"I: - I »- ' 3.... -'v0140.. “O.A. “4—1 "‘ “WNW-$14. muons 19944: i . mm for flu DmuofM, A- - l " - ‘ MlCHIGAN ”magmatic: 3 _ Artfiur,,DaVEd 09' 55mm 19517 ‘ _ , -' ‘J‘FT “To . This is to certify that the thesis entitled ITf—LL-XTI-EFCSLISP. EilfiLz‘tI 3N3 19‘0"—3§ presented by Arthur David De Santis has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Easter Mfrs—degree mm Major professor Date July 25; lCSl 0-169 "7—. N- ._-- __.-__,._ .__..v___.__.._.___‘._,.__ ‘7, a - _.. » __7 fl } _ _ . _ .. -l ITALIAN-ELGLISJ LELAIICLS 1904-1 0! by Arthur David DeSentis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Licaigen State College of Agriculture and Apglied Science in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MnSTER OF AATS Department of History 1951 THESIS I wisu to thank Professor Walter R. Fee for his supervision and guidance in the Writing of this I am also indebted to the staff of Kichigan ollege Library for tAeir courteous assistance. 2593"}3 hLLL: OF LLIaIui TS ‘ (1 '"t nu; I? OLJLE a UV Ole o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o O o i - h ,‘T. -. in“; LAJLJK I. IThLY'S LCVEULnT TCunfiD FAILLDCnIP sIId El GLrA-L'D o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o l A. Tne Lacedonian Crisis of 1904 b. Inaeri Clashes in africa C. Algeciras Conference II. ITALInn-"‘CLloJ PnnlIolrnlICn In THE D J4 to CO -‘r _ ‘t‘ r 0"" “Jibijv bszJLS o o o o o o o o o o o o o E” Adriatic and Novibazar Railway E. The Balkan Cris of 1906 C. The Racconigi Treaty 1909 U1 (:1 III. BRIIICJ JUPECAT CF ITgLIAE lCLICY 1909-15 . A. Agadir Crisis B. Tripolitanian Jar C. It dian-Enblisn relations concerning the neosan Islands IV. ITALY LCVZS FROL Tu; inIPLE nLLInnC'E T0 In; TRI PLE ELTLnTE 1915-15 . . . . . . 8 A. talian and English relations in the Balk an Wars 1912-1915 B. Italian-English attitudes tomard the Sarajevo assassination C. Negotiations leading to the Treaty London 1915 114 119 Foreword In 1904 Italy, a member of the Triple Alliance, was allied with the Central Powers of Euroge, Austria and Germany. In 191:, Italy signed the Treaty of London and entered the war on the side of England and France and Russia against her former Allies. The Purpose of this thesis is to investigate the ten years before this last event in order to discover why Italy found the Triple Alliance unsatisfactory and what cause her to turn to England. Although this is only one segment of the diplomatic history from 187C to I915, knowing the course of English- Italian foreign relations thoroughly in these years should throw some light on the evolution of internatiOnal tension which finally resulted in the first world War. I have tried to keep this in mind in conducting this research and to relate the relations between England and Italy to the rest of the diplomatic pictire in EurOpe. Before beginning to trace the foreign relations of Italy and England from l904 to l9lb, one must know something about the general European dielematic situation prior to 1904. First we must set the diplomatic stage on which Italy and England acted their roles in this great conglex diplomatic drama. To understand something of Italy's international ambitions, one must go back to the Congress of Berlin in ii 1873, which was reseonsible for determining her future foreign policy. Italy was bitterly disanpointed with the esults of tIe Congress. Tussia, Austria, and England had succeeded in obtaining territory in the settlement, and there were sus piCl ons, late“ proved, that France had received some- thing also. Count Corti, the Italian minister to Lerlin, did not reoresent Italian interial ambitions in fOllOWiné his policy of an "IIILIIOI'CL‘IC settlement," and this was so unfavor- able in Italy that he was forced to resign soon after the Congr ss. Francisco Crisgi, President of the Chamber of Deputies in Italy in lC7C, declared in a Speech in Kaples, "he were humiliated at Berlin as the last pe osle in EurOpe; we returned slapped and deSgised."l French occugation of Tunis in lCCl resulting from the Con‘; res of Berlin was difficult for the Italians to a accept. Its y knew that she would have to attach herself to a stronger power to accomklish her aims. Che needed m1 oIt aUaLnst IIencI inierialistic aneitions in North Africa. In addition, the questiOn of the Pepe's temporal tower affected her domestic situation. The hone of sugyort for her imfierial ambitions and fear of possible foreign interventiOn in Italy drove taly to acceyt the Alliance with Germany and austria in lCCC. Sidney b adshaw ray, The Origins of the Jorld Jar, Vol. I, Tie Lacnillan Cont any, I939, y. 0;. iii The renewals of the Iri ale Alliance in lCC7, 1891, ICCC, and 1302, left the tIea ty still in force in 1904 with ’"3 the several moaifications OI the renew” 5. Germany and Italy promise C to suCCOrt each other against French military action and to guarantee the status duo in the Lear East. Germany had given a satarate lledge of limited suCCort to Italy in case France became aggressive in North africa. Austria- hungary and Italy arran;ed that each ShOild consult the other On the basis of reciprocal comCe'sation in case of a change in tne Status auo in tne raikans or Ottoman coasts and islands. On the other hana, Italy's stalze in the Lediterranean drew her almost automatically toward England. Partly through Bismarh's ”‘hcuvar Italy, Entland anC AuCtria—nuICCIJ had ClCCQCd themselves in ICCD to the maintenance of the status gug_in the Adriatic, Aeéean and Black Seas as well as in the hediterranean. Furthermore, they agreed to maintain the independence of Turkey.5 Italy had also succeeded in 5ettin= 5 agreements with England over Africa. A long series of negotiations between the two nations resulted in division of territori for exiansion J I 0 “Alfred F. Pribram, The Cec Iet Treatie —s of Austria 1C79-1914, Vol. I, 99- 15 O- lCC’ J.L. Glanville, "Italy's Relations r.ith England," BC-ISCC, John honkins University in history and Political iv in Africa. In 1C94, Enéland and Italy came to an agreement which exalicitly TBCO&fllZCQ the rights of Italy over Abys- sinia.4 But friction between the two nations existed funda- mentally in this area, because France also had interests in North Africa. Italy and England both feared the Ot:l€I"S dealing with Frarce and dividing; up the territory. England felt Italy was not to be trusted, and Italy feared England. Iiouever, Italy's African ex,_,ansi0n came to a terasorary end in a military defeat in Abyssinia in 1896. Even though she achieved an understanding Lith France in North Africa, she had endured one humiliation after another since taking her place as a unified nation among the EurOPean Powers in 1C70. She dreamed of a place in the sun, but she was torn between the Triple alliance with Germany and her old and potential enemy, Austria-dungary, and an inclination to attach he‘self to either France or England. She had imberial ambitions in Africa and in the Balkans. By 1904 EHQlCMd had establ'shed an understanding with France. Thus, in 1904 Italy felt even greater Cressure uCon her to shift her allegiance to England. Je shall see this fundamental unity with the great Lediterranean Cower in the Balkan and African difficulties in the years 1904 to 1915. Furthermore, Italy's basic antagonism to Austria is aggarent , p. 290 p. 4J.L. Glanville, Italy's Relations with Englan A V in the duestiunable state of the Triple Alliance throughout these ’zars. As Enxland becane aore opCosed to the Central 7 (u rogers, Italy did tao until she finally signed the Treaty Of LOIrJ On. To trace the chief dislomatic events fron 1904 to 1231C VilliCil involved Italy and EII'IglaI/‘Id, t2 e various Cubjects will be dealt with in these four chanters. CHAPTER I {‘0 It 1135 Movement Toward Friendship with England The course of events from 1902 to 1906 show Italy moving gradually closer to England. The influence of the Central Powers was weakening on Italy, in Spite of the fact that the Triple Alliance was still in existence. Italy had two traditional imperial ambitions: to extend her influence in the Balkans and to develop her colonial power in North Africa. Furthermore, she was still, as she had been for a century, hostile to Austrian ambition 7w in the D” kans. These dominating factors are evident in diplomatic relations between 1902-1906. Since Italy had to find support for her own ambitions and support in her attempt to control Austria, she turned automatically to another Iediterranean power----Eng1and. The first area where this is evident is in Macedonia where the powers of EurOpe came into conflict in 1902. The Macedonian Crisis of 1904 Conditions in Macedonia had been in an unsettled state since 1900. Nationalistic feeling had grown up in this area and demanded that it be released from Turkish . . 1 1 . . domination. The Turks had used exce551ve measures against 1J. L. Glanville, "Italy‘s Relations with England," 1896-1905, John hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science, John HOpkins Pr ss, Baltimore, 1954, pp. 139-140. the macedonian peeples who wanted their freedom. This resulted in emigration from Kacedonia. The Powers of EurOpe began to look upon the situation there as a possible means of getting more territory. Various disturbances had taken place in 1901. At this time, even Sir N. O'Connor, English Ambassador to Turkey, had objected to the outrages of the Turks against the Macedonians.2 But this did not settle the difficulties. The Italians were interested in this area both as a means of halting Austrian expansion there and as a possible goal of their own eastward imperial ambitions. Italy was afraid that Austria might work with Russia to settle the difficulties in Macedonia and quietly extend her control throughout this area. The desire of the Italians was, therefore, for "maintenance of the status quo in the East, Ciaoedonié], and....if it cannot be preserved, a settlenent should be directed by a European Congress, and not by any isolated action in Eacedonia by Russia and Austria-Hungary . , , . 5 or either of them." 2British Documents, O'Connor to Lansdowne, February 19, 1901, Vol. V, no. 18, p. 49. 51bid., Lansdowne to O'Connor, February 19, 1901, Vol. V, no. 15, p. 49. 01 The British also objected to any EurOpean Powers bringing pressure to bear Upon the Sultan for a change in the territorial status. She had traditionally backed Turkey to protect her own interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and see did not intend to let Turkey down in Kacedonia. Nevertheless, the English realized that reforms in Macedonia were necessary and the English Ambassador at ConstantinOple, O'Connor, told the Sultan that the situation was serious and reforms must be brought about in Macedonia.4 When the situation did not improve, Lansdowne, English Foreign minister, decided that it was necessary to enforce some reforms in lacedonia. On September 29, 1905, he brought forward a program providing for appointment of a disinterested Christian governor or retention of the hohammedan governor assisted by EurOpean assessors, and for immediate reform of the genuarmerie. If these measures were adepted, he was willing to let the two Powers interested, Austria and Russia, appoint assessors, and i Turkey would‘traw her irregular trOOps, would try to prevent Bulgaria from sending bands 5 across the border. 4British Documents, Lansdowne to Plunkett, February 19, 1901, Vol. V, no. 26, p. 50. 5Ibid., Lersdowne to Plunkett, September 29, 1905, Vol. V, no. 44, p. 65. 4 The Italians vigorously supported this plan. This is explained by the fact that the Italian relations with Austria had grown progressively worse during the Spring and summer of 1903, and the Italians strongly wanted to inter- nationalize the Kacedonian question. But if they were not able to succeed in getting a general BurOpean Conference on the issue, Italy was glad to have at least England partici- pating and preventing Austria from getting a free hand. The British agreed with the Italian Government that the intervention of the Signatory Powers of the Congress of Berlin might be necessary in the future to prevent a change in the status guo in Eacedonia. But they were willing to let Austria and Russia try to work out reforms (according to the bursteg Scheme which the two Powers had concluded in 1905 over Eacedonia) first without too much interference from the rest of Europe. As Lansdowne, remarked: ....that if it becomes clear that the scheme of the two Powers is destined to failure, we shall be ready to prOpose that Macedonia shall become an autonomous Province of the Turkish Empire under a governor appointed by the Sultan for a term of years on the recom- mendation of the Signatory Powers, and we shall be glad to c00perate with the Italian Government in this perplexing matter....O Although England's attitude pleased the Austrians JJ and Russians, 81' the Italians supported it, the latter 6British Documents, Lansdowne to Bertie, February 25, 1904, Vol. V, no. 26, p. 69. 5 were not enthusiastic over this program i:1 dealing with the 'acedonian problem. They did not like to see the English - w r. ' ' T' ' 7 ,’-'_ - support the Austrians at all in nacedonia. As Signor Tittoni, Italian Foreign Linister, said, the Italian Govern- ment “would be very glad if the Austrian Government could be dissuaded from such occupation" as had already been author- ized by the Treaty of Berlin 1878. In other words, the Italians and the Englis .’1 silit on the importance they attach- ed to the i sue in Macedonia. England was not as willing to U) 55 interfere as Italy as. In Spite of her Opposition to Austrian action in Macedonia, Italy did not want to act without British support. She waited for that nation to indicate the first move on the Lace doni mu chess board. ‘he could not forego English support, and she had confidence that the British wo dld not let the Lacedonian situation get out of her control. Part of the reason for this confidence was a visit King Victor Emmanuel had made to London in late 1900, during which Tittoni and ansdowne had agreed to work together to give all the . . , . . 9 European Powers some VOice in the Lacedonian question. British Dr cuments, Bertie to Lansdowne, Karch 5, 1904, Vol. V, no. ed, p. 7o. 8 ,.. . . - , - . Ibig,, Bertie tOBanSdowne, Larcn 5, 1904, Vol. V, I10. 53 , I.) o 73}. Q . I , ’J.L. GlanVille, " italy' 5 Lelati ons with England", p. 148. 6 The Italians were not disappointed in England because Austria and Russia did not succeed in establishing reforms in Lacedonia which they had agreed upon in the Lursteg Scheme 0“ 903. Lansdowne became disgusted.lo He 5 gest ed that . 11 Italy join England in advocating a general EurOpean Congress. he even suggested utonomy for Lacedoni with international (" o 4' 1 o 0 control of finance. This gave the Italians a Chance to fall in line wi h the British and still gain their ends. The British finally made a direct challenge to Austria and Russia over Lacedonia. Lansdowne notified the Austrian and Russian Governments that judicial and financial reforms were needed, and the time had come for other Powers to make their influence felt, although he was willing for Austria 13 Austria and Russia did not and Russia to keep the lead. ignore this ckrall enge, but their proposal of reform in Lacedonia under the Turl :ish Inapector- General and "Powers interested" did not meet the approval of England. Lansdowne objected to tr eir scheme for it would place the financial loBritish Documents, Lansdowne to Lonson, February 17, 113 04, J01. V, no. 18, p. 67. llIbid., Lansdowne to Lonson, February 20, 1904, Vol. V, no. 21, pp. 68-69. 12Ibid., Lansdowne to Lonson, February 20, 1904, Vol. V, no. 21, pp. 68-69. 15221Q., Lansdowne to Bertie, FGDruary 5’ 1904, VOlo V, NO. 25, p. 74. 7 “ffairs of Lacedonia in the hands of Powers having inferior r‘ 'r-I1 n'-‘. O' (1 'n1 ° '\ -. e a 14 commerCiai and iinanCial intereo s. In other words, in the negotiations that followed for a revision in the Lursteg Scheme, England was afraid that the term "Powers interested" would apply to governments . , . , . , ., a . l5 , ,, ,, . Wltfl minor interests in Lacedonia. On tne other hand, Tittoni and the Italians were completely satisfied with the term "Powers interested" for this meant that Austria would . w \ f! I 'DH 0 16 fl , 1 -." ' not have a free nanu in Lacedonia. aven though Italy had a minor trade interest and financial stake in Lacedonia, she was willing to accept a compromise as long as the term "Powers interested" did not apply to Austria alone. The final result of these negotiations which followed was a note presented to Turkey by six powers: France, Germany, England, and Italy, in additionfihustria and Russia. This '— P was presented to the Sultan Lay‘d, l90o. These Powers demanded a Commission composed of representatives of the four Powers to act with Austria and Russian agents in es- l7 tablishing reforms in Lacedonia. The reforms themselves l4British Documents, Lansdowne to Bertie, February 5, 1905, Vol. V, no. 27, p. 77. 15gpig,, Lansdowne to Bertie, February a, 1905, Vol. v, no. 29, p. 77. aid., Lansdowne to Bertie, February 5, 1905, Vol. V, no. 29, p. 77. 17Ibid., Lansdovne to Bertie, February 5, 1905, Vol. V, no. 29, p. 77. 8 are not important Eere. The important point is that Italy had sided with England and was willing to follow her lead in blocking Austrian expansion in Lacedonia. Thus, Italy found herself drawn closer to England. Imperial Cla es in Africa As the Lacedon an crisis was drawing to a close, another area of diplomatic maneuvering reopened in North Africa. All the Powers had imperial interests there. For Italy, this w as a traditional area of ambition. She had alr read y made an unsuccessfil attempt to gain territory in Lby ssinia in the nineties, and she had long had her eye on Tripoli. The old question of Egypt, which‘had troubled the European Powers in the nineteenth century, was the first issue to arise, and this problem was settled finally in the diplomatic revolution which brought England and France into an Entente. All the great Powers had previously es- tablished certain political and financial rights in Egypt which continually hampered England's freedom of action and threatened the efficiency of Egyptian adminis t'ation. Egyptian finances were now in a flourishing condition. But owing to the international fetters originally imposed under conditions which no longer existed, the Khedive, 9 *1 that is to say, his English advisors, were unable to derive any real profit from surplus funds. Lord Cromer, a member 1'" -1 of Parliament, th ught it wise for England to make some kind of arrangement with France. This situation, said Lord Cromer, had become intolerable.18 The diplomatic problem that the English had to face was to have her superior position recognized by the rest of EurOpe. Therefore, the English obtained a waiver of the financial restrictiois and received the assurance that "the Government of the French Republic will not obstruct the action of Great britain in Egypt by asking that a date should be fixed for British occupation or in any matter.“19 But the English knew it was necessary to secure Italian Opinion on this Anglo-French agreement. Bertie, British Ambassador to France, informed Lansdowne that Fusinato, Italian minister for foreign affairs, assured him that the Italians would recognize the British superior financial interests in Egypt. Fusinato said "that the Italian bondholders ought to be pleased and there were very few Italian holders, and the number of Italian Employees in theEgyptian service had .. . . . 20 diminished." 18 a . . , .h . .., , . . S.B. ray, Origins of tne world war, The Maoimillan Company, 1‘29, Vol. I, 155. 190 .,. p , . , My, . CC 5.3. Fay, Origins oi the world war, Vol. I, p. loo. 20British Documents, Bertie to Lansdowne, April 21, 1904, Vol. III, no. 15, p. 17. 10 The only area of disagreement between Italy and England, in fact, was the boundary between Tripoli and Egypt. Italy' 3 influence in abyssinia caused her to feel mildly antagonistic toward England when she was informed in November, 1904, that Egypt included Ss'lum----a district near Tripoli.21 Italy adOpted the boundary claimed by Turkey to prevent England from encroaching on territory in which she was i:1ter ested. But this difficulty was too minor to cause real friction between England and Italy. Althou 3h En, land reconciled the It alians to British interests in Egypt, England knew that Germany was still on the "war path," and she would have to be satisfied. By granting certain rights to Germany in Egypt, England suc- ceeded in getting Germany's approval of the Khedive Decree which asserted the English posit;Lon in E Mypt. After this time, Egypt was no longer an issue in EurOpean diplomacy. Within six months, Kuhlmann, German ambassador at Tangier, n wrote that "....the Egyptian question is dead...."°3 O -01 . 1 , v7 0 , w o o “lward and Goocn, The Cambridge history of :ritish Foreign Policy, 1866-1919, Vol. III, LacLillan, p. 455. A... £3ZEritish Documents, Lansdowne to Lacelles, May 24, 1904, Vol. III, no. 16, p. 18. (>1 r) C.) n uerman Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, Translated and selected by E.T.S. Dygdale, New York; Harper and Brothers, 1 82-1927, Lemorandum by ICuhlmann, October 6, 1904, Vol. III, no. 01, p. 198. 11 It is clear from the episode in Lacedonia and in Egypt that Italy was not content to sit on the sidelines in the game of EurOpean diplomacy as a Spectator. Even though she played but a minor role in these acts, her interests in expanding Italian influence are obvious. She did not want even England asserting her authority over territory that Italy hOped to gain for herself. England recognized that she could not disregard Italy if she wanted to maintain the status duo in the Mediterranean. Even though Italy was sometimes considered a "weak" nation, England saw that she must remain friendly with her. However, Italy was still formally tied to Austria no Germany in the Triple Alliance. These two powers gs tried to suppress her African aSpirations and force her to adhere more closely to that agreement. But Italy felt that if she remained in the "ivory tower" of the Triple Alliance, she would gain nothing for herself. As a young, vigorous nation, nationalistic and imperialistic, she felt she would have to exert herself in EurOpean affairs more strenuously. She wanted to take advantage of every oppor- tunity that arose while still maintaining a favorable relationship with England. She seemed to seek her own interests both in the case of Lacedonia and in Egypt, but she would back down in the face of English opposition. Perhaps this was because of her hostility to Austria. In any case, the attitude seemed to be well expressed by Mussolini on a latter date when he said, "we waited to see a what England would do."“4 Italy's aspirations in Africa, however, were not to be denied. France had taken Tunis in lBBl and had now entrenched herself in Iorocco. England had put her stamp of ownership on Egypt. Italy felt that she should get on the "band wagon." In taking an active interest in the Mediterranean affairs, she looked for the best possible power wi h which to align herself. Was it to be with Eng- land, or with the Gen ral Powers? Or rather, would Italy find it more profitable to maintain a middle course, jumping from side to side, whenever her objects could be accomplished? It seems that Italy's primary policy was to keep the > other powers on pins and needles as to her real attachments. In the fall of 1905 Germany was afraid that the new Anglo- French Entente might draw Italy further to the side of the hediterranean Powers. For Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, explained to Emperor William of Germany, that friendship [Eith the Entente Powerg] was important for Italy's com- mercial relations and for enabling Italy to borrow needed ('3 44 . ~ . . , , ~. ~ ,. ~ w - - Benito hussolini, Ly autoeipgrapny, ultn foreword by Richard Hashburn Child, New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928, p. 34. 13 25 . . . money. Austria also suspected Italy was double dealing and suggested to Germany that the Triple Alliance be re- . ‘- 3 m1 , T" \ ,_. I" ' . 26 placed by the inree Emperors League (Germany-nustria-RuSSia.) Although the alliance was renewed in 1902, Count Eulow, foreign minister of Germany, suspected that Italy had made a re-insurance treaty with France by which the alliance was .,. . 27 nullified in case of a Franco-German war. In the soring of 1904 the Tri le Alliance almost went 1 on the rocks over a basically insignif cant affair; whether or not the entertainment of the French and the German chiefs of state, who were both to visit Italy at about the same time . -. _ . . , . . - 28 in march and hprll, snould he on a Similar scale. The Emperor came first on Maren 26-27 and his visit passed off quietly. Count Eonts, German Ambassador, forced E. Tittoni, Italian foreian minister, to *romise that the Tri le Alliance a B would be mentioned in the toasts during the ceremonies for the French. King Victor Emmanuel played his own hand, how- , . . . . 29 ever, by displaying extravagant affection for the Frencn. __ “58.B. Fay, Origins of the world War, Vol. I, p. 149. E.N. Anderson, The Firsthyoroccan Crisis, l904-l906. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1930, p. 145. (3 “7German Diplomatic Documents, Count Eulow to Count Lents, Larch is, 1904, Vol. III, no. 45, p. 169. 28J.L. Glanville, Op. Cit., p. 51. 29 ‘ ’ E.N. Anderson, Op. Lit., p. 144. 14 The Germans objected bitterly to this attitude;50 but it was apparent that Italy intended to keep EurOpe guessing as to where her re al allegiance la y. During this period of 1904 the arrangemen known as the Entente Cordiale settled once and for all the conflicts which had arisen between England and France as a result of their policies of ex‘riz-ansionfi'l Reactions in Italy toward this understandi-g were mixed. Italy was not enthusiastic for she did not see exactly how this was going to affect her interests. Fusinato of the Italian Foreign Office re- marlred that it might prevent Italy from ta ting advantage of both powers in Africa.32 In Eng and the Entente was received with satisfaction, for Sir Edward Grey, English Foreign minister, approved the Spirit of the agreement and said it would draw the two nations [France and England] tog ether by (D increasing th "opportunities for the exchange of inter- national courtesies between them." Itm y 'S posit on in regard to the state of affairs in Africa was peculiar. Her pi roximity to the northern coast Germ n Diplomatic Documents, Count honts to Count .Bulow, April ab, I904, Jol. III, no. 47, p. 50. 31 ‘ (1 ' 'T‘ 7.3.1 “ . J—‘ "Y - C. Ceymour, Ine Di:lomatic pacngrouna of hue war, .1870-1914, Yale Unive Sit; Press, new haven, I916, p. 156. "n O“british Documen s, Bertie to Lansdowne, April El, 1904, Vol. J, no. 10, p. 17. ‘2, V Vol. V, no. F4 (5' ., Bertie to Lansdowne, April 21, 1904, 0, p. 105. rJ wk; 15 of Africa and her dependence upon the hediterranean for commercial intercourse have already been commented upon. She looked with 'ealous eyes upon any shift in the status duo in the Kediterranean. Tunis and Corsica were in French hands and Italy's low-lying coast was open to an attack from any strong naval power possessing the Opposite Side.54 Her rail- ways were vulnerable to an attack from the sea. Suez, Gi braltar, and the Straits, the keys to "Hare nostrum," '2 o ’l 'f- . .. ‘ -. . - '- ' v V were in the hands 01 angland and Turkey. In ,J [-— l‘ alta, kustro~ E Hungary, and Tunis lived many Italians under alien flags. With a constantly expanding pOpulation and industry, She saw hat Tripoli and lorocco were being pre-empted by other great European Powers.56 On the other hand, Italy was handicapped in her expansionist tendencies. She was a heavy borrower abroad. Her emigrants preferred North and South America to the hardships of Africa. In wealth and resources she was the 9-, .1 H :1- ~ .- 1, , .__, :‘ Ti 0 weaxest oi the Six pOhch in adrope. 34 ' ‘1 r1 - . , h J. Lo GlhllVllle , H Italy '3 i't'Clat 10115 W ltn 43115]- End, II 16 AS a result, her policy was to maintain the status guo as long as her own ambitions were not threatened. She hOped that EurOpe would approve of her imperialism in Abys- 38 sinia. dowever it must be remembered that Italy in 1896 had burnt her i n erS in Abyssinia. Nevertheless, she kept a foothold on the East African Coast and was willing to play her part eVen though she had shownfliest of EurOpe, that she was not the Roman warrior sne had once been. During this period 1904-1905 Italian ambitions turned more and more to Abyssinia. The goverim mnt continued to insist upon the connection of Eritrea and Somaliland, two strips of territory which she already possessed and which could be connected only through Abyssinia. Some definite underst wading between the Powers chiefly interested in Abys- sinia was necessary. he ques tion arose in connection with the succession to the throne of King Kenelek in Abyssinia. Signor Martini, the talian Governor of Eritrea, discussed the question with Colonel harrington, an English representa- tive, with a View to an understanding as to the candidate which England and Italy should support, and, if necessary 7 09 'T o q o impose. Colonel narrington did not want any appearance 78 m. . n . A V L. wlllarl, Italy, Charles ocribner's and eons, Eri ish Documents, mediterranean Problems, Vol. VIII, 17 of foreign intervention in internal affairs of Abyssinia. 2r - -- -- r O that on the death of King Kenelek the country would probably return to the 011 state of internal dis: ntegration and civil tar until one of the rival candidates to the throne made himself supreme by force of arms. The Abyssinians should, however, be left to settle the (worst; on of succession by themselves as far as poss ible, although, if foreign inter- vention becom;s neces war some negative understanding be tween Engl- and, France, and 40 Italy, providing for common action be desired. In Abyssinia, Italian and English interests cla mled. mu w “- . u . V - . . - . i .:1,..,l, h- ine cniei bone oi contention was over better railways and highuey connections which Italy wanted within Abyssinia. She really wanted to get control of Any ssinia and sought to - i - ,, , 41 , , A - i ”at it in part by this method. Tne b'itis h were Willing to go along in presenting a program for the King of Abys- sinia's consideration which included maintenance of the s atus duo, cooperation in application for concessions, Italian agreement over f1 ontier settlement, no influence in.inte rnal affairs, and c00peration in the event of any 0 . . . 4 . diSintegration. ” The ltd ianS felt this was too vague. 4OBritish Documents, Mediterranean Problems, ‘Vol. VIII, no. 10, p. 24. 4 . , n . ii A lJ.L. GlanVilie, up. Cit., pp. loo-lo7. 42, . . , A . i british Documents, mediterranean rroblems, ‘Vol. VIII, no. 10, p. 24. 18 Governor Martini traveled through Northern Abyssinia to investiga e possible railways and to promote commercial 1 relations.45 When the Frencn Sigges ted that this area be divided up into Spheres of influence, Lord Lansdowne said that reference to Spheres of influence Should be avoided, 'and the three Powers content themselves Nl th a declaration that they desired to maintain the independence of Abyss- inia, and that, Should that independence prove, unfortuna ely, impossible to maintain, they would take council together with a view to arriving at an understanding for the pro- tection of their special interests.“44 The involvement of France in this issue wea kened the Italian position. Fr lace was willing to accept Eng land's suggestion concerning Abyssinia which did not fulfill Italian ambitions there. Furthermore, Italy was afraid that delay and disagreement might bring Germany rushing in and result in the internationalization of the railways.45 Tittoni, however, concluded finally that it was useless to disagree . 1 L,. . 46 With aniiand and accepted unis three power agreement. "5 Once again, Italy reiused to come to a serious disagreement with England. 43. . . , i. i, . i S.B. Fay, Origins oi the world war, Jol. I, p. loC. 44. British Do umcnts, Kediterranean Problems, Vol. VIII, 1100 9, L). 2'4. 45 E.N. Anderson, on. ’it., pp. 125-154. 46J.L. Glanville, Op. Cit., D. 156. 19 The following is a summary of the principle provisions of the Agreement: I. The three Powers concerned will maintain the integrity of the Ethionian Empire. 2. The interests of the three countries in the event of disintegration are defined. 3. The second section of the Jibuti railway from Dire Daowa to Adis Abeba is to be constructed by the Ethiopian Railway Compaxy, or any other private Company, under the auspices of the French Govern- ment, on condition that the subjects and commerce of the three Powers receive equal treatment over the whole line and at the port of Jibuti. 4. All railway cons ruction west of Adis 47 Abeba is to be under British auSpices. Even though Italy signed the agreement concerning Abyssinia, its reception at home was not favorable. Some of the members of the Italian Chambers felt that Italian interests were damaged by placing railway construction in Abyssinia under international control.48 Tittoni pointed out that England did not need Italy to agree over Abyssinia. In brief Tittoni struck the note when he said "that ac- ceptance was the only thing for Italy. Perhaps she could hOpe for a better uay."49 Meanwhile, other affairs in Africa aroused the feelings of EurOpe. Germany, angered by the Anglo-French Entente and 47British Documents, Rediterranean Problems, Vol. VIII, no. 9’ p. 23 O 48$£2Q3, hediterranean Problems, Vol. VIII, no. 9, p. 24. 49J.L. Glanville, 09. 313., p. 136. 20 determined to strike back at France, sent the Kaiser on a visit to Tangier where he made a defiant Speech supporting the Loroccan government and opposing French expansion there. Repercussions of this were felt all over EurOpe. Signor igland, informed Lansdowne, Pansa, Italian Ambassador to English Prime hinister, that Germany had apparently made this gesture in reSponse to the Frencn declaration to the Sultan that French representatives in Korocco Spoke as "the mouth piece of EurOpe."50 The Italians were torn between wishing to agree with the German reguest for a conference on the issue of Morocco and living up to their agreement with France respecting Morocco, in which France had promised to keep a hands-off policy in Tripoli. Engl ad was also willing for q El a conierence. The result of this incident pushed EurOpe to the edge of war. Tension between France and Germany became almost unbearable. The German Ambassador, Count Monte, told Mon- sieur Tittoni that if the French ministry maintained its threat of military measures against the Sultan of morocco, r a 1 1 ‘ 02' 1 ‘ « ‘ a Uerman army would cross the frontier. On the other hand, ‘— soBritish Documents, Lansdowne to Egerton, April 5, 1905, Vol. III, no. 73, p. 64. C" dlIbid., Egerton to Lansdowre, June IS, 1905, Vol. III, no. 121, p. 65. :0 ”“Ibid., Sgerton to Lansdowne, June l5, lQOE, Vol. III, no. 126, p. 95. Bl England supported every French argument strongly, and the Englisn Press launched a campaign against Germany. Thus, Italy was caught in a Squeeze between the Central Powers, with whom she was allied, and the Entente Powers with wh m she had come to an agreement in Africa. Furthermore, Sir Edward Grey, England's new foreign minis- ter, put pressure on Italy to back France. In informing the Italian Ambassador on December 27, 1305, of the British policy, Grey remarked that the four Powers most interested in the hediterranean were all good friends now and that he "hOped we should all come out of the conference as good I: W 1. «v5 Tne Italian Government protested friends as we went in. that it had "not only friendship but also an alliance [the a- Triple Alliance] to be considered."“4 Even though the English seemed inclined to disregard the Italian protest, Italy could make no promises to support England. Cir E. Egerton argued in home that the existing Entente was a "Special agreement respecting a local question," and that I: the Triple Alliance should regard it as such.5U Italy felt cg? ‘ _ . w , -. . . ”QE.N. anaerson, The First moroccan Crisis, 1904-1906, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1950, p. 331. £2 “4Ibid., p. 332. 55Ibid., p. 232. 22 the only role she could play at the forthcoming conference was that of mediator. It is, therefore, necessary to ex- amine Italia -Anglo relations at the Algeciras Conference of l906. The Algeciras Conference---1906 The Conference of Algeciras opened formally on Jan - ary 16, 1006. Among the delegates, there were at first three important groups: the German, the American-Italian- Austrian combination, British-French-Spanish-Russian. The middle combination of Americans, Italians, and Austrians found themselves in the role of the m st disinterested parties, at first, and attempted to act as mediators between the two antagonistic groups.5 The smaller States and morocco took practically no part in the proceedings. However, he Italians soon indicated that they were gOing to cooperate primarily with the British. The two I“ chief problems Oi the conference were those of the organ- ization of the police and of state bank in Morocco, and the power France or Germany) that succeeded in solving these satisfactorily would emerge victorious from he conference. __ 56 7 "l o 3.6. Anderson, The First loroccan Crisis, 1904-1906 ’ p. 349. 23 a ar quis Jis conti Venosta, representing Italy, and Er. hhite, representing the United States, first tried to mediate upon the basis that Germany should make concessions on the bank . T’u . 1 - 57 7" 1 ‘o and prance on tnc police. but wnen France went so Iar as to offer privately to let Italy participate with France and Sp ain on police supervision, Italy was drawn to the support of the French plan.58 But Zarquis Visconti Venosta, who feared a break-up of the conference, asked the French Govern- ment to attempt to harmonize the German plan about the police _ 5 with French demands. The real motivation of the Italians was self interest. As indicated above, she was willing to back France and England if she could get something out of it. On the other hand, when the conference was oh the verge of breaking up, and Italy fore- saw her delicate position between these two sides in case of r, she reverted to her position as mediator. It was very evident at the ngeciras Conference that Italy's position on the fence in the growing tensions betv me n the Entente and the Triple alliance was extremely difficult to maintain. Li) .7) C) C U - s ocuments, Hicolson to Grey, January 2 , l- ‘Jol. III, no. l7, p. 231. n.n. 4nderson, p. Cit., p. 364. German Diplomatic D~cuments, Radowitz to julow, .Ianuary 26, 1906, Vol. III, no. ll9, p. 233. 24 Of the two questions befor e the conierence the bank and police control in Zorocco, the latter was reach more complicated. 113 ice gave ilicii'tln; po:1nt of IJit national _ 1 D 1,, _ 60 ..,_ ,.3 .3 ._ L, 3 control oi Iinance. But brance did not want internatIOna ization of tne police and various plans were proposed by Germany to preVent France from controlling it.61 It became a question, therefore, of which of these Powers could win the necessary support to suing the conference. he Germans would rather have had the Italians or Austrians mediate on this issie than have the English mediate. They did not want to see Ingland act as the "protector" of French interests in horocco and thus strengthen the Entente 1. 62 .. . .3 Cor‘iale. To the dismayo oI Germany, the Italians sided (0 with the French; England al 0 refused to leave France with- 6'7 . . . .. out her support. Q Visconti Jen sta 1rged Germany to agree to the French plan, with modifications, in order to prevent 64 a brew up of the conference. COT ’7 - 1 c 1r- t“ A 0'1 (3' A 1 Ah 1.1.1». Arnie rs on, -11e 1 List. 2-0'occa1’ or leis, I .1 04121.91», P0 3560 El Gci1an Diplomatic Doc are do February 3, l.0~, vol. III, no. 523, p. 239. 2 T . 1 ‘ British Documc-nts, hicolson to Grey, Pebruary 7, 1906, Vol. III, no. 271, p. 24b 0 Ioio., nicolson to Grey, rebruary 7, 1900, Vol. III, no. 271, p. 243. 643 n. N-“ .Iv. And ”re son, Cg. £113., ', 330. 23 While the conference appeared deadlocked on this issue anot11 er incident occurred outside the conference which made Germany's position more complicated. In Italy, the Fortis Ministry fell on February I, l906, and took with it those ministers, such a marquis di San Giuliano, who were somewhat U) sympathetic tonaId the Triple Alliance. Baron Sonnino, who . . . . 65 succeeded as Premier, was extremely friendly to the English. The Germans now could count on even less support from the Italians, for Italy was even Lore solidly pro-English. This seemed to indicate a victory for In gland in the diplomatic tug-of—war over Italr The crisis became constantly more acute. France and Germany became s antagonistic towaId each other, that it was only a matter of time before they would be at each other's throats. Grey was pessimistic over the future of the confer- ence.66 Finally, the Austrian delegate broke the deadlock by suggesting a program that was eventually accepted with d'iicaticno.67 Although there were many torturous negoti- ations before the final settlement was reached, the ultimate 65 . . , d .ritisn Documents, Grey to hicolson, bebruary 15, 1906. V01. Ill, no. 253, p. 255, IoiA., Grey to Nicolson, February 3, 1906, Vol. III, no. 280, p. 230. E7 a - ' I' f E.N. Anderson, Op. Cit., p. 37?. 26 results were most satisfactory for France since she prevented Germany from getting any real control over the police force in morocco. far as nnglo-Italian relations were concerned, in , t‘. Italy's support of England, and thereby France, was another rude shock to the facade of the Triple alliance. This gave Germany real reason to worry. Speaking in the Chamber of Deputies on Karch l90 , Sonnino, Ltalian Premier, attempted to eXplain Italy's double poli'y, saying: "loyal from our heart to the Triple Alliance, we shall maintain the traditions of intimacy with England and our honest friendship with . "68 1. ,1 , . a. . . , France. To this one Laiser Hllflelm replied. "No one can serve two masters," it says in the bible; certainly therefore not three masters: France, Lngland, and the Triple Alliance, that is wholly out of the questiInl It will turn out that Italy stands in the ~ British-French group! We shall do well to reckon with trgs, and write this "ally“ off as s moke '. The net result of diplomatic negotiations from l904-l906 was that Italy was gradually moving into the orbit of the English. She refused to defy England in the hacedonian crisis and in Africa, and she sided with the English (and France) at the Algeciras Conference. Yet her position we not clearly 68 p o lilo (n .B. Fay, The Origins of the Jorld Ear, Vol. I, 27 defined, for in Spite of her friendly relations with England, she would not openly break with the Triple Alliance. ‘ . 9 ‘ ’ T-I‘ ,_ 1 O ‘r V“) f‘ ‘ I ‘0 “I ‘. 4 _n .' ’ D .‘ _‘l 1 ‘ _,‘ ‘ r Italian and angliSJ ralticipation in the halnan elasnes After the algeciras Conference in 1906 had temporarily settled. affairs in Africa, the scene of the diplomatic drama shifted back to the Balkans. both Italy and England partici- pated in the diplomacy which centered around this trouble- some area in the years 1907 to 1910. Italy was particularly concerned for she was afraid of Austria's policy of expansion southeastward in the Ealkans which encroached upon territory she wanted to control herself. England wished to maintain the status duo and to prevent any other power from apprOpri- ating territory without the consent of all the Powersinterested. the felt that this was essential to good international order. Thus, England and Italy found their policies of halting Austrian eXpansion in the Balkans in the years 1907-1910 coincided. The renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1902 had included a provision that the status gap in the nalkans was not to be altered without the agreement of nustria and Italy. Italy counted on this *rovision to act as a brake on Austrian activity there and to protect Italian interests. Italy had heped to see the Adriatic turned into an "Italian Lake" by possessing the territory on the East side. Furthermore, she had great ambitions to reclaim territory bordering on the 29 Balkans such as Trieste, Fiume and Dalmatia, that she felt :as Italian ty rights but which Avstria still possessed. Strong nationalists, lihe Hussolini, made a great point of reclaiming these districts. ihey maintained that the Italian line shou be"al on; the line of Brenner and of the Guidian and Illyion Alps, excluding Fiume and Dalmatia."l angland on the other hand, claimed that her attitude in the Balkans was simply one of disinterest, except for the ‘ . ' ainten'1ce of cod internat m1ai relations. Sir ndnard Grey asserted that England's only at 1d in the Ballians, was that a European Treaty should not be altered without the consent of all the Powers. He continued "....our motive was disinter- ested....I-£ot one of the other Powers mas disinteres te d.... Each was conscious of some bolitical motive of its own, and invented some political demand that was attributed Since the negotiaticns over the Ealkan area involved the interpretation of the terms of the Triple Alliance, the renewal which took Place in 1908 is of vital importance in understa11 din: Italy's shifting relations with England. ror l’fi . - c a D1 ‘1'0 ~ "\ benito Lussolini, E? xsitobiog rap1y, with boreword by Richard Jashburn Child, he: Iorh; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929, p. 56. 0 “British Documants, Grey hemo, April 19, 1906, Vol. V, no. 10, p. 167. 50 this reason, it is necessary to prelude the discussion of the Balkan d-Li 'ficulties with a brief examination of the negotiations be tneen Italy and Germany and Austria over the renewal of the Triple alliance. “nuland felt th1at Italy might change her policy at this time and come to some agIee- ment with her. But she discovered that she could count on the Italia 5 no more than the Germans could at the Second Hague Conference, a second area of negotiation of the Euro- pean powers. By 1907, it had become apparent that the Triple Alliance was in a questionable status Italy had sided with England at the Algeciras Conference. The Germans did not trust the Italians. Sir F. Lascelles, English Ambassador to Germany, infox med Grey tha , "cons. deI able attention is being devoted u; the Press by both countries as to the present relations betv seen Germ'ny and Italy, and the idea has been freely mooted that Italy might leave the Triple Alliance."5 In addition to this, the two partners of the alliance, Austria and Italy, were not on very good terms. Their re- lationship was weakened by nus tria' 8 internal troubles, the uprising of minority nationalities within the Empire. Italy's attitude toward the renewal of the alliance was very sus- I picious. hr. Cartwright, E1101ish anoa ssador at Germany, 1BEritish Documents Lascelles to Grey, April 20, 1906, Vol. VIII, no. 11, p. 26. El stated that uprising of the Irredentist Socities on the Austro-Italian frontier, the str1.g*le between Italian and Croatians, the buil ng the Italian school in some vill age of the hastrian Tyrol, immcuiately attIacted attention in Couthern Germany and gave rise to press comments. The Italians looked to England as a more nepeful supporter of their imperialistic policies in the Adriatic and the Balkans. Karquis di San Giuliano, newly appointed Ambas sador to London, hOped that some form of negotiations could be made between England and Italy concerning this matter. however, this diplomatic gesture failed, for as far as England was concerned, Italy's policy in the Adriatic C; was one of adventure.” Cartwright felt that the Triple Alliance did not satisfy Italian aSpiIations in the Hedi- terranean, in horth Allica or the Bre nce and Germany backed her up, and since Elm land refused to press the point, Italy and Bus sia were forced to back down. They abandoned 45British Documents, E5erton to Grey, October 22, 1908, Vol. V, no. 4Cl, p. 462. 461555,, Bgerton to Grey, October 22, l908, Vol. V, IN). 401, p. 462. 47 he idea of a conference. Austria's annexation had been accepted as an accomplished fact. In this crisis, England cared more for peace than for Italian prestige. She worked in accordance with Italian policy only up to a point, and then she disregarded Italian demands for a conference. Italy did not have the power to enforce her policy alone, even though she accepted the annex- ation unwillingly. Italy was aroused and Italian sentiment toward the acceptance of the annexation of Bosnia Herzegovina was so indignant that it practically shook the government in power off its feet. Bissolati, Socialist leader in Italy, was provoked at Tittoni's "blundering" diplomacy. He said: Even though taken by surprise, Tittoni should have understood that the Austrian action was endangerin5 more than Ital an interests, but also the interests of EurOpean peace. That action was going to open a furious struggle for the body of the Ottoman Empire and halted the process of the rejuvenation of Turkey, which is he best guarantee of peace in EurOpe. It was his Tittoni's duty, therefore, to pronounce the dignified word of protest, that word that even today, we notice, he is unable to pronounce. Italy's wrath did encourage her to demand some independent concession from Austria, althou5h her success was limited. She wanted to establish an Italian University at Trieste, but Austria, after promising this to the Italians, in the 47Leonida Bissolati, La politics esters dell' Italia dal 1897 al 1920, kilano Fravelli Trebes, Editori, 1925, pp. 156-157. 48 end finally refused to grait it. As Giolitti, member of the Italian Chamber, commented: ....we succeeded in obtaining the formal promise of the establishment of an Italian University at Trieste. but when in the beginning of 1909, the scheme was about to be put into execution, the plan that had been worked out by the Italian Government did not appear in the least in accord witn our wishes and the assurances given. In- stead of a University, an Italian figculty of "law" at the University of Vienna. ‘ This disappointment made the future course of Italian and Austrian relations more difficult. It threatened the security of the Triple Alliance, and caused Italy to look for support in another direction. England, though sympathetic, failed 0 give her any satisfaction. Therefore, Italy had to look for support from the other anti-Austrian powers in the Balkans who were also dissatisfied with the Bosnian crisis. If she could not get English support for her demands for compensation, Italy could at least turn to Russia and Serbia who were equally bitter against Austria. This, in fact, lead to the Racconigi Treaty of 1909 between Russia and Italy. 48 . . . . . a . - . 5 Giovanni Giolitti, memOir of My Life, bhapman and Dodd Company, London; 1923, pp. 204-205. . “ " ' '1“ 2-K _ ‘13:: m,“ .4 I. 3' “In! filial. *h U.) Italian rel ations with Auss'a had iec m-3 friendlier to the :csnian crisis. In October, l209, the Czar of I.“ '0 J 7 ~ I ~ _: _- 4— " T4— 1 u‘ + ‘4 ' " I V" : -, o ‘ , ~ 1 , MUSSLL I'Jnlill L. Vigil; tU J.L.Lhac'zl' (nu J.LL.CC‘IL.1'..LO 4-;l.a$ $15.5 t). '3 first of'icial Visit of a Czar to the Ilurdum oi Italy. V», - 1' i lOl‘ .1 to the visit 0: Czar LLchoias to Italy, King Jictor v, _- ,..~ .~ on: 4. :5 . 0 ~,.- I‘m». inlanaei had nude an oiiicia i.it t3 the cour oi tne ozai. at the sans time regaining loyal to the Triple Llliance. _-,,. 1 Cunci this These t 11 e the L ought —_ f. , . . + 1, -, "\r‘w 1".” -..“. L . f7 , A , v- P T ~ - evinu shoJed in land the te.acnc or italy to enter nm-'a»7-§a". -.-., .L—Tn (- um't‘r .-".1 t: q “m . . y‘. In nu.” yuLhLJn .LV'--le-;_~./--._J In; I]. (5...; 11:, .4J WOTJEAL rm ’ .LQ, H;l.L__Le 49 ‘itish night ha"e been Lore anuaionistic to this fr end '7‘ A. y“ Y‘" W. \ ~ {:1 T ‘ v . ’1 fl ’ . L ,5 Inst een1.:issia.anmi - aly, ii _.n:lar d.ln3r Af {uni not udei an intentq with Aussie in l907. do ever, w»3n the Caar's preposed visit was first known in l307, it met with opposition in Italy. at time, the gociaiist Party iade nelson: ra isns in Italy were a threat to the safety of the Czar, who postponed o 50 rT‘. 1 ‘ “~_ 5_ ‘,‘ ~ ' 7 , “Sit. ine second attenp t " use Lr ugnt antagOnism from ocialist Party. TherefOre, it was Qreed tint tmi visit no t to Le too piblic ized, and the Castle of Racconigi, 49 .. . . - . . .. . 5 G. Giolitti, LenOirs of Ly Li: , p. 202. 50 where the Kin5 passed the Autumn season, was chosen as the Spot for the meetizg. Altho u5h Italy and Tussia tried to maintain the ut- most secrecy over the meetin5, there were many rumors over what had been accomylished. En5land was enthusiastic over the meeting between Ricolas II and Victor Emmanuel. The British Under-Secretary, Sir Charles Hardin5e, eXpressed his "intens e satisfaction," saying it "was most pgortun 5.;- and of 5rea importance not only to En5land...., but even so to Italy....Italy i: the future will stand, closer to : w.i _i ,. m.. . .5 "52 . ., . r the antente than to the iriple alliance. It is indiCated that Italy w as moving farther than ever from the Triple . 53 Alliance. (D d d The Italians a5re 0 support Russia in trying to get the Opening of the Dardanelles and Russia agreed to recognize Italian ri5hts in Trigoli. According to Giolitti, the Italians also wanted to see the Straits Opened. He writes: For our part, we pledged ourselves to give our support and collaboration to the idea of ob- tainin5 the Openin5 of the Bards elles, or at least their neutralization. Le made our under- standin5 in this connection degendent on the K ”1G. Giolitti, Hemoirs of Ly Life) p. 205. 525.0,. Pug-y, 0.3. Cit., p. 4090 55 1951, pp. 176-177. Ear5* ot Larriott, The Li=Vers of Modern Italy, London; ~12. Wi‘tu “LI-I“! ’ assent of the other 5reat Powers, and our adhesion to his idea was also based on the consideration that Wlile Uie Opt enin5 of the Straits was not gm articul €.'ly a matter of great interest fo duss a, it did not on this account ceas- to be any he less an interest 0: cuis. In return Russia under- took to rec05nize Italy's predominant ri5hts a over Trigoli whenever the cas. should arrive. (" *3 ) ussia and Italy also agreed that they would support the "1 r\ "integrity" of the Ottoman Emgire, that they would supgort the principle oIf nat-onality in the E allians, that they . - . 55 V would present a united iront toward Austria. here, Italy found another gartncr outside the Triple Alliance and V. as, at the same time, drawri closer to Englan‘ and her ally, Russia. At the very same time, Italy was livin5 up to her traditional dual personality which had kept En5laid in sus- pense as to her real attachments previously. Hhile she Vas CChSpirin5 with Russia 65a:Lnst Austria, she was also con- Spirin5 with Austria against Russia. For Tittoni was also e50tiatia5 an a5reemeht Vith austria on the Balkans. In June, Tittoni had proyosed to Austria “an a5reement that neither of the two States without the knowledge of the other She uld make an abreenent conceihi n5 the Balkans with a third ()1 4 ' ' ' T" ' i '5' v “a G. Giolitti, hemOirs of i3 L118, p. 204. I a O [E .'-I_C. ’ p. K' D. 52 56 State." Italy was hostile to the Austr'ans in the Balkans as she had been for generations; but she was also hostile, with Austria, to any Slavic aggression in the area. Althou5h the nacconiri Treaty seemed to draw Italy closer to En5land, since Russia and En5land were members of the ggtente, it is agfiarent that Italy still was interested in the Triple Alliance. In fact, Italy's gosition in re5ard to England was just as f055y in 1909 as it had been l904. Again and again, sue found herself on the si‘e of In5land. Yet she would not break with the Triple alliance, and she would form aiy attachment U) that promised to extend her imperial interests. __ A“ [26; - ” Larriott, The haters of Lodern Italy, p. l77. Tx'u' W”. 'l..., "VI-(w -.;' »7- {at . C I 2.1.31“ 133 I I I rn.‘ - f". I.. - ‘+') .4— . _ “r1 . v 1. ‘f‘ (A 1 01‘2 .. 1.1.t Lam UVLifiOl‘L (J.L. Uhlal‘l 4- .}...ch)' .de_:.':_4_.._:z_.+_~_~_/_ Not lon5 after the difficulties in the Balkans Jere se tled teaporarily, the attention of Zuroge was p Q ‘ ‘ ’. h r '. f~ ': -q 4- ‘y -\ f “.1 ' ,' l f '13 ._ Vf'.' "' “' locused on “frICa in tie derIOgment of What was Alon the Agsdir crisis. -nis was a reoycnin5 of the dues 1“ v 0 C 'I ' ' '! rrencn exoanSion in morocco, Whic1 arous d the wra h D < . . n . -= .- TT' ,-1 .' _ I (a . '~ ‘n . .VA ..‘, Q 1:1" 3‘“ r < I ' 1 . V " r‘ . - ." Oi SJRPOIt-L.AL§ Hilblauu 333.4813 U81 1 Li. 7, 4lQlal C1 WdS lileEEcLS inb— v V ly hostile to G ri'1V's action in Lorocco. Italian ’njlish relations were further affected by the JlOWQtiC events of the ;rears l9OQ—l9l3 that c I 1‘ 1 * .. - I" v r 4 w ‘ .fi 5 .‘N "\ r“ l' . . ' l- 7‘ r. “lonod5n Ital! loinl flsiS e f once again in a po area a5ain 11 {IS tion of Of. Ger- .ti f—Jo entered aroqnd the ite"“*ncan area. annland sapgorted Italy in 4.x. m V.- 1 ° F . 4 r. ,5 , n ,1 "5°, -,1.-,. . - ' -\ b4: i'ig litan_an Jar oi lsll a ainst iuiaef, but the (“mi-n3 “'3‘ n]? t“. t x i: s 7 '? C: r‘ r“ '- 3nmp‘n t ‘ D w t‘ 3 A J n v1. w .L Ll-lu 1-51.3 J4. J C5 1 J..l(1..avd.ul Cbiugll (JVvl I]... -~ “ w. 1- -\ (a r~ gvr‘ ‘. , ‘ D, 1 1 V0 r\ “— V": \ islands in the Settlement union ioiioued. It Will be sary to investi5ate these sro‘lems in some detail to mine the course of Zn5lish-Italian relations in thes Althou5h the Al5eciras Coijerence of lQOG had supposedly settled the question oi I. ‘ ~‘v 'lr‘ -‘ 1 ‘ r‘ . .H r ' ' 'o’r:} morocco, German] JaS fa irin satisfied aid was r-a y d (J C..- H O 0 a r F141 F: E 1 g-J L ("a H H C‘- :3 (I; C) ., ... .,.. ‘ , 1 -. C‘ .-x (‘1‘ poortunity ail So. uh: Haul two ‘\ in: b e an eye ars . French and German congetition in W37 . ' ( W .4). 4’. T1 1' C' ,- v‘. . '\ ’ T“ l n / ‘ 1 l. "l ‘v' r' v ' ‘4 a 4‘ ‘0 W‘ '. .f\ a 3' "r. 1 011011ch Vultll r 1.0.A‘LCU, C-L.C.‘. .. hing.) that ttl‘3 -d- upoailS tn. 1 62 J- _ ‘~ '1 . "5 ‘f :‘. ", n ". I" V} 4‘.’ ‘1 f ‘mr‘."‘+¢2.‘ needed pictectlon, Sent a: army to morocco to wulhuulfl “\ order. The Germa.s recognized txis as a rrenoh attempt to main a foothold in morocco and protested strongly. .I O m; 4 .- ' ,4- , .x- : W -: ,w- 1. . r , Wu- inis series oi evenos inntdlately called foitn re- ; " . ‘ " " ‘7' ’1 r -.. I‘ " ‘ T n vw 7". ~4~- 1‘, A -': r~ aCtlQiiS in butll all§§+ullgl will ltoluv, W'JQ rebufueu morocco (3.5 a source oi friction for European diplomacy. Sir EdWaId Grey infO'med Imp; riali, Italian ambassador to England, a ‘ 1_ ‘ o r‘_ . \ ‘ A r _: A v ‘3 1 ’ ~: ' ‘ J. o 2 that he feared a reopenlnCD Cl the Moroccan quSleHo : n 'Y., ‘ a : ‘ ': if a“ ‘T 1 fi : r~ 4' 1 .‘ 2— T- s‘~ 1 . r ' malfidls oi wan Gilliano als iniLcatel that tne -taiians ‘rercn-U‘ nan antagonism there "might create a feeling of bitter lesentmont and disturb the territorial situation .7 VA. aw nix, . ,,‘,-~ 0"; 1 r. - —\ t x .7 ‘ ‘ 3 a LuilSlucl tibia LUI'lOUL tU Chili» H) But in Spite of this apprehension, the French were persistent in their imperialisti golicy in horocco. On Hay Bl, lgll, they claimed a protectorate over the Sultan. The Germans claimed that this destroyed the agreement of Algeciras, but they would a were compensated elsewherefl Italy Was immediately concerned, nd Jorld Politics, The . TV __ . ., .- ‘ - .n ‘. To P. ruOOil, I”: )Ci'ltillSIn' Q. \' 1 T: ‘ f‘ ‘ 1‘ . o .1 ~-i 1 aacnill n oomyani, - W York, l-e , Grey to Rodd, l'y 2, l9ll, 3 ’ W 1" fl Ibid., Road to Grey, nay 16, lQl_, Vol. VII, I10. 27:5, p. 252. roe to French occupation if they w, “ma-cli—an; .»r "Ti-U a 55 for she knew o: and resented Germany's designs on Libya, which she Wanted for her self. KOWever, she VJaS Willing to grant, for due compensation, concessions to Germany Which I: anal and. V vvvvv ' ”‘1 .1. 3.-. ,7 w. '1 ‘ ., .L. ,, , ' Mp - HILL-JILL; Ealgb...e [19$ GD 3C9 at l C lndege- ldfilltlJ 0-..an IT. .- ., ..,. r. . , - ' , '1 - ,. -,,.: 1 F.“ 1,01,. but Ita13 “as alreaLJ involved With .uiney. C . ~ ‘- 1 ~-y,‘ r. o“ r \ . , .'\ Vince Germany was offered n- alte native compensation, r sending a Sixboat to Agadir which brought the m C) CD (‘0 O (.1. G) OJ C” We! .. ‘ ', ._L _ crisis to a head. In the ensuing discussions, both Italy and England found themselves on the si:e of France. Italy claimed that her arreement With France of 1902 (p1 eceding the first Xoroccan risis) prevented her from obsosing France. Ingeriali said, "the Italian Government could not be disinterested in the eventual consequences which might affect the equilibrium in the Lediterranean."6 Grey fell in line With Italy in backing up the French action. he said that the British government could not "disinterest" itself in Lorocco. Once agai: EurOpe was on the brink of war, and Italy's position be bWéeil t e Entente POWcrs and the Triple alliance as difficult. In the atmosohere of agoroaching war, c- QBTltlSh Documents, Rodd to Grey, Lay 16, lGlI, Vol. VII, no. 875, t. 232. bid., Imceriali to Grey, La;f SO, l3ll, no. 39, p. 573. 7”,. . , , .fi . . d.d. Asquith, The G hes s of The War, Lassell ard Comsan3, London; p. 92. Marquis di San Guiliano, Italian foreign minister, said "that beca ise she Was a member of the Triple alliance, her agreement With France had mare her position very pre- carious. As long as her interests in ripoli were being respected, she [Itali] would still maintain the balance in the lediterranean."8 This statement was evasive and did not lari“y What h'1r relationshio Was to be toward England. She did indicate that her policy would be guided by her England firmly backe d France and Italy followed since she refused to support her ally of the Triple Alliance. In her policy of maintaining a middle course, she ac ually acted in accordance With Ln5land. For she clearly would not strike France in the back. As Eissolati, prominent Social- ist leader in Italy, stated "Italy had acted by supporting England in restraining Germany in Agadir; thereby En5lish 9 relations bec—- e more friendly aga din...." Even thou5h Italy didn't participate directly With England in the Agadir question, she did give diplomatic support to France, thereby, falli: g n line with Eritis h Opinion. Eoth Powers were left at the conclusion of the crisis With the question facing them of where Germany might strike next in the Hediterranean 8Eritis h Dc cuments, Rodd to Grey, July bl, l9ll, ‘1010 VII, no. 44v, Po Bu. 9Eissolati, La politica estera dell' Italia dal 1897 'al 122p, p. 120. c_‘::-—‘T¢f , g, .‘l ‘W‘; hi Armin area. Italy L‘S anxious over her opportunities in Tri ooli and England was afraid that Germany might attempt to es- tablish a naval ‘asc there. Trig Jolitaniau War h In the meantime, Italy had bec Jme involved in a problem that affected her interests and relations With _ i England mOre directly. While the other Toners we re pre- ii occupied With the lgad ir cris's, Italy by declaring war on Turkey and eiz ng She already had the consent of England pocle eted their share of the ba‘gain in this pos se ion Italy had long coveted. acted independently Tripoli and Cyrenacia. and Fr nce, who had Egypt and Tunis, and Furthermore, she was af'aid that Germaxy might make Tripoli her next project of aggression after A5adir. She concluded therefore that the way to occupy it Was simply to occupy it. England's interests in this area were affected by Italy's ambitions in Tripoli because of the proximity of Iripoli to Egypt. She Wedld power occupy the last piece of Turkish V” 1 42-, , Vs lined n to see a friendly territory bordering the Mediterranean. Er. Haxse, editor of the National neviev in England, said “that lngland would welcome the War, as lOLugi Villari, 192.7,, p. .129. London; Charles Scribner and bans, an go ,1 a means 0; preventing Germany from seizing Tobruk and es- «11 tablishing a na*al base in the auditerranvan Since England's interests in restra Lning Germany co-incided with Italy's in the Hediterranean it gave the opportunity she leeded to seize Tripoli. The relations between Italy and Tvukey had not been cordial for some ti;e. The‘turhs did not regard Italians or their country With re Spect. Italy felt that she had not been treated with the consideration by Turkey which a Great 8 Power expected to receive. Tur :ey, however, knew that Italy had long had designs on Tripoli. Thr Ju-:hout lSlO and the early month 5 of lbll, Italy Tu 13 complained of her difficulties in dealing with Wu rkey. She claimed that Italian interests in Tripoli were being molested. “pciiali, It alien ambassador to England, said that an Italian could not buy land in Tripoli, but other . . l4 , . nations were favored. Imperiali nOped to impress Grey T the situation and wanted ste=;)s taken. 0 with the seriousness l“, ., , . vv. ‘5‘ K a o q Ward and Gooch, The Ca abridge history Ol britisn Fo iggn Policy, 1866-l919, p. 45:. 12Eriti sh Documents, Italy and Zulkey, February to September ea, lQll, fol. XI, p. 259. l3Ibid., Italy and Turkey, February to September 28, lgll, Jol. XI, p. 253. l4;p;g,, Grey to Rodd, July 28, lgll, Vol. XI, no. 221, p. 264. 59 No relief was forthcoming. The Italian press was filled "i with complaints 01 the ve"atiuns to which Italians were sul';-,jected.]“3 These press reports aroused considerable anxiety throughout Europe concerning Italy's intentions in Tripoli. The Turkish press reSponded with several accusations of Italian activities in Tripoli. They asserted that the Italian Government had protested against granting a con- cession to an English group for constructing a harbor of . , . . . , . 7 Tiese reports the Italians firmly denied.l Tripoli.16 Italy could not afford to alienate England at the very time that she was going to need her assistance in the prosecution of the war. For this reason, she had to deny the aCC‘sations and to make an attempt at concealment of her policy and intentions. But England was not easily offended at this time. Grey recognized the difficulty of the situation and felt that Turkey would eventually appeal to England against Italy. At the same time the English were interested in seeing Italy succeed in Tripoli. he told Kicolson, English is . . , . _‘ 1“ British Documents, Italy and Turke‘, reoruary to September as, 1311, Vol. ii, p. 250, laIbid., Rodd to Grey, September 19, 1911, Vol. IX, —— “ML: ‘8 iminrl‘w'; AK“? 6O smbassador to Constantinople, that W"e mus t refer Turkey A rr—‘Kv I 1 ‘1 I. I" c a“; '3" -VV (“1' ' r . "» . . a to Germany and n.istIIa as being Italy 5 allies....It is most important that fie should not side against Italy now."18 Gre3 also premised Iaperiali, Italian ambassador to England, that if Italy did not get satisfaction from Turkey, England would not interi'ere in behalf of the Turks over any action Italy might take. C Just how strongly England desired to see Tripoli safely in the hands of a power such as Italy who was not a possible threat to Eritain is evidenced by the fact that Tujland had indicated that she would not support Turkev whom she had traditionally suppOrted. '“‘tation° in Tripoli cent i11ued and the Italians were determined not to postpone their plans. Turkey tried to reassure Italy by promising her that Italian rights vould be 1 But affairs in Italy, spurred on by an aroused popular Opinion, indicated that it Was too late to prevent the conflict. __ i. 21 Giolitti had come to power in the spIirg oi l9ll. aking matters in his own hands, he inforxned Grey that Turkey 18D ,. British Doc1m:nts,gGrey to Nicolson, September 19, 1.911., 1101. IX, I10. 20.1, pa 4:. ., fiicolson, September l9, l9ll, Vol. IX, no. RSI, p. Ibid., Lowther to Grey, September 26, l9ll, Vol. Ii, no. 3‘9, p. 277. r) “lLugi Viallari, OJ. Cit., p. 129. should be forced Tripoli. more and more, to Ch Giolitti felt tha SO tllut tile ItC‘. ange her conduct tOWard Italy in t this Iostility had increased lian Government was no longer in a position to Iesis t public Opinion Which Was calling , _ , fl __-. p p , _ J _ . J“ , .~_. 22 I for the saieguarcing 01 the national Interests and d15n1ty. 3 The English attitude was "vaguely" favorable. Sir 3 2 Edward Grey received Giolitti's proposal With great cor- f dialitg. He assured Italy of English support when he said: i If theIcfore, Italy, in order to guard her rights, failin5 eVery possible attempt to bring about a solutiun, IOInd herself compelled to take action, Enclanu not only would do not.11n,_, against this couI se of ction but WCW‘I give her sympathetic supportnauicn uld be of couIse om y of a moral nCLtJleO Although Italy could count on Grey's support, the attitude of the British Press V385 more uncertain. Some of the news- papers recognized that Italy's complaints were well founded, but they did not want English did request t action in Tripoli not fOr ing Turkish damage to 00 ““G. Giolitti, 23Ib1d., p. 56 241L1u., p. 36 hat the territory but conceal them unde V n to resort to war.“4 In addition the Italians make their reasons.for f those of mere im rialism and a desiIe r the pretense of justify- Italian rights in Tripoli. Grey felt I "N V‘“ . 1 D "x .—;r A-ACIliiOlI S 04'. P. 86k). 4. 62 .+— -.,'W ‘ . - .1 ‘ 1-, I- , _ I .. w: _ 4. 1 that BaIliaLaaa mauII n II; pernIt Eritish dip omatic suppOIt '5‘ c ’ *' '. " 4 .'.vv :- "- 7"”: j ’. .'~I ,~(. \ '-r-‘. . 7"1“ ' N. r‘ t" 2. oI anJ polIaJ In -IIloII that pave one poWer moIe autnOIIty 25 t ‘ ‘ g . 't r- ~u 1 YV' I‘ \t‘ I: r ."’ (- fl. ": " "fi '~ _ ". than otha s. vaIousIJ, Grey had to conceal hIs oun person- al desire for Italian occupation of Tripoli as well as Italian motives. Furthermore, England IeIRu ed to pIonise Italy anything beyond moral and diplomatic support and hedged at the srbject of outright aLIR ation. In the course of the long conver- I Onto. ~ ; x “To". " Itv,‘ '-:I -- D. A (,1 r: c;'«11'~'ct '1“ ~7'-".'.r C"! 17 made the following statement as to the Englisn attitud . In 1902 we had made an 9(leemvut v.1th Italy Ies pectinb Trip oli. From this te re'lized that in Trizoli es pecial y Italy could not tolerate heI int: Iests being thrust aside or uniairly tItated. 3e 51 Rs thtt the tra- ditional friendly feelings 01 he two peoples were such that 5 eps, which were forced upon Italy in any part of the world to redres the Wronbs of Italian sIs‘-c or protect Italian intIIests from unI'aiI tr:_ :.tment would have our sympathy. But the outriwlt and forcible annex- ation of Tr poli wa an —xtrenc step that might have indiI ect conse ~guen as very embarrassing to other Powers, and anongs t other to ourselves, who had so many Lohammeuan subjects. I hOpe therefore that the Ital ian GoveInment would conduct affairs so as to limit as Iér as possible the embaI asera nt to other IoW PS. -- - .1 O17(»‘-' I' . ‘,\ '~ uv.~. v A (\Wr —.\,r‘ I IN H. a. ,-‘- . Ore), mdirlta-I .LDGQ EIlchJ S tz’lut II’C; INCIS SrLQLI.-EI1(, IIUIII tIlC IIORIIU Of View of "non-intervention."~ 0;: ~ . s o rv ”VG. Giolitti, Lenoirs of iv Life, p. 26o. 0 £6 . V’\ w British Documnsnts, Gre , to nond, RpteL1ber 29,19ll, V01. I‘r, no. 250, i}. 28A. Ibid., Grey to Rodd, Septezsbor 29, 1911, no. 250, es 1 The Italian aha Ingiisg attitudes may thus be summe Up at this roint. a long series of incidents and a long period of strained relatiOns With Turkey had proouceu a situation Whioi found the tWo Poners some What unified in their interests. England knew that her own an' Mt y's in: eros ts in the Lediterranean ere mutu“' and haIm ny could be maintained. Enrlsud Was in no sositjon to entertain the thought of any «quieai nation corzctinD With her as far as naval arran¢ements were concerned. with Italy this was mpossibla. England knew that the Italian navy I. as smell, and her financial status was such that Itds y was not in a position to caIry throubh a tremendous naval p1 ojram. Thus, 1‘ v1th a 'Waeak" nation and a "strong" nation workinJ cooperative- ly, their reSpective interests wouldfwe jeo ardized in the Lediterranean. However, Italv was determined to act independently. September at, she sent an ultimatum to Cons antinople. P. re sly was demanded Within twentv four hours from the presentation of the ultin atum. Giolitti hOped that the Turks would accept the ultIIatun, but they refused. He said: In; Not even the Eli-117111158 oI foreign Anbas sadms had any effect. Only at the last moment, .hc n our Ileet Was already before Ir1 ipoli and Was entering into action, did she, [Turkey aslzim; GerIIIany C4 sud the other Foyers to inter one as peace- muk3is, ioxi1 . y" britisn Documents, Road to Urey, november 2c, 1311, Vol. IX, no. bBY, y ‘ “ o 01 [\‘1 ( V 0 48Ibid d., Rodd to Grey, January 8, 19l2, Vol. IX, no. 356, p. 558. 68 Eor were their suspicions u1iodndedFor Itslv had actually sent s squadron to tr; ent re ice of th: Terdenelles in the hOpe or enticinf out the 1urkisn ileet. 1. . A , hour iiring thet ended without r esult. anon tne 1u1n thereafter closed the Dardsnelles to trade, shutting off the I: 1 C‘ — ‘ ’— ' 1 "I ~ A. 4 bleed see, tne AnéllSfi were lurious. Yet the Englisn were unable to take action. They still did not desert Italy and criticized the closing of tne LtlLitS. Grey informed Giolitti, that Turk~y was not justified in v- closing the Derdenelles. me said: Tne fuM iS1 decision was undefensible; her right to close tre Straits, snnctione d by the Treaty of L011don l34l end confiimed loSG- l87l being exolicitly lir ited to vessels of war. Legally neither a con lc te blockade oi tn‘e Derdenelles by an enemy ileet nor their closin: by the Turkish Government was justified. Turkey soon be cked down and reopened the Derdenelles 40 Pressure uno er the same conditions as existed previously continued to be brought to beer to bring tneverring Powers to peaceful negotiations. Grey finally suggested a monetary compensation be paid to Turkey for the loss or Tripoli end. A . ' 4 1 - ‘ . r1 byrenaica. 7 Tnis suggestion n gnt nave proved success ul 43Eritish Documents, Grey to Rodd, April 19, lBlZ, V01. 11/3, I10. 0‘35, 11:). 0C7. ‘7 ‘id., Grey to fiodd, April 9, lQlB, VOl. IX, G. Giolitti, 0-. Cit., p. 300. 6 . 4 Eritisn Dccum:n s Lowtner to Grey, May 1, l9l2, Vol. Ix, no. 402, p. 391. 47Ibid., Grey to flood, June a, 1912, Vol. Ix, no. 407, 69 if another rumor had not reached Italirn ears that frightened them into further defiance. These were rinors of British interventions on the side of Turkey in the Turkish-Italian war. Imperiali, Italian ambassador to ;n;land, heard these and hurried to Grey for either confirmation or denial. According to G ey, Inperiali confronted him with a series of accusations and he replied ('1‘ ,-,.-.L 1‘ .‘vv.,".-‘ ‘.z'~ »'-1:.'4-.- sepaiately to etch. lned indicate the Conlllct of interests wan u.m.m;‘-h “1.1.1“. 01 Italy and England in the Leaiterrantan, and the mutual suspicion that was thei oundati on f01 t1eir superficral unity. Because of the r in or tanc they are listed below: Accusatien: That we [L1L11ni] had assured the Turks hat need 11ot Le anxious about the Aegean Islands, as these could revert to Turkey unc1anged aiter the war. Reply: I said that this was absolutely untrue. we had not said anyt1'1ing to the Turkish Government about the islands. all I had CMHEY&£ to observe, in conve sation with some of the Ambassadors oi oth1er Po ers, that the settlement 0: the qu Jestion of the slands at the end of the war mould present difiiculties. Accusation: That Lord Kitchener was contemplating the occupation of the harbor of Eardia: a harbor w- 1ich, I gathered, is beyond the Sollum boundary of Egypt. Reply: I said that here we 5 not a word of truth ‘ lA Oir COHCthHcl ting a move beyond the boundary oi Sollum, [near Tripoli as suggested in the rumor and that I had never be Lore heard even th; name of En (.A- (3.3.3. 4' 7O Accusa ion: That Great Eritian had approached the Powers with a view to the recognitiOn of the annexation of Tripoli by Italy, under the religious supremacy of the Sultan, Cyrenaica to renai. under Ottoman rul , with other details of the same sort.‘ (111) Reply: [bray] said we had not made aly proposal Whatever about Cyrenaica. flith regar to the religious supremacy of the S‘ltan, ; the only yossible founiation for the rumor would be what I had said to Count Eenckendorff about a possible annual payment to the Sheikhul-Islan: a sug- gestion which I had made in concert with the Italian ambassador, and of whic T -. l~ -‘ 'L' ‘1 1 ‘- ‘. v‘ 4' L . .4. gluti uleCL 113.211 ab 1'16 time. :«W ‘1 Accusatien: That Baron harschall has begun negoti- ations with us to settle the question of the Bagaad Railway and the harbor of Llexanderetta as Germany desired, we in return receive the annexation of Cyrenaica to Egypt. Reply: I said that I had never discussed Cyrenaica with Baron Larschall, nor couuled the question of the Bagdad Railwa*, or any other Question in asia Liner, with the Italian-Turkish war in anyway; and he had not made any such proposal to me. Our discu551on of the war had really been limited to an agree- ment that the Italian decree of annexa- icn was a great obstacle to peace.... Accusation: That the British Government ha assured the GWand Viz'er that she under no circum- stances recognize the Italian annexation of Trigoli. netly: I said that nothi1; of this sort had been said to the Grand Vizier. 48Imperiali felt that he had Grey "cornered" on this OIIEB and gave him an extract from to Daily Chronicle" to Ef¥isseuiect. However, Imperiali sai” of course that he knew ‘LLJ. about this. Eritish Documents e 1912., Vol. IX, no. 429,, 41s. “huh”. I. V w. 1..» n. -’.I1 1| ' . 11‘ Accusetion: 71 That stopoiné of cznt reband on the Egyptian frontier berLint ver expensive, Lord Ki ‘ ener intended to give more flee d;m for twl ossssje oi officers (4.410. arms 0 . ‘ - 1 ‘ 1' ‘r 1‘ ‘ "~ 1' I‘ I" Suid tnst no cnange Mn tever Add been ujgested “A Lord hitcher er, or by us '. v o I‘ ‘L J ,3 '\ - -\ . 0 him, he “so lat even mentioned the ' . "N. ‘ t f" a ICOL pulCJCQ oi (Azense. It v s tIue (5 If?“ nrq 4 V72 V1 v ‘hc‘VK‘L .5 J- i- convers'tisn with me d ' had nontitl:d the expense ‘ining eAtIE pol3ce on the frontier mt :;ce 0; the iicuuveuie ce of o Eggpt. I had admitted the ~nce, but had gointed out thst, , gert from our occuyetion, utrelity was the only tolicy for EIV'Jt, the TurAish i‘l eet could n; t protect from eing attacked by Ital}, and {st thereioze tle Obligations of neutrality must be preserved. On the quite ne. “toir as to the prohibition of mone" iessin; through Egypt, it did seem to me, after s udying the documents, that to treat money, as contraband would be to go beyond the inst rnetio‘nel Treaty of neutiztlity. (R (I 3 ( F cc 9 I 4-. ’1‘ ’ .4 in ’up.) y.‘ . I U ' 'J. ’- ,_‘,\ l._{ m :3 ([33 H- <+ (‘3 O (-r (1' P- c+ to H cf 0 he H (i ._ :1 .J c3 () (IV lid-1nd) These denials on the {art of Grey seemed to reassure trie Italians. Perhegs the Italians nervousness over the rwimo vxere based on the fact t2 at thev felt wiend “ight be indulging PI”cticei in tne 1 of doub le-crossing policy that Italy ned test. In any case, Ingerieli tented oubljc (ierliels and 1e QSSHPLQCCS on the part of Grey, as well as _ _ C’ PITlvste.QO ’01. IX, no. 4:39 CCU.ATH1t , Grey to Rodd June 25, 1912, pp. 4lfi- 413 C ~ . . .w . 1 dOIbid., Grey To node, June 2c, 1312, Vol. IA, 1'10 415. ‘1” T .- ' ‘ ' I“ ‘ . a ‘ ,VI'r ~‘, ,_ V. A . r . In Sglte of Grey 8 ueni Is, n never, snl the esialent .‘ _ .. _. in I.-.- m..1 T - -3 1 t - ‘ ’2‘. ., .3 . - -. - 3 C .kaS V‘llvUS VA ZJZL’a-O- ‘ L«.-~l:.-.:’l Ids—LL .LL... IS , “-‘1‘_‘lC—.A/J\l {Isis ‘1‘0’Orl.v-‘Ler c> er how far Ital an unngstion moves Inight 30. is indicated zibove, she r iterated her symgsthy and favorable vi WXSOint (h c>f Itelitn occugetion of Tripoli. But st the ssme time, the British Acmire lty was feerul thst Italy light occupy the hebb Cull Islsnds Th;is would have serious effects upon British Iiavs l policy, whic cn pIoh lited any one power Ir.m occupyirg tiiis stronghold. The following is a secret desgstch from t.- 18 311.31 lish Admiralty de ISlCili’15 t \J‘ r —v H 01. III, no. 4.3-3, ,3. 4.1:). ‘ 'fi t’l"_". ." A P 'LJ. tunilb JeItwent, concerning the Aeé e an I ecided to occuyy them LL ' 4.1. .‘ ,. J-‘r . T r-1 V .4, in wild CVpiit La.l(.Lt «Lug-“LI in the UOliCy aid to reple- e uI'e HON mu - W. ' ,. , _ .- -,.. ,- o o o 1:18 InglAtCJdflC‘B Of t '18 St 'Lfljb V‘ 1‘ (‘Ar 1*“ ‘. “\\"‘1' 1v - 1.33.) tie: €9.11 utid. IIaS .lOt UAL... «7 083111 a .1. f. r a ,m \ qu ~. I“ ' 1 ‘ 10: s Cent I,, but msy fairlv be ’\ I" K ‘ l ’ O f‘ - I SCll “1.80 t!le £.O:A..L3v v7 OJ. 2111B. Jije. I. .3. U cc; {O t U) ..J f‘ . ‘ I I‘ ‘IT. ‘.- 4“ . 'LV 0 L ‘\ Cd11£l all dd '.oltll b: ‘3 1.1055 -LL u.t._L wLL“; OJ. ball] I’b- + r . r‘ “ "" V~r‘ :‘ ‘7 " " I a ‘I. ‘ /'\ .-"~ ‘I- "\ .‘ UCAi;L...-1_~" i)\ SS'Q‘SS». Jxl 0-6 CCI. L4..;I1 UL till: “C’CLA—srl ‘ l " 1 fi- \ ‘ 1 v A A1 0“ Islenus in fill so\tre.,ntj...nlso the Iect x, TLFW'.A mw' «1' 3~ ~4+L tilt} *bwlc.“ -iAfiu...l fr; I. tifi .L. 110.? I115; CH ‘65 --.Lb.’l ‘ ,4. {3 "_. 1. . f. -..1. 1‘ 1,: . :1 q,‘ ', J .- tdst 0i s fyt was. not be leit OJt oi c>n51dera- + n I \ ‘- I . “- N‘, \p l“ 'pl 4 7'? 1 ‘r (x u -LUDJ o 0 L211“ 1 L... Cuiiu. Lt -..U.L1 p; Q14. (.1.-LI'S u‘J‘ 1.131 110.119 -) a \ 1153C} 13‘. _3,"“' .10 n 3 ,v "C+T" «J'- ~q \ .Wr '1 CLJ.1.);.J. Lu. LILLIlJ-e ACCQLIUV- J. La--d..4. bl LIL... {4.4. ' 1 . " a" " i 3 r“; '. +' A ""I' a u‘ .“~ A d 'v l;O.s.iC;' .LII t '1: M—UuJ. we; I glut; all. . o It is, theie ore, c o 1 -\~ ‘1 '7\ \rgc ‘3 ,’ i snodlu Wu 0..seIVes lOSt "-I {3.113. oi the nod A the be menent 0c cuoetioi her nevel Power, but (’1‘ :3 (f: c—f H *1 (f P 4 Islsnds by Itel; or an? ot’ we should be able to associste the co-siAnetories of all the treetie :0vc r11: n; the nevi ation Of. the DAIAAAelles with us in our pIot st.bl (L) l 333 laintS, Italian Occupation c“ Aegegn Islenus 5 0’12“; 3‘1 *‘Oli'i‘lv'. Adm reltv, June 29, 1.31:3, U 713 ,R‘ ,- '-‘,"\'0V‘ . h .7. V— t. - n. .1 . 1H ' ~, '. a 3. f‘. r - 2‘ n. J- 1 “+- . "‘\ uec"1 1.1.1.53 AIII‘IJCI'IELII IIL. C1 1-II Oran-sci uref u: brie resum,~ti-0I1 ' , ' - -. . -' \ ., 1| ‘ ‘ Irv. \ VW'I‘. '-‘ T t" I‘ \.~ of he oti-tiohs ih Connect Ion witfl the ”Ir Letu“€n -tely end m” a" \' TIL\ a . "‘ "' I L T".- 5 fi f "a" ’ I '2' V- '" m -'o "-" t ‘1" ’.1 pH" #vllL‘LC‘fr. 13“.: Sal.) t;1ub 11191;; 3-148 Pea/p1"; t0 LACS 4.11-116] .‘Iqu. u'aclbr ‘. , 4- \ . a ‘7 — ~ - , . 4— IT ‘ ;-‘ n xv v r in evsiythiu3 LACCfu skoreiUhty. up "cuteo Ire: to ingress 1 A m‘ *,.‘r'fi v 1 3 .L— . 1 . *- , m‘, -‘ m‘ » 1r . f‘i ' . 72“ tflfii I011 at: " .Lo'l 1; 1.1.5 Sulr‘JIQLI 1.01 0 L118 4. 131.1511 UOJb‘ {11133113 was .1 ," ‘ 1 . " "-‘, ‘,- .'- v.1. . " ‘r' - {111‘ . "s7: "ISO 8.? {IL 111:: to ‘31Ic1 til’J w " , Lut tile. a-ui (2132.1 UOJ‘J .LILIHLIIJC H 12.5 ' -\‘ U‘ . A‘ 7" r " I‘ r ,_ -' . ‘7‘ . «'- .: a‘5V : 1 ,- -. 7' ~ too new “ho woe. to do so tithou. Iisiiho its overthrov, unless v ‘— \ ‘yr .vv. -~ 4‘ f up .1 151 A mu, . T .-‘ . (3 j ‘ I I , v- . T p ’l' l V l y the te'is were IevoIeclc. Iie Atalieis reiused to lec “.3 Jd the sovereignty issue of Syrehafca.52 JIter crhsioeretle hego istichs, ”,nevr" Italy ah Tirkey eVehtucl 3 come 0 terms in Jily, 1312. Italy wanted recognition Ly the otd:r roa-rs of tas occupation of Iiitoii sh” Cyreheica.53 The two Powers signed the Treaty of s‘IS'uhe . 1. n‘fl 1' 1 fi'! (3 _0 ‘ v'yfi_ _: 1' m r '_ ‘ r‘ ., ih CCtubG', uiI, in ”hicg -uI’w..y ceoeo [‘3 Ln (. L vv1 “. r~ T g r .~ .1 f . V 1- .1. L‘ I -. r f ‘1 q 4— A m. ,. '- --.- ‘r wfllld Ital; abreed to Ietarh the ne3eeh Isl I = oILey with ‘l a I y ‘ o .,“\"‘ ‘ 5 ~ ': ' 1 ‘ n ’1‘: | . r , the Ihiexster mo Lug thet I lO‘MS Le iI-tLtatc. for thistieh .E4: ' V h‘ v‘ r‘ ‘A ‘ “ {.0 fisr‘ 7 r " I”: - ’\ o“ t r: 1"r~ - i IImtita-JIts 11115.1 A ILI s I war over the Aegean Island res not realized at least in the Treaty, at the conclusion 0: e w' that had all of Eurooe jittery as to its outcome. QE'}: " 1" r\ a , w .Ax'.‘- IA- «0 ll 1 ,1 _- 4" ‘ T1 r) a—rLt-1.5;i 49-31117: “.08, ‘Jfb‘f to “01.1.1, :17 0-0151; ~.J.L, 13 .5, Vol. IX, no. 443, w. 4 l. hid., Grey to De Mil_, October 14, 312, Vol. IX, r~ ‘ flan) .‘ V I ‘ 1 1-"" g ' :2 .C. stovell, '1”; DLilo mnecv of tune ”er of 1 l4, 1". "I ’: 1" 1;“ 3' .\,'*o .. (xi; or IIOUD 'TCO'I 11-1f1 1.4111 COAJPQJ...‘ '1 , “CH 10-1. , 41.}. 912-50. 1- — «flung: I 74 The most significant fact throughout this Italian adventure in imperial acquisition was that the Triple Alliance partners aid not strugole a.: aih t her aggression. Germany, of course, gave her no aii, but it might be con- sidered surorisL that she dii not offer more Opposition in the l gL1t of her own humiliation at Algeciras and Agadir. Neither did Austria raise strenuous jection to her rival's acquisitions. ;ossitlv the allies felt that Italy's pos- session of Tripoli he been fores hadovred so long that pre- entioh was useless. Also, they may have been gratified by the fact that Italy's occupation in Africa kept her from dis turLirj the sit u; tion in the Balka;s. And finally, they max have felt that Italy would escape from the bouhds of the ATriple alliance in her relations with England no matter what pressure they brought to bear on her. Occur’ing within this time was the renev val of the Triole Alliance which took place in lBlS. Thus, in Spite of Ital 3"5 intricate dealin s with England, she was keeping up appearances in her friendshiJ with her Allies. Ehe main- tained the double policy that she had followed for the ec de. (‘0 (1; 1.18 C) previ 1 - . ‘7.“ L‘! ' i 1,,1 ' v I“ ~~ -- r ". ItLiLlEIIl-IallLLijl ASLEITJLCJIS uOllCBI‘i’lill E; t’le 11.53383‘1 IS_LE:—51US Turkish war for Italy and the recognition by the other Powers of the ac uis Ht on of Tripoli and oyrenaica, dioloma tic ne- gotiations over the settlement of the war continued between + .1 "x, f: A Mn . T 1 l" I I \ 'L “ Y“..+ . control of the nebean Islands, she was not oromft in ”T1 J. :3 'slands were England's chief concern, as has alreac31 Leen indicated. angland would not al low any one Power, incliding Ital3, to hold an" of the islands because she knew that it would nan1e1 her hear Eastern trade. Italy on the other hand, was willing to return the Aegean Islands to Turkey, providing that Tuikey would fulfill th eTreaty arroqgements of l913 But the Italians found it hard to part with the islands. V Giolitti was awa re that Englandf eared that if the neg an (I; 1 Iles1ds lendined in Italian M1L1ds they might, in case of serve as a naval base for the fleet of the Trigle Alliance in the 255 tei n Xedite erra11ean. He also knew that even at the cost of var, England w.ould not permit aly of the Aegean n so Islands to remain the possession ~i a great rower. England C' C . r‘ r1 - 1 o + I _ , _’ _. ,‘Ko ' T I 7‘ V :V vve. oioiitti, Memoirs o1 hr Life, p. v63. WL ited the Ae5ean Islands to 50 to Greece. She argued that the 5reater Part of the pogdlation was Green. But Giolitti did not want to accent this. He said that it did not fulfil the grovisions of the Tree y of LauSLnne: I gave my assur't s the W6 had no intentions of ai1eXLn5 an; of these ileuds, vhich even as a nav val base wodld have been valueless without going to great exoense. At the same time they consisted a tledge in our hand, and it was lecessary the‘ should so remain until Turésy had fulfilled all of hxa'flreaty oelitnrtions.v althou5h Italy did not favor giving the islands to Greece instead of holdin5 them as security for Turkey's azreezents, there is some evidence that En5land was enerting unusual pressure. ’ccordin5 to Giolitti's account, Sir Edward Grey had "su55ested that by givin5 the Ae5ean Islands to Greece, we [Itali] could assist Germany in her efforts to draw Greece into the Triple Alliance."5'8 This would seem to be almost a diblomatic bribe to Itali Giolitti felt that Italy's obligations under the "Ii-eat‘r of Lais Lanne outVJeighed all ot} ier cons iderations. 59 Turke ey supported this attitude. A telegram from the Turkish Govern- mentto its various ambass sadors declared that since ItN Ly we merely in tomhorary occugation of the Aegean Islands, she —___ ‘.— iolitti, LanOi rs of Iv Life, p. 569. .A‘ 77 could make no engagements on their behalf without first having Turkey's consent. Cthe'wise she would run the risk of Tuikzy denouncing the Treaty of Lausanne and claiming her rights in Cyrenaci rey felt certain, however, tiat (.3 O in Spite of ItLl y's statements, she would not offer Opposition Y" __ n 61- *r-n ‘ , - 1 . . 1 ' 1 1 to Inglaho. Lnglano altered her proposal sligntly to compro- mise, giving some of the islands in question to Greece and same to I rkey, where Italian interests would receive special 62 recoénition. Sir Eyre Crowe, assistant undersecretarv of State for foreign officers, observed that some such scheme been in Italy's mind, because she was nadir; efforts must "v (i‘ F) D1 to obtain imyortant railway concessions in Adalia which was Turk sh territo: . In other words, Italy was determined to .. q - , . 63 get sometning Ior herself out of the deal. (1) an,la1d protested ov r this arrangement because it WOJld conflict with her own railway project in the same area. Further- more, the English did not want any railway project connected with Italian evacuation of the Aegean Islands. As Sir Eyre Crowe said, "It woxld becoLe ea sv for the Italian Government, 600. Giolitti, fe.oirs o; Lv Lire, p. 375. 61- . . , . i _ fl Britisn Documents, nodd to Urey, September 6, 1910, Vol. x, no. 146, p. lol. 0 6”Ibid., Grey to Bertie, October 88, 1913, Vol. X, 10. 'LB, p. 138. 633313161., Grey to Bertie, October 82. 1913. V01- X» no. 1:42, p. :38. 78 by taking credit for Ltlaiauir; from a 'ai wav scherne which rfrin; 3d orior Eritish rights, to clai. in return ior such a m? niifes tat ion of good-will, a recognition or Italian claims of a more or less excl sive character to other regions of Asia Linor."64 Grey agreed in this Opinion. he said, "re- Specting the islands the Italian Government has given us repeated assurances of leaving the islands, and yet she wants to obtain consensation in some other form elsewhere. he English were agreeable to making a separate agree- ment with Italy over the ra ilnay.. But San di Giuliano argued that the reason she wanted the concession in the agreement over the islands was that Tuikev was not Crhlfll out the Treaty of Lausanne conditions. Furthermore, res ist~1ce in Cyrenaica had cost her a great deal of money. he said that 66 pa Italy was entitled o comgens tion for the loss. This diSputs over the islands continued for some time. The Italian Government oifeie i only mild opposition and continued the oossibilLty for comeromise. It did not wish to irritate England too g°eatly. As Larroni, Italia. Ambassador to Constantinoyle, said, "the Italian Govellruent 64 ' "‘ W ‘ P‘ r'" British DoC‘ments, Grey to Lertie, October 2;, lglo, ‘10]... X, no. :12, t). 1:38. C. - w r* 1 5 Ibid., Grey to bertie, Octooer 22, l9lo, Jol. X, no. 162, p. 156 66l£ld., Road to Grey, December 13, 1915, Vol. X, no. 170, p. 154. was very anxious to be on good terms Wlth nngland, and would ' .1 ' - - vV ". .‘v c . ~* ’0' ~‘ I - ‘ a ‘ "w o u‘ press for a comtrotise aha that they noald probably give Way . . . 67 in order to flease breat Erit ain". (-1» Since Italy and England did not see eye to eye as 0 how the Aegean Islands should be dealt with, they [islands] were turned over to the six POJers concerned to deal with this berplexin; broblem. Some of the islands were given to Greece an. t 1osc two 1111.; the Turkish coastline were given to Turkey. This settled affairs in the Hediterranean. It is clear fr'm the events in these years that Englisn ~ and It alian intei ests were extremely similar in the Hediter- l" r'xl "7 ‘ "a 'n" 7‘ V.“ -~r . T r‘ V? 7' 'L" ‘7‘ 4 . ranean. -et anciand lcchded italy “lbfl sushi ion every tiie l "'5 . 'V';“‘"‘o \ r n ~ r 4' 1 4" - fl- "1 r~ ‘ _‘ '1 Q ldtte; ‘JO-ICL LCCQTL.“ t4 “mulbLOJSo AlchJlu was 1:11 .Lll rig to saptort Italy in achieving some ac uis itions and prestL e 'n this area, but she insisted always that Italy remain a seconaary boner in the heoit erraneaz. 67“ v « a - Drl itish Doc iments, mallet to usey, JGCGMbGT 16, 1910, Vol. X, no. 172, p. 156. f1 '1‘ Wm“) “v-w Volla‘ .LHAL J Italy aoves from the About two months after Its'y concluded peace with Turkey, the focus of international tension was again in the Balkan area. In this area England and Italy found their interests coin iding in Opbosition to Austria, but Ingland grim CL‘Hti us policy 'n the crisis in th halhans. (s) followed a mtr This crisis, however, mas to change Italy's questionable position between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente when the events occurred which resulted in world War I. The alignment of Italy with England, which had been deve10ping 'n its real form. f(-\ (D co *1; (0 (1. P for ten years, now as- Alt 1ou;.h Enslan. and taly cooperated in the Turko- Italian war of 1911 because of their mutual interests in Le oiterra re»n, in the Balk°1 cris's this Has not the .Va 9 H ‘ 'Ljr r "74 .l .f‘ (‘ "'. "‘ 'Yrr :" f. . ‘ I" V1 oto PCNCTS weie annious to naintain tne status aio t“ r C... (0 e. in the Ba kans, but England's interests were no affected as g;.eatly as those of Italy's by Austrian and nussiah intrigues he re. England thoughtit wise that the Balkan distutes be S neutralized and a comtrcmise be rea hed with the Balk States anu -dln-/ to prevent a diplomatic cleavage between not ('1) Austria and Russia. Eut her immediate interests wer Jererdized. On the other hand, Italy, above all else wanted 81 to prevent Austrian expansion in the area, and she w anted a much firmer policy of Opposition than En5lanu was leli; n5 to support. Thus Italy.replayed the exact role that she had participated in befOre in ‘estraining Austria in the Balzan, eSpecially concernin5 Albarian alia:L . En5land, a5ain, played the role of mediator, '3 she had in Kacedonia and durin5 the Bosnian Herzegovina crisis. Smi hOped to restrain Austrian and Ru- 'ues in the Balkans by maintainia5 a status duo policy, without 5oin5 to war. As she had before, Italy found herself forced to follow En5l'sh policy. She took what sup' “t she could get, even though she mi5ht ha‘e 'L o } 'r “‘ L P a 9' "a " r,‘ 3 " a" ‘ . y 11". 1rr r. ) T\r- "t‘yv ...r\_ wanted LOic. This Chapter will enanine the calhans wars of 1912-1315, England and Italy in the crisis of l9l4, En5lish attitude toward Italian neutrality, and the ne5otiati0ns m ’eading to the L eaty f London in l9l5. . ‘ " ‘ " W " ' . L\ T“ r‘ ‘ . ,' I ‘ -)a 1 "rl’ ' I_alian aha an,lisa melatiOns in the lalnm mars The Ballaan Jar of l912 was already in progress before Italy and Zn51and were brou5}. it into t ;e diplomacy concerning it. The Balkan League breece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and L-onte e5r:] to :advantage of a weakened u‘r :ey, already disinte51ated by the Turho-Italian lar, to make aggressive 1 .L n.’ 'V / u m 111'. I ' v (-1" “'P r‘ “" ‘« V deaanus on -ura sn territory. Italy has concerned only in so far as th se ni5ht jfect t1e fut wr of the Adriatic (T) D) littoral and in particilar Albania. As Ior 2n5l:nd, Grey felt tha Lr5lish interests we'e not affecte'1 directly but 5 the 5en:ral peac cm 33i: pa was in serious TeOpa'dy. Tur koy couldn't Withstand the attack of the Balkan Allies. She Has forced to an armistice at the eni of Deceabe -f lilS. The victors, hoWe ver, could not arree upon the di ision of the Spoils and war was res‘ned, this time by Serbia, Lon enegro and Greec against Eul5aria. When this conflict lea‘ to a denard by Serbia and aontenegro for an outlet to the Adriatic, Italy's interests in Albania were in serious jeopardy, esueciallv shen‘; Austria no" be5an to show interest 'n albania. C . '~ 1‘. r‘ V ' . '3 ~ (.1 r- 3. v '3 . h wince tneSe conplithions arCSe, Grey 1elt that a .‘ .r‘ ‘ - r .v . I, r\ A _‘. . . ‘7. a o I ‘ ‘_ ‘I ' — q teni arch has he ccSSa y en tLe nquhlau question and called ~.- . - ~ --‘ m?“ A . x-y . . t , r. ~ g ' . 3 in. -. . . rs '\ 1r ( One in LOIILLCLL. Luz: la.£40ltc;l.t cLSIJ€Ct Oi tue S-Lt‘.laatlal. tllut 'V faced the conierence Was that Italy and Austria had already ' f‘ 1". ' r» ‘l‘."a." . . I‘ '. ' a* y ’0 H“ 4 . Y:' \‘ .1. : \‘Y." T "‘ 'v ‘I l' ‘ ‘ " reached a preliminary a5ieement union would prevent the status ’1 1““ r 4 O I V» -5 ' r1 —. 1.3T.“ 3“ . W. (‘l n:" 1 - -‘ OI Albania lICw beia5 ai eree. aarauis Ci wan uiuiiano, GT9? Of FLllOUOh, I”sienty-Five fears. p. 251. O L»): ‘l‘.-r'v)'* (fl 5 (‘5'; 5‘ p 41.. L‘CLJLE—Jot, k’-‘o e’ibo, L}. leo (‘D C V I ”ILL—I. Asquith, T14; Genesis of the -..'ar, 9. 653. -r‘- . r- tun 15.5 " ' ’ . '1 -~ 0 ~' ”it; are; oi 1aIICaoA, Co. blt , Joi. I, pp. Loo-ass. Italian forei5n Linister, was WillinI; to have the proeosed J" '4 ‘3‘ \‘ a",-I_ ~“" .'-1 . T“: '1'"? a - I“ I I: ’0 Lleeti OJ. 1L..LL~SSL.MOI‘S ’ V bllt Ilfl‘-elilCA-.L LL, -buliwl (LlantasisSSuLAOl Jot: (- fl ‘ ‘1 " p I ‘ r I" "1 I" ‘ t ' I ‘ ‘4' . o 4’ ‘- r L ‘ .1 I‘"- ( Ni .1 t\ 4" —‘v to an5la. IQ, inio.neu u.ey that Aisaria and Ital" had already a:;reeu not to disc as Durizzo or Valona or any part of the ("3 COwSU tilt...t ~04?ng (1';;-t€uo ~F " . a E " ‘: J— ‘. r-V' ‘\ ’1 .-—5 . 1.x . . J‘vv ‘. 3 O I , 'x F. f. x "0 austria ana italv i- bflgv SHCCG‘JQa in satisiying nonten1e5 ro. ‘ .- w n- .. _ ' ‘ .. _ -. w 5;. r . .: .. -.° . “ 1 s ° ._ .-\ V} x. J v I. C .. :3 a ._ '." . fin +— '.. p , f“ ,.t x I ~71 w (-2 ,3 1_ fl C , F|V.L t - AE.’ -L ‘—~ tLI 5.) k4. VI-LLAia“ ‘JJM L" 'V L1 U L—Li‘i’ G— r’ J;- lull I‘vafifi—L Cd‘- bubb— r: w ‘ 5 1 .- m - __ .- 5,“ 77 ”.1 P ,5. ,. a deadl03: in the 5utiat s. .aere-0ie, an5iahu pit HF‘S‘ '1 . i 'Y' 'V . 5‘ ’ f"."\ ‘ 1' " "' I". ",A ' '-," ‘- “.'-. 7‘ " on Italy to force Austria to nalze sole arraA5ement Lita Monte- V. f‘“" T? ‘ . f A'T" u‘ ‘t ' , 3 ‘4' .‘ .‘- 4". a T 1 " I“ “ ne5r0. h: .f Ult punt it «6.5 LOST. iIIl iJOl‘ba..it Lirlcit +135... 7 5:10-11d ~ : .' 5 . , re . +o._ ,- ,. r ,. '- , - 5. , 5 I. .Li-'\i 5. one III-s 5;.L.S cl ‘tl- " £1.15 tfld “31.1". 311651 in GEII'aI‘n'L LL, 1n bring on the question of ' ‘ sadors with J V ‘" y one co JP n:ise about Seitari, a.icn aerha,s a railv-v or connércial concessi-ns ni5ht I.lav a part, we are laced wit‘ a possibility of a dea Li:l03l: azd consey on breakuOWA of was in-s of ’Wbas ad is.Lj The real si5nificecce of his deal was the iact tia T f V I 2 ' ‘ . r 7' f“) ‘ 1 ' ‘ .10". "f" V l‘,‘ ‘ “"‘\ . ,‘ I ‘ V 1““ .4 “ -* 3 ~' ~ ital? aha Austria were morain5 hand in hand h.en they ion. J C: v: - .- . *3 ~ r? ,4 r5 irit -1 Documents, Grey to nodd, uecenoer a, 19 a, ' 'T'wr 7—v ‘ .r -\ fol. .55 Ira..usé, p. ads. C I a"\" " z \ “ 1 n Y 1 T"'r‘ T1111. {3.1-er t'a ‘.sOLaa‘L, L‘CC~9:Ib“r .Ll, 1.31.5, Jig—LO L45, ’ r. 'z . r) “3. .2. u, e. 4.7- ,. CO , 1'] ‘3‘ l 0 II'; , O F. W (—t- O '- O Q. CL (D O s t”) (3“ I» '1’ }_J (I, *4 (5L1 FJ no. 397 0: Itig., Grey to Rodd, January 4, 1915, Vol. IX, Ila 0 4.50 A: o (7:20. 84 their interes s in maintaining the status guo in Albania “lied. Yet both were ac ‘ual ly jealous of the other's desi5ns uporx Alt Mu a's AAria ti c Coast. This is shown by the fact that Lentencgjro was ’.Izillinzj to cede Lioun Los c1en to Austria, in return for Scut a ri, and Ital" opposed it because she was afraid that Austria would develOp a strong . 9 m, .1 - . . tnere. .ne Italians su55ested a counter- 1O prOposal of a technical connission o settle the I‘iatter.‘L :3 CL <: (H t. _ m C1 (‘1 d. p. (D In shite of An5lisn no ouxa5emzz1t and Italian .ress‘re, Austria lefiseu to concede on the goint of letttg hontene5ro have Scutari. San di Giuliano said that Austria would fi5nt even if it entailed Eurosean war to prevent Scutari from de clA i med that Italy had done all (7‘. L. cv— d. C) F O H ’. c+ (7‘ : (U 0 ‘1 C. 0 that sne could to prevent Austria from actin5 alone against T" -3, _ '1 ._ ~ ‘_ 'j o 0 ll Aonoanegro. On this last gOlflt tna Aritish agreed. The Itali ans now sought British help. Their temporary agreement 1.ith Au Stl‘ia astcd only until Italy be5an to 5et AOIlied aoou t AJstIia' real intention concerning the "status ouo" in Altania. Ital? was ' Jraid to let Austria act alone. San di Giuliano, Italian foreign min ster appealed for British 9British Docun;nts, Grey to Rodd, January 4, 1913, Vol. IX, no. 452, p. 050. lolbiu., Rodd to Grey, rap o 5, 1315, Vol. IX, no. 675 p. 550. llIbid., Rodd to Grey, April 1, 1913, Vol. IX, no. 776, p. 652. (0 (fl support in preventing nustria from acting independently, in regard to the Scutari Lontenegrin question. In other words, he wanted England to take Italy's place in restrain- 12 in; hustria. Italy's behavior in thes complicated negotiatiois concerning, actually, a small point of diplomacy is evidence of her relationshig with Enoland. the was like a small child With an adventurous confidence Who acts independently until the situation becomes too much for her to cope witn. Then she rushes tech to the security of a parent. Italy did this with England, calling upon her When she got involved in more than her small resources and Idons-r could in le. Eut Znilan“ could not alWays be counted upon in this role of the all-pOWeriul pcrent. rey told the Italians that the question We 5 not for Austria and England to solve alone. He said to Imperiali: This country would never agree to the British Government taking the reSIonsit litv of being one of the executors for Euroue in abnatter in Which We had no direct interest. Italy was dis arPOil“ted When England refused to tak her part ii the groceedings. ne felt then tnat she would —; 123? iti.h Documents, Grey to Rodd, April 3, 1915, Vol. IX, n0. COS, p. 6500 léIbidoy Grey to fiOdda April 5’ 1915’ V01. IX, no. 8‘02, p0 CE’CO be forced to act alone a5ainst Austria, Who was becoming -omi nance over Albania. Imperiali, (1, more a551essive in claiming Italian Labassador to “n5lanu, told Grey that It’w y must reserve liberty of action to protect her OWn interescs. he said that if an expeditionary iorce Was neces L'Iy, Italy 5:7??? Tifi ‘ wanted nn5land to b; a partner to the 5roup. But the En5lish main ained their position that they were not directly inter- ested and couldn't participate. For En5land was suspicious ‘ W}. a.“ «or..- of Italy's inte iticns in Albania, and \hen the Italians su;;e ted th: possibility of military action, Grey told them they would have to answer to the other Power s if they sent an exoediticn to Southern albania.15 The fOSSihilitJ that Worried En5land most was that this diapute between Austrian, Italian and hontenegrin interests in Albania mi5ht deveIOp into a full-scale war. Grey urged that the Eallm d POWers accept the pending settle- ment of the ambassador's Conference.l6 Althou5h Austria su55ested the use of for e in a naval demonstration, Italy did not follow up ner threats about military action to Bn5land. l4British Docum:;nts, Grey to Lodd, April 28, lglé, Vol. IX, no. 097, p. 788. 15 1”" 540 Ibid. , Grey to Rodd, Ray 2, 1915, Vol. IX, no. 952, iolitti, b. Cit., p. 360. 87 As Giolitti, Ito ian prise sinister, told San di Giuliano: I am absolutely Opposed to our tak1n5 part in a naval demonstration, Which, unless followed up by a landin5 of trOOps, in a mere force, or, ii rllitary Operations are undertaken, is the Iirst step to a European War. To send warships to Scutari is more than a mere demonstration, as merchant ships ould sufi: ce to transp01t the inhab ants. For these it is my opinion that he must refuse.* 'IJ T" t‘ V‘."' ”t 1 ‘ . --, ’0" b n" r‘. a... . (V '. v‘. ': meaanile in Lay, ljlo, ne5otiatlons con tinued between . concernins the subject of Albania. Italy was agreeable to Austrian a35r ession in the North if she wa granted compensation in the South. Italy contenplate the occupaticn not only of ‘s‘ona, but also of Santi Quar- anta in southern Albania. This would affect Greece Whose land bordered these areas, but Zn5land refused to support any Opposition to the Austro-Italian settlements. one wanted peace and knew it could 110t be achieved until the imperialism of th se tWo nations was satisfied. Furthermore, Monte- negro's interests would have to be sacrifi ed to permit Austria and Italy to settle the question by negotiation. 17G. D Giolitti, Hemoirs Cl my Life, p. 56l. 18"Dn ' 1w /\ ‘ ‘- . f‘ f‘ 11 - .'\ PA elitish Doc- ants, Goscnen to Urey, La; 4, lfllu, Vol. IX, no. 916‘ p. 763. lg ' f‘ ‘“ ' xr bid., Grey to Rodd, nay 7, 1313, Vol. IA, no. 963, p. 778. 88 England was in a difficult position. On the one hand she wanted Li 0pe Ln f3ace and felt it could be achieved if Italy and Austria were satisfied. On the other hand, if she neglected the interests of the Balkan Powers concerned, such as Greece, she as s confranted with the sih li ty of their retellio against the settlement. This would lead to the very thing she wisned to avoid---war. Grey said the Elgl and 2 must not drift into the position of coming to an agreement V and then Le cahfrsntgd with the defiance of Greece. If Italy was grenhxxizi Sghere of llfinihfllc e in CLLtltruxi Inuiia the D Greeks vzould have to be driven out by force ior they alieadv fl ' " ‘l ,’ _, (:J 0 ’fi 1 - ~ . 1‘. ' occupied part or he territory. Ln bland, thereiore, was in the Lo siti01 oi iorcina Greece to a wee t the settlement. J. ‘0 I A .“ is was no small task for England. bne was in the L) unpleasant Losition of mediation in the situation. Italy was as icious of Greece and did not want her to have both sides of the Corru Channel, which she felt would endanger Italian security. The Italians were aIra id that Greece might make a de l with Austria over it.2 They, theiefor turned to nULer again for support. Inneriali emghasized Italy's assistance and hard wozk in the pending settlement h.— I 'sh Documents, Grey to Rodd, Key 7, 1913, 'J I T ’ ~ A a"? - ”'1’ 0-1... 4.}L’ Ilka. wok), i). 7 (C1. Ll ,. _ . ,, , P , Ioid., Elliott to Grey, any 15, lBlé, fol. IX, 89 “dd asked Grey to help taly in securin5 the position of the Corfu Canal. he said that Greece ni5h have so me congensntion in soithcrn thania if sle would be 5revcnted m . 2 from occup"in;; any or tLe coas al territory. This complicated problem involvi115 so many conflict- iL5 intercsps was ev~ntually resolved wrhen Italy 5 ave up the Ae5ean IleLls to Greece in return for a favorable settlenent in Albania. TWLi alreaay had been advocated by 1 ettle the Ae5een Is la zds cues t (D the Six Powers alfointed to but Ital’ Lad cont: Lied the occugation untilt the fi5htizl5 stopyed in her Le Iy acquired gossession of Cyrenaica. Chagter III) Inferiali 25 id that Italy would be willin5 to lCIl, see turn the islands in question over to Greece, if the Albanian settlement was favorable ard the Corfu Channel neutralize ’1 m aggression in the ~alLa1 Previous to this time, Italy refused to bar5ain a out the Ae5e an Is r.ds while fi5htin5 continued in Cyrenaica. But now, when the territo:ial ne- gotiations o; zlbania vere 5oLL5 on, I aly would sacrifice a 5reat deal to Prevent an? changes that mi5ht lead to 5reater Austrian dominance on the Adriatic. Grey niznse If reCO5 :nize |_J 6 this aLd felt that the Aewean Islanis grcposa ves a 5reat a? to Rodd, Kay 13, l9li, Ibid., Grey to Rodd, Lay l9, IBIS, Vol. IX, (5 his is a 503d indication of It- @y's lea or Lustrian d ‘\. .‘.".. m" L . Wu 181"“4 I I 9O sacrifice on Italy's aart. Le said he had noticed from the papers that the fightinj was still 5oiz'15 on in Cyrenaica, and a considerable number of Eulhish troops were still there. ive uu the is lands while .5. r tc a5ree to 02 Althea h the Powers interested still wran5led over the issues, Ln5land gut pressure on the Ambassadors to si5 n m .L the CC) IC ty of London. Only when he insisted that those williL5 to si5n the Tre eaty as it stood, did he succeed in 25 forciL5 acceptance. In egite of this, the Conference was failure for it settled notling, not even the details of the Albanian boundaries. Grey said, "tl1ere was no fo mal " " " - ,,26 finisn; no valedictory speeches; we Just left off meetin5. Yet he felt the conference had served a purpose in pre ventin5 The Eritish part In this dispute was not a LiectLCth one. Their iLterests were lOt really involved, beyond the revention of w-r. As Grey said, they had hoped to serve a :37 “Q as “mediators." Because of this iLtense desi “n for geace, the italians were able to use the aritish in furtherin5 their 24 British U3cu m r Vol. IX, no. 982, r. 739. (DC; ’ ‘V ‘ ””Ibid., Grey to Lavther, Lay £7, lgld, Vol. IX, no. 103, 13. 8‘16. 26 ts, Grey to Rodd, day 19, Isle . v '1 T‘Ir fl ‘. FT‘" ,\ ‘7' ”' - 1 , (fa/‘0 Grey 0: ralLOdon, iJCLtv-Live Lears, Jol. I, g. Lei. ‘ ‘ ”7““ L. (O n 4 ‘i 5L" .1 an". 3 ”4": I ' 3. ° \~ 4., V omn -Lterests, in rLev-Linn; Lustris from 5ettiL5 too Lucn ,. i .. . . N” .1 J— .. ' .. ‘ ,., power in th3 LleLn area an; lion alterin5 the status Luo tnere without 5ivin5 Italy due congensetion. 0n the other hand, ingltnd was nrt rLLll? 'n symie tr 3 with Italy's ialkan ems itions Itely ELd suy orted Austritn opinion in dis- Ccuteri ori5innlly, but she shifted her position . 5 -. . .. 3. z. r... ‘ -3 . "3-”, ' ' ,. : . ' afiefl her interests in woutnern Altenis or in the islands r in the Adriatic were inv0lved owerd the end of the W- mi: .mm.‘...n:v u- an.“ ’ l . 4", .. 'n - ,L ,- -, 1,. -~ 5 1- - onierence. ”HQnBV:F n;Cess;ry, She did not neSitate to turn to En5lend for support. m1, ‘ . 3 b "\ T‘n’c' 7' ‘ ‘ ‘r t . " V 'l Jule GVBHYE 1-1 T513 -cilx;{.rls tLILLt lilCL'€CLSCL1 "xll'orlgiil; —L n. . v- (‘1 n m .7 v" r“ n " l‘- ‘ LeLsL n in lle-lslo Here 5 eetly ovclsnaoc"ed by the eve Lt .L. L .. . ,; 1'5. T 4—1, . ~ A m - ,- tin b bro tight (n1 uOIl ”er .. :ltgwin5n tfk; ire atgr of ILo d: :1 1 _r _ Q. ~. w r\,4 ’..". '7: /\ 1 VI: — , . my ~. . ~ ('1‘ ‘.w . sas si5ned Lay oo, l9 s, details concernin5 he Albezisn but to no avail. En5land in the hL-ean in; still maintained - r p l'r \ ‘1“ fl:. 4 _ TL.- . x as Leeidtor. T-e conhission itsljl ldd pro- Ser3ie was still dissatisfied Witfl the Treaty of Lendon. Sie was en5ry MALL Ln5and e35r0v~d a detLCthnt O; telian troo;s be used to escort the comrission on the Korth Alhzn an Al bountary. “ Since 38 London Csnfercnce had failed to set ‘ " ' . ['1 1- 4 ’I I I "L - . '-l . —. .' (fl us a bov-1nmcnt 1 “111L1g, Lb tn1: IArt1cular t113, selbia '. —-‘ ‘— —\ _~ 1' , ‘ "- ‘~ . u r~‘ j ‘ ,'~. - . ‘ ‘ F . ~ "‘ IElt Sue Cowl; tale a1vshtsgc u: tau s1t1~ 103 by tsl111 V ‘ ' 1 \ 'l‘ , " W ,- . ‘ ' l— 1 ’ -. ~' .\ 1“ I - “a I“. x1; 51: “11 5d. brwy Iclt that S«1bia nun 541 CTOunds t1 . I: f‘n‘fi .1 I i't gv‘,‘ 1'\-~ Y"1_‘C n{‘>,y\trl‘1C./.{ tr‘ C‘Wf)\.~ "It t? an i 71:— (r‘. .i 1g! ~/&-1\J..L.' --$L , L..A-'-‘\. 1." .,~___, . - ul \ vL k.) lelalJOl .’ \_,1.1 . n (18.8 («A - r10 c+ tbs sat'sfactorf settlsmtnt cf tne lltzn a1 frontiers. Ye ’9 1 a. v\¢\ .‘ h ; 0 w '~ ._ ( 3 . o ‘I ('1 " -._ - ‘_'_ . c n; qu n11 sldct1cs utlLlau mi ita1y act1on. «I Cr (Nu ‘ .J V’) 3 I‘QCCEZIliZCIi 131$ necd iOI' -Uttlm’” 11t Of t2: 3 '1 '. r-‘r :r‘ ‘a 4" ,- a (1,. .'\c'* -... . .l '\‘ " altll-¢n 1: “t1_1. Lg~ All 1esd w1th 1us.r1a to I.roceg _: “ r. . .l I, f\ 4.1 _‘ Vr-y a h 11191,Jun1t and 11x tJC toutgcrr Loxndary Oi 1136:113 har- CGji. .7 anC‘ t' firm I.7*_r "nr,m-?p(~;, \ 7'9 V1 t CH no 4531 4‘ ~\4..— lgl Wkly-.1 .1. L11; v.1 .iCA.‘ VKJA.A:«--_:_.—h'\..s¢ Cxl“ $.O ~14CVLCKA An termil1atin its war; before the tug of Hov;nber, 1916. Italy felt that the b01n1sry Cozrission was not proceeding as fast as could he h;pec for. git: th; Greeks ‘3“t1n110 their policy of oL-stri1ctia1;, It ly felt the: med 01' haste 111111 wel- csmgd the Lustrisn 9109026 Thus, Itle and Lustr'a trie” to establisn a govern- Q U“: ' ‘ . ‘ T‘i I n ‘- ~ ‘1" " ' .". (‘ ' '.1 ‘ ‘ r : 131:1:n.5g;1;snjgj UPC k1nthg0ps to up y, se1tedter la, 1' ‘3‘ lgl‘_)’ ‘IOl. X, r10. ink), f‘. C. A . .. p. . -. x w ,. , Ih1g,, Luxxr'ta Gosc1sn, Octouer lfu lfiibj, fol. X, d., Grey to Goschcn, cto per 15, 1915, Vol. X, 932 of ”‘.lbania 2.222 t 2.2;; felt 1:22:30 t22 e 9222:2222 2222222222 2.2.22 2.2.237 r -\ J - .- 2-. -2 ~- .: -, -9 ,. .: _ if 4 * . I“. -. --‘ ' ak-PI‘OVQ tut: C22U23c; U2 122.222“. 2-6292, 2‘3. .153122222'1 (3222211518. 4— .- .» a. ' b.-. .- ‘.- -. ' .., 2". 2.2,, ‘1 ', L.J,- - {tugbrma 22:22.1 CAI/J. 235560 {:2 210p; 202' 22111212221. bgu2iOLlC ledidhuc m‘, T2. .1 . . n ‘,., -.. .. q 2.“ .“7 .7. .423 2ua21222 UOJ.4323.ut .22: 0.20:2x2 2. £225, .22 t2-iL t1 2igtiau r l A . . 2 . . “ v- 'F? ‘3 . ")‘1 ~‘ I\ ' - fl. 7 I‘, r\ . . - '06. ‘ - : r'a ‘ ’.— 2-‘ '~ -" ' 02 0y,0523- zapgl 2222.32ce .2 2332122 £212-2z, L22 ulSLfla a I ,1. S v 1 V1 ‘2'. VB .L'lo ‘ 7—. ._ 4-1 ‘ i v 1 0 I: _ ": '\ v. L+— N ‘ , +"l' ’ '.j— JL’l b-i*/:J 3 COX22‘ Llcateu LII-Li‘sl pJV-b.£Jl‘EI-0)L.Lo‘l>v dab U lids DCUVUGC$1 i I.“ $.06“ I C,“ 1' " . " r r‘ ' V ." 1 “ Il'\ ,\ u \" " " V 2-32.22 L22 .c.-; .012, “a as.“ dealiua tngt th2Luu s-o2-d - — .2 t—z. “.1 -,.,. t t-.. if. 02“;— 2.., , ”T, .21 2.1 ' -4 .13ch L213 2.2.L2'..-23. E211 v .. 2.2-2.55242‘2. -21: 2. 2;... L, Lax'lLt 221,232,122 2.. 21-3222 '1: 2.1,- - 2.- ,. '. '1 -2. _:1 . _-‘I .2. 11._..,: . uh-L 'JJV‘; -—YlLJ 4:.35t 3th-: 5‘: t; :$::\2LJ~U OVA— ‘iCt “okls “D'Dklb :;—;_LJ‘_.;-w*~v—a C\)l’1_ 053212; whicd Austri; L31 Italy m2de so mgny m2 f2-2-f2-.. Itgly :2: nast anxiv2s tLLt t3; igterngtfienal COHUPQL, in- 812212;; :52]: c.2221, 832231212; be; 1:2..;’.-;L:;.i-"223.1 :..2221 that t..22': Triple 2.2221,. c -2t22223 Lite .L2te2m-st LL; 212LLuLia. It 2325 'tzthe t ngt 1 4-.“1r ‘ l“'- ”' .“r+' '. z~(_‘:r‘c‘ :_‘ I-‘fi‘.a‘_": ’. ", u r t "1: .-. L1 12,122..) 2122 Drug/22,9223 1-27.31.22.21... .222 2".-.Lc222222 2,212.2.1 ~12L52c2222l, Lit ’20 v». . . ‘.Jog #- 1 1 4‘ 1 ‘ (‘1 ~ '.~. .’ A ' .-~—‘- ~ ("1 T+ v 2‘1, ~. -~ c“;(‘ Q 7 ‘ 1.;23 2;- .222ndn2 .2u.3: L25 g5:“uu2g2o 22 nuw I»: gobdd.d +— 2 -‘ I a _ . .u L- _ ‘. - r . _ _ q . _ ‘0 _ \ l \ _ ‘2 ‘ ' ,‘3 u ._‘ P , . -3 I) T C ¢_‘ . r 2 ’ j " (_ r. .. tllflt tillsJ --LL2.L-2.L,£..UL.;J :LL’J. A. VLAJ- 'JA. I‘LJLL‘ UJ. .LLA. TT:‘-,i _, 2’) 4‘11" - . fine 1 ‘0‘: .fi'c. (‘ .ar\;-.7' :1 OJ _\ Va \1. r21 ’.L"r .r~*- ‘: ‘ .lfl') a 1\.} U2$\.4(.,L U222, 1.." vv-J‘A-L ‘.r V.‘ 'J‘ v I.» L~.2 U‘ —LCA—L - .2l£/(..V-L‘.’L b “2&4. L‘“~N T—‘ w 1.(‘1 ‘ ; f L L“ ‘ . (vvv YHA‘ 4-5. +1.- -.9r~ 7. p: {1" ‘d-l’CJ #11 ....L2 .‘2 C-2-Lg..b UV 'H-I..t 222.29.", 21C Ob-.{222 gk/22S HUI ‘ L .Ll2L.~—L..L.f C’\ t /' mY‘llc '3 n *h‘.'_‘ '3."— C Y0 n ‘ .' l' ' ’: r." 1 5-1 ’ I'O Tto’ j if“: "I '5". willy—L; Lxlo 4-22 u, C2 C2 '-th—L 22.2...,'I.;..2L..L2 .122 22 2 -L (2.2. 22.22 2222 r2 - 3 ' .3 ' ‘ .. . ‘ ' . . L L i U 2 r~‘ (‘ .\’1 A )C "'rLC . .\ r V n, '2 ~_ '+' _ .'V .i“).‘, . -;w‘.yr' . C a," ~Va 3 (“p18 LI .LC..~22 £2.15 1J-_v2_,u {I L221 .L .--l(,;.-2- v" k, J“i2‘.l ., U‘Juo {-2 .L (4.22. I .12.;‘222L1u‘ 'l'v-L U ‘ '5 ‘ 3 - .- . 3.. ‘- . . . - 2. , . - 7":, .. 1 r ' " ,3 27' . ~ I .- I“ ' '_C ‘ 2;.f‘) \‘v‘j J c " “‘ . ' H (1‘ , ." . ‘ $4921)... .4 1:42:32“; 12.2_u'2.2.2-22 up... 'utJ b; 2..U2-2’:. 22.22 2.222321222223212 22-..-..)220231 a F, V T\ 3“ F 4 .‘ 1" q» ,3 ‘3‘1" 3“" F D’y‘VD'. .‘ '-‘ (‘3’: )“Y Cnt \bf“,‘ r.’ A 1 ’j'lf’" -«-J. .. 'J .L .2 b/ 4‘14 ‘.t1. 1.2; k; 2; , QQA -L2i:-_J. to L14. Lav , ‘V (J yr 'JU , J. -/ V , 7 '1 " r ‘5'". I ' ' - ' ‘ v3... 1., 120. Co, p. -6. rim ”41-2.; r1. ._, .2. 2 fry; 2... 2 m, ,- ‘ ,. ,L. (A. “n ‘7.-" 1' ‘.w 52;. , .J‘K’u Us} ‘u' ‘-V-L._._,.2,’ thuV-;.;V:J.L I, 24.4.1, J'v‘.-L.. £8, . “ - ’V - . " .2 - , .1 . -_ w 1 .1 ,. ;_ .- _ 1 Liv-Aida; C... U'4-1-1-.;L 4- ; .L...L‘-:v0 ("L-lg, i..LE.L “did-'4. Lig..LlAlJ(...J—-J. 11-1 '1..\ 1.1") " .‘L't . .11 -‘ T'Cr.:1;...‘ ll ~64 ULLL’ A-OJ. 'LLLLL I'LL L4 :fiil.-; " La”; 3“ 4- 2......9... . . (- L. (W i i I. ;. ; i f < {3 [>- (. g . O ' I‘. ’. uOlltZ-JI’M .n... 94.1.6... 0 .. , 1'. 4.... . 1.. ’1. my; rye-30¢” Lug uh) J "3315 .Lll +5 m ‘v‘-... .. -,,,:| 4., 1. - - . +1 . ..-.- -r| ..,~ t‘ . . (- ,. , .\ r' _ ‘__, O - S _ _ N .) 'I‘ . _ o " _ ‘ 7" ‘ ‘ Luv 07‘ 1.44.; U-‘l‘q Vv " (.3 LJJ. ‘ .13.“... aAAt, [AL -1-.-. '1‘. ,.l -' - 4—2. 1.; 2.0.4. adj 0‘3 .Lutd E. “41" b;1;.t 11...]. .L .L 1y3€41 1:1 ting :xj:i;;: £33: a; * acabie. Crx Jim 3 $33, 31. , £3?C?1 15311,“: t“./.. . r ‘2‘“ -.,] - ,.‘ n71 . .f C .- CC . h!‘ . I J. .3," -.' .) C -1' r; 7).:1 ‘ +_ U~A-‘-~~/ $ A. 5...... #1 L4; .-A.-'..‘.-.~.‘L‘-.~ “up ‘fiUUU—h’le-LQAyv’CJ—A -L.l “Oh-‘Ln—JO 45‘ .LtfiLI-hOJAL) be: 333 -Jstrl; Lag Serbi;, ;;;;;q? straigcg 3 the breakigg - .‘ 4-. - I) . ‘ u *" ” " 1 “’1 1 -_~‘, . ‘1 r1, .. 4- 1 ,fi .....‘ ‘tC‘ -. r " t -~ 3 4- ~ 1 .‘ *Jb-h-L.-' ’ th‘ '«u‘.* .L LIA. VALKJ ’J'J"J.1L “C (*‘L til bxl-wh-J ;;A\J —L\A ‘- .- . - + r 1 ‘- - - ‘-lL UVQLAL} “4.3L: Cad-4. Q‘ub‘vu L‘..L.L. 43-“;— r‘ 3L, . I" w‘ -\ vv . & “W “ :13 " o“. t ‘ h. 1H. -. “' ' -.—. ' c 7 “ .- A'lu $l;~ AVLAU U4. “'4‘ 342"" H-..U.A 9 dram-tic force. It :cvealed old antgganisms. Salandr a had replaced Giolitti as U1;; flu? Italian t--ml-., but Italian \;isli-&. of .au: ria.tugi.r't c:.3. :d Euhl thpz' 'wgs lgtttle sgngga- tlg.7 fo: the Archiuke, Lussolini describcd this s ”ntim nt W“ll: €1£03.1 Sat-1‘8. OGVO o. . ‘ . 7- ' J- ,- ‘la ; ulTSu £0: a , ‘5 .1 rnvr van r«\ :1..‘ V0 :41: 0“. "/ "r~r‘ r r f lv'l .1U';o o 0‘ lulv ¢ .Lu--l;g..¢.\ MC...) Cull (11.3113; .0 T' “ ¢. 1 1 - , - 4. -°.\ 1. -10 :-. L." +B€lero o 0 hit. bOCl; 6-D. :L;.t ~£US L: A.-. u‘J L... .L {LL-Li‘s T 1 . w 1 - _ \1» .L. - ‘ .- .L. l.- . .. ,. . ,- _ -. ,- '1 4- - f 0 -L.‘ z -47 v’ b-J ESL/5:. E... yuSS-LLJ_.'£ 30...”. .1311 01' + . \ '\ " " 'L‘ i " N4“ 4" \ J- ‘2 r ,' 1‘ ' ’\' , c. I. ‘ Y: ‘. 01.x. [JCS 0.7.. ..-- U... bil' bb-..r.'0-'c'_i.l You ‘1‘ \JJ. tilfi.‘ ¢ Oi <30 ‘ . 4“ u ‘.L . 3‘ ‘ T b . I - ‘y I. “-3 .L11 p.-. 1. tJH secre j o. 315 c Lrt ‘x . 1| L1 ': ' . h. .1. . ~~ . , ‘N ‘ .~ rr- >: < a ‘I—x . J— 1 4- .1 aLAKi QI.13.L;‘J 11-1.8 J. b... -.__ -. 01.153 adVLbO C :le Cdllbeiflil+3u€0 +1- - -.,-, - ,«L— " r-\ .f , A ,-. .1 4 -' 7' y. . . -' 1.”, _. .32 c. guldn ' a #QUfi. c.ty -n 3032 Wind an -. *1. :1— " ’ . . I i‘ ou..e. on tae 53;.-- fi‘“‘:" O }0'3 CLW‘1MT 0 firm :r L‘ 'C n T P ‘d dlA~J.~\—AIAL‘A, ‘Al A1 8..) b-L b.0(‘J—LC‘A .L. 01 BLLA-Ve -LJI b-l- O-J Vbll—L— ~15) ': . F‘ - 1 n "o \ .. l. “ Y7" " . .aC---..L\J.L 0.1. tilb 4....-C 1‘3‘.1101‘3r’ 3341 news of the assass in ation of 1'2 UV!“ I 'Y 3’ ' 1 o _ USSClini, ax." niltOpl" ‘1‘ r) .:-+ r - , ,1 . T 1‘ f‘ '- ... o..-. coucerJ. 53 -lord c.0300. ' 1~ 3‘ -. , 1.. , " '1 - 35. d, '.$.;1; I i.i.£:t 5h,&;11 BIN; +1.- 1 1. 1..-. ‘71» 1%. 1 T 5"].t . . 1, ,o ‘1 ‘ r- .. ') v , , Uil'x’ :84- CllauiLLd J.‘ 6...;— LL---.L(.LA.L\L, -— J. -' rot fit? 7-1 U»; (3.3.; , 1.). U_Lo "I. .w . .‘3 I. ‘- ”midi" . " ,- ' , , -.-~. 4. , -.,‘ 1‘ ' . .' “,1 ‘. 1,- h , A_ ta;t 1t «35 a 3.;V3 qutez, ah; twat 1t micdt grovoae s»r-qls 0 H 3 ‘— 1 __ 5 _‘u ' 1mm; '1 ‘4‘ 'w~'\C‘ C 11 f‘ l A”. 4 ..,. *4. l-g\lst flail“ -ALUU LI Unzi 21 1&9..le Cl ”L. lb " ’3 , ‘t’fi'f »r-'“ 0 ~.-.- I] .A‘ 7 1 (‘x ‘- 1. ,._ v‘ -: ~J- r r ‘, xx “'- g .fivv ‘ r k ‘1' -_‘1 d C0414 “i LJ-..u 4...°O;-. uLV 3+u‘u..-;0 -..I-v.) (4.; 51:11- u'v" -5; txlu‘v #34; ’. A 'I VYI\1 v _\' 3.x , L a — " t -L-.»I «.1. q J.LL.u-_ 4--.]. f m - n , ,r .g 1 : x. C 10 - . - J— - - : l ‘5 _J -\C \ w 4 TC C‘ r} 17 I, ; #1133 Up... “d (4‘, “1.1 LU I 4...; .LquLJ. "My Livb 1‘ Ctl~uu~Lx ”I (.4. |_: . , .. I' , ... - 4 , -' 4. ,- .0 ‘. , . J... ' . ’ 4. ‘ 7) ,—\. . x -. T7 ' '. C‘_. - , . C .._ v C;_ C1 ‘ . nI" . n .j(, _, - r CCgulub J. 0.; ‘llfir, .Lji Mllpl-U v OJ- t.Lc UsilquLDJ-l lb lfik-h\4 vuvtu—v LA. .LJ'vlt iE O ‘ I 1" - O h 1 1 — O O 0. h §- . - 3". . n‘ I 1 v ' ,* g .. . ' .'~ . " "' -" r “ ".l "s ‘ /“ ‘1 . '_ l ' ' b '7’ _‘“ .L u (J.LL I UL'CEL tag. f S .;p_..1u -L..L 1151.. LLQJL b d‘:€L_Ll‘iv.‘-F 140 l": f Lt1-IK'3'Q-L v x.) $ .1 +1 3 '7‘ ' l 1 1 4 ..,~, —~ I 3 L‘-.. P“! ' '1 ..\ "‘j. ‘_,‘- i _- flfi‘. .' v.1; LI'li/ c AA...L.L;;..J.':K: 6...“. 'J;A'5 -l‘lp...*: :Ilttjfl'; C. unluu iJOSLCLJH V v . ‘ ‘ -. u If"! u '3 '1 fl c 'V ‘ ~ (‘ '~ ; " r ' A. c ‘ —‘ m C w b. ""10 r 7;": 1‘ :--. -'- \ ‘-' r": ‘ .- “ ‘ " " u-.'./\A.LI.L U132, VM;.4 ~-L;.V-3 wjlk.’ ML..-’ (.1. Luvnuz‘ba. (JJ. tulv - 4.9.1.6 legilCu! ’ 3 . “ , .- ,4. :r. : A ._.-' . r‘, I" . "—,., v ..-v.. H‘lok’tl“; S 1.1: 5.1353; b £3151;ng -Lfl fil‘OtCSL’AA-(J t3 qudiéz? VJ. 51104.1.d " ~ f",- 1 . "‘ .‘j " 4 g 4 .. ,5. + ,5 "‘ , .‘ “TH. ,_ ‘ M‘ ,. ~. 5u3 .u;lOJ 3H5-aug -u tu-; mvutgr? 30114 4buly manna: to “‘l- —‘- ,~ ‘ .' ’ . l -: . ,-—'J ' "' ‘fi‘ * '_ I ' ‘ , ‘I " (‘1 t L". ‘N “a -I7. , (~— .- ~I\ SJRUQLt h4;.r3a Lu“ jut m334t31n 500d £333333ns "ltd «flolaud? 7'1 #7 -,...,~°.;., , a .— «0 1- v' ' TL 1"! .Lfl um; l.-Ili$:.LlE:.p 344.56 Mimic“ o 04. tm: CfilSlS, .LpLJ S .403th 011 reat ‘I. “1" \ .\_r 3/ ", : r-J" T .. V (v ,‘f . -~ It “as im1eaia c-j angient tJab -ta.w ‘.as 110t lenb to v I é D" .1 V' -‘ ‘J- ‘ . . - . ‘- -\ 1 . r. ”VI . T‘ r . -. .- .0-10J “13331; 3 eat 14 a 90313y 01 vi 303015 opp Slt3on to r) w." . n _ T_ _, ‘r‘ , _. - 0 (3:- r1: ° « ' w.- .0 -- '4 3 .38.»;3. um all; 17 333341: d1 gun uiullano, Italian -0“315a 4|. " . ‘- “ "a "- '1 ‘0 r" j ' ‘ J- ' 4 L‘ I " '7 ' 1 r ' v 3 '. ‘ - r »-r~ . , m3315331, ¢ulc;huu flQSbrLL thug a gen3gd d-lccted ucalust C_. -h a. -. 4' _1 '~ -. ¢_ ‘ r.-- .. 4.1. .. 4. ~“rbla .ram uzstr-a a-4 133 t;33t pu“bia M'it:1 pd: res>ecy due ““.“.~ .- 4- 4 4" - . ...., , 4—1 4 .., , n J .. .1 ;; ‘ \ A 'g ,5 ._. u a.“ 4' UMLd llu a J. DI]. .1. 130.3 (.2410 b :18; , Lam). ‘.‘I O J.L.; C e C allucmled by glib-LAC . ‘0 _ . _. ' H‘ T l 7 77 \ t‘ a ’w i ' . 1'_' ' ‘ “""4 03-1-111le I; 4.138.; x 0 AM: Sc..- J. ttht tut} :tg;-gc.ill UOVVAAAIVI "9.5 U 74 V ,. . 5 + V D'vid Lloyd G 0153, u=r mamalrs, 1911-13 3, V31. 4, r K... 4 -‘ '- 7-3.“ ‘ l- I - ‘.' v' ‘A\ Lofitt—Le A—J‘Oi‘ril “1&1. V‘d‘llIJCah-ll' , L tut-1011;1900’R0 EC. ' ' . . ‘ ' - a r. ‘ .. ’1 4— ,.,. _. . . A. - 4 ,,- 3v lntcxcst~3 .3 BA, “LLn,L33430 o: hue comylste lLJEfCudiuce 3!: L , V -~. n ° . . p1,, —: +~ o: SszL;a. LLlLJixa, taLlan p'emi , was V4 y dLsurcssed . ‘ - ‘ .L... J— fix ‘ “' 3 or). "T 7-»; 5t tilt; ¢‘\ls [41.in J.L.Vi-.-xLuL/i'- L10 v2_,'l.L. LE: 0.1. 01-4 2’ 59's.). -i‘a Si...n.'.1, , _ ' ‘ ‘_ 4—3 .,’,__1‘ ._, ‘ ,1 , 4_ ‘x a 2-» '. 4_ 1] l, "I callsd Che Lttcgti n 0: Eng 34L3ssag‘; LU tn: fgcb tugt . A ". , 3-: a 3 ,— . : ' ‘ r 4‘ . ‘ ~. ‘ ‘ . ,‘. 'u (4 4 ~ . n ‘l ‘- _ flu nag npt ta; LLD it to bw :3 Equ a 3:33 35 [2a-trlé] mad takun at :algrade, wit 7 n I ‘ ' 0 C ‘.‘thl “ll L-';S. "" 1'11; .L' 11" 1t pz'wVLC 5153.3? COinill-L; to ((341 uOlLLFLQL T.‘ ‘ " "- : “ T" I c ‘ o '\ " h" "" '. '7 - . “. ‘I-L —‘ ‘ ‘ 4" Hz #4110]. p.41“ UllJvfaLOuXSlvvl #145 (m(3'.L " C140 J.L.C .7 ILLS llil 04L {nil/J. tnub a, 4- ° " V . , +— '--. — ' ' 4 -. ,~ L but .pr1 DOVanmcug land 1t ingossLbls to 30033t tne " ' I‘ : :1 A n“: u‘ ('I;l '~~. ’ 3.“ *1.“ I If" "‘I‘ v"‘ ‘lf ’ ' ‘1 -. I‘I 1" .3 ' .L . ; nustrlgu ucwuuus, 3“; “Oybl bdwt HuQLaJL nouLd ugue nuSurla 3 ,V" ‘ ’v.| +' r‘ 1' ' (x ‘1‘, T?“'- «1 . : ’ ~ \‘ '.v ‘ ~ +‘ (:1 'V‘ THO-‘16.; up; ml; 50;]..50 u;l(_)4.axlu Inn. “.851. N’O.L.L; lno Lpil Itha—Luf 33 '3 w , p 3 ‘ r‘ -. 3, -, 1;» p - ' 1. in favor 0L peace. are] luLo; med It Ly 0L n15 dote to tne n‘Yo -‘ .3)‘. ' .3 “ \ '4' .2 ".'\"‘. u! r . , ~‘ ,’ uchgn hov nm3nt Pfluo to :32 Paid Jurflgfl uCtlDA and '5' ’.I‘ '.3' 6 "I ' 1" .' fi' . a ‘ f ‘41‘ ' , \ '. , 4‘, Wu" . x. 1:! p ' ~ . Iu:p9i+u_l_l, *tuLLp;l £U4Lg$££~u¢kx+ U\ HA 0*U;‘;, {4‘ .LO‘J‘BLI. OJ. E1; .180 T3” f\"‘ O \‘V 1 1' ‘ . 5: 4" \-'u‘ ”t“ +- .-\ o' ‘ "' ‘v ’\ j rn ‘l “a VLVLQLSLJ Q14 nob “gap Lo “QVs a “a? startuu. ths -AtLugd C ‘ 1 T“ .1 V —x\ ."~ ' ‘~ ( "T ‘. ‘- 1 '— . " . - . 4— . - r“. ,- 4- - l‘l v~_ ‘7'.»1 uuu 4- V ELL”? OuCL’ LQVLH L Skifld bdb’ll‘ 11248113918 - 3111:3305 US tflu 5 E4113 L1 vv+~r1 1% 09 gill-KL : 'J OHQ ard LA. titluda :JO—J— -5C3r . .~ :3. v " ‘ -' . 1 , -.-..,n- v o ’ 1.- 3‘ m- -: "1 .3 1 ' . M 1+— ., :15 (4.11 0.x. I. lCiQmL. Lisa-3055 OJ. Talk: 3 £4.11) :3 nLlluflce , J-u ' y 3. 3-,. . K - .0 _- 4. .- 1 _+.--;,_~ bee ame iHJOlvfi Lu 3H1 m mucus ulglomatlc conLchp vita “JSUBLQ. 35: 1 , 7" .. ‘ ‘1 “.,- 4‘ CT ‘ x- ~ oacll, JO lelcmacy OL tn- ”3; CL 131%, y. 461. .’,: 6 U 1" (~ r "— r" ‘yi T 1 v t‘ *- 4-1 -< P” .. . Fr - :- UQlQJIqJ. a, -L 52.1.; (4.1151 Lacs uh. Cuu :- _‘...L , p0 v‘Oo "Z7 . V " TK' : m‘h ‘. 2‘1 N. v. (.0, ’-. 1 m.P. rrLce L43 DLLLomath_g;.Mt3 o: tne ”orld, . 1. ’~- V '. ‘ "“ f“ . -\ \f‘l ( , " ‘3- I ‘r ‘f ‘ f ‘ CilCA‘LiLCS CILLILUP S Luigi UOllS, new; +OI'IL; 131:, CIdCLC "it ROLL ye TH) Gley, J1 y 24, 191 ”Q o”_pid., Rodd no. 19, i3. 17. 7-”) v“11:131., Rodd no. 23, a. 20. 4, (Edhfh), no 8, p. ll. to Grey. July 25. 1914, (2.3.P.>. to Slit—$3,, Jillr 25) 1:314: (:10 3:. Po ), Aus trie insis tea t- 11t, by the of tmegdlience, 97 Italy ' ‘7‘. .. " H r $- ' . 1 L1 + ' 4 r ’: 1r r\ "V ”‘1‘ + "H. «1 ‘1, . C‘f‘.‘ ¢‘ 'r r“ “as .1. OJ- CUQ t 0 (LC v Tukcltl’l r‘LlS U1.J.1.. L11 tll'c U J’JAlLJ OJ. U191 o UQLLA-IILLA..Q, c Jr-z' w.r1 '1. ' P . -. '. I A ‘- (1" ." (‘3'! Itel111 51em1er, den1ea tn1s Slucc 1e 1elt nustr1a s e11v 1151 ‘7‘ ’5sz r"? . ‘ ‘7‘ ' a c ‘ - 30,1 " ‘ '1‘ . ‘1 -- ‘\ 1e1ts 11t1 udss1e .11 not a ee1ens1Ve con1l1ct but 155resstve . v . . Le SLth Italy is ‘.1 '_ - 3 U MAAufi-Il no obli5etion to come .1 11:" $.1u"?. to hustrie's w'lm (133.5319). - assis tadce if thr3‘51 he' actian she finds herself involved in war with Aussie; for this reason 281ld be due to 1er own 910v aetion en:1 155r~°5111.* fl ‘ - I‘ n: ’1 “a . ‘. , 0 K . T v 1 I oslena1e felt 111t1e1 t11t 1telg slr1o1ld act wit.1 Ln5lan1 in . .. , 5 4l tne a1rect1on o1 peace. T 1 . - 1 '1. r 4,- 1 1 1,‘ ry . - _. 1t1ly eeht1n1e1 to 15ne1e tue nustr111 1lt1m1tum to fl " “T “* 'vo'Y (‘Wi r“ \r’1'" -‘ r' “IN 3“: ’ oez'bia ah1 e G1eg 11 stetea 1 esnfel 1ce to ettle the A 4 v: ‘\ ~ :4 r.- - . I T r w 1, A T r' \iutlst-L.OiiO 5:! leL, HrldluLSLl (AAAJLQSHHVLOII to Lth” 84.51.1de A’t ) ‘Vr 4° 1 - to join in the cause. Ben 11 G1ul1eno e5reed w1tn doad's .1 r ‘ 'o l “av "\u'--1 f’ I A -/ . .v ‘ r-' - p1 5'sal £01 1 uud:“1bncc to c 1011 11 L311on and u15ed the "1‘ , _' 1 _ + ‘4; net1uns iNQIOlJed to cease m1l1tsry tnreevs. m1 .1 1‘- . 4 ~. .. :..- 1. 1 «w .- .- 1 1ne Ln5l1sn “eye 1n11ous to 110" talj's ObllbuthuS in the lriyle Lllienee to hustrie. Sen Qi Giulieno, Italian forei5n minister, 1111011m3d L151111 tth t ’I' l‘ 1 o 1 Y? A. . 44 was 511e1J 101 GLLALIVL ,u1 poses. T11e 405 he Triple Allianc 1.11.1.0 11.1.1111. alJr‘Q‘Le ltly 821511111121, It'11 "fr 8111 the Great Tier, p. 1:0. 41 '2" v p ‘~’-\ C‘ '1 ‘ I: Dig>lomet1c ulstorf O1 tn: world pa5angr¢ to 1Mrrere, JUly 26, 1.9.1.. , (.b0110bo ), 1L0. 5.1.1., I). 5U. 111t1s1 uQCUfl1LCS, Grey to 101d July 07, 1914, Vol. X, no. 154, p. 107. 4dflgglom1t1t Histozy of the 20:1”, Grey to Rodd, 44“"i h “rcum‘nts, Rodd to Grev, July 7 1911 D r concurred end urged Italy to rei1eiri n:;ut1u in case 0i 6 ._ 5 . v' . . Vlv, ‘ ,4. -. '0”. ‘ u I " ‘ ' f 1 . . 3‘ . -"J cchil.ct MdlCa "all. not lUltflUr her [italy élihtelests. 1' ' ,1 l 4 r . ' M'c‘ .A o ‘a' " .—~ v‘ ' ‘ 1" A“ ' as nodl sell, "it has heidl; cl; ce iveble tdgt a shilld be 1 .. 1 r 'l' W. 1 V- v- v '1- -- ', ‘ w. y. -\ . /\ + f‘ P, ‘l . ‘ I" arc-inn ll; 0 z. strchle were no dilect lglbuI’CStS 01 air 0.: VV,-< -- '. ‘«¢j‘*.-“ ~r‘|/\ . -.‘."\ ." ‘ .1 "‘ {€091.11 i1- CLHLLJ' LIES Sigill,‘$ 0:33;- 4;“ 11%.? Chi: I'CLLJ. ifitEI’3s o ‘1 , 0'4)" 1 —: [fl VO”? -"J' . ‘ _4’1 #“ ‘ ‘1‘“‘3 l C .4“ _‘ l'j;\ ”\‘B L La: 0.;lm-u;_'._;_e J; "3 « CO;1blllJCu bU Ll; 33L d. 014.1. CI (“data 0 ' 1 l ‘v ’ ‘ ‘1' (fl V" ’ ‘ — 3 (‘11 f‘ .0 ,. Y I altAJlmd Ituly ecceyted the fireposw . for a uchlexcnce, ‘.x F v-v - < a _--_ . -. ~ - 7" ~ ‘,—— _- 1 - ‘ j . v. \ .1 f ,I‘, ‘ «’.J‘ ': “I '.’ I "' ff“. 8;-C ”CS ' I;C:ltt€;-'~.li Ill-.11, .13: ilk/'1‘ 13.1.1185 ’i'IOulid £20; U--C-‘.r3~_;.kaeo Wile ' . l "‘- 4‘ I“ "I. ‘t ‘1 I" ‘ p’vj ‘ I I“: "\o . ‘ " mes ulh‘ s cc db ueix-hy sh; lelt hit twat hetiOh u‘Odld SclaJG.m' Itali.l1.pr-emiei, unlited to * " | ‘7 v“ I‘ ‘v‘ (w ‘ .0 f‘ ‘ ‘r a ‘ v .f". r: - F1 . r‘h . I" 4 ‘ w‘a’Ol :; v..LC.1 Hilblgul €Vcll 1; 1.1813331; I til 1.188;; t0 yul’tlp--y0t€ .Lfl D 48 7-1 - ultimatums. England declared herself on the side of "fiance C‘d R ssia. Still Italy hell aloof from her Allies, nor did she swing inlmed' tely in with the Sntente. Germany expected her to fulfill her obligations according to the Triple Alliance 4: . . . - VBfltJCW “ *ments, Lodd to Gr3", July 57, 1914, h‘cA- u C'l Vol. x, no. lCl, p. 114. r tU-r- 0 ‘V‘\ x (1 ~, .bid., soud to crey, July 27, 1914, Vol. X, no. lol, 2‘). .1140 4 Q? q $2.3 ROdd to GP;’;, Jill :7 27’ 1914') "40.10 31:, n3. 139) iJO 131. 48 1.10 1;].- Ibi Built L33 -ct;v3 A.JblC-I;LiCD.iJ TLy3 -ripl3 .3Lflfirt3 33$ 111113154. T " r‘ r. ’. ‘. "i \ - 1:; ‘1 1 . «.\ -.. ' a ‘n‘ ,-,| "‘ ‘ ."\ '- -Lll &udit-gK/4" :11KZLML1 1!. L‘s IH-il_.'_-'_-4.‘ to 03:333;e i$ié$o ILG “d 0' o ' ' I I "~ V ' ‘1 . ‘ L ‘t _ n1- ‘.4‘7-"y .Iu ',. 3‘ It3lian sqyyo:t. Lt LQlL tim3 33:33; was 1333 ’ ,. . ' — "‘ —. . '1 Y -,‘1 3 w . ‘ 3 1- 3 3rigle 3Lli “ce tou3ys 333 Lnoiana reaiized t33 33nger '“drhisiizu3itiCLr tixnl'to 2;"pt a3ru; 31-32 C33n3i. Italy ed the C3nal to i3m31n 0p3n, but England hinted th3t 4~~ ‘ ~. ,3 4y ‘ m- '-. F‘r .. 57 m: y 'it3t £3pyo-t Lnol333 33 as fenginJ tn3 v3n3l. inus ads for barrainigg w re established. Q L ‘. ~ ,flvvv I ! . 5"“ I. “( T+ (’1 ' F" ‘\ 1 . . ’;~.!“-:' ”\I 1 '\ .114 .b 33 socialist Party was a strong op33n3nt of . .‘r'\+' ‘ “‘~“". I‘. W I ‘ ~- v. «- "/~\~ j .1 A I; . '9' . v.1 ‘ la}. l¢1bel.‘l U4»- bl‘d- —L.'l t... [.1 hurt-$1,. 14.";11 4.351.10; LJLSSClaUl, "'11 nzfid ‘- ' ’—" T ~ " a’ ' ' ‘ 0' - '» ‘ -'~ 1 . ‘ w . ~ '. j :363 -t33i33 n3ttt3334Lau 3t t;3 time 0: tea 333o-it3i3331 .. ,3 y .. 3.3- ,. .I‘ - ,-‘ . p - c;- - r1 ‘ ‘ ,0 33re no 30353: L333 PS 03 the 300131 ist 3arty CAQ iavored ivy : -. 4.14 L : .3- :0: _ , . '.'.*- 3 ‘.c- (:1 .°_ j .: , .. - iv33tiog. 330333r E¢Zniii 3n des3iter oi uociaitsm L35 ,0 4-, u...-...' 11. 3‘th CPULLJ. 7 broke Uitx tkle Socialists over inter- : ’ - ‘ ‘1 ‘t _.. m.“ I “- P 4' fl '1‘. .fl . ’ ’. "I.- t\ .v‘ ' 33; “t tgis t3mt. 333 ¢r3ct liCULE bio_itt3, 33n3v3r, ' . .1 .1 W. ' '0 , v- ’. ‘ "- \V ,. 1 '1: v .T" ' .1 . r- 1‘; 5 iii in 1‘? 3 0i strict n33ti3iitg. 33 91331533 tLL 1 " Q 1 0'.‘ If “' 'Pw' v'."“1' ‘ ' “u‘ J. ’ ”“9 1’3“ 1“: It‘ y 0031; 03t33u LUCM 3V3n Litmogt L33, LLZWIOJ : tuis dim not 4L- :11 u 5“it tLC Syiiit 0:” Italian naticnalism at the 1&3. Sonnino, who 5 -ccecd3d 333 di Guiliano, as Italian ‘ reign :7 U o 1 ‘ ’~ 0 . T‘- . w .‘ r11. ,3 F ' I .-y V‘ — A ULL$L .L 5;, d pp.-- 1' (.11 .4 4-31: Laij'gsLtLt Il:£.a.;1’ r). 16°10 c<8 \. v: o A " o P" 3uSSolin 33. vlt., p. 37. k-Lol '- 1‘aw .531: ." ~. q : ..: ,5 r‘ In A ,5. -' -. 1 - . u . t 2151115132? C11 CCtObEtI' '5, 1:12, 0311135111168 t5” lgttvI‘ ° 7“ ‘ .‘1 ' ’ - / 5551155 do 1315s. 5111: it5ly was "toylng" wltu th: 1 st1o5 of ,utrall ty or intervsntJQL, the German GOV5r5mcnt tel; Italy th5t 5551355 555 c“f;r~5 to Greece Coast 1.5tino;le 555 the 5;5 n 2 1515555, LS tell a; gtrt of the CO5: an: :5inlanmg of usia : Lino: IW)‘fiLll was afraid of such 5n En5lish actisn which "' ‘ \ ‘. z.. 4-- T -1-. m- . ‘—,. f _ ij‘ . J4 Senna: I'QfiQL‘t. 14 ‘r 5951,1615 til-5t 21135 a pray ssit :31; 1.5 . j ‘ . -_ ' 4. v1 " I .- “ 3 --. . 4.- - ~,, r. . ‘ 55:5r5 since 15 uu15u 555$ 51r1t55e 055 01 t5; intent :9 .-3~ _c g' t‘- fl ‘ v J— ~ T‘- _ q ‘ ' o .5 J. , - 13:115. 153511515 .JJC.J 55:1; 55'w‘f -151 11-551mx3ts :11 t1 3 1 ,‘ —.+- DD ., .L. . ’ -1 1», £95 53551 n55 {115:d 50 ante :05?”C hgr. ‘V ' 1‘ 4 4- . ‘ ’r‘ .1 ' '1. fl" _0 ‘ '- r. 1 r“ _ o ‘54," l‘xdlzl. .‘L 4-2-1: ul'j_€. «3L1: 11 L”; 1311,341in -Ll; 'T (.4... l?" d-U‘lf-J tI'l T .11. 4- -°. ~' +- I 1" ' ~ g 5 bl‘lLf *tL~.L\;r Li J d C's-AA U.‘Lt.;.:_l.. L -LLLE, .tLhQ' S LOAAZ‘5ALJ S T’I~.L/'l.‘b "‘ . ,, , ‘1 .. .. 5 "’ .. -, -.. '. . . .-.' _ ' I. O“ IJUJ.‘ In}. -L.'QS to {A CCUPtO ‘tpgd “6...: li. CL HOL.LL-U-J to _: ,- . : r J—‘ . . ‘ 5” ‘ ,.— ~. ,V\‘-1 ’- 54:. ,\ i x 5 ,. S558 (”CU-LAST“ but: 013.11.: 6.8 L1- ”110 .3 51.5.1 01; cf tab LCSt (J - 5 . . ' 1. . . _ ' ‘ ‘b 9 .: .: , fl ,5 1 m 5. whc 5'5 th most 53 5515 ITOL Jo5n5n5 ;51155. 1553 ’r’ , I"' 4" “o +' ‘ , ~‘ 6 " r' 0‘ 7' T " 565055555055 1551555 to t5- Trz-tJ of 53 Con te5an. of this flnl.“m&'. 1‘91 ‘ _ ”'35 h ‘ 5 . C ‘HOoler/Idus, r 1.1.5 {1 "6d. e5 to DUO 11.5011 :1? \—-d LLe g; A b'“‘m" £5; ,5- (540511 0 V In Fetruag" 131;, Ita5y began to pJSh t55 nego 1ati553 V'(-~ J.‘ 7'“ _ I _ . ‘5: _ . q a ’ .‘ n ”r __ o _: ‘ , Tau-V "'LL’“ 411311.441 11' {1 16913. 11 31. Cfllz‘l COllCcI'I 1 1.55.5 lll €511. C‘._LJ_LE’. ‘ 1‘ "* ‘\ ‘. v ‘r " A. l ‘. /\ ~ 1 I. V ' " ' ‘.n \ , , . : ‘w up}, : .-s "n tC>155t éflCU-J.JLd 1&1rse5l OJt cu IL;_'LLJ5515 ar5lzuyt 55V155 1.5 ‘ ‘ _ a 0 V ‘ ‘1 I . _> A ‘-~ ‘. I r,_ 5 ‘ ‘ 1. _ 1 t55 infresswo' t5;t tblé 55115505 555 fOHEJJLB anc1 C'. vgr‘ '3 ’Y ‘1’“ To -‘ -‘L/‘\‘ "1*", ‘w v .7. . r \ ‘Y'f‘\t"y')c 'rr‘j T J16 (.4; 165.10'515'1’ 5..-,1'1t -1 l.1 4-65.15, ilk/5.. .1, 125-51; '1. ')o .‘L\ "1. 104 In l«(11-011 Imperiali, ItLliLfl cub Header to England, was author- ized to pre sent to Gray with a set of Italia 1 hflnghS. In tn;se, Italy clairgd the "natural" frontier of the Alps V v" . 1 vv - .‘ 3-:- w s. 1,, - . --n C r xJ- ‘ - ‘r . "1—'v? “ 1 p 11121 dou1u L1ve Aer 1rentlho, thufcln 14r01 to Erenrer fss, 7.. '_ ,' 1 _v . ‘_‘_ _- -‘-_. 1"- 1‘ '- '_ _ ‘ ‘. A ‘.' r o _\ ‘ ;. a! ‘ . I“ “. ’ _' o 1 tug nur1¢t1c, ~1tm tug CHLUAatlLu o1 ‘L1onc, an“ neutrall- 1 4- ' .—., " '-‘,.,. .,- ..n 4.1,. ,. 2’ .1 1 1 ' .i '1- ,—.., '- zat1tg 01 1: 1e: U1 LAC coast. ~58 3153 asned u Sua16 1n . 1F. F, r. ,-’ ' R. -' fl ' ‘ ‘ . ., 3,. , ., ' J..- . ,. ., —, T111151 tcr11t01; 1n the evpht of a gultlbuCfl. 1n return I. 1 - ,‘s ’ vy . - r" - —- a: r", 1 , .1 u. v- . j ‘ w . ' ' 1 I‘ V. ' . ru $ 0;. tLA‘VSE-J thilLJC‘ .h‘ta'gAt Cf‘llcejss.l. \‘AJS, S;1L\: t‘Y0‘»l-Lr¥‘( L‘r‘tejl‘ t;l: i“ ELI' “~‘n 301n1i1o, new Ital1Ln fo;€i’n minister, insisted upon absolutp secrecy 1A the negotiations. Ct 2'W1ce the Central Poners midnt force ;t11y ts break off tr" 1e—ot1ut1th- by Toing to 1mm uiete tar Hith their formar ally themsuchS.Cl r's L sition a th's time in the proceedings was del1cat . The reaction of he Lntente was divided. Russia was met er1thusias tic over tug antry of Italy. SL5 foresaw a 0011 3-1 ct 01 ixtexests b;tween h; rec-1f and Italf. Sazonoff LIO;JCsed that a friendly reply Should bfl given t3 Italy's I u 0 o 62 ~ 0 offer, but :1t21out “fly LCCLVG conm1itm3nts. In tnls case, . ‘ I w Q Q ' 1 jf“? "‘ " ‘7 4' 1 L' 1‘ ,9». “". IL. .11 ‘.v . r . ._._ 7-. t1 t G1 5.; 3.1111151. £111 €..:f 5.0111: 1.; 1,19 L1 L4.” L1 .7 1‘6. 515 511.611 1L3) . .115 .‘3 - 21 (IL ’7 ' “’1' m}, .21‘. n“‘t"“"‘ ‘ 'C-.‘." "'3‘ 063—07“ (-4-, ‘-¥’L-o—' 9AA\J ‘-lk, a&\ Ls, J II“- ’ hp. r... - .V' V. C. ,3 3 C) lv—w p. E H O 1 O }-J ('3 C .1 ;Jo (*- (.4: L) r J 0 F4 '11 {‘7 I..J (Q . East. Ch; Ugnted comglute control mehefiifi-ua tne St1eits...It'Ty's C“0pcrst1on...11 ht to of the greetest while lnb1e11 no .: strenuous objection to these demsnos, she nee to conciliste the other tertners of the ' r r r, ‘n ,— r' \ij ,— . , -~ ‘1 c 1.. "r ,1 . ‘ . r- ‘r-: Tr - r, ' ntence to tnen. unen toe other Cohe1s UCSthtbu lmoelieli 3 assured the -1itish tnst Italitn motives for them were iusti- ff m d. fie said, that four aims were involved: (l) tmi li ber- aticn oi Itr iens ur der Iorei 3n domination n, (2) a secure Alpine fT3LCiGI, (3) e glarsntee of he Lariatic, (4) end 1!! - .. 10.1 C‘CLlCGI'I‘nIPEEL . uuuuu . fv . ‘,-' , s T— C3133. (ill-S L.t.; -svfl l-Ll t_l(._: L1. 1.1 (D o. ‘\/‘\ j“; vv.":) .' 91 v- uince tne intente 10 s we1e 1 ntin on the (0 5 "\.r ~ ( -.,. . ' :- 0 r1 r-‘_ N r .‘ of sertie, It 1v's demenls in DJ metie g1 inglenl in a cifrieu1t position. To; inglisn were, therefore, lesit 1nt The Ite -ian (legend for Dalmatia and for the Islands of tee Queranto togeth;r with the C1 to neutralize t.'1e Eastern poition rereiningn riet 1c cos-st, smears to es c very limited Isc ili ties for Serbia' 3 outlet to the See, an; snuts in the Ll evic prov: nces, whicn were hopeful c: ecnie ing tanUfin tnis nsr the legi inste poss sibilities of w111111.,1n1‘111til 1:r:_‘ o ' .a o_ £4. fl , -l .‘_(“ ~. 1.1 ' 1- .‘. ‘\ r0 .4 ;h‘4L U L! le- . J- J\.A'~I HAL ‘J‘M-A 34L. Co's- )!“LQBI —x—UL‘---—WL J—t‘—~.L-LW$ ‘u\/.'.'L'-J.L -).L_L‘_/ L a - o » a IT" .. n' - +’ ' f} 4" W "'1.'._ . (7+ {_; I. 'l y.- "L ‘3 ,, 3 r a.-_\- (71".~~‘:onlf'_\l rmn ”1* (1‘1 b.\k.L .LgU-v V ’ U.- I '5'" —L_4-/ J v WL_L *4. '.J‘AV--.b.~ ‘.y.‘ ‘.z‘tu, \— b‘ .1."- ‘\d\’ VA. A.) 'v; T+‘ n 1 '. . ' I: "'. C 3—3 ”x L " , L I ‘»‘ ’1 I; ' - ' 3; I ‘ 1 " 1"l_4 ". 1 (T “I _' +‘~| 1, -."'( W 1" & '.Jl.~_1.. --— g--$ ‘A-uw‘v ~J-1LJ .1--‘J , Lm—AA-‘fl k- “-'J- (.4 .4-L .4t4_\1 5 “’5‘ LJ .'....1 U-A‘\.r #4 \rfi+— '.wls . ‘ -. “~4 fl m *+.1v .W* ».4n w.n ~L 1n.: 2 W , *‘nH-t 1d . .~ I b. . ‘ - r , . _; ‘.— pd... .LOL *vC....~ , L44... b --'.._, Ht...» -111»: ,-u./|.L, ,lo -4- :il‘d LI-'.L up.» 1' t“ tr“°' ‘ +H. w:*“f';"{“xfi .-. Ln“ “w (Lu p awe: :~ 4 w“\n ~J t—IU.~~ CA. a VLA‘J A‘\_;~ ‘J u-'._AU.-\/-o.s_- L‘A‘k L1 5.: ‘.L '«u'uu‘ uv~z4.LL/\A A—-L K§kuyd «A. r‘ o OI: i‘ ‘- 1 1. ‘- ‘ J- a 1 f) ‘r "a. O ‘- flu" CA-‘-.—--~.4LA‘: UV JL/ Lav \J bvk‘t. . "1-- . .5.- w —. 1 ~| “-pro- 14. .- ‘:. 7' 4" \ ‘. f.“ ('5 .(w. ,..,. w ‘I 4;,4 ,' ‘ -, pry” h 1 '9 '1 .131 , r 1 '.~ ~‘ £1.40... '3 L5 _ttti A-L-Lv léLhcil-u—A— -L~_I\.L HA‘tJ—Ld—‘AKA L) (A-L-LJ. .fi-VKI‘.‘ Lid 'L¢l 11:4..‘LL’L-a— .L‘-O 3;~ '114nc “2‘ ‘vw t« u_,. nn+a Tt'j" an: 'vvcsn OH ff -. f . VL ‘M..L-L'.;~' O “Iii“; .-L~‘A. \J Aux/vi) dbl -L CA...”- (—sLAsA n-‘yis— “*CA -Lv—A\Alu ' . ' - v . 0 a ' '1 I *r‘ nY’-C 1“ T— . "\ ‘ '. \A -_l ,1 3‘ +:\ 3" -:~, .' 4- \Il-' (N4- “.i‘." .314. . ,\+( .,«'o) Ural. .'-;V H,L y‘; (4.1.1, n.4,-l' C 1‘4; .LJ U11£,J db. .2 U0 UV UA— CAJL‘J' (A'VL fw;b(..uv \ ~ _ V'\ o ». q - . W o a j y \ (fl 'g.“ " - * ,— " F 1., ‘- .‘a‘xw '2': C “‘7 '7'} ~ ' . t/N *qt "‘ t— - .‘.~ 3. tv .L\.’& O ~\\ASS-u J- v-a_Ll le‘¢'..~\l A... a I'QU b-L—V ”"itdv LA—L dig; ..Cr UO AA‘J‘Vt; 74 w T o '1 -. < ‘ ta t;yl“_, fi' - .- v .v\_-" . "L c (Tc-17:37. ‘7C‘C‘: r‘: "‘7,“ t‘";. nqq -~.-~\'1 \J ‘Lv '5 “‘-Lwli . --ml;‘1....L~..\ Lauvvfld- dd ‘LLLU w-A-C.‘ Vii .Lv ‘J-Lo\l .$sb&¢LA $- . A. "A 1, .' r I? .' . J. - “ " ' -L. .- 4. . ‘ - '1 1. . ~. . . _ _ 1 "~ ’3 ' (‘ ~ ’\ 1 c N, . .n q,% v-T h ‘ r‘\ K‘ t 15‘ fi-{P . _ .. U -L.U U14- U—h‘.‘ v .A.-.5\J A. VU 'U...’ 'IU-t-h.¢ Lv IJJ» OULIN.’ U.V\4L \I-J..LJ- 8 AL .Av UV 5;; ' ‘- 1 ’V' J.‘ ‘- 1 1 - ‘ 1 o - Ly . ~ g 4- o . ‘-P C‘ 1 '3: o . ' a n 'V ‘ I C \l“) "' "fi' '4 v‘ 4" ‘71:; /' ”\Vv‘ "It” ‘4'. " ' .'\ r‘ _‘J r.“ r "‘ -& U (As—I... .L‘ .1“ -‘ UmJ- b-1-.~b L4 LL: II .4 . «‘.L ll-.. V V KAL v'.“;-.'_~3-Vl: ~u$l U'Lv ‘-\s- .~C-sU-‘—C. '£+-,‘. C" -.- “ .. .' ..4_ §.. L. 3.‘ _ -1 1. -. . A , - ' ’i \ r . ‘ “3- . Q. . ~r\, o ‘1 A C‘ .- 4 - . I\,. I“ U‘JJ- u..4_J‘-‘I Lfi..‘% L‘a"4‘.&‘- -‘_-L'.¢"_A.Uv\4 -1- {_1 -.J'Uli.~U.L «'AAQ’ at); €\:uA-_-.L .U "2.; 'L"\ —- ‘~r-‘- I. -L—‘,(:‘ m“!]’ .~ r J-vv vv'a (‘ n“. ‘ .‘ .1 1 TV ). _J \ .~;,1 .‘_“\ 3‘ “a" fif— Ll~¢a U J~U a- ta- AJ- «LA—UV .IL...» 1. A..¢‘L.~.¢..J..v-' A uL~L¢-L§.}‘. Vi; tbi); -;._L oJU Al. "."qi. (.4.-:Wj ~:nn-, .,1_: 1..-, .,.n -.,. ' "'g:'1,\ -‘ . m ,-.-'..., “LL, ' u " - ..’" C. L .. b: '-'a 7+ >1 t";‘ W;-.“ ha V._-A-,L, u.--.4.A...v-z_..u L445; """’"» L4. ~../.L _, --vo 'l-l--..-‘.. 1L~4 .5; v WUJ "7'1“ T ‘ ,h .. . r, ‘§_J r 1 6 ‘fi )"3 r- 4.. t 1 " . . ' . “; "_‘vl'_ r J- r» . -* F‘- wal‘ug‘ L...’ - V_"..:_.o. 'LLAix; .':"‘L"1.-_-._“."_'--“‘R“'V .Lufi , L‘. '.J l v 0 74... . .) +::J.:'..__‘_J_..o, p. 27-10 Va... ., .- . ~ 1-x : - .. rt .. 4. r. - . 1 - -_~ ~ 3 r,‘1,a_ 't._.1 I.» :‘f ",Nt~+‘ '1 'L..C 1 L I ‘1. W U ‘ ' "f'1“."J(.I§ f‘g. “‘.v .Nr/ QI'LA—h Av“ “Lav U *(‘l-LLLAU‘A‘ ‘.rLJ VJ- A‘Ln‘ A‘va .'-\d;$ba '5.L‘\ ‘J—L v\~, - JIM‘I‘ #‘Q—su \ . r I -—1 . " 71:“ ‘.j I" C: ." '1. a ,5 ‘. ~.-- :3 ~..- a 1 i" u L “ ~._". u I". ‘a a ‘ 1x 1"; ‘. 1'". A: 11‘ . or" ‘3 1' . _ VA. U .‘U* ”I“; "..’-A.. ML .A-Au‘u “Ii 14V,_‘_ Al-~Ux.L‘~ a, O A‘ kl; (*fi—L 1A-; LnJ-L VL‘,QC"OBJ~‘ ’. Y‘ ‘ 5‘1-0. ' 'L“-I - . “ - \L* I ‘- I , (f? T". in. ~ .. \nJ' r-f- ~' 3‘": V-wf", .Léoy uu‘.‘ ._..2 LI ‘ 2 ii“: , .1 U-_L.4.KJ--. v.3‘L' ’ .L by... L‘L~\A JL U “U _L.I.) v.5..1'u An .. .A.w1"+,~.~-17+ ... '1f‘~“: -~,.p +q “w“f'w" Mu: . u no Ju\_~uv L‘A-J‘xt‘ - \AU '.4 a..—q_—._ ‘.l ‘_A.._u “J. V zM—o “V.L ~4‘$-_ U ~4 J. \A—h fi—L— i— i} .I-L '-wJ. \JJ— ‘ a 'V _ n r' a -0 ‘ 4. ‘— 1- _ r‘ _0 L1 5 + ‘ ‘ v. “a ’ '_ . . ‘ "'l" ‘ A n‘, f. I ~ ‘* "’ L. r t ' ‘ C 'T fl — U-‘..- Li_~- kafi—kAi-O ~~L~a \Jt —VL .L‘i-) b I'KAALlJ t .4‘ U..- 9Q--. (IA. A. (d-LLA --. 4.1-x: I‘-hbl& "Y ‘. . "i - . . ‘ "I ‘v .f . 1- _. 4- 1. n _ .L. ‘. .3. ,.' 1 1 . w 4. 3‘ . _’ Yb ‘ ’ o ’ "I _ _ C t ' IN 1' ' ‘a " . -§ .- . Vrv ‘ "."1 -1 u», u ' .11le L u—J’L -Q‘vJ. ‘5J..—~ 'wh/ VJ Lfivl. ~11.) U‘u' , J. CA U,xAL.~U 4..--Q1L'J J—vuu DO _) I a . . ‘ ‘ ,. , IW'IV‘ "‘ . t :‘J u— {‘ " f‘,f\1' "‘\ 'h ‘l "" ‘ ‘ 1‘ .‘. u ‘7 ' f“ . (‘4: ‘rl "l ' (f 9“; [1“ C “ (KW-'3 1 .L‘Al$.A[.a\.4-s\J. V Lfik) up-. ll-‘.\_‘v A add .44.; 1$C4.U v “-~..—"\_A,u VA ‘4 (s) VJ. L V9 UH ‘-L'szol E a ‘ Y] fu o . ‘. w ‘- f‘ ) -‘ ‘- n A n L‘ g - .1 .' —-, r v ‘ d .. 7" - ;. 7.," ' ' .3' :; V we - . ‘ H- "" W ;i~44|. O U'VALAL.;.-AD , U-.L‘J& b; DA. V, gaL-JJ. b\ Q ‘J\) vb JVJ- $ K4..-L~V-l. 2-1.u l--..U'-A i] ‘ 1 a o a Q t1_ “:1 MN” '."- 3.. _1‘ L., y 4 "(‘. . ' t . r- .— F ’3' ' .75 .’V1 .‘ . .. 1‘ '1' ‘(~-‘— T", 'Tfl -vv'] aL— " .l "l let V'4J5LU-L L.~_A_ ‘ \l I'VA. .4 \Ja...-.‘. Lox-«ls ~./ V;l../ ‘- -hv—n—u U’Cd -&¢;L‘ U JAVsu h‘-§-LI-$-ho -: r "4“” (“F I " -‘ . ;“' '7 ~ r’ 1“ . mv-A-‘x‘t' 'Q ("1 ' ‘- I .. - " 1 LA- luleLLILi L~J~— V «J. U-A'v H-A— \éL-L$LL_-J J4. biltz 4-; (.4. Kid . zOU VCAALa-ALKA<- (A L— Lab-bu, I' I: w w - 4- .., ’ 4 ". 1| r‘ . \} t .- [1,. f’*‘ . «'1 . 3.. - - 3 '- .~* ' 5" ~ ”U CUl—~LA A$Q 'J 45-: L4-.._L.LL:1.‘, Si. '1“;(_.L..L O .L L‘{;-'_._..t-.. 1-15 H-Lt.‘l K) J.L. 4.. dt‘iL‘e. 1 . a . g (3 ¥ - 1 . . ~ I) -_ - ‘ 77 C -' _w-c . . c.‘ "\ -. --‘ c -‘ * A.“ 2"!“ -."~ ‘0 :‘-\"-.'ac bi: '“~ 0;; t'. 4. .5 'H .2 U‘Ul J'v-L A— LA& l'qu , ‘1“ J. -Lu.L .L A. {v4-V'AJ‘JLI... ~.a'.i.lL..--- :‘Kl-ULAI. s. ’ 4L UL 'v I». V J. 0v- -. ‘ .' : .. ..¢. M. A ‘1 4—. ..--- -\ fl q -\ 4" A. l". C . 1. c f ‘ ,./-:‘ 1r...\ ‘7 .. ' 1 :_)V .‘J.LJ.l..LL, O J.--..L.~J$l up... ILJU L~u C‘. «LC‘JCAVQZJ bx-’ 5.1“ J. J. o , ,. ' .. .L. _ . . ‘ 1,. _ , \ {a '1 ‘ - "'1 4. .’ . ‘ ' ~a " . \ r‘ ,1 \ " ..(‘ . ‘ \ 3.x '1 4 r", r‘ r n 4 l . _/\ c‘ ,1 .'\ lJJ-t/Jk A AA— U.-.A- rev J" v(a$h¥ 11L.~._4 LJLszJ-L 01.1.21 d4... b-Lo‘ab 4- 9.4.. Lgv LiQ-A—L- ‘Dt‘tl‘r"" -\ T;.-1 . ‘__.,'} F‘ u‘ ‘ T+‘(»1 1.4.5, 1‘11 0|: " “:7“: 7‘ C‘kin w Ilv'v‘i *‘NJL~_._U (“Lug HALL » ~L.~JL_A’ ‘- U’fiJ.--N—’L-LA iaLskJ—h—LK.’ Uiv’p'uii-L V‘L, L, U-—- ~ "5‘ . J I o v o c s 'r‘r w 1"? r4. ~35: LA’} 1,47 ' . +-‘ . 1 ’4‘sz .1 f“ “.1er 0" “fl " -"" :‘fiJ'. 1.)“; .. ' LL'J..1.~..L¢L.—.vr-:‘.L b‘ V»U.-Oleo.~.Ui.i ul~_L-t-J-\’ ‘n- A. J. --4J‘-~ ‘l‘..g L111 u u ’ L) L; *3. . . °- 1 ~ m- “a - - J 1" * 1 —' " ‘."l_.“.(‘+'f‘ "‘ ". t ‘} ‘ fig, A‘ ' 7.51: r+ 1" 7n Y"-’f‘-,1';(_“v"f_‘-'.f\‘Vt " 0- J Juan. Vi-...sv 04-“ .,~)_._...-.A.'\..k. —-~..-~./ 'V.~4. -.— 'v .._ V'..~U..’Um.~.v ALK.’ "OURCAL‘II\J ’ x _ _ --' l- .- C c~ ‘Htf- 5" A Hg; ~ -"‘W‘\.‘-'-f\ 'v' r- f, 0 vav‘ Vou;. J L‘Vl.‘“.~tv’, CIAOLI'- . 1" o w -‘ o 'w 0 I " n4 1“- "‘—“ ' All“ (“'L' r v“" 7")!“ .i ‘: “'L'Ol "" ‘1‘." r;I 1 'l .; ""a‘ .]/| fi' t II-‘J v..u.l' -L- 'VC.) .3 wank; .‘. "J; xii. @141. (*4. - VJ ml“ ; 6.394 u .L — -. - - —. x L . ‘ -\ V' :- >\-r ,\ ~ww1 - " V1 rzc .' v. .a-_ _) , v‘ I, .. (T +— v‘;fi n ‘1‘ ' tr) (‘4') i ‘U, f i”. 3 C4,.) £4. C.L .LAA.'._, 97;) QA‘lu L; ‘4. J y.J-.{.-l Jud 1.10 ubbi‘ 'v v-5..uA 9L 4-H ‘ 1‘ ' W 1 .;- TL w .- ' J- - ' . 4 — ,. 'r 1 t u .4 ‘ , (T (f ‘ '. I. ,nlv 0'} f... . p} -' ~ 0‘ ' ' Viki, 1.. l‘wJ—‘Au OJ. "anA.-—1~L.-.Ll FuhrAUEALJi *Zv .kpl. (I. i'CA-v' [Ls-1L.» ‘ 1 g 1_ 1 _ _, ‘ .. . .. .‘ 1 ' .. 1 3‘: A ~-- r- -‘ r-_~m n 19 q: "f‘- ‘ .1 Jc‘ f‘= . '. I .3 lJ—LQl‘.l~J .‘lQ‘J.’ GL4... W'v-L 0.1.54 LJl;sv v‘fivlkaalb‘.’ kai lALVQ-‘V‘J o 1 >- . . " ‘- '~~~~.~.‘-v~.v ' .. - n—w c-c «,4 .,-_ ; w .c‘ t-l"" CKJLA-;\J-LOJ -L-»l L... ...'v .I Li-.~<...~ L; “A“; .. “1.1.0 o o 4‘... b3 r ; ~'v fi fr ‘7' inn? 'p'uv {1"1.1.2 + . ~ \ CW 49.4.! c“... #1“. u; ...u \'uJ- , Po vb o C 1“ A ‘1‘; A. 0 And A v . -y- n n 1.“ ' ' v AAK’ — ‘.J— 5-1” nw+n qt ~m~ . ka'd V -1 AA\ , an 'n/ A...» ‘.A . . "7" ‘\ tE'O‘" a u 1, . ". +‘ UV ‘-V In“; .A__~-‘ A UL ~"- C -: u 't 'I - '_ ' .1 ' P Ila“ “A 4511-14'CIJ» 'L—.~..‘-L\_ t tLii~Q .1"-- wl 14.5 9.....Ltv. HQ»: -..‘~ V“ '1 1 . L: LJlin-h\:{\A .LAL. AAA. 1 '1 n - p - a . >_ Ice . f . L‘rv—L—L -lv-L v A. U--LU:.& '1 '1 l ‘L‘ - . cor-x1 r_ g. A _~A .L. 1:. “anHQ-hf—A H W J .‘ .1. _' g -‘ r ( ' . t“ - ' Hilk‘J—L-‘L-h— A. ‘.t n. V.~.A . . I I "l t 1 (r n“? r‘ ‘ L..hh.¢‘ Kt; -uua - i 0Aomy i ‘ 7c, 1 Us)...» :AAAliA- a, 77 . L1 solatl, p. 31E). "u- ,"’TC" [1 .'. r‘ , '. .Lhu‘l-u quJ. J-- 4 WA“ “’ UM -' 4L Aging 5 “cred servil 1,. U A" (I; I V v r“ LOALkL 3L1 12':ch i iI‘Lk-J-uLVI ‘70:. ‘ Yr Va .A'L‘ «:nir f" .v nu; CALI wig v _ ‘I _ ,W 1 ‘ 1 f r ‘ I,.\C‘ C ,' \. LK“- -v U-lQb1.L—’L ‘ . - ~ ‘A- ‘ ‘ "D ‘ .‘. O ._’. A H V [JiALd - va.b€’ (0 Iv ‘ rum-1 4‘ NW 70 v“ - . u ‘ . . L;__’3‘v‘1 (‘f '.a“\")“(‘f‘1."o . y A v.‘, n'v A.:A..o.-J -LA; ‘ , 4. 4.. _. 1 1,...1 (Jaipulb, lb Hus A... ‘V,4 4- W" "u r. 4— -.-. .1 W a. a‘frxfig' -' b1 "4 G JUL —. '~.4— ' . f- . ,A — . AA» AA -var of AJJr, ‘lL’rLi 1:1;Aifhi ,— 4;;~opg, must T: L A. gal-119‘”, LAt’ :‘h—ll t:1\-: .L t‘- ~ In.“ Ala! “Ln—ht-LWA UHLI' ~ -. 4. f ‘10 or“ f';‘~ALA.A (.L/lbee .~. ‘ _ .31, 1A,, ~-A(_; LLAMAU "1" 'v I‘M/AA sur‘\'\rQ v H ‘ of I 313, wnflru of neutr"7ity, tries of ti: Cut “1w, Itgly had 81100.0 110 o .A‘L'q H; cf ’— (' cf M E: (U Wu“ In otncr Boxds, 'Tl v“. {LS £11.0- "I IIA L- I", l , ’3 *Mvv, (‘30 ..‘v 'VF‘U 7 Q—L .L-JAN ’ Treaty of London terms round in 'v' . J}- ‘-. -»-. ~ P r: i - " ~, , _ .1‘ , ’~. \ C4- fi \ _ in ~ J -‘ - . p ',' \ l ~~ 'Hl. v.1 H.LU.":1 u .-'~.) 11;...“ 1;;1.-u.'3 Lb” L4 1.1... £25 0.1. J. I.-LcnuS;—l.gf J. 0;. ‘ Oils -1 L‘— x L ,l ' ‘ ’3 A‘ 4‘ '- . 7‘ -‘~ (H‘- t1 2. In bu; *a1:;_u, L4, 1““ SJCCLpqu 1- appt43u no-» . ‘ 4‘ ~ 2 , 1. A1 n, +1~.- - .~ ...L. , 9.14%" 1 41/ 04. 391' QCKL.~.‘MS, QtLlQl;;1 u;x”.;€'c3 «3‘91"; JlJL; to DC; .ng 4.4.4-51; Ami . n‘ 1‘ - ‘ o CY ’ 5"" 1‘, 4—? 0 (\fi A >11 (1 "I 3 . ‘ 4‘ _. ~._‘ 1 .“‘» , ta; Jcrsa111cs ;rc&bf OL lJ;J. Hug aau s r'lu tuxoupngut _v - , ,4 4 1. 4- . L- . — —- w ‘— ‘v r r\ I '0 .m - . , ‘ . ‘- f .- ‘IW , ‘1 T . I-‘I ." tLI’CSG 11:7;QOulLDIJHS 53527.5 b0 be 011‘: Q; b-‘BAQFOSle" ulxd 011:...stlk atisn. Cue m1st bag: in mind, nowcvcr, that she was varv ¢lug to g;ve away anotxir hatiJn s p:;aerty. T13 reason Sn: could mafia SAC» ¢enprous cancessions to Ital? way thgt me territo:y what ItL;” w;uted did not cvnf;ict with her -— urtji‘ufltgore, 14115454111135 C011- O '7‘ (.77) J t '7 r- .‘ C :_.. ,.‘. ‘ ;;. "A “‘4. Luau-.14.. .5\J..--.r LA- ~\-\ $11UVA r; {343' 4-7.. t; C:,.,__‘ 'qgfl .7 +1 ‘3 or???“ ,5. “.9 I >-\_,, 4" ta. ”'1' V-n‘l'xr ‘Ju Uilw‘ u;il~l ll'v \JMACLA U114 C1»2~-L.., UL—Lbe b3. tgvv -~41 11": i}! L-.. n. n . .‘ T'V. 7-11 3’11r— "' 1.- ‘ .. .. .q 1 - rh.~ 1 . in I'\ n A , .fA ". ‘Vir l~ r‘ 1: 1\. f) _ __J O ‘\ T.l-JI v.5 U-L (v, Onl flickau VI. LL, *VLLI ’ J—tQ‘y (Jellde-lbeu tllv *1 lLJ.Le ' .1 1 . r‘ '\ r‘ ‘ YT - a". ‘v‘ r .' ~ ‘1 '1 1"" r 1 l . ‘n n ' .- n ‘ " ~ , fl - ’3': v“ ‘* ’. '4" rnglml-L, ’3 , v 1; v L‘i 4.40 0-1: J“; Lu] 9.4. 111.111, 2; 9.11:1 i'ELJLg-Lv--i.'o .L v ... ._ V, 3.. 1 . n‘ 1 ‘~ '.1‘ "‘ H‘lu-4. (Ai.vb..vJ-O L. ° . L. _ i \ J... ‘ - 4. .' . .. t . 7‘5- 1? t: C na__ 4 r '\ ‘- -_. v , C L} I U 444“ be H 1. U 6 lit; 0 U 19.x.» -L J.L..U v (D (7‘ ‘__ t H. L. ’— Cf :44 \L O 0 L14 ’1 H ( f +" y f: —. 'v‘ ‘ ,\ ‘ . . I "‘ r ' o '._‘n' ’1 (-1 :— "‘o "‘ V ~' fl“ uCIl" :3 Lulu -flclLII-(l 1.1 tut; y'ICiIS lu‘v-l-IJLV tILgt tat; 1.3.70 Ila V. v 1r .‘ .- .. f.~ . 1" .—- y o. ~x so '+ *x V- ‘ ‘7 "' 'c V“; .1- uece dfgfin IueviccclJ tOQ;tl r ty tee acme Intercsts. t'.."3*;:Il tlUI’IS ' . ’» . . "~ - " ‘9 \ r‘. "I a - --"'~ . l. "\ a -'. f \ ‘1 “ T‘v ‘fi . ‘t amtiti Gas In tIc IcaIterIaIeIu Heze QCCthuLlfi to ta: Hubilgj , .I , ‘. I _ I . 4 - , I I, . . 9... I I1 .. ‘. .— I.“ ‘- x . LSCQ.S€ sue was 113.1;I1D to Icie a ’Ieah' to er SAQLU In centroI ;. i’ ‘- + . I 1 .L. ..| 3" ‘ m‘ . . . . f. ’7‘.+ . ’.‘ 7 'x - OJ. t- lab €859 ilu <_._.. LI IJC—E center. 41115 .13 ayxag. .LAU 1-1 [161‘ SLIP" port of Italy in the Tritolitanian Bar of 1911 and in Ita f! , "A I“ . a“ I ‘, ’IV . I‘ '~ ‘r '\ 9-1, I 1 . r~ I (:1 ‘ 1 1’“!- . ’ CODRL-LthX ultu t1; Ia IISI It tnc nIDGCIras wonfe I ence the I:¢Iir crISIs. ‘ L“. I‘ .I (-q o +' v nu tn, srfi, .Ine, IanLnI wIc hOb O‘posed to It .. 1 , '1: WWII “IIHI . .,1 1 1 ' I ”.3, I eIpInsIIn in t.; ICIIIAI, QIUJDJUJ sue flpSluu ed to UIJB cf :5 (D }_J. (r) m " r ‘ r . ~ .'\ T r~ 1' - -. .. 'cII SIyI 3t t3 Itcljl til the .OIId Jar forced (L n the T ’.J. *: (. Cw . 1 " rrij ‘1 c ‘0 41':/\ rrvn-~'+"°r‘,'~r~ .— “nu". -’ 4‘ “7C r‘nwn T-. t“"') $19.». .110 UFQCL .Lv w-.ulv-LUIIQ LICLQV‘J. -LIl ULII...’ L14. LC... 4.4.1 ILL u" r 1,- I- V ‘v: ‘ f“ ‘ .- 1. ,-. , .‘ - . . .‘ T . ,7‘ ,- "I? . J— .1, J—I‘. ilece, sue flfS Lbfcugulp t3 Scalflb Italy conjete wle tn ’f' 1."): t Pry-"f, ‘roc A" .~ qt 0" l‘ rt, ’1; 'w (‘ C ‘: c 4‘ ‘=1 1W of .‘ dy t— ya \J'iblnu VA. Italy I-aLa CuL-lML “uyv.LCA. ‘0; LLLLL 41* in AllUL-‘le’ lien and a" w r1, Jr of L3m101 in 1315. In tme fi45 t Ple : :nélifld I + .2 I. I ' -. ,' I. ,5, .- , ,~ 1 _ "4. ,1.- - tucrc by Mrs UVCULHQ udollSJ IIIninImI e cf IuIL r dnd tae UIrII s. T" -..1: ~ .. I ~. ,T'Ii. "" ,1" :I 1... ‘4‘ I: ,. ' : ' Jung—3.1.4511 EI;;-;I‘e=:ff.x;IIt .‘ul U1]. itch...) .LLJ‘. t-lb wot-ICC. L10- 1 .LLLL CTLS .LS , ll . 1‘ 1 11.01 w.» ‘~ ,1-.. ' ,0 r-- 0 ' I . ta; osnIIn-IIIIIZJVIIII cI'ISIs OJ. last, III; lI'l tum: IIIIII ”are 15 eVIcegce OI tJlS. But it is most obvious that Italy and 3m,l¢I1d were allied in the face of a ccmmon ellemy I'tIeI thrq because A... , r . I‘m . . "-r T ~ T 1 . " 5 1 ‘~ ”I“ "I '. 1" .C "1 1: 7’0"“ r;I1’I;fl:-’ ELLIS ‘JCLIHQIJILJO -11 $1254” 5 Casts, tilt; LIILLIJ' HE...) AnvtIlao — :‘ ~ ‘\ ' V" I t r‘\ " " ," I" j . 'A 1"“ ‘ 'V" 'V A116 L ' Lift ta' uni; tiIl 3., th'u' L1 IDAII'VLCS i-QL'Q “11:91. LlltiIxIéltelL' KAI'O‘Je f,“ .. .. 1 . " r1. .?_\4.' 1.1 ‘- If . .5 r7“ -: ' Inn .-\,. , -‘ InbluII and Itte IIIQ LAC “11Ia30e. III: Is tIe Ieeson that 1IT“, ' I, g 1‘ v . v..-.I : (~. “4- I“ ' r'] ‘1 4+ ‘A ': i" ‘ ‘ VI" ' . ~ “ . 'L' I ~ IggIenI ves II11IL5 t3 SdffiOlu Italy In tIe medlte Ienedu an r‘ ... - - L - 4 -. -- -‘ v-A ~ - + 1” ‘NL . . +- - - L~ -‘ 1 . ~' v- — nv.._. we «r- . 1 n. "\' _d r xx 3 ”J l a , M an a. Vac rd :5 v* U ';;"‘lUt-LALI) too lll‘lv- fi'lL/ ”VII dd; bth/ “¢\4leel i 841‘; Q I'Ll— v-1 '.Kfiv C . .r -\ 1 L _‘ .-\‘ ‘ (- - m‘a - f“ - t 17 C h s ‘1 V-L UL tu 14A LLva—L .— vl ‘.ZLLALC r. ‘Al'L-S “r '. Gav-3 i r\ J , a” a ‘ 1 71" “H 1"” t“: T‘"N'7‘l) 11'rn‘nr‘, C: 7r~r-"-n’_3 t we 4t t 1071 .- .LI.-;1LLV .L K-"l. .-v #:L .Lr/ E4 ‘A-L_A_-LL—bd-a' v ’ Cm Ci¢LA~LLV K1 .3 -(U e -L 0 Al L (I Cl‘vr‘ 3‘ l f“;’\ ‘ "‘ ’3 A “‘1‘ SA“ Mo- \kfigv. U; 1" vk ~ .'4‘ . ; ~. A ‘.r', --. ce SIfipoxt LnI COACessIans rom vTl ~'1 . «c (“In x“. ' L' t (“1“: "‘- "-‘-’"‘7 ‘7‘“ tilt,” it“... ”'1‘: L—u QJLCILLILL, L...) ba“~J u-LL4 -LJL U .‘i bbLgL-L.~U WA‘LA -Lla. J V “LA—L;.:w u. " .'*' \ I ‘- o \ T‘ ‘ a "\ L'l ~1r " ‘ ". 1" " ’ . ". ‘V' SJluEJ Hui I,urpeses. In t1; cIsI U1 LeceIogIa, tne JosnIau o . . ‘ l‘ '0' 'l . fix ' .1 r 4“ . '.‘1 ,‘1 ‘. 7 ~ 1'- ._~J ’1‘1'V-1 ('4 ‘ r..‘ v! n if . “."' j . .1 ’ "o CI’ 1315.: can; 13.12; :LLs.r;;IIIC1.I L4.LSL'.JL1U‘V, ““01. 9.1.1 c1... I; S Stopyea SIIOit ‘11: ”I“ ’ 0‘ '~’* T4” I 1 T 0' a' . Taf‘ r "j 4 o ' I. .‘ "" . .“ .- ‘ ‘. a ' F: .5. Iiov ‘ at I‘LL—L "' '.‘I (is .Jd- :54 U D —LJ L 'v' J. .4. 5" Li “I vL CA LA 0' d force emu It " ‘ ccx- tv +01 0 I 5 CI t I L!“ 1" '.‘r- v :-"\H'“ ,‘I I ,. r {N'Ho 1 v-V(~C .'*-r.filvr . , :1. "1 ”\nH I b'f ". "-‘I- QCLLLIL'LL', (AK/till. 3"; -L L’lbr Hulllvl “Lia lCLLL J AMLACILVD’U. J COIlLei 11 5. ‘7. H \ '1 r‘ \ 1.0 «L- g. - 1, , . ,I, , ,1 ', "4‘ I 4 ‘ I) " 02. ‘ ‘ . foI tIe weIfeIe OI LAO otuer biCdyt “Ien It onvea Laven- """ “1' x ‘t‘ . .7 .‘ r . NLI . . taoeous. ItL r es,eCIeIly, In Malhbalnln 5both tIe Triple ,“1': -._ 1.1L“ .. “(IL-f 7‘ ....' ‘_ "'. r.."...v-,“ . nLIIInce LII fa 3: LI; IeIItI Is «Ita In5IenI lIlayed one Power OI f LgLiASt ens filtr to LJVLLCESE 1I -° .8— ' . p I) 0.: -- ~. I “I +1. ,1 1. ,I . -.«' a ; . TIIS treI OI SelIISI IAtclet taut CILIacteIIZeI tIe . 1 . ‘. q .1 '. . l "\ ‘—| 7' 'f f '9 '. 4 r“ "\ A ~ ‘ '0 “ "'f“ . IUngerIIIIstIc ghh LIterIelIetIc eIe before uoIlc ”gr I Is .‘ 1 V. ‘ . . - ‘- .,\ .- -,. 1 ( W. *\ ’\ F 1‘ T." . ' 1 f . '1 T g~ *- i l-L-Lvr ilLdS t1.p 8d 1.1] LJiC‘l .4. 8.1.. Qt -L 3118 b‘ fit H UQIL A—lly—tLCII 1L1 €2.11“. "tuz/ ‘7‘: +7——. - “a x» (‘1 :i oL-L‘ {J.L‘Z; Jerd—E.S LJCII- Q}_L.\J. LiLLIOSRATJY O l’- f r 4‘1 ‘ p‘.‘ r'\ ,‘-.‘ w [*1 7‘. " y‘ ~ 1 -ue most veiietie S¢QTC€S for ev uce conceruiué tae IGlLtiOuS of Ituly on; England 934-1915 are those that are the nest helpful in writing a 'iylometio history. Such sources of :4fOJLLtiCX a: tntlisied docu~;;f s, monographs, and Sgecfoi aistoricm studies, gersonol 3330115, and pe°iodicals. I he ve fogni tngse available in tho wit1i:"n ate Colle- 6 ago Juiversitv of Liohi Ln Librar'es Lu .2 ~ (I) By far the Lsst ource materiel is a oilebi~ in the ‘ " 1 _‘ '. ,. .' ‘ _ ‘ L .. , I ‘ ',. _: ‘_. .'._;_1‘._ r -.. J_ h.‘ ' l 4-1.7. ’ t: . 0“? 1”, rdJJ.-LS-l':d dUC1~1H.I~1AlUS 0‘11 f0; til+s fol. ULUllgl bQu 1.3 bLle Hrlb.4.s.‘l 4»! ., .°-« r~ +2«... c -. r: "4- -, oJS Cl“' 138 O: bud no! lw7i-1Jl4, Gfllbdd by f" v v- .‘ ‘ ‘ c I‘ I] r‘ n, N r. 3'71 r '~ " ' «‘ fl 7 — l"‘ D“ 1 ' r) f: oeoxbe I. 0003; end ugioig ,euterl, (ll vols., LUJQ'H, idea- .1. U- H" C: 7 I v". + . ‘r fi‘ 1 I ,\ . ‘,4\ ,"‘ I. I " I. ',- I ' " , N " - " WI ‘ ‘- iJoo) p-0ved to be a C,oii blue oi iuioinetion. -oes~ lMCLUQe 1' v“: " ‘, r1 1 n ‘ . ‘1 "x J- 1 f~ I‘- ~ ". r‘ 7 1 "\ tie meio did; an; uiglomitic Q35yébCflos organized OJ to: n ‘, Mn.» m'+t T~»1.w; A °~,7 1 a '« ‘. , ~- ,V— CSrdHuSJUe “itJ immiego -5 inciuoeo lu tasse volames and \ + W‘ ‘ ‘ _ U ' > 4 C ‘. 4 A! Q‘. r“ F" 0 -: -: 1‘ viiuu‘ I. (EV-.L..L.J Lug... S-L' 'QS bi Cv-i'4r0vk‘ls.;u~h LJSLI o5. 1:01 t:.i T , A. v. .n v A TT "T v v v .L 111' V” ‘J 4‘11“ ‘28 +4.1- : J 4.1 g 14;, It) A o ‘ o I. 0 V ‘ -L- .“ f) r: [3 p 'n CW" 1 * ‘V {3-3 bvr *- s 7 f ”:71".‘.n"‘,“- .- -~l Aw 4- ‘ fin‘~w~ “ "w Al'v-Jv LA‘ 0 WU-X-Llfio‘fi-VLA -' 01“.; \Jv‘ ¢..~...& UJsJJ UALMULC D‘vv _AlJviLv l“7l-1914, (4 vols., new York, 1922-1327), translate“ and ccn -.—4 *“ m <"' 4‘ ~ r D. 7-? 4n UV‘CCtdu LJ Lo&0UO Lin; ug+( iron ui: ufOCSG .04; in. U~LC9 (D cf T I V T'v r“ f“ v“ ‘ -- w P ‘- I‘ I" ' 7"..- . > - V. . .- ¢tuij no.5 o. 1.1;.1Lc1' OJ. tub 4.11519 121119118 r; - in 'V '1 A ,-. ~‘ A n a 1‘ A -1 r“ , _A , an eiceiiwnt Sou-0e log me; lttion-aiy ”it1 geimon’ end ‘ 'V' I . - ‘ L. d 'v ‘ "‘- r.‘ ‘~ '~ ’0 “/5 .1 t . ’* V ' ‘ “I ’ “1 l' 1"“! ‘ q "“ ‘ " 4 'fi no u it 1:14 .410le Cd ilb‘l a. 8.1.9; 1.518 11.11311 Lilngpiu. . xflthmul‘ 511;. 221.6- megtort source to to Eritisnu “3 cum nts, though it is usable (T2 .y J— fi ,_ . I‘1 J rnl'-‘ ‘ . y 1 a ~ n v ’ onlv MltA leservttiors, 18 ”.1. F'tce, 1he iilo1atie ”-5 :11 A 1~ I ‘. ~ ‘7 ~ 7- -‘ C“ C m’r ~ ~ .’ l r '3 .91.. .I’:‘.:'__ _‘L:_~_:J_ (e‘J II AOwal, .1 |..\ )0 J..l-LS .L; C-..Ukl€u tilt“ («L‘s—L3“? A number of hemoirs and personal narratives threw “I .fl1Ju-FY ~ a great deal of light upon SBGCifiC fiOihtS and iss1es and .m revealed OyiuiOuS or various leading Italian and English Q3231.“ y .0 ., '1 +1‘” ~ a, o ‘ ‘0 . _\ - n Fr T?’ I. ’7‘, ’. - figures. bor the inbllbd side, the bbSt hAOuH or these 13 Sir Eo ward Gi e;."s-‘Jisco;111t or" Fallodon, Tye. Ilt ~r‘iv ve Years :9S-l916 (2 vols., London, 1983 . Another volume was valuatle in making availatle the ideas and attitudes of this leading Eritish leatihn dialomat throu;hout this period. This is a selection of his Speeches r.u‘olL'Lshed under the 1 title, SueeC1es on Foreign Affairs lSOi-l9l , selected by Paul Kraplund (Cambridge, l932). H.A. Asquith's The Genesis ,3 of the Na r (Londoh,l %3) gave a particularly good account ,‘A oi the Years l':3‘l 3-91 l4 '-.-'Ihez'1 he was Pri1z1e Linister. David Lloyd George has also left an account of the story that was 1 this payer in the first volume of his Var lemoirs u able i (O H K 1014 1915 (6 vols., London, l933~l937). One could not get a clear idea of the Italian view- point without using Giovanni Giolitti's hemoirs of My Life (London, 1983). Giolitti was the dominant figure in politics 116 in Italy in the decade before timalknflli Jar and had great influence on the nerters of the Italia 1 Parliament. Antonino Salanura's Italy 6111:} The Great 1 :1" (London, 932) is also impOrtant since he was Prine hinister during the crucial year of 1913. Lenito Lussolini's fly Autobiograah: (Sew York, 1923) reveals a good deal of the nationalist sentiment in Italy growing; during; these yea1 ars A helpful tool: in shaving the Socialist viewtoint is Leoneda bissolati, La nolitica esters dell' Italia dal 1397 al 1920 (Lilano, 923 . For background material on Italian imperialistic yolicy, a good source is PPLHIC sco Crisoi, The Lemoirs of Frances co Cris pi. translated by Lary Picnard and Agnetti (3 vols., 1912). A nurner oi" 11101;;o,_;raphs and snecial studies iiroved useful in su p3lyi1; information on Specific Points and problems. 1 w '1 ror imredi ate bachground, J.L. Glanville, “Italy's Relations with England. 1393-19- 3," John Hookins Universit;r Studies in History and Political Scie11c ce (fol. 52, No. I, Ealtimore, 934). This was heliuiul in su3tlg in; bi olio; 1+1n1ca1 leads. The horoccan Crisis is well covered in Eugene H. Anderson, The First horoccan Crisis 1901- 190 6 (New York, 1930). For a sto; v of the alliances of Eur0pe and their formation William L. Lan e1, Nlianc s and 'nrcn' s 1371—1390 (new 1019:, 1931). (D Of course Sidney B. Fay's Origins of the .1or'ld war (ReW'YorK, 1931) is an invaluable all-around guide and bibliograohical ll? source. Thomas helson PegC's Italy and the florid Her (N1w York, ILBO) was useful in giving the ViewBoint or the Americeh Ambesseuor in Italy in lQlé ehu Rene Currie-Albrecht's onierence (hex York, IQQG) and (‘1 Italy at The Paris fleece n.s. LcCerthy, Peal Crem'ha's Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy 1314-1117 (Lonuon, 1911) was good for beefiground. Some histories of Italy were 11cl )ful i 1 1-10.111: the Policy of thLC nation. These 1e1e Lu’i Velle1i' sItalz (Jew York, lDSQ), Largot merriott, The Lekers of Loderh Italy (Lcnuon, 1911) ehu Cecil Sfrigge, The Devclojment oi Loderh Italy (lJe‘.'J.i‘c1ve11, lEJ‘i‘l ). Other seconqery 1orks thct were used for background neteriel were 11rd on” Goocd, The Cembrigge distory of Eritish Ferei.;1 Polit"*jLSCC- 15137 (Ken:iforh,l liffo ); Nerd {uni Gooch, *r 13,. ‘ .' \ “‘ v . I '.' . " . ‘1 ‘f- T 0 T: r' "F ‘. r I" IL'C/i 0.5.6; tile 1Jé~A.: Stéd S ll; D14 _LUJL-(:_:‘I_ ’1 T (w VOlS O , i‘eii *OL.4L, ('11 6); I‘ll; 1110.5 Po L-OOIl, 1:11 .‘LJJ.-LL1._LiSILl Lily; HOJ.lki i:OlitiCS —_.A_ (New York, 134:); Lu1"ay Gilbert, The Forcigh Policy of Sir Euwuru Grey, lJOC-lul5, (Lonooh); L01d Thomas 1ouehouse Leah, Lord Lansuo1he, A Eio;ray1y, (London, l925 ; alfrea Frances Pribrem, England an; The International Policxiof the Eurogean Greet Powe" l87l-lfil4 (LonuOH, lSJI); Thomas N. PLQe, Ital, emu The dorlu Sec1et Tre uties l (fleJ Y0°k, 9:0); Alfred Frances Pribram, The of Austro-Jungery, l37O-l9l4, (vol., I, New Yorh, I981); rn K.P. Seymour, 1he Di lone tic Eist01; of The Iorld, lBTO-lfil4 c1s, u {111‘ 1 -fl‘xtal; W‘q ‘ 3 4) (Engleho, l337); (New Yori, 191 r“ Her of l914 New Seton-Jetsoh, emu Eller C. St OWBll ’ Britain in :‘W ‘1 oO'-‘\ Q Diplom ", 1 u l789-l914 cy of 118 The 'fifi'm- . W' - 1' 1 Ln-'- | . . L ,. Efih I? .111 wait a; ,ifliio ‘LICDIX '\ s,— Afr l m; T“. 7" “.7 "it f\“7 r.‘*1\ “171n- »7-) '. '1- C‘ 13.11:“111 L11 LOHJKJI. 1'11“.) ULULIbLhTiVIuU v I. Agreemnt Setween France, Aussia, Great Britain and Italy, U2 Signed at London, Lgril 26, 1915 By Order of his Government the Laruuis Imperiali, Ambassaaor of dis naje ty the King of Italy, has the honor to connuniCate to the ht. hon. Sir Edward Grey, dis Britannic majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and to their Excellencies h. Paul Cambon, Ambassador of the Frencn Refublic, and to Count de Benckendorff, ambassador of his Majesty the Enfieror of All the Russias, the following nannorarmnnn: S Q “if“:nufifiifi- W1f‘auTTF: aria « 1 .‘ I LELZORAHDU‘ * Article I. A military convention shall be immediately concluded between the General Staffs of France, Great Britain, Italy, and nussia. This convention shall settle the minimum number of military forces to be employed by Russia against Austria-Hungary in order to yrevent that Power from concen- trating all its strength against Italy, in the event of Russia decidin; to direct her principal effort against Germany. This military convention shall settle question of rmistices, which necessarily comes Iithin the sc0pe of the r. c. f“ .11.,” 1);.) r”: 4 , n 1' "I. -4». +1- 1 Haw-'1‘ bu11111e111-11al ---LI1-v:1l‘c, Ul D116 1.1111le. s. Article 2. On her hart, Italy undertakes to use her inflience to use her entire resources for the purpose of waging war jointly with France, Great Britain and dussia against all their enemies. Article 3. The French anu British fleets shall render active and Hermanent assis ance to Italy until such time as the Austro-nunéarian fleet shall have been destroyed or until peace shall have been concluded. A naval convention shall be immediately concluded to this effect between France, Great Britain and Italy. Article 4. Under the Treaty of Peace, Italy shall obtain the rentino, Cisalpine Tyrol nith its geograyhical and natural frontier (the Brenner frontier), as well as Trieste, the counties of Gorizia anu Gradisca, all Istria as far as the Quarnero and including Volosca and the Istrian islands of .— lCarrie Albrecht Rene, Italy at the raris Peace Conference, pp. 334-559. 120 Cherso and L1ssin, as .ell as the small is lands of Plavnilz, Unie, Canidole, Palazzuoli, San Pietro di N emoi, Asinello, Gruica, and the n~1,1bo11n' islets Kote. The Irantier to ensure execution of Auticle 4 hereof shall be traced as follows: From the Piz Umbrail as far as north of the Stelvio, it shall follow tdC crest of the Rhetian Alps up to the so;a1ce of the Auige and the E'sach, then following the i BescE1en an; Brenner: mountains a111 the Cats and Ziller heights 3 The 111nt1 r s1a;l than be 1nd to1ards the south, cross Ht. 5 Toclac:1 and join the :resent frontier of the Carnic Alps. ; It shall Iollow t11is 111111a1 line as far as at. Tarvis and from at. Tarvis the watershed of the JL1li l Alps by the Predil Pass, Lt. hangart, the Tricor (Terg lu) and tl1e watersheds of he Podberdo, Poulaniscam and Id1ia passes. prom this goint he frontier shall follow a south-easterly direction towards he Schneeberg, leaving the entire basin of the Save and its tributaries outside Italian territory. From the Schneeberg the frontier S1a.l come dovzn to the coast in suc1 a war as to include Castua, nattuglia and Jolosca 1ithin Italian territory. “and amiafin ca \ dc+d- L— Awticle o. Italy shall also be given the hrovince of Dalmatia within its Hresent administrative boundaries, includ- ing to the north Lisarica and Triba1ia; to the south as far as a line starting irom Caoe Planna on the coast and following eastwards the crests oi the heights forming the watershed, in such a nay as to leave within Italian territory all the valleys and streams flowing towards Sebenico----such as the Cicola, Ke1ka, nutisnica and their tributaries. She shall also obtain ll the islands situate to the n01t1 and 1Jest of Dal1natia, from Premuaa, salve, Ulbo, Sche1da, naon, Pago and Patadura to the north, up to Heleda to the south includingo Sant' Andrea, Susi, Lissa, Lesina, Tercola, Currzola, Cazza and agosta, as well as t1: ne i u1o11h rocks and islets and Pelagosa, .ith t1e excebt tion oi Greater and Lesser Zirona, Solta and Bra zza. To be net1t1alized (l) The entire coast from Cape Planka on the north to the southern base of the penins ula of Sabbioncello in the south, so as to incline the w;ole ol t1at ycfllALdl a; (2) the portion of the coast which begins in the north at a boint situated lO kilometres south of the headland of jagusa Vecchia extending 501th1ard as far as the diver Voiussa, in such a way as to include the gulf and orts of Catta1o, Antivari, Dulcigno, 3t. Jeau de nedua and Du1azzo, without prejudice to the 110 1t1 oi nontene r1o co11111’ue11t on the decla1ations El exchanged between the Powers in Ayril and hay l909. As these rights only aggly to the aiesent n1n11n11iin territor;, they cannot Le extended to any territoly o1 O1ts which na ’ oe assi:ned to none teneOro. Consequently n-—ut1al121tio11shall not a,1ly to any Lait oi the coast now beloncing t» Lonte- negro. There shall Le 111ai11ta:'111ed all restrictions c1ncer11lng the Hurt of antivari which were accented by Lontenegro in l909; (5) finally, all t1e islands not given to Italy. 12‘ a) \. Kote: 'Tne lollo ing Lariatic ter1itory shall be a1ssigned by the four Allied 101e1s to Griatia, berbia, and 1ont1neoio. In tle Sayer adriatic, the Whole coast from the bay of Volosca on the berdars of Istria as far as the northern iiuntier of Dalmatia, iAClJuiflg the coas waiC1 is at ,1reser1t lungarian, and all the coast of Croatia, with the port of riume and the small ,orts sf Lovi and Carlopago, as well as he islands of . Ye;lia, Pervichio, Gregorio, Goli and Arbe. And, in the Lower i Adriatic (in the region interesting Serbia and Lontenedro) the whole oast irom Caner Pl auha as far as the River Drin, nith the infiortant ha1o01s 01 Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno and Lt. Jean de Ledua and the islands of Greater and Lesser Zirona, Bua, Solta, Lrazza, Jaclian and Calanotta. The gort o: Durazzo to be assi ned to the independent Loslem State of nlbahia. Article 6. Italy shall receive full sovereignty over Valona, the is and of Sasenc and surrounding territory of sufficient extent to assure defense of these foints (from the Voiussa to the north and east, agar x111telv to the northern boundary of the district of Chinara en the south). Article 7. Should Italy obtain the Trentino and Istria in accordance nith the provisions of Article 4, tog ct1e1 nith Dalmatia and the adriatic islands Witdln the limits 1Rec1111d in Article ’1, and t1e bay of Valona (Article 6), and ii the central Horti on oi nib uia is reserved for the establishment of a small autonomous neut1alize d btate, Italy Shall not opfose the division of 101thern and oouthern albania between Lentenegro, Serbia and Greece, should France, Great Britain and Russia soc1esire. The coast from the southern boundary of the Italian territory of Valona (see Article 6) up to Case Styles 5 all be neutralized. Italy shall be charged with the representatiOn of the ate of Albania in its relations with foreign Powers. Italy agrees, moreover, to leave sufficient territory in any event to the east of Albania to ensure the existence f a frontier line between Greece and Serbia to the west of Lake Ochriaa. Article 8. Italy shall receive entire sovereianty over the Dooecanese Islanos which she is at present occupying. Article 9. Gen: rally Speaking, France, Great rritain, and Russia recodnize t1at Italy is intere 5 ed in the maintenance of the balance of 901131 in t.1e L.e<‘1ite1'rane’-fan ano that, in the event of the total or cartial eartioion oi 1u1key/ in Asia, she ought to obtain a just share of the Mediterra ean region ad- jacent to the yrovince of Aualia, where Italy has alreaoy acwuired rirhts a; interests 1’1hic11 fume d the subject of an Ital o-a11crah convention. The zone whicn shal eventually be ailottcd to Italy s all oe delimited, at the groper time, due account being taken of the existing interests of rr'1ce and Great rritain. The interests of Italy shall also be taken into consider- ation in the event of the territorial integrity of the Turkish Entire being maintained an; alterations being nade in the zones of in e ests of the Po L15. If Franco, Sieat u1ita1n and Russia occupy any territories in Tirkey in asia c11in' t1e co11s e of the war, the aediterranean re ion bOruerin, o1 the Provi1mc of Adaiia within the limits i1u cateo above sh ‘l be1est1ve to Italy, who shall be en- titleu to occupy it. .1- U r Article lC. All r.“L 1ts aha privileges in Libya at ese11t belonyinc to the Sultan Ly virtue of the Treaty of ausa P L n1e are transferreu to Italy. Article ll. Italy shall receive a share of any eventual tar inuemnity c01res )011t’1i1‘1;5 to her ef1'01-ts anu her sacrifices. Article '2. Italy ceclares that s1e associates herself in the declaration mane by France, Great Britain ano Russia to abia the effect that Arabia and the noslen Joly Places in ar’ shall be left uncier the authority of an :L 111e11c11uc 1t hosl em power. "I I ArticLe lo. In the event oi E1ance and Great tritain increasin; t1-—i1 colonial territories in Airica at the exocnse of Germany, those two Powers agree in princigle that Italy qy claim som3 eluitable congensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favor of the question relative to the .frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Laliland and Lit;'a anu the HCLQJEQIIAQ colonies belon in; to F1ance and GI‘BLt L1. itain. 125 Article 4. Great Britain undertakes to facilitate the immediate conclusion, under eqiitable conditions, of a loan of at least £ SKL,OOC,OOO to be issued on the London market. Article l5. France, Great Lritain and Russia snall sugfiort excl opgosition as Italy may make to any troposal in the direction of introducing a regresentative of tne noly See in any Peace negotiatiOns or negotiations for the settle- ment of questions raised bv the present war. Article 16. Ta; gresent arrangement shall be held eeret. fie aanerence of Italy to the Declaration of tne ‘1 Seatenter, 19l4, snall alone be made outlic, immediately claration of war by or against Italy. 5"ifi,’ d7?! 3'15; Ru“ ‘ .TI— \Ig.u.:u.-% unorzt‘ After having taken act of the foregoing memorandum, tne retresentatives of France, Great britain and Russia, duly authorized to that effect, have concluded tne following agreement iitn tne representative of Italy, also duly author- ized by his Government: France, Great Lritain and Russia give tneir fill assent to the memorandum gresented by the Italian Government. Jith reference to Articles , 2 and 5 of tne memorandum, which provide for military and naval CJORefatiOfl between the four Powers, Italy declares tnat sne will take the field at tne earliest nossible date and within a period not exceeding one nontn from tne signatire of tnese presents. In faitner wnsreof the undersigned nave signed the present agreement and nave affixed thereto tneir seals. Done at Lonaon, in quadruglicate, the 8 th day of April, lalS. E. Grey. Imperiali. Benckendorff. HmlCmmmL C“ C0 U? U“ C . VVVV A/‘AA bbbb 7‘“ 1"‘71‘11" \T‘ 73"? ' 7"“ F ‘" """"" "T‘ -'m 17'7”?“ ‘ ""17 II. DLULmiIXL+CULI 4..)1. '1'..L.LI\J1J. 1131'“! UL, UL—iEnJ. ulianiib, ~,1,T "r 1‘ r- = ,‘Tf‘lc'\ ' *T’Tlr'\1:‘1;j,771 1ft" ‘ ' "V’fi ,‘. NI"'_ f1 ""F'\.V‘\ IIJLLJJ. I'LnnlJ lLuLJUIn uiuJLule-IILIL LbL/J. TU bUIubLUI/IL " rT1 '1‘: 10 1-1 A 0111111111114 PEI-ICE: UVILII‘G -1144 CUUIIQL OF ( " 71??" m r '1 '71 . "- £111.11 ELLELJIL-.I .LIUILULL‘JnJ “'th The Italian Gover1unent,havin5 decided to eart.ici5ate in the Lresent par with the rrench, 11It111 and R1ssian Governments aha to accede to the Decla ation made at London, 5 the 3th 569t81aar, lLlé, by the three above-named Governments. 1 T1e undersi5ned, tein5 duly authorized by their . leSyE Ctive Gove1nnents, make t1e follouin5 declaration: ; T1e1renc11, 13ritis‘11, Italian and 111.15-11.11 Goverr 1e11ts mutuall; indertahe not to co11cl1d e a sepaIate yeace durin5 the course of the oresent na1. T11: foir Gove‘r1'1111e1'1 s a51'ee that, .111ene 11,1 there may be occasion to disc1ss the terms of peace, none of the allied PCht”S shall lay QOJL any conditions of fleece without 5revious a5ree11e11t with each of the ot1e1 allies. In faith thereof the undersi5ned have si5ned the present Declaration and have affixed thereto their se "s. Done at London, in giadruLJIicate, the 26th day of ngfil, m‘ p. D: 131': J U. (L.b.) E. Grey. 0 ) Ingeriali. (L.S . ) Benclce 1dorff. ‘ ) Paul Cambon. III. 131401.111 ATIK‘HLH The Decla Great Britain, I seoarate l«veace a secret. After the declarati on of tar by or a5ainst Italy, t11e four Po.e:s shall si5n a new declare ion in identical terms, which shall thereupon be made gublic. In faith whereof the undersi5ned have executed the present Declaration aha have af led there 0 their sc—als. Done at London, in quadruylicate, the 26th ca; of April, l915. c 86 h A,.11il,l915, whereby France, v and nussia undertake not to conclude a "esent EuroRean ”ar, shall r 11ain L \ (L.£.) E. Grey. (L.S.) ImyCTitli. (L . S . ) Benchendorff . (L.b.) Paul C-1ton. ,, , _ -1 _ 11 __ .-l1.______._._-————‘1' / '.1 04 " “‘ ‘ *~\ \ / .1 HUNGARY an ! tlLlihlilli {0.1.3 1 In -\‘ -\ 4. L‘\\ ‘ (Am-‘3'.3.:H- ‘. ew‘-‘ . - ‘ {1 J 7’- _ ' A. a l, ____ 6.17 , § - (’ fig 821\\ . . 1 ~\\ e "1 ‘/ ‘ \ ' (I ~-’ : " .'\ ‘ '~\ 1 . _ ) . e a; o')/ . ‘ i Thia map has been altered to include the Serbian projected railway from the Danube to San Giovanni Di Madua and the Eulgarian projected railway from matend- 11 to Immanovo. . my mlflkrfiad 1'15 - ‘fifit I'L' .5" _1". .. ~~.— Fgoufim a)- mq ITau-n .Dcmnds 1 Ma '65 U, "‘5' m ’ chrfj M bTUJ h rt» 7 //’. '_ _. “4;...Lq. m EbOTlATlONo FOR THE TREATY or LONDON mm: ADRIAT‘ICJ‘I'ALIAN DEMAN 05, OFFER OF me sure-m»: ‘ Q r 1 O t I. -‘x 537 ON ‘. \ ’.‘V"~. 1 ‘ {\V ‘ 4 ' ROOM USE ONLY, . .. 4 k 4 I - .. _ I. . I . 4 x n . v I \ \ r u. . C '1‘ y ' x . .g . u / . \, a \. . ’ \‘ , «J ’ r v/ ' K _ t I V 4- . _ _ . 1- c . ~ 1 .3 h \ A \. r: . u u . . ~ 1 . x . . x I 4 4 . 4 . n 4 \. 4 I I . u r ‘4 f I.\.‘.. V I ‘ I ‘ \K \ .. . - 4. .. «if... .. Q- .. .4... . . s .V . _ . . . v. \. .. \ . . 4 I. . l .. . o hit . a ._ .\ 1‘. ”kg. ‘fifiifl w. I .I. II A\. 4‘. t ‘1 “RF/J n. . s. ~37”. s r..... K I § III . K. I‘. 5 x r . . ll .. x I. 4 4 :I l.‘ a . 4 I .. . r A x J. ’ k R . \i . . . 4 . ll! / 4! .~ . 1.4 I 2... ‘9; a? . 1 4 \ 4, A!\ .4 4 “I 4. :4”! If 4 \ I . w /....n .. . 4)! p. «I . ‘1 4 . ‘)V p v y 1‘ II. . w . r . . r . a. '\ . .. \j.. , . ‘ . .\ . w. . .. 4 .H.» .. .I ‘ .\ . .5 . 4 . I‘D... . 4 .. N 4 . r. . : . \ 4... 1 .401. /:t\ u .. . . .- 4, .wa-.. . 4. .r . .4 4x. JAR, I. .. I, 4 . 0. km ,rm .. «_ «I ..... ..... ~ I . .‘®.u.h .~V .fiMU.\—. ... . a /. Jr avgék- 4?.an 4.- . garish... . xx... .. .. k. 4. ...II.KI.> ‘4»)! MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRA S I I" III! III ll lllFlTE 0 3 1293 3071 0518