THE BRIT£SH LABOUR PARTY'S FOREIGN POUCY
AND NAZI GERMANY, 1929-1938
Thesis ï¬zz the Degree of M. A.
MECHQGAN STATE UNWERSiTY
Aï¬exander 19hr: De Voufon
1966
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WES†L I B F. _’ '1
Michigan Stab
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THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY'S FOREIGN POLICY
AND NAZI GERMANY. 1929-1938
by
Alexander John DeVouton
A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
Department of History
1966
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TABLE OF CCKTEKTS
INTRODUCTION
PART I. APBEASEmEET AND UNCERTAIHTY, l92;-l933
CHAPTER
1. LABCUR RECCEES ARRRE OF TEE RAZIS . . . . . .
ll. TEE NAZIS BECOME A THREAT . . . . . . . . . .
III. THE NRZIS--A FUTURE 0R FINISHED . . . . . . .
PART II. CCREUSICN AND VRCILLATICR, 1933-1936
IV. HITLER CONSOLIDATES RIS POWER . . . . . . . .
V. COLLECTIVE SECURITY VERSUS WAR-RESISTANCE . .
VI. OLD PRINCIPLES SHAKEN . . . . . . . . . . . .
PART III. REORIENTATION RED FIRMNESS, 1936-1938
VII. THE SPAEISR CIVIL tRR: TEE TURjING PCIE . .
VIII. RESCILUSS R:D:RUIICR: TEE FIEAL SLOT . . . .
CCRCLUSICN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................
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This paper will trace the evolution of the oritish Labour
Earty's foreign policy program between the formation of the second
Labour Government in June 1929 and the nunich crisis in September
1938. The reluctant and often painful change through Vhich its
policy passed was prompted almost exclusively by the aggressive
foreign policies of the European fascist regimes, particularly
that of Adolf iitler in Germany. This paper will concentrate on
the influence of the Kazis on the Labour farty's foreign policy
and on Labour's attitude towards hazi Germany.
During the two years, June 1929 to August 1931, that
Labour controlled the government there was little official re-
cognition of the Jazis. It was only after Labour went into
opposition to th national Government that it began to Show real
concern about the hazis and the british Government's attitude
towards them.
Throughout the thirties Labour was relegated to a small
minority position in Sarliament and thus had a very difficult
time making its influence felt in Commons. After the election
of 1931 the Rational Government, made up of Conservatives, a few
Labourite followers of J. Ramsay MacDonald, and some Liberals,
had an overwhelming majority. Labour was reduced to only fifty-
two representatives in Commons. Even the election of 1935 did
not do much to improve Labour's position although the party
gained one hundred more seats in Earliament. Labour W88 Still
throurhcut
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in no position to make itself a serious influence on the Govern-
ment's policy. Even with the other Opposition parties and
groups all of Labour's censure motions were overwhelmingly de—
feated throughout the thirties.
The leadership of the party underwent a drastic change
during the first few years of this period. The crisis in 1931
caused the leader of the party, J. Ramsay MacDonald, and another
top leader, Philip Snowden, to dreak with the party and Join
the National Government as Prime Minister and Chancellor of
the Exchequer reSpectively. This brought their explusion
from the Labour Party. Arthur Henderson, the Foreign Secretary
in the second Labour Government, became head of the party
briefly, but his Chairmanship of the Disarmament Conference and
the fact he had been defeated in the Election of 1931 and so no
longer sat in Parliament caused him to resign in 1932. He soon
became ill and although he continued to influence greatly
Labour's foreign policy program he faded from an active role in
the party. He died in 1935.
Henderson was followed as party leader by anOther old-
timer, George Lansbury, who was ". . .a respected Christian
socialist and sentimental pacifist, but was seventy-two and not
1
an able parliamentarian." Lansbury resigned in 1935 over a
1Carl F. Brand, The British Labour Party, 3 Short Histor
(Stanford, California: StanfordvUniversity Press, 1§55), p. l52.
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foreign policy disnute.
The 1935 intra-party strut.gle between the Tacifists and
those wh o favored strong policy of collective security through
the League of Iations and the election of the year brought a
new generation of le dare to the iore. Clement Attlee was
elected to the party leadership. Ernest Levin, zugh Dalton, and
ierbert Lorrison together with attlee recrese ted the â€strong
Le m ue" group and assu ed the policy making OSl tions in tin
rty. in the much wea.ehed necifist wing of the party Sir
.‘
ataf'ord Cripps and Aneurin Lev;n took over leadership and reare-
sented the younger generation in that faction.
bevin and Dalton would be particularly instrumental in
listic
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directing Labour's foreign policy towards a more re
ptsition after l935. They urged the party to support rearmament
in the face of the naai threat and to take a fi rm stand in
opposing fascist aggression.
Labour's foreign policy would change between 1929 and
1938 from one advocating disarma collective resistance to
LU
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greesion through the League of Tations, war-resistance by a
general strike to any attempt by Jritaih to participate in any
war other than through the Leai‘jue, appeasement of Germany's
u tif ied grievances, and the peaceful settlement of international
(O
g, c.»
isputes through the lorld Court and international law, to a
aosition supLorti ng Eri isn rearnament, recognizing that the
-
League was no lonfer nowerful enough to maintain peace,
iv
supportinï¬ the Anglo-Jrench alliance even though it was not based
on the League of ;aticns, and realizing that anpeasehent of Xazi
Germany would not preserve peace.
PART I: APPEASE‘NCENT AND UNCERTAINTY, 1929-1933
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CHAPTER I
LABOUR BECOMES A'.>‘."ARE OF THE lilA'ZlS
During the first year of the Second Labour Government,
there was little serious concern about the National Socialist
Party in Germany. The Nazis were still a small, ineffective
parliamentary group, and as such the Labour Government found
little reason to be concerned about them. When Labour mentioned
the German Right at all it was in general and not any specific
group.
At the time of the British General Election in 1929 there
was a belief that a Labour victory would be a serious blow
to the German reactionary parties. The London ygilx Herald,
a socialist newspaper considered the official organ of the
Labour Party, observed that the German parties of the Far
flight ". . . know that their own dreams of Fascist dictatorship
'would have not the smallest chance of success if a new wind of
democracy and Socialism were to blow from England over the
Continent instead of the reactionary spirit of the last four
1
and.a half years."
In September and October of 1929 the nationalist
.parï¬des of Germany undertook to defeat the Young Plan which
was to readjust the reparation payments to make them easier
1Daily Herald (London), May 28, 1929, p. 3-
- Si!
for Germany. They hoped to defeat it by collecting enough
signatures on a petition to have the question submitted to
the voters. The 2ailz_§ezgld believed that Hilter would be
the main benefactor from the campaign in which supernational-
ism would play so large a part. He was the; most extreme of
the nationalists and would thus draw heavily from the ranks of
his nationalist‘allies.2 The failure of the petition cam-
paign was seen by the Labour Party as not only a defeat for
the Nazis but a disaster for their cause. It admitted that
Hitler had made some gains among the workers in the indus-
trial areas of Saxony and Thuringia and in the rural areas of
the East and North where signatures had been gained by intim-
idation. Labour found it significant that in.Munich, the home
of the Nazis, only 6.2 percent of the electorate signed the
petition.
Local elections held in Germany during November 1929
'brought increases in the Nazi vote. In Berlin the increase
vwas explained by the extremist parties exploitation of a
government scandal. However, the M W was at a loss
tn: explain the results from a number of Rhineland towns where
tflie signatures for the petition the previous month had been
â€ridiculously few," but in the municipal elections the Nazis
zygily Egzglï¬ (London), October 21, 1929. P-3-
3Daily ï¬ergld (London), October 3l, 1929, Po 3.
*
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52
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had polled several thousand votes.
The next German crisis in which Labour took an interest
was the election campaign in the summer of 1930. Labour be-
lieved Germany was moving towards a decisive struggle between
Democracy and dictatorship and the September election would be
the first engagement of that conflict.5 The British Socialists
saw more meaning in this German election than just the future
of the German Republic. They believed that if Germany were
to overthrow a democratic government and turn to a fascist
dictatorship as Italy had done eight years before, it would
prove the Bolsheviks right when they claimed the Socialists
had misplaced their faith in democracy and that class war
was inevitable.6
The Labourites during the summer of 1930 became increas-
ingly alarmed at the growing strength of the Nazis demonstrated
by the recent local elections.7 The 23111,§§2gl§,predicted
that the campaign would be a violent one due to the growing
strength of the two extremist parties--the Communists and the
8
Nazis.
hDgilx Egrgld (London), November 19, 1929, P- 3.
5W. N. Ewer, "Hindenburg--the Mailed Fist Again," Daily
Eyzmgld (London), July 7, 1930, p. 13.
_ 6Emile Vandervelde, "Where is Germany Going?" Labour
W, IX (September, 1930), p. 226.
7Ib1d., p. 226.
8Dgil1 Egrgld (London), July 9, 1930, Do 3-
A
As the election drew near the British Socialists began
to become pessimistic about the future of German democracy.
They believed that a Nazi success would pull the other parties
to the Right. They thought that the Nazi parliamentary group
would try to create an impossible situation so to force the
disorganized parties of the Center to make a choice between
supporting the Constitution or becoming more nationalistic
and cooperating with the Right to overthrow the Weimar
Kepublic. Labour saw the Center parties as too weak to resist
the pull to the Right. The former Democratic Party in order
to retain a few seats in the Hgichspgg, was being absorbed
into a new party in which nationalism was the main plank.
Stresamann's old party, the People's Party, since his death
was returning to its former position as ". . . the Party of
heavy industry, of the great capitalist bourgeoisie, which
at heart hates democracy, suffers the Republic, and is ready
for anything, even Fascism, in order to maintain its class
domination." The Center Party's ambiguous position and its
tendency to the Right made it untrustworthy in time of crisis
to rely on to support the Republic. The British Socialists,
however, believed, or at least hoped, that the Social
Democrats would save the Republic. The party which ". . .
gained mastery over Bismarck. . .rid itself of the thenzollerns
9Vandervelde, Labou; has i , p. 226.
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. . .subdued the "putschists" in 1920. . .saved the hepublic
at the time of the Ruhr occupation" would again overcome its
adversaries in the September 1h election.10
In spite of the optimism voiced concerning the strength
of the Social Democrats, the Labourites still could not avoid
alarm over what was at least the possible outcome of the
election. Like most others they predicted the Nazis would win
from forty to eighty seats in the new Kgichstag.ll Un the eve
of the election the Qgily Herald editorially expressed the
fear that all Europe would be affected by the German election
in that even the responsible Right might abandon the policies
of Stresamann and become more nationalistic. They were also
alarmed at the attacks on the German Constitution and saw the
possibility for the establishment of a reactionary aggressive
government, a dictatorship, or even the restoration of the
12
monarchy in Germany.
The results of the election surpassed even Labour's
worst fears. The Nazis' parliamentary group grew from the
twelve elected in 1928 to not the forty or even eighty pre-
dicted, but to one hundred and seven, makini it the second
log—m. ,~' pp. 226-2270
111231;; m (London), September 13, 1930, p. 3.
121b1d., p. a.
6
largest party in Germany. The Nazi Party after this election
was a force that every group had to take into account in
considering Germany's actions in the future.
CHAPTER II
53 HAZIS BiCChE A TiREAT
The results of the German election showed the Nazis to
be surprisingly strong and caused Labour to begin to reflect
seriously on the political troubles of Germany and to fear for
its democratic government. Although Labour did not believe the
Nazis to be an immediate threat to the Social Democrats, it
found it particularly significant that the Nazis polled such
a large proportion of their votes from the group around the
age of twenty who had not voted in the previous election.l
Labour was alarmed by the fact that eleven million out of
thirty-five million German voters cast their ballots for
anti-democratic parties.2
In the days following the Nazi election victory, the
2g1l1,ߤ;gld_was full of articles giving descriptions and
details about the "mystery man" who was now the leader of
Germany's second largest party and speculating as to the reel
program of his party. The writers could find no detailed
program of what the Uazis would do, but only vague references
to "more room for the German people" and other general
3
"jingoistic, anti-democratic, and anti-Semitic plans."
1Daily Eergld (London), September 15, 1930, p. 8.
2m herein (London), September 16, 1930, p. e.
33. N. Ewer, "Germany Jingo Problem," Dgily Herald
kLondon), September 16, 1930, p. 9.
The Labourites found hope in the belief that now that
the Nazis were a large opposition party it would accept the
responsibilities of such a position and think out a practical
policy. Their hope was strengthened when Iitler himself
warned his followers to go slowly now that victory was near.
Eitler believed that the next election, which he expected in
about a year, would bring overwhelming victory to the Nazis.
Labour was particularly disturbed by what it feared
would be the affect of the Nazi victory upon international
relations. France would become more nervous about Germany,
and would harden its attitude on disarmament. In Germany
Labour feared there would be increased pressure brought on
the Government to declare the Young Plan unworkable and to
demand revision of it. This particular point had won millions
of votes for both the Nazis and the Communists in the last
election.5
As things began to settle down in the weeks after the
election the fear of a Nazi "putsch" faded and the stock
market began to steady itself again, although Reichsbank
shares which before the election were 247 were a week after
it still at 230. Labour, relieved because an immediate Nazi
hDgily Egrglg {London}, September 17, 1930, p. 9.
5W. N. Ewer, "Men and Things Abroad,†Daily Eeralg
(London), September 19, 1930, p. 13.
9
revolt seemed unlikely, was still worried by the support that
Hitler was drawing from the army and industry.6
Labour was both relieved and alarmed towards the end of
September 1930 by Hitler's testimony at the treason trial of
three Nazi army officers. At the trial Hitler declared that
his party planned to seize power only through constitutional
means, but also threatened that "heads will roll" when the
Nazis take power and that the Nazis would refuse to recognize
any of the treaties and would break and evade them by all
means. The revolution would follow the constitutional
acquisition of power.7 An editorial in the 2a;lx,Egza1Q
stated that this new policy of waiting might cause some of
the more fanatical members of the party to split away.8
During the remainder of 1930 Labour was not so concerned
with the threat of a Nazi takeover in Germany as they were
with the danger of a dictatorship being set up by the Chen-
cellor Heinrich Bruning with the approval of President Paul
von Hindenburg. Brï¬ning, it felt, was planning to suspend
ï¬gighgpgg and rule Germany through the emergency powers of
the Constitution, as he did not have a majority (without the
62g111,§gzglï¬,(London), September 22, 1930, p. 8.
72gi1x,§§relg_(London), September 26, 1930, p. 1.
8MW (London), September 26, 1930, p. 8.
10
Nazi vote) to get the cabinet's financial program through the
legislature. British Labour hoped that Brflning would change
his program enough so the German Socialists could support it
and thus avoid a dictatorial government that the Qgily Herald
predicted would be ". . .more absolute than the Bonanzollern
Nonarchy." Many felt that a dictatorship was inevitable for
Germany and in Germany even supporters of parliamentary
government favored a "dictatorship by consent" in order to
avert a "dictatorship by force." A Labour columnist believed
the Nazis would play an important role in bringing about a
dictatorship, not because they would be a part of it, but
because they served as a menace to secure the reluctant
10
consent of the Reichgtgg and the people.
As the winter of 1930 progressed this same writer again
said that the Nazis were increasing in strength as the misery
of the German people increased. Three things were working to
Hitler's advantage at that time. Firstly, there was the anti-
Polish feeling. Hitler was able to denounce the Poles violently
while the Government had to be tactful. Secondly, the imposition
of taxes by decree was making the Brï¬ning Government more and
more unpopular. Thirdly, the Nazis' ability to capitalize on
9De;;z Egg-gm (London), October 1, 1930, p. 1.
10W. N. Ewer, "Machine Guns May Rule Berlin!" Baily
'Hergld (London), November 7. 1930, Do 13.
mean
11
Germany's many problems both domestically and in foreign affairs
with vague slogans proved a large drawing point for them.11 By
the middle of December it was predicted that if an election were
to be held immediatley the Nazis would win at least 180 seats,
drawing support mainly from the middle and working classes who
were most affected by the increasing taxes, falling wages, and
rising unemployment.12
By January 1931 W. N. Ewer, the Daily Hggelg's diplomatic
correspondent, was predicting that the Nazis would be in the
government within two months and would dominate it. The
bourgeois parties were seeking Hitler's entry, but he would
come in only on his own terms, Ewer believed. Even if there
would be no Nazi Government in 1931, the leaders of the Nation-
alist and People's Parties and some from the Center Party were
beginning to use Hitler's language, so there would likely be
a Nazi foreign policy for Germany no matter what party formed
a government. This policy would involve demands for revision
of the Versailles Treaty, a Young Plan revision, parity in
armaments, and a very stiff policy towards Poland. Ewer
thought this would cause a very dangerous situation in
11W} N. Ewer, "Men and Things Abroad," Daily ngalg,
(London), December 5, 1930, p. 13.
12W, N, Ewer, "Men and Things Abroad," Daily E22219;
(London), December 12, 1930, p. 13.
mESX 2
12
13
Europe, considering France's likely reaction to it.
By April 1931 it again seemed to British Labour that
Hitler's party was in trouble. Eis lieutenant, Wilhelm Erick,
the Minister of Interior and Education in the Thuringie gov-
ernment, was forced to resign and a revolt with the party,
although put down, had distrupted it.lh A shift in the Nazi
tactics to try to take over the German trade union alarmed
the British Socialists. The Nazis, they said, were using the
Communist's method of setting up cells in unions and working
to win influencial positions for their members. Labourites
found this particularly dangerous to German democracy since
they believed the trade unions were the backbone of the
Weimar Republic.15
By'May Hitler no longer seemed to be a serious threat
in Germany. It appeared that Hitler had watered down his
program to such an extent with his declaration against un-
constitutional acts and his opposition to violence that the
Nazi revolution was off and it seemed he would lose many of
his fanatical followers. "It is not the Hitler menace," the
13W. N. Ewer, "Men and Things Abroad," Dgily Herald
(London), January 2, 1931, p. 13.
â€Egg Engels (London), April A. 1931, p. A; and
April 7, 1931, p. 7.
15"International Trade Union Notes and Labour Abroad."
Iaaheanhaeazina. DC (April. 1931). p. 572-
13
Daily Herald declared, "but the present half-veiled dictatorship
that is the danger to German democracy." Hitler was being used
by the reactionary forces in Germany and Hitler's followers
would ". . .one day wake up to find that they have been tools
of those very financial interests against which they thought
they were in revolt."16
The Nazi fortunes which seemed on the wane as late as
key, by June again began to increase due to the worsening
economic crisis. By the middle of the month Germany appeared to
be on the verge of revolution. It was feared that if the
economic crisis were not eased immediately by foreign aid to
Germany the Brflning Government would fall and that there would
be a "cold putggh" which would establish a dictatorship under
Alfred Hugenberg's Nationalists and Hitler's Nazis.l7
Hitler's fate fluctuated rapidly in the eyes of the
British Socialists, who seemed unduly alarmed at each Nazi
victory, and unduly hopeful at each Nazi setback. By August
1931 Hitler again appeared to be losing ground, Labour thought.
It was predicted that in the next election there would be a
large slump in the Nazi vote. The failure of an attempt in
16nA Waning Hero," ng11 Egzgld (London), May 9, 1931:
p. 8.
l7
23111,§e;a1§ (London), June 2, 1931, p. 1: and
July lb, 1931, p. 1.
mam
1A
Prussia of a referendum that would have dissolved the Prussian
Diet was seen as an important defeat for the Nazis, and that,
coupled with Eitler's followers' shock at his cooperation with
the Communists in the attempt, Labour thought, would cause him
to lose a great deal of influence as a political leader.18 A
Nazi-Communist success would have been a severe blow to Brflning,
"who is doing so much at home and abroad to serve his country's
highest interests by a policy of pacification and international
co-operation."19 (A strange comment about a man whom Labour
believed to be setting up a "half-veiled dictatorship."}
By November 1931 things were again looking dismal to the
Labour Party for the future of democracy in Germany. It felt
that an increase in the British tariff would throw another
million Germans out of work to Join the five million already
unemployed. If this were to happen it would probably mean
riots and a revolution of the Right or the Left, either of
which would result in the rggudiation of the Versailles Treaty
and the possibility of War. W. N. Ewer in November again
predicted that there would be Nazis in the cabinet, possibly
1823111 hemp. (London), August 7, 1931, p. 3: and
.August 10, 1931, p. 8.
19"Well Done," 2a111_ï¬grgld,(London}, August 10, 1931,
p. 8.
20C. Delisle Burns, "International Aspects.of the General
Election," in mm, A (November, 1931), p. 306.
mam
15
even Hitler, within a month. However, he believed it would not
be the old Bitler who ". . .talked of chopping off heads, but one
who comes quietly and constitutionally into the Government. . ."
The main reason of this entry was that negotiations were soon
to begin with France to study the matter of reparations, and
the German Government wanted the Right Wing parties to share
the responsibility for the negotiations and their results.21
By the end of the month rumors were beginning that
Eitler might oppose Hindenburg for the presidency. This
started with a refusal by Hitler to pledge Nazis support for
the old President's re-election.22 Hindenburg agreed to run
again in order to stop Hitler. It was believed that Hitler
would not dare run against him, as he would not have a chance
and.would suffer a severe rebuff. The Nazis, on the other hand,
had hoped that the President would step down and Hitler would
then.stsnd a good chance of being elected.23
The British Socialists again believed that the Nazis
1were losing ground. This time their reversal was due to a move
by Braning. He threatened the Nazis with martial law and a
state of siege if they did not stop their terrorism. Yahereas
21W} N. Ewer, "Ken and Things Abroad," Daily Herald
(london), November 3, 1931, p. 8.
222a111,Eerald (London), November 27, 1931, p. 3.
2323111,E§zald (London), December 11, 1931, p. 1.
was“
‘4-4——_
16
a few weeks before it had seemed that there were only two
alternatives--to invite the Nazis to join the Government, or a
Nazi march on the capital-—now, enjoying the supgort of the
Socialists because of his stand against the Nazis, Brï¬ning
was able to put across his unpopular economic program and thus
avoid a crisis. The author of an article on this situation
hoped the Brï¬ning Govermment would be able to hold out until
the French, the British, and the Americans realized that it
was in their own interest to wipe out the reparations and to
lend Germany more money so she could once again put herself on
a firm financial footing. He thought Germany would not "crash"
as long as the Social Democrats continued to support the
Brï¬ning Government. However, he predicted, if Germany did
collapse she would bring the rest of Europe down with her.2h
In another feature article, the Berlin correspondent
for the 2ailx.flarald.explored the Nazi program and its appeal.
By offering something to everyone Hitler was able to amass a
large following, he found. He was alarmed by the attitude of
many Germans that since the other parties had tried and
failed to cure Germany's ills Hitler should be given his chance.
The people were in a mood for change and the method did not
really matter so much. Much of Hitler's strength was based, he
2"*Vernon Bartlett, "Fill Germany Crash?" Dailx.§ara1d
(London), December 18, 1931, p. 8.
17
believed, on the lack of courage in the middle class parties.
They know that his program was pure nonsense, but many were
willing to let him come into office where they figured he
would disappoint his followers as soon as he had to face the
political and economic realities. They believed it was useless
to try to stop his advance by fighting him, but his movement
would collapse under the weight of governmental responsibility.
This correspondent, however, was worried about the terrible
harm Hitler might do to Germany and the rest of the world in
the meantime. Only by standing firm could the government
convince the German people that Hitler's time had not come
25
and would not come, he said.
In early January 1932 Ewer predicted that 1932 would be
Hitler's year, bringing his triumph or his collapse. It was
hard to say which-~"He might prove to be only Boulanger or he
might prove to be a I-Iussolini."26
The German presidential race dominated the attention of
the Labour Party during the first quarter of the year. Braning
attempted to outmaneuver Hitler by proposing that two-thirds of
the Epiphgtgg_should re-elect Hindenburg and thus avoid a
strenuous campaign. Hitler refused to go along with the plan
2.5"Hitler's Land of Promise--Thy He is an Idol,"
2&111,§p2gld (London), December 29, 1931, p. 6.
26W. N. Ewer, "To-day's Men of Destiny," Daily EGQQLQ
(London), January 8, 1931, p. 8.
meal 2
18
and it was defeated in the joghstag by the Nazis and the
Hugenberg Nationalists. It was doubtful in early January
whether Hindenburg would run in a public election, and certainly
not as a candidate of one party. After the failure of his first
plan, Brï¬ning proposed to present the old President as the
candidate of all parties except the Communists. There was some
doubt whether the Socialists would support this plan.27 The
Nazis did not approve of this plan either, but for some weeks
they would not state definitely whether they planned to present
a candidate of their own. It seemed throughout the last part
of January that they would probably nominate some candidate,
possibly with the idea of a compromise in mind. No one was
sure if Bitler, or even Bindenburg, would be a candidate. It
was thought that Hitler did not wish to run as he believed it
would be a serious political blunder to oppose Hinderburg, but
the extremist wing of his party was pushing him.into it.28 The
controversy continued well into February. In the early part of
that month it was discovered that some time before Hitler had
been made a minor official of Thuringia, thus also a citizen of
29
Germany and legally able to run for the presidency. However,
27222.11): M (London). January 9, 1932, p. 1; and
January 12, 1932, p. l.
2823;11_E§LQlQ (London), January 14, 1932, p. 1; and
January 30, 1932, p. 9.
29§§111,§era1d (London), February 4, 932, p. 1.
mssxs
19
for a while it was still believed that his lieutenant Frick
would run in the first election to split the vote in the hope
that Hindenburg would then withdrew and Zilter could replace
Frick on the second ballot.30 Hindenburg finally announced his
candidacy on February 15, 1932. The German Socialists withheld
their support for him until it was clear that the Right Wing
was going to nominate a candidate of its own.31 Hitler at
last announced his candidacy on February 22.
The Labour Party press followed these developments in
Germany with a great deal of interest. it tended to agree
that Hitler had made a mistake by running against Hindenburg.
It believed, or at least hoped, that this would mean the end
of Hitler as an important political force in Germany.32
In an editorial on the eve of the election, the Dgily
Efgrald expressed its doubts about Hitler's ability to impose
iris "Third Reich" on Germany even if he should win. If he
sfluauld lose it hinted that he probably would not be able to
33
hold his party together.
3023112,Ee1a11,(London1, February 10, 1932, p. 9.
3121ill.§§£§£§ (London), February 16, 1932, p. 6.
323. W. fostgate, "Germany-~aCountry in Search of
Itself," Dgilx herald (London), march 7, 1932, p. 8.
33"Germany's Choice," Dajlx Eï¬rflld (London), march 12,
1932. no 8-
was“
all!"
20
In the first election iinderburg missed an absolute
majority by less than one percent and British Labour saw the
election as a defeat for the Nazis who, the Daily Hepald
reported, were so sure they would win that they were pre-
paring a ggpp,g'eta . The Nazis, however, did increase their
vote considerably over the results of the 1930 Reichstag
election. Labour attributed this increase to the fact that
there were fewer parties involved in this election}!+
The results of the next election were a foregone con-
clusion. There was no doubt that Hindenburg would win. Even
Hitler admitted that he did not have a chance of winning.35
The British Socialists believed the decisive defeat of
Hitler was due to the ". . .discipline and strength of the
Social Democrats." Their support of Hinderburg, dispite the
fact that he opposed many of the ideals for which they stood,
36
:made his victory possible.
â€261.111 Eerald (London). I~-«‘arch 11+. 1932, p. 1; and
march 15, 1932, p. 9.
35Dailx Iierald (London). April 9, 1932, p. 9.
6 , "_ . _ ‘
3 "Hitler's Next Round," Dgily mgzaJQ (London),
April 11, 1932, p. e.
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CEABTER III
THE NAZlS--A apruns 6h 3;:Iarrpv
The election chaos in Germany did not end with the
reelection of Hindenburg as President. A number of state
elections, most importantly the Prussian election, were
scheduled for April 2A, 1932. Judging from the gains Hitler
had made in the presidential election it was expected that the
Hazis would make large gains in their representation in the
various state legislatures. It was hoped that many of those
who had voted for Hitler would be discouraged by his defeat
and drift away from his party or return to their old parties,
but it was still expected the Nazi vote would be large. The
Hitlerites were particularly interested in Prussia because it
contained four-fifths of the German population and was the key
1
to Germany.
Even the suppression of the Nazi storm troops shortly
after the presidential election by order of Einderburg did
not prevent the Nazis from greatly increasing their vote.2
In Prussia they increased their representation from.seven to
one hundred sixty two, which made them the largest party but
did not give them an absolute majority to enable them to form
a government. The Daily herald did not believe that Hilter
lQaill,§§zgld,(London), April 19, 1932, p. 6.
22allz.harald (London), April 14, 1932, p. 1
VES“
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22
would be able to get the co-operation of enough parties to
enable him to form a coalition government. It hoped a dead-
lock would follow which would allow the old government under
the Social Democrat, Ctto Braun, to continue provisionally but
indefinitely.3
During May 1932 governmental conditions in Germany grew
more chaotic. The Braun Government in Prussia resigned and,
as no party or coalition was large enough to form a new
government, affairs remained disrupted there. It was also during
hay that the Braning Government resigned. Labour saw both of
these events as steps towards dictatorship. It thought
Eindenburg planned to replace a democratic government with a
". . .cabal of Junkers and generals, largely personal friends,
which will have no chance of a parliamentary majority."4
With the appointment on.May 31 of Franz von Papen as
Chancellor, the British Socialists saw Germany taking another
step to the Right. They believed, however, that although the
Papen Government would have reactionary tendencies it would
oppose the Nazis as well as the Socialists and the Communists.
They also expected that there would be an early dissolution of
the Epighgpgg,as the new government could expect a defeat there
3"Prussia's Next Step," _gily_§gzgld (London), April 26,
1932, p. 8.
ADaily ngg d (London), hay 31, 1932, p. l.
Elf-.81
23
very quickly. In a new election it was feared that the Nazis
would.make large gains once again and might possibly, with
their Nationalist allies, be able to secure an absolute
majority.5 Papen did dissolve the Reichstag within a few days
and Germany entered another period of electoral chaos. The
problem in Prussia continued also with rumors that the dead-
lock might be broken with the appointment of a federal
commissioner. The Daily Egrald,felt this was merely a ploy
to set up a diCtatorship under the pretext of preserving
order.
The Lapghrjï¬ggazin§,examined the situation in Prussia
in some detail in its June 1932 edition. The desire for a
ggpp de533 was strong among many of the Nazis, it said. A
great number of the storm troops were becoming impatient with
the effort to take over the government legally. They wanted
to seize power immediately. However, as the Nazi vote
increased the clamor for a coup lessened. The Communists held
the key in the Prussian Diet. If they could be persuaded to
forget their slogan that the Social Democrats were their arch-
enemies then they might help vote down a Nationalist-Nazi
Government. However, if they abstained it would mean the Hazis
Bhadllharald (London). June 1, 1932, p. 1.
61am herald (London). June h, 1932, p. 1.
mesa
'14 T. 015‘
[5(-
2h
7
and their allies would have an absolute majority.
Throughout June British Labour thought the end of the
German Republic was near and that civil war was imminent. It
believed that it was Papen's plan to establish a military
dictatorship which would lead to a restoration of the
thenzollern dynasty. If the coming election failed to give a
Right Wing majority, Labour thought it entirely likely that
the W might be quickly dissolved again, and the new
cabinet remain in office for years without the legislature.
They also forecast that within a few months a majority of
the new ministers would be removed and replaced by
Nationalists and Nazis. However, Hitler himself would not be
allowed to take an office as the Right Wing was using him tg
come to office with no intention of allowing him any power.
It was feared that a civil war.might break out over
the question of the ban on Nazi uniforms by the Bavarian
State Government. The Papen Government lifted the ban on
uniforms imposed by Brï¬ning. The Bavarian Government,
however, refused to comply and continued to outlaw the
wearing of uniforms. The Nazis refused to obey and riots and
disorders broke out. Federal Government threats to call out
- 7M3! Jesthal "Where is Germany Going?" Labgflz
I“*aaéilzilnc-a.141(June, 1932), pp. 58-59.
8Dgilz Hezald (London), June 6, 1932, pp. 1-2.
mesa
25
the Civil Guard if any attempt were made by the Federal
Government to lift the ban by force.9
During July as the election set for the last day of that
month drew nearer, Labour's idea of what was happening in
Germany became.more and more uncertain. It thought for a while
that Papen would be removed along with several members of his
cabinet and replaced by Nazis who.might be inclined to support
the agreements entered into at Lausanne on reparations. This
might have the affect, Labour believed, of splitting the Nazi
Party, as several of Hitler's lieutenants, such as Joseph
Goebbels and Gregor Strasser, had already beg un to violently
10
attack the agreement.
On July 19 an alleged Nazi plot to overthrow the Govern-
ment was exposed. It was to take place election night if the
results warranted it. If the Right Wing parties were to win
a majority it was planned to make the ex-Crown Prince the head
of the Government. Hitler would not join the cabinet but would
remain as head of his party. It was then planned to abolish
the Republican Constitution. If the parties of the extreme
Right did not win a majority then Eitler intended to present
(London), June 18 1932, p. 9; June 25,
1932, p. 9D9, and â€T we 27, 1932, p. 9. ’
lohallx.harald.(Londonl. J'uly 12, 1932, p. 1.
mas-3x:
26
an ultimatum to the Government. He would demand that the
Government transfer all its power to the army and to his private
army, the S.A. Should the Government refuse to obey, Hitler
believed himself strong enough to resort to violence. The
Right Wing leaders did not think the Labor movement or any other
opponent was strong enough to resist.11
The takeover of the Prussian Government that Labour had
feared took place on July 20. An editorial in the 2gily,H§;ald
denounced the move because it set up a dictatorship in which
Papen as self-appointed ruler held more power in Germany than
had the Kaiser. With Prussia under control, the editorial said,
it would be relatively easy to dominate the south German States.
The main reason for the takeover was to gain control of the
Prussian police force. The editorial believed the move could
have been prevented and.might still be reversed if the German
working-class would unite to oppose it. Unfortunately the
Communists refused to cooperate and were, therefore, responsible
for the weakened position of German Labor. It was still not too
late to stop Hitler, British Labour asserted, if the working-
12
class would put up a united front.
â€Pails herald (London). July 19. 1932, p. 9.
12"Germany in Chains," Dgily Eprgld,(London}, July 21,
1932, p. 8.
DIES! 2
54
.rfl"-‘
27
As the election drew near and Hitler still had not made
a dramatic gesture to gain control of the Government, British
Labour began to question how much of a threat Hitler really was.
W. N. Ewer reported that the 3.3. was ready to move but Hitler
was not able to make a decision. He claimed Hitler was a man
of words and not action. He preferred to play politics, to
Join a coalition, and to become "respectable." Ewer was not
sure whether or not Hitler's more fanatical lieutenants would
allow him to do this. hany of then were tired of waiting and
wanted action at any cost. The correspondent was not certain
the Government could put down a Nazi pppï¬gh, as Papen claimed,
for no one was sure where the army stood.l3 In another article
a few days later Ewer was even more positive that Hitler was
losing control of his party. If he did not take decisive action
in the next few days, Ewer said, he was finished. He.might have
". . .a future as a useful.mob orator of the Reaction--as a
glorified Boy Scout leader, even as a respectable party politican.
But the dream of a "Third Reich," with "Our Adolf," as its leader
and dictator, of "heads rolling in the sand," are going to
14
vanish rapidly."
13W. N. Ewer, "Hitler's Army Pressing for Instant Coup,"
nglz m (London), July 28, 1932, p. l.
14W. N. Ewer, "Hitler's Last Chance to Seize Power,"
Haï¬z W (London), July 28, 1932, p. l.
'\
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28
General Kurt von Schleicher, the flinister of War, was
coming to be recognized during the last part of July as the
real power in Germany. He was referred to as "a twentieth cen-
tury Bismarck." It was reported that he had no intention of
allowing Hitler to come to power. He found the Nazis useful
in weakening the Socialists and the Communists and in helping
to destroy parliamentary government. However, once they had
served their purpose he meant to "crush them." If they
attempted a coup he would order them fired on. Schleicher
figured there would be no majority in the new Rpichstag so he,
as the head of the government, would be able to rule by decree.
He planned to put a couple of "safe and gentlemanly" Nazis in
his cabinet and to give a number of minor offical Jobs to other
Nazis. This would leave Hitler and the other leading Nazis
stranded with their organization split.15
The results of the election were interpreted by the
Daily,§§;gld as fulfilling its prediction that the German
people would crush Hitler's hopes of becoming dictator. "The
wave of Nazi popularity," the newspaper said, "has been
checked. . .the reactionary Papen-Schleicher dictatorship is
16
likely to go on." There was talk that Hitler was planning to
15.12am herald (London). July 27, 1932, p. 9.
16Ball}: herald (London). August 1, 1932, p. l.
masx
29
present an ultimatum to the Papen Government demanding a Nazi
Chancellor and Minister of Interior. In spite of the fact that
the Nazi newspapers were talkingbig, Hitler, himself, the Qgggy
ngald thought, had lost his momentum and was merely going
though the forms demanded by his party. General Schleicher was
in control of the situation, it was believed, and was acting
while Hitler hesitated. Rumors said that the Government was
going to ask the Rpichgtgg for dictatorial powers and would
need the support of the Nazis for that. They were willing to
buy the necessary Nazi votes with a ministry or two.1
Although Labour thought ï¬itler had reached his zenith
they admitted that he had done amazingly well in the polling
and expressed shock that over twenty million people in Germany
had voted for parties with revolutionary programs. Uispite the
.fact that the revolutionary trend had been checked, Labour still
saw much trouble for Germany in the near future.
The desire for equality of armaments was most alarming
to Labour. It feared that if the Disarmament Conference did
not soon find a plan to disarm the other nations to the level
of Germany, then Germany would begin to rearm to their level.
A Germany which was too poor to meet her reparation obligations
‘was in no financial position to undertake a large rearmament
_g 17WLN. Ewer, "The Reichstag May Never Meet," Daily
Eï¬zald,(London), August 2, 1932, p. 1.
30
18
program.
There were constant rumors during the latter half of 1932
that the Nazi Party was spliting because of Hitler's fear of
exerting himself to demand the Chancellery. It was said that
Hitler was afraid if he became Chancellor he might fail to
improve conditions in Germany, and thus ruin himself and the
party. Gregor Strasser, his second in command, reproached
him for this attitude and threatened to split the party if he
refused.19 In an interview with Rindenburg, Hitler refused to
accept a position in Iapen's cabinet as Vice Chancellor along
with several ministries for his followers. He told Hindenburg
he would only accept the Chancellorship, but he promised to
take no illegal acticn and agreed to give his Storm Troops an
eight day leave of absence, thereby ending the threat of a
20
putggh which was feared.
It was rumored that Hitler had suffered a nervous
breakdown because of his inability to decide what course of
action to follow, from the pressure on him to act, and his
.lose of prestige among his followers. It was believed that
18"Gemany's Next. Step,†g: I! H§2§;g (London), August 2,
1932. p. 8-
192§Lll.§£1hlï¬.iLondon), August 11, 1932, p. l.
202all1.hsrald.(London). Ausust 15. 1932. p. 9.
mash
31
21
Strasser had taken over the party. This rumor was soon dis-
counted, but it illustrated the low position to which Labour
believed Hitler had sunk during the summer of 1932.
It was thought towards the end of August that if a Kazi
were to become Chancellor now it would not be Hitler, but
probably Strasser who was at that time carrying out negotiations
with Brï¬ning in an attempt to form a coalition between the Nazis
and the Catholic Center Party for the Reichspag and the Prussian
Diet.22 They did, in fact, form a coalition in order to elect
a Nazi, Herman Ggring, Speaker of the Epighï¬pgg, The Nazis
were on their best behavior during the opening of the Reichstgg
as they want to give Hindenburg no excuse to dissolve it.23
I“levertheless, Hindenburg gave Papen a decree dissolving the
body to be used at his discretion. Papen planned to use it to
forestall Hitler while he made a direct appeal to the Nazis,
already discontent with their leader's hesitation. The
Chancellor hoped a strong demand to rearm Germany, presented
to the other nations at the Disarmament Conference, would rzily
around him supporters from many of the nationalist parties.
This move by Papen pushed the Nazis and the Center Party closer
21262521 herald (London). August 26, 1932, p. l.
zzPallx herald (London). August 30, 1932, p. 9.
232§1l1,§§1a11 {London}, August 31, 1932, p. 9.
zhhallx herald (London), September 1, 1932, p. 1.
was
n.'-'"- lr‘ O-I
32
in their effort to adopt a program so that they could present
the President with request that they be allowed to form a
Government. The Center Party regarded the Chancellor, Papen,
as a traitor to their Party, but would not form a coalition
with Hitler unless he gave definite guarantees that he would
respect the Constitution.25 It was believed that Hindenburg
would not accept such a coalition, especially as it was
rumored that Papen was attempting to form a new party made up
of Right Wing groups such as the Spgnlhelm, the Crown Prince
and his brothers, except Prince Auggst Wilhelm who was a Nazi,
and most of the war-time generals.2 As September passed it
became more evident that Hindenburg would not appoint a Nazi-
Center coalition to replace the Papen Government.27 By the
middle of the month the dissolution of the Reighgtag seemed
near. Hindenburg asked the Nazi and Center Parties if they
would support the Papen Government in view of the crisis
caused by France's absolute refusal to consider Germany's
demand for abrogation of the armament restrictions of the
'Versailles Treaty. When Hitler and Brï¬ning refused, the
W was dissolved the next day, September 12, but not
252mm herald (London), September 1, 1932, p. 2.
2622;;1,§§§glg_(London), September 2, 1932, p. 1.
272§£;1_§§£gld (London), September 8, 1932, p. 2.
mssr
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33
before the Bpiphspgg,voted down the Government. A brief dispute
arose over which of the two acts took precedent. It was settled
when Ggring called a meeting for the next day. Papen threatened
to send troops to occupy the building, so Ggring withdrew the
Summons.28
The election for the Rpighgpgg,was to take place on
November 6; as the date approached it appeared to the British
Labourites that the Nazis were increasing their violence in
order to have the election postponed. The Nazis feared a loss
of votes (the 23.11 mm estimated up to two million) if the
election was to be held on schedule. host of those votes, it
said, would go to the Communists as there was a great deal of
discontent among the Left Wing of the Kazis.29
Labour interpreted the election as the turning of the
tide for the Nazis. They estimated from the incomplete returns
on election night that the Nazis would lose about twenty per
cent of their July 1932 vote. Nazi hopes of breaking the
Epiphgpgg deadlock were now shattered.30
The November election did in fact do nothing to solve
2822111,§§1§Ld (London), September 12, 1932, p. l; and
September 13, 1932, p. 1.
2923111 W (London) November 5, 1932, p. 9.
â€Paid: herald (London) November 7. 1932, p. 1.
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the deadlock in the Epiphgpgg, Papen's position was weakened
by the election and almost all of the political parties were
demanding his removal. However, he still remained a favorite
of the President, and there was some speculation that the
Bpiphï¬pgg might again be dismissed and Papen given dictatorial
control by emergency decree.31 However, he resigned on
Kovember l7, largely because he had only the support of about
ten per cent of the Epighgtgg which was not nearly enough.
Hindenburg hoped that by dismissing Papen he would remove all
the obstacles preventing Nazi and Center cooperation with the
32
Government.
For the rest of the month Labour could not decide
whether Hitler was on his way in or out. On November 19 the
Epilylgngld,reported that Hitler was meeting with Hindenburg
and that the chances were about even whether he would insist
on being Chancellor or would agree to support a cabinet headed
by a nominee of the President.33 however, the same day a
feature article by H. J. Laski appeared in this paper which
stated that Hitler and the Nazis were finished. He said if
they came into the cabinet they would be quickly submerged by
_ 312ailx,§§zald (London), November 8, 1932, p. 9; and
November 1a, 1932, p. 2.
322ailz Eezald (London), November 18, 1932, p. l.
332ailx,§£rald_(London), November 19, 1932, p. 3.
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the Right Wing forces and lose their Socialist appearance. If
they attempted a gggp,d'§ta§ they would be beaten by ". . . com-
bination of General Schleicher and General Strike." He saw
Hitler as a man of words who was afraid of action, and as a
puppet used by reactionary big business. Hitler was a symbol
of the discontent of Germany, but now he was proved a fraud.
He was ". . .a cheap conspirator rather than an inspired
revolutionary, the creature of circumstances rather than the
maker of destiny." Laski concluded: "Accident apart, it is
not unlikely that Hitler will end his career as an old man in
some Bavarian village, who in the Eigzggztgn in the evening,
tells his intimates how he nearly overturned the German Reich."3[+
Two days later the same paper was predicting that Hitler would
be Chancellor within a week. This was due, it said, to a change
in his position. He now tried to appear as a moderate to the
old President. In an interview with Hindenburg, Hitler
abandoned his claim to dictatorial powers and denounced the Nazi
election violence. The main stumbling block now was his demand
for a complete prohibition of the Communist Party. It was
feared that this would only strengthen that group.35 The
following day it seemed again that Hitler was out, having been
BAH. J. Laski, "Hitler-~3ust a Figureheed," Daily Herald
(London), November 19, 1932, p. 8.
352g1l1,§§231ï¬ (London), November 21, 1932, p. 9.
mes
1-...°
-kï¬
36
"lured into a trap" by Hindenburg. He told Hitler in a ten
minute interview that he would appoint him Chancellor if he
could obtain ". . .a homogeneous, strong majority with a well-
connected program." Hitler knew immediately that he had been
tricked as this was an impossible task, especially in view of
the fact that Eugenberg, the leader of the Nationalists, had
told the President he would not support the Nazi-Center
coalition.36 It was rumored that Papen had been Hindenburg's
chief advisor in drawing up the condition which Hitler had
found impossible to accept.37 The following day, November 2h,
it was reported that Hitler was ready to accept the Chancellor-
ship at any price. Hitler had changed his demand that a cabinet
must be supported by the Beighstgg,and advocated a Presidential
Cabinet such as Papen had. Hitler wanted to head this cabinet,
but was willing to accept all Hindenburg's conditions, in-
cluding carrying out Papen's economic program and emergency
decrees. This was the same program Hitler had been attacking
for months. The reason for this sudden change, according to
the 2gilx,§§zgln, was that Hitler found his entire political
and military organization on the verge of financial collapse.
He could no longer pay salaries and feared a revolt and mass
36Daily Herald (London), November 22, 1932. p. 1.
37D§111 ngalq (London), November 23, 1932. Po 9-
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desertion. He knew he could only prevent this by securing places
for his lieutenants in a new cabinet, and for the storm troopers
jobs in the police or a so-called "voluntary working service."
The paper doubted that the President would accept his offer.38
The next day Eindenburg gave a "clear and final" refusal to
appoint Hitler Chancellor. By Hovember 28 it was certain that
Schleicher would head the new cabinet.39 It was officially
announced on December 2 that Schleicher would be appointed
Chancellor. The Nazis announced they would fight him as they
had fought Papen. Since the Nazis and the Communists held a
majority in the Bï¬ighspag,it was expected Hindenburg would
dissolve it very quickly.“0 It soon began to be rumored that
although the Nazis would publicly oppose the new Government,
behind the scene Goring and Schleicher would work together
and perhaps a dissolution would not be necessary.41
Throughout the remainder of the year and on into January
1933 the Nazi Party was struck by a crisis that threatened to
split it badly. The difficulty arose over dissatisfaction with
Hitler's handling of affairs. The leader of the dissatisfied
382E1l1.H§3§1d (London), November 24, 1932, p. 9-
39E§ilx,§§zald (London), November 25, 1932, p. 9.
h02§111,§§3§ld,(hondon), December 3, 1932, p. 1.
“12am m (London), December 5, 1932, p. 2.
was
U. “I
38
faction was the second most influential man in the party,
Gregor Strasser. British Labour believed that if Strasser left
the party it would be so badly divided that its predominance in
Germany would end}2 The Dgilz,§gxalï¬,reported Hitler was
living in "hourly terror" of an attempt to remove him as leader
of the party. Strasser was said to be in Home seeking the
support of Mussolini in his fight with Hitler.43 It appeared
to the British Socialists that the Nazi Party was beginning to
fall apart. There were reports of mass desertions and of a
large unpaid debt. They believed that if there were no great
events in Germany during 1933 and if the Government could
improve Germany's economic position and reduce unemployment,
the Nazis would again fall to the second or third party in
Germany, far behind the Socialist.hh The trouble in the Nazi
Party became so serious that by the beginning of 1933 there
were reports of open warfare between Hazis and of Schleicher's
idea of bringing Strasser into his cabinet as Deputy Chancellor
#5
to further split the Nazis. The Daily Egzgld,believed, how-
ever, that Hitler's chance of becoming Chancellor might actually
422a1114E§211Q_(London}, December 9, 1932, p. l.
432ailx,§erald,(10ndon}, December 17, 1932, p. 9.
M‘.4|?_.aj.,l.1,Ei_'§.::a.'|_si,(London), December 27, 1932, p. 2.
452a111_ï¬azald (London), January 3, 1933, p. 3.
“mes
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39
improve with the decay of his party. Previously he had been
too powerful, but in January 1933 as he was losing supporters
he was becoming more willing to compromise}6
As January went on the Schleicher Government became more
and more unstable and soon there was speculation as to whom his
successor would be. It was thought that Papen would again be
appointed, but as he was "the most hated man in Germany"
Eindenburg's advisers feared trouble if he were to once again
head a government. As late as the day before he became
Chancellor the Daily E§2a1ï¬_was predicting that Hindenburg
would not appoint Hitler as his demands were still impossiblef+7
Thus, up to the day before Hitler was to be appointed as
Chancellor, the offical organ of the British Labour Party was
not sure whether he was on his way in or out. During the four
years that the Nazis grew from one of the smallest to the
largest party in Germany, Labour never really believed Hitler
‘would be successful in establishing any kind of permanent dic-
tatorship. They viewed the Nazis' growth with alarm and were
duly shocked by the violence and extremes of Hitler and his
followers, but they thought that if Hitler would come to power
he would moderate these abuses. They believed the responsibilites
“MM (London). Jarmary 9, 1933. p. 2.
â€MW (London). Jamuarv 27. 1933, p. l; and
January 30, 1933, p. l.
40
of office would make a respectable politician of him. They
were certain that if Hitler attempted to abuse his power his
Government would be brought down by the overwhelming power of
the Socialists, the Trade Unions, and the working classes in
general.
British Labour did not see Eitler as a strong, self-
asserting dictator, independent of all pressure such as
Lussolini, but as a weak, vacillating damagogue who was
supported and ruled by reactionary big business in Germany.
They were sure that if Hitler would come to office he would
not be allowed to carry out any part of his revolutionary
program that did not meet the approval of those behind him.
The Nazis had little or no effect on the Labour Party's
foreign policy during this early period. This was mainly be-
cause the radical changes the Kazis called for were not part
of offical German foreign policy, but merely the campaign
propaganda of an "out" party. Labour believed Hitler would
have to modify.many of his demands and threats if he ever pre-
sented them as official policy. It thought the enforcers of
the Treaty of Versailles, especially France, would allow no
unilateral changes in the Treaty. Thus, Labour thought if
Hitler'did come to power through.some chance, his program
would not be radically different from that of his reactionary
predecessors.
PART II: CONFUSICN AZ-ID VACILLATION, 1933-1936
ES
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ChAPlER IV
EITLER CONSOLIDATES HIS Povm'a
British Labour greeted Hitler's advent to the
Chancellery with a.mixture of foreboding, ridicule, and a
strong feeling or hope that he would quickly prove himself to
be the incompetent ex-housepainter his enemies had so long
claimed he would be. It felt he would not hold the office
long. It was also believed a number of factors would keep
Hitler in line. The first of these was the threat of general
strike by the working classes. This was already being urged
by the Communists. Hindenburg had only agreed to appoint
Hitler as Chancellor if he would have men such as Papen,
.Konstantin von Neurath, and Franz Seldte in his cabinet.
This would prevent him from following a purely National
Socialist program. Hindenburg also insisted that Hitler
should try to obtain the cooperation of the Bgighgtag_and with-
out expecting special powers under Article 48 of the Consti-
tution. Frick, the new Minister of the Interior, gave assurance
that.if the Government were overthrown by a parliamentry.majority,
the Constitution would be respected. He also stated that the
Nazi storm troops would not be incorporated in the police or the
l
armed.forces.
ngjly Eggglg (London), January 31, 1933, p. l.
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A feature article in the 2gily_§ngld the day after
Hitler came to power was entitled "Hitler--the Clown Who Wants
to Play Statesman." The author wondered how such a ridiculous
figure as Hitler with his "comic opera" background could really
expect to be the ruler of a great nation such as Germany. His
whole appeal was an illusion--"some trick in his voice, some
vibrant nuance, gives him an almost hypnotic power over his
listeners." Heuld Hitler last? The author could see nothing
in the public career of "little Adolf Hitler" to indicate that
he could escape the fate of his immediate predecessors.2
British Labour was alarmed very early by the steps Hitler
took with regard to German Labor. Ch his first day in office
he gave Hugenberg, the Minister of Economics and Agriculture,
dictatorial powers over the workers' wages and insurance. He
also dismissed the permanent Secretary of State at the Labor
lainistry, Dr. Grieser, who was noted for his cooperation with
the Trade Unions. The next day, February 1, Hitler announced
two FoureYear Plans, one in agriculture and one in industry.
He was vague in the details but did indicate that they would
4
include forced labor.
2Gordon Beckles, "Hitler--the Clown Who Wants to Play
Statesman," 2g111,h§zglg_(London), January 31, 1933, p. 8.
32ai11,ggrgld (London), February 1, 1933, p. l.
ADaily ngald (London), February 2, 1933. p. 1.
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As the Nazis' repressive measures grew during february
they were met by a universal denunciation by British Labour.
In spite of Hitler's promise to work within the Constitution,
Labour realized a Fascist state was rapidly being established
in Germany. It was particularly worried about the actions
Eitler was taking to supress the Socialists and the Communists
—-the two forces in Germany which Labour expected to stop
5
Lit]. er 0
William M. Citrine, the General Secretary of the British
Trade Union Congress, visited Berlin in February and reported
back many examples of Nazi dictatorship and terror. Citrine
believed that Hitler intended to retain power regardless of
the results of the March 5 general election. He predicted it
would be an election by intimidation as Nazis would take the
place of regular police "to maintain order" during the election.
British Labour looked on the entire election as a farce. Every-
one knew what the results would be. The terror and repression
used by the Nazis made it impossible for their opponents to run
an effective campaign. The election would make no difference
in Germany's political situation. Labour could see no possible
way that Hitler could get a majority. Yet, it predicted, he
5'Germany's Perils", Daily Egza Q (London), February 24,
19339 p- 10 '
6Daily Herald (London), February 2h, 1933. Do 13.
mas
#5
would carry on with or without the ï¬giphgpag,and irrespective
of the Constitution.7
The Reichstgg fire, which took place February 27, was
spotted immediately by Labour as a probable ruse by the Nazis
to discredit the Communists.8
An editorial in the 25111_H§:a1d denounced Nazi terror
and particularly that against the worker and warned that they
would sooner or later turn against a government using such
9
methods.
on the eve of the election the Daily ngald again
editorially denounced the German elections as a fraud which
could in no way reflect the wishes of the German people. How-
ever, it saw a great deal of trouble ahead for the Hitler
Government. The regime had begun with an unnatural union be-
tween the Junkers of the old regime and the Nazis. They had
little in common except a Joint hatred.for Marxists, Jews, and
foreigners. They had united to "crush the forces of democracy,"
but once they had gained full power there was little chance that
they would not begin quarrelling among themselves. "A frantic
â€73' R0 9' Phillpott. "Secrets of Hitler's Silent Terror,"
22;;1,E§;glg,(bondon), February 27, 1933, p, 9,
823i11,§§zgld (London), February 28, 1933. Po 1.
9"White Terror," Daily Hezgld (London), March 1, 1933,
Do 80
i.
mas
#6
denunciation of harxism will not serve any longer to hide a
bankruptcy of policy," Labour exclaimed. From the moment
that Hitlerism was in power the reaction began. Labour be-
lieved it would be a long struggle for the Germans to regain
their freedom, but it saw no doubt of the outcome. The
editorial ended with a sharp warning to Hitler concerning his
foreign policy. "That there will be, while he is in power,
no disposition in any other country to make concessions to
Germany in the international sphere or to tolerate any rash
adventures in the domain of foreign policy."10
The elections turned out much as Labour expected except
that Hitler with his Nationalist allies won a slight majority.
Labour did not yet recognize Hitler as the power in Germany,
but still believed he and his followers were puppets controlled
by the "barons and the generals of the old regime." There was
a great deal of difference between the two groups' philosophies
and there certainly would develop an internal struggle. How-
ever, it was thought that perhaps the struggle was already
decided and Hitler had given up all of the revolutionary
features of his program.and had become the servant of the
11
Prussian nobles and big business. Hitler, it was thought,
10"Germany's Future," Daily m (London), harch in
19339 p0 10'
11"There is 8 Tomorrow," 1231].! W (London),
March 7, 1933. Po 8-
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was only to rule temporarily. He would fall, Labour said, on
the issues of the economic crisis and foreign affairs.12
Practically every day there was a warning of some kind
that the German worker would not tolerate for long the Nazi
abuses--that the day of reckoning was approaching. British
Labour was looking for German Labor to stand up to Hitler in
a united front that could have but one result--the downfall
of the Nazi dictatorship.
In the two months following the general election of
Larch 5, Hitler began to consolidate his power and to carry
out a pogrom- against the Jews. Labour was quick to attack
the "Enabling Acts" proposed by Hitler and passed by the
Hgiéhgpag on March 23. The "Dictatorship Bill," as it was
called by British Labour, was opposed by those German
Socialists who were allowed to attend the meeting of the
Beighgtgg, British Labour felt their German colleagues
showed great courage in opposing Hitler in spite of the per-
secutions and the danger involved.l3
By April it appeared that perhaps Hitler's reign would
be longer than Labour had anticipated. The "staying power" of
12Eric Siepmann, "Hitler will Fall," Dgily Hegald
(London), march 7, 1933, p. 8.
lBDQiJI HQIEJC (London), March 24, 1933: Do 3-
“mas
48
the Nazis was not altogether conditioned by the same factors
that brought them to power--"unemployment, argicultural
crisis, paralysis of trade, corruption and failures in in-
dustry, private and public finance." They were being helped
by many who had not previously supported them. A great many
non-Nazi Germans opposed the Republic and desired to return to
the old way-~Imperial Germany. The Communists, although they
opposed old Imperial Germany, had also helped to overthrow the
Republic. The 1“'azis also had foreign help "from the negotiation
of the Peace Treaties on to the belated and clumsy reception of
Germany into the League of Hations and the attitude taken to the
Austro-German Customs Union. . ." the outside world did a great
deal to help the Germans". . .build up the psychology of unity
in adversity, an excellent adjunct of extreme nationalism."
The war guilt legend and the enforced disarmament of Germany,
coupled with the slowness in the achievements of the disarm-
ament negotiations, had fanned the flames.“+
EconOmic problems were still believed to be the one
factor that could cause Hitler's downfall. Labour believed
that even if conditions would improve economically in the rest
of the world, Germany would not benefit because Hugenberg and
llejarne Braatoy, "German Labour in Eclipse," The
Labguz W, 3:1 (April, 1933. pp- 532-534-
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The Prussian Junkers were in control of the economic policy
and they could only harm German industry and trade.15
Hitler's persecution of the Jews brought the most alarm
and the loudest protest from the British Socialists during
the period directly following the German general election of
march. 2h§,Labgur haggzigg credited Hitler's concentration
on persecuting the Jews to the fact that this was the only
part of his program that he was able to carry out. His other
pledges, it claimed, were a ". . .mere demagogic humbug, just
as Hitler's Socialism is a pure bluff."16 The Qgilx‘Hegalg
and particularly its columnist Hannen Swaffer, was instrumental
in suggesting and organizing protest meetings and a boycott of
German goods. Swaffer, shocked by the seeming indifference of
the Jews outside Germany to the plight of those in that country,
criticized British Jews for their inaction and suggested a boy-
cott by them (and the rest of the British) of all German pro-
ducts. Ee believed this was the most effective way of7hurting
Hitler as Germany needed 811 the trade she could get. This
boycott did have an effect on German trade and in the years to
- 15"International Trade Union Notes, The Lab23£,M838 i .
Jill (May, 1933), p0 1+.
, 16"Circuses--but no Bread,†T e Lghgn: ha a ine, 311
(may, 1933), p. h.
_ l7Eannen Swaffer, "I Heard Yesterday," Qéllx.§§£§lfl
(London), march 22, 1933. p. h.
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follow it reduced appreciably the sale of German goods in
18
Britain.
To climax a series of local protest meetings during march
and the first part of April, a gigantic rally was called by The
National Joint Council of The Trade Union Congress and the
Labour Party at Albert Hall for April 12. The nearly ten thou-
sand people in attendance listened to speeches by the Labour
leaders and unanimously passed a resolution protesting the
persecution by the Nazis of Jews, Socialists, and Communists.19
In addition to the treatment of the Jews, another major
concern of British Labour was the future of the Trade Union
movement in Germany. There was a great deal of speculation
and forebodance as to what was going to become of German Labor.
It was realized by most that the union would not be allowed to
remain unchanged. Some thought they would be reconstructed on
the Italian Fascist model.20 The more optimistic hoped they
might be able to maintain some form of organization and unity
21
by dissociating their political ties. Although throughout
18Carl F. Brand, The M m Pgny, g Sh t History
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964 , p. 175.
192ai11_Herald (London), April 13, 1933, p. 3.
20Daily Herald (London), March 11, 1933. p. 1.
leTBatOY. 9.2. 915.... p. 531.
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51
Larch and April the trade unionswere harassed by the Nazis,
their newspapers were closed, their leaders arrested, and their
offices raided, no move was made by the £8213 to dissolve the
unions themselves. Even though the unions would be without
power or influence, Labour at least hoped that by retaining
some form of organization for the unions, unity would be
maintained among the workers-~the one group upon which British
Labour could pin its hopes for the eventual overthrow of
Hitler.22 These hopes for the German trade unions were
shattered in the early part of way. On May Day Hitler held a
huge nation-wide festival for the German workers. Hoping to
save their organizations the trade unionists cooperated fully,
although the Socialists split with them over the issue.23 At
the rally Hitler announced the opening of the second phase of
the National Socialist revolution--the "Socialist" part. This
included the introduction of compulsory labor, providing work
through either private employers or the State, and plans for a
large public works program. Labour believed this new program
would bring the predicted break between the Hazis and the
Nationalists. Both sides had been using the other to achieve
its own ends. How, Labour believed, the time had come to see
22mm (London). April 12, 1933, p. 15.
23Dg111 Herald (London), April 24, 1933, p. 13.
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52
which had made the "shrewd calculation." Labour had by now
changed its opinion of Hitler's strength and believed he
would come out on top.24 The following day, Lay 2, Hitler
ended all speculation as to the future of the trade unions by
seizing their offices and funds, arresting their leaders, and
suppressing their periodicals. British Labour, although long
dreading this move, was, of course, disturbed and denounced it
as another example of the fact that there could be no compromise
between "Hitlerism and free institutions of any kind." It still
maintained, however, that the German worker would ". . .in time,
destroy Hitlerism and restore freedom to Germany."25
With the rise of Hitler to power and his establishment
of a firm dictatorship, foreign affairs began to play a.major
role in the Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress's de-
bates. The winter of 1932-33 was the watershed, although, of
course, it was not recognized as such at the time, between the
post-war period ending with the Depression and the pre-war
period of Hitler. By early 1933 slow economic progress was
being made and with the advent of Hitler in January, the issues
of foreign policy and defense began gradually to replace
24mm (London): 1"‘33, 2: 1933: pp. 32 80
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26
domestic economic and social issues.
Labour's foreign policy in the late twenties and early
thirties was full of "crosscurrents and confusion." Its
various lines of thought developed from what it considered the
causes of World War I. The main cause, Labour believed, was
capitalism with its arms race and imperialism. This was
supported by an excessive nationalism. How to prevent a re-
occurance of the disaster was a matter of disagreement with
the party. One group believed in disarmament, pacifism, and
war resistance, while the other wanted a strong organization
to enforce peace.27 This split would cause some dissention
and disputes in the ranks as well as the leadership and it would
be a couple of years before Labour was truly unified in its
approach to foreign policy.
The immediate effect of the lazi takeover and their
brutalites was a basic change in the Labour Party's attitude
to Treaty concessions for Germany. When Arthur Henderson took
the Foreign Office in 1929 one of his major objectives was con-
ciliation with Germany. By the time he left office in 1931, the
effects of the Depression and the rise of the Nazis made con-
26Alan Bullock, m Ljï¬g and T' Q; Eznegt Bevi
(2 volumes; London: Heinemann, 1960 , I, pp. 511, 52 .
27Brand, 3L9. Brit: an LQQQQI Party, p. 171.
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ciliation impossible. Labour even after January 1933 felt it
necessary to make concessions to Germany. It still believed
the terms of Versailles unfairly harsh and believed they must
be corrected and Germany given real equality with the other
nations before there could be any real hope for world peace.
However, it opposed giving to Hitler's ". . .brutal dictator-
ship the justice which was denied to democracy."29 There
could be no territorial revision, the 2gily_Heralg said, as
long as the Nazi regime lasted, as no decent people would con-
sider placing a minority under Hitler's rule.30 "Revision",
to Hitler, the paper realized, was not the removal of injus-
tices of the Versailles Treaty, but merely a polite name for
the realization of territorial ambitions.31
Thus, in the first.months of Hitler's regime it seemed
British Labour was taking a firm stand against Hitler in its
foreign policy. Its position was not, however, as firm as it
appeared at first. It would be a few years before Labour's
policy would be uniformly solid against Hitler's aggressive
281bid., p. 135
292311 herald (London). April 13. 1933. p. 3.
30"Listen Hitler!" Dallx.§£2§lï¬.(L0nd°n)’ April 15’
19333 p0 8' ‘
31"Fascism and You," Dgily Edlhli (London), April 18,
1933. p. 8.
mas
55
moves.
In.kay 1933 expose in the French press of Germany's
violations of the disarmament provisions of the Versailles
Treaty brought the question of German rearmament to the fore.
The Disarmament Conference under the chairmanship of Arthur
Henderson had the previous December promised Germany "equality
of status" with the other nations in armaments. The Conference
was looking for ways that equality in armament might be
achieved through nations disarming to the level of Germany.
Now it was feared that Hitler was using the inability of the
Conference to arrive at a workable disarmament plan as an
excuse to declare the military restrictions of the peace
treaty null and void. Hitler's violation of the Treaty must
be dealt with, Labour believed, through the League of Nations.
Under no circumstances should Hitler's actions be allowed to
stop efforts to disarm or cause the other nations to abandon
their "equality with security" promise.32 Labour was com-
pletely opposed to any sanctions of a military nature. A
blockade would be illegal, it said. An occupation of the
Rhineland as a punishment would be a disaster. Labour thought
the Nazis would not back down and would resist such a move with
arms. This would doubtlessly lead to war. Even worse it would
unite the German people behind the Nazis, and would destroy any
chance for the workers' revolt that Labour expected to take
ma
56
place eventually in Germany to overthrow Hitler and replace him
with a Socialist State. Even if an occupation succeeded it
would leave a bitterness that would upset the peace of Europe
for many years to come.33 Tensions over the rearmament question
were reduced by a conciliatory speech made by Hitler in which
he accepted President Franklin D. Roosevelt's proposal for a
new, world non-aggression pact and said he was prepared, on
certain conditions, to accept the more detailed plan of
Ramsey MacDonald calling for no increase in German arms for a
fixed and limited period. The three conditions set down by
Hitler were: firstly, Germany was to have "qualitative
equality," that is she might have any type of weapon which
according to the other nations was essential for adequate
national defense; secondly, that she.muSt be allowed a period
of about five years in which to convert her long-term army
into a short-term.militia; and thirdly, that at the end of the
transitional period she would have the full equality of status
promised her in December 1932. Labour did not find these de-
mands unreasonable and believed that the Disarmament Conference
34
could not successfully finish its work. It did not, however,
33H. N.“Brail§ford. "Germany Will Remember Broken Promises,"
ng]_v_ Harald (London), may 17, 1933, p. 8.
3"*"H'itler's Offer," gily Egzald,(London), May 18,1933.
p. 8.
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place eventually in Germany to overthrow Hitler and replace him
with a Socialist State. Even if an occupation succeeded it
would leave a bitterness that would upset the peace of Europe
for many years to come.33 Tensions over the rearmament question
were reduced by a conciliatory speech made by Hitler in which
he accepted President Franklin D. Roosevelt's proposal for a
new, world non-aggression pact and said he was prepared, on
certain conditions, to accept the more detailed plan of
Ramsey'MacDonald calling for no increase in German arms for a
fixed and limited period. The three conditions set down by
Hitler were: firstly, Germany was to have "qualitative
equality," that is she might have any type of weapon which
according to the other nations was essential for adequate
national defense; secondly, that she must be allowed a period
of about five years in which to convert her long-term army
ihto a short-term militia; and thirdly, that at the end of the
transitional period she would have the full equality of status
promised her in December 1932. Labour did not find these de-
mands unreasonable and believed that the Disarmament Conference
34
could not successfully finish its work. It did not, however,
33H. N._Brailsford, "Germany Will Remember Broken Promises,"
ngly Egrgld,(LondonJ, may 17, 1933, p. 8.
3""‘Hitler's Offer," Dgilx ï¬ï¬rald,(London), May 18,1933.
p. 8.
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think this speech reflected any real change in the basic
foreign policy attitude of the Hazis, but rather it resulted
from the isolated position in which Germany found herself
after the Nazi takeover. It arose from ". . .tactical con-
siderations and from opportunism" rather than from ". . .any
innately peaceful disposition on the part of National
Socialist policy. . ."35 In spite of this Labour felt it was
better to go along with nitlar, knowing full well his cynicism,
than to risk the consequences that would result from a rejec-
36
tion of his offer.
June brought a split between Hitler and his Nationalist
allies and hope to the Labourites that this might further
weaken the Hazi hold on Germany. Uazis raided the head-
quarters of the Nationalist Party and arrested over one hundred
leaders. Its veteran organization and its "fighting ring", the
Steel Helmet League went over to the Hazis in a body.3 Hugen-
berg, the leader of the Nationalists and a man who was instru-
mental in aiding Hitler's rise to power, was forced out of the
cabinet a few days later after a brief attempt to defy Hitler
35Hudolf Breitsheid, "The Foreign Policy of Herr Hitler,"
,Tha.éshdnr magazine, X11 (June. 1933). pp. 54-55.
36"Hitler's Offer," Daily Herald (London), may 18, 1933,
p. 8.
37ng13 ggzglg (London), June 22, 1933. p. 11.
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38
by refusing to resign, and his party was dissolved.
Labour predicted the next split would be within the Hazi
Party itself. There was a great deal of difference between the
two wings of the party. The "conservative" Hazis wished to use
the party to stablize the old order, to strengthen capitalism,
and to rebuild a militant Imperial Germany. The "radical"
faction wanted to begin the social revolution immediately.39
By the middle of July there were disturbances breaking out
among some of the storm troop units, that part of the party
which tended to be the most radical in its demands for social
change. They protested giving up the fight against capitalism
and insisted that the anti-capitalist points of their original
program be carried out. They also objected to the fact that
their leaders were given high paying governmental posts while
they got nothing but "festivals and torchlight processions."
British Labourobelieved a showdown was very near between the
two factions.A
It was also in July 1933 that Arthur denderson, the
former Foreign Secretary of the Second Labour Government, the
38D§jlx HQIQJQ (London), June 22, 1933, 9- 11-
39"Nazi Split Next, "Dailx.harald (London): June 22’
1933’ pa 80
_ h0§§il1_§§zald (London), July 12, 1933, p. 3; and
July 18, 1933, p. 1.
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chairman of the Disarmament Conference, and the spokesman for
the party in foreign affairs, issued a pamphlet setting forth
Labour's foreign policy. Henderson said the international
situation had worsened greatly since the Labour Government
had left office, and the world situation was extremely grave.
Le listed the causes of for the state of fear and tension
that existed in 1933 as the state of war in the Far East;
menacing position of Germany in Europe; the distrust of
Germany's neighbors; the rapid deterioration in relations and
loss of confidence between some of the more important nations,
particularly Great Britain and Russia; the economic crisis,
accentuated by extreme forms of economic nationalism; the
increase talk of war in Europe; and the unwillingness of
heavily armed states to seek seriously a solution to the dis-
armament problem. He setciown in some detail the basis of
Labour's foreign policy. The central objective was "to
abolish war by organizing peace." This was to be done through
the League of Nations--"the League is the pivot of Labour's
policy." He wanted the next Labour Government to pass a
"?eace Act of Parliament" making it clear that Britain would
settle all disputes by peaceful means, never use coercive
measures except to resist aggression or when the "organized
community of nations" has recognized that the use of force was
unavoidable, and to take part in worldwide economic action to
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restore peace by isolating the peacebreaker. He went on to say
that a Labour Government would strengthen the peace system by
completing existing obligations, not by resorting to force; by
undertaking drastic disarmament by rapid stages and through
international agreement; by early abolition of weapons of
aggression forbidden to Germany; by suppressing private manu-
facture of armaments; by the internationalization of civil
aviation; by the limitation of budgetary expenditure on
armaments; and by constructive measures of "moral disarmament."
Henderson also believed there was an urgent need for economic
and financial cooperation and planning on a world-wide scale.
Ee proposed that a Labour Government would fight economic
nationalism; would work to increase world consumption; and
would try to organize world production for the use of all. This
included equal access to the world's raw materials for all
nations, especially those rare materials for which nations might
be tempted to go to war. He wanted to try to draw both the
United States and the Soviet Union into more participation in
world affairs, especially on questions of peace and war. With
Russia this would mean also friendlier relations commercially
and politically and conclusions of a treaty of non-aggression
and conciliation. For the troubled Far East, Henderson pro-
posed "world action" to uphold peace and law. He wanted full
cooperation with the International Labour Organization by
61
adoption of a general convention for a forty hour week and other
measures to meet the problems caused by automation, machinery,
and mass production in industry and agriculture. Finally he
demanded full public knowledge of all international dealings--
"No secret alliances, treaties or engagements of any kind."hl
0n the matter of revision of the peace treaties, Labour
had long opposed many parts of these treaties and urged their
change. In the pamplet Henderson repeated this and said, with-
out naming the Kazis, that even the objectionable clauses must
be scrupulously observed" until they could be changed by
"common consent." "The sanctity of law and contracts," he
said, "is the very foundation of order and peace." However,
he assured Germany that "this does not mean that the right of
veto by one Party will indefinitely prevent the removal of
obvious injustices." He pointed out that, in fact, the Treaty
had undergone quite a bit of change in the previous ten years
by general consent. The discriminations on German commerce
imposed by Versailles, the occupation of the Rhineland, the
reparation clauses, the unilateral disarmament of Germany had
42
disappeared or were plainly destined to disappear.
“lArthur Henderson, La ' Egzgign,PQligx (London:
the Labour Party Press, 1933 , pp. l-2, and 28.
h21b14., p. 23.
62
During the summer of 1933 a new Austro-German crisis
arose. Labour, which had been sympathetic to the abortive
Austro-German Credit-Anstalt, was now opposed to any type of
union between these countries. It wanted the League to take
action to stop Hitler's activities in Austria. In fact, Hugh
Lalton, the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the last
Labour Government, proposed that Hitler be arraigned before the
League of Nations. He wanted the Council of the League to con-
sider Nazi aggressions against Austria and to set League
machinery in motion to examine reports of German rearmament.
Le said the protection of Austria must not have to depend on
the "secret pressure of Signor mussolini." Dalton felt that
if ï¬itler had nothing to hide he should welcome the oppor-
tunity to clear himself and his Government before the League.
However, if he was threatening Austria and was rearming then
it was best for the world to know it so steps could be taken
to prevent war before it was too late};3
The means of stopping Hitlershouid be through the
collective security of the League, Labour believed. It was
still disgusted with the League's failure to act in the Sino-
Japanese war. This failure it blamed largely on the British
"3"Arraign Hitler!" Daili,§ï¬Â£ï¬lfl.(Lond0n)’ August 23’
1933. p. 8.
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Government's refusal to support any action. It demanded that
if the nations were in earnest in their support of the League
and the League's peace machinery, the League Council should
be called immediately. The only alternative that Labour saw
to League action was to let the situation drift to the point
where mmr'would be unavoidable.hh The protection of Austria
should be taken out of the hands of Lussolini and put into the
hands of all nations through the League. Labour still believed,
however, that there should be much economic aid and cooperation
between the Germans and the Austrians.h5
The Trade Union Congress' annual General Council meeting
in September and the Labour Party's annual Convention in Uctober
both adopted resolutions condemning dictatorships and endorsed
democracy. The T.U.C. Conference heard a report by W.Iï¬.
Citrine entitled Digtatgzshipa ggg_tng_I;g§g,§higgQMQvgment.
Citrine had made several trips to Germany and had watched the
growth and takeover of the Nazis. His report dealt with the
suppression of the German Social Democratic Party and the trade
unions, the confiscation of their property, the arrest of their
leaders, and the abolition of collective bargaining and the
hhflï¬itler's New Folly," DELI! Hï¬lï¬ld (London),
August 26, 1933, P. 8.
“S"Help for Austria," 2gily,§§;glg_(London)g
August 28, 1933, Po 8-
64
right to strike. The report condemned both dictatorships of
the Right and the Left, for both involved the suppression of
opposition and freedom of Speech. Thus, the trade unions
should oppose all dictatorships and support democratic insti-
tutions.A6 There was some opposition to this report,
particularly from Aneurin bevan, who objected to grouping
Russia with the Fascists. He argued that as unemployment and
poverty grew the foundations of democracy would be undermined
from the Right, not from the Left. He said it was Capitalism,
not Socialism, which attacked democracy. Hitlerism was merely
a defense of Capitalism by violence when democracy threatened
Capitalism};7 Nevertheless, the Citrine report was supported
by a vast majority of the delegates. in addition to Citrine's
report the presidential address and several other speeches
condemmed the Nazis abroad and Sir Oswald Losley's Fascist at
home.AS
The Labour Party Convention which met the next month
was similar to that of the T.U.C. in its stand against dicta-
torships. It passed a resolution condemning all types of dic—
tatorship and reaffirmed british Labour's faith in democracy.
“Brand. The m ‘ i Lemur. 2am. 9. 17h-
h7Dgily Egzgld (London), September 8, 1933, 9- 11-
ABBrana, 2m amp-lag Labgg; m, p. 175.
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It concluded, "Korkers everywhere should strengthen the Labour
Party--the spearhead of political power against Dictators,
Fascist or Communist.“+9 This resolution, as did the Citrine
report, brought protests that it was too harsh on Russia.
Herbert Merrison answered the critics by declaring that if
Labour was to cooperate with a dictatorship of the Left in
order to defeat one on the Right it would be compromising its
democratic principles. For if it justified one form of dic-
tatorship it gave ". . .an equally.moral justification for
dictatorship from the Right in a Fascist direction."50
E. H. Elvin, a Labour candidate, moved a resolution which ex-
pressed the Labour Party's concern over the destruction of
democratic institutions in Germany and the unwarranted per-
secution of the Pacifists, Trade Unionists, Socialists, and
Communists. It called on Britain to aid refugees and to
provide funds to help the oppressed. It also asked all members
of the Labour movement to boycott all German goods.51
The Labour Conference also passed a resolution calling
for war resistance and a general strike of all workers if war
kgThe British Labour Party, "Democracy Versus
Dictatorship " W at. the 33m mm W.
Appendix IX.(Hastings, 1933), pp. 277-278.
SODgily ngald (London), October 6, 1933, p- 15.
5llpid,, p. 15.
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should break out. This resolution supported by the active
pacifist wing had been tabled at the T.U.C. Conference where
the pacifist faction was not too strong. In its place there
was passed a resolution calling for propaganda against war,
but leaving the general strike to be called when the aggressor
had been identified, when it should be called by the workers
of that country. At the Labour Convention, Sir Charles
Trevelgan of the Socialist League moved the resolution for a
general strike. He argued that the League of ï¬ations was in-
effective as long as it was controlled by governments which
were either skeptical or contemptuous of it. The only real
force for peace was the labor movement. Eugh Dalton accepted
the resolution for the Harty's Executive Council as the temper
of the conference seemed to demand it, but he was not
enthusiastic about it. He knew Henderson was to speak later
to set down the official view on foreign policy. Henderson
said that Labour must base its foreign policy on the League
and must.make use of all economic, financial, and "other powers"
in order to fulfill Britain's collective security obligations.
Labour at its 1933 Convention was, thus, looking in two direc-
tions for peace. On one side it believed peace could be had
through war resistance, while on the other side through the
League and the use of sanctions. The acceptance of the war
resistance resolution has been considered the zenith of the
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52
pacifist influence in the party.
The coming meeting of the Disarmament Conference,
scheduled to meet in October l933, was considered to be crucial
by Labour. It saw the situation in Europe becoming graver with
"the strutting provocations of Nazism." There was too much
talk that war was inevitable, it said. Her could be prevented
if cool heads could be maintained and if aggressors knew that
the League was ready and willing to use fully the machinery of
sanctions against any nation breaking the peace. Also, a
genuine achievement in arms reduction was necessary to ease
a 53
the tension in aurope, it believed.
There were those who were saying the Disarmament Con-
ference was useless as Germany would never agree to supervision.
Labour said that the chance of failure made it that much more
important that the Conference go on as planned. Germany must
be given no excuse for pulling out of the Conference. All
other nations must carefully live up to their pledges to
Germany. On the other hand, it had to be made clear to Germany
that justice and fair play did not imply weakness or condone-
tion of aggression. All nations must be made to understand that
â€Brand. .inTï¬ amuse ML b u ism. pp. l7v-l77o
53"Guarding the Peace," Dgily Egrgld (London),
September 6, 1933, p. 8.
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even with disarmament any aggression could and would be quickly
and completely checked by "the whole force of civilization."
"The removal of legitimate grievances, the repression of
illegitimate adventures, are in international as in internal
affairs the twin conditions for preservation of peace."5h
Labour was alarmed by the "attempts to exploit the
jingoism of the Hitlerites" by those interests which would pro-
fit from a war scare and rearmament. The Disarmament Conference
was endangered by this, and Europe was in danger of "sliding
back to the old evil system of arms rivalry and the "balance of
power."55
3’»’hen the Conference opened it appeared that a series of
petty squabbles might disrupt it. In one instance Germany de-
manded that it be allowed a few "samples" of weapons prohibited
1;0 it by the Treaty of Versailles. France, supported by Britain
and the United States, declared that this would be impossible.
Labour condemned the whole matter as nonsense. Germany would
have no appreciable advantage by having only a few samples of
heavy guns or airplanes and France would have no appreciable
advantage by denying them to Germany. The whole issue was just
,5 51*"Difficult Problems," Daily mm (London),
Deptember 7. 1933. p. 8.
1933 55"1‘Jar Whispers," Dgily ngald (London) , September 11,
‘ ’ p. 8.
69
a question of prestige, Labour said. It maintained that the
Government that was big enough to give in on such an unimportant
point would be the one to gain prestige.56
With the beginning of the Conference, Arthur Henderson,
its chairman, warned the British people that a real disarmament
convention must be arrived at shortly or failure would have to
be admitted. He attacked the isolationists on the grounds that
in the modern world it was impossible to live apart on the hope
that one's country was stronger than any rival or combination
of rivals. Entering into alliances would be to abandon
isolation. The doctrine of the isolationists not only ignored
the facts of the modern world but were self-contradictory.
isolation, Henderson went on, was immoral for it would plunge
the world back into international anarchy and that meant war.
The League had been founded to put an end to international
anarchy. Under the League's collective security, nations would
not have to be heavily armed as they could count on the arms of
the rest of the peace-loving nations to stop an aggressor.
Henderson admitted the failures of the League in the previous
two years had been grave but they were not due to any inherent
defects in the League's peace machinery, but were the fault of
of the govermments responsible for working that machinery. He
56"Don't Be Childish," Daily Eï¬rgln (London),
October 2, 1933, p. 15.
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set forth three things britain must do if it were to save it-
self from a drift into war. firstly, it must proclaim.its
faith in ". . .the ultimate possibility and necessity of a
world commonwealth." Secondly, though the Peace Act of
Parliament, proposed earlier by ï¬enderson, it must incor-
porate into the law of the land its fundamental obligations
as members of the League. Finally, it must take the initiative
to make the League universal by bringing the United States and
the Soviet Union into it.57
It was obvious from the beginning that the Conference
was in serious danger of failing. The German "observations"
communicated to the other participants were not only unaccep-
table to the French, but also to the British. There seemed
little lihflJhood that further conversations would produce
any better results. Labour demanded that the "private talks"
method be ended and the problems be brought back to the full
Conference for frank and open discussion.58
The worst fears of Labour were realized on October 14
when Germany walked out of not only the Disarmament Confer-
ence but also the League of Nations. This was the thing Labour
had long feared and had warned would be the first step towards
war.
5722mm harm. (London). October 7. 1933. p. 15.
58nA New Crisis," ngll ï¬grglfl (London), October 7.
1933. p- 10.
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CHAPTER v
COLLECTIVE SECURITY vnnsus ’e‘JAR-RnSlSTAL-JCE
The Labour Party put a great deal of the blame for
Germany's withdrawal from the League and the Disarmament Con-
ference on the British Government and particularly on Sir John
Simon, the Foreign Secretary. Simon believing Germany was
bluffing in her demands had.made a speech in which he asserted
that if Germany were treated firmly by a "united front" she
would give in. Labour deplored this tactless approach. It
showed, the Labourites believed, an astounding lack of under-
standing of the current public mind in Germany in which "equality
of status" was an obsession. The demands of Britain and France
that Germany should agree at once to disband the Reichswehz
and to accept supervision, agree to the postponement for several
years all thoughts of reduction of armaments by her neighbors,
and even accept a token recognition of equal status were hard
enough for Germans to accept. The demand that she "take it
or leave it" by the former powers who "dictated" the Treaty
of Versailles made it impossible for Hitler to accept it even
if he wanted. The only result of Simon's "ultimatum" and the
German answer was to give the Hitler Government new strength
and prestige at home. The withholding of equality from.Ger-
many because of the Hitler Government was not valid, Labour
argued. Itvas a handy excuse, but it had been denied to the
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Braning and Papen Governments also. The opportunities to firmly
establish peace offered by the Locarno Tact, by Germany's entry
into the League, and by the Disarmament Conference were thrown
away by the statesmen. Labour believed there was one chance to
bring Germany back into the League and the Conference. That was
to go on with the work of the Conference and to produce an agree-
ment that gave genuine and substantial disarmament, thereby re-
lieving Germany of her feeling of humiliation and inferiority
and ending the menace of rearmament in Europe. Failure to do
this, it believed, would lead to "new and suicidal wars."l
With the deadlock that resulted in the Conference from
the German withdrawal, Labour saw a drift in Europe back to
the policies which produced World her I. Eitler had given
the.militarists of all countries the chance for which they had
been waiting and now they were jumping at it. The cry was
going up on all sides for more armaments, Labour said, and if
something were not done soon it would lead to disaster. It
called upon the people to show their disapproval of the current
trend by supporting only Labour candidates in the coming by-
2
elections.
, lnBritain's Part in the Crisis," D5111 Herald (London)
October 16, 1933: p. 10.
2"Stop the Racket!" Bail! Herald (London). October 2h:
1933, p. 10.
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To a great many people in Britain it appeared that all
chances for disarmament ended with the German walkout from the
Conference. Labour, however, did not give up, in fact, could
not give up its hope for some break in the deadlock. Disarm-
ament was such a intrinsic part of its foreign policy it
could not be abandoned easily. Labour, therefore, continued to
search for new ways around the impass at the Conference.
George Lansbury, the leader of the Labour Party, made an
appeal shortly after the German withdrawal from the disarmament
work to be carried on. Ultimatums were no way to get disarm-
ament, he said. Although Britain opposed Fascism and the
"brutal tyranny" of Germany, it was still a sovereign state and
should be treated as such, Lansbury stated. He warned the
Government that Labour would not support any increases in arm-
aments nor would it support any attempts to apply penalties or
sanctions against Germany.3
Labour supported a British plan to adjourn the Conference
for several months on the condition that this period be useï¬ to
redraft plans and to remove misunderstandings with Germany.
The whole question of disarmament was tied in directly
3Da111 §§2a1d_(London}, Uctober 20, 1933, p. 9.
4"Just a Chance," Daily Earald (London), October 2h:
1933. p. 8-
7h
with the strength of the League, Labour declared. The deadlock
at the Conference was due only partly to the aggressive attitude
of Hitler. hora importantly it was due to a loss of faith in
the peace-keeping machinery of the League, Armaments grew as
fear that the collective action of the League would not be able
to keep the peace. Labour called on the Government to show by
words and actions that it fully supported the League. Only
in this way, Labour thought, could the League be preserved as
a force for peace in the world and could a new attempt at dis-
armament be made.5
For the rest of the year and well into l93h Labour con-
tinued almost desperately to work for some type of arms settle-
ment. It constantly berated the Government to do something to
get the talks going again. Sir John Simon came under
blistering attacks for not taking positive action to renew the
disarmament talks and to strengthen the League. Labour charged
that ". . .his handling of foreign affairs his been not merely
inept in detail, but dangerous in tendency." The only thing
keeping Germany from returning to the Conference, as Labour
saw it, was not an unsolvable problem of disarmament, but was
†suuhy Fear Has Grown," Daily ngalfl (London):
November 1, 1933, p, 10.
- 6HA Record Of Failure," Bail! ngaLQ (London),
November 8, 1933. Po 10°
IHE
mask 7
75
merely a matter of honor and prestige. Germany would be glad
to come back, Labour believed, if she could do it without
sacrifice of honor and prestige. Other nations wanted her to
come back too, provided they were not forced to make such a
sacrifice. The German complaint at bottom was that they were
treated as inferiors, that they were â€different" from other
great powers. If the other powers would stop thinking of
Germany as an ex-enemy to be faced by a "united front" and if
Germany would stop being so oversensitive and would start
acting as though she were an equal, then the main problem
would be solved and the Conference could get on with its work.7
In January l93b Britain presented a memorandum on Dis-
armament to Paris and Berlin. It provided the Germany should
gradually rearm and the other powers gradually disarm until
they reached the same level. Labour supported this plan feeling
it was probably the only one that would work at that time. The
Daily Herald urged France and Gerrany to give it serious consid-
eration as it provided a goog chance and perhaps the last chance
to arrive at some agreement. The German press welcomed the
memorandum as an attempt to solve the problem, but its approval
7"Qlear Up the Less," Dgill nggld U—aOfldOfl), :TOVGflleI'
11, 1933, p. 10.
8"Une 1,101.8 Chance,†Daily Herald (London), February
1, 1931+, p. 10.
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was cautious and non-connittal. The french press, on the other
hand, found it totally unacceptable. Labour hoped this did not
reflect the thinking of the French Government and found reason
to believe it was merely an attempt to make the French Premier,
Edouard Daladier, change his views.9 Unfortunately the
official views of neither the Gernan nor the French Governments
gave much hope that the british.mehorandun would be accepted.
The Germans said the amount of rearm nent it proposed was in-
adequate and the French explained that under the existing 10
conditions they were not prepared to make any arms reductions.
In larch 193h the French sent a note to Britain, and
Germany a note to France. Both showed the impass that had
been reached and which had to be removed if the Conference
were not to fail. The French note declared there must be no
rearmament of Germany and that the Versailles limitations must
be enforced. The German note said that the Versailles figures
were no longer acceptable. France must realize, Labour warned,
that neither Britain nor Italy would agree to help enforce
Versailles. The issue was no longer rearmament or no rearm-
ament for Germany, but controlled or uncontrolled rearmament.
9"Awaiting an Answer," Daily Herald (London),
February 2, 193h, p. 10.
lOnMurKy Outlook," Dï¬ily HQIQJQ (London), February 13,
1934. p. 8-
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77
Britain and Italy were willing to concede and Germany willing
to accept, a limited and controlled amount of rearmament. If
Brance would face realities and also accent this, then some
11
agreement could be reached.
A few days later France sent another disarmament note in
which she declared she would sign no agreement unless Great
Britain would agree to some form of action against any nation
which exceeded the armaments allotted to it by the agreement.
Labour said it might accept this proposal if the type of sanc-
tions were made clear and if the nature of the agreement were
such that it brought real disarmament, that it were such that
there could be reasonable expectation that Germany could loyally
carry out its provisions, and that all obligations were "with-
_ 12
in the framework of the League."
Labour put most of the blame for the continuing deadlock
during the spring of 1934 on France. France's refusal to budge
from her position of no rearmament for Germany without a
guarantee that britain would take part in penalizing any signa-
tory country vhich violated the agreen ent exasperated Labour.
The question, it maintained, was not whether or not Britain
11"The Arms Deadlock," Daily ngglg_(London}, “aTCE 19:
1934. Do 10-
12".Vhat Does France mean?†Daily Esrald (London)
luaI‘Ch 21+, 19314,, E). 100
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would guarantee the execution of a convention, but whether a
convention could be arrived at, at all. France had rejected
plan after plan. Labour suggested it was time for Trance to
make a proposal that might be acceptable to all including
Germany.13
The negotiations between the governments trying to
find some plan to present to the Conference were ended on a
sour note with France placing the blame for the breakdown on
Germany's announcement of greatly increased defense estimates.
The General Commission of the Conference was scheduled to meet
soon and Labour admitted it would find itself in a most
difficult position. It could not condone Germany's withdrawal
from the Conference and the League and to rearm as she pleased.
At the same time, it could not be turned into a Conference for
devising ways of enforcing the military clauses of Versailles.
The Conference had no choice but to stick to its task of de-
vising a convention for the "general limitation and reduction
of armaments." It must also honor its promise to Germany of
equality of status. The job was made more difficult by the
fact that the convention must be one that Germany could
lh
honorably accept even though she played no part in its framing.
13"Issues at Geneva," Daily Herald (London), April 11,
193h. p- 10.
lh"Closing the Door,†Daily Hg;ald_(London}, April 19:
1931+: p' 10'
79
After the short session of the Conference in June 1934
adjourned, talk of an immediate disarmament agreement stopped.
Labour slowly realized it was not possible at that time to
reach an agreement. Labour continued to desire disarmament,
but gradually it ceased to be a major part of its program.
As it became obvious that disarmament was not to be, the
governments of Europe turned more and more to rearmament. Just
as the failure of the disarmament plans depressed Labour, the
rapid increases in rearmament programs, particularly Britain's
upset it. by late 1933 Labour was aware of a growing pressure
from some political and military circles for an increase in
arms, and it was determined to oppose all these efforts for
several reasons. Firstly, Labour opposed an increase in arm-
aments because this would undermine the already weakened Dis-
armament Conference. Secondly, it would cause another arms
race which had been one of the major causes of World War I, and
would lead inevitably to another war, Labour believed. Thirdly,
it would weaken the League as rearmament was part of the
isolationist mentality which opposed the League's collective
security approach to maintaining world peace. Labour saw the
armament capitalists and the military as the force behind the
pressure for rearmament. They were, Labour said, using Hitler
as an excuse to push for rearmament. They had feared for years
the restraints that a disarmament convention would put on them.
{as
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80
Now they used Iitler and the deadlock at Geneva to support
their claims that the national defense must be strengthened.15
As winter 1933 came on, Labour became more and more
alarmed about the rate of rearming that was beginning to spread
through-out Europe and Japan in the East. The British Govern-
ment's Service Estimates had increased sharply in 1933 and were
expected to be even greater in 1934. Every government was
claiming it was in dangeréof attack and it could only be safe
if it were better armed.l The Government, Labour claimed, was
only paying lip-service to the cause of disarmament. The
ministers were showing in their speeches "unmistakable evidence
of a hankering after stronger fighting services." Labour
planned to call upon the Government when Parliament reassembled
to make a clear statement of its intentions regarding armaments.
Labour demanded a "clear disavowal of the warmongers" and wanted
a clearly outlined program for peace and disarmament.17 Sir
John Simon's statement did little to reassure Labour. It claimed
he ". . .merely assured the House of Commons that it (his
15"Stop the Racket!†Dail1,§gzgld_(London), October 21’
1933. p. 10-
16"The mad Race," Dal]! Herald (London), October 10,
1933, Do 10-
17"No Lore "war." Paul herald (London). iiovembel‘ 2:
1933, p0 10.
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foreign policy] had been beyond criticism and beyond reproach."
Labour did not agree. It said that the two years he had been
Foreign Secretary had been ". . .two years of reverses and de—
feat for the cause of peace, for the cause of disarmament, for
the cause of internationalco-operation."18
Dissatisfied with Simon's statement Labour introduced a
censure motion in the House of Commons. In the debate Sir
Stafford Cripps, a Labour member, attacked the Government's
rearmament program. He charged that the present amount of
spending was considerably higher than that spent before the
war at the height of the arms race, even when an allowance was
made for the difference in money value. This was an unwarranted
financial burden on the taxpayers. The only good thing that
could be said about Britain's rearmament, he asserted, was it
had not been allowed to grow as rapidly as some of the other
countries. A move to try to get the Government to commit
itself on a number of points was made by including a number of
proposals in the censure motion. RamsaylmacDonald, the Prime
Linister, avoided most of these in his answer to the Labour
motion. He said nothing about Labour's proposals for the
abolishment of all weapons forbidden to Germany, for sup-
pression of private arms manufacture, for international
18"A Record of Failure," Q31l1,§gzgld (London),
November 8, 1933. P- 10.
[HE
82
inspection of arms, and for immediate reduction on arms ex-
penditure. To the idea that air bombing be abandoned he said
it had to be retained for police purposes. He agreed with the
proposal for the internationalization of civil aviation, but
said it could not be immediately undertaken. He scoffed at
Labour's proposal for an international police force. Cripps
was questioned by the Conservatives about his statement that
Britain was bound to support any League's collective security
action if necessary. They asked by what means Labour proposed
to pursue collective security. Cripps said by economic boycott
or armed force. When asked if Labour planned to call a general
strike if Britain went to war, Cripps assured the House that a
strike would be called only ". . .to prevent this country from
acting contrary to its obligations." The censure motion was
defeated #09 to 5h.19
To the Government's demand that the air force be
increased, Labour argued that the leader of the Tories, Stanley
Baldwin, had himself said earlier that it would be impossible
to stop an enemy air attack. No matter how many airplanes
Britain had some of the enemy would get through. Labour de-
plored the idea that the only defense for a country was an
20
offense that could kill more women and children than the enemy.
192al12,§§1g11 (London), November 14, 1933, P. 2.
20"Defending the Country," Dgily EeIQJQ (London)
November 29, 1933. p- 10.
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83
George Bernard Shaw had a little different view of the
effects of large air forces. He said large cities would
surrender when threatened with large scale destruction. There-
fore, the next war would be ridiculously short and would end
with ransoms, reparations and indemnities cancelling each other
after a squabble in Geneva, ". . .and the most disgraceful and
inglorious war on record will peter out in general ridicule."
It was foolish, he said, to protest against the multiplication
of bombers as they were "angels of peace."21
By the spring of l93h some Tories were calling for the
abandonment of the Naval treaties and for a naval building
program. Labour, of course, objected to any and all proposals
of this type. Besides the tremendous cost of such a program,
it protested that it would increase distrust and fear among
the nations of the world. "Swollen armaments are no safeguard
of peace, but a provacative of war," it exclaimed.22
There were only two types of international systems
possible, Labour said: the collective system and the old system
of alliances. The collective system was based of two ideas. The
first was that every nation should pledge itself to abstain from
21Bernard Shaw, A §§_§§gging ï¬g; Wag? (London: The
Labour Party Press, l93h . PP. B-A. '
22"Towards "war," ï¬ll! Herald, (London), hay 3: 1931+: p0 100
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the use of force, and to settle disputes by peaceful means.
The second provided that any state breaking the peace should
be met by the united strength of the rest of the nations of
the world. Even the strongest nations would not dare to go
against such opposition. The other method was that of
alliances and counteralliances. This method was the old one
that had never succeeded in preserving peace.23
To those who were suggesting some type of alliance must
be formed to strengthen Britain militarily, Labour answered
that this was the job of the League. Although, it admitted,
the League was weak at that time it was the only basis upon
which a genuine and effective collective security system could
be built. Britain, it said, must have nothing to do with
sectional alliances, groups, or coalitions of any kind outside
the League framework.2h
U. N. Ewer more or less expressed Labour's view on the
likelihood of war in Europe. Ewer, who had just returned from
the Continent where he had made an extensive study of the
fascist government, answered "No" and "Yes" to the question of
the probability of war. He said no power in Europe, including
23"Keeping the Peace," Dai'z Harald {London}, June 29,
193h: p. 10'
2I'WAlliance or League?" Dalll,§§I§lï¬.(L0nd0n): may 5’
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Germany, was arming with the aim of "a" war. ions of the
European countries was preparing to attack its neighbors. The
"melodramatic view†that Hitler was getting ready to overrun
Europe, Ewer said, was ". . .as silly as the melodramatic view
. . .that the Soviet Union was getting ready to overrun Europe."
Germany was rearming because she was afraid, and Ewer believed
it was easy to understand the position of the Germans. They
still remembered the occupation of the Ruhr and the attempt to
dismember post-war Germany with the founding of the Rhineland
Republic. They heard their neighbors saying they could not
safely disarm under their present level and the Germans re-
alized that they must be far below the "safe level." The
French too felt threatened by the attempts to arm by a people
who had invaded and occupied their territory twice within fifty
years. Therefore, the rearmament in Europe stemmed from a lack
of security rather than a deliberate plan of aggression by any
cine state. Ewer answered "Yes" to the question of war when
jlooked at from the angle of a slow drift caused by the rearm-
eunent and economic conditions. The arms race and the alliance
system had always brought war in the past and was likely to do
so again. The fact that Germany and Italy were two great
nywers without colonies was also likely to be the cause of war.
(whey were both looking for outlets for their industrial surplus
and were seeking markets and fields for investment. They were
WE
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86
looking chiefly in the Balkans for these. Bwer felt the most
likely European war in the near future would be between
Germany and Italy for control of the Danube and the Balkans.
That or a war between Italy and a Balkan alliance resisting her
penetration. This area was a much greater danger spot that the
Iranco-German frontier or the Polish corridor.25
Meanwhile, Labour was still looking for cracks in the
wall of German and Nazi solidarity at home and it was finding
many. With every crack it saw hope for an eventual crumbling
of the ï¬azi power structure. In October 1933 Ewer saw a great
deal of unrest in Germany, particularly among the Nazi storm
troopers. This dissatisfaction was due to the failure of the
Nazi officials to better the economic conditions of their
followers. Ewer also saw a split in the Nazi hierarchy 6
developing with Ggring and Alfred Rosenberg on their way out.2
In an interview Lion Feuchtwanger, a leading German novelist
living in exile, told the 2g111,§gzgld there was a spirit of
revolt and anti-Hitlerism in Germany, but it was made ineffec-
tual and powerless as much by the weak and yielding policy of
other nations toward Hitler, as by Nazi terror and concentration
25W. N. Ewer, "Will There Be a New Tar?" Daily Hegalg
LLondon), June 8, 193h, p. 15. '
263.'N. Ewer, "Give Us Bread, Or--," Dgily Herald
(London), October 27, 1933. p. 15.
87
27
camps.
In January l93h the plebiscite for the Bear was just a
year away and Labour began to worry about its outcome. Until
Hitler took over there was little doubt that the Saar would
wish to return to Germany, and Labour certainly favored that
choice. However, it appeared in early l93h that it might not
be best for the Saar to return to a Germany under Nazi control.
Certainly, Labour believed, a great number of Socialists,
Communists, Catholics, and Jews would oppose return of the Saar
in view of the Nazi treatment of their comrades in Germany.
The League must take firm action to see that the Nazis not be
allowed to use their usual methods of influencing the election
outcome. The rights of those opposed to the Nazis had to be
28
protected.
January l93h brought the first anniversary of Hitler’s
rise to power and Labour had a great deal to say about that
year. Hitler's only success in carrying out his promises was
in fulfilling his pledge to destroy democracy. In his first
year, Labour claimed, Hitler had effectively destroyed all
29
traces of freedom. Nazi economic policy had been a dismal
27A. L. Easterman, "Germany Will Not Stand It for Long,"
Dailz ngalg (London) December 11, 1933, p. 10.
28"Nazi Terrorists," Dgily Henglg (London), January 15:
193G: P‘ 8‘
29H. N. EWer, "One Year of Hitler," Dailx EQEQLQ (London)
January 30, 1934, Po 8.
88
failure. Foreign trade for 1933 was one-trird less than in 1932
and seventy-five percent less than in 1931. During these same
years most of the democratic countries in Europe showed a slight
upward trend in trade.30
Labour particularly abhored the treatment given the
German working class and the trade unions by the ï¬azis. It
found grim irony in the fact that Hitler chose Lay Day for the
day his new Labor Code was to become effective. The code placed
the workers completely under the control of their employers and
the state. They lost all rights to organize in trade unions,
as well as the right to strike. Labour could only again warn
Hitler that such actions would lead to the eventual destruction
of his government. It called on all believers in democracy,
in the meantime, ". . .to give no quarter to the insidious
agents of Fascism."31
Hitler was now showing his true colors, Labour claimed.
In the days before he came to power he talked like a real re-
volutionary. Bis National Socialism, although not Larxist,
was in a real sense Socialist in its aims. Now that he had
attained power it was evident that he planned to carry out no
30"Failures of Fascism," Daily 331g Q (London),
January 20, l93h, p. 10.
31"Executors," Dgily Egzgld,(London), February 20,
l93h. p- 8.
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socialist reforms. He was handing Germany's economy to the big
industrialists, the men who had supported his movement finan-
cially. It was these men, not Hitler, who were the real
32
dictators of Germany.
The British Socialists found signs of unrest in the Ger-
man working class. In.kay 1934 elections were held in the
factories for workers' representatives under the new Labor Law.
In a great many cases, in spite of pressure and propaganda, the
Nazi candidates were rejected in favor of "neutrals." The Nazi
leaders were divided over how to handle the workers. Goebbels
wanted to placate them.with new promises. Goring wanted to
threaten them with even harsher means of punishment.33
Ewer, who spent several weeks in the spring of 1934
touring Europe observing Fascism at work, gave a rather dismal
picture of Germany and Nazism in a series of articles for the
,Qflilx Eerald, He found an undercurrent of opposition to
Hitler, but everyone was afraid to speak of it to anyone but
his closest friends. Ee found the Nazi pgipaganda crude and
that few people paid any attention to it. Germany was a land
of apathy, Ewer reported. People were taking no interest in the
32"}‘7821 Dupes," Daily Egza'id (London), i‘nlaI'Ch. 15, 19311"
p. 80 ‘
33pm†nggld (London), may 21, 193A, 9. 1-
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iHerald (London), may 23, 1934, p. 10.
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Nazis, hitler, or what the Government was doing. Lwer contrasted
Germany with Russia. There, he said, the Government made every
attempt to get the people enthusiastic absut new programs. In
Germany there was none of this. The Government tried to explain
nothing. It merely flung endless slogans at the public which
were practically meaningless. Nazism's glamor was disappearing
and it had become a "bore". This did not mean, Ewer said, the
end was near for Hitler. The S.A. might be bored, but it was
still loyal. Any serious attack on the regime would rekindle
its enthusiasm. It was because the Nazis' power was so come
plate, and that there seemed nothing that could be done about
it, that Germany and the Nazis themselves were bored and
35
apathetic.
Ewer also found that the Jazis were the heads of the
various ministries, but the old bureaucracy ran Germany. They
treated the Hazi system in the same way they treated the Neimar
system. Very rapidly the Iazis in the main administrative posts
were being tamed and controlled by their departments and the
economic interests with whom they had to deal. The army, he
found, was the most independent of the groups in Germany. It
tolerated no interference from the Nazi Government just as it
35?. N. Ewer, "Germany is Just Bored!" Daily Heralg
(London), may 2h, l93h, p. 8.
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91
had allowed none from the Republic. General von Fritsch, the
Inspector-General, was the real power in the army and perhaps
the man who held the key to Germany's future. "He.might be-
come a Napoleon; he might become a honk; hg might just go on
with his job. But he is a man to watch."
The failure of the Nazis to solve the economic problems
would be their undoing, Ewer predicted. He would not go so far
as to prophesy collapse, but even Government spokesmen were
warning of a hard winter ahead, and were calling for new self-
saorifice for the sake of the nation. He saw at least a chance
for a revolution as ï¬azism decayed.37 The Kazis' brutality and
terror had been suffered by the Germans for nothing. After a
year of Hitler there was no sign of regeneration or rebuilding.
The economic situation was even more desperate than before.
Nazism had revealed itself as "an instrument for subjecting the
German people to the greedy will of the industrial barons and
the agrarian Junkers." The S.A. having done its work was now
being thrown aside and was told to find jobs if it could. If
the storm troopers resisted or even protested the weapons which
they used against others would be used against them. The
‘36w. N. Ewer, "She Cld Gang Still Rules in Germany,"
ng11 hgzalg (London), may 29, 1934, p. lb.
37Ib1g,, p. 1a.
[HE
92
Rgighgwgh: and the §§ghlh§lm would be only too happy to under-
take the suppression of the Brownshirts and the iitler Youth.
The 2gi11_ngald believed every sign suggested Germany was ". .
.heading straight for a military-financial dietatorship." How-
ever, it said, "bayonets cannot solve social and economic pro-
blems. A Rgiphswghz dictator must fail as Hitler has failed.38
The Blood Purge of June 30, 1934 surprised Labour only
in its size and brutality. Labourites had long predicted a
split in the Nazi ranks and had said the the S.A. would be dis-
carded, but they had expected nothing of the scope that the
purge turned out to be. Hitler had started something which in
the and would bring his destruction, they said. The terror that
had been started within the party would leave no member, in-
cluding Hitler himself, secure. It was, Labour said, the be-
ginning of the end for the Nazis.39 Behind the whole affair
were the men of the old regime-~the Junkers and the generals.
Hitler had turned on his own followers to please this group and
in doing so had sold himself for the sake of power. He was now
completely dependent on them. He had been ". . .the tool of
men who were equally unscrupulous but far more clever than he."
38"Nazism in Decline," ‘ailx ngald (London), June 12,
1934, p. 10.
39"Heads in the Sand," 413361 Bernie. (London): July 2»
19314" p. 8'
IBE
r-v—t.
1......" .
93
He and his followers had successfuly destroyed freedom and
democracy in Germany. The S.A. was, therefore, no longer of
any use to the "old gang" and had been destroyed. Eitler would
be retained until he had exhausted his usefulness and then he
too would be pushed aside and probably shot.40 Ewer reported
Litler suffered from.an acute persecution complex and it was
being used by the "Reichswehr Cabal" to clear out Hitler's own
men who might be obstacles to them. Oskar von Hindenburg and
Otto Meissner, the private secretary to every President since
1918, were members of this group. They were looking for some-
one to take Hitler's place. It probably would not be Ggring,
Goebbels, or Papen. Rudolf Hess, the Secretary of the Nazi
Party, was the most likely dark horse candidate. There was no
loyalty left among the Nazi leaders since the Blood Purge,
Ewer said, so it would be no problem to divide them against one
another. He would not be surprised, Ewer stated, within a
short time to see Hess as acting Chancellor and a new purge
under way. If so Goring, Goebbels, Robert Lay, and the rest of
the top Nazis would go. Goebbels was the one possible exception
41
as he had "a keen eye for the winning side."
40"016 Gene on Top," 2.23.111 herald (London). July 3.
1931?, p. 100
-th. N. Ewer,‘"Hitler's Afraid of his Big Bad Nazis,"
may. herald (London). July 13. 1934. p. 15.
IRE
94
The day before Bresident lindenburg's death Hitler com-
bined the offices of President and Chancellor. iindenburg died
August 2, l93h and on August 19 a plebiscite was held in which
Hitler's decision was confirmed by an overwhelming majority.
Labour said this vote did not represent the true mind of Germany.
The terror and coercion produced the large majority. However,
it admitted, a free election would not have voted down Hitler.
That might come, but not for awhile, Labour said. In the mean-
time Eitler's regime was strengthened by the move. But the
regime was now Bitlerism not Nazism. National Socialism was
dead and Hitler had survived it but at a heavy price. The old
revolutionary Hitler was gone and was replaced by an "Ersatz-
Hindenburg." Be was doomed "reverently to wear the mantle of
the old Fieldemarshall, to carry out the policies of the old
Fieldéharshall." He would have to accept the superiority of
the army, to recognize the authority of the aristocracy, and to
prepare for the restoration of the monarchy};2
Through the winter of 1934-35, the economic situation
grew steadily worse in Germany according to Labour observers,
and the British Socialists took great satisfaction in pointing
to the inefficiency and failure of the Nazis in this area. In
August 1934 there was already a shortage of potatoes and farmers
42"Hitler's Doom," Dad]! Herald (London), August 20,
1934, Po 8-
. lea-fl
95
were selling their animals as there was not enough fodder to
keep them. A meat shortage was expected by winter}?3 Ger-
many's inability to pay foreign debts, both political and
trade, reflected the increasing chaos and poverty in Germany,
Labour declared. Real wages had fallen in Germany since
Hitler had come to power. The cost of living had risen from
117.4 in January 1933 to 122.9 in August l93h. Real wages had
fallen about one percent. There was still a large number of
unemployed and the number was artificially shrunken by not
counting certain classes of unemployed.4h The export trade
which had been so large was by August 1934 in ruin. By
February 1935, in spite of ever effort by Hjalmar Schacht, the
Minister of Economics, the German exports had declined even
more. They were less than one-third what they had been in 1929
when the Depression began. At the same time imports, which
were held szgady for a long thme by tight restrictions, were
increasing.
0n the whole the German economy seemed very unhealthy
ABEllen Wilkenson, "Berlin: What Next?" Daily Hepgld
{London}, August 10, 1934, p. 8.
h4"Fruits of Hitlerism," 25111_§§2gld (London),
AHEUSL 31, 19349 p0 100
#5 - - -
"German Trade," Daily herald (London), February 18,
1935, p. 10.
96
and chaotic, and growing worse not better. Labour still
thought it would be this factor that would eventually bring
down the Hitler Government.
The attempt by the Austrian Nazis to overthrow
Dr. Engelbert Dollfuss' Government was obviously backed by the
Litler regime, Labour declared. Labour had no particular love
for Dollfuss who had only the previous February broken the
back of the Austrian Socialist by force, but it opposed vehe-
mently any Nazi Government in Austria. It expressed deep
sympathy for the Agstrian people who were caught in the middle
of this struggle.4 The independence of Austria was a League
problem and should not be left to Italy, France, or any other
single country. The Treaty of St. Germain stated that the
". . .independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than
with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations."
Labour demanded the nations act only through the League in
settling this matter}7
Labour welcomed ï¬itler's speech of August 6, 1934, in
which he "preached the virtue of peace," because it helped to
to ease tensions in a Europe which badly needed soothing words.
A6"In Tragic Vienna," 2g111,§§3glï¬ (London), July 29:
1934: p0 8'
47"Perils of Austria," Daily Herald (London), July 27:
1939: p0 80
97
however, Labour was not sure it could completely trust Hitler's
words, but said it was willing to give hi; the benefit of the
doubt if he would back up his words with actions. It would
like to see Germany stop exciting "terrorism and civil war†among
her neighbors, and to really show his good intentions hitler 8
night release those he was holding in his concentration camps.A
Eis continued talk of peace Labour found hard to reconcile with
"the intinsive militarist teaching in the schools and the military
training of the young men throughout Germany." If Hitler really
meant peace, Labour asked, why was he holding tens of thousands
of Pacifists in prison for advocating peace? It found it
". . .strange that what is virtuous coming fromgthe Fuehre; is
criminal when uttered by an ordinary citizen."AL
The Saar plebiscite scheduled for January 13, 1935
occupied a great deal of Labour's attention during the fall and
winter of 1934. Eitler, it believed, feared a heavy anti-Nazi
vote there. There was.much agitation led.by'hax Braun, the
Socialist leader in the Saar, for a vote to remain under the
League. The Socialists, Communists, Jews, and Catholics all
had good reason to oppose a reunion with ï¬azi Germany. To-
ASHNOW Brove It," Dgilz nggld (London), August 7, 193h)
p. 80
h9nsafe for Him," Dgilx Egzaig (London), September 13:
1934. p- 10-
98
gather they made up seventy percent of the population. hitler's
declaration that there was religious freedom in Germany while
designed to win over the Catholics seemed to Labour to be having
50
little effect.
The Labourites opposed vigorously the French suggestion
that British troops take part in an occupation of the Saar both
before and after the plebiscite. It was necessary that the
vote in the Bear be a free choice, but the vote should be deci-
sive, and the League Council should respect the wish of the
majority. The idea that the territory should be kept from Ger-
many no matter what the vote was would do nothing but laid to a
new Franco-German war which would also drag in Britain.5
George Lansbury, the Labour Party leader, hurried to see Sir John
Simon, the Foreign Secretary, to obtainhis assurance that
British troops would not be used in the Saar. Simon promised
they would not and added that the French Government had promised
that the arrangements it had made were purely precautionary, and
that the German Government had given "a solemn assurance" there
was no danger of an invasion of the Saar and reported the steps
52
it had taken to insure that there would be none.
50"Saar Opinion,†Baggy nggld (London), August 27»
1934. p- 8-
l - _ -
lgBh: p. 12‘
52"Saar PledgeS," QQLLX.§§2QLQ (London), November 6’
1931+, p. 100
99
Labour supported whole-heartedly the suggestion that an
international police be used to maintain peace in the Bear
during the period of the plebiscite. Here was the perfect op-
portunity to demonstrate in miniature the whole basis of Labour's
foreign policy philosophy--a League action using the collective
system. This would prove, if given a chance, that world pro-
blems could be settled in a peaceful, orderly fashion if the two
nations concerned were willing to accept "the common rule" and
to subordinate their particular interest for the common good,
and if the other nations were willing to fulfil "certain
functions" and to accept "certain responsibilities."53
Max Braun warned the readers of the Daily Heralg the Saar
must not become part of Germany again. He cited the fact that
the Saar was dependent upon Lorraine for the sale of coal and
as a source of iron ore for its industry. If the Saar became
part of Germany the French would probably turn to other sources
for their coal, while the Saar would have trouble selling coal
in Germany as most industry in southern Germany ran on hydraulic-
ally produced electricity. France would not sell iron ore to
Saar industries knowing it would be used for German armaments.
Also France was not particularly anxious to take too much ore
out of Lorraine as the deposits were believed to be good for
SBHIt can Be Done," Bail! Hgnfllg (London), December 79
1931+: p0 10’
100
only sixty more years and so there was a desire on the part of
the French to conserve as much as possible. Kore important
than economic factors, he said, was the religious and political
side. Lany in the Saar were willing to renounce their Father-
land rather than forfeit their political and religious freedom.
The Saar, Braun warned, was just the first step in Nazi foreign
policy to bring all small neighbors under her influence. Switz-
erland, Luxembourg, Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
and Austria were also threatened. The Nazis were not motivated
by a desire to rectify the injustices of the Versailles Treaty.
They were driven by the old spirit of Pan;Germanism which sought
to unite all German-speaking peoples, even against their wills,
into one empire. For the peace of Europe, he concluded, the
Saar must remain under the League of Nations.54
Labour warned against loose talk in both Britain and
France that the three British regiments moving through France
to the Saar during December showed that the entente was still
in being, that Britain still stood at the side of France, or
that it was "just like l9lh again." It was nothing of the
kind, Labour said. These soldiers were on an errand of peace
not war. They showed Britain was playing her part in a system
. SQMaI Braun. "If the Bear Votes for Eitler," Dgily
Egrald (London), December 21, 1934, p. 8.
101
55
of collective security. They were policemen of the League.
After the Saarlanders voted overwhelmingly to return to
Germany, Labour said it had known all along this would happen.
1"Tow the transition to German rule must be made smoothly. Hitler
must realize the eyes of the world would be upon him and his
treatment of the minority in the Saar who opposed him would do
much to determine future relations between Germany and the free
nations. Hitler spoke of the settlement of the Bear question
as being "a first and decisive step on the way to a gradual
reconciliation." Labour hoped he and the other leaders of
Europe would ingeed take the subsequent steps, but immediately
not gradually.5
Labour deplored the fact that the Saar settlement, which
it believed had been handled so well, might be destroyed by
last.minute squabbling caused by France. France, it seemed, was
raising new and trivial demands which could cause a great deal
of bitterness. Labour urged the date be fixed immediately for
handing the Saar back to Germany, and that it be done in a
57
spirit of good will.
55"l93£p Not l9lh," Dgilx Eergld (London), December 22:
1934. p- 8.
56"The Saar Vote," aily Egrgld (London), January 16,
1935: P0 8'
57n5t0p This Follyz" DEiIE nggld (London), January 17:
1935, p. 8.
102
At home Labour continued to worry over the fact that
Britain seemed to be slipping further away from the concept of
collective security through the League towards alliances,
particularly with France. The issue arose over a visit by
Louis Barthou, the French Foreign minister, to Britain. Labour
did not put too much faith in Baldwin's pledge that "the Gov—
ernment does not contemplate making any arrangement with France
without consultation with the League with reference to mutual
action in the event of hostilities breaking out in Europe."
It believed "the publicity given to the intriguem 1 «had for
the moment, 'spoiled the game.'" But, Labour warned, the
danger was still there.58 Labour remained highly suspicious
of the Government's actions. If it was not changing its
foreign policy, Labour asked, why were the generals and diplo-
mats holding secret discussions with the generals and diplomats
of other countries. Labour thought "something was up" and
called on the Government to make a full foreign policy statement
in Parliament, clearing up such questions as what was its atti-
tude towards the League, and its attitude towards suggestions
59
of "close cooperation with other powers."
58"So Far, So Good," Dgily nggld (London), July 7, l93h.
p. 10.
59"No Secret Diplomacy." 41117? .W “Cndonh July
10, 1934, p. 8.
l03
As the talks with Barthou went on, Labour became in-
creasingly uneasy. The Government, it felt, although the
ministers did not admit it openly, was coming to look on the
League as "an amiable but useless†organization "underserving
of effort and irrelevant of reality." The french Government also,
it feared, had the same attitude. Labour disliked the current
talk of "regional pacts of mutual assistance†and of the "more
vague, more dangerous assurances of loyal cooperation.†it was
said these were the only alternatives to a system of alliances,
but Labour believed they could easily turn into just that with
a "little secret diplomacy" and "a few military conversations."
It went on to say again that the only workable system was that
m 60
of â€collective pooling of security under the League."
Baldwin in a speech supporting an increase in the air
force said, " hen you think of the defense of England you no
longer think of the chalk cliffs of Dover, you think of the
Rhine." Labour was puzzled as to exactly what he meant by
this. if he was speaking of britain's obligations under the
Locarno tact, then why was it necessary to call for an increase
in the air force or any armaments. one of the major facets of
collective security was to make large armaments for single
nations unnecessary. It seemed more logical to the Labourites
éovtLeague 01‘ Groups?" Daily E I" 113. (London), Jilly 11)
l93h, p. 8.
104
that the Government had made a secret military agreement with
France. The only circumstances under which the public would
sanction cooperation with France, they declared, would be in
defense "of world law under the League of Nations against an
outlaw." The British people would not tolerate a secret alli-
ance with France outside the League, they said.
Lord Davies, the President of the Commonwealth Society,
in an article in the Daily Herald insisted an international
police force was necessary and practical. The questions
raised against it, such as who would command it, how would it
be financed, of whom would it be constitmmd, were questions
which had been resolved during the war. Was not what was
possible in war possible in peace?, he asked. bhy could the
nations not organize to preserve peace, rather than organize
61
to make war?
At the annual meetings of the T.U.U. in September 1934:
and the Labour Party in October, the leaders of the party, the
T.U.C., and the parliamentary party presented a statement, Egg
gag Egggg, to the two gatherings. It stated the war-resistance
resolution of the previous year, which call for a general
strike in case of war, was not enough, as it did not include
" 61Lord Davies, "Security hithout Arms," Daily
§££§11.(London), August 16, 1934, Po 8.
“ms
105
Labour's policy of preventing war by organizing peace. The
statement also included a reaffirmation of the party's faith
in the League and the collective system. It made a distinction
between the use of military force in a war of aggression and
its use in defense of collective peace. It said,
Labour is emphatically opposed to any form of
aggressive War, but we recognize that there might be
circumstances under which the Government of Great
ï¬ritain might have to use*its military and naval
forces in support of the League in restraining an
aggressor nation which declined to submit to the
authority of the League and which flagrantly used 62
military measures in defiance of its pledged word.
Labour found the idea of using force unpleasant, but had to face
the fact that the "final guarantee" of peace was the readiness
to use force in the last resort against an aggressor. The true
efficacy of the collective system lay in the "overwhelming
probability" that no nation would dare risk facing the united
forces of the whole world and would, therefore, refrain from
committing aggression. There must be no doubt that the sage-
3
tions would be of a "crushing and irresistible character."
At the T.U.C. Convention there was a great deal of debate
over the "abandonment" of the general strike. Those opposed to
the resolution claimed it was a betrayal of the party's "hatred
of war and determination to fight it.†The supporters of it
62Brand, The British Labgg; m, p. 178.
63"Peace and Force," Dgily ngald (London), September
7, 1934, Do 10-
a.-.)
106
said it was not fair to nut the burden of war-resistance com—
pletely on the trade unions. it was the duty of every citizen
"1
to try to keep his country out of war. 'ne advocates of the
u. ‘ ‘
reneral strike overlooked, tnose for the resciuticn said, that
W)
outside of three or four nations in Lurope there mere none
capable of initiating an effective strike. eritish Labour
could strike if it wished, but there was little likelihood that
britain would be an aggressor. The real danger spots in
Europe were Germany, and because of its situation, Austria.
ï¬ere general strikes were impossible. The idea of the general
strike was not being abandoned, but as irnest Devin argued,
each incident had to be judged on its own, and there should be
h an
no definite comnitment on what Labour would do.
All 1'
"3
(D
At the Labour farty Convention in Cctober Her e ace,
which had been accepted by the T.U.C. the month before, was
presented for the approval of the delegates. Arthur menderson
introduced the report wi h a speech which was to be his last
65
before that body. he spoke mainly of the League, and em-
phazised the need for honoring all obligations to it. is
stressed again his idea for an Act of zarliament which would
make the renunciation of var "an essential part of the british
GhDaily mega}; (London), September 7, 193A, 9- 13.
65srand, The british Labour farty, p. 179.
107
Constitution." iBritain would reject the right of making war
as an instrument of national policy, and would agree to submit
all disputes to some form of peaceful settlement. Labour's
ultimate goal was a "collective world commonwealth." "Loyalty
would in the future, under Labour rule, be to a world state
through which the eventual abolition of armed forces would be
secured." He believed the people of Britain should be citizens
of the world before they were citizens of Great Britain. The
Conference pledged the party to stand by the League in any war
action taken against an aggressor. The Labour Party Conference
supported the stand taken by the T.U.C. on the question of the
general strike. The report stated that, "The responsibility
for stopping war ought not be placed on the Trade Union.movement
alone. Every citizen who wants peace and every other section
of the Labour Movement must share the responsibilitgéof any or-
ganized action that might be taken to prevent war." The
main opposition came from members of the Socialist League. They
attacked it on the grounds that it was useless to rely upon a
League of capitalist-controlled countries and that Britain should
encourage disarmament by example. The Conference accepted the
67
E;;,ang,2§a§g resolution by a vote of 1,519,000 to 673,000.
66Da111 Herald (London), October 3, 193L, p. 1.
67Brand, The §21115h_LapQuz 2a1%y, p. 179. Hugh Dalton,
3%? F Yggza: hï¬ï¬‚212§.193l'1945 London: FredericK.Muller
Liu, 1957 , pp. 53-55-
"KBE
108
In September 1934 the Soviet Union joined the League of
Nations. This was something which Labour had long desired. It
believed the Russians' entry and the closer cooperation of the
United States offset the loss caused by Germany and Japan's
withdrawal from the League.68
Although Labour had long sought Soviet participation in
the League, the previous Larch it rejected the first of several
attempts by the British Communist Party to join with it in a
"United Front" against fascism. On behalf of the Nation Ex-
ecutive of the Labour Party, Henderson wrote a letter to the
Communist Party leader in which he turned down their request
for united action on the grounds that the Communist Party did
not believe in Parliamentary democracy and that Labour would
weaken its principles by cooperating with an anti-democratic
group.69
Labour did its best to stop what it called "war-talk" or
"panic-mongering." It accused all the European leaders of
using such propaganda for their own ends. Hitler and.Mussolini
were dependent on such talk for their political lives. Fear of
an enemy made their people accept the dictatorship for the sake
68"Geneva's Future," nglx ngglfl (London), September
19, 1931+, p. 10
6912mm herald (London). march 3, 1931+, p- 13.
E
109
of national unity. The other governments also used it to pro-
mote their rearmament programs. The governments of France and
Lritain were faced with public opinion opposed to either the
armaments themselves, the heavy expenditure of armaments, or
both. To excuse their new, expensive programs, the leaders
had to persuade the people that there was a real and grave
danger or war. Labour feared the constant talk of war would
make the coming of one easier.70 The British Government was
afraid, Labour maintained, to come right out and declare it
was rearming. Public opinion would not allow it and it would
quite likely topple the Government.71
The Government's drift away from the collective security
principle became more obvious to Labour when Baldwin in a speech
at Glasgow in November l93h declared that, "a collective peace
system, in my view, is perfectly impracticable to-day." This,
coupled with an appeal in his talk for more armaments, as they
were the only guarantee for security, disturbed Labour greatly.72
To make things even more troubled, word leaked out that France
and the Soviet Union were about to conclude a military agreement
7O"This Mad War Talk," Daily ngalg (London), November
12, 193h. p. 10.
71"The Panic mongers," Daily Herald (London), November
28, l93h, P0 10.
" 72"Peace and the League," Daily Egrglg (London),
November 26, 1931+, p0 loo
ms
at
as...
_~ “J
110
against Germany. Labour did not accept the argument that this
was a war-preventing alliance. It believed Germany would seek
a counter-entente and the world would be on its way to a rep-
etition of 1911,.73
In late l93h the famous Peace ballot to gauge britain's
outlook in foreign affairs and particularly towards the League
was undertaken with whole-hearted cooperation of Labour. This
would demonstrate once and for all, it believed, where the pub-
lic stood, and it was sure the people would support the Labour
position in foreign policy. The Tories attacked the Ballot as
"party politics of the lowest kind," but Labour dismissed their
mud slinging efforts to discredit it on the ground it would
completely disrupt their trend in foreign policy away from.dis-
armament, arbitration, and collective security.7h
It was several months before the final results could be
compiled, but Labour could see from.even the partial results
that the Ballot would be in its favor. The poll reached
11,500,000 persons, about half of the electorate. The wording
of some of the questions has been criticized and the sampling
was not as scientific as it might have been, but the answers
" 73"Reviving Past Evils,†2a111,ï¬ï¬ralï¬,(London),
November 24, 193h, Po lO.
74"Ballot for Peace," Dajgy ngald (London), Hovember
13. 1934. p. 10-
111
because of their number provided a significant expression of
public opinion. There was practically unanimity in favor of
the League, of a disarmament agreement, of aboliton of
national military aircraft, and of prohibition of private
manufacture of armaments. 0n the question concerning the
League and collective security the vote was 11,157,040 in
favor of membership, 357,460 against, and 113,256 abstained;
for economic and nonmilitary sanctions through the League to
stop aggression the vote was 10,088,312 for, 638,211 against,
and 801,242 noncomittal; for the use of military measures, if
necessary, 6,827,699 favored them, 2,364,279 opposed, and
2,435,789 abstained. The results appeared to confirm that the
majority of the electorate favored Labour's foreign policy.75
In the first.months of 1935 the rearmament question
again dominated Labour's thinking. W. N. Ewer, in a feature
article in the Qgily,§grglï¬, explored the entire question of
German rearmament. The unilateral disarmament imposed by Ver-
sailles created a situation that could not possibly last.
There were from the beginning only four possible ways out of
it. Firstly, there could be a general disarmament to the
Versailles level, as was "half-promised" in the Treaty.
Secondly, the powers could forcibly make Germany observe the
75Brand. The Law Earn. 9. 180.
ms
112
military clauses. Thirdly, there could be an agreement by the
victorious powers either to free Germany to rearm like the
rest of the nations, or that she and the other powers should
be subject on equal footing to limitations. Finally, there
could be a refusal by Germany to be bound any longer by either
the Versailles or any other unilateral limitation. It becam
obvious soon after the var, Lwer said, that none of the powers
F’h
had any intention to disarm to the Versailles level. ine
abortive occupation of the Ruhr by francs and Lelgium showed
that the second method would not work. The failure of the
Disarmament Conference ruled out the third method. This meant
that the only alternative open to Germany was the fourth--which
she was beginning to follow. Lwer answered the argument that
Germany under the :azis was different than other nations as
shown by her brutal treatment of her minorities, by saying the
two points were unrelated. Just because a nation mistreated
its minorities did not mean it was about to attack its neighbor.
He admitted there was something to the argument that Gernany was
more dangerous because it we a nation with â€lost provinces,"
but even here, he said, there were many nations with lost terri-
76
tory which did not use force to regain it.
“763. K. Lwer, "Face These ’ar Scare Eacts-- isely,"
Daily Herald (London), Lecember 3, 1934, p. 10.
113
Labour called upon Germany to "tear away the veil of
secrecy" surrounding her military preparations. Secrecy
breeds suspicion and suspicion breeds fear, it said.77
In early February 1935 an Anglo-French meeting was held
in London to try to decide what to do about Germany's rearming.
Labour pleaded with the Conference not to lose what might be
the last good chance to reach an agreement with the Germans.
Germany, it said, should be negotiated with as an equal and
not have terms dictated to her.78 The talks resulted as
Labour wished. There was no Anglo—French plan which was pre-
sented to Germany in a "take-it-or-leave-it" manner. Rather
Germany was invited to take part in conversations designed to
reach a "general settlement freely negotiated." Labour was
cautiously optimistic that Germany might accept the invitation
and an agreement might at long last be reached.79 The next day
the German press stated it "definitely regards the London pro-
posals as a basis for negotiations." While this was not an
official reply, Labour believed it reflected the thinking of
77"Veil of secrecy," Dailx herald (London): January 3'
1935, Do 8. A
78"To-day's Talks," Bail! Hggalg (London), Eebruary 1:
19359 p0 10‘
79"Opening the Door," Dailx Hegglg (London), FGbTUETY h:
1935: p' 10'
114
the German Government. Now, Labour urged, Britain and France
must have patience while Germany studied the proposals. The
negotiations could take several months, it warned. lt
cautioned the French Right Wing press not to try to undermine
the negotiation expecting that their failure would result in
an Anglo-French air convention. The british people, it said,
would not stand for a conversion of the proposed air conven-
tion, which was to be a part of the collective security
80
system, to a "one-sided alliance.",
The German answer seemed to open the way for negoti-
ations, especially on the question of the air convention.
Lewever, between the tine of the London meeting and the German
answer, the French afpeared to be shifting their position on
the suggested procedure and Labour hoped this â€embarrassing
situation" would not ruin the chances for an agreement.
On.harch 4, 1935 Prime minister MacDonald presented in
the form of a Mhite Paper the Government's apology for rearm-
ament. He argued that more armaments were needed to "preserve
peace, to maintain security and to deter aggression." Labour
said it would do nothing of the kind. It repeated its position
80"30 Far, So Good," ngjx H§z§JQ (London), Eebruary
5. 1935. p- 8.
81"German Answer," Daily Herald (London), February
16, 1935, p. 10.
115
that a new arms race would bring no security or peace, only
fear and war.82
The main effect of the White Paper, Labour claimed,
was to "complicate the diplomatic situation, to make the
coming conversations more difficult, and the chances of their
success more remote." The comments on it in the British con-
servative press, Labour said, could do nothing but arouse
German resentment. The Paper was described by the Tory's press
as a "stern word" and a "warning" to Germany. She was accused
of "treaty breaking" of "aggravating" the situation and of
tending to "produce a situation where peace may be in peril."
to matter what their views, such statements on the eve of a
visit to Berlin by the Foreign Secretary and the coming nego-
tiations was a serious blunder in tact. Now the firs; step of
the diplomats must be to undo the harm that was done. 3
Hitler's announcement on.Larch 16 that Germany no longer
considered herself bound by the military restrictions of Ver-
saflles came as no surprise to Labour. This was something, it
said, it had expected and warned of for a long time. The
armament race had been on for some time, but now, in.March 1935,
82"N6‘W Arms Race," Daj II nggld (London), l"iaI‘Ch 5, 1935:
p. 10.
83"Premier's Bad EI‘I'OI‘," Bail! m (London), l‘HaZE‘Ch.
6, 1935, p. 10.
116
the masks were coming off everywhere. The British White Paper
gave Hitler the pretext he needed, but the French decision to
double the term of military service, the Russian increase in
her army from 400,000 to 900,000 men, Lussolini's boast that
if necessary he could put 8,000,000 men in the field, all
played their parts. Germany must, henceforth, be considered
again a fully armed great power. However, Labour said it was
no time for panic. The fact that the Versailles system--the
attempt to insure security and peace by keeping one European
Power in a condition of military inferiority to the rest--had
broken down. It could only be restored by another war. New
there was only two possible steps. Either the nations of
Europe could step up the arms race to try to keep ahead of
each other, which would lead only to bankruptcy and to war, or
they could start over in an attempt to secure disarmament.
"Sanity can turn it [Hitler's declaration) from a great disaster
into a great opportunity." "Hitler's declaration should be
taken as a challenge not to further rearmament, but to a new and
84
serious effort to secure all-round disarmament."
_ 8“Give Peace a Fresh Start," Daily Enznlï¬ (London),
Larch 18, 1935, Pa 10-
EAPTER VI
OLD PRINCIPLES SHAKMI
The renunciation of the military clauses of Versailles
by Hitler disturbed Labour not because it objected to the
result, it had long favored doing away with such sections of
the Versailles Treaty, but because it was done unilaterally
by Germany without the consent of the other nations or the
League. Labour hoped some good would come from this action.
It might very well clear the way for an arms settlement now
that a major stumbling block had been removed and now that
Germany had the "equality of status" she had so long sought.
Europe must recognize Germany's full equality without reser-
vations. Germany must take her place in the "comity of
nations" without arrogance, but with a readiness to "con-
tribute generously to the common task." If this were done
then there should be no reason why an effective peace system
could not be built.1 Germany's return to the League was
fundamental to the whole peace structure of Europe, Labour
insisted. However, if Germany refused to return, the League
had to go on without her, even at the risk of appearing
2
against her. Because Labour believed Germany had to be
lnpast or Future," 98111 Herald (London), March 22:
1935, PO 120
2"Note to Berlin," Dgily Herald (London), March 19,
1935. p. 10.
118
given every encouragement to return to the League, it opposed
France's efforts to raise the question of German rearmament
at Geneva. France's sole purpose in this, Labour claimed,
was to make it more difficult for Germany to return.3
By late March 1935 with the purpose of the Stress
meeting (scheduled for early April) still unknown, Labour
urged the Government to use this meeting to make clear to the
rest of Europe that Britain stood completely behind the
League, and was ready within the League's framework to under-
take security commitments and to give guarantees of mutual aid
wherever European peace was threatened. As the Stresa
meeting got underway, it appeared to Labour that British
foreign policy was now once again on the right path;-a return
to Geneva through Stresa. The meeting between France, Italy,
and Britain would not produce a three-power pact, Labour
hoped, but rather these three nations would work out a scheme
to strengthen the collective security machinery of the League.5
Luch of Labour's optimism about the change in the Government's
attitude towards the League was based on a speech by baldwin
3"The Main Purpose," DQLLI.§§IQLQ.(L0nd0n): March 21’
1935, p. 10.
, hustand by the League," Dï¬jll HQIQIQ (London),
march 29, 1935. Po 12-
5"Stresa to Geneva," Dag]! Hggglfl (London), April 8:
1935, p. 10.
119
in which he reversed his position on collective security as
stated the previous November in his Glasgow speech. In that
speech he had declared the collective security system was
"impracticable." In April at Llandrindod Wells he said, "As
one who has been studying and working on this question through
many years, I am driven to the conclusion that the last way
we have of ensuring peace is by some means of collective
security, and to that end, inside the League of Nations, the
whole of Europe must get together to devise the means by which
this great and can be achieved.6
At first glance, it appeared to Labour that Stresa had
accomplished something positive. It did call for "creating
an impregnable system of collective defense. . ." in which
". . .Germany will be invited to take part freely and equally."
The recognition of Germany's equality was the first step to a
collective peace system. Labour congradulated the Government
for its role in securing the decision to do this. However,
Labour wondered, what should the rest of Europe do if Germany
refused the invitation? It urged the other nations to go on
without her, for not to do so would be giving Germany a veto
over all security measures. This, Labour said, was "equality
6"Britain and Stress," Daily Eezald (London), April 11,
1935, p. 10.
120
run mad." 0n the other hand, just because Germany chose not
to join in a security pact, the other nations were not justified
7
in undertaking anti-German measures.
Labour believed Aurope would regret one of the decisions
+3
reached at Ltresa. his was the one to ask the League Council
to study the Question of applying penalties to States which
violated or repudiated treaty obligations. This, Labour said,
was obviously directed at Germany and was an attempt to pre-
vent further "whittlins away‘ of the Versailles system without
the consent of the victorious powers. The League, it said, was
created to enforce peace not to enforce treaties. The League
only had power to impose penalties for one crime--â€making war
in violation of Covenants." The League had no power or right
to take any action against a state which did not overstep that
line. The problem in expanding the League's power to enforce
treaties would be that it would apply to all countries and all
treaties. This would bring a revolutionary change in the whole
structure of international law and would push the concept of
collective security far beyond its original intent. it would
also call for machinery for revision of treaties as the League
must have that power if it would be exaected to fairly enforce
7"nquality for All,†Baily herald (London), April 13,
1935, p. 10.
121
them. Labour certainly did not oppose such developments in the
power of the League, but it did not believe the Government
favored such a plan and so it wished to make the implications
clear as it believed the Government did not fully understand
what it had proposed. Once such a reform of the League had
been begun, Labour said, it would have to be carried to the
end. It could not just be directed against Germany by enforcing
only Versailles.8
The events at the League Council meeting in April crushed
Labour's hopes that the Stress decisions would bring Germany
back to the League. The "three Stress Powers" presented a
resolution formally condemning Germany's unilateral breach of
the Versailles military clauses, and the Council passed it.
This virtually destroyed any chance of Germany's return,
although the door was still technically open. Labour warned
against two possible results of Stress. Germany's decision to
remain aloof from the League could not be allowed to prevent
the rest of the world from continuing to build up a collective
system. Secondly, the security system must not be allowed to
degenerate into a mere system of anti-German coalitions or into
a "holy alliance" system in which the Stress powers would use
8"Geneva's Problem," Daily Herald (London). April 15
1935, p. 10.
122
Germany's actions to establish a joint dictatorship over
European affairs. Any security system had to be kept under the
control of the League as a whole, it declared.9
By the end of April Labour had come to look on Stresa
and the League Council meeting as a turning point in the
European system and Britain’s foreign policy. It was now clear,
Lwer said, that a rival policy to the pre-Stresa policy of a
"general settlement" by "free negotiations" was being advocated
in Britain, as well as France, Italy, and Russia. The basis of
this new policy was the assumption that there was no point in
trying to negotiate with Hitler's Germany. He would never make
an agreement, or if he did, keep it. He was planning and pre-
paring for an aggressive war and the only wise course was to
build, as rapidly as possible, a series of barrier treaties,
supported by adequate armaments. A Triple Entente came out of
Stress. Britain had gone there with its policy still based on
the League, and returned with it based on the new Entente
aiming at consolidation of all possible forces against the
"German danger." At Geneva this new Entente was seen in action.
The three powers worked together in promoting each other's
interests. Further evidence that there was some defense agree-
ment was found in the fact that since Stresa French enthusiasm
9nGermany's Next Step," nggl HengJQ (London),
April 18, 1935. p- 8-
123
for an Eastern fact had declined. If France could count on
British and Italian aid, her need for Russian help lessened.
Ewer saw it not only as a Triple Entente against Germany, but
also as an attempt to replace the League withimussolini's
idea of a junta of big powers which would dictate European
policy. The plan, Ewer said, was unworkable in the long run,
but its effects could be very harmful. It would drive Germany
farther into a dangerous isolation, it would weaken the League,
and it would produce a great deal of insecurity in Europe.10
Labour welcomed the Franco-Soviet Treaty of mutual
assistance against aggression which was signed in.May 1935. It
was within the framework of the League, and invited all nations,
including Germany to join it. It made war less likely, Labour
said, ". . .by the simple but essential process of increasing
the forces which will be thrown against aggression." These
forces could not be created "out of nowhere." Each nation had
to make its contribution. Labour called on the British Govern-
ment to follow the lead of France and Russia by declaring what
contribution it was willing to make to keep the peace. No use
of force by the League would really be effective without British
11
participation, Labour warned.
"10W° N- EW8T:."Driftifl8 into a New Triple Entente,"
211.11 herald (London), April 21., 1935, p. 8.
llnA Peace Pact," nglx ï¬g;§lfl,(London), may 6, 1935,
p. 10.
124
The Labourites believed that in light of the Franco-
Soviet and the Czecho-Soviet Treaties ofiLutual Assistance
which were drawn up in.Kay 1935 along with the Franco-Polish
and Franco-Czech Treaties of Alliance, Germany would have to
join in new talks. The "Eastern Pact" which Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Baltic States and the Soviet Union
"all seemed inclined to join," was one of "non-aggression and
non-assistance." The non-aggression pledge added little to
the pledges already taken under the Covenant and the Kellogg
Pact, but the pledge not to aid an aggressor under any cir-
cumstances was a valuable supplement to the Covenant. How-
ever, Labour deplored the fact it was to be a regional pact.
It could see some validity to the arguments for regionalism
when a pledge of military assistance wasinvolved, but in the
Eastern Pact there was no military commitments. Therefore,
there was no reason why it should be restricted and should not
include all of Europe or the rest of the world.12
By'May 1935 it seemed there was going to be serious
trouble over Italy's ambitions in Ethiopia and it was going to
involve the League. It appeared, Labour said, because the
Abyssinian question was not brought up at Stresa that mussolini
believed this implied that Britain and France were prepared to
- 12"Europe's Next Step." Enily Herald (London):
may 18! 1935’ p. 10.
125
give him a free hand in Africa. It also appeared that he
figured the League would back down in the face of an Italian
threat to resign. Labour warned-Aussolini he had miscalcu—
lated on both counts. The British in no way condoned his
plans for Abyssinia, nor would it be possible for the League
to back down. An Italian withdrawal, it admitted, would
weaken the League, but failure to act would destroy it.
Labour said that if Italy did proceed it was "unthinkable"
that Britain would not carry out her obligations to the League.13
By July 1935 the Italians and the French were expressing
dismay respectively over the British opposition to Italy's
ambitions in Abyssinia and the Anglo-German naval agreement,
in the light of the Stresa agreement.lh Both accused Britain
of bad faith in breaking away from the "Stresa Front." The
problem was, the British Socialists said, that France and Italy
viewed the Stresa front as something very close to a military
and diplomatic alliance. They were angered when they discovered
Britain did not. This resulted from the fact they both went
into the Conference knowing for what they were arming, while
britain, as usual, did not. They believed.MacDonald and Simon
13% Word to the Duce." 231.11 herald (London): may 24:
1935: p0 10‘
lhThe Anglo-German Naval Agreement will be discussed
later in this chapter.
126
were talking about the same thing hey were when they spoke of
the "supreme importance of Anglo-Branco-Italian solidarity."
When MacDonald assured the British people upon his return he
had made no new commitments, the others regarded this as re-
ferring only to binding legal commitments to go to war in
defined circumstances. "They believed that morally the
British delegates had committed themselves to solidarity, to a
united front, to whole-hearted support of French and Italian
diplomacy, to a policy of approving any action which Rome or
Laris.might take." They believed after Stresa this would be
the dominate British policy. Labour warned that Britain could
not continue to fluctuate between Stresa and the League, be-
tween a Triple Bntente and collective security. It also warned
against the new attempt to define "collective security" as
"a network of pacts and ententes in which the Covenant is an
unimportant item." "Mutual assistance" and "Regional Pacts"
were just new phrases to cover what in reality was the old
system of alliances. Britain had to choose immediately which
course it wished to follow. If it were interested in main-
taining world peace, the course would have to be through the
League, as the "'spirit of Stresa' is the antithesis and the
15
negation of the 'spirit of the Covenant.'"
"15W0 N-_Ewer. "Not-So-Quiet on the Stresa Front,"
2Ell1.2§2§i1 (London), July 10, 1935, p, 15.
127
In his first speech as Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel
Boare declared the Government's loyalty to the League and its
principles. Labour, however, was not satisfied. It demanded
that the Government do more than just pay lip-service to the
League. Nhy, it asked, in the light of the Italian threat to
Abyssinia, was the Government not trying to organize collective
security through the League to preserve peace? Instead Hoare
was admitting the "need for Italian expansion" and spoke about
the possibility of invoking the 1906 Treaty, which wogld have
divided Ethiopia into spheres of economic influence.1
In September ï¬oare made what Labour declared to be "the
most momentous speech ever delivered at Geneva." In it he
proclaimed Britain was ready to fulfill her "collective
obligations in defense of the League." This covered not only
Abyssinia, Hoare made clear, but any case of aggression upon
any member of the League. The French Government announced
that "loyalty to the League is the supreme principle of its
foreign policy."1
Labour at the same time was embarrassed by a split over
16"Loyal to the League," Daily Herald (London), JUlY 12:
1935, p. 10.
l7"Crisis at Geneva," Daily Herald (London),
September 11, 1935. P- 8.
128
foreign policy within the party ranks. In spite of the fact
the Trade Union Congress in September 1935 approved the policy
of collective security "in the full knowledge of all that it
entails" by a vote of 2,962,000 to 177,000, a minority of the
party opposed action through the League. Labour hoped to make
it clear that this minority was very small and certainly did
not reflect the attitude of the vast majority of the Labour
Party, the T.U.C. or the British people in general. The
dissenting group was made up of two factions. The first, the
Pacifists, opposed the use of force under any circumstance.
Labour warned them the choice was not between "the use of force
or the avoidance of it, but between the use of force to destroy
law and commit a crime, and the use of force to uphold the law
and prevent a crime." To the other faction which opposed the
League on the grounds that its actions were "capitalistic and
imperialistic," Labour answered that if the purposes of capi-
talism and imperialism were to "preserve against external
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political
independence of one of the weakest and most helpless League
members“ then these forces deserved less "denunciation than
18
we believed."
A number of important Labour leaders broke with the
18Ibid., p. 8.
129
party over this issue. These included George Lansbury, Sir
Stafford Cripps, and Lord Ponsonby. The latter two resigned
their positions on the National Council of Labour but did not
leave the party. Labour told the "anti-Labour Press" that its
attempt to make the difference within the party seem a serious
split was misleading. There was always room within the party
for "free and open discussion," but it pointed out the Margate
declaration fully supporting collective security passed by an
overwhelming majority at the Trade Union Congress in September
and represented the true feeling of Labour.19
In early October 1935 at the Labour Party Conference
held at Brighton, the supporters of the League had their show-
down with the Bacifists. The foreign policy resolution pro-
voked a long debate between the two groups. The League
supporters accused the Socialist League and the ultra-Pacifists
of joining the British Fascists and the Independent Labour
Party in taking the side of international anarchism. They all
opposed for various reasons an effective world law and govern-
ment. They likened the enforcement of collective sanctions in
international affairs to supporting the police at home. "To
refuse sanctions is to disperse the police force and hand the
19"Currents of Opinion," Baily Hegelg (London),
September 20, 1935, p. 10.
130
20
world over to criminals." Labour admitted the debate at the
Conference injured the party. It made it appear, it claimed,
to the electors that Labour was less loyal to Britain's League
obligations than was the Government. The one point that saved
Labour's reputation was that the Hational Council of Labour
had not waivered from the beginning to the end in its support
of the League, so much so that Cripps and Ponsonby felt obliged
to resign from it.21 The resolution passed 2,168,000 to 102,000.
This, Labour said, established once and for all where it stood
on foreign policy--the only method of preventing war was a world
combination against aggression.22
Throughout 1935 and early 1936 the British Communist
Barty tried twice to win the approval of the Labour Party for
a "United Front" against Fascism. At the 1935 Trade Union
Congress a resolution to this effect was rejected. The Congress
agreed that it opposed both Fascism and war, but this negative
agreement was not enough. The two parties were poles apart on
the question of democratic government, and this fundamental
‘ 20"Is It Law or Anarchy?" Dgily Egrgld_(London), , ,
October 1, 1935, p. 10. Dalton, The ggpgjgl Y er , pp. 65-69,
21"Labour and Sanctions," Dgily Egrgld (London),
October 2, 1935, P. 10. Eric Estorick, Staffgrd Cripp : Master
Stategman (New York: The John Day Company, 1949), pp. 123-127.
22"The 33515 of Reece," Daily ngald (London), October
3, p. 10.
131
23 u _
difference made an agreement impossible. in danuary 1936
Labour rejected another Communist proposal for cooperation.
1t attacked the Communist leaders as "fickle, underhanded and
unashamedly opportunists." For fourteen years before 1934 the
Communists had attacked the League, the farliamentary system,
democracy and the Labour Party and its brand of Socialism.
Now, Labour said, the Communists wished to join in the ranks
of "the defenders of democracy." Labour questioned the value
of uniting with such "hysterical muddlers incapable of taking
a consistant line." Even if the Communists were sincere in
their wishes to cooperate with Labour the fundamental difference
remained. They were still revolutionaries advocating the estab-
lishment of a class dictatorship, and as such they had no place
in the Labour Partyfl+
In October 1935 baldwin became head of the Government
and immediately dissolved Parliament and set the new general
election for November it, Labour had a great deal of optimism
about its chances for gaining a large number of seats if not a
majority. The Rational Government had a very poor record in
domestic affairs and so it hoped to win votes by adopting the
23"United Front,†Daily ï¬erald (London), September 5.
1935. p. 8.
21""United Front," Daily H§2§11.(L0fld0fl}g January 24’
1936, p. 10.
,4
132
Labour Party's role of appearing as the champion of the League,
it charged. Public opinion was naturally directed to foreign
relations at this time because of the Abyssinian crisis.25
The Peace Ballot of the previous spring had proven to the
Government that the British people supported Labour's position
on foreign policy. Labour warned the voters that the National
Government was Just a resent convert to support of the League--
if a convert at all. It pointed to the Government's poor
record of working with and through the League during the pre-
vious four years. Even at the present time, it said, there
was a large number of Government supporters who were openly
hostile to the League. It was very much afraid that after the
election the Government would gevert to its old ways of ignor-
ing and weakening the League.2
Labour made foreign policy its number one campaign issue
in its election manifesto, a Erggramm§_gï¬ Egggg gng Social
Reggnstructign. It put forth its usual stand, calling for a
firm collective peace system; an end to the war in Abyssinia;
to be followed by renewed negotiations for all-round disarm-
ament. It promised to maintain "such defense forces as are
necessary and consistent with our membership in the League."
253:3:Ic'eand. he?" .rL’W ' 'a- mm. D. 181»-
26flBacK to Simon," Dï¬jlx HQIQJQ (London), October 22,
1935, p. 10.
133
The best defense, it said, was not through heavy increases in
armaments, but in organization of collective security and arms
reduction. It proposed that all nations negotiate a complete
abolition of air forces, effective international control of
civil aviation, and the creation of an international air police
force. It wanted the abolition of private arms manufacturing
and private trade in arms. Labour, also, promised to seek to
prevent wars by removing economic causes through "equitable
arrangements for the international control of sources of
supply of raw materials, and for the extension of the mandate
system for colonial territories."27
The result of the election was disappointing to Labour.
It had expected if not to win control of the Government, at
least to put itself in a position to make its influence felt
in Commons. Although it increased its members by about one
hundred over its 1931 representation of 52, it was still in
the minority by 2&7 seats even with the rest of the opposition.
Actually these figures did not give a true picture of the
election which was, in fact, much closer. The Government re-
ceived approximately 11,500,000 votes to slightly under
_ 27"Labour Party Election.wanifesto," Dailx HQZQJC
(London), October 26, 1935, p. l.
13h
10,000,000 for the opposition, of which Labour got 8,325,260.
The system of territorial constituencies made the Government
victory seem greater than it was. Each Government seat repre-
sented 27,102 votes, while each Labour seat represented
51,,060.28
Hith the election over, it did not take the Government
long to begin to move away from the League in the eyes of
Labour. The leak of the Hoare-Laval agreement in December
made it plain the Government was not conducting its foreign
policy through the League in the face of the Italian aggres-
sion. Labour claimed the Government had in the matter of a
few hours "betrayed the League and Abyssinia, and the British
name, and the British people." It demanded the Government
"drop and abandon completely and forever the Hoare-Laval plan."
Labour insisted the Government return to supporting League
action and cooperate with it in setting up an effective sanc-
tion plan which would force hussolini to give up his aggressions?9
Throughout the rest of the year and until the fall of
Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, in.Lay, 1936, Labour con-
tinued its fruitless attempts to get the Government and the
League to impose meaningfu1.sanctionsonLItaly'by stopping
283rand, Tug 3:151 an L, m m: p0 18hâ€
29"It Must Ngt Pass," DQiJI ngggg (London),
December 12, 1935, p. 10.
135
important war materials such as oil and steel. In June the
Government announced it was abandoning all sanctions against
ltaly and Labour devoted Sunday June 23 to a giant protest
rally in Hyde Park, and the Parliamentary Party denounced the
CTovernment's actions in Commons.30 The League had been dis-
credited and weakened by the Abyssinian affair, but Labour
was not yet ready to abandon its foreign policy of action
through the League.
Labour’s main interest in relation to Germany itself
between Larch 1935 and Larch 1936 was with regard to Germany's
rearmament program and its effect on britain's program.
Labour tried to talk down the "scare-mongering" which
it believed was part of the campaign of the british and other
European governments to justify their rearmament programs.
Ear, it said, was not imminent nor inevitable. There were fewer
causes for war in Europe in the spring of 1935 than at any time
since 1919. The war talk besides being untrue was very danger-
ous. It was creating in Europe a feeling of panic and was
turning men from seeking peaceful solution to preparing for war.
31
"Europe is scaring itself into danger," Labour claimed.
303mm. .hnT W .ahnnnL Earn, 9- 195-
April 23. 1935. p. 8-
136
At the end of April 1935 Germany announced she was going
to build submarines. Labour, although disapproving this move,
stated it was Germany's right as an equal power in the world
community. Those who denounced Germany's action did so in
terms that suggested they wished to perpetuate the Versailles
system. This system was dying and Labour urged patience
during the phase of "dangers and strains and fears." 1t ad-
mitted Germany's methods made it difficult for those groups
in Britain who supported her equality, but Labour would not
let this drive it into the position of defending the Ver-
sailles system. As the system died the precarious security
which it provided would vanish and would have to be replaced,
perferably by the system of collective security under the
League.32
Labour found continual hope in Eitler's peace speeches.
in may 1935 Liitler stated his position on settling Europe's
problems and Labour urged the Government not to reject them
without very careful consideration. The speech could well be
the first step to new negotiations. Hitler had declared that
Germany, while insisting that the door be left open for re-
vision, accepted the territorial settlement of Versailles,
unless changed by agreement. He would adhere to the Locarno
32"Germany and Britain," Daily HgggJQ (London), April
30, 1935, p. 10.
137
Treaties â€including h r Lcce Itance o: the 'onerous burden' of
keepinï¬ the h nela d demilitarized as a contribution to Eur-
opean peace.†5e also offered to mahe treaties of non-aggres-
sion with his neighbors and of non- assis tapes to an hare sor.
. .. . , -. a m
Labour found his conditions for return to the League as 'not a
“ ~- — - . . _ , 1
insurmountable.†it believed his ofzer to disarm at tne same E
r;te and in the same quality as the other nations was a useful
step towards a new disarmament conference, as was his offer to
limit the Germany navy to thirty-five percent of the british LI
navy, which would also leave it inferior to the Erench navy.
The only weakness in his plans yes that they excluded Eus ssia.
This was a serious gap which would have to be overcome if
there was to be real peace. Ln the whole, however, Labour
33
found “itler' s proposals encouraging.
Labour criticized tze ‘overnhent's reply to Litler's
speech that it would give it â€serious con.<.=,-ideration"r as too vague.
The British people wanted to know precisely what the Government
was going to do about his offers, it said. It also regretmfl.the
tim in of the Government's announcement that tr e air force was
(at)
to be trebled as rapidly as possible. This seemed to Labour a
comment on Litler's speech and threatened to nullify his offer
33"Hitler's Speech," Daily h ra (London), may 22,
1935, p. 10.
138
EL
for disarmament and to give impetus to the arms race.
Labour could not understand the Government’s position
on rearmament and particularly on an air pact. Labour's first
objection was that the proposed pacts were not based on the
League and in fact were designed to operate completely outside
of it. ’Secondly, they were based on the assumption some air
force had to be retained. Labour asked why? Why not abolish
all military aircraft or at least all bombers? hitler had
offered to abolish them if the other governments would also.
The main obstacle was the british Government. By the Peace
Lallot, of which the results were almost complete at this time
in the spring of 1935, it appeared the British people favored
nearly six to one the abolition of all military aircraft. In
light of this, Labour could not understand the Government's
reluctance to go ahead with some plan to end the threat of
air warfare.35
The Anglo-German naval talks in June 1935 brought real
hope to Labour that at last some steps were being.made towards
an arms agreement with Germany. It was willing to accept even
an informal understanding until a new naval convention could
34"Reply to Hitler," Dgily Egzgld (London), may 23.
1935, p. 10.
35"0utlaw the Bomber," Daily Herald (London), June 1:
1935. p. 10.
~43. r
139
work out a solution to the naval restrictions of Versailles.
Hitler, it said, had made "a notable contribution to the cause
of armament limitation." His voluntary agreement to restrict
the new German fleet to thirty-five percent of the British 1
fleet would rule out a renewal of the Anglo-German naval race FT
of the pre-l9lh period. It should also increase the chances
of bringing France and Italy into a new navaé limitation 5:
3 :
agreement to replace the expiring treaties. When the re-
sults of the agreement were known, Labour was generally pleased. Li
Criticism of it on legalistic grounds was easy and was certain
to come from some quarters, but the essential thing was not the
agreement itself, but the fact Hitler voluntarily and unilat-
erally agreed to keep his fleet within certain limits. Germany
had done her part, while renouncing the Versailles limitations,
she had accepted a new limitation, Labour said. It was now up
to the other powers to do their part in eliminating competitive
shipbuilding as a cause of European insecurity.37
Labour's attitude soon changed about the peace contri-
bution the treaty made. As it quickly became evident the
treaty was not going to bring further disarmament, Labour
36"The Navy Talks," 'ailx Herald (London). June 4»
19353 p0 10’
37"The Naval Pact," QQLLI.E§IQLQ (London), June 19’
1935. p. 10.
140
>ecame convinced the treaty was causing uneasiness and fear 1
.mong the other nations of Europe that Britain's policy was
to strengthen Germany as a balance against Franco-Soviet in-
'luence, to avert naval competition with Germany, to avoid a
$.35
Ltruggle over colonies by giving Germany a free hand in the i 7
a . "' 0 o ‘L
.ast, and to encourage German and Japanese aggreSSion against 1
.ussia. By Uctober 1935, at its annual convention, the
labour Party branded the treaty as "a further step in the dis-
- 38 4 ;
ntergration of the collective peace system of Europe." L9
In late June 1935 Labour set down its attitude for
elations with Germany to clear up the misunderstandings and
isrepresentations of its policy. It said, "That there can be
either condonation nor palliation of the brutalities of Iazism
s self-evident. but those who would deduce from this that
azi Germany should be treated as a parish nation, as a public
nemy in the comity of nations, are surely allowing feeling to
estroy judgment." If this were applied to Germany it would
ave to be applied to all dictatorships and international
narchy would result. To the argument that Germany should be
reated as a menace to civilization because of her leaders'
38Elaine Windrich, Epitish Lapggz'a Egreign P li r
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1952?,
. 127. miss Nindrich in her account neglects to show
abour's initial favorable reaction to the Treaty and gives
he impression that Labour vigorously opposed it from the
eginning.
141
glorification of war and their philosophy of aggression, and
that no concessions could be made to her least it increase
her strength, Labour answered that a system of repression of
one nation could not lead to lasting peace and would "aggra-
vate the very evils and dangers it professes to cure." The
two principles which Labour proposed to use in guiding its
relations with Germany, as with any other nation, was firstly,
to insure that Germany or any other state would not be able to
make war without having to face the united forces of the rest
of the world, and secondly, to treat her while she kept the
peace, with "perfect justice: to remove the last vestiges
of inequality which goads her: to give equitable remedy to
her every reasonable grievance."39
By January 1936, while contending that the Government's
new armaments program would be too costly, Labour admitted
that it was not unconditionally opposed to any increase at any
time. dowever, its main reason for opposing the arms estimates
was not the estimate itself, but the foreign policy that made
it necessary. This policy was leading to increasing arms com-
petition and not to peace. Under the collective security
system there might be times, Labour admitted, when it would be
necessary for Britain to increase her arms in order to carry
39"Gemany," Dajll hï¬zï¬lfl (London), June 28, 1935’
p. 10.
[BE
1&2
out her part in enforcing peace. However, three things were
necessary before Labour would give its complete support.
Iirstly, there must be evidence the collective system really
needed strengthening. Secondly, a demonstration of League
loyalty by a British initiative to extend sanctions. Thirdly,
a straight declaration that Britain would work for world dis-
armament as soon as the collective system was "vindicated" by
the restoration of peace.l+0
In a speech on the third anniversary of the Nazi take-
over, Hitler spoke again of Germany's desire for a "basis for
real peace. . .so long as her honor is not slighted." Labour
replied that there could be no peace as long as Germany re-
mained outside the "general system of co-operation and of
collective security." It contended that Germany no longer had
reason to feel inferior in status to other great powers.
Hitler said the territorial settlement of Versailles could
stand but the "moral humiliation" of it had to be removed.
Labour assured Germany that the british people and Government
were ready to "do anything possible to remove any Vmoral
humiliation' which Germany may still feel and to secure her
h0"New Arms Programme," Dajjx nggJQ (London),
January 30, 1936, p. 10.
1b3
that equality of status to which she is entitled." Labour also
believed the other European countries, including France, were
willing to "heal those wounds of Versailles." however, it
asked that litler be more specific as to just what was neces-
sary for the "vindication of Germany's international honor. . ‘37
. ." It also asked that Hitler make a contribution to peace. :
It complained he always spoke of a settlement in the West and I
never the East. It was the east of Europe which was the most
unrestful and as long as the ï¬azis maintained their program of L;
eastward expansion there could be no real peace in Europe.
A meeting was scheduled in the first week of.March 1936
of the League Committee which had been studying the question of
imposing new sanctions on Italy. Labour hoped that at long
last effective sanction might be brought against Lussolini.
Unfortunately the meeting was threatened with disruption by
France. It was rumored France feared some German move in the
hhineland in response to the Franco-Soviet Pact of the pre-
vious may, and was unwilling to further alienate Italy in the
face of this new danger. Labour abhored this as it believed
it would greatly weaken the League. The League's actions in
the Abyssinian war must not be interferred with by the threat
of trouble elsewhere, Labour said. The nations of the League
fl G1"A Word to Litler,†Daily §§2g11_(London),
January 31, 1936, p. 10.
lhh
would destroy it, Labour warned, if they sought to subordinate
its actions to their own particular interests and national
42
policies.
When, on March 7, ï¬itler did reoccupy the Rhineland
militarily, Labour cautioned that the crisis had to be handled fâ€
with care to avoid war. It dismissed the German contention
that the Locarno Treaty had already been broken by the Franco- #
Soviet Pact. This, Labour said, was a complicated legal
lf—L‘Ux J. i n' "l J\
question, but hardly convincing. Nevertheless, Germany's other
argument that one-sided demilitarization was "unfair, intol-
erable, and grossly in contradiction to the solemn promise of
'equality of status‘ given in 1932" carried much weight. It
was too much to expect, Labour asserted, that Germany would
be content to accept a system which left her richest and most
vital industrial areas undefended, while France was able to
line her side of the "common frontier with aerodromes and forts
and garrisons.†This was not equality of stahua Labour argued.
This did not, however, justify the violation of the treaty in
such a manner. The debates over which country was right was
useless now. The fact was that a Germany army was in the
Rhineland and what was Europe going to do about it? There
were really only two possibilities, Labour believed. The first
42â€Confusing the Issues," Dgily Herald (London),
February 29, 1936, p. 10.
1&5
was to take advantage of the opportunity offered by nitler for
negotiating a new Locarno, a series of Eastern non—aggression
pacts and a return of Germany to the League. The other choice
was to go to war with Germany to force her out of the hhineland.
The idea of imposing sanctions through the League was out of the fa
question since Germany had not "had recourse to war." Negoti-
ations were the only solution, as the british people, Labour
asserted, and most likely the French people, would not stand
for a war to keep "German troops from garrisoning German L;
R3 1
tOV‘IHS o "
Labour was pleased with the way the Foreign Secretary,
Anthony Eden, responded to Germany's action. Eden promised to
examine "clear sightedly and objectively" Hitler's offer to
negotiate a new series of pacts. Labour hoped France too would
take a reasonable attitude to the situation. A refusal to
discuss the problem would not remove the Germans or restore the
Locarno Fact. It would merely leave troops in the Rhineland
and France without any guarantees. France should not count on
a military alliance with Britain if no new Locarno should be
drawn up. It was out of the question, Labour warned. Germany,
on the other hand, might have recovered her freedom, but she
‘_ 43"Seize the Chance," Raj]! Hargjg (London)
march 9, 1936, Po 10-
146
had shaken confidence in the value of her word. Locarno, un-
like Versailles, had been signed freely, and Hitler had promised
to observe it. Germany should not be surprised if for a period
of time she might be "looked at a little dubiously and regarded
as in some measure on trail."hh
The National Council of Labour invited the Bureau of the
Labour and Socialist International and the Executive of the
International Federation of Trade Unions to meet in London as
soon as possible to discuss what international labour should do
in light of the Rhineland crisis. The Conference took place
Larch 20-21. It approved a declaration condemning Hitler's
action and warned that aggression could not be stopped by
"moral appeal." It stated that aggressors could only be stopped
by "an overwhelming superiority of force" and that "National
armaments should now be regulated with this end in view." The
Labour Party as well as the nation as a whole did not become
aroused as it had in the Abyssinian affair and Hugh Dalton told
Commons the people would not support military action or even
economic sanctions to drive the Germans back across the Rhine.
The Government which "needed no holding back" was willing "to
45
go on talking until the danger past."
hhflThe Door is Open," Dgilx Egggld (London), March 10,
1936, p. 10.
“5Aian Bullock, The Ljï¬g and.T' Q1 Ernest bevin,
29l4.1: Erada.2ninn.ésan§r. lhhlrlflhu. London= i1’einemrm.
1960)? p. 581.
‘ _ ‘J'Vh': "- "c .I’.- K
v
lh7
The Rhineland incident caught Parliament about to begin
debate on the Government's defense estimates. The incident
did not alter Labour's opposition to the Government's bill,
despite the fact Bevig and Dalton warned their party that the
situation was grave.A Attlee followed the traditional
Labour line in denouncing the estimates. He said the Govern-
ment was abandoning the attempt to "build up a new world
system based on the rule of law: and was returning to the old
belief that security could be had by national armaments. The
Government paid lip-service to collective security, used the
need to strengthen its ability to aid the League to enforce its
decisions as an excuse to rearm, but in reality its whole
emphasis was on national defense. It was looking at European
problems from the point of view of isolation. It had entered,
in fact, into an arms race that.must inevitably end in war.
This drift had been going on since Labour left office in 1931,
and the National Government shared in the responsibility for
it. The Government made its position even weaker by not taking
a definite stand on either isolation or collective security,
but vacillated between the two positions and so had no policy
of its own. How faced with a situation largely of its own
making the Government was asking for a blank check to increase
89 9 461b;d., p. 580., and Dalton, The Fateï¬gl Ygags, pp.
-3.
1&8
its armed forces enormously. Attlee reaffirmed Labour's
traditional policy of full support for tie League and for
collective security to resist aggression. he called on the
Government to take the lead in trying once again to find a way
to avert a war by a conference of nations. The main cause of %ï¬
he world's discontent was economic. â€threme nationalist E
movements thrive on the soil of economic discontent,†he said.
it was the place of the more prosperous nations of the world
sts
(I)
to take the lead in trying to develop the economic inter
fi_‘
of all. The discontented states should state openly what
they needed ehd the other states should in a spirit of â€sensible
international co-operation†try to find a may to fill their
#7
needs.
The three years following the Nazi rise to power saw the
beginning of changes in Labour's foreign policy. After Nazi
Germany left the League and the Disarmament Conference in
October 1933, Labour hoped for a time she could be brought back
if the powers would recognize her as an equal and give in to
her reasonable demands. By the spring of 1936 Labour realized
the chance for a successful disarmament agreement was very
poor. While it continued to vote against the British Govern-
47C. R. Attlee, â€Arming for Disaster," Daily ierald
(London), Larch 9, 1936, p. 10.
149
ment's rearmament program, it was doing so by 1936 largely as
a protest against the Government's foreign policy. Even then
leaders such as Dalton and Levin were beginning to urge the
party drop its opposition and to recognize the seriousness of 1
the situation and the need for rearming. Labour was still [‘1
.
.mn
basing its foreign policy on collective security throught the
League of Nations, but by 1936 the loss of Germany and Japan
and the failure to stop Italian aggression in Ethiopia had
greatly weakened that body. Within the party the struggle L;
between the Pacifists and those favoring collective action
through the League was won by the latter group and so the war
resistance through a general strike was quietly dropped as a
major plank in Labour's platform. Zitler's actions in foreign
affairs during this period, with the exception of his indirect
support of the abortive Kazi coup in Austria, were aimed at
destroying the unfair restrictions of Versailles. Labour ob-
jected to his unilateral method and believed the other powers
should have been consulted, but it could not object to the
results as it had long favored such changes. It hoped with the
removal of these grievances Germany would begin to cooperate
again in trying to insure peace. Labour was shocked by the
internal activities of the Nazis and did what it could to help
the Nazi's victims, but it refused to let this interfere with
its attitude in foreign affair-~that is to the point where it
wished to treat Germany as a pariah to whom there should be
no concessions whether just or not.
150
PART III :
REORIENTATION AND FIPï¬s-INESS, 1936-1938
v-V~_
Cï¬APTER VII
THE SPAKISE CIVIL WAR: TiE TURKING POIFT
In the days following the immediate crisis of the Rhine-
land occupation, Labour was hopeful that some good might yet
come from the incident. 1t hoped iitler was sincere when he
promised Germany had no aggressive intentions toward her 1
' )
neighbors, and was willing to negotiate a new Locarno zact.
It even went so far as to believe Germany might now be willing
l
to return to the League. Labour also hoped britain and France ,4'
had learned their lesson and would in the future be willing to
work more closely with the League to strengthen collective
security, and seek more sincerely a disarmament agreement. The
lack of these had brought on the crisis, it said.
Labour was soon to be disappointed as it quickly becam
evident Hitler was not going to cooperate seriously in new
proposals made by the Locarno
I
a.
negotiations. Eis replies to
powers were so vague and without counter-proposals that they
seemed to widen rather than narrow the breach. Labour cautioned
Germany about the danger of misinterpreting britain's attitude.
Lt stressed that Germany had not received justice since the war
1"Plea for Sanity," Daily Hezalg (London), march 16,
1936, p. 1C0
(London), march 20,
‘ 2â€Hitler's Chance," Dajlq
1936, p. 10.
153
and the Gernan demands for equality were just, but the hitler
Government had given much cause for the apprehension and sus-
picion of the rest of the world. This suspicion of German
notives and intentions was a fact the German Government would ‘
have to take into account. If Kitler wished to arrive at an til
agreement with the rest of the world, he had to restore con-
3
fidence among the other nations in Germany. 5
The British Socialists by the end of Larch had more or
less resigned themselves to the fact that nothing fruitful was _p
going to come from iitler's declaration he would negotiate new
treaties to replace those he had broken.
The Spanish Civil her, which began in July 1936, brought
immediate sympathy for the Republican Government from Labour.
It feared that if Spain was to fall under fascist rule as had
Germany and Italy all Europe would be threatened. it thought
the Republican forces would be able to win if either there was
true non-intervention, or if the British and French Governments
would treat the Spanish Government in the accepted way of inter-
national law. That was to treat it as a legally recognized
government which was attempting to put down internal revolution.
In more specific terms this meant the british and French Govern-
fl
U)
ments had a perfect legal right to allow arms ‘nd upplies to
(
3"Widefliflg the LT613011," Enllz Jerald (London), march 25,
1936, p. 10.
“ms
15h
be sold and shipped to the Spanish Government. These two alter-
a w
natives, either estaolisn true non-into_ve tion or treat the
legally recognized Republican C-overn;1;ent as it should be under
international law, would be the major concerns of Labour in
the Spanish problem. It continually urged the Government to
£011 w one or the other depending on he actions of the other
European powers, particularly Germany and Italy. The active
intervention of Germany,'ltaly, and Russia made the issue more
than just a Spanish problem. It became an international dilemma
which threatened the peace of all Europe. Labour favored the
French proposal of non-intervention at first because it believed
this was the best way to preserve neutrality and to prevent the
A
war from soreading.
From almost the beginning Labour suspected Iitler was
working to upset the policy of non-intervention. German news-
papers during August undertook a violent campaign against the
ï¬oviet Union for allegedly sending arms to Spain. Labour
feared this meant Hitler was setting the groundwork for some
type of German intervention. Labour urged the iritish and
French Governments in case this did happen to drop what would
then be a "one-sided and improper embargo against the Spanish
5
Government.†Soon after this, however, Germany did agree to
F'l
ï¬rand, The iritish Tabogr 9ar , pp. l9h-l99.
5"Cminious Signs," Daily Jerald (London), August 2h,
155
the embargo against arms to both sides in bnain as did the other
major powers and a comnittee was set up to find ways to enforce
it.
Jith the establishment of the Hon-Intervention Committee,
Labour believed perhaps trouble over ipain could be avoided. it
did not take long before it was apparent Germany and Italy were
violating their pledges of non-intervention. nowever, at the
Trade Lnion Congress meeting in September and the Labour Iarty
Convention in early vctober the extent of this aid was not yet
Known, and although the delegates did not like doing it, they
voted by large majorities to support the non-intervention course
because it was the most expedient. A minority of the Lational
Council opposed non-intervention, but the majority supported it
because the only other alternative carried the threat of war.
Arthur Greenwood asked the convention if it was ". . .prepared
to have the battle between dictatgrship and democracy fought
over the bleeding body of Spain?"
by November it was obvious iitler had broken the non-
intervention agreem nt and was supplying the rebels with air-
7
Planes as well as other arms. The crisis worsened as Germany
6brand, The Dzitigh Labour Party, p. 199.
7"No Complaint," Daily Regald (London), hovember 16,
1936, pp. 10.
TI'E'Y‘ï¬â€˜Y. ‘ D
u.
156
1
and ltaly recognized tne franco side as the legal government of
Spain. Labour fear that now Iitler might carry out his threat
to attack the Spanish fleet if any more German ships carrying
supplies to the rebels were stopped. Ion-intervention had now
become a farce, Labour said, and it was up to the British
Government to find some other alternative. It surgested the
Government call for an immediate nesting of the League Council.
It hoped the League would be able to take some action to ease the
8
situation.
BY th“ end Of the year it was known the German "volunteers"
in Spain were in fact part of the German army acting under
pain
(I)
orders from Iitler. This, said Labour, was an invasion of
chweh , and went far beyond merely supplying arms to
by the Rei
the rebels. It believed Iitler was doing this to "whip ug
flagging popular enthusiasm by some 'foreign adventure.'â€
The Labour Party began to turn against non-intervention,
at least in the manner in which it was being applied by the
Eritish Government. It denounced the ministers for their hasty
unilateral action. The imposition of an embargo before a final
agreement with the other powers had been reached was a blunder.
(London), Iovehber 2o,
8"League Lust #eet," 3
1936, p. 10.
(London), Becenber 28,
9"liitler's Choice,†Dail
1936, p. 10.
157
Labour believed the Government repeated this blunder in January
I
1937 when it prohibited volunteers from going to Spain. a ain
CC}
the Government did it without a firm agreement for similar
action on the part of the Fascist powers. This, Labour warned,
would in no way stop the German and Italian troops from going
to Spain, and would, in fact, make it more difficult to bring
_ _ lO
titler and mussolini to an agreement on total non-intervention.
The early part of 1937 brought renewed hope that an
effective non-intervention agreenent might yet be accepted by
all powers. Negotiations dragged on for several months, and
finally in April Labour believed a victory had been won when
a Spanish non-intervention control plan was accepted by all
the major powers. Labour hailed this as possibly the first
step bach towards a policy of collectivism. It even hoped
now that the powers had cooperated to restrict the war, they
ll
might cooperate to end it.
Labour again quickly lost its optimism about the chances
for any real non-intervention. Germany and Italy continued to
keep their "volunteers" in Spain in spite of the agreement.
IONA Foolish Blunder," Dgily Herald (London), January
11, 1937, p. 10.
April 16. 1937, p- 12-
158
O
Q
Labour was particularly shocked and disgusted by German bombing
of civilian populaticns, their refusal to stop, and in fact,
their attempt to justify it on the grounds of military neces-
sity. Such action Labour said only put Germanv outside the
, 3 u .. u l
2
"law of nations†and increased world distrust of her. Ger-
1
many s "barbarisn" in Spain continued to be a point of denun-
ciation for Labour throughout the remainder of the war. The
bombardment of the Spanish town of Almeria by German planes
and ships for the alleged attack on its warship Deutschland
brought a sharp attack by Labour. It wondered what right
Hitler had to demand equality of status and treatment when
he failed to give any proof of "equality in civilization and
13
equality in behavior."
By the end of June 1937 it was apparent to Labour that
Germanv was planning to use the alleged torpedo attacks on her
warships as an excuse to justify acts of violence against the
Spanish. Labour demanded that if Germany really had a case
and was sincere in her desire for peace she should be willing
to submit the dispute as Spain suggested to a third party for
14
judgment.
12"Jarnins," Baily ierald (London), may 5, 1937, p. 100
13"A Nord to Germany," Daily Herald (London), June 2,
1937, p. 10.
. 14"bad Signs," Daily Eezald (London), June 22, 1937, p. 10;
and â€ahither Germany?" Daily Hera d (London), dune 2A, 1937, p. lt.
159
By the end of June Labour declared non-intervention was
impossible. This was because Germany and Italy refused to tak
part in any system of control or would not even agree to any
control which did not include them. Ton-intervention without
effective control was useless. Labour called on the Government #7
to warn the fascist powers that an end of control meant an end
of the embargo. It said, â€. . .a situation cannot be tolerated
in which the rebels can draw from abroad all the munitions they
15
need while the legal Government is denied its legal rights."
rm“! A‘UKfl‘J" L'. {13K
During the summer of 1937 Labour became impatient with
the British Government's unwillingness to make a definite
move to counter Fascist aid to Franco. The Government did
warn Germany and Italy that unless controls were established
the embargo would have to end. This pleased Labour, but the
lack of action on :26 part of the Government to carry out its
threat annoyed it. The Government's plan in July 1937 by
which it hoped to continue non-in erventicn was received by
Labour "without enthusiasm and with much misgiving." It
feared while the Government was trying to patch up the old
plan Fascist aid would continue. It also was afraid that the
Government might be preparing to compromise by accepting the
15"ContI‘Ol is Dead," Daily ngzalfl (London), June BC:
1937: 9' 10'
16"Time for Thought," Daily ierald (London), July
1937, p. 10. a
160
Fascist demand for recognition of Franco. Labour would oppose
both, it said, and would accept non-intervention "strictly and
fairly enforced or ended." Ho new plan would be considers
unless it filled the gaps that under the existing setup favored
17
the rebels. In a debate in Commons over this issue Attlee
accused Eden and the Government of giving into the dictators
and trying to please them. He said it was obvious that Franco
was dependent on outside support. Eden in turn accused Labour
of picking on small points, of abandoning their peace stand,
of giving no detailed criticism, and of making the job of the
18
1
Government harder.
The details of the pritish Plan were released in mid-
July. It called for removal of the naval patrols and their re-
placement by officers stationed in Spanish ports to carry out
the functions preformed by the patrols. The rest of the control
system was to function as before with the land control to be
restored immediately. A committee was to examine possibilities
of controlling aircraft flying to Spain. Limited recognition
of belligerent rights were to be given both parties as soon as
the committee was satisfied substantial progress had been made
in the withdrawal of "volunteers." Uithdrawal was to be apï¬roved
17â€New Plan," Dally Eerald (London), July 7: 1937:
p. 10.
.n.
1812ail1 .sxlin (London). July 15, 1937, p. 1.
161
in principle at once, and a commission set up to nahe and
supervise the arranï¬ements. The british Government was to
discuss with both sides the various points for which their
consent would be needed. Labour had nuch criticisn for this
plan. It doubted that the consent of both of the belligerents
could be obtained, and said the plan did not provide for what
to do if either or both refused to agree. It also objected to
the trade of linitad recognition for withdrawal of volunteers.
The real problem, it said, was not in the plan itself, but that
the international atmosphere made any plan impossible. All
past plans had failed because the Fascists lacked the necessary
"spirit of international cooperation." Until that was estab-
lished no plan would work. Labour demanded the Government stop
wasting tine on ingenious plans that would surely fail because
of lac: of cooperation. Rather it should frankl recognize non-
intervention had failed and the right to buy arms should be
immediathly restored to the Spanish Government and the whole
19
Spanish question should be referred to the League of iations.
These denands by Labour to abandon one-sided non-interven-
tion continued throughout the summer of 1937 until Septanber
when it seemed again that there might be some hogs for interna-
l9nPlan and Spirit,†Daily Hera (London), July 15,
19379 9° 10°
162
tional cooperation to settle the problem. The cause for this
new optimism was th Iyon Anti-Piracy Agreement. Nine nations
met at Nyon near Geneva with Italy and Germany not in attendance.
They set up a naval patrol in the hediterranean to deal with the
mysterious submarine attacks that were taking place against ship-
ping to Spain. The patrol was given authority to attach any
suspicious submarine in the western Lediterranean. This was
soon extended to give the patrol the same power against air-
craft. It also authorized the petrol to come to the aid of
neutral shipping attached by warships whether in Spanish terri-
torial waters or not. The greater part of the patrol was made
up of the British and French navies. Cn September 30 Italy
2 .
joined the patrol. Labour fully supported this as a working
example of what collective security could do if used properly.
It hoped the success of this venture, or the very fact it cogid
be arrived at at all, would lead the nations back to Geneva.
The 1"i“yon agreement proved to be merely the one bright
spot in the gloomy Spanish policy of the British Government.
Rather than continue the firm step taken at Hyon by standing up
» 20Liugh Thomas, The Spanish Ciyil War (New York: darper
and brothers, fublishers, 1961}, pp. A75—h78.
21 , a . u- ~ - i
"All for all," Daily n a (bondon), peptember 14, 1937,
p. 10; and "Partners for feace," ~aily gerald (nondon), September
lb, 1937, p. 10.
163
to the Fascists on other issues concerning Suain, the Government
continued to try to rebuild the authority of the Jon-lnterven-
tion Committee. Labour constantly urged the Gove Fn;ent to
abandon that bankrupt policy and to recognize the legal Govern-
ment's right to buy ants.
Labour did what it could to aid the Spanish Republicans.
1t raised funds for medical aid, and for milk for the children.
It sent clothing, maintained a base hospital, and brought
several thousand Spanish children to the safety of Britain.
Lany young British Socialists volunteered to fight in Spain.
in spite of the aid they sent, most Labourites felt frustrated
that more could not be done. Dne later said, "Even the very
best British bandage is not very much use against a German gun."
This continued for another year and a half. Labour tried
until the last to get the Govw ant to tel? e a more positive
stand by selli 1g has to the Spanish. Then on February 27, 1939
th e British Government unco ditionally recognized the rranco
regime, Labour bitterly denounced the shameful betrayal of the
22
legal Spanish Government. In the meantime Labour's attention,
like that of the rest of the world was drawn away from Spain by
the Austrian and Czechoslovakian crises of 1938.
The matter of collective security and the League of
22srand, The Laogg: EC , pp. 201- 202.
16h
Nations continued to be a major concern of the Labour Party and
more particularly how to strengthen it and even how to get the
powers moving again in the direction of collective defense
through the League. It was during this period too that Labour
began to resign itself to the fact that collective security as
it envisioned it was at least temporarily dead and it began
reluctantly to accept substitutes.
During the crisis that followed the Rhineland occupation,
the Labour Party warned Fierre Flandin, the French Foreign
hihister, that the French had better not take an uncompromising
C
Â¥
stand against Germaiy that would prevent a new Locarno or a
German return to the League. If France did this in hopes of
forcing an Anglo-French alliance, it was basing its plans on
false calculations. The ï¬ritish people, Labour said, were
willing to support a truly collective system of defense, but
23
would not be drawn into alliances.
Labour was very suspicious that this was exactly what
the Government was attempting to do. In response to a speech
made by Anthony Aden in late march in which there were hints
that an alliance of some type with France might be in the offing,
Labour declared this would be a betrayal of the collective
security principle. The Government had never favored the League,
23"Widening the Breach," Daily ï¬erald (London), larch
25, 1936, p. 100
[BE
165
it said, and was now attempting to relegate it to second place
while the old unsuccessful Anglo-French alliance was again
made the basis of British foreign policy. It warned the Govern-
ment the British people would not support such a policy. They
wanted the opposite-—â€a sturdy organization of collective
_ 2h
security through the League of Jations."
This renewal of efforts to swing'the Government fully
behind the League and to strengthen it as the best means to
preserve peace through collective defense continued throughout
the spring of 1936. In April Attlee declared it would be
better if Locarno was not renewed as Jitler was offering to do.
Lot that Labour opposed the obligations it imposed, or the
pledges of mutual assistance, or the staff talhs, but it ob-
jected that Locarno was built on too narrow a base. The League,
he said, could offer all of these advantages, but on a larger
scale with more chance for success if the powers would only back
it fully. Abyssinia, he declared, was proof of what could
happen when a League action received less than full support.
All military cooperation must not be divided in the future, but
25
must be achieved through the League. In answer to the critics
U 24"League or Alliances," Daily Herald (London),
1*4aI‘Ch 279 1936’ p° 10'
25"Locarno Bailinas," Daily Herald (London),
April 7, 1930, p. 10.
166
who said the League had failed, that it was powerless to stop
aggression as proven by Abyssinia and the ï¬hineland crisis,
Labour answered it was not the League that had failed, but the
nations. The Le-gue principle had not failed because it had
m
never been tried. In fact, because the nations had refused to
use the League's machinery as it should have been used the
efforts to stop the Italian's aggression had failed. About
unll ' ’
the future of the League it was still hopeful. "Setbachs and
difficulties, disappointments and there have been, there will in
be," it said. "But the League cannot fail, because its
principles are lastingly right. And a world which turned from
the League would be forced, as certain as morning, to return
to it, because nowhere else could it find the essentials of
26
eternal peace."
The Ethiopian war continued to plague the Labour Party
throughout the spring and summer of 1936. ï¬ith the new
session of the League about to begin in early nay, Labour issued
a declaration calling for increased sanctions. By that time it
seemed the fall of Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, was
all but certain. Labour insisted this was merely symbolic and
militarily meant little. The war was not over, it said, Italy
had not yet won and the League had not yet lost. Lussolini
26HThe League Can't Fail,†Daily Egralg (LOfldOfl)
April 20, 1935, p0 100
167
would surely use the opportunity provided by the capture of
Addis Ababa to set up a puppet government and to declare the
war over. Fighting was sure to go on in the highland and the
League Council must not fall for nussolini's bluff. Sanctions
must be increased and under no circumstances should they be
removed. They had to continue ". . .to help the Abyssinians,
27
to vindicate the League, and to stigmatise the outlaw."
Labour blamed France and Britain for Italy's success in Ethiopia
on the grounds that had they acted strongly through the League
léussolini could have been stopped. In that case there would
have been no Rhineland crisis either as Germany would not have
dared to have moved had the League's prestige and power still
have been in tact. Britain was particularly to blane as had
she tahen a firm stand she could have forced France to follow
28
her lead.
By June 1936 Labour was even more discouraged about any
likelihood of further action in Ethiopia. As the session of
the League Council drew near, it appeared it was going to put
off again any decision on Abyssinia. This must not be done,
Labour warned. To put off firm action again would only serve
D
27"Future of Sanctions,†Daily 3 (London),
April 23, 1936, p. 10.
2°â€Eho Shall Answer for this Crime," Daily ierald
(London), nay 4, 1936, p. 10.
V far; .a'ul. arr. -:
168
to streng hen.uu°sollni vlile further weahe nin v the League.
l"CD
re:
Lhis policy of delay was partio ly hu wailie ting to the League,
it believed, after the promising start it had made to stop
Lussolini the previous bctober. How this was all gone and much
2
of the blame rested on the shoulders of the british Governnent. 9
3y the middle of the month it was Known that Eden would ask that
sanctions be lifted v'r ien the Coup acil met. This Labour denounced
as an unjust and unnecessary "unconditional surrermde to an
aggressor." It was "an ominous and terrible precedent," Labour
said, Vmich didx Inore than just give Lussolini more than even he
had expected in Abyssinia. It showed the world aggression paidh_
u
and that britain would not stand behind her League obligations.)
Labour tried to rally the people to pressure the Government to
change its position. It held demostrations and public meetings
on Sunday June 28. Great nunwo rs of people turned out, and this
was followed by a Labour supported o‘mpaign to flood the Govern-
ment with letters and telegrams to urge it to support the con-
31
tinuation of sanctions against ltaly. These protests did not
have any noticable effect on the Goverr lent s policy. On
29"3till Waiting," Daily ï¬erald (London), June 2, 1936,
p. 8.
BONT W a o n Bl F] (T ) J.. - Q ’
he recs uold, a Ml; erald uondon , une 19, 1,30,
p0 1C.
31"The Public Speaks,†Eaily ierald {London}, June 29,
1936, p. 10.
“.4. u —; [AI- 1- .mn ' -" ' ‘ "7 'CV' r. .. I]
l‘ .
h
lo9
July A, 1936 sanctions were lifted by the Lea ;;ue Coup icil.
Tl 1e tremendous let down to Labour caused by the failure
of collective security led it to a rather s; gnificant shift in
its attitude town rds universal collective defense during the
spring and summer of 1936. It began to turn to other, more Fï¬
narrow agproaches to the security dilemma. Uhen the French
Eopular Front cane to power in hay 1936, Labour declared its
first and most important duty was to help in forming an all-
Luropean security pact. britain too must make clear that it
was willing to accept â€military responsibilities to withstand
32
aggression." A short time later Labour exo_anded its new idea
for the reforming of the collective sec irity system. In the
light of the failure of the League to act quicnly and effectively
against ltaly, Labour suggested nations unable or unwilling to
support wholeheartedly collective action should be eliminated
from responsibility to act and also from the right to make that
decision. One power should not be allowed to veto the actions
of the rest by its unwillingness to act. Each nation in the
Lee gue should be as}. ed, Labour said, just what it was willing to
do for the League. They should then be grouped according to
their response so that every danger point would be adequately
covered by the military guarantee of some group. Economic
32"The Fight for Peace,†“a'ly Igrald (London),
5-8:}? 1+, 1936, .9. lo.
{HE
mm ‘1
170
sanctions would rennin universally binding. These egional
security pacts would then be within the League, but would in-
clude only groups that were willing to act-~that is nations
which found their interests threatened. in the light of the
failure of universal military sanctions this arrangement would
be a far better compromise then returning to the anarchy of
the pre-war period, Labour insisted. This it hoped would gain
he support of enough nations in a region so a potential ag-
gressor would still be faced with the certainty of defeat if
33
he violated another's rights.
Labour, reacting to the experience of the economic
sanctions fiasco against ltaly, also wanted a League reform to
make economic sanctions, the “first line of resistance to ag-
gression," not only a binding and universal obligation for all
members, but a plicably in advance of aggression and to make
3b
the boycott complete rather than partial.
by the end of the Sixteenth Assembly of the League WhiCh
adjourned in July l936, Labour was admitting the League was at
its lowest ebb and as it stood its position as a force for peace
was almost useless. The defeat over Ethiopia had caused it to
k 33"Shat Sort of Reforms?" Bail! Eï¬nili (London),
1.52837 5, 19 36 , p o 10 O
’3hâ€The Last Chance," Daily Herald {London}, June
15, 1936, p. 10.
.
171
if. The bigger states, Ewer said in the
(I)
lose faith in its
Baily Herald, had become cynical while the szaller states were
a.
isillusioned. It was apparent from the Council debates, he
said, that the attempt to restrain an aggressor by economic
sanctions would never again be tried. in the future no eco-
nomic sanctions could stop ggression unless accompanied by
military sanctions. This, he believed, was very unlikely. The
whole idea of the League had at least temporarily been destroyed.
peace-Keeper the action against an aggressor
To be effective as a
had to be so strong and so certain that he would not dare to
take a chance on it. As the situation stood in the summer of
1936 any would-be aggressor hnew League action was not only
uncertain, but very improbable. He, therefore, no longer would
i 35
tans the ueague into serious consideration in his calculations.
As Labour's entire philosophy towards foreign policy was
based almost exclusively on the League, it undertooh a serious,
almost desperate, campaign to prompt the British Government to
take the lead in rebuilding it. it believed the majority of
the British people supported its foreign policy, and, therefore,
appealed to the; to bring pressure on the Government. The
world, it said, could not get along without the League as war
,. 353. N. Ewer, "Faith is Lost in the League," Daily
Cgrglg (London), duly 8, 1930, p. 17.
- IT. *v I _. .
4
l
172
36
was almost certain without it.
The first necessary step in r vitializing tie League was
(D
to bring Germany and ltaly bac: into it. Labour supported
Eden's offer to separate the Covenant from the Treaty of Ver- a
sailles to make it easier for Germany to re-enter. Labour de- me
nanded that Lden stand firm otherwise, and not let Germany and
, 37 ,
ltaly dictate terms to the League. The Carmen and ltalian
intervention in th Spanish Civil Yar and their recognition of i
th Franco Government made it even more imperative that a special .!
session of the League be called, Labour believed. It wanted
Germany and Italy invited to the session so a real solution
could be found. Labour, thus, was not yet willing to worh through
any other international means other than the Lea us even though
it admitted the League had been rendered useless during the pre-
vious war. It hoped a League success in solving the Spanish
3
problem would restore much of its lost prestige.
By the end of the year Labour had reached the point where
it was willing to fully accept regional alliances but hoped they
night be brought under the League. It welcomed the announcement
g6"BacK_to Geneva," Eaily Herald (London), September
21, 1930, p. 10.
37â€Towards a New League," Dgily Herald (London).
September 28, 1936, p. 10.
38"League Aust meet,†Daily Eerald (London), November
2t, 193e, p. 10.
173
in 1Covenber 1936 the Lritain would defend France, belgium, and
Egypt should they be victims of aggression. It also approved
France's reaffirnation of the Franco-Soviet Pact, as well as
the closer relations between Britain, France, and Joland. It
saw these developments as the beginning of a new peace move- r“
ment, and urged they continue and move to a "higher level."
That "higher level" was, of course, to bring them under the
league. ï¬hile it believed the pact even outside the League was
necessary and useful in the face of the threat of war from the
aggressive Fascist states, it thought that for a truly lasting
peace they needed to work under the authority of the League.
The reasons for this were two. Firstly, in order to cover all
of the danger spots something more comprehensive was needed,
particularly in Eastern Jurone. Here the lack of any guarantees
of assistance against aggression offered great temptations to
the "warlike Gover nents." Czechoslovakia was in particular
danger, Labour believed. Unless it were soon given League
guarantees of assistance, there was a real danger it might be
attacked and if this happened "a European war would certainly
arise." The british guarantees to France and belgium made a
war in Western Europe unlikely, but if one began in Eastern
Europe it would soon spread to the East. The second reason
these agreements should be brought under the League was to pre-
vent the impressien they were â€alliances based on the denial of
174
righ t and refusal of legitimate redress to 'dissatisfied'
39
Towers."
Labour answered Iitler's complaint that these new guaran—
tees and pacts were endangering Gernans 's security by encircle-
H-
O
,3
m
a:
Q.
ment, by ar3uing that his act brought this on and if
his acgr ession would stop there would be no tr reat to Germany.
Labour said that although it deplored his method it had excused
his treaty breaking in the past because it believed he was only
seeking justice for Germany. Iis violation of the rights of
Spain, however, was an entirely different situation. This was
an act of unprovoked aggression which destroyed Hitler's argu-
ment that Germany would cease to be the disturber of peace
when she had achieved equalitv of rights. This action in Spain
coupled with the econor ic crisis in Gernany caused nzany to be-
lieve Iitler was attempting to whip up public enthusiasm at
home with a foreign adventure. This, together with Germany 's
refusal to cooperate in European peace efforts, caused great
susp oicion and was the cause for th see new guarantees Germany,
Labour said, was welcor‘.e to join any of the pacts she wished,
but to base a pact solely on German cooperation would give her
a veto power over them. These pacts were little enough, but to
reputiate them would destroy t1 a little security Europe had.
39"New Hope for Peace," Daily Ferald (London),
loveLioer 3U, 19 3o, p. 10.
Labour urged that these pacts be continued and if possible
brought under the League as a comprehensive European pact of
mutual assistance. At the sane tine efforts should not lag in
trying to persuade Gernany to join. it should be nade clear
,. J
[D
{\‘1
that all grievances would be considered n ll injustices re-
dressed. The Labourites wanted, in particular, the british
economic offer of September 1935, to discuss the question of
raw materials, to be onsidered at a conference in the near
future. This, they believed, would do much to alleviate the .
AU
tensions in the world caused by competition for raw.naterials.
Rumors that the Lerlin-Rome Axis was breaking up in the
spring of 1937 caused new hope for Labour, but for somewhat
different reasons for than than for most others. It did not
welcome a quarrel between Germ ny and ltaly over Austria,
Labour said, as quarrels betwe n great powers were always
dangerous and could easily lead to a general war. It also de-
plored the hope of some that such a quarrel would make a re-
building of the Stresa front possible and thus complete the
encircle-ent of Germany. This, Labour declared, was equally
dangerous. The reason it found the weahening of the Axis de-
sirable was it proved once again that alliances even when based
on similar ideologies were unstable and unreliable. It proved
A0"Hit1er's Choice," Daily Herald (London). Lecember 28:
1936, p. 10.
.
'3." "_â€._’\.s
.
,a
'.
'I
I
176
the only way a country could really guarantee its security was
by basing it on a genuine collective defense system.A
Labour agitation for a return to the League continued
during the summer of 1937 even though (or perhaps because) it
was becoming more and more obvious the p were were moving away
from it. It was not dead, Labour insisted, in spite of its
failures in Kanchuria and Abyssinia. These were not due to
failure of the League's machinery, it said in its standard
argument, but because that machinery had not been used. It
pointed out the League was still doing such good in such areas
as stopping illegal drug traffic, combatting disease and many
2
other important but unspectacular activities.h Labour also
said the League still represented the majority of the world's
people. Fifty-eight members represented 1.5 billion people
while non-members only 350 million. The United States would
cooperate with it, Labour believed, if it were strengthened.
To do this it must have machinery to settle international dis-
.putes and for preventing war. This would mean organizing in
advance economic and financial action by which aggression could
immediately be opposed. Cil, it said, was the hey to collective
41â€Trouble in the Axis,†Daily EQIQLQ (London),
April 23, 1937, p. 12.
hgBernard Loore, "Is the League Dead?--Ho!" Daily
(London), may 4, 1937, p.10.
177
. #3
peace and must be included in all sanctions.
The Hyon Anti-firacy Agreement in September 1937 was
proof, Labour alleged, that if nations would only cooperate
collective security would be practical and effective. It I
an 1
wondered why the nations would not apply it in other areas. F51
Labour's hope for a return to the League received a blow m
in the king's Spee ech at the bpening of Earliament in Dctober
- (A?
1937. For the first time in years the Grovernnent did not men-
1 “ha. â€Mm
tion that oritain' 5 foreign policy was based on the League.
This seemed to ma? e if official that tl e Goverh17;ent had dropped
45
7'
it as "a wo rld in strument to be tahen seriously.
By the end of 1937 Labour was all but ready to adznit this
tself. In a Daily herald editorial entitled â€Alive but not
Po
5 ching" it confessed the League was "tragically week." It
H4
‘4 0
could not yet shake off the League completely because it said
despite its failures "the moral, the intellectual and the 6
A
political principles upon which the League is based are right."
43Philip Noel-3am "The Only Real Insurance for Peace,"
M.§£QLQ (London), Au:,~ ust 13, 1937, p. 8.
h4"Partners for feace," Daily Eerald (London), September
45"Drcpiing the League," Dailv Herald (London), bctober
279 1937’ p' 10‘
46"Alive but not #icking,†Daily lerald (London), January
26, 1938, p- 8-
178
Since the League was so was: Labour considered the Anglo-French
defense pact and the Eranco-Soviet-Czech defense pact as "props
of peace." Iowever, Labour still insisted the door must remain
open for Germany to join these so they would remain "open de-
fense confederations" and would not degenerate into anti-German
47
power alliances.
In December 1937 there was talk that Iitler was attempting
to mediate between Japan and China. Labour attributed his
motives to the fact Japan's aggression was pushing China and the
Soviet Union closer and he did not want to see the Soviets have
any friends. ï¬e wanted China to enter the Anti-Comintern Fact,
and, therefore, was bound to try for peace terms not too unjust
to China. Labour believed China might be willing to listen to
iitler now that the Brussels Conference that had tried to settle
the dispute between Japan and China had failed. It deplored the
fact the iritain, the United States, Fiance, and the Soviet
Union had not supported one another in a collective policy in
the Far East. It felt sure Japan would have backed down in the
face of such a powerful coalition. As it was these powers
would not even promise to stand by the French if she was threat-
ened with attack for allowing arms to go through lndo-China to
A8
China.
h7"Germany and Peace," Daily Herald lLondon), December 3,
48"His New Role," Daily ierald (London), December 3,
1937, p. 100
rl'xilnlyu mama-.1 . ‘ ' v:
179
A
\
Labour by the end of l; 7 had reached the point where,
\Q
a it still wishe
()1
althoug to work through the League, it recog-
nized the world orgaiization's current impotency and was willing
to accept other measures of security. in light of the growing
seriousness of the European situation it had come to the point
where it was willing to accept defense alliances. It hoped
these would be open and within the League and urged this on the
Government, but it did not insist on it any longer or make it a
condition for its support.
During the period between the ramilitarization of the
Rhineland in Larch 1936 and the Austrian crisis of bebruary-
Awarch 1938, Labour struggled with its dilemma of whether and
to what degree it should yield on its principle of disarmament
to the expediency of preparedness in the face of Fascist ag-
gression.
Even after the Rhineland crisis Labour believed disarm-
ament together with collective security were the hays to world
peace. It blamed the current world problems and eSpecially
the ï¬hineland incident on the arms race. Even if new security
agreements were reached there would be no real peace until the
anxiety, the continual threat, and the heavy competitive expendi-
tures of the arms race were cheched. an agreement on armament
was, thus, an essential part of any peace settlement that might
be worked out. Labour by 1936, however, held no hope that dis-
armament could be achieved at a low or even a moderate level.
RESE-
ï¬ . .
[, ._. .-
180
The level would have to be high, it said, in the face of the
current world situation. but it believed an agreement at any
level was better than none at all because it would at least
stop the race. It insisted any arms agreement must include
international inspection and control. The breahing of such
an agreement must result in the refusal to supply the offending
country with "arms, munitions, loans, credits, minerals, oils
#9
or other essential war materials."
Labour, although it favored some increase in British
armaments to a level that would â€. . .maintain the Services at
a level necessary to defend the country and others against law-
breakers" the size depending on the intergational situation,
continued to vote against the estimates.5 Attlee explained
this was not a vote against the defense budget but a vote
against the Government's foreign policy which had made the
increases necessary. It was customary, he said, for the Lib-
erals and Labour to vote against the service estimates. It 51
was understood that it was not a vote against all armaments.
At the Labour Party Conference in October 1936 the party
49"Arms," Daily Herglg (London), harch 19, 1936, Po 10
5O"Cpposition to Arms Budget,†Daily Herald (London),
July 29, 1936, p- 8-
510. R. Attlee, ï¬g lt_5aopened (New York: The Viking
Press, 195A), Do 139.
181
declared its adherence to the principles of collective security
and to the maintenance of the rule of law hrough the League.
Britain's level of reamament must be to the level to enable her
to do her part in the League's collective defense system. The
level would vary according to the world situation. It attacked F“?
the Conservatives for having no correlation between their
2 ;
foreign policy and their rearmament plans.5 A split developed i
over the resolution presented by Iugh Dalton to the Labour Con-
vention on the issue of rearmament and whether or not Labour
should vote for it in Parliament. The resolution recognized
that because of Fascist aggression and rearmament, especially
the very rapid rearmament of Germany, Britain too had to rea no
1t reserved the right, however, to criticize and to decline to
accept responsibility for the Government's purely competitive
armament policy.53 The split, although not too serious, was
over whether the party should abandon its policy of automatically
opposing the service estimates. Dalton believed Labour should no
longer take the responsibility of opposing any increase in
Britain's military strength. Attlee insisted the resolution did
not infer support for the Government's program, but it reaf-
firmed Labour's international policy of collective security and
â€Pails: m (London), Lctober 5, 1936, p. 13.
53Dalton, The Fateful Year , p. 101.
l82
its willingness to raise or lower the level of armaments in ac-
cordance with the requirehents of that system. is said the
Parliamentary Party would reserve the right to vote for or
against any specific bill. The resolution was passed.5h
Labour changed its objections to the Government's rearm-
ament policy during the next few.months from opposing rearmament
itself to opposing the government's method of financing it. The
program called for rearmament to be financed by a loan. This
could shift the greater burden of the cost to the worher because
it would cause inflation, Labour charged. It should instead be
financed through taxes on those who could afford to pay them.55
Labour continued to criticize the Government for not
relating its arms program to a positive foreign policy. Unless
rearmament were coupled with â€a vigorous policy for defending
international law and redressing national grievances" it would
be dangerously insufficient and would only postpone trouble.
Lritain might be able to avoid defeat when trouble came, it
said, but it would not prevent trouble from arising. The
Government's lhite taper on rearmament failed to present a
program for rebuilding the League and for creating international
54"Labour's Arms Vote,†Daily ï¬erald (London).
Dctober 7, 1936, p- 10
55"Payiflg for Arms," Daily: m (London), February 2,
1937. p. 12-
183
conditions in which the League might be made to work again, the
ocialists declared. They did not object to the rearmament
U)
proposals of the taper, but the fact that it ignored these other
factors. Labour believed the Paper showed the Government had 1
lost interest in "a just sett ament of world problems," but {an
rather intended to concentrate on its own defenses and let the i
rest of the world get by as best it could. This policy only
accelerated the arns race and did nothing for reestablishing
5o
peace. L.
Labour in voting for the Defense Estimates in July 1937
broke the tradition it had followed in the previous years.
The decision was in line with the arguments of Dalton at the
Party Conference the previous Cctober. Labour emphasized the
vote in no way reflected approval of the Government's foreign
policy. It would continue its consistant opposition to the
policy for which it blamed in large part for the "tragic
deterioration of the international situation since the last
Labour Government." Eowever, it said, faced with the growing
Fascist menace no peaceful nation could fail to prepare for its
own defense and for the defense of democracy. It cited the
example of the Soviet Union and France as to other peaceful
nations which were being forced to rearm. Labour, therefore,
56"Ho Policy for Peace,†Dail‘ narald (London),
February 18, 1937, p. 12.
184
was â€prepared not to stand in the ray of the provision of the
instruments of defense." Labour voted for the estimates, but
resolved â€to insure that the instruments or defense shall be
used to strenghten the authority of the League and thus to
L:
57
secure peace."
At the Trade Union Congressin September 1937 and the
1 hour Party Congress in Cctober, the party had to defend its
(0
new position on rearmament against attacks by the Facifist
minority. At the T.U.C. meeting Labour’s position was attached
as a "surrender†to the Government and an â€abdication“ to it so
it could go ahead without â€electoral anxiety and without oppo-
sition, with its general foreign policy.†The National Council
denied these charges. it insisted there was nothing more the
Government would have liked than Labour's continued opposition
to strengthening the nation's defenses. It Knew Labour could
maze little headway in attacking its foreign policy so long as
Labour's own policy was to oppose any increase in the country's
defense system. The people, it insisted,wanted rearmament and
it was Labour's duty to give it to them, but at the same time
to convince them "it is only a temporary and evil necessity,
which can be made to give way to disarmament by world agreement
57"Labour and Defense," Daily Egrald (London), JUlY 23,
1937, p. 10.
._....- r
185
F 58
if only oritish policy is generous and courageous enough."
The Congress passed a resolution by a vote of 3,54h,000 to
22A,CCO that said: firstli, the next war could be prevented,
the arhs race stopped and the League of fations made strong
again if a Labour Gover.ment soon cane to power; secondly, such
a Government must be strongly equipped to defend the country,
play its full part in collective security, and resist intime
idation by the Fascist powers; thirdly, until the time that such
‘
a Government nas eased the international situation the present
>9 fl~
rogram of rearmament could not be revised. ï¬ne same resolu-
‘r’i
tion was passed the next month by the Labour 1zarty Conference
60
by a nine to one majority.
Although of minor importance during this period Labour
continued to worry about the safety of Austria and Czechoslovakia
and to oppose the anti-Soviet orientation of many of the western
powers, particularly Germany, Italy, and britain.
Labour wished to believe Hitler's claims during 1936 that
he had no intention of attaching Austria, but it remained
skeptical about whether he could be trusted. It warned iitler
that it would be a grave error to attempt to annex Austria, as
59"TUC Solid for Defense,†Qéil1.¥§2ili (London),
September 11, 1937, p. 1.
60§§;;1_§§rald_(London}, Cctober 8, 1937, p. 11.
186
a Nazi coup would destroy completely any chance for a settle-
ment which Litler claimed he wanted. It would force the rest
of Europe to regard the Third Reich not as a suitable partner
in a European system, but rather "as a deliberate, constant,
o1
and incorrigible disturber of the peace."
The Kazi-Sustrian Non-Aggression Pact of July 11, 1936
came as a pleasant surprise to British Labour. It believed
the pact did much to ease tensions in central Europe. It ob-
jected to those who might oppose it on the ground that it
would strengthen Germa y's influence and power because, it
said, that was a short range View based on the "crude" idea
that if Germany was surrounded by unfriendly states on all
sides she could be controlled. This view, it claimed, was
based ultimately on the belief it was wiser to prepare for war
than to try to remove the limely causes of it. This treaty
was a steo towards removing one of these causes. Labour, how-
ever, could not bring itself to u conditionally accept the
pact. Although it looked good on the surface, because of the
British Socialists' lack of trust in Hitler they preferred to
reserve final judgment until his real motives could be deter-
62
mined.
61"Austria," Dailx Herald (London), April 30, 1936:
O. 100
‘-
62"hitler's Coup," Daily flerald (London), JUlY 13:
1936: p0 10'
187
Eitler's general intentions in eastern burope and par-
ticlarly in Czechoslovahia were still a matter of speculation
for Labour during 1936 and 1937. As Germany and Italy began to
draw together in 1937 Labour saw them as the two main trouble-
makers in eastern Europe. it stated, that when left alone after
Â¥orld Ear l the former powder keg of Europe .ad become remark-
ably calm and their differences were being gradually worked out.
Labour doubted that Litler and.mussolihi would be able to reach
a permanent agreenent because of their rivalry to control
Austria. These two powers, it was believed, would play for the
favor of the Little Lntente powers. The Labourites believed
probably Yugoslavia and Bumania could be easily won over by
Germany. The former because of its fear of ltaly and a desire
for a German market for its agricultural goods, and the latter
because of its fear of Russia. Labour said that if Czech-
oslovahia could thus be isolated from her allies she would be
open to direct attached from Germany. dhether Eitler would
follow such a policy, which was so likely to bring war to Europe,
Labour said, desended mainly on the internal condition of Germany
and no one could say what that was. 1t insisted the survival
of Czechoslovakia was vital as she was the only true democracy
63
in eastern Europe. in June 1937 a minor incident between
6Biedgewood benn, â€If flitler marches East. . .," Daily
herald (London), January 6, 1937, p. 8.
188
0
Germany and Czechoslovakia was played up so much by the Kazi
press thzt Labour nas afraid itler would present Czechoslo-
va? in with dehands she could not Hos ibly meet. Labour urged
both sides to submit the incident to an indeeendent investi-
gation before it develoned into soret ing neither side could
64
control as in l9lh.
(
Labour worried a great deal about eitler's attitude
towards the Do viet Union. Lis refusal to deal with Russia was
a major source of unrest in Surope. Sven xmor e IEs litler's
hysterical attitude Wherever bole sheviL* s were concerned. This
was tolerable when he was just a lea er of a far atical party,
but as the h ad of a great country there could be no place for
(I)
it. 1t was obvious that he was not sane when it came to Jews
and Communists, Labsur believed. This lack of sanity led other
statesmen to wonder if it did not go further and if he could be
65
negotiated with at all. Hitler's refusal to make a settle-
ment with Russia would spoil the chances for a gen eral agreement
in Europe, Labour said. Litler, thus, had brought on his own
isolation in ï¬urope and his complaints of encirclement were
absurd. The rest of Europe, Labour asserted, could not be
61"â€lihither Germany?" Dailv Herald (London) June 24,
1937, p. 10. ,
65"Eitier's Lind,†Daily herald (London), Septenser 12,
1936. p. 8-
expected to make no effort to* ards security and peace just be-
cause ;itler did not like Connun‘sn. If European efforts to
avert war could not be nade with German assistance tiey must
00
be ma de '.7ithout it.
The Ger ran-lual1 n trotocol of Lctooer 1936 and the
ï¬nti-Cor zintern tact concluded in late Xovenber 1936 between
Germany and Japan were most ominous signs to Dritish Labour.
They were ". . .a most menacing step for Hard in th e novv un-
-v-
concealed Iasci
.1
t ir’ve against the Soviet Union.†litler's
(I)
O
'.
intentions were onv viously aggressive for if he really anted
peace he would not contiiue to re; use to join the Lastsrn tact
between francs and Russia, to rejoin the League, or to enter
into a 7estern fact. The fact that he rejected these and chose
to join a "closed and e} :clusive allian ce†Labour found very dis-
turbin g. It warned britain of the danger to the ï¬ritish ï¬moire
if it were faced by a "triple alliance of 'dissatisfied' fascist
Powers flushed with victory over the Soviet Union." The answer
to the pr roblem, it stated, WES not in building a counter-
alliance. This would only increase the dangers. Instead bri-
tain should take the lead in reconstructing the Leagu us which
would offer peaceful redress to all grievances and one7that
0
could enforce its decisions through collective force. Labour
66"Hitler's Threat," Daily ierald (London), September
w 67"1t is cur :lain Duty,†Daily_nerald (London),
november 20, 1936, Do 10.
believed in 1937 thct the most important aspect of Xazi diplo-
macy was to isolate hussia. Labour thought Eitler would be
willing to sacrifice Eranco if this would create a split between
the western powers and the Soviet Union. This was what it
seemed to Labour he was doing in Uctober 1937 when Gerhany and
ltaly dropped their objections and reservations to a non-
ihtervehtion plan offered by the best to which Russia was in
disagreement. by siding with the dest they hoped to divide the
anti-Fascist block. Labour we mad that London, Paris, and
hoscow must be gore careful in their negotiations to prevent
Soviet isolation, as this would be a serious blow for peace in
__ o8
Lurope.
In spite of Labour's dehand that britain cooperate with
Communist Russia, the hritish Socialists steadfastly continued
F
to refuse to cooperate with the ï¬ritish Communists. A reso-
lution at the annual Labour Party Congress at dournemouth in
October 1937 approved 1,730,000 to 373,000 an executive report
which called upon all members of the party to refrain from any
further joint activitggwith the Communist farty and the Inde-
pendent Labour tarty.
68333 ggry," nglx herald (London) Lctober 28, 1937,
p. 120
69HThe Door is Open,†Daily nerald (London), october
6, 1937, p. 10.
191
1'0
Th Nazi-italian alli nce was not taken too seriously
in the beginning by Labour. Uhile it aas being negotiated
the Lailv I re“ predicted it would â€cone to nothi g.†The
Labourites believed there were too hany differences between
the Italians and the Germans to allow them to form any sort of
70
a close relationship. even after the alliance had been signed
Labourites did not believe it could last long. N. N. Swer re-
ported that the Germans did not think much of the Italians and
particularly Iitler was not very fond of aussolini. They
remehbered Italy going over to the Allies in korld Bar 1, and
hat Lussolini had been one of the chief supporters of that
move. wore recently there was the Italian support of Austria
against the aazis. had it not been for Ethiopia Lussolini
would still be "anti-German, anti-Hitler and anti-Nazi,†Ewer
said. He predicted that the union would not last another two
71
years.
Labour during this period between the reoccupation of
the Rhineland and the Anschluï¬s continued its basic attitude
towards Hazi Germany's internal policies. it continued to de-
plore the violence and brutality of the regime. It still made
_7OBernard Moore, â€The Marriage Kill Not Take flace,"
Daily Herald \uondonl, bctober 29, 193c, p. 14.
715. N. iwer, â€H w Long before the Divorce?" Baily
Herald (London), September 29, 1937, p. 8.
192
much of the failure of tie Lazis to solve the problems of Ger-
many and predicted still that these would be its downfall, but
reluctantly admitted this dovnfa l would probably not be in the
nediate future. Labour haintained still that Germany must be
I 1]
F1
H
h
treated fairly and ecually and that her complaints be listened
to and legitimate attempts should be nade to rectify them even
if the rest of the world despised the way the Cazis treated
their fellow countrymen.
bn the second anniversary of the lazi purge, the Daily
Eerald in an editorial reflected on Germany's internal situ-
ation. Although the Kazis tried to ignore it and encouraged
the German people to forget it, the rest of the world must not
forget that it was a regime based on mass murder and constant
terror. The filled concentration camps and the suppression of
all freedoms lent little weight to Litler's protestations of a
desire for peace. Until Litler gave some positive proof he had
nothing but peaceful intentions internationally, Labour said it
could not believe he would not also use murder and terror in
72
external policy as well. How, Labour asked, could the rest
of the world expect Gernany's external policy to differ from its
internal policy? Could people of other nations exyect better
72"Thins-ts to hemember,†Daily Eerald {London},
J—Uly l, 1936, 00 100
-
"(V‘j -“._
193
73
treatment the; â€itler gave his fellow Germans? This charac-
teristic of the basis cane to the surface in Spain. The German
naval bombardment of Almeria in may 1937 proved to Labour that
Hazi leaders under â€nervous stimulus. . .react not as sane,
adult men, but as neurotics, or savages-~violently, spasmod-
ically, and dangerously, nd brutally." Th's showed that it
was dangerous to expect to deal with Gernany as one dealt with
other nations. Germany’s intentions might be excellent, but
"her emotions and her nerves are obviously still uncontrollable,
her reflexes unpredictable and violent.†If Litler expected
equality of status and treathent, Labour said, he must first
give proof of "equality in civilization and equality in be-
74 p
havior.†uabour, thus, began to change its position that
German internal affairs should in no way affect how they acted
internaticnally or how they sh uld be treated by other nations.
The Nazis' actions in Spain seem.to have been the factor that
prompted this change.
Labour believed it was internal conditions that would
ultimately bring down Litler, a modification of the theory it
had held since the hazis became a threat in Germany that the
. 73"Hitler's Terror,†Daily herald (London), DCtObeT 30:
193b, p. 12.
74"A Jord to Gernany," Daily Jerald (London), June 2,
1937, p. 10.
_ I
I“ “n.1- ‘I—-'-
F: J 5'23!
19h
proletariat would first, orevent the Jazis from coning to
power, and the an after the Jazis had tahen over that the working-
men would quickly overthrow him. Jhen this failed to materi-
alize Labour modifi d the idea to that eventually when conditions
became bad enough the orxers of aernany would rid themselves of
the Kazis. dhile t is ex.vected revolution never came about
abour continued to believe economic conditions were the Key to
{-4
tr‘e stability of the Litler regime, and, therefore, kept a close
vatch on the German economy for signs of weakness.
During 1936 and 1937 the German economv still seemed very
weak and unstable to Lritish Labour. It pointed particularly
to iitler's admission in beotember 1936 that it *as still im-
yooss1ible to raise tile wages of the German worker. iowever,
Labour did not accent Hitler's and Financial Linister ijalmar
C; 1“ 1n 6 V “ I? :“ '. n 1n r‘ '3‘" . . \ T" ‘1 .
Lonacnt s arouse that this was due to the fact vernany had lost
her colonies. Rather Labour in nsi sted it was the economic
policies of the Hitler regime itself that caused the serious
75 _ .
econon ic situation tr ere. A further sign of tne economic
deterioration cane in danua rv 1937 nen food rationing was
introduced in Germany. It was obvious now, Labour said, that
70
the German was having to sacrifice butter for guns.
75"Jeak fazi ixcuse,†Daily Herald (London), September
1c, 1936, p. 10.
76‘Short ï¬ations,‘ Lailz he re 1d \LOldOfl), January 2:
1937. p- a.
George Ldinae or re orted to the Lailv ferald in may 1937
after a trip to Darnany that un est and dissatisfaction were
n Germany. Le found many berma.ns worried about the
I...)-
grow1ng
lack of freedom and many of then were saying so privately. The
lull
(D
(I)
C+
t
7
d.
d
U)
2'7â€
*
LT)
Lazisr 0 deal of popularity and support since
\IID
C“
r“
1933, he sa
The treatment of the Jevs, of cour e, was still a major
mnlaint of the Labour 1 arty . It deplored Litler's policy
toward tlis group and insisted he must nodify his position
before there could be any rea l understan 1ng between the Lritish
and the Germans. It warned Litler he vas only hurting himself
if his mission was to make Germany a great and respected power.
It pointed out that his abuse of this defenseless people was
only a mark of inferiority and not greatness-that it won him
78
not respect but contempt. Labour teroorarily saw a ray of
hope in Eitler's attitude and policy toward the Jews in
January 1938. He had confiscated a particularly revolting issue
of Egg Sta , Julius Streicher's anti- Ev:ish ne1.:spaper. At
long last, Labour said, Hitler was listening to his ambassadors
vho had been warning hi: of the affect his anti-Semitic policies
"1
1 7?George 3diflger’ â€Revolt begins 1 Uermany," Lail
neral (London), may 3, 1937, p. 1.0. _, :2
78HJeW baiting,†Daily Herald (London), July 6, 1937,
o. 10.
WIDE-'3'
196
was having in other countries. It hoped this was a sign that
79
he was begi1nnirg to soften his rarsh policy. This hope was
\
very short-lived as a few days later the ban on Der Sturmer \vas
lifted and it was learned that it had been supp resse ed not for
its anti-Demitic articles, but because of an urrelated article
80
of which the Government did not approve.
In the first days of 1938 Labour had other reasons to
believe Iitler mi git be mellou1n1. :is speeches vzere much
better than earlier ones. They were quieter, more controlled,
and less provocative. The old "bluster, fury, and hysteria"
seemed to be gone, Labour said. The German sense of being
oppressed and held down by the rest of the world ahich had
grown in Litler to the point of a persecution complex seemed
less acute. What was needed next, it proposed, was some positive
action to confirm this. It sugge ested a Germ "1tnora al from
Spain, or a â€self-censorship" of gain Iagoï¬ to remove the sec—
tions vatich threatened Russia, or perhaps a statenent on how the
League might be revised to make it acceptable so Germany might
81
rejoin.
79"Worth a Cheer,†Daily H al" (London), January 24’
1938, o. 8.
86â€German Je we,†Daily Herald (London), January 29,
1938: p. 8'
81"Steadying Down?" Daily H'era d (London), January 12:
1938: p0 8'
197
(D
The fifth anniversary of Iitler's ris to power at the
end of January 1933 found Labour guardedly hopeful that the
Litler regime might have reached its zenith and was on its
way down. At the tine it adnitted Jitler's hold was fairly
proportions
U)
secure and a revolutionary movenent of any seriou
in the near future was unlikely. Devertheless, it believed,
he would not be able to achieve all of his aims without war and
any but a brief war in which he was immediately successful
82
would bring revolution.
Hitler's purge of his top army generals in Eebruary l938
suggested to Labour Hitler's hold on Germany was not as strong
as had been thought. It said he would have to disband half the
1g
army to root out everyon who thought as the purged officers
did. It would tahe months to Tazify the army and to heal the
f)
wounds caused by the dismissal of these generals. In the mean-
only source of trouble. The Germans
J
i
(1)
time the army was not 1
P
were growing tired of the Spanish involvement. Germans were
being Killed and money spent on a cause in which most had no
interest. They were also beginning to feel â€that they have put
their money on a loser.†Labour found the industrialists were
cooling in their enthusiasm for the Tazi as Ggring expanded
state control over private enterprize. There was no real unity
o ' h
823arold Laski, Five Years of Hitler,†Lail' Herald
(london), danuary 29, 1938, p. 8.
Hâ€
198
P.
n Germany, even among the 3321 Party which was torn by internal
rivalry. Because Iitler had destroyed all the organizations
which might prove a potential replacenent for his regime the
hope the Iazis would soon be replaced was ". . .pleasant to be-
53
lieve. . .but not what the facts will support."
Durinï¬ this period Germany began to make much ado of her
lost colonies. Iitler and Schacht tried to blame Germany's
8h
economic problems on the fact that Germany had no colonies.
U1
1he Iazis stepped up
CO
H
'ticn in sons of their former colonies,
85
rticularly the one in bouthwest Africa, during 1937.
Cf
(‘7
:i
(D
"c 3
Labour did not believe the South African offer to discuss the
colonial question with Germany would be accepted. Germany, it
said, did not want to discuss colonial problems, it wrnted its
old colonies back. Hitler needed the excuse of lacs of colonies
to appease the German workers. Impartial discussion would only
expose the weak ass of his excuse. The :azis wanted colonies
not for economic reasons as t1ey clained, but for reasons of
06
prestige, glory, and military power.
83"Germany Uobbles,†Dajlv 3e al {London}, February 7:
84"heah Nazi Excuse,†Daily
85“†- ° :e ' n fl '1 a ,
ua21s 1n nirica, Dal 2 were
1937, p. 10.
’5 _
06"Jhy uaxis â€ant bolon1es,
Sept nber 15, 1937, p. b.
I?
199
The Labourites believed Ge many mould soon make a fo rual
reeuest to the Lri ish Govermn er t for a return of her colonies.
They advised the Government in tlis case not either to refuse
to return the; or to agree to return them. ether they tr ou3ht ‘
the best solution vas to do away with the old concept of rm,
colonies and to 8110 . all nations absolute and eclplete equality
07
cf access to raw materials and markets.
Labour regained critical of the Government's general
attitude towards Germany during this period. Labour desired ;
friendly but firm relations with her. it was willing to concede 1
to Germany's justified grievances, but believed this should work
both ways--that Germany should soften her demands and stop her
threats to settle grievances by force. The Chanberlain Govern-
ment, Labour believed, rent too far in 1937 in trying to be
friendly with Eitler. It should not try to excuse or explain
the Kazi crimes, but should recognize and expose them. The
trouble with the Government's policy we s it hoped "that war
could be avoided. . .by retreat, by 001‘;donin g criines, by never
making a stand." his, it said, was ". . .nct the road away
from var but the one sure road tovards it. "In other words,â€
Labour said,â€friendliness will do no harm and perhaps some good,
but feebleness and flatterv and a humble enduring of every
0
87â€ï¬enly to Germany,†Iailv Hepald (London), June 26,
2C0
(0
defiance of law are a d naerous encouragenent to more law-
sa
(5‘
-hing. For it will be very surnrising if Lerlin and zone
C)
I'
(D
-ot read the 9rine Linister's speech [corcerne‘ with Gernan
DJ
0
F
aggression in Spain] to mean that there are no limits to which
88
they may not safely go.â€
During Lord Califax's talks with Yitler in Iovember 1937,
Labour took the opportunity to once again state clearly its
attitude towards Germany. It favored the Halifax visit and be-
lieved much good could come from it. Peaoe was no longer secure
without sche understanding with Gernany. The internal govern-
nental structure, be it democracy, Communism or F'SCism was no
I
0
reason to exclude a country from the connunity of nations.
Lritain certainly wanted justice for Germany, Labour asserted,
but not only or Germany. Germany was not the only country with
problems and grievances. The only peaceful solution to these
problems was through international law and an impartial third
party. It was Germany's rejection of this that made the Bri-
tish anxious about her intentions. Geinany must be encouraged
to participate in a new community of nations. Lord Halifax, it
said, "can offer Germany nothing save on those terms. For those
terms are the only terms which are fair to all nations as well
08"The Basis of Peace,†Daily Herald (London), June 26,
1937, p. 10.
i": “Thea
201
89
as to Germany."
Whig.-
89"Talks in berlin,†Daily Herald (London), November
17, 1937’ p. 12‘
CHAPTER VIII
ANSCHLUSS AID MUNICH: TH†FINAL ELLE
The Austrian crisis caught Labour, as it caught the rest
of Europe, by surprise. It was not until after Iitler sunmoned
Lr. Kurt Schuschnigg, the Austrian Chancellor, to Berchtesgaden
to present his demands on Austria, that Labour really realized
the dangerousness of the situation. A month later on.harch 12
the Tazis invaded Austria andlthe crisis ended almost before
Labour had a chance to react.
In February when Litler's demands were made public,
Labour confessed there was nothing Schuschnigg could have done
but yield to them. Italy, which had been the protector of
Austria, was now Germany's ally. France and Britain would do
nothira as to act would risk war. The day had passed when
‘91,
they were sufficiently powerful to impose their will on Germany.
The League, which on paper â€guaranteed the existing political
independence" of Austria, was "hanstrung and powerless." The
clear and unfortunate lesson from this to every great power was,
Labour said, that as long as it refrained from touching a vital
interest of another great power it could impose its will on any
2
aher neighbor.
larana, The apitgsn Labour Party, p. 203.
2â€Austria," Daily Eerald (London), February 16, 1938,
o. 10.
&
203
The actual invasion of Austria again caught Labour by
surprise. Labourites violently condenned the action, which
shattered the little faith they still had in flitler's word.
Labour, as much as Chamberlain, wanted agreements with Germany,
but it now questioned of what use they would be as Iitler would
only honor them as long as it suited his nurpose.3 The fact
that any aggressor could impose his will on a neighbor if he only
dared to act was now even more painfully clear. Luch of the
blah must go to Chamberlain, Labour insisted. he had made it
clear to the dictators that under his leadership Britain would
do nothing to deter them.A It was too late to help Austria,
said Francis Jilliams, the editor of the Daily Herald, but the
western powers must see to it that aggression not be allowed to
succeed again. Tar was not inevitable, he stated, but every
9
successful act of aggression made it more likely.
by 1938 Labourites were ready to admit collective security
through the League was almost impossible, although they still be-
lieved it was the best means of securing peace and that if war
were to be avoided permanently the nations would have to return
3"Diplomacy of the nailed fist,†Da"1 Eerald (London),
larch 12, 1935, p. 1C.
4â€Three Keehs,†La‘ * herald (London), aarch lh, 1938,
o. 10.
L
r.
I
Sfrancis Iilliams, â€After Austria--Lhat?" Jaily ierald
(uondon), karcn 14, 1938, p. 10.
n
‘I-v ‘-"- T'Jj
.I.
rm
2C4
to some forn of collective defeise. They continued to believe
it was not the Lee us or the collective security idea that had
failed and had created the tense situation in Europe. Rather,
the failure arose fron the refusal of the powers to put complete a
faith in the systen and use it effectively. Labour maintained ‘
F__
tie principle was still sound.
The Austrian crisis once a ain orc ugl1t derands by Labour
that sone sort of collective systen be established. This time
Labour hoped the system would be on a firler foundation than be-
fore. 5y esta bli sin g collective security on Versailles the 1
powers had :aée a fatal blunder, as the peace settlement,
Labour n"d always he d, vas impos sible to maintain. Versailles
contained too hany possibilities for future conflict. lrom the
beginning it was obvious Gernany would use every means at her
disposal to revise the systen. As Gernany grew stronger the
Versailles settlement could only be preserved if the other p wars
6
were w lling to go to var to maintain it. The actual invasion
of Austria made the need for collective guarantees eveii more
obvious and urgent, Labour declared. There was no escape from
war now, "save by working with redoubled power, tunin' every
difficulty as a spur, for the reconstruction of the collective
7
s¥stem.†How that iitler's ““lllfl‘flsSS to use force to achieve
6â€Austria,†Evilv Lerald (London), rebruary lo, 1938, p. lb.
LO
omacy of the sailed fist,†Lailv he er
7“
205
ris objectives had been made clear, Czec1oslovhia must be given
ssurance that Aritain and the other League pow rs
(D
{D
inmediat
would fulfil their obligations to maintain her integr rity an d
"1
indenendence. inis would show Aitler for the first time that
the risks involved in aggression mere too great. uhen this was Land
8 .‘ 1
clear, Labour assured its followers, aggression would stop. ;
Labour insisted that althOQ rearmament was necessary, i
it must not be allowed to taxe the place of honest attempts to 3
est“; blish a collective security system. Aearmament would only 3 g
i...
ir1sure that :rita 'in Tould not lose the next war, it would do i
nothing to insure that war would not break out.
The German violation of Austrian inde endence, the Aazi
aboarent devotion to aaeression, and the unwillingness to co-
operate in a constructive security arrangement must not be
alloved to stand in the vay of some security arrana enent, La-
bour said. in fact, it was all the more reason to pursue
collective defense with more vigor. Labour suggested this new
ar algenert be created within the League between nations bound
together by a treaty of mutual assistance a Qainst aQare ssion.
The Anglo-French defensive alliance could be the ntdeus of such
9
a groub.
.Q—
8Francis milliams, "A fter Austria--uhat?†Daily Lierald
(London), march 14, 1938, p. 10.
9"Arms are not Anough,†Daily Lerald (London), march
15, 1938, p. 10.
/
200
Labour sunnerized its foreign golicy again in Larch 1938
to contrast it with that of the Joverii1ent. it had two points
of difference; first, Labour believed tlat by coo; Mt on between
nations an ir te r:w tional EutMLO ity must be as ‘ lished ca_ aole of
V o
guaranteeing all law-ab; ing nations innunity from attach. 1t
0.
Pa"
.3
believed this could be doze v1er a sufficient number agreed to
I
treat an attac; on one as an attac; on all. Until this was done
nations would continu to rely on their own strength and alliances
to de.‘ end themselves, and the arms race and alliance systeL v.ould
hese two factors, Labour believed, were far more
ihely to bring var than to orevent it. Second y Labour said,
the nations must bind tl1enselves to tr e rule of interr ational
law and justice and must abandon all clains to self-judge their
10
ovn cases in di spite s.
('1
The Czech crisis of Aay l93 , Labour believed, illustrated
the point that a firn collective stand could effectively prevent
aggre ssi on. The fir: support given the Czechs by ne British
and French together with the â€cool heads and steady nerves†in
lra ue had prevented Geruen a ression. 311is s;o* ed, Labour
said, he hnovledge by any would-be aggressor hat it would be
‘r'
met by overHFelLln- collective resistance would cause him to
‘ lO"The Desi s of reace,†Qaily 5 raid (London), march
20, 1935, p. 10.
2C7
back down. This must be ccugled with the knowledge by a dis-
satisfied country that any leQitihate grievance will be adjusted.
The only complaint Labour had with tne handling of this crisis
was that the powers waited to the last monent to declare their r
position. This meant that an accident, incident, or rashness on ran
the part of a minor official could have touched off a war. The
powers must hahe the'r position absolutely clear before a crisis
arose so there could be no miscalculation on the part of the
1
Labour continued to advocate this bolicy throughout the
summer of 1938 and urged the Government to adogt such a position
when the Czech crisis of Seoteiber began to develop. Clement
LI (3
Attlee on eeptember l, 1938 wrote that the real dang r to peace
(0
arose if Iitler, using the minority question in Czechoslovakia
to pursue his territorial ambitions, miscalculated the position
of the brit‘sh and French Governments to supoort the Czechs. he
warned the Government that although it must not refuse to deal
with countries because they had a fern of governnent different
from Britain's, it must not assist that Government in maintaining
its dictatorship and in suppressing liberty. This, in effect, was
ave way to forces of aggression.
what the CTovernrnent did when it
B fositive peace prograr, he said, was one that offered to the
11â€Lesson of the Crisis," Daily Kerald (London), lay
24, 1935, p. 10.
208
peoples of the world greater advantages than those held out as
the rewards of successful aggression. 3 policy of appeasement,
Attlee said, which in effect merely yield ever*nhere to violence
did not promote veace but rather war. The true path to peace,
he emphasized once again, we: in convincing aggressors their
actions would be overwhelmingly defeated. Attlee emphasized
trat the road to peace led back to a strong League, one that
would not concern itself with maintaining the status pug, but
with renoving causes of friction and dealing with the causes of
12
war, especially economic causes.
Labour was willing to modify its base for collective
veloped. It called
(D
security, as the Czech crisis of Septenber d
ate to nahe it
Cl-
(:2
on Lritain, trance, Russia, and the United 3
clear to Litler that any attempt to coerce the Czech Government
or to weahen her in any way would be resisted by these four
By 1938 Labour had resigned itself to the fact that re-
armament was necessarr and inevitable. It even admitted it was
regrettable but true the Germany paid far more "respectful
attention†to an increase in britain's arms program than to her
12C. R. Attlee, "Folicy to Rally the Tcrld,†Jaily
Re a ‘ (Condon), September 1, 1938, p. 10.
13John marchbank, â€hitler hast set Clear garnin3,.
3237K Heralg {London}, September 5, 173v, Do 110
.. ,V.
m!
2C9
peaceful words of protest to 4itler's aggressive policies. Tow-
ever, Labour believed that more than just increased armaments
was needed. It also demanded a new foreign policy--one in which
o 14
the peaceful nations held firm a ainst the aggressors. Attlee
said in July 1938 that Labour's attitude to armaments was that
they were only justified as a support for a constructive peace
. ._ TL...-__3
I
’5
L.
_ _ I.
(1“
policy. She amount of arms required, he said, dehended on
1
foreign golicy and tn
(D
world conditions obtaining at any one
time. ~n‘hile Labour still opaosed the aolicy which resulted in
the conditions as they were in l§3S--tha was the Government's
mishandling of foreign affairs, the abandonment of collective
security, and the free hand given to aggressors--it accepted the
15
fact that some increase in armaments was necessary. This same
support for rearmament was reiterated in September by John march-
bank, the head of the Railway Korhers Union. Ea said, "Te will
do our part in building up the national defenses to enable us to
resist aggression and assist the Government in such action as
could be taken to restrain and repel unarovohed attache on other
16
nations." ihe annual Congress of Trade Unions in September
‘ _ ' -. . _ _ ._ ~ \ .. -
14"Arms are not Anough,†Baily :erald (London), Larch
15, 1938, p. 10.
;5C. B. Attlee, "The Peace That Esople Sean," ‘ai‘y
herald (London), July 26, 1938, p. s.
. léJohnyaarchbanK, "Hitler Lust Get Clear aarning,â€
Daily Jerald (London), beptenber 5, 1938, 9. ll.
210
Voted overwhelming to suhgort re-rnanont on the grounds of neces-
l7
sity.
The Lunich crisis not only intensified Labour's suï¬port
of rearmament, but also its demand that something in addition to
rearmament was needed.
ease production by l?38,
H.)
pid incren e in de
[-3
(f)
hith the r
Labour began to worry about the effect it might have on the
~—
Jritish worker. It warned that defen e measures must not be
U)
allowed to violate civil liberties. it was particularly con-
cerned about industries taking away hard won worker's benefits
18
and gains on the excuse of national deyense necessity.
During 1938 Labour grew even more critical of the Govern—
nent's handling of foreign policy. This was particularly true
after Anthony Lden resigned as Foreian ainister in February 1938.
It saw Eden's resignation as evidence that Chamberlain was now
ready to give the dictators a free hand. Another manifestation
of this was that there was no british orotest to the demands
Hitler had forced on Austria in February. Labour predicted a
g A
Pact of "agpeasenent" wits cern
L0
nv and ltaly, nd at the same
I
0
time a weakening of the ties between :ritain and France. Chanber-
(London), September
. l7â€Arms and the TIC,
7’ 1338.
18"True Defense,†Zaily Jerald (London), october 15:
.. 8.
H
\()
\ I,
m
U
I‘J
me
211
lain's new policy also meant, Labour said, giving up the hope
the United States night participate in a â€real policy of world
appeasement,†as it was now "angrily and righ 1y suspicious" of
Chanberlain's policy. It meant ï¬ussia would be even more‘
suspicious of the western powers and this might easily lead to
her withdrawal from a â€discredited†League. It nleant the aban-
donment of Spain to Easeisn. To central Jurope, Labour said, it
would mean that if they are to ca safe t ey must "hurry now as
quickly as possible into the German orbit." It was, Labour
warned, "an end of all that remains of Britain's moral authority
19
in the world."
Labour placed much of the blame for the situation in 1938
on the Government' 3 blunder ing since 1931 and more particularly
on Chamberlain's "virtual disn issal ofï¬nr. Eden, his patent de-
sire for frie Md nip at any price with the dictators, his eager
advances to Rome, his anxiety to start conversations n tn berlin,
and his expressed conte npt for tie Lea3ue He let the dictators
know they could act as they chose xHitIout fear that Britain would
Optose them with force. dcen' s dismissal, Labour claimed, was
the signal for Eitie 's taking flustria and for tr e renevved vigor
with which Italy acted in the new rebel offensive in Spain. Thus,
Chamberlain bore direct responsibility for the "fall of Vienna
I19"Pramier' s -olicy," Dajl { :era d (London), Fabruary
212
and the threat to maroelon::.’r The only answer to reverse this
policy was a general election which would return a Labour Govern-
2O
ment, it said.
Labour deplored the Government's return to alliance dip-
Erench alliance as a ne-
lonacy. It had come to View tne Anglo
oessary evil, but constantly called upon the Government to ex-
pand it into a real collective security system. It objected most
to the pre- orld bar 1 thinking that bilateral alliances were
21
enough to keep the peace.
Labour resented the attempts by Chamberlain and his party
to brand Labour as the â€war >rty." It pointed to its long
’0
L)
5
record of attempts to bring abo t true world appeasenent by re-
moving he causes of war. It said it had since the signing of
AAV
the Treaty of Versailles advocated major revis.ons i
J
the
:3
U)
settlement. It had wanted abolition of war indemnitie , and had
supgorted Gernany's entry into the Les us, it had long called
for open access to raw M8 erials and markets, and removal of
other econonic causes of war. Labour had been the leading advo-
cate of disarnament. It had been the strongest supoorter of the
League, collective security and international law under which
20"Three Seeks,†Daily Jerald \London}, Larch 1h,
21â€nxis into Jedge,†Daily herald (London), nay 19,
213
peaceful adjustments of disputes could be achieved. fhe Conser-
vatives' abandonment of all of these had caused the present
situation in which 1.:ar se LiSd a real lirelihood. Labour had
never urged rash action-~only a firm stand and a refusal to be
"bullied.†Labour believed its policy of firmness was far more
likely to preserve peace than the Government's policy of backing
down in the face of ag,ression. This would only cause the
r Britain would in the end
22
have to fight or recognize t -e dictators as its masters.
(D
dicta ore to dehand more until eit1
All the way up to Lunich Labour continued to predict
hitler was in trouble at home. Lovever, it agpeared even Labour
was no longer taking this too seriously or placing much hop 9 in
this View, for it always hastened to add that an overthrow was
not in the forseeable future.
In February 1935 it appe eared the La is v.7ere in trouble
with the generals and tLe big industrialists. Labour seemed to
almost hope it would not be these groups that would overthrow
Hitler. †hen he does go do :n at last,†the Daily Eerald wrote,
"it will be before the forces of humanity, freedom, tolerance and
justice." Thus, even as late as 1933 Labour had not abandoned its
long established and long awaited theory that the worhers would
220. R. Attlee, "The ï¬eace feoole Seek," Dailv Herald
(London), July 2o, 1938, n. .
'3
Fl}. .Il¥.A“———.—_‘i__ I AWT': 'F 1I.
214
_ 23
save Germany from titler.
Labour believed Litler's renewed pursecution of the Jews
in the summer of 193E was partly because of his frustration from
being unable to intimidate the Czechs in may and partly as a
Safety value for the growin , discontent over the shortage of food.
J. 4. ï¬wer attached niat he said was the "great Uazi myth"
that the German army was unecualled and irresis table. This had
become tiresome as well as dangerous, he said. The army was, in
fact in no condition to va
{M
e a n;ajor war. The new army was only
three years old. There was a lacr of officers and AOL's. There
was every reason to believe Germany had not made up the handicap
in arms with mhich she started. posed in production, shortage of
raw materials had led to poor quality in their new arnanents. The
air force was the one exception. Lowever, air power would not be
decisive unless in overv.he mine; suneriority. The German rail-
roads in 1938 did not compare in effiCiencv_ vit those of 1914.
fne German econon y ï¬ner said, would not be able to stand the
strain of war either in agriculture, fl‘ nance, administration, or
industry. The fact that Germany could not stand amajc r, pro-
J~ fl
lon1ed war was the reason she was counting on the â€blitzhrieg.
Ewer said, ", . .it is a tempm r gvigion. out--there are too
many buts.†Air hover had to be overwhelming. miscalculations
23"Germany,†Da'ly H a 6 (London), February 12, 1938:
D. 8.
215
or breahdown would be disasterous. The techniques of blitzkrieg
was very difficult, he said. Faith in it Ha waning as the war
in Swain and China had given reason for doubt. Austria gave
even more. The Austrian invasion was to have been a dress rehears-
al and, militarily, it had been a "comolete fiasco." To under-
estimate Germany would be a.mistake, he said, but to egard her
as "the most oowerful military machine tne world has ever seen,
2A
is simple nonsense."
Anoth r Labourite wrote that he believed Hitler and
Lussolini would remain â€great forces and terror†in the world
only so long as the people of Germany and Italy supported them
morally. in his opinion the time might be near at hand when
because of the “resulting wretchedness of such continued support
will defeat all the propaganda, all the drilling, all the war-like
25 -
circuses on earth."
3. 3. Ewer wrote in August 1938 that "Hitlerism reached
its full flood with the annexation of Austria and now is turning,
perhaps already ebbing.“ He saw many signs of discontent in Ger-
many. Enthusiasm was waning. The people were losing confidence
in Litler. There was a "depression of spirit†among the middle-
L _24f. H. iwer, :The Great Hazi Lyth," Daily Herald
(London), dune 22, 33o, p. 8.
‘ 25T. 3., i'.c*‘at man's Conscience,†Daily Lerald (London),
July 6, 1938, p. 8.
class, as the .or::ers,
tne army, and even
a;mmn;3t e you
216
the peasants, the aristocracy,
O
0‘
«L
4.
Uh.
To one was usina the â€He 1
Litler†greeting any more. aven the 3-5. was settling down, no
one vmnted war, especially the army. There was no illusions,
he said, about an easy victory. Germans were talking about the
possibility of war with
fear 4itler might drag the
â€a sort of puzzled bitterness.â€
country into war
The
was turning the na-
tion against him. ihe pro 9a:anda ‘d ceased to have an effect,
he reported. The people were tired of it a;d distrusted i .
Everything was suspected as preparation for war. jven the anti-
Jemvish campaign had defeated its purpose, Ewer claimed. It had
gone too far and was now arousing pity for the Jews. In economics
there was no longer confidence that Iitler could cure Germany's
economic ills, as thi in3s v.rere getting horse, not better. Lwer
had some doubts as to whether
Litler could overcome tr ese problems.
He believed Litler had lost much of his old demagogic flair. He
thought litler mi3h t be forced to gamble with war in the hope a
quick victory would restore his no: ul aritgy. lowever, Ewer said,
it was not at all aositive the " nerals would obey Hitler if he
26
ordered a war.
While the Austrian cris
by surp Hi e, they realized tfe
_r ‘26.:13’. :9. 51,2781', FNlllq'
(London), august 2o, 1933, D-
.1.
x
J
is took the Labourites more or less
irminent danéar of Iazi aggression
t Over Litler,’ Daily Jerald
8.
217
E{ ains t Czec oslovagia for several months before the. union
crisis of Septenber l§38.
During :ebruary l933, while the Austrian crisis Ives still
at its neirnt and there seehed to be little that could be done
eginning to be concerned about the
he britil sh Government's
H.)
(‘5
C“
(D
O
[nu-b
d
i
(D
C
N
(D
O
r—
U)
.
P- -' .
C+
h)
(D
Q. (3‘
9"
(D
Clâ€
g,
*‘5
(J
(I)
$31
0
“1
refusal to 3ive pub .lic reassurances to Czechoslovakia that
Britain would stand by France against a: 3r t reat to Czech integ-
27
rity and indeienden e. Labour attached the new slogan "Jould
you figh for Czechoslova'.;ia'i'I which was bein3 used by certain
groups within the Conservative Party. It was strange, Labour
said, that those who said they vo Jld not fi3ht for Czechoslovakia
(‘0
bec use it was a small, far away land vould fight for bier ra
eone, Sarawah, the Solomon Islands, or 3t. ielena, just because
twi
t ey belon3 ed to Bri tain. This did not prove they wanted war as
they were sayin3 about Labour because it fa ored suitortlng the
Czechs. It nroved only that th ey would fi3ht under certain cir-
cumstances. Labour asked the; to think what would hagpen to
Europe if Litler took Czecloslovakia. Labour said, "a fire will
be ali33t and who can tell where it will soread?†Labour ur3e
that guarantees be imme diately 3iven to the Czechs to the effect
that any attempt by Germany to settle their diife rences by force
’ :27"Prelier's folicy,†Daily E rald (London), February
23, 1935, o. lo.
1
would be met by collective resistance. At the same tine it
.. v11 ‘1 .an/q 1 r- f:- -- ~- ‘ ." ~ ,-. r -. ‘ .'~
snOuld be Made clear to eerhany tnot there can be a peaceful
DJ
+4
Pb
examinatio and settlement of her grievances if she wishe
Geruany could prove any case for chan e then it must oe done.
If that right were refused, Labour said, then it would not be
justice but power politics and Germany would have a case for
28
...v v
I I Q
a ‘DLA +f"
".LULL Ul-e ""
in march the Czech's
m
N
H-
O
(J
O
p.
1:3
S‘-
d.
} :-
O
L)
O
r‘b
a.
g:
m
d"
H
Fl
LU
hosition becsme even nore threatened. Labour was sure that if
Litler attempted an invasion the Czec s would fig t and the would
start a Enragean war. britain could not stand aloof and risK
the defeat of France. That would leave Gernany all-powerful in
Europe. Therefore, Labour urged once a3ain that the Government
with the other League powers dealers they would fulfill their
3 naintain the integrity and indeoendence
Yet, the Government did not offer the desired guarantees.
Clanberlain stated dritain had no "vita' interest" in Czechoslo-
vahia and therefore could give no guarantee. Labour disagreed.
,1
r:
w
—-,
q
the last stron3-hold of denocracy in central and
F"
~esides be
28"No Lore Iar,†Baily Ierald (London), February 25,
r‘ - - - . --. r ' - "
27i‘â€rancis millions, â€After Austria--nnatr†Daily herald
(London), march 14, 1938, p. 10 '
l
«a»: Lvmz r. _ . ')I r'V"
L
F
219
eastern durooe, it was also allied to the French. Britain's
military alliance with :rence plainly showed tha' :ritain could
not tolerate the destruction of France. herefore, any war,
whatever its origins, which threatened def
would automatically become britain's war.
Iot until the Czech crisis of éay, did Labour get the
firm stand it desired frog the Government. This incident proved
abourites said. Then
t—l
their point about collective resistance,
Eitler understood clearly that an attempt to settle problems by
1
force was ligelv to be met with overwhelming resistance, he
dared not act. That was the right way to handle the si nation,
but it was wrong to wait until the last minute to maï¬a it known.
Zed Britain's position been clear from the beginning the crisis
31
likely would not have occurred.
The Czechs' willingness to negotiate with the Iazis won
hearty approval from the british Socialists. The Czechs were
probably the most anti-Fascist nation in the world, but they did
not let that interfenewith their willingness to discuss with the
Germans their mutual grievances. In this the Czechs proved them-
selves to be first-class democrats, Labour said, and even more
3O"Prenier's Speech,†Daily Ierald (London), Larch 25,
lgga, 9. lg.
_ 31â€Lesson of the Crisis,†Daily ierald (gondon),
33-33.," 21+, 193‘8 , p. 100
[HE
32
deserving than ever of Lritisn supoort.
The “abourites were susvicious of Lord huncinan's visit
3 going as
Q}
to Czechoslovakia in August. They said tnat if he w
a genuinely independent adviser that was good, but if he was
going as the representative of a great power to a small one to v,__ï¬
impose the will of the former on the latter then this was not
1
'1' ~_ .l‘v_ 1r
so good. Czechoslovakia had won the admiration of the world by
her reasonableness in considering the demands of her ninorities
‘J
P 'J‘ .’;i'i’ â€Ill('
and for the courage she showed in standing up to the threat of
‘
d
force against her. There were also rumors that Dritain would
try to make her give up her alliance with Russia to please Ger-
many. She must not be forced to do this, Labour warned, as it
would greatly weaken the Czechs and would further isolate Russia.
Labour insisted Russia's cooperation with the fleet must be in-
33
creased not decreased.
As August ended Labour continued to be concerned about
the Czechs. Labour said that war was not inevitable, and if it
came it would be through the deliberate act of some men or groun
of men. The Daily Eexgld again warned Germany that an attack on
Czechoslovakia would not be isolated, but would bring a new world
32"Peacenal-zers," Daily Herald (London), June 16, 1938,
o. 8.
33â€Runcimanfs Vigit,†Qfléll in 51‘ (London),
July 27, 1938: p0 10'
221
var. Germany, it said, should not have any illusions about a
34
quick, easy Victory. Labour observed that it was obvious the
Czechs were making every effort to make fair concessions to the
Sudetens. It was up to :itler in he and whether or not these
would be accepted. In either case Qitler would bear the respon-
35
sibility for what followed. The “roblems between the Czechs
and the Sudetens were not so great that they could not be solved.
hitler alone was standing i the way of a settlement. Certainly
there would be no question of solving the problems by war were
Eitler not involved. Labour believed a satisfactory agreement
could be reached based on the pronosals made by the Czechs at
3b
the end of August.
At the annual T.U.C. Convention in early September, the
delegates passed a resolution calling for Britain to support the
37
Czechs.
A iitler speech in the first days of the new crisis made
threats, but no threat of immediate aggression which Labour had
feared. It seemed to Labour that â€at the eleventh hour he had
34"The Lanark Speech," Lajll ngald (London), August
23, 1938, p. lo.
19?“ 35â€kiitler's Choice,†Daily herald (London), August 30,
,C', p. 80
3611'
Naiting," Dailv Herald (London), Septeuber 5, 1938:
p. 8.
37Daily Herald (London), September 9, 1938, P- 11.
222
understood what such action by Gernany would involve and he re-
frained." There was an urgent need, Labourites said, for a joint
declaration by britain, France, an ï¬ussia giving full support
38
to the Czechs.
In the rapidly moving crisis this feeling of optimism
cianged quickly. A Hitler ultimatum on September 12, demanding
the right of self-determination, changed the situation drasti-
cally--â€the situation which seemed so hopeful in the morning by
evening had become very bad.†Labour believed there was now
only a slight chance to stop Iitler, but it had to be taken. A
strong british warning to Sitler might stop him at least tempo-
rarily and that might provide enough time to find a solution,
39
Labour said.
Labour firhly supported Chamberlain's first visit to
see Iitler at berchtesgaden, September 15. It was a wise move,
Labour believed, to â€out through normal diplomatic procedure at
a time when something out of the ordinary was needed." Labour
insisted the ï¬ussians be kept informed--they must not be isolated
in this crisis. Labour cautioned Iitler not to misunderstand
38"Hitler's Speech," Daily Herald (London), September
\.
2, 1938, p. (a.
A“
39â€Voice of britain,†Daily Herald {London}, deptember
la, 19 8, p. 8. Dalton, 2h; fateful Years, pp. 174-207. Ealton
gives the best account of Labour's activities during the gunich
crisis and its attempts to bring pressure on the Government to
stand firm.
223
t
tr
e british attitude--not just the Government's but also that of
{7.1
people as a whole. Lhat attitude was, Labour eclared, one of
â€uncompromising resistance to any attempt by Germany to settle
what can and should be a matter of reasonable negotiation by an
act of deliberate unprovoked aggression." Also the world must
know clearly what Hitler considered a satisfactory solution.
Chamberlain's purpose, Labour asserted, was not to strihe a pri-
vate bargain, but to put forth the british and Zrehch position,
to hear Eitler's views and to report back to the cabinet and the
Erench Government. Above all the Czech Government must partici-
LO
pate in any future discussions.
Labour made it plain at that time it wanted a peaceful
solution to the problem, but not one at any price. It was
ready to make a stand if an acceptable solution could not be
gained from iitler. lt admitted a settlement without fighting
could be reached at any time simply by giving litler everything
he wanted, but this simply would not do. The latest Czech plan,
it maintained was a fair basis for settlenent. It was "just and
Al
even generous."
a
-\
On September 19 the Cational Council of Labour issued a
40â€GoodgLQcK, Chanberlain!J Lailv Iergld (London):
centemoer 15, 1936, p. 8.
Alâ€oritain's Attitude,†Lailv Jerald (London) oeptemoer
16, l938, p. 10.
224
statement in sun ort of tie Czechs.
The hational Council of Labour earnestly desirous
of maintaining peace, views wi h disuay the reported
proposals of the British and Erench Governments for
the disnehberqent of bzec?oslovaxia under the brutal
threat of arsed force by Iazi Gerhany and without
prior consultation with the Czechoslovahian Govern-
ment.
1t declares that this is a shaheful betrayal of
a peaceful and democratic people and constitutes a
angerous precedent for the future.
The Jational Council of Labour exp esses its
profound sympathy with the Gzecnoslovanian people
in the grievous anxieties through which they are
n‘w passing.
It reaffirus its conviction that enduring peace
can be secured only by the re-establishment of the
rule of law and the ending of the use of lawless
force in international relations. 42
Chamberlain's second trip to see Jitler, September 22-23,
was not welcomed by Labour as the first had been. Ihe Labourites
denounced vehemently the role of he british Government in the
surrenders of the second meeting at Godesberg, and the preceding
1
ressure put on the Czecns to accept iitler's demands. It said
“:3
every decent man and woman in ï¬ritain offered sympathy to the
Czechs and felt ". . .shahe at the part of our Government in
their betrayal. Iever in history has there been so disgraceful
a case of intolerable pressure brought to bear upon a small Bower
by two great Bowers to force her to surrender her integrity to a
M ,42"British Labour Stands by the Czechs,†Laily nerald
(London), Deptehber 2D, 1935, p. l.
225
third." Labour claimed all British influence in Europe was now
,
gone. Chamberlain had stood before the world as a "couragous
ce ender of inte national law until two hours with herr Litler
sent him hurrying home to carry out with indecent haste Qerr
5p #3
aitler's demands." As Chamberlain returned to Germany one
week after his first visit, Labour wondered with bitter sarcasm
whether Zitler would be â€. . .satisfied with so faithful an
execution of his requirements?†fhe Oily thine that was clearly
understood, Labour said at the time of this second trip, was that
in one weeh's time a denocracy had been surrendered by its frien‘
and 3ritish inl luence on world affairs had been dealt an almost
an
fatal blow.
iitler' s de ands at this second meeting proved only fur-
ed. 315 demands were
#5
so impossible that no country could be expected to agree to them.
I...“
ti Sf
m
ther to Labour that he â€as 1:ot to be 8
Labour during the days following this second meeting held a series
of protest rallies calling for no further sacrifices to be imposed
40
on the Czechs. Attlee told one of these rallies that the Ger-
43"Hitier Jins, Lailv n rald (London), Sentenber 22.
1938, p. 8.
44â€Une geek,†bai‘y Jerald (condon), September 23,
n. 10.
A.
1938:
L5Lailv Jerald (London), September 26, 1938. Do 13.
5
héDaily '%;§:ald (London), Deptezzber 27, 1938: p-
TO
N
O\
K I)
V)"
(D
nan demands did not come from national sentiment, but from er
aggression as outlined in Lein â€anof. he said it was still not
strong stand. brita in and rrar ce mus t
0)
too late to avert war by
now stand by their pled as as Russia had done throughout the whole
crisis. Such a stand by thes three powers backed by world
oginion could prevent war. If war cane the blame would clearly
be on Litler, and Attlee did not believe he would take such a
risk. Labour urged a strong stand, nttlee said, not because it
wanted war, but because it knew there could be no peace if
aggression went uh hallenge . Uhile he did not want war, he said
there were some hinfs that could not be surrendered. If war
came Labour and the british must meet it with courage. mr. C.
Duke, leader of the Aunicipal and General Worhers Union, said
at this rally it would be better to fight ". . .now rather than
when we are driven too far along the line of concession, until
we are finally too weak, "ithout morale, and without determina-
A7
tion†to fiqht.
Hitler's denands nade at Godesberg made war lihely with-
in four days, Labour claimed. in that period everything must be
done to prevent the war if it could be prevented with honor and
justice. if war cane it must be faced â€. . .with calmness, with
resolution, with unshahable coura ge.†iitler's demands which
47"Four Eateful Days,†Lailv Lara d (London), Sentember
227
went beyond the question of the Sudetenland simply could not be
accepted. Iitler seened determined to have war, and it was
better that it should be fought while Britain had strong allies
than when Litler had beccne master of Europe through successful
48
aceression.
The third meeting between Eitler and Chamberlain, this i
. . a ' . . 7N -. . v . . ‘-
time Witn.mussolini aid Maladier, at munich was greeted Wlth a E
little more support from Labour than had been the one at
Codesberg a week before. Labour regretted the Czechs and the
‘.‘ ,EL'
Russians had not been invited, but agreed th's might have pre-
vented the meeting. Hevertheless, Labour insisted the Russians
and Czechs must be kept informed of everything that was done
there. Labour's cautious support of this meeting came from the
fact that it looked as though Hitler was backing down from his
October 1 deadline. Labour believed this was caused by world
pressure that had been brought to bear on him during the pre-
#9
ceeding weeh since Codesberg.
U]
Cn the day the munich Agreenent we signed and the war
threat lifted, Labour felt the same great enotion of relief the
rest of Britain and the world felt. However, Labour sai , when
\
o
thohn 3. Lerleian, â€If Ear Comes," Baily ï¬erald (London),
eptember 28, 1938, p. 10.
U)
( 49â€Four Power Conference,†Dailv 3erald (London),
oeptember 29, 1938, P- 80
{HE
228
this initial feeling had passed there would be deep shock at the
L):
sacrifices made for peace. The etails had not yet been released
on September 30, but Labour hoped Chamberlain and Daladier had
their â€strong position. . .backed by Russia
50
and world opinion.â€
:1
taken advantage Cl
Labour thought that the molilization of the British
fleet had finally convinced Iitler at the last moment that Bri-
tain would fight if he invaded Czechoslovakia by force. He was
. 51
also aware the Gernan people did not want such a war.
As the details becam known, Labour admitted the Plan,
although open to grave criticism, was better than the Godesberg
terms laid down by nitler. A number of the more brutal items
had been dropped. it said iitler, â€for the first time has had
to realize that there are forces in the world.more powerful
52
than the absolute Will or a dictator.‘
This reluctant acceptance quichly changed again to out-
right opposition to the Government's action at lunich, and to a
denunciation of the Agreement signed there. The Government's
policy since 1931, Labour charged, had resulted in triumph after
5O"The Four Agree,†Dailv Herald (London), Septenber 30,
.n—
ms
229
triumph for the dictators. That policy had broken the League
and killed collective security. It led bro ught Jritish in-
fluence in world affairs to th e lonest leve_ in two hundred
years. It was directly responsible for the war scare of the
previous week. The only tring that had prevented 1ar from
breaking out was at the last 1.:inute colle active preparedness of
Britain, France, and Russia had halted ;itler. Ur nfortunately
the part of the ï¬ritish Government in that va s only a des 3erate
ex edient, not the basis of a genuine policy, and at th e vary
'0
moment when its first consequence was seen in aitler's agree-
ment to negotiate, it was abandoned. Labour deplored
Chamberlain's attitude towards the Soviets. They were excluded
from the me eting, but were expected to help oppose aggression
if war broke out. It appe ear ed to Labour that Cha::.berlain was
“ 53
deliberately trying to isolate Hussia.
Attlee spoke officially for the Labour Party on October
3, 1938 in I’arliam alt about the Lunich Agreement. he said
Labour felt relief that war had not come, but it did not believe
pe ce had been established. Ee said the situation was merely an
armistice in a state of war. Labour was unable to ". . .go in
for carefree rejoici.g. 3e have felt that we are in the midst of
a traded*." Lunich brought onl humiliation to Britain, it had
.1 L2
53"The Hext Step," L‘a‘lv 3ezald (London), bctober 3,
f"
-n
E "' nit-€311!
230
1
brourdit victory to â€brute force.†The terms had not been nego-
\J"
, he said, they had been laid down as an ultimatum. The
D.-
4.3
be
{‘7
i
d‘
peo_le of the world had witnessed the betrayal of a "civilized
democratic people†to a "ruthless despotism." Denocrscy had
been dealt a terrible blow. {nunich was one of the greatest
diplo natic defeats ever suffered by ï¬ritain and France. It
was on the other hand a trehendous victory for Hitler, Attlee
charged. Fith only a Show of force he was able to achieve a
dominating position in Europe that Germany had been unable to
win after four years of war under the Kaise r. 3e had over-
hrown the balance of power in Europe, Attlee warned. He had
destroyed the last fortess of democracy in eastern Europe and
he had opened the way for food, oil and other resources which
he needed to consolidate hi semilitary power. It was time, he
said, for a worl d- vside peace conference, not just four poner
talks. The United States and Russia must be included. lbussolini
and Eitler could prove their good faith by abandoning aggression
5A
in Spain and supporting such a conference.
(T'
Lunich was the last step in La
T
the t_irties tovards all out resistance to Lazi ag re ssion. By
d)
October 1938 Labour was supporting through necess1‘ty the AEtc-310-
Erench alliance, -rhahent and was willing to fight rather
, 51+".J‘sttlee'S Speech on Lunich,†Daily ï¬erald (London),
October A, 1938, p. 5.
t}. 14“.?
our's movenent throughout
231
than bach down to gitler's unjust demands. Lt still believed
ts earlier prograh of collective security, disarmament, and
H.
H-
n
peace, but it was willing to lay these temporarily aside in the
face of the dictators' determination to achieve their territorial
desires through the use of force.
CLICLULIUE
between the years 1929 and 1938 the British Labour :arty's
foreign policy underwent a reluctant but major change. In 1929
Labour favored and fought for disarmament, universal collective
security through the League of {ations in place of bilateral,
secret alliances, resistance to britisi participation in wars
other than through the League by a general strike, revision of
’v-
‘I
the unjust articles of ersailles in Germany's favor, treatment
of Germany as an equal among nations, and peaceful settlement of
disputes among nations through the iorld Court and international
law. By the end or 1938 Labour had come around to voting for
Dritain's rapidly increasing rearn'rent program and was admitting
that disarmament was impractical for the immediate future. The
Labourites had finally recognized that the League was useless to
stop aggression, through no weakness of its principles but through
lack of cooperation and support of the big powers. They supported
the Anglo-branch alliance even though it did not work through the
League and was of the â€pre—Jorld Ear" variety that Labour had
opposed for so long. by the time of wunich Labour had given up
all hope that cooperation with and appeasement of the Jazis would
maintain peace. In September 1938 Labour preferred to fight
rather than sacrifice the prestige and honor of Britain and the
independence and territorial integrity of Czechoslovahia to the
pressures and threats of force of Qitler.
The sole cause of this change in Labour's foreign policy
A
. ID'V‘“-"l"". u“-
233
was the rise of the 4azis and their and other rescist regimes'
aggressive foreign policy. Labour, although it always firmly
believed the systeh of international relations it supported was
the surest and possibly only way to insure world peace, realized
the governments of the world were not going to follow its system.
/.
Do, reluctaniy and often bitterly, it re
LY)
djusted its program to
meet the real world situation. Lt never gave up hope that the
)
tuation was temporary and wLen the fascist problem had been
'40
C
5.4
’1
settled the nations would learn from their mistahes during this
crisis and return to collective security through the League and
The Spanish Civil ar was the turning point in Labour's
transition. Jefore hitler's ope- support of :rahco, Labour was
not able to tens a firm stand on what should be the british
attitude towards uazi Germany. The british Socialists deplored
what gitler was doing to Germany and the German people, partic-
ularly his treatment of the worners, Socialists, Communists, and
Jews. They strongly disliked Litler's method of conducting
foreign relations and his unilateral denunciation of treaties,
but until his actions in Spain they approved the results of his
actions in international relations if not the neans by which they
were accomplished. Labour was more critical of he :ritish and
French Governnents in these instances for their refusal to
negotiate a fair settlement of these trouble points and thus
forcing Kitler to take the action he did. Iitler before his inter-
] u-w'.
23h
vention in bpain was morning to overthrow those unfair restric-
tions of Versailles that uabour itself had long favored revising.
The only two actions of Hitler before the Spanish involvement
which Labour denounced completely were the abortive Xazi coup
g'etat in Austria in l93h, and the renunciation of the Locarno
Treaty which Germany had freely signed and Litler had pledged
to respect. The Spanish intervention by Germany had nothing to
do with removing treaty iniquities but was outright aggression.
from that point on Labour began to demand that Hitler's aggression
be resisted, but still insisted the door he left open for read-
grievances. Labourites came to
Q1
tifie
(I)
O
justment f Germany's ju
realize much sooner than the british Government that the Iazi
Government was different frog ordinary governments and could
not be bargained with or trusted to honor a promise. Therefore
by the tine of aunich Labour believed little good and possibly
much harm would come from negotiating with Hitler. Rather it
believed that if Sritain, Jrance, and the Soviet Union would
stand together firnly opposing Lazi aggression Hitler would back
down.
Eecause of basic ideolO“ical differences the Lritish
Socialists allowed their prejudices to exaggerate certain aspects
of jazi Germany while underestimating others. abour even as
late as 1938 believed (or desperately hoped) that the German
workers ‘NOUld rise L1}? and. thI‘O'v‘F Off the Iazi tyranny. The
Labourites had long believed their Gernany colleagues to have
235
the strongest labour move ent in Europe. Until January 1933
lists cid not believe the German workers would
(1)
CL)
the British oci
tolerate the esta blis;ment of a fascist dictatorship in German*.
Khen one 1‘?;s estatlished Labour expected during the first year
or so that it would be overt roxn by the workers. as it became
evident t1is was not going to hagpen, Labour modified its pre-
“ction to a rather vajue-far-distwnt but inevitable rising of !
the democratic forces in Gerxany. Tlï¬ is was based more on y
ideological faith than on actual evidence.
Labour tried to iznore or play down the improvenents
tle Iazis made in Ceruar y's eccnogic and social conditions. At
the sage time it exaggerated those economic problexs which the
Iazis “ere unable to solve. Labour stressed ccnstar tly bet .een
3c; the fact that the uazis had done little to raise
\O
1933 and l
the wajes of the German worXer, but at the ::e tine sa id little
about the ra id reduction of unemgloym nt in Germany. It put
much enphasis on the loss of freedOh of the workers ar 0 the
trade unions, but seldom menti ned lazi attempts to provide
in
m
social and cultural advan ages for the w.orking cl 5.
Labour did not until very late realize fully the strength
of the Tazis, and more particularly, Iitler. before 1933 it did
not believe the Jazis JOUlQ be strong enough to cone to power.
After they in fact did, Labour said Litier and his follower
would not be able to hold power, or even that they did not have
Idts trialists
t"
m
cf-
H-
C)
t.)
0."
i"
F.)
(n
c+
U)
9
F"
power but were only the tools of the
236
and the generals. As “itler remained in office month after month,
Labour declared it was through no strength of his own or his party,
but only because he had sold out his socialist program and his
party's left wing to big business and the army and that these
forces allowed him to remain in office as he was still useful to
than. it was not really until Zitlei's purge of the top rant
<3f the army in February 1938 that Labour began to fully under-
l-b
stMind the true strength 0 Litler's hold on Germany. Even then
u.
Itars-our did not give up its belief that sooner or later Litler
wcnnld be overthrown by force.
Labour's political position in Sritain during the
tlrirties made it difficult if not impossible for it to make its
v‘
i position felt or acnreciated by the Government. The only hope
113 had of influencing britain s foreign policy was not through
‘
'—
cirliaxent, where even after the election of 1935 it was badly
Cï¬ltnuhbere‘
, but by going â€over the head†of the Governnent by
allpealing directly to the people. Labour firmly believed through-
Cnit this period that it had the overwhelming support of the
Eiritish people behind it in its approach to international rela-
tiaons. The Peace Ballot of 1935 seemed to confirm this, and in
f‘Eact, Labour charged the ballot convinced the Jational Government
tC) the extent that the Government adopted Labour's foreign policy
(â€I' collective security through the League until after the election
(Dr. 1935 and thus destroyed what Labour believed was its strongest
caIi‘ ' f
APaisn issue. The Government, in tea yes of Labour, quickly
Q
(I)
on col
(3
'51
()1
abandoned tï¬e prefrau be
Leab
office.
237
active security and the
l
.a- V
sue shortly after it was assured of another five years in
a2~ther or not the firn position
in son
Inent was so small
tflze results.
SLlch as Lalton, uevin, and Attlee,
Counpletely over the pacifist leaders
ii: seems this position was genuine and would
head Labour been in power.
- - . q u': M r'
However, Juuginé froh
after 1936 was completely or
a part due to the fact that their influence on the Govern-
bear no resgonsibility for
the attitudes of the leaders
who by 193‘ had won out
sburr and Cripps,
b ..
m
:3
o
1
m
m
L
Lo
L 3
have been pursued
r- .
_-- .2.-- ‘. _ ._ .. ;"‘";'.’
LL .41an -J..".-1 -. . ._‘J...'_: quw‘ibf
The London oailv Lcwald was the main source for tnis
gaper. it was controlled editorially by the T ades Union Council
.3
and was considered the official organ of the iritish Labour ï¬arty.
During the thirties the Lailv ierald had the largest circulation
of any British newsuaper, going over tw million for a time. It
in its presentation of the news,
H
tended to be rather suectacula
but editorially it was reasonable and resoonsible. All of the
inportant Labour leaders used it frequently to present their
views on various issues, but the paper seemed to favor the major-
ity opinion of the oarty in its editorials. In the intra-party
L
1
.d the Devin-Dalton faction
—
(f)
squabble between he pacifi ts a
’—
WhiCh favored stronv COllECtiVG SSCQBitV the oaper sided With
E) w , _
uhe latter group.
‘
Among the memoirs and biographies there are no wortn-
\.
while worhs on Arthur yenderson or George Lansbury which relate
to the subject of this paper. Clement Attlee's autobiography
é§,;t_ï¬gooeged, is very brief and sketchy and of very little
use. Alan bullock's, Egg gig; and Times of Ernest bevin, is a
useful account of bevin's activities in the field of foreign
POlicy and particularly his attitude towards Iazi Ge manYo
iugh Dalton's, Egg Hateful Years, lï¬jlrlggi, is also a very
valuable and detailed account of the behind the scene development
0f the Labour L"’arty's shift in foreign policy. Herbert Lorrison,
éflhégtobiggraohy is concerned primarily with Labour's domestic
rel
ms
239
policy and is of little use in the study of its program for
international relations The Lric Estorich book, Stafford Cri age
taster States: n and nichael foot's Aneurig L v n, give a fairly
good account of the pacifist ni ncri ty's activities within the
Lf the secondary works the best by f r is Carl F. brand's
The British Labour forty, i éhort listorv. brand gives a very
good account of the evolution of Labour's foreign policy during
the thirties. Alaine indrich' s v.orh, british Labour's Foreign
folicy, is a bit too crief and \H.it:1out enou:h detail on some
events. She does not show the vacillation of th pa arty's attitude
on Liany issues, and thus gives tr e impression that Labour very
early adopted a firn, unconpronisin; attitude towards :itler's
Germany.
The Earliamentarv Debates were not used as a source for
this paper, as it was fou und after a preliminary investigation
of the; that all the imnortant debates in lfrliam nt were
accurately an d adequately covered in the Daily Zerald with addi-
tional comments which better reflected the Labour Party's position.
2;; Documents 93 h nggjpg PQJjgy, 1919-1939, were
likewise not used, as the papers to which Labour had access were
those from the period 1929-1931 when there was little serious
concern about the Iazis and as the Nazis were not yet in office,
there was little if any comment on their foreign policy program.
2h0
Also, the papers dealing with the Jazis mere almost all sent by
Sir Horace ï¬umbold, the pritish Ambassador to Germany, who was
not a Labourite, and Arthur lenderson's reaction to these is
not available.
BIBLIOGRAEHY
ARTICLES AJD Ehï¬lCLlCaLS
Daily Herald (London). hay 1929-Tovamber 1938
Dalton, Eugh. "Brit1sh Foreign Folicy, 1929-1931," Political
W. 11 (19311. p. 72. " "“-
Labgu; hgggzige. August 1931-July 1933.
BRITISH LABLTR PARTY EA;?IL415 AX
bevin, Lrnest. 1h arltain I ban at _Q See. London: The Labour
farty -re 5:, l93h.
British Labour Barty. For Socialism an d P , he Labour Party's
Programme g§_AQt;Qg. London-1he Labour Barty :ress, 1934.
. The Case Against the Lational Government. London: The
Labour“ iarty Iress, 1935.
. T Q Years g: Labour Rule. London: The Labour Party
Press, 1931
Ever, U. E. and Hilliams, rrancis. The ï¬gzlgsmugdle. London: The
Labour Party Brass, 1932.
Eehdersoh, Arthur. Labour ang the Crisis. London: The Labour
rarty tress, 1931.
. Labour Outlaws Tar. London: The Labour Party Press, 1933.
'1 Labour's Ebzeign b91191. London: The Labour Barty
i‘ress, 1933.
1 Labour' 3 Peace Policv, Arbitration, Security, Disarmamer t.
London: 1he Labour rarty tress, 193A.
Lansbury, Georg e. The Futility of the lational Govern1:.ent.
London: The Labour farty L'ress, l93h.
National Council of Labour. Labour egg t1 Deflense 9: Peace.
London: 1he uabour larty :ress, 1936.
London: The Labour Party
I"
"National" Government' 5 b19._909ent heccrd. London: The Labour
rerty 1ress, 1935.
38213, 18139, T 1d 9. London: The Labour Party Press, 193L.
Shaw, Jernard. Are jg: e dd 9 Q19:?London= The Labour
ferty tress, L 34.
EEMCIRS, BIOGRAPHIES, AUD SECQHJARY JDRKS
Attlee, Clement R. §§_;§’uaanened. New York: The Viking Press,
1954.
brand, Carl F. The irit1夕 Labgu: Qrty, n Shgrt istorv.
Stanford, Ualifornia: ~tanford University 1ress, 19 é‘h.
bullock, alan. The Lifea nd Times g; Eggest Devin. Vol. I:
Trade Union Leedez, 1&51-19b0. London: neinemenn, 1960
Cole, G. D. H. g 11storv of the Labour 1arty from 1911. London:
Routledge and “egan _rau1 Ltd., 1918.
Dalton, Juan, .tggg1gg, Vol. I: Cellwbagk Y ï¬erda , Vol 11:
The béteggl Iears 1931-1915. London: frederick
“*Uller, Ltd. , 1957.
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