegelian theories of Recognition

> "Each extracts one side of the Hegelian system and turns this against the whole system as well as against the sides extracted by the others"[123]

1. Introduction

In the last chapter, I argued that a framework of recognition seems to be appropriate for overcoming the post-development critique, which argues that established development practices and theories necessarily result in stigmatization (violation of self-respect) and oppression (unequal power relation). However, I also showed that Honneth's theory of recognition, which is today the most popular and influential among theories of recognition, does not fully realize reciprocal features of recognition because it depends on the struggle model exclusively and incorrectly. Thus, it is necessary to search for a normative theory that is included in the framework of recognition but can overcome Honneth's weaknesses, in order to overcome the post-development critique. For this purpose, in this chapter, I reinterpret Hegel's idea of recognition and reconstruct a Hegelian theory of recognition, focusing Hegel's later works in order to reveal his reciprocal features of recognition more correctly and to fully realize them.[124] I argue that

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[123] Karl Marx (1845-46), *The Marx-Engels Reader* (2nd edition), p. 148.

[124] The relationship between Hegel's idea of recognition and Hegel's works is controversial. Some try to understand Hegel's all works from a perspective of recognition and others try to limit this relationship only to some works. For example, Axel Honneth and Jürgen Habermas claim that Hegel gave up his idea of recognition in his later works, while Robert Williams and Robert Pippin claim that Hegel's later works are

this reconstructed Hegelian theory of recognition is superior to other Hegelian theories of recognition—especially, in this chapter, to Avishai Margalit's recognition.[125]

2. Hegel's Idea of Recognition in His later Works

While many philosophers have written on Hegel's recognition on the basis of his earlier works, in order to fully realize reciprocal features of recognition, I focus on his later works—*Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), *Philosophy of Right* (1821), and *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit* (1817/1830). They are the only three works related to recognition written by Hegel and published during his time.[126] Focusing on Hegel's unpublished earlier works, Axel Honneth and Jürgen Habermas have claimed that Hegel's reciprocal recognition[127] had been abandoned in his later works, although it was

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based on his idea of recognition. In addition, some doubt that Hegel sticks to his idea of recognition in his works. This is because, for example, in *The Philosophy of History*, Hegel constructs the major poles of his dialectical narrative through the opposition between the "sensual Negro" and the "rational free spirit of the European," and then argues that the rational mediation between the Negro and the European is slavery (pp. 98-99). For these reasons, I investigate Hegel's idea of recognition and reconstruct a Hegelian theory of recognition, rather than Hegel's own theory of recognition, which is based on customs and prejudice of his time.

[125] According to Axel Honneth (1997), representative Hegelian authors of recognition in the English-speaking world are Charles Taylor (1995), Axel Honneth (1996, 2003), and Avishai Margalit (1996, 2001). Taylor said that his approach is different from Honneth in that his approach is historical, rather than normative: "I [Taylor] am looking for an understanding of why recognition has become so important in the modern world and of the big shifts in self-understanding and in the predicament that brought this situation about. So I am not looking first and foremost for normative rules or recommendations [as Honneth did]" (Taylor, 2002, p. 175). Margalit said "where I do differ directly from Honneth is in the politics of recognition. Honneth advocates positive politics, and I advocate negative politics ... It entails a difference in our respective notions of recognition: his is 'thick' and mine is 'thin'" (2001, p.127-128). Thus, among Hegelian theories of recognition, Honneth's and Margalit's theories are normative. Because in the last chapter Honneth's theory was critically examined, in this chapter Margalit's theory will be partially examined.

[126] I believe that only a published work by an author is appropriate for being used to understand the author's claims correctly and consistently because it reveals the author's ideas in well-organized arguments, while unpublished drafts are sometimes mingled with inconsistent and uncompleted ideas.

[127] In this chapter, I use the terms "reciprocal recognition" and "pure recognition" interchangeable in the normative sense, contrasting with "corrupted recognition," which refers to a negative recognition. On the other hand, I use the term "ontological sense of recognition" in a neutral sense.

a vital concept in his earlier works, unpublished during his lifetime.[128] In his *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Habermas argues that the so-called early Hegel's concept of recognition and intersubjective concept of spirit is overridden by and subordinated to the later Hegel's self-reflective monological subjectivity of absolute idealism.[129] According to Heikki Ikäheimo and Robert Pippin, it is a widely shared view.[130] Although their opinion is the minority, Pippin and Robert Williams oppose this view. Pippin treats Hegel's mature theory of ethical life as an extension of the original, or Jena-period theory of recognition, because Pippin believes that the widely shared view such as Habermas's is "insufficiently attentive to the unusual foundations of the mature theory of ethical life, or to Hegel's theory of sprit (Geist) and so the very unusual account of freedom that position justifies."[131] Williams also makes a critique that "Habermas is ... wrong to believe that the mature Hegel closes off or undermines this approach [recognition]."[132] Along this minority view, in this section, I argue that Hegel's later works make Hegel's idea of recognition more fruitful and sophisticated.

Before interpreting Hegel's later works with the concept of recognition, it would be helpful to clarify why I take a different position from Honneth and Habermas. Because Honneth focuses on Hegel's earlier works alone, especially *System of Ethical Life*

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[128] Honneth, 1996; Habermas 1971, 1987, 1999.

[129] Habermas, 1987.

[130] Pippin (2000) and Ikäheimo (2004). Pippin says "versions of such a claim [Hegel gave up his idea of reciprocal recognition in his later works] can be found in Habermas 1973 and 1987, Theunissen 1982, Hösle 1987, Honneth 1996, inter alia" (2000, p. 168 n3).

[131] Pippin, 2008, p. 185. In his interpretation, Pippin distinguishes the Jena and post-Jena theories "as components of one theory with different emphases; first between genetic versus structural conditions of freedom" and "secondly, between an initial stage of exploration, where the desideratum of mutual recognition is posed and explored, and the later discussions, where Hegel seems to have decided that forms of ethical life wherein we recognize each other rationally, where the terms of recognition are rationally grounded, satisfy the conditions for the achievement of free individuality and so provide the answer to the issues he was grappling with in his Jena period" (Pippin, 2000, p. 168 n2).

[132] Williams, 1997, p. 4.

(1802/03), which claims that "where there is a plurality of individuals, there is a relation between them and this relation is lordship and bondage [master and slave]" ([442], p. 125-126), Honneth interprets that conflict represents a sort of mechanism of social integration into community, which forces subjects to cognize each other mutually in such as way that their individual consciousness of totality has ultimately become interwoven, together with that of everyone else into a universal consciousness.[133] Owing to this interpretation, Honneth's recognition depends on the struggle model exclusively. However, this interpretation is not only problematic, as seen in Chapter Two, but also does not show other forms of recognition, especially reciprocal recognition without struggle. In addition, Honneth's interpretation does not answer some questions about how struggle is related to reciprocal recognition and how it should be understood in recognition. As will be seen below, Hegel's later works answer these questions.

Habermas claims that Hegel places mutual recognition through the media of language and labor in the central role in his earlier works, especially *Jena Realphilosophie* (1805/06), but later came to relegate them inside of the absolute subject, as Hegel returned to the construct of the mentalist paradigm.[134] However, there is a possibility of other interpretations on Hegel's spirit or his state. Hegel's idea of spirit can be interpreted as substantial or material, rather than spiritual or subjective. For example, J.N. Findlay argues that Hegel's spirit or universalism in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which Habermas considers as the absolute subject, is "*substantial* as well as subjective, whose laws and customs clothe the bare bones of ethical prescriptions with living flesh, and make universalizing life genuinely possible" (PS, forward, p. xx.). In his interpretation of

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[133] Honneth, 1996, p. 28.
[134] Habermas, 1999.

Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, Shlomo Avineri considers the state, which Habermas considers as the absolute subject, as one of the three modes of inter-human relationship, rather than the final stage of ethical life.[135] I believe that these interpretations can make Hegel's idea of recognition more fruitful.

2.1 Recognition in *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807)

In the discussion of Hegel's recognition, this work is important for three reasons. First, it shows a model of negative recognition, "corrupted recognition," in the master-slave dialectic, which has resulted in many agonistic interpretations since Alexandre Kojève's first attempt to identify Hegel's recognition with the master-slave dialectic.[136] Agonistic interpreters claim that "Hegel portrays human consciousness as shaped primarily by domination, subordination, and death."[137] In other words, agonistic interpreters argue that Hegel's recognition is always already a relation of asymmetry that necessarily results in relations of superiority and inferiority, relations of domination and subordination, etc., and "comparison and domination are thus inherent in the recognition model of identity, a model that helps to maintain oppression and colonialism on a psychological level."[138]

However, this widely shared agonistic interpretation is a misunderstanding because in the same chapter of *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel suggests reciprocal recognition (# 178 to # 184) together with the master-slave dialectic (# 185 to # 197).

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[135] Avineri, 1972.

[136] Monahan, 2006, p. 400. Richard Lynch (2001) has offered a compelling argument that much of this focus on the master-slave dialectic has its roots in Alexandre Kojève's French translation of parts of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, which, though highly influential on Twentieth-Century continental philosophy, omitted entirely much of the account of reciprocal recognition found in Hegel's original text.

[137] Ferguson, 1993, p. 40.

[138] Oliver, 2001, p.36.

Thus, if Chapter 4 of *Phenomenology of Spirit* is to be fairly interpreted the latter should be interpreted in the relationship with the former. Interestingly, however, the father of agonistic interpreters, Kojève, did not mention the former and most agonistic interpreters also focus on the master-salve dialectic alone.[139] As will be seen later, Hegel in *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Sprit* (1817/1830) explicates more clearly the fundamental sense of conflict or struggle, which is seen in *System of Ethical Life*, *Jena Realphilosophie, Phenomenology of Spirit*, etc., and through this explication the master-slave dialectic could be fairly understood in the relationship with reciprocal recognition. If this understanding is accepted, Hegel's recognition in the master-slave dialectic should be understood as a negative form of recognition, corrupted recognition, in the contrast with reciprocal recognition, rather than the archetype of recognition. This negative model shows how recognition comes to be corrupted in unequal relationship without reciprocity. Michael Monahan argues, "the purpose of the Master/Slave dialectic is to point out a way in which we can fail to manifest the ideal of pure [reciprocal] recognition, and to reveal the pitfalls, and eventual resolution, of this particular detour from our 'proper' path."[140]

Second, it shows a subjective or individual aspect of recognition although this aspect is also necessarily related to objective or social/institutional aspects of recognition. *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) shows how a person's solipsistic nature is overcome and transformed to recognize the other through the process of recognition at the individual level. Chapter 4 of *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) begins with a discussion of desire (# 166 to # 177). Desire begins as "a kind of natural solipsism that is naively self-centered

[139] Kojève, 1934/1969.
[140] Monahan, 2006, pp. 400-401.

and narcissistic" that human beings naturally have.[141] Desire is self-centered in that it regards its objects as non-essential, that is, as consumables to be used and consumed at will (# 174). However, desire is also a reflexive and self-developing consciousness (# 167, # 174). Thus, the natural solipsism of desire is a condition that must be transformed and sublimated if the self is to become capable of enduring relationships with others. Hegel says that "in order for this overcoming [of the other] to occur, there must *be* this other. Thus, self-consciousness, through its negative relation, cannot overcome the other. [Rather] it thereby creates it all the more [in desiring it], along with creating desire. Indeed, it is something other than self-consciousness that is the essence of desire" (# 175). In *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel shows that the process of recognition is at the same time the sublimation of desire. However, in this process desire is not eliminated but deepened: "Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (# 175). In addition, the change of desire shows that an individual's epistemic attitude is changed through the process of recognition. This subjective aspect of recognition explains why a framework of reciprocal recognition could be effective for motivating people to participate in an ethical activity.[142]

Third, the struggle for recognition between master and slave shows Hegel's social ontology—dependence and independence—in the most persuasive and dramatic form, while, in Chapter 4 of *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel also seems to suggest his ontology of interdependence through his explanation of reciprocal recognition (# 178 to # 184) and his discussion of desire (# 166 to # 177). In the struggle for life and death, the master has

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[141] Williams, 1997, p. 50.

[142] Hegel's subjective aspect of recognition is related to "forms of autonomous motivation." According to recent researches on motivation, forms of autonomous motivation, which are based on self-determination theory, are much more effective to promote people's motivation, rather than forms of controlled motivation (Van Steenkiste, Lens, & Deci, 2006).

to give up his particular will because he has to care for his enjoyment through the slave, and the slave also has to give up his particular will because he has to care for his life through the master. Through this struggle, the master and the slave are forced to realize that their subjective viewpoints of the world are not absolute. They are forced not only to recognize that they inhabit a world with the other, but also to recognize the other as "an intentional subject for whom it [the other] is a direct object."[143] Thus, Williams argues that, through this dramatic struggle, "Hegel presents an alternative to the abstract atomic individualism of modern liberalism and to abstract collectivism, whether of classical political philosophy (Plato) or of modern communitarianism."[144]

As seen above, Chapter 4 of *Phenomenology of Spirit* contributes to Hegel's idea of recognition for three reasons: first, it shows a negative form of recognition, corrupted recognition, through the master-salve dialectic; second, it shows a subjective or individual aspect of recognition, which is effective for motivation; and third, it shows Hegel's social ontology of interdependence.

2.2 Recognition in *Philosophy of Right* (1821)

This work presupposes reciprocal recognition because this work deals with objective spirit, or social institutions.[145] It focuses on exploring what sense social institutions have in the process of recognition rather than explaining the process of reciprocal recognition. In the discussion of Hegel's recognition, this work is important for two reasons. First, this work shows that recognition-favoring institutions are necessary

[143] Redding, 1996, p. 123.
[144] Williams, 1997, p. 263.
[145] According to Shlomo Avineri, "in his *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Hegel divides the section dealing with the philosophy of spirit into three parts: subjective spirit, objective spirit and absolute spirit. The part on objective spirit is then dealt with much greater detail in the *Philosophy of Right*" (1972, p. 132).

for realizing reciprocal recognition. In *Philosophy of Right* (1821), Hegel claims that recognition-favoring institutions are a necessary condition for human (substantial) freedom. This is because without these mediated institutions, reciprocal recognition cannot be realized. Reciprocal recognition in nature is not something that can be demanded of a person but should be freely undertaken by both parties because, if recognition is forcefully demanded of a person, it is not reciprocal recognition anymore and necessarily falls into a corrupted recognition as seen in the master-slave dialectic. In other words, reciprocal recognition is never realized without the mediation of recognition-favoring institutions. For Hegel, "Ethical Life [as recognition-favoring institutions] is accordingly the concept of freedom which has become the existing world and the nature of self-consciousness" (PR, §142). The key to realizing human freedom, therefore, is not constant struggle or perpetual reiterations of the master-slave dialectic, but rather the formation of the kind of social world in which reciprocal recognition is fostered as "the *norm* of human interaction."[146]

Second, this work suggests a possibility to interpret three recognition-favoring institutions as three inter-human relationships, which a specific sense of recognition should be applied to. In Part Three of *Philosophy of Right*, "Ethical Life," Hegel shows three ethical forms of life, in which human relations of recognition can be genuinely reciprocal. Because he is also a "child of his time," however, Hegel's specific descriptions of ethical life are based on the custom of his time and, for this reason, it is hard to apply them to contemporary institutions (PR, preface, p. 21). Still, it is possible to find some abstract and fundamental principles of recognition in Hegel's descriptions,

[146] Monahan, 2006, p. 405.

which can be applied to contemporary institutions. In this sense, this work also shows a systematic framework of recognition, which can be applied to all institutions. Although Hegel in *Philosophy of Right* deals with only three institutions—family, civil society, and state; according to Shlomo Avineri these institutions can be applied to all institutions. Avineri argues that these three institutions can be interpreted as the examples of three abstract categories which cover all institutions—particular altruism, universal egoism, and universal altruism: "the three moments of ethical life can also be projected as three alternative modes of inter-human relationship. Hegel's argument would be that men can relate to each other in either one of the three following modes: particular altruism—the family; universal egoism—civil society; universal altruism—the state."[147] In the family, I am ready to make sacrifices for the other members of family—for example, to work so that my children can go to school, but not for others. Thus, although my sacrificing activities are altruistic, they are particular. In civil society, I treat everybody as a means to my own ends, rather than an end. Thus, my activities in civil society are universally egoistic. Hegel's state is different from other philosophers' ideas of the state. For example, what social contract theories call a state is, to Hegel, but civil society, which is based on needs. For Hegel, the state is not derivative from the antecedent wills of independent individuals and appears to be optional, and state does not appear to be an instrument that subserves and protects private rights, including property rights. Hegel's state involves a transformation of reciprocal recognition from the formal external reciprocity of contract, which leaves individuals unaffected, into a mutually enhancing union in which the I becomes a We. In this way, acquisitive self-seeking individualism

[147] Avineri, 1972, pp. 133-134.

undergoes transformation into a universal altruism. For Hegel, thus, people know "the state as their substance, because it is the state that maintains their particular spheres of interest together with the title, authority, and welfare of these" (PR, §289). Thus, my activities in the state are necessarily based on universal altruism. If this interpretation is accepted, Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* may not only claim that all institutions, which form human relationship, should be recognition-favoring, but also claim that these institutions should be guided by different principle of recognition according to their classification of human relationships.

As examined above, *Philosophy of Right* contributes to Hegel's idea of recognition for two reasons: first, it shows that recognition-favoring institutions are necessary for realizing reciprocal recognition; and second, those institutions can be interpreted to be projecting three inter-human relationships, to each of which a specific sense of recognition should be applied.

2.3 Recognition in *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit* (1817/1830)

Hegel's *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit* (1817/1830) is important for understanding Hegel's idea of recognition for three reasons. First, this work explicates the relationship between the master-slave dialectic and reciprocal recognition, which was not explained in *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807). Hegel explicitly remarks that the master-salve dialect is the historical fiction of "the natural state" (§432 Zusatz). Hegel says that "to prevent any possible misunderstandings ... we must here remark that the fight for recognition pushed to the extreme here indicated can only occur in the natural state, where men exist only as single, separate individuals; but it is absent in civil society

and the State because here the recognition for which the combatants fought already exists" (§432 Zusatz). According to this remark, in focusing on the transition from consciousness (chapter 3) to self-consciousness (chapter 4) in *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), Hegel intentionally brackets social-institutions and political background to consider an interpersonal confrontation in the absence of any mediating institutions. Thus, extreme struggle for recognition, "a life and death struggle," happens in this fictional situation as a model of corrupted recognition, namely the failure to achieve such reciprocal recognition.

Second, this work shows where struggle should be applied. In this work, Hegel implies that struggle should be applied to institutions in order to achieve reciprocal recognition rather than to individuals. While a life and death struggle between individuals, as seen in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, results in a corrupted recognition, or catastrophe, "in the civilized condition, especially family, civil society, the state, I recognize and am recognized by everyone without any struggle."[148] Hegel mentions that a life and death struggle is "absent in civil society and the State [as Ethical Life] because here the recognition for which the combatants fought already exists" (§432 Zusatz). This remark implies that "the recognition for which the combatants fought" may be applied to recognition-favoring institutions such as the State. Hegel shows that only this kind of struggle for institutions can result in reciprocal recognition, while a struggle between individuals in the master-slave dialectic results in catastrophe. This interpretation is supported by Hegel's remark: "the result of the struggle for recognition brought about by the Notion of mind or spirit is universal self-consciousness ... [and] consequently it is

[148] Hegel, 1825, p. 78.

only when the slave becomes free that the master, too, becomes completely free. In this state of universal freedom [Ethical Life], in being reflected into myself, I am immediately reflected into the other person and, conversely, in relating myself to the other" (§ 436 Zusatz). For Hegel the struggle for reciprocal recognition does not mean the struggle between individuals in the master-slave dialectic, but a struggle which can result in Hegel's freedom or Ethical Life. For this reason, this work shows where struggle should be applied for reciprocal recognition, while *Philosophy of Right* shows what recognition-favoring institutions are as the result of struggle.

Third, this work shows how reciprocal recognition is related to Hegel's freedom. Hegel argues that "Only in such a manner [of reciprocal recognition] is true freedom realized; for since this consists in my identity with the other, I am only truly free when the other is also free and is recognized by me as free. This freedom of one in the other unites men in an inward manner, whereas needs and necessity bring them together only externally. Therefore, men must will to find themselves again in one another" (§431). Hegel's freedom requires recognition of the other for its self-realization. Only a free subject can be truly recognized and another subject can affirm the subject's freedom. According to Monahan, for Hegel "true freedom for one demands the freedom of all."[149] Hegel's attempt to connect recognition with freedom is very important to explain the motivational basis of recognition.

As examined above, *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit* contributes to Hegel's idea of recognition for three reasons: first, it explicates the relationship between the master-slave dialectic and reciprocal recognition; second, it shows where struggle should

[149] Monahan, 2006, p.403.

be applied for reciprocal recognition; and third, it shows how reciprocal recognition is related to Hegel's freedom.

3. A Hegelian Theory of Recognition from a Conceptual Perspective

As examined above, Hegel's later works play an important role in making his idea of recognition sophisticated and fruitful. Without his later works, for example, Hegel's struggle for recognition is likely to be misunderstood, as it was by Honneth. Thanks to his later works, Hegel's idea of recognition can be used to respond to an agonistic view, to explain its process of motivation at the individual level, to dramatically suggest his social ontology of interdependence, to show his strategy at the institutional level, to explicate the relationship between reciprocal recognition and freedom, etc. In this section, I construct a Hegelian theory of recognition with these ideas.

3.1 Meaning of Recognition

Williams considers recognition as "an operative concept" in Hegel's ethics, rather than a thematic concept.[150] This claim is reasonable because the concept of recognition in Hegel's works is never made explicitly in a thematic sense. For this reason, the term 'recognition' is ambiguous to scholars as well as to ordinary people. Honneth says "in contrast to the concept of 'respect,' which since Kant has had relatively clear contours in moral philosophy, the concept of 'recognition' is not determined in any definitive way,

[150] Williams, 1997, p. 1. While thematic concept is one that is explicitly coined and thematized by and author, operative concept is a concept used by an author to explain and elaborate his thematic concept. In Hegel's works, for example, Williams says "spirit [as a thematic concept] originates in reciprocal recognition [as an operative concept]. Master/slave [as a thematic concept] represent only the particular shape of unequal recognition [as an operative concept] and fail to exhaust the possibilities inherent in the concept" (p. 1).

neither in philosophy nor in ordinary language."[151] In this situation, I try to explicate the sense of recognition because when the meaning of Hegel's recognition is not clear it results in many misunderstandings such as Kojève's misinterpretation of Hegel's recognition.

According to Ikäheimo, there are three broad families of meanings that the term 'recognition' has in English: first, identification; second, acknowledgement; and third, recognition in a specific sense.[152] In the sense of identification we can recognize, i.e. identify anything numerically as a distinct individual, qualitatively as having particular features, and generically as falling under a genus. In the sense of acknowledge we can recognize, i.e. acknowledge, normative or evaluative entities or facts, such as values, reasons, norms, rights, responsibilities, institutions, claims, facts, guilt etc. In the third sense, we can recognize persons. Hegel used the German word '*Anerkennung*' for the second and the third senses, but not for the first sense in his works.[153] Although the second and the third senses intertwine with each other, when intersubjective recognition in the Hegelian sense is discussed, recognition should be understood as only the third sense of recognition.

Recognition in the intersubjective sense can be distinguished into the ontological or phenomenological sense and the normative sense. Robert Sinnerbrink distinguishes between the ontological sense of recognition, which is a precondition for social interaction, and the normative sense of recognition, which finds its articulation in ethical

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[151] Honneth, 1997, p. 18.

[152] Ikäheimo, 2007, pp. 226-228. This distinction is widely shared among scholars. According to Ikäheimo, these three categories can be applied to Ricoeur's analysis of recognition in French (2007). Although Ricoeur distinguishes between 16 meanings of the French word "reconnaissance" in his 2005 book, those meanings can be ordered under these three categories. In addition, according to these categories 'five broad meaning of recognition in English' can be also re-classified (Inwood, 1992, pp. 245-247).

[153] Ikäheimo, 2007, p. 227.

relations.[154] In Sinnerbrink's using, "the ontological sense" is similar to "the phenomenological sense," rather than having "the metaphysical sense." The ontological sense of recognition indicates a state of any intentional interaction, whether it involves domination of, or reconciliation with, another subject. While the ontological sense is only a normatively neutral state where a person interacts with another person, the normative sense of recognition includes a normative demand of Hegel's fully realized freedom. In other words, the normative sense includes both an ethical state of "universal We"[155] and the process or recognitive attitude where a person "takes something/-one as a person."[156] Taking something/-one as a person means in concrete terms that one's intentionality, or as Hegel says, consciousness, becomes mediated through the other subject's intentionality.[157] In other words, others recognize me as having the social status and identity I attribute to myself; others recognize the deed as falling under the act-description that I invoke; and others recognize me as acting on the intention I attribute to

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[154] Sinnerbrink, 2004, p. 286. This distinction is very helpful to explain the sense of struggle for recognition in *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807). According to this distinction, corrupted recognition is based on the ontological sense of recognition, but not the normative sense of recognition. When I mention "recognition" without special remarks in my dissertation, it means the normative sense of recognition.

[155] In *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel claims that "Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged [*Anerkanntes*]. ...The detailed exposition of the Notion [*Begriff*] of this spiritual unity in its duplication will present us with the process of Recognition [*die Bewegung des Anerkennens*]. [178]" This structure of recognition produces the "'I' that is 'We' and the 'We' that is 'I',"[177] which I call "universal We."

[156] The formula of recognitive attitude is based on Ikäheimo's proposal (2002 and 2007). I want to mention that "person" here is not the same one with Hegel's, but it should be understood in the contemporary ways—different from immediate desire-bound animals in an axiological sense (e.g. Frankfurt, 1971) and in a deontological sense (e.g. Brandom, 2007), because for Hegel the term "person" is sometimes limited and negative. For example, Hegel says "the individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a *person*, but he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as *independent self-consciousness*" (PS, # 187). In addition, in *Philosophy of Right*, personhood is limited to the property owner.

[157] Ikäheimo, 2002, p.449. In the same vein, Brandom claims that "taking someone as one of us also requires, it was suggested, interpreting that individual as an intentional interpreter—as able to *attribute* intentional states, and so as able to adopt toward others just the same sort of attitudes out of which that very stance is constructed" (Brandom, 1994, p. 67.).

myself.[158] This recognitive attitude consists of two aspects: epistemic and performative. Recognitive attitudes should be not only voluntarily motivated from an epistemic perspective, but also expressively acted from a performative perspective. This is because, as seen in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel's recognition has a subjective or individual aspect of recognition which needs an epistemic change, and for Hegel, an epistemic change should be expressed in the determination of action. Hegel argues that the determination of action "must be known in its externality as mine" and "the content of my action, as accomplished in immediate existence, is entirely mine" (PR, §113-114). Hegel argues that "the true being of man is...his deed" as something expressed externally (PS, #322) and "an individual cannot know what he is until he has made himself a reality through action" (PS, #240).

This general normative sense of recognition cannot be applied to all inter-human relationships in the same way. This is because ethical problems happen in human relationships, which consist of three irreducible modes, and these problems should be addressed according to each mode. For example, an ethical problem in the human relationship of particular altruism, as seen in family, cannot be addressed the same way as that of the relationship of universal egoism, as seen in civil society, which is based on the principles of mutual exploitation and utility.[159] As seen in Table 3.1, thus, this general normative sense of recognition—the state of reciprocal recognition ("universal We")

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[158] Pippin, 2007, p. 67.

[159] This distinction of inter-human relationships could be criticized by some feminists, who deny the distinction between the public and the private. However, although I do not deny the distinction between the public and the private from an ethical and ideal perspective, I do not claim that a current form of institution automatically assigns a mode of inter-human relationship. For example, although an ethical problem is in *the system* of family, it cannot be an ethical problem in *the inter-human relationship* of family. For this reason, as will be claimed in Part Two, a reciprocal attitude in the inter-human relationship of particular altruism can be applied to some people beyond family members because of their closeness of human relationship.

through recognitive attitude ("taking something/-one as a person")—could be classified into three specific senses of recognition, according to the three modes of inter-human relationships as seen in Avineri's analysis of Hegel's ethical life. These senses are intimacy through love in particular altruism, solidarity through honor in universal egoism, and fraternity through philanthropy in universal altruism, as seen in *Philosophy of Right* (1821).[160] This specific sense does not correspond to a different aspect of personhood and answering to a different dimension of need which the person seeks to satisfy socially, but corresponds to each mode of inter-human relationship.[161] As will be examined in Chapter Four, three specific senses of recognition are helpful in applying Hegel's recognition to each mode of inter-human relationship specifically.

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[160] In my discussion, "solidarity" means the emotional cohesion which is found wherever individuals form a group in order to stand up for their common interests, as seen in the context of the social movements in the 19th and 20th centuries (Bayertz, 1999, p. 16). In addition, "fraternity" and "philanthropy" should be understood in a spiritual or religious sense, rather than in a political sense. Rawls says "the ideal of fraternity is sometimes thought to involve ties of sentiment and feeling which it is unrealistic to expect between members of the wider society" (1999a, p. 90). In the same vein, Véronique Munoz-Dardé says "'fraternity' meaningfully belongs to opposed traditions and works in the same equivocal manner in contemporary political rhetoric" (1999, p. 83).

Williams says "the ethical disposition constitutive of ethical life is grounded in religion" (1997, p. 328). This is expressed "patriotism, which Hegel calls '*sittliche Gesinnung*'" (Taylor, p. 447). These specific senses are different from Honneth's (1996) and Ikäheimo's (2002) classifications, which are based on Hegel's early works alone.

[161] This remark shows that my interpretation is different from Honneth (Honneth, 1996, pp. xii-xvii, pp. 92-130).

Table 3.1: Three Senses of Reciprocal Recognition in Inter-human Relationships

Human relationship / Reciprocal recognition	Relationship in particular altruism	Relationship in universal egoism	Relationship in universal altruism
Recognitive attitude "taking something/-one as a person"	Love	Honor	Philanthropy
Ethical state of reciprocal recognition "universal We"	Intimacy	Solidarity	Fraternity

3.2 Conceptual Structure of Recognition

3.2.1 Recognitive Attitudes

As suggested in my analysis of Hegel's later works, reciprocal recognition needs two factors: attitudes and institution. In a sense, reciprocal recognition is a process where a person takes something/-one as a person. This process should be reciprocal because, as seen in the master-slave dialectic in *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), unilateral relationship—a mere recognitive attitude of A toward B regardless of the attitudes of B toward A (or A's attitudes)—results in domination and oppression. This unilateral relationship would be corrupted because reciprocal recognition in nature is not something that can be demanded of a person. In other words, if recognition is forcefully demanded of a person, it is not recognition anymore and necessarily falls into a corrupted recognition as seen in the master-slave dialectic. According to a reciprocal conception, it takes the attitudes of two (A and B) to constitute recognition. A's recognitive attitude toward B adds up to B's being recognized by A, only if B has relevant attitudes towards

A (or A's recognitive attitudes). More specifically, according to the dialogical conception, B has to have a recognitive attitude towards A (or A's attitudes); she has to recognize A as a competent recognizer. This reciprocal conception shows that both recognizers and recognizees are in the relation of both dependence and independence. When a recognizer does not receive a recognizee's recognition, the recognizer is misrecognized. In other words, a recognizer should also become a recognizee.

As examined in 3.1, recognitive attitude consists of epistemic and performative aspects. In other words, a recognizer should take a recognitive attitude in practice and a recognizee should epistemically understand her recognitive attitude in a right way. As Ikäheimo and Laitinen mention, however, "understanding the attitudes of others is always fallible, and we can easily be seriously mistaken about the recognitive attitudes of others towards ourselves—say, by interpreting sincere praise as sarcasm or sarcasm as praise."[162] In addition, this attitude should not be demanded of a person, but voluntarily motivated in order to achieve reciprocal recognition. Thus, these attitudes should be cultivated and educated, rather than being claimed. Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* shows how a person's solipsistic nature is overcome and a person is motivated to have a recognitive attitude. This process is a kind of education. Thus, education is necessary and important in my Hegelian theory of recognition.[163] This emphasis on education shows the close relationship between recognitive attitude and recognition-favoring institutions, which will be examined in the next section.

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[162] Ikäheimo and Laitinen, 2007, p. 46.

[163] I will discuss education in Chapter Seven.

3.2.2 Recognition-favoring Institutions

Recognition-favoring institutions[164] are necessary for reciprocal recognition. As seen in *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit* (1817/1830), the master-slave dialectic is the archetype of corrupted recognition results from the historical fiction of "the natural state" (§432 Zusatz) without any mediating institutions. Without recognition-favoring institutions, it is hard for recognitive attitudes to be cultivated, and even if they could be cultivated, these attitudes are not sustainable. Thus, current institutions should be reformed to arouse recognitive attitudes or new recognition-favoring institutions should be established for reciprocal recognition. If these analyses are expressed as a formula, it is as follows: Reciprocal recognition = Recognizer's recognitive attitude + Recognizee's recognitive attitude + Recognition-favoring institutions.[165]

Someone may criticize my Hegelian theory of recognition as too idealistic because my formula of reciprocal recognition seems to deny struggle in itself. While it is a mistake to understand all human interaction on the model of struggle as Honneth does, it is surely questionable to think that liberation for the dominated and oppressed will emerge without some kind of struggle. As seen in my analysis of *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit* (1817/1830), struggle itself is not excluded in my Hegelian theory of recognition. I argue that struggle should be applied to institutions, but not individuals as Honneth does. I showed in my analysis of *Philosophy of Right* (1821) that recognition-

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[164] My understanding of "institutions" is similar to Améli Oksenberg Rorty (1997). Améli says, "institutions range widely from those whose activities are publicly defined and controlled (courts, jails, banks, post offices) to those whose activities are internally defined but publicly subsidized and regulated (schools, hospitals) to self-generated but legally constrained civic associations that receive indirect public benefits (unions, corporations, churches) to private associations between individuals whose interactions are subject to public concern and scrutiny (marriages, family, attachments, teacher-student relationships" (1997, p. 113).

[165] I revise Ikäheimo's ideas (2002). Although Ikäheimo emphasizes on the importance of recognitive attitudes, he does not take seriously the necessity of recognition-favoring institutions, or his "social or institutional settings," in the relation with recognitive attitudes. Furthermore, he seems to ignore it.

favoring institutions are important in order to mediate recognitive attitudes without degrading to a corrupted recognition. If I compel recognition from a group or persons, then the recognition thereby made manifest will necessarily be corrupted, since reciprocal recognition must be freely undertaken by both parties. The recognition I receive from another, whom I have forced to recognize me, is not the recognition of another free person, and so cannot render concrete my own freedom through that recognition. Therefore, this conceptual structure of recognition is helpful in guiding how struggles should be applied. In other words, it shows that a struggle for reciprocal recognition must explicitly apply to fostering recognition-favoring institutions.

3.3 Purpose of Recognition: Substantial Freedom

Hegel's reciprocal recognition should be understood in relation to his idea of freedom. In *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Sprit* (1817/30), Hegel argues that "I am truly free when the other is also free and is recognized by me as free" (§431 Zusatz). In *System of Ethical Life* (1802/03), Hegel also argues that "in this [reciprocal] recognition of life or in the thinking of the other as absolute concept, the other [person] exists as a free being" (#441, p. 124). As seen in these remarks, Hegel's freedom is the purpose of reciprocal recognition and can be achieved through the process of recognition.

In *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel explains his concept of freedom in a dialectic process. The first moment is expressed as "the pure indeterminacy" of the self (§5). This is what people are left with by taking away every limit and all content that is present to their consciousness at any moment of time. According to Hegel, it is "negative freedom" and it is the most primitive conception of freedom that people can have. Peter Singer calls

this moment "abstract freedom" or "the classical liberal conception of freedom" in that it is only defined in terms of not being restricted and not having any content.[166] The second moment is expressed as the "determinate" of the self (§6). In willing, the self is in transition from the pure indeterminacy to the positing of determinacy. This is the ability to enter into a specific state of mind or activity and to concern oneself with something particular. So the self has resolved its indeterminacy and has become something particular in seeking its content and obtaining its object. However, the self must still preserve its freedom to withdraw from specific pursuits, if the self is to remain in the negative freedom. The final moment is to be unity of both the pure indeterminacy and the determinacy (§7). The will's content and object are reflected back into itself, and in this way brought to universality. This unity is individuality. In other words, the will makes those ends and aims its own and identifies itself with the ends it has adopted. As seen in this dialectic process of freedom, Hegel's idea of freedom is unique.

According to Luwig Siep, Hegel's freedom has four features: (mediated) autonomy (*Autonomie*), union (*Vereinigung*), self-overcoming (*Selbstüberwindung*), and release (*Freigabe*).[167] First, autonomy for Hegel, as for Kant, constitutes a break with nature and natural causation; it is the self-originating capacity of the will that makes it independent of everything else. Autonomy is understood negatively as freedom from external influence, and positively as independence, self-determination, and spontaneity. Second, self-overcoming is an ethical conception that expresses the sublation (*Aufhebung*) of immediacy and natural solipsism. This feature is also expressed as superseding its otherness or "return[ing] into itself" in *Phenomenology of Spirit* (# 181)

[166] Singer, 1983, p. 25.

[167] Siep, 1992. This paragraph is based on Williams' explanation of Siep's analysis (Williams, 1997, pp. 80-88).

and as "overcome[ing] this contradiction" in *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Sprit* (§431 Zusatz). Third, union does not mean fusion, but an ethical state of reciprocal relationship. In union between self and the other, the limits that divide and separate self and the other are both preserved and overcome. Freedom does not signify the isolation of one from the other but rather union and reconciliation with the other. For Hegel "since this [freedom] consists in my identity with the other, I am only truly free when the other is also free and is recognized by me as free. This freedom of one in the other unites men in an inward manner" (Hegel, E §431 Zusatz.). In other words, union with the other transforms and enlarges the formerly narrow individualist self. Fourth, release is realized to accept and respect the other as an end in itself such that controlling, dominating, and manipulating behaviors are inappropriate. This "letting to be" (*Freigabe*) does not have the sense of alienation or indifference. Rather, it is the acceptance of the otherness of the other, the difference of difference.

Hegel's freedom is "being at home with oneself in another" (*bei sich im anderen zu sein*) (*The Encyclopedia Logic*, #24A). Thus, Williams claims that "what is lost in reciprocal recognition is egoism and the desire for domination, as seen in the features of autonomy and self-overcoming; what is gained through reciprocal recognition is substantive ethical freedom and community with the other, as seen in the features of union and release."[168] Because Hegel's freedom is different from other philosophers' ideas, it is called "recognitive freedom" by Sinnerbrink, "substantial freedom" (*substantielle Freiheit*) (PR, §149, §257), "genuine freedom," "social freedom" by Neuhouser, etc. Whatever it is called, Hegel's freedom is unique in that he claims that my

[168] Williams, 1997, p. 82.

freedom depends on the other's freedom. Neuhouser claims that "[Hegel's] social freedom is not the freedom to do as one pleases (which is, roughly speaking, personal freedom), nor is it the freedom that consists in being the source of the normative principles that govern one's actions (which is the freedom, or [unmediated] autonomy, of moral subjectivity)."[169]Thus, Hegel's freedom can explain the motivation of recognition in a realistic way, rather than in a deontological way. In other words, the reason that I should take something/-one as a person is for me to be free. I should try to let the other go free, namely to have recognitive attitudes to the other, because I can be free only in the other's freedom. Hegel says that "it is only when the slave becomes free that the master, too, becomes completely free" (*Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit*, §436 Zusatz).

3.4 Two levels of recognition

As examined in 3.2, reciprocal recognition should be realized both through cultivating recognitive attitudes at the individual level and through establishing recognition-favoring institutions at the institutional level. Without cultivating recognitive attitudes, it is hard to motivate people to establish recognition-favoring institutions, and even if these institutions could be established these institutions are will be deteriorated. Without establishing recognition-favoring institutions, it is hard to cultivate recognitive attitudes, and even if these attitudes could be temporarily cultivated, these attitudes will not be sustainable in unethical social backgrounds.

In *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel shows the process of recognition at the individual level. Hegel shows through the master-slave dialectic and the analysis of

[169] Neuhouser, 2000, pp. 5-6.

desire how a person's solipsistic nature is overcome and transformed to recognize the other through the process of recognition at the individual level. In this process of recognition desire is not eliminated but deepened: "Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (# 175). In addition, the change of desire shows that individual epistemic attitude and belief is changed through the process of recognition. This level is very necessary to activate the process of reciprocal recognition voluntarily and to motivate people to establish recognition-favoring institutions. Especially, this level is related to the process of self-determination, which results in autonomous motivation. According to recent researches on motivation, forms of autonomous motivation—based on self-determination theory— rather than forms of controlled motivation, are much more effective in promoting people's motivation.[170]

In *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel shows the process of recognition at the institutional level. This level is also necessary to make the process of recognition reciprocal and to sustain recognitive attitudes at the individual level. Without mediating institutions, as Hegel dramatically shows, people cannot escape the struggle for recognition, which necessarily results in corrupted recognition, rather than reciprocal recognition. In addition, without mediating institutions, it is hard to explain how an individual's ethical attitudes are cultivated and, furthermore, it is hard to expect an individual's ethical attitudes to be sustainable in unethical social backgrounds. Monahan says that "Hegelian recognition is about the constant effort, on the individual level, to establish and maintain relationships of reciprocity that are freely given and freely accepted. On the larger social/political level, recognition is about the effort (and often, but not necessarily, the struggle) to establish

[170] Recent field experiments are reviewed showing that intrinsic goal framing produces deeper engagement in learning activities, better conceptual learning, and higher persistence at learning activities, than external goal framing (Van Steenkiste, Lens, & Deci, 2006).

conditions that are conducive to relationships of reciprocity."[171] As examined in 3.2, in Hegel's recognition, the individual level and the social/institutional level are necessarily connected and complementary.

4. Hegelian Recognition: Avishai Margalit's Theory of Recognition

As mentioned in footnote 131, today there are three representative Hegelian authors of recognition who try to apply Hegel's recognition to contemporary issues: Charles Taylor, Axel Honneth, and Avishai Margalit. Taylor's 1992 article about the politics of recognition has been considered the pioneer to revive Hegel's recognition in the contemporary context. As he mentioned in the interview with Heikki Ikäheimo, Taylor's theory of recognition is not a normative but rather a historical approach to look for an understanding of why recognition has become important in the modern world.[172] Thus, it is not appropriate to compare Taylor's theory at the historical level with my Hegelian theory of recognition, which is at the normative level. Because the previous chapter examined Honneth's recognition, in this part I examine whether Margalit's recognition is justifiable and superior to my Hegelian theory of recognition.

4.1 Margalit's Minimalist Project of Recognition: Decent Society

Margalit's idea of recognition is proposed in his 1996 book, *The Decent Society*. In this book, Margalit argues that a good society is a decent society whose institutions do not systematically humiliate people. Margalit's project is minimalist for two reasons. The first reason is that Margalit's project is negative in that its purpose is to eliminate

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[171] Monahan, 2006, p.413.

[172] This interview is presented in Taylor (2002).

misrecognition, "humiliation," rather than to realize recognition itself. Margalit argues that "eliminating humiliation should be given priority over paying respect."[173] This is because eliminating humiliation is more urgent, and it is not justice that brings us into normative politics, but injustice that is urgent. The second reason is that Margalit's project is limited to institutions. According to Margalit, "a decent society is one whose institutions do not humiliate people."[174] For Margalit, humiliation itself is understood as damage to a person's self-respect, inflicted either through insititutionalized behavior or through human-made conditions, but not through personal attitudes or behaviors. Margalit defines these institutionalized behaviors as any sort of behavior or condition that constitutes a sound reason for a person to consider his self-respect injured. A decent society strives to eliminate, for its members and other people dependent on it, the institutional humiliation that deprives them of their self-respect or control over their lives.

Margalit's minimalistic project results from his global concern—"how to move from thick 'tribal' relationship to recognition based on formal rights of people who are strangers to us."[175] Margalit doubts that the concept of recognition could be extended to outside the tribe. Thus, Margalit proposes a minimalist project of recognition to establish decent society, based on the "thin" sense of recognition.

4.2 Critique against Margalit's Minimalist Project

Margalit's minimalist project seems attractive because it is more urgent and realistic to deal with humiliation than to deal with recognition, which is based on the

[173] Margalit, 1996, p. 4.
[174] Margalit, 1996, p. 1, p. 272.
[175] Margalit, 2001, p. 127, p. 139.

"thick" sense. On the close examination, however, Margalit's minimalist project can be criticized from both internal and external perspectives.

4.2.1 Critique against Margalit's Project from an Internal Perspective

From an internal perspective, Margalit's project is not justifiable because the core distinctions that support his project are blurred. For this minimalist project, Margalit's theory of recognition is based on two distinctions: decent and civil societies, and self-respect and self-esteem. The first distinction is necessary for Margalit because it supports his concern of institutions. According to Margalit, "the idea of a civilized society is a microethical concept concerned with the relationships between individuals, while the idea of a decent society is a macroethical concept concerned with the setup of the society as a whole."[176] However, in the idea of recognition, or misrecognition or "humiliation," as seen in 3.2 and 3.4, the individual level and the social/institutional level are closely connected in that the idea of recognition is related to a person's attitude as well as institutions. Margalit also admits that there are "borderline cases where it is not clear where speakers should be considered to be speaking in their own name or in the name of the institution."[177] If this distinction is blurred and Margalit's project has no choice but to include the relationships between individuals, his project would be not minimalist anymore.

The second distinction between self-respect and self-esteem is important for Margalit because it supports his concept of decent society. According to Margalit, "respect constitutes a ground for treating people equally, while esteem forms a basis for

[176] Margalit, 1996, p. 2.
[177] Margalit, 1996, p. 171.

ranking people."[178] Margalit proposes a minimalist understanding of a decent society that not only limits recognition to its most basic form of a universal respect for human dignity, but also defines this principle in negative terms as the avoidance of humiliation. In other words, a decent society is not interested in self-esteem or an unequal distribution of honor. However, as Margalit admits, it is hard to maintain this distinction because, for example, the person in involuntary poverty has good reasons to see herself injured in the two roles, both as a valuable member of a community of cooperation and as an equal member of the human community.[179] In addition, it is doubtful that a society without self-esteem can be a decent society, namely a society without humiliation. As Adam Smith argues, a society has to be able to make it possible for its citizens to appear in public without shame.[180] Smith's remark is to express his concern of self-esteem, rather than self-respect. Thus, it is doubtful that a society without humiliation can be realized in the ignorance of self-esteem. If this distinction between self-respect and self-esteem is blurred and Margalit's project has no choice but to include self-esteem in his project, his project would be not minimalist anymore.

4.2.2 Critique against Margalit's Project from an External Perspective

From an external perspective, it is doubtful that Margalit's minimalist project can realize a society without humiliation for two reasons. The first reason is that Margalit's project focuses on institutions and overlooks the influence of individual's misrecognitive attitudes. Even if institutions without humiliation could be successfully established in

[178] Margalit, 1996, p. 44.
[179] Margalit, 1996, p. 229. Honneth, 2002, p. 320.
[180] Smith, 1904, v.2.148.

accordance with Margalit's project, if individuals' misrecognitive attitudes still remain in these institutions, it is doubtful that a society without humiliation could be realized. For example, although an institutional system is not humiliating, if an officer of that institution still has a humiliating attitude, the guests of that institution still feel humiliated. In reality, many cases of misrecognition or humiliation occur in the relationship between individuals in everyday life, as well as in institutions. For example, an African-American Wall Street banker, who is rejected by a taxi driver because of his black complexion, is humiliated not by institutions, but by the relationship between individuals.[181] Thus, it is doubtful that a society without humiliation could be realized in Margalit's minimalist project, which does not take individuals' attitudes seriously.

The second reason is related to the first reason but gets a slightly different angle on Margalit's project. The point of the second critique is that Margalit's project focuses on the reform of institutions in connection with current humiliations and ignores the influence of past humiliation or misrecognition. However, it is doubtful that in a society where past humiliations are not addressed relevantly, the reform of current institutions can lead to a society without humiliation or misrecognition. For example, in a culturally patriarchal society, it is not enough to permit girls' enrollment to schools to eliminate girls' rooted consciousness of humiliation. Elaine Unterhalter reports that girls in South Africa still feel humiliated in school although they can go to school and there is no legal discrimination to humiliate girls.[182] This report shows that it is not a negative response, but a positive response to eliminate the influence of past humiliation or misrecognition in which its influence is rooted. Thus, even if institutions without humiliation would be

[181] I borrow this example from Nancy Fraser (Fraser and Honneth, 2003, p. 34.).
[182] Unterhalter, 2003.

established, if the influence of past misrecognition remains, it is doubtful that a society without humiliation can be realized.

As examined above, Margalit's project is not justifiable from an internal perspective because the core distinctions that support his project are blurred. For his project it is necessary to distinguish both a decent society from a civil society and self-respect from self-esteem. However, in his theory, Margalit admits these distinctions could be blurred and in reality these distinctions are easily blurred. It is hard to distinguish humiliation between individuals from humiliation in institutions because, as seen in Margalit's example of "speaker," institutionalized behaviors and personal behaviors are often not distinguished in reality. From an external perspective Margalit's project cannot realize a society without humiliation. Even if institutions without humiliation could be established in accordance with Margalit's project, they cannot be led to a society without humiliation when individuals' recognitive attitudes are not cultivated or educated and personally disrespectful attitudes remain in institutions.

5. Conclusion

I have argued that Hegel's idea of recognition is not only a vital concept in his whole works, especially his later works, but also it cannot be understood fully without his later works. I reinterpret Hegel's idea of recognition with the help of his later works. This reinterpreted Hegelian recognition could respond to an agonistic view, to explain its process of motivation at the individual level, to dramatically suggest his social ontology, to show his strategy at the institutional level, to explicate the relationship between

reciprocal recognition and freedom, etc. With these ideas, I have reconstructed a Hegelian theory of recognition, which suggests the meaning of recognition at the general sense and at the specific senses, shows the conceptual structure of cooperation between recognitive attitudes and recognition-favoring institutions, explains the relation between recognition and substantial freedom, and operates at the individual level and at the institutional level.

I have also argued this Hegelian theory of recognition is superior to other Hegelian theories of recognition such as Margalit's. I have criticized that Margalit's minimalist project is not justifiable. This is because from an internal perspective Margalit's core distinctions that support his project are blurred. For his project it is necessary to distinguish both a decent society from a civil society and self-respect from self-esteem. However, in his theory Margalit admits those distinctions could be blurred and in reality those distinctions are easily blurred. From an external perspective, Margalit's project cannot realize a society without humiliation. Even if institutions without humiliation could be successfully established in accordance with Margalit's project, they cannot be led to a society without humiliation when individuals' recognitive attitudes are not cultivated or educated. These critiques show that a minimalist project or a "thin" theory is not appropriate for realizing the idea of recognition. As examined in 3.2 and 3.4, the idea of recognition consists for a person's attitude as well as institutions in that the individual level and the social/institutional level are closely connected with each other in the idea of recognition.

Chapter Four

Development Ethics as Recognition

> "I have found that, among its other benefits, giving liberates the soul of the giver"[183]

1. Introduction

Post-development theorists have made a critique against current development practices and theories. In Chapter One, I argued that this critique takes place because those practices and theories necessarily result in psychological harms such as stigmatization, as well as material harms such as oppression of developing countries. In Chapters One and Two, I showed how the post-development critique is related to the tradition of distributive justice and critically examined whether current theories can respond to the post-development critique effectively. In Chapter Three, I reinterpreted Hegel's idea of recognition, focusing on Hegel's later works. This is because, as seen in Chapter Two, although a framework of recognition in itself could be effective for addressing the post-development critique, current theories of recognition have fatal weaknesses as seen in my critiques against Honneth's and Margalit's theories. In Chapter Three, through my interpretation of Hegel's later works, I argued that the idea of recognition, which pays attention to recognitive attitudes as well as recognition-favoring institutions, could supplement established theories of development ethics, which are powerless in addressing development problems. In other words, with the help of a

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[183] Angelou, Maya (1994), *Wouldn't Take Nothing for My Journey Now*, Bantam.

framework of recognition, established theories of development ethics such as Sen's capability approach could be reformed or re-visited to respond to the post-development critique adequately, namely to respect the recipients.[184]

My negative purpose of dissertation has been achieved because I have showed why established theories of development ethics are powerless in addressing development problems and what aspects of development ethics should be supplemented. I have argued that established theories of development ethics did not take seriously the respect deserved by developing countries, and the idea of reciprocal recognition could make established theories of development ethics more ethically desirable. The remaining purpose, namely my positive purpose, is to construct a theory of development ethics that can take reciprocal recognition seriously. For my positive purpose, in this chapter I propose "Development Ethics as Recognition" (DER), which is based on my Hegelian idea of recognition as I argued in Chapter Three. For this purpose, I examine whether DER is appropriate for being a theory of development ethics to respond to the post-development critique and whether DER is superior to other theories of development ethics. I suggest theoretical advantages of DER in this chapter, and in the next part—Chapters Five to Eight—I will examine whether DER is feasible by responding to hard development issues.

2. Development Ethics and Recognition (DER)

Denis Goulet, a pioneer of development ethics, argues that a unifying mission of development ethics is "to diagnose vital problems facing human societies, to guide public

[184] David Crocker's "agency-focused version of capability ethics" could be an attempt to include an idea of recognition (Crocker, 2008, p. 1). However, Crocker's attempt fails because he does not give up a redistributive feature of capability approach, which is based on human diversity. I believe that capability approach can be supplemented by a framework of recognition only if it is willing to accept its fundamental change according to this framework of recognition.

policy choices, and to clarify value dilemmas surrounding these problems and policies" in the context of development.[185] Thus, if a theory is to be a theory of development ethics, it should fulfill the three tasks: diagnosis, guidance, and justification. Furthermore, if the theory is to be a better theory of development ethics, it should be able to overcome asymmetric attitudes, which necessarily result in psychological harms such as stigmatization as well as material harms such as oppression. This is because established theories of development ethics not only cause those harms as unintended results, but they also do not respond to those harms effectively. In this section, I will examine whether my Hegelian theory of recognition can be used as a theory of development ethics through Goulet's three tasks.

2.1 Diagnosis through Recognition

2.1.1 Description of Background Systems

My Hegelian idea of recognition is effective in describing three background systems in which development problems occur: the status quo of current global society, the history of colonization, and the status quo of development era. First, the status quo of current global society is well described in the ontological sense of recognition. Leaving the normative evaluation alone, it is hard to deny that, phenomenologically, global society becomes more and more interactive, as seen in footnote 8. These interactions

[185] Goulet, 1995, p. 6. Because I want to argue that DER is superior to its rivals in diagnosing problems in development, in guiding development practice, and in justifying a new form of development as recognition, the third mission of development ethics by Goulet would be more largely interpreted into the task of "justification." This is because I believe that to justify a theory is not only "to clarify value dilemmas surrounding these problems and policies," but also to show that the theory is superior to the other major contenders, as Rawls says in *A Theory of Justice* (1999a, pp. 15-19).

show that current global society is placed in the ontological sense of recognition as a state where a person interacts with the other person.

Second, the history of colonization can be explained from a perspective of corrupted recognition. As seen in Chapter Three, a "life and death struggle" of the master-slave dialectic in *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) is the archetype that fails to manifest the ideal of reciprocal recognition. While the stage of invasion for the purpose of colonization is similar to the first part of life and death struggle, which would be likely to be a catastrophe, afterward the stage of colonial domination is similar to the second part of life and death struggle, in which the master dominates the slave. In the history of colonialism, many colonized people were consigned to a lifetime of servitude, instead of preserving their lives.

Third, the status quo of the development era can be explained from a perspective of corrupted recognition. Development practices after the breakdown of imperialism could be indirectly explained from a perspective of corrupted recognition. Developed countries, whatever their real intentions are, have expressed that their practices of development are to assist developing countries in poverty, and have implemented their policies of development since the Second World War. However, as seen in the post-development critique, their attempts did not attain economic prosperity and, rather, resulted in psychological and material harms of developing countries. As seen in Chapter One, this is because development practices are based on asymmetric relations resulted from unethical attitudes, which necessarily result in psychological harms such as stigmatization, as well as material harms such as oppression. These asymmetric relations resulted from unethical attitudes are evidently seen in the master-slave dialectic.

At the macro level, my Hegelian idea of recognition is effective in explaining the status quo of global society, the history of colonization, and the status quo of development, to which development ethicists have paid attention. This Hegelian idea of recognition explains how these situations are understood, and from which consequences these situations result.

2.1.2 Diagnosis of Development Problems

In addition to macro diagnosis, my Hegelian idea of recognition is effective in describing development problems at the micro level. The general normative sense of recognition is "taking something/-one as a person" and, thus, misrecognition is taking a person as a "thing," sub-human or animal. Specifically, in the context of development this sense of misrecognition can be classified into three forms: invisibility, disregard, and exploitation.

The first form of misrecognition is invisibility or social exclusion. In the context of development, misrecognition as invisibility is a phenomenon that the people of developed countries consider the people in plight such as extreme poverty[186] "the socially invisible men."[187] For example, according to *UNICEF Progress of Nations 2000*, 26,500-

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[186] In my dissertation, "extreme poverty" means that the living cost of a person a day is below the poverty line, which is $1.08 a day at 1993 Purchasing Power Parity (World Bank, 2000). According to the *World Development Report* (2000), worldwide poverty rose from 1.2 billion in 1987 to 1.5 billion in 2000 and, if recent trends persist, it will reach 1.9 billion by 2015. (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/Resources/WDR/English-Full-Text-Report/ch1.pdf)

[187] Honneth, 2001b, p. 116. Bohman claims that Hegel's social theory makes it clear that invisibility or domination by social exclusion is a different phenomenon from both recognition and distribution (2007, p. 269). Bohman suggests as a ground that invisibility cannot be seen in Hegel's master/slave dialectic. Although it is right for Bohman to argue that only domination as tyranny is seen in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, it is wrong for him to claim that there is no place of invisibility in Hegel's recognition. This is because this type of misrecognition can be seen in *Philosophy of Right*. In *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel argues that poverty is not only a matter of material deprivation, but involve social isolation, which makes the poor "more or less deprived of all the advantages of society, such as the ability to acquires skills and

30,000 children die each day due to poverty. They "die quietly in some of the poorest villages on earth, far removed from the scrutiny and the conscience of the world. Being meek and weak in life makes these dying multitudes even more invisible in death."[188] However, in 2000 Americans made private donations for foreign aid of all kinds totaling about $4 per person in poverty, 0.04 % of the U.S. Gross National Product (GNP), and the American government gave only 0.10 % of the U.S. GNP to developing countries.[189] Whether poverty results from natural disaster or from the global economic structure, it is misrecognition to ignore this misery.[190] Pippin says that "it may be that one manifestation of *such non-interference* (the theoretical ultimacy of the human individual) might be a callous indifference, resulting in the humiliating invisibility suffered by, say, Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man.*"[191] This phenomenon is misrecognition in that the people in a miserable plight are not taken as persons.

The second form of misrecognition is disregard. This is a phenomenon in which the people of developing countries are considered only as recipients but not as subjects. As post-development theorists claim, developed countries have ignored autonomy of developing countries and have not taken seriously native cultures, life-styles, etc., of developing countries during their intervention of development. This phenomenon means that developed countries consider the people of developing countries as subhuman, or things, rather than subjects. This phenomenon is misrecognition in that developing countries are not respected as subjects.

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education"(PR, § 242). This quote is an explanation of invisibility.

[188] http://www.unicef.org/pon00/immu1.htm

[189] Singer, 2002, p. 152.

[190] Papadopoulos and Tsakloglou (2008) explain the relation between poverty and social exclusion. They argue that social exclusion is a particular form of relational capability deprivation, closely related to the notion of poverty.

[191] Pippin, 2007, p. 63 (Original italic).

The third form of misrecognition is exploitation. In the process of development by developed countries, according to post-development theorists, the natural environment is destroyed, natural resources (foods, fuel, fodder, shelter, etc.) are exploited, and so on. In addition, for exploitation of natural resources, developed countries sometimes help military powers in developing countries undergoing civil war, which sometimes results in genocide (as seen in Rwanda), torture, family-destruction, etc. This kind of destruction is only made possible by misrecognition—to take someone's life is not to take someone as a person who deserves to be respected. Thus, exploitation is one form of misrecognition.

Hegel's recognition is effective in describing the development problems at the micro level. Hegel's recognition explains how physical harms, material deprivation, and mental harms are related to recognition. Thus, Hegel's recognition is effective in diagnosing development problems.

2.2 Guidance through Recognition

2.2.1 Recognitive Attitudes and Recognition-favoring Institutions

In my Hegelian idea of recognition, development problems, which are diagnosed above, can be addressed effectively. As seen in Chapter Three, recognition in nature cannot be forcefully demanded of a person and if recognition is forcefully demanded of a person it is no longer reciprocal recognition. If I compel recognition from a group or a person, the recognition thereby manifest will necessarily be corrupted because reciprocal recognition must be freely undertaken by both parties. However, it is too idealistic to argue that it is possible to achieve an ethical ideal such as reciprocal recognition without struggle or making a claim. It seems to be a puzzle in my Hegelian idea of recognition.

In my Hegelian idea of recognition, it is not a puzzle because my Hegelian idea of recognition does not exclude struggle in itself, but guides where struggle should be directed. This position is well seen in the two features of recognition as seen in Chapter Three: conceptual structure of recognition and two levels of recognition. First, conceptual structure of Hegel's recognition is explained in the following formula: Recognition = Recognizer's recognitive attitude + Recognizee's recognitive attitude + Recognition-favoring institutions. In this formula, a struggle for reciprocal recognition must be explicitly applied to recognition-favoring institutions to help cultivate each person's recognitive attitude. Although this formula accepts the necessity of struggle at the institutional level, struggle for recognition-favoring institutions do not result in corrupted recognition. This is because these institutions help a person to undertake recognitive attitudes freely, rather than demanding recognition of the person.

Second, Hegel's recognition also focuses on self-formative activity to change the people's attitudes to be recognitive at the individual level, for example, as seen in *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807). This change can be attained through a kind of education (*Bildung* or *Pädagogik*) . Hegel says "education [*Pädagogik*] is the art of making human beings ethical: it considers them as natural beings and shows them how they can be reborn, and how their original nature can be transformed into a second, spiritual nature so that this spirituality becomes habitual to them. In habit the opposition between the natural will and the subjective will disappears" (PR, §151 Zusatz). In his works, Hegel does not suggest his recognition as a deontological imperative to people, but tries to persuade people to follow his recognition through showing a logical process from an immature stage to a mature stage. For example, *Phenomenology of Spirit* may suggest a method of

education, "showing," as seen in the "drama" of the master-slave dialectic. The master-slave dialectic dramatically shows that when a person tends to satisfy his solipsistic desire alone ironically the person does not satisfy it and falls into a state of subordination. Through this dramatic struggle, the readers can understand that a person's unmediated consciousness or solipsistic desire could result in the person's own destruction as well as in others' tragedy, and they would hope for reciprocal recognition. Thus, in his theory of recognition Hegel suggests how a person's attitude can change to a reciprocal one.

My Hegelian idea of recognition provides ethical guidance for addressing development problems by using the concept of recognition consistently, from the task of diagnosis to the task of guidance. Hegel's recognition practically suggests how a struggle for reciprocal recognition should be directed to foster recognition and how people's recognitive attitude should be changed. Thus, Hegel's recognition is effective in performing the guiding task of development ethics.

2.2.2 Gradual and Multi-tiered Strategy of Recognition

According to my Hegelian idea of recognition, which is suggested in Chapter Three, my theory of development ethics will take a gradual and multi-tiered strategy. In *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel shows that his arguments are based on a dialectic method, namely a gradually ascending process. In other words, Hegel tries to show a process from an immature stage to a mature stage as his final claim, rather than suggesting his final claim in a rush. For example, the overall structure of *Philosophy of Right* is a process from Abstract Right (part one) to Morality (part two) to Ethical Life (part three). Although Ethical Life is a stage of Hegel's reciprocal recognition which Hegel considers

the ethical ideal, he tries to show the process from non-ideal thinking to ideal thinking. This feature is not limited to *Philosophy of Right*, but also applied to Hegel's other works because the feature of dialect is shown in his corpus. For example, *Phenomenology of Spirit* can be compared with "the ladder" to the standpoint of ontological logic.[192] In other words, *Phenomenology of Spirit* is intended by Hegel to provide the justification by demonstrating that the standpoint of speculative logic or absolute knowledge is actually made necessary by the certainties of ordinary consciousness itself. As will be argued in Chapter Seven, this feature expresses Hegel's educational or pedagogical feature. To put it differently, it is Hegel's pragmatic or practical method to leading the ideal theory from the non-ideal theory gradually. This method is Hegel's gradual strategy to persuade people or readers to accept his claims.

In addition to Hegel's gradual strategy, I pay attention to his multi-tiered strategy. Like Avineri, I understand the relation between Hegel's three institutions in Ethical Life of *Philosophy of Right* as horizontal.[193] In other words, Hegel's three institutions represent the three modes of human relationships: particular altruism, universal egoism, and universal altruism.[194] This understanding implies that each mode of human relationship should be guided by different principles of recognition, rather than the one principle of recognition as a panacea for ethical problems. This is because according to this horizontal understanding, ethical problems happen in human relationships that

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[192] Pinkard argues that Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is "a ladder that one kicked away once one had arrived at the proper heights" (2000, p. 336).

[193] My horizontal understanding does not mean that the structure of three institutions in Ethical Life is not vertical. My point is that although three institutions are vertical in Hegel's dialectic in that his ultimate ideal is universal altruism, they should be also understood horizontally in the non-ideal situation of the real world.

[194] Although it is a metaphysical assumption, there is a phenomenology consensus about three spheres of interaction among theorists. Honneth says "no matter how extensive such a list of historical interconnections among theories might be, it could hardly do more than demonstrate that a division of social life into three spheres of interaction has a high degree of plausibility" (1996, p. 94).

consist of three irreducible modes, and these problems should be addressed according to each mode. In each mode, a human being forms each identity. Thus, people have three identities in their three human relationships. For example, I am a father in the relationship of family, a worker in the relationship of market, and a God's son in the relationship of spirit or religion. These three identities should be developed and respected in balance because the formation and the balance of three identities help freedom to be realized.[195] If freedom means a status of one's being at home with oneself in the other according to Hegel, the formation of identity can be called a realization of freedom because ethical identity can be formed only in the ethical relationship with the other. For example, if the relationship of family is controlled by needs without love, my identity would be a boss, rather than a father. In this distorted identity I could not be at home with myself in other members of family. Thus, each inter-human relationship should be controlled by each principle in accordance with each inter-human relationship.

2.2.2.1 Human Relationship of Particular Altruism

For a human being, the human relationship of particular altruism, which is based on feelings such as love, is very important and necessary in that it is not only given to the human being, but also contributes to the human being's life development significantly and endlessly. Hegel's concern with the natural unit such as family is supported by modern psychologists such as Donald W. Winnicott. Winnicott's research shows that in the process of child development, the young child's ability to be alone in her own

[195] I do not claim that three identities are horizontal because two human relationships of particular altruism and universal egoism should be controlled by the human relationship of universal altruism. This is because reason, a force of the third scope, is stable to realize freedom; while two forces, feeling and needs, are not stable in that they could be degenerated.

personal life relies on the experience of the "continued existence of a reliable mother" as the picture of a love relationship.[196] This relationship does not have to be limited to the unit of family. Hegel claims that one should "love your neighbor as yourself, that is, love the human beings with whom you are in relation or with whom you come to be in relation."[197] This remark implies that the human relationship of particular altruism can be extended to larger units. In other words, a relationship, whatever it is with neighbor or tribe or nation, is based on feelings from particular entities, a feeling-based relationship can be included in this relationship of particular altruism.

The human relation of particular altruism is based on feelings such as love. For Hegel, love is "being oneself in another" (*System of Ethical Life*, p. 110). According to Williams, for Hegel, love is not a metaphysical or theological principle, but a social principle of union constitutive of the family as a natural unit.[198] Thus, when an ethical problem is based on the human relationship of particular altruism, the problem should be addressed from a perspective of feelings such as love in that ethical life in this relationship "cannot be fulfilled as an abstraction; it must first acquire the further determination of particularity" (PR, §134).

2.2.2.2 Human Relationship of Universal Egoism

For a human being, the human relationship of universal egoism in "civil society,"[199] which "affords a spectacle of extravagance and misery as well as of the

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[196] Winnicott, 1965, p. 32.

[197] Karl-Heinz Ilting and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen uber Rechtsphilosophie*, 1818-1831. Vol. 4. Grieshein Nachschrift. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1973. p. 338. (From Williams, 1997, p. 189).

[198] Williams, 1992, p. 85.

[199] Hegel's civil society is different from contemporary scholars' idea of civil society. Hegel's idea should be understood as an institution, which is based on economic relations.

physical and ethical corruption common to both" (PR, §185), is very important and necessary in that the desire of self-interest or universal egoism is natural and innate. Because this relationship is based on the principles of mutual exploitation and utility, it looks like an example of corrupted recognition. Instead of ignoring this relationship, Hegel suggests an ethical life in this relationship, namely corporations, which are based on solidarity for common goals or interests between members. For Hegel, corporations are suggested to resolve the problem of egoistic relationship.

Taylor explains that "For Hegel civil society is thus to be kept in balance by being incorporated in a deeper community. It cannot govern itself. Its members need allegiance to a higher community to turn them away from infinite self-enrichment as a goal and hence the self-destruction of civil society. Self-management through corporations can be seen as a stage on this road. It makes the individual member of a larger whole, and lifts him, as it were, toward the state. In the corporation he has the respect and dignity which he would otherwise seek, left as a simple individual, in endless self-enrichment."[200] Thus, for Hegel, the corporation is a mediating social and economic institution, which educates and looks after its members' interests, and admits members according to their skills and appropriate numbers. In addition, the corporation looks after and protects its members against contingencies, including the contingency of unemployment as a kind of insurance. For this reason, according to Hegel, the corporation is a second family through which individuals receive education, admission, recognition, and honor (PR, §252). Therefore, when an ethical problem is based on the human relationship of universal egoism, the problem should be addressed from a perspective of solidarity.

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[200] Taylor, 1975, p. 438.

2.2.2.3 Human Relationship of Universal Altruism

For human beings there is the human relationship of universal altruism to aim for fraternity. Although at first glance this claim seems doubtful in the era of capitalism and new-liberalism, many people have conceded it explicitly or implicitly. Many empirical researchers argue that human beings' altruistic feature is innate, or at least widely found. For example, according to Judith Lichtenberg "studies of rescuers show that they tend not to believe their behavior is extraordinary; they feel that they have to do what they do, because it's just part of who they are."[201] In reality, one example of universal altruism is many rich people's generous donations, such as Bill Gates's. Muhammad Yunus argues that his idea of "social business"—a business not for private benefit, but for social benefit—is feasible because there are many people who want to live for others' benefit as many religions teach.[202] Actually, Yunus's first project of social business began with the generous donation and cooperation of French company, Danone, in 2006.

The human relationship of universal altruism is based on religious spirit. Hegel says that "the state is not a family; it is a unit not of blood, but of spirit"[203] because "the state is an organism, i.e., the development of the Idea in its differences" (PR, §269 Zusatz) and "the state consists in the march of God in the world" (PR, §258A). This human relationship, the state in *Philosophy of Right*, is based on "a willingness to perform extraordinary sacrifices" (PR, §268R). Williams says "the ethical disposition constitutive of ethical life is grounded in religion."[204] Thus, when an ethical problem is based on the human relationship of universal altruism, the problem should be addressed

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[201] Lichtenberg, 2008, p. 6. See also Taylor (2002) and Badhwar (1993).
[202] Yunus, 2007.
[203] Hegel (1818). *Vorlesungen ü. Naturrecht* (Homeyer). Berlin. §114. (From Williams, 1997, p. 294.).
[204] William, 1997, p. 328.

from a perspective of fraternity. In the area of ethics or moral philosophy, many moral philosophers' theories are also based on human relationship of universal altruism. According to David Crocker, for example, "Sen's empirical concept of agency enables him to claim that people can and often do act to realize other-regarding goals, even when to do so is disadvantageous."[205] As will be examined in Chapter Six, most theories of human rights are also based on universal altruism. However, the position of many moral philosophers is different from my position in my Hegelian idea of recognition because while those philosophers attempt to address all ethical problems only with universal altruism, I argue that in my Hegelian idea of recognition universal altruism addresses only one dimension of three human relationships.

Because human relationships can be classified in these three modes, when my theory of development ethics attempts to suggest an ethical guidance on development problems, it should address those problems with using a gradual and multi-tiered strategy. In Part Two, this gradual and multi-tiered strategy will be fleshed out according to each development problem.

2.3 Justification through Hegel's Recognition

As mentioned in footnote 192, the third mission of development ethics suggested by Goulet is more largely interpreted into the task of "justification," which includes not only clarifying some core values of the theory in question, but also arguing that the theory is more reasonable than the other major contenders. While clarifying some main

[205] Crocker, 2008, chapter 5.

values would show how development ethics as recognition (DER) is different from other theories, arguing its superiority would explain why DER is more reasonable than the other major contenders. The latter could be performed both theoretically and practically. In this section I do this task at the theoretical level and, in Part Two, I will do it at the practical level, showing that DER is to be preferred in some respects to other theories.

2.3.1 Two core Values of DER

Although DER is based on many values, both Hegel's social ontology of interdependence and Hegel's concept of substantial freedom make DER different from other theories of development ethics. The social ontology of interdependence indirectly shows what development means in DER and guides how development policies should be put into practice. The concept of substantial freedom explains which concept of freedom is achievable in the context of development and guides how to motivate people to realize reciprocal recognition.

2.3.1.1 Social Ontology: Dependence and Independence

In his theory of recognition, Hegel's social ontology—dependence and independence—is presented as an alternative to the abstract atomic individualism of modern liberalism and to the abstract collectivism. According to Pippin, "at its most ambitiously dialectical the full claim [of Hegel's arguments] is that acknowledging, acting in the light if, such relations of dependence is a necessary condition for the achievement of true independence, or true 'self-realization,' or 'actualized,' 'concrete'

freedom."[206] Hegel attempts to justify social ontology of "dependence and independence" through suggesting three paths to recognition in his works.

The first path is seen in the master-slave dialectic. As seen in the master-slave dialectic of *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel does not ignore the real world, full of domination and oppression. Through the master-slave dialectic, Hegel shows that both slave and master are not free in corrupted recognition. This asymmetric recognition, to attempt to gain recognition through dominating others (for example, through forcing their exclusion from the sphere of what is one's own), is self-contradictory because in order to gain recognition as an excluding totality, each must be ready to bring about the death of the other.[207] In other words, Hegel implies that the master-slave dialectic, which is based on social ontology of independence, may result in catastrophe. Through this tragic drama, Hegel shows that human beings are both independent and dependent.

Second, Hegel shows a path to approach reciprocal recognition through non-extreme struggle which is seen in his earlier works such as *System of Ethical Life* and *Jena Real Philosophie*. According to Hegel, "where there is a plurality of individuals, there is a relation between them and this relation is lordship and bondage ... [and] the relation of lordship and obedience is also set up whenever individuals as such enter into relation in connection with what is most ethical" (*System of Ethical Life*, [442], p. 125-126). This remark shows that through this struggle the combatants are induced to realize that they are dependent beings as well as independent ones, rather than falling into catastrophe. This is because their struggle is based on competitive relation, which is not extreme as seen in the master-slave dialectic.

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[206] Pippin, 2007, pp. 60-61.
[207] Foster, 1997, p.8.

Third, Hegel shows the path to realize freedom through reciprocal recognition in *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit*: "it is only when the slave becomes free that the master, too, becomes completely free" (§ 436 Zusatz). In reciprocal recognition, people are always recipients (recognizees) as well as addressers (recognizers). Hegel shows that social ontology of dependence and independence, on which reciprocal recognition is based, results in his substantial freedom, while social ontology of independence necessarily results in catastrophe or non-freedom.

These three paths to justify Hegel's social ontology of interdependence seem to represent many cases of human relations: antagonistic relations, competitive relations, and friendly relations. Through these paths, Hegel may imply that people can realize at any relations that they are interdependent. In my dissertation I apply this social ontology primarily to individuals, and secondly to countries as aggregations of individuals.[208] When recognitive attitudes are explained and argued, this social ontology of interdependence is primarily applied to individuals. When dealing with development policies, this social ontology is applied to countries. Thanks to Hegel's social ontology of interdependence, Hegel's reciprocal recognition can address to the PD critique.

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[208] According to Taylor's interpretation of Hegel, Hegel has two aspirations, which were both connected but opposed: one is to the unity with others such as society and the other is to the radical moral autonomy (Taylor, 1975, p. 76). These aspirations could be explained as political solidarism and political singularism. The former is the endogenously organized group, which represents the people as a unified agent or agency, focusing on the people's participatory character. However, because of the extension of citizenship there is little plausibility in this model. The latter is the exogenously organized group implies that social and political involvement make no difference to people's basic claims or rights because it considers the people as a multitude or crowd of separate agents. The people can be compared with the shareholders in that it has little or no participatory significance. However, it is not realistic. Thus, in these two aspirations Hegel's social ontology should be understood not purely endogenously and not purely exogenously. This involves continuous interaction between an exogenously representative government and an endogenously responsive citizenry. In this understanding, I apply Hegel's social ontology—dependence and independence—to individuals and to countries as groups of individuals according to the context.

2.3.1.2 Substantial Freedom and Motivation

My Hegelian idea of recognition attempts to motivate people to change their attitudes recognitive and to foster recognition-favoring institutions through his concept of freedom. Hegel shows the path to realize substantial freedom through reciprocal recognition in *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit*: "it is only when the slave becomes free that the master, too, becomes completely free" (§ 436 Zusatz). As examined above, Hegel's freedom is not the freedom to do as one pleases, nor is it the freedom that consists in being the source of the normative principles that govern one's actions. Hegel argues that one's freedom depends on the other's freedom in reciprocal recognition.

According to Hegel's substantial freedom, in the context of development, freedom of the people of developed countries is guaranteed only when they are appropriately recognized by the people of developing countries (vice versa). When the people of developing countries are misrecognized, their symptoms of misrecognition are as follows: hunger, helplessness, hatred, violence, and so on. On the other hand, when the people of developed countries are misrecognized, their symptoms of misrecognition are as follows: fear, guilt, shame, etc. Although symptoms are different, both show that people's freedom is restricted. For example, when the people of developed countries watch a program on the extreme poverty in developing countries and how their countries ignore it, they feel ashamed or guilty. These negative feelings do not make them free—"being at home with oneself in another" (*The Encyclopedia Logic,* #24A). Thus, both developed and developing countries should recognize each other in order to achieve Hegel's substantial freedom. This explanation is very helpful in motivating developed countries to pay attention to a miserable plight of developing countries.

Most theories of development ethics, including Sen's capability approach, have trouble explicating the motivation of moral practices such as foreign aid. For example, when someone may ask why developed countries should aid developing countries, Sen may answer that we should strive for "equality" because we have "capacity," and Peter Singer may answer that it is our "moral duty" because of "capacity."[209] This motivational structure, which is based on external factors and deontological imperative, seem to be less persuasive and result in stingy foreign aid, as will be examined in Chapter Six. However, Hegel's idea of substantial freedom may help suggest a more persuasive justification of motivational basis for assistance because in Hegel's substantial freedom, this value of assistance is autonomously adopted by people as important and valuable.[210] According to recent researches on motivation, forms of autonomous motivation, which are based on self-determination theory, are much more effective to promote people's motivation, rather than forms of controlled motivation.[211] Thanks to Hegel's substantial freedom, thus, my Hegelian idea of recognition is more effective in motivating people to participate in ethical activities such as charity, rather than other theories whose motivational structures are based on external factors such as capacity.

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[209] Sen, 1980 and 2008; Singer, 2002 and 2009. Although in his 2009 book, Singer seems to suggest a 'new' argument about motivation with the utilitarian concept, namely happiness, this argument should be understood in his previous argument of capacity because this utilitarian happiness is not possible without capacity. For this reason, it is reasonable to understand that Singer's motivational basis for charity is capacity.

[210] According to Deci and Ryan (2000), Singer or Sen's motivational structure can be included in the category of "external regulation" and "introjected regulation" which are more controlled and extrinsic. On the other hand, my motivational structure based on Hegel's substantial freedom can be included in the category of "identified regulation" and "integrated regulation" which are more autonomous and intrinsic.

[211] Recent field experiments are reviewed showing that intrinsic goal framing produces deeper engagement in learning activities, better conceptual learning, and higher persistence at learning activities, than external goal framing (Van Steenkiste, Lens, & Deci, 2006).

2.3.2 Justification of DER

In the area of development ethics, Sen's capability approach is not only the most sophisticated framework among theories of development ethics at the theoretical level,[212] but also theoretical foundation of many development practices, such as Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).[213] In spite of its dominance and popularity, Sen's capability approach seems to overlook, or at best superficially consider, three important aspects that development ethics should take seriously: historical concern, psychological concern, and motivational basis. First, Sen's capability approach not only overlooks the past issues such as colonialism, but also does not analyze and address current development issues in connection with historical concern. Even when Sen attempts to approach poverty from a social perspective, he does not proceed to a historical analysis. In his empirical study of four well-known historical cases—Bengal, 1943; Ethiopia, 1972-1974; Sahel, 1972-1973; and Bangladesh, 1974, in his social analysis of poverty Sen concludes that food decline need not be the main cause of famine, or even a minor cause, and he stresses the success of democratic regimes in coping with poverty.[214] Despite his social analysis, Sen's suggestion of democracy seems to be abstract and superficial because he does not have a specific strategy to implement democracy in a miserable plight of developing countries. Although Sen argues that democracy is a universal value, he does not explain why

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[212] Crocker, 2008, pp. 109-149. As seen in Sen's assessments of alternative approaches to development, Sen's capability approach is superior to the commodity approach (the crude version and the Rawlsian version), the welfare (utilitarian) approach, and the basic needs approach. In addition, although Martha Nussbaum is considered "an important proponent" of the capability approach (Crocker, 2008, p. 109), I believe that Sen's capability approach is superior to Nussbaum's capability approach because Nussbaum's theory is controversial in that she suggests her list of capabilities through her overlapping consensus, which is based on controversial Aristotelian assumptions such as human dignity.

[213] Gasper 2007.

[214] Sen, 1981 and 1989. Sen argues that "no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press ... [and] famines have occurred in ancient kingdoms and contemporary authoritarian societies" (1999, p. 152).

democracy as a universal value has been damaged in developing countries and how this damaged value can be restored from a military or authoritarian regime in accordance with their own cultural and historical contexts.[215] In order to answer these questions and to suggest a specific strategy to implement democracy in developing countries, it is necessary to approach extreme poverty in developing countries from a historical as well as a social perspective. Development problems or issues seem to be entangled with the past, the present, and the future. Thus, taking a historical perspective is necessary and effective in analyzing and addressing development problems. DER takes a historical perspective seriously, as seen in 2.1 of this chapter where historical situations such as colonialism are diagnosed through Hegel's idea of recognition and as will be seen in Chapter Eight where unresolved past wrongs are addressed in DER.

Second, Sen's capability approach does not fully pay attention to psychological aspects of human nature. Although Sen pays attention to people's psychological aspects when remarking people "appear in public without shame," his discussion leads to material distribution, rather than focusing on psychological aspects themselves.[216] In addition, as examined in Chapter Two, Sen's capability approach overlooks some side-effects of its practice such as redistribution, although Sen's capability approach can result in unintended psychological harms, such as stigmatization. As will be argued in Chapter Eight, psychological harms should be taken seriously because these problems, such as distorted identity, may negatively influence the future generations, causing violence or helplessness. Post-development theorists such as Ashis Nandy have also emphasized

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[215] See Sen (1999b) for more explanation about democracy as a universal value.
[216] Sen, 1999a, p. 71.

these psychological harms of colonialism and development practices.[217] Different from Sen's capability approach, DER takes psychological aspects of development seriously, because Hegel's reciprocal recognition can be realized through the change of both epistemic and performative attitudes, as well as the reform of institutions. As seen in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (1821), furthermore, Hegel's analysis of poverty is based on both psychological harms and material harms.[218]

Third, Sen's capability approach is poor at motivating developed countries to assist developing countries. Sen ignored motivation in his theory for a long time and he took it for granted that equality should be strived for. In his 2008 article, however, Sen mentioned for the first time that motivation comes from just recognition of the "capacity" you have for helping.[219] It is good news that Sen began to pay attention to motivation because motivation is necessary for development ethics which should suggest an ethical guidance for development practices. However, it is bad news that Sen's justification of the motivational basis for assistance is based on capacity, which Singer has already suggested and has been criticized for because it is too deontological. Iris Young criticizes that this kind of motivation based on capacity is too demanding: "it flies in the face of moral intuition, moreover, to suggest that all moral agents have exactly the same duties to all other agents."[220] According to Edward Deci and Richard Ryan (2000), furthermore, this kind of extrinsic motivational structure, which is based on external factors such as capacity, is less effective to motivate people than an autonomous motivational structure, which is based on self-determination. While Sen's capability approach is stingy with

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[217] Nandy, 1997.

[218] I introduce Hegel's analysis of poverty in Chapter Six, comparing it with the analysis of poverty in post-development theories.

[219] Sen, 2008, pp. 335-336.

[220] Young, 2006, p. 104.

motivation and ineffective, DER suggests its motivational structure more positively. Motivation in DER is based on Hegel's substantial freedom, which induces people to change their attitudes internally and autonomously. In DER, the reason why I assist a person is for my freedom. When the people of developed countries watch a program on the extreme poverty in developing countries and how their countries ignore it, they feel ashamed or guilty. These negative feelings do not make them free—"being at home with oneself in another" (*The Encyclopedia Logic*, #24A).

Motivation in DER is based on a gradual and multi-tiered strategy of recognition, which has three different motivational forces according to three human relationships. As seen in Table 2.3, the motivation force in particular altruism is feeling; that in universal egoism is common interest; and that in universal altruism is reason (altruistic desire). This multi-tiered strategy is effective in motivating people who are in different relationships. For example, it is reasonable to motivate a person in a family relationship on the basis of feelings such as love, but it is not reasonable to motivate a person in an economic relationship on the basis of feelings such as love. It is more appropriate to appeal to common interests for motivation in an economic relationship. In addition, this gradual and multi-tiered strategy in DER is practical as seen in Table 2.3 in that each motivational force is developed from an immature stage to a mature stage. In other words, in the framework of DER, the degree of motivation would be gradually enlarged from a weak degree to a strong degree, in accordance with the degree of transformation of each person's recognitive attitudes.

Table 2.3 Motivation in Development Ethics as Recognition

Human relationship / Motivation in DER	Relationship in particular altruism	Relationship in universal egoism	Relationship in universal altruism
Multi-tiered strategy (motivational forces)	Feeling	Common interests	Reason (altruistic desire)
Gradual strategy (from an immature stage to an mature stage)	A strong degree ↑ A weak degree	Many common interests ↑ A few common interest	A broad scope ↑ A narrow scope

While Sen's capability approach overlooks these three aspects—historical concern, psychological concern, and motivational basis, my Hegelian theory of recognition takes them seriously. This examination shows that my Hegelian theory of recognition is more reasonable than Sen's capability approach.

My Hegelian idea of recognition is effective in performing the diagnosing, the guiding, and the justifying tasks of development ethics. As examined above, my Hegelian idea of recognition is effective in capturing development problems at the macro and the micro levels, in addressing these problems, and in clarifying value dilemmas surrounding these problems. Thus, it can be called "development ethics as recognition" (DER) from a perspective of development ethics.

3. DER and "Rawlsian Resourcism"

As examined in Chapter Two, Pogge argues that the capability approach is concerned only with institutional distribution of resources and necessarily results in

stigmatization because the capability approach is based on "vertical" inequality. As an alternative to Sen's capability approach, Pogge proposes "Rawlsian Resourcism" that focuses on building justice-favoring institutions in order to escape stigmatization of the disadvantaged people. Pogge argues that "the resourcist approach is supported by this conception of natural inequality as horizontal" and "those whom you call naturally disfavored and whom you want the institutional order to compensate would actually fare rather well under the difference principle even without being singled out for special compensatory benefits."[221] In other words, Pogge argues that "Rawlsian Resourcism" does not result in stigmatization, because its distribution is based on institutions rather than applying to individuals directly.

Someone may argue that in this sense, Pogge's "Rawlsian Resourcism" is not different from DER. This is because "Rawlsian Resourcism" also focuses on building justice-favoring institutions in order to escape stigmatization of disadvantaged people, as DER emphasizes recognition-favoring institutions. Despite this similarity, there is a fundamental difference between DER and Pogge's Rawlsian Resourcism. Although Pogge tries to address official disrespect in institutions, he does not do personal disrespect which is related to people's recognitive attitudes rather than recognition-favoring institutions, and which occurs extensively in everyday life or cultural norms. Misrecognition such as stigmatization happens as personal disrespect as well as official disrespect in institutions. For example, Nancy Fraser's example of misrecognition in everyday life is a black banker, who is rejected by a taxi driver because of his black

[221] Pogge, 2002a, p. 206, p. 225 n 108.

complexion.[222] This taxi driver's misrecognitive attitude happens as personal disrespect, rather than official disrespect in institutions. Pogge seems to be silent in responding to these misrecognitions as personal disrespect. In contrast, DER focuses not only on building recognition-favoring institutions but also on changing the people's (both recognizer's and recognizee's) recognitive attitudes. The relationship between recognitive attitudes and recognition-favoring institutions in DER is connected and complementary. Without cultivating recognitive attitudes, thus, it is hard to motivate people to establish recognition-favoring institutions, and even if these institutions could be established, these institutions will be deteriorated. Without establishing recognition-favoring institutions, it is hard to cultivate recognitive attitudes, and even if these attitudes could be temporarily cultivated, these attitudes will not be sustainable in unethical social backgrounds. For this reason, Pogge's ignorance of recognitive attitudes is a fatal weakness of Pogge's institutional approach because this ignorance could prevent not only constructing justice-favoring institutions, but also keep them sustainable. Thus, Pogge's institutional approach is not only different from DER, but also has a fatal weakness.

4. Conclusion

I have argued that Hegel's recognition is effective in capturing development problems at the macro and the micro levels. At the macro level, Hegel's recognition is effective in explaining the status quo of global society, the history of colonization, and the status quo of development, to which development ethicists have paid attention. At the

[222] Fraser and Honneth, 2003.

micro level, Hegel's recognition explains how three forms of misrecognition—invisibility, disregard, and exploitation—are related to development problems. I have also argued that Hegel's recognition is effective in performing the guiding task of development ethics. Hegel's recognition practically suggests that a struggle for reciprocal recognition should be directed to foster recognition and that people's recognitive attitude should be changed in order to realize reciprocal recognition. In addition, my Hegelian theory of recognition suggests an ethical guidance on development problems with a gradual and multi-tiered strategy because human relationship can be classified in these three modes. In addition, I have argued that Hegel's recognition is effective in performing the justifying tasks of development ethics. My Hegelian theory of recognition is more reasonable than Sen's capability, which is the most sophisticated framework among theories of development ethics, in that while Sen's capability approach overlooks these three aspects—historical concern, psychological concern, and motivational basis, my Hegelian theory of recognition takes them seriously. Thus, I have called my Hegel's theory of recognition "development ethics as recognition" (DER) from a perspective of development ethics.

I have also argued that DER is superior to Pogge's "Rawlsian Resourcism," which Pogge suggests as an alternative to Sen's capability approach, after criticizing it. While Pogge's "Rawlsian Resourcism" ignores misrecognitions as personal disrespect happening extensively in everyday life and exerting influence on people's life widely, DER addresses misrecognitions of both personal and official disrespect.

Part Two

Applications of Development Ethics as Recognition

In Part One, I showed that post-development theorists emphasize the importance of respect or recognition deserved by developing countries and that this feature of recognition should be supplemented to theories of development ethics to be more ethically desirable. In addition, I constructed "Development Ethics as Recognition" (DER), which is based on Hegel's recognition. I showed that DER not only effectively responds to the post-development critique, but also it is theoretically superior to other theories of development ethics such as Sen's capability approach and Pogge's "Rawlsian Resourcism." While I showed theoretical advantages of DER in Chapter Four, in Part Two I examine whether DER can address development issues effectively from a practical perspective.

For this purpose, I choose four issues which directly arise in developing countries and are indirectly related to issues of global ethics: immigration, extreme poverty, education, and unresolved past wrongs. From a synchronic perspective, immigration and unresolved past wrongs have not been fully studied in the area of development ethics, although illegal migrants from developing countries to developed countries to escape extreme poverty are increasing and violence related to past wrongs has not disappeared in developing countries. [223] In addition, extreme poverty and education issues are still

[223] One exception of this claim is David Crocker. Although Crocker mentions "immigration" as one of new directions of development ethics in his new book (2008, p. 64 n53), his short remark is limited to the narrow subject of "brain drain." Although he has also presented some articles about past wrongs (1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2007, 2008), his research is limited to assess South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu's

controversial despite the existence of much research. From a historical perspective, unresolved past wrongs are related to the past; immigration and extreme poverty are currently urgent; and education enables people to have a sense of a future for themselves. Most established theories of development ethics have focused on current development problems but development problems are necessarily entangled with the past, the present, and the future. Current problems have been negatively influenced by unresolved past wrongs and both also will influence future generations, whether their influence is negative or positive. Thus, it is important and necessary to have a framework of development ethics to address the past and the future issues, as well as the current issues. I argue that DER can provide this framework and from a practical perspective, it is superior to other theories such as rights-based theories, responsibility-based theories, and Sen's capability approach.

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arguments and to respond to them by arguing that retributive justice can contribute to different models of reconciliations. In other words, Crocker's discussion is limited to the discussion of transitional justice, rather than leading to the discussion of transgenerational justice or treatment.

Chapter Five

Immigration in the context of development ethics

> "Migration is the oldest action against poverty. It selects those who most want help. It is good for the country to which they go; it helps break the equilibrium of poverty in the country from which they come. What is the perversity in the human soul that causes people to resist so obvious a good?"[224]

1. Introduction

Between 1965 and 2000, 75 million people undertook cross-border movements to settle in countries other than that of their origin; in 2000 about 175 million individuals lived in other countries as migrants.[225] These numbers may prove that the era of the open-borders has arrived. However, this idea is only related to economically advantaged people who are seen as potential contributors to the host country, rather than disadvantaged people from developing countries. Aihwa Ong calls this phenomenon "transnational citizenship" that is rooted in an instrumentalist definition of individual freedom as economic optimization in the realm of borderless markets.[226] In reality, it is still hard for

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[224] John Kenneth Galbraith (Cited in International Organization for Migration, 2005, p. 253).

[225] United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2003). These estimates are based on census data for 210 countries or areas out of a total of 228 in principle (International Organization for Migration, 2005, p. 379). Censuses enumerate all persons present or living in a country at a particular time. Consequently, census counts do not necessarily exclude undocumented or unauthorized migrants. Evidence suggests that censuses generally include undocumented migrants in the counts they produce, thus providing a good basis for the estimation of all international migrants

[226] Ong, 2006, p. 239. Some people call this phenomenon "brain drain" or human capital flight. It is an emigration of trained and talented individuals to other nations. This phenomenon is most problematic for developing countries, where it is widespread. In these developing countries, higher education and

economically disadvantaged people to enter into developed countries. *The New York Times* reports that in 2006 more than 22,000 migrants from Africa attempted to enter Spanish territory illegally and most of them were repatriated to their home country.[227] David Miller describes a situation of immigrants from Africa who attempt to enter Europe: "During the night ... several hundred desperate migrants have rushed the fence, using makeshift ladders. A few were shot dead; many more displayed broken limbs and deep gashes on their hands where the wire has cut them."[228] Although goods, money, and other resources are freely moving across borders in the era of globalization and the movement of economically advantaged people is also relatively free, the movement of disadvantaged people has been seriously restricted.

In exploring the issue of immigration, this chapter is limited to the consideration of would-be migrants from developing countries, especially economically disadvantaged migrants, to developed countries in order to escape extreme poverty.[229] These would-be migrants from developing countries do not enter into developed countries legitimately and despite their desperate plight they are not considered even refugees in current international law in many countries. How should developed countries or the people in those countries treat these people who leave their developing countries and migrate to developed countries in order to escape extreme poverty? Should developed countries or the people in those countries permit "the first entry" or "the first admission" of the people

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professional certification are often viewed as the surest path to escape from a troubled economy or difficult political situation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brain_drain).

[227] The New York Times (October 8, 2006).

[228] Miller, 2007, p. 2.

[229] In this chapter, I deal with a specific population, would-be migrants from developing countries to developed countries because of their extreme poverty. I do not consider some migrants who try to enter into developed countries for a better life although they are not in extreme poverty. I also do not consider some migrants from their own developing countries to another developing country because of their extreme poverty.

from developing countries in the context of membership?[230] I critically examine whether rights-based theories can efficiently address this issue of immigrants from developing countries because most philosophical theories of immigration have been discussed on the basis of rights-based theories.[231] Then, if rights-based theories cannot address this issue, I examine whether development ethics as recognition (DER) can address the issue of immigration, especially would-be immigrants from developing countries, effectively.[232]

2. Immigration and Rights-based Theories

Since the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR) of 1948, rights-based theories have been dominant in the discussion of international norms.[233] In order to examine whether rights-based theories can address the issue of immigrants from

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[230] Benhabib, 2006. Although the illegal immigrants from developing countries succeed in living in developed countries secretly, immigrants from developing countries have been economically exploited or severely treated because they are not legally protected. *The NewYork Times* (May 19, 2008) reported that violence against immigrants from poor African countries such as Malawi is spreading across one neighborhood after another here in one of South Africa's main cities and the mayhem left at least 12 people dead — beaten by mobs, shot, stabbed or burned alive. According to the report of the US ambassador for fighting international slavery, in 2005 thousands of North Korean refugees are working as sex slaves in China under threat of being returned should Chinese authorities catch them (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2005/12/10/2003283761). Although these affairs are ethically serious, because these are the issues of "after entering" or "naturalization" I will not discuss these issues. This is because although there are still some violence or exploitations, the issue of naturalization has been taken seriously and positively in politics and practical philosophy, but the issue of first admission is "the least developed aspect of an ethics of migration" (Bader, 2005, p. 332).

[231] Although most development ethicists have not directly addressed the issue of immigration from developing countries to developed countries, this claims can be also applied to the area of development ethics because many development ethicists support rights-talk or their approaches are based on rights-talk. For example, Amartya Sen supports rights-talk without reservations (Sen, 2004). Although Martha Nussbaum and Onora O'Neill have some reservations of rights-talk or "the rhetoric of rights," rights still play in their ethical theories of development. According to Nussbaum rights-talk is a mere rhetoric if it is not understood in terms of capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000, pp. 97-98). According to O'Neill ..."rights are mere rhetoric unless there are counterpart obligations, to take seriously the need to assign specific tasks to institutions and individuals" (O'Neill, 2004, p. 246).

[232] I think that both rights-based theories and DER are effective in diagnosing problems related to immigration but they are different to guide public policy choices to address these problems. Thus, in this chapter I will focus the comparison to their guidance of public policy.

[233] Benhabib, 2004, p. 7. This tendency is also seen in the area of development ethics, as mentioned in footnote 238.

developing countries, I classify rights-based theories into three positions according to their views regarding borders: the cosmopolitan position, the communitarian position, and the discourse theory position.

2.1 Cosmopolitan Position: Open-Borders

Cosmopolitans[234] claim that borders should be open to all human beings. They question all politically constituted boundaries that restrict the freedom of movement because they believe that the freedom of movement is a universal human right. Their belief is based on two assumptions: the principle of moral equality and the arbitrariness of boundaries. First, some cosmopolitans argue that the freedom of movement should be permitted because all human beings are free and equal. For example, Joseph Carens inquires into three main strands of contemporary liberal theory that are based on the principle of moral equality; Robert Nozick's libertarianism, Rawls's theory of justice, and utilitarianism.[235] After examination, Carens concludes that if we give the principle of moral equality, its full extension human beings should have the freedom of immigration as a human right. However, Carens's logical arguments are not justifiable because from accepting the principle of moral equality, it does not logically follow that human beings have the freedom of immigration as a human right. Alasdair MacIntyre argues, "every attempt to give good reasons for believing that there are such rights has failed."[236]

Instead of logical arguments, some cosmopolitans can suggest a method of agreement to argue that the freedom of immigration should be unconditionally included

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[234] In this chapter, cosmopolitans are Thomas Pogge, Charles Beitz, Joseph Carens, and so on. I also believe that Sen, O'Neill, and Nussbaum may be included in the cosmopolitan position regarding immigration from developing countries because their theories are based on the universality of human rights.
[235] Carens, 1987.
[236] MacIntyre, 1981, p. 69.

in a list of human rights. However, if they accept that a list of human rights should be based on agreement, they would come to realize that the freedom of immigration is not included in UDHR which is the typical agreement of human rights. Although UDHR accepts the principle of moral equality—"all human beings are born free and equal" (UDHR, Art. 1), according to UDHR human beings have only "the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of *each state*" and "the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to *his country*" (UDHR, Art. 13, my italics). According to UDHR, human beings have no right to enter into other countries, but instead, they have only "the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution" (UDHR, Art. 14). This asymmetry between immigration and emigration happens because UDHR combines cosmopolitan aspirations of universal human rights with communitarian assumptions regarding particular civil rights.[237] Thus, it is hard for the freedom of immigration to be included in human rights through the process of agreement even on the assumption of the principle of moral equality.

Cosmopolitans may claim that, although there is asymmetry between immigration and emigration in the non-ideal situation in which UDHR was agreed, the freedom of immigration would be agreed upon as a human right through John Rawls's device of the "veil of ignorance" in the ideal situation.[238] Although it seems plausible, it results in another problem, namely inherent conflicts between rights. The freedom of association can also be agreed to as a human right behind the veil of ignorance, and it will necessarily conflict with the freedom of immigration because it cannot be realized without any exclusion. Regretfully this conflict cannot be resolved, because there is no ordering of

[237] O'Neill, 2004, p. 243.
[238] Rawls, 1971, revisited 1999a.

conflicting rights in right-talk. Thus, although there may be no asymmetry between immigration and emigration in the ideal situation, because of the conflict between rights it is still hard to defend the right of the freedom of immigration on the basis of the principle of moral equality. Therefore, from the principle of moral equality it does not follow that human beings have the freedom of immigration as a human right, whether it is based on logical arguments or agreement.

Second, cosmopolitans argue that the boundaries of countries are morally arbitrary and so they should be disregarded.[239] However, it is doubtful that morally arbitrary factors should always be disregarded. Rather, it is reasonable to say that arbitrary factors are neither just nor unjust in themselves; they are only natural facts. Whether they are just or not depends on how one deals with these factors. If arbitrary factors contribute to others' interests and can be used justly, they can be justified. Similarly, if boundaries are advantageous, the arbitrariness of boundaries can also be justified. Some people argue that boundaries are useful and efficient to protect and enhance the culture of a country. For example, Quebec has passed a number of laws in the area of the French language and has tried to separate from Canada in order to maintain the French culture.[240] This is because most people in Quebec think that the survival and flourishing of the French culture in Quebec is good and it is best to set boundaries around Quebec for this purpose. Norway also separated itself from Sweden in 1905 because Norway wanted to preserve the Norwegian language and culture.[241] Rawls argues that boundaries play a very important role in preserving territory of a country and

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[239] Beitz, 1975, pp. 291-293, Pogge, 1994, pp. 198-199.
[240] Taylor, 1995, p. 245.
[241] Walzer, 2003, p. 204.

its environmental integrity, as well as for the size of their population.[242] Therefore, from the arbitrary boundaries of people it does not follow that the boundaries should be disregarded.

According to the cosmopolitan view of immigration, economically disadvantaged people from developing countries should have the right of freedom of immigration. However, as examined above, from their assumptions—the principle of moral equality and the arbitrariness of boundaries—their claim of open borders does not logically follow and it is also hard to defend their claim of open borders because the cosmopolitan position on the right of immigration necessarily conflicts with other rights such as the right of association. Therefore, it is hard to defend a cosmopolitan position of open borders in rights-talk.

2.2 Communitarian Position: Closed-Borders

Communitarians claim that borders should be restricted for two reasons. The first reason is to guarantee democratic legitimacy of a country. Some communitarians argue that democracy does "require closure precisely because democratic representation must be accountable to a specific people."[243] Will Kymlicka claims that there is an optimum size of the "demos," which is appropriate for the exercise of collective self-government.[244] This is because according to communitarians, democracy is not only a formula for aggregating votes, but is also a system of collective deliberation and legitimation. In addition, democratic deliberation requires mutual understanding and trust,

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[242] Rawls, 1999b, p. 38.
[243] Benhabib, 2004, p. 219.
[244] Kymlicka, 1997, p. 318.

such as some sense of commonality or shared identity, in order to sustain a deliberative and participatory democracy. Thus, communitarians argue that if borders are not restricted and immigration is unconditionally permitted, democratic legitimacy of a country could be seriously threatened. However, this claim seems exaggerated because appropriate control of immigration does not damage democratic legitimacy of a host country. Immigrants may not be a threat to shared identity because identity is always in flux and it is molded by the different subcultures that exist within it. As immigrants adapt when they go to a new country, so the host country will change as it accepts these new immigrants. Therefore, it is hard to claim that borders of a country should be closed in order to guarantee democratic legitimacy of the country.

The second reason is that countries have the right of self-determination. It is also related to the right of association in that the criterion of membership in an association is determined by existing members. An individual can be considered a moral and political subject, only if the individual has a capacity for self-determination. In the same vein, in order for a country to be considered a moral and political subject in the global society, the self-determination of a country should be also respected. Michael Walzer's hypothetical example shows that the self-determination of a country is important.[245] Suppose that a democratic country has a wondrous chemical which, if introduced into the water supply of a neighbor country that does not permit political liberties, would turn the people of the neighbor country into a democratic people. Walzer claims that the democratic country should not use the chemical to change a neighbor country into a democratic people. In this thought experiment, to use the chemical will violate the self-determination of the

[245] Walzer, 1980, pp. 225-226.

neighbor country that could have been democratically formed in its own political and religious cultures. Although the right of national self-determination should be respected, however, it does not mean that all affairs should be exclusively decided by the country because some affairs are closely related to other countries in the era of globalization. In addition, the right of national self-determination diminishes as global interdependencies increase. For these reasons, borders cannot be decided by a host country alone in the era of globalization. Therefore, it is hard to claim that borders of a country should be closed because of the right of national self-determination in the era of globalization.

According to the communitarian view of immigration, borders should be restrictive because a country has the right of self-determination and the right of preservation for cultural groups. However, these rights cannot be exclusive in the current context of global interdependence. Therefore, it is hard to defend a communitarian position of closed borders in the era of globalization.

2.3 Discourse Theory Position: Porous-Borders

As seen above, the cosmopolitan position is based on universal human rights but faces the challenge of particular civil rights, while the communitarian position is based on particular civil rights but faces the challenge of universal human rights. In other words, the issue of immigration involves a tension between universal human rights and particular civil rights. According to the human rights claim, the right of immigration should be unconditionally accepted. According to the civil rights claim, however, the right of immigration should be restricted because countries ought to have rights to establish their own rules of membership and to defend themselves against those who may threaten them.

Because of this tension, as examined above, it is hard to accept both extreme positions—the open-borders and closed-borders positions. This inherent tension in rights-talk seems to show that rights-based theories cannot address the issue of immigration from developing countries.

Although they concede this tension, some rights-based theorists who advocate discourse ethics or public deliberation claim that rights-based theories can address this because they consider this tension productive, rather than fatal to rights-based theories.[246] Amartya Sen claims that disagreement of rights is "no embarrassment of human rights," but "a sign—the best possible sign in modern circumstances—that people take rights seriously," because Sen believes that "the approach of open public reasoning ... can definitively settle some disputes about coverage and content [of rights]."[247] Discourse theorists believe that their approach will bridge the gap between the universality of the cosmopolitan position and the particularity of the communitarian position, through the communicative reformulation of rights. In other words, they believe that the conflict between universal human rights and particular civil rights can be resolved through dialogic processes. Based on this belief, discourse theorists suggest the porous borders position as the third way, believing that economically disadvantaged migrants from developing countries can enter into developed countries in accordance with dialogic processes.

Discourse theorists believe that conflicts between rights are resolved through dialogic processes between implicated parties. In other words, they believe that in

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[246] In this chapter, discourse theorists are Seyla Benhabib, David Ingram, and Amartya Sen. However, more philosophers can be called "discourse theorists" because, in my discussion, discourse theorists mean all philosophers who emphasize the process of discourse or deliberation in order to resolve moral disagreement.

[247] Sen, 2004, pp. 322-323.

discourse or public reasoning "the unforced force of the better argument" prevails and participants could reach an uncoerced agreement on the rank-ordering of rights because participants do not only attempt to further their own interests but to serve the best interest of their shared fellowship.[248] In discourse ethics, this optimism is based on both participants' strong solidarity and moral conscience. However, it is doubtful that both reasons for this optimism can be applied to the issue of would-be migration in question. It is doubtful that strong solidarity between citizens and would-be migrants from developing countries can be expected in the public sphere. This is because citizens from a host country are culturally, linguistically, and historically different from would-be migrants from developing countries, especially economically disadvantaged people. It is hard to find some common denominators between rich citizens from developed countries and poor would-be migrants from developing countries, except that they are human beings. Thus, it appears too optimistic to believe that conflicts between rights can be resolved through discourse or public reasoning, although there is, at best, weak solidarity between citizens from developed countries and would-be migrants from developing countries. In history, many disagreements show how optimistic this belief is without grounds. For example, when representatives of developing countries asked the first President George Bush to place the over-consumption of resources on the agenda at the

[248] Habermas, 1987, p. 130. To begin with, Habermas assumes that participants in the public sphere do wish to resolve their conflicts not through violence or even compromise, but through communication. Thus participants' initial impulse is to engage in deliberation and work out a shared ethical self-understanding on a secular basis. Then, he suggests four pragmatic presuppositions: 1) nobody who could make a relevant contribution may be excluded 2) all participants are granted an equal opportunity to make contributions 3) participants must mean what they say 4) communication must be freed from external and internal coercion so that the "yes" or "no" stances that participants adopt on criticizable validity claims are motivated solely by the rational force of the better reasons. Habermas insists these four presuppositions are not normative so his argument is not circular (Habermas, 1998, p. 44).

1999 Earth Summit in Rio De Janerio, Bush refused it because he took priority of civil rights over human rights.[249]

It is also doubtful that human beings are willing to help the needy through the permission of would-be migrants only because they have a moral conscience. It appears too optimistic to rely only on moral conscience without other suggestions for motivation. The reality of foreign aid shows how optimistic it is only to rely on human beings' moral conscience in order to arouse moral actions. For example, although 1.5 billion people live in poverty, Americans made private donations for foreign aid of all kinds totaling 0.04 % of the U.S. Gross National Product (GNP) to reduce poverty, and the American government gave only 0.10 % of the U.S. GNP to developing countries in 2000.[250] Thus, it is hard to believe that discourse ethics will fill the gap between universal human rights and particular civil rights because participants have moral conscience.

Even if discourse ethics could resolve conflicts between rights at the abstract level, it is doubtful that at the practical level, conflicts between rights regarding immigrants from developing countries could be resolved. It does not seem plausible to claim that discourse or deliberative process always reaches an agreement, especially in the practical context. For example, David Ingram attempts to mediate between universal human rights and particular civil rights as follows: "states can refuse entry to persons in dire distress for the sake of maintaining law and order, basic health and welfare, and democratic sovereignty, but they cannot do so for the sake of maintaining *a high standard of living*, a pristine environment, or an elite or distinctive ideal of political and cultural

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[249] Singer, 2002, p. 2.
[250] Singer, 2002, p. 152.

attainment."[251] Although it seems plausible at the abstract level, to use the criterion of standard of living at the practical level will be controversial in the name of right. As Amartya Sen mentions, a standard of living is culturally, socially, and regionally relative. For example, although a citizen's income, in absolute terms, may be much higher than the level of income at which would-be immigrants from developing countries can live with great ease, he may not think that he maintains a high standard of living because to be able to "appear in public without shame" may require higher standards of clothing and other visible consumption in a richer society than in a poorer one.[252] He may claim that his developed country can refuse would-be immigrants from developing countries for the sake of maintaining basic health of the host country, namely in the name of right. Thus, discourse ethic's position cannot bridge the gap between universality of cosmopolitan position and particularity of communitarian position, at least at the practical level.

The issue of immigration is held in tension between universal human rights and particular civil rights. It is an inherent conflict between rights and this conflict is not resolved in rights-talk because there is no ordering of conflicting rights. In addition, discourse ethics fails to resolve this conflict because there is no strong solidarity between citizens and would-be immigrants, at least at the practical level. Thus, rights-based theories cannot address efficiently the issue of immigrants from developing countries in order to escape extreme poverty.

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[251] Ingram, 2000, p. 136-137 (My italic).
[252] Sen, 1999a, p. 71.

3. Development Ethics as Recognition and Immigration

While rights-based theories are to be situated along a one-dimensional spectrum of rights in order to address all issues of immigration, development ethics as recognition (DER) tries to address them in a three-dimensional spectrum of recognition, based on the three modes of inter-human relationship: particular altruism, universal egoism, and universal altruism. This is because DER believes that ethical problems happen in human relationships, which consist of three irreducible modes, and these problems should be addressed according to each dimension.

From a perspective of DER, which takes this multi-tiered strategy, rights-based theories do not reflect diverse human relationships and necessarily result in their inherent conflict because they try to resolve two different-dimensional problems in the one dimension: the claim of civil rights is based on the human relationship of universal egoism, while that of human right is based on that of universal altruism. Thus, DER attempts to address the issues of immigration from developing countries in a three-dimensional spectrum of recognition. While the issue of immigration from developing countries is directly addressed in universal altruism, it is indirectly addressed in particular altruism and universal egoism in that they are effective in decreasing attempts to illegally enter into developed countries.

3.1 Current Policies of Immigration

The multi-tiered strategy of DER is realistic in that this three dimensional spectrum of recognition corresponds with current policies of immigration in a broad sense. As seen in Table 3.1, Current policies of immigration in most countries consist of

three main categories: family reunification, the immigration of economically advantaged persons, and refugees or asylum seekers.[253]

Table 3.1 Comparison of the composition of immigrant or long-term migrant admissions by category, selected developed countries, 1991 and 2001

Receiving Country	Family Reunification		Workers		Refugees	
	1991	2001	1999	2001	1999	2001
Australia	47 %	33 %	45 %	55 %	8 %	12 %
Canada	64	62	18	26	18	12
United States	75	70	10	19	15	11
Denmark	60	53	20	22	20	25
France	58	69	27	20	15	11
Sweden	62	65	2	2	36	33
Switzerland	51	42	47	55	2	3
United Kingdom	42	35	49	54	9	11

Sources: OECD, *Trends in International Migration*: SOPEMI. Annual Reports 1998 and 2003, Chart 1.2[254]

Since the 1980s, family unification has become a major source of immigration in many countries.[255] For example, in 2001 the rate of family reunification in America was 70%. In current policies of immigration, family migration is closely related to economic value. Most countries require poof of the sponsor's ability to support incoming family members and to provide them with adequate accommodation.[256] For example, in America, a family member who is currently a citizen or permanent resident must sponsor an

[253] Ingram, 2000, p. 126.
[254] International Organization for Migration, 2005, p. 400.
[255] Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2002, pp. 24-26.
[256] Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2002, p. 25.

applicant for family migration by providing financial support and accommodation for a period of two years. This provides a tiered opportunity for access to family unification. Those who have a family member who is wealthy enough to support them are admitted, but those who lack the prerequisite financial resources are not.

According to *International Migration Report 2002*, over the past three decades policies in the area of labor migration have developed along growing restrictiveness and selectiveness in the admission of labor migrants in developed countries, but the foreign labor force has significantly increased during this period.[257] This paradoxical phenomenon implies that skillful workers may enter into developed countries more and more.[258] Economic migrants are increasing more and more in the process of globalization. For example, 55 % of immigrants who are admitted to Australia enter as economic migrants. In America the average percentage from 2002 to 2006 in this category is about 33 % (Employer sponsored lawful permanent residents is about 9% and temporary workers and dependents are about 24 %).[259] Would-be economic migrants must demonstrate that they already have sufficient wealth to bring investment or business advantages with them, or show that they have specific job skills that are deemed to be financially beneficial. These prerequisites for inclusion in the largest group of immigrants reveal a preference for wealthy individuals and those who are most likely to generate more wealth. This reflects the fact that many countries value those who have money more than other people who contribute the society in other ways or who may be more in need.

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[257] Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2002, p. 20.

[258] As will be mentioned in 3.2.2 of this chapter, this paradoxical phenomenon expresses the issue of "brain drain."

[259] http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FS16_USImmigration_051807.pdf "In 1980-81, there were approximately 44,000 gust workers admitted into the United States. By 1990, that number had increased to 139,000, and by 1996, to 227,000 (Center for Immigration Studies 2006)" (LeMay, 2004, p. 61.).

The humanitarian migration program in most countries follows international conventions, such as *the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, that provide a limited definition of a refugee. According to this convention, a refugee is a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of their nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail him/herself of the protection of that country."[260] In this definition, grounds for persecution include reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or having a particular political opinion. However, the people who have left because of famine or environmental collapse are not included in this category. In this limited definition, many countries tend to limit the population of refugees or asylum seekers because of the financial cost of host countries. For example, in Australia the humanitarian program has a fixed quota of 10% of the immigrants who are admitted each year. According to *America 2007 statistics*, this category is also about 10 % in America.[261] In the EU as a whole, the rate of admission is about 11 % in both 2000 and 2001.[262] Furthermore, some developed countries such as the United Kingdom have adopted measures aimed at preventing the arrival of asylum seekers, as a means of restricting asylum.

From a general perspective, these three categories correspond with the three modes of inter-human relationship in DER. The policy of family reunification is related to particular altruism, the policy based on economically advantage is related to universal

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[260] http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=3b66c2aa10

[261] http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/LPR07.shtm

[262] Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2002, p. 26.

egoism, and the policy of asylum is related to universal altruism. However, current policies remain in immature stages and are not ethically realized. Each category has not been developed in accordance with the change of real world and does not work according to its internal force or principle. The first category, family reunion, in the current policy also depends on the criterion of the second category; the second category is not realized from an ethical perspective; and the third category is too restricted.

3.2 Realizing Current Policies in DER

Although current policies of immigration in many countries correspond with the three modes of inter-human relationship in DER, their policies are immature because they do not represent the change of real world and they are ethically corrupted because of the domination of economic value. While rights-based theories result in an inherent conflict between human rights and civil rights, DER can reform current policies from an ethical perspective. This is because DER approaches issues with a gradual and multi-tiered strategy, based on the three modes of human relationship, from an immature stage to a mature stage.

3.2.1 Immigration Policy in Particular Altruism: Family Value

In DER, the current policy of family reunification is criticized for two reasons. The first reason is that the current policy is based on economic value, as well as family value. In other words, this policy is corrupted by economic value. In human relationships, that of particular altruism should be based on feelings such as love and should not be limited by an economic criterion. This is because when this relationship is broken by

other values such as economic value, the people in question could experience the breakdown of emotional stability, which reflects Hegel's substantial freedom—"being at home with oneself in another" (*The Encyclopedia Logic,* #24A). Much psychological research shows how important the family relationship is in the development of children. For example, Donald W. Winnicott's research shows that, in the process of child development, the young child's ability to be alone in her own personal life relies on the experience of the "continued existence of a reliable mother" as the picture of a love relationship.[263]

The second reason is that current policy does not reflect some changes of family organization in the relationship with citizenship. In other words, this policy remains in an immature stage without development. For example, in the current policy of family immigration when family members' citizenship is different, it is hard for them to legally live together in a country. One example is a case of an Irish boy, who lives with illegal parents in Ireland and faces his parent's deportation to Nigeria.[264] Thousands of Irish children face similar risks, and in the world an estimated five million children—including three million American citizens—have parents who are illegal immigrants. According to the current policy, these children cannot legally live with their parents. Another example is that the current policy does not reflect fully new concepts of family such as adoption.[265] In the current institutions, a new form of family based on adoption seems not to be considered under the traditional family value. For example, there has been a sudden increase in the U.S. federal government's investigations of adoptions from Vietnam,

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[263] Winnicott, 1965, p. 32.

[264] The *New York Times* (February 25, 2008)

[265] Although there are other forms of new family such as same-sex marriage, I do not deal with them because there are not directly related to some issues of developing countries.

preventing some babies from returning home with their adoptive parents. About this issue, Senator Barbara Boxer, democrat of California, says that "Everything we know now says the State Department is, frankly, using these babies as a tool in a battle that has nothing to do with these families or the children themselves."[266] This remark shows that a new form of family based on adoption is not fully included in the policy of immigration, based on traditional family values.

In these situations, DER suggests that the current policy, which is based on family unification, should be reformed to expand the scope of family and not to be affected by economic value. In other words, the category of family reunification in immigration policies should rely on family values such as love alone. For a host country it could be a big burden to admit a would-be immigrant without a financial sponsor for family unification, and to permit illegal family members to live together in the host country. In order to reduce the financial burden of the host country DER does not oppose limiting would-be immigrants' membership in a reasonable way. Whichever they have, "full" or "partial" membership, DER claims that would-be immigrants for family unification should be admitted to the host country in the policy of family immigration. In addition, DER suggests that new forms of family such as adoption should be taken seriously. In other words, adoption should be considered not in a diplomatic or economic sense but in the traditional family value. In order to reform current institutions to recognition-favoring institutions for supporting adoption or respecting family value, DER suggest that

[266] The *New York Times* (February 11, 2008)

recognitive attitudes should be cultivated in educational systems such as school, as well as through campaign or mass media.[267]

3.2.2 Immigration Policy in Universal Egoism: An Ethical Guest Worker Program

In DER, the current policy, which is based on economic advantages of developed countries alone, is criticized for two reasons. The first reason is that it results in "brain drain" to developing countries. Owing to brain drain, developing countries lose their opportunities to develop their countries.[268] The second reason is that it does not give opportunities to unskilled laborers to work in developed countries. For this reason, this policy results in vulnerability of illegal migrants, who experience exploitation and oppression. The current policy results in advantages for developed countries, while it results in disadvantages for developing countries. In order to result in advantages for both countries, DER proposes an ethical guest worker program, based on Hegel's idea of corporation.

A traditional guest worker program, currently found in many developed countries, is not ethical because it is designed to only meet the needs of developed countries and does not consider the needs of guest workers from developing countries. Economists Ruhs and Chang make a critique against the existing national labor immigration programs,

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[267] According to The *New York Times* (August 8, 2008), South Korean's perception on adoption has changed in the help of governmental policies such as financial incentives and public education through mass media or campaign. Since 1958, when South Korea began keeping track of adoptions, 230,635 children have been adopted. About 30 percent were adopted by South Koreans, while 70 percent found homes overseas. This is because Koreans felt ashamed about their adoption. But 2007, for the first time, more babies were adopted by South Koreans than foreigners, as the government announced: 1,388 local adoptions compared with 1,264 foreign ones. With South Korea becoming more accepting of adoptive families, adoptive families do not feel ashamed anymore.

[268] According to *World Migration 2005*, some 60,000 highly skilled workers are reported to have fled African economies during the last half of the 1980s (Ghana losing 60 % of its doctors) (p. 258).

claiming that many of them are based on a relatively low moral standing for noncitizens and relative high weights on economic efficiency of the host country.[269] In the traditional program, businesses employing guest workers have tremendous power over their guest workers due to the fact that they can fire and deport a worker with little or no notice and often without cause. Granting such extensive powers to employers creates a precarious situation for guest workers and makes them extremely vulnerable to exploitation.

The idea of Hegel's corporation is basically a win-win strategy in civil society, which is based on economic needs. Hegel's corporation is contrived to "look after its [corporation] own interests," "admit members," "protect its members against particular contingencies" such as poverty, and "educate others so as to make them eligible for membership" (PR, § 252). Thanks to the corporation as an ethical institution, Hegel's civil society would not be destructive and human's needs would be constructive. In the spirit of Hegel's corporation, DER suggests that a traditional guest worker program should be ethically reformed in the sphere of universal egoism in order that it could be beneficial to all stakeholders in question.[270] Instead of losing the best and brightest skilled workers as well as the most highly motivated low skilled workers, this program would allow developing countries to benefit from the enhanced financial and intellectual resources brought home by returning migrants. This program would especially increase

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[269] Ruhs and Chang, 2004, p. 92.

[270] "The overall economic effects of emigration on the sending country thus appear to be ambiguous, although the evidence may be interpreted to suggest that the emigration of unskilled labor is likely to be beneficial (as production and fiscal effects are likely to be minor and the benefits from remittances may be significant) while that of skilled labor is often not" (Ruhs and Chang, 2004, p. 79). This conclusion is also supported by many sending countries' continued efforts to convince receiving countries to open their borders to more unskilled workers. The best examples may be Mexican President Vincente Fox's efforts to liberalize significantly migration flows from Mexico to the United States and the developing countries' effort to include the issue of international migration in the agenda of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

substantially the financial and human intellectual capital necessary to promote the sustained ethical development of developing countries.

Specifically, in order to prevent the potential exploitation of guest workers, DER argues that an ethical guest worker program should guarantee guest workers have at least some freedom of employment within specific sectors or occupations of the host country's labor market, and guest workers need to be offered protection with regard to employment conditions, especially those pertaining to working hours and safety at work. This would also ensure that foreign workers do not compete with native workers in terms of non-wage-related employment conditions, such as accepting overtime without pay and lower safety standards at work. On the other hand, this ethical guest worker program should have some restrictions for host countries. Guest workers cannot choose their employment in the host country's labor market, and they cannot remain employed in the host country following the expiration of the work permit. These restrictions are necessary to make the program beneficial to the host country in the first place by, for example, protecting the employment of citizens in certain sectors and by facilitating the voluntary or forced return home of foreign workers whose work permits have expired and who have failed to upgrade into different, more permanent immigration programs.

3.2.3 Immigration Policy in Universal Altruism: A New Type of Refugee

According to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of their nationality, and is unable to or, owing to

such fear, is unwilling to avail him/herself of the protection of that country."[271] The concept of a refugee was expanded by the Convention's 1967 Protocol and by regional conventions in Africa and Latin America to include persons who had fled war or other violence in their home country. In the current policy of immigration, still, the idea of refugees is limited to only political persecution, which was the main reason to leave their home country in the last centuries. In other words, it does not include ecological catastrophes, famine, and other reasons for forced migration although these reasons are also "well founded fear of violence" which have resulted in many migrants since the last century. Although the idea of refugee is based on philanthropy, it has not been developed in the current policy of immigration, according to situational changes. This reality is to consider those would-be migrants in need socially excluded or invisible, namely to misrecognize those people. Thus, DER suggests that this ethical issue should be newly addressed from a perspective of philanthropy in the human relationship of universal altruism. DER claims that according to a gradual and multi-tiered strategy in DER, would-be migrants from developing countries should be considered a "new" form of refugee.

Most would-be immigrants who leave their developing countries and migrate to developed countries in order to escape extreme poverty are economically disadvantaged people.[272] Their main reason for immigration is to survive from extreme poverty or famine. Since the beginning of 2006, up to 10,000 Africans have boarded handmade

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[271] http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=3b66c2aa10

[272] Some people may argue that the least advantaged people in developing countries cannot even try to enter into developed countries and, for this reason, would-be migrants to developed countries are not economically disadvantaged people. Although it is true that would-be migrants are relatively richer than people who do not try to migrate, it is not true that would-be migrants are not economically disadvantaged people. It would be reasonable to argue that both people are economically disadvantaged people despite the difference of their degree.

boats in the hope of getting into Europe, ready to risk death. That is twice the number recorded in 2005. Officials say more than 1,700 have died along the way and coastguards working off the Canary Islands have rescued hundreds of men, women, and children. African illegal immigrants say that because there is extreme poverty in Africa that results from drought or flood, there is no option but to get out via illegal means.[273] African poverty resulting from natural disasters creates many illegal immigrants. This situation is similar to North Korea defectors. North Korea experienced 100-year floods in July 1995 and 1996, and suffered from a heat wave and drought in 1997. These natural disasters resulted in a famine: an estimated 5 million people out of a total population of 24 million are malnourished, 220,000 people died of famine between 1995 and 1998, and average life expectancy fell from 73.2 in 1993 to 66.8 in 1999, due to medical shortages.[274] In addition, the population of North Korean defectors rapidly increased after these natural disasters. About 100,000 North Korean defectors are estimated to reside in China illegally.[275] However, because both African would-be immigrants and North Korean defectors are illegal according to the current international law, they have been repatriated. Thus, the immigration policy in DER should include other forms of refugee such as economic refugee.

This suggestion does not claim that host countries should give "full" membership to "new" refugees. This is because a policy should be realized from the realistic stage to the idealistic stage with the expansion of the concept of refugee. Thus, a policy in the human relationship of universal altruism could begin from Kant's realistic idea of

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[273] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5151740.stm

[274] Aidan Foster-Carter, "The Koreas: Pyongyang Watch," May 23, 2001. www.atimes.com

[275] http://www.segye.com/Service5/ShellView.asp?TreeID=1052&PCode=0007&DataID=200609041206000052

hospitality. In *Toward Perpetual Peace*, Kant does not admit a right of residence on a place on the Earth to foreigners and limit foreigner's rights only to the right of visitation.[276] Someone may complain that my suggestion is not enough to realize an ideal of free movement, and it is too moderate. Timothy King makes the eminently sensible point along this line that "to ask people to accept policies which threaten to lower their own well-being sharply in the name of some abstract moral principle is clearly impracticable."[277] According to Hegel's pragmatic and practical strategy, DER suggests that a policy should begin from the realistic stage in the direction to the idealistic stage.

4. Conclusion

I have argued that the issue of would-be migrants from developing countries to developed countries in order to escape extreme poverty cannot be resolved in rights-based theories because this issue is placed in tension between universal rights and civil particular rights. According to the human rights claim, the right of immigration should be unconditionally accepted. According to the civil rights claim, however, the right of immigration should be restricted because countries ought to have rights to establish their own rules of membership and to defend themselves against those who may threaten them. This is an inherent conflict between rights and this conflict is not resolved in rights-talk because there is no ordering of conflicting rights. In addition, discourse ethics fails to resolve this conflict because there is no strong solidarity between citizens and would-be immigrants, at least at the practical level.

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[276] Kant, 1996, p 329.
[277] King, 1983, p. 533.

Instead of rights-based theories, I have argued that DER can suggest a feasible policy of immigration. DER does not suggest a new approach or policy but explains why the current immigration policy in many countries has been adapted and suggests how it should be developed and realized in DER. DER suggests that current policies of immigration should rely on family value alone in the inter-human relationship of particular altruism. An ethical guest worker program should be realized in the inter-human relationship of universal egoism and would-be migrants from developing countries should be considered in the category of refugee in the inter-human relationship of universal altruism.

Chapter Six

Addressing Extreme poverty with DER

"In the global village, someone else's poverty very soon becomes one's own problem"[278]

1. Introduction

New estimates released by the World Bank in August 2008 show that the number of people in the developing world living in extreme poverty may be higher than previously thought.[279] Using a new threshold for extreme poverty now set at $1.25 a day (purchasing power parity) in 2005 prices, the World Bank concludes that there were 1.4 billion people living in extreme poverty in 2005. This number is over 20% of the world's population. In this miserable situation, it is an urgent and necessary task to suggest policies to eradicate, or at least to alleviate, extreme poverty in the area of development ethics. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to suggest policies to alleviate extreme poverty on the basis of my development ethics as recognition (DER). For this purpose, I examine whether a framework of responsibility can address extreme poverty effectively. This is because most theories, which are used to address extreme poverty, are based on the language of responsibility.[280]

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[278] Report of the High-Level Panel on Financing for Development appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-fifty Session, Agenda item 101, 26 June 2001, A/55/1000, p.3, www.un.org/esa/ffd/a55-1000.pdf. (from Singer's *One World*, 2002, p. 7).

[279] http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml

[280] Many philosophers tend to approach the poverty issue from a perspective of responsibility: Peter Singer—moral responsibility (the cosmopolitan view); David Miller—remedial/outcome responsibilities; Thomas Pogge—institutional responsibility; Iris Young—responsibility-based on social connection theory;

In the process of examination, I focus on two issues: the moral psychology of distance in aid and the respect of recipients. This is because those issues should be considered in order to make policies to alleviate extreme poverty more ethically and effectively. Despite the plight of extreme poverty, in 2000 Americans made private donations for foreign aid of all kinds totaling about $4 per person in need, 0.04 % of the U.S. Gross National Product (GNP) and the American government gave only 0.10 % of the U.S. GNP to developing countries.[281] These numbers are totally different from people's perception about aid. According to surveys of Program on International Policy Attitudes (1995, 1996, and 2000) and the *Washington Post* (1995), a majority of Americans believe that the U.S. spends too much money on foreign aid and they estimate that 20 percent of the federal budget goes to foreign aid.[282] Why are developed countries and their people stingy about aiding developing countries in extreme poverty? Why is their actual amount of aid different from their estimation? Arguably, the highest obstacle to greater foreign aid is the moral psychology of distance in aid. It is hard to deny special concerns for "my family," "my neighbors," and "my compatriots," over the people in developing countries, at the theoretical level as well as at the practical level. Thus, in the situation of extreme poverty from which developing countries cannot escape without help, the moral psychology of distance should be appropriately addressed in any policy to alleviate poverty.

Even if the moral psychology of distance could be appropriately addressed in a policy to alleviate poverty, when the policy is implemented without respecting recipients,

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Onora O'Neill—responsibility-based on duty; Amartya Sen—responsibility-based on capability approaches, and so on.

[281] Singer, 2002, p. 152.

[282] Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2001.

those recipients could be psychologically harmed. In other words, they would be stigmatized and made to feel dependent. David Miller argues that "Not to respond to the needs of the famine victims would be a moral failure, a failure of respect. But it is also a failure of respect if we ignore the second perspective [agent], and treat people simply as passive recipients of our aid, and not as agents who are potentially able to take charge of their own lives and improve their situation by their own efforts."[283] This remark shows that it is important to set foreign aid policies ethically to respect recipients and not to result in psychological harms such as stigmatization, as well as material harms such as oppression/dependence.

2. Analysis of Poverty from Post-development Theory and Hegel's Theory

In order to examine which policy to use in alleviating poverty is ethical and effective, an analysis of poverty should be completed. This is because a policy or an attitude of foreign aid depends on this analysis of poverty. Most development supporters from developed countries, such as Jeffrey Sachs, tend to understand poverty from a material perspective alone.[284] Although this kind of material analysis such as the poverty line, as seen above, is very effective to make the people of developed countries pay attention to extreme poverty, post-development theorists such as Majid Rahnema claim that it is not enough to understand extreme poverty from a material perspective because poverty also includes "such factors as one's inability to meet one's end, lack of good fortune or self-confidence, not being respected or loved by others, being neglected or

[283] Miller, 2007, p. 7.
[284] Sachs, 2005.

abandoned, etc."[285] Post-development theorists even claim that "the lack of particular material means is not, however, always perceived in negative terms ... [because] the Iranian sufis, the Indian sanyasin, and some contemporary schools of thought, such as the Gandhians, to be free from alienating material possessions is a blessing indeed, and an opportunity for reaching higher forms of riches."[286] According to a perspective of post-development theorists, poverty is not only a problem of material deprivation, but also a problem of mental deprivation, and furthermore, the latter is more significant in that the former cannot be addressed without addressing the latter.

Similarly, Hegel analyzes poverty from a mental perspective. For Hegel, it is not poverty per se that makes people miserable, but the emergence of what he calls a "rabble" (Pöbel). A rabble emerges when the "feeling of right, integrity, and honor which comes from supporting oneself by one's activity and work is lost" (PR, §244). Such a rabble is characterized not simply by its objective poverty, but by a certain subjective "disposition associated with poverty, by inward rebellion against the rich, against society, the government, etc." (PR, §244). Without the sense of honor or pride that comes from supporting themselves, the members of a rabble become ever more shameless "frivolous and lazy" (PR, §244). They no longer even try to support themselves through work but, rather, demand that they be supported by others, on which they blame their impoverished condition. In the same vein, Mafa E. Chipeta, East Africa coordinator for the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, argues that foreign aid has made recipients of developing countries dependent and powerless: "the world food crisis [of 2008] might help Ethiopia in the long run. Shortages and higher prices would cut food aid. The

[285] Rahnema, 1992, p. 160.
[286] Ibid.

immediate effect would be harsh, and thousands would die. But if Ethiopia were ever to feed itself ... [Ethiopians] have to make sacrifices at some point."[287] According to Paul Franco, Hegel argues that the rabble-mentality can also characterize the rich as well as the poor: "The rich man thinks that he can buy anything," and thus "wealth can lead to the same mockery and shamelessness that we find in the poor rabble."[288] Hegel's analysis of poverty shows that poverty is the problem of the rabble-mentality although this disposition is generally associated with material deprivation.

The contrast of poverty analysis between development practitioners and post-development theorists explains their difference of aid policy. While development practitioners put their priority on economic value, post-development theorists put their priority on mental value over economic value. This is because, as seen in the above example of Ethiopia, economic value cannot be gained without respecting mental value. If the analysis of poverty by post-development theorists and if Hegel is to be taken seriously, a policy to alleviate poverty should pay attention to the mental side of the recipients, as well as the material side.

3. Extreme Poverty and Responsibility-based Theories

In order to examine whether extreme poverty can be effectively addressed in the language of responsibility, I chose Peter Singer's, Thomas Pogge's, and David Miller's theories of responsibility. This is because these three theories represent three types of responsibility-based theories, into which many responsibility-based theories can be

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[287] *Time* (Aug 06, 2008). http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1829996,00.html?xid=feed-cnn-topics

[288] Hegel (1819/20). [Dieter Henrich (Ed.) (1983). Philosophie des Rechts: Die Vorlesung von 1819/20, Suhrkamp, p.196. (From Franco, 1999, p. 271.).

classified.[289] Some scholars such as Peter Singer strongly argue that every person is obliged to do what she can to minimize suffering everywhere, right up to the point where she begins to suffer. Their concern is to help the people of developing countries through foreign aid or charity. Other scholars such as Thomas Pogge claim that extreme poverty should be addressed through institutional responsibility. Their concern is to reform global institutions, rather than giving materials directly. While the previous positions emphasize the role of developed countries, some scholars such as David Miller emphasize the role of developing countries to alleviate extreme poverty in the balance with that of developed countries. When I examine these three theories, I focus on two issues: the moral psychology of distance in aid and the respect of recipients. This is because I believe that, according to the analysis of poverty by post-development theorists and Hegel, a policy to alleviate poverty should pay attention to the mental side of the recipients, as well as the material side.

3.1 Peter Singer and Aid

Peter Singer's 1972 article, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," has been considered a pioneer work in the area of ethics to address extreme poverty.[290] This paper attempted to frame a moral response to the circumstances surrounding the 1971 Bengal famine, in which several million Bengalis were on the edge of starvation. After that, Singer has continuously argued that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad [such as extreme poverty] from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable

[289] The first type of responsibility-based theories includes Singer (1972, 2002, 2004) and Unger (1996); the second type includes Pogge (2002), Michael Green (2002), and Young (2006); and the third type includes Miller (2007) and Scheffler (2002).
[290] Singer, 1972, pp. 229-243.

moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it."[291] In order to refute the moral psychology of distance in aid, Singer suggests a "drowning child" example. That is, when someone walks past a shallow pond in which a child is drowning, the passer-by has a duty to rescue the child even at some cost, such as getting his clothes wet and being late for his meeting. Although this example is very powerful and impressive, this example is not appropriate for the situation of extreme poverty. Putting aside many critiques of this example,[292] I focus on examining whether Singer's argument can address the moral psychology of distance and respect the recipients. To address the moral psychology of distance in aid is important because without addressing this psychology, it is impossible to motivate people to participate in foreign aid positively. To respect the recipients is important because, without it, the process of foreign aid could psychologically harm the recipients and, finally, they cannot escape poverty as seen in Hegel's analysis of poverty.

First, concerning the moral psychology of distance in aid, Singer argues that "it makes no moral difference whether the person I help is a neighbor's child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away."[293] This is because, according to Singer, partial preferences based on the moral psychology of distance are not morally justifiable. Singer argues that our responsibilities to the world's poor are in principle exactly the same as our responsibilities to our fellow citizens. However, Iris Marion Young makes a critique that Singer's claim is too demanding: "It

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[291] Singer, 1972, p. 231.

[292] Miller thinks that Singer's analogy about the drowning child is a very bad analogy for thinking about responsibility for extreme poverty at least for three reasons (2007, p. 234). First, Singer's drowning child example does not deal with the problem of assignment because it has only one child and only one passer-by. Second, Singer's example does not deal with the problem of effectiveness in aids because it is "a rare, one-off event" (p. 235). Last, Singer's example "encourages us to ... ignore" that the recipients are "agents capable of taking responsibility for the outcomes of their actions" because it is about a child, rather than an adult (237).

[293] Singer, 1972, pp. 231-2; 2002, p. 157; 2004, p. 11.

flies in the face of moral intuition, moreover, to suggest that all moral agents have exactly the same duties to all other agents and no special obligations to some subset of persons with whom an agent has a special relationship."[294] Judith Lichtenberg doubts whether Singer's deontological claim can motivate people to aid the distant needy even though they are in a position to do so.[295] This is because, whatever the proper moral relevance of distance is, its psychological influence is widely acknowledged. Many people believe that ties of community—political, social, or cultural—create special responsibility or duties of aid. Despite the influence of moral psychology of distance in aid, Singer seems to overlook it. Thus, Singer's deontological claim is not persuasive to address this moral psychology.

Second, Singer's example of a drowning child could be criticized because he seems not to respect the recipients. Although the recipients in aid are both agents capable of taking responsibility for the outcomes of their actions and vulnerable and needy creatures who may not be able to lead decent lives without the help of others, Miller makes a critique against Singer, claiming that "Singer's child-in-the-pond analogy encourages us to take up the second perspective [recipients] but to ignore the first [subjects]."[296]In agreement with Miller, Andrew Kuper claims that Singer has a "tendency to treat active individuals in developing countries almost wholly as recipients of moral patients." [297] This is because poor people are neither powerless nor ignorant in respect of important problems and opportunities for action and, thus, they need to be

[294] Young, 2006, p. 104.
[295] Lichtenberg, 2004.
[296] Miller, 2007, p. 237.
[297] Kuper, 2002, p. 116.

considered agents, capable of independent action as well as cooperative assistance.[298] In reality, this kind of position that Singer takes is seen in some donor countries' policies to violate self-determination of recipient countries. There are many donor-imposed restrictions on how assistance should be spent and these restrictions violate the self-determination of a developing country.[299] As seen in some examples of sub-Saharan Africa, there are some negative effects of aid dependence on the donor countries and their dependent tendency violates self-determination of a developing country.[300] Thus, Singer's approach is problematic because it does not accept recipients as agents.

As examined above, Singer's responsibility-based theory does not address effectively the moral psychology of distance and the respect of recipients. In addition, it is not only ethically problematic, but also practically fruitless because it is not effective in motivating people to help the poor and it makes developing countries dependent and powerless.

3.2 Thomas Pogge and Institutional Approach

Thomas Pogge argues that extreme poverty is the creation of a global system for which the people in developed countries are collectively responsible.[301] Pogge

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[298] Goulet, who has been considered a pioneer in the area of development ethics, calls aid without respecting the agency of the poor "assistentialism." (1975, p. 3.)

[299] Julie Howard pointed to the need for dramatic improvement in aid effectiveness, including the reduction of donor-imposed restrictions on how assistance should be spent, and for avoiding fragmentation of project portfolios. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of March 2005 mentions the importance of ownership – partner nations should exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies and coordinate development actions. (Howard, 2005)

[300] Moss, Pettersson, and van de Walle, 2006.

[301] Pogge, 2002b. Iris Young (2006), Michael Green (2002), etc take a similar position with Thomas Pogge. Although there are some differences, they all argue that extreme poverty should be addressed in institutional responsibility. The institutional approach can apply to a new interpretation of human rights as Pogge suggested. Pogge claims that a nature of human rights is institutional according to UDHR Art. 28: "Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this

understands institutions along Rawls's lines, as systems of rules that govern our interactions with one another, and claims that we harm others by participating in institutions that predictably lead to more harmful results than alternative practices would. In the process of globalization, people participate in many global institutions, whether they know it or not. In other words, in global institutions, individuals bear responsibility for structural injustice because all agents contribute through their actions to the processes that produce unjust outcomes.[302] For this reason, although there are some domestic sources of poverty, they should be explained primarily in terms of the international context in which poor countries are placed and citizens of rich countries bear primary outcome responsibility for extreme poverty. For Pogge, our responsibility derives from belonging together in a system of interdependent processes of cooperation and competition through which we seek benefits and aim to realize projects. In his institutional approach, Pogge seems to respect people because there is no distinction between agents and recipients in this institutional approach. Thus, Pogge's institutional approach is effective in respecting the recipients.

In his institutional responsibility, Pogge seems to try to overcome a tension between special and general responsibilities through focusing on negative duty rather than positive duty. Pogge argues that in his institutional approach, people have only a negative duty not to harm others and they do not have a positive duty to help others. According to Pogge's emphasis on negative duty, there is no distinction between special and general responsibilities because negative duty should be applied to every person. However, it is questionable that Pogge's negative duty is really "negative." It looks like a

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Declaration can be fully realized."

[302] Young, 2006, p. 102.

positive duty to reform the global institutions not to harm the poor and to protect the victims of injustice, although the need for these stems from a previous failure to fulfill the negative responsibility not to impose an order that harms the poor. In other words, in his institutional understanding, Pogge's distinction between negative and positive duties seems to be blurred because his negative duty is too demanding. Miller complains that Pogge "does not allow people who are going about their daily business and are uninvolved in politics to distance themselves from the policies their governments may pursue."[303] In the current situation of injustice, Pogge's strategy of negative duty is not negative but positive, at least until a global system is completely reformed. It is asking too much to expect most of us to work actively to restructure each and every one of the structural injustices for which we arguably share responsibility. If we accept Pogge's suggestion, this following question can be raised: How should we decide the best ways to use our limited time, resources, and creative energy to respond to structural injustice? This question shows that Pogge's strategy necessarily falls into a puzzle of the moral distance. This is because if we participate in many institutions and we have some responsibilities to reform these institutions, it is unclear why we do not first reform some institutions in "our" country, rather than those in other countries. Thus, Pogge's institutional responsibility does not address the moral psychology of distance in aid.

As examined above, Pogge's institutional responsibility is effective in respecting the recipients but does not address effectively the moral psychology of distance. This is because Pogge's negative duty is too demanding and, for this reason, people have nochoice but to choose where they invest their time and resources.

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[303] Miller, 2007, p. 245.

3.3 David Miller and Outcome/Remedial Responsibilities

In order to respect the recipients and to address the moral psychology of distance in aid, Miller assigns both outcome responsibility—the responsibility we have for gains and losses resulting from our actions—to the poor, and remedial responsibility—the responsibility we have to relieve harm and suffering when we are able to do so—to the rich at the same time. This is because Miller believes that the poverty of developing countries partially results from their own corrupt governments, which members of developing countries also support or acquiesce in. This strategy shows that Miller considers the poor of developing countries to be agents in his analysis of poverty. Regretfully, however, Miller does not say what position he has about the poor when addressing poverty. Miller ignores, or at least is silent about, the poor's role in addressing poverty with foreign aid from developed countries. Thus, it would be reasonable to say that Miller's theory of responsibility does not fully take the agency of recipients seriously.

Miller's strategy to use both outcome and remedial responsibilities does not address the moral psychology of distance in aid effectively. This is because according to Miller, domestic aid always takes a priority over foreign aid in that domestic aid is considered in the scope of outcome responsibility, while foreign aid is considered only as a humanitarian duty which is "less weighty than duties of justice."[304] Miller distinguishes three circumstances in which citizens of developed countries might have remedial responsibilities towards citizens of developing countries—first, a result of past injustices; second, a failure to implement fair terms of international cooperation; and third, the bare fact of poverty itself—and he claims that only the first two are duties of justice which are

[304] Miller, 2007, p. 248.

enforceable. According to Miller, however, linking historical injustice to present-day poverty is not causally evident and it takes a long time to establish fair terms, and thus, in reality it is only a humanitarian duty of remedial responsibility for the rich of developed countries to take toward the poor of developing countries. In addition, although he distinguishes three possibilities of responsibility carried by the poor—none are responsible, some are responsible, and all are responsible—and identifies the first alone as a matter of justice. According to Miller's analysis, however, most cases of poverty in reality, would be included in the second category. Miller argues that "when responsibility lies with a subgroup within the society in question (together perhaps with foreign companies or governments who support them) rather than with the people as a whole ... it may be better to say that the duty [to help the society by rich people] is a humanitarian duty rather than a duty of justice."[305] In Miller's analysis, thus, most cases of poverty in reality are connected with both outcome responsibility of developing countries and remedial responsibility of developed countries which is identified as a humanitarian duty, rather than a duty of justice. In addition, Miller does not suggest an argument for motivation to encourage developed countries to do their humanitarian duty of remedial responsibility. In these situations—Miller's emphasis on humanitarian duty for developed countries and no argument of motivation for humanitarian duty—it is reasonable to interpret that Miller's theory puts its priority on domestic aid over foreign aid.

As examined above, Miller's theory of responsibility is not effective in respecting the recipients and in addressing the moral psychology of distance in aid. Although Miller considers the poor of developing countries to be agents in his analysis of poverty, he does

[305] Miller, 2007, pp. 257-8.

not say what position he has about the poor when addressing poverty. Miller ignores, or at least is silent about, the poor's role in addressing poverty with foreign aid from developed countries. In addition, although Miller seems to address the moral psychology of distance in aid through outcome and remedial responsibility, he ultimately puts his priority on domestic aid over foreign aid.

4. Development Ethics as Recognition and Extreme Poverty

I have argued that these three theories of responsibility are not effective in addressing the two issues do not respect the recipients of developing countries and do not address the moral psychology of distance in aid. Still, these theories showed some insights: the importance of institutional approaches for respect of recipients, the concern of motivation for foreign aid, etc. I believe that these insights can be realized in development ethics as recognition (DER), respecting the recipients of developing countries and addressing the moral psychology of distance in aid.

4.1 DER and Moral Psychology of Distance

DER does not deny that people tend to place the importance on their special relationships such as family, but DER does not admit the priority of special relationships over other relationships. In other words, DER approaches the moral psychology of distance in aid from a multi-tiered perspective. According to Avineri, as argued in Chapters Three and Four, Hegel's three institutions in *Philosophy of Right* represent the three modes of human relationships: particular altruism, universal egoism, and universal altruism. This understanding implies that each mode of human relationship should be

guided by different principles of recognition, rather than the one principle of recognition as a panacea for development problems. This is because according to this horizontal understanding, ethical problems happen in human relationships that consist of three irreducible modes, and these problems should be addressed according to each mode. In each mode, a human being forms each identity. Thus, people have each identity in each of their human relationships. For example, I am a father in my relationship to family, a worker in my relationship to market, and a God's son in my relationship to spirit or religion. These three identities should be developed and respected in balance because the balance of all three identities realizes freedom.[306] In DER, these three identities do not conflict with each other because they belong to different categories. From a perspective of DER, thus, a conflict between special and general responsibilities results from a kind of categorical confusion because each responsibility belongs to a different category which has a different motivational force. Because there are many motivational forces in accordance with human relationships, in the framework of DER it is nonsense to claim that a special relationship takes priority over a general relationship as Miller or Samuel Scheffler claims or that there is no moral distance between the special and the general

[306] Muhammad Yunus also claims "human beings are multi-dimensional" (2007, p. 39). As claimed in Chapter Four, DER takes a gradual and multi-tier strategy because DER believes that inter-human relationships can be classified into three irreducible categories: particular altruism, universal egoism, and universal altruism. Each category of human relationship naturally forms an identity. As three inter-human relationships are irreducible, three identities are also categorically irreducible. This is because a force which forms each identity in each human relationship is different. For example, an identity which is based on particular altruism is not chosen, but given to a person, in that it is formed by "feelings" such as love, while a force in universal egoism is self-interest or needs. My position about identity is different from both Sen's idea and communitarian idea. I agree with Sen's critique against "a 'solitarist' approach to human identity, which sees human beings as members of exactly one group" (Sen, 2006a, p.xii) and agree that there are many identities within each individual. However, I disagree with Sen's implication that all identities are the object of choice because in DER an identity which is based on particular altruism is not chosen, but given to a person. I agree with many communitarian thinkers who "tend to argue that a dominant communal identity is only a matter of self-realization, not of choice" (Sen, 2006a, p. 5). However, I think that this communitarian idea is applied only to an inter-human relationship of particular altruism. Thus, my position about identity is a midway position between Sen's position and communitarian position.

relationships as Singer claims. According to DER, for example, aid in the special relationship is motivated by feelings such as love and aid in general relationship is motivated by reason or altruistic desire such as philanthropy. In other words, they are in different categories and each type of aid is important and necessary in order to realize a person's freedom.

This approach is basically different from other theorists' methods to balance between the special and the general relationships. For example, Singer finally concedes the partiality of parents for their children, but he claims that "there is no requirement to satisfy every desire a child expresses."[307] Miller may also claim that the special relationship takes priority in aid but it should not be exclusive. The point of these claims seems to prevent the monopoly of the special relationship, conceding its priority. However, in DER there is no priority. DER argues that aids should be conducted in balance on the bases of three motivational forces, which correspond with three inter-human relationships. Thus, in DER the method to overcome moral psychology of distance is different from that in the framework of responsibility.

4.2 DER and Respect

In DER the poor and the rich are both recipients and subjects. This is because recognition can be realized only in a reciprocal relationship in that Hegel's recognition attempts to justify social ontology of "dependence and independence." As mentioned in Chapter Four, this ontology of interdependence is seen in the master-slave dialectic of *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in the non-extreme struggle as seen in *System of Ethical Life*

[307] Singer, 2002, p. 164.

and *Jena RealPhilosophie*, and in the reciprocal recognition in *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit*: "it is only when the slave becomes free that the master, too, becomes completely free" (§ 436 Zusatz). Thus, according to Hegel's idea of recognition we are always recipients (recognizees) as well as addressers (recognizers). This social ontology is supported by Hegel's substantial freedom. In the context of aid, for example, when a rich person helps a poor person, the rich person is free because the poor person is not her burden anymore and she can be at home with herself in the poor person. The poor person is also free because he can escape from a material obstacle that blocked his freedom and he can be at home with himself in the rich person in that he has no negative feelings such as hatred to the rich person anymore.

In this social ontology, DER does not claim to supply some materials with the poor of developing countries directly and individually. Instead, as seen in Chapter Four, DER prefers indirect supply through recognition-favoring institutions. As seen in Chapter Two, direct redistribution of materials could result in stigmatization. Thus, DER supports indirect ways such as construction of infrastructure, rather than giving money to the needy. Muhammad Yunus claims "all that is required to get poor people out of poverty is for us to create an enabling environment for them."[308] For example, DER encourages the poor to enroll in a school that is based on recognition and furnishes students with free school meals. This school system supplies the poor with methods for their self-support through education in the long term and, furthermore, supplies them with some food in the short term. The poor would not feel ashamed of free school meals which all students would equally receive. For the poor adults, one example is a school system with

[308] Yunus, 2007, p. 54.

vocational courses. This school can supply the students with a small salary as well as free school meals. I believe that these schools can not only meet emergent needs in the short term, but also help the poor in supporting themselves without stigmatization and oppression.[309] Thus, a policy for foreign aid in DER does not damage the self-respect of the poor in developing countries in that they are considered primarily as subjects, rather than recipients.

4.3 Example of DER to alleviate Poverty: Grameen Bank

For Hegel, poverty is a necessary result of modern society which is based on needs, namely universal egoism. Hegel suggests one way to address poverty is through corporations. They are civil bodies, which are formed by members of the estate of trade and industry who share a certain skill, trade, or occupation. They are called a "second family" for their members because they are educating members for membership, looking after their interests, and protecting them against particular contingencies (PR, §250-52). Hegel argues that "Within the corporation, the help which poverty receives loses its contingent and unjustly humiliating character, and wealth, in fulfilling the duty it owes to its association, loses the ability to provoke arrogance in its possessor and envy in others" (PR, §253R). According to Paul Franco, the central significance of the corporations for Hegel is that, in them, individuals begin to go beyond the individualism and selfishness that characterize civil society and make the universal, a common good, their explicit purpose.[310] It is only at the level of the corporation that individuals begin to work

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[309] I do not claim that all schools or education are ethically desirable or, at least, permissible. As will be seen in Chapter Seven, I claim that education is ethically desirable only when it should be based on recognition.

[310] Franco, p. 275.

consciously for others and make universality their explicit purpose. Hegel argues that "we saw earlier that, in providing for himself, the individual in civil society is also acting for others. But this unconscious necessity is not enough; only in the corporation does it become a knowing and thinking [part of] ethical life" (PR, §255A). Thus, Hegel argues that the corporation is the second ethical root (PR, §255).

Hegel's idea of corporations gives three insights to addressing extreme poverty. First, extreme poverty should be also addressed in the economic relationship, namely universal egoism, as well as altruism. Second, the poor should work, rather than receiving some materials for free. Third, an economic unit should be based on solidarity. Yunus' Grameen Bank or his idea of "social business" coincides with these insights.[311] Grameen Bank does not offer the poor handouts or grants but credit-loans they must repay, with interest, through their own productive work. The lending is not the only role of Grameen Bank. In its concrete guideline and formula, Grameen Bank educates its borrowers, organizes their membership, helps to form credit, etc. These roles are based on the accurate understanding of the poor. For example, Grameen Bank does not wait for its clients, but goes to them because the bank knows that the poor in the distant village cannot come to the bank. Since its establishment in a small Bangladesh village in 1977, Grameen Bank has developed tremendously.[312] In 1977, the number of members was only 70 but in 2007, this number grew to 7,411,229. In 1977, Cumulative Disbursement (all loans) was $6,000 but in 2007, this number grew to $6,685,510,000. According to *Annual Report 2006*, 64 per cent of Grameen borrowers' families have crossed the

[311] Yunus, 1999; 2007.

[312] http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=177&Itemid=432

poverty line.[313]These numbers show that Grameen Bank is effective in addressing extreme poverty.

Yunus' Grameen Bank and his social business show well how universal altruism is related to universal egoism in order to establish recognition-favoring institutions such as the corporation in civil society. Although Yunus' Grameen Bank or his idea of "social business" works as a recognition-favoring institution in civil society, it cannot start without some people's generous donation or investment. While for Singer, Miller, Pogge, etc, universal altruism is the only way to address poverty, for DER some forms of aid such as donation are only one category to address extreme poverty. As Yunus claims, when donation is the only way to address poverty, poverty cannot be addressed because donation is limited and temporary. This is because donation is always not enough to help the poor in helplessness and, furthermore, it tends to be smaller and smaller as donors witness the failure of their donations. In addition, when a donation is given to the poor directly, it damages the self-respect of the poor. However, when universal altruism is used as a seed to construct an institution such as Grameen Bank, donation does not damage the self-respect of the poor. Thus, recognition-favoring institutions such as Grameen Bank, which can be interpreted as a Hegelian corporation, can help the poor to escape from poverty without damaging their self-respect.

5. Conclusion

I have argued that responsibility-based theories are not effective in addressing extreme poverty because policies of foreign aid based on responsibility-based theories do

[313] http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=297&Itemid=285

not respect the self-respect of the poor fully and do not address the moral psychology of distance in aid effectively, as seen in Singer's, Pogge's, and Miller's theories. Instead, I have argued that DER is effective in addressing the extreme poverty because DER does not result in psychological harms to the poor in that the poor and the rich are both recipients and subjects in DER which is based on the social ontology of interdependence. In addition, DER does not deny that people tend to place the importance on their special relationships such as family, but DER does not admit the priority of special relationship over other relationships. In other words, DER overcomes the moral psychology of distance in aid effectively from a multi-tiered perspective.

Chapter Seven

Taking education seriously in the context of development

"Education is the art of making
human beings ethical"[314]

1. Introduction

In the area of development, education has been widely considered an important and necessary factor. Many international organizations such as United Nations, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have tried to establish educational systems in developing countries. Many development theorists and ethicists have also emphasized the significant role of education in the process of development. Despite much concern, education in development tends to be examined unfairly because education is considered absolutely good without side- or negative effects. Thus, my purpose of this chapter is to examine education in development more fairly. In other words, I examine what side- or negative effects education in development has in practice as well as in theory. I also examine whether my development ethics as recognition (DER) is superior to established theories of development ethics, such as Human Capital theory and Amartya Sen's capability approach, in addressing education issues in development.

These examinations could clarify what education in DER means and how different it is from educational ideas of other theories. I have often emphasized the significance of education in DER, but I was not able to suggest what education in DER means in detail because I focused on criticizing other theories and on constructing DER

[314] G.W.F Hegel, PR, 151A

in previous chapters. When I criticized Sen's capability approach (CA) in Chapter Two, I argued that CA does not take education seriously and, for this reason, education in CA does not incorporate the issues of recognition. In Chapters Three and Four, I argued that recognitive attitudes can be cultivated through education as seen in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Philosophy of Right.* Thus, this chapter will attempt to explicate the relationship between education and DER more concretely.

2. Education and Development

In the context of development, education has been considered a very effective way to help the poor escape their "extreme poverty," [315] as well as an ethical way to help recipients, without psychological and material harms.[316] While aids such as donation are only a temporary relief measure and they could result in psychological harms such as stigmatization, as argued in Chapters Two and Six, education has generally been considered a vehicle for sustainable development without oppression or dependence. Mafa E. Chipeta, East Africa coordinator for the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, claims that self-sustaining development by education is necessary and important in developing countries because their poverty is not a short term problem, but a persistent problem.[317] In this widely shared belief, however, side- or negative effects of

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[315] In my dissertation, "extreme poverty" means that the living cost of a person a day is below the poverty line, which is $1.08 a day at 1993 Purchasing Power Parity (World Bank, 2000). According to the *World Development Report* (2000), worldwide poverty rose from 1.2 billion in 1987 to 1.5 billion in 2000 and, if recent trends persist, it will reach 1.9 billion by 2015. (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/Resources/WDR/English-Full-Text-Report/ch1.pdf)

[316] Specifically, the intergenerational transmission of poverty model shows that poverty is transmitted to the future generations because insufficient education is considered as the primal vector of poverty throughout the life cycle and across generations. Thus, this model emphasizes the importance of education in order to break out the cycle of poverty and to escape from poverty Morán (2003).

[317] *Time* (Aug 06, 2008). http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1829996,00.html?xid=feed-cnn-topics

education in development have been overlooked. Thus, in this section, I examine what side- or negative effects education has had through examining historical cases.

2.1 Negative Effects of Education during Colonialism

It seems to be believed that education in itself is absolutely good in the context of development and to be ignored that education can result in negative effects as well as positive effects. For example, ex-colonizers sometimes claim that their modern education systems, which they had established during colonialism, helped ex-colonies to be modernized and economically developed. Arguably, this seems to be true. However, they do not mention what harms their colonial education caused the colonized. During the era of colonialism, colonial education resulted in at least three harms to the colonized: first, the disregard of colonized people's own traditional culture and values; second, the distortion of preference; and third, negative influence on future generations.

First, colonial education resulted in the ignorance or disregard of colonized people's own traditional culture or life-style. Colonized children were taught everything from a western world view in the system of colonized education. In colonial education, which was used to manipulate the colonized people's minds or identities at conscious and unconscious levels, colonized people believed that their cultures and values were inferior, primitive, uncivilized, savage, etc. They admitted without criticism Western values such as capitalism. Ashis Nandy calls this phenomenon "colonization of the mind."[318] In this process, colonial education destroyed the native and traditional value of colonized societies and, furthermore, this kind of colonization of mind resulted in the breakdown of

[318] Nandy, 1997, p. 168.

native communities because the colonized young generation conflicts their old generations.

Second, colonial education distorted the colonized people's preferences and subjective well-being or choices. Although education can play a role to achieve substantial freedom, colonial education distorted the colonized people's preferences and limited their opportunity to realize their substantial freedom. The colonized adapted their preferences according to what they though was possible for them in the colonized situation. Sen argues, "for example, people living under tyranny may lack the courage to desire freedom, and may come to terms with the deprivations of liberty, taking whatever pleasure they can in small reliefs, so that in the scale of utility (measured either in terms of mental satisfaction, or in terms of intensities of desire), the deprivations may be muffled and muted."[319] This kind of adaptive preference was supported and enforced by colonial education. For example, in the so-called "practical education" policy in 1930s by Japan, Koreans' desire to move toward modern industrialization was discouraged and adapted to lower-level practical job skill training.[320] Under this policy the contents of vocation courses were usually composed of manual agricultural labors, which were basically the same as those manual skills practiced in the traditional farming sector of Korean agricultural industry, and the proportion of hours in the curriculum of vocation courses was allocated, such as 320 hours for six years of primary schooling. In other words, during colonialism, Koreans' preference was controlled and distorted by the Japanese policies of education, through which Japanese wanted to oppress strictly any

[319] Sen, 2002, p. 634.
[320] Oh and Kim, 2000, p. 85.

sort of socialist, labor, or peasant movement from Koreans educated in schools and to produce only low-skilled labors.

Third, colonial education influenced the colonized after independence. Kwesi Kwaa Prah argues that "In Africa, after decolonization in the 1950s and 60s, the emerging African elites continued to follow the European models of education."[321] This is because world pressure for modernization was mounting and the ruling elites believed the only way to modernize was to continue with their ex-colonizer's formal education system. Martin Carnoy argues that "old-style imperialism and colonialism have all but disappeared and the great empires of the last century are dismantled, but educational systems in the ex-colonies remain largely intact after independence. Curriculum, language, and, in some cases, even the nationality of the teachers themselves, are carried over from the colonial period. In many ways, the relationship between the ex-colony and the ex-colonizer is stronger economically and culturally than during the colonial administration." [322] In other words, colonial education negatively influences future generations of the ex-colonized.

These three harms of colonial education resulted not from the non-expansion or non-existence of education, but from the expansion or emphasis on education. These harms show that the mere fact of widening educational opportunities is not always desirable because this process does not always go in the same direction as the process of expanding people's freedom. Thus, colonial education is an example to show that education can result in negative effects.

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[321] Prah, 2007, p. 12.
[322] Carnoy, 1974, p. 17.

2.2 Analyzing Two Educational Goals of Millennium Development Goals

In the belief that education in the context of development is absolutely good and desirable, many international organizations have emphasized education in development. For example, at the Millennium summit of the UN, two Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) among eight were set in relation to education: first, universal education by 2015; and second, gender equity in education by 2015. Although these two MDGs are distinct because of their emphases, they are based on the same policy to increase the rate of enrollment and the emphasis on literacy in practice. Many attempts for education in the history of development can be reduced to the second goal of MDGs: achieving universal primary education.[323] This goal is specifically as follows: "Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling." As MDGs' monitor shows, countries such as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda have abolished school fees, which has led to a surge in enrollment: in Ghana, for example, public school enrollment in the most deprived districts and nationwide soared

[323] In 1990, at the Jomtien Conference in Thailand, organized by UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, and the World Bank, 157 governments agreed to the World Declaration on Education for All that signaled their commitment to achieve Education for All by 2000. *Annual Report 2006 of UNESO* shows how its project, namely "Education For All," is related to MDGs. (http://www.unesco.org.uk/UserFiles/File/Annual%20Report/MDG.pdf). In addition, the 2002 UNESCO Report "Education for all" shows the relation between the capability perspective and education. This report suggests that policies should be "judged to be successful if they have enhanced people's capabilities [...], From this capability perspective, then, education is important for a number of reasons. [...] The human capabilities approach to education [...] recognizes that education is intrinsically valuable as an end in itself. [... Compared to other approaches] the capability approach goes further, clarifying the diverse reasons for education's importance. Although many of the traditional instrumental arguments for education [...] are accepted, the distinctive feature of the human capability approach is its assessment of policies not on the basis of their impact on incomes, but on whether or not they expand the real freedoms that people value. Education is central to this process" (UNESCO 2002, 32-33).

from 4.2 million to 5.4 million between 2004 and 2005.[324] According to these reports, Goal 2 of MDGs seems to be successful.

Despite the increase of the enrollment ratio in primary education, it is doubtful that the success of MDGs can result in people's substantial freedom. This is because the increase of the enrollment ratio does not correspond with the increase of students' freedom. According to Elaine Unterhalter, "in contrast to countries in East and West Africa, and South Asia, there are relatively good levels of access and retention in South African schools ... [and] the assessments carried out for the 'Education for All' summit in Dakar in 2000 indicated that 87% of children in the relevant age band were in primary school, that is enrolled for basic education."[325] Unterhalter argues that despite this high rate of enrollment "sexual violence is a significant feature of South African schools ... [and] the considerable anecdotal evidence of high levels of rape and other forms of sexual violence in schools collected over many years was confirmed and augmented ... [and, furthermore,] male teachers and young male pupils were frequently major perpetrators."[326] For this reason, many female students do not want to go to school and fear their male classmates and teachers in school. As Unterhalter convincingly argues, "the failure of management in schools with regard to providing a safe environment for education places the assumption of education simply and unproblematically enhancing capabilities in question."[327] Without ethically pedagogical strategies, in other words, school cannot be a place of substantial freedom, nor easily a place of active, empowered

[324] http://www.mdgmonitor.org/story.cfm?goal=2
[325] Unterhalt, 2003, p. 13.
[326] Unterhalt, 2003, p. 15.
[327] Unterhalt, 2003, p. 16.

capability. Thus, the emphasis on the enrollment ratio without pedagogical concerns, which MDGs show, cannot achieve students' substantial freedom.

In addition, MDGs overlooks side-effects of literacy policies. The concern of MDGs is the increase of literacy rates, regardless of whether ex-colonizer's language or aboriginal language. Because, as mentioned above, ex-colonies consistently tend to adapt their ex-colonizer's language as their official language, literacy policies for MDGs are applied to colonizer's language, rather than their aboriginal languages. This kind of tendency could result in psychological harms to the ex-colonized because, according to Charles Taylor's analysis, this kind of language education may damage children's native identity.[328] Unterhalt argues that "indeed, much of the work in critical literacy studies points out how difficult it is for dominated groups to utilize their literacy when gender, racial or ethnic discrimination and injustice persists."[329] Although the current policies of literacy could give students many opportunities for economic and political activities, they tend to result in psychological harms to minority students. Thus these side-effects of current literacy policies should not be overlooked. I argue that despite its importance, literacy should not be considered absolutely good, and for this reason, literacy policies should be carefully implemented with relation to aboriginal culture and languages. As an additional alternative, John E. Petrovic argues, "for language minority children, bilingual education provides the opportunity for them to engage in the self-respect-promoting activity of their language both as the *sine qua non* of other academic activities as well as an activity in and of itself."[330]

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[328] Taylor, 1995.
[329] Unterhalt, 2003, p. 12.
[330] Petrovic, 2002. p. 387.

As examined above, current policies of education in the context of development, which are based on MDGs, could not result in people's substantial freedom because the increase of enrollment rate does not correspond with the increase of freedom. In addition, current literacy policies of MDGs could distort the ex-colonized people's identity because literacy policy does not respect aboriginal language. Thus, educational goals of MDGs should be carefully re-set and implemented.

3. Education in Human Capital Theory and Sen's Capability Approach

In the previous section, I have argued that educational policies in the context of development should be carefully implemented because education could result in side- and negative effects, as seen in colonial education and educational targets of MDGs. Thus, it is necessary to establish a theory of education, which can guide educational policies for "ethical development"[331] and address side- and negative effects of education in the context of development.

The history of development has been led by economic development and human development. In the mainstream of economic development, there was the gradual evolution of concepts of development toward a "human development" conception, which includes the features of a decent human life, and away from a central focus on the growth of monetized activity. While economic development is based on human capital ideas of education, human development is based on educational ideas of Sen's capability approach. In this section, I examine whether educational models—, which are based on

[331] My use of the term "ethical development" is similar to Mozaffar Qizilbash's term (Qizilbash, 1996). Qizilbash argues that "ethical development" should be "(a) consistent with the demands of social justice, (b) consistent with the demands of human freedom, and (c) concerned with human beings as ends rather than means and with *human* well-being" (Qizilbash, 1996, p. 1209). More broadly, I use this term as development, which is based on ethical components such as substantial freedom.

human capital theory and Sen's capability approach— in the context of development, can be considered a model to guide educational policies for ethical development.

3.1 Human Capital Model of Education

In education, human capital ideas are dominant.[332] Human capital theory considers education relevant insofar as education creates skills and helps to acquire knowledge that serves as an investment in the productivity of the human being as an economic production factor. A.R. Thomson argues that "Historical evidence deriving from studies of more advanced countries during their periods of rapid economic growth, and notably of the United States, the Soviet Union, Denmark and Japan, suggested that there had been a very significant relationship between their economic growth and the amounts and kinds of education provided to their workforces."[333] A number of empirical researches have indicated a certain correlation between the increase in national expenditure on education and the increase in the gross national product (GNP). For example, Harbison and Myers found significant statistical relationships between levels of human resource development on the one hand and levels of GNP on the other for 75 countries grouped according to the former criterion.[334] For this reason, human capital theory considers education an important vehicle for self-supporting economic development.

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[332] Walker, 2006. Human capital theory was pioneered by a group of University of Chicago economists, including most prominently Gary Becker and Theodore Schultz in the 1960s and it is a well-established part of standard economic theory (Robeyns (2006), p. 72). For more information, See Chapter 8 of Todaro and Smith (2009).

[333] Thompson, 1981, pp. 86-7.

[334] Harbison and Myers, 1964.

While this human capital model of education is especially important in the context of development in that having a decent education can make all the difference between starving and surviving, this model has two fatal weaknesses based on its economy-oriented features. First, the human capital model of education does not explain people's various activities of education for non-economic reasons, because this model does not include the intrinsic value of education. For example, some people find the study of science, even when one is unlikely ever to use what they learn, intrinsically satisfying: they like the new discovery. Second, this economy-oriented logic, on which the human capital model of education is based, ironically could result in the abandonment of education. This is because this logic compels people to compare education investment with other alternative types of investments only from a material perspective, and when other alternative of investment is more profitable than education, the abandonment of education is more acceptable. According to the human capital model of education, in a society with no labor market for women, the abandonment of education for women would be not only taken for granted, but also be promoted. Because of these two weaknesses, the human capital model of education cannot be considered a model to guide educational policies for ethical development.

3.2 Sen's Capability Approach and Education

Sen's capability approach has been offered as an alternative discourse to dominant human capital ideas in education.[335] Sen and Dreze argue that the "bettering of a human life does not have to be justified by showing that a person with a better life is

[335] Walker, 2006.

also a better producer."[336] In contrast with the human capital model of education, Sen's capability approach is assumed to support the intrinsic value as well as the instrumental roles of education: "the benefits of education, thus, exceed its role as human capital in commodity production."[337] In this section, I examine whether Sen's capability approach can suggest a model to guide educational policies for ethical development.

3.2.1 Relationship between Sen's Capability Approach and Education

In Sen's capability approach (CA), education is fundamental and foundational because of its transformative potential to enhance capabilities and to empower individuals. Sen identifies education as one of a relatively small number of centrally important "beings and doings"—capabilities—that are crucial to well-being.[338] Lorella Terzi argues that "the capability to be educated" plays a substantial role in the expansion of other capabilities as well as future ones."[339] The broadening of capabilities entailed by education extends to the advancement of complex capabilities. While promoting reflection, understanding, information, and awareness of one's capabilities, education promotes at the same time the possibility to formulate exactly the valued "beings and doings"—capabilities—that the individual has reasons to value. These considerations lead to an understanding of education as a fundamental capability, which includes basic capabilities, in terms of those enabling beings and doings that are fundamental in meeting the basic need to be educated but equally foundational to the promotion and expansion of higher, more complex capabilities.

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[336] Sen and Dreze, 1995, p. 184.
[337] Sen, 1999, p. 294. See also Sen (2000).
[338] Sen, 1992, p. 44.
[339] Terzi, 2007, p. 30.

In Sen's CA, education is necessary for individuals to achieve their substantial freedom because, without the process of education, individuals cannot overcome "adaptive preference."[340] This is because individuals' preferences seem to be adjusted over time to make life bearable in the face of long-term exposure to adversity so that, for example, the "tamed house wife" finds herself giving way to an uneasy truce between experience and desire through the lowering of aspirations.[341] In order to address the problem of adaptive preference, Sen distinguishes what individuals have reasons to value from what they value, because the former takes into account the difference between what individuals are made to prefer and what they would prefer if they had control over the levers of power.[342] However, it is difficult for individuals to have an ability to distinguish between the former and the latter in reality, because challenging deeply embedded adaptations requires reflexivity. Without opportunities for education, thus, individuals have no choice but to fall into adaptive preferences and they are not likely to achieve their substantial freedom, which Sen's capability approach tries to achieve. For this reason, education is considered important and necessary in Sen's capability approach.

As examined above, education in Sen's CA is fundamental and foundational because it plays a role in the expansion of other capabilities as well as future ones. In addition, education is an important way to empower individuals and to overcome adaptive preferences. Thus, education in Sen's CA should be considered a core factor, rather than an additional value or theory.

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[340] Sen considers "adaptive preference" negative, while Nussbaum considers it positive as well as negative. In my discussion, I follow Sen's position of adaptive preference.
[341] Sen, 1985b, p. 11.
[342] Sen, 1992, pp. 64-66.

3.2.2 Roles of Education in Sen's Capability Approach

Sen argues that education can be seen to be valuable to the freedom of a person in at least five distinct ways: first, intrinsic importance; second, instrumental personal roles; third, instrumental social roles; fourth, instrumental process roles; and fifth, empowerment and distributive roles.[343] If social and individual aspects are not distinguished for my analysis, these five ways can be re-classified into three broad categories: intrinsic importance (first), economically instrumental roles (second and third), and non-economically instrumental roles (fourth and fifth). According to the intrinsic importance of education, being educated is a valuable achievement in themselves, and the act of learning itself may have much intrinsic value (e.g. in terms of fulfilling aspirations for enlightenment, self-improvement and social interaction). Elizabeth Anderson says, "the development of human talents is a great intrinsic good, a good to the person who has it, and a good to others."[344]

Economically instrumental roles of education help people to find jobs, to be less vulnerable on the labor market, to be better informed as consumers, to be more able to find information on economic opportunities, etc. In addition to these personal roles, they can help the society develop economical. For example, according to Sen's analysis, economic growth of Japan results from a high rate of literacy through education.[345] Thus, education plays an economically instrumental role at individual and social levels.

Non-economically instrumental roles of education help people to be knowledgeable about issues of health, reproduction, and contraception, to be able to

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[343] Sen, 2002, pp.38-41.
[344] Anderson, 2007, p. 615.
[345] Sen, 1999, p. 41.

speak with strangers in their languages, to be able to work with a computer and communicate with people worldwide through the internet, and so on. Furthermore, through education people can participate in public discussions to decide which values are important, how they can be obtained, etc. In addition to these personal roles, education can help people to live in a society where people have different views of the good life, which is likely to contribute to a more tolerant society. Education also can help people to discover what problems their traditional custom or religion may have had and how to reform them. In other words, education plays a role to enlarge people's agency or empowerment. Thus, education plays a non-economically instrumental role at individual and social levels.

Sen emphasizes that education should play all these roles in the achievement of freedom. In the next section, I examine whether each role of education is well played in Sen's CA.

3.2.3 Critiques against Sen's Capability Approach in Education

Although education is considered fundamental and foundational to Sen's capability approach, it is dealt with superficially for two reasons. First, Sen tends to overlook the intrinsic importance of education. In his works, Sen's remarks on education tend to focus on the instrumental value of education. Specifically, Sen considers literacy as an important factor of education from only an instrumental perspective, ignoring an intrinsic perspective.[346] Through many examples of economic growth, Sen emphasizes

[346] According to Sabina Alkire (2002), education for literacy has intrinsic value as well as instrumental value.

the correlation between economic growth and rates of literacy.[347] Sen has no concern about which language is taught and about whether this language education is related to the intrinsic value of education. His only concern is about whether language education results in economic growth. In other words, Sen tends to emphasize the instrumental value of education and to overlook the intrinsic value of education.

Second, Sen does not take seriously the pedagogical aspects of education in his theory. Sen has not scrutinized education through the lens of the capability approach in the way in which he has examined general policies regarding poverty and famine.[348] Sen does not examine power in relation to curriculum and pedagogies in his capability approach when mentioning education. Elaine Unterhalter and Melanie Walker argue that "what is missing in both Sen's and Nussbaum's writing on education is the sense of history and struggle in the formation of learner identities in pedagogical spaces in the face of dominant education norms and values and learning practices permeated by power, history, language, and contradiction."[349] This statement supports the fact that Sen does not take seriously pedagogical aspects of education. Sen's insensitivity to pedagogy seems to result in his optimistic belief that education necessarily results in desirable effects: "through education ... people can become much more productive over time, and this contributes greatly to the process of economic expansion."[350]

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[347] Sen (1971, 1994, 1999c, and 2006b) has mentioned that the China-India contrast in education, and specifically the rate of literacy, explains their difference of economic development. Sen argues that the importance of basic education has been persistently neglected in India and, as a result, the high rate of population in India is illiterate, while China is quite close to universal literacy. Sen argues that this contrast of the rate of literacy, or basic education, between China and India results in their difference of economic development. Sen argues that it is not easy to make use of the opportunities of globalized trade if illiteracy makes it hard for the common man and woman to participate in production according to international standards and specifications, or even to have quality control.

[348] Dreze and Sen 1989; Sen 1999.

[349] Unterhalter and Walker, 2007, p. 246.

[350] Sen, 1999, pp. 292-293.

As examined above, Sen tends to overlook the intrinsic value of education and he does not take seriously pedagogical aspects of education. Sen's discussion of education is problematic because when pedagogical aspects of education are ignored and the intrinsic value of education is not emphasized, education in Sen's CA would prevent people from achieving their substantial freedom, as colonial education did. As Basil Bernstein mentions, all education is a site of symbolic control, where "consciousness, dispositions, and desire are shaped and distributed through norms of communication which relay and legitimate a distribution of power and cultural categories."[351] For this reason, the pedagogical aspects of education—how to educate—are fundamental and necessary in education. When pedagogical aspects are ignored or distorted, thus, education does not achieve the intrinsic value and damages a student's freedom. It is a mistake to assume that education promotes valued "doings and being"—capabilities—automatically. This is because while education can certainly contribute to the expansion of capabilities, under certain conditions it can result in the opposite, as seen in colonial education. For this reason, it is necessary to keep assessing how well educational policies are implemented and pedagogies are practiced in schools. Thus, when Sen's CA ignores pedagogical aspects of education, it could result in the same kind of harms in which colonialism resulted, as mentioned in section 2 of this chapter.

Someone may respond to my critique that Sen's ignorance of pedagogical aspects and the intrinsic value of education is a fatal weakness. Someone may do so because Sen is not an educational theorist and CA is a framework requiring additional theories for

[351] Bernstein, 2001, p. 23.

specific contexts such as an application in education.[352] I argue that this response is irresponsible because education in Sen's CA is not a specific context for an application but a vital and operative concept, as seen above. It is problematic that a vital concept is not explicated in its own theory. Therefore, I argue that Sen's CA cannot suggest an alternative to Human Capital model of education and a model to guide educational policies for ethical development, because Sen's idea of education is naïve in that it may result in serious problems to contribute to unfreedoms.

4. Development Ethics as Recognition and Education

Kwesi Kwaa Prah argues that "Lack of funding is not the only problem with African formal education systems. Another, perhaps even greater problem is that these systems exclude traditional African education methods, cultural values, and social structure. Parents are alienated from their children's educations, especially those parents who were excluded from the system themselves. Another problem is that students that make it through the system often find it difficult to use or apply the knowledge they obtain through formal education in their own societies and communities, and as a result, often leave their countries to seek employment elsewhere."[353] This long quotation shows what harms developing countries have experienced because policies of education in the context of development have not been carefully implemented, ignoring the intrinsic value of education and overlooking pedagogical aspects of education. In this section, I examine whether DER considers both the intrinsic value of education and pedagogical aspects of

[352] Robeyns (2003) claims that the capability approach is not a theory, but a framework that can be interpreted as various theories. For this reason, Robeyns (2004) and Unterhalter (2003) claim that additional theories of education are needed to complement the capability approach.
[353] Prah, 2007, p. 15.

education important and whether DER can suggest a model to guide educational policies for ethical development.

4.1 Relationship between DER and Education

As Nigel Tubbs mentions, Hegel's works are based on educational strategies. Tubbs argues that "*Phenomenology of Spirit* traces the misrecognition of relation by itself through its various shapes in western history, up to the point at which relation becomes being-for-itself, or achieves itself as a mind of its own ... [and] this relation in Hegel requires to be comprehended as 'education,' and that the work by which relation gains a mind of its own is 'learning.'"[354] In the same vein, Terry Pinkard compares Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* to "a ladder" because this work is intended to provide the justification by demonstrating that the standpoint of speculative logic or absolute knowledge is actually made necessary by the certainties of ordinary consciousness itself.[355] In *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel also shows how "abstract right" is developed into "morality" and, finally, into "ethical life." These examples show that in his works, Hegel tries to suggest his arguments in the structure of development, namely progress from ordinary thinking to speculative thinking.

In addition to this educational feature of Hegel's works, for DER, which is based on Hegel's idea of recognition, education is not an additional but a core factor because the main concept of DER, recognition, is a process of realizing substantial freedom from an immature stage to a mature stage. In the same vein, Newhouser argues that "recognition is a form of Bildung [education] because it instills in the recognized

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[354] Tubbs, 2004, p. 26.
[355] Pinkard, 2000, p. 336.

individual a particular self-conception."[356] For Hegel, substantial freedom can be realized through the process of recognition, which is educational. Thanks to the internal connection between recognition and substantial freedom, education in DER holds intrinsic value as well as instrumental value for substantial freedom.

4.2 Education in DER

As argued in Chapter Three, reciprocal recognition cannot be forcefully demanded of a person. Instead, recognitive attitudes should be cultivated or educated in recognition-favoring institutions. In DER, thus, schools or other educational systems should be designed to cultivate students' recognitive attitudes, and pedagogical aspects of education should be carefully considered in those institutions. This is because recognitive attitudes cannot be cultivated without well-organized institutions and pedagogies, as seen in Unterhalt's research about schools in South Africa. For example, curriculums, teaching methods, textbooks, classrooms, facilities in school, teachers' attitudes, etc. should be based on reciprocal recognition.

In DER, recognitive attitudes are related to the three modes of human relationship: particular altruism, universal egoism, and universal altruism. In other words, when educational policies are implemented to form three identities of these three inter-human relationships in balance, recognitive attitudes are well cultivated.

[356] Newhouser, 2000, p. 314 n 18.

4.2.1 Education in Universal Egoism

While colonial education and established theories of education—Human Capital theory and Sen's CA—emphasize only professional or vocational education for economic contribution, DER argues that this education should be only one area of universal egoism, and it should be in harmony with educational forms in other areas—particular and universal altruism.

DER also suggests that professional or vocational education in DER should be based on a recognitive attitude of honor for solidarity, rather than pursuing only self-interests. While colonial education and established theories of education focus on individuals' economic advantages, vocational education in DER emphasizes common goods as well as self-interests in the relationship of a civil society that is based on the principles of mutual exploitation and utility. For Hegel, the corporation is a second family through which individuals receive education, admission, honor, etc. (PR, §252). In the corporation, individuals can form solidarity on the basis of honor in that they belong to the same estate of job. Thus, vocational education in DER should emphasize an ethical aspect of common goods as well as self-interests, and for this reason, students can cultivate their recognitive attitudes in civil society.

4.2.2 Education in Particular Altruism

In the context of developed countries such as the U.S.A., multicultural education emerged out of the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s, and it has been developed and emphasized in accordance with globalization.[357] A major goal of

[357] See Banks (2004) for more information of multicultural education!

multicultural education is to reform the schools and other educational institutions so that students from diverse racial, ethnic, and social-class groups will experience educational equality. In the emphasis on multicultural education, thus, each minority language or culture is considered important and valuable. However, in the context of developing countries, this kind of multicultural education—education in particular altruism—has been ignored and overlooked at the expense of economic value. As mentioned above, multicultural education is very important because the disconnection of traditional value breaks down people's emotional stability and damages their basic identity.

Although multicultural education is based on different contexts with education in particular altruism, insightful ideas of multicultural education can be realized in education in particular altruism. DER emphasizes an education for traditional culture, aboriginal language, etc., in the human relationship of particular altruism, and because students in schools of developing countries are also from diverse ethnic groups. As seen in Figure 4.2, multicultural education emphasizes the five dimensions: first, content integration; second, the knowledge construction process; third, an equity pedagogy; fourth, prejudice reduction; and fifth, an empowering school culture and social structure. This is because traditional cultures and aboriginal language of a society influence the forming of a basic identity of members of the society and, for this reason, multicultural education is important. For the same reason, DER suggests that the five dimensions of multicultural education as pedagogical suggestions should be applied to education in particular altruism.

Figure 4.2. The Dimensions of Multicultural Education[358]



Note: Copyright ©2002 by James A. Banks.

[358] Banks, 2004, p. 5.

4.2.3 Education in Universal Altruism

DER emphasizes an education for fraternity in the human relationship of universal altruism. Hegel claims that "education is the art of making human beings ethical: it considers them as natural beings and shows them how they can be reborn, and how their original nature can be transformed into a second, spiritual nature so that this spirituality becomes habitual to them" (PR, §151A). As examined in Chapters Three and Four, DER does not forcefully claim that people should be universally altruistic, but motivates people to cultivate their universal altruism through education.

Nussbaum's educational strategy for "cultivation for humanity" could be an example of education in universal altruism.[359] Nussbaum claims that "we must educate people who can operate as world citizens with sensitivity and understanding,"[360] and she provides normative pedagogical guidelines for cultivation of humanity by means of higher education: first, the capacity for critical self-examination; second, the necessity of conceding ourselves as citizens of the world; and third, narrative imagination. For the capacity for critical self-examination, Nussbaum recommends some textbooks and emphasizes the importance of an instructor. Nussbaum argues that "The world citizen must develop sympathetic understanding of distant cultures and of ethnic, racial, and religious minorities within her own."[361] For this purpose, she suggests that a curriculum for world citizenship should have multiple aspects to include the multicultural nature. She also shows how the literary imagination can develop compassion in the education of literatures. These pedagogical suggestions such as curriculum could be an example for an

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[359] Nussbaum explains how to cultivate humanity in liberal arts education (Nussbaum, 1997) and in legal education (Nussbaum, 2003).
[360] Nussbaum, 1997, p. 52.
[361] Nussbaum, 1997, p. 69.

education for fraternity in the human relationship of universal altruism. DER also emphasizes that this kind of education is important for human beings' spiritual identity.

DER's main claim in education is that three forms of education should be practiced in balance in recognition-favoring institutions such as school, because only under these conditions, can recognitive attitudes be well cultivated. DER suggest that a vocational education should be based on solidarity in the inter-human relationship of universal egoism; a multicultural education should be applied to an education in the inter-human relationship of particular altruism; and education in universal altruism should include some curriculum and pedagogies such as Nussbaum's educational strategy for cultivation for humanity.

5. Conclusion

I have argued that educational policies in the context of development should be carefully implemented because education could result in side- or negative effects, as seen in my analysis of colonial education and educational targets of MDGs. I have also argued that human capital model of education and Sen's CA cannot be considered a model to guide educational policies for ethical development because both do not take seriously the intrinsic value of education and pedagogical aspects of education. I have suggested DER as an alternative to these theories. I have argued that DER considers the intrinsic value of education important because DER's core ideas, recognition and substantial freedom, are internally connected. In this internal connection, education in DER is an end as well as a means. In addition, DER is pedagogical in nature because its core idea, recognition, is a

process in itself from an immature stage to a mature stage, and DER suggests a multi-tiered strategy for education in the three modes of human relationship. Thus, I have argued that DER takes education seriously.

Education is also important for future generations. Each individual should be given conditions for fair opportunities to achieve his self-determination through education, if we believe that from a perspective of justice each individual should be in a fair system of cooperation between generations over time.[362]As Schuller et al. claim, "the important function it [education] provides is enabling people to have a sense of a future for themselves, for their families and perhaps also for their communities, which they can to some extent control or influence."[363] Thus, education should be also taken seriously from a transgenerational perspective.

[362] Rawls, 1999a, pp. 251-258.
[363] Schuller, 2004, p. 190.

Chapter Eight

Addressing Unresolved Past Wrongs with DER

"The wounds of spirit heal, and leave no scars behind."[364]

1. Introduction

Most developing countries are ex-colonies of Western developed countries. Some people have claimed that a miserable plight of developing countries is closely related to unresolved past wrongs such as colonialism. Although resource exploitation during colonization could result in current development problems in ex-colonies, this claim is controversial from an economic perspective because there are some exceptional ex-colonies such as Korea, which have rapidly become one of the wealthiest countries in the world.

Instead of a material perspective, I examine unresolved past wrongs from a mental perspective. My questions are as follows: are there some relationships between the current plight of developing countries and the mental "scar" of misrecognition during colonialism? If so, what are they? And how can they be ethically resolved? These questions are significant because if current development problems are related to unresolved past wrongs, any attempt to resolve current problems only from a current perspective without considering past wrongs is a temporary solution rather than a fundamental one. In this chapter, I argue that unresolved past wrongs negatively influence future generations in the form of psychological anger or helplessness, which

[364] G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 407.

could result in violence or poverty in reality. I also argue that although other established theories of development ethics do not address these past wrongs, development ethics as recognition (DER) can ethically resolve these negative influences.

2. Unresolved Past Wrong and Its Influence in Identity

In the era of colonialism, colonizers contrived some ways to dominate their colonies effectively. One of them is to manipulate the colonized people's identity at conscious and unconscious levels through their colonial education and administration. Ashis Nandy calls this phenomenon "colonization of the mind."[365]

2.1 Group Identity and Its Transmission

Charles Taylor proposes that everyone should be recognized for his or her own unique identity.[366] This is because a person's identity is shaped by others' recognition. For example, my present identity has been formed by the people who I have met, who I have conversed with, and whom I have been influenced by. This explanation can be similarly applied to groups such as people or country. Anthony D. Smith argues that group identity is the subjective feelings and valuations that refer to three components of the group's shared experiences: first, a sense of continuity between the experiences of succeeding generations of the unity of populations; second, shared memories of specific events and personages which have been turning-points of a collective history; and third, a sense of common destiny on the part of the collectivity sharing those experiences.[367] As

[365] Nandy, 1997, p. 168.
[366] Taylor, 1995, p. 235.
[367] Smith, 2003, p. 280.

social behavior patterns, values, and knowledge are transmitted to future generations, group identity is also transmitted to future generations, consciously or subconsciously, through mass media. According to Jeremy Waldron, remembrance—the deliberate and honest attempt to recollect and record what happened—is a crucial part of human identity at the level of the individual and at the level of communities such as families, tribes, nations, etc.[368] In the same vein, Elizabeth Jelin claims that "memory provides a link between past experiences and future expectation."[369]

The intergenerational transmission of group identity is performed through the transmission of memory in both private and public spheres. Generally, public spheres such as the education system play a crucial role in transmitting memory to future generations. For example, the past in curricular textbooks or in the "official history" contributes to formation of the identity of the present generation. On the other hand, public spheres can also prevent people from remembering the past to form their identity to a certain degree. For example, when the Chinese government intentionally tried to freeze the memory of Japan's massacre in Nanjing on December 13, 1937, in order to get some economic benefits from Japan during China's beginning period of modernization, many Chinese people seemed to forget it in their memory.[370] However, when the Chinese government had begun to arouse this memory through mass media in the public sphere in order to re-anchor the Chinese people's national identity in the rapid development of economy and capitalism, this memory was quickly raised and expressed in violence as

[368] Waldron, 1992, p. 141.
[369] Jelin, 2003, p. 92.
[370] Aria, 2006.

seen in the young Chinese's attack against the Japanese Embassy in 2005.[371] In addition to these public spheres, traditional institutions such as family serve to transmit shared memories of specific events as a private sphere of memory. Especially in the governmental policy of memory-freeze, private spheres can transmit the silenced truth to future generations. Therefore, the past transmits as memory to future generations through the cooperation of private and public spheres, and these transmitted memories influence future generations to form their group identity.

2.2 Misrecognition and Past Wrongs

2.2.1 Negative Influence of Distorted Group Identity

The distortion of identity happens when group identity is artificially formed by false or distorted information and external manipulation. Thus, if a group is misrecognized by other groups the group can suffer real damage or real distortion. In colonialism, the Western powers used this kind of manipulation at the level of policy. For example, according to Mahmood Mamdani, although their identities had not been distinguished as neighbors before colonialism, the Hutu's "native identity" and the Tutsi's "settler identity" were artificially formed in Belgium's colonial policy to favor the Tutsi and to discriminate against the Hutu.[372] In other words, in the situation of past wrongs such as colonialism, oppressed groups' identity was sometimes distorted.

If these distorted images in identity are corrected through revealing the truth and redressed through the proper treatments, future generations would not be influenced by

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[371] Hundreds of young Chinese broke windows at the Japanese Embassy and other buildings in 2005 after as many as 10,000 people marched through Beijing calling for a boycott of Japanese goods in a demonstration that appeared to have been sanctioned by the government (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40503-2005Apr9.html).

[372] Mamdani, 2001.

these distorted group identities. However, when these distorted images are not corrected, future generations as well as present generation are negatively influenced because these distorted group identities are consciously and subconsciously transmitted to future generations and negatively influence them. In other words, these distorted images in identity could result in two negative influences: first, anger or violence; second, helplessness.

First, the distorted images tend to arouse both intra-national violence such as civil war or genocide and inter-national violence or resentment as dormant violence. According to Frantz Fanon, the colonizer's misrecognition to the colonized people's culture results in the colonized people's violence to the colonizers as well as their fellow citizens.[373] Mamdani also shows, with a case of the Rwandan genocide, how the distorted identities during colonialism result in intra-national violence such as a civil war or genocide after independence.[374] Mamdani argues that the Rwandan genocide results from their distorted group identities, the Hutu's native identity and the Tutsi's settler identity that were artificially formed through Belgium's colonial policy to favor the Tutsi and to discriminate against the Hutu. Although their identities had not been distinguished as natives before colonization, after colonization the Tutsi became "settlers" while the Hutu were still "natives." The Tutsi were not the Hutu's neighbors anymore, but for Hutu, the Tutsi were settlers who the Hutu should fight against. Fanon explains this kind of violence as follows: "the native's work is to imagine all possible methods for destroying the settler ... [because] for the native, life can only spring up again out of the rotting corpse of the settler ... [In addition] The practice of violence binds them together as a

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[373] Fanon, 1999, pp. 165-166.
[374] Mamdani, 2001.

whole, since each individual forms a violent link in the great chain, a part of the great organism of violence which has surged upward in reaction to the settler's violence in the beginning."[375] This explanation is useful to explain current civil wars in ex-colonies in a sense.

The distorted images also tend to arouse inter-national violence or resentment as dormant violence. Unresolved past wrongs in the distorted identity are expressed as bloody violence or are covered as dormant violence such as a feeling of resentment against ex-colonizing people, consciously or subconsciously. According to Derrida, the 9/11 attack is closely related to past wrongs in that terrorists of the 9/11 attack are related to the persons who had been trained by the United States during the the Cold War era and that their weapons are things that are produced by the modern high-tech knowledge of the United States and given for the benefits of the United States.[376] In addition, the phenomenon of dormant violence can be seen in the relationship between China, Korea, and Japan. China and Korea are geographically very close to Japan but their military tension still remains as seen in their recent territorial disputes because of unresolved past wrongs.[377] Although Japan colonized Korea and China and massacred many Koreans and Chinese during colonialism, Japan did not apologize for its past wrongs sincerely.[378]

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[375] Fanon, 1999.

[376] Boradori, 2003.

[377] The Japanese assert that they had incorporated Dokdo, an island that they considered to be a *terra nullius*, into the Japanese Empire on February 22, 1905 when the Govenor of Shimane prefecture proclaimed the islets to be under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands branch office of the Shimane prefectural government under the name "Takeshima", cited in Shimane prefectural proclamation number 40 of that year. Koreans also complain that the Japanese took advantage of Korea's political weakness vis-a-vis Japan in 1905, when the islets were registered as a part of Shimane prefecture, Japan. Korea had not been able to effectively protest the Japanese action at the time because Japan had had already taken control of the foreign affairs of Korea via the Protectorate Treaty of 1905, also known as the "Eulsa Treaty" or the "Second Japan-Korea Agreement". (http://www.geocities.com/mlovmo/page4.html)

[378] Derrida seems to perceive that Japanese government apologized for past wrongs during colonialism to Korean and China and the Japanese Prime Minister asked forgiveness of the Koreans and the Chinese for

Owing to these unresolved past wrongs, most Chinese and Koreans have resentment in their minds, waiting for its outburst. When Japan stirred up a territorial dispute about Korea's island, most Koreans showed overwhelming resentment. As mentioned in footnote 378, hundreds of young Chinese violently responded to Japan's decision to issue new textbooks that do not contain the atrocities Japan committed in China during the Second World War.

Second, the distorted images such as inferiority tend to result in helplessness at the psychological level and, finally, in poverty at the material level. Someone like Thomas Pogge have claimed that resource exploitation in the era of colonialism have resulted in current development problems in ex-colonies.[379] Although this claim may be plausible, it is still controversial.[380] In order to escape this empirical controversy, I focus on the relationship between current problems of developing countries and the mental "scar" of unresolved past wrongs. This is because it seems not enough to explain extreme

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past violence (2001, p. x. and p. 31.). Still, most Koreans and Chinese do not agree with Derrida because Japan's so-called apology does not express what Japan apologizes and why Japan apologizes in vagueness. In addition, even after Japan's so-called apology the Japanese government has tried to justify its colonialism in school history texts and has denied the existence of comfort women from Korea and China.

[379] Pogge, 2002b, p. 204.

[380] Although some scholars such as Pogge claim "... there are at least three morally significant connections between us and the global poor. First, their social starting positions and ours have emerged from a single historical process that was pervaded by massive grievous wrongs. The same historical injustices, including genocide, colonialism, and slavery, play a role in explaining both their poverty and our affluence" (Pogge, 2002c, p. 14), some people may claim that there is no relationship between the unresolved past wrong such as colonialism and the present tragedies such as poverty and violence. For example, David Miller claims that "although it is undoubtedly true that historically the relationship between societies that are now affluent and societies that are now poor has been darkened by the moral evils that Pogge describes, it is far less clear that these evils explain present-day affluence and poverty" (Miller, 2007, p. 251). Rather he claims that "The work most frequently citied in support of the primacy of domestic factors is David Landes' book The Wealth and Poverty of Nations ... Other economic historians, however, have produced more solid evidence to support the significance of domestic factors in explaining differential rates of development ... The independent effect of culture can be seen most easily by studying the varying success rates of different ethnic groups in a single society – for instance by comparing the performance of Asian immigrants to the U.S.A. with that of blacks and Hispanics (L.E. Harrison and S.P. Huntington (eds.) Culture Matters (2000)) ... Institutional effects have been studied by looking at ex-colonial societies starting out with contrasting legal systems, sets of property rights, and so forth and comparing their economic performance over time (See note 21!)" (pp. 242-3).

poverty in ex-colonies only by resource exploitation. As seen in Jeffery Sachs's analysis of poverty, the "poverty trap" from which it is hard to escape results from psychological states such as helplessness and a sense of inferiority that are transmitted to future generations through memory and influences to form the group identity.[381]

As examined above, distorted images in identity of ex-colonized people are related to current civil wars or violence in developing countries, or they prevent ex-colonized people from cooperating with ex-colonizers because of their resentment. In addition, distorted images such as inferiority result in helplessness of ex-colonized people at the psychological level and, finally, may influence their poverty.

2.2.2 The Case of South Korea: Unresolved Past Wrongs and Development

Korea has frequently been suggested as an example to show no relationship between current tragedies of developing countries and past wrongs such as colonialism. This is because although Korea experienced colonialism for almost 40 years, Korea now becomes a rich country. Thus, it would be helpful in examining this relationship through the case of Korea. After liberation, most Koreans were possessed by inferiority or helplessness as many ex-colonized people were. This inferiority or helplessness was formed during Japan's colonization of Korea because Koreans had been taught by Japanese teachers that they were inferior and lazy, and this distorted group identity was not corrected.[382] Because Korea is originally not rich in natural resources, it may be more plausible to explain the poverty of Korea during the 1950s and 1960s after liberation with the mental "scar" of past wrongs rather than with resource exploitation in the era of

[381] Sachs, 2005, pp. 19-20, p. 331.
[382] Oh and Kim, 2000, pp. 84-85.

colonialism.

In 1945, after the end of colonialism for 36 years, the South Korean government did not punish pro-Japanese collaborators and did not have a process for reconciliation with them, in spite of national desire that Korean national spirit should be set right by doing so. In other words, past wrongs were unresolved and the government that had been fully supported by the U.S.A. government tried to freeze the memory of colonialism in order to fight against communism. The first president Rhee Syng-man necessarily rested on pro-Japanese power. In agreement with the U.S.A. government, he thought it was more important to prevent the spread of communism with the help of pro-Japanese collaborators serving as officials such as policemen rather than being punished. After that, unresolved past wrongs during colonialism became disappeared in curricular textbooks or in the "official history," thanks to the governmental policies of freezing memory. In addition, in 1965, after declaring military law the government signed the "Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty" in spite of people's protests. Through these policies, past wrongs were not resolved and the distorted group identity was not corrected in South Korea.

Thanks to the governmental policies of freezing memory, South Korea could accept much economic help from the U.S.A., and the Japanese governments and South Koreans seemed to forget their distorted identity in order to strive for economic prosperity alone, rather than trying to correct it. Owing to these policies, although South Korea experienced Japan's colonialism for about 45 years, South Korea became one of richest countries, the world's 11th largest economy, and 12th largest trading nation.[383] South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world, but today's South Korea is in

[383] http://www.investkorea.org/InvestKoreaWar/work/ik/eng/bo/bo_01.jsp?code=1020102

the league of the wealthiest nations: per capita gross national product, only $100 in 1963, exceeded US by $20,000 in 2005. However, Korea's economic development cannot be used for arguing that unresolved past wrongs do not form the distorted identity and do not harm future generations. Although the governmental policies of freezing memory might have partly helped Korea's rapid modernization, it left many negative influences on South Korea.[384] In the intra-society, unresolved past wrongs of pro-Japanese collaborators have continuously caused ideological, regional, national conflicts in the modern history of South Korea. The Presidential Committee for the Inspection of Collaborations for Japanese Imperialism (PCIC), established in May 2005, has been ordered to reveal the actual state of collaborations done in the period of Japanese imperialism in Korea to confirm the historical truth and the national legitimacy and thereby to realize a just society. The establishment of PCIC shows how severely these unresolved past wrongs have afflicted on Koreans.

After their liberation, some ex-colonies tended to prefer their rapid economic development, voluntarily or involuntarily, rather than correcting the distorted identity or redressing past wrongs, in the situation of Cold War and the logic of international power relationship. For this reason, some developing countries froze their people's memory and concealed past wrongs for the rapid modernization as seen in some Asian countries.[385] Although some developing countries could be economically rich owing to these policies, as seen in the case of Korea, unresolved past wrongs negatively influence future generations in the form of psychological anger or resentment and these negative influence

[384] I doubt that the governmental policy of freezing memory is the only way of encouraging economic developments. This is because I believe that it is more efficient to redress unresolved past wrongs and correct distorted identities, rather than freezing memory.
[385] See East Timor (Nevins, 2005).

causes societal conflicts in the intra-society. Thus, governmental policies of freezing the memory of past wrongs are simply papering over the cracks to conceal past wrongs and cannot prevent unresolved past wrongs from influencing future generations negatively. For this reason, it is irrelevant to claim there is no relationship between unresolved past wrongs such as colonialism and current tragedies of developing countries.

3. Transgenerational Treatment and Unresolved Past Wrongs

In the last section, I argued that unresolved past wrongs negatively influence present and future generations as a form of anger or resentment, which results in violence or civil wars, through forming the distorted group identity. In addition, I have argued that governmental policies of freezing the memory of past wrongs are simply papering over the cracks to conceal past wrongs and cannot prevent unresolved past wrongs from influencing future generations negatively. Thus, a transgenerational treatment is called for in order to redress unresolved past wrongs, namely to correct the distorted group identity.

Transgenerational treatment can be understood in the relationship with transitional treatment because when transitional treatment is not achieved and the time passes, transgenerational treatment is called for by future generations who have been negatively influenced because of unresolved past wrongs. In history, there have been many attempts for transitional treatment[386]: the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East

[386] Transitional justice is one form of transitional treatment. Transitional justice refers to a range of approaches that societies undertake to reckon with legacies of widespread or systematic human rights abuse as they move from a period of violent conflict or oppression towards peace, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for individual and collective rights (http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/). It includes both retributive justice such as trial and restorative justice such as reconciliation.

Timor (CAVR), Bulubulu in Fiji, the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague, etc. Thus, in order to find out a proper form of transgenerational treatment, it could be effective in examining these attempts of transitional treatment. These attempts can be classified into two categories: trials and reconciliation. The former is one of "retributive justice." The latter is one of "restorative justice" in which the central concern is not retribution or punishment, but "the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships, [and] a seeking to rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community that he has injured by his offense."[387] I examine which attempt is more justifiable and relevant to transgenerational treatment among trials as retributive justice and reconciliation as restorative justice.

3.1 Present Generation and Unresolved Past Wrongs

Before examining which category of justice is more justifiable and relevant to transgenerational treatment, first this question should be answered: Why should future generations redress their ancestors' past wrongs, although it is conceded that unresolved past wrongs negatively influence future generations of victims? An attempt to search for transgenerational treatment cannot be justified without answering this question. When in 1997 the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, is asked to make an official apology for past wrongs inflicted on Aborigines in the last two centuries of colonialism, he customarily replies that present generations of citizens should not be expected to take

[387] Crocker, 2007, p. 12.

responsibility for the deeds of past generations.[388] It is important to examine why the descendants of victims have a claim to redress unresolved past wrongs owing to what was done to their ancestors, even when their ancestors would not exist today.

One possible reason that future generations should redress past wrongs is that descendants of wrongdoers have enjoyed the benefits in the institution of past wrongs. For example, African-Americans, whose ancestors were subjected to the terrible injustices of being kidnapped in Africa and subsequently enslaved, have a just claim to compensation as seen in Affirmative Action. This is because wealth generated from the institution of slavery helped to pay for the infrastructure and other institutions through which the present Americans use for their economic increase. Previous colonizers' wealth also has directly or indirectly contributed to the economic development of the colonizers' descendants. Thus, future generations of wrongdoers should redress unresolved past wrongs in that they have enjoyed the benefits generated from the institution of those past wrongs.

3.2 Two Transitional Treatments and Transgenerational Treatment

In the context of globalization, there are some attempts to integrate retributive features with restorative features in a transitional treatment.[389] In addition, international trials have been conducted by a reference to a combination of principles, such as retribution or deterrence or truth and reconciliation, applicable differently for different contexts.[390] In this section, however, for the effectiveness of my analysis, trials are

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[388] http://www.albionmonitor.com/9706a/ausapology.html

[389] See Findlay and Henham (2005),especially chapter 7.

[390] May, 2008, p. 319.

considered to have only retributive features and reconciliation is considered to have only restorative features.

3.2.1 Trials as Retributive Justice

Retribution is considered as a prime objective of criminal trials. Trials as retributive justice are based on the formal criminal justice system, which is oriented to wrongdoers and not victims. In history, trials have been largely used for justice. However, trials as retributive justice are not relevant to transgenerational treatment for two reasons.

First, retribution is sometimes impossible in the context of transgenerational treatment in which the wrongdoers do not exist anymore. Second, even when trials are possible, trials are not relevant to transgenerational treatment because, in the context of transgenerational treatment, they are contradictory with their prime value, namely the rule of law. Trials by nature are best at dealing with individuals who are responsible, not with groups that are responsible.[391] However, transgenerational treatment is related to groups rather than individuals. As seen in the Rwanda genocide, the Hutu who killed the Tutsi were not an individual, but a group. In the context of transgenerational treatment related to groups, trials face issues concerning selectivity, which is against the rule of law, if one wrongdoer, and not the other, is prosecuted. Especially when some groups are both wrongdoers and victims as often seen in the context of transgenerational treatment, it is much harder to establish the rule of law. The Introduction of the Final Report by CAVR, thus, tries to explain the history of conflicts between East Timorese people from colonialism to militarized occupation, focusing on showing that conflicts or splits of the

[391] May, 2005, p. 237.

East Timorese society resulted from Portugal and Indonesia in order to justify the necessity of reconciliation. For these two reasons, retributive justice such as trial is not relevant to transgenerational treatment.

3.2.2 Reconciliation as Restorative Justice

Reconciliation as restorative justice seems to be more relevant to transgenerational treatment for two reasons. First, the main goal of reconciliation is to heal the society. As seen in the case of Rwanda, unresolved past wrongs generate intra-national conflicts because both victims and wrongdoers' identities were intentionally distorted or manipulated through colonial policies. In this sense, Rwandans are all victims, whoever they are, the Hutu or the Tutsi. When Rwandans understand that the Hutu and the Tutsi group identities were artificially formed through Belgium's colonial policy, and they ask for forgiveness of each other; they can heal their society. Hannah Arendt says that forgiveness is "the possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility—of being unable to undo what one has done though one did not, and could not, have known what he was doing."[392] Thus, through reconciliation, their distorted identity can be corrected and the society that has experienced conflicts can be healed and restored.

Second, reconciliation can redress the distorted identity of the present generation and its negative influences. In other words, reconciliation can resolve a feeling of resentment or inferiority because "identity is bound up with symbolism."[393] Thus, when the descendants of wrongdoers sincerely apologize for the past wrongs of their ancestors and show their attempts to correct these past wrongs, the descendants of victims can

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[392] Arendt, 1958, p. 237.
[393] Waldron, 1992, p. 143.

remove their distorted images and redress their distorted identity. For example, when in 1988 the American government awarded each of some eighty thousand Japanese-American survivors $20,000 as the token sums of compensation and a letter of apology signed by President George H. W. Bush in order to redress the past wrong of detention in 1942, the identity of survivors and their descendants could be restored. The point of these payments was not to make up for the loss of home, business, opportunity, dignity, etc., but to mark a clear public recognition that this past wrong did happen. In other words, it was to correct the distorted identity. For these reasons, reconciliation as restorative justice is more relevant to transgenerational treatment.

Some forms of reconciliation are crucial for moving toward establishing the conditions necessary for a return to the rule of law, but it is often thought that amnesty programs aimed at reconciliation are themselves clear violations of the rule of law. However, amnesty programs are not violations of the rule of law, as seen in many truth commissions. For example, amnesties were only granted to those who came forward and confessed their role in apartheid in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) which has been the one that has most effectively captured public attention through the world among the many truth commissions. Because the TRC demanded more than cursory explanations of the roles played in apartheid, the wrongdoers who came forward were subjected to the public embarrassment of having to confess in detail precisely what they had done.[394] In other words, reconciliation is granted in exchange for public acknowledgment of guilt and acceptance of public condemnation. Thus, reconciliation is not violation of the rule of law, especially when trials are not

[394] May, 2005, p. 231.

plausible.

3.3 DER and Transgenerational Treatment

Although reconciliation as restorative justice seems to be more relevant to transgenerational treatment, it should be carefully applied to the context of transgenerational treatment for two reasons. The first reason is that historical forms of reconciliation such as the TRC were limited to the healing of intra-society, while unresolved past wrongs are applied to inter-society as well as intra-society. The second reason is that the TRC is not effective in promoting reconciliation or forgiveness even in the context of transitional treatment. The TRC was expected to provide the ostensible therapeutic benefit, namely the psychological relief that deponents would experience from testifying in public and forgiving and the reconciling with wrongdoers responsible for their abuse. According to Audrey Chapman's recent empirical research, however, participation in the TRC process appears to have had a negative impact on the willingness to forgive: respondents who submitted a statement to the TRC were more unforgiving of wrongdoers than those who did not, although they agree with the necessity of forgiveness.[395] These limitations of the TRC do not mean that reconciliation or forgiveness cannot be promoted in the context of transgenerational treatment, but that a new framework is called for to realize the idea of effective forgiveness.

I believe that insights of reconciliation as restorative justice in the context of transitional treatment can be fully realized in DER, especially in the context of transgenerational treatment. Unresolved past wrongs can be addressed in the multi-tiered

[395] Chapman, 2008, p. 76.

strategy of DER. Unresolved past wrongs needing forgiveness in the intra-society can be addressed in the dimension of particular altruism, while unresolved past wrongs which need forgiveness in the inter-society can be addressed in the dimension of universal altruism. Unresolved past wrongs which should reveal truth could be addressed in the dimension of universal egoism.

3.3.1 Reconciliation in Particular Altruism

As seen in the case of South Africa, some unresolved past wrongs are placed in intimate relationships with friends or fellow countrymen. Although they had been neighbors or friends or fellow countrymen, they became victims or wrongdoers during colonialism or in the evil system. Thus, reconciliation in particular altruism is similar to something seen in historical reconciliations such as the TRC in that it is applied to intra-society alone, but it should be ethically developed or reformed. According to Chapman's empirical research, the TRC fails to promote forgiveness for two reasons. The first reason is that the TRC demanded unconditional forgiveness to victims although in many cases, victims or their family did not have any opportunities to identify their wrongdoers. According to Archbishop Desmond Tutu, chair of the TRC, "when something is unforgiven it has physical consequences for us. Unforgiven tension, unforgiven sin, actually has a deleterious impact on the person."[396] From its inception, the TRC had placed a great deal of emphasis on unconditional forgiveness. However, forgiveness in this inter-human relationship of particular altruism, which is based on feelings such as love, should be not unconditional but conditional in that victims and wrongdoers are

[396] Tutu, 1998, p. xiv.

fellow countrymen in the intimate relationship and, for this reason, forgiveness in question requires confession or apology for emotional restoration. In the same vein, Graeme Simpson, the director of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, believes that the TRC should have provided space for people to express feelings of anger, sorrow, sadness, and rage, rather than placing pressure on victims to forgive their wrongdoers unconditionally.[397]

The second reason is that the TRC process did not offer an appropriate setting for effecting forgiveness.[398] Thus, DER needs a recognition-favoring institution to offer opportunities for victims/their descendants and wrongdoers/their descendants to come together in appropriate settings in order to become acquainted with each other and to understand their motives. In this institution, DER can help victims/their descendants and wrongdoers/their descendants to cultivate recognitive attitudes for conditional forgiveness.

In addition to forgiving wrongdoers or their descendants conditionally, reconciliation in the inter-human relationship of particular altruism can also play a role to accept victims of past wrongs, whether they are alive or not, into their home society. Victims frequently tend to be excluded from their own society because they are considered shameful. However, as the TRC did, DER tries to accept victims or their descendants as their fellow countrymen in the inter-human relationship of particular altruism. This dimension helps future generations of victims to lead to the dimension of universal altruism, which reconciles with past wrongs on unconditional forgiveness.

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[397] Chapman, 2008, p. 81.
[398] Chapman, 2008, p. 81.

3.3.2 Reconciliation in Universal Egoism

Although conditional forgiveness in particular altruism can partly help future generations of victims to lead to the dimension of universal altruism, this process should be based on reconciliation in universal egoism. Reconciliation in universal egoism is to strive for common goods between descendants of victims and of wrongdoers. In other words, the truth of unresolved past wrongs should be revealed in recognition-favoring institutions at the governmental level and at the non-governmental level. First of all, truth should be uncovered at the governmental level. As mentioned above, it is necessary to uncover the truth of history in order to correct distorted identities. For this reason, most historical reconciliations such as the TRC or the CAVR include a form of truth committee. In addition, uncovered truth should be included in "official history" or textbooks and should be educated through mass media, school, museum, and so on.

Second, truth should be uncovered at the non-governmental level. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for truth and reconciliation should be founded between victims' and wrongdoers' descendants. For example, a Japan Fukuoka-based citizens group called the "Truth-Seeking Network for Forced Mobilization"[399] was formed in 2005 to cooperate closely with citizens groups such as "Daegu Citizen Forum for Halmuni"[400] in South Korea and the South Korean government's "Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under Japanese Imperialism."[401] This kind of NGOs helps both victims' and perpetrators' descendants to know truth at the non-governmental level and to open a possibility of apology and forgiveness at the governmental level.

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[399] http://homepage3.nifty.com/iimptc/index.htm
[400] http://www.1945815.or.kr/
[401] http://www.gangje.go.kr/en_index.asp

Above mentioned recognition-favoring institutions, especially NGOs, cannot start without some people's universal altruism. Although universal altruism is used as a seed to construct an institution such as a NGO for truth, this kind of activity for truth should be considered in the inter-human relationship of universal egoism in that the purpose of these activities is to strive for common goods. It is a common good to reveal the truth of unresolved past wrongs because truth provides both descendants a ground for right judgment or action in that through revealing truth, both descendants can have an opportunity to correct their distorted identities. Thus, recognition-favoring institutions for truth and reconciliation can be compared to Hegel's corporations in universal egoism.

3.3.3 Reconciliation in Universal Altruism

Among the three modes of human relationship, the relation between DER and unresolved past wrongs is directly placed in the inter-human relationship of universal altruism. This is because the object of reconciliation in question is "past wrongs" which still psychologically affect future generations but belong to an abstract and symbolic category. As Arendt mentions, furthermore, unresolved past wrongs, are placed in the predicament of irreversibility.[402] As argued above, with the help of reconciliations in particular altruism and universal egoism, reconciliation in universal altruism can lead to unconditional forgiveness. Forgiveness in universal altruism is unconditional in that it does not presuppose apology or confession, and for this reason, unresolved past wrongs are unforgivable. Thus, forgiveness in question is applied to wrongs especially in the inter-society.

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[402] Arendt, 1958, p. 237.

3.3.3.1 Recognition as Forgiveness

If a government or the descendants of wrongdoers makes an official apology in sincerity, it is relatively easy for the descendants of victims to cultivate a recognitive attitude for forgiveness. This kind of forgiveness would be conditional. However, the government or the descendants of wrongdoers usually tend to deny opportunities to give an official apology or to confess their past wrongs. This is the reason why past wrongs still remain unresolved. In the framework of DER, forgiveness in this situation is unconditional. In forgiving a person, I do not insist on subjecting the person to my own self-righteous judgment but let the person again go free. For this reason, unconditional forgiveness is to achieve substantial freedom, which is the purpose of reciprocal recognition. In the same vein, Hegel argues that forgiveness makes possible the "reciprocal recognition which is *absolute* Spirit" (PS, # 670).

Unconditional forgiveness in universal altruism should be understood at the spiritual or religious level. This is because in reality, it seems not to be reasonable to forgive a wrongdoer who does not confess his sin and do not ask forgiveness. For this reason, unconditional forgiveness should be understood in Hegel's state in which Hegel's spiritual or religious aspects of reciprocal recognition appear. Houlate argues that "In Hegel's view ... [reciprocal] recognition also requires a *religious* ground ... For Hegel, religion is thus integral to the community that is to be held together by loving, respectful unity with others, rather than by force and enslavement. It is in such a community that we find ourselves recognized as free and so gain genuine self-consciousness."[403] Because it is hard to promote unconditional forgiveness in reality, recognitive attitudes for

[403] Houlgate, 2001, p. 26.

unconditional forgiveness should be cultivated in religious activities or education for universal altruism, which is suggested in Chapter Seven.

3.3.3.2 The Effect of Forgiveness

As seen in Chapter Three, forgiveness is related to the fourth feature of Hegel's substantial freedom—"release" or "letting to be" [*Freigabe*]. When unresolved past wrongs are forgiven, substantial freedom can be achieved. Unless, those memories continuously would prevent us from being at home with ourselves in others, whether it is consciously or unconsciously. For example, because most Koreans and Chinese do not forgive Japan's colonization, they are always uncomfortable with Japanese people.

Several empirical researches have shown that forgiveness is associated with mental and physical health. In a study of 25 women above age 65 (mean age D 74:5), Hebl and Enright showed that forgiveness was related to higher self-esteem, as well as, lower depression, state-anxiety, and trait-anxiety.[404] Hargrave and Sells demonstrated that, in a sample of 35 adult men (*n* D 12) and women (*n* D 23), forgiveness was associated with better life satisfaction.[405] Poloma and Gallup collected data from a national, random sample of 1,030 adult men and women and found that forgiveness was modestly related to life satisfaction.[406] Pingleton has reviewed research that suggests forgiveness may have a role in recovery from cancer,[407] and Kaplan has argued that forgiveness might be protective of coronary heart disease.[408] In sum, empirical evidence and theory suggest

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[404] Hebl, J., & Enright, R, 1993.
[405] Hargrave, T., & Sells, J., 1997.
[406] Poloma, M., & Gallup, G., 1991.
[407] Pingleton, J., 1989.
[408] Kaplan, 1992.

that forgiveness may be associated with better mental and physical health.

4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that unresolved past wrongs negatively influence present and future generations. This is because unresolved past wrongs form a distorted identity and this distorted identity is transmitted to future generations through memory. I have also claimed that in order to redress unresolved past wrongs and to correct the distorted group identity, reconciliation is more relevant to transgenerational treatment, but it should be carefully applied to the context of transgenerational treatment for two reasons. The first reason is that historical forms of reconciliation such as the TRC were limited to the healing of intra-society, while unresolved past wrongs are applied to inter-society as well as intra-society. The second reason is that the TRC is not effective in promoting reconciliation or forgiveness even in the context of transitional treatment. Thus, I have argued that insights of reconciliation as restorative justice in the context of transitional treatment can be fully realized in DER, especially in the context of transgenerational treatment. In other words, in DER unresolved past wrongs can be addressed in the three modes of inter-human relationship: particular altruism, universal egoism, and universal altruism.

In order to "look forward" and "reach forward," it is necessary to redress unresolved past wrongs. Representative Michael Honda says that an official apology about the comfort women during the Second World War from the Japanese government will only "increase Japan's standing as a member of the community of free, democratic nations." However, if wrongdoers' descendants hesitate to make an official apology

victims' descendants can resolve past wrongs through forgiveness. As Derrida correctly mentions, "true forgiveness consists in forgiving the unforgivable."[409]

[409] Derrida, 2001, p. vii.

Conclusion

Summary

In Part One (Chapters One to Four), I argued that established theories of development ethics are powerless to address the post-development critique because they do not take seriously the respect or recognition deserved to developing countries. In order to address the post-development critique of development, I proposed a new framework of development ethics, "Development Ethics as Recognition (DER)," which is based on Hegel's idea of recognition.

In Chapter One, I argued that the post-development critique of development can be interpreted to argue that development practices and theories necessarily result in psychological harms such as stigmatization, as well as material harms such as oppression to developing countries. To put it differently, the post-development critique is to emphasize the respect deserved by developing countries as agents as well as recipients. I showed that this emphasis on respect is one of the old themes that theories of distributive justice have tried to address but they have failed. In order to show this connection, I critically analyzed John Rawls's self-respect in Chapter One and Nancy Fraser's perspectival dualism in Chapter Two.

In Chapter Two, I examined the Fraser-Honneth's recognition-redistribution debate that seems to be an attempt to overcome the post-development critique, namely to take respect or recognition seriously. I also examined whether Amartya Sen's capability approach can take recognition seriously. I argued that Fraser's perspectival dualism and Sen's capability approach fail because both theories result in unintended stigmatization

owing to their direct redistribution method. I also argued that although Axel Honneth's framework of recognition seems plausible to take recognition seriously, his theory has some fatal weaknesses because it depends on the struggle model exclusively and incorrectly.

In Chapter Three, I reinterpreted Hegel's idea of recognition in his later works in order to represent Hegel's reciprocal feature of recognition more correctly. Unlike Jürgen Habermas and Honneth's interpretations, I argued that Hegel's later works are important and necessary in understanding his idea of reciprocal recognition. In addition, I argued that my Hegelian theory of recognition is superior to other Hegelian theories such as Honneth's and Avishai Margalit's because it reveals reciprocal features of recognition more fruitfully and suggests a practical guideline to achieve reciprocal recognition in its gradual and multi-tiered strategy.

In Chapter Four, I examined whether my Hegelian theory of recognition can be a theory of development ethics and showed that it is effective in performing the diagnosing, the guiding, and the justifying tasks of development ethics. Thus, I called it "development ethics as recognition" (DER). I showed that DER is superior to Pogge's "Rawlsian resourcism" because Pogge's theory ignores personal disrespect, such as social norms, but DER addresses misrecognitions at the personal and social levels.

In Part Two (Chapters Five to Eight), from a practical perspective I examined whether DER can address development issues effectively. For this purpose, I chose four issues which directly arise in developing countries and are indirectly related to issues of global ethics: immigration, extreme poverty, education, and unresolved past wrongs.

From a synchronic perspective, immigration and unresolved past wrongs have not been fully studied in the area of development ethics, although illegal migrants from developing countries to developed countries to escape extreme poverty are increasing and violence related to past wrongs has not disappeared in developing countries. In addition, extreme poverty and education issues are still controversial despite the existence of much research. From a historical perspective, unresolved past wrongs are related to the past; immigration and extreme poverty are currently urgent; and education enables people to have a sense of a future for themselves. Most established theories of development ethics have focused on current development problems but development problems are necessarily entangled with the past, the present, and the future. Current problems have been negatively influenced by unresolved past wrongs and both also will influence future generations, whether their influence is negative or positive. Thus, it is important and necessary to have a framework of development ethics to address the past and the future issues, as well as the current issues. I argued that DER can provide this framework and, from a practical perspective, it is superior to other theories such as rights-based theories, responsibility-based theories, and Sen's capability approach.

In Chapter Five, I argued that right-based theories do not address an immigration issue from developing countries to developed countries to escape extreme poverty because they have an internal conflict between civil rights and human rights. I showed that DER can address this conflict in its gradual and multi-tiered strategy that corresponds with the three modes of human relationship: particular altruism, universal egoism, and universal altruism. In this gradual and multi-tiered strategy, I also suggested

three practical policies: the reformed family unification, an ethical guest worker program, and the expanded concept of refugee.

In Chapter Six, I argued that responsibility-based theories do not address extreme poverty effectively through examining Singer's, Pogge's, and Miller's theories of responsibility. This is because all three theories do not respect the recipients and do not address the moral psychology of distance in aid. I argued that DER can address these issues for two reasons: first, although DER accepts the moral psychology of distance DER considers it as one of three categories in its gradual and multi-tiered strategy and second, DER is based on social ontology—dependence and independence—to foster recognition-favoring institutions. I also showed that Grameen Bank could be an example of Hegel's corporation to address poverty in the human relationship of universal egoism.

In Chapter Seven, I argued that in the area of development ethics education should take seriously pedagogical aspects of education and the intrinsic value of education, as well as the instrumental value of education. I showed that, because Sen overlooks pedagogical aspects of education and the intrinsic value of education, his capability approach could result in side- and negative effects of education as seen in colonial education, and for this reason, it cannot suggest an educational model for ethical development. I argued that DER takes seriously pedagogical aspects of education and the intrinsic value of education, as well as the instrumental value of education. I also suggested three educational forms in accordance with the three modes of inter-human relationship.

In Chapter Eight, I argued that unresolved past wrongs negatively influence present and future generations because they form distorted identities which are

transmitted to future generations through memory. I argued that although historical reconciliations such as the TRC is not enough to address unresolved past wrongs, DER can do it because it can suggest unconditional forgiveness as well as conditional forgiveness in its multi-tiered strategy. I also argued that when unresolved past wrongs are ethically resolved, descendants of victims and wrongdoers could achieve substantial freedom.

Contribution and Discussion

My dissertation makes several contributions to ethics and political philosophy. First, I showed what makes established theories of development ethics powerless to address the post-development critique. In other words, they do not take seriously the respect or recognition deserved by developing countries and for this reason, they tend to unintentionally result in psychological harms such as stigmatization as well as material harms such as oppression of developing countries. I argued that the idea of recognition, which pays attention to recognitive attitudes as well as recognition-favoring institutions, could supplement a fatal weakness of established theories of development ethics. In other words, with the help of a framework of recognition, established theories of development ethics such as Sen's capability approach could be reformed or re-visited to respond to the post-development critique adequately, namely to respect the recipients.[410]

Second, DER emphasizes both institutional reform and cultivated attitudes. Established theories of ethics tend to focus on individuals' virtue, ignoring institutional

[410] David Crocker's "agency-focused version of capability ethics" could be an attempt to include an idea of recognition (Crocker, 2008, p. 1). However, Crocker's attempt fails because he does not give up a redistributive feature of capability approach, which is based on human diversity. I believe that a framework of recognition can supplement capability approach only if it is willing to accept its fundamental change according to this framework of recognition.

reforms, while established theories of justice tend to focus on institutional reforms, ignoring individuals' virtue. However, DER emphasizes that both should be integrated to address ethical problems in society. This is because deontological imperatives without motivation cannot result in practical changes and individual virtues without institutional reforms cannot be cultivated and, at best, would be temporal.

Third, DER expands the scope of development ethics. DER shows that it is applicable to issues of global justice. As seen in the Introduction, development problems are not distinguished from global problems in the era of globalization. Still, established theories of development ethics tend to limit its scope, distinguishing itself from global justice or global ethics. The four topics of Part Two show that development issues are closely related to issues of global ethics or global justice.

Fourth, DER connects post-development theories with theories of development ethics such as Sen's capability approach and with the contemporary recognition-redistribution debate, which has a long history since Rawls. Although the post-development critique strongly strikes a note of warning against development practices, it is still the minority view and seems to be ignored in contemporary development theories and practices. In addition, post-development theories seem not to be connected with theories of political philosophy as well as of development ethics. When they are connected in DER, practical philosophy would be more feasible and fruitful.

Five, DER makes Hegel's idea of recognition much richer, emphasizing reciprocal features of recognition. Many Hegelian theories, such as Honneth's and Habermas's, make people pay attention to the idea of recognition but they do not pay attention to reciprocal features of recognition because they focus on Hegel's earlier works

and ignore his later works. My Hegelian theory of recognition, based on Hegel's later works, would be able to supply scholars with more impressive insights for development ethics and global ethics/justice.

Limitation

As mentioned in Introduction, development ethics is interdisciplinary in nature. There are two forms of interdisciplinary research in question: first, a theory of development ethics is supported by interdisciplinary literatures; and second, a theory of development ethics is based on empirical researches. I believe that the latter is superior to the former, because I believe that theoretical research should be practically re-examined and developed by empirical research, and the theoretical research should guide and analyze the empirical research.

My dissertation followed the first form because of realistic limitations. Thus, in my further research field research such as Dr. Jeffrey Sonis's project of "Psychological Effects Of South Africa's Truth Commission" could be possible in a different region or context.[411]

[411] University Of Michigan (1998, September 12). Study Of South Africa's Truth And Reconciliation Commission. *ScienceDaily*. Retrieved September 17, 2008, from http://www.sciencedaily.com /releases/1998/09/980912112125.htm. I found an article to introduce this project in the web-site but I did not find the final report. Anyway this project appears interesting and I believe that it could be related to my Chapter Eight.

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