A MECHANIZED CORN PROJECT v
' m COSTA RICA:
A CASE ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

A MECHANIZED CORN PROJECT IN COSTA RICA:
A CASE ANALYSIS

BY

Thomas M. Dickey

In the fall of 1971, the Ministry of Agriculture of
Costa Idea, in coordination with two other governmental
agencies, initiated a small development project for the
introduction of mechanization and modern inputs into the
cultivation of corn by small farmers near the town of
La Fortuna. The development efforts of many countries
involve many projects of this size. Such small projeCts
rarely receive much evaluation or analysis even though they
constitute a large portion of a government's effort when
aggregated. The objective of this study was to present an
evaluation framework for use by development institutions
which have large numbers of small projects and to use the
framework in the evaluation of the La Fortuna project. The
evaluation framework concentrates on the effects of a project
that generally are not listed as project objectives. The
project objectives are usually considered if some evaluation
is made. The Side-Effect Evaluation Framework may be used
either rigorously (in a written form) or loosely (just by

thinking through it; either way, the agency official gains

 

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Thomas M. Dickey

an understanding of the meaning of each side-effect. The

framework involves answering the following questions.

1.

Identify and Describe the side-effect.
Determine the Incidence of the effect.

For each person or group listed in Step 2, estimate
the potential duration of the effect.

For each person or group listed in Step 2, judge
whether it is a bad or a good effect and also judge
how good or how bad it is (a) taken by itself and
(b) taken in conjunction with the other effects of
the project.

Determine what aspects of the project, in conjunction
with the social and economic context of the society,
could have caused the effect.

(For purposes of evaluating the agency planning
ability) Was this effect anticipated or was it a
surprise to the agency?

The primary data sources were the small farmer survey

which was conducted for the MSU-AID research project and

conversations with agency officials in Costa Rica. Secondary

data sources included studies performed by the Costa Rica

Ministry of Agriculture and by the IICA-AID research team.

The evaluation of the La Fortuna Project produced the

following observations:

1.

The project did not achieve the listed objectives
of increases in per manzana yields or in terms of
the area to be planted under the project.

The farmers accepted the recommendations of the
project as was required, but in the case of fertil-
izer and herbicide use they reverted to the original
low levels of usage, once they left the project.

In the case of machinery usage, they reverted from
mechanical planting to hand planting, retaining
mechanized plowing and disking. The latter effect
was probably due to the land clearing Operations of
the project which made mechanization possible.

 

3. No conclu:
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nation Frame

Thomas M. Dickey

3. No conclusions could be drawn considering changes in
labor usage. Although the overall average manzana
labor requirements did show a significant decIine,
the negative correlation between unit labor require-
ments and area planted to corn by farmer produced
a large variance in the individual farmer's average
labor requirements per unit of area.

4. A few special Opportunities for individuals resulted
from the project, although little resentment by
the other farmers was perceived through the interviews.

5. The data suggest that the farmers in the project now
have a significantly lower level of confidence in
the institutions involved in the project. Based
on this result and on the impressions received from
the interviews, a relationship is suggested between
past institutional performance and current levels of
farmer confidence in the institution. The importance
of this relationship results from the role of a
farmer's confidence in an institution in his decision
to adopt the innovations recommended to him by the
institution.

6. Possible factors in the results of the La Fortuna
project are listed, although direct causes can not
be established. These include (a) low operating
standards and poor planning, (b) the project moni-
toring and evaluation systems of the institutions,
(c) the personalities involved, (d) the weather
and (e) the input supply system.

Although the simple documentation of a project's
successes and failures does not answer the questions of how
the failures can be avoided and how the successes can be
enlarged, it hopefully narrows the range of aspects through
which to search. This is the essence of the Side-Effect

Evaluation Framework which is presented.

 

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A MECHANIZED CORN PROJECT IN COSTA RICA:
A CASE ANALYSIS

1.3?”
Thomas M2 Dickey

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

Department of Agricultural Economics

197”

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The research for this thesis was done while the author
was a Research Assistant with the Department of Agricultural
Economics working under a research contract with the U.S.
Agency for International DevelOpment.

While in Costa Rica, Dr. Malcolm McDonald, Francisco
Nadal and the rest of the IICA-AID staff, Mr. Tim O'Hare and
Mr. Lusk Robinson, Peace Corps Volunteers assigned to the
Ministry of Agriculture and Mr. Michael T. Weber, a fellow
graduate student, cheerfully provided assistance for which
the author is grateful.

The members of the author's M.S. committee, Dr. Garland
P. Wood, Major Professor, Dr. Warren Vincent and Dr. William
Herzog provided both guidance and reassurance. Appreciation
is also due Dr. Wood, who as Project Director, provided the
Opportunity to participate in the research project.

The evolution of this thesis was significantly and
unknowingly affected by Dr. A. Alan Schmid who taught two
courses during the time that the thesis was being written.

A special note of appreciation is due the author's
wife, Elizabeth de Leon Dickey. In addition to her patience,
understanding and reinforcement during all phases of the work,

she accompanied the author, occasionally through ankle-deep

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aggreCIate the far

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mud or four hour horseback trips to the houses of the farmers
in Costa Rica. Her presence permitted us to better know and

appreciate the farmers and produced a more relaxed atmosphere

in which to hold the interviews.

iii

Chapter

I.

II.

III.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Introduction to the Research and the
Data Sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Data Sources. . . . . . . . . . . .
The Michigan State University Project
The Ministry of Agriculture Data. . .
The Interamerican Institute of
Agricultural Sciences (IICA) Data . .

Background of the Costa Rica Agricultural
Development Program . . . . . . . . . . .

The La Fortuna Project Plan . . . . . . .

The Goals and Objectives. . . . . . . .
The Project Area. . . . . . . . . . . .

FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . .

The Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Notes on Project Analysis . . . . . . . .

THE GOALS AND THE OBJECTIVES. . . . . . . .

The Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Objectives. . . . . . . . . .
The Relation Between the Goals. and the
Objectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Achievement of the Objectives . . . .

Supplying an Increasing Part of the
National Needs 0 O O O O O O O O O O O I

Estimates of Corn Yield . . . . . . .
Estimates of Area Planted . . . . . .
Increasing the Incomes of Small

Farmers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Continuing Farmer Participation . . .

iv

Page

10

10
11

l7

l7
19

21

21
21

23
25
25

26
27

29
30

 

 

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Chapter

IV.

V.

VI.

VIII.

OTHER PROJECT IMPACTS. . . . . . . . . . .
Evaluation of Side Effects . . . . . . .

Externalities. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Implicit Pricing . . . . . . . . . . .
A Side-Effect Evaluation Framework . .

Technology Adoption and Reversion. . . .

Use of Mechanization in Land

Preparation and Planting . . . . . . .
Fertilizer Use . . . . . . . . . . . .
Herbicide Use. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Labor Use Change . . . . . . . . . . . .
Opportunities for Individuals . . . . .

Selection Policies . . . . . . . . . .
Specific Indirect Opportunities . . .

CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS . . . . . . . .

The PrOblem. 0 O O O O O O O O O O O I O
The Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Responses to the Questions . . . . . .
La Fortuna Participants Versus
Control Group . . . . . . . . . . .
La Fortuna Participants Versus
Cartagena Participants . . . . . . .

Farmer Participation . . . . . . . . .

Additional Insights on Farmer Confidence
A Model of Farmer Confidence . . . . . .

FACTORS IN THE PROJECT RESULTS . . . . . .

Low Operating Standards and/or Poor
Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Project Monitoring and Evaluation Systems.

Personalities. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Input Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
31
31
33
34
36
37
37
43
47

50
56

57
58

60

60
62

62

62
63
64

65
69

75

75
78
79
80
80
82

83

APPENDICES
Appendix A.
Appendix B.
Appendix C.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Training Materials.

The Eleven Modernity Questions.

Conversion Factors.

vi

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LIST OF TABLES

 

Table Page

1. Projected Area and Yields for La Fortuna

Project and Projected National Needs for

corn. 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 26
2. Average Yields Estimated in La Fortuna. . . 27
3. Adjusted Estimates of Area Planted. . . . . 28
4. Estimates of Total Production . . . . . . . 29
5. Changes in Land Preparation and Planting

Technology Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6. La Fortuna Land Preparation Technology

Levels 0 O O O O O O C O O O O O O O O O O I 40
7. Land Preparation Technology Levels of

Non-Participants, La Fortuna. . . . . . . . 42
8. La Fortuna Fertilizer Adoption and Reversion 45
9. Fertilization Levels in La Fortuna

(Quintales per Manzana) . . . . . . . . . . 46
10. La Fortuna Project Herbicide Use. . . . . . 48
11. La Fortuna Herbicide Adoption and Reversion 49
12. Labor Used on Average Manzana of Corn,

La Fortuna and San Jorge de Arenal. . . . . 52
13. Changes in Use of Hired Labor . . . . . . . 55
14. Mean Scores on "Experience" Questions . . . 63
15. Coefficients of Correlation: Total Land

and Experiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
16. Coefficients of Correlation: Years

Farming and Experiences . . . . . . . . . . 66

vii

 

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Table

17.

18.

19.

Page

Coefficients of Correlation: Modernity
and Experiences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Coefficients of Correlation: Conversations
and Experiences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Intercorrelations of Experiences with
Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

viii

 

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Figure

1.

LIST OF FIGURES

Schematic Representation of National

and Regional Coordination Arrangement,
Costa Rica. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Costa Rica. . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . .
Project Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Distribution of Interviews. . . . . . . . .
Suggested Relationship Between Past
Performance of the Institution and Farmer
Confidence in the Institution . . . . . . .
Suggested Relationship Between Past
Performance of the Institution and

Farmer Willingness to Adopt . . . . . . . .

Recorded Rainfall in La Fortuna and
Ciudad Quesada, October 1971 to March, 1972

Recorded High and Low Rainfall by Month in
Ciudad Quesada, 1961-1972 . . . . . . . . .

ix

Page

l3
14

15

72

74

81

81

 

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Introduction to the Research and

the Data Sources

In the fall of 1971, the Ministry of Agriculture of
Costa Rica, in coordination with two other agencies, initiated
a project for the introduction of mechanization and modern
inputs into the cultivation of corn by small farmers near
the town of La Fortuna. It was a small project in economic
development--only 48 farmers participated. The analysis
presented here is based primarily on field research performed
by this author for the Michigan State University, Department
of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Management Research
and Training Project which was performed under contract with
the U.S. Agency for International Development (U.S.A.I.D.).

This paper sets forth a framework for the analysis or
evaluation of small agricultural development projects--the
size of project that is the mainstay of efforts to develop
the small farm sector. Although some aspects of the project
are explored in greater detail and some theoretical consid-
erations are included, the major portion of this evaluation
can serve as an example of the type of evaluation that
development planners and administrators can and should, but
are generally not, performing. In general, it attempts to

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show what may be done with limited sources of information
(or limited time to investigate a project). The M.S.U.
field research questionnaire was not designed with this
evaluation as its major objective. However, these data and
data from other sources do provide a basis for an evaluation
of the project that goes beyond the type of evaluation that
one would expect to find done by the agencies involved.

Much of the literature concerning economic development
deals with questions of investment decisions, means of
financing development, problems of national economic planning
and problems in the administration of development. Most of
the literature deals with these problems on the national or
international level, although a project as small as the
La Fortuna project receives an occasional reference. Although
agricultural development efforts by a country must be con-
sidered first on such a national level, the programs and
projects, at least those aimed at the small farmers, must
be disaggregated and evaluated, both ex-ante and ex-post,
on a project level if the successful execution of the projects
is to be expected. The centrally located tOp officials of
government agencies and Agricultural Program Officers of
foreign development agencies do not currently, in the opinion
of this author, perform or receive the type of project
analysis needed for the intelligent administration of
agricultural development. The effective development of small

farm agriculture (which implies a concern for distribution

 

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of wealth in addition to overall national development)
requires a deeper understanding of the complex economic and
social problems involved. Sociologists have provided
insights into the culture of small farm agriculture, but
unless these aspects are integrated into analyses of specific
projects, these high level officials cannot be expected to
gain that deeper understanding. In addition to these cultural
aspects, the Officials need to have a realistic understanding
of the Operating procedures and capacities of the change
agencies and how these procedures interact with the social
and economic aspects of planned or directed social and
economic change. It is with this perception of current
agricultural development efforts in mind that this-case

analysis is presented.

The Data Sources

The Michigan State University Project

The purpose of the Agricultural Management Research
and Training Project was to formulate a methodology to
determine where and what kind of ”bottlenecks" are occurring
in the management and administration of public institutions
serving the agricultural sectors of the Less Developed
Countries (LDC's) and then to suggest ways by which these
bottlenecks might be overcome. The research was carried out
by a multi-disciplinary team and the institutions were
studied through several different approaches. One of these

approaches was the Small Farm Survey which was designed to

evaluate the impact that the institutions were having and to
measure the knowledgeability of the farmers about the
projects, the participation they had in the planning of the
projects and the communication flows between the farmers

and the institutions. The information gained through these
surveys was then compared with the information produced by
the other approaches. In this manner, the Operations of the
institutions could be traced from the top levels to the
field agent level.

The two projects studied, were selected upon the
recommendation of agency officials and were the La Fortuna
Project and a corn and rice project in the Cartagena area
of the Nicoya peninsula. This author personally administered
the interviews during the period September to November, 1972.
In La Fortuna, 25 participants and 10 nonparticipants were
interviewed, while in Cartagena 35 participants and 10

nonparticipants were interviewed.

The Ministry of Agriculture Data

 

The Department of Agricultural Economics and Statistics
of the Directorate of Planning and Coordination of the
Ministry has performed a series of production costs and
returns studies which will be referred to as the "MAGPIE"

studies.1 These studies obtain data from farmers and

 

1MAGPIE stands for "Ministerio de Agricultura, Programa
de Investigaciones Economicas," a computer program written
by U.S. Peace Corps Volunteers serving in the Ministry.

 

classify the dat
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classify the data according to type of expense (materials,
works or other; with works further classified as being human
labor, animal power or mechanized power) and the disposition
of the yields (prices, product destination, e.g., sale, home
consumption, seed or animal feed). The La Fortuna MAGPIE
study included 28 of the 48 farmers that participated in the
project, although these were not selected in a random fashion.
The data gathered are fed into a computer program that
computes averages and totals and performs some two-variable
regressions. The mimeograph reports basically present the
data averages with only little additional analysis included.

A similar study was done on a nonmechanized corn project
in San Jorge de Arenal, also located in the San Carlos
region. Data from this study are compared with the La Fortuna
data in Chapter IV, ”LaboruUse Changes."
The Interamerican Institute of Agricultural Sciences (IICA)
921:3 '

A study similar to the M.S.U. research was being done by
IICA to measure the quantity and quality of services received
by the farmers. This study was a component of IICA's larger
research which attempts to "study the conditions under which
it is possible to improve the management of the agricultural

. . . . . 2
programs 1n order to optimize resources and objectives."

 

2Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agricolas de la
O.E.A., "Programa de Gestidn, IICArAID, Proyecto III," Fase
I, mimeo, 1972, San José, Costa Rica, p. l.

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IICA interviewed a broader range of small farmers throughout
the country, and among these were 13 small farmers from the
La Fortuna area. Since these names were selected randomly
from a list provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, they
were, in all probability, all participants in the La Fortuna
Project. Although the IICA data are similar to the M.S.U.
data in a few respects, they provide more information on
farmers' perceptions concerning reception of services and
their uses of the services.
Background of the Cost Rica
Agricultural Development Program
In August of 1970, the U.S. Agency for International
DevelOpment (AID) signed a loan agreement with the Government
of Costa Rica for $20,000,000 to help finance a four-year
Agricultural Development Program (ADP). The Government of
Costa Rica committed itself to provide an additional $16,885,000
for a total program of $36,885,000. The program consists of
seven individual projects, which were considered to be
sufficiently interrelated to be termed a sector program,
although it was noted that the program does not constitute
a "complete" sector program. The seven projects were:
1) Agricultural Services, 2) Agricultural Education, 3)
Credit, 4) COOperatives, 5) Marketing, 6) Land Tenure, and
7) Community Organization and Municipal DevelOpment.
As a condition precedent to the disbursement of the loan,

the Government of Costa Rica was required to establish a

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National Coordinating Council and provide it with the necessary
authority, resources and administrative branch (Secretariat)
for it to perform the coordinating role assigned to it. To
this end, the Consejo Agropecuario Nacional (C.A.N.) (National
Agricultural Council) was established in September of 1970.
C.A.N. is composed of representatives of the private and
public sectors and is presided over by the Minister of
Agriculture. (See Figure 1) In March of 1971, the C.A.N.
authorized the creation of Regional Agricultural Committees
(CANcitos). Each committee is composed of regional delegates
from the agricultural institutions and some of the farmers
from the region. Supportive services for the CANcitos are
provided by the Regional Center of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture. The C.A.N. and the CANcitos are to make policy,
approve and assign priorities to individual projects and
leave the details up to the implementing institutions and
the Project Coordinator.

The working form of this arrangement for coordination
is based on individual projects. For each project in a zone,
as established by the CANcito, a Project Coordinator is
named and this person is to facilitate the coordination of
the implementing institutions in the project.

The actual operation of this arrangement at the regional
level has been greatly influenced by the structure of the
institutions involved. Of the major institutions, only the

Ministry of Agriculture (MAG) is structured with a regional

 

 

 

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level. The Consejo National de Produccion (CNP) (a semi-
autonomous marketing agency with various additional functions)
has only national and local offices. The four nationalized
banks have similar structures, with the branch offices
reporting directly to the national office. Although the CNP
and the banks generally have local offices in the same towns
as the regional offices of MAG, they often have additional
offices within the same region. Thus, the local officials
in the town of the regional office of MAG often become the
representatives of these institutions on the CANcitos even
though the sphere of interest and influence of these offices
do not coincide with the other offices that may exist in
the same region. For example, if the office of a bank in
the town of the regional office indicates support for a
given project, and the bank office in the town of the project
refuses to participate, the project may be doomed to failure.
Since it is the MAG Regional Office that formulates
project proposals and not generally the CNP or the banks,
the CANcitos become essentially a formalized meeting in
which to present the project proposals to the other institu-
tions and to gain a promise of cooperation and assistance.
Since the CNP and the banks have limited authority at the
regional level, they are not necessarily capable of providing
the requested cooperation even though their representative
may be in favor of the project and may have given his approval

to the project in the CANcito meeting.

 

 

The La F0
3::jects that
idea for t

Cffme of the
33:1: . FAG
:;1e:entation
312:0 Anglocos
tare a branch .
:ffice to be s

q
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The descr;
section is take
Center for San

ire, entitled

:L1Carlos, Sec

10

The La Fortuna Mechanized Corn Project is one of the
projects that came about through this system of coordination.
The idea for the project apparently came from the Regional
Office of the MAG and was, also apparently, approved by the
CANcito. MAG and CNP were responsible for the project
implementation and the financing was arranged through the
Banco Anglocostarricense (BAC) even though the BAC did not
have a branch office in the region. The BAC Opened an
office to be staffed by agronomists to receive applications
and payments, but the loans were funneled through the branch

office in Alajuela (ninety minute drive by car).
The La Fortuna Project Plan

The description of the project plan contained in this
section is taken from the document produced by the Regional
Center for San Carlos-Sarapiqui of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture, entitled "Corn Mechanization Project in La Fortuna,

3

San Carlos, Second Half of 1971," hereinafter referred to as

the Project Plan Document.

The Goals and Objectives
The general goals of the project are:
1. Increase the production of corn with a view of

contributing toward the fulfillment of the national

 

3Ministry of Agriculture, Proyecto do Mecanizacion de
Maiz en La Fortuna, San Carlos,#Segundo Semestre de 1971.
(Mimeo) September 22, 1971.

 

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11

demand, and

2. elevate the incomes of the small farmer and thus the

level of living of his family.

These goals are quantified by the following objectives:

nine

1. Cultivate an area of 600 manzanas (1,044 acres) for
the second crop of 1971 with a total production of

36,000 quintales (36,000 cwt.) (An average of 60

 

qq./mz. or 61.58 bushels per acre.)

2. Increase the yields from 20 qq./mz. to 60 qq./mz.
(24.63 bu/acre to 61.58 bu/acre.)

3. Involve 69 small farmers whose average (total) farm

size is 20 to 30 manzanas (34.8 to 52.2 acres).

 

4. Establish an organization of farmers in the area.
5. Introduce mechanization into the area, possibly

even mechanized harvesting.
The document stated that
". . .the success of the project will be based on
(the two conditions of) the receptivity of the
farmer to the technological changes in the crop
and the services that the institutions involved
should provide in a coordinated and opportune
manner."4

The Project Area

The project was carried out in an area approximately

kilometers square in which are located the settlements

 

4MAG, op. cit., p. iv.

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12

of Los Angeles, San Jorge, El Tanque, San Isidro and San
Josecito. (See Figures 2,3, and 4) the all-weather road
from Ciudad Quesada to La Fortuna passes through Los Angeles
and El Tanque and extremely poor roads go from Los Angeles
into San Isidro and from El Tanque into San Jorge and San
Josecito. Bus transportation from Ciudad Quesada to La
Fortuna does not leave the all-weather road so that persons
living in from the road must either walk, ride a horse or
hitch a ride with an occasional truck or tractor. For those
living in San Josecito, that means 8 kilometers (5 miles).
The trip from San Jose to Ciudad Quesada requires two hours
by private car (slightly longer by express bus) and from
Ciudad Quesada to El Tanque requires another two hours by
jeep. From El Tanque to San Josecito requires 45 minutes by
jeep. Electricity is not available in the project area
except for the few individuals that have gasoline-powered
generators. Mail and telegraph service is available at

Los Angeles (also serves San Isidro), El Tanque (also serves
San Jorge) and Boca de Arenal (serves San Josecito and is
about 7 kilometers away).

The project area is at an altitude of 75 to 100 meters
(246-328 feet) above sea level (not at 300 meters as the
project plan document states). The land is reported to be
firm and without stones and is relatively flat except for
gullies of varying size, thus making feasible the use of

machinery. Rainfall occurs throughout the year, diminishing

13

 

 

NICARAGUA
N

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[:3 Project Area
oCiudad Quesada

La Fortuna

"o
. - San Jose

 

Figure 2. Costa Rica

 

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16

during the months of February through April. Precipitation
has been estimated at 3,000 to 3,500 mm. per year (118" to
137" per year) with 212 days of rain. The average temperature
is 26°C (78.8°F). The soils are aluvial with a loam texture,
deep, dark brown in color, and with a pH of 6.2 to 6.6. The
subsoil is very permeable with excellent drainage.

The population of the project area was reported to be
composed of small farms ranging from 10 to 50 manzanas (17-87
acres), generally raising cattle, corn and other crops such
as plantains, bananas and yucca. The existence of large
cattle ranches and banana operations was not mentioned in
the project plan document. The current cultivation methods
for corn were described as being "antiquated" but adapted to
the conditions of uncleared lands. Fertilizers, herbicides
and insecticides are not generally used. These factors, as
suggested by the document, result in yields of 20 QQ/mz (20.53
bu/acre). Trials performed by the Regional Office technicians
have shown that one local nonhybrid variety is superior

when used with applications of nitrogen and phosphorus.

CHAPTER II
FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

The Questions

 

An ex—post project analysis should determine the extent
to which the project achieved the objectives for which it
was executed. In addition to answering that basic question,
the analysis should also attempt to determine what else the
project did and how it all happened. Before restating these
questions, certain terms require definition so as to avoid
confusion.

A goal is a desired state of affairs described by words

and it represents a subjective value. An objective represents

 

a measurable condition that can be considered as progress
towards the achievement of the stated goals. An objective

must be expressed in terms of a quantifiable target measure

 

and may also be expressed with words. More than one objective
may be required to adequately describe progress towards a
goal. The outputs of the project are the changes in the
target measures that are due to the execution of the project
and the changes in the social, physical and economic condi-
tions due to the execution of the project. The inputs to the
project are those activities or physical objects which,
through interaction with the "task environment" (other
conditions of the state of affairs), influence the outputs

of the project.
17

 

Depending o
’_:rcject) under
are consequently
3:: example, the
are inputs into
3.51] outputs of

The questio
restated in a rto

1- Are the

. The first U
J. Chapter III

II
3‘56:
39Ct
I IT

18

Depending on the definition or delineation of the system
(project) under consideration, physical objects and activities
are consequently defined as being either inputs or outputs.
For example, the activities of the local extension agents
are inputs into the project "system" but they are simultane-
ously outputs of the Extension Service "system."

The questions to be answered in an analysis may now be
restated in a more specific form:

1. Are the stated goals appropriately represented in

the form of quantifiable objectives?

2. Do the selected target measures properly correspond
to the intent of the statement of objectives?

3. Did the project result in the achievement of the
objectives, as quantified by the target measures?

4. What other changes in the state of affairs and the
task environment resulted from the execution of the
project?

5. Did the variables considered as inputs: a) include
all those that did influence the result and b) exclude
those that had no influence on the results (even
though they may be correlated with the results)?

6. How did the interaction among the input variables
and the task environment produce the outputs?

The first three of these questions will be considered

in Chapter III, "The Goals and the Objectives." Chapter IV,

"Other Project Impacts" reports some of the other changes

 

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19

that occurred in the state of affairs and the task environment
(question 4). Questions 5 and 6 are difficult to consider
completely, especially with limited information, but an

attempt is made in Chapter V, "Factors in the Project Results."

Notes on Project Analysis

 

The manner in which an analysis is organized and written
has an important effect on the way the readers of the analysis
are likely to interpret it. First, an analysis that does not
ask all of the relevant questions, as suggested above, is
directly misleading. If the reader is not asked to evaluate
seriously the relationship between objectives and goals or
to verify that the target measures are valid measures of the
objectives, a project that results in achievement of the
desired target measures may be continued or even expanded in
spite of the fact that it had little or no effect on the goals
themselves. Secondly, an analysis that does explicitly
evaluate all of the pertinent questions, but emphasizes
some and considers the others in one small paragraph may
mislead an unsuspecting or uncautious reader. A similar result
occurs when some of the pertinent questions are lightly
touched upon in the body of the report, but are not mentioned
in the summary (especially when it is known that many decision
makers will read only the summary). It is in this spirit
of being explicit that the present analysis is written.

Some of the questions cannot be answered with the data

presently available. Detailed agronomic studies would be

20

required to show conclusively that the recommended fertilizers
and insecticides would have produced the projected corn yields
under the conditions of the project area. Properly operated
control plots could have indicated what the effect of the
drought had on the corn yields. It may have been impossible
to measure the effect on yields of the delays in planting
caused by the delays in tree clearance and plowing operations.
These shortcomings in data will be pointed out in the rest

of the paper.

In spite of the missing data, it does seem worth the
effort to utilize the data and other information that is
available for three reasons. First, if complete information
were to be required for all analyses, there would be few
analyses ever completed. Secondly, an evaluation of the
La Fortuna project is unlikely to be carried out otherwise.
Thirdly, it provides an Opportunity to raise and illustrate
additional aspects of a project of this type which the
develOpment planners and project implementers may not have
considered in the past nor are likely to consider in the
future. These last two reasons are poignantly illustrated
by the normal operating procedures of the Regional Center
in Ciudad Quesada. A new project arises periodically, gets
added to the hopper of ongoing projects, and the old projects
quietly fall to the side and get forgotten. Projects seem to
have a short life and like "old soldiers", they fade away--a

death would require a burial (evaluation).

CHAPTER III

THE GOALS AND THE OBJECTIVES

The Goals

 

The goals given in the project document were:

1. supplying, in part, the national needs for corn, and

2. increasing the farmers' incomes, and thus their

levels of living.

Although it was not explicitly stated in the project document,
the tone of the document and the information on the distribu-
tion of areas planted to corn in Costa Rica implied that the
first goal was really that of increasing the part of national
needs that the San Carlos region provides. The second goal,
if restated in accordance with the terminology noted in the
Framework of Analysis, would be: "increasing the farmers'
levels of living." The reference to increasing farmers'
incomes is more properly an objective. Since goals are
statements of values held, they cannot be "wrong." The
analyst can only accept them. Individuals can, however,
state their beliefs as to their appropriateness or state

that, in their opinion, the goals should have been different.

The Objectives

 

The objectives and target measures of this project were
stated in a manner that could better be described as being

21

 

 

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22

projections. The implicit objective was the (increased)
production of corn and its disposition; to be achieved
through increased mechanization, extension and improved
marketing facilities. The statement of the objectives

implied that 600 manzanas would, in fact, be planted and

 

that 36,000 quintales would, in fact, be harvested under

 

the project. By stating the objectives in this manner,

the Ministry of Agriculture runs the risk of fooling itself
and the country as a whole. The fact that little formal

or serious analysis or evaluation occurs is the reason

that they are able to do it, but the danger is that the
government may be led to continue to spend its resources
and perhaps even borrowed resources for projects of little
value. This might seem to be a question of little impor-
tance, but had the objectives been stated as objectives and
not as projections, at least the question of evaluation of
results would be asked by more persons.

Perhaps a more subtle reason for more explicitly
dealing in objectives instead of projections is the effect
that it would have on the personnel of the institutions
involved. If the individuals involved see the numbers
as targets they might be more likely to strive to achieve
them. For example, each agent is expected to make a certain
number of farm visits each week or month. He normally
sees this number as a target and realizes that an explicit

comparison of his efforts is likely to be made against such

 

 

 

a target :1
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23

a target number. However, if the number of manzanas to be

 

planted in the project is not considered as a target, he
will realize that an explicit comparison of his results
with the projected number is less likely to be made.

The objectives (projections) for 1971, as stated in the
project document were:

1. The cultivation of 600 manzanas of corn.

 

2. The increase of corn yields from 24 quintales to 60

 

quintales per manzana.

 

3. (By combining the first two) The production of 1.83
percent of the estimated corn needs of the country.5

4. Increase the incomes of the small farmers (implied).

5. Involve 69 small farmers.

6. Establish an organization of small farmers in the zone.

7. Introduce mechanization into the zone.

The Relation Between the Goals
and the Objective

 

 

The third objective does represent the goal of increas-
ing the part of the national needs for corn that is supplied
by the San Carlos region.

The goal of increasing the farmers' levels of living
through the achievement of the objectives is likely as long

as several conditions hold. If 600 manzanas are brought

 

into cultivation of corn that were either previously unused

 

5Project plan document cited Econometrica, Ltda.,
'Granos Basicos en Centioameuca/‘San Jose, c.r., 1970, (mimeo)
as the source of the estimated national need of 1,962,240
quintales.

 

 

 

 

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24

or taken out of a use that produced less net income than would
be obtained in corn (whether the yields increased or not),
then the farmers' incomes would be increased. If increasing
the yields, whether on land previously used or not, resulted
in an increase of receipts greater than an increase in costs,
then the farmers' incomes would be increased. If the
establishment of a farmers organization in the area assists
the farmers in learning the proper utilization of the package
of new technology, losses due to the misuse of the new
technologies may be prevented. And, if the introduction of
mechanization increases productivity and thus receipts to a
greater extent than it increases costs (if at all), then
farmers incomes would be increased. If, as may well be the
case, the introduction of mechanization results in fewer
opportunities for hired laborers, then these laborers may not
be able, at Some point in time, to begin or to expand a
farming operation of their own. This effect is a matter
which concerns the distribution of benefits as between small
farmers and is not necessarily in conflict with the goals.
However, if a decrease in the supply of labor were to be a
later consequence, then the larger farmers may be induced
into increasing their use of mechanization, thus diminishing
even further the opportunities for hired labor. In this case,
the question of distribution of project benefits is between

small farmers and the larger farmers and is in conflict with

 

 

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25

the second goal; although a determination of the effect of
the project itself would probably show only a slight effect.
The objective of involving 69 small farmers is by
definition congruent with the goals of the project, as long
as the other conditions hold and as long as no larger
farmers are included in the project. If some larger farmers
are served by the project, the goal of increasing the incomes
of the small farmers may be achieved to a lesser extent--to
the extent that the serving of larger farmers decreases the
number of small farmers that can be served and/or the

effectiveness of service to the small farmers.
The Achievement of the Objectives

Supplying an Increasing Part of the National Needs
The project plan document accepted the projections of

national needs of corn made by Econometrica, Ltda.,6 as shown

 

in Table 1, along with the projections of area and yield for
the project.

It should be noted that the data that follow refer to
corn produced under the auspices of the project and do not
indicate that this production, or any increase thereof, is

due to the project.

 

6Econometrica, Ltda., Granos Basicos en Centroamerica
(San José, Costa Rica; mimeo, 1970). p. 140.

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26

Table 1. Projected Area and Yields for La Fortuna Project
and Projected National Needs for Corn.

 

 

 

 

 

Year Area Yields Project Projected Project
Under Per Total National As Percent
Project Mz.a Production Needs of Needs
--Mzs-—- -------- Quintales ----------------- % -----

1971 600 660 36,000 1,962,240 1.83

1972 1,000 60 60,000 2,047,360 2.93

1973 1,600 80 128,000 2,136,960 5.99

 

 

 

 

 

 

aNo explanation is given for projecting 1,000 mzs in 1972 and
1,600 mzs at 80 qq/mz in 1973. No indication is given as to
whether or not these figures include two crops per year.
Since the project was to begin with the second crop of 1971,
the 1971 figures can only be for one crop in that year.

Estimates of Corn Yields

 

For both the MSU and the MAGPIE studies, averages can
be computed by two methods. Method 1 computes the average

yield for the total number of manzanas:

Total Production Reported

Method 1: Total Manzanas Reported

 

Method 2 computes the average of reported farm yields:

Method 2: Sum of Farm Production
Farm Mzs in Corn

Number of Farms

 

The IICA study does not indicate the method used for computing
average yields and thus it will be assumed that they computed
the yield of the average farmer (Method 2) since their use

of the data is for making comparisons between farmers by

location. The estimates of average yield by method and by

27

source of data are given in Table 2. Since the estimation
of total production under the project is the current objec-
tive, the sample average yield (Method 1) will be utilized

here.

Table 2. Average Yields Estimated in La Fortuna

 

 

 

Study Method 1 Method 2
Sample Average Yield of a
Yield Average Farmer
MSU 17.25 qq./mz. 20.68 qq./mz.
MAGPIE 16.84 qq./mz. 21.35 qq./mz.
IICA No Data 23.3 qq./mz.

 

 

 

aThe fact that Method 2 results in higher

average yields is due to the fact that, in

general, the larger size of the corn plot,

the smaller the yield per manzana, in the

case of this project.
Estimates of Area Planted

The Regional Center in Ciudad Quesada provided to this

author a list of project participants and the number of
manzanas that each participant was cultivating under the
project. That list contains 48 names with a total of 381.5
manzanas. However, by comparing the areas reported by each
farmer to the MSU and the MAGPIE studies with the area that
the MAG list indicated for that farmer, the 381.5 mz. total
can be adjusted downward. This variation may be due to the

farmers' decision to plant an amount that is different from

the amount he signed up to plant or to the abandonment of

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28

areas in which the corn did not develop properly. By taking
the high estimate of 381.5 mzs. and the low estimate of

350.2 mzs. along with the high estimate of 17.25 quintales

 

per manzana and the low estimate of 16.84 quintales per

 

manzana, a range of figures for total production is estimated.
The highest estimate of total production is 6,581 quintales
and is equivalent to 0.336 percent of the projected national

need and the lowest estimate of 5,897 quintales is 0.301

 

percent of the projected national need. Based on these
estimates, it can now be stated that the project did not
meet its stated objective (projection) of 1.83 percent of

7

national needs for 1971. Neither the objective of 600

manzanas nor the objective of raising yields to 60 quintales

 

per manzana were achieved.

Table 3. Adjusted Estimates of Area Planted

 

 

sury' bk» of qunted Anamslishai Repmdrfl. Adyrned
Fammms infinwey forfbnnns aslkmoan: IamfimBUeci
.nISunmgs ofIisuai fkfiallhea

 

MAGPIE 28 212.5 mzs. 218.0 mzs. 97.5 372.0 mzs.
IVBU 20 201.0 mzs. 219.0 mzs. 91.8 350.2 mzs.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

7Table l is incorrect since the corn produced under the
project in the last half of 1971 would not be harvested until
early 1972, and therefore could not have been available to
meet 1971 needs. Since the basis on which the La Fortuna
projections were made is not known, this error is just
noted and not corrected. However, a correction of the project
plan document would only make the project appear in a worse
light.

 

 

4.

..
..u.\-

##-
,-

I):

7':

331;:ates

 

 

'"n
.‘a

;::;:atio:
:eer. withc
areas plan
C;E:ations

::v—-- . .
“sit: " l C

3n. .

», a a
\: a‘r‘oed ‘
U‘ ‘L ‘

\.Q I.
I. \
3:5. 01

29

Table 4. Estimates of Total Production

 

 

 

 

Yield Area Estimates
Estimates High (381.5 mzs.) Low (350.2 mzs.)
High (17.25) 6,581 qq. 6,041 qq.
Low (16.84) 6,424 qq. 5,897 qq.

 

 

 

The data available were insufficient to give any
indication of what the areas planted or the yields would have
been without the project. One might suspect, however, that
areas planted to corn may have increased slightly due to the
operations in clearing land of trees and stumps, but it
is also quite possible that these newly cleared lands might
now be planted to some other crop that would yield the

farmer higher incomes.

Increasingythe Incomes of Small Farmers

The data available are insufficient to give any
conclusive proof that farmers' incomes were increased or
decreased as a result of the project. However, the data
do suggest that the farmers' incomes may well have been
diminished by the project, at least in the short run. The
MAGPIE study of 28 of the 48 participants, although not a
random sample, indicated that each manzana, on the average,
produced a loss of ¢ 320.01 ($37.21) on a cash plus noncash

8

basis. Of that amount, cash losses were ¢185.75 ($21.60)

 

8Noncash items include family labor, imputed rent, corn
retained for farm or family use, etc. Cash items include all
of the "out of pocket" costs and the corn sold to a second
party.

30

and noncash losses per manzana were C 134.26 ($15.61). On
a per participant basis, total cash plus noncash losses
averaged ¢ 2,428.64 ($282.40). Average cash losses per
farmer were ¢ 1,409.69 ($163.92) and average noncash losses
per farmer were ¢ 1,018.95 ($118.95).

Only three of the 28 farmers reported a profit on a
cash plus noncash basis, while only 12 of the 28 reported

a profit on a cash-only basis.

Continuing Farmer Participation

 

Although a lack of continuing farmer participation in
the organized project is not a completely reliable measure
because the farmers may continue to cultivate increased
areas of corn or use improved methods in their cultivation,
the lack of continuing farmer participation would indicate
a dissatisfaction with the results of using the improved
methods under the auspices of the project. For La Fortuna
the evidence is fairly clear. Of the 48 farmers in the
first crop season of the project, only 11 participated in
the second season‘s project, no additional farmers entered
the project at this time, and a Ministry employee reported
that these 11 had indicated their intentions of not

continuing in the project.

CHAPTER IV

OTHER PROJECT IMPACTS

Evaluation of Side Effects

 

The previous chapter considered the extent to which the
objectives of the project were or were not achieved. Such
an evaluation is incomplete by itself. By their very nature,
economic and social development projects have "side-effects"
or "impacts" which do not get listed among the objectives.
The fact that complex interrelationships exist within a
society means that a process of adjustment occurs when some
aspect or aspects of society undergo a change. Arensberg
and Niehoff state that,

”Every cultural system is a functional whole. . .

Customs are interwoven so that an economic or

technical practice is related to religious beliefs,

social structure, and general values of the

functioning system. A change may disrupt a

related practice and if the disruption is enough,

it. . .the change. . .might be rejected."9
The people promoting specific changes are too often blinded

by narrow preoccupation with the tasks at hand to be aware

of these related effects and of their importance. It is

 

9Arensberg, Conrad M. and Arthur H. Niehoff, Introduc-
ing Social Change, 2nd Edition, (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton)
1971, p. 134.

 

 

31

32

logical that the better is one's ability to predict all of
the impacts of a change, the better will be one's ability to
guide the societal state of affairs toward one's goal; the
fewer will be the wrong turns due to unexpected interactions.
The potential importance of such "side-effects" or inter-
actions should not be underestimated; they can affect both
current and future efforts of planned change.

Economists have written large amounts of literature
about project side—effects or impacts, especially as they
relate to decisions concerning public programs and projects.
Much of this literature is on Benefit-Cost Analysis and
deals with the problems of measuring these side-effects
once they have been identified. The concepts of consumers'
surplus and producers' surplus are prominent among the
methods of measurement.10 However, when it comes to small
development projects, attempts at measuring the side-effects
will be of questionable value and accuracy. Also, the
application of the measuring techniques will generally be

beyond the abilities of the field level or regional officials

 

10See, for example, McKean, Roland M., Efficiency in
Government Through Systems Analysis, (New York: John Wiley
and Sons) 1958, Mishan, E. J., Cost-Benefit Analysis: An
Introduction, (New York: Praeger) 1971, and also by Mishan,
EEonomics for Social Decisions: Elements of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, (New York: Praeger) 1973, and Bromley, Daniel W.,
A. Alan Schmid and William B. Lord, Public Water Resource
Project Planning and Evaluation: Impacts, Incidence and
Institutions, (Madision, Wis.: Center for Resource Policy
Studies and Programs, School of Natural Resources, College
of Agriculture and Life Sciences, the University of Wisconsin)
1971.

 

 

 

 

 

33

and would require inordinate amounts of the officials' time
given the relative size and number of the small projects.
Although the use of the measurement concepts is not recom-
mended, the program administrators could improve their
planning, implementation and evaluative tasks through the
understanding of the concepts of externalities and implicit

pricing.

Externalities

In a broad sense, any project effect may be seen as a
product or good--including changes in societal relationships
and economic or social practices. Although not normally
traded, such changes in cultural practices may be considered
by some as an imposed "cost" and by others as a "benefit."
If an effect occurs for which compensation by a market
process (whether monetary or otherwise) is not made, it is
termed an "externality." An effect is not an externality
if it is completely internal to the decision-making unit
(firm or individual). If an effect is not internal but
compensation is made with the other decision-making units,
the effect is said to have been "internalized." The
classification of an effect as being an externality or not
is thus clearly dependent upon the division that exists among
the decision-making units. In the case of the La Fortuna
project, most of the effects would be externalities since
the MAG, CNP, BAC and each farmer are individual decision-

making units and since few effects were traded in a market

34

process. As Schmid points out, the classification of an
effect as an externality does not describe the character of
the effect, rather it describes the existence of a market for

that effect in which trading could occur.11

Implicit Pricing

The underlying concern is to in some way be able to take
into account in the decision-making process the many and
varied effects that an action or a project produces. The
"internalized" effects are by definition already accounted
for through internal or market processes. It is the external
effects which provide the difficulties. Although the cul-
tural side-effects and many of the economic side-effects
of development projects are neither traded nor given prices
in a market process, relative prices of the various side-
effects are implicitly established by the decision to carry
out the project in a certain way. The choice of a project
or the choice among alternative methods of implementation is
based, at least in part, on the expected effects of each
alternative and the trade-offs that must therefore be made.
The choice itself therefore established some set of implicit
prices that satisfies the values on which the choice was made.

These are not money prices. Rather they are in terms of the

 

11Schmid, A. Alan, "Non-Market Values and Efficiency
of Public Investments in Water Resources," American Economic
Review, May 1967, p. 162.

35

other project effects or products that constituted the
alternatives. Although the determination of these prices in
terms of a monetary unit is not being suggested here, it is
important that this concept be understood by the development
administrators.

A major concern of this thesis is improving the decision—
making processes of the development agencies through an
improved ability of the decision~making units to, first, be
aware of the many effects or products of their decisions,
and second, to be more consistent in their establishment of
implicit prices of these "goods" from project to project.
Improved consistency of pricing does not have any intrinsic
value or importance--it acquires importance because it is a
measure of the adherence to the values of the decision-making
units by these units. Assuming that the values of the
government agencies are the bases upon which their decisions
are made, and assuming further that those values do not ~
undergo large and significant changes between every project
decision, then the relative prices of project effects should
not vary significantly between projects due to the decisions
of the agency, unless their value systems also change.
Assuming that the agency official desires to adhere to his
values or those of his agency in a consistent manner, then
a framework for the description of side-effects that aids
the official in evaluating the meaning of the side-effects

should be useful to him.

36

Keeping in mind that the agency official cannot spend

large amounts of time documenting small-project side-effects

or determining precise cause-effect relationships, the

analytical framework must be kept simple, but descriptive.

The framework proposed here is a series of steps which may

be followed by the official either rigorously-~in a written

formr-or loosely--by just thinking through it in his mind.

Either way, if the agency official gains an understanding of

the meaning of each side-effect as it interacts with the

other aspects of society, he should be better able to adhere

to his value system when he makes decisions in the future.

A Side-Effect Evaluation Framework
Identify and Describe the side-effect.

Determine the Incidence of the effect. Who does it
affect?

For each person or group listed in Step 2, estimate
the potential duration of the effect. Is it a
short run or a long run effect?

For each person or group listed in Step 2, judge
whether it is a good or a bad effect and also judge
how good or bad it is a) taken by itself, and b)
taken in conjunction with the other effects.

Determine what aspect of the project, in conjunction
with the social and economic context of the society,
could have caused the effect.

(For the purpose of evaluating the agency planning
ability) was this effect anticipated or was it a
surprise to the agency?

Several examples of side-effects are discussed in the

following sections and in Chapter V. Except for the section

on Special Opportunities, the analysis presented goes beyond

the framework presented above,

since there are more data available.

37

Technology Adoption and Reversion

The La Fortuna Project promoted the use of a "package"
of newer technologies which included the use of mechanization,
fertilizers, insecticides and herbicides. The use of these
technologies was required in the sense that the farmers
could not continue to participate in the project if they did
not comply with the recommendations made by the MAG personnel.
This section presents the data that show the levels of
technology that the farmers were using before, during and
after the project. The side-effect under consideration is
the net adoption of these technologies by the farmers.

Use of Mechanization in Land
Preparation and Planting

Most of the land cultivated under the project had not
been cleared completely and therefore was previously unsuit-
able for tractor plowing, disking and planting. As a part
of the project, the CNP provided a land clearing service to
the participants at a cost of ¢200 ($23.26) per manzana.
Financing for this service was arranged separately from the
corn expenses loans, but with the same bank. The term of
this loan was four years, with repayment at the rate of
¢25 per crop (two crops per year).

The plowing, disking and planting operations were to be
contracted locally by each farmer. Payment was to be made
with the proceeds of the short-term corn crop loan.

Five basic combinations of methods of land preparation

and planting were found in the La Fortuna area. These methods

38

are ranked as follows, in ascending order of labor intensity:

1. Broadcast seeding followed by hand weeding by machete.
(Voleo)

2. Hand weeding followed by planting with a metal-tipped
stick. (Espegue)

3. Oxen plowing followed by planting with a metal-tipped
stick.

4. Tractor plowing and disking followed by hand planting.

5. Tractor plowing, disking and planting (which includes
the first of two or three applications of fertilizer).

The methods normally used prior to the project were the
first two since the others are not feasible in uncleared
lands.

Of the 48 participants in the first project (1971 second
crOp) (designated 1971-2) a random sample of 20 farmers were
interviewed. An attempt was made to find out what methods
each had used for at least three crop seasons, i.e., the crop
preceeding the project (1971-1), the project (1971-2) and
the crOp following the project (1972-1). It was not possible
to obtain such information on all three crOps for all 20
farmers due to: 1) the farmer may not have planted in each
cr0p season, 2) he could not remember the specifics of one
or more of the crop seasons, or 3) the circumstances of the
interview led to a decision to not pursue completely all
questions in order to obtain more accurate or more detailed
responses to other questions. Therefore, in measuring the
adoption of increased mechanization between crops 1971-1

and 1971-2 only 10 of the 20 responses were usable. In

39

measuring the reversion to lower levels of technology between
crops 1971-2 and 1972—1 only 12 of 15 responses were usable.
In measuring net adoption between crops 1971-1 and 1972-1

only 5 of 15 responses were usable. The last two categories
were limited to 15 farmers because five of the 20 (#16-20) had
continued in the project for the 1972-1 crop. Table 5
indicates the changes in use of mechanization.

Table 5. Changes in Land Preparation and Planting Technology
Levels

 

 

Adoption 1971-l to 1971-2 (10 of 20 responses usable)

7 (70%) changed from level 2 to level 5
l (10%) changed from level 2 to level 4
2 (20%) changed from level 1 to level 5

 

Reversion 1971-2 to 1972-1 (12 of 15 responses usable)

10 (83%) reverted from level 5 to level 4
1 ( 8%) reverted from level 5 to level 3
l ( 8%) remained at level 4

 

Net Adoptions 1971-l to 1972-1 ( 5 of 15 responses usable)

3 (60%) changed from level 2 to level 4
2 (40%) changed from level 1 to level 4

 

 

These changes are perhaps more easily seen by glancing
at Table 6 (page 40) which presents the raw data.

The effect of the project is striking; the farmers
complied with the requirements of the project, but once free
from these requirements they reverted to a lower level of
technology which was about the level they previously used.
Care should be taken at this point, however, to note that no

information is available to indicate whether these farmers

40

will continue to use tractors for plowing and disking or not.
What can be said, however, is that they apparently adjusted
their farming operations as they saw fit once they were no
longer participating.

Table 6. La Fortuna Land Preparation
Technology Levels

 

 

 

 

Farmer ___f Crop Season
1971-1 1971-2 1972-1
1 2 5 4
2 -a 5 4
3 2 4 4
4 - 5 4
5 - 5 4
6 - 5 4
7 2 5 4
8 - 5 4
9 - 5 3
10 1 S 4
ll 1 5 4
12 — 5 4
l3 - 5 -
14 5 -
15 - 4 -
16 2 5 5b
17 2 5 5
18 2 5 5
l9 - - 5
20 2 5 5

 

 

 

 

aDashes indicate no Response, Did not
Remember or Did not Plant.

b#16-20 continued in project for crop
season 1972-l.

41

From conversations with the farmers, it would seem that
the use of tractors for cultivating corn was generally not
previously posSible due to the uncleared lands and the low
supply of tractor services. Once these lands were cleared
as a result of the project, several individuals purchased
additional tractors and provided the service for which the
demand had been created by the project.12 After the project,
the increased availability of tractor services remained and
they voluntarily continued the use of them. Although there
are several possible reasons for the discontinued use of
mechanical planting, the most significant one is probably
the poor performance experienced by the farmers during the
project. It was reported that the planter was not planting
all of the seeds (nor all of the fertilizer). Mechanized
planting appeared to be economically competitive with the
hand planting methods although there was a wide variability
in the reported costs of the two methods.

The adoption of mechanized land preparation and planting
does not appear to have been common in the area, although a
few of the nonparticipants interviewed did adopt the use of
mechanization. Ten nonparticipants were interviewed and of
that number, one did not respond for the project crOp season
(1971-2). Of the remaining nine, one used level 5, one used

level 4, four used level 2 and two used level 1. In the

 

12
ities."

See also Section D of this chapter, "Special Opportun-

42

following crop season, the ones using level 4 and 5 reverted
to level 2 and two of those using level 2 adopted level 4.
The low adOption rate by the nonparticipants may be seen
in Table 7.

Table 7. Land Preparation Technology

Levels of Nonparticipants,
La Fortuna

 

 

 

 

Farmer Crop Season
1971-1 1971-2 1972-1
26 2 5 2
27 - l -
28 -a 4 2
29 1 2 4
30 - - 2
31 - 2 2
32 - 2 2
33 - 2 4
34 - l l
35 - 3 3

 

 

 

 

aDashes indicate No response, Did not
remember, or Did not plant.

By comparing Table 6 with Table 7, it appears that the
project had a definite effect on the use of mechanization
by the participating farmers and that the increased use of
mechanization was probably not due to other influences.
Since four of the farmers tried the higher levels of mech-
anization, it may be that a "demonstration effect" also
occurred.

Although the introduction of mechanization was listed

as a minor goal of the project, it may be analyzed or

43

evaluated using the Side-Effect Evaluation Framework set
forth in Section A of this Chapter. The effect is the
increased use of mechanization by farmers. The partici-
pating farmers were the group primarily affected, although
some of the nonparticipants also adopted the use of mechan-
ization. The use of mechanized planters was of a short run
duration although the use of mechanized plowing and disking
may be a longer run phenomenon. No indication is available
for the probable duration of the effect on the nonpartici-
pants. The increased use of mechanization is probably a

good effect, although it may have the consequence of decreased
opportunities for hired labor in the longer run. The use

of higher levels of mechanization was due to its promotion

by the project organizers. Since this effect was promoted

by the project organizers, it may be assumed that the effect
was anticipated by them, although the reversion to an inter-

mediate level of technology may not have been anticipated.

Fertilizer Use
A second effect of the La Fortuna project was the use
of chemical fertilizers by the farmers. The general
recommendation of the Ministry of Agriculture was the

application of 5.5 quintales per manzana (316 lbs/acre).

 

This included 3 quintales of 18-18-5-2 (N-P-K-Mg) at

 

planting time and 2.5 quintales of 18-18-5-2 30 days later.

 

The Ministry of Agriculture had the responsibility of

supplying the farmers with the necessary inputs and instead

44

of supplying 18-18-5-2, they sent to the farmers five other
formulas which were applied with a large variation in amounts
and formulas applied on each application. This problem, when
added to the difficulties that the farmers had in remembering
the details of formulas that they applied make it difficult
to use the data obtained. For these reasons, the data for
each farmer were summarized to show the total amount in

quintales per manzana that each farmer applied in each of

 

 

the three crop seasons. This summary was then categorized
on the following basis. If a total application of more than

5 quintales per manzana was applied it was designated a

 

full application. If some fertilizer was applied, but an

amount less than 5 quintales per manzana, it was designated

 

as a partial application. If no fertilizer was applied

the designation none is used. This constitutes the Adop-
tion Measure. The Adoption Measure compares fertilizer use
in 1971-2 with 1971-l.

A measure of reversion between crop seasons 1971-2 and
1972-1 uses the same terms but refers to the change in levels
of fertilizer use. Thus, if a farmer applied a full amount
in 1971-2 and only a partial amount in 1972-1, his measure of
reversion is partial. The resulting combinations of the
Adoption and the Reversion measures are then ranked on a
scale of l to 6, where full adoption and no reversion is
ranked number 6. Table 8 presents these six combinations

and the number of farmers in each class.

45

Table 8. La Fortuna Fertilizer AdOption and Reversion

 

 

 

Rank Acceptance Reversion 8 of 15 12 of 20
6 Full . None 0 % (0) l7 % (2)
5 Full Partial 13 % (1) l7 % (2)
4 Partial None 13 % (l) 8 % (l)
3 Partial Partial l3 % (l) 17 % (2)
2 Full Full 25 % (2) l7 % (2)
1 Partial Full 38 % (3) 25 % (3)

 

 

 

 

 

The column headed "8 of 15" refers to the eight usable
responses given by the 15 participants which did not
participate in the 1972-1 crop season. Of the 20, only 12
usable responses exist since some of the farmers did not
plant or did not respond to the questions. The raw data,

in quintales per manzana, are given in Table 9

 

Table 8 and 9 show that the farmers did not comply with
the fertilizer requirements as fully as they did with the
mechanization requirements. Of the 12 that responded for

1971-2, only six applied more than five quintales per manzana.

 

Of the eight responding farmers that dropped out of the
project after 1971-2, only one continued to fertilize at
the same (partial) level and five of these eight reverted
fully to zero levels of fertilization.

Conversations with the farmers indicated that they
were familiar with inorganic fertilizers before the project
and many of them used fertilizers on their other crops. A

probable cause of the low rate of adOption may have been the

46

mix-up in the fertilizer deliveries by the Ministry of
Agriculture--both in terms of types of fertilizers delivered
and the delivery system failures.

Table 9. Fertilization Levels in

La Fortuna (Quintales Per
Manzana)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Farmer Crgpgeason 4‘
1971-1 1971-2 1972-1
1 2 4 4
2 -a - 1
3 0 5.3 0
4 - - 0
5 - 8 0
6 - 4 0
7 0 4 3.2
8 0 - 0
9 - 4 0
10 0 4 0
ll 0 5 4
12 - 3
l3 - -
14 0 4.5 -
15 l -
l6 0 5.5 5b
17 0 6 6
18 0 4.3 3.7
19 - - -
20 0 5.5 5.5

 

 

 

 

aDashes indicate No response, Did not

remember, or Did not plant.

b#16-20 continued in project for crop
season 1972-l.

47

Using the Side-Effect Evaluation Framework, the effect
of fertilizer use may be summarized as follows. The
participating farmers were the ones affected. The high rates
of reversion indicate that the effect was of short duration.
The use of fertilizers is accepted as good but poorly
applied fertilizers (in terms of types, amounts, and
timing) and drought can render useless the expense involved.
The use of fertilizers was promoted by the project organ-
izers and therefore should have been anticipated, even

though the reversion was probably not anticipated.

Herbicide Use

A third example of technology adoption and reversion
in the La Fortuna project is the use of herbicides. The
data obtained from the interviews were varied and incomplete.
Since many of the farmers could not remember the details
for the three crOp seasons, the data were converted to a
binary form. If the farmer indicated having used herbicides
for a crop, it is shown in Table 10 as a "1"; if not, it is
shown as a "0".

Table 10 shows that of the 20 random sample participants,
only 11 gave responses for both 1971-1 and 1971-2. Of these
11, nine (82 percent) began using herbicides and two (18
percent) continued their use. In measuring reversion from
1971-2 to 1972-l, only 11 of the 15 respondents that left the
project responded for both crop seasons. Of these 11, nine

(82 percent) reverted fully, one (9 percent) continued using

herbicides and one (9 percent) had not used herbicides in

either of the two crop seasons.

in Table 11.

48

This analysis is summarized

 

 

 

 

Table 10. La Fortuna Project Herbicide
Use
Farmer CrOp Season
1971-1 1971-2 1972-1
1 0 l l
2 0 - 0
3 0 l 0
4 0 - 0
5 -a 1 o
6 - l 0
7 0 1 0
8 O l 0
9 - l 0
10 0 l 0
ll 1 l 0
12 - l 0
13 - - -
l4 0 l -
15 - 0 0
l6 1 1 157
l7 0 l 1
18 0 l 1
l9 - - -
20 0 l l

 

 

 

 

 

aDashes indicate No response, Did not
remember or Did not plant.

b#16-20 continued in the project for
crop season 1972-l.

 

49

Table 11. La Fortuna Herbicide Adoption
and Reversion

 

Adoption 1971-1 to 1971-2 (11 of 20 usable)

9 (82%) Adopted
2 (18%) Already Used

 

Reversion 1971-2 to 1972-1 (11 of 15 usable)

9 (82%) Reverted Fully
l ( 9%) Continued Using
1 ( 9%) Never Adopted

 

 

As was the case with mechanization, the farmers complied
with the requirements of the project, but deemed the practice
of herbicide use to be not worth continuing when making their
own decisions. Although the farmers probably knew about
herbicides before the project, it is not known if they used
them prior to the project. It may well be that difficulty in
obtaining herbicides on their own is a determining factor in
the farmers decisions to discontinue its use, especially in
light of the reduced fertilizer use. This is because trans-
port costs of herbicides by themselves would be prohibitive,
whereas they would not add much to the costs of transporting
the fertilizers. Another possible factor in the discontinued
use of herbicides is the health hazard involved. This was
dramatically demonstrated to the farmers of the area by the
death of several of one participantts children when chemical
poisons were unknowingly added to the tortillas by his wife.

Using the Side-Effect Evaluation Framework, the effect
of herbicide use may be summarized as follows. The parti-

cipating farmers were the ones affected. The high rate of

50

reversion indicates that the effect was of short duration.
The use of herbicides is probably accepted as good, but less
so than chemical fertilizers since weeding can be done by
hand. Also, the improper application of herbicides may be
useless and they do pose a serious hazard to health. The
use of herbicides was promoted by the project organizers

and therefore should have been anticipated by them, even

though the reversion was probably not anticipated.

Labor Use Changes

 

The increasing concern about unemployment in less
developed countries suggests that a development project such
as this one should be evaluated also on the basis of its
effect on labor usage.

The impact of this mechanized project can be considered
in both the context of the farmer's corn crop and in the
context of his total farming operations. First we shall
consider the context of his corn cr0p. One would hypothesize
that the increased use of machinery would diminish the use
of labor on a per area basis for the cultivation of corn.

If the farmer increased his corn crop area by a larger per-
centage than the percentage decrease in labor requirements
per unit of area, then more employment opportunities would
result. If not, his total labor requirements for corn
would diminish.

In the context of a farmer's total Operation, other

factors must be considered. If the increased mechanization

51

in his corn crop allowed the farmer more time, he will benefit
only if there exist other opportunities to which he could
apply his labor and management efforts. If mechanization

has reduced the total labor requirements of the farmers'

corn crops, the employment opportunities for the hired
laborers will also be reduced unless the farmers' new
opportunities use more hired labor than the amount reduced.

In order to determine the effect of labor usage, the entire
realm of economic activity in the area must be analyzed. In
the La Fortuna area, one would judge that alternative oppor-
tunities for labor usage would be or become available. The
area is much like a frontier area with farms that are larger
relative to other areas of Costa Rica such as in Cartagena
where farm sizes are smaller due to many years of land
division and where the production activities of the small
farmers are of a more subsistence character. In La Fortuna
the farms are more diversified; 14 of the 20 farmers in the
sample had at least one additional farming activity and six

of those had three or more additional farming activities.
Twelve of 19 farmers responding (63 percent) reported having
no off-farm income to the family, while seven did have outside
sources. In Cartagena, only eight of 35 (23 percent) reported
having no other family income. The average farm size in

Cartagena (excluding one 280 mz farm) is 11.9 manzanas.

 

In La Fortuna, the average farm size (excluding one 400 mz

farm) is 31.0 manzanas--over 2.6 times larger. In La Fortuna

 

52

there appeared to be relatively fewer landless laborers.
All of this information suggests a real difference in the
relative supplies of land and labor between the two areas
and a higher probability of new economic opportunities for
farmers of La Fortuna and thus for hired laborers. Based
on these observations, it may be reasoned that other oppor-
tunities for labor may exist in La Fortuna, while they are
less likely to exist in Cartagena.

Several types of data are available concerning labor
usage in the La Fortuna area. The Ministry of Agriculture
"MAGPIE" studies in both La Fortuna and nearby San Jorge de
Arenal provide data on labor usage. The San Jorge de Arenal

project was a nonmechanized corn project. From the MAGPIE

 

analyses on these two projects, we find that the average

manzana received the following amounts of labor.

Table 12. Labor Used on Average Manzana of Corn, La Fortuna
and San Jorge de Arenal

 

 

Location Type of Paid Nonpaid Total
Project Man-hours Manehours Man-hours

 

La Fortuna
(212.5 mz.) Mechanized 30.6 36.1 66.7

San Jorge
de Arenal Non-

(41 mz.) Mechanized 59.2 34.6 83.8a

 

 

 

 

 

aThe total does not equal the sum because not all of the
manzanas received all of the labor activities. The nonpaid
amounts represent the average for only those manzanas that
had such activities.

53

Since the San Jorge de Arenal project included three
farmers (18 mzs.) that plowed and disked with tractors, a
calculation of man-hours per average manzana of the remaining

23 manzanas would result in a total of 96.0 man-hours. Thus,

 

it appears that the seven nonmechanized farmers (herein
termed San Jorge-7) used 43.9 percent more labor, while the

inclusion of the 18 mechanized manzanas (the total; herein

 

termed San Jorge—10) brings the increase in labor usage down
to 25.6 percent.

The data may also be used to calculate what the average
farmer used on his average manzana by performing the following

calculation: Sum of total labor used/sum of manzanas .
Number of Farmers

In this manner, we find that the average La Fortuna farmer
spent 110.63 man-hours on his average manzana; the San Jorge-7
farmer Spent 97.55 man-hours; and the San Jorge-10 farmer
spent 86.27 man-hours. Since the average farmer, in each
case, spent more man-hours per manzana than the average
manzana received, one would expect a negative correlation

between the number of manzanas of corn that each farmer had

 

with the average labor input to those manzanas. In La

 

Fortuna, the correlation was r = -.5015; for the San Jorge-7
it was 7 = -.0660; and for the San Jorge-10 it was r = -.1051.
The reason that the data do not provide any strong
indication is the large variances that exist in the data.

For example, a Student's-t, one-tailed, test of a zero

difference between the means of the amount of labor the

54

average farmer applied per manzana in La Fortuna compared

with the San Jorge-10 results in the acceptance of the null
hypothesis that the mean amounts of labor used is equal at

the 5 percent level. A 95 percent confidence interval on

the difference between the means in (-16.71; 65.43), with

the sample means of 110.63 (La Fortuna) and 86.27 (San Jorge-10)
for a difference of 24.36 man-hours. The standard deviations
of the sample means were 3 = 74.52 (La Fortuna) and s = 41.52
(San Jorge-10).

In summary, although the average manzana data suggest

 

that mechanization did reduce labor requirements by up to
44 percent as might be expected, these data could not be
properly disaggregated to perform statistical testing. On

the other hand, the data for the average farmer's average

 

manzana showed no significant difference in labor require-
ments per manzana, mainly due to the large variances that
existed in the data. The negative correlation of medium
strength between the manzana labor requirements and the
number of manzanas planted to corn by each farm would suggest
that the larger the area a farmer plants to corn, the less
labor per unit of area he will require. This would tend to
confirm the expectation that, for a single crop, the dis-
placement of labor by mechanization has a greater impact
on larger farms.

None of these data give any indication of the impact
of mechanization in the broader context of total farm oper-

ations, as mentioned earlier. The MSU questionnaire contained

55

a very broad question on changes in the use of hired labor:
"Did you use more hired labor (or less) in 1972 or in 1971?"
The question was repeated for comparing 1971 with 1970. The
resulting combinations of pairs of responses are given in

Table 13.

Table 13. Changes in Use of Hired Labor

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hired Labor Usgiin 1971 Compared with 1970
None Less Same More
in 71 in 71 in 71 in 71 Total Percent
None
Hired in 72 4 - 1 - 5 25
Lab°r Less
Use in .
1972 in 72 - 6 - 1 7 35
Compared Same
with in 72 - l l l 3 15
1971
More
in 72 - 2 l 2 5 25
Total 4 9 3 4 20
% 20 45 15 20 100

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

For each of the questions on labor use changes, the
question of why the change occurred was also asked. Of the
six that used less in each of the two years, five listed
mechanization as a reason for the change on at least one of
the two questions. As can be seen in Table 13, 5 of the 20
used the same amount or more in both of the comparisons;
three used less and then the same or more. Of the nine
responses (out of 40 possible) that indicated more hired labor,

the reasons given were: mechanization (2), a change in area

56

planted to corn (2), natural phenomena (2) and other
reasons (3). No real conclusions can be drawn from these
data concerning the context of the farmers' total Operations.
Using the Side-Effect Evaluation Framework for the
context of the farmers' corn crops, the data on average
manzana labor usage suggests an effect of diminished labor
usage. Judging from the data in Table 12, hired laborers
were the ones affected. No judgement can be made concerning
the potential duration of this effect. A decrease in the
opportunities for hired labor may be judged as bad in itself,
but the context of total economic activity in the area is
the important consideration here. The decrease in labor
requirements is a direct result of the introduction of
mechanization and this effect may or may not have been
anticipated by the project organizers since their main
concern was probably with the farmers themselves and not

the local laborers.

Opportunities for Individuals
A development project such as the La Fortuna project

inherently creates opportunities for individual gain. That
is its objective. A project may be designed so as to
improve community welfare by providing a good,service or
facility which may be used by any or all individuals in the
community (a public good) or it may be designed so as to
improve the community welfare by providing assistance or

opportunities to individual members of the community who

57

will be able to benefit privately by such assistance. The
belief that community welfare is enhanced by the provision
of assistance to individuals for their own private benefit
is evidenced by the Operation of extension services with

public monies.

Selection Policies i
Since MAG is operated by the government with public
monies, it is to be presumed that the service is to be made

-available to any or all individuals that desire to receive

 

it. However, since there normally exist limited budgets and
capacities of extension services, there also exists the
possibility that some individuals or groups will be served
while others may be systematically not served. That this
possibility not only exists but often occurs is widely
accepted. The systematic favoring of one group over another
is not necessarily a result of an intentional policy of the
institution--it may well be an unintentional result of the
local agent's selection of participants or the regional
director's choices of project to implement. These choices
may have been based on the expected ease of project imple-
mentation, e.g., the farmers living close to the road are
easier to visit and farmers that can obtain loans by theme
selves can more easily purchase the needed items for a
project requiring purchased inputs.

The problem of planning and evaluating project parti-

cipant selection patterns will not arise when a project

58

faces a condition of under-enrollment or lack of demand for
participation. This appears to have occurred in the

La Fortuna project. The projection of 69 or 70 participants
was not met--only 48 participated. Thus, even though the
farmers were to be selected by the Regional Director with
assistance from the CNP, BAC, the La Fortuna MAG agent and
a Committee of Farmers (the existence of which was neither
apparent nor determined), the La Fortuna agent was probably
soliciting farmers to participate.

When a project is under-enrolled, the project Officials
should attempt to determine the reasons for the under-
enrollment for several reasons. First, it may be due to
poor project design and thus a need to redesign the project
may exist. Second, if certain types of projects are
consistently under-enrolled, the institution officials should
seriously consider eliminating that type of project from
their future activities and replace them with projects that
meet with popular demand; thereby permitting an improvement
in the institution's capacity to serve within their budgetary

limits.

Specific Indirect Opportunities
Whether the project required some selection policy to
be used or whether the agents had to solicit participation,
there may exist special Opportunities which are not open to
all participants. These special indirect Opportunities may

be such that once one individual, participant or not, has

59

taken advantage of them they will no longer be Open to
others. There is nothing inherently undesirable about these
special opportunities; in fact, it may often be more desir-
able to allow one individual to take advantage of an oppor-
tunity to provide a service required by the project than to
have the extension service provide it themselves. However,
if the institution desires to attempt to control the project
side-effects to the greatest degree possible, then the
institution should do its best to foresee such opportunities
so that they can anticipate these side-effects. Also, by
searching for these types of side-effects in the project
evaluations, the institution will be better able to control
them in future projects.

An example of an indirect special Opportunity created
by the La Fortuna project was the purchase of an additional
tractor by one of the relatively better-Off participants.
The increased demand for tractor services by the partici-
pants--both during the project and later due to the land
clearing operations--made such a purchase profitable. That
this man was benefitting from the project to an extent
greater than the others was well known by the area farmers.
However, in this case, there did not appear to be any
resentment by the other farmers. If there had been resentment,
the farmers' confidence in the institutions might have been
diminished. (The potential consequences of reduced confidence

are discussed in the next chapter.)

 

CHAPTER V

CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS

The Problem

 

An additional effect of the La Fortuna project, and
one that requires a more detailed analysis, is the effect
that this project had on the confidence that the farmers
place in the institutions. A lack of confidence in the
institution promoting planned or directed change is one of
the most serious obstacles to planned economic development
efforts and it is possibly the most unnoticed Obstacle.

When any development project relies on individuals accepting
the recommendations of an institution, it is logical that
those individuals must trust the agents Of that institution
if they are to be expected to accept those recommendations
in the face of risk and uncertainty. This is especially
true Of small "risk-averting" subsistence farmers.

Everett Hagen suggests four difficulties in innovation
in agriculture; the third of which is:

"The peasant Often has reason to distrust the

persons who come to suggest changes to him. . .

In many countries almost every peasant has had

a lifetime of experiences with landowners, rent

collectors, moneylenders, and government agents
which justifies his suspicion that anything

60

61

prOposed by an elite'person is 23% likely

to be to the peasant s benefit.
Thomas Fraser also suggests that what villagers perceive to
be the ”real" objective of the outsiders is a factor in
their decisions.14

Arensberg and Niehoff point out that a change agent
usually comes to a community as a person of high prestige
or influence, but that he must remain "predictable" if he

15

is to be a real positive force over time. "Reliable"

would perhaps be a more accurate term since it incorporates

 

a quality-of-advice factor. Rogers provides an example of
reliability that is lost when he describes a case where the
use of hybrid seed was discontinued due to a "cultural
incompatibility" (the corn made inferior tortillas). He
noted that in this case, "As a result, the change agent's
future promotion of other innovations was also damned."16
This leads to the following hypothesis, as stated in
null form:
Hypothesis: The La Fortuna Project did not result in any

significant reduction in farmer confidence in
the institutions.

 

 

13Hagen, Everett E., The Economics of Development.
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.) 1968, p. 72.

4Fraser, Thomas M. Jr., "Sociocultural Parameters in
Directed Change," in Human Organization, Vol. 22, NO. 1,
Spring 1963, p. 104.

15

 

Arensberg and Niehoff, gp. cit., p. 107.

16ROgers, Everett M., with F. Floyd Shoemaker,
Communication of Innovations, 2nd Edition (New York: The
Free Press) 1971, p. 150.

 

62

The Evidence

 

The evidence that is available is insufficient to
perform any conclusive testing Of the hypothesis. Ideally,
the evidence would have been based on a series of interviews
with an improved instrument before, during and after the
La Fortuna project. The fact that the research was performed
after the project was completed is an obvious limitation.

In spite of this serious weakness, the evidence that is
available is instructive, even though it is not conclusive.

The evidence consists of two types of information: a) the

 

|-.\

responses to a question concerning experiences and b) farmer

participation.

Responses to the Questions
"Have you had (good, bad or regular) experiences

with the institution?" Scale: 1-4.

La Fortuna Participants Versus Control Group

Participants Rating of MAG 2.737 (n = 19)

Control Group Rating of MAG 3.6 (n = 5)

A student's-t test of significance of the difference
between the mean scores given the MAG showed no significant
difference at the 10 percent level. This result is not
surprising since a) the project was well known and the
nonparticipants may have been influenced by their empathy
with the participants and b) the small sample sizes. It
might be noted, however, that at the 15 percent level, the
test does show a significant difference between the mean

score of ratings between the two groups.

63

La Fortuna Participants Versus Cartagena Participants

 

The Cartagena project was located in a different region
of Costa Rica and was a project that was not as integrated
as the La Fortuna Project. It did not include such a great
emphasis on the use of mechanization and was basically a
production credit type project. Although the Cartagena
project also showed poor results, the participating farmers
generally did not perceive the existence of a "project",
nor did they generally associate the MAG and the CNP with
the corn and rice cultivation which was financed by the
Banco de Costa Rica (BCR). Based on this, it seems to be
possible that the Cartagena responses would be similar to the
responses that would have been given by the La Fortuna
participants if they had been interviewed before the project.
Table 14 lists the mean score given to each institu-

tion and a mean composite score, for each project.

Table 14. Mean Scores on "Experience" Questions

 

 

 

Institution La Fortuna Cartagena Difference
MAG 2.737 (n=l9) 3.353 (n=l7) -.616
CNP ‘ 2.895 (n=l9) 3.333 (n=15) -.438
Bank BAC 2.842 (n=l9) BCR 3.828 (n=29) -.986
Composite 2.821 (n=l9) 3.487 (n=31) -.666

 

 

 

 

A student's-t test of significance of the difference
between the means of the composite scores shows a significant

difference at the 1 percent level with 48 degrees of freedom.

 

64

A similar test performed on the difference between the
scores given MAG also shows a significant difference--this
time at a 2.5 percent level with 34 degrees of freedom.
These results suggest the rejection of the hypothesis but
do not constitute conclusive evidence--they can only be

instructive. 'F‘fih

was... .;

Farmer Participation

The under-enrollment of farmers in the project17 and

 

the comments of some of the nonparticipants might suggest a if
less than ideal level of confidence in the institutions. Em;
One farmer in particular reported that his refusal to parti-
cipate was based on his judgement that the plowing should be
done at a depth of four inches instead of the eight inch
depth that the Regional Director of MAG was requiring of
all participants.
An additional indication of a lack of confidence in
the institutions was the fact that 37 of the 48 participants
decided to not continue in the project after the first crop.
The remaining 11 were all in the San Josecito sub-area and
through conversations with these and other farmers it is
apparent that their continuing participation was directly
due to the leadership of the local school teacher and the
well-to—do farmer that had benefitted from providing the

tractor and truck services. These 11 also indicated that

 

17See also Chapter IV, Section "Special Opportunities".

 

65

they would not continue after the second crop season. If
one can assume rationality on the part of the farmers, then
it would be reasonable to expect at least some of the
farmers to continue if they felt that the losses were due
to the drought and not due to the performance of the insti-
tutions and if they did not expect a drought to occur again (-T.

during the next crop season.

Additional Insights on Farmer Confidence

 

Before presenting a model of farmer confidence that . jl
points out the importance of this aspect of development pro- ‘5.
jects, some related insights from the MSU questionnaire
results will be presented.
As would be expected, not all of the farmers reported
identical experiences with the institutions. The following
data suggest some of the other variables which seem to
affect the responses given by the farmers.
1. There are consistently positive, though weak,

correlations between the size of a respondent's farm (TOTALLAND)

and his perceptions of experiences with the institutions.

Table 15. Coefficients of Correlation: Total Land and

 

 

Experiences
TOTALLAND versus Experience - MAG r = +.22
TOTALLAND versus Experience - CNP r = +.12
TOTALLAND versus Experience - BAC r = +.16
TOTALLAND versus Composite Experience r = +.l9

 

66

These relationships would weakly suggest that larger
farmers generally perceived better experiences with the
institutions.

2. There are consistently negative, though weak,
correlations between the number of years a respondent has
farmed (YRSFARM) and his perceptions of experiences with

institutions.

Table 16. Coefficients of Correlation: Years Farming and

 

 

 

Experiences
YRSFARM versus Experience - MAG r = -.20
YRSFARM versus Experience - CNP r = -.36
YRSFARM versus Experience - BAC r = -.47
YRSFARM versus Composite Experience r = -.38

 

These relationships would weakly suggest that those
farmers that have more years of experience in farming
generally perceived worse experiences with the institutions.

3. There are consistently positive correlations of
medium strength between a respondent's composite measure of
modernity (MODERNALL)18 and his perception of experiences

with the institutions.

 

18The composite measure of modernity (MODERNALL) is
the sum of responses given by the farmer to eleven questions,
each with a scale from 1 to 4 where l = traditional and 4 =
modern. See Appendix B for a list of the eleven questions.

67

Table 17. Coefficients of Correlation: Modernity and

 

 

Experiences
MODERNALL versus Experience - MAG r = +.25
MODERNALL versus Experience - CNP r = +.51
MODERNALL versus Experience - BAC r = +.56
MODERNALL versus Composite Experience r = +.49

 

These relationships would suggest that the farmers
with the more "modern“ outlook generally perceived better
experiences with the institutions.

4. There are consistently positive, though weak,
correlations between the number of conversations a farmer
reported with agents of an institution (CONVERSE- ) and
his perception of experience with that institution and with

the Composite Experience variable.

Table 18. Coefficients of Correlation: Conversations and EXperiences

 

 

(DNVEIBE- MG vs. Experience— MAG r=+.32 Carp. Experience r--+.23
CDNVEEBE— CNP vs. Experienoe- CNP r=+.34 Carp. Experience r=+.36
CDNVEEBE- BAC vs. Experience- BAC r=+.31 Ccmp. Experience r=+.35

 

 

 

These relationships would weakly suggest that those
farmers that had more contact with an institution's agents
generally perceived better experiences with that institution
and with all three institutions (the composite measure).

5a. There are consistently positive and generally

strong correlations between the score that a respondent gave

 

L17

W

,J-
h

 

 

68

an institution and the scores that he gave the other

institutions.

Table 19. Intercorrelations of Experiences
with Institutions

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Experiences with Fa“
MAG CNP BAC
Experience- MAG 1.
Experience- CNP .80 1.
Experience- BAC .51 .71 l. Er .

5b. Tests of significance on the difference between
the mean scores given each institution with the mean score

19

given each other institution showed no significant differences

at the 10 percent level.

These relationships would suggest that the farmer either
a) perceived the institutions to be working together in the
project (as they were supposed to) or b) confirm the suspicion
that the farmers tended to confuse the institutions and agents
and therefore tended to give all institutions similar scores.

In summary, these related relationships suggest that
the more traditional farmers reported worse experiences and
that, in general, farmers tended to give similar reports on
experiences with all institutions. The other relationships

are much weaker, but they would suggest that the smaller

 

19The three combinations for testing are MAG vs. BAC,
MAG vs. CNP, and BAC vs. CNP.

69

farmers with more years of experience in farming and that

had fewer contacts with the agents, reported worse experiences.
These relationships may be only partial explanations of the
reasons why farmers responses differed, but they do not
explain or document an overall reduction in confidence. As~
partial explanations of why responses differed, they may be
instructive for agency personnel in regard to their dealings

with individual farmers.

A Model of Farmer Confidence

Although the hypothesis could not be properly tested,
the available evidence leads to the preliminary conclusion
that if the farmer perceives that the project has caused him
harm, the level Of confidence that he places in the insti-
tution will be reduced. This preliminary conclusion, however,
describes only one side of the spectrum. What happens to
farmer confidence when the farmer perceives neither harm nor
help or when the farmer perceives significant help? Some
impressions received by this author in the process of inter—
viewing the farmers in bOth Cartagena and La Fortuna suggest
what happens in the intermediate case--that of no significant
help nor harm.

The questions concerning experiences with institutions
produced responses from the Cartagena farmers that generally
indicated that they tended to base their evaluation of their
experiences with the institutions on their own fulfillment

of responsibilities. For example, a typical response to the

 

70

question relating to the bank which financed the Cartagena
project was, "Very good, I have always complied and paid on
time." These reasons that were given and the tendency of
the farmers to respond, "Yes, they are all good" indicates
that the farmers may judge (or at least report to outsiders)
the institutions not so much on the institutions' abilities
or responsibilities to assist them or to fulfill the objec-
tives that someone perceives the institution to have, but
rather they report good experiences as long as the insti-
tution has not needed to pressure the farmer to achieve

a required compliance.

The plausibility of this basis for farmers' judgements
was not diminished by the responses given in La Fortuna.
Since many of the farmers in La Fortuna had needed to request
an extension of their loans and since the banks were refusing
to give further extensions, many of the farmers were openly

resentful of the bank and the other institutions.20 Occasional

 

20It was reported that Ministry of Agriculture officials
had visited the corn plots shortly before harvest time and
had estimated yields to be around 50 qq./mz. Farmers reported
yields that averaged 16.837 qq./mz. to the MAG production
costs study. (Total production of 28 farms, 212.5 mzs., was
3,577 qq. The average farm yields were thus 21.35 qq./mz.
A regression of average farm yields per manzana 'y', with
the number of manzanas of corn by farm 'x' resulted in y = 24.517
- .417x. The regression coefficient was -.417 and the corre-
lation coefficient was —.415. A Student's-t test on the
regression slope is significant at the 2 percent level.) A
Student's-t test run on the average per farm yields provides
a 95 percent confidence interval of (18.366, 9, 24.334).
This implies a 95 percent probability that the mean of the
population lies within this interval. This would indicate
that farmers were either telling the truth or lying in a
consistent manner. The IICA study interviewed 43 farmers in

 

71

comments by the nonparticipants interviewed indicated a
sympathy towards those participants then faced with financial
difficulties.

These impressions involve two aspects. First, if a
farmer does not perceive harm being incurred, he will give
a "good" or "Okay" rating to the institution. Second, if the
institution imposes a requirement on the farmer, he will give
a "good" rating if he is able to comply without having to
restrict his normal way of farming or of life, or he will
give a "bad" rating if he is unable to comply. The first
aspect and the conclusion drawn from the evidence in this
chapter is suggestive of a relationship between past
institutional performance and current farmer confidence, which
is curved downward from a point representing mediocre past
performance and an "okay" level of confidence. Figure 5 is
an example of the shape of such a relationship, which when
extended upward (on the basis of logic) would have a symmetri-

21,22

cal but inverted shape. The complete relationship may

 

the San Carlos area and found an average yield per manzana
of 21.8 qq. For the sub-sample of the La Fortuna area, the
average yield per manzana for corn was 23.3 qq. This would
appear to be consistent with the above findings.

21The precise function for the example curve in Figure
5 is (x—2)3 where y is the farmers level of confi-

Y=""T"+2'

dence and x is the measure of the institution's past perfor-
mance. With this function, the midpoint is (2,2), Point A is
(l.l34,1.838) and Point B is (2.860,2.162). Both axes extend
from 0 to 4. For both points A and B, dy/dx = 1.

For the middle range of past performance, between points
A and B, the distance on the x-axis (performance) is (2.868-
l.l34) = 1.732. This represents 43.4 percent of the possible
ratings (0 to 4) of performance. Between points A and B, a

.—

 

72

now be posited as follows: 1) there is a large middle range
of "mediocre" performance which produces a small middle range
of an "okay" confidence level on the vertical scale and 2)
that from the midpoint, slight and equal successive increases
(decreases) in the quality of an institution'- performance
will result in increases (decreases) in the farmers' level

of confidence at an increasing (increasing) rate.

 

 

 

 

Hhmi4
3
IEMWERIINEL
OF<XIFDMEEE
INIDHHITUNKN
"OW'Z
1
1m 0 1 l I l ‘1
l 2 4
Bad ubdnxze Gboi

I¥BTI¥RRXWENJBOFTHE§DfiflITUHIN

Figure 5. Suggested relationship between past performance of the
instiunionemd:finmer<xxfiidaxe.nnthe:hmmiuuion.

 

:range of (2.162-l.838) = .324 (8.1 percent of 4) exists on
'the farmers' level of confidence axis. These figures are
(nonsistent with the assumption that a wide middle range of
rxast performance will result in a rating of "okay" by the
farmers.

22This relationship is much easier to conceive than to
nmuasure. Measurement problems of two types exist for both
sixes. First, the measures must be such that they may be
‘useui for interpersonal and interinstitutional comparisons.
Secondly, there is a statistical problem in the approximation
of‘.any precise function since both variables are only
1ruiirectly observable.

73

If Point B is defined as having a slope of one, any
improvement in institutional performance beyond this point
will result in increasingly greater improvements in the
farmers' level of confidence. Similarly for Point A, with
lepe of one, any worsening in performance will result in
increasingly greater declines in the farmers' level of
confidence. Point A can be interpreted as the point where,
when moving to the left, the institution begins to inflict
significant harm on the farmers. The experience in La
Fortuna would suggest that the Ministry of Agriculture of
Costa Rica, with reSpect to the La Fortuna area farmers,
is located somewhere to the left of Point A on the curve.

The importance of this relationship is based on the
assumption that the farmers' "willingness to adopt" a
recommendation given by an institution is greatly affected
by the level of confidence which they place in that insti-
tution. If a farmer's willingness to adopt is directly
related to his level of confidence in a scalor function,
then it becomes possible to substitute the variable
”farmer's willingness to adopt" in place of the variable
"farmer confidence in institution" on the vertical axis,
as is shown in Figure 6.

From this author's experiences in Latin America, it is
expected that most of the institutions serving the small

farmer do so in a nominal manner and would be in the range

between Points A and B of the two figures. That MAG had to

 

 

74

look for participants instead of selecting from among
applicants is evidence of the nominal service normally
provided by MAG. In other words, they are ineffective in
either helping or hurting most small farmers. The conclusion
that follows from this hypothesized relationship between
institutional experiences and farmer willingness to innovate
is that an institution such as the Ministry of Agriculture

in Costa Rica will require a large improvement in effective 4
ability toassist small farmers before any significant a

response is to be expected from the small farmer. For

 

institutions with mediocre histories, the importance of

avoiding failures and of improving performance is significant.

 

 

 

High 4 .-
FARMER
W5 3 '
TO AIDPI‘
B
p
"OK" 2
I
l
I
1 l
l
l
Dav 0 {L j
3 4

 

(Rod
IESTIHETOHTWEE<1?THEIDEHTHHHON

. . Figure 6. Suggested relationship between past performance of the
Jthiunjonamm!fanma:wiLUUgne§5to.aixmx

CHAPTER VI

FACTORS IN THE PROJECT RESULTS

In the chapter "Framework of Analysis", the last two
of the six questions to be answered by an analysis deal with
the determination of the cause and effect relationships of
the project. This chapter will endeavor to point out certain
conditions which would appear to have had an influence on
the results of the project and the reasons for which it is
felt that they may have influenced the results. Although
the information concerning rainfall during the project is
very indicative, it cannot show the specific cause-effect
relationship or its magnitude. As also noted in the Frame-
work of Analysis, the manner in which an analysis is written
influences its interpretation; for this reason, the suggested
factors that follow are not presented as definitive causes

of the project outcome--only as possible factors. The order

 

in which these possible factors are listed is completely
arbitrary and does not indicate any ranking in terms of

importance.

Low Operating Standards and/or Poor Planning

 

A number of conversations that this author had with
people associated with the project indicate the possibility
that the agents of the institutions were either 1) not

75

 

76

sufficiently trained to meet the unforeseen problems that
might have arisen, 2) not sufficiently in contact with the
project to meet the problems when they arose and/or 3) had
not planned the project sufficiently well to be able to
anticipate the problems that did arise. Several of the
problems are listed here.

First, a number of the farmers complained about the
fact that the poor organization of the mechanization services,
both clearing by the CNP and the locally contracted tractor
services, delayed planting as late as December and January.
The normal planting times are October and November. The
effect that these delays had on corn yields can not be
determined with the information available, especially con-
sidering that the rainfall pattern was abnormal during
this period.

Second, the pricing of tractor services of the CNP,
and at least initially, for plowing and disking, was fixed
on a per manzana basis and apparently administratively fixed.
Given the wide variation that existed in the amount of time
required to do each manzana, many of the farmers interviewed
complained loudly about the overpricing that resulted.

Third, it was reported that the farmers were required,
without having been previously informed, to supply the
lunches of the CNP bulldozer Operators and, on occasion, the
farmers reported being held responsible for the supply and/or
transportation of the fuels and lubricants required by the

machinery.

 

 

77

Fourth, the CNP was to install a grain purchase and
drying station in the project area, supposedly before the
time of the first harvest. Some, but not all, of the
farmers reported being unable to sell and/or have their
grain dried at the station and thus had to transport their
corn to Ciudad Quesada.

Fifth, there was criticism voiced by the farmers and
also by a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer located at the Regional
Office, that the operation of the mechanical planter was
extremely detrimental. Instead of planting in parallel
rows, the tractor Operator drove around the field from the
outside to the inside and thus disturbed an area of planted
corn when he drove out of the field. This pattern of planting
'would also make mechanical harvesting more difficult. As
was previously mentioned, the planter was very poorly
calibrated from the result that insufficient amounts of
fertilizer and seed were applied.

The observed operating practice of the Ministry of
.Agriculture in Costa Rica is the promotion of project after
;project with many failures occurring. In conversations with
iflae Regional Directors of the Ministry in two regions, the
BTSU researchers were encouraged to look at other projects
.and.not to continue with the ones previously selected on
theebasis of Ministry recommendations. In the early stages
(xi the MSU research, the Cartagena project was recommended
by the Ministry. In the field work stage, the Regional

llirector in that region told us that: "Cartagena is the

 

 

78

“23 He then placed the blame

project most behind in progress.
on the people of Cartagena themselves by saying that you

could not work with them and that there was no leadership

there. In a separate conversation with this author and

with the IICA researchers, he suggested that we look at

the project in Sardinal. 'Pjey

In the San Carlos region, the Regional Director was

described by one of his subordinates as having a new project

 

every week, with each new project receiving his and the whole

office's full attention until the next project idea surfaced.

 

Althoughthis is probably an exaggeration, when this researcher
talked with the Regional Director, he consistently steered
the conversation to the newer projects, in spite of efforts
to ask questions about the La Fortuna project.

This mode of operating may be possible due to the lack
Of any project evaluation and the methods used in reporting
activities by the agents. If the agents report only the
manner in which they spend their time and the number of
contacts with farmers, and not the results Of projects in
which they were involved, the question of the effectiveness

of their efforts is never raised.

Project Monitoring and Evaluation Systems
The evidence gathered by the MSU research indicated

that the higher level and central office employees of the

 

23"Cartagena es el proyecto mas atrasado que tenemos."
:Ing. Victor Quirés, September 28, 1972, in Liberia, Guana-
caste, Costa Rica.

79

institutions knew relatively little about the project.
Given the size of the project in relation to the overall
operations of the institutions, this low level of knowledge
is not too surprising. If the reports that were sent up the
hierarchy were mainly concerned with the activities of the
agents and the number of farmers contacted in a given month
(as might be expected) and not a report on the progress of
the project, then there is no way for the higher levels to
know about the problems or success encountered. Reporting
by agent and not by project, coupled with the apparent poor
coordination between institutions is not very conducive to

institutional improvement.

Personalities

 

As was indicated above, the Regional Director of the
Extension Service tended to periodically change the emphasis
among ongoing projects; his most recent idea tended to
receive top priority and thus a larger share of the employees
time, to the detriment of older projects.

Another aspect of his personality also permeated the
character of the project (and possibly its under-enrollment).
Being somewhat dictatorial, the recommendations of the project
became requirements of the project and the farmers did not
seem to appreciate this limitation on their management of
their farms. This tenor of requirements probably also led to
an inflexibility to adapt the loan amounts to the actual needs

of each individual farmer.

 

80

Weather

Data included in the MAG production costs study report
are the sources for Figures 7 and 8. Figure 7 shows the
recorded rainfall for Ciudad Quesada and La Fortuna (the
town) for the months of October, 1971, through March, 1972,
in relation to the average rainfall by month as recorded for
11 years in Ciudad Quesada. Figure 8 shows the high and
low record rainfalls for the 11 year period and the average.
The two arrows indicate that the record lows for the months
Of November and December occurred in 1971 during the project
planting period. No information is available on the magni-
tude of the impact on corn yields that this drought caused
although one might assume that it was significant since the

drought occurred in the critical period just after planting.

Ipput Supply

The President of the San Jorge sub-area Committee of
:Farmers reported that the MAG had had delivered the inputs
for San Jorge to a room ("bodega") and that farmers from
«other sub-areas, in addition to those from San Jorge, had
retrieved their supplies without any inventory control. He
said that since farmers from other sub-areas had used part
<3f the San Jorge supply, he had needed to bring supplies
:firom rooms in other sub-areas to fill the needs of the San
.Jorge area farmers. This report indicates that two problems
«occurred. First, that there was no assurance that each

:farmer got the exact amounts of and the proper types of

 

L3}

81

 

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82

supplies needed. Second, the existence and accuracy of the
records kept were questioned by some of the participants;
one of whom complained that the bank had refused to show him

their record of his withdrawals.

Implications
With the exception of the drought, all of the factors
mentioned reflect the administration of the institutions or
the management of the project. Although cause and effect
relationships cannot be conclusively shown with the available
information, the possibility that these management factors

did have some effect on the outcome of the project is

strongly suggested.

 

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS

"The success of the project will be based on

(the two conditions of) the receptivity of

the farmer to the technological changes in the

crop and the services that the institutions

involved should provide in a coordinated and

opportune manner." Project Plan Document, p.iv.

At first glance, and if based on the specific objectives
or projections of the project, it is clear that the La
Fortuna project was a failure. The area planted to corn
under the auspices of the project fell short of the objec-
tive and it appears that the yields were improved little, if
at all. Farmers' incomes were not generally increased;
many reported losses. Of the original 48 farmers, none
stayed in the project for more than two crop seasons.

Even though it is unlikely that any significant analysis
of this failure will be done by the Ministry Of Agriculture
or by the other institutions, the project is no longer an
activity which the agents and regional officials may list
on their reports; they have other and newer projects to list.

In spite of this, the project did have an impact not
:aoon to be forgotten by the farmers. Some aspects were good
4and some were bad. Although these impacts cannot be averaged
(Jr netted out to provide a single judgement, they can be

.listed and evaluated individually.

83

 

84

First, the available data suggest a definite increase
in the use of mechanization after the project was over.
Although it was impossible to indicate the real effect on
labor utilization, the residual impact of mechanization may
result in an increase in area under cultivation and the
agricultural production in the area. The residual use of
fertilizers and herbicides does not appear to be very large. ~J

Second, and probably the most significant impact of

the project, the available data suggest a reduction in the

 

level of confidence which the farmers place in the institu-
tions. Based mainly on the impressions of this author
obtained from interviewing the farmers (rather than from

any specific data) a model of the relationship between the
institutions' past performances and the future willingness

of the farmer to respond to the innovations promoted by the
institution is suggested. It is noted that an institution
such as the Ministry of Agriculture generally Operates in an
ineffective manner; incurring no perceptible harm on the
small farmer nor significantly assisting him and having
little, if any, impact on the farmers' adoption of innova-
tions. The model suggests that if the institution could
improve to the point where significant assistance is perceived
by the farmer, the responsiveness of the farmers to innova-
tions being promoted would increase more than proportionally.
Similarly, if the institution became more effective, but

through poor standards, procedures or recommendations,

 

85

incurred perceptible harm on the farmer, then the farmer's
responsiveness to innovations being promoted would decrease
to a greater extent than did the performance of the institu-
tion; possibly even to the point of not even listening to

the suggestions of the institution. Based on the experience
of this author in Costa Rica and in other countries, it
appears that most of the institutions similar to the Ministry
of Agriculture would require large advances in effectiveness
in being of assistance to small farmers before any signifi-

cant increase in the small farmers' adoption of innovations

 

will occur as a result of their efforts. Conversely, a
smaller decrease in institutional performance, involving
perceptible harm, would probably result in large numbers of
farmers refusing, on an a priori basis, to participate in
similar projects.

Finally, since development projects inherently create
special opportunities for individuals, the example of the
La Fortuna Project indicates that project planners and
evaluators should take note of and document such opportun-
ities that arise. If a project is to benefit a certain
target group, then such documentation of who benefits is
required to properly evaluate the project.

The causes of the project results are extremely

difficult to assess. However, it does appear that, in

 

addition to the drought, the project planning, management
and execution were deficient and thus were significant

factors in the poor results.

.1“

.
1e J
—_——’.'

 

86

The La Fortuna project appears to confirm the quali-
fication which Hirschman applies to his principle of the
"Hiding Hand." This principle holds that an underestimate
of future problems which, if accurately forecast would have
precluded the project's initiation, and an underestimate of
one's creativity or ability to solve those problems may
often lead to an improved, though often different, project T—fis
result. Hirschman qualifies this principle by noting, among p

other things, that if the problems arise too early in the

 

project's life, the creative problem solving effort may not 3
be forthcoming. Since agricultural projects have a relatively
short life (in comparision, say, to a hydroelectric dam),
it is not likely that such creativity will occur.24

Although the simple documentation of a project's
successes and failures does not answer the question of how
the failures can be avoided and how the successes can be
enlarged, it hopefully narrows the range of aspects through
which to search. This is the essence of the Side-Effect

Evaluation Framework which is presented.

 

24Hirschman, Albert 0., Development Projects Observed.
(Brookings Institution; Washington, D.C.) 1967.

APPENDICES

 

APPENDIX A

TRAINING MATERIALS

Several ideas which have been given emphasis in this
thesis may be recommended for use in a training course for

project administrators and staff.

Clientele Confidence in Institutions

 

The relationship between institutional performance and
farmer willingness to adopt which was presented in Chapter V
may be expanded to a discussion Of how an institution's
current performance affects its ability to perform in the
future. By presenting case studies, some of which are
familiar to the course participants, the importance of this
relationship may be shown. This discussion should perhaps
follow a discussion of institutional policies and objectives
and precede a discussion on the topic of project planning
and implementation. If the course participants do not
become aware of the objectives of their institutions so that
they can better understand their personal motivations, the
discussion of the importance of clientele confidence is not
likely to be as effective as it might be. Similarly, a
discussion of project implementation techniques will be more
effective if the course participants are aware of the

87

 

88

importance of selecting implementation techniques which do

not reduce the confidence of their clientele.

Side-Effect Identification

 

Although the discussion of side—effects presented in
Chapter IV was set primarily in the context of project
evaluation, the concepts of side-effect identification should
be presented to the course participants in the contexts of
project design, planning, implementation and evaluation.

The importance of properly identifying the potential side-

effects of a project lies in, first, improving the institu-

 

tion's ability to design projects which most accurately
reflect the priorities among the institution's objectives.
Secondly, the proper identification of actual and potential
side-effects is important in order that an institution may
improve its ability to plan and implement projects which
will accomplish the goals of the projects with the least

possible amount of interference from undesirable side-effects.

Evaluation of Small Projects

 

The general theme of this thesis has been that the
honest evaluation of small projects is important as a means

of institutional improvement--even if the evaluations are

 

relatively simple and in general terms. The fact that an
exhaustive evaluation of all small projects is too costly

should not be an excuse for not performing any evaluations.

89

Project monitoring systems which ask only that the project's
implementing agent account for his time and not the problems
and successes encountered cannot constitute an evaluation of

the agent nor of the projects he implements.

 

APPENDIX B

THE ELEVEN MODERNITY

1. Do you consider your life to be now than it was five
years ago? 1 = Better,2 = Worse, 3 = Same, 4 = Who knows,
God knows, don't know.

2. DO you expect your life to be ___ five years from now?

1 = Better, 2 = Worse, 3 = Same 4 = Who knows, God knows,
don't know.

3. To better one's situation, it is best to:

1 = Just start working 4 = Doesn't know

2 = Make plans first 5 = Question not understood

3 = Both 1 and 2 6 = Gave reason for neither
4. To better one's situation, it is more important to:

l = Work hard 4 = Doesn't know

2 = Have luck 5 = Question not understood

3 = Both 1 and 2 6 = Gave reason for neither

QUESTIONS

 

 

Questions 5 through 11 are to be answered as follows:

1 = Agrees with statement

2 = Disagrees with statement
3 = Thinks it may be true

4 = Doesn't know

5 = Question not understood

90

10.

11.

91

Making plans only brings unhappiness, because the plans
are hard to fulfill.

It doesn't make much difference if the people elect one
or another candidate, for nothing will change.

With things the way they are today, an intelligent person

ought to think only about the present, without worrying

 

about what is going to happen tomorrow. f-fimn
The son of a farmer does not have a very good chance of

becoming a professional.

When looking for a job, a person ought to find a position

in a place located near his parents, even if that means L1_yj

losing a good Opportunity elsewhere.

In order to be happy, one must behave in ways that other
people desire, even if one has to suppress his own

ideas sometimes.

PeOple in a big city are cold and impersonal; it is hard

to make new friends.

Questions 5 through 11 were taken from Kahl, Joseph A.,

The Measurement of Modernism: A Study of Values in Brazil

and Mexico. (Austin: The University of Texas Press for

the Institute of Latin American Studies) 1966. pp. 30-33.

See Table 1, questions 1, 2, 3, 9, 18, 21 and 43.

 

[—1

l-'

APPENDIX C

CONVERSION FACTORS

1.74 acres

Manzana (Mz.)

Quintal (qq.) 100 pounds
Bushel of Corn = 56 pounds
Kilometer (km.) = .62 miles
Meter (m.) = 1.094 yards
Millimeter (mm.) = .04 inches

Bushel per Acre = 1.026 quintales per manzana

pound per acre = 1.74 pounds per manzana

92

 

 

r - .
“a.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

at”...

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arensberg, Conrad M., and Niehoff, Arthur H. Introducing
Social Change. Second Edition, Chicago: Aldine-
Atherton, 1971.

 

Bromley, Daniel W.; Schmid, A. Alan; and Lord, William B.
Public Water Resource Project Planning and Evaluation:
Impacts, Incidence and Institutions. Madison, Wisconsin:
Center for Resource Policy Studies and Programs,

School of Natural Resources, College of Agriculture and
Life Sciences, the University of Wisconsin, 1971.
(Mimeographed)

 

Econometrica, Ltda., Granos Basicos engentroamerica
("Basic Grains in Central America"). San Jose, Costa
Rica, 1970, (Mimeographed)

Fraser, Thomas M., Jr., "Sociocultural Parameters in Directed
Change," Human Organization, Vol. 22, No. 1, Spring
1963.

 

Hagen, Everett E. The Economics of Development. Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968.

Hirschman, Albert 0. Development Projects Observed. Washing-
ton, D.C.: The Brookifigs Institution, 1967.

Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agricolas de la O.E.A.
Programa de Gestion, IICA-AID, Proyecto III, Fase 1.
("Management Program, IICA-AID, Project III, Phase I").
San Jose, Costa Rica, 1972 (Mimeographed)

 

McKean, Roland M. Efficiency in Government Through Systems
Analysis. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958.

 

Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia de Costa Rica, Centro
de InformaciOn. "Estudio de Costos de Produccién
'Proyecto de Mecanizacion de Maiz en La Fortuna, de
San Carlos'," ("Production Costs Study of the
'Mechanized Corn Project in La Fortuna, San Carlos")
Boletin Tecnico No. 7, D.E.E.A., San Jose, Costa
Rica, 1972, (Mimeographed)

93

94

5 "Estudio de Costos de ProducciOn de un Proyecto de
Maiz en la Region de San Carlos-Sarapiqui, Zona de
San Jorge de Arenal," ("Production Costs Study of a
Corn Project in San Jorge de Arenal, San Carlos-
Sarapiqui Region," Boletin Tecnico No. 4, D.E.E.A.,
San Jose, Costa Rica, 1972 (Mimeographed)

Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia de Costa Rica, "Proyecto
de Mecanizacién de Maiz en La Fortuna, San Carlos,
Segundo Semestre de 1971," ("Mechanized Corn Project
in La Fortuna, San Carlos, Second Semester of 1971,")
San Jose, Costa Rica, 1971, (Mimeographed)

Mishan, E. J. Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Introduction.
New York: Praeger Press, 1971.

, Economics for Social Decisions: Elements of
Cost-Benefit Analysis. New York: Praeger Press, 1973.

ROgers, Everett M. with Shoemaker, F. Floyd. Communication

of Innovations. Second Edition, New York: Free Press,
1971.

 

Schmid, A. Alan. "Non-Market Values and Efficiency of

Public Investments in Water Resources," American
Economic Review, May, 1967.

 

 

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