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SPAIN'S MOROCCAN POLICY, 1902-04

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FOREWORD

Spain emerged from the Spanish-American War a defeated and demoralized nation shorn of all her American and Pacific possessions. For a power that could look back to a glorious past of conquest and empire, it was difficult to accept the reality of a dominion which had shrunk to a mere fraction of its former dimensions.

Spain's misfortune occurred at the threshold of a period in European history marked by an intensification of colonial rivalries over a greatly diminished field of expansion. At the turn of the twentieth century there remained one independent state in North Africa--Morocco. Spain had, she thought, the strongest claim to influence and territory in that ancient and feudalistic state. The Spanish people for centuries were associated with the inhabitants of the Moorish empire in peace and in war. Spain even retained a few penal colonies on the Moroccan coast, but other powers, France and Great Britain in particular, also pointed to strategic and economic interests of their own which could not be ignored because of the latter claimants' superior strength.

French policy with regard to Morocco often receives a generous share of attention in modern works while Spain's Moroccan policy usually is treated only in so far as it injects itself into northwest African affairs. In this con-

nection, the present study has inverted the French and Spanish positions. This essay endeavors to set forth the role of Spain in the disintegration of Morocco from 1902 to 1904 in relation to the policies of France and England, as important principals affecting Spanish strategy.

It is hoped that the first three chapters, dealing with the source of Spain's interests in Morocco, the plight of that African empire, and the policy of the powers, will lead to a better understanding of this thesis.

CHAPTER I

ORIGIN OF SPANISH PREOCCUPATION WITH MOROCCO

For eight centuries before the discovery of America Spain was the battleground of the Moors and the Spaniards. In this long period the Moors never succeeded in occupying the whole of the peninsula. Whenever the Moors found Spanish pressure too strong they called on their allies at their base in northern Africa for assistance. The idea of "swapping roles," of carrying the war from Spain into Morocco was, therefore, but the natural reaction to expect as soon as the North African infidels had been driven out of the Peninsula.

At first, expeditions from Spain were impelled by a desire for revenge and the ambition of religious zealots to Christianize their former conquerors. Later, invasions of northern Africa were undertaken from time to time in order to insure the security of the Kingdom of Granada and the Andalusian region against Moorish attacks. From these campaigns sprang a policy of expansion, at the expense of Morocco and other North African states, which was adhered to intermittently by governments of Spain from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries.¹

¹ Diario de las Sesiones, Congreso de los Diputados, Legislatura de 1903, Sesión del 3 de junio de 1904, Vol. 12, no. 158, p. 4774. Hereafter cited as Diario. Mariano Gómez González, La Penetración en Marruecos (Madrid, 1909), p. 86; Salvador de Madariaga, Spain (New York, 1943), p. 198.

Following the expulsion of the Moorish invaders from Spain in 1492, Isabel, the Queen of Castile, encouraged her subjects to undertake military expeditions to North Africa.² As a result, the late fifteenth century saw numerous military efforts of a private character for colonizing the southern side of the Strait of Gibraltar. One of them was led by Don Pedro Estopiñán. With the private fleet of the Duke of Medina Sidonia, a great noble holding feudal rights over the African coast granted to him by the Castilian King John I in 1449, Don Pedro took Melilla³ and held it for the King and Duke.⁴

Cardinal Cisneros, who was given the direction of Castilian affairs after the death of the Queen and the short regency of Philip the handsome, actively continued the policy of the deceased ruler at his own expense under the regency of King Ferdinand of Aragon.⁵ After the Cardinal's death, however, the policy of expansion and pacification south of the peninsula was modified and at times pushed into the background. This was due to the diversion of Spanish

² Ibid., p. 198; Gabriel Maura y Gamazo, La Cuestión de Marruecos Desde del Punto de Vista Español (Madrid, 1905), p. 1. This author states that Isabel, in her testament, begged and commanded the heirs to the throne not to cease the conquest of Africa and to fight against the infidels.

³ A Mediterranean coast city located in northeastern Morocco.

⁴ Gonzalo de Reparaz, Política de España en Africa (Barcelona, 1907), III, 168-69; Madariaga, Spain, p. 198.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 198-99.

attention by the power politics of Europe and the exploitation of Hispanic America. Isabel's African policy of expansion survived principally as a defensive strategy designed to contain their former conquerors within bounds. This limited policy was characterized by the conquest of key positions along and near the North African coast. Among them were Melilla, Mazalquivir, Peñón de Velez de la Gomera, Orán, Bugía, Algiers, Tunis, Tlemcen, and Tripoli. They served as observation posts and as bases for military action whenever Spain or Spanish interests were threatened by African states.⁶

On September 18, 1509 Spain and Portugal, the latter for a time also casting covetous eyes toward Africa, signed an agreement which gave the former country everything east of Peñón de Velez de la Gomera.⁷ After the disastrous defeat of the Armada in 1588, however, Spanish interest in Africa diminished.⁸ In the seventeenth century the Hapsburg rulers exhausted the energies of the Spanish realm in European wars while at the same time African affairs were neglected. As a result Spain suffered the loss of a number of strategic forts on the north and west coasts of Africa, in-

⁶ Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, III, pp. 169, 172-75; Maura, Cuestión de Marruecos, pp. 3-4; Madariaga, Spain, pp. 198-99.

⁷ A rocky coastal Moroccan cliff located southeast of the Strait of Gibraltar and Ceuta.

⁸ Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, III, 172-74.

cluding Larache⁹ which was lost in the reign of Charles II. The critical state upon which the seventeenth century ended marked a profound change in the position of the Spanish nation with regard to the status of Morocco and Northwest Africa in general.¹⁰

The eighteenth century saw the accession of the Bourbons to the throne of Spain and on them rests the responsibility for the permanent loss of Gibraltar to England in 1713. From that moment Spain was no longer the only major power possessing preeminent rights in the Moorish empire. Spanish governments thereafter could not touch the question of Morocco without awakening the fears and suspicions of the interested powers. The future status of the Shereefian empire became an international concern.¹¹

In the span of one thousand years before the position of Morocco became a matter of international significance, Spanish-Moroccan relations evolved through four stages. The evolution of this association began with a lengthy period of Moorish military operations on Spanish soil followed by a shifting of the scene of fighting from Spain to North Africa. With the avowed aims of seeking vengeance, Christianization of the enemy, and conquests, Spanish expeditions

⁹ Larache is located forty miles south of Tangier on the Atlantic coast of Morocco.

¹⁰ Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, III, 176; Maura, Cuestión de Marruecos, p. 6.

¹¹ Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, III, 180.

moved south across the Strait. Soon, however, under the rule of the Hapsburgs Spain's attention was drawn away from the African continent and toward European and American affairs. By the time Spain awoke to the opportunities lost in Africa as a result of neglect and lack of foresight, England was planted on the Rock of Gibraltar squarely on the Spanish path to Africa. This British intrusion in the Moroccan question marked the initiation of a new Spanish course with reference to Morocco. It eventually led to the policy of the status quo.

CHAPTER II

THE PLIGHT OF MOROCCO

At the turn of the twentieth century Morocco was the only independent state left on the north coast of Africa. In a world inhabited by nations ever on the watch for opportunities to expand their borders behind a false face of peace, that country of from four to five million souls and comprising an area of approximately 225,000 square miles, was in sore need of a government which could maintain order at home and present a bold face backed with bayonets to acquisitive European powers.¹ But such was not the situation.

The last able sultan, and he was not the strongest representative of his line, was Mulai-el-Hassan, who died in 1894. His policy of maintaining strong imperial authority at home and keeping foreign nations at arm's length was continued with some success by an able minister, Si Ahmed, but he died in 1900.² When the young, inexperienced, and incompetent Sultan Abdul Aziz, the son of Mulai-el-Hassan, assumed authority in person, he found a system of government in existence which only a firm ruler could control with any hope of success. For this the young sultan was ill prepared.

¹ Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War (New York, 1931), p. 156.

² Eugene N. Anderson, The First Moroccan Crisis (Chicago, 1930), pp. 1-2.

Si Ahmed, who had put the boy on the throne as being more docile than his older brother, had taught him that his only mission in life was to amuse himself. Abdul Aziz, poorly trained and much too ready to accept any advice offered him, devoted his time to amusing pursuits.³

The sultan theoretically possessed both religious and temporal powers, but in actual practice his control more nearly resembled that of a feudal suzerain than that of a national sovereign. To enforce his authority there grew up around him a corps of officials known collectively as the Maghzen. Many of them were sinecurists whose duties were similar to those of Louis XIV's gentlemen of the chambers. The functions of the government were in the hands of an administrative court, divided like the Cabinets of Europe, and the administration of the provinces was placed under the control of governors, or caids, and Oumanas, tax collectors, who were the personal appointees of the sultan or by his authority appointees of the Maghzen. To complete the list of parasites, the government was honeycombed with a large number of minor officials. The system was saturated with corruption.

³ Graham H. Stuart, French Foreign Policy from Fashoda to Serajevo, 1898-1914 (New York, 1921), pp. 139-40; Harold G. Nicolson, Sir Arthur Nicolson, Bart. First Lord Carnock, A Study in the Old Diplomacy (London, 1930), pp. 144-45. These sources state that Abdul Aziz, on the advice of his foreign advisers, purchased automobiles and pianos by the dozen, bicycles by the hundred, and quantities of cameras, coaches, dolls, lawnmowers, houseboats, cigarette-lighters, and animals for his menagerie.

The position of the sultan was made even more difficult by his military weakness which effectively prevented any change that might strengthen the hands of the sovereign. Like feudal lords of the Middle Ages, the Shereefian emperor recruited his army when needed by requests to the tribal chieftains to bring their contingents to his service. The response depended on the will of the chieftains rather than that of the sultan. If the sultans were strong or the chiefs wished to gain some material advantage, the request was complied with, but if he was weak it was likely to be ignored. The richer the tribe the more defiant it was of the sovereign.⁴ This was a situation which "invited" foreign intervention.

Prior to 1912 no intensive or accurate survey of Morocco's resources was made by the government of the country nor by any foreign power, but enough had been learned by some of its European residents and occasional travellers to satisfy the advocates of colonial expansion that the country was a very worthwhile morsel. Very attractive were the agricultural possibilities of the land. The soil was rich and barely scratched by the natives. Barley, some wheat, olives, figs, vines, and palms flourished, horses, sheep, goats, cattle, and mules grazed on the plains and mountain slopes. This was true of both north and south Morocco where the pleasant climate acted as an additional incentive to would-

⁴ Stuart, French Foreign Policy, p. 137; Gómez, Penetración en Marruecos, p. 23.

be colonizers. More important still, buried beneath the soil was a great variety of minerals including iron, copper, coal, cobalt, magnesium, zinc, molybdenum, silver, gold, tin, and graphite.⁵ These assets in the hands of a weak power were a great temptation to ambitious Europeans.

A factor which also contributed to Morocco's eventual loss of independence was the ethnological make-up of its people. The feeling of national consciousness, very common in a great part of the world, simply did not exist in the Shereefian Empire. Berber, Arab, Moor, and Jew inhabited the land as distinct elements with little or no tendency toward fusion. All these people possessed a strong sense of independence, but the Berbers, who inhabited the northern areas, and especially those in the mountain sections, clung to their freedom with excessive fervor.⁶

Within the tribes the chieftains of pre-protectorate Morocco occupied positions similar to feudal lords. They built castles in the most inaccessible locations in the mountains, often well guarded by narrow, steep passes. Force was of no avail. Only hunger was an effective weapon against them. From their strongholds they ruled their subjects and defied the authority of the Sultan. Each little

⁵ Ima Christine Barlow, The Agadir Crisis (Chapel Hill, 1944), pp. 4, 9-10; Gonzalo de Reparaz, Aventuras de un Geógrafo Errante (Madrid, --), p. 271; José María Cordero Torres, Organización del Protectorado Español en Marruecos (Madrid, 1943), I, 20-21.

⁶ Barlow, Agadir, pp. 12, 14.

division defended a small area of fertile land and pasture and waged war on neighboring sections to widen the territory under their control. Caids or governors were seldom successful in trying to subdue them.⁷

In consideration, then, of the ruler's corrupt and grafting administration, his inability to raise an army personally loyal to him, and the evident disunity of the people, it is not at all surprising that foreign powers determined to add it to their dominions. What is surprising is the fact that they waited so long to carry out their intent.

⁷ Ibid., p. 14.

CHAPTER III

POSITION OF THE POWERS WITH REGARD TO MOROCCO IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The international status of Morocco became an issue when the advancements of the nineteenth century, notably those in communication and commerce, made the isolation of any peoples impossible and doomed to elimination from the list of independent, but backward, states those which failed to progress. These circumstances coincided with the deterioration of Spanish unity at home and power abroad, which together with the restraining influence of the British entrenchment at Gibraltar (accomplished early in the previous century) and the "intrusions" of the other nations, forced Spain to become resigned to the fact that Morocco could no longer be dealt with on strictly bilateral terms. As a result, the policy adhered to by Spanish governments throughout the century was the maintenance of the status quo in Morocco. This policy was made necessary by the need to prevent the absorption of that African state by third powers -- a tendency that, as time passed, became more and more evident in the activities of the other European nations which were attracted in ever-increasing intensity to the relatively weak Shereefian Empire.¹

¹ Cordero, Organización del Protectorado, I, p. 25.

France, after the conquest of Algeria and Tunis and particularly subsequent to the debacle of the second empire under Napoleon III, appeared to be exceedingly interested in further colonial expansion westward. With respect to Morocco, which lay in this region of Africa, French policy looked forward to eventual annexation, but was cautious as it would have to deal with Great Britain, Spain, and Germany.²

British policy in Morocco was never expansionist with the exception of a mild wish to acquire Tangier in order to keep it out of the grasp of a possible future opponent. The efforts of the government of England were rather negative and watchful of other nations and designed to prevent her rivals acquiring political, economic, or strategic advantages prejudicial to her own interests. English power was not dominant, but it was the most influential in Moroccan court and commercial circles.³ The opposite was true of the newly arrived German competitor.

Since Germany did not achieve unity until 1870-1871 and the German government under Otto von Bismarck was not really interested in overseas territorial acquisitions, its policy toward Morocco was dictated almost exclusively by economic considerations which called for the continued ex-

² Edmund D. Morel, Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy, An Unheeded Warning (London, 1915), pp. 13-14.

³ Jerónimo Becker, España y Marruecos (Madrid, 1903), p. 306; Morel, Secret Diplomacy, pp. 7-8; Fay, Origins of the War, p. 158; Gómez, Penetración en Marruecos, p. 58.

istence of an independent Moroccan entity. These were only a small part of German holdings abroad in the late nineteenth century, but they appeared to promise further gains in the future; so trade and investments were nurtured with the hope of creating an important market for the finished products of Germany.⁴

The Conference of Madrid occurred because of the keen rivalry of these four western nations. It led to, and was accentuated by, the abuse of the protégé system.⁵ This disregard for Moroccan rights placed the sultan in the very difficult position of satisfying the violent objections of his subjects to foreign infiltration without bringing the wrath of the powers on his neck. Secretly animated by British sympathy with Morocco's point of view, therefore, the sultan was moved to ask his European customers to limit the extension of their protection to those persons and under such

⁴ Becker, España y Marruecos, p. 305; Gómez, Penetración en Marruecos, pp. 65, 67; Stuart, French Foreign Policy, pp. 138-39.

⁵ The "protégé system" was instituted by treaty arrangement with the major powers of Europe as follows: Diplomatic and consular posts, as they were established, were granted the privilege of extending their protection over natives whom they employed in their services. This protection also applied to natives who conducted commercial business concerns of aliens to protect them from the rapaciousness of tax collectors and the vengeance of fanatical Moroccans. Until 1880, the ownership of land by foreigners was prohibited in the country, therefore, enterprisers, interested in making agricultural investments, acquired control of agricultural associations among the natives who owned land, and gathered their profits in this indirect manner. (Barlow, Agadir, pp. 19-21.)

conditions as his treaties with them stipulated.⁶ In this regard Morocco was supported by Spain. The Spanish government was aware of the weakened condition of that African state and was fearful of accelerating its decomposition.

The diplomatic representatives at Tangier discussed the problem brought up by the sultan. But due to the unyielding attitude of the French diplomatists, who were anxious to prevent any diminution of the rights and privileges of France in Morocco, no solution was found. Great Britain was not satisfied with this lack of decision. The London government used its influence, consequently, to bring about an international conference for the purpose of ameliorating the difficulties which the practice of protection had produced.

Spain was favorable to the idea of a conference and gave it her support. To the Spanish government an international meeting presented an opportunity to avoid making any changes in the status of Morocco, thereby preventing the alteration of Spain's security position in the Mediterranean.⁷ In addition, the decision to make Madrid the site of the international gathering was concrete evidence that in arriving at this choice of meeting-place the powers recognized the exceptional, if not primary, interest of Spain in the Moroc-

⁶ Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, pp. 239-40.

⁷ Ibid., p. 240.

can problem.⁸ Spain's government was thus encouraged to think that Spanish interests would not suffer significantly.

The conference convened in the Spanish capital on May 19, 1880, with the president of the Council of Ministers of Spain, Cánovas del Castillo, as the presiding member of the gathering. Mohamed Torres, the delegate of Morocco, presented his program of reform and had the support of the London representative, Sir Lionel Sackville-West, but all his efforts were in vain against French opposition, which was in turn supported by Germany because the latter declared she had no special interests in Morocco.

France recognized that there were abuses, but she wished to maintain the protégé system for her own purposes. Spain wished to reduce protégés to a minimum in order to preserve the independence of Morocco. Great Britain, Spain, and Morocco, then, were the least successful participants, France obtaining her desire to leave a door open through which she could penetrate the Moorish empire.⁹

The agreement which was finally signed in Madrid on July 3, 1880, by Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain, and the United States did not represent a radical change in the foreign protective system al-

⁸ Conde Alvaro Figueroa y Torres de Romanones, Las Responsabilidades del Antiguo Régimen de 1875 a 1923 (Madrid, 1924), p. 8.

⁹ Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, pp. 240-41.

ready in force. Protégés attached to consular establishments and business concerns were limited, but the number of interpreters, guards, and domestic servants employed by diplomatic offices remained unlimited. The right of protection was extended only to the immediate family of protected persons and were made subject to the civil courts of Morocco, but none could be arrested without his protector's first being notified. Agricultural associations were to pay the agricultural tax and the tax on herds, but the collection was to be accomplished through the protégé's consular agents. Irregular protection was forbidden, and Moroccans naturalized as citizens or subjects of a foreign power on returning to their native country were again to be subject to the laws of the sultan. Lastly, the government of Morocco was to be furnished with a list of all subjects over whom foreign powers had spread their protection.¹⁰

The Conference of Madrid failed in its principal purpose to limit effectively the ability of foreign powers to spread their political and economic influence in Morocco with little regard for any but selfish motives. They still retained privileges which infringed on the sovereignty of the sultan and roused the anger of the natives toward their ruler for permitting it, thus aggravating conditions which later led to revolts, civil war, and foreign rule.¹¹

¹⁰ Barlow, Agadir, pp. 19-21.

¹¹ Romanones, Responsabilidades del Antiguo Régimen, p. 8.

If the multi-nation agreement accomplished anything, it was the extension of the "most favored nation treatment" (hitherto limited to Britain and France) to all nations.¹² Nothing else was significantly modified. The policies of the four chief rivals most immediately involved remained essentially the same through the remainder of the century.

Spain continued to frown on any suggestion of the alteration of the position of her neighbor across the strait.¹³ Great Britain likewise desired no changes and was determined to keep any strong country from becoming established near Gibraltar, and particularly in Tangier.¹⁴ France, while giving lip service to the policy of the status quo, continued to work for the extension of her Algerian territory westward toward the Atlantic.¹⁵ And Germany, outwardly at least, still largely restricted its activities to the expansion of the Moroccan market for German goods and the extraction of natural resources to feed the industries of the homeland.¹⁶ For a time, then, the ambitions and jealousies of these powers allowed Morocco a relatively in-

¹² Morel, Secret Diplomacy, pp. 18-19.

¹³ Maura, Cuestión de Marruecos, p. 25; Reparaz, Política de España en África, pp. 245-51.

¹⁴ Morel, Secret Diplomacy, p. 7; Fay, Origins of the War, p. 158.

¹⁵ Becker, España y Marruecos, p. 307.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 305; Gómez, Penetración en Marruecos, p. 65.

dependent existence. In this sense the Madrid accord helped delay Morocco's eventual partition.

CHAPTER IV

FRANCO-SPANISH ACCORD OF 1902

The policy of Spain from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries was sympathetic and pacific toward Morocco. It had as its immediate purpose the preservation of Moroccan political and economic integrity. The policy was designed to protect Spanish interests and prevent a potential enemy from establishing itself in that African country.

In the nineteenth century, Spanish strategy, with regard to Morocco, existed in harmony with Spain's major policy of maintaining friendly relations with all the nations of Europe. At the same time, care was taken to avoid intimate, and entangling, associations with any individual state or group of states. Spain desired to be free to decide, as occasions arose, the course which expediency might demand. This policy received a shattering jolt from the cataclysmic disaster of the Spanish-American War in 1898. That defeat taught the Spanish government that Spain lacked powerful and close friends in Europe. In addition, the loss of her valuable possessions in America and in the Pacific was a source of bitter regret. The combination of these two results of the struggle with the United States brought about a search for another policy which would satisfy the Spanish desire for international recognition and respect as well as the re-

surgent ambition to expand in Africa.¹ It was natural that Spain should remember Isabel's and Cisneros' efforts to conquer northwestern Africa and turn longing eyes in the direction of the weak Empire of Morocco.²

To the Spanish government, French endeavors to help bring the war with the United States to a close, and their offer to accommodate the peace negotiators in Paris, were entirely welcome. That friendly gesture from France was looked upon as perhaps the very opportunity to form an association with a neighbor which, in common with Spain, had a material interest in Morocco. France, for her part, was motivated by an ulterior purpose. Fearing that Spain would turn her attention to penetrating Morocco alone, the French government wished to gain Spanish confidence. The Paris government hoped to predispose Spain to a future arrangement regarding the Moroccan state and other west African territories.³

British diplomats were acutely aware of Théophile Delcassé's victory in bringing the peace negotiations to

¹ Romanones, Responsabilidades del Antiguo Régimen, pp. 1, 35-36; Wenceslao Ramírez de Villa-Urrutia, Palique Diplomático--Recuerdos de un Embajador (Madrid, 1928), p. 125; Alberto Mousset, La Política Exterior de España, 1873-1918 (Madrid, 1918), pp. 130-31; Javier Martínez de Bedoya, Don Antonio Maura (Madrid, 1940), pp. 109-10.

² Romanones, Responsabilidades del Antiguo Régimen, pp. 34-35.

³ Charles W. Porter, The Career of Théophile Delcassé (Philadelphia, 1936), pp. 121-22, 126.

Paris. Sir Henry Drummond Wolff wrote from Madrid to the effect that the choice of the French capital for the peace negotiations established for the moment French supremacy in Spain, and that Spain, though no longer a strong power, still possessed features likely to attract the ambition of other countries, especially of France. Her natural resources, her position ^{at} ~~of~~ the Strait of Gibraltar would make a valuable reenforcement for France. He thought that the influence of the Spanish nation in Morocco could be utilized, while her desire for more territory in Africa to replace those lost made her extremely susceptible to the friendly action of the French government.⁴ This judgment proved to be accurate.

In response to a Spanish protest, in September of the previous year, concerning the encroachments of local French officials on the Spanish protectorate of the Río de Oro region south of Morocco,⁵ the French ambassador at Madrid, on January 24, 1900, expressed his government's desire to come to a definite agreement with the government of Spain regarding the limits of the possessions of both nations in western Africa.⁶ The reply of the Madrid government being favorable,

⁴ Porter, Delcassé, p. 125.

⁵ Documentos Diplomáticos Presentados a las Cortes en la Legislatura de 1900 por el Ministro de Estado, Marqués de Aguilar de Campóo (Madrid, 1900), La Iglesia to Silvela, Sept. 22, 1899, no. 1, pp. 1-3.

⁶ Ibid., Patenôtre to Silvela, Jan. 24, 1900, no. 3, pp. 4-14.

the two nations, after agreeing to base the negotiations in Paris, proceeded, in the months of April, May, and June, to the conclusion of a settlement. The parleys were conducted directly between Fernando de León y Castillo, the Spanish ambassador at Paris, and Delcassé, the French foreign minister. Both powers were anxious to obtain a smooth and quick adjustment of their colonial claims. Accordingly, on June 27, 1900, a convention was signed by León y Castillo and Delcassé on behalf of their governments.⁷

The accord fixed the boundaries of the Spanish possessions of Río de Oro and Río Muni so as to give Spain an additional 136,250 square miles.⁸ Fishing and navigation rights were reserved to French and Spanish settlements in those rivers and bays which were common to the territories of the two powers, and it was stipulated that those rights could not be transmitted or conceded in any way to any other nation. The right of Spain to fortify the Elobey Islands was acknowledged, and Cape Blanco was divided, with Spain receiving the western half and France the eastern half. In case Spain wished to cede all or part of Río de Oro, Río Muni, the Elobey and Corisco Islands, the French government was to enjoy the right of preference of securing them on the same conditions that any other power would offer to the

⁷ Documentos Diplomáticos, June 27, 1900, no. 41, pp. 67-75.

⁸ See the maps attached, showing all territorial divisions.

Spanish government. The treaty, almost in anticipation of the eventual dissolution of Morocco, whose southern boundary reached toward these regions, left undetermined the northern limits of the tract allotted to Spain. This omission was not made out of regard for the susceptibilities of the sultan of Morocco, who nominally ruled the territory. The area was left unpartitioned because under the Anglo-Moroccan treaty of 1895 the sultan was bound not to alienate certain portions of it.⁹

Strategically the apportionment accomplished by this accord--it was the first Spanish move toward Morocco in the twentieth century--meant to Spain a reinforcement of her position, because of the territory's proximity to the Moroccan sultan's domain, in any partition of Morocco.¹⁰ France was similarly strengthened, but in addition obtained a good title to a stretch which included an adequate outlet to the Atlantic Ocean.

From the economic standpoint neither Spain nor France gained much more than an addition of square miles to the possessions already under their control. Spain, perhaps, was more vitally concerned because the fishermen of the Canary Islands (also Spanish owned), whose only means of sub-

⁹ British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1894-1914, edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London, 1932), Lansdowne to Egerton, April 11, 1904, Vol. III, no. 24, p. 26.

¹⁰ Carlos Hernández de Herrera y Tomás García Figueras, Acción de España en Marruecos (Madrid, 1929), I, p. 46.

1. The first part of the document is a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various offices of the city of New York.

2. The second part of the document is a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various offices of the city of New York.

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sistence was on the sea, had long been accustomed to using the coasts secured to Spain by this treaty in their operations and needed them, therefore, if they were to continue in their practiced vocation. There was also a slight gain for the Spanish by the inclusion in their zone of a section which contained good sources of salt--an item of prime usefulness in the fishing trade. The zone acquired by France was not of immediate value. There were at the time, however, unconfirmed reports of deposits of industrially valuable minerals which probably attracted the more imperialist official French opinion.¹¹

The significance of the Franco-Spanish treaty of 1900 rested on its association with the subsequent diplomatic relations between these two nations. The Spanish government, looking for a European connection, found in France a state which seemed to exude good will. The effect of this sympathy, with the memory of the painfully friendless period of the war of 1898 still fresh, acted like a stimulant to Hispanic spirits. Furthermore, the negotiations had been conducted by León y Castillo and Delcassé with a degree of understanding for each other's problems that made agreements, on each point discussed between them, relatively easy. There was throughout their conferences a spirit of fair play which brought the Spanish and French representatives to an eminently satisfactory conclusion of their tasks. It was

¹¹ Diario, Legislatura de 1903, Sesión del 3 de junio de 1904, Vol. XII, no. 158, p. 4775.

natural that the high note upon which one bargain had been negotiated should serve as a transition step toward a discussion of the Moorish question.¹²

Encouraged by the prevailing friendly atmosphere in the Spanish Embassy, Delcassé, in the summer of the same year, broached the subject of Morocco during a conference with León y Castillo.¹³ The latter, who had been rewarded with the title of Marqués del Muni for his successful diplomacy in Paris, promised to consult his government and almost immediately wrote a dispatch to Fernando Silvela, the Spanish president of the Council of Ministers, telling him that the time was opportune to settle the Moroccan issue. The **Spanish** ambassador averred that Spain was in error; that the question of Morocco was ripe; that France and England had begun to think that their essential interests, instead of being antagonistic, could be reconciled, and were, therefore, "on the road" to an understanding; that there was no way to delay that entente; and that, consequently, the problem of Morocco "would be decided at any moment with us or without us, and in this case against us."¹⁴

The exchange of letters initiated by León y Castillo

¹² R. Gay de Montellá, España Ante el Problema del Mediterráneo (Barcelona and París, 1917), pp. 17-18; Mousset, Política Exterior de España (Madrid, 1918), p. 134.

¹³ Gómez, Penetración en Marruecos, p. 127; Mousset, Política Exterior de España, p. 134; Diario, sesión del 8 de junio de 1904, Vol. XII, no. 166, pp. 4919-20.

¹⁴ León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos (Madrid, 1921), p. 174.

with Silvela was of no avail in convincing the chief minister at Madrid. The latter maintained that the convenient policy with respect to Morocco was the continuance of the status quo. Consequently, the ambassador was directed only to listen to Delcassé and make no replies.¹⁵

Silvela appeared to be fearful of concluding compromising international arrangements without first obtaining supporting connections with strong European powers which would give Spain more weight and prestige. He was more concerned with over-all security for Spain in the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean than with questions which dealt with only a part of it. This is evidenced by his bitter feeling toward Great Britain because of the British government's sympathy with the United States during the Spanish-American War and by the suspicion that the British navy intended to seize the port of Vigo, on the Atlantic coast of Spain, in case Britain became involved in a war with France. In order to obtain insurance against embarrassing future eventualities, Silvela sought a secret alliance with Germany, France, and Russia. He wished to take Spain into one of the European alliance systems--the Franco-Russian or Austro-German alliance. When it was proposed to them separately, however, the German government was encouraging but skeptical; the

¹⁵ Gonzalo de Reparaz, Páginas Turbias de Historia de España (Barcelona, 1931), pp. 67-68; Hernández y García, España en Marruecos, Vol. I, p. 46; Enrique Arques, El Momento de España en Marruecos (Madrid, 1943), p. 29.

French government was dilatory; and the Russian government did not seem to favor it, advising Spain instead to hold to France.¹⁶ Silvela stepped down from the ministry without improving his country's international position or allowing others to do it.

Although León y Castillo was almost alone in advocating an early understanding with France with regard to Morocco, he continued to work on the question with Delcassé on his own despite the attitude of succeeding Spanish governments. The conversations with the French foreign minister became, each day, more interesting. Delcassé was animated by a strong desire to associate Spain with his policy.¹⁷ As long as the Spanish government was opposed to his ideas, however, León y Castillo could do no more than prepare the ground and wait for a favorable change of opinion at home.

The first indication by any high Spanish leader of an altered point of view came from the very individual who had previously criticized León y Castillo. This came about as a result of a reexamination of the Spanish ambassador's messages urging an understanding with France in the light of the attention being given to the Moroccan problem by the French press during the late summer months. Silvela, in the August, 1901, issue of La Lectura, wrote an article titled "La Cues-

¹⁶ Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, pp. 35-36.

¹⁷ Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, p. 365; Geneviève Tabouis, The Life of Jules Cambon (London, 1938), p. 127.

ción de Marruecos," which represented a practical reversal of his former opinion. In it he laments that if Morocco were closed to civilization, the result would be of no benefit to Spain. He also states that the prolongation of the status quo is very certain; in case it should be altered, whether by internecine warfare or by foreign complications, one should remember that the omission of Spain in any Moroccan agreement would be a mortal blow to Spanish interests and prestige. In this connection he says that since it is not possible for a single power or European influence to resolve the question without an international accord, Spain would find the most natural understanding and secure support in France, not for warlike purposes, but for an equitable and reasonable partnership. Lastly, Silvela warns that if the problem should unexpectedly present itself and be decided without Spain or against Spain, the Spanish nation would see repeated its experience with the Cuban and Philippine questions.¹⁸

The conversion of the ex-president of the Council of Ministers came as a complete and welcome surprise to León y Castillo.¹⁹ Encouraged by Silvela's changed attitude and having arrived at the point where it was no longer possible

¹⁸ Francisco Silvela, "La Cuestión de Marruecos," La Lectura, II (August, 1901), pp. 177-78, 190, 192-93. This article was anonymously signed by the author as "Un Diputado a Cortes." Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, pp. 353-354, 364.

¹⁹ León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, p. 175; Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, p. 365.

to continue conversations with Delcassé without the consent of his government, the Spanish ambassador determined to approach once more the cabinet at Madrid.²⁰ In late August, 1901, on arriving at the Spanish capital, he invited the minister of state, the Duke of Almodóvar del Río, to dinner in a private room of the New Club where the marquis proceeded to lay before the duke the general outline of the treaty which he and Delcassé had worked out in Paris. The minister of state's objections were similar to those given by Silvela the year before. He argued in favor of the status quo and pointed to the possible opposition of the British government if Britain were ignored in a matter which affected her position at Gibraltar.²¹ León y Castillo, well versed in the pertinent facts regarding the project, assured him that no difficulty would arise from that quarter. He stated that Delcassé, profiting from the amicable atmosphere occasioned by the friendly attitude of the French government during the Boer War, was engaged in conversations, through French Ambassador Jules Cambon in London, on the meaning and the necessity of France's talks with Spain, within the framework of a much wider policy that should put

²⁰ León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, pp. 177-78; Gómez, Penetración en Marruecos, p. 131; Reparaz, Política de España en África, p. 365.

²¹ León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, p. 176; Reparaz, Páginas Turbias, p. 70.

an end to Franco-British colonial rivalries.²² The duke not only was converted but became an active supporter of the marquis in the latter's campaign.²³

Suspecting that it would be difficult to win the chief minister's approval, León y Castillo approached the Queen Regent to enlist her aid. She readily agreed and undertook to prepare Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, the president of the Council of Ministers, before a meeting between him and the ambassador should take place.²⁴ Sagasta was still not easy to convince even with the support of the minister of state, but under the weight of León y Castillo's argument that Spain had to act soon or miss the chance altogether of securing Spanish rights in Morocco, he acquiesced, saying:

"It is not necessary to think alone of the inconveniences involved in going to Morocco, but in the dangers of not going there. I foresee all the consequences of the step we are going to take, but what is there left to do! One cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs."²⁵

Lastly, the Marquis of Muni and the Duke of Almodóvar, travelling by different routes in order to maintain secrecy, called at midnight on Silvela, the leader of the opposition (Conservative) party, as a measure of precaution and to as-

²² Tabouis, Cambon, p. 127; León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, p. 175; Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, p. 365.

²³ Reparaz, Páginas Turbias, p. 70.

²⁴ León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, p. 176.

²⁵ León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, pp. 176-77; Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, p. 366.

sure a continuity of policy should a change of government occur. On being informed regarding the proposed treaty, the Conservative party chief signified his complete approval, even going so far as to state that "Any government which fails to take advantage of such an opportunity is not deserving of the Lord's forgiveness."²⁶

All was not well at home, however, Silvela's article in La Lectura failed as a means of awakening Spanish opinion because the newspapers spoke of the author rather than of what he wrote.²⁷ Silvela himself was attacked in the Cortes for advocating the abandonment of the status quo and, in particular, for recommending an "entente" with France. There were two conflicting policies advocated in Spain. According to one, generally that of the Conservatives, the Spanish government was advised to hold to a position of neutrality between France and England, on condition that the latter powers refrain from disturbing the Moroccan question without the knowledge and consent of Spain. Conservative opinion wished Morocco to be let alone until Spain could recover sufficient strength to assume a dominant role in the

²⁶ León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, pp. 177-78; Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, p. 366; Maura, Cuestión de Marruecos, p. 55.

²⁷ Maura, Cuestión de Marruecos, p. 54. This source states that he was unable to use the clippings from the Spanish press referring to the Moroccan question which he had gathered, because they were impregnated with the subjectivism which made the press of Spain one of the poorest of Europe from the intellectual point of view.

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country. This strategy was based on the assumption that the antagonistic interests of Great Britain and France, displayed at Fashoda (in the Egyptian Sudan), would keep those colonial nations apart. The second policy, supported by León y Castillo and the Liberals, was advanced in the belief that the French and British governments were in the process of composing their differences. León y Castillo in particular feared that France would arrive at an understanding with Great Britain if Spain did not act soon.²⁸

Meanwhile conditions in Morocco became increasingly unsatisfactory. The Sultan was no longer respected by anyone. The fiscal reforms provoked the opposition of the most pacific tribes against the Maghzen. Finally an incident occurred which converted the general discontent into a feeling of outrage, sparking a revolt that lasted a number of years. A Moorish fanatic assassinated a British doctor in Fez and then sought refuge in the inviolable sanctuary of Muley--Idris. In compliance with the energetic protest of the English vice consul, the Moroccan ruler ordered a platoon of soldiers to the mosque where the killer was found, dragged out, and immediately shot. A short time later the rebellion broke out under the leadership of Bu - Hamara. Although he

²⁸ Documents Diplomatiques Français, Série 2, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (1871-1914), Patenôtre to Delcassé, Nov. 9, 1901, Vol. I, no. 496, p. 586; León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, pp. 126, 128, 178-79; Mousset, Política Exterior de España, pp. 135-37; La Lectura, I (1903), p. 651; Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, pp. 378-80.

did not succeed in displacing Abdul Aziz, whose older brother Bu - Hamara claimed to be, the sultan's position was so weakened that it became only a matter of time as to when the latter would lose his scepter.²⁹ This deplorable situation could not help but affect the policies of the powers who were either neighbors or had a commercial interest in Morocco.

León y Castillo, who had returned to Paris after receiving instructions to obtain for Spain the best terms possible, resumed, with renewed enthusiasm, the conferences with Delcassé.³⁰ The negotiations were lengthy, continuing until late in 1902, and on occasion difficult. They were based on the Spanish ambition to obtain a zone that would offer Spain, in Morocco, an adequate field of investment and production to compensate for the efforts which it was foreseen would be required. To meet this specification, the sphere should extend not only to the coast, which is wild and inhospitable in its northern sections, but include an extensive wealth and populous hinterland.

In consideration of the historical precedents of Spain and the value of Algeria and Tunis which were occupied by and for France, the Spanish government desired and asked for the inclusion of the greater part of Morocco in her

²⁹ Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, p. 368; Stuart, French Foreign Policy, pp. 141, 148.

³⁰ León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, p. 180; Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, p. 375.

sphere. For France would be reserved an outlet to the Atlantic completely under her control, the southern part of the empire with all of the oases of the Sahara, which would permit the union of Algeria with the Sahara, and western Africa, forming a great Franco-African empire.

Delcassé was not satisfied with the Spanish offer and asked for more.³¹ The scheme proposed by him provided for a division of Morocco as follows: Spain was to obtain north central Morocco, including Fez and Taza, and the north Atlantic coast, and France the remainder.³²

The Spanish government was aware of the fact that Delcassé was negotiating with the London government and that it was imperative, if Spain was to realize her aspirations in Morocco, to come to an understanding with France as soon as possible.³³ The Madrid government also knew that the French foreign minister had concluded a secret agreement with Italy in October, 1901, which gave France a free hand in Morocco and similar liberty to Italy with respect to Tripoli.³⁴ The Spanish cabinet, however, felt strongly the justice of its claims and since Spain's representative in

³¹ Romanones, Responsabilidades del Antiguo Régimen, p. 41.

³² Morel, Secret Diplomacy, p. 50.

³³ Reparaz, Política de España Africa, p. 369; Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, p. 37; Lord Thomas Wodehouse Legh Newton, Lord Lansdowne (London, 1929), pp. 267-68.

³⁴ Hernández y García, España en Marruecos, Vol. I, p. 46.

Paris, León y Castillo, was a keen and persistent negotiator the bargaining continued until late in 1902.

In consideration of the relative political, economic, and military weakness of Spain, the terms of the final draft which was completed on November eight were very generous with respect to the Spanish nation. They represent a satisfactory compromise between the extreme claims of Spain as well as France. The agreement contained eleven articles.³⁵

The first article claims that France, by reason of her community of frontiers and Spain, because of her penal colonies, have a preeminent interest in maintaining the independence of Morocco, and prohibits either of the contracting powers from compromising the interests of the other. This beginning, on the surface, augurs well for the integrity of the Moroccan empire, but on examination of the succeeding paragraphs of the accord it is plain that the signatories were only giving a dead policy, the policy of the status quo, lip service and were in reality approaching their object by cynical indirection.

In the second article, the conditions are stated under which the parties to the agreement would act to protect what they considered their rights. Here again their true motives are left to the imagination. If because of the impotence of the government of Morocco, its incapacity to pre-

³⁵ Documents Diplomatiques Français, série 2, Nov. 8, 1902, Vol. II, no. 473, pp. 583-86.

serve order and security, or for any other cause the maintenance of the status quo should become hopeless, they state, the governments of France and Spain will determine, as it is hereafter provided, the limits to which each of them will have "the exclusive right to restore tranquility, to protect the life and the property of the people, and guarantee the liberty of commercial transactions." In other words, in anticipation of the disintegration of the Moroccan empire, the two powers wished to be prepared to act without delay. Conspicuous by its absence is any mention as to the time limit of the proposed occupation. If there had been any thought of withdrawing from the country after their declared objectives had been achieved, it would appear reasonable that some indication of this intention could have been made part of the text. It may be concluded, therefore, that France and Spain intended to occupy Morocco permanently.

The third clause outlined the zone which each power would control. Almost all of the old kingdom of Fez, including the capital and Tangier, and the region of the Sus in the south were assigned to Spain, while France would extend her protection to the remainder of the territory. In area, the French sphere of influence exceeded that of Spain, but the latter's comprised the richest and most populated regions including the city of Fez, which was of incalculable value, and Taza, also of particular importance. From the political as well as an economic point of view the sphere

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recognized as Spanish was better and greater than the one reserved for France.³⁶

At that time Delcassé was willing to concede so much to Spain because he felt that an understanding with the Spanish government might be useful. Spain would very probably recover a great part of her former strength; therefore it was to the advantage of France to be certain of her friendship. More important still, Spanish goodwill would be of considerable value in case of war with Germany.³⁷

In recognition of the strategic importance of the position of Tangier with respect to the location of the Strait of Gibraltar, the French and Spanish governments bound themselves, in the fourth article, not to oppose the eventual neutralization of that city. This stipulation was not entirely welcome in Hispanic circles, as it was feared that such a disposition would provide Great Britain with a bargaining lever in arriving at an understanding with France.³⁸ As an attempt, therefore, to approach the Spanish viewpoint and at the same time win British approval of the accord,³⁹ no date was set for Tangier's change of status after a period of occupation by Spain, but the door was left open for

³⁶ Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, p. 375.

³⁷ Porter, Delcassé, p. 164.

³⁸ Documents Diplomatiques Français, Lafaivre to Delcassé, September 25, 1902, Vol. II, no. 410, pp. 493-94.

³⁹ The British government preferred to see Tangier neutralized. Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, p. 369.

future negotiation of the point.

Article five bound each party (to the convention) to show to the other party the necessity for employing force, in case either of them felt constrained to use it in order to protect its interests. Likewise, during the existence of the status quo, if either signatory were obliged to use force, as a result of an insult or injury, a property loss, or a threat to its interests, for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction, the second party to the accord would have to be consulted regarding the need for such action. Here is evidence of the mutual distrust of France and Spain.

France, desiring to prepare the "ground" in Morocco in order to execute a pacific penetration rather than a military invasion of the country, wished to check Spain so as to prevent undue haste on the part of the latter and avoid the precipitation of armed resistance among the fanatical subjects of the sultan. On the other hand, Spain could not seriously object to a stipulation which reciprocally restrained her partner. It should be noted, however, that France, being the wealthier power, could, by means of loans and other investments, extend her economic tentacles to all parts of Morocco, against the day when that state should become a European protectorate, and thus assume a predominating position in it.

The sixth clause simply states that the two powers are to lend each other diplomatic support in any question re-

specting the agreement.⁴⁰ The meaning of "diplomatic support" in this proposed treaty is not clear and no definition was made for later reference. It can be assumed that France and Spain were willing to render each other their full aid and support, but only short of war. This article was partly responsible for the difficulties which arose later in connection with its ratification by the Spanish government.

Articles seven and eight provided for reciprocal rights and advantages in regard to navigation, fishing, tariffs, and other matters of a commercial nature; number nine stipulated that neither power could, without the consent of the other, alienate all or part of the territories placed under its sphere of influence. This clause was important to France as a precaution against the disposition of Morocco by Spain as in the case of the Caroline Islands when the latter were sold to another European state. The tenth article agreed that in fixing the boundaries, as required in the two annexes attached to the treaty, due consideration should be given to the location of the neighboring tribes. Both Spain and France were desirous of avoiding any injury to native susceptibilities, so as to facilitate a peaceful penetration of the African state.

The last article stated that the convention was destined to remain secret. The two powers concerned were en-

⁴⁰ Silvela letter of June 9, 1904, quoted in León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, p. 187.

joined not to divulge, communicate, or publish the accord, as a whole or in parts, without the previous agreement of both parties. There was nothing new in this requirement. It was in harmony with the common practice of the time to negotiate far-reaching compacts behind closed doors and conceal the documents from general view. This procedure was justified as necessary in order to protect national interests; but not infrequently it was a means of masking the true intentions of its authors.

The failure of Spain to sign the Franco-Spanish convention was an accident. On December 1, 1902, just as authorization for its signature was about to be communicated to Ambassador León y Castillo at Paris, the Duke of Almodóvar was called away from Madrid and, before he could return to transmit his order for the formal signing of the treaty, his government unexpectedly fell on December third.⁴¹ The new Conservative ministry headed by Silvela, who was informed regarding the detailed progress of the conversations with Delcassé and had up to the last moment indicated his approval of the results, also unexpectedly, declined to sanction the agreement. The new president of the Council of Ministers accepted full responsibility for refusing to authorize its ratification.⁴² Silvela and Minister of State

⁴¹ León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, pp. 128, 178-79; Romanones, Antiguo Régimen, pp. 42-43; Mousset, Política Exterior de España, p. 135.

⁴² León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, pp. 187-88.

Buenaventura Abarzuza, supported by the cabinet, deemed the French promise of diplomatic support insufficient. In spite of León y Castillo's assurances that Delcassé had taken proper precautions, the Spanish government leaders were fearful of London's attitude and wished to consult it before taking any more steps. It was remembered that, in the previous year, the Madrid government had declined to concede British requests for adjustments of the boundary of Gibraltar.⁴³ Accordingly, the Marquess of Lansdowne, the foreign secretary of Great Britain, was consulted early in January, 1903, by the minister of state. The British foreign secretary's reply was that, in the case of a dissolution of Morocco, Spain "would be entitled to a voice in any new international arrangements," concerning the Shereefian Empire, but that the government of the United Kingdom was strongly opposed to any discussion of such an eventuality at the moment.⁴⁴

Abarzuza approached the London government again in February, 1903. This time the minister of state revealed the contents of the proposed Franco-Spanish accord. Lansdowne's answer was definite. He stated that Great Britain "could of course recogni[z]e no such arrangement unless [the

⁴³ Maura, Cuestión de Marruecos, pp. 55-56; León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, p. 189; Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, p. 382.

⁴⁴ British Documents, Lansdowne to Durand, Jan. 5, 1903, Vol. II, no. 333, p. 277; Porter, Delcassé, p. 164; British Documents, Durand to Lansdowne, Jan. 3, 1903, no. 332, p. 276.

British Government]were a party to it.⁴⁵

Lansdowne's veto of the completed convention appeared to indicate a reversal of the attitude formerly held by the foreign secretary, as he had had ample opportunity to interpose objections in his conversations with the French ambassador in London.⁴⁶ It may be deduced, however, that, to avoid antagonizing the power with which a useful understanding was in the process of taking form, he chose this indirect manner of obstructing the treaty. The opportunity to do so was afforded not only by the timidity and hesitancy of the chief minister, but by the erroneous belief of the minister of state that Great Britain and France would never arrive at an understanding.⁴⁷ He based his opposition to the agreement on an interpretation of the Fashoda incident which ruled out any possibility of Franco-British friendship.⁴⁸ Finally, Abarzuza felt sure that the London government would be hostile to an alteration of the status quo in Morocco because of Great Britain's vital interests at Gibraltar. In this stand, Abarzuza was supported by Minister of Government Antonio Maura who two years later confessed in the Spanish

⁴⁵ British Documents, Durand to Lansdowne, Feb. 14, 1903, Vol. II, no. 336, p. 279; Ibid., Lansdowne to Durand, Feb. 16, 1903, Vol. II, no. 337, pp. 279-80.

⁴⁶ Stuart, French Foreign Policy, p. 111; Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, p. 365.

⁴⁷ Ramírez, Palique Diplomático, p. 125.

⁴⁸ Tomás García Figueras, Marruecos (Madrid, 1941), p. 103.

Cortes that "For the remainder of [his] days [he] should have been unable to sleep if [he] had belonged to a government which had affixed its signature to the treaty."⁴⁹

Silvela tried to salvage something from the wreckage through an alliance with France supported by Russia,⁵⁰ but nothing came of it and, before anything more could be done, his ministry fell as a result of another crisis and was succeeded by a Conservative government presided over by Raimundo Fernández Villaverde. He in turn was soon followed by Antonio Maura as president of the council of ministers and by then the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 was imminent.⁵¹

As a result of the Silvela government's blunder, Spain found herself in a serious dilemma. She was left without the desired "entente" with France; a Spanish sphere of influence in Morocco remained as elusive as before; although the policies of isolation and of the status quo with respect to Morocco had been abandoned, no other strategy had successfully replaced them; and lastly the British cabinet had not been won over by being taken into Spain's confidence re-

⁴⁹ Diario, Legislatura de 1903, Sesión del 9 de junio de 1904, Vol. XII, no. 167, p. 4903; Morel, Secret Diplomacy, p. 50; Romanones, Antiguo Régimen, pp. 43-44.

⁵⁰ Wallace Richard Klinger, Spain's Problem of Alliances, Spanish Foreign Policy from the Conference of Madrid, 1880 to the Mediterranean Agreement of 1907 (Philadelphia, 1946), p. 11; Mousset, Política Exterior de España, pp. 137-138.

⁵¹ Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, p. 377; Mousset, Política Exterior de España, p. 141.

garding the proposed treaty. Throughout 1903 and the first months of 1904, Spain was in the unenviable position of having to wait for the completion of the Franco-British negotiations in order to obtain then what France would be willing to concede.

CHAPTER V

SPAIN AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION OF APRIL 8, 1904 REGARDING MOROCCO

Soon after the failure of the proposed Franco-Spanish accord of 1902, regarding Morocco, a report circulated in Madrid to the effect that Anglo-French conversations for the purpose of settling the Moroccan problem were in progress. Although the rumor should not have come as a surprise in view of León y Castillo's warning,¹ the Spanish government was alarmed by the news. The Duke of Mandas, the Spanish ambassador in London, was instructed to query the British foreign secretary. Lord Lansdowne assured the Spanish government that the British government was willing to enter into an agreement with it that neither country would commit itself to any settlement of the Moroccan question without previously consulting the other.²

A few weeks later the minister of state at Madrid approached the British ambassador on the subject of Morocco. The minister stated that he had received disquieting news regarding the attitude of the French government on the

¹ See above, p. 27.

² British Documents, Lansdowne to Durand, March 29, 1903, Vol. II, no. 344, p. 282; Ibid., Lansdowne to Durand, April 8, 1904, Vol. II, no. 346, p. 283; Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, p. 40; León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, pp. 179-180.

southeast frontier³ and asked whether London had any apprehension of an advance by French forces and whether any change of view had developed on the part of England in regard to the status of Morocco. Again the Spanish government was assured that there had been no change in policy with respect to Morocco and that the British government would not enter into any fresh arrangement without the knowledge of Spain.⁴

In spite of the assurances given to the Spanish government, conversations commenced in earnest between the British and French governments in July, 1903. Throughout the negotiations Spain was not allowed to participate and was never given an opportunity to examine the British-French proposals which would affect her interests. Spanish attempts to intervene were simply not welcomed. In a polite manner Spain's minister of state, as well as her ambassadors in London and Paris, were put off with promises that Spanish interests were receiving consideration in harmony with Spain's historical and geographical rights in Morocco. When the Spanish government was "consulted", it was only to inform it in general and vague terms of the broad outline of

³ Paul Cambon, the French ambassador in London, informed Lansdowne that, as a result of a costly native attack on a French convoy at the Algerian-Moroccan frontier, the French government had decided to send a punitive expedition against them which would, probably, destroy their villages and crops. (British Documents, Lansdowne to Monson, May 13, 1903, Vol. II, no. 348, pp. 348-49.)

⁴ British Documents, Durand to Lansdowne, May 15, 1903, Vol. II, no. 349, p. 284; Ibid., Lansdowne to Durand, May 15, 1903, Vol. II, no. 350, p. 284; Ibid., Lansdowne to Monson, Feb. 25, 1904, Vol. II, no. 391, p. 346; Ibid., Lansdowne to Egerton, Feb. 27, 1904, Vol. II, no. 392, p. 346.

the agreement that was being negotiated.⁵ It was natural that Spain should be anxious with respect to the proceedings in London and in Paris and that the Spanish attitude was detected by the British and French governments. Its main effect, however, was to cause Lansdowne to say to Cambon, the French ambassador, that the British government attached the greatest importance to obtaining the concurrence of the Spanish government. He also emphasized that Spain ought not to be taken by surprise.⁶

Anxiety over the secret negotiations between the French and British governments was also evident in Spain's Cortes, that country's legislative body. Former Minister of State Almodóvar del Río, alluding to the debates in the French Chamber of Deputies regarding Morocco, directed the following question, on the same subject, to the Count of San Bernardo, the actual minister of state: "Is the government ready to adopt all the necessary measures in order to prevent the injury or diminution of [Spanish interests] in the Moroccan empire?" The query was a difficult one to answer, as it was intended to determine whether or not the Spanish government was taking part in the Anglo-French talks.

⁵ Ibid., Lansdowne to Durand, Aug. 11, 1903, Vol. II, no. 306, p. 310; Ibid., Lansdowne to Cambon, Oct. 1, 1903, Vol. II, no. 369, p. 313.

⁶ Ibid., Lansdowne to Monson, Nov. 20, 1903, Vol. II, no. 377, p. 328; Lansdowne to Monson, March 11, 1904, Vol. II, no. 398, p. 353; Ibid., Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 23, 1904, Vol. II, no. 388, p. 341.

San Bernardo could not admit the true situation of Spain with respect to the London-Paris deliberations. This would have embarrassed the Spanish government before the world and probably caused a cabinet crisis in Madrid. In addition, the relations of Spain with Great Britain and France could have become so strained that Spanish hopes in Africa might have been seriously jeopardized. His reply, therefore, was limited. He stated that on the previous day, November 23, 1903, Delcassé had recognized the indisputable rights of Spain in Morocco. Furthermore, the cabinet in power would always safeguard the legitimate claims of Spain so that if, and when, the status of Morocco should be altered, Spanish political, commercial, and economic interests would be guaranteed.⁷

Deputy Emilio Necedal y Romea then took up the attack on the administration. He observed that, with regard to the affairs of Morocco, the Spanish government, of which San Bernardo was a member, was asleep and its interests completely abandoned. So far as Necedal was concerned, previous governments, including the one in which Almodóvar was minister of state, were equally guilty of neglect. Naturally, San Bernardo denied the truth of the deputy's accusation.⁸

The Spanish government was attacked again in the Cor-

⁷ Diario, Legislatura de 1903, Sesión del 24 de nov. de 1903, Vol. VI, no. 81, pp. 2247-48.

⁸ Ibid., Legislatura de 1903, Sesión del 24 de nov. de 1903, Vol. VI, no. 81, p. 2249.

tes in December, 1903. Rumors were rife that Great Britain and France, and even Italy, had signed, or were about to sign, agreements concerning the control of the Mediterranean and freedom of movement through the Strait of Gibraltar. The Cortes wished to know what Spain was doing about them. The fact that the Spanish government was not really being taken into the confidence of the French and British governments was strongly suspected and pressure was being brought to bear on Spain's representatives to interfere in the Paris and London conversations. Since the Spanish government was reluctant to admit its weakness openly, the Cortes could not be told that their government had tried to break into the negotiations, but had been courteously kept at a distance.⁹

In British quarters two reasons are given for excluding Spain from the Anglo-French deliberations. First, it was thought that if the Spanish government intervened in the parleys, it would appear that she did so because of distrust of negotiations conducted by England and France and, therefore, seemed to assume that Spanish interests would suffer. Since the British foreign secretary had given Spanish officials repeated assurances of Britain's concern for their rights in Morocco, Spanish participation would have been embarrassing.

A second reason, one held by Delcassé, was that Span-

⁹ Ibid., Sesión de 23 de Dic. de 1903, Vol. VIII, no. 106, pp. 3418-19.

ish ministers were notoriously dilatory, and that it would be intolerable if, when the French and British governments had come to terms, the whole transaction were to be held up because Spain did not answer the communications which might be sent to her. Lansdowne concurred with the French foreign minister's observation. The English foreign secretary stated that he should definitely object to any action on the part of Spain which might have the effect of needlessly delaying the conclusion of an arrangement to which Great Britain and France were ready to agree.¹⁰

A third motive, but one which was not discussed in this connection by either Lansdowne or Delcassé, concerned the territorial terms of the contemplated accord. The French minister had no intention of conceding as much to Spain in the negotiations which would follow the Anglo-French agreement as had been agreed to in the ill-fated Franco-Spanish deliberations of 1902. Delcassé's intent is evidenced by Paul Cambon's observation to the British secretary, on behalf of his chief in Paris, that Spain had been assigned far too extensive a proportion of the Moorish coast line. Should the dissolution of Morocco ever take place, it would never do for France to find herself enveloped by a

¹⁰ Montellá, España Ante el Problema del Mediterráneo, p. 32; British Documents, Lansdowne to Monson, Nov. 20, 1903, Vol. II, no. 377, p. 328; Ibid., Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 23, 1904, Vol. II, no. 388, p. 341; Ibid., Lansdowne to Egerton, Feb. 27, 1904, Vol. II, no. 392, p. 347; Ibid., Lansdowne to Monson, March 13, 1904, Vol. II, no. 399, p. 354; Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, p. 89.

strip of Spanish territory reaching from Mazaghan¹¹ to the Algerian frontier.¹² Under these circumstances tri-partite deliberations would have revealed French plans to Spain's negotiators. As a result, the success of the talks could have been endangered or at least postponed considerably. French apprehension in this regard was expressed by Cambon. In compliance with instructions from the Paris foreign office, the French ambassador stated that Delcassé wished Lansdowne to know that he thought it most inadvisable that anything should be said to Spain until it was quite clear that England and France had come to terms. The British foreign secretary made no reply to the ambassador's remark.¹³

Lansdowne's and Delcassé's reasoning appears to be mere rationalization for the purpose of satisfying their selfish national interests. If the Spanish government employed dilatory tactics, a natural defensive measure in view of Spain's relatively weak state, that was no one else's concern. Spain was entitled to pursue any fair means at her disposal in defense of Spanish interests. Spain had the right to take part in any discussions which involved her future position in Morocco.

¹¹ Mazaghan is located on the Atlantic coast of French Morocco, 62 miles south of Casablanca.

¹² British Documents, Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 7, 1903, Vol. II, no. 370, p. 318.

¹³ Ibid., Lansdowne to Monson, Feb. 25, 1904, Vol. II, no. 391, p. 346; Ibid., Lansdowne to Monson, March 13, 1904, Vol. II, no. 399, p. 354.

With reference to Spanish distrust of the Anglo-French deliberations, Lord Lansdowne failed to display British confidence in the Franco-Spanish accord of 1902 when he was consulted by Abarzuza in January and February, 1903.¹⁴ Why should the Spanish government have been expected to trust Great Britain and France a short time later? One must conclude that Spain was ~~ex~~cluded because the English and French negotiators were sure of Spanish opposition to their disposition of the Morocco question. They wished to present a fait accompli to the Madrid government, thus ruling out any possibility of the latter country's being able to expose, and therefore upset, the plans of the British and French foreign offices.

The Spanish government, not unreasonably, was extremely disturbed over the conclusion of the Anglo-French agreement without any semblance of Spain's participation. Opinion both in and out of the Cortes was indignant over the event. The Liberals took the occasion, when the Cortes met on June sixth, seventh, and ninth, to expose the important clauses of the Franco-Spanish Agreement of 1902 which the Conservative government of Silvela had declined to sign, and to accuse that party of having failed to uphold adequately the interests of Spain.¹⁵ As for public opinion, the press

¹⁴ See above, pp. 43-44.

¹⁵ Diario, Legislatura de 1903, Sesión del 6 de junio de 1904, Vol. XII, no. 162, pp. 4842-44; Ibid., Sesión del 7 de junio de 1904, Vol. XII, no. 164, pp. 4883-85; Ibid., Sesión del 8 de junio de 1904, Vol. XII, no. 166, pp. 4917-25.

reflected its ill humor in reproaches directed at the government for having failed to obtain a seat at the British-French Conference table.¹⁶ The general dissatisfaction did not end there. In higher official circles resentment was equally vigorous.

The Queen Mother, María Cristina, branded the Declaration, which was signed at London on April 8, 1904, as an act of unfriendliness to Spain, while León y Castillo was angry with France and Great Britain. He was bitter toward Delcassé in particular, by whom he felt he had been duped.¹⁷ The Marquis of Muni was further provoked by Delcassé's unsatisfactory replies on the subject of the recently concluded treaty.

On April 11, 1904, the Duke of Mandas called on Lord Lansdowne to manifest the perturbation of his government over the attitude of the French government when queried regarding the completed accord. The Spanish ambassador had brought up the subject a few days before at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and had found the French representative uncommunicative. The British secretary, in a conciliatory tone, suggested that the visit of León y Castillo at the French foreign ministry had occurred before the signature of the agreements and that it was natural, therefore,

¹⁶ Romanones, Responsabilidades del Antiguo Régimen, p. 47; Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, pp. 381-83; Mousset, Política Exterior de España, p. 149.

¹⁷ Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, p. 118.

that the French government should be reluctant to discuss the matter. Lord Lansdowne assured the Duke that during the negotiations the British government had insisted that the interests of Spain should be kept in sight. The British secretary was reluctant to reveal the detailed contents of the accord, but to pacify him, summarized a selected number of them as follows: The agreement contained an article in which the French government stated that it had no intention of disturbing the political status of Morocco, another providing for commercial equality, and a third clause which stated that France and England would not permit the construction of fortifications on the coast of Morocco between Melilla and the Sebou River. It has also been agreed by the two governments to take into special account the interests which Spain had acquired because of her geographical position and from her actual possessions on the Moroccan coast. Lastly, the French government had pledged itself to negotiate an agreement with Spain based on the one just signed in London. The accord with Spain was to be communicated to the British government.

Lansdowne's explanations did not satisfy the Spanish diplomat. The latter complained that Spain would be left to fight matters out with the French government. He observed that the Spanish government would have preferred to have dealt with the question of Morocco on a three power basis. In reply Lansdowne argued that it had taken them almost a

year to arrive at an understanding with France, and that if the deliberations had included a third party, it would, in his opinion, have been impossible to come to an agreement. Since the British and French governments had concluded their negotiations, he understood from the French ambassador that no time would be lost in approaching the Spanish government. The interview ended without any reference by Lansdowne to the secret clauses of the accord.¹⁸

The agreement between the United Kingdom and France respecting Egypt and Morocco was part of an over-all accord designed to remove the causes of dispute between the two European powers.¹⁹ The declaration regarding these African states contained nine articles, which were published immediately, and five others that remained secret. Of the first nine articles, numbers two, four, seven, eight, and nine touched Morocco and Spain. Three of the secret articles also vitally affected the two latter states.

In article two the French government declared that it had no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.

¹⁸ British Documents, Lansdowne to Egerton, April 11, 1904, Vol. III, no. 24, pp. 25-26; Ibid., Lansdowne to Monson, April 12, 1904, Vol. III, no. 26, pp. 27-28.

¹⁹ Ibid., Declaration between the United Kingdom and France respecting Egypt and Morocco, April 8, 1904, Vol. III, pp. 374-98. One Convention and two Declarations were signed at London on April 8, 1904: The Convention was concerned with Newfoundland, and West and Central Africa; the first Declaration with Egypt and Morocco; and the second with Siam (now Thailand), Madagascar, and the New Hebrides.

Great Britain, on her part, recognized that it devolved upon France, because of her neighboring position in Algeria, to preserve order in Morocco, and to render her assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it might require. The British government declared that it would not obstruct the action taken by France for the above purposes, on condition that such action would not disturb the rights of the United Kingdom in Morocco.

This article sounded the death knell of the Moroccan empire. Notwithstanding France's statement of intent, the British government, in effect, turned over Morocco to the French government for its administration as the latter should deem expedient. Morocco's outer form, it was anticipated, would be kept intact, but the state's inner "mechanism" was to be reformed. There would be no annexation. Instead, France would exercise control in the name of the sultan.

The fourth clause provided for commercial liberty and equality in Morocco. The stipulation was a necessary prerequisite so far as Great Britain was concerned, because of British trade interests in that country. It was also a precautionary provision to forestall objections by other powers to a French monopoly in the North African state. Spain would surely object if France obtained a commercial superiority which might be disadvantageous to her own interests. Although Spanish commerce with the Moroccan state had been

on the decline since 1899 and as late as 1901 the balance of trade was unfavorable to Spain, the Spanish government felt that it was valuable. It hoped that the future would see an increase in exports to Morocco. Germany, with her expanding economic activities, could also be counted on to complain vociferously if German commercial connections were disturbed without her consent.²⁰ A comparison of the relative position of the powers with respect to the foreign trade with that North African country in 1903 show that Great Britain enjoyed 41.6%, France and Algeria 30%, Germany 9%, Spain 8.4%, and the other nations negligible amounts. These figures demonstrate that, apart from strategic considerations, British and French trade with Morocco was sufficient to command the serious attention of these two countries. Of this trade Germany's percentage, although not so large as that of England and France, was nevertheless important. It was also very significant to the German government because it desired to hold and enlarge the overseas markets of the homeland.²¹

Under article seven, the signatory powers agreed not to permit the erection of any fortifications between, but not including, Melilla, and the high ground which dominates the right bank of the Sebou River. This clause, however, was declared not to affect the localities which Spain occu-

²⁰ Ibid., Lansdowne to Cambon, Oct. 1, 1903, Vol. II, no. 369, p. 312.

²¹ Maura, Cuestión de Marruecos, pp. 295, 297.

pied on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean. In effect, as much of the coast of Morocco as possible was to be neutralized in order to insure free movement through the Strait of Gibraltar. Not incidentally, this provision would help protect the predominant position of the fortress of Gibraltar. The British government wished to make certain that no power, even a weak one, could challenge her control over the entrance into the Mediterranean Sea from the Atlantic Ocean.²²

The eighth clause fulfilled Britain's promise to the Spanish government that Spain would not be forgotten. It provided that the French government should arrive at an understanding with the Madrid government regarding Morocco and for the communication of any such agreement to the British government. This article was not compulsory, but it served to remind France that she was expected to enter into negotiations with Spain. It gave the Spanish government some support. The Spanish government was not left alone to fight it out with the French government. One must note, however, that the stipulation carries no direction, or even an implication, obliging France to satisfy the legitimate interests of Spain in northern and northwestern Morocco.²³ Being the weaker state, Spain was bound to encounter great difficulties

²² British Documents, Lansdowne to Cambon, Oct. 1, 1903, Vol. II, no. 369, p. 312.

²³ Ibid., Lansdowne to Cambon, Oct. 1, 1903, Vol. II, no. 369, pp. 312-13.

in her future negotiations with France.

Under the ninth article the British and French governments agreed to lend to one another their diplomatic support in order to obtain the execution of the accord with regard to Egypt and Morocco. This clause was not directed against Spain, as the French government did not need British support in order to deal with a power which had not yet recovered from the war with the United States. It was undoubtedly included for the mutual benefit of France and Great Britain in anticipation of difficulties with third powers in connection with their agreement. In case the Spanish representatives proved obdurate in negotiating with French officials, however, Britain could conceivably be called upon to aid France. The British government would thus be cast in the role of mediator. This position might turn out to be embarrassing, however. Lord Lansdowne was morally bound to give the Spanish government every assistance possible. The latter, early in the Anglo-French conversations, had betrayed confidences regarding the Franco-Spanish negotiations of 1902 to the British foreign secretary which had been useful to the English government. Furthermore, Spain had refused to sign her 1902 accord with France without the approval of England. On the other hand, Britain would need French support in carrying out the Egyptian part of the agreement. The British government, therefore, could not appear to dis-

regard French interests in Morocco.²⁴

The secret articles were, by their nature, the most compromising of the Anglo-French agreement. They provided for future contingencies which might force them to alter their policies. At the same time the real intentions of each were outlined. These clauses left no doubt that Morocco's life as an independent state was likely to come to an end in the near future.

Secret article number one provided that in the event that either of the signatory states were forced by circumstances to modify their policy in regard to Egypt and Morocco, clauses four, six, and seven would remain operative. Of these, number four, concerning commercial and economic equality in Morocco, and seven, providing for liberty of movement through the Strait of Gibraltar and non-fortification of the Moorish shore, were the most important with respect to Spain. Excluding the Egyptian question, the meaning of its terms appears to be that in case France should find it necessary to act in disharmony with the declared aims of the agreement, the advantages obtained by these three stipulations would not be disturbed. In the eventuality, therefore, that France thought it necessary to change the political ~~an~~ economic status of Morocco, Britain would not object if British rights were left unmolested. Spain was, by im-

²⁴ Ibid., Cromer to Lansdowne, March 14, 1904, Vol. II, no. 400, pp. 354-55.

plication, relegated to a secondary role in this clause. It seems logical to believe that an alteration of French policy in the area to be controlled by the agents of that republic could have the effect of discriminating against Spanish trade. Likewise, if it should turn out that any part of Morocco which had been destined to come under Spain's influence should fall to France, the position of the United Kingdom at Gibraltar would remain intact. There is a vague hint here that Spain might not receive all of what was contemplated in the accord.

According to the third secret clause the governments of Great Britain and France agreed that a certain portion of Moorish territory bordering Melilla, Ceuta, and other penal colonies should, whenever the sultan's authority over it comes to an end, fall within Spain's sphere of influence, the administration of the Moroccan seacoast from Melilla up to, but not including, the heights on the right of the Sebou River was assigned to Spain. The Spanish government was required to acquiesce formally to the terms of articles four and seven. In addition Spain had to promise to refrain from alienating all or a part of the land placed under her control or in her sphere of influence.

The clause has three distinct parts. First, the general area where Spain is to become the power in authority is designated. The actual boundary lines are not drawn, leaving such "details" to future settlement between the Spanish

and French governments. Since France, for all practical purposes, was given a free hand in Morocco, the size of Spain's sphere would depend, to an appreciable extent, on how much the French government was willing to concede. Second, Spain was required to adhere to articles four and seven as a condition to her acquisition of a zone of territory. Like the French government, the Spanish government would be committed to policies desired by England. Third, the Spanish government had to undertake not to dispose of any part of the area allotted to it. The requirement was one in which France as well as England were interested. The French government insisted upon it in order to obtain a reasonable assurance that another, and stronger, power could not establish itself in a strategic position bordering Algeria and the expected future protectorate in Morocco. If Spain found herself in need, the Spanish government could decide to sell to a third state unless such action were prohibited from the start. Great Britain, of course, was concerned with the security of the route into the Mediterranean. It was natural that provision should be made to allow only a relatively weak state to hold shores along the British empire's life line to India.

In the fourth secret clause, it was stated that if Spain should refuse to agree to the stipulations of secret article three, the Anglo-French arrangement would still be

in force.²⁵ This clause and the other secret provisions were not communicated to the Spanish government. The reason or reasons for withholding this information from Spain were not indicated by the principals involved. The opinion may be ventured that, privately, they feared that the Spanish government, in possession of such delicate intelligence, might threaten to expose the whole arrangement unless Spain was satisfied in Morocco by France.

The existence of the secret clauses as a part of the treaty is another matter. It may be deduced that these articles were added to the accord in anticipation of all foreseeable eventualities. One cannot deny that their addition gave France a decided advantage. In spite of the French declaration of intention to arrive at an understanding with Spain, the Paris government could have claimed, in the last resort, that it was impossible to negotiate any agreement with the representatives of Spain. France could not openly use it against Spain, but the knowledge that French interests might lose nothing if the Spanish government could, or would, not come to satisfactory terms with the French government, made the latter's position infinitely stronger.

Sir Edward Grey, in discussing the Anglo-French accord of 1904 with respect to Egypt and Morocco, wrote:

On the face of the agreement with France there was nothing more than a desire to remove causes of dispute

²⁵ Romanones, Responsabilidades del Antiguo Régimen, pp. 49-50.

between two nations, to make up old quarrels, to become friends. It was all made public, except a clause or two of no importance, which were not published at the time, owing to regard, as I suppose, for the susceptibilities of the Sultan of Morocco. Even these were published a few years later.²⁶

On the basis of available documents concerning the Anglo-French agreement, Grey's appraisal appears to be conspicuously inadequate. The understanding is much more than a wish to make friends. It is a British plan to consolidate their position in Egypt and a declaration of a French intent to infiltrate and then dominate Morocco.

The agreement contained five aims in regard to the Moroccan state. First, and most important of all, it opened the way for France to become the most influential power in Morocco during the existence there of the status quo. Two, the French government obtained a free hand to determine the future course of Morocco as soon as the sultan should cease to exercise authority in the country. Three, Spain was assigned a subordinate role in the administration of the African state on condition that the Spanish government sign a subsequent agreement with the French government. Four, care was taken to safeguard British strategic and economic interests in the general area of northwest Africa. Five, provision was made for commercial liberty and equality as a concession to those powers which had economic interests in Morocco.

²⁶ Sir Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916 (London, 1925), p. 49.

These goals were not immediate, but were a long range program to be put into operation gradually. Rather than attempt a bold annexation, there was a desire to accomplish the same purposes with a minimum of friction. The fact is not thereby hidden, however, that the arrangement "pushed" the moribund African state a little closer to its "sepulcher."

The effect of the Anglo-French accord on Spanish policy was immediate. Realizing that France had obtained a free hand in Morocco, the conviction became general that Spain must also drive toward an understanding with the French republic. It was not a question, any longer, that could be postponed with the hope of finding a more opportune moment to press for a solution. Shorn of all camouflage, Spain was faced with the alternatives of negotiating and securing a measure of her desires, or refusing to discuss the issue and obtaining nothing.

By force of circumstances, the Spanish government therefore found it expedient to enter into conversations with the French government. Also, as a result of the situation created by the Paris-London "entente," Spain was obliged to seek British support in dealing with the French government. Because of Morocco, Spanish policy was tied to the coat tails of France and England.

When the Spanish government, for fear of offending Great Britain, refused to sign the already mature agreement

with France in 1902, the position of Spain in Morocco was endangered. Relying on the promises of Lord Lansdowne that the British government would not commit itself to any settlement of the Moorish question without first consulting Spain, the Madrid administration decided to postpone consideration of the issue. Subsequently, Great Britain entered into secret negotiations with France covering the broad questions affecting the interests of both powers. Without allowing Spain to participate in their deliberations, regarding those points touching on Morocco, they arrived at an agreement. The Spanish government, finding that it had gained nothing by its extreme candor toward the British government, was compelled to lean on England in order to deal with France.

CHAPTER VI

FRANCO-SPANISH AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 3, 1904

Spain's exclusion from the Anglo-French negotiations was a source of great irritation to the Spanish government. This slight had been reluctantly endured with the expectation that as soon as the British and French governments arrived at an understanding, Spain would be taken into their confidence and negotiations with France would commence immediately. The Madrid government's presumption, however, failed to materialize as rapidly as it was anticipated.

France and Great Britain concluded their conversations and signed the agreement reached between them on April 8, 1904. The Spanish ambassadors in London and Paris became aware of this event immediately through unofficial sources and naturally awaited an early official communication from the British or French foreign offices formally announcing the long expected accord and enclosing a copy of it. Days passed without a word from either power. Spanish annoyance turned into anger. Finally, Spanish distrust of France, and of Delcassé in particular, prompted León y Castillo to call on the French minister on or about April fifteenth.¹ At this meeting each side waited for the other to offer suggestions. As a result no progress had been made and the Span-

¹ The Friday previous to April 19, 1904.

ish ambassador, as well as his government, became apprehensive.²

It is not clear whether Delcassé or León y Castillo initiated the negotiations which were finally commenced between the two men on April nineteenth. The discordant beginning was not improved at this second meeting. Having obtained a free hand in Morocco from England, the French minister no longer felt obliged to be generous with Spain. He therefore inferred, in the interview with the Marquis of Muni, that Spain's sphere in Morocco would have to conform to the new situation created by the British-French agreement. León y Castillo, in disgust, immediately called on the British ambassador in Paris, Sir Edmund Monson, to complain regarding the attitude taken by the French foreign minister. He stated that an agreement had been drawn up in Paris more than a year before as to the eventual partition of Morocco which was never signed because Spain insisted that it must first be submitted to the approval of England. This agreement was now repudiated by Delcassé who, instead, offered greatly diminished advantages. León y Castillo believed that the French minister was guilty of bad faith.³ In his opinion, now that France and Great Britain were in accord, Delcassé seemed to wish in a spirit of condescension

² British Documents, Lansdowne to Monson, April 20, 1904, Vol. III, no. 28, p. 28; Ibid., Lansdowne to Egerton, April 20, 1904, Vol. III, no. 29, p. 29.

³ Ibid., Monson to Lansdowne, April 22, 1904, Vol. III, no. 30, p. 30.

to leave Spain a few insignificant portions of the Moroccan territory.⁴

The Marquis of Muni's mood was visibly pessimistic with respect to Spain's situation in the new conversations with the French government. His attitude was one of evident distaste for the task which lay before him. He had to negotiate once more and engage in a second struggle, not in the wake of a defeat, but after winning the first encounter. The second effort would not take place on a clear field and under equal conditions as in 1902. Negotiations would be an uphill drive along a narrow path between heights occupied by France and England. Furthermore, an understanding had to be sought with France after Great Britain had recognized French protection over Morocco. León y Castillo had no illusions concerning the provision in article number eight of the published Anglo-French Declaration, which looked toward a Franco-Spanish arrangement. He considered it no more than a British gesture recommending Spain to the benevolence of France.⁵ The Madrid government reflected the frame of mind of the Spanish ambassador in Paris. Spanish ministers were aware that they had no power to protect the interests of Spain.⁶

On April 27, 1904, the Duke of Mandas paid a visit to

⁴ Klinger, Spain's Problem of Alliances, p. 26.

⁵ León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, pp. 128-29, 180-81.

⁶ British Documents, Gosselin to Lansdowne, April 23, 1904, Vol. III, no. 31, p. 30.

the British Foreign Office to present his government's point of view concerning the proposals which had been made to it by Delcassé in Paris. The ambassador stated that in 1902 the French government had offered Spain a sphere of influence beginning at the mouth of the Muluya River, following its course for some distance, then running to the south of Fez, and to the mouth of the Sebou on the Atlantic. The new offer, the Duke pointed out, was much less favorable to his country. Delcassé had suggested that the boundary line between the French and Spanish spheres should be drawn, not from the mouth of the Muluya, but from Melilla in a south-westerly direction describing a line running north of Fez and west toward the Atlantic Ocean.⁷

Again in 1902, the Ambassador continued, Spain was offered a second sphere of influence commencing at Cape Bogador and including the Sus valley. Here also Delcassé wished to reduce materially the territory to come under Spanish control. In effect, both zones under consideration were being curtailed to a great degree. His government strongly objected to these reductions. The curtailment on the Mediterranean coast was unsatisfactory because Spain owned the Zafarin Islands located opposite the mouth of the Muluya. Consequently, it would be intolerable to have the area between Melilla and the Muluya remain within the French

⁷ See the map attached for these and other geographic locations in Morocco.

sphere. Regarding the disposition contemplated by the French foreign minister on the Atlantic, the Spanish government also objected, for it would have the effect of depriving Spain of territory close to Santa Cruz which she had acquired in 1870. It seemed to the Duke of Mandas that it was unfair that Spain should be requested by France to accept less favorable conditions merely because England had entered upon the scene. He added that feeling in Spain upon the question would be quite strong, and if the French government refused to modify their proposals, there would be a great deal of popular excitement.

Lord Lansdowne replied that it was gratifying to learn that the French government was willing to provide extensive spheres of influence in those areas of Morocco which might be considered as most important to Spain. It seemed to the British foreign secretary, however, that the precise extent of the spheres to be incorporated under the control of France and Spain was a matter for discussion between them. In conclusion Lansdowne assured the ambassador that he would follow the negotiations with friendly interest.⁸

At his next meeting with Paul Cambon, the French ambassador, Lansdowne repeated to the French representative what the Spanish ambassador had said on April 27 on the subject of spheres of influence in Morocco. Cambon, in defense of the French position, assured the British secretary that

⁸ British Documents, Lansdowne to Egerton, April 27, 1904, Vol. III, no. 32, pp. 31-32.

there had never been any thought of including Fez within the Spanish sphere. It was true that the boundary of the northern sphere had been traced in 1902 further to the south than it was intended to trace it in the current deliberations, but that two years before there was "no question of a second sphere south of Morocco."⁹ The offer of a southern sphere by Delcassé was therefore considered an ample compensation for the diminution of the northern sphere. Acting as mediator, Lansdowne then called the French ambassador's attention to the objections which the Duke of Mandas had voiced regarding the exclusion of Spain from territory directly opposite the Zafarin Islands. In an effort to assist in bringing the French and Spanish governments' conversations to an early end, he expressed a hope that Delcassé would see his way clear to make a concession on that point.¹⁰

As a result of the British foreign secretary's friendly representations to the French ambassador, Delcassé sent for the Marquis of Muni and informed him of his decision to accept the British suggestion. In addition, the French minister offered to expand the southern Spanish sphere. Delcassé followed this action by another, to arrive at a quick termination of the negotiations. He instructed

⁹ P. Cambon admitted his error on this point to Lansdowne at a later date. (British Documents, Lansdowne to Monson, May 13, 1904, Vol. III, no. 37, p. 35.)

¹⁰ British Documents, Lansdowne to Monson, April 29, 1904, Vol. III, no. 34, p. 33.

Jules Cambon, the French ambassador in Madrid, to advise the Minister of state, Rodríguez San Pedro, of the conclusive character of the offers made to León y Castillo.¹¹ This was in line with the urgings of the French ambassador in Spain, who had been pressing for an early completion of the negotiations in order to silence the press' criticism of France and enable the Spanish government to go before the Cortes with at least something in their hands. The Spanish legislative body was due to open its sessions on May 20.¹²

On receiving Delcassé's proposal, San Pedro acknowledged the French concession of the coastline east of Melilla, but complained that those made to Spain opposite to the Canary Islands were insufficient. In rebuttal, Delcassé made it plain to the Marquis of Muni in Paris that the concessions were offered upon condition that the remainder of the French terms be accepted. The Foreign secretary added that he was not prepared to prolong the discussion of the details, and his offer was being made on a take it or leave it basis.¹³

The sharp tone of Delcassé's proposal did not impress the Spanish government, as it felt that France was in need of an agreement with Spain. The Madrid administration be-

¹¹ Ibid., Lansdowne to Monson, May 13, 1904, Vol. III, no. 36, p. 34.

¹² Tabouis, Cambon, p. 135.

¹³ British Documents, Lansdowne to Monson, May 13, 1904, Vol. III, no. 36, p. 34; Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, p. 119.

lieved that the prolongation of the negotiations would rebound to the benefit of Spain. Prince von Bulow, the German chancellor, encouraged this tactic.¹⁴ Also heartening to the Spanish Cabinet was the apparent disposition of the French government to yield on certain points when pressured by Lord Lansdowne. In recognition of his valuable assistance, expressions of appreciation were sent to him by the Spanish Minister of state through Sir Edwin H. Egerton, the British ambassador at Madrid.¹⁵

Just when it appeared that the boundaries of the Spanish spheres were about to be settled, another disagreement on the same point was reported to Lord Lansdowne by the Duke of Mandas in the morning of May 16, 1904. To the great disappointment of the Spanish negotiators, they had learned that Delcassé did not mean to withdraw the western boundary of the French sphere to the Muluya River, but to the mountain crests west of the stream. On the Atlantic coast, the southern border of the same zone, instead of beginning at the entrance of the Sebou River, was to be drawn much further north. Regarding the southern sphere, the northern limit would not reach the Sus River, as had been decided in 1902, but was to be fixed further to the south. In short, the Spanish ambassador pointed out, the effect of the French

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 120.

¹⁵ British Documents, Egerton to Lansdowne, May 6, 1904, Vol. III, no. 35, p. 34.

offer was to close to Spain the valleys of the Muluya, the Sebou, and the Sus, thus depriving her of those avenues of penetration. Although Lansdowne thought there must be other routes of ingress, he promised to mention the ambassador's observations to Cambon during their next meeting.¹⁶

At the same time in Madrid, Minister San Pedro had also protested Delcassé's attitude to the French ambassador. The latter was informed that the Spanish government could not accept the delineation of the zones as outlined by Delcassé.¹⁷

In the evening following the Spanish ambassador's visit, Cambon called on the British foreign secretary. Lord Lansdowne related to the French ambassador the substance of the statements made by the Duke of Mandas and again supported the Spanish view regarding the eastern frontier of the proposed sphere of Spain. The foreign secretary expressed the hope that Delcassé would find it possible to adopt the Muluya River as the frontier, for, in his opinion, the area involved could not be of great importance to the French government.¹⁸ The next day, the French foreign minister agreed to the Muluya rectification in the hope that his concession

¹⁶ Ibid., Lansdowne to Egerton, May 16, 1904, Vol. III, no. 38, pp. 35-36.

¹⁷ Klinger, Spain's Problem of Alliances, p. 27.

¹⁸ British Documents, Lansdowne to Monson, May 16, 1904, Vol. III, no. 39, p. 36.

would end the discussion.¹⁹ This modification was found satisfactory by the Spanish government on May 21, 1904. For all practical purposes, the points in dispute between Madrid and Paris had apparently been settled.²⁰ The impression, however, proved to be a mistaken one.

Very early in July, the Duke of Mandas reported to Lord Lansdowne that the negotiations between León y Castillo and Delcassé in Paris had been virtually concluded, when, at the last moment, the French minister had announced that he wished to add a new clause. Under the stipulation, Spain would be prevented from taking any action in her zones of influence until such time as the status quo in Morocco had come to an end. The Spanish ambassador stated that his government regarded Delcassé's proposal very gravely as completely at variance with the Anglo-French Declaration of April, 1904. If the clause suggested by the French Minister were adopted, the result would be that France would have, for an undetermined period, an exclusive opportunity to establish her power in Moroccan territory. The Spanish government feared that the French government would found its influence in a manner that would prevent Spain from ever claiming that the political situation of Morocco had been altered. The ambassador felt, therefore, that the time had come for an

¹⁹ Ibid., Lansdowne to Monson, May 18, 1904, Vol. III, no. 40, pp. 36-37.

²⁰ Klinger, Spain's Problem of Alliances, p. 28.

assertion of Spain's rights to spheres of influence in Morocco without any limitation whatsoever. In his opinion, nothing would induce the Spanish government to sign such an article. Finally, if pressed to do so, it would probably make an appeal to the powers.

The threat made by the Duke of Mandas on behalf of his government recalled to Lord Lansdowne a statement made to him by the German ambassador in the event of Spain's receiving less than she was entitled to at the hands of France. It occurred to him that the Spanish ambassador's remarks probably pointed to an attempt to obtain the support of Germany in case the French government proved inflexible.²¹ The British secretary's suspicion was well founded. San Pedro in Madrid had approached the German representative concerning the latest proposal of the French foreign minister and had been encouraged to object to the limitation implied in it. The Spanish minister of state continued to believe that it was to the advantage of his country to employ dilatory tactics in order to press France into yielding to Spain's requests.²² As a result of this attitude, an impasse was reached in the Franco-Spanish discussions.

The government at Madrid, in the meantime, was under

²¹ British Documents, Egerton to Lansdowne, July 1, 1904, Vol. III, no. 43, p. 38; Ibid., Lansdowne to Egerton, July 2, 1904, Vol. III, no. 44, pp. 38-40; Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, pp. 120-21.

²² Klinger, Spain's Problem of Alliances, p. 28.

pressure of the Cortes with respect to the former's conduct of Spanish foreign relations in general, and the Moroccan issue in particular. The Count of Romanones demanded the submission to the legislative body of those documents relating to the negotiations with France in 1902, as well as the agreement itself, which was not signed by the administration of Silvela. This was refused by the minister of state on the ground that the current deliberations were a continuation of the previous discussions with the French government. Consequently, owing to the delicate nature of the question, it was impossible to submit them for examination by the Cor-
tes.²³

In the sessions of the Cortes first one member and then another voiced remarks which were embarrassing to the Spanish government. Deputy Gil Robles was opposed to any negotiation regarding Morocco until Spain should recover sufficiently in military and naval strength;²⁴ Emilio Nocedal **protested** that Spain's role in Morocco should not be inferior to that of France;²⁵ and the Duke of Almodóvar del Río took the president of the Council of Ministers to task for failing to consult the nation's congress before commenc-

²³ Diario, Legislatura de 1903, Sesión del 28 de mayo de 1904, Vol. XI, no. 153, pp. 4673-74.

²⁴ Ibid., Legislatura de 1903, Sesión del 30 de mayo de 1904, Vol. XII, no. 154, p. 4686.

²⁵ Ibid., Legislatura de 1903, Sesión del 3 de junio de 1904, Vol. XII, no. 158, p. 4773.

ing to negotiate with France.²⁶ These criticisms reflected the general uneasiness felt by Spanish leaders in that body as to the outcome of the expected understanding with the French government. They were painfully conscious of the impotence of Spain and feared the worst.

The contributions of the Spanish press were also valueless. If the publication was in agreement with the objectives of the government, the defense of Spain's rights and a respectable sphere of influence in Morocco, it had a tendency to be unrealistic regarding the position of their country in the power situation of Europe. If the journal or newspaper was opposed to the administration, its ill-humored remarks hampered the negotiations that were in progress in Madrid and Paris.²⁷

The Spanish government, for its part, could not admit a pessimistic view of the conversations with the French government. On behalf of his administration, the president of the Council of Ministers, Gabriel Maura y Gamazo, assured the Cortes that Spanish interests had not and would not be neglected. He insisted that Spaniards had nothing to fear from France. Maura pointed out that the references made to Spain in the Anglo-French agreement were ample proof that justice would be done with respect to a Spanish sphere in

²⁶ Ibid., Legislatura de 1903, Sesión del 8 de junio de 1904, Vol. XII, no. 166, p. 4917.

²⁷ Maura, La Cuestión de Marruecos, pp. 39, 56-57, 91; Reparaz, Política de España en Africa, pp. 386-87.

Morocco.²⁸

The expressions of confidence uttered by the chief cabinet minister were governed by political necessity in the face of a threat to the successful termination of the negotiations with respect to Morocco, and to the continued existence of the Conservative party in power. Actually, there was real concern regarding the ultimate position of Spain in North Africa. Maura's anxiety, and that of the ministry of state, was evidenced by the not infrequent complaints of San Pedro to Egerton in Madrid, the pessimism of León y Castillo in Paris, and the frequent visits of the Duke of Mandas to the British foreign office.

Two days after the Spanish ambassador's interview with Lord Lansdowne, regarding Delcassé's proposed restriction of Spanish action in the latter's prospective zone in Africa, the British secretary spoke to Paul Cambon. Lansdowne acquainted the French ambassador with the substance of the Duke of Mandas' remarks and, on his own account, observed that even if it were recognized that Spain had an immediate right to exercise a kind of peaceful penetration within the zone allotted to her by the recently signed Anglo-French Declaration, he thought it doubtful that the Spanish government would be able to take advantage of its opportunities. It would be lamentable, therefore, not to recognize Spanish

²⁸ Diario, Legislatura de 1903, Sesión del 4 de junio de 1904, Vol. XII, no. 160, pp. 4809-12.

hopes, at least in theory, in that direction. Lansdowne added that an arbitrary rejection of Spain's aspirations would have an ill effect, and possibly lead to international complications--an obvious reference to the Spanish government's threat to appeal to the powers.

The French ambassador omitted any comment regarding the British foreign secretary's allusion relative to conceivable international difficulties. He stated that it was his understanding that the disagreement had occurred as a result of the demand of León y Castillo for permission to publish an accord as to the manner in which Morocco would be administered in case that country should disintegrate. The Spanish government wished to make such a publication in compliance with a provision of Spain's constitution under which the king was not permitted to sign secret agreements. Cambon added that Delcassé could not accede to the Marquis of Muni's request, but that the latter was willing to humor the Spanish ambassador with regard to the future of Spain in her Moroccan zone of influence. In this connection, the French minister had submitted certain proposals to the Madrid administration.²⁹

The offers which Delcassé had made in Madrid provided for Spanish participation in the economic development of Morocco and the association of Spanish with French officials

²⁹ British Documents, Lansdowne to Monson, July 4, 1904, Vol. III, no. 45, p. 40.

in two or three ports whose customs revenues were to be collected as security for a recent French loan. Delcassé also proposed, in harmony with the third secret article of the agreement signed at London in April, that Spain should "undertake not to alienate the whole, or a part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence." The Spanish government considered the latter suggestion beneath its dignity and offered instead to give France a right of preference if, at a later date, Spain wished to cede any or all of that area. When the French ambassador in London reported Delcassé's proposal and San Pedro's counter offer to Lansdowne, the latter immediately telegraphed Egerton in Madrid to press the Spanish government to accept the French suggestion. The British secretary did not wish to give France a preferential claim to the Spanish sphere if Spain were unable to hold it. San Pedro quickly acceded to Lansdowne's request, but another, and more serious, disagreement emerged at once.³⁰

The French foreign minister proposed to the Spanish government that Spain abstain from exercising her influence in the zone to be allotted to her for a period of thirty years. This period was reduced to fifteen years, but it was still rejected. The Duke of Mandas explained to Lord Lans-

³⁰ Ibid., Lansdowne to Monson, July 8, 1904, Vol. III, no. 47, p. 41; Ibid., Lansdowne to Monson, July 29, 1904, Vol. III, no. 49, p. 42; Ibid., Lansdowne to Egerton, July 29, 1904, Vol. III, no. 50, p. 43; Ibid., Egerton to Lansdowne, July 31, 1904, Vol. III, no. 52, p. 44.

downe that his country did not wish to resort to hasty action in Morocco, but they resented such an indefinite postponement of the realization of their desires. He echoed the feelings of the minister of state in Madrid who told the British representative that the clause would have the effect of giving France control of Spain's sphere during the period designated.³¹

León y Castillo in Paris was equally, if not more, disturbed by Delcassé's effort to delay the exercise of Spanish action in northern Morocco. It was on his initiative, occasioned by somewhat excessive suspicion of French designs, that the matter had reached that point. He confessed that it had occurred to him, during one sleepless night, that the Anglo-French agreement gave France a protectorate over all of Morocco. This would place the anticipated Spanish sphere of influence within the French zone and, in effect, make Spain's sphere a subprotectorate under the French protectorate. Believing that no agreement at all was better than one under such conditions, he apprised Delcassé of his feelings on the subject. The first reaction of the French foreign minister was to say that in that case the whole negotiation should be forgotten. After a moment of silence, however, the conversation was resumed and they decided to inquire from the government at Madrid whether it

³¹ *Ibid.*, Egerton to Lansdowne, July 31, 1904, Vol. III, no. 52, p. 44; *Ibid.*, Lansdowne to Egerton, Aug. 3, 1904, Vol. III, no. 54, p. 45.

was ready to assume responsibility for all that might take place in the Spanish zone. The Spanish ambassador journeyed to Spain to discuss the issue with San Pedro and receive instructions. The latter refused to accept responsibility for what could occur in the Spanish sphere and instead asked for the option of assuming it or not as desired by Madrid. Delcassé declined to countenance the minister of state's suggestion and proposed instead a fifteen-year suspension of action by Spain in her sphere.³²

The disagreement over the time when Spain should begin to assume control over her African zone occupied the foreign ministries of Spain, France, and England from July until October, 1904. It was difficult to find a solution because, for the two Latin powers, it involved what they considered a matter of vital concern to them. Delcassé, recalling past examples of Spanish maladministration (Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines), wished to make it difficult for the agents of Spain to interfere in Moroccan affairs, and thus postpone the disintegration of Morocco until the suitable moment should arrive. In the meantime the integrity and independence of the country could be undermined while a pretense was made of maintaining them. In principle, Delcassé was within his rights in assuming that attitude toward Spain, and was in some degree protected against British intervention in the latter's favor. The third secret article

³² León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, pp. 182-84; Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, p. 121.

of the Anglo-French accord provided that the area in question should come within the sphere of influence of Spain and be administered by her "whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it."³³

Spain was the other power with a special position in Morocco. She was very sensitive about her prestige and very fearful lest, as the weaker nation compared with France, her influence and her territorial ambitions should be checked.³⁴ The Spanish government, consequently, wished to obtain the same privileges and freedom of movement with regard to its future zone in Morocco as France had secured in her arrangement with Great Britain the preceding April. With this object in mind, the Spanish government offered to take no action for fifteen years without a previous accord with France, provided the latter recognized that she "ought to proceed in accord with the Spanish government in that which touches the zone of influence reserved to Spain." Delcassé initially stood firm on his prior stand, but, being aware of Germany's interest in the negotiations,³⁵ he agreed

³³ British Documents, Vol. II, pp. 393-94; Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, p. 121.

³⁴ Grey, Twenty-Five Years, p. 211.

³⁵ British Documents, Egerton to Lansdowne, July 22, 1904, Vol. III, no. 48, p. 41; Tabouis, Cambon, p. 138; Barlow, Agadir Crisis, pp. 3-4. The French Foreign Ministry suspected that the German government wished to intrude upon the Franco-Spanish negotiations in order to obtain a concession which would establish Germany at some point on the coast of Morocco. The proximity of the latter country to the British and French communications routes with their empires made it an extremely disagreeable eventuality.

upon condition that the Spanish proposal be amended to read that "France would take no steps within the Spanish sphere without giving previous notice to Spain."³⁶ The French suggestion was accepted by the Madrid government and an accord was signed by Delcassé and León y Castillo in Paris on October 3, 1904.³⁷

The Franco-Spanish agreement was composed of a general declaration to be published and a convention which was to remain secret. The declaration stated that Spain adhered to the Anglo-French declaration of April 8, 1904, and that France and Spain remained firmly attached to the integrity of the Moroccan empire under the sovereignty of the sultan. This portion of the accord was significant in three respects. It conceded French leadership and acknowledged Spanish inferiority in Moroccan affairs. In deference to British wishes, the Spanish government agreed not to fortify those regions of Morocco which were to come under its influence excepting those that were already controlled by Spain. The principle of economic and commercial liberty and equality was agreed to, meaning that Spain would not be able to monopolize those activities in her zone. Like the "parent"

³⁶ British Documents, Lansdowne to Egerton, Aug. 16, 1904, Vol. III, no. 55, p. 46; Ibid., Monson to Lansdowne, Sept. 16, 1904, Vol. III, no. 57, p. 48.

³⁷ Ibid., Cambon to Lansdowne, Oct. 6, 1904, Vol. III, no. 58, pp. 48-52; Diario, Legislatura de 1911, Sesión del 18 de enero de 1912, Apendice 1, no. 67, pp. 1-3; Documents Diplomatiques Français, Série 2, Oct. 3, 1904, Vol. V, no. 358, pp. 428-32.

British-French understanding, the reference to Morocco's integrity was mere lip service. It was designed to appease the sensibilities of the sultan and veil the ulterior motives contained in the secret clauses which followed the opening announcement.

The convention contained sixteen articles. Article one repeats Spain's adherence to the terms of the agreement signed in London by Great Britain and France. Under the second article Spain is assigned a sphere of influence in northern Morocco of some eight thousand square miles in area. The most significant features of the zone were its rugged mountains, its long strategic coasts on the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, the density of its population in comparison with the French zone, and the warlike character of the natives who inhabit the country. Economically, the Spanish sphere represented a potential rather than an actual value as a market for the products of Spain and a source of raw materials. The principal Spanish exports to the zone consisted of cotton, sugar, tea, and crude silk, and Spain's share in francs at Larache, for example, amounted, in 1901, to five per cent of the total exported by all nations to that Atlantic port.³⁸

Article three provided that for fifteen years Spain would be permitted freedom of action in her northern zone of influence only after an accord with France, unless the main-

³⁸ Maura, Cuestión de Marruecos, pp. 285, 295, 297.

tenance of the status quo in Morocco became impossible. In that case Spain could without hindrance exercise her action. The French government could thus control effectively the operations of Spain and thereby prevent precipitate actions by Spanish officials. France wished to make her penetration gradual and peaceful in order to prevent interference from third powers³⁹ and avoid the generation of a spirit of resistance among the natives of Morocco. On the other hand, French activity was not hindered as France was only required to notify the Spanish government before acting in the African state.

Article four enlarged the Spanish territory of Ifni located halfway between the Sus and Draa Rivers in the extreme south of Morocco. The increased size of the land was of little significance. The principal value of the region lay in its proximity to the Spanish-owned Canary Islands, whose fishermen used the mainland area in the course of their fishing operations. This acquisition represented Spain's southern sphere. The fifth clause was a completion of the delimitation of the Río de Oro region which had been the subject of the Franco-Spanish convention of June, 1900. Under the terms of this article the territory north of that Spanish colony and inland from Cape Juby, was extended up to the River Draa. Here again the Spanish gain was of little

³⁹ Germany had economic interests in Morocco and was jealous of them. It was to be expected, in view of Germany's well known desire for colonies, that the German government would seize the first opportunity to protest any French action.

practical value. The land is practically all desert. Spain was precluded by article six from assuming control of the areas described in the two preceding clauses except through prior agreement with the sultan. If the latter should cease to exercise authority in his empire, however, Spain would be free to act in accordance with article two.

Article seven enjoined the Spanish nation not to alienate or to cede in any form all or part of the territories under her spheres of influence. As in article nine of the unratified agreement of 1902 (between France and Spain), the French government wished to prevent the Spanish government from transferring any part of Spain's future sphere in North Africa to another power. It was obviously undesirable to allow even a possibility that a strong nation might establish itself near the prized Algerian province. For strategic reasons connected with the position of Gibraltar, England was loathe to see any but a weak country in possession of the Mediterranean and northern Atlantic coasts of Morocco.⁴⁰

The eighth clause provided that if, in the application of the territorial provisions of the convention, one of the signatory powers should be forced to resort to military action, the other party should be notified immediately. Both France and Spain were forbidden to appeal to a foreign power for assistance. On close examination it appears that the article was directed against Spain. There was no ques-

⁴⁰ Barlow, Agadir Crisis, p. 2.

tion as to the ability of France to deal with any military contingencies in Morocco. Spain's weakness had been exposed, however, by the Spanish-American War. Logic would demand, therefore, that the possibility of outside intervention, through a request for military aid from an interested power, should be anticipated and prevented.

Article nine stipulated that Tangier would retain the special character given to it by the presence of the diplomatic corps. It was included in obedience to the wishes of the British government. Due to the location of the city near the entrance to the Mediterranean and on the route around **Africa**, England had no desire to see any state, even a weak one, established there.⁴¹

Articles ten through twelve were of an economic nature: railroads, canals, and highways, leaving from a point in Morocco and terminating in territory under the Spanish sphere of influence or vice versa, would be undertaken jointly by companies composed of Frenchmen and Spaniards; Spanish schools then existing in Morocco, the circulation of Spanish money, and rights of navigation and fishing would not be interfered with, and reciprocal rights were to be enjoyed by the French in the Spanish zones of influence.

Under article thirteen the two parties (to the convention) promised to take the necessary precautions, in

⁴¹ British Documents, Lansdowne to Cambon, Oct. 1, 1903, Vol. II, no. 369, p. 312; Ibid., Lansdowne to Egerton, July 6, 1904, Vol. III, no. 46, p. 40.

their African lands, to prevent the introduction of arms and ammunition into Morocco if the government of the latter country should prohibit their sale within its boundaries. This provision anticipated at least police action to subdue rebellious Moroccan elements. France planned to use the sultan as her instrument of penetration.⁴² If the ruler's authority were threatened and French forces went to his aid, it would be necessary to keep military supplies out of the reach of Moroccan natives.

Article fourteen clarified the seventh clause of the Anglo-French accord, regarding the security of the Strait of Gibraltar, by specifying that the unfortified zone should extend 18.75 miles southeast of Melilla. This definition was made necessary by the intermittent nature of the Sebou River. If the stream disappeared, or altered its course, an opportunity might be provided for the evasion of the stipulation against fortification of the area. Under the fifteenth article, Spain and France agreed to proceed together in the establishment of an economic regime, in accordance with their reciprocal interests, in the event that the Paris-London agreement should be denounced.

The last article provided for publication of the convention if the Spanish and French governments, in common accord, decided that it could be done without inconvenience.

⁴² Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 386-87; Ibid., Lansdowne to Egerton, Aug. 3, 1904, Vol. III, no. 54, pp. 45-46; Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, p. 121.

It could be published by either of the two states after fifteen years without reference to the second power. The secrecy which Delcassé desired was thus maintained, while the Spanish constitutional provision forbidding Spain's king from signing covert agreements was overcome.⁴³ It could be claimed that the arrangement was not really secret since it was only intended to be kept from public view for a temporary period only.

The secrecy provision was a matter of vital concern if the penetration of Morocco was to be accomplished by peaceful means. It would have been cause for serious disturbances in the Moroccan empire, which was already seething with resentment against the hated whites, if France and Spain had let it be known that they were only waiting for the country to fall apart in order to divide it between themselves. There was no desire to provoke difficulties that might prove costly in the end. A consideration which could not be overlooked either was the effect that the agreement might have on other interested powers. What would be the reaction of an ambitious country like Germany? It was well known in diplomatic circles, if not in other centers, that Germany yearned for colonies in which to expand.⁴⁴

The Spanish agreement with France concluded in 1904

⁴³ Ibid., Egerton to Lansdowne, July 29, 1904, Vol. III, no. 51, pp. 43-44.

⁴⁴ Maura, Cuestión de Marruecos, p. 127.

does not compare favorably in three principal respects with the accord negotiated by the two powers, but left unrati-fied, in 1902. The more notable difference between the two agreements is the smaller size and lesser economic value of the territories conceded to Spain in 1904. In 1902, Spain was given spheres of influence in north and south Morocco which included nearly the whole of the old Kingdom of Fez, including Tangier, and the region of the Sus. The area re-maining to France in 1902 was larger than that reserved for Spain, but Spain's zone was richer and more populated.⁴⁵

In 1904 the northern sphere assigned to Spain was half the size of the zone she failed to obtain two years be-fore. It did not include the valuable Gharb (kingdom of Fez) territory of northern Morocco. In the south, the Spanish tract was reduced to a small fraction of what the Spanish government had won in 1902. These reductions were not com-pensated by the extension of the Río de Oro region up to the River Draa, for the latter area was relatively unexplored and, so far as was known, it was nothing more than a desert.

In regard to freedom of action, the unratified con-vention was also much more advantageous. The arrangement under the accord of 1902 placed Spain on an equal footing with France. It provided for each side to consult the other in case either found it necessary to employ military force

⁴⁵ Romanones, Responsabilidades del Antiguo Régimen, pp. 44-45, 51-52; León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, p. 129; Mousset, Política Exterior de España, p. 16.

during the existence of the status quo. The later understanding, however, obliged the Spanish government to obtain French agreement before exercising its action, while France was only required to give Spain notice of her intention to act insofar as it concerned the Spanish sphere of influence. Presumably, since the convention of 1904 makes no mention of it, the French government would not be obliged to notify the government of Spain if the former decided to take action in the zone reserved for France.

A third unfavorable aspect of the 1904 agreement in relation to earlier accord, is the requirement that Spain should not alienate all or part of the territory which would eventually come under her control. This embarrassing obligation was not imposed on the Spanish government in 1902. It seemed to carry with it the implication, which hurt Spanish pride, that Spain was either too weak to hold her position in Morocco or so much in need of funds that at the first opportunity the land would be sold to the highest bidder. The Spanish government was compelled to accept the injunction under British pressure,⁴⁶ but Spain was considerably irritated by the requirement.

The opinions of Spanish leaders differed widely in their evaluation of the Franco-Spanish convention of 1904. The Count of Romanones, Gonzalo de Reparaz, and Mariano Gó-

⁴⁶ British Documents, Lansdowne to Egerton, Aug. 16, 1904, Vol. III, no. 55, p. 46.

mez deplored the fact that Spain failed to sign the agreement of 1902. Maura Gamazo and Salvador Canals believed that the accord of 1904 offered Spain a more modest dominion, but that it was more in harmony with her activity and proportionate to Spanish resources. Each of the two judgments has sound elements of reasoning.

It is true that the advantages that Spain would have obtained, if she had ratified the first Moroccan agreement negotiated with France, were infinitely greater than those which she secured later, but there are four facts which dominate the issue. First, the Spanish government did not sign the accord, therefore it was a dream born of hope. Arguments over opportunities which do not present themselves twice are useless. Two, when Spain finally concluded an agreement with France, the latter had already obtained a free hand in all of Morocco.⁴⁷ This placed the Spanish government in the position of asking the French government for a share of what, on paper, amounted to a French protectorate. Third, France had had to make tangible sacrifices in Egypt and elsewhere in order to secure the support of Great Britain for a program of penetration in Morocco. Realizing by this time the value of the areas which it had been willing to concede to Spain in 1902, the French government naturally demanded that the Spanish government make concessions, too.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 386-87.

⁴⁸ León y Castillo, Mis Tiempos, p. 129; Montellá, España ante el Problema del Mediterráneo, p. 43; Tabouis, Cambon, p. 137.

Fourth, France no longer was in great need of Spanish support in Africa. The French government had won the even more valuable friendship of England and had the latter's written promise of diplomatic aid, if needed, to carry out the eventual absorption of Morocco. Winning Spanish adherence to France's Moroccan policy became, then, a matter of secondary importance.

A question might be asked at this point. Would Spain have been able to take full political and economic advantage of her position if she had been allotted all of Morocco north of a line running east and west immediately south of Fez in addition to the Sus area? Judging from past performances in Latin America, the answer can only be in the negative. The conclusion must be drawn, therefore, that the spheres of influence finally placed in the trust of the Spanish government were quite adequate in size and consistent with Spain's ability to exploit them.

In spite of disappointment with small gains which Spain had been allowed in the Franco-Spanish convention signed at Paris, the immediate effect of the accord was to draw the Spanish government one step closer toward an entente with France within an Anglo-French-Spanish understanding.⁴⁹ Spain became intimately associated with France in Morocco, and through the Anglo-French agreement Great Brit-

⁴⁹ Ramírez, Palique Diplomático, p. 126; Romanones, Responsabilidades del Antiguo Régimen, p. 52.

ain also was connected with French strategy in Northwest Africa. The latter's policy looked toward a partition of Morocco. Spain, consequently was irrevocably committed to a similar policy. From the moment the Spanish government affixed its signature of approval on the accord with France, the attitude assumed in Madrid was one of watchful waiting in regard to French African activities. Morocco after October 3, 1904, became the great center of Spanish interest.

In summary, when the Spanish government declined to give its approval to the first Moroccan accord negotiated in Paris, the French government turned to Great Britain and concluded an agreement regarding Morocco (among other questions). As a result, France secured a free hand in the Moroccan empire, and Spain found herself at a disadvantage in arriving later at an understanding with the French republic. The negotiations were tedious and marked by a French tendency to disregard the interests of Spain.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the Spanish government, with British support, obtained a recognition of Spain's rights and a small but relatively populous sphere in northern Morocco, together with another zone of some value in the south. Spain was not entirely satisfied with the "division of spoils," but the agreement did fulfil, in a measure, the desire of Spain's government to increase Spanish possessions in Africa and, at the same time, secure powerful friends in Europe.

⁵⁰ Newton, Lansdowne, p. 280; Porter, Delcassé, p. 218; Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, p. 92.

CONCLUSION

The refusal of the Spanish government, in December, 1902, to ratify the very advantageous agreement negotiated by the Marquis of Muni, for fear of offending Great Britain, was a grievous error. In view of Spain's evident state of exhaustion following the war with the United States, the treaty's completion would have been a signal victory for the diplomacy of León y Castillo and the policy adopted by the Liberal government of Sagasta at the urging of the Spanish ambassador. The administration of Sagasta was not at fault, however, for that serious blunder. That mistake may be laid to the extreme caution and timidity of the succeeding Silvela cabinet which inherited the already mature agreement before the previous administration could authorize León y Castillo to sign it at the French capital.

In Spanish eyes, Silvela's misjudgment cost Spain dearly in lost territory and economic opportunities in the Moroccan empire. France, rebuffed by the Spanish government, turned to Great Britain and, in the Anglo-French agreement of April 8, 1904, obtained vastly superior advantages in Morocco in exchange for French support of Britain's policy in Egypt. By this time the French government fully realized the value of the land which had almost been included in the sphere of Spain in 1902. Also, since England had promised France diplomatic aid, in the latter's Moroccan

plans, the need for Spanish assistance became a relatively minor consideration. Spain's power was neither feared nor indispensable.

As a result of this radically altered situation, the Madrid government was forced to accept in 1904 much smaller zones of influence in Morocco. In addition, Spanish freedom of action in the northern sphere was made entirely dependent on French action for fifteen years, thus tying the policy of Spain to the strategy of France. The treaty, in effect, left to the latter power the decision as to the time to put the arrangement into operation. Though Spaniards considered their own historic and economic rights greater than French interests, Spain was compelled to recognize French preponderance in Morocco. By implication, the minor role which the Spanish people were to play in the decadent Empire of Morocco was acknowledged, too.

The Franco-Spanish accord of October 3, 1904, was, to some degree, a humiliation for Spain. Under the circumstances which existed after the British-French agreement, however, the October understanding is not a mean accomplishment for the administration of Gabriel Maura. The latter agreement did allot modest, but respectable, spheres of influence to Spain, and Spanish entrepreneurs were provided with an ample field of production in consonance with the resources and abilities of the people of Spain. If Spanish Morocco has not proved as fruitful as had been anticipated, Spaniards ought not to blame their predecessors, but their own incapacity.

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APPENDIX

EL MINISTRO DE ESTADO, MARQUÉS DE AGUILAR DE CAMPÓO
DOCUMENTOS PRESENTADOS A LAS CORTES (1900)
TRATADO CON FRANCIA

Para determinar los límites entre las posesiones españolas y francesas en la costa occidental de África.

SU MAJESTAD EL REY DE ESPAÑA, Y EN SU NOMBRE SU MAJESTAD LA REINA REGENTE DEL REINO, Y EL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPÚBLICA FRANCESA, deseando estrechar los lazos de amistad y de buena vecindad que existen entre ambas Naciones, han decidido concluir con tal objeto un Convenio especial para determinar los límites de las posesiones españolas y francesas del África Occidental, en la costa del Sahara y en la del Golfo de Guinea, y han nombrado como sus Plenipotenciarios, a saber:

EL REY DE ESPAÑA, Y EN SU NOMBRE SU MAJESTAD LA REINA REGENTE,

Al Excmo. Señor Don Fernando de León y Castillo, Caballero del Collar de la Real y distinguida Orden de Carlos III, Gran Cruz de la Legión de Honor, Académico de número de la de Ciencias Morales y Políticas de Madrid, Su Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario cerca del Presidente de la República Francesa;

Y EL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPÚBLICA FRANCESA,

Al Excmo. Sr. Don Théophile Delcassé, Diputado, Ministro de Negocios Extranjeros de la Rep. Francesa, Caballero

de la Legión de Honor, Gran Cruz de la Real y distinguida Orden de Carlos III,

Quienes, después de haberse comunicado sus plenos poderes, y de haberlos hallado en buena y debida forma, han convenido los artículos siguientes:

ARTÍCULO 1º

En la costa del Sahara, el límite entre las posesiones españolas y francesas seguirá una línea que, partiendo del punto que se indica en la carta de detalle A, yuxtapuesta a la carta que forma el anejo 2 al presente Convenio, punto situado en la costa occidental de la península del Cabo Blanco entre la extremidad de este Cabo y la bahía del Oeste, se dirigirá por el Centro de dicha península, y después, dividiendo a ésta por mitad en cuanto el terreno lo permita, subirá hacia el Norte hasta encontrarse con el paralelo $21^{\circ} 20'$ de latitud Norte hasta la intersección de este paralelo con el meridiano $15^{\circ} 20'$ Oeste de París (13° Oeste de Greenwich). Desde este punto, la línea de demarcación seguirá en la dirección del Noroeste describiendo, entre los meridianos $15^{\circ} 20'$ y $16^{\circ} 20'$ Oeste de París (13° y 14° Oeste de Greenwich), una curva trazada de modo que deje a Francia las salinas de la región de Idjil con sus dependencias, manteniéndose la frontera, por lo menos, a una distancia de 20 kilómetros del límite exterior de dichas salinas. Desde el punto de encuentro de esta curva con el meridiano $15^{\circ} 20'$ Oeste de París (13° Oeste de Greenwich), la frontera se dirigirá lo

más directamente posible hasta la intersección del Trópico de Cáncer con el meridiano 14° 20' Oeste de París (12° Oeste de Greenwich), y se prolongará por éste último meridiano en la dirección del Norte.

Queda entendido que, en la región del Cabo Blanco, la delimitación que deberá practicar la Comisión especial a que se refiere el artículo 8 del presente Convenio, se efectuará de manera que la parte occidental de la península, incluso la bahía del Oeste, se adjudique a España, y que el Cabo Blanco, propiamente dicho, y la parte oriental de la misma península sean para Francia.

ARTÍCULO 2º

En el canal situado entre la punta del Cabo Blanco y el Banco de la Bayadera, así como en las aguas de la Bahía del Galgo, limitada por una línea que una la extremidad del Cabo Blanco a la punta llamada de la Coquille (carta de detalle A, yuxtapuesta a la carta que forma el anejo 2 al presente Convenio) los súbditos españoles continuarán, como hasta ahora, ejerciendo la industria de la pesca, al mismo tiempo que los sometidos a la jurisdicción francesa. Los pescadores españoles podrán entregarse en la ribera de dicha bahía a todas las operaciones accesorias de la misma industria, tales como secar las redes, componer sus utensilios, preparar el pescado. Podrán en los mismos límites levantar construcciones de poca importancia y establecer campamentos provisionales, debiendo estas construcciones y campamentos

ser deshechos por los pescadores españoles cada vez que se hagan de nuevo a alta mar; todo esto bajo la condición expresa de no causar daño en ningún caso ni en ningún tiempo a las propiedades públicas o privadas.

ARTÍCULO 3º

La sal extraída de las salinas de la región de Idjil, y enviada directamente por tierra a los territorios españoles de la costa del Sahara no será sometida a derecho alguno de exportación.

ARTÍCULO 4º

El límite entre las posesiones españolas y francesas del Golfo de Guinea partirá del punto de intersección del thalweg del río Muni, con una línea recta trazada desde la punta Coco Beach hasta la punta Dieke. Después seguirá por el thalweg del río Muni y el del río Utamboni hasta el punto en que este último río es cortado por primera vez por el primer grado de latitud Norte, y se confundirá con este paralelo hasta su intersección con el grado 9º de longitud Este de París (11º 20' Este de Greenwich).

A partir de este punto, la línea de demarcación estará formada por dicho meridiano 9º Este de París hasta su encuentro con la frontera meridional de la colonia alemana de Camarones.

ARTÍCULO 5º

Los buques franceses disfrutarán para la entrada por mar en el río Muni, en las aguas territoriales españolas, de toda las facilidades que tengan los buques españoles. En

concepto de reciprocidad los buques españoles serán objeto del mismo trato en las aguas territoriales francesas.

La navegación y la pesca serán libres para los súbditos españoles y franceses en los ríos Muni y Utamboni.

La policía de la navegación y de la pesca en estos ríos, en las aguas territoriales españolas y francesas, en las inmediaciones de la entrada del río Muni, así como las demás cuestiones relativas a las relaciones entre fronterizos, las disposiciones concernientes al alumbrado, valizaje, arreglo y aprovechamiento de las aguas, serán objeto de convenios entre los dos Gobiernos.

ARTÍCULO 6º

Como los derechos y ventajas que se derivan de los artículos 2, 3, y 5 del presente Convenio se han estipulado por razón del carácter limítrofe ó común de las bahías, desembocaduras, ríos y territorios antes mencionados, quedarán exclusivamente reservados a los súbditos de ambas Altas Partes Contratantes y no podrán en manera alguna ser traspasados o concedidos a los de otras Naciones.

ARTÍCULO 7º

En el caso de que el Gobierno Español quisiera ceder, en cualquier concepto, en todo o en parte, las posesiones que le son reconocidas por los artículos 1 y 4 del presente Convenio, así como las islas Elobey y la isla de Corisco, vecinas al litoral del Congo Francés, el Gobierno Francés tendrá derecho de preferencia, en las mismas condiciones que se propongan al Gobierno Español.

ARTÍCULO 8º

Las fronteras determinadas por el presente Convenio quedan inscritas en las cartas adjuntas (anejos Nos. 2 y 3) con las reservas formuladas en el anejo No. 1 al presente Convenio.

Ambos Gobiernos se comprometen a designar, en el plazo de cuatro meses, contando desde la fecha del canje de las ratificaciones, Comisarios que serán encargados de trazar sobre el terreno las líneas de demarcación entre las posesiones españolas y francesas, de conformidad y con arreglo al espíritu de las disposiciones del presente Convenio.

Queda convenido entre las dos Potencias Contratantes que cualquier cambio ulterior en la posesión del thalweg de los ríos Muni y Utamboni no afectará los derechos de propiedad sobre las islas que se adjudiquen a cada una de las dos Potencias en el acta de los Comisarios, debidamente aprobada por ambos Gobiernos.

ARTÍCULO 9º

Las dos Potencias Contratantes se comprometen recíprocamente a tratar con benevolencia a los jefes que, habiendo celebrado tratados con una de ellas, queden en virtud del presente Convenio bajo la soberanía de la otra.

ARTÍCULO 10º

El presente Convenio será ratificado y las ratificaciones serán canjeadas en París, en el plazo de seis meses, o antes si es posible.

EN FE DE LO CUAL los infrascritos han extendido el presente Convenio en el que han puesto sus sellos.


Hecho por duplicado en París, el 27 de junio de 1900.

ANEJO NÚMERO I

Aunque el trazado de las líneas de demarcación en las cartas anejas al presente Convenio (anejos números 2 y 3) se suponga generalmente exacto, no se le puede considerar como una representación absolutamente correcta de estas líneas hasta que haya sido confirmado por nuevos planos.

Queda, pues, convenido que los Comisarios o Delegados locales de ambas Naciones que sean encargados ulteriormente de determinar sobre el terreno los límites de todo ó parte de las fronteras, deberán basarse en la descripción de éstas, tal como está formulada en el Convenio. Al mismo tiempo podrán modificar dichas líneas de demarcación, con objeto de determinarlas con mayor exactitud y de rectificar la posición de las líneas divisorias de los caminos o ríos, así como de las ciudades o pueblos indicados en las cartas antes mencionadas.

Los cambios o correcciones propuestos de común acuerdo por dichos Comisarios o Delegados se someterán a la aprobación de los Gobiernos respectivos.



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