THE McKINLEY ADMINISTRATION AND CUBAN INDEPENDENCE (MARCH, 1897-APRIL, 1898)

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THE McKINLEY ADMINISTRATION AND CUBAN INDEPENDENCE (MARCH, 1897-APRIL, 1898)

By

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THESIS

To Dr. Harold B. Fields, who kept me from straying beyond my subject, and whose penetrating questions crystallized my thoughts, and to Jean, a most unmerciful critic, who made me write, and rewrite, and rewrite, ad infinitum.

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Chapter I

The Background of American Interest in Cuba

The banner of Cuban independence was once again unfurled on February 24, 1895, the Grito de Baire was sounded, and the pinprick of flame in the province of Oriente soon became the fire of bloody civil war.[1] The people and government of the United States showed immediate concern. One young man, Theodore Roosevelt, wrote the governor of New York, asking an appointment to that state's quota of forces sent to Cuba. He added, a little wistfully, "But of course there will be no war."[2] He was right. Despite pressure for American intervention, Cleveland would not be forced. Instead, the President adopted an attitude of neutrality while maintaining a careful scrutiny of conditions in the island.[3]

Lying little more than one hundred miles from the coast of Florida, the "Ever Faithful Island" has long been a source of interest to the American people. European activity, slavery, and two internal convulsions have each given rise to an American policy of distinct design.

As early as 1739 the conquest of Cuba by American colonial troops was being proposed. Cuba was looked upon as the

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[1]Russell H. Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States (Menasha, Wisconsin, 1935), pp. 16-17.

[2]Theodore Roosevelt, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, ed. Elting Morrison (Cambridge, Mass., 1951-1952), I, 436.

[3]Grover Cleveland, The Letters of Grover Cleveland, 1850-1908, ed. Allan Nevins (New York, 1933), p. 410.

"Key of all America," for to control Cuba would control all the trade of the Spanish Empire.[4] During the English occupation of Havana in 1762 this spark of interest was possibly fanned by colonial soldiers who were present and who might have carried interesting stories of the island back to their homes.[5]

With independence came an increasing American interest in the future of Cuba. The acquisition of New Orleans and the Mississippi only partly aided the trans-Allegheny settlers, for they still felt at the mercy of any power that held Florida and Cuba. American statesmen entertained the same view, and especially feared British designs on the island. Jefferson, in 1807, felt the United States should stop Britain by taking Cuba, even if this move entailed a war with Spain. "Our southern defensive force can take Florida," he wrote, ". . . and probably Cuba will add itself to our Confederation."[6] The next year he advised Adams that he believed the American Constitution was well calculated for an "extensive empire."[7] His ideas on this extensive empire perhaps started with Cuba, for he noted on one occasion (1826), "I have ever looked upon Cuba as the most interesting

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[4]Charles E. Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic; A Study in Hispanic American Politics (New York, 1927), pp. 46-47.

[5]Ibid., p. 47.

[6]Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, p. 6.

[7]French Ensor Chadwick, The Relations of the United

addition which could ever be made to our system of states. . . . Her addition to our confederacy is exactly what is wanting to advance our power as a nation to the point of its utmost interest."[8]

Madison viewed Cuba, not as an interesting addition, but as a potential source of danger. He believed that some European nation might make of Cuba a "fulcrum . . . against the commerce and security of the United States."[9] This same year, 1810, Governor Claibourne of Louisiana restated Madison's idea by declaring that Cuba was "the real mouth of the Mississippi, and the nation possessing it, could at any time command the trade of the western states."[10]

A newspaper report that received wide circulation in 1817 increased American fears as to the fate of Cuba. This report noted that Britain proposed to relinquish her claim against Spain for the maintenance of the British army during the Peninsular campaign in return for cession of the island. The American purchase of Florida in 1819 led British papers to insist more strongly than ever on this proposed course of action to protect the British West Indies. Some American observers demanded a positive stand by their own government

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States and Spain, Diplomacy (New York, 1909), p. 216.

[8]Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul L. Ford (New York, 1899), X, 261, 278.

[9]John H. Latané, The United States and Latin America (Garden City, 1925), p. 285.

[10]Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic, p. 48.

to counter-balance any British action.[11] This was finally taken in April of 1823 when Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, in his instructions to the American Minister to Spain, Hugh Nelson, gave the first official statement of American policy towards Cuba. Adams noted that although Spain had irrecoverably lost her hold on South America, she still possessed Cuba and Puerto Rico. Continuing, Adams felt these islands to be natural appendages to the North American continent, and that the law of "political gravitation" made this fact obvious. He added that American interest in the future of Cuba (because of its position in American economic life) was greater than that of any other nation in the world with the possible exception of Spain herself. Adams concluded by instructing Nelson that he should not hide from Spain the "repugnance of the United States to the transfer of the island of Cuba to any other power."[12] The United States thus served notice on Europe, especially Britain and France (the latter dickering to restore the Bourbons to the Spanish throne and therefore suspect in American eyes) not to interfere in Cuba. In December of this year the whole Latin-American situation led to the Monroe Doctrine.[13]

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[11] Ibid., p. 49.

[12] John Quincy Adams, The Writings of John Quincy Adams, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York, 1917), VII, 371-381 passim.

[13] Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, p. 7.

Two years later Canning proposed that the United States, France, and England jointly disclaim any intention of occupying Cuba and protest any such occupation by other nations. The United States and France refused, but Secretary of State Clay added in a note to England that each country "must now be considered as much bound to a course of forbearance and abstinence in regard to Cuba and Puerto Rico as if . . . pledged . . . to it by a solemn act."[14] Towards the Panamá Congress in 1826 Clay displayed the same attitude. In his instructions to the commissioners, he warned against any attempted conquest of Cuba and Puerto Rico by the American republics. The probable emancipation of the slaves in those islands if they should become detached from Spain might have had some effect on this policy. The Haitian terrors were too fresh in American minds, especially in the South, to permit the establishment of what they feared would be another "Black Republic."[15]

American policy in this first period of interest in the fate of Cuba can be stated as that of keeping Spain in firm control of Cuba. England, on the other hand, effectively checked any possible aspirations held by the United States, while both England and the United States held France at bay.

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[14]Harry F. Guggenheim, The United States and Cuba; A Study in International Relations (New York, 1934), p. 6.

[15]Samuel Flagg Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy (New York, 1928), IV, 152. See also Chadwick, Diplomacy, p. 206.

"You cannot allow that we should have Cuba." wrote Canning to Rufus King, "And we cannot allow that you should have it. And we can neither of us allow that it should fall into the hands of France."[16] The status quo in the Caribbean was thus assured, with Spain's control of Cuba practically guaranteed. The United States kept a suspicious eye on European moves towards the Caribbean area, but made no change in policy until the second half of the 1840's.[17]

From the annexation of Texas to the opening of the War Between the States, Cuba figured prominently in the Manifest Destiny of American political thought, especially in the South. While the talk of canal routes across Central America increased the strategic value of Cuba for some people, the great attraction of the island proved to be its potential as another slave-holding area. President Polk, who favored annexation by "amicable purchase," twice broached the subject of purchasing Cuba from Spain to his cabinet, and $100,000,000 was set as a reasonable price. This plan misfired when the news reached the Spanish people. Castilian honor, with which the United States was to have much contact, would not countenance such a dealing.[18] The Spanish Foreign Minister informed Saunders, the American Minister, that

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[16]Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, p. 7.

[17]Bemis, The American Secretaries of State, V, 141-144, 208.

[18]Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, p. 9.

"sooner than see the Island transferred to any power, [the Spanish people] would prefer seeing it sunk in the ocean."[19]

The three attempts at securing the independence of Cuba made by Narciso López in 1849, 1850, and 1851, while having no prospect of success, led many people to believe the Cuban question was about to solve itself. Taylor and Fillmore had dropped the plan of purchasing Cuba, and many people, particularly in the South, looked to López, an ex-Spanish officer, ex-Venezuelan General, and ex-Cuban citizen, to free the island from Spanish rule. He had staged a revolt in Cuba in 1849 and, having failed, came to the United States. Here he raised a force of men, went back to Cuba and was routed, returning once again to the United States. The contacts López had in this country to aid his schemes were seen in his subsequent trial for violation of American neutrality. Governor Quitman of Mississippi barely missed spending time in jail for his part.[20] López was freed, however, because of the inability of the government to find a jury that would bring in a conviction. After being acquitted, López organized another force and again invaded Cuba; again his forces were dispersed, and he himself was captured and subsequently garroted for treason.[21]

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[19]Bemis, The American Secretaries of State, V, 300.

[20]Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, p. 10.

[21]An excellent account of the López expeditions in all their phases can be found in R. G. Caldwell, The López

The position assumed by the United States government during these activities on its shores was to adhere strictly to the letter of the neutrality law of 1818.[22] After the failure of López, filibustering plans for the liberation of Cuba fell into disrepute.

With the Democrats' return to power in 1853, projects for the purchase of Cuba were revived. Pierce, in his inaugural address, stated that "our attitude as a nation and our position on the globe render the acquisition of certain possessions, not within our jurisdiction, eminently important for our protection. . . ."[23] Cuba was one of these "certain possessions" and diplomatic posts were filled with an eye to the Cuban question:[24] Pierre Soulé was sent to Madrid, Buchanan to London, and John Y. Mason to Paris. All of these men, particularly Soulé, were in favor of the acquisition of Cuba. Soulé held extreme views, having commended filibustering publicly and having advocated the acquisition of Cuba--but "not by purchase."

At first, Pierce did not contemplate buying Cuba, for in 1853 Secretary of State Marcy instructed Soulé only to

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Expeditions to Cuba, 1848-1851 (Princeton, 1915). The definitive work on this subject will be, when completed, Herminio Portell Vilá, Narciso López y Su Epoca (Habana, 1933-1953), I-III. The third volume is now being published.

[22]Bemis, The American Secretaries of State, VI, 37-40.

[23]Guggenheim, The United States and Cuba, p. 15.

[24]Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic, p. 56.

try to arrange a commercial treaty leading to direct trade between the United States and the island. This policy was changed early in 1854, and the Pierce administration decided to re-open negotiations to purchase Cuba. The reasons for the change seemed to hinge on the difficulty of handling diplomatic issues concerning Cuba arising out of the illegal importation of slaves, the difficulty of trading, and the treatment of American citizens on the island. Marcy instructed Soulé to offer as much as $130,000,000 for Cuba, and then added that if Spain were unwilling to sell, he should direct his efforts "to the next most desirable object which is to detach that island from the Spanish dominion and from all dependence on any European power." Marcy felt once Cuba was free of Europe, the island would "undoubtedly relieve this government from all anxiety in regard to her future condition."[25]

To effect this policy, Pierce ordered Soulé to meet with Buchanan and Mason to see what could be done. Soulé, who had accomplished nothing up to now except to increase his unpopularity by wounding the French ambassador (the Marquis de Turgot) in an unwarranted duel and by attempting to intimidate Spain over the Black Warrior affair,[26] met with his colleagues in October of 1854 at Ostend, Belgium. The

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[25]Bemis, The American Secretaries of State, VI, 185-186.

[26]Guggenheim, The United States and Cuba, p. 18.

three later transferred to Aix-la-Chapelle for added privacy. The result of their labors was the so-called Ostend Manifesto. This document conformed to Marcy's instructions. First, it was stated that the United States should offer $120,000,000 for Cuba. If, however, Spain should reject the offer, the United States would be justified in wresting the island from Spain for it had become "an increasing danger and a permanent cause of anxiety and alarm. . . ." The principle behind the American position was the same as that which "would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home."[27] This, combined with the explosive Kansas-Nebraska legislation of 1853-1854, caused the anti-slavery North to oppose violently any such action on the part of the government.[28] Marcy repudiated the Manifesto, and Soulé resigned his post.[29]

The Ostend Manifesto reared its head once more. In the Presidential campaign of 1856, Buchanan's part in the formation of the document assured him Southern support. Despite the Republicans' branding of the Manifesto as a "highwayman's plea," Buchanan was elected. In 1858, the President re-opened the question of purchasing Cuba, and the next year

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[27]Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, p. 12.

[28]Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic, pp. 59-60.

[29]Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, p. 12.

Slidell, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, introduced a bill looking to this end. Nothing came of this venture, however, and the War Between the States soon eclipsed the Cuban problem. After the war, the second phase of American diplomacy, that of securing Cuba by purchase or annexation with an eye to the extension of slavery, had passed.[30]

American interest in Cuba remained dormant for some time after 1865. However, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes sounded the Grito de Yara on October 10, 1868, and for a period of ten years Cuba underwent a blood-bath that engaged both the sympathy and attention of the American government and people.[31]

The Ten Years War, as this struggle is called, was one of the problems facing Grant when he was inaugurated in 1869. The Cuban revolutionists by this time had formed themselves into a junta and proclaimed a "Republic of Cuba." Their next step was to address an appeal to the American President, asking, in the name of humanity and mutual benefit, for recognition.[32] Grant's personal sympathy lay with the Cubans, and in the fall of 1869 he signed a proclamation recognizing the belligerency of the island. Secretary of State Hamilton Fish held up the publishing of this document, however, and later persuaded Grant to include a passage in his annual

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[30] Ibid., p. 12.

[31] Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic, pp. 62-63.

[32] Guggenheim, The United States and Cuba, p. 24.

message for 1869 warning against any hasty recognition of belligerent rights. Fish believed that if the American government recognized Cuban belligerency, it would have a difficult time in pressing its claim against Britain concerning the Alabama, a situation with many of the same circumstances and principles involved.[33]

By June of the next year, American policy concerning the Cuban revolution had been established. Grant stated in a message that the conflict in Cuba lacked the necessary requirements for a recognition of belligerency, and it would therefore not be accorded. Congress, not satisfied with this, attempted to pass a joint resolution according the Cubans belligerent rights. Passing the House, the resolution was so amended in the Senate as to be little more than a protest against the barbarities of the war.[34]

The positive aspect of American policy was also established in 1870. In his instructions to Sickles, the American Minister to Madrid, Fish stated that the American government regarded the abolition of slavery in Cuba as the only solution to the tribulations being experienced on the island, and Sickles was to inform the Spanish that the United States would "expect steps to be taken for the emancipation of

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[33]Bemis, The American Secretaries of State, VII, 134, 147-148.

[34]Ibid., VII, 149.

slaves."[35] To settle the grievances of American citizens arising from the destruction of their property in Cuba by both the rebel and Spanish forces, Fish reached an agreement with the Spanish whereby a mixed commission would investigate and settle any claims made.[36]

Spanish-American relations almost reached the breaking point in 1873. The Virginius, flying the United States flag and carrying United States registry, was seized on the high seas near Jamaica by a Spanish warship. The Virginius was taken to Santiago de Cuba, and the crew, passengers, and captain were all tried and convicted for piracy by a court martial. Fifty-three of the members of the expedition were executed, and the other ninety-three were only saved by the prompt action of the British ship Niobe which threatened to bombard the harbor if another person were killed. Fish demanded from Spain the release of the Virginius and the prisoners still alive, a salute to the flag, and punishment of those responsible for the executions. After an exchange of notes the ship, surviving passengers, and crew were released, and Spain paid an indemnity of $80,000. Because of a technicality in registry, however, the salute was dispensed with.[37] The Spanish general responsible for the executions,

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[35]Latané, The United States and Latin America, p. 111.

[36]Ibid., p. 143.

[37]Guggenheim, The United States and Cuba, pp. 27-28.

Burriel, was "punished" by being promoted to Major-General.[38]

The United States had attempted to mediate in the struggle between Cuba and Spain as early as 1869. One of the American suggestions, that Spain recognize Cuban independence, would not be countenanced by Castilian honor, and the mediation died a-borning. The Spanish did offer to grant an armistice if the Cubans would ask for it, but this compromised Cuban honor, and the rebels refused to take cognizance of the gesture. Fish's next move came in 1875. He wrote to six European capitals, asking them to urge Spain to stop the war, but no notice was taken of this action. The new minister to Spain, Caleb Cushing, was then instructed to seek a more liberal government for Cuba, gradual emancipation, and improved commercial relations for the United States in regard to the island.[39] Spain answered by agreeing with all that the American government counselled, but held that only when the war ended could the reforms come.[40]

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[38]Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, p. 13. For an extremely pro-Cuban view of the Virginius expedition see Gonzalo de Quesada and Henry Northrup, The War in Cuba (New York, 1896), pp. 367-377. Quesada was the "chargé d'affaires" of the "Cuban Republic" in Washington, while, to use the words of the title page, Northrup was the "well-known author." Liberally sprinkled with murder, torture, rape, starvation, plague and what-have-you, the book is an excellent example of the type of material the Cuban Junta circulated among American readers in an attempt to solicit support.

[39]Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic, p. 68.

[40]Latané, The United States and Latin America, p. 122.

The war finally did reach an impasse, due to exhaustion on both sides, and the Treaty of Zanjón in 1878 stopped the hostilities. Under the provisions of the treaty, Cuban representation in the Spanish Cortes was granted, but this provision was more honored in appearanee than in fact. The powers of the Captain-General were defined, but incompletely, and suffrage was still to be limited only to Spaniards. The only reform carried out was emancipation in 1886.[41] From 1878 to 1895 American interests in Cuba were primarily concerned with commercial matters and roused no great interest or trouble in the United States.[42]

This period of American policy concerning Cuba was one pointing to the abolition of slavery, the establishment of some form of more liberal government, and the promotion of more lenient commercial intercourse with the United States.

The Grito de Baire on February 24, 1895 began the final period of Spanish rule in Cuba. Caused by dissatisfaction with Spain's reforms and a severe economic depression, organized by the genius of José Martí, and led in the field by Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo, the revolt was planned to break out in all six of the Cuban provinces simultaneously. In actual fact fighting was limited to Oriente, Santa Clara, and Matanzas in its first phases, spreading slowly to the

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[41]Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic, pp. 69-70.

[42]Bemis, The American Secretaries of State, VIII, 190-191, 206.

other provinces of Pinar del Río, Havana, and Camagüey.[43]

The chances of Cuban success were dim. Spain had 33,000 men in the island and could put 200,000 more into action. The Cubans, on the other hand, never numbered more than 25,000 at any one time. On top of this, not all the Cubans were united in their desire for independence.[44] Even families were split between father and son as to the course of action to take.[45] The Spanish, however, did not press their advantage and chose to fight a defensive war under General Martínez Campos. Seizing the main fortified towns, Martínez Campos established a series of trochas (a type of small fort) and sat behind their walls, scattering his army and spreading his troops thinly. The Cuban general, the wizened, bespectacled Dominican, Máximo Gómez, on the other hand, proclaimed a war of destruction on November 6, broke the trochas, and carried a guerrilla warfare throughout the island. Under Gómez's order, no cane was to be grown, and no worker was allowed to harvest any grown in violation of

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[43]Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, p. 16.

[44]Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic, p. 77.

[45]Jose Martí and his father offer a good example of this. Martí's father remained a complete loyalist throughout all of his son's activities. The only complete biographies of Martí in English are Jorge Mañach, Martí, Apostle of Freedom, trans. Coley Taylor (New York, 1950), and Félix Lizaso, Martí: Martyr of Cuban Independence, trans. Esther Elise Shuler (Albuquerque, 1953). Martí is viewed as the Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln of Cuba. He was killed early in the war at the Battle of Dos Ríos, and provided Cuba a martyr around whom to rally.

the order. Gómez's plan was to strip the island of any value to Spain, destroy every possible source of revenue, and either exhaust Spain or force American intervention.[46]

The Cubans also took other steps. The independence of the island was declared on July 15, 1895, and the following September a Constitution for the "Republic of Cuba" was proclaimed. A provisional government was established with Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, former Marquis of Santa Lucia (a title he had sacrificed when he had joined the Cuban forces in the Ten Years War), as President, while Tomás Estrada Palma and Gonzalo de Quesada were sent to the United States, the former in charge of the Cuban propaganda junta in New York, and the latter as chargé d'affaires at Washington, though without recognition by the United States government.[47]

Martínez Campos was replaced in February of 1896, after a year of no success, by General Valeriano Weyler, who soon earned himself the sobriquet of "El Carnicero," or "The Butcher," because of his infamous reconcentrado order. Under this, all inhabitants of the island outside the garrisoned places were ordered to "reconcentrate" themselves in Spanish occupied towns. Anyone found outside the towns after eight days was to be considered a rebel and shot. Stories of misery, starvation, sickness, and general horror soon

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[46]John H. Latané, America as a World Power, 1897-1907. Vol. XXV of The American Nation: A History, ed. Albert Bushnell Hart (New York, 1907), p. 6.

[47]Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic, p. 82.

began to accumulate.[48]

The United States was again an interested spectator of these events. Secretary of State Olney wrote President Cleveland on September 25, 1895, his opinion as to what course of action the United States should pursue. Olney questioned the stand taken by the Spanish that the insurgents made up the lowest, most ignorant and lawless elements on the island. "The Cuban insurgents," he wrote, "are not to be regarded as the scum of the earth. . . . In sympathy and feeling nine-tenths of the Cuban population are with them." He concluded by saying the Cuban revolution "was just in itself, commanding the sympathy, if not the open support, of the great bulk of the population affected, and capable of issuing in an established, constitutional government."[49] On September 29, Cleveland, taking caution as his watchword, answered Olney that he wanted to think the situation over before he took any action. Six months later Cleveland set the policy his administration was to follow. He wrote Olney in March of 1896 that he had no objection to expressing sympathy for Cuba, but that he did not want the United States to take any overt step towards intervention.[50] Somewhat in this line, he had already recognized the revolt as something more than a riot, but less than belligerency,

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[48]Latané, America as a World Power, p. 6.

[49]Grover Cleveland, Letters of Grover Cleveland, p. 410.

[50]Ibid., pp. 410, 431.

by proclaiming Cuba in a state of insurgency, and he felt this was as far as he could go.[51]

The positive aspect of Cleveland's policy took form on April 4, 1896. Olney addressed a note to Spain offering the mediation of the United States to restore peace in the island on the basis of more complete autonomy.[52] Spain rejected this on May 22 by stating Cuba already enjoyed "one of the most liberal political systems in the world," and that the United States could best help pacify the island by prosecuting "the unlawful expeditions of some of its citizens to Cuba with more vigour than in the past."[53] The latter was to prove a particularly sore point in the two years ahead. Cleveland adhered to his policy throughout his administration, but his annual message of December 7, 1896, while stating the reasons belligerency could not be accorded Cuba, sounded a warning to Spain. The President stated that circumstances could fix a limit to the patience of the United States. He concluded his message with:

> When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurgents has become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence,

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[51]Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, p. 18.

[52]Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President, 1896 (Washington, D. C., 1897), pp. 540-544, hereafter cited as Foreign Relations.

[53]Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents 1896-1900, trans. (Washington, D. C., 1905), pp. 9-12, hereafter cited as Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence.

> and when a hopeless struggle . . . has degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our obligation to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge.[54]

Here was a warning, but fortunately for Cleveland in this case, his responsibility for this policy was inherited by his successor.

Congress also ventured to take an active part in the Cleveland policy concerning Cuba. The Senators and Representatives, however, had their own ideas as to what American policy should be and attempted to force the President to take action. This was partly due to political expediency: if trouble were to come due to the Cuban situation, the Republicans, generally favoring recognition of Cuba at this time, wanted that trouble to come in Cleveland's administration.[55] McKinley, for example, is reported in November of 1896 as wanting the crisis to come in the winter so that it would be settled before he took office.[56]

Congress had taken action even before November. The Senate passed a resolution recognizing the belligerency of

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[54]"The War of Cuban Independence," in Great Debates in American History, ed. Marion Mills Miller (New York, 1913), III, 104, hereafter cited as Great Debates.

[55]Arthur Wallace Dunn, From Harrison to Harding, A Personal Narrative Covering a Third of a Century, 1888-1921 (New York and London, 1922), I, 165-166.

[56]Henry Cabot Lodge, Selection from the Correspondence

Cuba on February 28 and urged the Executive to mediate in behalf of Cuban independence. The House concurred in the resolution on April 6. Cleveland declined to take the Congressional policy as his own. Instead, he had Secretary of State Olney prepare and publish a statement on the executive functions and prerogatives, stating that only the President had the power to recognize foreign governments and declare belligerency in time of war or revolution.[57]

Regardless of Cleveland's views Congress again attempted to force his hand. Two days after the annual message of December 7, 1896, in which Cleveland directed his warning to Spain but withheld recognition of Cuban belligerency, three joint resolutions were introduced in the Senate. All three resolutions had as their purpose American intervention of one type or another in the Cuban situation: one to recognize the independence of Cuba and use the good offices of the United States to bring the war to a close; one to have the President use his power to take possession of Cuba and establish a protectorate in the island until the Cubans could establish a government; and one to recognize, with no reservations, the "Republic of Cuba." None of these resolutions came to a vote, while similar resolutions in the House

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of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918 (New York, 1925), I, 240.

[57]Dunn, Harrison to Harding, p. 166.

were never reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations.[58] Thus no action was taken.

In March, 1897, Cleveland left office, but he had no illusions as to the future. On returning from the inauguration ceremonies Cleveland, according to McKinley, said, "I am deeply sorry, Mr. President, to pass on to you a war with Spain. It will come within two years. Nothing can stop it."[59] His words were prophetic.

The policy of the United States in this latter phase was directed towards keeping peace with Spain, while trying to mediate peace in Cuba on the basis of liberal reform. Congress, on the other hand, was pulling in the opposite direction: the securing of Cuban independence. McKinley inherited this situation, both as to policy and Congressional temper.

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[58] Great Debates, III, 105-122.

[59] H. H. Kohlsaat, From McKinley to Harding: Personal Recollections of Our Presidents (New York and London, 1923), p. 64.

Chapter II

The American Temper

When McKinley assumed the presidential responsibilities in March of 1897, he soon found himself being pulled in opposite directions on the "Cuban Question": one counseled immediate intervention; the other a "hands off" policy. The Republican Party platform in 1896 seemed to mark the path McKinley was to follow:

> The government of Spain, having lost control of Cuba, and being unable to protect the property or lives of resident American citizens, or to comply with its treaty obligations, we believe that the government of the United States should actively use its influence and good offices to restore peace and give independence to the island.[1]

McKinley, however, interpreted the word "actively" in a conservative manner. He felt that the American people had elected him as the "advance agent of prosperity," and that any hint of war would retard industrial and commercial revival. The President also found himself in political debt to Mark Hanna who, representing the moneyed interests of the East, advised a peace policy.[2]

Indirect pressure was constantly applied on McKinley in 1897 to let Spain handle the Cuban situation without American interference. Various businessmen and organizations, possibly with an eye to cabinet meetings, wrote to Secretary

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[1]Fred J. Matheson, "The United States and Cuban Independence," Living Age, CCXVII (May, 1898), 507.

[2]Ibid., p. 508.

of the Navy John D. Long, urging peace. William Endicott, Jr., a Boston merchant, for example, advised Long in November that war would badly damage business. Endicott stated that the acquisition of Cuba would prove a great misfortune for two main reasons: first, it was contrary to the American theory of government to have subject populations; and second, there was little human material in Cuba with which to make intelligent citizens. To Endicott the Cubans were a lot of "ignorant semi-barbarians." Again, the President of the Boston Chamber of Commerce, J. R. Leeson, wrote the Secretary that, "As a method of dealing with international differences, wholesale slaughter is out of date, and is surely abhorrent to all those higher interests of humanity toward which our civilization is tending." Leeson also stated that the "better and stronger" side of Massachusetts did not want war.[3]

American plantation interests in Cuba itself desired peace and Spanish control. The spokesman for this group was Edwin F. Atkins, an American planter who had resided in Cuba for many years. Since the beginning of the insurrection in 1895, Atkins had traveled between his plantation at Soledad and Washington exerting his influence for American neutrality in the Cuban struggle. He was introduced to the new administration by a letter from Charles Francis Adams and met

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[3]John Davis Long, The Papers of John Davis Long, 1897-1904, ed. Gardner Weld Allen (Boston, 1939), pp. 31-32, 81.

with McKinley and some of his cabinet. According to Atkins, they seemed very interested in learning about the actual conditions of the island. Up to a week before the Spanish-American War started, Atkins worked for peace and believed that a liberal autonomy for the island would settle all problems. Besides talking with the President and his cabinet, Atkins also supplied information to the members of Congress who were advocating peace, and this information was used to prove that the insurgents were, in effect, not worthy of independence. How much real influence Atkins had is hard to determine. His activities, however, were prominent enough to draw an attack by Senator Proctor on the floor of Congress.[4]

The journalism of 1897-1898 is pictured as being bellicose and "spread-eagle." This picture, for the overwhelming majority of periodicals and newspapers, is true. One conservative periodical in an otherwise jingoistic company was Godkin's Nation. Comparatively early in the struggle a clever article by A. G. Sedgwick stated the problem that was uppermost in the minds of American businessmen: if the United States recognized Cuban belligerency, would American commercial interests in the island be protected? Sedgwick, through the Nation, answered "no." He felt the insurgents did not have an effective political organization, and therefore

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[4]Edwin F. Atkins, Sixty Years in Cuba; Reminiscences of Edwin F. Atkins (Cambridge, Mass., 1926), pp. 262-282 passim.

no one could be held responsible for any damages done to American property by the Cuban forces. A recognition of belligerency, according to Sedgwick, would only release Spain from the responsibility of paying damages caused by the insurgent army.[5]

Another article of general interest to business also appeared in the Nation. The author, H. White, pointed out that bonds, such as the United States 4% bonds of 1925, declined when relations between Spain and the United States seemed to be getting worse. He continued by stating that many businessmen felt that a war would put the gold standard in jeopardy, and (what was worse) might mean a return to silver, perhaps even to inflated paper. No one, according to White, could tell what would happen financially during a war.[6]

Godkin himself also entered the arena and bitterly denounced the "jingoes" who saw a war as a business enterprise only.[7] He felt that the whole question should be left in McKinley's hands for the President seemed to be the only person in Washington capable of sound deliberation.[8]

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[5]A. G. Sedgwick, "Cuban Catechism," Nation, LXII (March 12, 1896), 211-212.

[6]H. White, "Cuban Autonomy or Independence?" Nation, LXVI (March 10, 1898), 178.

[7]E. L. Godkin, "The War in Its Right Place," Nation, LXVI (March 31, 1898), 238.

[8]E. L. Godkin, "Deliberation," Nation, LXVI (April 7, 1898), 258.

The forces counseling American intervention were equally as strong as, and eventually proved stronger than, those already mentioned. The evils of the reconcentrado system were exploited to the utmost by the periodical press. In article after article the Cuban was pictured as a poor, innocent, peacefully-inclined, starving person who had been uprooted from his home and who had to stand by and watch his family beaten, starved, raped, and murdered. Guards were charged with shooting people for doing no more than slipping from the camps to hunt food, and the camp areas were graphically pictured as filthy, overcrowded places where people had to live amidst noxious odors and sleep on the bare ground.[9]

The actual effect of the reconcentrado system on the health of the inmates can be seen in the following statistics sent to Assistant Secretary of State Day by Lee, the American Consul-General in Habana:

Santa Clara--Reported Deaths[10]

A.	1890-1897	5,489
B.	1897 alone	6,981
	1. January	78
	2. February (first month of the reconcentrado system)	114
	3. December	1,011

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[9]One example of this type of material is Stephen Bonsal, "Starvation in Cuba," Harper's Weekly, XLI (May 29, 1897), 531.

[10]Consular Correspondence Respecting the Condition of the Reconcentrados in Cuba, the State of the War in that

Figures such as these, which could be repeated for each province in Cuba, plus tales of horror, provided ample material for a press on an orgy of sensationalism.

Another type of story printed to influence opinion and thus, one presumes, the McKinley Administration, dealt with the "duty" of the United States towards Cuba. War, according to H. D. Money, was a question of fact only, and the facts justified calling the rebellion in Cuba a war. He continued by stating that the mere recognition of Cuban belligerency would not, however, discharge the "duty" of the United States. International law, the writer felt, recognized the principle of intervention in civil wars by another nation if that intervention was to preserve material interests. As American investments were being hurt by the war, the actual "duty" of the United States was to intervene in the situation, peacefully or otherwise, and end the war. Once the war had ended, Money concluded, then the question of independence or annexation of the island to the United States could be discussed.[11]

The foregoing type of material brought forth a rash of articles by those who desired Cuban independence, which attempted to prove that Cuba was ready to take her place in the family of sovereign nations. One good example of this

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Island, and the Prospects of the Projected Autonomy. 55 Cong., 2d Sess., House Document No. 406, p. 18.

[11]H. D. Money, "Our Duty to Cuba," Forum, XXV (March, 1898), 17-24, passim.

was F. G. Pierra's article which emphasized the reasons Cuba should be free and independent. The insurgent army had proved its strength, the author believed, for Spain would never be able to win the war, although she was capable of continuing it. Furthermore, Cuba's sovereignty would be beneficial to the United States. Pierra believed this for two reasons: one, the island would no longer be a danger to the United States for, as a free nation, it could not be used by a European power as a base for an attack on the North American continent; and two, American capital would produce dividends again, as it was not doing since the war. In answer to the critics who felt that Cuba could not be free and independent because of chaotic economic conditions, Pierra intimated that, given freedom, the industrious Cuban laborer would be able to exploit the island's resources and thus recuperate its financial health. This in turn would lead to political stability.[12]

Cuban leadership was extolled in many articles. One writer, for example, showed the average Cuban to be a peace-loving individual who desired nothing more than law and order. Under the "Republic," it was then noted, Cuba had established a civil government that functioned, and the officials of this government were proving to the world that Cubans were able to administer their own affairs. At the

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[12]Fidel G. Pierra, "Present and Future of Cuba," Forum, XXII (February, 1897), 659-672, passim.

very least, it was stated, the Cuban could do no worse at governing than the Spanish, who had been corrupt, and who had prostituted their trust for monetary gain.[13]

The daily newspaper that greeted every American during this period both reflected popular opinion in favor of free Cuba and, by a bellicose pro-Cuban stand, made the business of diplomacy difficult for the Administration. These newspapers relied even more heavily on atrocity stories to fill their columns than did the journals of opinion. One story, for example, gave a detailed description of the "murder" by Spanish authorities of three brothers,[14] while another printed an eye-witness tale of a young boy who was "butchered alive" for not "hurrahing" Spain. His mangled corpse, so this story related, was left to rot in the street. The writer of this account also stated that it was not at all unusual to find dogs gnawing on human bones in the streets of various cities in Cuba.[15]

It is interesting to note the various adjectives used by the daily press to describe the Spanish and Cuban forces. Almost invariably the Cuban is described as a dashing soldier and polished gentleman while the Spaniard is treated as

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[13]T. G. Alvord, "Is the Cuban Capable of Self-Government?" Forum, XXIV (September, 1897), 119-126.

[14]Detroit Free Press, January 2, 1897, p. 7.

[15]Ibid., January 11, 1897, p. 1.

a butchering murderer.[16] One story in particular is illustrative of this. The Cuban forces had succeeded in smashing a Spanish fortress, and, after the Spaniards surrendered, the Cubans parolled their prisoners. At the next fort taken one hundred Spanish troops and three officers joined the Cuban forces for they "were sick at heart because of the murderous work they were obliged to do." This same story pointed out that Weyler's troops, when on the march, burned villages, killed many innocent people, and "arrested" women. Many of these women, the story concluded, killed themselves rather than suffer "the fate they knew awaited them."[17] The newspapers did not deny that the Spanish occasionally won a battle from the insurgents, but they prefaced such stories, on occasion, with the phrase, "If Spanish reports can be believed. . . ."[18]

George W. Auxier, in an article in the Hispanic-American Historical Review, has brought to the attention of scholars another potent force that was operating on the American public: the Cuban Junta. Composed chiefly of naturalized Cubans who lived along the Atlantic seaboard, the Junta made its activities felt all over the United States, particularly in the Mid-West. From the beginning of the War

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[16]Ibid., January 2, 1897, p. 15, and Detroit Evening News, March 8, 1897, p. 4, seem to be representative of this.

[17]Detroit Sunday News-Tribune, January 21, 1897, p. 1.

[18]Detroit Evening News, February 18, 1897, p. 1.

of Independence in 1895, one of the major operations undertaken by this group was the outfitting and sending of filibustering expeditions. Martí was the chief organizer of these activities, but after his death in 1895 Tomás Estrada Palma ably carried on the task. The "Cuban Legation" was also established by this group at Washington and was charged with securing American recognition of Cuban belligerency.[19]

Propaganda, of course, played a large part in the activities of the Junta, and the Consul of the unrecognized "Legation," Horatio Rubens, stated as much in his memoirs.[20] A willing press printed articles sent out by the Junta that depicted Spain as a barbarous Goliath losing a battle to freedom's new David. The Junta also staged plays, issued newspapers, engineered "sympathy" meetings, and distributed pamphlets. All these activities served a dual purpose: they raised money to help carry on the insurrection, and they gained sympathy for the Cuban cause.[21]

The problem of evaluating the total influence exerted by the Junta on all Americans is difficult, if not impossible. McKinley, however, realized the power exerted by this group. Rubens repeats a curious conversation he had

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[19]George W. Auxier, "The Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Junta in Precipitating the Spanish-American War," HAHR, XIX (August, 1939), 286-289.

[20]Horatio S. Rubens, Liberty: The Story of Cuba (New York, 1932), 106.

[21]Auxier, "Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Junta," HAHR, XIX, 290-303, passim.

with the Chief Executive that illustrates this. Late in March, President McKinley, through Woodford, had proposed that Spain offer an armistice to the Cuban forces.[22] The Cuban insurgents, through the Junta, rejected this move, and Rubens evidently visited McKinley within days after the proposal to make this clear. The President asked the reasons for Cuban opposition to the armistice, and Rubens told him that his proposal would accomplish something 200,000 Spanish troops could not. The President is then recorded as saying he believed the real reason to be that Cuba wanted the United States in the war. Such a thing, McKinley concluded, would not happen.[23]

As has been noted, phrases, such as the "American duty to Cuba," were used by journalists to provoke a pro-Cuban reaction from the American public, and the newspapers and the Junta added weight to these arguments. Did these activities elicit the desired reaction? Several observers of the American scene seemed to give an affirmative answer to this question. The Spectator attempted to analyze the American character and presented some of its conclusions: the American had a contempt for Spain and felt the Spanish were corrupt and cruel; the American also felt a genuine sympathy for the underdog; and there was a definite feeling in the

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[22]See below, pp. 71-72.

[23]Rubens, Liberty, pp. 327-329.

West for some blood-letting.[24] Another article, although written a month after the war started, was a bit more analytical and summarized many of the other articles written in 1897. Matheson, the author, stated four fundamental principles were behind the United States' action in intervening: one, a desire to be avenged on Spain for the "murders" it had committed; two, self-interest (i.e. to rid the commerce of the United States of serious interference such as conditions in Cuba had occasioned); three, sympathy with a brave people; and, four, humanity.[25] Thus there is little doubt that the journalistic and propaganda efforts met with success as far as the American public was concerned. There is also evidence that the administration was very much aware of the pressures created by these stories, for Dawes wrote that the atmosphere engendered by the press had seriously hampered American diplomacy with Spain.[26]

Another factor working against the peace policy pursued by McKinley was within his own Executive branch of the government. Tucked away as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt made his views known with no room for doubt. In a letter to William Astor Chanler, dated

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[24]"American Impulsiveness," Spectator, LXXVII (December 26, 1896), 924.

[25]Matheson, "The United States and Cuban Independence," LA, CCXVII, 505-506.

[26]Charles Gates Dawes, A Journal of the McKinley Years, ed. Boscom N. Timmons (Chicago, 1950), p. 147.

December 23, 1897, Roosevelt stated that he hoped all European nations would be "driven out of America, and every foot of American soil, including the nearest island . . ., would be in the hands of independent American states, and so far as possible in the possession of the United States or under its protection."[27] His views did not change in the period under discussion except to become more bellicose, and his many letters concerning the Cuban situation all showed his desire for some active American policy, preferably war.[28] Roosevelt's desires erupted into activity on February 25, 1898. Long had taken a day's vacation and left his young assistant in charge. Roosevelt took advantage of the situation and, later, claimed he did all in his power to get the United States ready for the "inevitable" Spanish conflict.[29] The Secretary took a somewhat less enthusiastic view of his assistant's activities. Long stated he returned on the next day to find that Roosevelt had caused an explosion in the department. The Assistant Secretary had authorized ship movements, ordered ammunition which there was no means to move to places where there was no room to store it, sent messages to Congress for legislative action, authorized the enlistment of an unlimited number of seamen, and ordered guns from

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[27]Roosevelt, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, I, 746.

[28]See, for example, Roosevelt, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, I, 717, 747, 784-785, 797-798.

[29]Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography (New York, 1929), p. 213.

the Washington Navy Yard to be shipped to New York with the plan in mind of arming auxiliary cruisers. The foregoing, said Long, showed that Roosevelt lacked a cool head and careful discretion.[30]

A final pressure to be considered in this study was that of Congress. Here the battle was between the so-called "jingoists" and "conservatives": those desiring either American intervention or recognition of Cuban belligerency, and those desiring no American action at all. When McKinley took office in March, 1897, the Democrats and Republicans switched positions on this issue, with the Democrats introducing measures calling for recognition, and the Republicans defending the peace policy of the Administration.

Congress met for the first session of the Fifty-fifth Congress on March 15, 1897, but not for two weeks did the "Cuban Question" come to the fore. On April 1, Senator Morgan of Alabama rose and proposed Senate Joint Resolution 26:

> Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, etc. That a condition of public war exists between the Government of Spain and the government proclaimed and for sometime maintained by force of arms by the people of Cuba, and that the United States of America shall maintain a strict neutrality between the contending powers, according to each all the rights of belligerents in the ports and territory of the United States.[31]

According to John Bassett Moore, this meant a "public war"

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[30]John D. Long, America of Yesterday, ed. Lawrence Shaw Mayo (Boston, 1923), pp. 168-170.

[31]Congressional Record, 55 Cong., 1st Sess., p. 562.

was raging on the island, that a political community or de facto power having a certain coherence and a certain independence of position in respect to territorial limits, population, interests, and destiny, existed, and that the actual or imminent existence of an emergency made it incumbent upon neutral powers to define their relations to the conflict.[32] Simplified, this means the conditions that actually existed on the island were more than local uprisings, that the insurgents had an operating civil government, and that the island's situation in relation to the United States was such that the latter's interests were affected.

Senator Morgan opened the debate in favor of his resolution on April 6 by stating it was his conviction that the war power belonged to Congress, whether it was a declaration of war by the United States or a declaration of war existing between other countries. Although Morgan gave no reasons for his conviction, he did state his grounds for believing war actually existed in Cuba. The United States protested that Spain did no carry on civilized warfare, Morgan said, and he wondered what right of such protest existed if there was no legally recognized war in Cuba. Morgan continued by stating that Cuba had an army of 50,000 to 60,000 men and controlled most of the island.[33]

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[32]John Bassett Moore, The Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore (New Haven, 1944), II, 100-101.

[33]Congressional Record, 55 Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 615, 617-618.

After stating these legal arguments, Morgan brought in some practical considerations. The filibuster laws, he said, had caused great expense and irritation, and settlement of the just claims of American citizens arising out of the destruction of their property had been long in coming from Spain. If belligerency were accorded to the Cuban Republic, Morgan believed, all the evils he had enumerated would vanish, as international law would make it possible to enforce on both side the protection of American citizens. As an afterthought, he mentioned that a recognition of belligerency might enable the Cubans to become independent. This he saw as a "good thing."[34]

A more emotional set of reasons was given by Senator Mason of Illinois as to why he believed a state of war existed in Cuba. In these, one can see the influence of the journalism of the day. Mason felt that, as long as either side could take towns and burn them, and if the Spanish were harming American citizens, then certainly a state of war existed. Mason rose to a climax by stating that men were being killed, women raped, and people were starving, and he concluded that recognition of Cuban belligerency would give the insurrectionists an equal opportunity to purchase war material in the United States and thus give them an equal chance in their war against Spain.[35]

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[34]Ibid., pp. 616, 618-620, passim.

[35]Ibid., pp. 1130-1133, passim.

Senator Turpee and Senator Daniel presented some of the best legal arguments in favor of the Morgan Resolution. One of the points of international law applying to the "Cuban Question" revolved around the insurrectionists not having a seaport. Turpee pointed out that although the Cubans had no seaport, they were capable of having one. He called the attention of the Senate to the fact that the insurrectionists had captured a port in the past when they needed one, but that they had subsequently been driven from it. The implication was that this did not alter the fact that the rebels could, on occasion, have a port. Turpee also offered to prove that the insurgents operated under a republican civil government. With a recognition of belligerency, he concluded, Americans in Cuba would be protected by international law, and the Cuban government would have the ability to wage the war on more even terms.[36]

Senator Daniel presented a reasoned argument favoring the Morgan Resolution. After a lengthy examination of the distribution of powers under the Constitution, Daniel stated that nowhere in that document was the President invested with the power to recognize belligerency. Indeed, Daniel leaves one with the impression that the only duty of the President is to enforce the law made by the legislature. That being the case, Daniel concluded, the Congress should recognize the belligerency of Cuba by passing the Morgan

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[36]Ibid., pp. 950-953, passim.

Resolution, and the President should enforce that law regardless of his personal opinions.[37]

The humanitarian support for the Morgan Resolution was, of course, not lacking. While all the Senators supporting the resolution made a point of this, Senator Frank J. Cannon of Utah had no peer in coupling a moral justification for recognition with a type of humanitarian imperialism. Speaking to those who called the supporters of the resolution "jingoists," Cannon waxed vehement, saying that if all who hated "that mad dog, Weyler, . . . [that] ravisher of women, [that] assassin of men, [that] crucifier of children . . ." were jingoists, "then 71,000,000 Americans are jingoes." There was no need to worry about European action, as some feared, Cannon went on, for the United States was the most prosperous, intelligent, industrious nation in the world and could stand alone. To any who might find the resolution incompatible with international law, Cannon posed a series of questions: "What is international law? What legislature wrote it?" When applied to Cuba, he stated, international law was a serpent and the heel of the United States was to be placed on its head. Providence, he declared, had held the Western Hemisphere from settlement until free men were ready to settle it. Therefore the United States owed it to God to strike the Spanish from all the Americas. Cannon also felt that the establishment of a protectorate over Cuba

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[37]Ibid., pp. 1093-1101, passim.

would be a wise move, and only when Cuba was ready for self-government should it be given.[38] He did not state, however, how and by whom it would be determined that Cuba was ready for sovereignty.

Senator Foraker states in his Notes of a Busy Life that he supported the Morgan Resolution and advocated the recognition of belligerency in Cuba.[39] A look into the Congressional Record, however, shows that, while advocating the resolution, Foraker seemed more concerned with having it sent to the Committee on Foreign Relations for their considered action than in having it immediately passed. Repeating many of the arguments of his colleagues, Foraker stated that war existed in Cuba, property was being destroyed, and humanity made American action imperative. He also stated, however, that only by referring the resolution to the Committee on Foreign Relations could all the facts be carefully considered.[40] In this desire, Foraker was supported by several other Congressmen. Lodge, for example, wanted the Senate to allow the Committee to secure data and report the resolution back with a careful documentation of fact behind it. To alleviate the fears of those who felt the resolution would be pigeon-holed, Lodge assured the

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[38] Ibid., pp. 1050-1051.

[39] Joseph Benson Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life (Cincinnati, 1916), II, 17-18.

[40] Congressional Record, 55 Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1154-1158, passim.

Senate that he knew the attitude of the Committee and what type of report they would return.[41]

The opponents of the Morgan Resolution, like those favoring it, used both legalistic, humanitarian, and realistic reasons in their attempt to defeat the measure. Hale opened the debate for those opposed to the resolution and, like Foraker and Lodge, stated that no committee had backed Morgan's proposal. Therefore, he wanted the resolution referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Unlike Foraker and Lodge, however, Hale did not put himself on record as approving the resolution. Indeed, he let it be known his thinking was the exact opposite.[42] Wellington supported Hale in debate, declaring the only reasons advocated for the resolution had been the opinions of Senate members and not fact.[43]

During the debate, Hale also objected to the resolution on the grounds that McKinley himself opposed it, and that the President was investigating the situation in Cuba to determine what steps needed to be taken. In the light of this, Hale felt it would not be wise to force the Presidential hand.[44] Senator Morrill agreed with Hale, but carried the argument further by disputing with those who felt that

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[41] Ibid., p. 998.

[42] Ibid., pp. 946, 949.

[43] Ibid., pp. 1089.

[44] Ibid., pp. 947-948.

Congress had the right to recognize a state of belligerency. This action, he felt, was the exclusive right of the President. If those who held otherwise persisted, the way to settle the jurisdictional dispute was impeachment, not usurption, for the verdict would conclusively locate the power in question.[45] Caffery would have ruled out impeachment, for he felt that no jurisdictional dispute existed. While some of the Senators had tried to disprove that the Executive had the sole right of recognition in the case at hand, he believed that they had in no way proved their own power to act, while a century of precedent proved that only the President could act in the Cuban situation.[46]

Several opponents of the resolution based their objections to it on what they believed were the ramifications of the measure. To pass the resolution, they felt, would lead to broken relations with Spain. This in turn would lead to a war for which the United States was not in the least prepared.[47] Such a war was not only unwanted by the people of the United States,[48] but, it was believed, would prove disastrous, for it might lead other European nations to side with Spain. Even if the war were won, it was felt, the United States would then find itself with Cuba, a destitute

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[45] Ibid., pp. 993-994, 1173.

[46] Ibid., p. 1179.

[47] Ibid., pp. 993-995, passim.

[48] Ibid., p. 949.

area full of a mixed population of foreign cultural background.[49] What would the United States do with such an area? That was the implied question.

International law was also used to bolster the attack of those opposing the resolution. Senator Morrill questioned the belief of those who held that Cuba had an operating government. The war itself, he stated, was a guerrilla warfare conducted from no fixed seat of government. To add weight to his arguments, Morrill reminded the Senate that the Cubans actually held no port.[50] Thus Morrill ruled out the resolution on three basic points necessary under international law for a recognition of belligerency: the war was not "public" in nature, there was no fixed seat of government, and no port was actually in the hands of the insurgents at the moment.[51] He also called the attention of the Senate to the fact that a recognition of belligerency would relieve the Spanish government of any responsibility for paying American citizens for damage done to their property by the insurgents.[52] Senator Hoar also used a point of international law to question the effect of the resolution. If the resolution passed, Hoar believed that Spain could search American ships anywhere outside the American three

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[49] Ibid., p. 995.

[50] Ibid., pp. 994-995.

[51] Ibid., p. 994.

[52] Ibid., p. 993.

mile limit of Cuba. Thus, he concluded, passing the resolution would actually harm the Cuban cause for the Spanish would have greater opportunity to seize and search vessels that were loaded with materiel for the insurgent forces.[53]

Two other reasons for not passing the Morgan Resolution were also mentioned. Viewing Washington's Farewell Address as the shining principle of American foreign policy, Morrill warned that a recognition of Cuban belligerency would ignore this wise advice by mixing America in the affairs of other nations.[54] Secondly, it was pointed out that the United States was in too poor a condition economically to cast its vision other than to its own internal problems, and that campaign promises to the American people on economic matters still had to be fulfilled. In conclusion it was stated that if such matters did not receive prompt attention, the American people would vote the Republicans from office at the next election.[55]

The Morgan Resolution finally came to a vote on May 20, 1897, passed, and was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. As this committee had not been appointed, however, the resolution was put on the calendar, but never reported.[56] The House did attempt to force the President to

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[53]Ibid., pp. 1136-1140, passim.

[54]Ibid., p. 994.

[55]Ibid., pp. 1089-1090.

[56]Ibid., pp. 1186, 1394.

take action along the lines proposed by Morgan. On May 13 the Senate agreed unanimously to an Executive request that Congress appropriate $50,000 to be used to aid suffering Americans in Cuba. The House was not so generous as the Senate. First, an unsuccessful attempt was made to attach a belligerency amendment to the bill of appropriation. Then various Representatives, while stating their desire to aid any American undergoing hardship, used the debate time devoted to them to express their views on the Cuban situation. In essence, their arguments can be stated as saying that the appropriation of money to aid suffering Americans, which they intended to vote for, was not the real way to aid distressed citizens. It would be better, so the argument ran, to intervene in the Cuban struggle and settle it.[57] Those favoring the appropriation, but not belligerency, met the critics of the President's policy with essentially the same arguments as their colleagues in the Senate.[58] The bill was finally passed as sent from the Senate (with no mention of a recognition of belligerency), and the President signed it on May 26.[59]

The foregoing chapter has attempted to show those pressures working on the Administration that may be termed

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[57] Ibid., pp. 1081, 1196.

[58] See, for example, Ibid., pp. 1190-1191, the views of Representative Hitt.

[59] Ibid., p. 1246.

"continuous" in that they were constantly at work seeking to bring about a change in American foreign policy. McKinley succeeded, during the first year of his Administration, in holding at bay these forces, and attempted to carry out his policy of securing peace in Cuba while staying out of war with Spain.

Chapter III

The Search for Autonomy and Peace

The diplomacy of 1897 illustrates McKinley's desire to pursue peace while attempting to find a solution to the "Cuban Question" that would be acceptable to both the Spanish and the insurgents. To aid McKinley in this delicate task, John Sherman was appointed Secretary of State, and in May Judge Day was made his assistant.[1] McKinley asked Seth Low, J. D. Cox, and John W. Foster, in that order, to accept the post of Minister to Spain. For various reasons, each candidate refused the office. Finally, Stewart L. Woodford consented to the appointment and proved to be an admirable choice.[2]

During 1897, Judge Day assumed more and more control over State Department affairs, until near the end of the year Sherman was not even consulted on many matters. There is also evidence that Day controlled, in direct consultation with the President, all foreign affairs dealing with Cuba.[3]

Before McKinley occupied the Presidential office, the Queen Regent of Spain made it known that she would decree an extension of liberal political reforms to the island of Cuba.

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[1]James Ford Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, 1897-1909 (New York, 1922), p. 46.

[2]Ibid., p. 41. See also Dawes, A Journal of the McKinley Years, p. 120-122.

[3]Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 37. See also Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, p. 41.

As a condition of granting these reforms, however, the Queen ruled that the insurgents had to lay down their arms; if they did not, the war would continue with the same energy as before.[4] One of the first things the Spanish Minister to Washington ascertained after the announcement of the proposed reform was the attitude of the incoming administration to the plan. He reported home that the President-elect and many of his political advisors seemed to favor the decrees.[5]

The foregoing does not mean that McKinley took a passive role in the events transpiring on the island of Cuba. Once in office, McKinley directed Sherman to call the attention of the Spanish to the manner in which they conducted their operations in Cuba. The President felt constrained to protest the indiscriminate use of fire and famine to attain what the Royal military forces seemed powerless to accomplish directly. The President also protested "in the name of the American people and in the name of common humanity . . . the inclusion of a thousand or more of American citizens among the victims of this policy, the wanton destruction of the legitimate investments of Americans . . . , and the stoppage of avenues of normal trade. . . ." McKinley concluded his remarks by warning Spain that the latter's actions and conduct of the war would have to be changed if the United States was to continue to leave the Cuban people under

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[4]Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence, pp. 19-20.

[5]Ibid., p. 24.

Spanish control.[6]

Less than a week passed before Spain, through the Spanish Minister, Dupuy de Lôme, replied to McKinley. Dupuy de Lôme prefaced his remarks by stating that the information available to the President was undoubtedly exaggerated. Further, the Spanish Minister insisted that what little hardship actually existed was caused by the way the insurgents, not Spain, conducted the war. The Spanish authorities, Dupuy de Lôme felt, were protecting the non-combatant Cuban as best they could, but he also believed that the islanders were partly responsible for their condition because they refused to cooperate with Spain. Dupuy de Lôme concluded by stating that the evils of the situation would remain until the war ended, and that the United States could best help improve conditions by enforcing filibuster laws, counseling peace, and not encouraging the insurgents.[7] This closed the matter for a time, but it shows the opening of the first breech between Spain and the McKinley administration.

Besides the negative action of protesting the conduct of the war, the President sought to restore peace in Cuba. In McKinley's instructions to Woodford on July 16, the President reviewed the past condition of the relations between Cuba and Spain. From this review, he came to the conclusion

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[6]Foreign Relations, 1897, pp. 507-508.

[7]Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence, pp. 27-28.

that it was visionary for Spain to hope that the island would again bear the dependence it once had to the mother country. McKinley, therefore, felt that the time had come for the United States "to . . . consider and clearly decide the nature and methods of its duty both to its neighbors and itself." Reflecting on the difficulties of enforcing neutrality laws, the effect of the insurrection on commerce, and the probability that an incident might inflame passions beyond control, the President believed mere inaction on the part of the United States could not be expected. As a step in the direction of peace, he instructed Woodford to inform the Spanish that the United States felt the time had arrived when Spain, of her own volition, should put a stop to the war and make definite proposals for a peace settlement honorable to both the Spanish people and Cuba. While stressing the grounds under international law by which the United States could conceivably intervene in the struggle, McKinley directed Woodford to inform Spain that no such intervention was contemplated. In closing, the President stressed the point that if no action on the part of Spain was taken, he was convinced it was his duty to come to an early decision as to the policy the United States would have to pursue in the future.[8]

Before Woodford could deliver this information to Spain, the assassination on August 8 of Cánovas del Castillo,

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[8]Foreign Relations, 1897, pp. 558-561.

President of the Spanish Government, changed the political environment.[9] Woodford's first official interview was held on September 18, but the government with which he dealt was tottering, for no successor to Cánovas had been chosen. After delivering the pertinent parts of his instructions to the Duke de Tetuán, a representative of the old Conservative cabinet, Woodford closed the interview by suggesting that Spain should give the United States an assurance by November 1 that an early and certain peace would be secured in Cuba. Otherwise, he stated, the United States would feel free to take such steps as it felt necessary to attain this result. No satisfactory answer was immediately tendered, although the Spanish representative agreed to call the attention of the cabinet to the American suggestions. The Duke then declared that Spain felt the United States could best help the cause of peace by a more strict enforcement of its neutrality laws.[10]

The general outlines of the American policy were well-known to other European countries. Even before Woodford had been officially received, he had busied himself with informing the British Ambassador to Spain of the views of the American government. If Cuba possessed an autonomy such as Canada enjoyed, Woodford stated, the United States would be

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[9] Ibid., p. 525.

[10] Ibid., pp. 556-557.

content.[11] Russia and Germany were also kept abreast of American policy.[12]

Before the Conservative government had an opportunity to draft a reply to the American proposals, the Ministry was forced to tender its resignation to the Queen.[13] Five days later, on October 4, a new Liberal government came to power with Sagasta at the head, and Gullón as Minister of State.[14] With this change, a new question had to be answered: how would the new Ministry react to the American proposals? Woodford believed that not even the Ministry itself knew the answer, but he ventured the opinion that a somewhat indefinite autonomy would be offered the insurgents with the hope that it would end the rebellion. The American Minister felt this would be inadequate, however, for he believed the Spanish incapable of understanding autonomy as did the Anglo-American.[15] McKinley suspended judgment on what the changes in the Spanish government would mean, but did go so far as to say he thought conditions would be better.[16]

The Spanish in late October formally answered the American suggestions. Prefacing their statement by a declaration

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[11] Ibid., p. 565.

[12] Ibid., pp. 573-575, 576-579.

[13] Ibid., p. 573.

[14] Ibid., p. 580.

[15] Ibid., p. 581.

[16] Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 37.

of the liberal orientation of the new government, they informed the United States that a totally new colonial policy was to be put into effect. This, they felt, amounted to autonomy for Cuba. The island was to have its own local government, while Spain retained control of foreign relations, the army, the navy, and justice. General Weyler was also replaced by the more liberal and less brutal General Blanco. Because of the liberal nature of the reforms, the Spanish government believed that the insurgent forces would be defeated, for the Cuban people would turn against them. Spain also took advantage of this note to press again its wish that the United States would apply with more vigour means to prevent aid from reaching the insurgents.[17]

The official reaction in Washington to the new program was tentatively favorable. Early in November, the United States stated that it discerned in the Spanish program a "hopeful" indication in the direction of peace for Cuba. Enthusiastic support was not forthcoming, however, for it was felt that only time could show how successful the program would be. The American government even went so far as to say that an evidence of sincerity was needed, and suggested that an immediate change in the treatment of noncombatants would be an effective guarantee of Spanish motives.[18] The Spanish Minister in Washington was more

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[17] Foreign Relations, 1897, 583-585.

[18] Ibid., p. 598.

optimistic about American support for the new reforms, for he reported to Spain that the President was entirely satisfied with the development of events and felt all causes for rancor would disappear as the measures were carried out.[19]

The last exchange of notes did, however, raise two subjects to the point where the United States felt constrained to take action. Since the beginning of McKinley's dealings with Spain, the Spanish had hinted that the United States was not being so careful as it should to see that American neutrality laws were enforced. According to the American government, the point at issue was a mis-interpretation by Spain of the Neutrality Act of 1818. This Act, the United States declared, made three things mandatory on the American government: first, the United States could not knowingly consent to the enlistment within its territorial jurisdiction of armed forces intended for the service of an insurrection; second, the United States could not knowingly permit the arming of vessels within its territorial jurisdiction if those ships were to be employed in the service of an insurrection; and third, the United States could not knowingly permit an insurgent force to set afloat a military expedition from its territory against the power with which the insurgents were contending. This did not mean, the note continued, that the United States could not sell arms, or

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[19] Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 39.

its vessels could not carry passengers. For Spain's objection to the enforcement of American neutrality laws to be valid, the note concluded, the "intent" of the passengers to aid the insurrection, and the "intent" of the arms to be used by the insurrectionists would have to be proved.[20]

The second subject that arose from the last exchange of communications, although indirectly, was that of the reconcentrados. In answer to the American suggestion that some step be taken to alleviate the plight of the non-combatant, Dupuy de Lôme informed the United States that General Blanco had vigorously attacked the problem: zones of cultivation had been organized; food had been, and was being, furnished by the government; and work had been allotted to the people. It was also reported that subscriptions had been raised and would be spent to relieve any hardships being suffered.[21] On top of this, Spain also informed the United States that Blanco had rescinded the reconcentrado order.[22] The American government expressed its pleasure with these efforts, but later had again to call the attention of Spain to the fact that the condition of the reconcentrados was still deplorable. As action by the Spanish government had failed to relieve the plight of these non-combatants, McKinley suggested that Spain allow the generosity of American citizens

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[20]Foreign Relations, 1897, pp. 609-610.

[21]Ibid., p. 510.

[22]Ibid., p. 602.

to help by contributions of food, clothing, and medical aid. An exchange of notes between Washington and Madrid finally culminated in a Presidential directive on December 24 informing the American public that they could send aid in money or in kind, to Lee, the American Consul-General in Habana. Spain agreed to admit any such aid duty-free.[23]

These two issues, which were, in reality, only side-issues, were soon submerged in the main current of interest: autonomy and peace for Cuba. Three decrees were signed by the Queen Regent of Spain on November 25, and these comprised the extent of the liberal reforms that had been promised. The first conferred upon the residents in the Antilles all rights held by peninsular Spaniards, and the second extended the electoral laws of Spain to Cuba. While the foregoing did not need ratification of the Cortes, the third decree, published on November 27, did. Under it a number of privileges were granted: the Cuban executive power and parliament could consider and vote domestic legislation; the legislature, through the Governor-General, could apply for modification of existing laws and propose new laws to the central government; and the legislature could also receive the oath of the governor, establish and administer electoral machinery, make regulations concerning the budget, and take part in making commercial treaties that affected

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[23]Ibid., pp. 511-514.

Cuba.[24] From the above decrees it is possible to discern one other point: the Governor-General, a Spanish appointee, was still the most important link with whom the Cubans had contact with Spain, for it was through him that all changes in existing legislation would have to be proposed.

Did the reforms as outlined in the decrees satisfy official Washington? Dupuy de Lôme felt the answer to this question was yes. In fact, he was extremely optimistic. Just before the President delivered his annual address, the Spanish Minister wrote his government that he felt the whole triangle of Spanish-Cuban-American relations had never been better, and that he had been informed that all motive for irritation had disappeared.[25]

On the face of things, Dupuy de Lôme was justified in his belief. In the President's annual message, McKinley retraced Spanish-American relations concerning Cuba briefly, and then outlined the activities of his administration to re-establish order in Cuba. He then informed Congress of the Spanish reforms, stated he felt that the United States must give the Spanish time to try their plan, and declared that during this time the United States would watch and see if conditions of a righteous peace for all concerned were likely to be attained. If it appeared that the war was to continue, the United States then would have to take further

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[24] Ibid., pp. 616-617.

[25] Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 43.

action in line with its indisputable right and duty. McKinley concluded his address with the following:

> If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization, and to humanity to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part and only because necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the civilized world.[26]

It is clear from this that there had been, in reality, no change in the McKinley policy. The United States wanted peace in Cuba, and Spain was to be given an indefinite period of time to achieve it. If peace did not come, then the United States would have to take other steps.

Woodford made the President's position even clearer to the Spanish. Speaking to Gullón, Woodford stated that the United States observed with satisfaction encouraging signs from Cuba. He also stated that, without committing the United States government to the details of the plan, " . . . Spain could reasonably look to the United States to maintain an attitude of benevolent expectancy until the near future would show whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace . . . was realized."[27]

"Benevolent expectancy," with the threat of some further action if expectations were not realized, was therefore the policy the McKinley administration had determined to follow by the close of 1897.

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[26]Congressional Record, 55 Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 4-5.

[27]Foreign Relations, 1897, pp. 647-657, passim.

By February, 1898, the rapport that had been established between Spain and the United States was completely shattered. What good-will the Spanish had fostered in Washington evaporated when Gullón answered Woodford's note of December, 1897. In his reply, Gullon reiterated that Spain and Spanish troops had conducted themselves in an "untarnished" manner towards the Cubans. He also declared that his government was perturbed with the stated American policy of future action if the facts, within a more or less undetermined period, showed that peace could not be obtained. Spain did not admit, continued Gullón, that the United States had any right to limit the struggle. The Spanish Minister then parried Washington's demands by fixing, as his government saw them, the American obligation and duty in the struggle: the United States should strive to see that no one hindered in any way Spanish efforts to put down the insurrection. "Cuba," Gullón concluded, "free, autonomous, ruled by a government of her own and by laws which she makes for herself, subject to the immutable sovereignty of Spain, and forming an integral part of Spain, presents the only solution of pending problems to the colony. . . ."[28] This was as sharply-worded a note as Spain had written to McKinley during his administration. It was not a bluff for, by February, Spain had made all the concessions she possibly could without causing an overthrow of the monarchy. Woodford

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[28]Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 658-663.

stated the Spanish dilemma thus: ". . . they can go no further in open concessions to the United States without being overthrown by their own people. . . ." Spain wanted peace, according to Woodford, but they preferred war with the certain loss of Cuba to the monarchy's overthrow.[29]

Added to the above controversy as to the roles the United States and Spain should follow in their relations towards each other and to Cuba were two unfortunate incidents: the Dupuy de Lôme letter and the sinking of the Maine. About the middle of December, 1897, Dupuy de Lôme had written a letter to José Canalejas. This letter was acquired by a Cuba Libre patriot, sent to the United States, and published in the New York Journal. Several different paragraphs seemed to prove to the American people and to the administration that Spain had been acting in bad faith despite statements to the contrary. Speaking of the war raging in Cuba, Dupuy de Lôme stated that it was a waste of time to deal with either the "rebels" or the autonomists in seeking a peaceful solution for the island. The war, he felt, would be settled only by military strength. Also, the Spanish Minister felt "it would be advantageous to take up, even if only for effect, the question of commercial relations, and to have a man of some prominence sent hither in order that I may make use of him here to carry on a propaganda among the Senators and others in opposition to the

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[29]Ibid., pp. 665, 1011.

Junta and to try to win over refugees." In addition to these views on policy, Dupuy de Lôme took the opportunity offered by the letter to characterize the American Chief Executive as "weak and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd, besides being a would-be politican who tries to leave a door open behind himself while keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party."[30]

Despite the fact that the letter stated only the private opinions of Dupuy de Lôme and not his government, the wide publicity it received made the Spaniard persona non grata, and Woodford was instructed to demand Dupuy de Lôme's recall.[31] Before this could be accomplished, Dupuy de Lôme, after admitting he wrote the letter, tendered his resignation to Madrid, thus saving his government the embarrassment of having to recall him in disgrace.[32] Spain "lamented" the incident and officially disavowed the sentiments expressed.[33]

The explosion of the Maine in Habana harbor, coming only a week after the printing of the Dupuy de Lôme letter, heaped more fuel on the fire of American passion. During the first meetings of the McKinley cabinet consideration was given to the suggestion that a naval ship be sent to Habana.

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[30]Ibid., pp. 1007-1008.

[31]Ibid., p. 1008.

[32]Ibid., pp. 1013-1015.

[33]Ibid., pp. 1015-1016.

This action was urged on two points: first, Habana was a friendly port and therefore American vessels should go in and out; and second, the American Consul-General, Fitzhugh-Lee, was finding his responsibilities for protecting American property and commercial interests hampered by the absence of a naval force. Despite these arguments, it was deemed prudent not to send a ship. The President did not want it to seem as if the United States were applying pressure on Spain to compel acceptance of his proposals for the termination of the insurrection.[34]

In the fall of 1897, however, there were indications that Habana might become the scene of anti-American disturbances. Such demonstrations, it was feared, would cause disastrous consequences to the peace of the United States and Spain. If this should happen, it was felt, a United States warship should be close to the Cuban capital. Therefore, in October of 1897, the armored-cruiser Maine was sent to Port Royal, South Carolina, and in December continued on to Key West. Captain Sigsbee had instructions to proceed to Habana whenever the American Consul-General felt the conditions in that city warranted such action. It was hoped that the Maine could be used as an asylum for American citizens should they appear to be in danger.[35]

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[34]John D. Long, New American Navy (New York, 1903), I, 134. Also see Long, America of Yesterday, p. 154.

[35]Long, New American Navy, I, 134-135.

It soon appeared to Lee that the ship might be needed, for on January 12 and 13 riots broke out in Habana between two Spanish factions. Those who did not wish to see autonomy granted to Cuba formed a mob on the night of January 12 and attacked a pro-autonomy newspaper. Lee believed that American lives and property might be endangered if the riots became worse. He therefore cabled for a ship to be held in readiness to come to Habana to protect American interests if it became necessary.[36]

Although Lee advised delay in sending the ship until the excitement of the riots died down, the Maine sailed past the Castillo del Morro early on the morning of January 25, was moored by a government tug, and all the amenities of a friendly visit were exchanged.[37] There is no reason to believe that the Maine was ever calculated to overawe the Spanish, but much of the opinion in the United States and among the Spanish regarded the arrival of the Maine as a hostile act. Long, however, stated emphatically that "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" was that the sending of the warship was purely a friendly matter and a resumption of customary relations.[38] That he seemed to overlook the use of the Maine as an asylum does not alter

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[36]Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 1024-1025.

[37]Ibid., p. 1026.

[38]Long, America of Yesterday, p. 155. Also see Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 68.

the fundamental truth of his statement.

An interesting, and most important, sidelight on the sending of the Maine to Habana is the effect produced by the January riots on the McKinley administration. Dupuy de Lôme, still Minister at this time, wrote several brief notes to his government on this subject. He stated in each that the riots were the turning point of official opinion in the United States. Previous to January, the American government seemed content to give the autonomy plan a chance to be applied and await its results. After the riots, Dupuy de Lôme stated that ". . . the government and cabinet, although they have said nothing to me, seem to have lost all faith in Spain's success, and, to some extent, to have lost tranquility."[39] Although Day told Dupuy de Lôme that the policy of the United States had not changed, the Spanish Minister still felt the effects of the riot had hung on.[40]

An explosion blasted the bottom from the Maine on the evening of February 16. Immediately, the Spanish rendered every possible aid and promptly tendered sympathy to the United States over the terrible disaster.[41] McKinley did not make this event, which took the lives of over two hundred seamen, a casus belli, and still maintained his policy

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[39]Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 64.

[40]Ibid., pp. 66, 68.

[41]Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 1029.

of peace,[42] but the insistence of the Spanish that the Maine exploded due to internal causes was contrary to the report of the American Naval Board of Inquiry, which placed the blame for the explosion on an external agent.[43] Certainly the press and public opinion felt the Spanish were directly responsible, and additional pressure for war was exerted on the administration.[44]

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[42]Dawes, A Journal of the McKinley Years, p. 143.

[43]Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 1036-1044.

[44]Nicholas Murray Butler, Across the Busy Years, Recollections and Reflections (New York, 1939-1940), II, 299.

Chapter IV

The Final Efforts for Peace

The first day of March marks the beginning of a series of new policies used by the McKinley administration in an attempt to settle the "Cuban Question." On the first day of the month Woodford received new instructions on the President's views concerning conditions on the island. The autonomy policy of Spain, McKinley remarked, had utterly failed to pacify Cuba, and a state of political and financial chaos still existed. The insurgent forces remained in control of the eastern end of Cuba and made forays into the West without any substantial check on their activities.[1] This note, while not suggesting the United States contemplated any action, was not encouraging to those who believed Cuban autonomy would re-establish good relations between the United States and Spain. It also marked a change from the policy of "benevolent expectancy" that had governed American conduct since the preceding December.

Spain answered the note promptly by asserting that autonomy was making real and effective progress and would surely succeed if the United States would extend sympathy and cooperation to the program.[2] In sending this reply on to Washington, Woodford added his own view of the situation:

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[1] Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 666-668.

[2] Ibid., p. 674.

unless the insurgents were defeated by April 1 (the beginning of the rainy season in Cuba), Spain would be unable to suppress them by any effective military operations. Thus the war would drag on. The American Minister also stated that if the insurgents were not defeated, sickness and suffering would descend upon Cuba even more so than in the past, and this would pose a health danger to the southern American coast. Woodford then queried if the United States might not actively intervene in the insurrection to protect itself.[3] He received no immediate answer.

The United States took another step on March 9 that did not "excite the Spaniards--it . . . stunned them." On this day Congress appropriated $50,000,000 for defense (against whom was not stated), and this was to be put at the disposal of the President. It was the view of at least one prominent Spaniard, according to Woodford, that the appropriation meant war, while others in Spain began to feel the whole Cuban situation was hopeless, and advocated that the island be sold to the United States.[4] Evidently Woodford was in close touch with this latter group, for he strongly believed that the sale of the island was near, and soon wired for authority to make the purchase in case he should be approached. Woodford also sincerely believed that the purchase of the

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[3]Ibid., p. 675.

[4]Ibid., pp. 684-685.

island was the only way to end the struggle, for he had "reluctantly, slowly, but entirely become a convert to the American ownership and occupation of the island." Shortly afterwards he said, "There is but one power and one flag that can secure peace and compel peace. That power is the United States and that flag is our flag."[5] Once again, however, as so often in the past, the idea of purchasing Cuba never reached fruition, for the Queen refused to countenance the sale.[6]

By March 22, some type of immediate, active intervention in Cuba was being considered by the McKinley administration. In his Journal under this date, Dawes wrote that the President "had hopes and still hopes to stop the suffering in Cuba without war. But he expects it will be stopped. . . . Intervention will be on broader grounds than the question of responsibility for the disaster to the Maine."[7] Woodford was also instructed to inform the Spanish that the whole "Cuban Question" would be referred to Congress unless peace was established immediately on the island.[8] The Spanish Minister in Washington, upon hearing this, immediately informed his government that a reference of the

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[5]Ibid., p. 688.

[6]Ibid., p. 693.

[7]Dawes, A Journal of the McKinley Years, p. 147.

[8]Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 696.

Cuban situation to Congress would mean war.[9]

During the last week in March, Woodford made various proposals to the Spanish government that the latter would have to follow if the United States were to be placated. The Spanish efforts, Woodford stated, while sincere, had not proved successful, and this had been the point all the time. Continuing, the American Minister stated that the ". . . time [had] come when the United States must, in the interest of humanity and because of the great and pressing commercial, financial, and sanitary needs of our country, ask that some satisfactory agreement be reached within a very few days which will assure immediate and honorable peace in Cuba." Gullón countered by stating that autonomy would succeed and Spanish arms would be victorious, and he then suggested that any peace negotiations be left to the insular Parliament that was to meet on May 4. This answer was unsatisfactory, however, and Woodford stated that the United States wanted peace immediately. Would the Spanish government grant and enforce an immediate truce provided the insurgent forces would also agree? Gullón was personally opposed to this course of action, but said he would consult with the Cabinet on it.[10]

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[9]Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 98.

[10]Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 698-703.

The day after the above conversation, on March 26, Day informed Woodford of a new turn in American policy. The President, according to Day, would gladly assist Spain in settling the conflict if Spain would offer the Cubans full self-government, with reasonable indemnity.[11] This was clarified to mean Cuban independence.[12]

On March 27 the American Minister received definite instructions on the course of action he was to follow. He was directed to offer the following for Spain's approval and acceptance: an armistice to last until October 1, with the good offices of the President used in the interval to negotiate peace; and the immediate revocation of the reconcentrado order. If the foregoing failed to achieve peace, Woodford was ordered to see if he could get Spain to agree to the President's acting as final arbiter.[13]

Woodford immediately attempted to put this policy into effect, and, in a conference with Sagasta, made the American position known. Spain, Sagasta stated, would grant an armistice, but only if the insurgents asked for it and only if the insular Parliament arranged it. Sagasta was confident

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[11] Ibid., p. 704.

[12] Ibid., p. 713.

[13] Ibid., p. 711. Although the reconcentrado order had allegedly been rescinded by General Blanco on November 14, 1897, it would appear from Woodford's instructions that the system was still in operation. See Foreign Relations, 1897, p. 602.

that military operations would reduce the rebellion before that time.[14] The Spanish proposal for concluding an armistice was put into a formal note to the American government on the last day of the month. Along with it, Spain offered to arbitrate the differences that had arisen from the Maine investigations and to have General Blanco rescind the reconcentrado order in the western provinces. The eastern provinces would have to wait until the termination of military operations before they would be relieved of the order. Woodford, in transmitting the note, added a comment that he felt the Spanish proposition would only lead to prolonged war in Cuba. He conceded that the Spanish really desired an armistice, but he stated that the "ministry have gone as far as they dare go today." Spanish pride, plus a fear that the monarchy would be overthrown if the American proposals were accepted, made Spain powerless to take any further action.[15]

Peace proposals were also being urged on the United States and Spain from other sources. On March 25 Spain had asked Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Italy if they would use their good offices to request McKinley to retain in his own hands all questions regarding Spain and Cuba.[16] The European powers answered

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[14] Ibid., pp. 718-719.

[15] Ibid., p. 727.

[16] Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 98.

this by making a statement that they hoped the President would strive for a peaceful settlement of the Cuban question.[17] More positive action was undertaken by the Pope. A rumor was abroad that the President seemed disposed to accept the offer of the Holy See to mediate in the situation before it became worse. Spain requested His Holiness to formulate a suspension of hostilities and to request the United States to withdraw its ships from the vicinity of the Antilles so as to show it did not support the insurrection in Cuba. Archbishop Ireland then saw the President, talked with him, and advised Spain to acceed without condition to the American proposal of an armistice if a war was to be avoided.[18] The visit of the Archbishop may have been a complete surprise to the President, for Day wrote to Woodford that the President had not asked the Pope to intervene and regarded an unconditional armistice and independence for Cuba as the only way to settle the conflict.[19]

As all the above negotiations were in progress, the pressure on McKinley was daily becoming harder to withstand. The public demanded haste in the settling of the Maine dispute,[20] and, what was worse, it seemed that the President

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[17] Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 740.

[18] Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence, pp. 109-111.

[19] Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 732.

[20] Dawes, A Journal of the McKinley Years, p. 149.

was losing control of his party. Secretary of War Alger showed this when he told a Senator, "I want you to advise the President to declare war. He is in danger of making a great mistake. He is in danger of ruining himself and the Republican party by standing in the way of the people's wishes. Congress will declare war in spite of him. He'll get run over and the party with him."[21] The situation in Congress was equally difficult for the Chief Executive. Congressman Boutelle reported that forty or fifty Republican members of Congress had held a caucus, sent a committee to the President, and demanded he take action. If a resolution for war was not recommended, they made it clear that they would introduce one of their own and vote with the Democrats to carry it.[22] Day after day the Democrats, under the leadership of Joseph W. Bailey and Champ Clark, had tried to bring a vote declaring Cuba independent or a belligerent state.[23] McKinley had taken pains to avoid this and consulted with his personal and political friends to help him muzzle the war spirit.[24] This new threat was therefore perilous indeed for the administration's peace policy.

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[21]Charles S. Olcott, The Life of William McKinley (New York, 1916), II, 28.

[22]Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, p. 60.

[23]Dunn, Harrison to Harding, I, 232.

[24]Butler, Across the Busy Years, II, 299-300.

More than the independence of Cuba was involved in this issue for some members of the House. Pettigrew remarked, "I don't care anything about Cuba. The island would not be worth anything to us unless it was sunk for twenty-four hours to get rid of its population, but I want a war with Spain because I believe it will put us on a silver basis."[25]

In the Senate the situation remained rather quiet until the latter half of March. On the 17th of that month, Senator Proctor of Vermont arose and addressed his colleagues. He had just returned from a trip to Cuba and had been urged by many Senators to put his impressions on the record. This he did with all pathos he could muster. "Outside Habana all is changed. It is not peace nor is it war. It is desolation and distress, misery and starvation." All the towns of the island had become prison yards, and all transportation had to be armored. There were no houses, he continued, no animals, no crops. The reconcentrado system operated as before, with the people being hounded and mistreated while their homes were being burnt over their heads. Hospitals were in a deplorable condition, so terrible mere words could not describe the misery. He concluded by reviewing the political situation and stated that there would be no peace under Spain.[26] Proctor's speech, while not advocating the

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[25]Dunn, Harrison to Harding, I, 232.

[26]Congressional Record, 55 Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 2916-2919.

course the United States should take, gave great impetus to the interventionist cause.[27] Reed acidly remarked that, "Proctor's position might have been expected. A war will make a large market for gravestones." Proctor owned large marble quarries in Vermont.[28]

The pressure began to tell on McKinley by the first week in April. Long stated that he began to feel war was near on April 2, and that the President was showing weariness and nervous strain.[29] Kohlsaat also reports that in his presence McKinley broke down completely and wept because he felt Congress was driving him into a war.[30] The whole situation was made known to Woodford with the obvious implication that he should use it to speed Spanish action on a peaceful settlement.[31]

Sometime between April 2 and April 4, McKinley crystallized his course of action. On the latter date, the President read to his cabinet a message he had prepared on the Cuban situation.[32] Either before or after the meeting,

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[27]Foraker, Notes, II, 6.

[28]Dunn, Harrison to Harding, I, 234.

[29]John D. Long, "Ancient Days of the Spanish War; Chapters from the Diary of John D. Long," ed. L. S. Mayo, Atlantic Monthly, CXXXI, (January-February, 1923), 212.

[30]Kohlsaat, McKinley to Harding, p. 66.

[31]Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 721.

[32]Long, "Ancient Days of the Spanish War," AM, CXXXI, 212.

McKinley also consulted with Judge Grosscup and Dawes, and the latter gives the substance of the Chief Executive's message: no recommendation for the recognition of the independence of Cuba under the existing "Republic," but a recommendation that the insurrection had to cease, by force if necessary, on the broad grounds of humanity. The original plan was to send the message on April 4, but the date was later moved up to April 6. Consul-General Lee then wanted time to evacuate any American citizens, and the message was again delayed.[33]

As the above events were taking place in the United States, the machinery of diplomacy was still being used. In addition to the pleas of Consul-General Lee not to send the message he had prepared, McKinley received new information from Woodford on the evening of April 5 that also may have helped delay the message.[34] On March 31, a new manifesto had been published in Cuba by Spain, embodying the proposals for peace that had been made to the American government and upon which Woodford had unfavorably commented.[35] The manifesto came to the attention of the American government on April 4 and was found lacking. This plan, as the United States saw it, stated that the insurgents must submit to the

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[33]Dawes, A Journal of the McKinley Years, p. 152.

[34]Long, "Ancient Days of the Spanish War," AM, CXXXI, 213.

[35]See above, pp. 71-72.

autonomous government of Cuba, and only then would there be a consideration of expanding the home-rule decree. Coupled with this was another proclamation rescinding the reconcentrado order in Habana, Matanzas, Santa Clara, and Pinar del Río, which was later extended to cover the whole island.[36] The armistice proposed was a very different thing, therefore, from that which the President desired.[37] On the evening of the 5th, however, Woodford posed the following: if the Queen Regent proclaimed an immediate suspension of hostilities before noon, April 6, could the President prevent hostile action by the Congress?[38] An immediate answer was wired that the President could not assume to influence Congress, but if the armistice were offered, he would transmit the fact to Congress.[39] When the Spanish government did not publish the armistice about which they had inquired, Woodford sent an official note to the Spanish Ministry stating that the United States had hoped to hear before noon that Spain had proclaimed a suspension of hostilities. On returning to his office, he learned that the message McKinley had prepared for delivery to the Congress was not to be sent on the 6th, and he immediately withdrew the American note,

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[36]Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 725, 737.

[37]Ibid., p. 733.

[38]Ibid., p. 734.

[39]Ibid., p. 735.

hoping that Spain would take action without its seeming to come from American pressure.[40] Nevertheless, the Spanish sent an official answer to Woodford and stated they could do no more than had already been done in their manifesto of March 31.[41] The plan of April 5 to publish an immediate suspension of hostilities had evidently been dropped at this time.

On April 9, however, Spain revived its armistice proposal and made a final bid for peace. In a proclamation issued on this day, the Spanish government stated that in view of the earnest and repeated request of the Pope, supported by the declarations and counsel of the six great European nations, who formulated the plan, the Spanish government had directed the Captain-General of Cuba to grant immediately a suspension of hostilities for such length of time as he thought prudent to prepare and facilitate peace on the island.[42] The next day the American government was formally advised of the Proclamation by the Spanish Minister, and informed that General Blanco would publish it, reserving "to himself to determine, in another bando (order), the duration and other details of its execution with the sole aim that so transcendental a measure should lead within

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[40] Ibid., p. 745.

[41] Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 112.

[42] Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 746. See Appendix A for the full text of the Proclamation.

the shortest possible time to the desired pacification of the Great Antille." It was called to the attention of the American government that Blanco was prepared to grant every possible facility to the insurgents as to the duration of the armistice. Polo de Bernabé then went on to state that the political system of Cuba was as liberal as that of Canada and would enter on complete development when the insular Parliament met on May 5. That Spain did not contemplate independence for Cuba is apparent from the Minister's conclusion. He stated, ". . . the franchise and liberties granted to the Cubans are such that no motive or pretext is left for claiming any fuller measure thereof. . . . The Cubans will obtain whatever changes they may justly desire, within the bounds of reason and of the national sovereignty . . . ."[43]

Woodford was enthusiastic about this Proclamation and believed he could get, before August 1, a final settlement of the Cuban question embodying either an autonomy the insurgents would accept, independence of the island, or cession of the island to the United States.[44]

The Spanish proposals, however, were too late, for on either April 8 or 9, the President had determined to send his

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[43] Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 747-748.

[44] Ibid., p. 747.

message to Congress on April 11.[45] This document stated that the war in Cuba had come to a point where final victory for either side seemed hopeless, and it was therefore the duty of the United States to Cuba and Spain to bring about the end of the war and to secure in Cuba the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations as well as insuring peace, tranquility, and security to its own citizens and to citizens of foreign nations. The President did not feel it prudent to recognize the existing government, for he felt it would restrict American action in achieving peace. The specific bases for intervention were also outlined in the President's message: one, humanity (to stop a barbarous war at our doorstep); two, protect the persons of our citizens in Cuba; three, protect the commercial interest of our citizens in Cuba; and four, stop a condition of affairs in Cuba that was a constant menace to the peace of the United States and had entailed an enormous expense on the American government. McKinley's intention seems clear: stop the war, stabilize the island, and then let the island proceed on an independent course. The President concluded his message by

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[45] Dawes and Long conflict on the date that the President decided to send his message. Long has the decision being made on April 8, and Dawes on April 9. In light of Spain's proposal of April 9, it is an important point, for McKinley may have taken the action of sending his message on the principle that the Spanish proposal did not meet American demands. cf. Long, "Ancient Days of the Spanish War," AM,

referring to the Spanish proposals of April 9. He stated that he had been informed that the Queen Regent had directed General Blanco to proclaim a suspension of hostilities, hoped that the proclamation would settle the trouble, and stated that Congress should carefully consider the Spanish proposal. If the Spanish Proclamation fell short of American desires, however, the President felt that it would be another just cause for America's contemplated action. McKinley concluded by saying, "The issue is now with Congress. . . . I await your action."[46] When he put the matter in the hands of Congress, Lodge stated, McKinley clearly had decided that war was the only way to deal with the situation, for the only power Congress had to deal with foreign nations was the war power.[47]

Congress responded immediately to the Presidential message. During the two months preceding the message, various resolutions had been introduced in the Senate looking towards the independence of Cuba, either with or without a recognition of the "Cuban Republic" that had been proclaimed in the island. All of these had been referred to the Senate

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CXXXI, 213, with Dawes, A Journal of the McKinley Years, p. 152.

[46]Congressional Record, 55 Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3699-3702.

[47]Henry Cabot Lodge, The War With Spain (New York and London, 1899), pp. 35-36.

Committee on Foreign Relations.[48] On March 29, Senator Foraker had introduced one such measure which stated that the people of Cuba were of right free and independent; that the government of the United States recognized the Republic of Cuba; that the war Spain was waging against Cuba was destructive to American interests, besides being cruel, barbarous, and inhuman; and that the President was authorized to intervene in the situation, with force if necessary, to drive Spain from the island and to establish peace.[49] This proposal was also referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and became the basis for Senate Committee action.[50]

There was some controversy in the Committee's deliberations about recognizing the "Cuban Republic." McKinley was set against any such action and let it be known he would veto any resolution that embodied a recognition clause.[51] When the majority resolution was finally reported for debate, therefore, no mention of the "Cuban Republic" was in it.[52]

The essential point of the debate that followed was not whether the United States had the right to force Spain from

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[48]For several examples of these proposals see, Congressional Record, 55 Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1393.

[49]Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life, II, 20.

[50]Lodge, War with Spain, p. 37.

[51]Dawes, Journal of the McKinley Years, p. 154.

[52]Congressional Record, 55 Cong., 2d Sess., p. 134.

Cuba, but whether the United States should or should not recognize the existing "Cuban Republic." The reported resolution had an elaborate preamble stating that the conduct of a ruthless warfare in Cuba by Spain, plus the sinking of the Maine, constrained the United States to take action in the situation. Therefore, Congress, at the invitation of the President, resolved the following: one, ". . . the people of Cuba are, and of right ought to be free and independent"; two, ". . . that it is the duty of the United States to demand . . . that . . . Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island . . ."; and, three, "that the President of the United States be . . . directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States . . . to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect." This was the majority report. A minority report, while agreeing with the majority, stated that they favored "the immediate recognition of the Republic of Cuba, as organized in that island, as a free, independent, and sovereign power among the nations of the world."[53]

Foraker, on April 12, spoke first in the debates on the Resolution, and supported the Foreign Relations Committee's minority report to recognize the existing Republic of Cuba. The Ohio Senator believed that if the Cubans were free and

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[53]Ibid., p. 134. See Appendix B for the content of the Senate Resolution.

independent, then logically there must have been a political organization that created this condition. He continued by outlining the then existing government in the island: a written constitution, republican in form; a popularly elected legislature; a President, Vice-President, and a cabinet. The Senator felt this was more than a paper government, for a postal system was operating, a fiscal organization collected taxes, education had been made compulsory, and a capital city had been established at Cubitas. The Ohioan had other reasons for recognizing a "Cuban Republic." He felt that the army of General Máximo Gómez would swell in numbers if the Cuban people knew they had a recognized government. Besides this practical effect, there was also the question of the Cuban debt. If the United States did not recognize a "Cuban Republic," the American government would be conquering Cuba and would therefore be responsible for the island's $400,000,000 public debt. With recognition, Foraker felt, the debt would be wiped out, as a revolutionary government does not assume any previous debt of the parent country.[54]

Senator Foraker had outlined the reasoning the "radicals" (those supporting the minority report on the Resolution) were to take all through the debate. Daniel, another "radical," put one of Foraker's points even more succinctly:

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[54]Congressional Record, 55 Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3778-3781.

if the Cubans were free and independent, as the Resolution stated, then they must have the right to choose their own form of government; if they did not have this right, then they were not free and independent. As this was the only logical conclusion the Senator could reach, he advocated recognition of the existing "Republic."[55]

The "conservatives" (those supporting intervention but not the recognition of the "Republic") offered their own reasons for not considering the minority report. Henry Cabot Lodge stated that the President wanted only the power to intervene in the situation and had advised against recognition. Recognition, Lodge felt, could be given at any time, but the present was a time of crisis, and the President should be supported in all he wanted so as to show harmony and unity to the world.[56]

Senator Hoar made a passionate speech in opposition to the proposed recognition. Speaking strongly against the effects of war and in favor of McKinley's position throughout his year in office, Hoar agreed that the time had arrived when the United States must actively intervene in the Cuban situation. This did not mean, however, that the United States must recognize a non-existent "Republic." If America should take such action, the Senator continued, it would

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[55]Ibid., p. 3886.

[56]Ibid., pp. 3781-3782.

admit England was right in wanting to recognize the Confederacy during the War Between the States. To Hoar, therefore, a precedent that the United States had established in international law prevented any action further than intervention. The Senator concluded his remarks by stating:

> I confess I do not like to think of the genius of America angry, snarling, shouting, screaming, kicking, clawing with her nails. I like rather to think of her in her august and serene beauty, inspired by a sentiment even toward her enemies not of hate, but of love, perhaps a little pale in the cheek and a dangerous light in her eye, but with a smile on her lips, as sure, determined, unerring, invincible as was the Archangel Michael when he struck down and trampled upon the Demon of Darkness.[57]

Senator Fairbanks answered those "radicals" who felt the United States would become responsible for the Cuban public debt if the "Republic" were not recognized. In his view, the difference of opinion was between one contention that stated, recognize the "Cuban Republic"-- then intervene, and an opposite contention that said, intervene--then recognize the "Republic" when its condition merits such action. To Fairbanks, there was no difference in the ultimate end of each of these views. The Senator then declared that the United States would have no liability regardless of the method followed, for Spain, by its cruelty, had forfeited any rights to further revenues from Cuba. To Fairbanks the

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[57] Ibid., pp. 3832, 3835.

rights of humanity were superior to those of bondholders.[58]

Teller then arose and made a proposal to attach an amendment to the Resolution. He stated that the United States should make it clear to the world that it was not intervening for conquest.[59] His idea was embodied in a fourth resolution that was added to the report of the Foreign Relations Committee. This stated, "That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people." This was agreed to without dissent. Turpie of Indiana also moved to amend the first resolution by inserting, "That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent, and that the Government of the United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful government of that island." This, too, was passed. The Resolution, as amended, was brought to a vote on April 16, passed, and sent to the House for their action.[60]

All the while the Senate was working on its version of the Resolution, the House had been formulating one of their

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[58] Ibid., p. 3846.

[59] Ibid., p. 3899.

[60] Ibid., p. 3899.

own. As in the Senate, various proposals had been introduced, and the House finally agreed on House Resolution 233. This was reported from the Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 13. The preamble of the Resolution stated all the reasons leading to American intervention and the actual Resolution authorized the President to intervene to secure peace and then establish a stable, independent government in the island. It did not, however, recognize the Cuban people as being independent or having a government. As in the Senate, a minority report was also submitted that recognized the "Republic of Cuba."[61]

It would be repetitious to outline the arguments on these resolutions, for they were essentially the same as those in the Senate.[62] The majority Resolution passed the House and was referred to the Senate.[63]

The Senators, as has been shown, had already put themselves on record as favoring a recognition of the "Cuban Republic" and as favoring a recognition that the people of Cuba were, and of right should be, free and independent. They therefore amended the House Resolution so as to state

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[61] Ibid., pp. 3810, 3815. See Appendix C for the full text of the House Resolution.

[62] See, for example, the statements of Butler, Dinsmore, and Adams in Ibid., pp. 3703, 3816, 3817-3818.

[63] Ibid., p. 3820.

these principles, and sent it back.[64] There was a fear among the "conservatives" of the Senate that Reed would not be able to control the House "radicals" and that the latter group would pass the Resolution as it had been amended.[65] This was not the case, for the "conservatives" in the House managed to amend the Resolution again so as to strike out the clauses recognizing the "Cuban Republic" and the independence of the Cuban people. It soon was seen that the two Houses were deadlocked. Two conferences were held to settle the controversy, and the second one finally produced a compromise: no recognition of the "Cuban Republic" was made, but it was declared that the Cuban people "are, and of right ought to be, free and independent." This was exactly the way the original Senate majority Resolution had read. The Resolution was signed, referred to the President, and he signed it on April 20.[66]

Woodford was immediately ordered to communicate the Resolution to the Spanish government. He was also to state that if Spain took no action by noon of April 23, the President would move to implement the Resolution.[67] This action

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[64]Ibid., p. 3993.

[65]Lodge, War with Spain, p. 40.

[66]Congressional Record, 55 Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 4017, 4027, 4033, 4037, 4040-4041, 4061-4062, 4064, 4085, 4112.

[67]Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 762-763.

was never taken, however, for the Spanish Minister informed the United States that his government considered the Resolution a declaration of war. He therefore formally broke relations with the American government, and asked for his passport.[68]

In this manner the United States embarked on a war that was to make it a world power.

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[68] Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 138.

Chapter V

McKinley and the Coming of War

The preceding study has attempted to place McKinley's diplomacy and actions concerning the "Cuban Question" in their proper perspective. A nation's foreign policy is, of course, not created or administered in a vacuum, for both domestic and international events, opinions, and activities tend to give it shape. This is very clear in the situation under study.

McKinley's actions in sending his message to Congress and thus precipitating the war with Spain have been subjected to harsh criticism. Rhodes, for example, states that just as the President's diplomacy was about to succeed, he abandoned his policy and surrendered to the "war party" in Congress. This conclusion Rhodes based on the armistice offered to Cuba by Spain on April 9, and on Woodford's telegram of April 10 wherein he stated he could make a final settlement on autonomy, independence, or cession of the island to the United States. Greater attention should have been paid to these proposals, according to Rhodes, and he implies the President's message to Congress should have made their importance more clear to that body.[1]

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[1]Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, pp. 61-65.

Carleton Beals has also attacked the President's action in these words:

> Big business and official Washington did not want war. . . . Washington wanted peace and order in Cuba, not war with Spain, not intervention, least of all Cuba's independence.[2]

Other authors have taken the same stand. They imply that Spain acceded to all the American demands, but that McKinley, because of the pressure for war, sent his message anyway.[3]

To oppose these views, McKinley has few supporters. His biographer, Olcott, for example, states that the President took the action he did because the Spanish offer of April 9 did not meet American demands and because it convinced him that Spain was using evasive tactics to avoid an immediate settlement. Olcott is aware of the pressures that were being exerted on the President for war, but holds that McKinley did not bend to them until he was convinced that active American intervention was the only way to bring peace to Cuba.[4]

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[2]Carleton Beals, The Crime of Cuba (Philadelphia, 1933), p. 114.

[3]Frederick H. Gillett, George Frisbie Hoar (Boston, 1934), p. 197. Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York, 1938), I, 196. Alfred L. P. Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1906 (New York, 1928), p. 63.

[4]Olcott, The Life of William McKinley, II, Chapter XXIV, passim.

The writer of this thesis believes that a dispassionate study of the little more than a year McKinley dealt with the "Cuban Question" leads the student to the conclusion that Olcott has treated the President's activities more fairly than the other authors cited.

First, had Spain by April 9 acceded to all the American demands? An examination of the facts shows that McKinley desired peace for Cuba above everything else. When autonomy for the island proved unsuccessful, in his eyes, independence was decided upon as the only alternative. Spain's armistice proposal of April 9 did not agree to independence, and left the extent of the armistice to the discretion of the Governor-General. Indeed, the Spanish note that was sent to Washington on April 10, confirming the armistice, stated that Cuba could expect no more in the realm of political liberty than it already enjoyed. It is true that Spain met American demands on other points: the reconcentrado order was rescinded, and an armistice was granted. It should be recalled, however, that although Spain had abrogated the reconcentrado order before, the intolerable conditions had persisted. As for the armistice itself, it is the student's opinion that the insurgents would reject it, thus forcing the war to continue. This conclusion is based upon several things: the independence of Cuba was not recognized in it, the insurgents had consistently refused previous armistices, and active American intervention to aid the insurgents

seemed near. The Cubans would have had everything to gain by refusing the armistice and forcing the war to continue.

Secondly, would the Spanish-American War have been delayed, or possibly even averted, if McKinley had exercised patience? Any answer to this question is pure speculation, and certain factors must be kept in mind. As shown above, Spain was not going to grant the one condition McKinley felt necessary to restore peace and placate the United States: independence for Cuba. The war therefore would have continued, engaging American attention as before. The next question that arises is, could the President's diplomacy have succeeded if he had delayed action? There is reason to believe that Spain might have procrastinated further if this had been the case, for it had done so in the past, and had urged patience on McKinley when he had previously made suggestions for a settlement. Patience on the part of the President would therefore have been exactly the action Spain desired so that it might further prosecute the war. The Treaty of Zanjón in 1878 was not the best advertisement for Spain's good faith in carrying out promised reforms. One must also keep in mind that perhaps the Spanish government had conceded as much as they possibly could both to the United States and to Cuba without causing the overthrow of the monarchy. Woodford, on several occasions, had pointed to this situation as one reason for Spanish temporizing. One should also keep in mind that the President could wait

little longer in sending his message, for he was faced by a rebellious Congress threatening to declare war over his protests. Some of the President's critics, nevertheless, imply that a delay would have brought peace, and they base this conclusion on Woodford's note of April 10.[5] It would seem, however, that the American Minister had, in the past, been in contact with a group of Spaniards who did not represent the views of the Spanish government, and possibly his ideas on the settlement he felt he could achieve were inspired by the same sources. Both the Spanish note of April 10 and Woodford's belief that he could purchase Cuba lend themselves to this view. The student, therefore, feels that while the Spanish-American War might have been delayed if McKinley had postponed his message, the nature of the entire situation was such that the war could not have been averted for any length of time.

Thirdly, was Congress advised as to the supposed importance of the Spanish armistice proclamation? It is true the President devoted only a small portion of his message to the armistice, and this in outline form only. He did, however, admonish Congress to consider it carefully. The charge made against him by his critics, that he should have

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[5]See, for example, Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, pp. 63-64, and Horace Edgar Flack, Spanish-American Diplomatic Relations Preceeding the War of 1898 (Baltimore, 1906), pp. 91-92, and John D. Hicks, A Short History of American Democracy (Cambridge, Mass., 1949), pp. 604-605.

dealt with the Spanish proposals in more detail in his message may be true, for regardless of what his own opinions might have been, the President could have devoted more space to the Spanish offer. The student believes, however, that the charge is without point, for in light of Congressional temper and the determination of the Cuban insurgents to resist any settlement with the exception of outright independence, any message sent by the President based on the Spanish proposals would have had the same outcome: active intervention by the United States in the Cuban struggle.

Lastly, did political and public pressure affect the President's actions? The evidence is overwhelmingly in the affirmative. A fear that the Republican party would be swept from office if some action were not taken, plus the assorted influences exercised by newspapers, periodicals, the Junta, and persons within his own administration, certainly bore heavily on the President and made executive action on the "Cuban Question" mandatory. Newspapers and periodicals, it will be recalled, found a fertile field of material in the reconcentrados, the Dupuy de Lôme letter, and the Maine incident, while the Junta helped to keep the cause of Cuba Libre before the American public. The student differs at this point from Olcott, but it is a difference in emphasis only. McKinley's biographer did not place the proper weight on the effect of the influences operating on the President. Nevertheless, the student believes that Olcott

has given the most reliable account of McKinley's diplomacy, for he has taken into consideration all the factors influencing it. This consideration the President's critics have neglected, thus distorting their interpretation of his responsibility for taking the United States into war.

McKinley, badgered by Congress into an impossible political situation, possibly suspicious of the good faith of Spain, subjected to a public openly sympathetic to the Cuban insurgents, did what he could to settle the "Cuban Question" peacefully. That a war was the ultimate result should not be placed at his door alone.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Bibliographies of Bibliographies

In studying the diplomatic relations of the United States with Spain, the student found Samuel Flagg Bemis and Grace Gardner Griffen, Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States, 1775-1921 (Washington, 1935), to be the most fruitful source of bibliographies dealing with his topic. This work is divided into two main parts: a section dealing with American diplomatic relations by topic and chronology, and a section dealing with remarks on sources. The first section is further divided into the individual countries with which the United States has conducted diplomatic relations. Another work in this category, not so good as Bemis and Griffen, but better than most examined, is Henry Putney Beers, Bibliographies in American History; A Guide to Materials for Research (New York, 1942). This volume lists many of the same works included in Bemis and Griffen, and also includes those that have appeared since 1935. Beers' organization is easier to work with than that of Bemis and Griffen, listing first general aids, then bibliographies dealing with specific topics, but this may be due to its not being so complete as the latter.

Other works consulted under this heading were:

Besterman, Theodore, A World Bibliography of Bibliographies and of Bibliographical Catalogues, Calendars, Abstracts, Digests, Indexes, and the Like (3 vols., London, 1947-1949).

Coulter, Edith Margaret and Gerstenfeld, Melanie, Historical Bibliographies; A Systematic and Annotated Guide (Berkeley, Cal., 1935).

Mudge, Isadore Gilbert, Guide to Reference Books (Chicago, 1936 ed.).

Bibliographies

The two bibliographies found by the student to contain the most extensive listing of materials dealing with Spanish-American relations were Bemis and Griffen, Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States, 1775-1921, and Grace Gardner Griffen, Writings in American History (Washington, 1906-1945). The former offers an excellent collection of titles placed in the categories of special works, printed sources, official documents, and also offers suggestions on

manuscripts to consult. The latter work, issued by the American Historical Association, is organized chronologically. Within each period listings are made on general sources and documents, and on the major event or events happening within the time span. The bibliography also has a "regional" section, containing titles of books that deal with the individual states, the various American republics, and the West Indies.

Other bibliographies consulted were:

Allison, William H., et als., A Guide to Historical Literature (New York, 1931).

Channing, Edward; Hart, Albert B.; and Turner, Frederick J., Guide to the Study and Reading of American History (Boston, 1912).

Cushing, Helen Grant, and Morris, Adah V., eds., Nineteenth Century Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, 1890-1899 (2 vols., New York, 1944). This collection lists periodical articles by subject only, omitting their dates of publication.

Poole's Index to Periodical Literature (6 vols., New York, 1938). These volumes are much more useable than those of Cushing and Morris, for the listings are by subject, and the subject is then further categorized by topic, i.e. commerce, finance.

Documents

The Congressional Record, 55 Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., was used extensively by the student in his research. Containing some beautiful examples of oratory and wit, it is an indispensable source for determining the reasoning of the "radicals" and "conservatives" on the "Cuban Question." It was also used as a check on the statements concerning Congressional temper made by other authors. For the section in the introductory chapter dealing with Cleveland's Cuban policy and Congressional reaction to it, the student found Marion Mills Miller, ed., Great Debates in American History (14 vols., New York, 1913) to be adequate. Miller has extracted from the Congressional Record the most pertinent debates on the "Cuban Question" and presented them with an introductory note and comments.

The best collection of the diplomatic documents is, of course, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President (Washington, 1896-1899). Herein are contained exchanges of notes with foreign countries, and instructions to American

representatives all over the world. The student found that a careful reading of all the correspondence between the United States and Spain concerning Cuba distinctly shows McKinley's policy in all its stages. A second collection of diplomatic documents examined was Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 1896-1900, trans. (Washington, 1905). This collection is not nearly so complete as the Foreign Relations series, but it does contain some notes exchanged between the Spanish Foreign Office and its representatives in Washington not contained in the American publication. The Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence was originally compiled in Spain and presented to the Cortes by the Spanish government.

Another document used slightly to ascertain the facts concerning the reconcentrados was Consular Correspondence Respecting the Condition of the Reconcentrados in Cuba, the State of the War in that Island, and the Prospects of the Projected Autonomy, 55 Cong., 2d Sess., House Document no. 406.

Autobiographies, Diaries, Journals, Memoirs, Reminiscences, etc.

The personal comments of those active in Washington during the year and a month that the McKinley administration dealt with the "Cuban Question" proved especially enlightening on the subject of the pressures exerted on McKinley. The best of these for determining these influences are:

Atkins, Edwin F., Sixty Years in Cuba; Reminiscences of Edwin F. Atkins (Cambridge, Mass., 1926). Atkins was an American sugar planter, favored Spanish control of Cuba, and, according to the author himself, exercised quite some influence on the Cleveland administration and its foreign policy towards Cuba.

Dawes, Charles Gates, A Journal of the McKinley Years, ed. Bascom N. Timmons (Chicago, 1950). The author was a close associate of McKinley, having been instrumental in securing for him the nomination for the Presidency. Under McKinley, he served as comptroller of the currency. He firmly supported the President's policy respecting Cuba.

Dunn, Arthur Wallace, From Harrison to Harding: A Personal Narrative Covering a Third of a Century, 1881-1921 (2 vols., New York, 1922). Dunn was an astute reporter for the Associated Press, covering Congress during the period under investigation.

Long, John Davis, New American Navy (2 vols., New York, 1903). Long wrote this book to give information on the start and progress of the "New American Navy" that was being built after the Spanish-American War. He also deals with the period immediately preceeding the war and sheds light on both McKinley's policy and the pressures being exerted for war. Two other volumes that do the same but in more detail are:

Long, John Davis, The Papers of John Davis Long, 1897-1904, selected and ed. Gardner Weed Allen (Boston, 1939).

Long, John Davis, America of Yesterday, ed. Lawrence Shaw Mayo (Boston, 1923).

Rubens, Horatio Seymour, Liberty: The Story of Cuba (New York, 1932) is the recollections of the man who acted as Consul for the Cuban Junta in the United States and is therefore an indispensable source for determining the activities of this organization. One must exercise care in the book's use, however, for the author tends to exaggerate when discussing his own and the Junta's influence.

Other works consulted in this category were:

Adams, John Quincy, The Writings of John Quincy Adams, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford (7 vols., New York, 1913-1917).

Butler, Nicholas Murray, Across the Busy Years: Recollections and Reflections (2 vols., New York, 1939-1940).

Cleveland, Grover, Letters of Grover Cleveland, 1850-1908, ed. Allan Nevins (New York, 1933).

Foraker, Joseph Benson, Notes of a Busy Life (2 vols., Cincinnati, 1916).

Jefferson, Thomas, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul L. Ford (10 vols., New York, 1892-1899).

Kohlsaat, H. H., From McKinley to Harding: Personal Recollections of Four Presidents (New York, 1923).

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918 (2 vols., New York, 1925).

Moore, John Bassett, The Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore (7 vols., New Haven, 1944).

Roosevelt, Theodore, An Autobiography (New York, 1929 ed.).

Roosevelt, Theodore, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, ed. Elting Morrison (8 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1951-1954).

Newspapers

Three Detroit newspapers were used to obtain a sampling of the type of stories that greeted American citizens during the period under investigation. All three of these papers were pro-Cuban. Thus the stories they carried emphasized the gallantry, bravery, and righteousness of the Cubans, while the Spaniard was painted in the darkest of colors. The newspapers sampled were:

Detroit Evening News, January, 1897-April, 1898.

Detroit Free Press, January, 1897-April, 1898.

Detroit Sunday News-Tribune, January, 1897-April, 1898.

The student realizes that this sampling is limited. However, George W. Auxier, The Cuban Question as Reflected in the Editorial Columns of Middle Western Newspapers (1895-1898) (Columbus, Ohio, 1938) has shown that the pro-Cuban attitude existed throughout the Mid-West, while the journals and diaries examined show that the newspapers of other areas took the same stand.

Articles in Periodicals

Two types of periodical articles were examined for this thesis: those published during 1897-1898, and those that have appeared subsequently. Many articles were examined, but as they all soon began to fit a pattern, only those cited are herein listed.

Alvord, T. G., "Is the Cuban Capable of Self-Government?" Forum, XXIV (September, 1897), pp. 119-128, is an attempt by the author to show that the Cubans were fully capable of managing their own political destiny.

"American Impulsiveness," Spectator, LXXVII (December 26, 1896), p. 924, tries to judge the reasons for the opinion in the United States favoring the Cuban insurrectionists.

Auxier, George W., "The Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Junta in Precipitating the Spanish-American War, 1895-1898," Hispanic-American Historical Review, XIX (1939), pp. 286-305. The author of this article, while coming to no absolute conclusion, feels the weight of evidence make it possible to state that the Junta exerted more than a little influence in helping to bring about the Spanish-American War. The author also states that the subject needs further study. The student has found no reference to later attempts to assess the influence of the Junta.

Bonsal, Stephen, "Starvation in Cuba," Harper's Weekly, XLI (May 29, 1897), p. 531. Bonsal has presented the plight of the reconcentrado in a sensational manner, but the student feels the author has not overdrawn his picture.

Godkin, E. L., "Deliberation," Nation, LXVI (April 7, 1898), p. 258. Appearing in an "anti-jingo" periodical, this article was a plea by the editor to Congress and the American people to let the President deal with the "Cuban Question" in his own way. Godkin felt that war with Spain would thus be averted.

Godkin, E. L., "The War in Its Right Place," Nation, XLVI (March 31, 1898), p. 238, was an attempt by the author to show those forces that were pushing the administration into a war.

Long, John D., "The Ancient Days of the Spanish War; Chapters from the Diary of John D. Long," ed. L. S. Mayo, Atlantic, XXXI (January-February, 1923), pp. 39-47, 209-218. Mayo has extracted certain portions of Long's diary, to point up the critical days previous to April 11, 1898.

Other periodical articles used were variations of the foregoing themes. For the greater part they contained additional evidence which supported the theses of the various articles already listed.

Matheson, Fred J., "The United States and Cuban Independence," Living Age, CCXVII (May 21, 1898), p. 505.

Money, H. D., "Our Duty to Cuba," Forum, XXV (March, 1898), pp. 17-24.

Pierra, Fidel G., "The Present and Future of Cuba," Forum, XXII (February, 1897), pp. 659-672.

Sedgwick, A. G., "Cuban Catechism," Nation, LXII (March 12, 1896), pp. 211-212.

White, H., "Cuban Autonomy or Independence," Nation, LXVI (March 10, 1898), p. 178.

Biographies

Many biographies were examined for this study, but only those cited are herein listed. Generally, the student used these biographies to ascertain the author's viewpoint on McKinley's activities. The biographies of Martí were used to determine the conditions of opinion in Cuba and Martí's organizational genius in bringing about the insurrection.

Gillett, Frederick H., George Frisbie Hoar (Boston and New York, 1934). Written by the son-in-law of Hoar, this book condemns McKinley's actions.

Jessup, Philip Caryle, Elihu Root (2 vols., New York, 1938), by implication also condemns McKinley's actions.

Lizaso, Félix, Martí: Martyr of Cuban Independence, trans. Esther Elise Shuler (Albuquerque, 1953), and Mañach, Jorge, Martí, Apostle of Freedom, trans. Coley Taylor (New York, 1950) both are hero-worshipping studies of a man who deserves a good, sound biography. A poet, newspaperman, diplomat, and revolutionary organizer, Martí has been neglected by scholars in the United States.

Olcott, Charles S., The Life of William McKinley (2 vols., New York, 1916) is a sympathetic treatment of McKinley's actions in the year and a month he dealt with the "Cuban Question" by diplomacy. In the student's opinion, Olcott gives the fairest treatment of the President's activities.

Secondary Works

Beals, Carleton, The Crime of Cuba (Philadelphia, 1933) is an hysterical treatment of Cuban conditions under Machado, but also containing an equally hysterical view of McKinley's actions in connection with Cuba.

Bemis, Samuel Flagg, ed., The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy (10 vols., New York, 1927-1938). Taking each Secretary individually, Bemis has put together a detailed study of American foreign relations.

Chapman, Charles E., A History of the Cuban Republic (New York, 1927). This book deals for the most part with Cuba since 1902, but spends the first one hundred pages or so with the background of the Republic.

Dennis, Alfred L. P., Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1906 (New York, 1928), takes the stand that McKinley should have exercised patience in dealing with Spain and the war would have been averted.

Fitzgibbon, Russell H., Cuba and the United States, 1900-1935 (Menasha, Wis., 1935). This book was useful in determing the background of American interest in Cuba.

Guggenheim, Harry F., The United States and Cuba: A Study in International Relations (New York, 1934). This book is a review of United States relations with Cuba, emphasizing the effects of the Platt Amendment on the Cuban government.

Latané, John H., America As a World Power, 1897-1907. Vol. XXV of The American Nation: A History, ed. Albert Bushnell Hart (New York, 1907). This volume aided in determining the background of American interest in Cuba.

Latané, John H., The United States and Latin America (Garden City, 1925). Chapter III deals with Cuba, and served to ascertain the foreign relation with Spain concerning Cuba during the Nineteenth century.

Millis, Walter, The Martial Spirit (New York, 1931). This author is also persuaded that McKinley is to be blamed for intervening in Cuba. Millis believes that the armistice proposals satisfied all American demands.

Portell Vilá, Herminio, Historia de Cuba en Sus Relaciones con Los Estados Unidos y España (4 vols., Habana, 1938-1941). Portell Vilá has written in this work one of the best studies of Cuban-American relations. He views McKinley's intervention as having been economically determined, although he also believes that the Spanish armistice proposals were not made in good faith.

Rhodes, James Ford, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, 1897-1909 (New York, 1922), takes the view that McKinley abandoned his diplomacy on the eve of its success, thus precipitating the Spanish-American War.

Other secondary sources used were:

Benton, E. J., International Law and the Diplomacy of the Spanish-American War (Baltimore, 1908).

Caldwell, R. G., The López Expeditions to Cuba, 1848-1851 (Princeton, 1915).

Callahan, James M., Cuba and International Relations: A Historical Study in American Diplomacy (Baltimore, 1899).

Chadwick, French Ensor, The Relations of the United States and Spain: Diplomacy (New York, 1909).

Flack, H. E., Spanish-American Diplomatic Relations Preceeding the War of 1898 (Baltimore, 1906).

Fish, Carl Russel, The Path of Empire: A Chronicle of the United States as a World Power. Vol. XLVI of The Chronicles of America (New Haven, 1919).

Hill, Howard Copeland, Roosevelt and the Caribbean (Chicago, 1927).

Wilkinson, M. M., Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War: A Study in War Propaganda (Baton Rouge, 1932).

Appendix A

Armistice Proclamation, April 9, 1898[1]

In view of the earnest and repeated request of His Holiness, supported resolutely by declarations and friendly counsels of the representatives of the six great European powers, who formulated them this morning in a collective visit to the Minister of State, as a corollary to the efforts of their Governments in Washington, the Spanish Government has resolved to inform the Holy Father that on this date it directs the general-in-chief of the army in Cuba to grant immediately a suspension of hostilities for such length of time as he may think prudent to prepare and facilitate the peace earnestly desired by all.

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[1]Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 746.

Appendix B

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Resolution to Intervene in Cuba[1]

Majority Report

Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battleship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message of April 11, 1898, upon which the action of Congress was invited: Therefore,

Resolved, First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

Cushman K. Davis
Stephen B. Elkins
H. C. Lodge
G. F. Hoar
Charles W. Fairbanks

Minority Report

The undersigned members of said committee cordially concur in the report made upon the Cuban resolutions, but we favor the immediate recognition of the Republic of Cuba, as organized in that island, as a free, independent, and sovereign power among the nations of the world.

David Turpie
R. Q. Mills
Jno. W. Daniel
J. B. Foraker

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[1] Congressional Record, 55 Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3775, 3776. The majority Resolution is the one under which the United States finally intervened in Cuba.

Appendix C

House Committee on Foreign Affairs Resolution to Intervene in Cuba[1]

Majority Report

Whereas the Government of Spain for three years past has been waging war on the Island of Cuba against a revolution by the inhabitants thereof, without making any substantial progress toward the suppression of said revolution, and has conducted the warfare in a manner contrary to the laws of nations, by methods inhuman and uncivilized, causing the death by starvation of more than 200,000 innocent noncombatants, the victims being for the most part helpless women and children, inflicting intolerable injury to the lives and property of many of our citizens, entailing the expenditure of millions of money in patrolling our coasts and policing the high seas in order to maintain our neutrality, and

Whereas this long series of losses, injuries, and burdens for which Spain is responsible has culminated in the destruction of the United States battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana and in the death of 260 of our seamen:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is hereby authorized and directed to intervene at once to stop the war in Cuba, to the end and with the purpose of securing permanent peace and order there and establishing by the free action of the people thereof a stable and independent government of their own in the Island of Cuba. And the President is hereby authorized and empowered to use the land and naval forces of the United States to execute the purpose of this resolution.

Minority Report

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the United States Government hereby recognizes the independence of the Republic of Cuba.

Sec. 2. That, moved thereto by many considerations of humanity, of interest, and of provocation, among which are the deliberate mooring of our battleship, the Maine, over a submarine mine and its destruction in the harbor of Havana,

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[1]Congressional Record, 55 Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3810, 3815.

the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, directed to employ immediately the land and naval forces of the United States in aiding the Republic of Cuba to maintain the independence hereby recognized.

Sec. 3. That the President of the United States is hereby authorized and directed to extend immediate relief to the starving people of Cuba.