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THE CASE OF KONO DISTRICT IN SIERRA LEONE presented by Sigismond Ayodele Wilson has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for the Ph.D. degree in Geography /7 ' M or rofess r’s Signature ‘/ , WM 7 ~/ / Date MSU is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. To AVOID FINES return on or before date due. MAY BE RECALLED with earlier due date if requested. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE 5/08 K:IProi/Acc&Pres/ClRC/Date0ue.indd DIAMONDS, A RESOURCE CURSE? THE CASE OF KONO DISTRICT IN SIERRA LEONE VOLUME I By Sigismond Ayodele Wilson A Dissertation Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Geography 2010 ABSTRACT DIAMONDS, A RESOURCE CURSE? THE CASE OF KONO DISTRICT IN SIERRA LEONE By Sigismond Ayodele Wilson Using an actor-oriented approach to political ecology integrated with theory on the social production of scale, this dissertation examines the extent to which diamond exploitation constitutes a resource curse in Sierra Leone, with Kono District as a case-study. It uses social survey methods and remote sensing analysis of Landsat images to (1) evaluate the role of Sierra Leone’s diamonds in economic development from a historical lens, (2) examine the extent to which a weak regulatory state apparatus makes a rich diamond endowment more of a curse than a blessing, (3) determine whether geographically diffuse and remotely- located diamonds are more a liability than an asset, and (4) assess whether enviromnental conditions are worse in diamond than in non-diamond chiefdoms. Results of the study showed that the contribution of diamonds to national economic growth declined precipitously following the politicization of diamonds and growing informalization of mining under the leadership of Siaka Stevens. Growing disenchantment combined with grievances over access to diamond resources and rights, culminating in a civil war fuelled by conflict diamonds. Findings indicated that actors capitalized on a weak regulatory state to fulfill their agendas. Illicit diamond exploitation was mainly driven by corruption, economic constraints and perverse economic incentives. Preferential land allocation to industrial mining following World Bank Group-directed national mining policy reforms and the weakness of the state in ensuring companies’ adherence to mining clauses precipitated corporation-community conflicts. Study findings showed that the resource curse was acute on diggers who received less than $1 a day unlike their South American counterparts who made at least $7 daily. Results from the study demonstrate that the spatiality of diamonds also contributed to the resource curse. Illicit diamond mining was more acute in remotely located mining sites than in extractive sites closer to towns, and spatial proximity to Guinea and Liberia facilitated diamond smuggling. Remote sensing analysis and social surveys revealed that negative environmental impacts were more manifested in the diamond mining chiefdoms than in non-mining areas, confirming the environment as major dimensions of the resource curse. The environmental impacts of diamond mining had broader implications as the forest, land, and water were affected. Transformation of fertile lands (wetlands) to mining lands, and without required reclamation, had negative consequences on the agricultural productivity of local residents in mining areas. Examination of power relations constituted the pros and cons of managing diamond exploitation. Policy makers should employ broad-based strategies to empower mining communities so that they can elect credible local governments. Clearly demarcated industrial and artisanal mining zones and equity and transparency in the distribution of mineral revenues could minimize potential conflicts between corporations and mining companies. Cepyright by SIGISMOND AYODELE WILSON 2010 DEDICATION I dedicate this dissertation in memory of my Parents Akie and Eva Wilson, both of whom held a strong belief in the values of a good education, but did not live long to see the fruits of their vision. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation was made possible with generous funding from the Compton Foundation Africa Peace Fellowship, the International Studies and Program and the Graduate School of Michigan State University. The Department of Geography also provided financial support to the research. I am deeply grateful to all of them. It would have been virtually impossible to complete this dissertation where it not for the assistance and generous support of individuals too many to mention, here, but to whom I am greatly indebted. First, I thank all of those local residents of Kono District who sacrificed their time to participate in this research in diverse ways. Special thanks to Mr. Steven Manga, Director of CARD Sierra Leone who allowed me to utilize the services of his research staff, linked me to key contact persons, and provided office space for me during fieldwork. I also wish to thank officials of the Ministry of Mineral Resources for their assistance, starting from the Director of Mines, Mr. Jonathan Sharkah to the Mines Monitor on the ground. I am particularly grateful to my advisor, Dr Assefa Mehretu for so competently guiding me through this challenging process, both intellectually and in many practical ways, and for his companionship. Special thanks to Dr Leo Zulu, a committee member, who thoroughly examined my work and provided insightful suggestions. I also thank my other committee members, Dr Robert Walker, and Dr John Kerr for valuable input in the development of my dissertation over the years. I also wish to thank fiiends, colleagues, and professors with whom I have trekked this route for their support in diverse ways. Special thanks go to Dr Richard Groop, the Chair of the Department of Geography, and to Dr Antoinette WinklerPrins, Graduate vi Program Director for their constant support, and ensuring that I received funding throughout the course of my study. I also wish to thank the Geography Graduate Group and the Geography Department for regular Colloquia and Professional Development Sessions. These programs have widen my intellectual horizon. I would also like to thank the Graduate Secretary, Ms. Sharon Ruggles for her numerous assistance during my period of study. To Wilson Ndovie, I say thank you for computer technical assistance you rendered. I am also deeply indebted to Dr Adele Simmons, Vice Chair of Chicago Metropolis 2020 who supported me financially and morally throughout my graduate program. I also owe debt of gratitude to my research assistants in Sierra Leone, Tamba Mbayo, Rebecca Konneh, and Tamba Komba for their competence, dedication, insights, and for making it possible for me to obtain adequate, in-depth first hand information surpassing what I anticipated considering the duration of fieldwork. I also acknowledge logistical assistance provided during fieldwork by my family in Sierra Leone, especially my mother-in-law Mrs. Ethel Parsons, my sister Christiana, and Ernest Foday-Mannah. Final and special thanks to my family for the great sacrifice they have endured for me to navigate the program — my wife Vivat for her patience, encouragement, and courage, my daughters Eva and Adele for making this all worth it. I am deeply indebted to my brother Cyril whose insights, advice, suggestions, and assistance were invaluable to me during my graduate program. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ xii LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... xiv CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Statement of the Problem: A “Resource Curse?” ................................................. 1 1.2 Poverty and Inequality .............................................................................................. 6 1.3 Access to Land .......................................................................................................... 7 1.4 Political Consequences ............................................................................................. 8 1.5 Environmental Degradation ...................................................................................... 9 1.6 Regional Variation in the Resource Curse .............................................................. 10 1.7 The Focus of this Study .......................................................................................... 12 1.8 The Study Area and Context ................................................................................... 14 1.9 Research Objectives and Hypotheses ..................................................................... 17 1.10 Significance of Study ............................................................................................ 21 1.11 Organization of Study ........................................................................................... 22 CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 2.1 Political Economy ................................................................................................... 24 2.2 Political Ecology ..................................................................................................... 25 2.3 Approaches to Political Ecology ............................................................................. 30 2.3.1 Regional Political Ecology .............................................................................. 30 2.3.2 Post—structuralist Political Ecology ................................................................. 32 2.3.3 Politicized Environment ................................................................................... 33 2.3.4 Feminist Political Ecology ............................................................................... 37 2.4 Application of Theme in Study ............................................................................... 39 2.5 Socio-spatial Relations and Politics of Scale .......................................................... 42 2.6 The Resource Curse: A Review .............................................................................. 47 2.6.1 Political and Economic Explanations of the Resource Curse ......................... 47 2. 6.2 The Spatial Geography of the Mineral Resource ............................................ 50 2.6.3 Socioeconomic Explanations of the Resource Curse ....................................... 52 2.6.4 Conflicts as Explanation of the Resource Curse .............................................. 53 2.6.5 Environmental Explanation of the Resource Curse ......................................... 55 2.7 Focus of Study: Social and Environmental Implications ........................................ 56 2.8 Diamonds and the Resource Curse in Sierra Leone ................................................ 57 2.9 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 63 CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 65 3.2 Social Analysis of Diamonds as a Resource Curse ................................................ 67 3. 2. 1 Sample Frame and Sample Size ....................................................................... 67 3.2.2 Structured Household Interviews ..................................................................... 68 3.2.3 Key Informant Interviews ................................................................................. 69 viii 3.2.4 Focus Group Discussions ................................................................................ 70 3.2.5 Personal Observation and Secondary Data Sources ....................................... 71 3.3 Land Cover Change Analysis ................................................................................. 72 3.3.1 Remote Sensing Based Analysis of Land Cover Change 1986 to 2007 ........... 72 3.3.2 Methodology for Land Cover/Use Change ...................................................... 73 3.3.2.1 Image Pre-processing .................................................................................... 73 3.3.2.2 Image Classification and Accuracy Assessment ........................................... 76 3.3.2.3 Image Change Detection ............................................................................... 77 3.3.2.4 Comparison of Forest Cover Spatial Extent to other Land Uses .................. 78 3.4 Analysis of Social Survey Data .............................................................................. 79 CHAPTER4: HISTORY OF DIAMOND EXPLOITATION IN SIERRA LEONE 4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 80 4.2 Diamond Exploitation during the Colonial Era (1930 to 1960) ............................. 82 4. 2.1 Initial Mining Policies ..................................................................................... 83 4.2.2 Diamond Production and Economic Implications for the Government and DeBeers ..................................................................................................................... 85 4.2.3 Power Relations between the Government, the SLST, Chiefs, and Mining Communities ............................................................................................................. 86 4.2.4 Political Transformation and its Implications on Diamond Management .. 89 4.2.5 Power and Agency: the Case of Illicit Diamond Mining ................................ 91 4.2.6 Policy Shift: the Emergence of the Artisanal Diamond Mining Scheme ......... 96 4.2.7 Policy Shift: Diamond Marketing Structures ................................................... 99 4.2.8 Mining and Community Development Programs and Political Economic Implications ............................................................................................................. 101 4.2.9 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 103 4.3 Diamond Exploitation: Independence to Pre-War Period (1961 to 1990) ............ 104 4.3.1 Diamond Production and Revenue Utilization during the Initial Years of Independence .......................................................................................................... 105 4.3.2 Diamond Management under Siaka Stevens ’ Patrimonial Rule .................... 106 4.3.3 Diamond Management during J.S. Momoh 's Leadership ............................. 114 4.4 Diamonds and the Civil War (1991-2002) ............................................................ 117 4.4.1 Principal Causes of the Civil War ................................................................. 118 4.4.2 R UF and its Sociospatial Network of Regional Allies and International Diamond Agents ...................................................................................................... 1 19 4.4.3 Private Security Agencies, International Peacekeepers and Conflict Diamonds ................................................................................................................................. 122 4.4.4 International Diamond Organizations and Conflict Diamonds .................... 124 4.4.5 Network of Local Actors, Spaces of Production and Conflict Diamonds ...... 124 4.4.6 Conflict Diamond Exploitation: who Benefited, who Lost? .......................... 125 4. 4. 7 End ofCivil War ............................................................................................ 127 4.5 Diamond Management in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone .......................................... 127 4. 5. 1 Evaluation of the Kimberley Process and National Diamond Mining Regulations ............................................................................................................. 1 29 4.5.2 International Involvement: Addressing Economic Disparity and Poverty in Artisanal Mining Communities .............................................................................. 131 4.5.3 Transforming Sierra Leone ’s Diamonds into ‘Diamonds for Development’ 133 4.5.4 Industrial Diamond Exploitation: an Engine of Economic Growth and Development? ......................................................................................................... l 34 4.5.5 Rescaling Management of Diamond Revenue: The DA CDF in Community Development ........................................................................................................... 1 36 4. 5. 6 Sociospatial Dynamics surrounding Artisanal Mining .................................. 139 4. 5. 7 Environmental Impact of Diamond Mining ................................................... 140 4.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 142 CHAPTER 5: SOCIOECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF DIAMONDS AS A RESOURCE CURSE IN KONO DISTRICT 5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 144 5.2. Challenges to Diamonds for Development Concept: Illicit Diamond Exploitation ..................................................................................................................................... 147 5. 2. 1 Illicit Diamond Mining .................................................................................. 147 5.2.2 Illicit Diamond Trade .................................................................................... 156 5.3 Socioeconomic Analysis of Diamond Exploitation .............................................. 163 5.3.1 Sociospatial Dynamics of Access and Control of Mining Land .................... 163 5.3.2 Sociospatial Dynamics surrounding Labor ................................................... 169 5.3.3 Gender Relations and the Resource Curse .................................................... 175 5.3.4 Access to Capital for Diamond Mining ......................................................... 179 5.3.5 Trends in Artisanal Mining Production ......................................................... 180 5.3.6 Diamond Marketing ....................................................................................... 182 5.3.7 Economic Disparity and Inequality amongst Diamond Actors ..................... 186 5.4 Sociospatial Analysis of Conflict over Diamonds ................................................ 189 5. 4. I Conflicts between Mining Communities and Traditional Leaders ................ 189 5.4.2 Conflicts between Mining Companies and Communities .............................. 193 5.4.3 Conflicts between Diamond Diggers and Miners/Supporters ....................... 200 5.4.4 Perceptions of Spatial Variation of the Intensity of Conflicts ....................... 202 5.4.5 Measures to resolve Conflicts in Diamondiferous Communities ................... 204 5.4.6 Discussion: Actors, Structures and Conflicts over Diamonds ....................... 208 5.5 The Geography of Diamonds and the Resource Curse ......................................... 211 5.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 214 CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION IN KONO DISTRICT 6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 217 6.2 Environmental Degradation in Mining and Non-Mining chiefdoms .................... 218 6.2.1 Local Perceptions of Environmental Degradation ........................................ 218 6.2.2 Impacts of Mining on Agriculture, Forest and Local Livelihoods ................. 228 6.2.3 Perceived Trends in Agricultural Production and State of Forest ................ 230 6.2.4 Actors responsible for Environmental Degradation ...................................... 235 6.3 Land Use/Land Cover Change Analysis ............................................................... 239 6.3.1 Land Covers Quantification and Change Detection ...................................... 239 6.3.2 Spatial Extent of Forest Cover in Mining and Non-Mining Chiefdoms ........ 251 6.3.3 Environmental Mitigation Measures ........................................................ 257 6.4 Diamond Mining and Environmental Management ........................................... 260 6.5 Environmental Policy Implications ....................................................................... 265 6.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 267 CHAPTER7: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 7.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 270 7.2 Summary of Findings ............................................................................................ 271 7.3 Hypothesis 1: introduction and maintenance of patrimonial politics and growing infonnalization of diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone have historically reduced the positive role of diamonds in national and local economic development largely into a resource curse .............................................................................................................. 275 7.4 Hypothesis 2: Diverse social actors at local, national and international scales have taken advantage of the weak regulatory state apparatus in Sierra Leone to exploit diamonds in ways that turned a rich endowment of a rare, portable, precious mineral more into a curse than a blessing. .............................................................................. 278 7.5 Hypothesis 3: Geographically dijfuse and remotely-located, highly valuable natural resources are more a liability than an asset. ................................................. 283 7.6 Hypothesis 4: Environmental conditions in diamond chiefdoms are worse than in non-diamond chiefdoms .............................................................................................. 284 7.7 Actor-Oriented Political Ecology, the Politics of Scale and the Spatial Resource Curse ........................................................................................................................... 286 7.8 Implications and Conclusions ............................................................................... 296 xi LIST OF TABLES Table 3.] Satellite images for land cover change ............................................................. 73 Table 4.1 Diamond production and export at independence .......................................... 105 Table 4.2 NDMC profits, dividends and taxes ............................................................... 112 Table 5.1 Sources of capital for artisanal and small-scale mining ................................. 180 Table 5.2 Conflict resolution: communities and traditional leaders ............................... 204 Table 5.3 Conflict resolution: mining companies and communities .............................. 205 Table 6.1 Local perceptions of the biggest environmental problem ............................... 218 Table 6.2: Environmental impacts of diamond mining .................................................. 225 Figure 6.3Most affected natural resource in mining and non—chiefdoms ....................... 225 Table 6.4 Most affected farming activity in mining chiefdom ....................................... 228 Table 6.5 Reasons for decrease in access to forest products .......................................... 230 Table 6.6 Local perceptions of perpetrators of environmental degradation ................... 236 Table 6.7a Land use/land cover 1986 ............................................................................. 240 Table 6.7b Land use/land cover 1991 ............................................................................. 240 Table 6.7c Land use/land cover 2002 ............................................................................. 240 Table 6.7d: Land use/land cover 2007 ........................................................................... 241 Table 6.8a Land use/land cover by acreage 1986 to 2007 .............................................. 241 Table 6.8b Land use/land cover change by percent 1986-2007 ...................................... 242 Table 6.9 Land use/land cover change 1986 to 2007 ...................................................... 242 Table 6.10 Comparison of forest cover to other land uses ............................................. 251 Table 6.11a Land cover change by type of chiefdom 1986 ............................................ 253 Table 6.1 lb land use/land cover change by type of chiefdom 1991 ............................... 253 xii Table 6.1 lc Land use/land cover by type of chiefdom 2002 .......................................... 255 Table 6.11d Land use/land cover change by type of chiefdom 2007 ............................ 255 Table 6.12 Suggested measures to improve environmental conditions in Kono District258 Table 1: Correlation coefficients of TM bands 1986 ...................................................... 320 Table 2: Correlation coefficients of TM bands 1991 ...................................................... 320 Table 3: Correlation coefficients of TM bands 2002 ...................................................... 320 Table 4: Correlation coefficients of TM bands 2007 ...................................................... 320 Table 5: Classification accuracy assessment of TM 1986 image .................................. 321 Table 6: Classification accuracy assessment of TM 1991 image ................................... 321 Table 7: Classification accuracy assessment of TM 2002 image ................................... 322 Table 8: Classification accuracy assessment of TM 2007 image ................................... 322 xiii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1 Map of Kono District ....................................................................................... 15 Figure 2.1 Schematic conceptual model: socio-environmental ramifications .................. 62 Figure 3.1 Land use/land cover change detection flow chart ........................................... 78 Figure 4.1 Map of Sierra Leone showing diamond concentration by district .................. 81 Figure 4.2 Value of diamond production in the colonial era ............................................ 85 Figure 5.1 Study sites and diamond concentration in Kono District .............................. 147 Figure 5.2 Perceived trends in household diamond production ...................................... 181 Figure 5.3 Intensity of diamond-driven conflicts in chiefdoms surveyed ...................... 203 Figure 6.1 Water-logged mining pit in Sewafe, Nimiyama Chiefdom ........................... 220 Figure 6.2a Perceptions of the proximate causes of land cover change in mining chiefdoms............ ............................................................................................................ 221 Figure 6.2b Perceptions of proximate causes of land cover change in non-mining chiefdoms ........................................................................................................................ 221 Figure 6.3a Perceptions of the underlying causes of land cover change in mining chiefdoms ........................................................................................................................ 222 Figure 6.3b Perceptions of the underlying causes of land cover change in non-mining chiefdoms ........................................................................................................................ 223 Figure 6.43 Land excavated by the SLDC in Nimiyama Chiefdom ............................... 227 Figure 6.4b Corporate mining in Babakama, Nimiyama Chiefdom ............................... 227 Figure 6.5a Perceived trends in agricultural productivity in mining chiefdoms ............. 231 Figure 6.5b Perceived trends in agricultural productivity in non-mining chiefdoms ..... 231 Figure 6.6a Perceived state of forest cover in mining chiefdoms ................................... 232 Figure 6.6b Perceived state of forest cover in non-mining chiefdoms ........................... 233 Figure 6.7a Perceived trend of forest cover in mining chiefdoms .................................. 234 xiv Figure 6.7b Perceived trend of forest cover in non-mining chiefdoms .......................... 234 Figure 6.8 Part of the Bafin River whose course has been diverted ............................... 237 Figure 6.9a Land use/land cover classified map for Kono District, 1986 ...................... 245 Figure 6% Land use/land cover classified map for Kono District, 1991 ...................... 246 Figure 690 Land use/land cover classified map for Kono District, 2002 ...................... 247 Figure 6.9d Land use/land cover classified map for Kono District, 2007 ...................... 248 Figure 6.10 Forest cover change detection map, 1986-2007 .......................................... 250 Figure 7.1 Value of Sierra Leone diamond exports (in 1995 S) ..................................... 277 Figure 7.2 Social actors and scalar dynamics of the resource curse (‘pyramid of scales’) ......................................................................................................................................... 293 Figure 7.3 Major routes of transaction of Sierra Leone’s diamonds .............................. 295 XV ADMS AOI APC AF RC CAST CCMS CSSL C] M CMP CRO CMS CSO DC DACDF DCSL DDI DFID DICORWARF DRC ECOMOG EIA EITI FESS GDO GDP GGDO GOSL GPS HRD IDMP IMF KHL KMC KPCS KPM MADA MMR MW MY SA NACE NaCEF NDMC NGO NMJ D KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS Artisanal Diamond Mining Scheme Area of Interest All People’s Congress Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Consolidated African Selection Trust Cooperative Contract Mining Scheme Conservation Society of Sierra Leone Campaign for Just Mining Core Mineral Policy Community Relations Officer Contract Mining Scheme Central Selling Organization Diamond Corporation Diamond Area Community Development Fund Diamond Corporation Sierra Leone Diamond Development Initiative Department For International Development Diamond Corporation Democratic Republic of Congo Economic Community Military Operation Group Environmental Impact Assessment Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative Foundation for Environmental Security and Sustainability Government Diamond Office Gross Domestic Product Government Gold and Diamond Office Government of Sierra Leone Global Positioning System Hoge Raad voor Diamant (Diamond High Council) Integrated Diamond Management Program International Monetary Fund Koidu Holdings Limited Kariba Mining Company Kimberly Process Certification Scheme Kono Progressive Movement Mining Area Development Association Ministry of Mineral Resources Mines Warden Minera Yanacocha National Advocacy Coalition of Extractives National Commission for the Environment and Forestry National Diamond Mining Company Non-Governmental Organization Network Movement for Justice and Development xvi NPFL NPRC NRA PAC PDA PEER PMMC RUF SLDC SLPP SLST SSA TM UAC UNAMSIL UNITA USAID USGS WBG National Patriotic Front of Liberia National Provisional Ruling Council National Revenue Authority Partnership Africa Canada Peace Diamond Alliance Public Emergency Economic Regulations Precious Mineral Marketing Company Revolutionary United Front Sierra Leone Diamond Company Sierra Leone People Party Sierra Leone Selection Trust Sub-Saharan Africa Thematic Mapper United Afiican Company United National Mission in Sierra Leone Uniao Nacional pela Independecia Total de Angola Unites States Agency for International Development United States Geological Survey World Bank Group xvii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Statement of the Problem: A “Resource Curse?” The primary purpose of this study is to examine the extent of the so called resource curse with respect to diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone using Kono District as case study. For purposes of this study diamonds as a resource curse are characterized by illicit diamond exploitation, socio-economic disparity between diggers and dealers, a proclivity for conflicts, and propensity for environmental degradation. A related objective is to investigate the extent to which the spatial spread of diamonds could have contributed to illicit extraction of the resource. Second, the study explores environmental conditions in diarnondiferous and agricultural chiefdoms to ascertain to what extent diamond exploitation may have worsened conditions in diamond areas. Natural resources continue to be the principal ingredient for economic development in developing countries in general and Sub-Saharan Afiica (SSA) in particular (Bebbington et a1., 2008; Rosser, 2006; Ross, 1999). Conventional wisdom suggests that an endowment of highly valuable natural resources like oil and diamonds is expected to foster development (Rosser, 2006). This is not always the case as is evident in the developing world in general and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. Under certain conditions, there is a paradoxical negative relationship between natural resource endowment, and socio-economic conditions'. This negative relationship between abundant natural resources and socio-economic performance is referred to as a “resource curse” (Auty, 1993, ' Resource dependence is a situation in which natural resources contribute significantly to a country’s GDP and foreign exchange earnings. 2001; Ross, 1999)2. Generally, resource endowments in developing countries do not necessarily lead to the resource curse. The resource curse is contingent upon specific endogenous political, economic, social, geographic conditions and exogenous conditions. What then are these conditions under which a valuable resource endowment becomes a resource curse? Economically, many developing countries (especially those in SSA) that are endowed with and are economically dependent on highly valuable natural resources do have slow or negative economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 2001). Arguments for the resource curse indicate that the economies of countries with fewer natural resources grow faster than those richly endowed with natural resources (Ross, 2003', Stevens, 2003). Poor economic growth can be mainly attributed to what are known as revenue volatility, the ‘Dutch disease’, and rent seeking (Auty, 2004). Resource volatility refers to international price fluctuations that can have debilitating effects on resource dependent countries. The Dutch disease is an economic situation in which a revenue boom from the sale of natural resources (which include mineral resources) raises the value of a nation’s currency (Stevens, 2003). The resulting effects are a decrease in price competitiveness with other nations and thus decrease in export of manufactured goods, and an increase in imports. Rent seeking refers to efforts both legal and illegal, to acquire access to or control over opportunities for earning rents. In mineral and oil dependent countries, rent seeking can be defined as an approach used in the public and private sector, aimed at capturing 2 The World Bank supports existence of this phenomenon: see Sala-I-Martin, Xavier, and Arvin Subramanian (2003) mineral or oil money through non-productive means (Tollison, 1982). Rent seeking is greater in resource rich countries since wealth is centered in the public sector or few companies. Rent seeking can breed corruption especially in cases where only a few business units are involved (Addison et al., 2002). For instance, companies can give kickbacks to earn mining rights. Therefore “. .. the bulk of the rents created in those economies are channeled by bureaucrats, the majority of whom are members of the politically dominant group ...” (Mbaku, 1992: 250). Rent seeking can also discourage economic diversification as the political and economic elites are satisfied with resource revenues. Global Witness (2002) notes that the Angolan govermnent obtained 80 percent of its revenue from crude oil production. However, the Angola state and its component actors also engaged in illegal practices as political elites benefit fiom resource rents illegally by diverting from public accounts for private use. Some of them also receive kickbacks from business negotiations with oil companies (Cilliers and Dietrich, 2000). They are reluctant to adopt policies geared towards economic diversification or investment in social services. In addition to economic issues, political factors play perhaps a more significant role in the problem of the resource curse especially for diamonds whose value and demand make them less vulnerable to some of the economic uncertainty of oil and other mineral resources.3 Poor governance in mineral-dependent developing countries can contribute to a resource endowment being more of a curse than a blessing. Weak institutions of governance, corruption, authoritarian rule, and nascent democracies are 3 The value of gems is relatively constant; therefore diamonds are not prone to price fluctuation and the boom and bust cycle typical of other natural resources. attributes of poor governance that can result in a paradox of plenty (Basedu, 2005; Bannon and Collier, 2003; Karl, 1997; Le Billon, 2007, 2008; Omeje, 2008). Geographical attributes of the resource can also contribute to a resource curse. The geographic distribution/location of a valuable natural resource such as gemstones and oil can affect its monitoring and control. This is especially the case for alluvial mineral resources that can be extracted with little training and investment. There is a tendency for a large influx of people into alluvial mining areas, with legitimate as well as criminal intent. A large influx of miners in diamond extractive locations, the presence of foreign diamond magnates, and porous borders have thwarted governments’ efforts at controlling and securing the diamond industry in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Ghana, and Sierra Leone (Cilliers and Dietrich, 2000; Global Witness, 2004).4 This also makes it difficult for governments to provide law and order in the extractive regions (Ross, 2003; Reno, 1995). The situation is more serious when these governments lack the capacity to monitor mineral exploitation. The problem of inadequate state capacity is further aggravated when some government fimctionaries collude with illegitimate stakeholders to exploit mineral resources for private gains. Widespread corruption is another major problem in resource rich countries in developing regions, including Sub-Saharan Afiica. Its special significance in SSA is that while rent accumulation is evident there is the problem of equity in distribution of resources. When governments receive a high inflow of rents for 4 Mine operators often evade export tax if is raised and smuggle diamonds to neighboring countries with low export taxes. A case in point is the smuggling of diamonds from DRC to Congo as the latter has a lower export tax. See Global Witness (2004). natural resources (oil, minerals, gemstones) they may not have the technical capabilities to account for all of the rents. This creates an opportunity to siphon part of the benefits for personal use (Ross, 2003). This is more applicable to revenues obtained from mining and oil companies. Corruption is rife where institutions such as civil societies, the judiciary and others that can serve as checks and balances to government’s activities are either weak or non-functional. Authorities can therefore create avenues by which natural resources can be accessed through legal and illegitimate channels. As a consequence, few economic and political elites in collusion with illegal agents benefit immensely while the majority of the people do not (Reno, 2003). It is estimated that about 50 percent of Sierra Leone’s alluvial diamonds are smuggled out the country annually yet there are police officers, customs officers and monitors of mines whose responsibility is to ensure that diamond exploitation follows the legal channel. In Sierra Leone senior politicians and traditional heads are often accused of using diamonds for political gains. The pre-civil war period (from 1968 to 1990) was dominated by patron-client relations in which the ruling government used diamonds to appease local financial backers called ‘supporters,’5 and business allies, most of whom were of Lebanese descent, while dissenters were either co-opted or suppressed (Davies, 2000; Fithen, 1999; Kabia, 2008; Reno, 5 In alluvial diamond mining in Sierra Leone, a supporter is a person who funds a mining project and also provides basic social welfare needs of laborers who dig and wash diamonds. These laborers are called diggers. l995)6. Thus, rather than enhancing economic prosperity, valuable natural resources can create social problems. 1.2 Poverty and Inequality A major social problem that stems from the resource curse is high prevalence of poverty and marked socio-economic inequality. Empirical evidence suggests that in resource-rich countries where the aforementioned economic and political conditions are pervasive, there is high incidence of poverty and striking inequality (Renner, 2002; Ross, 2001). This is more evident in alluvial diamond mining areas. The structure of diamond extraction and trade is configured in a way that results in significant economic disparity between diggers and dealers (Olsson, 2006).7 A dependency syndrome in which diggers are dependent on supporters and the chain of middle men in diamond mining and selling are partly responsible for this disparity. A report by Global Witness (2004) states that the average wage for alluvial diamond diggers in SSA is about one dollar a day (below the UN poverty line) while diamond dealers, and exporters take the lion’s share of the income.8 Poverty is further exacerbated in local mining communities due to environmental damage, land expropriation and human rights abuses (Ross, 2001 ). 6 The All Peoples’ Congress was the ruling government from 1968 to 1991 when the war started. They were however toppled by the military in 1992. 7 The major actors in diamond extraction are diggers/miners, license holders, supporters, managers, buying agents, and diamond dealers. 8 The estimated number of diamond diggers in alluvial diamond mines in Africa is 1 million. They produce an annual revenue of 1 billion dollars, which on average is about $1000 per worker (Global Witness, 2004). 1.3 Access to Land It should be noted that access and control over land-based resources is centered on power relations. A communal land system is prevalent in SSA and is generally beneficial for its people. However, there are instances in which its applicability is rather ambiguousg. Central governments and traditional authorities have considerable power over land rights and have strong influence in land allocation (Diamond Development Initiative, 2008; Ukiwo, 2008). While land in theory belongs to communities, in practice central governments have eminent domain in decision-making with regards to land for mineral/oil extraction. In many instances, land allocation decisions favor the economically and politically powerful while the ordinary people are marginalized. The interplay of these factors intensifies poverty. Socio-economic inequality is therefore prevalent, as a small percentage of the population owns a significant amount of the country’s wealth. For instance, in oil rich Nigeria, politicians and few business tycoons control about 80 percent of the country’s wealth (Bannon and Collier, 2003). It is essential to point out that in some resource-rich countries the political, economic, and social effects of the resource curse accentuate greed and/or grievances that can culminate in conflicts of various intensities (Le Billon, 2008; Silberfein, 2005; Ross, 1999; Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Wilson, 2006). Social conflicts between large scale mining companies and communities and between national governments/local authorities and communities, and amongst local miners are increasing in SSA (Andrew, 2003; Third World Network Africa, 9 Traditional authorities are regarded as custodian of community land yet central government has more power. Land use decisions do not always benefit local communities even though it is said to be for the ‘good of the country.’ 2001). Manifestations vary from demonstrations against traditional authorities, to protests against mining companies, violent confrontation between residents of mining communities and security officers of mines and national government paramilitaries (Ngoie and Omeje, 2008; Watts, 2004). 1.4 Political Consequences There are other cases especially in SSA where mineral/oil dependent countries have created or exacerbated appalling economic and political conditions resulting in civil wars and secessionist movements. The risk is greatest when at least a third of the nation’s GDP is obtained from natural resources exports (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000).'0 The economic incentive of gaining access and control of natural resources can motivate rebels to launch a rebellion. If successful, they can obtain revenues to sustain the war and enrich themselves (Ross, 2004; Le Billon, 2003). For instance, in Democratic Republic of Congo rebels signed a contract with a foreign firm for the extraction of columbite- tantalite while they were fighting a legitimate government and such revenues assisted them in gaining power through the gun (Bannon and Collier, 2003; Johnson and Kayser, 2005). In Liberia, rebel leader Charles Taylor (who later became President) was able to trade illicit diamonds and timber for arms and ammunition to sustain his rebel movement (Sayndee, 2008; Smillie et al., 2000). The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, with the support of warlord Charles Taylor, was able to sustain attacks on the government and people '0 In their seminal work, Economic Explanations of Civil War, Collier and Hoeffler (2000) underscore greed as pivotal in the incidence of civil wars. Others have emphasized grievances as primarily being responsible for the onset of civil wars. of Sierra Leone by trading diamonds for arms (Hirsch, 2001; Kabia, 2008; Davies, 2006).” As regards secessionist movements, people in a resource rich region may have the economic incentive to launch a rebellion with the ultimate aim of seceding. This is more evident where there is high ethnic homogeneity within mineral-rich areas and heterogeneity nationally. They might be aggrieved by the unfair appropriation of mineral/oil wealth by central government while local communities bear the social and environmental costs (Renner, 2002; Ukiwo, 2008; Watts, 2004, 2008). The Niger Delta in Nigeria is a clear manifestation of what Michael Watts refers to as petro—violence. The Kasai and Katanga Provinces in Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Cabinda Province in Angola also exemplify the socio-environmental costs of mineral extraction (N goie and Omeje, 2008). 1.5 Environmental Degradation Another area of concern is the environmental dimension of a resource curse, which has not been dealt with sufficiently in previous research. A number of Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are now examining the enviromnental impacts and local livelihood implications emanating from resource extraction in developing countries. 12 It is evident that weak controls or regulation of diamond mining has wreaked environmental havoc throughout Afiica and other developing regions. Partnership Africa Canada (2004) notes that in Angola, ninety ” It is estimated that RUF made between $25 million and $125 million during Sierra Leone’s civil war. '2 Earths Right International and Campaign for Just Mining are amongst those NGOs concerned about environmental impacts of mineral and oil exploitation in developing countries. years of environmental neglect in mining areas have devastated large tracts of land, poisoned local water, forced indigenous populations to relocate, and marginalized their primary livelihood — agriculture. Nyarne and Danso (2006) pinpoint land degradation, loss of biodiversity, and pollution of rivers as the environmental consequences of diamond mining in Birim, Eastern Ghana. It is estimated that in Sierra Leone mineral extraction accounts for 80,000 to 120,000 hectares of land mined out with no concrete reclamation plan (Partnership Africa Canada, 2006). In fact, a World Bank review of extractive industries indicates that mining and oil exploitation in developing countries have a profound impact on the natural environment and the rights of marginalized indigenous groups (World Bank, 2004). Thus, there is a tendency for marginalized people in mining areas to become poorer due to a double jeopardy -- they do not benefit from the proceeds of mineral exploitation and are also deprived of their alternate source of agrarian livelihood. '3 1.6 Regional Variation in the Resource Curse While the natural resource curse is prevalent in SSA it is not ubiquitous. Some countries have lived up to the economic promise of the exploitation of abundant natural resources to enhance economic growth. Botswana and Namibia exemplify a resource blessing in Sub Saharan Afiica. Good governance, an efficient regulatory system, a joint corporate- government venture, and the geographic concentration of diamond deposits are primarily responsible for '3 Destruction of wetlands and other farmland, and reduced forest have negative impact on the local local livelihoods of mining communities. 10 Botswana’s success (Taylor and Mokhawa, 2003).'4 However, Angola (diamonds and oil), the Democratic Republic of Congo (diamonds, columbite-tantalite, and copper), Liberia (diamonds and timber), and Sierra Leone (diamonds) have witnessed a resource curse. However, manifestation of the resource curse is case- specific and dependent on the historical, political and economic history of the country, the type and characteristics of the resource and the degree of development of institutions (Le Billon, 2005). '5 Much attention has been given to economic and political explanations of the resource curse, yet social factors have not been given sufficient consideration. The role of social phenomena needs to be comprehensively addressed given that contextual and historical social patterns do shape the functioning of state institutions (Rosser, 2006). External contextual factors beyond dependency theory should also be factored in as they can facilitate or hinder development in resource-abundant countries”. Further, such discussions tend to be reductionist as they explain development in terms of resource endowments rather than examining them from a broader spectrum. Instead of asking why natural resources endowment results in negative socio-economic and environmental outcomes, a more pertinent question is what contextual political and social phenomena determine whether natural resources foster a country’s development or underdevelopment? '4 Botswana‘s diamonds are mined by Debswana -a partnership between De Beers and the government of Botswana in which each has 50% shares. 5 Empirical evidence indicates that alluvial diamonds (a diffuse resource) that are located in remote areas (distant resource) are more susceptible to negative socioeconomic outcomes than kimberlite diamonds (a point resource). See Auty (2001), Le Billon (2003, 2008). '6 Dependency theory underscores a global system in which economic growth in the developing world is conditioned by the economic advancement of the developed world. 11 Resource-curse discourse is often centered on cross-country analysis of data yet there are increasing cases of what Bebbington et al. (2008) refer to as environmental and community-level “curses” that are outcomes of mineral expansion”. Specific variables that can be quantified are used in cross-country analysis. While this shows variation between countries, its aggregate output does not truly reflect variations at local levels and may omit some qualitative factors that are significant for a more detailed and robust explanation. Further, such analysis is informed by the political economy, which almost invariably neglects environmental ramifications. 1.7 The Focus of this Study This dissertation adopts a case-study approach to gain a more nuanced understanding of the social and environmental conditions of the resource curse at a scale of the extractive location and nationally. The study explores how power relations influence the interactions of various diamond actors at various levels and how they are manifested in an extractive location — Kono District. In other words, it assesses the social, economic and environmental implications of diamond mining. For any meaningful investigation of the socioeconomic, political and environmental dimensions of the resource curse the vicinity of resource extraction and other levels of operation should be the foci of inquiry. Understanding local diamond mining dynamics in Kono District involves an examination of contextual political, social, and environmental factors. Through multi-scalar analysis (local, '7 Most of the national level analysis of the resource curse focuses on resource abundance and armed conflicts. See Olsson (2006), Le Billon 2008, Cilliers and Dietrich (2000). 12 national, regional, and global), the study portrays a comprehensive evaluation of diamonds as a resource curse in Sierra Leone. This dissertation adopts a political ecology approach as a framework of analysis. Political ecology comprehensively addresses socio-environment interactions across temporal and spatial scales (Robbins, 2004). It emphasizes that political and economic power influence resource allocation and use (Bryant, 1998). Specifically, the study uses the actor-oriented approach to political ecology integrated with the politics of scale theory in order to appraise the degree of the resource curse in Kono District, Eastern Sierra Leone. By politics of scale we mean the positioning of scale at the epicenter of politics and power relations, and varied agendas of social actors. In other words, when scale is understood as the outcome and spatial tactics used by social actors to fulfill their political goals it is referred to as the politics of scale (Swyngedouw, 1997). Actor-oriented political ecology is appropriate as it focuses on how power relations influence the actions, motivations, and strategies of the various social actors involved in diamond exploitation in Kono District. Further the actor-oriented approach is significant as it allows us to link power relations to scale and politics of scale. In other words, politics of scale aids to explain how various actors have used scale as a strategy to satisfy their interests over those of others (Lebel et al., 2008; Purcell and Brown, 2005). Most studies on oil or mineral resources have explored the socioeconomic aspects of the resource curse. Other works have appraised the political and economic dimensions of the curse using the political economy framework. Some 13 studies investigate mineral extraction and its environmental implications from a sustainable development perspective”. This research integrates the socioeconomic, political, and environmental dimensions of the resource curse at a local (mineral extraction) level and multiple scales of analysis in order to unravel the intricacies and complexities of diamond exploitation and its impacts. 1 combined social and geospatial methods. For social analysis, I conducted structured interviews of 360 households in 12 towns/villages, and detailed semi- structured interviews of 49 key informants. Further, I conducted focus-group discussions with 10 diamond diggers groups, youth groups and women’s groups. I also conducted archival research in Sierra Leone. Social analysis addressed issues related to the political, social, economic and environmental dynamics of the causes and impact of diamond exploitation. Geo-spatial analysis and satellite- collected Landsat Thematic Mapper (TM) and Enhanced Thematic Mapper (ETM) data were also used to derive the spatial pattern and change statistics in land use/land cover in diamond areas and non-diamond areas. The use of remote sensing and GIS allowed me to map and quantify the spatial and temporal dimensions of land use/land cover change in order to determine the degree of environmental change in the diamond mining chiefdoms. 1.8 The Study Area and Context The study site, Kono District is located in the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone with an area of 5,641 square kilometers representing 7.8% of the total land '8 See works like Bannon and Collier’s (2003) Natural Resources and Armed Conflict, Ross’ (1999) The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, Robinson, Torvick, and Verdier’s (2006) Political Foundations of the Resource Curse, Le Billon’s (2005) Fuelling Wars: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict. Most of these works underline how mineral exploitation results in negative economic growth and how weak state institutions also contribute to negative socioeconomic outcomes. 14 area of the country (N MJ D, 2007). It consists of fourteen chiefdoms, six of which are chiefdoms where diamond mining is the principal economic activity (Figurel . 1). Eight are non-mining chiefdoms where agriculture is the primary economic activity. As of 2004, the population of Kono District was 335,401 (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2006) with a density of 60 people per square kilometer, the highest in the diamond regions. The average annual population growth rate between 1985 and 2004 was 7.4 percent of which more than half was due to in- migration compared to the national average population growth rate of 2.3 percent (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2006). -—'— Nimi Yema Legend 0 Headquarter Town 0 Major Towns Dram ond Concentration MinorRoads O 3 6 12 18 24 Malornoads III—:Miles MajorR'vers E Chletdom Boundary Figure 1.1 Map of Kono District 15 The topography of the district consists of plateaus, hills, valleys and considerable amount of inland swamps (Odell et al., 1974). The rocks in the district are part of the Archaean granite-greenstone terrain. The greenstone belts comprise low-grade metamorphic rocks, mainly schist, arnphibolites, and quartzite (Williams, 1978). The rocks are mineralized into diamonds. Kono has a worldwide reputation for quality gem diamonds'9 The drainage in Kono consists of a network of two rivers, the Bafi originating in northeast, and the Male, originating in Guinea. The tributaries of these rivers form a dense network that has transported and deposited considerable amounts of gravel containing millions of carats of alluvial diamonds at various parts of the district (N MJ D, 2007). Initially, its vegetation was tropical rainforest but over the past 70 years deforestation has occurred as a result of economic and social activities”. Currently, some tropical forest exists especially in the eastern parts of Kono District while very few patches of secondary forest can be found in central and western parts of the district. Kono District was chosen for this study because its principal economic activity - diamond mining — is believed to have contributed to its underdevelopment (Zack-Williams, 1995). Kono district is also a land of contrasts. Despite the endowment of diamonds, it has one of the highest poverty levels in the country.“ Further, alluvial and kimberlite diamond mining are ‘9 The world’s third largest diamond was found in Sierra Leone and weighed over 900 carats. 2° Diamond mining may have significantly contributed to deforestation especially in the central and western parts of Kono District where it is concentrated. lRural Kono has a poverty level of 79.6% compared to rural Pujehun’ 59.6% according to the Diamond Industry Annual Review — Sierra Leone (PAC, 2006). 16 believed to have affected local livelihood, especially agriculture (Gbekie, 2003; Levin, 2005; USAID, 2005).22 The proposed study focuses on Kono District because it is also an area of conflicts — civil war and community conflicts. The civil war had a tremendous impact on the district. Proceeds from diamond mining in the district were the economic base of the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) for the greater part of the civil conflict (1991-2002). The RUF forced youths that were forcefully conscripted to mine diamonds (Hirsch 2001). 1.9 Research Objectives and Hypotheses The overarching objective of this study is to examine how a valuable resource like diamonds can become more of a curse than a blessing in Sierra Leone using Kono District as a case study. The specific objectives are as follows: 1) to assess the socioeconomic impact of diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone through a historical lens; 2) to determine whether spatial pattern and location of alluvial diamonds may influence illegal mining and smuggling; 3) to determine whether the power relations amongst the various social actors could influence socio-economic conditions in mining communities; 4) to examine the extent to which the multiple interests and actions of social actors at various scales may create community conflicts; 4) To determine the proximate and ultimate causes of environmental degradation, the spatial pattern and extent of land use/land cover change, and the role of diamond mining in both. 22 The land in the diamond areas is scarred with thousands of unregulated mining pits, overturned soils and pools of stagnant water. Forests have also been exploited heavily for fuel wood and charcoal production. 17 In attempting to achieve the objectives, this research tested four descriptive hypotheses. The first is: introduction and maintenance of patrimonial politics and growing informalization of diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone have historically reduced the positive role of diamonds in national and local economic development largely into a resource curse. In order to address the first hypothesis, I used archival data, secondary data, oral history accounts, semi-structured interviews and informal interviews. These multiple sources enabled a detailed explanation of the history of diamond exploitation and the declining role of diamonds to the country’s socioeconomic development. The second hypothesis is: diverse social actors at local, national and international scales have taken advantage of the weak regulatory state apparatus in Sierra Leone to exploit diamonds in ways that turned a rich endowment of a rare, portable, precious mineral more into a curse than a blessing. In this dissertation, a weak regulatory state is one that has some or all of the following characteristics. The state lacks the technological and human capacity to monitor mines. It also cannot implement mining policies effectively. Further, endemic corruption and thriving informal market prevail. Elements of patron-client support are manifested in a weak state. Chiefs have enormous political and economic power and play dominant role in access and control of land. A weak state normally succumbs to powerful international stakeholders such as the World Bank Group. The existence of a weak regulatory state has created 18 conditions favorable for local and international stakeholders to pursue their own vital interests at the expense of national integrity and local livelihood. In order to address the second hypothesis, 1 used a combination of structured interviews, semi-structured interviews, focus groups, secondary data, oral history accounts, and archival data. The surveys provided information about governance and wider political-economic factors and how international and national policies interact with local realities. These multiple sources enabled a more robust explanation of the social dimensions and extent of the resource curse within the state’s regulatory framework. My third hypothesis, which is related to the second states: geographically diffused and remotely-located, but highly valuable natural resources are more a liability than an asset. The political geography of the resource can influence the level of control government has on a natural resource. Accessibility of diamonds, for instance, is dependent on the spatial spread of the resource - diffuse or point-source resource and mode of exploitation (Auty, 2001; Le Billon, 2005). Diffuse-area resources like alluvial diamonds are labor-intensive activities that are widely accessible. The geographically diffuse nature of the resource and its remoteness, with many poor and unsupervised laborers makes it difficult for government to maintain law and order and collect taxes. This makes it vulnerable to contraband influences. In contrast, point resources are likely to occur in few locations (two dykes in Tankoro and Nimikoro Chiefdoms Kono District, and one dyke in Tongo Field, Bambara Chiefdom Kenema District) and are exploited by a few capital-intensive l9 operators (Le Billon, 2005; Olsson, 2006).23 Proximate resources are more firmly under government control while distant resources located in remote areas and along porous borders tend to be areas of weak government control (Le Billon, 2005). Alluvial diamonds in Kono are characterized by both diffusion and remoteness and therefore it is essential to investigate whether these spatial geography characteristics facilitate illicit diamond mining and smuggling or not. Responses obtained fi'om household interviews about their perception of the diffuseness of alluvial diamonds and their remoteness from central government control were utilized. In addition, responses from key informants and general views of focus groups about the diffuseness and location of alluvial diamonds provided additional information that were used to prove the hypothesis. Supplementary information was also garnered from secondary data. A map of known locations of diamond deposits based on government provided additional information (Figure 1.8) My fourth hypothesis is that environmental conditions in diamond chiefdoms are worse than in non-diamond chiefdoms. I posit that environmental degradation is more marked in diamond areas that in non-diamond areas because of diamond-mining activities. To address this hypothesis, responses from interviewees in the diamond and non-diamond areas were analyzed. I also used land cover change analysis of remotely sensed satellite data to compare land cover change from 1986 to 2007 in the diamond and non-diamondiferous chiefdoms. 23 Koidu Holdings Limited mines kimberlite diamonds in Kono districts. These dykes are about 150 m long. 20 In sum, the study examines the social, economic and environmental dimensions (both as drivers and impacts) of the resource curse. Socially, it examines the socio-political (power dynamics) drivers and consequences surrounding inequitable access to diamond resources, and the economic focus examines the economic dimensions. It assesses the roles that a weak regulatory state apparatus and spatial and scalar politics play on the inequitable access to diamond resources and it consequences. Finally, the environmental impacts of the social, economic and other factors are examined in relations to what extent they represent a curse. 1.10 Significance of Study This study contributes to the development literature dealing with how a valuable natural resource becomes more of a curse rather than a blessing. It examines how important determinants of a weak regulatory state contribute to multiple symptoms of the resource curse. The research provides a detailed micro- level analysis of social actors in the diamond industry while also examining structures at the national and international scales that have impact on local resources. While considerable political ecology research has been done on human-environment interactions in relation to agriculture, forestry, and water, the relationship between diamond mining and its socio-environmental ramifications has not been given sufficient attention. This study therefore contributes to political ecology with respect to mineral resources. Furthermore, research on the paradoxical negative relationship between natural resource endowment and socioeconomic outcomes has been dominated by the political economy 21 perspective. This dissertation thus expands study on the resource curse beyond the political-economic focus as it incorporates the environmental dimension of the curse in addition to other wider political economic indicators. The research is also significant as it moves beyond the resource curse to specific dynamics that construct it, thereby opening opportunities to find solutions. The study provides concrete information that has policy implications that can not only mitigate the resource curse but could transform mineral resources into a catalyst for sustainable development at the local and national levels. Issues such as the geographical characteristics of the resource and security measures also have policy implications in terms of creating an effective regulatory system. It is also useful in guiding development policies in other SSA countries in which symptoms of the resource curse exist. 1.11 Organization of Study The dissertation is organized into seven chapters. Chapter One introduces the study, presents the problem of the natural-resource curse with particular reference to oil and mineral resources in SSA. The chapter also covers the purpose of study, hypotheses, and a brief description of the study area, Kono District, and significance of the study. Chapter Two includes the literature that informs this study and the theoretical framework. It examines the suitability of the political ecology framework for this study and its limitations. The literature encompasses theory on the social production of scale, development studies related to oil and mineral resource curses, mining and environment studies, and sustainable livelihood studies. Chapter Three deals with the research 22 methodology. This includes the rationale for the methods, analysis of social surveys, and geo-spatial analysis of land use/land cover change. Findings of the research start in Chapter Four. Chapter Four provides contextual information on the wider political economy and state policies in regard to diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone. Based on archival, secondary data, and oral history accounts this chapter highlights the historical development of diamond mining and marketing in Sierra Leone. I discuss this chapter in four phases: colonial period; independence to pre-civil war period; civil war, and post civil war periods. Chapter Five focuses on empirical analysis of diamond exploitation in Kono District. First, it explores illicit diamond mining and marketing. Second, it investigates the socioeconomic dynamics of diamond mining and economic disparity between diggers and supporters. Third, it examines diamond-driven conflicts at the community level. Lastly, the chapter examines the spatiality of diamonds in regard to the resource curse. Chapter Six assesses environmental degradation in Kono District. This encompasses perceptions of environmental degradation in the mining and non- mining chiefdoms, the spatial pattern and extent of land use/land cover change and how it has been influenced by diamond mining. Chapter Seven consists of concluding statements and policy implications. 23 CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 2.1 Political Economy Political economy is the traditional theoretical approach that has been used to address the sometimes paradoxical relationship between oil/mineral resource abundance and underdevelopment (the so called resource curse). A central tenet of this approach is that political factors are crucial in determining economic outcomes. Political economy underscores how power relations structure the institutions, processes and outcomes of resource exploitation. In discussing a resource curse, political economy examines how political institutions, rules, policies and decisions at various levels influence socio-economic choices in a society (Keefer, 2004; Ross, 1999). The role of the state in the social relations of production and its linkages to the global economy is emphasized. Within political economy, some developing countries endowed with and heavily reliant on oil or mineral resource exploitation are referred to as rentier state. Rentier states are reliant on resource revenues, especially those paid by transnational companies, and on profits from their equity stakes in transnational companies’ investments (Karl, 1997). Oil/mineral revenues are mostly obtained and controlled by the governing elites many of whom misappropriate rent meant for national development (Omeje, 2008). In other words, political elites use their political power for personal economic accumulation at the expense of society. While the political economy approach focuses on the political and economic aspects of a resource curse, the study goes beyond the political and economic dimensions of the resource curse. It embraces political and economic 24 discussions, cornerstone of the political economy framework, as well as the role of social forces and the environmental implications of resource exploitation. As a consequence, it requires the adoption of a more multidirectional framework of analysis that captures the various strands of the problem. It engages in a historical and contextual analysis of the political, economic, social, and environmental factors. Such analysis is the centerpiece of political ecology, an approach that is utilized in this dissertation. 2.2 Political Ecology There are numerous definitions of political ecology but a central artery of these definitions is terrestrial ecosystems. As Blaikie and Brookfield (1987:17) note, “ The phrase ‘political ecology’ combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political economy. Together this encompasses the constantly shifting dialectic between society and land-based resources, and also within classes and groups within society itself.” Political ecology examines society and environment interactions across different spatial and temporal scales (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Robbins, 2004). This perspective adopts the view that societies are heterogeneous, and that political and economic power affect resource allocation and use. Starting with local dynamics and histories, it places the society-environment discussion within the context of the wider political economy (Harvey 1996). Within political ecology, local land use, land cover change, and environmental problems are linked to state policies, interstate relations and global capitalism (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). 25 Political ecology emerged in the 19703 and drew much from cultural ecology and natural hazards research with a very strong Marxist perspective.24 Cultural ecology focuses on the evolution of cultural systems through environmental adaptation (Bates and Fratkin, 1999). Cultural ecology explores local socio-cultural practices and surrounding socio-ecological relationships for a single geographically bounded community or village, or inter- community comparison. In comparison, political ecology examines the importance of micro- level studies of single communities or ecosystems and their linkages and processes at broader and multiple scales. Political ecology has been utilized mainly in Third World settings as an alternative approach to a deterministic and apolitical nature of environmental research. Political ecology seeks to overcome deterministic approaches of other traditional explanations of environmental degradation. These include Malthusian theory, the tragedy of the commons thesis, and ecological equilibrium models. The main thrust of political ecology, however, is how political, economic and biophysical processes and actions of social actors at various scales combine to restrain opportunities for human agency at the local scale or open new opportunities for local action. Several studies in political ecology therefore examine how land managers struggle against policies imposed by the state, socioeconomic relationships, and the physical environment (Bassett, 1988; Carney, 1996; Peluso and Watts, 2001; Robins, 2004; Zimmerer and Basset, 2’ Third World Political ecology is an alternative way to address issues related to environmental change in developing countries. It counters the orthodox claim that land use activities of ordinary people are responsible for environmental degradation ( Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Watts 1983). 26 2003). Some of these studies advocate a more balance approach to political ecology while others emphasize politics or ecology. Political ecology has been examined from the ecocentric and anthropocentric perspectives. Proponents of the anthropocentric perspective advocate more ‘politics’ in political ecology research while those favoring the ecocentric approach emphasize more ‘ecology’.25 Scholars embedded in ecological sciences criticize political ecology for being too focused on the social and political dimensions of resource access (anthropocentric) while very little attention is given to the biophysical and ecological realities of the natural environment (Walker, 2005). Zimmerer and Bassett (2003) maintain that the environment should not be viewed as simply a stage or arena in which struggles over resource access and control takes place. They advocate for environmental agency and capability to influence human behavior as behavior influences the physical environment. In order words there is a dialectically opposed relationship between nature and society. Irrespective of the area of emphasis, however, political ecologists utilize a combination of theoretical strands. Rather than a unitary theory, political ecology is an amalgam of approaches for socio-ecological analysis (Peet and Watts, 2004). The multiple approaches or themes are pivoted on the focus of analysis. Paul Robbins encapsulates these various approaches in four key themes: degradation and marginalization; environmental conflict; conservation and control; and environmental identity and social movement (Robbins, 2004:13-15). 25 Bryant and Bailey’s ‘politicized environment’ underscores the need for more politics (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Similar sentiments are expressed by Michael Watts (Watts, 1996). 27 The degradation and marginalization theme maintains that natural resources (on which communities are dependent) become overexploited due to state development interventions and integration in regional and global markets (Hecht and Cockbum, 1989; Schmink and Wood, 1992). The outcome is increasing poverty, and cyclically increasing overexploitation of natural resources. A related assertion is that modernist development efforts to augment production systems of local people have instead led to diminution in sustainability of local practice and concomitantly to a decrease in the equity of resource distribution. Schmink and Wood’s (1992) works on deforestation in the Amazon illustrate the degradation and marginalization theme. They emphasize that market expansion has increased class stratification, and the emergent hierarchical arrangement of groups’ struggle over forest products and agricultural productivity result in more degradation of forests. The integration of market economies has resulted in competition amongst market producers. Imbalances in landholdings have emerged and with falling commodity prices, marginal producers on very small landholdings ‘overcrop’ and deforest disproportionately. The environmental conflict theme posits that resource enclosure and appropriation by state authorities, private firms, or social elites create ‘scarcity’ of natural resources that trigger conflict between groups (including those defined by gender, class, or ethnicity). Schroeder’s (1999) work on the Gambia illustrates how the involvement of non-governmental organizations (N GOs) in fostering women’s horticulture resulted in gendered conflict. Men directed the horticulture project on garden plots. Since men predominantly control tree resources, this 28 allowed them also to seize control of garden lands. In managing horticulture women are required to manage trees as they are grown on the same land. In this context, two rural livelihood schemes — gardening and agroforestry — were drawn into a gender struggle. Environmental problems are socialized also when particular local groups are in control of collective resources at the expense of others. This is applicable to community based natural resource management approaches. The conservation and control theme points out that control of resources has been removed from local producers by the implementation of programs to ,9 ‘6 preserve “sustainability, community,” or “nature.” The effect is the disruption of local systems of livelihood, production, and socio-political organization. In fact, state authorities and other players have counteracted local sustainable production systems and have described such activities as unsustainable in the struggle for control of resources. The creation and protection of parks and game reserves in East and Southern Africa exemplifies this thesis. Robbins’ fourth thesis, environmental identity and social movements has very strong links with post-structural approaches, especially what Peet and Watts (1996; 2004) refer to as “liberation ecologies”. Modification in environmental management regimes and environmental conditions has created opportunities or has forced local groups to secure and represent themselves politically.26 This is a new form of political action as their ecological stands link different groups across class, ethnicity and gender. 26 Social Movements in the mining areas of Peru and Ecuador is an example of local political action (Bebbington et al. 2008). 29 Three of Robbins’ four themes — degradation and marginalization, environmental conflict, and environmental identity and social movement — can be utilized in examining the socio-environmental dimensions of diamond exploitation. The role of the state and international political economic institutions is a common thread in his themes. However the environmental identity and social movement theme/approach differs slightly as it underscores local political action as a response to a traditional governance structures. In addition to Robbins four-theme classification, key approaches to political ecology can be discussed within broader categories. This also allows some consideration of theoretical insights to the respective approaches. These broader categories of approaches are: 1) regional political ecology; 2) post- structuralist political ecology; 3) a politicized environment; and 4) feminist political ecology. 2.3 Approaches to Political Ecology 2. 3.] Regional Political Ecology Regional political ecology which is sometimes referred to as structural political ecology, draws mainly from Blaikie and Brookfield’s chain of explanation.27 The chain of explanation is an explanatory device that links levels, scale and spaces in analyzing environmental problems. In order words, environmental issues are influenced by local, national, and global factors. The 27 Blaikie and Brookfield’s “chain of explanation” is an explanatory device that links levels, scale and spaces in analyzing environmental problems. Using land degradation as example, Blaikie starts with physical changes in soil and vegetation and their associated economic symptoms, links these to location- specific land-use practices and individual and group decision-making processes, before ending with wider contextual forces associated with the state and the international economy. 30 land manager (who can be a farmer) is central in decision-making with regards local resource use. Within regional political ecology, Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) underscore the roles of global capitalism and the state in the exploitation and marginalization of the ordinary people. They note three forms of marginality: ecological marginality, economic marginality and political-economic marginality. The land manager is politically marginalized as he/she is excluded from political decisions that include the imposition of heavy taxes by the state. As a consequence he/she intensifies land use (for example, agricultural activities) leading to ecological marginality. Intensified land use decreases agricultural yields, which results in economic marginality. Blaikie and Brookfield’s work on land degradation clearly illustrates these forms of marginality. It should be noted that structural regional political ecology was primarily materially-oriented and was applicable mainly to Third World countries. In addressing Third World issues, regional political ecology explores three major propositions. Firstly, the roots of environmental problems are social, economic, and political. Access to and control over natural resources are major determinants of environmental problems in developing countries (Carney, 2004; Bassett, 1988). Secondly, the relationship between society and natural resources is dialectical and in most instances contradictory. For instance, there is mutual causality between poverty and environmental degradation. Through poor management of resources, poverty can induce environmental degradation and environmental degradation can exacerbate poverty because most rural dwellers are heavily dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods (Schmink and 31 Wood, 1987; J arosz, 1993). Thirdly, the focus is on social actors especially the poor viewed from a historical, economic, and political context, with an emphasis on the role of the state (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Peet and Watts, 2004; Basset, 1988).28 Thus, the adoption of regional political ecology in Third World studies is relevant as it presents an in-depth and complex analysis of socio- environmental issues. 2.3.2 Post-structuralist Political Ecology Post-structuralist political ecology is another approach that is gaining pre- eminence. A post-structuralist perspective is the ‘analysis of the production of social reality which includes the analysis of representations as social facts inseparable from what is commonly regarded as “material reality’” (Escobar, 1996:46). Post-structuralist approaches maintain that language is part of social reality. Therefore, discourses about the environment have an essential role in post-structuralist political ecology because they can have real impacts on policy interventions and the decisions of local land users (Peet and Watts, 1996, Escobar, 1996) Another concept emphasized by post-structuralist political ecologists is the construction of environmental realities by scientific discourse. Fairhead and Leach’s (1998) work clearly illuminates this notion. Policy makers and scientists have long regarded the islands of dense forest in the savanna region of ‘forest Guinea as the last vestige of extensive forest cover that has been degraded and rapidly degrading as a result of inhabitants’ land use. Their study, however, 28 In examining farmer-herder conflict in Ivory Coast, Bassett illuminates the role of the state in such contestation (Basset 1988). 32 proves that people around villages have created forest islands. Fallow vegetation has been transformed to more woody vegetation and consequently secondary forest. This has shown that though there is population grth in this area, land use management by the locals has led to more rather than less forest. Their findings question the development of century-long erroneous policy of environmental reality in West Afiica. In a similar vein, Bassett and Zueli’s (2003) work on Ivory Coast found a contradictory answer to the conventional policy and general view that desertification is the result of occupants’ land use activities. Their findings suggest that while increase in cattle population results in diminished grassland it concomitantly increased wooded vegetation. This shows that ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy is not always true and environmental conditions are context specific. Thus whether an area is classified degraded, endangered or protected is normally defined or influenced by scientific and institutional discourses that are perpetrated by decision-makers who have power and authority. 2. 3. 3 Politicized Environment The manifestation of power is a centerpiece of the ‘politicized environment,’ a conceptual focus that has gained momentum in political ecology (Bryant and Bailey, 1997:27-29). According to this perspective, access to and control over resources, in general, and environmental conflicts specifically, can be perceived as demonstration of differentiated power relations. Power then becomes the key concept to be analyzed so as to specify the ‘topography’ of a politicized environment. Politics, power relations, institutions of civil society, and environmental regulation issues are comprehensively examined. Emphasis on the 33 means through which environmental control, access and property rights are portrayed in the context of social relations, and how negotiation and contestation occurs within the political arenas of the household, work-place, and the state are explored (Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Bryant, 1992; Peet and Watts, 1996; Rocheleau et al., 1996). In a nutshell, the politicized-environment focus emphasizes power relations amongst social actors and its socio—environmental outcomes. An approach that is deeply rooted in the ‘politicized environment’ is the power-based, actor-oriented political ecology. This perspective recognizes that environmental issues are explicitly “socialized and are influenced by socio- political processes and power relations occurring at different scales” (Robbins, 2004214). An actor-oriented approach fosters understanding about the interests, characteristics, and actions of different actors in relation to processes of social, political, and environmental change (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Thus, through an actor-oriented approach, researchers have underscored the relevance of both structural factors and the role of human agency in determining social and environmental change (Giddens, 1984; Long and Long, 1992). The actor- oriented approach is useful for socio-environment research in a number of ways. Firstly, it demonstrates that outcomes of conflict and cooperation are influenced by the interaction of various actors that at times pursue disparate interests. Secondly, it is explicitly recognized that outcomes are mutually determined by elements of structure and agency across multiple analytical scales. For instance, Bury (2008) illuminates how structural forces and 34 agency at multiple scales influence local outcomes by examining a transnational corporation and livelihood transformation in the Peruvian Andes. He notes that through mineral rights with the Peruvian government, the company Minera Yanacocha (MYSA) has access and control over considerable amounts of land, which reduces the available land in the community. Locals moved to more mountainous areas to engage in farming practices, an essential ingredient in their livelihood portfolio. Thirdly, the power relations that affect interactions between various social actors are reciprocal but often not symmetrical (Bury, 2008). An actor-oriented political ecology approach is relevant to understand how the behavior of social actors’ operating at different scales influences local interaction with resources. It examines the impact of state, corporate, and civil society actors on social and environmental change in multi scalar analysis (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). The actor- oriented approach has also been utilized by observers who examine local organizations and institutions beyond the household and have shown its relevance in the managing and accessing local resources in addition to linking with larger scale actors and processes (Bebbington, 1999; Sheridan, 2001). Peluso (1996) utilizes the actor-oriented approach in examining the impact of the state and market intervention on property rights and landscape change in Indonesia. Actor-oriented political ecology has also been adopted in examining resource conflicts in Jharkland, India (J ewitt, 2008). Further, the actor-oriented approach in political ecology is significant as it allows researchers to show causal relationships between the activities of particular actors operating at multiple scales and local resource transformation and utilization (Bury, 2008). 35 Actor- oriented research also depicts complex relationships between local places and larger scales of analysis, without having to worry about what analytical scale is the best one because the various actors lead the analysis to their various operational scales. In sum, analysis of environmental outcomes, struggles over resources, and political and social change within an actor-oriented approach can help identify and examine the actors, their networks, and the contingent and heterogeneous outcomes through such interactions. Another concept that has been examined within the politicized environment is the politicized and conflicting nature of environmental relations based on the environmental entitlement perspective.29 Environmental entitlements can be defined as alternative sets of utilities obtained from environmental goods and services that social actors have legitimate effective command over and which are instrumental for achieving wellbeing (Leach et al., 1999). The alternative set of utilities may include direct uses of commodities, e.g. food, fuel, market value of the resources, or rights to them. The environmental entitlements perspective examines how social actors at different strata command environmental goods and services that are essential to their well being (Bohle et al., 2000). It focuses on how entitlements in regard to natural resources are distributed and reproduced, negotiated and fought over, lost and won in violent environments (Peluso and Watts, 2001). Leach et a1. (1999) assess how different social actors control environmental goods and services that are fundamental to their well being. They note that environmental entitlements involve negotiations 29 According to Amartya Sen ( 1984: 497) entitlements represent ‘the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she faces" 36 among social actors, and include power relationships and the debates over meaning rather than fixed rules. The environmental entitlement perspective has been useful in addressing community-based natural resource management, a theme that has been widely addressed in academic discourse. 2.3.4 Feminist Political Ecology Another strand of political ecology that gained momentum is feminist political ecology. Feminist political ecology refers to gender’s place in the political ecological landscape. It explores gender as a factor in ecological and political relations (Hovorka, 2006). Feminist political ecology explores the convergence of gender, science and the environment in academic and political discourse in everyday life, and in the social movements that have brought new impetus to it. It focuses on gender and its interaction with class, race, age, ethnicity and nationality. Gendered environmental rights of access and control as well as responsibilities to procure and manage resources for the household and community are explored in this strand of political ecology research (Carney, 1993; Mackenzie, 2003; Rocheleau et al., 1996; Schroeder, 1999). These rights and responsibilities are applicable to resources as well as the quality of the environment. Feminist political ecology also addresses gendered division of power and labor to preserve, protect, change, construct, rehabilitate and restore the environment and to regulate the actions of others to explain socio-ecological outcomes. The works of Judith Camey(2003) illustrate the gendered land and labor nexus in agricultural production in the Gambia. Access and use rights to land are gender specific. Both men and women are engaged in household food production and also produce goods for sale. Growth in market for groundnuts in the colonial period meant that men exerted more energy on peanut 37 production. Consequently, women became primarily responsible for lowland subsistence rice production while men concentrated on peanut cash production. The advent of rice mechanization and later horticultural food crop development further exacerbated women’s plight as they were required to cultivate new areas and expended longer time on domestic food crop production. These included areas where women initially cultivated crops for sale, leading to a loss of women’s autonomy. The outcome was divisive as women asked for cash compensation, withdrew their labor, and politically challenged agricultural development schemes (Carney, 2001, 1993; Carney and Watts, 1991). Thus feminist political ecology has brought new insights to socio-economic stratification and differentiation grounded in unequal power relations between men and women and its environmental ramifications. It is essential to point out that regional political ecology, post-structural political ecology, environmental politics, and feminist political ecology have two common attributes. They are: (1) power relations between the various segments of society influence socio-environmental outcomes and (2) the socio-environmental processes occur at different temporal and spatial scales. However, there are some differences amongst them. Regional political ecology is mainly influenced by structures in which the role of the state and its national policies, laws and instructions, and global capitalism strongly influence socio-environmental outcomes. In contrast, post-structuralist political ecology underscores the role of environmental discourse, narratives, and meanings in addressing socio-environmental outcomes. Although environmental politics emphasizes politics, it also underscores the role of structure and agency in determining socio-environmental impacts. The role of social actors and the emergence of social movements and local 38 politics is on the ascendancy. Feminist political ecology however focuses on gender relations and struggles in various social organizations, locations, and space. In most instances, it pinpoints the need for women empowerment in social processes leading to environmental change. 2.4 Application of Theme in Study While several approaches or themes have been examined in the above discussion the current study adopts an actor-oriented approach of political ecology nuanced with a social construction concept of geographic scale (Bury, 2008; Jewit, 2008; Sheridan, 2001; Zulu, 2009). Social construction of scale refers to a geographic scale that is transformed as a result of socio-political actions at a particular level or levels (Swyngedouw,1997). This research examines how power relations between the various stakeholders in the diamond industry are manifested socio-environmentally. It utilizes the actor-oriented approach based on the assumption that the costs and benefits of using natural resources (in this case diamonds) are distributed unevenly. The differences among social actors imply wealth formation for some and impoverishment for others, and it also alters the ability of actors to control or resist other actors (Bryant, 1997:29). Further, it explores the interests and motivations of the various social actors, the levels of power that they wield, the strategies that they use, the spatial-scalar dimensions of these strategies (6. g. porous boundaries), and their social, economic, and environmental impacts (focusing on local livelihoods). The study explores how various actors in Sierra Leone’s diamond industry use scale as a strategy to advance their motives and interests over other actors. In other words, how the 39 social production of scale is utilized and transformed by social actors for socio- economic and environmental goals. Illicit diamond trading is one example of how diamond stakeholders utilize their operational scale to achieve their economic and political interests. This study addresses issues related to some of the central themes of political ecology as espoused by Robbins (2004): degradation and marginalization, environmental/resource conflict, and environmental identity and social movements. Thus by adopting the power-based, actor-oriented political ecology approach the current study aims to “follow” main social actors across scale, and explore themes of social domination and marginalization. Notwithstanding its widespread application in socio-enviromnental research, political ecology has been criticized for underscoring the political at the expense of the ecological dimensions of human-environment interactions (Walker, 2005; Vayda and Walters, 1999; Walker, 2005; Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003). It has also been criticized for emphasizing the ecological while downplaying politics (Walker, 2007). Others say that it lacks disciplinary coherence that may constrain intellectual and policy influence (Bryant, 1997; Peet and Watts, 2004; Schubert, 2005). The current study utilizes the actor-oriented political ecology focus so as to avoid the ‘local trap’ as it “follows” the main social actors across their operational levels. Further, the dissertation engages the social production of scale (politics of scale) literature so as to inject a theoretical focus on scale that is often lacking in political ecology. Further, the politics of scale prevents the ‘local trap’ in which the local is privileged over other scales of analysis. Thus, its emphasis on the socio-spatial dimensions of power relations 40 surrounding resource exploitation (in this case diamonds) within an actor-oriented approach makes it overcome these shortcomings. Further, its integrative, theoretical and thematic properties make it an exceptionally suitable analytical approach for this study. It informs critical examination of the complex interplay between political, social and economic and environmental processes surrounding diamond mining. Such linkages are often missing in purely mining-based research or purely environmental studies, or political-economic analysis of the resource curse. The study extends political ecology analysis to a natural resource, diamonds, which is often handled as a political economic issue at macro scales (e. g. national and international) at the expense of local socio-spatial, political, and environmental dynamics of diamond mining. Kono District also permits a unique consideration of the impacts of extreme conflict in the form of a civil war. In addition to potential contribution to literature in political ecology, natural resources management, mining, and development, this study has policy implications for understanding and balancing mining, environmental conservation and rural livelihoods in Sierra Leone and other Afiican countries in similar situations. The multi-directional approach necessary to conduct such analysis not only calls for a political ecology approach, but also dictates multiple and hybrid research methodologies in the social and natural sciences, as shown in the methods section. 41 2.5 Socio-spatial Relations and Politics of Scale Scale is a fundamental aspect of geography and is pivotal in geographic analysis. The concept of scale in geography is subject to considerable debate especially in human geography. The difficulty in understanding what is meant by scale is partly due to the different and often implicit definitions and models that are often employed without clear distinction (O’Lear and Diehl, 2007). As a consequence, conception of geographic scale ranges across a spectrum of almost intimidating diversity (Sheppard and McMaster, 2004). Gibson et al. (2000) identify the following four scale-based theoretical areas fundamental to explanation in the sciences: the degree to which scale, extent and resolution influence identification of patterns; how disparate levels on a scale affect explanation of social phenomena; how theoretical proposition obtained about phenomena at one level on a spatial, temporal, or quantitative scale may or may not be generalized to another level; and how optimization of process can be done at specific points on a scale. The first three categorizations are relevant for the current study investigating diamonds as a resource curse in Sierra Leone. Based on the political geography perspective, socio-spatial scale is “ the nested hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing sizes, such as the regional, national and global” (Delaney and Leitner, 1997: 93). For a considerable period of time, scale has been regarded as either natural levels of organization (the local, national, regional, or global) or arbitrary chosen to fit the researcher’s methodology. However, scales are both the realm and outcome of social relations and struggles over political, social, economic, and geographic space. 42 While many researchers call for a multi-scalar approach to research, the question remains as to whether scale should be conceived in a traditional hierarchical fashion of spatial containers or be viewed as socially constructed and subject to socio-spatial reconfiguration. Recent debates in political geography, however, have come to some consensus: scale is socially constructed and consequently historically contingent; it can be politically contested; and it is essential to understand a plethora of political, sociocultural, economic, and environmental phenomena (Marston, 2000; Smith, 1990, Jonas, 1994; Sheppard and McMaster, 2004). Scale and level are used interchangeably as units of analysis in most research. There is however, a distinction between scale and level. Gibson et al. (2000: 218, 219) point out that scale is “the temporal, spatial, quantitative or analytical dimension used to measure or study a phenomenon” while levels are “units of analysis located on different positions of a given scale”. Similarly, Sayre (2005) refers to the singular use of politics of scale as referring to level, i.e. local, regional, national, etc., while the plural sense is politics wherein relations between levels are prevalent, and scale is relevant. Smith (1995) stresses that scale “ can be both fluid and fixed, both materially and conceptually”, while level are fixed. Scale is conceptualized as both fluid and fixed. Since scales are socially produced through political struggle, and political contestation is an ongoing process, scales and scalar arrangements are fluid and processual (Brown and Purcell 2005). Swyngedouw (1997) pinpoints scale as fluid and contends that it is a mistake made by some geographers to conceive scale as fixed and given. He 43 emphasizes the fluidity of scalar arrangements and the degree to which they are in historical motion. The assumption that scale is fixed and given has resulted in some geographers treating scale as a latent object rather than an active object of inquiry. A major shortcoming to this is that it may forestall geographers’ recognition of the continual reorganization of scale. The transformation of European states to a supranational entity — the European Union— exemplifies the reorganization of scale. The continued geographic expansion of the European Union (EU) thus shows the continual reorganization of scale. It should be noted however that the fluidity of scale is not in totality. Scalar arrangements can be fixed due to relatively hegemonic structures over a certain time frame (Brenner 2001). Hegemony is a function of political power. For instance, the role of the Sierra Leonean state in controlling mining and export of diamonds is a case in point. The creation and implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has resulted in global governance of diamond trading thus curtailing national authority (Zulu and Wilson, 2009). Scale can be perceived as the outcome and spatial strategy utilized by social actors to meet their political aspiration. Scale is therefore positioned at the epicenter of politics, thus the phrase ‘politics of scale (Swyngedouw, 1997). Scalar politics is evident when “actors, directly or indirectly, attempt to shift the levels of study, assessment, deliberation and decision-making authority to the level and scale which most suits them. . .where they can exercise power more effectively” (Lebel et al., 2008: 129). Politics of scale imply that “geographical scales and scalar configurations are socially produced and politically contested 44 through human social struggle” (Brenner 2001: 604). The epicenter of the politics of scale is the manipulation of relations of power and authority by actors and institutions that operate and are situated at different spatial scales. It is a highly contestable process and it involves myriad negotiations and struggles between various social actors as they try to reconfigure the spatiality of power and authority (Leitner, 1997, 2004). Most struggles are centered on the appropriation and control of natural resources. Socio-spatial processes therefore change the relevance and role of certain geographic scales, strengthen the significance of others and occasionally create new scales (Swyngedouw, 1997). Scale re- definitions therefore alter the geometry of social power and control, empowering some actors while dis-empowering others. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, 3 global regulatory mechanism for ‘conflict diamonds’ is a case in point.30 It has reduced the power of the national state in diamond regulation (Grant and Taylor, 2005). However, scalar outcomes do not always reflect the interests of the powerful. Scale can have a liberatory zest and symbolize spaces of resistance where marginalized groups can use scale as a political strategy to evade and challenge extant social, economic, and entrenched scalar structure. This manipulation of scales is what Smith (1993) refers to as ‘jumping scale’. The idea of jumping scales elucidates the significance of levels in scalar discussions. ‘Jumping scale’ refers to situations in which some social actor (group of people, a firm, or a government body) shifts the level at which some process 3° The United Nations defines conflict diamonds as diamonds that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments, and are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments, or in contravention to the decisions of the Security Council. 45 (decision-making, enforcement, production or distribution of some valued good) occurs so as to secure a desired outcome. It follows the presumption of an extant structure of social organization, with functional and mostly hierarchical relationships among its constituent parts or levels. Actors that are disadvantaged at one scale can pursue their goals at a different scale, with the intent of transforming the balance of power in their favor (Zulu, 2009). Normally marginalized groups jump scales because they do not gain from existing scalar arrangements. For instance, diamond diggers may opt out of an exploitative mining system in which they work for an investor (locally known as supporter), and receive very little reward. By mining independently diamond diggers have jumped scale. Certain groups benefit while others lose. While the net of these gains and losses matters, who gains and losses, how and with what social, ecological, and economic impacts may matter more in terms of the outcomes of scalar politics. Scale is also relational as scaled spaces exist in association with other scaled spaces, and scalar analysis in essence is a function of interactions and changing relationships across scales or levels (Brenner, 2001; Marston, 2000). For instance, the national scale is embedded within the global scale, while the global scale constitutes various national scales. Therefore, in analyzing scale it is essential to analyze the relationship among scales and the changing interrelationships among the various scales (Bremer, 2001). The relational co- existence of multiple levels on a scale is of importance to this study because each level in diamond mining and trading embodies “differences in powers and 46 capacities, opportunities and constraints. . .for practices of individual and collective agents” (Leitner and Miller, 2007:119). In summary, analysis of scale must examine how the linkages among scales are continually socially produced, disintegrated, and re-produced through political struggle. It should thus assess which political interests (e. g. government mines officials) pursue particular scalar arrangements (e. g. national control of industrial mining) and should examine the motives of those political interests because they help to explain scalar outcomes. Theorizing the politics of scale therefore involves recognizing the dialectical association between structure and agency as manifested in disparate sphere of society (Leitner, 2004). 2.6 The Resource Curse: A Review 2. 6. 1 Political and Economic Explanations of the Resource Curse Initially, scholarly works on the resource curse focused on economic explanations with emphasis on poor economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 2001; Mikesell, 1997). Through quantitative analysis and econometric models, studies found that economic performance of mineral-dependent countries in most developing countries fell. The World Bank (2002) documents that in developing countries that are heavily dependent on mineral exports (15-50 percent of export) economic grth fell at an average rate of 1.1 percent in the 19903. It is essential to note that while poor economic performance can result in the resource curse, it is not necessarily the case as there are a few cases in which countries that perform 47 well economically have elements of the resource curse3 '. Perhaps, the absence of distributive equity and political stability are more significant aspects of the resource curse. Political explanations and the role of institutions are also discussed as explanations of the resource curse (Bannon and Collier, 2003; Basedu. 2005; Bulte et al., 2004; Le Billon, 2005; Mehlum et al., 2006; Omeje, 2008; Robinson et al., 2006). Poor governance in mineral-dependent developing countries can contribute to a resource endowment being more of a curse than a blessing. Le Billon (2005) asserts that weak institutions of governance, corruption, authoritarian rule, and nascent democracies have resulted in a paradox of plenty. Bannon and Collier (2003) note that governments may lack accounting capabilities to manage high inflows of rents from natural resources (oil, gas, precious minerals). This creates an opportunity to siphon part of the rent for personal use. Transactions between governments and natural resource extractive companies are normally opaque and they are worse in less developed countries. This also creates an opportunity for government functionaries to either siphon government revenue or receive kickbacks (Reno, 2003; Cilliers and Dietrich, 2000; Brannon and Collier, 2003; Watts, 2004). The situation is more prevalent in authoritarian regimes or in countries that have nascent democracies, and institutions like civil society, the judiciary and other arms that can constrain the unscrupulous activities of government are not in place (Le Billon, 2005; Reno, 2003; Watts, 2004). While it is true that the resource curse, with few notable 3' The Federal Republic of Nigeria generates substantial amounts of oil revenue, yet the majority of its population lives in poverty. The situation is more serious in the oil producing Delta region where conflicts, poverty and environmental degradation are manifested. 48 exceptions, is prevalent in mineral-dependent developing countries, the political and social climate in a number of oil/mineral dependent countries in Sub-Saharan Afiica (SSA) has created conditions through which the resource curse is manifested in numerous ways. A number of studies have addressed the politics of petro-violence in Nigeria (Engel, 2005; Ukiwo, 2008; Watts, 2004). In examining the resource curse in Nigeria, Salai-Martin and Subramanian (2003) maintain that waste and corruption from oil are primarily responsible for the poor long- run economic performance in Nigeria. However, this study did not address the scalar dynamics of oil exploitation, the ecological impact of oil drilling and its effect at local level. Watts (2004) examines violence in Nigeria’s Delta region by identifying three different forms of govemable space and rule (the chieftainship, the ethnic minority, and the nation state) associated with oil-based capitalism. He notes that while govemable spaces have forms of rule; identity and territoriality are not necessarily fully govemable and may not be compatible, but rather work against one another in complex and contradictory ways. He underscores the simultaneity of different scale politics as a product of the oil-complex and petro-capitalism. Relatedly, Watts (2008) maintains that oil insurgency and petro-belligerence in Nigeria are a function of five different issues. First, there is an oil complex that is overtly territorial and is operational with a geographic logic of oil concessions. Second, activities of companies constitute a challenge to different forms of community authority, inter-ethnic relations and local state institutions. Third, this (corporate- community contestation) results in reconfigured govemable spaces 49 many of which are mostly violent and unstable. Each govemable space creates a dialectical tension within the interplay of territory, identity, and rule. Fourth, the overlapping and contradictory tenets of violent govemable spaces manifest the complexity of oil rule. Oil has simultaneously held together the politically volatile multi-ethnic state while it has also pulled it apart. Lastly, the oil complex and its violent and unstable spaces resonate with the notion of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2005). The resource curse has also been examined from an economic perspective (Auty, 2004; Bannon and Collier, 2003). Bannon and Collier (2003) maintain that lack of economic diversification can undermine the national economy and could lead to very slow economic growth. This is evident in a number of SSA countries that are heavily reliant on one or two natural resources. Watts (2008) points out that Nigeria is highly reliant on its oil economy. He notes that in 2006, oil accounted for 80 percent of government revenue, 96 percent of export revenues and close to 50 percent of GDP. Global Witness (2002) indicates that 80 percent of Angola’s government revenues is obtained from oil production. As a result of poor accountability of resource revenues, the government and its key actors receive illegal wealth from resource rents through diversion of public funds and kick backs from business negotiations. Angolan government authorities thus become reluctant to implement economic diversification policies. 2.6.2 The Spatial Geography of the Mineral Resource Another dimension of the resource curse that is gaining momentum in scholarly debates is the political geography of the resource. The political 50 geography of the resource can determine the level of control government has on a natural resource (Le Billon, 2007). Le Billon (2005), and Auty (2001) note that accessibility of precious minerals (for instance diamonds) is dependent on the spatial spread of the resource (diffused or point resource), the distance away from central political control (proximate or distant), and the mode of exploitation. According to them, diffused resources such as alluvial diamonds are highly accessible to artisanal miners. This makes it difficult for governments to control and tax, and makes the resources a target for rebel movements. In contrast, point resources cover small areas and are often exploited by a few capital-intensive operators (Le Billon, 2005; Olsson, 2006). Oil, deep-shaft hard mineral exploitation and Kimberlite diamonds are examples of point resources. Point resources are more susceptible to secessionist movements especially in situations in which the local population are marginalized economically, socially, and ecologically.32 This study examines alluvial diamonds in Sierra Leone to ascertain the extent to which diffuseness and remote location from government control are responsible for its illicit exploitation. Further, diffuse resources like alluvial diamonds are highly susceptible to illicit exploitation and smuggling and can be hard to put under fiscal control by governments (Cilliers and Dietrich, 2000; Dietrich, 2004'; Le Billon, 2005). The ease of transferability, its high value per weight, and its store of wealth have facilitated its illegal exploitation. This has resulted in low government revenues and economic decline with attendant socio-economic ramifications. A large influx of miners in diamond locales, the presence of foreign diamond agents and 32 A case in point is the Niger delta in Nigeria’s oil region. 51 porous borders have hindered efforts at controlling alluvial diamond mining in most places in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cilliers and Dietrich, 2000; Global Witness, 2004).33 Illicit mining and smuggling through neighboring countries is a common phenomenon (Gberie, 2004). This reduces official revenues generated from diamond exploitation. However, the value of diamonds originated from these countries run into millions of dollars annually. Dietrich (2004) maintains that the regional diamond-trading platform and the opaque nature of the diamond industry facilitate illicit trade in diamonds. This can also create an atmosphere in which state power and legitimacy is challenged. He notes that countries in the Great Lakes region in Central Afiica provide a platform for conflict diamonds originating in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Dietrich also mentioned a regional network in West Africa in which Liberia and a few other countries facilitated trade in conflict diamonds. The current study examines the issue of illicit diamonds as a dimension of the resource curse in Sierra Leone in general and Kono District in particular. 2.6.3 Socioeconomic Explanations of the Resource Curse The structure of diamond extraction and trade is configured in a way that results in significant economic disparity between diggers and dealers (Olsson, 2006). A report by Global Witness (2004) states that average earnings of alluvial diamond diggers in SSA are about a dollar a day (abject poverty) while diamond 33 Mine operators evade export tax if the taxes are raised and smuggle diamonds to neighboring countries with low export tax. A case in point is the smuggling of diamonds from DRC to Congo as the latter has a lower export tax. See Global Witness 2004. 52 dealers, and exporters take the lion’s share of the income.34 Davies (2002) asserts that abject poverty amongst the ordinary people may result in growing disenchantment, particularly if a few political and business magnates benefit immensely. The current research attempts to determine the degree of socio- economic disparity between diggers and dealers in the diamond industry in Sierra Leone as exemplified by Kono District. 2.6.4 Conflicts as Explanation of the Resource Curse The relationship between oil/mineral resources and armed conflict has been given considerable currency in the resource curse debate (Bannon and Collier, 2003; Campbell, 2002; Collier, 2000; Davies, 2006; Le Billon, 2005; Olsson, 2006; Omeje, 2008; Reno, 2003; Ross, 2003; Silberfein, 2005). A central theme of these works is that precious natural resources, especially diamonds and oil, serve as economic attraction for belligerents who out of greed and/or grievance may decide to challenge the state to access, control and manage resources. It should be noted that while there are divergent views35 as to whether precious minerals are primarily responsible for the cause of war, there is consensus amongst scholars that they played a dominant role in the protraction of violent conflicts in countries like Angola, DRC, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Davies, 2006, Ross, 2004, Le Billon, 2005; Lujala, 2005). 36 A Global Witness report (2004) pinpoints alluvial diamonds as the fuel for Angola’s civil war as 3’ The estimated number of diamond diggers in alluvial diamond mines in Africa is 1 million and the estimated annual revenue is 1 billion dollars. This implies that the average value by worker is $1000, however, most studies showed that they receive an income of about $1 a day. 35 While authors like Hirsch 2001, Smillie et al.2000 underscore diamonds as the cause of instability in Angola, DRC, and Sierra Leone, others like Davies 2002, Ross 2004 maintain that other factors precipitated civil wars. 6 Greed is emphasized as the primary economic explanation of civil wars in particular and resource conflict in general (Collier and Hofllier 2001). 53 the rebel group Uniao Nacional pela Independéncia Total de Angola (UNITA) were in control of diamond areas from 1992 to 2003. It is estimated that five billion dollars worth of diamonds have been mined in Angola within that period, and over half of that was smuggled out (Global Witness, 2004). Some scholars have explored the link between mineral resources and violent conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC] (Global Witness, 2004; Johnson and Kayser, 2005). A common thread amongst these scholarly works is that the present mineral-based conflicts in east DRC in partly influenced by historical dynamics of mineral exploitation. Foreign companies have been attracted my lucrative mining concessions offered by the autocratic government of former President Mobutu Sese Seko and subsequent rebel groups. Most of the mineral rents, however, have been siphoned into private pockets.37 In spite of its mineral endowment (which includes copper, cobalt, coltan, and diamonds) greed and grievance has resulted in conflict-ridden underdevelopment in DRC. Other scholars, including Gberie (2004); Smillie et a1. (2000); Wilson (2006), and Zack- Williams (1998) have examined how the diamond trade was also used to destabilize West Africa. They noted that Charles Taylor, a warlord and then leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (N PFL) served as an agent in the trading of arms for diamonds. It is essential to note that most of these works focus on mineral/oil resources and civil wars. Very few works address community conflicts at the locale of extraction (Bebbington et al., 2008; Hilson, 2002; Ngoie and Omeje, 37 It is estimated that President Mobutu’s personal wealth was $4 billion. 54 2008; Watts, 2008)”. Bebbington et al. (2008) point out that the expansion of corporate mining in Peru and Ecuador has resulted in community protests as rural livelihoods of community groups have been adversely affected. They note that while conflicts can threaten corporate activities, pressure from social movements may lead to a more inclusive participation in decisions geared towards community development. N goie and Omeje (2008) explore low-intensity conflict over diamond and copper mining in Kasai and Kasanga regions in the DRC. They assert that the conflict is pivoted on the contestation between modernity (government’s expansion of concession for corporate mining) and traditionalism (local people’s continued use of land for small scale mining and agrarian and forest activities). Their research examines the political economic dynamics of such conflicts. This dissertation contributes to the literature on community conflicts in mining areas, but focuses instead on the sociospatial dynamics of such conflicts. 2. 6.5 Environmental Explanation of the Resource Curse Scholars have examined the environmental impacts of mining (Hilson, 2002; Naidoo-Vermaak, 2009; Zack-Williams, 1995). The environmental impacts of diamond mining include deforestation, land degradation, and soil erosion. Weak controls or regulation of diamond mining has wreaked environmental havoc throughout Africa and other parts of the world. Partnership Afiica Canada (2004) notes that in Angola, ninety years of environmental neglect in mining areas have devastated large tracts of land, poisoned local water, forced 38 Low-intensity community conflicts are those in which extreme violence is sporadic, as distinct fiom armed conflicts in which extreme violence result in at least 1,000 combatant deaths per annum. 55 indigenous populations to relocate, and removed their primary livelihood, agriculture (Partnership Afiica Canada, 2004). Nyame and Danso (2006) pinpoint land degradation, loss of biodiversity, and pollution of rivers as the environmental consequences of diamond mining in Birim, Eastern Ghana. In a similar vein, Aryee et al. (2003) examine the environmental impact of precious mineral extraction in Ghana and highlight some major impacts. First, mineral extraction affect the lithosphere of which the primary impact is land degradation. This is more so in uncontrolled, unmonitored small-scale mining sites. Large tracts of agricultural land are also destroyed due to excessive vegetation removal and disruption of soil structure. Second, the drainage system is adversely affected by mining. Tailings may enter streams and rivers during heavy rains leading to sedimentation problems as streams become unusable for domestic and industrial purposes. While these studies highlight environmental impacts of mining, they did not explore the spatial pattern and extent of the environmental impacts of mining. This study assesses the spatial pattern and extent of environmental impacts of diamond mining focusing on land cover change, and its impacts on local livelihoods. It also explores respondents’ perceptions of mining/farming induced environmental change and its local impacts. 2.7 Focus of Study: Social and Environmental Implications Most of the aforementioned studies emphasize economic factors such as poor economic growth, lack of economic diversification, and political factors like weak governance and corruption as explanations of the resource curse, yet social and external factors have not been given sufficient consideration. The role of 56 social phenomena needs to be comprehensively addressed since contextual and historical social patterns do shape the functioning of state institutions and the (mis) management of oil/mineral resources (Rosser 2006). This dissertation aims at examining how the interactions of social actors in diamond exploitation at multiple scales do influence socio-environmental outcomes. 2.8 Diamonds and the Resource Curse in Sierra Leone Some works posit that politicization of Sierra Leone’s diamond industry has worsened government’s capacity to regulate the diamond industry (Davies, 2002; Reno, 1995; Schwartz, 2006). Some studies have examined how former president Stevens implemented the patrimonial system of governance in Sierra Leone (Davies, 2002; Kabia, 2008; Reno, 1995, 2003; Zack-Williams, 1998). They maintain that the use of the diamond industry as compensation mechanism for party loyalists marginalized most local people and opposition members, and was the root cause of political and economic collapse. Davies (2006) asserts that the politicization of diamond exploitation during Stevens’ era undermined the state and accelerated informal mining. Gberie (2004); Levin (2006); Reno (2003); and Zack-Williams (1995) have examined informal and illicit diamond trading in Sierra Leone. They pinpoint that a striking feature of Sierra Leone is the degree to which top politicians and businessmen pursue personal wealth and political power through informal markets. Gberie (2004) and Reno (2003) note that the informal and 57 illicit diamond trade mainly controlled by foreigners and a few local elites39 resulted in a precipitous decline in official earnings from diamond exports and increasingly high unemployment. This study examines why and how illicit diamond mining and smuggling of diamonds is prevalent in Sierra Leone focusing on Kono District. It questions the effectiveness of the Kimberley Process in combating illegal trade of Sierra Leone diamonds. Few works have examined the links between diamond exploitation and local livelihoods (e. g. Global Witness, 2004; Levin, 2006, USAID, 2005). A notable exception is Levin (2006) who uses the sustainable livelihoods approach to examine diamond mining and governance in Kono District.40 Levin’s study shows the sharp economic disparity between the diggers on one hand and the dealers and exporters on the other hand in alluvial diamond mining. Findings of Levin’s study suggest an integrated livelihood approach for analyzing sustainable livelihoods in Kono so as to demonstrate how the various natural and human capital endowments can enhance sustainable livelihoods“. This research builds on Levin’s work, but adds how the environmental impacts and social dynamics of diamond mining affect local livelihoods. A number of scholars have examined how unregulated diamond mining in Sierra Leone has fuelled conflicts, culminating in civil war from 1991 to 2002 (Campbell, 2002; Fithen, 1999; Hirsch, 2001; Olsson, 2006; Reno, 2003; 39 Illicit mining and smuggling occurs in collusion between local business elites, traditional authorities, and foreign businessmen many of them of Lebanese descent. See Reno (1995, 2003). 4° Sustainable rural livelihoods enhance the assets and capabilities of rural dwellers while maintaining the natural resource base. See Ellis 2000, Rural Livelihood and Diversity in Developing Countries. “ An integrated local livelihood may consist of a myriad of resources that households utilize in the production of their livelihoods. See Bury (2005). 58 Richards, 1996; Ross, 2004; Silberfein, 2005; Smillie et al., 2000;). Smillie et al. (2000), Hirsch (2001), among others maintain that access to and control of diamonds was a major causative factor for the civil war and its protraction. Others like Fithen (1999); Kabia (2008); Olsson (2006); and Ross (2004) contend that diamonds were not a primary causative factor of Sierra Leone’s civil war but they contributed immensely to its protraction as proceeds from diamonds provided finances for belligerents (especially the rebel Revolutionary United Front ~RUF). While extensive work has been done on diamonds and armed conflict in Sierra Leone, not much attention has been given to contemporary local conflicts (Jenkins-Johnston Commission Report, 2008; NMJ D, 2006; 2008). According to NMJ D (2006) there are conflicts between diamond mining companies and communities, and mining communities and local authorities. It is important to understand the social dynamics of these conflicts so as to mitigate the problem, thus preventing further escalation to national scale. The current study gives an overview of the diamond-civil war debate while discussing the historical evolution of diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone. Its primary focus though is to examine contemporary local conflicts driven by diamond mining in Kono District. In addition to social problems, mineral exploitation in Sierra Leone has been shown to result in environmental impacts, including deforestation and land degradation (Akiwumi, 2006; PAC, 2006; NACE, 2009; Schwartz, 2006; Zack- Williams, 1995). For purposes of this study, environmental degradation refers to environmental and natural resource deterioration that result in substantial decrease in biological productivity and are 59 triggered by anthropogenic activities. The study focuses on land cover change degradation, especially deforestation. Akiwumi (2006) examined environmental impacts of rutile mining in South Western Sierra Leone and observed that large areas have been devastated due to mining. She noted that artificial lakes have been created and massive deforestation has occurred. Schwartz (2006), and Partnership Afiica Canada (2005) have described environmental degradation associated with diamond mining. They noted that non-implementation of mining policies contributed to enviromnental degradation. While both Kimberlite and alluvial diamond mining have contributed to environmental degradation; the latter is significantly more damaging as its deposits are spatially dispersed and surficial (Gbekie, 2003; Sesay, 2002)“. Gbekie (2003) and Sesay (2002) did empirical studies on environmental impact of diamond mining in Kono and Kenema districts respectively. Though these works identified environmental problems, they did not examine them from a spatial change perspective. This study adopts a spatially explicit approach to land cover change in mining areas in Kono district based on the analysis of remotely sensed images. Such analysis has been shown to provide useful information that can aid natural resource and environmental management.43 It also explores other aspects of environmental degradation. Diamond mining communities are not only marginalized economically, socially, and politically but also appear to bear the enviromnental costs of ‘2 Artisanal miners, some of whom are illicit miners devastate the environment as they lack geological knowledge of diamond deposit locations, thus they engage in ‘trial by error’ mining. ‘3 Determination of the spatial extent and pattern of land cover change can guide land rehabilitation measures. 60 diamond extraction.44 Diamond mining can have a debilitating effect on land- based resources (6. g. soils, water and trees), thus minimizing local livelihood options. This dissertation therefore aims at contributing to the resource curse literature from a social as well as ecological standpoint by examining the spatial and temporal dynamics of environmental change along with the traditional political economic dynamics as summarized in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.1 illustrates how political and economic factors at the national and international levels influence the socio-spatial dynamics surrounding diamond exploitation at the local level, national, and global levels and the socio-ecological impacts especially at the local and national levels. It shows how market forces and governance issues at multiple scales intersect with socio-political dynamics and the spatiality of the resource and the socio, economic, political, and environmental ramifications and how they affect local livelihoods in Kono District. ’4 Communities suffer from land rights violation by authorities, inadequate compensation if any, and have to cope with degraded land-based resources. 61 0:530:53.— 3u:0:_:0.:>:0.0_000 "—0.00:— 333050 03:52.5 _.N 0.55...— ...JOU<..J 5.83:0: 00002.:0toanam 0050 3505:0550 «0.553 0:3 505500» 303 0:58.3m 3055—550: 3505:0550 >558: 3:532 803— 3355: $000033 055:: 9sz 0.83.0: 303.83: 33:0 033 855—550: 3505:0550 5:03:59: 50:30:03 \ 505.5005 353003 3 0:: 35335000.: 550:8 “00:0..— 05: 0055500 5080.50 8:35 3050: 3:532 303:5 3505:0551: .950585 505020.53 3:255 :55 2:03 _ 0050 .0055 :0559 305—0: 80.5535 300— 0:05:50 86:5 e5 0 0:05:00 000505450559 0.58:. 3852 550:000 3505:0550 5555 3:53: 50000:“ 0305:0— -m_0>0~ 3:055:85 0:: 3:532 3000: 35:30 0510955 0 0 .5 8:50: 50.05 3w0~ 0:: >020: :23— .052 .305005v .3353 0:050: .8059 33:50 05808. 0:533: 00:00 888% .8 335% 5380 8338 850:8 050:000500m 655892 33555003555006 50:05 02935055— )\ 05555583058500 5:00.35 .m:0:3:m5 E0005 80:8 5505353555 3&3 8:050: 3600. :0 :0 3:53: .0300 ”0:533: 030: 3:030: .303 “0:95 30mw0_000.0_00m _0>0_ 5020.50 3 853:»: 3550503 5803 05800..“— 62 2.9 Conclusion In this chapter, I have examined the political economy framework that has been adopted to appraise the problem of the resource curse. It emphasizes political institutions, rules, and political actions and their socio-economic outcomes. The role of the state and global capital are key aspects of analysis. Further, I have justified why the dissertation has adopted a more encompassing approach, political ecology, in interrogating socio-environmental ramifications of the resource curse. Political ecology brings out the essence of political and economic power and how they influence resource access, control and utilization across temporal and spatial scales. By specifically adopting an actor-oriented political ecology focus, the power relations amongst various social actors engaged in diamond exploitation are examined in order to evaluate the extent and socio- environmental outcomes of the resource curse. The actor-oriented approach implicitly allows for consideration of the politics of scale theory in explaining spatialized power relations. The actor-oriented approach allows the actors to be followed thereby reducing the possibility of privileging a particular scale, thus avoiding the local trap45 . Thus, actor-oriented political ecology examines the socio-spatial dynamics of the power relations surrounding the exploitation of diamonds. 45 Local trap refers to cases in which political ecologist privilege local scale of analysis with the belief that they would have desired social and ecological outcomes than activities at other scales. 63 I also reviewed the literature on the resource curse with particular reference to SSA and Sierra Leone is reviewed from the political, economic, social, and environmental perspectives. Political and economic conditions seem to be the primary contributors to the resource curse with social and environmental ramifications. 64 CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 3.1 Introduction Methods used in this study include social survey and remote sensing analysis. These were employed in order to achieve the objectives and test the hypotheses stated in Chapter 1. Social survey analyses involved structured household interviews, in-depth key informant interviews, focus groups, secondary data, and archival research to investigate the social, political, economic and environmental dimensions of diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone with specific reference to Kono District. In addition, the study utilized remote sensing analysis as proxy for landscape level analysis. It was used to determine the spatial pattern and extent of land cover change which was compared to local perceptions of environmental change. In this chapter a detailed explanation and justification of research methods is presented, including data collection methods and data analysis techniques. To address the first hypothesis, introduction and maintenance of patrimonial politics and growing informalization of diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone have historically reduced the positive role of diamonds in national and local economic development largely into a resource curse. I used archival data, secondary data, oral history accounts and semi-structured and informal interviews. Materials from these sources enabled a comprehensive analysis of the declining role of diamonds to the country’s socioeconomic development. In order to address the second hypothesis, diverse social actors at local, national and international scales have taken advantage of the weak regulatory 65 state apparatus in Sierra Leone to exploit diamonds in ways that turned a rich endowment of a rare, portable, precious mineral more into a curse than a blessing, I used a combination of structured household interviews, semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and archival data. These multiple sources corroborated in giving a more robust explanation of the extent of the resource curse. While responses from household interviews focused primarily on the extent of government’s capacity to monitor mines and patron-client relations in diamond exploitation, key informants interviews and focus groups discussions provided more detailed reasons about the characteristics of state capacity. To address hypothesis three, geographically diffuse and remotely-located, highly valuable natural resources are more a liability than an asset, household responses to issues related to illicit mining and trading, key informants’ perception of government regulation and illicit exploitation, and secondary data were utilized. Existing maps of known deposits were also used to determine the spatial spread of diamonds. Alluvial diamonds that are widely dispersed have heightened illicit mining and smuggling thus contributing to the resource curse. In order to prove that environmental conditions in diamond chiefdoms are worse than in non-diamond chiefdoms (hypothesis 4), responses from households in the diamond and non-diamond areas related to environmental conditions were analyzed. This was supplemented by key-informant interviews and focus groups in diamond and non-diamond regions. With regards to the environmental conditions analysis of remotely sensed satellite images provided insights into the spatial and temporal pattern of land cover change by comparing diamond and non 66 diamond areas, in the pre-war (1986 to 1991), war (1991 to 2002), and post war periods (2002-2007). This was used in concert with responses from household surveys, key informants interviews and focus groups to the environmental change schedule. 3.2 Social Analysis of Diamonds as a Resource Curse 3.2.] Sample Frame and Sample Size Understanding the sociospatial context of social actors and diamond exploitation is important to unravel the socio-environmental ramifications of diamond mining. Data were collected on social, economic, political, institutional, scalar, and environmental factors to examine the extent to which diamonds constituted a resource curse. The main methods used were a household questionnaire survey, key informant interviews, focus groups, observation, and secondary data. A stratified random and systematic sampling procedure was used for household interviews (Alreck and Settle, 2004). First, the household population of Kono District was stratified into diamond and non-diamond producing areas at the scale of the chiefdom. Diamond producing areas are those communities in which the principal economic activity were diamonds though there were secondary economic activities while non-diamond producing areas did not necessarily have direct involvement in diamond production. Second, four chiefdoms from the diamond-mining areas and two from the non-diamond mining areas were randomly selected. Third, two towns/villages from each of the selected chiefdoms were randomly selected, totaling eight from the diamond mining chiefdoms, and four from the non-diamond chiefdoms; hence, twelve towns/villages in 67 total. Thirty households were selected in each town/village through a systematic sampling. Every sixth household was systematically selected along representative and clear transects across each town/village. Of the 360 households interviewed, 240 were from diamond mining chiefdoms and 120 from non- diamond mining (agricultural) chiefdoms. In his study of the social and environmental impacts of mining in Geita District, Tanzania Kitula (2006) used a sample size of 148 to compare mining and non- mining communities from a population covering seven administrative sections and a population of 712,195. Selection of chiefdoms through stratified sampling ensured spatial representation of the population while random sampling of household served as a protection against biased representation of the population. 3.2.2 Structured Household Interviews Structured interview instruments were administered by questionnaire to household heads. An adult household member was interviewed in a few cases in which the household head was unavailable. On the whole, 97.1 percent of household respondents were males while 2.9 percent were females. The mean age of respondents was 35 while their ages ranged from 20 to 76. The questionnaire was in Krio, the linguafranca of Sierra Leone (99.9% of Sierra Leoneans understand and speak Krio). The average time for household interviews was 50 minutes. Prior to pilot surveys, the author organized a three day workshop during which research assistants (three) were given thorough insight about the questionnaire, the level of details required, and the intent of the survey. Mock sessions were held during the second and third days to ensure that they were 68 abreast with the survey.46 The questionnaire schedule was pre-tested in four towns/villages by the author and research assistants and was modified accordingly. The survey instrument was organized into six main sections: (1) demographic and livelihood information; (2) illicit diamond mining and marketing; (3) socio-economic disparity; (4) conflicts over natural resources; (5) environmental degradation; and (6) livelihood and household gender relations (see Appendixl). An ordinary 1-5 or 1—3 likert scale was used to record responses to questions involving ordinal rating. For open-ended questions, interviewees’ personal impressions were noted in the questionnaire. Questions asked included the causes of illegal mining and smuggling, temporal and spatial aspects of illegal mining and measures by which legal diamond exploitation can be enhanced. Questions asked included the following: ls illicit mining in Kono greater in remote places than in places close to cities and towns? Does the spatial dispersal of diamonds result in increasing illicit mining? Over the past 5 years, how would you characterize the trend in illicit diamond mining? These questions were designed to gather information about the spatial geography of diamonds. A number of questions were asked in relation to the weak state apparatus. They included: how do you rate the effectiveness of local mining rules in your community? How do you rate the effective of national mining rules in your community? Which of these is the major cause of illicit trade in diamonds? 3.2.3 Key Informant Interviews Semi-structured interviews of key informants were designed to further develop issues related to diamond mining regulations, scalar linkages and politics, 6 These research assrstants had consrderable experience in socral surveys in the Eastern Provmce. 69 diamond mining conflicts, environmental conditions in mining/non-mining areas, context, town/village history, and to validate information obtained from other methods or sources. The author interviewed selected town/village (henceforth referred to as town), state and non-state actors at different scales. These included three paramount chiefs (chiefdom heads), eight town/section chiefs, religious leaders, teachers, elderly persons, and farmers. Government mining officials, diamond dealers, license holders, diamond mining supporters, company workers, district council officials, and mining-related NGO officials were also interviewed. Interviews provided an ample account of government regulatory mechanisms for diamond mining, their strengths and weaknesses, the effectiveness of mining and environmental policies, power relations amongst the various actors and their impact, oral historical accounts of diamond exploitation, agricultural and food security trends, and forest use in mining/non mining communities. 3.2.4 Focus Group Discussions Focus groups were useful as they amplified some themes indicated by household respondents. Focus groups helped to capture community interests and the sociospatial dynamics of diamond exploitation with the benefit of group discussion and consensus (Alreck and Settle, 2004). Focus groups included six digger/miner groups, two youth groups, and two women’s groups. The focus was on sociopolitical dynamics of diamond exploitation from the viewpoint of groups considered marginalized by the literature (c.f. Global Witness, 2004; Levin, 2006). lnforrnation collected was centered on perceptions of illicit diamond mining and marketing, trends in diamond mining, the impacts of mining on 70 livelihoods at household and community levels, the strengths and weaknesses of government regulation practices, socio—economic conditions of miners and farmers, land use conflicts, trends in land use/land cover, major environmental problems, and gender dynamics of environmental change. 3.2.5 Personal Observation and Secondary Data Sources During the duration of fieldwork, the author kept a field diary and noted daily observations and impressions from the field, which provided a salient source of perspective on the study. The author visited a number of mining operations in various mining chiefdoms and observed that there were several small pits covering extensive areas. This was particularly so in remote areas where illicit mining was common. Further, secondary information on the broader political economy of diamond exploitation, historical aspects of diamond exploitation, mining and forestry policies, environmental impacts of diamond mining, conflict diamonds, international diamond regulatory mechanisms, and international diamond actors was collected from various documents in the form of ministry of mineral resources reports, policy papers, projects, diamond extraction research records, the World Bank, donors and international NGO reports, conference and workshop proceedings, and formal correspondence. Archival research of Ministry of Mineral Resources and other government documents was conducted in the National Archives of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone Library Board, and the University Library at Fourah Bay College. The author also attended a one-day workshop in Koidu Kono on community initiatives on the identification and mitigation of social and environmental impacts of large-scale diamond mining in 71 Sierra Leone in January 2007. This broadened the researcher’s horizon on issues related to the socio-environmental ramifications of diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone. 3.3 Land Cover Change Analysis 3.3.] Remote Sensing Based Analysis of Land Cover Change 1986 to 2007 In an attempt to prove or disprove the environmental dimensions of the resource curse in a spatially explicit manner, the author compared perceptions of interviewees with empirical land cover change analysis based on remotely sensed Landsat Thematic Mapper (TM) satellite data between 1986 and 2007. The year 1986 was used as a baseline because change of leadership that called for the enforcement of mining regulation occurred in Sierra Leone.47 The civil war started in 1991 and ended in 2002. During this period rebellious groups especially the RUF controlled diamonds. In 2002, diamond mining came under central government control. The dates of the Landsat images were chosen in order to examine land cover change in different diamond management regimes: (1) from the onset of stricter regulation (1986) to the rebel incursion of Kono, in 1991; (2) from 1991 to the end of the war and subsequent resumption of official mining in 2002; and (3) from the resumption of official mining in 2002 to 2007 when a new government was elected. Changes detected in pattern and rates of land use/land cover change helped to demonstrate the environmental dimension of the resource curse (Agyemang et al., 2007; Akiwumi and Butler, 2007; Kusimi, 2008). ‘7 A new dispensation called New Order was introduced by President Momoh who succeeded President Stevens in 1986. 72 3.3.2 Methodology for Land Cover/Use Change Radiometrically corrected Landsat images for 1986, 1991, 2002, and 2007 (two scenes per year) obtained from USGS Earth Explorer were used for the land cover change detection analysis. Table 3.1 shows the type and dates of the images used. Images selected were those covering the period January to April (mid-dry season) so as to increase the chances of cloud-free images and for clear distinction between trees and other vegetation. Actual year and acquisition dates selected for the analysis were partly determined by available image that were relatively cloud cover fi'ee. Cloud cover on all but one of the images was 0%. One of the 1991 images had a cloud cover of 10 %. However, the study area was outside the cloud prone region of the image. The spatial extent of a Landsat image is 185 by 185 kilometer, and the spatial resolution of the images was 30 meter. Table 3.1 Satellite images for land cover change Image type & year Date Path and Row TM 1986 1/21 p200r54 TM 1986 1/12 p201r54 TM 1991 1/24 p200r54 TM 1991 2/2 p201r54 ETM+ 2002 2/25 p200r54 ETM+2002 1/16 p201r54 TM 2007 3/20 p200r54 TM2007 4/12 P20 1 r54 3.3.2.1 Image Pre-processing Data analysis includes converting the images from Tiff file format to Erdas imagine image format and subsequently stacking the non thermal bands (1-5 and 7). Next the images were corrected by image-to-map rectification and image to image registration using bilinear interpolation resampling algorithm (Jensen, 2005). The 1986 image was 73 rectified using a topographic map of the district while the subsequent images were registered to the corrected 1986 image. Each of the scenes within the same path and row were overlaid to verify that the geometric correction was accurate. The total root mean square (RMS) error was less than 0.1 for all the geometrically corrected images. For each of the geometric correction, more than 20 ground control points were used. The next stage of image preprocessing was the correction of each of the images for atmospheric interference. Dark object subtraction method was used in atmospheric correction (Lu et al., 2002). Atmospheric correction was done in two steps. The first step involves conversion of the raw satellite image to apparent at-sensor radiance followed by conversion to surface reflectance. Conversion of the raw satellite image (Landsat digital number) to at-sensor radiance was executed as follows: Equation (1) was used for images where maximum and minimum radiance values were included in the image header file, while equation (2) was used where gain and offset information was included in the header file (Chander et a1, 2009). LMAX/r — LMIN/r Qcal max— Qcal min Ll : ) (Qcal — Qcal min) + LMIN/l Equation (1) Lk= Grescale X Qcal + Brescale Equation (2) Where Ly = At-sensor spectral radiance in [W/(m2 sr um)] Qcal = Landsat image pixel value (digital number DN) Qcalmin = Minimum quantized calibrated pixel value corresponding to LMINl Qcalmax = Maximum quantized calibrated pixel value corresponding to LMAX; 74 LMINK = Spectral —at sensor radiance that is scaled to Qcalmin [W/(m2 sr um)] LMAXX = Spectral -—at sensor radiance that is scaled to Qcalmax [W/(m2 sr um)] Grescale = Band-specific rescaling gain factor [W/(m2 sr um)] Brescale = Band-specific rescaling bias factor [W/(m2 sr um)] In the second stage of correcting for atmospheric interference, the at-sensor spectral radiance images were converted to surface reflectance images using dark object subtraction method (Lu et al., 2002). The equation used in dark-object subtraction is as follows: R1 = H * D2 * (Ly - Lkhazey (E81111). arr COS 95) Equation (3) Where Rx = Surface reflectance. n = Mathematical constant equal to 3.14159 [unitless]. D = Distance between Earth and sun [astronomical units]. L), = At—sensor spectral radiance. Lkhaze = path radiance. Esunx = Mean atmospheric spectral irradiance [W/(m2 um)] GS = sun zenith angle (or 90- sun elevation angle). Following atmospheric correction, each of the bands in the 8 scenes were stacked and mosaickcd. The images were successfirlly mosaicked by the area of interest region around each scene. Histogram matching algorithm using band by band method was used to mosaic the images (Erdas, 2003). The study area was subsetted from the mosaicked image by deriving an area of interest (AOI) file from a shape file of the study area. The A01 file of the study area was used to subset the study area from each of the mosaicked images for the four time periods under investigation. 75 Image statistical analysis was conducted to locate those bands in the images that highly correlate with each other in order to prevent the problem of data redundancy (Jensen, 2005). In the 1986, 2002 and 2007 images, band 2 was removed from the rest of the bands in the images during classification as it highly correlated with band 3. 3.3.2.2 Image Classification and Accuracy Assessment A hard classification approach was used in classifying the images with the aid of a hybrid classification procedure. Firstly, an unsupervised classification using ISODATA algorithm was conducted to guide in the selection of unique signatures from the images. Additional signatures were manually collected and merged with those obtained by the unsupervised classification. A supervised classification using maximum likelihood classifier was conducted. The final land cover classes derived from image classification include grass, agricultural, forest, water, settlement and bare ground. To conduct accuracy assessment of classification, a total of 330 points was selected by stratified random sampling technique wherein each land cover class had a minimum of 50 reference points. As a result of the lack of aerial photographs for all the time period of the study, a topographic land cover map of 1986 wasused as a reference for the 1986 classification. High resolution aerial photograph of the study area was used to assess classification accuracy for subsequent years. The tables in Appendix 2 summarize the classification accuracy for the four study periods. The 1986 image had the highest classification (86.67%); this was followed by 2002 and 2007; while 1991 had the lowest accuracy (84.55%). The very low classification accuracy of the 1991 image can be attributed to the relatively low quality of the image compared to the others. For individual classes, water had the highest 76 producers’ accuracy for all the classified images. Lowest producers’ accuracy was recorded for bare ground and grass. Highest users’ accuracy was recorded for grass while urban/settlement recorded the lowest users’ accuracy. 3.3.2.3 Image Change Detection Change detection was conducted to show how forest cover changes over the 21 year study period. This was done by developing a model in Erdas Spatial Modeler that shows the types of land uses that forest changed to between 1986 and 2007. The model was executed in two stages. In the first stage, an ‘If then’ conditional expression was written to show only forest areas in 1986 while all other land covers were masked out. Similarly, four ‘if then’ conditional expressions were written to show grass, agriculture, water, 11er built-up areas and bare ground respectively in 2007. The above gave two temporary images for 1986 and 2007. To obtain lands that changed from forest to other land uses in 2007, a ‘bit—wise’ expression was written using the temporary images as variables. The model produced four binary images of forest cover change to grass, agriculture, 11er built-up areas and bare ground. These images were overlaid in ArcGIS 9.3 to produce the change detection map (See Chapter 6). These outputs have contributed to amplify respondents’ perception of the environmental dimension of the resource curse in Kono District. Figure 3.1 is a flowchart showing the various operations employed in change detection. 77 TM for 1991 ETM for 200 TM for 2007 l Preprocessing of images Classification of images Accuracy assessment of classification 1 l l l l Classified TM 1986 Classified TM 1991 Classified ETM 2002 Classified TM 2007 post classification I [ Post classification] [Post classification] I Post classification 1 , 1 Figure 3.1 Land use/land cover change detection flow chart =1] Change detection 3.3.2.4 Comparison of Forest Cover Spatial Extent to other Land Uses The proportion of forest cover in the classified images was compared to non forest land uses during the four time periods of study. This was executed by creating a shape file for the six diamondiferous regions. Next, the shape file was converted to Erdas imagine area of interest (AOI) file; the latter was used to subset the classified images thus extracting the diamond regions. After this process, the spatial extent of all the other land uses was summed exclusive of the forest cover. The proportion of forest to other land uses was expressed in percentage (See Chapter 6). To extract the agricultural regions from the classified image, a simple model in Erdas imagine spatial modeler was developed. This model subtracted the diamond regions from the classified image producing the agricultural region. The percentage of 78 forested vis-a-vis non-forested regions within the agricultural region was then calculated (see Chapter 6). 3.4 Analysis of Social Survey Data Common themes that resonated in study objectives and direct overall analysis were power relations, socio-spatial relations, context, and scale. Qualitative content of semi-structural interviewee’ responses were summarized into themes and outstanding ideas and quotes were pinpointed to explain findings. Simple descriptive statistics (which included percent counts, mean, and mode) were utilized to summarize survey data. Chi- Square tests were used to test statistical association in qualitative responses between demographic, social, and economic, and household characteristics to diamond mining, farming, and forest use. Frequency responses provided a measure of strength of the level of the various categories of responses with reference to types of economic activities, income obtained from diamonds, income obtained from other economic activities. Estimates of diggers/miners’ income from diamonds were based on the monetary value of daily mining support during annual mining period(s), amount obtained from diamond sales. Other incomes were estimated based on what households earned from non—diamond mining activities. A range of income brackets were created and the mean income was calculated. 79 CHAPTER4: HISTORY OF DIAMOND EXPLOITATION IN SIERRA LEONE 4.1 Introduction This chapter investigates diamond mining and marketing in Sierra Leone, an essential facet of the country’s economic and political life since the inception of mining in the 19303. Although diamond concentration varies, the spatial extent of diamonds is widespread (Figure 4.1). The main goal of this chapter is to address hypothesis one: “introduction and maintenance of patrimonial politics and growing informalization of diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone have historically reduced the positive role of diamonds in national and local economic development largely into a resource curse.” In order words, it assesses the degree to which diamonds, over successive periods, have been transformed from being more of a ‘resource ‘blessing,’ to more of a ‘resource curse’ for Sierra Leone. The chapter illuminates how governments have formulated mining policies geared towards fiscal revenue generation for national development, but for the most part ‘underdevelopment’ has been the outcome. It examines the sociospatial dimensions of power relations surrounding diamond extraction and marketing, and the socio-economic outcomes at the national and local levels. Various social actors with multiple interests, motivations, and actions and differential power relations have been involved in diamond exploitation and have used their operational scales to achieve different and sometimes conflicting goals (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Attention is paid to how political and economic structures enabled some actors to benefit immensely while others bore the cost, and how those actors with limited power circumvented extant and entrenched structures to achieve their aspirations/ goals. It also examines the degree of enforcement of national diamond mining laws/policies in relation to illegal exploitation, 80 and how some regulatory officials had been either complacent or colluded with other actors to achieve their economic and/or political interests. r2 .. L", ' ‘u \le :4, “ Bomball l, .. .I f V, . I I, " , l J “ ’ r ‘ -.-- ' .1 IP / Ir 1. I,» — ‘l _ _‘ (- _ ‘k‘. \- ’1 (I L.“ if "7” fl 1 _ J!) l .r‘ F\' M" l ‘x n J A . ' ‘ 4', .I. \x, K!" t... Kambra f l Nam" ( - j ’ (:31 [,1 "~.\ \, 1,”: ~_~_.. u.-"\s-:rw"-PJ' ;‘ “I ‘ 1‘ i l i r/j \ fl l.\‘ ? Port Loko «.1; kao'll' \‘r’ Kono Freetown .3 - ‘ ‘ g — g ‘-y'.l‘.-~ J ‘ If {ft _ f k . fin.” \\ if" ~. _ __ A g I, b { {NJ : '7 ~ t'. g It *3/— —LL ,1 A; l \. kg 5.} J I .11. _fi ',L‘ .’ . .— ) I; '9‘]. I ~ K, M b l‘. . II (I: . (‘I/ 4 oyam a .Bo '. I; Kallahun _/ Atlantic g) ,r’" “'4 ,._-/ .1" Ocean '“ I ,. i" 0K enema \ 5’ I r_ ’“vl‘ Vt} f,’ ' — I Y I x J ‘ l"? A t / ..r .. o —- ~ . w x r' , l ,_.., “a, ‘L 7’ 53-; "— I. ‘(tw ‘ :1“ \'%‘ _I‘ . “H x”), L47! 1 \rn __ . v ‘9'“ “i. 71:33:” \k'fij) l r( ‘4 " ~ - Borithe ‘ 3 I . |. 17 .-. I. , ’ Legend ~ ‘ . _ PUJGhUl'l ,_ 0 Provincial headquarter towns L\ o" F'— ”" . . “x. {:4 l I District boundary I; D "we ...; [--_] Low concentration 0 10 20 40 60 80 . | J Moderate concentration -:-:_:- Miles L__j High concentration Figure 4.1 Map of Sierra Leone showing diamond concentration by district 81 Data for this chapter were obtained from archival sources as well as interviews. The principal sources of information were historical records from the Sierra Leone National Archives, the Ministry of Mineral Resources, the Kono Government Office, various government reports, published works, and theses/dissertations. Data were also obtained from oral historical accounts of elderly people and informal interviews. The discussion will be structured along the following: 1) diamond exploitation during the colonial era; 2) diamond exploitation in post-colonial to pre-civil war period; 3) diamonds and the civil war; and 4) diamond management in post-conflict Sierra Leone. The four time period were chosen because they were significant benchmarks in the country’s political fabric which had major implications on its diamond industry. A historical overview of diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone is relevant as it demonstrates the varying degrees of the resource curse over time and that the contemporary situation has historical bearing. 4.2 Diamond Exploitation during the Colonial Era (1930 to 1960) During the colonial period a number of economic and political policies were initiated to facilitate an effective system for the production and marketing of diamonds. The most significant innovations were government’s monopolistic control over the mining, marketing, and utilization of mineral revenues. The period also witnessed the emergence and growth of illicit diamond mining. Local political pressure and security threats over illicit mining necessitated the introduction of a dual mining system (corporate and artisanal mining) and the establishment of mining community development projects. 82 4.2.1 Initial Mining Policies Colonial government’s hold on Sierra Leone minerals was consolidated following the enactment of the Mineral Ordinance in 1927 which vested control of all minerals in the Crown (Greenlaugh, 1985; Laws of Sierra Leone, 1946; Van der Laan, 1965). From the onset, the power relations surrounding access, control and utilization of mineral resources were asymmetrical as the colonial authorities in London and the colonial government stationed in Freetown had considerable if not absolute power over minerals. In justifying its position towards mineral exploitation, the colonial government maintained that it was better placed to negotiate mining concessions with corporate entities than the traditional leaders —pararnount chiefs and their subordinates (Van der Laan, 1965).48 Thus traditional leaders were not involved in negotiation for industrial diamond mining concession.49 Government’s authority over minerals was manifested in the negotiation, and terms of corporate mining concession following the discovery of diamonds by the geological survey team in 1930 in the Gbobora stream, Nimikoro Chiefdom in Kono District of Sierra Leone (Saylor, 1967; Van der Laan, 1965; Zack-Williams, 1995). The Consolidated Afiican Selection Trust (CAST) a subsidiary of the Selection Trust Group of London, with shares held by De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited of South Afi'ica, was notified about the discovery (Van der Laan, 1965; Zack-Williams, 1995). In 1931 the colonial government of Sierra Leone granted CAST an exclusive license to prospect 4,170 square miles in areas adjacent to the initial discovery (Saylor, 1967). Prospecting results indicated that there were deposits over the entire area but substantial deposits ‘8 The chiefiaincy structure is hierarchical and consisted of the paramount chiefs, sections chiefs, town/village chiefs. ‘9 This was the case of gold mining that started in the late 19203 and diamond mining in the early 19305. 83 existed within the Bafi-Sewa river system especially in Kono and Kenema districts. In fact, considerable prospecting from 1932 to 1935 indicated that the principal deposits were within 90 square miles centered on Yengema near Koidu, Kono District (Zack- Williams, 1995). Based on the prospecting report, CAST applied to the British Colonial Government for exclusive diamond mining rights for the whole country. Although the United African Company (UAC) was also interested in mining, the Legislative Council in Freetown turned down its application and granted exclusive prospecting and mining rights to a Britain-based foreign company (Saylor, 1967; Zack-Williams, 1995).50 CAST, on behalf of its subsidiary, the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) established in 1934, argued that success of operating the diamond fields would be difficult if several parties were involved. Further, it underscored that “only when diamonds are in strong hands can the market be kept on a payable basis” (Zack-Williams 1995:51). However, it appears that the colonial government granted industrial mining concession to a British company because of its own interests. According to an agreement in 1935 (Ordinance No. 22 of 1935), CAST was granted exclusive rights for the production and marketing of all Sierra Leonean diamonds for a period of 99 years. CAST agreed to pay 27.5 percent tax of net profits (later increased to 45 percent) and a £7,000 per annum mineral rent to operate the Sierra Leone leases (Burke, 1959; Saylor, 1967; Van der Lann, 1965).51 Thus government consolidated its power to control diamonds and generate mineral revenue following the commencement of industrial diamond mining. 50 Members of the legislature were mainly Europeans with a few representing the colony of Freetown while there were no representatives for the rest of the country. 5 l The £7,000 mineral rent was paid to the Protectorate Mining Benefits Fund. The rest of Sierra Leone (excluding the Western Area) was referred to as the Protectorate and this included the diamondiferous south-eastern Sierra Leone. 84 4. 2.2 Diamond Production and Economic Implications for the Government and DeBeers Exports ’2 000 5000 4500 4000 l 3500 3000 I 2500 / 2000 / 1500 ~ A A / 1000 v 500 ’/, ‘\\\V” 1/7 0 —/ Figure 4.2 Value of diamond production in the colonial era Note: no data available for the period 1941 to 1945 Growth in industrial diamond production was of economic importance to the colonial government of Sierra Leone. As of 1936 diamond production accounted for 56 percent of exports (Saylor, 1967). In fact, revenues from corporate diamond mining transformed the colony’s budget from deficit to surplus up to World War 11. As indicated in figure 4.2, from 1949 onwards the value of production exceeded £1 million. In 1958 production per carat increased by 28.1 percent of the previous year’s exports, while value of production increased from £1395 to 2.415 million (73.1% increase). Although output figures rose by only 3.8 percent from 1959 to 1960 production value for the same period increased by 52.6 percent (from £2856 to 4.358 million). This could be attributed to 85 rising global demand and a steady to increasing global market price of diamonds. Unlike other minerals, diamonds were generally not affected by price volatility, thus government’s share of mineral revenue was encouraging. During the period 1948 to 1952 (following the intensification of mining) the SLST paid the government of Sierra Leone £3.113 million (Van der Laan, 1965). From the economic perspective, therefore, corporate mining was very beneficial to the national government. While diamond production was regarded as an economic windfall for the colonial government it was considered a threat to business ventures of De Beers, a major defacto regulator of the supply and price of rough diamonds in the international market. The Central Selling Organization (CSO), an arm of De Beers, was responsible for the purchase of 80 percent of global rough diamonds. De Beers’ prudent action was to incorporate SLST into the diamond cartel so as to prevent flooding of the international market with rough diamonds. An agreement was reached in which DeBeers would buy at least £1,395,000 of outside producers which included some of Sierra Leone’s output. This purchasing agreement was short-lived as it was only implemented for two consecutive years. The major impediment was declining production due to a reduction in proven deposits. In fact, Sierra Leone’s share of the world market output (in carats) dropped precipitously from 4.6 percent in 1947 to 1.7 percent in 1952. 4. 2.3 Power Relations between the Government, the SLST, Chiefs, and Mining Communities Although national control of diamond exploitation served as an economic stimulus for the colonial government, the position of local people in the diamond economy was marginal. The colonial government negotiated industrial mining concessions without the involvement of the indigenous Kono residents (Conteh, 1979; 86 Reno, 1995). In fact, SLST held a meeting with chiefs and elders and required that they signed agreements by which they divested their rights to land and minerals to the company for nothing in return. Unequal power relations between the colonial government and the local people of Kono were also manifested when, in a feeble attempt to seek the interest of natives, the government passed laws which stipulated that locals be compensated for items destroyed during mining; yet the amount was arbitrary fixed by m. the government without input from the people who owned the land. As of 1934 only one compensation payment had been made but recipients were dissatisfied with the paltry sum (Conteh, 1979). Apart from surface rent payable to paramount chiefs, the initial * agreement did not make provision for royalties to the Konos.52 Furthermore, Kono local residents were restricted from mining except to serve as laborers in the industrial mining sites. The colonial government collected mineral revenues and directed spending while the natives were excluded in decision making related to diamonds (Reno, 1995). This eventually led to popular resentment which affected the state’s capacity to control diamond mining. State’s capacity was clouded with sociospatial power struggles between the central government and local chiefs who had marginal status in the formal diamond economy. Unlike chiefs, ordinary Konos virtually had no role in the formal diamond economy. Chiefs anticipated direct economic benefits in exchange for political loyalty as was the case prior to diamond mining. However, chiefs regarded their exclusion from diamond mining as an unjustified extension of state power over their authority. They 52 The Konos are the natives of the diamondiferous district of Kono and they own the land based on customary land tenure. 87 therefore utilized a social network of strongmen to defy colonial mining policy.53 As a consequence, the colonial government in Freetown embarked on reform so as to increase state capacity to directly control diamond wealth. It also hoped to address the growing dissatisfaction amongst Kono residents with regards to the rate of development (Reno, 1995). Yet, in enhancing state control, the colonial government maintained and increased native authorities’ prestige, encouraged their ideas, and supported their authority. Such ".7 measures adulterated the intended motive of reforms - an effective and capable state administration. Kono chiefs, however, considered the reform unfavorable as they were denied formal authority over what they viewed as their rightful powers over mineral resources. However, government’s effort to increase state institutional capacity included greater legal powers to chiefs in regard to the “alienation of land, control of settlement and local immigration” (Reno 1995146). The special gains of chiefs eventually affected state’s capacity over diamonds as they became essential conduits for chiefs’ influence over diamonds in subsequent years. While the colonial government and the mining company’s intent was to ensure the flow of mineral revenues with marginal economic benefit to the local people in mining communities; chiefs utilized their socio-spatial and political power for personal economic gain by encouraging informal diamond mining. In 1936, the national government enacted the Diamond Industry Protection Ordinance. The main goal of this ordinance was to control international and local migration in the diamond protection area. 54 The colonial government delegated power to the SLST to police the protected area which resulted in ’3 Prior to diamond mining the colonial government had assigned formal and informal authority to chiefs and this had led to the growth of a social network of influential traditional authorities and their allies. 5‘ Only those belong to the Kono ethnic group were regarded as natives. 88 the establishment of the Diamond Protection Force (Van der Laan, 1965).55 This led to growing resentment among Kono residents who regarded this law as an intrusion of local administrative power and an unwarranted extension of state power to alienate Konos from the region’s major resource. A chief felt that by restricting the inflow of migrants, his authority was undermined and that such action could result in disruption in his chiefdom (Reno, 1995). A standard practice was the payment of rent to chiefs for migrants’ protection. Colonial government officials believed that security officers had persuaded local chiefs to work in the interest of the new law. With the belief that chiefs could control the influx of migrants (many of whom were illicit miners), SLST made unilateral agreements with them in which each was given £50 armually to withhold settler rights of migrants (non-Konos). Yet, chiefs who had power to determine who would reside in mining chiefdoms in Kono, continued to permit more migrants because the migrants (locally known as “strangers”) paid huge sums for permission to settle in the diamondiferous areas of the district (Hirsh, 2001; Rosen, 1973). Such double-dealing was inimical to the economic interests of government and the company in particular but aided migrants’ goals which were to circumvent the company’s monopolistic mining rights by engaging in illicit mining (Hirsch, 2001). As head of chiefdoms, chiefs therefore utilized their socio-spatial and political authority to acquire personal wealth from migrants and the company. 4. 2.4 Political Transformation and its Implications on Diamond Management Constitutional changes in 1947 resulted in fundamental transformation of the political system with implications on mineral resource management. Amongst other things, the 1947 constitution made provision for representation of provincial members in 55 CF 47/34, Diamond Protection Force, 5/29/1934, 2. 89 the legislative council. However, it was a dual political system (generally referred to as ‘indirect rule’) in which a centralized national government dominated by national political leaders was dependent on traditional leaders headed by paramount chiefs (Cartwright, 1970).56 The inclusion of elected Afiicans in the legislative council in 1951 resulted in growing demand for better economic benefit (in the form of fiscal revenues) from the SLST (Van der Laan, 1965). Political pressure from indigenous politicians reduced the power of a purely colonial government whose economic interests (like that of the company) were both internally and externally driven.57 A number of negotiations in Freetown and London resulted in a review of tax liabilities of SLST that were more favorable to the government of Sierra Leone. While income tax was 45 percent, the new agreement called for a combination of income tax and diamond industry profit tax that together amounted to 60 percent of profits. The estimated increase in government’s revenue from these tax amendments was £145,000 for the period 1951 to 1952 and about £105,000 for fiscal year 1952-53 (Van der Laan, 1965). It was also agreed that the company increase annual mining rent payable to the Protectorate Mining Benefits Fund from £7,000 to £10,000, and another annual grant of £1 0,000 to Kono and £5,000 to Lower Bambara Chiefdom in Kenema District (SLST, 1966). These grants were meant for the development of roads, water supplies, education, agricultural and other projects in the diamondiferous communities. Thus the new political dispensation succeeded in 56 Prior to that, there was a system of indirect rule in which a British dominated centralized government ruled the protectorate through paramount chiefs. 57 Both the colonial government and the SLST had strong political/economic association with colonial authorities in London and investors in UK. 90 increasing central government’s mineral revenue and ensured that additional grants were paid to Kono and Kenema Districts.” Though corporate mining was very beneficial at the national level, it also contributed to some level of development in mining communities. Company laborers were mainly natives of the mining districts. Local company employees increased from less than 2,000 in 1942 to over 3,500 in 1960. The company built quarters for employees and made accessible the company’s hospital for staff and their families (SLST, 1966). On average 56,000 patients were treated annually in the company’s hospital of which 42 percent were not company workers. Company’s grants were used to build schools in Kenema and Kono while the company expanded roads and provided tools for community development projects including bridges and roads. In terms of social infrastructure, corporate mining was regarded as a blessing for mining communities. However, from an economic perspective, mining chiefdoms did not derive much benefit as it was more of an enclave economy. Although company’s laborers who were an insignificant percentage of the population in the diamondiferous chiefdoms received some financial rewards, many other residents did not. 4. 2.5 Power and Agency: the Case of Illicit Diamond Mining The non-participation of indigenes and other nationals (except as laborers) in diamond mining, and the informal intermediary roles of chiefs may have influenced illicit mining.59 Two events in the period 19403 to 19503 contributed to illicit mining. The first 58 These were the two districts where industrial mining was undertaken. 59 Chiefs played an informal intermediary role between the diamond industry and Kono residents (Reno, 1995; 49). 91 was the influx into Kono of Lebanese and West African nationals.60 These migrants, who were mainly entrepreneurs had enough capital to buy illicit diamonds and therefore stimulated local participation in illicit diamond mining. Illicit mining was also aided by the behavior of some chiefs. They utilized their positions in the colonial state and their customary role as ‘landlords’ to offer protection of illicit miners for personal economic reward. Colonial rulers believed that chiefs were custodians of land “in a socially enforceable sense and responsible for law and order” (Reno, 1995:49). Chiefs had great control over the settlement arrangements of strangers that were seeking Kono’s diamond wealth illicitly. It was reported that chiefs in Nimikoro and Gbense (the heart of diamond deposits) allocated plots to immigrants rather than local residents as the former paid “consideration?"l Thus, Lebanese and wealthier Africans were in a better place to obtain valuable land-use rights. The second was the growth of the Kono Progressive Movement (KPM) in the 19403 that advocated for political emancipation, and for development of Kono through diamond proceeds (Rosen 1973).62 The KPM was therefore vociferous in its clarion call for active participation of Konos in the diamond industry. The belief that the land and its resources belong to the Konos contributed to illicit mining as individuals felt that it was their right to mine though their action was illegal (Rosen, 1973). Actors involved in illicit mining, dealing and smuggling, aided by organized social networks, circumvented existing mining regulatory structures to satisfy their economic gains. These social networks existed across local, national and regional levels. 6° They were referred to as strangers and paid rents to chiefs. It is reported that these strangers while engaging in trade, bought diamonds and also encouraged and supported illicit miners. 6' ‘Consideration was the money strangers paid to chiefs to settle and eventually engaged in illicit mining activities. 62SLST and the government agreed in 1954 that £10,000 be paid for development purpose. However, SLST in its bid to forestall illicit mining unwittingly paid directly to chiefs for ‘development’ purposes. This did not solve the problem as others who did not benefit from such payments continued to mine illicitly. 92 It can also be argued that initially illegal diamond mining was a reaction to the exclusion of natives from mining in their communities. In other words, the action of the marginalized people against powerful actors (in this case the colonial government and SLST) was to turn the balance of power in their favor by engaging in illicit diamond mining. Those with investment capital locally called ‘arrangement masters’ provided financial support to illicit miners. Illicit miners used various strategies to access the rich deposits of SLST (Rosen, 1979). Security men were bribed to allow nocturnal illicit mining operations in SLST concessions. Illicit miners also hired vehicles that they drove into SLST mines late at night and shovel gravels into them. The vehicles loaded with gravels were taken to distant locations where they were washed to obtain gems. 63 It is essential to mention that though miners got earnings from illicit diamonds, they did not know the actual value of diamonds. Their economic reward was a fraction of the actual value of the diamonds extracted. Illicit dealers bought diamonds from the ‘arrangement masters’ that sold them to other influential dealers. These dealers invariably smuggled diamonds out of Sierra Leone (Van der Laan, 1965). While chiefs and financiers were benefiting from legal and illicit mining, the SLST was seriously concerned about the growth of illicit mining. The period 1953 to 1957 witnessed a dramatic increase in illicit miners from 5,000 to 75,000, about10 percent of the labor force (Smillie et al. 2000). The company therefore called on the government to combat illegal activities. The government felt that migrants were primarily responsible for illicit mining and decided to substantially reduce the influx of 63 Informal interview with an elderly person in Yengema, Nimikoro Chiefdom. 93 migrants to mining areas."4 Based on the Diamond Industry Protection Ordinance and the Aliens (Control in Special Areas) Ordinance, the government expelled foreigners from the SLST lease areas and 15 chiefdoms in B0 and Kenema districts in October 1956.65 A subsidiary act — the Tribal Authorities (Restriction of Strangers in Kono District) Order — was passed in 1956 and was extended in 1957/58 to include Kenema district. These acts resulted to mass expulsion and limited non-natives in mining areas to only 5,000 per fl district.66 Government security forces (the police) also arrested and tried illicit miners but occasionally encountered violent reactions. Conflicts between illicit miners and security forces increasingly became violent in the 19503. While some illegal miners bypassed security forces, others had gangs organized like riot units with a line of slings men with stones and a second rank of men with cutlasses or knives (Daily Mail, 1959:1a). Diamondiferous mining communities were “verged on anarchy, with armed bands of as many as 400 to 500 men raiding SLST. .. areas, and on occasions doing battle with the police” (Cartwright, 1970). Other reports also indicated that these armed bands attacked security men guarding the reserves and sometimes overrun them with numerical strength. In 1958 there were recurrent attacks on police posts at swamps resulting in the firing of teargas and on three occasions police fired live ammunition in self defense. The armed gangs’ major mission was to protect illicit diggers from police arrest. There were instances in which illicit miners set up road blocks to prevent police patrols from carrying out raids and in attempting to 6‘ It was estimated that about 75,000 miners mainly migrants were involved in artisanal mining in the mid- 19503. 65 The expulsion was code named “Operation parasite” and led to the expulsion of 25,000 to 45,000 foreigners especially West African nationals. 6" Non-natives were Sierra Leoneans who belonged to other ethnic groups who migrated to Kono District. Those belonging to the Kono ethnic group were regarded as the natives of Kono District. 94 remove a barricade a police patrol had been fired on but no casualty was reported (Patnelli, 1959). Nevertheless, police arrested over 500 illicit miners and over 2000 men for residing in the diamondiferous areas without permit in November and December 1958 (Daily Mail, 1959a).67 The massive expulsion of international migrants from the diamond protection areas and the punitive actions taken against violators contributed to the diminution of illicit mining in 1959 and the early 19603. While there were patrol officers and stringent penalties for illegal diamond operations, actors in most instances successfully carried out their illegal activities. Regional trading networks used by Mandingos and F ulas businessmen were utilized for illegal diamond transactions in the early to mid-20th century (Reno, 1995; Van der Laan, 1965). Some diamonds were smuggled through Freetown while others were taken across the border directly to Liberia and Guinea which are part of the international market. The growth of illicit mining (exacerbated by the diamond rush) had economic implications for the SLST and the colonial government. The government lost substantial customs revenues due to smuggling of illicitly mined diamonds to neighboring countries, especially Liberia. It was estimated that in 1954, 360,000 diamond crystals valued at £54 million were mined illegally and smuggled out of Sierra Leone (Van der Lann, 1965). The diamond rush was evident and by 1954, a number of Sierra Leoneans (migrants fiom non-diamond areas), Africans and Lebanese were fully involved in illegal diamond mining in Kono and also in the diamondiferous areas in B0 and Kenema districts"8 [Figure 4.1] (Greenhalgh, 1985). The diamond rush could be attributed to increasing 67 Arrests of dissidents were frequent in the 19503 and the numbers dramatically increased in 1959. As of December 1959 1,364 people were arrested of which 195 were arrested for illicit mining while the others were strangers without permits (c.f. Daily Mail, 19590, 195%). 68 The diamond rush was more evident during the period 1954 to 1956 as several people migrated to the diamondiferous areas (See Van der Laan, 1965; Zack-Williams, 1995). 95 global diamond prices, widespread recognition of the spatial extent and value of diamonds, the collusion of foreigners particularly Lebanese and nationals in illegal mining and smuggling. Other factors that aided the diamond rush were advancement towards political emancipation, the willingness to flout laws, the increasing belief that African diamonds should be for Afiicans, and the recognition that one can strike it rich (Greenhalgh, 1985).69 The Central Selling Organization (CSO) was concerned that production by diggers will affect its 80% level of rough diamonds as the outside market would receive part of this production. An outside market was operating in Monrovia. In order to strengthen its supply CSO established a buying organization responsible for channeling the production of diggers in Sierra Leone to CSO. However, illicit mining and smuggling were on the increase. Thus, in 1955 SLST and the government decided that illicit diamond mining and marketing was beyond their control and was becoming a threat to state security. They therefore agreed that a measure to combat illicit diamond exploitation was to abrogate the 1935 corporate agreement which gave exclusive mining rights to the SLST (Van der Laan, 1965; Greenhalgh, 1985). 4. 2. 6 Policy Shift: the Emergence of the Artisanal Diamond Mining Scheme The new agreement had a number of conditions that essentially created opportunity for the accommodation of alluvial diamond mining. It stipulated that SLST reduce its exclusive rights to an area of 310 square miles in Kono district and Lower Bambara chiefdom in Kenema district were there were proven diamond deposits (PAC, 2005; Saylor, 1967).70 The 99 year lease was substantially reduced to fifteen years and the possibility of subsequent renewal. In agreement to the new concession, SLST 69 As of December 1954 the estimated number of illicit miners in the diamond areas was 30,000 (of. Van der Laan, 1965) 7° Mines Department Report, 1957, pp. 3-6. 96 obtained £ 1.57 million as compensation with a proviso that govermnent increased border patrol of SLST’s new lease area. Thus the spatial reconfiguration (reduction in SLST land area), and the abrogation of the exclusive rights of the SLST created opportunities for alluvial diamond mining by individuals or groups. The Alluvial Diamond Mining Ordinance 1956 (Cap. 198) was the legal framework for the establishment of the Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme (ADMS) in the non-SLST diamond areas. Its primary goal was to legitimize indigenous miners, reduce smuggling and improve government’s mineral revenue. This scheme allowed the minister to declare land in the protectorate to be a licensed alluvial diamond mining area. The inspector of mines, on the recommendation of the local tribal authority and the agreement of the Iandholder and occupier, can grant an alluvial diamond mining license to a native of Sierra Leone or a firm owned by Sierra Leoneans (GOSL, 1956). The spatial extent of each licensed area was 1,000 feet by 400 feet with a maximum of 20 laborers or tributors per license (Saylor, 1967; Zack-Williams, 1995). Although indigenous participation in alluvial mining was a welcome idea, the socio-spatial dimensions of power relationships created opportunities for some actors and constraints for others. While political and economic benefits were highly favorable to chiefs and migrants (financiers of mining ventures) the natives of mining communities remained at the economic margin in terms of benefits. Though most chiefs did not have the investment capital for mining, they utilized their administrative position to gain favor from mining investors (Rosen, 1973). A provision of the Alluvial Diamond Mining Ordinance was that artisanal mining license should be granted for six months and was renewable. It stipulated also that chiefs had to endorse permits for alluvial mining 97 operations in their chiefdoms before a license can be issued. Those investors who came across rich deposits in the first six months of mining were eager to ensure that their licenses would be renewed. In return they paid chiefs huge sums which were known as ‘consideration money.’ As chiefs had control over land that can be licensed, they gave relatively poor deposit areas to license holders who paid lower amounts of ‘consideration money.7| Chiefs also used their political power for economic gains following the enactment of ordinances that reduced movement of migrants to diamondiferous communities. They manipulated residence codes and exempted strangers from residence permit requirements by placing them on Tribal Authority Lists (Rosen, 1973). Other strangers were given renewable chiefdoms permits. Migrants (especially the foreign ones) were therefore under chiefs’ control and rewarded the later well for continued favor. In addition to illegal payments made to chiefs, the ADMS was administered in a way that was more favorable to traditional authorities and non-Konos and less so for Konos (especially those not directly related to chiefs). Rosen (1973) has noted that over 65 percent of licenses were held by those who did not belong to the Kono ethnic group and that 14 percent of licenses were held by those related to chiefs. Prominent chiefs owned some of the mining plots. Thus very few Konos (apart from traditional authorities and their associates) were able to successfully engage in legal mining. Another impediment to the ordinary Kono resident was lack of initial capital outlay. While the ADMS resulted in scalar reconfiguration from the exclusively industrial to local participation in diamond mining, chiefs were the greatest indigenous winners. 7' Chiefs’ knowledge of proven deposits was based on a combination of the following: soil type, location close to rivers/streams and previous outputs in places with similar attributes. 98 4. 2. 7 Policy Shift: Diamond Marketing Structures While monitoring and enforcement minimized illicit mining, diamond trading and marketing arrangements eventually curtailed smuggling. The ADMS made provisions for the establishment of dealers and exporter licenses. License holders were required to sell to dealers or exporters. Section 13(1) of Cap. 198 states, “Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of this section the Governor in Council may grant to any person an alluvial diamond exporters license to export alluvial diamonds mined or found in the course of prospecting under this Ordinance on such terms and conditions and for such a period as he may see fit.” The absence of a single buying organization in Sierra Leone until 1959 meant that smuggling was still a cause for concern. The Diamond Corporation Agreement ratified in September 1959, however, legally allowed the Diamond Corporation (DC), (a private South Afiican company) to value, price and market diamonds (DFID, 2004). The agreement also required the establishment of the Government Diamond Office (GDO). The government believed that it was in the interest of the country that all diamonds (apart from SLST’s) should be exported and marketed only by the Government Diamond Office. While the contracting of DC was a welcome gesture of government, a senior official of SLST asserted that DC manipulated their assessment of SLST’s diamond supply. Consequently, price increases negotiated by SLST with DC resulted in reduction in the number of gem quality diamonds that was indicated in shipments. The South Afiican based DC was replaced by a British based company Diamond Corporation of West Africa (DICORWAF) in 1961. Unlike the DC that was accused of price undervaluation, DICORWAF stabilized diamond prices and reduced export duty to 4 percent. It 99 therefore succeeded in buying output for alluvial miners. Eventually its exports surpassed SLST. Subsequently, the government (through De Beers influence) persuaded DICORWAF to market all Sierra Leone diamonds through the GDO. Within the period 1955 and 1962, diamond traders and diggers found out that the price paid by the central buying office (based on its price book) was influenced by price changes in the international market. As Van der Laan (1965:112) notes: “When the GDO was opened in August 1959, copies of the new price book were available to guide the buyers. The diamond dealers soon discovered that the prices were higher and began to sell more diamonds (reduce their smuggling). From the opening till the end of June 1961 (a period of 23 months) £21.5 million of diamonds were bought, while the[Diamond Corporation in Sierra Leone] DCSL has bought only £14.7 million during the 42 months in which it was a licensed exporter. The GDO attributed its success to regular reviews of prices which ensured a close correspondence with trends in the outside market.” Within these provisions, the Mines Department confirmed that smuggling was reduced to about £1-2 million per year since 1959 unlike the £ 10-15 million worth of diamonds that were smuggled between 1954 and 1959.72 This is an illustration that with proper policies, smuggling can be reduced to low acceptable levels. The reduction of smuggling following improved marketing of alluvial diamonds was economically beneficial for the government. Alluvial diamond mining contributed significantly to the official diamond export in the early years of the ADMS. In 1959, alluvial diamonds accounted for 47.1 percent of total diamonds exported and were valued at £1.627 million while in 1960 they were 73.3 percent of total diamond exports valued at £2.125 million (Van der Laan, 72 Report of the Mines Department, Sierra Leone, 1962, pp.4-5. 100 1965). Thus government’s revenue generated from alluvial diamonds was significant. 4. 2.8 Mining and Community Development Programs and Political Economic Implications The establishment of ADMS was followed by the creation of the Mining Area Development Association (MADA) which was set up to enhance development in diamondiferous districts that had received little gains from diamond revenues made to the state treasury. This move was partly a response to the Kono disturbance of 1955 and politicians’ assertion that Kono was not benefiting from diamond revenues (Reno, 1995).73 However, the real intention of MADA was jeopardized due to misappropriation of firnds by chiefs and local bureaucrats.74 In attempting to rectify the situation, the government in Freetown and SLST were met with threats of non-cooperation by the chiefs. In theory, MADA should have fostered development of mining communities but in practice it served to ensure stability and political allegiance to British-favored political organizations like the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP). In fact, it was alleged that in 1962-63 MADA funds were used to purchase electoral support as the KPM was in stiff competition with the ruling SLPP. This demonstrates that diamond proceeds and control of the district became intertwined with broader political issues (Hirsh, 2001). It also elucidates corruption amongst district authorities and weak and/or inept institutions at the local level. In addition to MADA, a Contract Mining Scheme (CMS) between SLST and diamondiferous communities was initiated in 1959. The desired objective was to ensure 73 A group of miners stormed company security guards and police post. The Kono riot was attributed to popular dissatisfaction with chief‘s influence in illicit markets and their special access to state resources (c.f. Reno, 1995). 7‘ The elected district council was given the task of administering the MADA program. 101 better cooperation between diamondiferous communities and the SLST, and that both parties benefit economically from diamond exploitation. The company’s intention was to grant contracts to local Kono miners to mine areas within the Yengema concession that was not viable for industrial production (Rosen, 1973; SLST, 1966; Van der Laan, 1965).75 It was intended that contract holders mine sites allocated within the SLST lease areas and sell diamond ‘winnings’ to the company. Miners were not provided with labor or given equipment but could rent the company’s equipment. They were also exempted from the Mineral Ordinance that allowed a maximum of twenty laborers for an alluvial mining plot. In justifying this move, the company’s General Manager maintained that the alluvial mining scheme was creating many gutted and derelict areas and that the ADMS introduced by the government in 1956 was not working. He asserted that the contract scheme would enhance the development of resources in Kono by using the company’s techniques (Reno, 1995; Rosen, 1973). While the developmental motive was plausible, another possible reason was that the ADMS could be abolished and the CMS could discourage illicit mining that was becoming a major security and economic challenge both to the SLST and the government. The agreement stipulated that contract awardees should be nominated by the paramount chief of the chiefdom of the proposed mining site. While paramount chiefs were expected to nominate miners, they manipulated the system for personal economic gains contrary to the initial objective of the CMS. For instance, PC Bona of Nimikoro awarded contracts to two relatives and an influential supporter who subsequently sold shares at an exorbitant amount ($125) per share (Rosen, 1973). Though the company refused to accept direct contract with chiefs (as requested by some chiefs), within a few years they totally dominated the CMS. For instance, non-Kono 75 A contact mining site was established near Tumbodu and another near Tefeya, in May and August, 1959 102 miners were only able to participate in CMS as partners with the Sando chieftaincy while in Nimikoro; non-Konos were not allowed to take part in the mining scheme (Rosen, 1973). Nevertheless, some Kono residents utilized the CMS for economic advancement.76 4.2.9 Conclusion Although unequal power relations between the colonial government and the local people resulted in initial success of monopolistic mining policies, political pressure from emerging local politicians and the expansion of illicit mining necessitated the establishment of a dual mining system and development schemes for mining communities. The colonial government established the ADMS to involve individual Sierra Leoneans in legal diamond mining, to increase government’s mineral revenue and reduce illegal mining in SLST concession area; yet some diamond stakeholders were still able to circumvent existing administrative, regulatory, and economic structures by participating in illicit mining and smuggling. “Arrangement Masters” continued to support illicit operations especially within the SLST concession area in Central Kono and Lower Bambara, Kenema as they believed that it contained the richest deposits of diamonds. Part of the problem was the colonial government’s incapacity to effectively patrol mining areas and exit routes to neighboring countries that served as market for smuggled diamonds. Another issue was that some chiefs colluded with illicit miners and smugglers. Furthermore, enforcement of mining ordinances was not quite effective. Interviews with elderly persons confirmed that diamond dealers were trading diamonds in Koidu town central Kono even though it was officially a non-dealing area. Miners also utilized circuitous diamond mining strategies. Interviews revealed that some license 76 Interview with an elderly person who was a beneficiary of the CMS and loan equipment from the SLST for his mining activities. 103 holders were involved in legal mining during the day and illicit mining at night and were able to get illegally mined diamonds to the Government Diamond Office which was the only official exporter of diamonds.77 There was also a complicated network of middlemen that facilitate legal and illicit transactions between miners and dealers.78 Notwithstanding the negative impacts of illicit diamond exploitation, diamond mining contributed immensely to national economic development during colonial rule. Corporate mining was a resource blessing due to its profound economic contribution r nationally. In 1960, for instance, the SLST paid a total of £1 . l 39 million as taxation to the government (SLST, 1961). Apart from the direct contribution in the form of taxes on profit, grants and rents (discussed earlier), the company also made indirect contribution to ,I} the national economy. The company spent about £720,000 annually on salaries and wages and £670,000 on local purchases. Further, it expended £30,000 on customs duty and £15,750 on rail freight annually (SLST, 1961). It can also be argued that, to a reasonable extent, it was also a resource blessing to local mining communities as it provided some social infrastructure and services and employment opportunities. 4.3 Diamond Exploitation: Independence to Pre-War Period (1961 to 1990) Although some of the colonial policies were retained, this period witnessed the politicization of diamond mining par excellence and its negative socioeconomic impacts on the majority of Sierra Leone. Diamonds were more of a resource blessing nationally at independence but such gains were eventually lost during Stevens’ patrimonial and kleptocratic governance. The informalization of diamond exploitation and subsequent 77 The Government Diamond Office was located in Kenema to purchase all alluvial diamonds for export. Subsequently it became the sole exporter of diamonds including SLST’s production. 78 These middle men included British subjects, aliens and native foreigners (Daily Mail, 1959b). 104 precipitous socioeconomic decline and growing discontent during the All People Congress (APC) rule set the stage for the civil war. 4.3.1 Diamond Production and Revenue Utilization during the Initial Years of Independence Extant mining policies and laws at Independence in April 1961 created enormous financial gains for the government, the SLST, and diamond financiers.79 An exception was a promulgation of the Diamond Marketing Act of 1962 which allowed the SLST to market only 50% of its production by value via the GDO (DF ID, 2004). With measures in place to curtail diamond smuggling, export of corporate production and the ADMS rose significantly during the initial years of self rule.80 Table 4.1 Diamond production and export at independence Year SLST Export ADMS production Export production ‘000 value ‘000 carats value carats £’000 £ ‘000 1961 889 4.428 1,406 11.54] 1964 600 7,886 1,050 13.984 Source: Report of the Mines Department, 1932-63, Sierra Leone; and Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, No. 3 (1964) As shown in Table 4.1 during the initial years of independence more diamonds were obtained through the ADMS than SLST’s production. However, corporate payment to the government was substantial. In 1963, they paid about £25 million as income tax and diamond industry profit tax. In addition to that, corporations invested and spent about £22 million annually on other fields of economic development in Sierra Leone. This included £688,000 on buildings, roads, bridges, housing, mining machinery and ancillary services, £92,200 on food subsidies for workers, and £81,200 on medical and 80 These included security measures and marketing incentives. 105 health services (Golfa, 1989). On the whole, the company’s annual expenditure in Sierra Leone was about £4.65 million which was about 5% of the national income. In the late 19603 and early 19703, official diamond exports (from corporate and the ADMS) peaked with average production valued at $250 million (1995 dollars) constituting 20 percent of GDP and 60 percent of foreign exchange earnings (Davies, 2006, 2008; Williams, 1982). On the whole the national government and the SLST made considerable economic gains from diamonds but these gains were not adequately reflected in the development of diamondiferous districts.8| Unlike a few foreign investors most local residents made modest gains from diamonds, thus could not improve socioeconomic conditions in the district. Financiers of diamond mining projects (who were mainly Lebanese and other West African nationals) made substantial economic gains while diggers barely managed to make a living. In fact, most diamond dealers (both legal and illicit) were of foreign descent and repatriated huge profits to their countries of origin. Furthermore, chiefs were not accountable for funds disburse to them for development purposes. Although some development projects were implemented, stringent accountable measure could have minimize the tendency of siphoning some development funds for personal use, thereby enhancing better community development programs. 4.3 .2 Diamond Management under Siaka Stevens ' Patrimonial Rule While legal diamond mining had provided substantial economic reward for the government and the SLST, the inception of the Stevens’ led All Peoples Congress (APC) brought about policy changes some of which were inimical to legal mining. Such changes 8' Not much was done in terms of social infrastructure and services with the exception of company‘s facilities. 106 created opportunities for some stakeholders and constraints for others and changed the balance of power amongst some interested parties. For the greater part of APC rule, politics and diamond exploitation were inextricably linked. Interestingly, Stevens opposed the ADMS in favor of corporate mining when he was minister of mines in the 19503. However, in campaigning for the 1967 elections he successfully utilized a strategy that called for the freedom of the ordinary man to participate in diamond mining as diamonds symbolized the ordinary man’s hope for acquiring wealth (Smillie et al., 2000. Stevens’ party won the 1967 elections but a military junta seized power for a year; the APC was reinstated in 1968. At the embryonic stage of its rule, Stevens’ authority was threatened as he faced local challenges from affluent chiefs and their clients, especially the pro-SLPP stalwarts in the Eastern Province. A number of chiefs and their associates had acquired wealth from MADA and wanted to maintain the status quo. Yet, the Stevens’ led APC believed that in order to consolidate power, the scale of management of diamond exploitation should be shifted from the local to the national level. Thus the APC government maintained decree 49 that was promulgated by the military junta in 1967. Essentially, decree 49 shifted the level of control of alluvial diamonds from the local to the national scale. It took the responsibility of assigning mining licenses from the chiefs to the Ministry of Mines (Akiwumi, 2006; Zack-Williams 1995). This change altered the extant bureaucratic structure of land tenure and deprived chiefs of additional revenue from rent and taxation. While this centralization of diamond control was expected to be good for the country’s grth and development, in reality it was not. In other to ensure that the central government (through the Ministry of Mines) gained control of diamond 107 exploitation, he restructured the traditional elite and chieftaincy in the diamondiferous districts, especially Kono (Reno, 1995). The APC (headed by Siaka Stevens) undermined chiefs loyal to the opposition SLPP and installed rulers and a support network that were committed to the centralized government in Freetown. Stevens’ firm arm of government was particularly demonstrated in his relations with corporate entities. In a move to generate more revenue for the central government, a revised agreement on the marketing of rough diamonds came into effect in 1969. It stipulated that Diamond Corporation West Afiica (DICORWAF) would pay an annual fee of Le330, 000 ($ 330,000 or £165,000) for the exclusive right to be the final buyer and exporter of all diamonds mined under the ADMS. Other taxes included a 7.5 percent export duty on diamond purchases at GDO, and income tax on any profits made by the marketing company (Van der Lann, 1965). A significant post-colonial development occurred in 1970 when the APC government decided to transform the SLST to a quasi-national company. The government acquired 51 percent shares of the company and named it the National Diamond Mining Company (N DMC). By nationalizing corporate diamond mining and having direct stake in the business, the government hoped to obtain more benefits fi'om diamonds through local employment creation, direct spending on social services for diamondiferous communities and high budget revenue (Li ghtfoot-Boston, 2009). Total taxes from NDMC constituted 70 percent of net profits (income tax, surtax, and diamond industry profits tax). In addition, the government obtained 51 percent of the remaining profit as a form of dividend. Therefore, the quasi-national mining parastatal was a major contributor 108 to fiscal revenues accounting for $60 million dollars (3.6% of GDP) in 1974 (Davies, 2008). While the financial gains through nationalization of corporate mining could be regarded as a resource blessing at the national level, Stevens had a hidden agenda. He wanted to find avenues for compensating his senior political stalwarts.82 Further, the government cut off revenue sources of chiefs following the nationalization of SLST and stopped paying them local development funds. Stevens therefore established a network of informal markets, the ‘shadow state’ in order to control the diamondiferous districts, especially Kono (Reno, 1995; Zack-Williams, 1999). By reconfiguring the patronage network, Stevens gained control of diamond revenues and greater political security which were two essential ingredients for his patron-client (patrimonial) form of governance. Patrimonialism is ‘a form of political order where power is concentrated in the personal authority of one individual ruler. . .. The State is their private property, and the act of ruling is consequently arbitrary’ (Thompson 2004:115). An essential element of his patrimonialism was the patron-client relationship in which APC politicians and their cronies received favors in exchange for unflinching support of the party (Davies, 2000). The Ministry of Mines was an avenue through which Stevens controlled the organization of illicit mining by preferentially allocating private plots to his clients. Unlike indigenous elites and SLPP supporters, preferential treatment was given to foreigners (mainly Lebanese) who could not challenge him politically. Preference was given to foreigners in the allocation of mining plots bypassing opposing traditional leaders (Akiwumi, 2006). Part of the discrimination was also 82 Many of the top party officials were appointed to the board of NDMC and over time manipulated the company’s operations for personal gains. These included exorbitant allowances for meeting and the misuse of the CCMS. Scheme. 109 manifested in the diamond business when in the early 19703; the Gold and Diamond Office (the official purchaser of alluvial diamonds) started paying higher prices to Lebanese than indigenous miners (Levin, 2006). Realizing that their diamonds were undervalued, some indigenous miners decided to sell diamonds through other channels and this accelerated smuggling. Those miners who sold diamonds to the GDO received fewer amounts which were also reflected in the lower payment to diamond diggers. As a result of low rewards, diggers decided to seek their profits independently of miners and invariably switched to illicit mining. The growth in illicit mining and smuggling led to the diminution of official tax revenues obtained from diamonds. Another policy that was meant to increase the standard of living of Sierra Leoneans (through the Afiicanization of the economy) was the launching of the Cooperative Contract Mining Scheme (CCMS) in 1973. In practice, this policy was part of the patron-client drive to satisfy APC clients. This scheme allowed the setting up of private digging companies to mine rich diamond deposits within the NDMC concession area (Fithen, 1999; Reno, 1995). These places were apportioned into ‘blocks’ or ‘areas’. In essence, the scheme was specifically formulated to reward influential APC party stalwarts who included permanent secretaries, ministers, and members of parliament. In fact, implements used in these mining activities were those belonging to the Ministry of Works while laborers were rewarded with rice obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture (Fithen, 1999). 83 These political tycoons made substantial profit from mining ventures since capital inputs were those misappropriated from government ministries. While rezoning of land for CCMS was economically beneficial to top APC stalwarts and their associates, it was of great cost to the ordinary miner who could not 83 Informal interview with an elderly person in Yengema, Nimikoro Chiefdom. 110 afford the very high cost of participating in legal mining. Furthermore, the ordinary miner lacked the political connections to be an entrepreneur in the CCMS. The situation became critical for the ordinary man as diamond poaching was suppressed by the government paramilitary, the lntemal Security Unit (ISU).84 In order to continue their activity, miners and diggers had to join APC operations or use violence to protect illicit activities (Levin, 2006). Thus the CCMS program changed the balance of power in favor of APC party stalwarts while many ordinary miners were increasingly marginalized due to deprivation of access to alluvial mines (both legal and illicit mining). Another area of reward to pro-APC political elites was the termination of the monopolistic export rights of Diamond Corporation DICOR, a subsidiary of DeBeers Central Selling Organization (CSO). Prior to the establishment of the CCMS all diamonds were exported directly to CS0 in London. Stevens however, wanted to create more opportunities by which he could have access to international markets, an avenue for credits, and a conduit to foreign exchange for government and party clients (Fithen, 1999). He therefore relinquished DICOR’s export monopoly and allowed private operators to export 20 percent of annual diamond production. Export licenses were granted to business personalities most of whom were Lebanese and Afro-Lebanese. APC’s reform of the diamond sector through the creation of the NDMC, CCMS and export licenses to pro-APC private operators did increase the government’s control over diamonds and aptly rewarded its clients, as part of its patron-client relations. As the aforementioned discussion illustrates, the political economy of the diamond industry was firmly rooted in patrimonialism and kleptocracy in the 19703 8" The ISU was instituted in 1975 and consisted mainly of APC thugs who were ruthless in general and local elections suppressing those who were regarded as opposition to the government. 111 onwards. The diamond industry provided state revenues and was instrumental in attracting foreign investors and financial support from international financial institutions. However, corrupt politicians used these revenues as political and economic instruments to disempower rivals in a bid to meet their personal aspirations and patrimonial commitments (Levin, 2006; Reno, 1995). In fact, the repressive and autocratic rule of Stevens’ led APC was cemented in 1978 when a one-party system of government was imposed. This facilitated patrimonialism par excellence. The situation was exacerbated by the 19803 when the state had started to collapse as a result of dwindling aid budgets, reclining revenues from official diamond mining and other economic ventures. Legitimate diamond trading dropped from more than two million carats in 1970 to 595,000 carats in 1980 and 48,000 carats in 1988 (Lightfoot-Boston, 2009). Table 4.2 NDMC profits, dividends and taxes Year Sales Taxation Net Profit Dividends (Le million (Le million Le million (Le million 1971 19.4 4.8 2.3 1.0 1972 21.6 4.5 1.7 1.0 1973 36.5 14.4 5.4 5.2 1974 35.1 15.8 6.8 6.8 1975 36.6 13.9 5.4 5.4 1976 36.7 9.9 4.5 3.0 1977 29.8 4.9 4.0 0.0 1978 35.2 10.9 4.8 2.0 1979 47.6 14.9 6.9 2.0 1980 43.2 11.4 5.6 4.0 1981 42.0 5.1 2.8 0.0 1982 29.1 0.8 Loss (8.9) 0.0 Source: NDMC Annual Reports As indicated in (Table 4.2), the NDMC (corporate production) was profitable to the government, the company and shareholders in the 19703 but by 1982 the company was running at a 1033. Although depletion of deposits was a contributor, the major issue 112 for the dwindling official production was the sabotage of corporate mining by players of the informal diamond networks and shadow economy. Dwindling production by SLST led to the closure of some mines and laying off 1,500 workers in 1982. In 1984, SLST’s 49 percent share in NDMC was bought by the Precious Mineral Marketing Company (PMMC) owned by Sierra Leoneans. Thus NDMC became totally nationalized. It should be noted though that two of the major shareholders Messrs. Jamil Sahid Mohamed (Managing Director of PMMC) and Tony Yazbeck were of Lebanese descent and very close business associates of Stevens. While PMMC initially marketed ADMS diamonds, the buying of SLST’s shares in NDMC widened the scope of diamonds it could market. Thus DICOWARF’s mandate of buying 50 percent of NDMC’s output was under threat (Golfa, 1989). PMMC therefore had greater control in marketing diamonds to international dealers mostly in Antwerp. From November 1984 to 1986, the company earned $13.4 million from diamond sales, of which $8million was paid to government. While this was encouraging for the goverrunent it was short-lived. Dwindling production, massive exploitation, shady deals, and mismanagement led to the demise of NDMC by the end of the 19803. Further, state functions were incapacitated and economic activities were embedded within informal diamond mining and marketing (Reno, 1995). In fact, diamonds aided black market activities that undermined state control of the economy in the 19803. Price controls and overvaluation of exchange rates supported a thriving underground trade that involved diamond smuggling whose proceeds were used to purchase scarce essential imports (Davies, 2006). An informal market that was tightly controlled by Lebanese with the support of a few highly influential political figures in 113 government was very lucrative in the short run (F ithen, 1999). As Alao (1999) aptly puts it, “local politicians and resident Lebanese entrepreneurs have colluded with external business interests, petty criminals and other streetwise individuals to bypass official channels and smuggle the country’s diamonds.” The Lebanese businessmen were in an advantageous position due to banking connections in Beirut and support of some key politicians. They therefore began to establish their patronage networks by giving private loans. The growth of the Lebanese dominated informal network and corruption had worsened when Stevens retired in 1985 and was succeeded by his military head, Major General J.S. Momoh. 4. 3.3 Diamond Management during J. S. Momoh ’3 Leadership With shrinking official revenue and the reluctance of international financial institutions (IFIs) to provide financial assistance, J .S. Momoh was faced with an uphill task: formalization of part of the diamond industry and concomitantly reducing a Lebanese-dominated informal sector“. He therefore wanted investors whose business ventures would ensure that the government obtained revenues for the treasury. In 1986, an Israeli, Shaptai Kalmanowitch set up LIAT Company with considerable initial capital. The activities of LIAT were to the economic benefit of Momoh’s cash-trapped government as proceeds from diamonds entered the treasury, and part was used to honor IMF debts (Golfa, 1989; Reno, 1995). While some financial assistance was restored for development purposes, the APC government used most of it to support its patrimonial system. However, there was growing resentment amongst Lebanese and Sierra Leonean business elites because such changes adversely eroded their commercial pursuits. In order 85 IF Is wanted a formalized system by which they can be assure that the government would meet its financial payments to these institutions. 114 to curtail informal economy activities, Momoh’s government instituted the Public Emergency Economic Regulations (PEER) with draconian enforcement (Fithen, 1999; Zack—Williams 1999). It should be noted that actors normally device strategies aimed at circumscribing official policies and this one was no exception. Some senior government officials and Lebanese traders continued their illicit commercial ventures in violation of PEER. Diamond smuggling was still a viable commercial activity as gems dug in Kono, Kenema, Bo, and Pujehun were bought in buying offices in Monrovia. In other words, “jumping scale” occurred when diamond dealers circumvented the official level of transaction (selling diamonds to the government GDO) and sold diamonds in Liberia thus modifying the balance of power in line with their economic agendas. Illicit diamond activities continued to provide foreign exchange for hi gh-placed individuals at the expense of official diamond revenue. As of 1988, official diamond exports had dropped to $22,000 while their contribution to GDP had dropped to less than 0.1 percent (Davies, 2008; Francis, 2001). The precipitous decline in official export earnings was a result of widespread corruption, smuggling and incapability of the government to effectively regulate the diamond industry (Kabia, 2008). The government’s steady flow of diamond revenue was put to a halt following the exit of Kalmanowitch.86 Momoh’s led APC government was again faced with what appeared to be an insurmountable task: maintaining financial flow while resisting the thriving informal sector. After a while another Israeli, Nir Guaz’s SCIPA Company was established in Sierra Leone. This company assisted the government by importing essential commodities like rice and fuel through the formal channel. In order to enforce 86 It was reported that Kalmanowitch was arrested by Interpol for alleged money laundering in one of his trips abroad. 115 formal economic activities, the APC launched PEER II to crack down on the informal economic sector and to ensure greater control of Kono diamond fields in particular. In practice, this did not bear fi'uition as collusion amongst officials of the Mines Ministry, NDMC officials and a few influential politicians led to the continuation and growth of extensive illicit mining. The situation was precarious for Momoh, as Guaz developed linkages with rivals to the president, thereby undermining presidential power (Fithen, 1999) By the mid to late 19803, the decline in official revenue was having a tremendously negative effect on the socio-economic conditions of most Sierra Leoneans. Per capita GDP growth was negative during this period. Essential commodities like rice and fuel were very scarce due to scarcity of foreign currency and price controls (Davies, 2000). Real wages for the public sector had dropped significantly while government services were almost grounded. In fact, a household income and household economic activity survey in 1989 indicated that 80 percent of Sierra Leoneans lived below the poverty line of $1 a day and that poverty was more acute in the rural areas compared to urban areas (Davies, 2008). The political elite continued to amass wealth to the detriment of the ordinary people in particular and the country in general, worsening the socio- economic condition in the country (Boas, 2001; Reno, 1998). In fact, the World Development Report 1988, stated that Sierra Leone was one of the poorest countries in the world, with a GNP per capita of US. $310 in 1986, an average life expectancy of only 41 years, with as many as 154 of every 1,000 infants dying every year before they reached their first birthday (World Bank, 1988). Furthermore, infrastructure had deteriorated. 116 As the precarious economic condition exacerbated, Momoh was advised by IMF officials to secure reputable companies to undertake diamond exploitation in Kono. Some American multi-nationals were discussing the possibilities of engaging in corporate mining. The informal diamond operation seriously affected Momoh’s legitimacy. The government therefore agreed to launch a major crack down of illicit mining activities in Kono in 1990 in what was called ‘Operation Clean Slate (Fithen, 1999). This resulted in the violent eviction of over 15,000 illicit diamond diggers (locally known as ‘san-san boys’) most of whom joined the rebel movement. Dispossessed fi'om mining and with no other opportunity, these miners became aggrieved and most of them were the early recruits of the rebellious group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). As Hirsch (2001 :28) notes, “a dismal pattern of official corruption, mismanagement, and electoral violence led over the years to deepening public cynicism, the virtual collapse of the education system, and the creation of a generation of young men and women who became the Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) rank and file”. 4.4 Diamonds and the Civil War (1991-2002) In this section, I examine how diamonds influenced Sierra Leone’s civil war.87 It shows how the government of Sierra Leone lost control over diamond exploitation and how diamonds fuelled violent conflicts. I discuss how various interested parties (actors) at the local, national, regional and global scales used diamonds during the civil war to satisfy their social, political and/or economic goals, thus prolonging the war. The section also investigates how power relations amongst actors created opportunities for some and constraints for other stakeholders. The section also discusses how actors utilized scale 87 In March, 1991, about 200 armed men (the RUF and some Liberian and Burkinabe mercenaries) attacked the eastern border town of Bomaru in Kailahun District. 117 and networks to satisfy their political and/or economic agendas. In examining diamonds and civil war in Sierra Leone from a spatial perspective, I employ O’Lear and Diehl (2007: 168) notion of scale as an expression of spatiality by focusing on actors, spaces, and interactions with emphasis on how “a place and the processes unfolding there are connected to other places.” 4. 4.] Principal Causes of the Civil War While bad governance, appalling socio-economic conditions (including high unemployment and dissatisfaction and high poverty levels) were the major precipitants of the civil war, poor management of the diamond sector also contributed to the war in two ways. Firstly, the sharp disparity in economic benefits accrued from diamond mining resulted in fi'ustration for the ordinary diamond digger. Informal financiers (supporters) of diamond mining often inflated mining expenditure.88 Consequently, the percentage of the [remaining amount] net gains that was apportioned to diggers was quite low. A number of diamond diggers were aware that the prices they received for diamonds was far below their actual value and this, over time, resulted in accumulated grievances against local stakeholders at the upper end of the diamond chain.89 As Richards (2001) notes, “The rebel movement first recruited among the most thoroughly marginalized diggers working the “border-zone limbo-lands.” Intimate with the processes through which the magic money sustaining national politics is made and angered by social marginalization, this secret army of gravel sifiers was quick to heed the call.” 88 Supporters normally financed mining operations and feed the diggers on agreement that such expenses will be deducted when “winnings” are obtained. The remaining amount of money is shared based on the initial agreement. 89 Interview with an influential elderly man in Koidu, March, 2008 118 While social and economic marginalization of diamond diggers may have triggered the civil war, perhaps the general neglect of diamondiferous communities was a broader scale of causation. As Alao (1999:46) argues, “first, and one which in turn had attendant ramifications, was the extent to which successive governments’ neglect of the welfare of the rural population, especially those living in the diamond-rich areas (the south-east) was a cause of the conflict.” Secondly, (as discussed in section 4.2) extensive illicit diamond mining and smuggling and undervaluation of exports significantly decreased fiscal revenue and contributed to a weak state (Keen, 2005). Thus mismanagement of diamonds was a contributor to the war; however, it played a more instrumental role in fuelling and prolonging the war. 4. 4.2 R UF and its Sociospatial Network of Regional Allies and International Diamond Agents During Sierra Leone’s civil war (1991 to 2002) several players were involved in the exploitation of the country’s diamonds to fulfill their social, political, and economic agendas. These actors operated at different levels — local, national, regional, global and utilized scales and networks within and across different levels to satisfy their interests. While it is indisputable that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and their regional and international allies (some neighboring countries and international business agents) were the main actors, others included the diamond organizations, diamond dealers, the national army and pro-govemment forces, private security firms, regional and international peacekeepers, and successive governments. The RUF exploited local lawless spaces of diamond production that were linked to global spaces of consumption with the aid of a network of regional allies and international diamond agents (Zulu and Wilson, 2009). The rebellious group was 119 therefore able to circumvent the extant structure of a fragile state. Through the complex local-regional-global network, the RUF was able to sustain their war machinery after the initial year of fighting.90 The RUF invaded and took control of the diamondiferous Kono District in 1992 but were temporarily ousted by the national army after some fierce battles. However, the RUF continuously occupied Kono and Tongo Field fiom 1994 until 1996, and from 1997 to 1999 they and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) were in control of the diamondiferous areas of eastern Sierra Leone.” During their occupation of diamondiferous areas, RUF performed various roles in the diamond chain: fiom miners, to dealers, and exporters. Abductees were ordered to mine extensively (which included residential areas) and handed over all diamonds to RUF officials at gun point.92 An interviewee revealed that RUF’s controlled mining areas were mainly in central parts of Kono, which included Komani Park in Gbense Chiefdom, Number 11 in Kamara Chiefdom, and Nimikoro Chiefdom. Further, he states, “rebel leaders came for diamonds which they took to Liberia by road and footpaths”.93 RUF continued mining Operations, facilitated by a sub-regional network of allies that include Liberia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and The Gambia. Documentary evidence has also shown that conflict diamonds were handed over to Charles Taylor (the former president of Liberia) in exchange for arms, an RUF rebel base in Liberia, including Liberian and other mercenaries (Davies, 2000; Kabia, 2008). The accusation of Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire engaging in conflict diamonds is substantiated by the sharp discrepancies between the 90 At the outset, RUF focused on a political motive, ousting the APC government and establish an egalitarian government; put economic motive soon gained momentum which political ambition dissipated (See Abdullah, 1997). 9' The diamondiferous areas occupied by RUF included Kono, Tongo Field in Kenema, and Kailahun District. 2: Interview with former RUF abductees, March 2008 Ibid 120 quantity of diamonds produced and the sale of diamonds from these countries. For example, in 1997, Liberia exported 5,803,000 carats of diamonds to Belgium while that for Ivory Coast was 885, 000 carats. However, estimate of diamonds produced in Liberia was merely 150,000 carats and nil for Ivory Coast (Smillie et al. 2000). A further attestation to Liberia’s involvement in conflict diamonds was the fact that sales of diamond export in 1988 was US$ 8.4 million but rose astronomically to US$ 500 million in 1995 when civil war was occurring in both Liberia and Sierra Leone (Smillie et al. 2000). It is documented that between 1994 and 1998 about 31 million carats, valued at US$1.96 billion, were recorded in Belgium as originating from Liberia even though Liberia does not have the capacity to produce that quantity of diamonds (Smillie 2000).94 While it is possible that other diamond tax evaders purportedly obtained diamonds from Liberia, it is highly probable that most of the so-called Liberia’s export were conflict diamonds siphoned by the RUF. There was also dissonance between Guinea’s domestic production of diamonds and its exports. For instance, in 1997 it produced 205,000 carats of diamonds but exported 533,000 carats (Smillie et al., 2000). As diamond mining areas were mainly in the hands of rebels then, it is reasonable to suggest that the difference emanated from Sierra Leone. As of 1999, the rebels controlled 90% of Sierra Leone’s diamond mining area. Though it is suggested that most of the proceeds from rebel diamond sales were in the hands of Charles Taylor, it is estimated that the rebel share of proceeds from diamond sales was between US$7 and 20 million (Davies, 2000). The UN estimated that RUF annual exports were between $25 and $125 million. 9" Liberia has the capacity to produce a maximum of 100,000 carats annually (c.f. Smillie et al., 2000). 121 RUF’s arms-for-diamonds transactions were also fostered by a network of South Afiican, American, and Eastern European companies and unscrupulous middlemen (Kabia, 2008).95 In addition to funding the war effort, RUF top commanders acquired considerable wealth from conflict diamonds. A UN (2000) report accused the new RUF leader Issa Sesay of selling 8,000 carats of smuggled diamonds in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire. Senior RUF commanders were therefore reluctant in supporting peace accords implementation. Sierra Leone’s war time illicit diamond transactions were associated with small arms proliferation (UN, 2000). The UN Panel of Experts has catalogued the network of companies, individuals and states that participated in the arms-for-diamonds transactions. It is essential to note that this network had a global and regional dimension in which the former Liberian President was strongly accused of playing a key role. 4. 4.3 Private Security Agencies, International Peacekeepers and Conflict Diamonds During the war, successive governments reconfigured state security by assigning national security roles to territory-less private security companies. While governments used diamond proceeds to pay them, there were cases in which they were rewarded with mining rights to their associated mining companies (Kabia, 2008). The Gurkha Security Guard and the Executive Outcomes are examples of such companies. The NPRC junta hired Executive Outcomes, a South Afiican mercenary firm. The Strasser led military government agreed that Executive Outcomes would receive $1.5 million monthly (Alao, 1999). Part of the agreement also involved the granting of a mining lease to its associated mining arm, (Branch Energy Limited), a twenty-five year lease on a diamond 95 In 2000 documents found in the residence of RUF leader Foday Sankoh showed a number of shady diamond deals he did with these companies. 122 mining concession (Ndumbe and Cole, 2005). President Kabbah sought the services of Sandline International, a British Private Military Company to provide logistic and intelligence support to ECOMOG for the ousting of the AF RC. It was agreed that Vancouver based business tycoon Rakesh Saxena provide Sandline with $10 million for the importation of arms to oust the AF RC-RUF forces in return for mining concession (Afiica Confidential, 1998; Alao, 1999). International peacekeepers have also been accused of involvement in conflict diamond exploitation. ECOMOG troops were accused of exploiting Sierra Leone’s diamonds. A United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) Commander implicated some Nigerian ECOMOG officer when he noted that “the Nigerian army was interested in staying in Sierra Leone due to the massive benefits they were getting from the illegal diamond mining” (J etley, 2001 cited in Kabia, 2008). Other evidence suggests that some Nigerian troops were involved in diamond mining in Sierra Leone. An interviewee who initially was abducted by the RUF revealed that they were mining for ECOMOG. Further, a former Nigerian Commander that was in charge of Kono had this to say (Adeshina, 2002: 143 cited in Kabia, 2008): Most of the personnel of units deployed at Kono District except those located at Njaima Nimikoro were deeply involved in illegal mining of diamonds. Our boys forgot our main mission in Sierra Leone and opted for material gains due to the influence of the SLA soldiers. The allure of having a few gem stones in their pockets was too tempting to resist, especially as the only gratification to take back to Nigeria was a paltry $150 as opposed to $900 they often collect while on UN operations. This unprofessional attitude reduced their will to fight tremendously (Adeshina, 2002: 143 cited in Kabia, 2008). 123 4. 4.4 International Diamond Organizations and Conflict Diamonds Large scale international diamond organizations such as De Beers and the Diamond High Council (HRD) in Antwerp were the destination points of some of the conflict diamonds. These organizations were complacent in the rough diamond trade during the civil war. For instance, there was virtually no official export of Sierra Leone’s diamond in 1998 as the RUF was in control. Amazingly, HRD in Antwerp, Belgium recorded 770,000 carats of diamond as originating in Sierra Leone (Smillie et al., 2000). What is of major concern is that HRD glossed over the fact that diamond imports to the world trading capital; Antwerp had no relation to the production capacities of their respective points of origin. Although de Beers has vociferously denied the accusation, the continued pervasive purchase of ‘loose’ diamonds (until late 1999) with the ultimate aim to retain control of the market makes the denial questionable. Smillie (2001) has noted that anyone who had bought a single polished diamond in recent years was an unwitting and indirect participant because the diamond industry in general benefited from conflict diamonds. 4. 4.5 Network of Local Actors, Spaces of Production and Conflict Diamonds At the national level, diamonds resulted in the prolonged war on the side of the government as the army was accused of deliberately protracting and escalating the war to sustain private economic gains obtained from diamond mining. They were accused of selling arms to rebels, defecting in large numbers and attacking defenseless civilians rather than the rebels. Ghetto boys and the former illicit miners enlisted on either side with the primary aim of mining diamonds and looting. As a consequence, the soldiers were called sobels- soldier rebels (Abraham, 2001; Hirsh, 2001; Keen, 2005). Pro- 124 government militias like the Kamajor96 were also accused of engaging in mining and looting within the diamondiferous Tongo Field and the vicinity of Kenema. The diamond-rich Kono District and Tongo Fields changed occupancy a number of times when either side was taken by surprise by the other while mining. Abraham (1997) maintains that the unilateral ceasefire announced by the NPRC in 1993, which resulted in the regrouping of the routed rebels, justifies the general view that the NPRC was not willing to end the war. The RUF was accused of receiving money from Lebanese entrepreneurs for permission to access mining sites. While many Lebanese license holders faced difficulties in accessing their mining sites during the civil war, many of them negotiated agreements with both sides in the conflict (Alao, 1999). Thus it was alleged that links between the rebels and Lebanese allowed the latter access to mining sites under RUF’s control. While these allegations have been denied, they have some veracity as the reinstated government in 1998 revoked the diamond mining leases of some Lebanese in retaliation. 4. 4. 6 Conflict Diamond Exploitation: who Benefited, who Lost? The continuation of this lucrative trade resulted in the further destabilization of the already weakened state machinery as the state lacked economic strength and political power as it could neither protect the siphoning of diamonds from its territory nor could it provide security and stability. Thus, the trade in Sierra Leone’s blood diamonds was a global trade in which RUF and their West Afiican allies created a market from which diamonds can be obtained for onward shipment to their European destinations. This was exemplified by the exploitation of Sierra Leone’s diamond resource which was beneficial 9° The Kamajor was a militia group organized by residents of the south and east of the country to defend their territories from RUF onslaught 125 to the external players especially the diamond conglomerates while the civilians continued to live in depredation, abject poverty and insecurity. Struggles over diamonds during the civil war created opportunities for some actors (especially the RUF, unscrupulous diamond dealers, and rogue states) while the majority of Sierra Leoneans faced adverse constraints. Conflict diamonds were a blessing for the RUF whose annual diamond proceeds was at least $25 million a year from 1997 when rebels controlled about 90% of the diamondiferous areas (Davies, 2008). Diamonds were also beneficial to the buying centers at Antwerp who bought conflict diamonds from West African states whose quantity of exports far outweighed their annual production capacity. Liberia’s war lord Charles Taylor and rogue businessmen who were allies to the RUF and facilitated their ‘diamond-for-arms and drugs’ transactions also benefited immensely fi'om Sierra Leone diamonds. On the other hand, RUF control, exploitation and trading of conflict diamonds created severe economic constraints for the national government. Official diamond exports reached their lowest level during the peak years of the war. In 1998, government accounted for only 15, 818 carats of diamond valued at $1.78 million while in 1999; official production was 9,320 carats valued at $1.24 million. Government annual war expenditure alone ranged from $15-$30 million between 1995 and 2000 (Davies, 2008). In fact, GDP growth during the war period was -2.2 percent while per capita income growth was -2.5 percent (Davies, 2007) The resource curse was also manifested politically and socially. The country was not only politically unstable but for the most part the fragile government was only in control of Freetown. Perhaps, the social ramifications could be considered the greatest 126 manifestation of the resource curse at the national level. The resource war resulted in the death of over 75,000 civilians, more than 500,000 refugees, about 1.5 million internally displaced in addition to numerous rapes, amputations, abductions, and arson attacks (Smillie et al., 2000; Wilson, 2004; Zulu and Wilson, 2009). 4.4.7 End ofCivil War Concerted effort by ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, the British government, and the government of Sierra Leone led to the implementation of the Lomé Peace Accord and the cessation of hostilities in January 2002. Yet, it was the creation of a certification scheme for Sierra Leone diamonds, and the subsequently establishment of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) that turned the balance in favor of the legitimate government (Grant, 2004; Maconachie and Binns, 2007). It blocked the flow of conflict diamonds that was the main instrument of support for the RUF. The Kimberley Process was fully established in January 2003 following a clarion call for boycott of diamonds by Western countries, thanks to the consumer campaign launched following media attention orchestrated by Global Witness and other NGOs under the umbrella of “Fatal Transaction.” A tripartite agreement involving the governments, diamond organizations and civil society called for the stemming of conflict diamonds (Grant, 2004; Paeas, 2005). 4.5 Diamond Management in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone Post-conflict Sierra Leone has witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of international and local actors involved in the management and governance of the diamond sector. In addition to the strides made by the implementation and enforcement of the KPCS, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the UK 127 Department for International Development (DFID), the World Bank, and a consortium of diamond organizations under the umbrella of the Development Diamonds Initiatives (DDI) have been formulating programs, implementing projects, and drafting policies and reforms aimed at transforming diamonds from more of a curse for Sierra Leone to more of a blessing (Garret et al., 2008; Le Billon and Levin, 2008)”. While the focus and levels of operation vary, the key goals are ensuring peace and enhancing development at the national and local levels. Peace has caused the reemergence of large-scale diamond mining companies engaging in prospecting, exploration and mining. While most of the diamond mining activities are guided by the 1996 Mines and Mineral Act, recent regulations include the 2003 Core Mining Policy, and the 2005 Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining Policy. In the case of industrial diamond mining, (for instance, Koidu Holdings Limited, formerly Branch Energy); individual agreements are signed between the specific company and the government of Sierra Leone (GOSL). The Ministry of Mineral Resources (MMR), the main institutional body responsible for mining has also been trying to ensure that mining is developmentally oriented. The emergence of civil society and advocacy groups like the National Advocacy Coalition of Extractives (N ACE), and the Network Movement for Justice and Development’s (NMJ D) Campaign for Just Mining introduced new actors in the diamond sector. In the analysis that follows, I appraise the major diamond management mechanisms in relation to extant regulations to determine to what extent diamonds were a resource curse. How have scalar reconfigurations and power relations played out amongst actors at different levels? How 97 During the period 1999 to 2007, USAID and DFID spent about $15million on diamond reforms in Sierra Leone (Le Billon and Levin, 2009). 128 have the socio-spatial dynamics created opportunities for some and constraints for others? 4.5.1 Evaluation of the Kimberley Process and National Diamond Mining Regulations Global governance of the diamond trade as exemplified by the KPCS has stymied the flow of conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone to a significant extent and has remarkably increased the state’s official diamond export within an emergent sociospatial diamond reconfiguration. Official diamond exports which amounted to $31.3 million at the onset of the civil war in 1992 and dropped to $1.78 million at its lowest (1998-99), rose to $41 million in 2002 (following the inception of the certificate of origin controls for Sierra Leone diamonds in 2000) and increased to $141 million in 2007.98 Official diamond export was 12 percent of GDP (estimated at $240 per capita) in 2007 (IMF, 2009). Although these figures seem very encouraging and demonstrate the efficacy of the KPCS, yet the government’s total mineral revenue is a significantly low fraction of exports. For instance, of the $141 million worth of exports in 2007, the government of Sierra Leone received net revenues of $5.19 million [mainly from royalties and export tax] (GDO 2009). Nevertheless, such revenue can be regarded as significant economic gains for the national government of a country undergoing post-war reconstruction. Furthermore, KPCS processes have led to slight improvement in government’s regulatory capacity as it has been able to meet some of KPCS minimum requirements (including 98 Diamond exports for 2008 dropped significantly to $98 million due to the global credit crunch and the moratorium of kimberlite mining following the December 13, 2007 violent conflict. Koidu Holdings Limited (KHL) a South African based company failed to complete the housing project for people displaced by blast mining activities as stipulated in the concession agreement. In spite of repeated notices to local authorities, the mines ministry and senior politicians they continued blast mining without relocation. Hundreds of affected people of Koidu town demonstrated in front of the office of KHL chanting ‘No Blast Mining‘ yet the company went ahead and blasted kimberlite dykes. Confrontation ensued between secruity forces and the crowd. Security forces responded by firing live bullets that led to the death of two youths while nine were injured. 129 data base and diamond export statistics and a temper-proof certificate of origin). Other national regulations that may have reduced illicit diamond exploitation and increased official diamond exports included the independent professional diamond evaluators, and the 2004 Mines and Minerals (Amendment) Act which stipulates “ a reward of 40 percent of the net proceeds of the precious minerals in connection with which the offence was committed shall be paid to any person who provided any information leading to the conviction of the offender” — sub-section 7 (Grant ,2005; PAC, 2006; GOSL, 2004). Notwithstanding the gains made through the KPCS, numerous institutional, technological and human capacity challenges are evident at the national and perhaps more significantly at the local levels, thereby forestalling the maximum net national revenue that can be acquired from diamonds. One major impediment is that there is no verifiable audit trail for diamonds from the mine to the market (Grant, 2005; Smillie, 2001). In other words, there is no legal provision for dealer information on the certificate, and diamonds parcels are not linked to specific mines, thus they cannot be traced to the specific mining site. Other weaknesses include poor strategic government oversight, weak airport security, and the absence of a system to ‘check the checkers.’ In addition, government officials are few, receive very low salaries, and face logistical and structural impediments (PAC, 2004).99 These persistent inadequacies resulted in diamond smuggling with a conservative estimate of (36.8 million) 21 percent, (IMF, 2005). '00 Industry insiders estimate that about 20 percent of the country’s diamonds sidestep official recording (Garrett et al., 2008). Rather than adhering to the local-national-global route for diamond marketing, illicit diamond dealers circumvent the national structures 99 Interview with a senior mines official in Freetown also revealed these difficulties (July 2008). '00 This estimate is similar to the 20% cited by a senior mines official interviewed in June 2008. 130 and regulations (marketing through the GDO in Freetown) and utilize the local-global conduit. Illicit dealers therefore ‘jump scales’ to fulfill their economic aspirations - evading national taxes and maximizing profit (Smith, 1992). The spatially dispersed nature of the resource and porous borders are also facilitators of smuggling. Furthermore, the KPCS emphasizes global-national linkages to stop conflict diamonds getting into the market but did not make provision for local socio-economic issues generally regarded as the principal precipitants for the outset of the civil war. These included economic exploitation, inequitable diamond revenue distribution, and poverty in Sierra Leone in general and more importantly in mining communities (Zulu and Wilson, 2009). 4. 5 .2 International Involvement: Addressing Economic Disparity and Poverty in Artisanal Mining Communities International involvement in addressing economic disparity and poverty in artisanal mining communities included the Development Diamond Initiative (DDI). The DDI may be regarded as an outcrop of the KPCS, bringing together governments, NGOs, and the diamond industry with the primary aim of promoting development revolving around the miners and mining communities (Maconachie, 2009)."” As Smillie (2006: xii) aptly explains, “In the long run, better remuneration, better conditions and better alternatives are more likely to make a real difference in the artisanal mining sector than more rules, more antipathy and more peacekeeping”. Although the DDI has formulated policies and programs geared towards ‘fair trade’ diamonds; (that include artisanal miners’ cooperatives, the dynamics of diamond marketing and pricing), very modest economic achievements have been made at the community and household levels in mining areas. In fact, rural poverty levels are significantly higher in the diamondiferous '0' Its foundation members are De Beers, Global Witness, Partnership Afiica Canada, diamond sector analyst Rapaport and the World Bank. 131 i 7' districts of Kono compared to the agricultural district of Pujehun (PAC, 2006). Thus while the DDI is laudable, the transformation of such rhetoric to reality remains an uphill task. lntemational efforts to address some of the shortcomings of the KPCS at local levels included a USAID sponsored Integrated Diamond Management Program (IDMP) and its Peace Diamond Alliance (PDA).'02 The primary goal of the project was to formalize and rationalize artisanal diamond mining, and augment the benefits to miners and mining communities (Levin and Turay, 2008). PDA activities included the provision of funds for a credit schemes for miners, the purchasing of diamonds that were certified by the alliance which would be sold as fair trade diamonds, and provision of logistics (transport and communication equipment) to the MMR. The other activities included training of miners and diggers about the value of their production, and strengthening local institutions to be more democratic and truly representative of the community (Garret et al., 2008). Measures aimed at providing alternative modes of governance, poverty alleviation, and reduction of inequality in the artisanal mining sector were less satisfactory due to poor leadership, political squabbling and a drive towards consultant centralized control of decision-making (Le Billon and Levin, 2009). Although the USAID sponsored initiatives made modest gains in terms of logistics provision, training of miners and developing local institutions, the major aim of ‘fair trade’ diamonds and augmenting miners’ income was not quite successful. The main goal of diamond cooperatives was to serve as the engine for market-led change, formalization, and miner empowerment (Levin and Turay, 2008). The intention was to reduce the number of '02 Management Systems lntemational (MSI) was the consultant agency for both projects that covered the period September 1999 to December 2007. Diamond Policy and Management Project (DIPAM) was transformed to IDMP. 132 ‘middle-men’ actors and establish a direct local-global linkage between miners and international buyers. USAID funds would have been used for a revolving loan scheme but an environmental assessment (EA) report inferred that the credit scheme was unworkable, so the project coordinators sought firnding from two American investors to the tune of $75,000 on the arrangement that they would buy ‘winnings’ from the cooperatives. Of thirty five registered cooperatives only five were funded. As of the 2005 mining season only 320 stones totaling 60.37 carats and valued at $4,390 had been recovered. Due to the big loss for the two investors the project was cancelled. Nonetheless, it was socio-economically beneficial to a few diggers as it created employment, access to medical care, increased household income which was used for children’s education and in rehabilitation and construction of houses (Levin and Turay, 2008). Lack of proper prospecting of the land mined, undemocratic characteristics of cooperatives, corruption of executive members, and poor monitoring, were amongst the obstacles faced by the cooperatives project. It should be noted that while it had good intentions, it was a pilot based project with a very low spatial coverage and membership. '03 Though such projects are good in some respects, they are normally limited in extent and short-lived. 4. 5.3 Transforming Sierra Leone '5 Diamonds into “Diamonds for Development' Another international donor driven venture is DFID’s effort in transforming the country’s diamonds to “diamonds for development.” DFID’s programs were centered on industrialization and macro-policy issues that included a fiscal transparency mechanism (Le Billon and Levin, 2009). DFID funded a presidential adviser on diamonds and an independent diamond valuator whose major duty was to oversee diamond exports. It has '03 It was limited to five cooperatives in Kono only and each group had not more than 70 members. 133 provided funding (£2 million) to support management and institutional capacity of the government’s MMR. The terms of the project include the provision of an expatriate Director of MMR, finalizing the new mineral act (enacted in 2009), and drafting mining reforms, and implementing a project geared towards civil service reform in MMR (N ACE, 2009). DFID have been a major advocate of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) agenda and plans to invest £16 million in reforming the National Revenue Authority (NRA). These are reform measures aimed at increasing transparency and accountability and attracting large scale investors in the mining sector. While these international-national linkages are useful for national economic development, unequal power relations are evident as host countries (e. g. Sierra Leone) cannot dictate the fundamental terms of such agreements. While there is need for the inclusion of pro-poor tax conditions for industrial companies that would increase government’s revenue base, this is not included in DFID sponsored project. On the whole, DFID sponsored reforms have been helpful in creating a conducive investment climate. 4. 5.4 Industrial Diamond Exploitation: an Engine of Economic Growth and Development? The reemergence of large scale mining investors could be attributed to efforts of the international community (through the KPCS and other donor funded programs) in ensuring that some semblance of peace and stability was prevalent in Sierra Leone. The World Bank’s interest in influencing and supporting mining-led development as an engine of economic growth and development was supportive of reforms aimed at creating a neo-liberal investing atmosphere. Though the 1996 Mines and Mineral Act remained the main legal mining instrument, the 2003 Core Mineral Policy (CMP) designed by the 134 government in conjunction with DF ID and the World Bank is investor fiiendly (GOSL, 2003). Section 1.2 of the policy reads: The new Core Mineral Policy (CMP) of the Government of Sierra Leone has been designed to create an internationally competitive and investor-friendly business environment in the mining sector. The policy is expected to assist the mining industry in attracting foreign and local private sector funds and to provide benefits and protection for the people and the environment of Sierra Leone. The policy will provide an enabling legal and fiscal regime for all mining operations from large-scale mines ...... to the small artisanal gold and diamond mines in the provinces”. The growth of diamond companies engaged in prospecting, exploration and mining of diamonds in post-civil war Sierra Leone are signs of national economic recovery and potential for development. As of 2007, the MMR issued 22 diamond prospecting licenses, and 35 exploration licenses. Afiican Minerals Company, for example, owns 8 prospecting licenses covering 26,000 square kilometers. In all there were 35 small scale mining companies engaged in alluvial mining, and 5 large scale mining companies (Mansaray, 2008). The Koidu Holdings Limited (KHL), the largest diamond company is mining kimberlite diamonds in Koidu, Tankoro Chiefdom in the '04 The operations of KHL are guided by two agreements with the Kono District. government of Sierra Leone: the 1995 mining lease agreement and the 2006 ‘profit sharing agreement (N ACE 2009).'05 Economically, the activities of these companies especially KHL can be regarded as a resource blessing for the country. KHL total payment to the national government in 2004 was $1.63 million while payment for 2005, '04 KHL holds prospecting license for kimberlite pipes in Lower Bambara Chiefdom in Kenema District, eastern Sierra Leone. '05 The 1995 agreement is the basic legal framework for KHL operations. Amongst other things it stipulates that the duration of the lease is 25 years. 135 2006, and 2007 were $2.42 million, $2.67 million, and $3.22 million respectively. '06 From the period 2004 to 2007, the company has paid a total of $9.97 million to the G08 L. It is expected that payments to the GOSL would increase substantially once KHL starts to make profit in 2011. The 2006 profit sharing agreement stipulates that GOSL would receive 10 percent of KHL’s profit while Kono District would be paid 10 percent of it also. As to whether the mining activities of KHL are an economic blessing to diamondiferous communities is open to debate. The company’s monthly expenditure on its 600 local workers (whose average monthly salary is the equivalent of $250 and lowest salary is $130) is $300,000. It also pays 0.1 percent of diamond sales to the Agricultural Development Fund (ADF) and DACDF payment (0.75 percent of the 3 percent export tax). Furthermore, KHL pays annual surface rent to chiefdom authorities (NACE 2009).”)7 In 2007 surface rent paid to Tankoro Chiefdom amounted to $29,300 (JJ CR 2008). It is believed that the income paid to workers has transformed local economies. Monies paid to chiefdom authorities should also be used to enhance socio-economic conditions in diamond mining areas. In the discussion that follows the DACDF is critically examined to determine its contribution to community development in mining areas. 4.5.5 Rescaling Management of Diamond Revenue: The DA CDF in Community Development Rescaling management of diamond funds from the national to the local community level may improve its utilization. Within the purview of the Ministry of Mineral Resources (MMR), the Sierra Leone government established the DACDF in December 2001. It was agreed that 25 percent of revenue obtained from diamond export '06 These payments were about 11% of the value of KHL production. '07 Interview with a prominent paramount chief in Koidu, June 2008 136 taxes should be deposited in the fund meant for the development of mining communities. lntemational donor agreed to provide matching fund to the DACDF for sustained social and infrastructural development in mining communities ‘whose environment have borne the brunt of decades of [artisanal] mining.’ DACDF adopts a participatory system in which local actors can exercise their natural resource management responsibilities and decision-making power (Maconachie, 2009). As of 2007, 54 chiefdoms with a total of 2,313 licenses are benefiting from the fund. For the period 2001 to 2004 the total amount goverrunent paid out to mining communities was $1,923,000 with almost $850,000 for 2004 (MMR, 2008). In 2005, more than $900,000 was disbursed to diamondiferous chiefdoms. '08 DACDF generated approximately, $4.5 million during the period 2002 to 2007 (Temple, 2008). The criteria for apportionment of funds is centered on the number of licenses issued in chiefdom and the value of diamonds extracted. The amount to each chiefdom is disbursed twice yearly to the chiefdom development committee. The committee comprises the paramount chief who is the chair, representatives from local governments and the community (N ACE, 2009). Based on the gradual decentralization of power to local governments (following the 2004 Local Government Act and Local Council Elections), district councils receive 15 percent of the fund and town council gets 5 percent. In chiefdoms without town councils, the district council receives 20 percent of DACDF. Proponents of DACDF believe that the chiefdom has personal interest in combating illegal mining and smuggling since increase in legal revenues implies increase in chiefdom allocation. The fund have been adequately used by some chiefdoms for local development such as infrastructure projects (including schools, health centers and roads), agriculture projects and skills training programs (Temple, 2005). Funds were effectively '08 As of 2007, mining companies paid $885, 561 to the DACDF. 137 used to rehabilitate the Native Administration police quarters in Kayima, Sandor Chiefdom as well as the rehabilitation of the community center at Paguma in the Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District (Maconachie, 2009). Thus there has been some improvement of social infrastructures in diamondiferous chiefdoms. Notwithstanding the gains made, the DACDF has been fraught with problems due to poor governance at the local and community level. In 2004, the Government of Sierra Leone High Level Diamond Steering Committee raised concern about the level of transparency, community awareness and local involvement in decision-making in regard to the use of the DACDF (Maconachie, 2009). In finding strategies to enhance transparency the GOSL in 2006 decided to channel DACDF funds through the elected district council instead of disbursing them through the paramount chief of the chiefdom (Temple, 2008). '09 While decision making is the collective responsibility of Chiefdom Development Committees (CDCs), they are normally dominated by traditional elites (paramount, section and town chiefs). Chiefs wield considerable power in decision making and this has stifled the conception of local ownership of funds and democratic process in the use of the funds. Unequal power relations between chiefs and other groups have resulted in the marginalization of stakeholders such as women and youths. Effective management of DACDF for community development was also thwarted by corruption (especially at the initial years of disbursement) in which some funds got missing. Other impediments for its effective utilization include cronyism with the award on projects based on personal connections with the chief, not focusing on urgent community needs, and the non-alignment of projects with broader development plans at local/community level (NACE, 2009). '09 That was just an experiment, but the CDC is the major recipient of chiefdoms’ DACDF. 138 4. 5. 6 Sociospatial Dynamics surrounding Artisanal Mining Mining advocacy NGOs like the NMJ D and NACE have been instrumental in advocating a ‘rights-based’ approach to the issue of mining. These groups have utilized global-local and at times global-national-local linkages to design legislations and measures aimed at a more transparent and socially responsible mining industry (PAC, 2006). While their action is primarily focused on reviewing mining policies geared to better mining agreements between large scale mining companies and goverrunents that would be more beneficial to the state and mining communities in particular, very little if any have been done to reconfigure the socio-spatial dynamics surrounding artisanal mining in local communities. In other words, significant unequal power relations between mining financiers (supporters most of whom are dealers and/or exporters) and diamond diggers/miners that were evident befOre the civil war are prevalent. Thus diamond diggers are still economically exploited as many of them earn less than $1 a day while mining financiers (especially diamond dealers make 100 to 200 percent profit on big stones (Levin and Gberie, 2006). Diggers maintain that they receive less than 10 percent of the value of diamonds found and that if they refuse the “inhuman price” the master sells it openly at an undervalued price, paying a third to the gang of diggers and two-thirds to himself. Later on the master returns to the dealer (the buyer) and quietly collects the rest of the gem’s real value (PAC, 2008). In defense of such assertion, the masters say diggers are ‘dishonest’ as they steal diamonds. Further, masters opined that their expenditure of diggers is high and that profit is low due to few winnings. In fact, some diggers are even worse of economically as the increase cost of mining deep deposits and the rarity of big finds reduces their share of net profit as the financier has to 139 deduct mining expenses that may be exaggerated prior to distribution of benefits to diggers, license holder/miner, and financier. Thus from an economic perspective, post- war reforms have not really transformed the earning capacity of diamond diggers and implicitly their household income derived from artisanal mining. For the most part, artisanal diamond mining is still a resource curse to the ordinary diggers and their families in diamondiferous communities. Diamond dealers and exporters make astronomical profit in Sierra Leone’s diamond industry as illustrated by Levin and Gberie’s work (2006). The average cost of investment in a diamond mining project is estimated at $20, 000 per year and about 2,400 mining sites were licensed in 2005. Since licenses can cover a maximum of five acres, then estimates of total expenditure on license mining in 2005 is about $12 million, for an average acreage of 2.5 acres. Compared to the export value of $116 million for artisanally mined diamonds in 2005, this is a small investment even if another $6 to 10 million is factored in as informal payment (‘envelopes’). If we include the informal payment, total expenditure is approximately 15 percent of the international market value of Sierra Leone’s artisanal diamonds produced in 2005 and conforms to Even-Zohar’s estimation as of 2003. While these are estimates, the similarity in conclusive evidence tends to suggest and perhaps affirrn that artisanal diamonds in particular is more of a resource curse than a blessing to the junior actors while external players and a few internal ones reap substantial benefit. 4. 5. 7 Environmental Impact of Diamond Mining While the social and economic dimensions of diamonds as a resource curse have been widely examined, one area that has been given superficial attention by the numerous 140 diamond reforms is environmental management of mining communities. The Foundation for Environmental Security and Sustainability is an international agency that primarily focuses on rehabilitating mine out areas by local residents. Other ‘reform actors’ have not adequately addressed this segment of the resource curse, a pivotal arm of rural livelihoods that are land-based (agriculture and forestry). It is ironical to note that while post-colonial mining regulations have clauses related to sound environmental practices, implementation of such rules are non-existent. The 1996 Mines and Mineral Act, the 2003 Mines and Mineral Policy and the 2005 Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining Policy indicate that mining should be done in an environmentally sustainable manner and that mining should result in sustainable development. The 1996 Mines and Mineral Act indicates that the Minister of Mineral Resources “shall take into account the need to conserve the natural resources in, or the land over which the mineral right is sought, or in the neighborhood land” in arriving at a decision as to “whether or not to grant a mineral right” (GOSL, 1996). Yet this clause at it very best has been given minimal consideration. While payment for artisanal mining licenses include a rehabilitation fee of 200,000 leones (~$67) virtually nothing has been done to reclaim, rehabilitate, and reforest artisanal mine out areas. Large scale companies are required to reclaim and rehabilitate land but this is yet to be seen. The major issue at hand is that mining (both artisanal and industrial) is largely unregulated. As a consequence, an estimated 80,000 to 120,000 hectares of mine out land has been created with close to zero reclamation (PAC, 2005) In summary, post-conflict Sierra Leone has witnessed a transformation of diamond management with some positive outcomes while numerous challenges remain. 141 The greater involvement of international donor agencies in frmding diamond reform projects aimed at transformation ‘conflict’ diamonds to development diamonds have helped in improving official export and the economic gains at the national level. Official export revolves around $140 million and is expected to rise when prospecting and exploration companies start full scale mining. Furthermore, government’s 10 percent share of revenue from KHL would result in dramatic increase in official revenue. Global-local linkage in diamond management has also been demonstrated by the activities of USAID in formalizing artisanal mining, improving the conditions of miners and empowering diamond mining communities. Attempts at establishing artisanal mining cooperatives to ensure ‘fair trade’ diamonds through a local-global diamond chain (mine- to- export) proved futile. However, modest gains were made in increasing awareness and empowerment of mining communities. The advocacy role of the NMJ D and NACE in ‘pressuring’ governments and leading mining companies in the areas of justice and development has also yielded some dividends. A major rescaling approach in the disbursement and utilization of diamond revenue is the creation of a community-based management of the DACDF. It contribution to infrastructure development and general community development has shown (though modestly) that mining can contribute to community development thus reducing the degree of resource curse in mining communities. However, economic, social and environmental dimensions of the resource curse are still evident in mining communities. 4.6 Conclusion This chapter has assessed diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone over four political epochs in order to determine the extent to which this resource accelerated or decelerated 142 development aspirations. It has shown that for the most part diamond exploitation fostered national economic growth and development during the colonial period and the initial years of independence. However, the politicization of diamonds during Stevens’ patrimonial and kleptocratic rule witnessed the growth of informal mining and receding of formal mining resulting in socioeconomic decline at the national and mining community level. The manifestation of the resource course culminated in a civil war during which war protagonists and external players benefited immensely while the majority of Sierra Leoneans bore the socioeconomic and political costs. The chapter has also demonstrated that the GOSL has been benefiting from diamond exploitation in post- war years due to improved regulations; however, not much gain has been made in enhancing the socioeconomic and environmental conditions in mining communities. 143