OBSTACLES T0 WORLD PEACE

WESTS FEB THE BEGREE OF M. A.
Constance N. Eek
1931

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'Obotaoloo to Iorld Ponce“

Constance 12’ not

-19 3],.

“knitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the ' degree of tutor of
Arts in tho Graduate School of Elohim
Stat. College.

 

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THES.

Approved for the Department of History

and Political Science:

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Acknowledynent

The author wishes to acknowledge her
indebtedness to Dean I. H. Ryder. He selected the

topic and offered constructive critical.

A

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction --------------------- - ------------------------
1. Political factors incongruous with world peace ---------
‘A. German political unrest ...............................
1. Nazis, a strong party --------------------------------
a. Papular appeal of Hitler ............................
b. Nazis platfonn --------------------------------------
2. Communisn.growing - ------ - ........................... -
3. TWO parties compared and contrasted ------ ------------
B. Polish.Corridor ------- ------- -------------- -----------
1. Analysis of the problem - ------------- - .............. -
2. Problem.of Gdynia - -----------------------------------
3. Effect on.Prussia --- .................................
C. Anschluss ------------------------------------------;--
1. French attitude - ------------------------------------ -
2. Earlier attempt to establish the Anschluss -----------
3. Attitude of the Little Entente - ----------------------
D. Augsleich. ------------------ - ........... ------ .........
1. French attitude ------- - ............................ --
E. Ukrania ------------------------- - ........ - ............
1. History --------- - ....................................
2..Attempts at independence ----------- - ............... --
3. Divided between Russia and Poland --- ................ -
F. Balkan.Union - ---------- - ..............................
1. Tension between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia -------r------
2..Att1tude of other European nations - ..... —------------
G. Franco-Italian Relations - ................ - ..... -------

1. Newspaper propaganda - ------ - ----------- - ............ -

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F.

2. Disagreements resulting from Treaty of London ---------
a. Dispute over Tripolitania ---------- ----------------- -
b. Status of Italians in Tunis ------ - ...................
0. Controversy over Fiwme ............................. --

1'. Final settlement - ----------------- - --------------- -

3. FranCO-YHSOBIaV Treaty --------------------------------

4. Franco-Italian Naval Agreement - --------------- - ..... --
H. Spain - --------- - ................................... ----
1. Reasons for discord -------..---- ....... ---------------
2. Place of militarism - --------------------------------- ..
I. Latin America -----------------g----- ............ -------
1. Right of revolution - ------ - ........................ ---
2. Venezuela - ------------- - ..............................
a. Dictatorship ------------------- -------- ......... -----
3. Santo Domingo - --------------------- ----- .......... ----
a. Dictatorship --- -------- - ------ --- .................. --
4. Nicaragua ----------- - -------------------------------- -
a. United States policy towards Nicaragua ------- - ...... -
b. Chamorro --- ----- ------------- ....................... -
c. Diaz ----------------------------------------------- --

d. United States attempts to establish.stable government-

1'. Reasons for failure ----------------- - ...... - .......

J. India ------------------------------------------------ --
l. Desire for freedom ----- ...................... - ....... -
2. Gandhi-------- -------------- - ...... - ............... ----
a. Civil disobedience program ...........................
b. Reasons for popularity ----------- - ................ ---

3. Simon.Commission ---- ............................... --

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“a.

c. Demands destruction of French fortifications -------- 59

IV} Economic conditions inimical to world peace ---------- - 60.
A. Danger of economic motives ---------------------------- 60
l. Anglo-German rivalry --------------------------------- 61
B. Economic necessities of nations ----------------------- 62
C. French fear immigration ------------------------------- 63
D. Free trade as a war-preventer - ------------------------ 64
E. Real vs. ostensible causes of war --------------------- 64‘
F. Part of imperialism in causing war -------------------- 65
G. Economic needs of Japan ------------------------------- 66
I. Democracies readily resort to war ---- ---------------- - 66
l. anger of present economic depression --- -------------- 67
J. heparations ----------------- --------- ---------------- - 68
1. Should Germany be made to pa --------- ------------- -- 68

as Dependence of the world on German prosperity -------- 69

2. Settlement imperative ---- --------------------------- - 69
3. Danger of extremists gaining control in Germany ----- - 70
4. Poverty in German --~-----—-------~--~4 ------------- - 71
h. American tariff act of 1930 -----------------------~--- 72

L. Embargo on Russian products -------------------- ------ - 75
‘H. Oil Industry -------------------- ----- ----------------- 74
1. Largely eXporting ~---- -------- - ------------------- --- 74
2. Demand for high tariff -------------------- ---------- - 75
N. Cepper Industry ----------~------------------------¢--- 75
1. Tariff ----- ----- - ----------- - ------------------- ~---- 76
a. Effect on foreign trade ---~------ ----------- -------- 76
0. Wheat ------- - ----------- - ---------------------------- - 76

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1. Danubian Wheat growers's problem» -------------------- 77

2. Rome conference ------------------------------------- 78
a. Diverging vieWpoints ----------- - ------------------- 79
1'. Reasons for failure ------------------------------ 80
P. Effects of high tariff ----------------------- - ------ - 81
1. Other countries retaliate --------------_--i -------- - 82
2. Creates national antagonisms ------------------------ 83
Q. Russian Five Year Plan ------------------------------- 84
1. Danger to other countries -------------------------- - 84
2. French and.English attitudes --- -------------------- - 85
3. Effect of a boycott ------------------- - --------- ---- 86
4. German attitude toward Russia ----------------------- 87
V. Conclusion ------------------------------------------- - 88
A. Difficulties involved in abolishing war ---- --------- - 88 m
l. Attitude that war is inevitable --------------------- 88 ‘
2. Human nature ---------------------------------------- 88
3. Nationalism. ----------------------------------------- 89
4. Militarism ------------------------------------------ 9O
5. Economic rivalry ------------------------------------ 91
B. Reasons why wars should be less frequent ------------- 91
1. World getting smaller ------------------------------ - 91
2. Education ---- --------------------------------------- 91
3. Abolition of secret treaties 5 ------- ----- -------- --- 92
4. Imperialism replaced by the mandate system --- ------- 92

5. Wars too costly - ------------------------------------ 93

 

a. -'

(1)

c-IFl'RONGTIOI-

The Obstacles to Iorld Peace may be conveniently
discussed in several categories. In the first chapter poli-
tical factors incongmous with Iorld Peace are discussed. The
second chapter deals with man nature in its psychological
bearing upon activities shich deter-ins the policy of war or
peace at a given moment of crisis. In the third chapter the
dangers of militarism are pointed out. Icons-is conditions
ininical to Vorld Peace are discussed in the fourth chapter.
The fifth chapter presnts the conclusions drawn. .

leedless to say. no one Obstacle to 'orld Peace is pure-
ly economic or political. In the last analysis. any specific
obstaclak will be found to be closely associated with sons
econaeio cause. The divisions taken nust not be considered as
_ arbitrarily defined. They were adopted by the writer merely to
I facilitate the presentation of the material. ‘ A

’ this thesis does not presmle to be acculplete study of
the sub: ect of Obstacles to Vorld Peace. Books have been
Iritten on the topic without smausting .411 the material
available. This thesis is an attempt to present as unbiased a
view as possible of the most important Obstacles to Iorld
Peace. ‘

Ordinarily a thesis involves an exhaustive study of
source material. The nature of this problem prohibits any
such treatment. To be of any value. such a study as this must

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(2)

consider primarily those things which are today Obstacles

to Iorld Peace. as well as those influences mich have in the
past proved dangerous to the maintenance of peace. For such
movements as the recent attempt to convert the Anschluss into
an actual fact. no source material is available. It has been
necessary to rely on infomtion obtained largely in sash
magazines as 'Gurrent History'. FForeign Affairs“ and others
“the same nature. Ideas of problems injurious to the best
interests of the world have been gleaned fra books and
pamphlets compiled by the carnegie lndouent for Iorld Peace.

 

 

...

(3)

To the student of World politics. the situation in
Germany is the one most dangerous. Since the chaotic condition
of her politics is of concern to her neighbors as well as to
herself. the attention of the world is focused upon Adolph
mm.

A brief character sketch of Hitler will emphasize the
danger of allowing such a man to obtain goverflsntal supremacy.
'Hitler is an unbalanced. temperamental actor. an easily ex-
cited neurasthenic who is everwhelned by the events of the
moment. He lacks the capacity for real leadership and the
ability to cone to a decision at the right time.‘ 1 It has
been said that he lacked decisive qualities during the elect-
ions of Last September. Certainly in 1923 he struck inoppor-
tunely at lunich. He has demonstrated his inability to carry
out a fin decision with cool conviction. .

The past winter has shown a growing spirit of restless-
ness in Germany. The air has rung with cries of aOezt'lany
awake. Jude Perishi', and “Rail Hitler!a These outcries come
‘ from the rational socialists or 'lasis.‘ The Communists. ever
hostile to the lazis have also staged their demonstrations.

Supposedly Germany is at peace. but actually bitter in-
ternal warfare is going on. It is a figth to determine shether

Gegggz is to remain a Republic or go over to Fascism with
1. The Living Age. Vol. 540. p. 15.

 

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a dictator 111:. Iussolini. or whether it is to "become a
columnist state like Russia. Speculation as to the outcome
would be futile. .

At present the lasis is the second strongest party in
Germany. Iere there another election today. it is very likely
that the party would take first place. The party program calls
for 'a dictatorship. the scrapping of the Treaty of Versailles.
the stoppage of reparations payments. repression of the Jews.
and the creation of a 1.1-3. Semen am.‘ 2 Can it be imagined
that France would sit by peaceme and watch the adoption of
such a program? If the present depression continues to engulf
Germany and n11 her people with dispair. the lasis will
probably have little difficulty in seizing the govsrmsent and
putting their plans into effect. ’

This movuent is the rssnltof the-s some forces that
produced Fascism in Italy. Along the cooler-headed Germans
events have progressed more slowly. It has taken a long time
for the Fascism of Hitler to get under m.~ncugh stretched
5 over a much longer period of time. the trend of events in
Ger-am is similar to the march of oust-stances which put
Russolini in power in Italy.3

The recent Ger-an elections were a result of the wed-
ness of parliament. The old Reichstag had been dissolved
by the President because it could agree on nothing. The only
__‘_____‘ . » '.:.. 5 .1_ . 5 . 1, 3‘- . 34‘

2. Form. Vol. 85. P. 218.
3. Ibid.

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(5)

powers. The elections only made matters worse. For years the
Oo-unists have been growing in numbers and in boldness. At
present they are the third largest part in the Reich. There
are now one hundred and seven lasis and seventy-six Omists.
The chance of any sort of conservative action is slight.‘

If business should pick up in Germany. the hopes of the
people might be revived and serious trouble avoided. If
present conditions continue there is danger of an uprising of
radical el-ents driven by want and dispair to violent action.
If such a thing happens the Iasis will appear as saviors of
their country. The Hitler arm may be expected to march in
force upon Berlin and try to seise the government}5

'ith five million unuployed in Genany and with the
.glocliest business outlook so far. Hitler's call 'eernany
awake” falls on very fertile soil. Ritler' s party has fed on
the prevalent dispair until it has obtained a great national
following. If Hitler strikes again for, the dictatorship. as
he did in 1923. it will take considerably more to stop him.

If Hitler had a constructive progrn for betterment. the
outlook would not be so pessimistic. Of one thing Hitler is
very sure. Jude must perish. The reason for this policy is
partly psychological. S‘uebsdy in Germany has to be to blame
for Germany's troubles. and the Jewish race offers the most
convenient point for Nationalist wrath to strike. Their only
offense is that they stand for capitali- which is hateful
t2 the lasis and g; cggg as g mgig. Thg dog... In
4. Ibid. p. 219.

5. Ibid.

( 6‘)

supports the reparations settlement. To him it is simply a
'business transaction.‘ 6

The platfon of the Hasis hasty has ten nain planks.
Seven of these are directed against 'the rule of Gold.‘ is
they concern only German internal affairs. we shall pass to
the last three which are imperialistic. 7

l. Unification of Gemany and Austria.

2. Restoration of Ger-an colonies. f

3. Oreition of a large standing am.

. It is inconceivable a... in. french. with their present
attitude. would allow the working out of such a policy. But
will Ger-aw suhit to Trench dictation for ever? lot with a
Hitler at the head and a strong lasis backing hil.

Iithin Genany. the bitterest snemies of the Hazis are
the Oo-Iunists. Though bloody street fighting between the two
is a daily occurence. ths‘ains of both these radical parties
are very similar. Both are socialist parties. and both desire
the cots-unizing of land and industry. and both are nilitaris.
tic. The difference is largely one of phrasiology. The ‘
co-unist doctrine is so sorded that it appeals only to the
vorking class. shile Hitler has so'cleverly worded his pro-
gr. that he gets the support of industrialists and landowners
as well as of large nuubers of workers.

The Nazis call themselves Nationalists and the
Omnists internationalists. The difference is largely one
of degree. lo doubt swig would go much a; the; L! the
6. Ibid. p. 221.

7. Ibid.

 

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( 7:)

of degree. Ho doubt Communism would go much further in the
socialization of land and industry than would Hitler. 'In
practical politics these differences nean only that one
party would seek alliance with Russia. whereas the other
would ally Germany with Italy."8

Hither policy would disturb the peace of scrape. should
Hitler ally Germany with Italy. Trance would be thrown into a
panic; in her attespt to secure defensive alliances. 'ith the
present nilitaristic attitude of Prancs. a Osman-Italian
alliance night bring a french declaration of war. A Russo-
Gerlsan alliance would hardly be less disastrous.

Three danger spots now exist in Hurope- the Polish-
German frontier. the Franco-Italian frontier. and the Italian-
Yugoslav frontier. There seens to be nothing like the general
dissatisfaction with the status quo along the nasses in Italy.
Trance. Yugoslavia. or even Poland. that exists in Gemany on
the subJ ect of the Polish Corridor.

Genany considers peace impossible without the corridor-
Therefore. the peace of Europe depends considerably on the
willinaess of Poland to return the territory voluntarily.
and the capacity of the Polish to resist force. Genany has
presented an ultilatul not only to Poland but to all of
lurope. requiring revision as the price of Osman association
in reorganizing European Peace. 9consequently much depends
on the Polish attitude.

r thor n ti tion at tu f P
8. Ibid. p. 223.
I 9. Review of Reviews. Vol. 82. p. 63.

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(8)

opinion by Frank H. almonds. assures us that the Polish people
are ready to defend the existing frontiers with their lives.
They are ready to fight not only against German attach. but
also against any effort of Europe as a whole to destroy the
Polish Corridor.“

The situation is paradoxical. Germany does not quarantee
token the peace as long as Poland has the corridor; if
Germany is given. or takes. the corridor. war‘is inevitable.
The situation is still sore cuplicated by the over confidence
of each side. Each party views its claims as the only leans of
escaping war. which neither desires. The Hellog Pact. the
Covenant of the League of Hations - all existing national
agreuents. - are useless in this case since all are designed
to prevent war. while at the same tine all fortify the
Polish situation.

Briefly the situation is this. Two nations. one of
65,000,000. the other of 32,000,000 are facing each other. each
resolved to carry out irreconciable prograls. in actual
struggle is being carried on. a struggle of public opinion. of
governsent' and of propaganda. This struggle continually en-
flenes public opinion and national passion. Since the existing
frontiers have large numbers of Poles in German territory and
an equally large nulber of Germans in Polish territory. nation-
al anbitions are expressed and persecutions follow. 11

The difficulty of the problem lies in the fact that there

beno sibilit of r s trsntG
10. Ibid. p. 64.
11. Ibid.

‘4

\e'

(9)

consummation with last Prussia by land is at the mercy of
Poland; should there be reversion. Polish access to the sea
would be largely at the mercy of Germany.

This region has long been an ethnic battleground between
Slav and Teuton. Ho plebescite would illustrate the true con-
dition. There has been a tremendous nigration into Germany from
Poland. A large proportion of the people in the Polish Corri-
dor today are Poles. 12

The city of Gdynia apparently provides still another para-
dox. Laws prevent Poles fran obtaining land or becoming citi-
zens of Dansig. The Poles have quite largely transferred their
industry and col-sores fran Dansig to Gdynia. Should this policy
continue. Danni; will steadily decline in inpurtance. But." on
the other hand. if restrictions on Poles be removed. no doubt
prosperity would follow. but there would no longer be Ger-an
culture and control. "Ivery scone-1c consideration incessantly
presses for Dansig surrender. every racial and national in-
stinct inposes resistance.‘ 13 Such a situation is hardly
capatible with world peace.

Though the existence of the corridor has placed no real
burdens on trade and traffic between Prussia and Gernany. the
total result has been unfortunate. The sense of insecurity
and isolation has produced an atmosphere of almost caplete
helplessness. The Prussian faner sees little in the future
but the ultinate necessity of selling his land to the Pole at
famine prices. The fear is not of an invasion by an am. but
..:_- 11111 _x-~e Sir- “w . a H...- a...” t w
12. Ibid. p. 65.

13. Ibid.

.-

do

'

 

(10)

standard of living. Economically the Pole has the suprene
advantage. I '

Tor Germany there seas to be but two‘methods of avoid-
ing the loss of Prussia. Either Poland nust surrender or
there will probably be a Polish-German war. Such a. war would
inevitably involve Russia. France and Italy.

Germany har recently become involved in another prole
which appears to threaten the status quo of Europe. Ihile
Europe has been debating the possibilities Of a general
customs union and apparently concluding that it cannot be
achieved. Genany and .iustria have quietly arranged a customs
agreement of their own. The main features of the plan are ex.-
traely simple. 'Roth import and export duties up to ninety
per cent of the trade between the two countries are to he
abolished. and the remaining ten per cent are to disappear
within three years. In the meantime. each country will con.-
tinue to collect tariff duties on other imports. f The not pro-
coeds. after providing for the services of the Dawes Plan loan
and the League of Hations loan to Austrigwill constitute a
cannon fund and will be divided between the two countries
according to same plan to be determined later. is long as the
Austro-Gernan agreement is uninpaired. each country will re-
serve the right to conclude trade treaties with other coun-
tries. Other nations wishing to Join will be welcomeda 1‘
Trance. of course. sees in this tariff agreement a long step
toward the forbidden union of~Gerlsany and Austria.

By their decision to set up a sustains union which later
b .t—ma -inclu o «—r m to

14. The Nation. Vol. 132. p. 340.

 

 

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(11)

Join. Germany and Austria have issued a challenge to the rest
of the Continent that cannot fail to have far reaching con-
sequences. Ihether their action leads to a period of strained
international relations such as Europe has not witnessed since
the'orld Tar. or proves to be the necessary first step toward
the creation of an economically united Europe depends very
largely on the attitude of Trance and her satellites. If Trance
continues hostile. the probability is that the new custons
union will either fail to materialize or will bring the two
Genan nations into a Joint defiance of the rest of Europe. If
Trance on the other hand. should modify her present attitude
and agree to the custas union in so far as her own economic
and duestic interests are not encroached upon. her action
might 'prove the beginning of genuine European cooperation.
Briand can. of course. attach the proposed Conan-Austrian
custons union on political grounds. but the wisdom of such
questioning is another latter. There is no good reason to sup-
pose fron their published statements that Chancellor Bruning
and Foreign Hinister Scholur are insincere in declaring the
proposed union wholly economic in character. Europe may recall
that a somewhat similar customs federation preceded the forma-
tion of the German Empire in 1871. but the political situation
of today is very different. Then Trance was relatively a weak
country. and the German states were not defeated and diseased
but had Just come through two successful wars. and in uniting
had established themselves as one of the strongest political
units on the continent. To rational observer believes that a
union of a. disarned Germany and dismembered Austria could be

(12)
much of a threat to any other group of powers in Europe to-
day. By shifting the emphasis from the economic to the poli-
tical aspects of the proposed economic union. however. Briand
might indeed force Germany and Austria as a matter of political
defense into the arms of other dissatisfied Powers. including
Russia. Then he would have created that opposition bloc of I
states which France and. the Little Entente so greatly fear.

It is not only within the last few weeks that the
Anschluss has aroused the fear of Europe. In 1919 occured the
proclamation of Austria's union with the German Republic. a
union for which Germany's provisional constitution of the pre-
ceding month had likewise provided. 15 According to racial
and economic principles. the consolidation of the two German
republics seemed a logical step. and the much-lauded principle
of self-determination seemed to point the way. But immediately
vigorous protests were raised against the Anschluss. especial-
ly in Trance and Czechoslovakia. The peace conference forbade
the union. and in the treaty of St. Germain which Austria was
oblidged to sign in September 1919. she agreed not to alienate
her sovereignty without the consent of the Council of the
. League of nations. and to abstain fru any act which might
directly or indirectly compruise her independence}6

During the years 1927-1928. revival of agitation in
favor of the Anschlusa reawakened the fears of the Little

Entente. The policy of this group of Trench satalites then

 

15. T. Lee Benns. PEurope Since 1914'. p.‘ 548.
16. Ibid. p. 192.

 

 

 

 

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' (15)

prevent their union. As with French opposition. the danger
lies in the unwillingness of Germany. or any othhr country. to
admit to a League or any cubination of powers preventing her
development along natural racial and economic lines. Resent-
ment of intervention in her affairs is growing in Germany. a
resentment which may make itself felt.

.Iany Austrians believe the Anschluss is far fru feasible.
They can. however. see no objection to a similar economic
union with Hungary. 17 If the old Augsleich were revived. great
sconcnsic benefit would accrue to both countries. He doubt each
would retain its own autonomy. but the dividing customs houses
would disappear. The culmination of this plan would not be
economic misfortune for other countries. Hot only did Vienna
banks formerly finance all the Empire's manufacturing. but to-
day her banking facilities greatly exceed her opportunities of
service.

Though the Trench are the stumbling block in the way of .
the Ansehluss. they do not sea to be men excited over the
prospect of a reunited Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless. . the
movement has great opposition. To a Czech. Serb or Rumanian.
such a proposal arouses the fear of the old Emperial system i
and their subordination. '

The eccnaic situation in middle Europe obviously de-
mands agreement between neighbors. A Danubian readjustment is
essential. The re-allianoo of Austria-Hungary would be a step-
ping stone toward economic adjustment. without which' political

security‘is unobtgggble. It is t2 be hgped thgt the Littlg
1'7. Review of Reviews. Vol. 82. p. 74.

 

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(14)

Entente will not obstruct such a policy. At present. the
Auschluss movement. though desirable in itself. would probably
seriously threaten the peace of EurOpe. The probability of the
success of the Anschluss would be negligible if the economic
union of Austria and Hungary be allowed. If it be not allowed.
Gem-any and Austria are sure to draw closer together; Trance
and the Little Entente would become panicky and the peace of
Europe totter. . ' '

One would think that after generations of subjection and
deprivations. Poland would have learned a lesson of sympathy
and toleration for other national groups trying to work out
their own destiny as a national unit. The Testern World was
scarcely able to believe that Poland had actually sent organi-
sed raids into East Galicia. Tor centuries Galicia as a border
country has been a sore spot. It has long been a battleground
between Poles and Ukrainians. . I ‘

The Ukrainian country is known as the granary of Europe.
but there are other itm of vast natural wealth. It. has cans
of the largest deposits of iron and coal in the world. The oil
wells‘ears marvelously rich. There are incense quantities of
tobacco and sugar beets grown. It would seem that the country
would be more fortunate if less rich in natural resources. for
its territory is coveted by every powerful neighbor. 18

There was a time when all of Ukraine belonged to the
Ukrainians. a separate individual branch of the Slavic race
having its own language. history. folklore. culture and poli-
tical ideals. Tor nearly a century and a half it has been di-
videdI the lgggr eastern portion beigg administered by the
18. Current History. Vol. 34. p. 681.

\.

(15)

Russian Czar. and the smaller western part coming under the
administration of the Emperor of Austria. In spite of their.
political division, the Ukrainians have remained ”one in
culture and political aspirations."

When the Russian Empire collapsed the nations of Russian
Ukraine attempted to establish their own republic. At the fall
of the Austrian.Empire. the Poles. Czechs. Serbs and other nan
tionals included in the Dualenarc y claimed their right to
independence. The Ukrainians of East Galicia proclaimed their
freedom and declared for union with the Ukrainian Republic.

But twentyhfour days later the Republic of Poland was
proclaimed. One of its first acts was the invasion of East
Galicia..After nine months of hard fighting the Poles triumph»
ed. established an iron;militariatic rule in East Galicia. and
pushed on into the Russian Ukraine. The Ukrainians were hem-
med in.by the Bolsheviki on the north. the Russian monarchists
on the south. and the Poles on the west. The Ukrainian leader.
Petlura. concluded an alliance with the Poles in order to save
his forces frmm annihilation. He had no other alternative.

‘At the end of the war. march 23. a treaty was signed by which
Poland abandoned.Petlura. recognized a Russian Soviet Ukraine.
In return the Russian Soviets recognized.Poland's claims to
rule over Galicia and two Ukrainian provinces previously
Russian as well. These three provinces are inhabited by
7,500,000 Ukrainians with only small minorities of Jews.
Germans. and Poles. 19 The allied recognition of this treaty
temporarilywcrushed the hgpes of the_galicians.
19. Ibid. p. 682.

(15)

Thus. of all the nations formerly subj ect to Russia or
Austria. Ukraine alone failed to achieve independence. Hopes
have not altogether been abandoned. Throughout Europe today
are scattered nearly 100.000 Ukrainian soldiers. writers and
politicians planning for an ultimate independent Ukraine. 20
Ihile such a national group is prohibited frost expressing and
acting upon its national desires and aspirations the peace of
Europe is none too secure.

Russian Ukraine is sud-independent under loscow but none
the less seething with rebellion. Guerrilla warfare is con-
stantly being carried on. Uprisings are frequent. In the I
Galician Ukraine an active secret Ukraine nilitary organiza-
tion exists. In it there are approximately 3.000 Ukraine pa-
triots who have sworn to give their lives to end Polish rule.
rortunately the most significant nov-ent of the Ukraines of
Galicia has been along educational rather than military lines.
Such a seemingly harnless enterprise as Iaintainisg a Universi-
ty was forcibly forbidden. Drivin froI—Lunberg. the Ukrainians
organized a national university in Prague.

According to original treaty arrangements Ukraine was to
have entonosy. 22 Disregarding this. Poland deliberately
attenpted to Polonise the country. Golinization was first un-
dertaken. The government secured a. monopoly of the sale of

landed estates and created a special bank. Landlords were re-

t s o to this b ch n t id t
20. Ibid. p. 683.
21. Ibid.

22. Ibid. p. 684.

I

-.'§

 

(17)

Poles. But this was not enough..Alleged acts of incendiarims
provided a:nsre semblance of Justification for sending a puni-
tive expedition into last Galicia. The brutality of the Polish
soldiery‘wasunspeakable.23

Probably a year ago autonany. with some responsibility
would have been acceptable. but today the Galicians dusand com-
'plete independence. Guerrilla warfare is still being carried
on in Russian‘Ukraine. Galicia is recognized as the heart of
the Ukrainian novesent. undeniably dangerous to both Russia
and Poland. 0 .

The projected Balkan Union is a love regarded with plea-
sure by those sincerely interested in the maintenance of peace.
Greece seems well disposed toward all of her neighbors. Hr.
Venizelas considers the tension existing between Bulgaria and
Yugoslavia as the greatest obstacle to the Balkan Union. .24
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria seen to have more serious grounds for
dispute than do Greece and Bulgaria. There are a large number
of Bulgarians in Serbianinacedonia. The Bulgarians complain
loudly of the Yugoslav administration there.

There seem to be two sides to the question. The repeated
attempts made by Bulgarian 'Kmitadjis' upon the railway whidl
unites Greece with the rest of Europe. attacks always on Yugo-
slav territory. the assassination of General Ibvatchevitch at
ShtiJs as well as the legal advisors of the Governor of Skole e
and the bmb explosions at Perot. Kriva Palanka and Shumica
hgyg so argoused the fag: of Belggade that rglgtions with Sofia
23. Ibid.

24. Foreign Affairs. Vol 9. p. 494.

u
s
H-b‘ -
I

(18)

are very difficult.

While in these disputes between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
as well as in the less serious ones between Bulgaria and
Greece. both the British and Prench governments have amicably
intervened at both Sofia and Belgrade. Italy has been conspi-
cuous for her absence. Belgrade regards Italy as the supporter
of Bulgaria. Yugoslavia. being surrounded by a chain of states
which either. like Italy. contain Yugoslav minorities. or like
Bulgaria. Albania and Hungary. are interested in their kineman
living in their country. naturally desire and need to concili-
ate these states. The patching up of petty irritations inflict-
ed upon one anothsr is to the interest of all civilization if
a second Sara: eve is to be avoided.

- The present attitude of certain European countries seems
to rather aggravate than heal the greviences. It has been said
that if the Balkans were the I'powdernmsgazine" of Burcpe. the
Great Powers had provided the powder. Europe does not seen to
have profited much by the lesson of 1912-1914. Though no Great
Power possesses Balkan territory as Austria-Hungary previously
did. Italy and France are both continually interfering in
Balkan questions. and have practically divided up the penin-
sula into Italian and Prench spheres of influence. In spite
of the experience of their predecessors. each has her own pet
Balkan states. pampered and encouraged according to the in-
terests of their respective backersgslor is the danger of an
eXplosion decreased by the natural Jealousy between 'the two

'Lgtin sistgrs.‘ Th2 fat that Italy; after the war incggpgrg-
25. Ibid. ’

(19)

ted within.her frontiers a very considerably Yugoslav
:minority complicates matters. especially as France regards
'the high.ldlitary qualities of the Yugoslavs as a valuable
asset in the event of trouble between the two countries." 26

Though Greece stands aloof from.the embarrassing and
compromising patronage of any Great Powers. were there a war
between Italy and Yugoslavia. her position would be difficult.
The Great City of Saloniki contains a Serbian Pres Zone. in
attempt on the part of Yugoslavia to import war1material
through the Free Zone and over the Greek railway into Yugo-
slav territory would.make it difficult for Greece to remain
neutral.

The tension in Franco-Italian relations has been grow-
ing for the last nine months. Though negotiations between
Paris and Rome have been in progress for a number of years.
they'have not yet been brought to any satisfactory conclusion.
It is fully realized that the differences between France and
Italy must be settled before a general conference on the re-
duction and limitation of arms can be profitably held.

The natural causes of jealousy and ill feeling have been
aggravated by misunderstandings and misrepresentations in part
fostered by newspaper prepoganda. The fact that the negotia-
tions have been conducted in strict secrecy has led to futile
and.ldstaken arguments calculated to influence public passions.
0f the two probably Italy has been the worst offender in this
respect. Seemingly. the campaign waged against France in Italy

has had a semi-official chaggcter.
26. Ibid._

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(20)

The Italians claim that the promises made to them at the
time they entered the war and afterwards have not been kept.
France feels that Italy won even more than she in that Italy
received her natural frontiers and her traditional enemy was
swept from the map of Europe.

Moreover. France does not feel that she alone is to be held
responsible for Italian disappointment. In Article 13 of the
Treaty of London (April 26. 1915) it was stipulated that
should France and Great Britian increase their colonial terri-
tories in Africa at the eXpense of Germany. those two powers
would agree in principle that Italy might claim some equitable
compensation. particularly as regards the settlement in her
favor of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Ital-
ian colonies of Eritria. Somaliland and Libya and the neigh-
boring colonies belonging to France and Great Britian.27

The Franco-Italian agreement of September 12. 1918 was
consumated to carry out this agreement. Italy was granted a
rectification of the western frontier of Libya whereby the
Cases of Ghadames and Ghat passed under Italian sovereignty.
France considers this equitable compensation; Italy does not}8

In 1928 the French government proposed the cession of the
Djado Oasis south of Tummon ( which was already an Italian
possession ) on condition that Italy accept certain preposals
concerning affairs in Tunis. 29 At the time the Italian go-
zgrnment_was disposed to accept the offgngoday it is r9-

27. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 9. p. 223.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid. p. 224.“

(21)

garded as far from satisfactory. The residents of the colonies
have been aroused. and the reoccupation of Mourzouk by General
Graziani only aroused their desires for more. They new demand
Bella. Tibesti and northern Barbou. Moreover. they arenow
demanding access to Lake Chad. Such access would cut all the'
lines of communication which France has been struggling to
establish between West Africa and Equatorial Africa.

Since 1927 Italy has been claiming that she inherited all
the rights of Turkey in Tripolitania' and the 'hinterland' of
Tripolitania. 30 Thus any concessions France might make in the
direction of Tibesti and Barbou would not be considered as eq-
uitable compensation. Though in 1890 the Ottanon government.
asserted the slain that the 'hinterland' of Tripolitania exten-
ded as far as the frontiers of the Cameroon. this theory was
. never Justified by continued occupation; nor was it ever recog-
nized by France or England. France refuses to consent to the
reopening of the question now. 31

'The status of Italians in Tunis is regulated by Franco-
Italian agreements of 1896.. Article thirteen of the agreement
for the'lstablishment of Consulates provides that: 'Italy will
regard as Tunisians and trance will regard as Italians . such
individuals as shall have retained Tunisian or Italian nation-
ality in accordance with the laws of their respective countries!
Notice of the repudiation of this article was served on Italy
by France in 1918. but the article has been left in force by
W
30. Ibid. ’

31. Ibid. p. 225.

.

s“

(22)

have been escaping application of a French decree of November
8. 1921. which stipulates that 'all individuals born in the
Regency of Tunis of parents one of whom was born in the Regen-
cy are French.‘ This decree was modified December 20. 1923.

so that any individual in the category mentioned has a right
to decline French citizenship. provided he does so within a
year of majority; though children born of an individual who
has etercised this principle are French.‘ England has accepted
this arrangement for her own subjects as well'as for her
llaltese dependents; Italy regards it as another Trench attempt
to weaken her colonial power. -

Two years ago France proposed a scheme for a treaty of
arbitration and friendship with Italy. This treaty was de-
signed torevive certain provisions in the treaty which Italy
concluded in 1924 with Yugoslavia. This treaty was never re-
newed. As a result lrench friendship for the Yugoslavs a... to
play an inportant part in her relations with Italy.

Italy has only herself to blame for the failure of the
Powers to adhere to the Treaty of London. According to that
treaty. l'iume went to Yugoslavia. Italy in demanding line.
made the Treaty of London a back number. To this demand. the
United States as well as France and England were opposed. By
the Treaty of Rapallo (1920) Fine was made an independent
free city. 32 The arrangement was unsatisfactory to both the
Italians and Yugoslavs and proved unworkable. The Yugoslavs
closed the Zagreb-Finns railroad in an attempt to cripple

Italian commercial interestsLAs a result Fiume was forced-

 

32. F. Lee Home “Europe Since 1914'. p. 446.

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X

(25)

into idleness and the Yugoslav hinterland became economically
disorganized.

By the Treaty of Rome. January 27. 1924. the Free State
of Fiume was divided between Italy and Yugoslavia. Port Bares
went to Yugoslavia while ll'iume proper was given to Italy. 35
In larch the final annexation of the city which had caused so
such controversy was settled. This settlement brought about
an improvement in Italo-Yugoslav relations.

But two years later Italy signed the Treaty of Tirana
with Albania. marking the close of Italy's policy of concord
with Yugoslavia. To the Yugoslavs it appeared that Italy had
at last secured the protectorate over Albania which Italian
nationalists had been seeking ever since the outbreak of the
world War. Excitement in Belgrade was intense. In 1927 the
Franco-Yugoélflv Treaty was consulated. Italy regarded the
treaty as aimed at her. tightened her hold on Albania. and
neglected to renew the Treaty of Friendship with Yugoslavia.

Italy chooses to consider the Franco-Yugoslav Treaty
as evidence of. France's 'encircling‘ policy . Thus friendship
between France and Yugoslavia has become a cause of Franco-
Italian misunderstanding. “In asking for a formal alliance
with Belgrade to the exclusion of all other Powers; in es-
tablishing herself in Albania; in concluding alliances with
Bulgaria. Hungary and Austria. and in talking of a rapproch-
ment with Germany. Italy has launched forth on a policy of
expansion toward the East. a policy that does not foster

warm relations on her part eithgr with Yggoslavia. or with
35. Ibid.

 

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the Little Entent. or with France." 54
Secret diplomacy by itself is bad enough. but when it

becomes associated with publicity stunts and dirt-throwing in
the daily press it is considerably worse. The Franco-Italian
naval agreement is the latest instance. After days spent in
hurrying from London to Paris for an interview with N. Briand
arranged by telephone. conversing at high speed at the French
Foreign Office. catching the next train for Rome to converse
with Signor Grandi and Premier Iussolini. and hastening back

to Paris to make sure that France would accept what Italy agre-
ed to. llr. Henderson. British Foreign Secretary. announced

that the controversy between’Italy and France had been patched
up and that those powers would soon adhere to the London

naval treaty. Nothing of the terms of the agreement was di-
vulged. and the newspaper correspondents were left to create
hypothetical terms out of hints and speculations. Now. it
appears. the agreement is not so perfect. at least. as to
keep Great Britian from fearing that-its own "naval position
has been Jeepardized and that France conceded less than was
supposed.

Naval agreements will soon become a hissing and a by-
word if they continue to develops such contentions and mis-
understandings as have followed recent ones. Now comes the
demand of France for a volume of replacement tonnage by 19:56
which Italy regards as preposterous.

The causes of disagreement and antipathy between France

and Italy are almost multitudinous. Yet :19 reduction 9; gm
34. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 9. p. 231.

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or any enduring peace in Bumps can be assured with these
differences unadjusted. The prospect is not encouraging.

Spain presents another and different troublesome situa-
tion. At present Spain seems to be the victim of almost con-
stant political turmoil. The root of the trouble apparently
is the continued existence of an autworn institution - monar-
chy. Though personally King Alfonso XIII is popular with the
majority of his people. he. as king. represents an era which
Spain is struggling to outlive. These groups are hardly a
minority. Four chief groups. the Intellectuals. the Socialists.
the New Industrialists. and the Republicans are Opposed to the
present regime.

The situation is complicated by the presence of old
causes of discontent such as separatism. regionalism. race and
language. To each of these groups the monarchy represents some-
thing different. 'To the separatist and regionalist itrepre-
sents a centralised form of government; to the Socialists and
New Industrialists. a landed aristocracy and a national econo-
my better suited to the sixteenth than to'the twentieth centu-
ry; to the intellectuals it personifies the Church and cultural
stagnation; to the Republicans it is the symbol of unconstitu-
tional government and militarism. 35 The Opposition cuposes
those who desire a new cultural. political and economic era.

There are certain conditions peculiar to Spain which have
been and are contributing to the revolutionary movement. Spain
has never really been united. Aragon and Castile were not even

unite gm thggelves. This gountu also lacks unity in 2392
35. Current History. Vol. 34. p. 24.

 

9...

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and language. Each section has its own individual dialect and
the people customarily refer to themselves as "Castellanos' or
'Gallegos.' The Galician dialect is very unlike the Castilian.’
Often people in one region cannot understand those in another.
Such racial and linguistic prejudices that naturally follow
provide fertile soil for the seeds of revolt.

The church is the corner stone of the monarchy endeasssuhh
is open to bitter attach. Spain is now as she has been for
centuries almost entirely Catholic. Through the centuries the
church and state have stood together. the state contributing
large sums to the support of the church. 36 Consequently the
church is conservative. wishing no change in the system of
government. The intellectuals center a considerable part of
their attack on the church. It accuses the church of 'debasing
the confessional to a spy system for the government."37

The situation is one which engenders rebellion because the
present royal family are not the legitimate heirs to the throne
of Spain. According to the Republicans the present regions is
unconstitutional. The majority of the intellectuals see in the
monarchy a permanent barrier to the constitutional parliamen-
try form of goverrlent they desire.

A brief review will be necessary in order tounderetand the
military situation in Spain. In earlier centuries an army
career and a Christian life were almost synonymous. The one
absorbing occupation of every Spanish gentleman was fighting.
Ngne but thg cog; worked. A contmt for ml. labor ggvgl-
36. Ibid. p. 25.

37. Ibid.

a

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oped. Noreover. Spain became saddled with a military system
far worse than either pro-war Genmany or present-day France.
This militarism was directed at the homngovernment rather
than at any external enemy. Spain passed through a.period of
internal wars which consumed her entire strength. All political
activity was directed by the army. Whenever a party failed to
win by the ballet it resorted to warfare.‘Unfortunately. Spain
does not seem to have outlived this system.

It is principally upon the military class that the pre-
sent crisis depends. As long as the army holds together in
support of the monarchy. Spain will no doubt have a.king.
Though there is not yet~sufficient popular strength to depose
Ihnm. the government does not rest on strong. long established
foundations. Happily the rest of Europe seems little concerned
with what happens in Spain. The chances of revolution there
throwing the rest of Europe into war are slight. The outlook
for internal peace. however. is far from bright. as '

Revolts in Latin America cause considerable concern to the
united States. They effect investments amounting to 35.000.000.
000. a trade of 32.000.000.000 annually as well as the security
of thousands of our national residents in these countries. 39
In many cases they are alleged to involve both the Monroe doc-
trine and the domination of the Canal Zone by the United States,

Secretary of State Simpson. in a recent address. claims
justification for the tutorial role of the United States in
'38. The predicted revolution has taken place since the writing

of this thesis.

39. Current History. Vol. 34. p. 12.

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Central America on the grounds that we have acted at their
earnest request and in cooperation with them. These words are
misleading. It is the executives of the countries. not the
peOple. who have desired our intervention. Naturally the Presi-
dents of 1923 favored such a policy in order to continue in
office.

The right of revolution is a symbol of national integrity.
Undoubtedly revolution is unfavorable to world peace. Under
certain circumstances its denial is still more dangerous. The
policy of the United States in Latin America seems to rest on
three assummions: 'that revolutions are not necessary there.
that orderly self-government after the manner of England and
the United States is possible in the region; and that the Unit.
ed States has the right and duty to maintain order in the
Caribbean area." 40 Actually a number of these revolutions
have been protests against manifest injustice. oppression and
exploitation. For one country to interfere with the attempt of
another people striving for governmental reform is apt to
foster rather than inhibit the desire for revolution. By
denying the right of revolution. we tend to create and main-
tain in power a succession of dictators. who by oppressing the
people bring about the very disorders which our State Depart-
ment wishes to prevent.

Any attempt at intervention on our part. or on that of
any other country. is more apt to bring disorder than lasting
peace. Revolutions are most undesirable. The only other method-
and the more desirable one - of obtaining needed reforms is

through the elections. This method is not without its dangers:

40. Ibid. p. 15.

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In both Nicaragua and Panama our goverrmsnt has supervised the
elections. If. after we have imposed free and peaceable elec-
tions. the governments chosen should be unable to cope with the
opposition. we would propably feel compelled to send the marines?
to protect the established government. to see that the govern-
ment carries on an orderly administration. attends to socinl
justice and promotes the public wellfare. The present policy of
the United States exposes it to the charge of using the superi-
or strength to advance the interests of its own capitalists.
and of preferring profits and wealth to human liberty.

Recent revolutions in South and Central America are evi-
dence of social progress rather than retrogression. There is
mch to show that they are largely inspired by sincere patrio-
tism. True. a real democracy is not yet possible in some of
these states. and whether the new governments will bring a
greater liberalism time alone will tell. With wider and more
effective conmmnication. public opinion has come into play as
never before: and the appeal to freedom and democracy. even if
these ends are not wholly and at once achieved. serves to stimu-
late the latent political consciousness of the people. Inter-
vention in an attempt to establish democracy functions to steer
the rising tide of nationalism. and if irritated too much. may
some day turn against those attempting to play the part of
benefactors.

For nearly thirty years Juan Vicente Gomez has succeeded
in. maintaining a brutal dictatorship in Venezuela. He has been.
materially aided by Dutch. British. and American warships which
patrol the coast of the second largest oil producing country in

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the world. Most of the political Opponents of the dictator-
ship have fled the country; the rest have been exiled. killed
or sent to prison. Evidence showing that American oil inter-
ests have obtained for Games the support of the Department of
State was presented to both houses of Congress last year. and
resolutions calling for an investigation of our relations with
Venezuela were introduced. 41 So far nothing has'been done
either to stop the misrule or to withdraw our support of the
dictatorial government there.

On avsmallcr scale than that of the Games dictatorship in
Venezuela. but equally vicious and despotic. the Trujillo dic-
tatorship in Santo Domingo has been riding 'roughshod' over the
Dominican peeple. At least eleven of the opposition leaders
have been assassinated and many others have been imprisoned or
forced into exile. Primary schools have been closed and the
money used to raise an army. 42 It is to be hoped that the.
people will not long endure such misrule. The present condi-
tion must be considered as dangerous to world peace. Santo
Domingo is virtually a protectorate. Should revolution occur.
the United States would find it difficult to keep her‘hsnds
clean.

The problem of Nicaragua is difficult. The question is.
are we doing more to foster ill will and resentment by inter-
vening in the internal affairs of Nicaragua than we would be
if we left them to work out their own salvation. accepting
thTrevolpjions that would accgpanz thgir attgps. _
41. Nation. Vol. 132. p. 243.

42. Ibid.

 

 

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In order to arrive at some conclusion. let us review
briefly Nicaragua's recent history. In July 1912 Diaz. feeling
himself unable to handle the situation. appealed for assistance
against the revolution. The marines had crushed that revolution
for him by October of that year. From then until August 1. 1925
a company of marines remained at Nicaragua. During that period
of thirteen years no revolution occured. The presence of this
small group is said to account for the maintenance of peace.
The only ones dissatisfied were the liberals who complained of
always losing the elections. Now that they have won two elec-
tions since the intervention of 1927. they no longer obj set to
the occupation.

In November 1923. our Goverment notified the officials of
_ Nicaragua that we intended to withdraw our marines in January
1925. In the meantime. the elections of 1924 were to be held in
accordance with a model electoral law drafted by an American
expert and recommended by the State Department. Also an effi-
cient constabulary was to be organized under the direction of
American instructors. It was thought that the new government
would be very strong and capable of managing licaraguan affairs
satisfactorily. The Central American treaty was ratified and
the plans materialized as predicted. 43

In spite of such an encouraging- outlook. both the retir-
ing Conservative Goverment and the incoming Coalition Liberal-
Conservative Government requested the retention of the marines.
The request was granted in the hope that the organization of

the nu constgbulgz would be facilitated, The marines wgrg
43. l'oreign Affairs. Vol. 9. P. 498.

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withdrawn August 1. 1925. It was the general opinion in
Nicaragua that this withdrawal would be the signal for a coup
d'etat. probably by General Chamorre. 4‘

According to these predictions. Chamorro seized complete
control of the Goverment October 25. On January 16. 1927. he
occupied the presidency through congressional proceedings
which he chose to call constitutional. The Chamorro goverment
was not granted recognition. In May the new president succeeded
in putting down a revolution. In August another revolution broke
out. This time the insurgents were aided by llexican arms and
Chamorro was forced to resign. ‘5

Former President Diaz assmned the presidency on November
11. and the same day was recognized by the United States. Us
had hoped thereby to terminate the civil war. but soon another
revolution under the leadership of General lioncada developed.
The United States Government intervened to the extent of estab-
lishing neutral zones favorable to the Diaz Government. selling
it United States war materials on credit. and making it a loan
of 31.000.000. ‘6

In April 1927. President Coolidge sent llr. Stimson to
Nicaragua in a final effort to secure peace. A letter stating
that the United States had accepted the invitation of the
Nicaraguan Government to supervise the elections of 1928. with
the authority to accept the custody of arms of those willing
to lay them downI and to disarm forcibly thosg whg would not do
44. Ibid.

45. Ibid. p. 499.

46. Ibid.

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so was delivered to General Moncada, who immediately surren-
dered. The civil war was reported to be definitely at an end.
The following statistics hardly verify that conclusion.
Since May 15. 1927. the American marines have suffered the fol-
lowing casualties: “27 killed in action; 15 dead from wounds;
59 wounded but not fatally; 52 dead from sickness. The Nicara-

" 47 In spite of the peace

guans killed'have numbered 3.764.
proclamation of May 1927 and the employment of as many as
5.7000 American marines in fields of operation. the pacifica-
tion of Nicaragua is still unachieved.

Several contributing factors account for this failure. In
the first place there are too few roads to allow effective pa-
trolling of the entire sparsely settled area. Bands of natives
roam the vast tropical Jungles and are able to secure a meager
existence safe from American pursuers. Secondly. the organized
Opponents of our interventionhave the sympathies of the masses
both in Nicaragua and through Latin America. This fact accounts
both for their abundant supplies of arms and for their know-
ledge of the movements of the marines. Fran time to time pro-
perty owners have been raided in order to replenish the war
chest and larder. .

In order to rid Nicaragua of these bandits. an extensive
system of roads and legal administration would be required.
Financially Nicaragua is unable to attempt such a project.
Though we have attempted to give Nicaragua two fair elections.
one in 1928 and again in 1930. we have not been moved to use

ggr rgsources for materig improvements which are a necesggy
47. Ibid.

 

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part of any permanent solution. The stage is therefore set .for
the continuation of present disorders and the repition of
recent history.

However. the choice between intervention and non-interven-
tion is not a choice between peace. safety. and trade on the
one hand. and disorder and no trade on the other. A Nicaraguan
civil war in which the American marines participate differs
from a purely Nicaraguan civil war mainly in that one costs us
a hundred American lives and good will throughout South Anerica
while the other does not. The choice between a Nicaraguan-made
peace and an American-made peace is. a choice between Chamorro's
way and our way of violating the Nicaraguan constitution.

India presents still another probles1 .ii‘a‘thé 'figt £567.34“),
of educated Indians. including most of those who are members of
the Indian National Congress. freedom means primarily freedom
from foreign domination. from alien rule; they are passionately
longing for the some political freedom that so many western
nations have achieved by force of arms within the last 150
years. and many of them believe that so great a blessing can
only be secured by the traditional means of anned revolution.
Nevertheless. the illiterate millions of peasants are content
to allow Gandhi to lead the movement. and to adopt his non-
violent methods of overthrowing the government's authority.

But their aim is the aim of all revolutionary nationalists: to
destroy the alien government. and to establish in its place an
Indian Government .' controlled by themselves or their friends.

The position of Mahatma Gandhi is rather different. Natu-

rally he too wants to see india self governing. taking her

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rightful place as a great free people with the other self-
governing nations of the world. But that hardly seems to be the
dominant motive for his actions. He wants India to become
politically'free in order to be economically free. The peasants
in many parts of indie. have learned from Gandhi and his close
associates that their grinding poverty is not inevitable; that
their land tax is so heavy because the alien government has to
support so many expensive foreign officials; that they can
strike at this evil system by collecting their own salt and so
evading the salt tax. by boycotting the liquor and drug shops
and so reducing the goverment excise; and as a last resort
they can refuse to pay their land tax and their rents.

Aside from revolutionary activities of this kind. they
have been encouraged for years to use their hours of idleness
in spinning and weaving their own cotton clothes. instead of
buying machine made goods from Lancashire. The villages that
have taken up the 'khaddar“. as it is called. are reported to
be better off and morally superior to their neighbors. It is
no wonder that the peasants are supporting him. not only in
his own province of (had erat. but in many other parts of India
where his disciples have been working. ‘

The business oomuunity also supports him. To them econo-
mic freedom means tariffs. protection against foreign manu-
facturers. the right to change the rupee value to suit the
interests of India. .

Nost significant of all. thousands of women of all classes
have responded to Gandhi's call. They have proved that freedom

means to them. first. freeda from lives of seclusion. but.

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beyond that. .his emphasis on non-violence, on purity and Chas-g
tity of life. on sacrifice, on home-crafts: above all. perhaps.
something in his own personal life that defies analysis. has
rallied than in thousands to his standard.

These are the main forces which have cooperated in the
civil disobedience movement. but it has received support from
many other sections of the country owing to another cause. tem-
porary but potent. Faced by widespread violation of laws. the
government of India began to enact ordinances restricting the
riait of public meeting. the freedom of the press. and other
rights. 48 Fresh demonstrgtions and more extensive civil diso-
,bedience followed until the jails were filled and authorities
encouraged officers to disperse the crowds. Often quite orderly
crowds were dispersed with anything but gentleness.

Whatever reason may be advanced for such action on the
part of the authorities. the effect on Indian public opinion
has been unfortunate. Many felt that the Simon Commission com-
pletely misjudged the situation. seriouls underestimating the
strength of the nationalist movement. Moreover. police repres-
sion alienated a large section of Opinion. What might have been
adopted as a reasonable degree of self-government in 1929 would
have no chance of acceptance in 1931.

The round table conference has not fully appreciated this
change. The Simon Commission proposed provincial self-govern-
ment with the central authority reserved in the hands of the
vioeroy. who would still receive instructions from London. The
round t b1 s n b n this in that i r iz
48. Christian Century. Vol. 47. p. 435.

(37)

that India is in no mood to accept anything less than respon-
sibility for the central government. This is recognized in
principle. but certain restrictions in the nature of “safe-
guards“ have been attached which cannot prove penanently sa-
tisfactory to India.

Under the existing conditions. the subjects of defense
and external affairs are to be reserved to the governor gene-
ral and the powers necessary for the administration of these
subjects are to be placed in his hands. Since the governor '
met be able in an emergency to maintain peace within the state
and must also be responsible for the observance of the consti-
tutional rights of the minorities. he must be given the nece-
ssary'powers for these purposes.

England reserves the right to interfere in financial
arrangements to the extent that the fulfillment of the obli-
gations incurred under the authority of the security of state
and the maintenance of the unimpaired financial stability and
credit of India necessitates. Except for these provisions. the
Indian government would have full financial responsibility for
the methods of raising revenue and for the control of other
expenditures. ‘9 However. if the new constitution works rea-
sonably well. the transfer of financial responsibility should
be complete within ten years. If India obtains a constitution
according to the lines laid down in the round table conference.
the bureaucracy will immediately be under the financial con-

trol of a responsible government. and the army should come

fully under that ggntggi m ntuallz. 5°

49. Ibid. p. 455.
50. Ibid. p. 456.

(38)

A difficult problem remains. If the control passes into
Indian hands. whose hands will they be? Will they be just the
princes. landlords. and capitalists. or the high caste Brahmin
Hindus. or will the masses of peasants and workers have any
voice in the matter? At present the princes rule over 70.000.
000 subjects; some of these may be content with the benevolent
despotism of certain'rulers. but subjects of other less bene-
volent rulers are gravely discontent. No one spoke in their
behalf in London.

The princes demand for themselves.- not for their subjects.
a large representation in the central legislature. and probably
they will expect to have seats in the central executive. Should
this be the case. the condition of the masses. economically and
politically would not be perceptibly improved. The danger of
revolution would still hang over India.

The proposals. are not final. If the influence of the
congress can be exerted to shift the balance of the constitu-
tion more to the side of the..masses. either by further exten-
sion of the franchise or by other means. there seems to be
nothing to prevent it. If they have to fight for these things.
it will be against the priviledged classes in India rather
than against the British government.

(59)

II

William Archer in his “Color-Blind Neutrality‘ attempts
to show that the blame for the war lies entirely in the Central
Powers. 0n pages twenty-nine to thirty-one. he sumarizes his
interpretation of the responsibility for the 'orld War by
comparing Germany and the allies in regard to militarism. For
instance he says Germany “Believes ardently in war as the no-
blest and most beneficent of Man activities; a doctrine
preached by her most popular historians and philosOphers. and
everywhere reechoed in literature. Journalism and education“
while “In every country“ of' the allies “there is a strong-“paci-
fist party. including men of great influence. Every country.
whatever war party may exist. derives its whole strength from
the constant menace of Germany's military preparations and
aggressive temper.“ Next he says that the allies “have no de-
sire for territorial expansion. least of all at Germany's ex-
pense.“ while Germany “contains at any rate a considerable
party which openly agitates for large territorial expansion in
or out of Europe.“ 51

This type of propaganda is (the most dangerous. It was
written. not by one who'was war-crazed and incapable of see-
ing that there are two sides to the question. but rather. it
was written in a scholarly manner with as little evidence of
emotion as could be found at such a time. It was written for
the purpose of showing the United States how unjust and con-
trary to the interests of humanity her policy of neutrality
was. It was written in such a manner as to convince thinkinL

51. William Archer. “Color-Blind Neutrality“. pp. 29-36.

.l

(40)

pe0p1e that war was necessary. It is bad enough when the mob

is swayed by emotional propaganda. but when the thinking ele-
ment which we must dependupon to maintain a sane national
policy in time of crisis. is won over by the appeal of such
writers. then there is little hepe for maintaining neutrality.
When thinking peOple have presented to them. by some one who 9
has apparently studied the question. what appears to be the
truth but in reality is but part of the truth. they too are apt
to be convinced and follow the mob. Such is what happened in
the United States in 1917. That type of literature was on obsta.
cle to world peace in. 1917. and the same sort of thing would be
sure to present itself as an obstacle to peace were similar '
toonditions to arise. .

In his “Shirking the Issue“ Uilliam Archer goes even fur-
ther in his attempt to show the folly of neutrality. He makes
such people as Dr. George 'Brandes. one of the very few who in
the excitement of the moment kept his head enough to see that
the allies hands were also stained with war guilt and attempted
to make that fact clear to America before it was too late. ap-
pear as an enemy of civilization. to be avoiding the issue and
purposely misrepresenting facts.

The curious thing is that the inhabitants of a country
rarely dispute the external sovereignty of their governnent.
They may know as a matter of bitter experience that their
rulers are a corrupt. stupid. reactionary group of men. But
when these rulers speak to a foreign people. those opinions
acquire an almost supernatural importance. They becomethe
“national will“ and men will give their lives for them.

(41)

In a consideration of the differences between the psycho-I
logy of domestic and'foreign politics. the most striking dif-
ference seems to be this: in domestic affairs we live with and
know the men who disagree with us; in foreign countries the
opposition lives behind a frontier and probably speaks a dif-
ferent language. Simple and obvious as this sounds. the conse-
quences are enormous. Thus when a nation crystallizes; its - epin-
ion. it does so practically unopposed. The average man meets
almost nobody who disagrees with him. In fact. Opposition is
about the only incentive we have to practice reason and toler-
ance. Unless our ideas'are questioned they become established.
It is only by constant criticism that any of our ideas remain
human and decent. '

The consequences of the Moroccan crisis were far reaching.
National feeling was set loose which extended far beyond the
original dispute. Morocco came to mean not money. but bad will.
suspicion. fear and hatred. 52 Propaganda played on this fear
and made it a question of national prestige and even security.

In sane such way as that patriotism becomes involved in
business. Specific disputes over specific trade Opportunities
become the testing points 'of national pride. Just as a man will
fight a law suit at an enormous cost for a trivial sum. so na-
tions will risk war to score a diplomatic victory. They feel
that a defeat on one point will exhibit weakness and carry in
its train defeat on other points. So they throw their armaments
into the scale of decision.

It is a wgl kngwn fact that within the memou of livipg
52. Walter Lippmann. “The Stakes of Diplomacy“. p. 81.

-h

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men the nations of Burcpe who fought on Opposite sides, in the
recent war. were friends with their enemies and enemies with

their friends. 0n no theory of racial antagonism. nationality
or cultural differences can the fact be explained that until

thirty years ago. England was friendly to Germany. and deeply
hostile to France and Russia.

It may seem a paradox that the anarchy of the world is
due to the backwardness of weak states; that the modern states
have lived in an armed peace and collapsed into terrible war-
fare because in Asia. Africa. the Balkans. Central and South
America there are rich territories which invite exploitation.
in which the prizes are so great that the competition for them
leads to war.

PeOple will not go behind it. however. unless they are
made to feel that the subject matter of diplomacy is related
to their daily lives. Uithout, some direct and constant interest
public Opinion ignores foreign affairs until a crisis is reach- 9
ed. Everyone is interested in a dramatic event or a possible
war. But the tedious negotiations which prepare the situations
leading to crises and wars are not much discussed because they
deal with distant and shadowy countries. When the crises arrive
public Opinion is swayed by the prOpaganda of the moneyed’inter-
- ests until war becOmes‘ inevitable.

In considering the use of international force to secure
peace. we are brought to the fundamental necessity of common
accord. In the field of conflicting national policies. and what
are deemed to be essential interests. when the smouldering fire

of old grievances have been fanned into a flame by a passionate

(43)

sense of immediate injury. or the imagination of peOple is
dominated by fear of present danger to national safety. or
what is believed to be an assault on national honor. what force
is to control the outbreak. The trust in force must be in the
common agreement behind the force. The application of force
when there is a disagreement means war. not peace; and then the
basis of confidence. if found at all. is merely in the disparit-
ty of arms.

All contrivances for maintaining peace by economic pres-
sure. as well as by military force. depend on the sentiment
which will apply the pressure and direct the force when the
test comes. The way to peace is through agreement. not through
force. The question then is not of any ambitious general
scheme to prevent war. but simply the constant effort to find
a just and reasonable basis for accord.

It is necessary to reckon with the special difficulties
inherent in the democratic organization of government with re-
spect to the endeavor to maintain peace by' concluding interna-
tional agreements to end controversies closely affecting na-
tional interests. The more important the agreements. as insur-
ing peace by settling bitter disputes. the more certain it is
that they will involve mutual concessions. Thus in each coun-
try it is likely to be insisted that the other has gained at .
its expense. and this gives exceptional Opportunity to critics
who assume the most extreme positions on patriotic grounds.

There are today certain questions betweenpeOplde which
ought to be taken up and settled in order to heal festering
sores. But those in charge of foreign affairs do not dare to

(44)

undertake to negotiate agreements because they know that in
the presence of attack inspired by political or partisan mo-
tives. the necessary adjustment could not receive the approval
of the legislative branch. Democracies mey be loath to go to
war.‘but they are extremely difficult agencies of internation-
al compromise in the interests of peace.

It is sometimes suggested that all would be easy if nego-
tiators would simply tell the public everything that they are
doing. But the trouble is that in every negotiation there are
preliminary positions to be taken and nothing can be accom-
plished if every suggestion must be publicly made. Negotiators
under such restrictions would inevitably take their positions.
’not to Dvomote a settlement. but to win public approval by the
firmness and vigor of their partisanship. Misleading state-
ments. misapprehensions and unfounded rumors are likely to be-
come current and perhaps make necessary in.order to avoid
greater difficulties. disclosures which it would be in the
interest of successful prosecutions of the negotiations to
wdthhold for the time being..

Perhaps the most troublesome source of irritation are to
be found in the subjects uhich states decline to regard as
international in the legal sense. Every state. jealous of its
sovereign rights. refuses to permit the intrusion of other
nations into its domestic concerns. But in these days of inti-
mate relations. of economic stress. and of intense desire to
protect national interests and advance national opportunity.
the treatment of questions which from a legal standpoint are
domestic. often seriously affects international relations. The

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principle each nation for itself to the full extent of its
power. is the principle of war. not of peace. Propaganda ac-
centuates‘the dangers involved. It'does not require gains for
the people as a whole to explain war. It is enough if influ-
ential classes have a mistaken hope of gains.

In the past. certain officials and writers have striven
during wars to make peOple forget the issues which make war;
the reasons given- the public for enterring on war were seldom
the real reasons; usually the real reasons never reach the
mind of the general public. Hence the ease with which govern-
ments launch nationals into war.

It was ruled in England in 1915 by certain “leaders of
thought“ that it was “unwise. unpatriotic. and un-English to
suspect the motives of Governments. or waver for a moment in
swearing whole-hearted allegeance to the authorities. you must
think only of war. If you dare ask for the truth. you are help-
ing the enemy; if you suggest an early peace. you are hinder-
ing the militarists who desire no peace'until their enemy is
utterly crushed.“ 53

Certainly ill feeling aroused between countries is inimi-
cal to assured world peace. It can not be denied that our ex-
clusion policy has done much to offend and to arouse the ill
will of Japan. The psychological effect has been regrettable.
The following memorandum from the Japanese Goverment has been
received by our State Department;

“To Japan the question is not one of expediency but of
principle. To her the mere fact thfl few hundred or thougarnp
53. Frances Neilson. “How Diplomats Make Var“. p. 568. f

Om

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of her nationals will or will not be admitted to the domin-
ions of other countries is immaterial so long as no question of
national susceptibilities is involved. The important question
is whether Japan as a nation is or is not entitled to the pro-
per respect and consideration of other nations. In other words.
the Japanese Government asks of the United States Government
simply that proper consideration ordinarily given by one nation
to the self-reapect of another. which. after all. forms the ba-
sis of amicable international intercourse throughout the civi-
lized world.“ 54

In 1925 Viscount Shibusawa made this statement in refer-Ice
to the exclusion law; “It is not a closed incident......'e ob-
ject not because it shuts out our immigrants but because it
derogates us to a position separate from and inferior to that
of other nations of the civilized world.“ 55

In the Spring of 1950 former.Amhassador Hanihara declared:
“It is not so much a question as to whether one nation should
or should not exercise its sovereign rights in regulating mat-
ters relating to its domestic affairs. as it is often repre-
sented to be. Here precisely. it is a question as to whether
one peOple should treat another peOple sympathetically or un-
sympathetically. fairly or unfairly.....In.that incident the
Ambassador of a friendly power was gratuitously accused of the
wanton act of using a veiled threat against that very country.
Naturally the Japanese Government and.peOple deeply resented.
_this. and that resentment is felt now as it was then.....Nor
54. I. A. S. Whitely. “Immigration Problems on the Pacific

Coast“ p. 123

55. Ibid.. Do 124

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(47)

will it ever die out so long as the wound remains-s unheal-
ed.‘ 56
Should the United States Government and the Japanese Gov-
ernment tangle on any question of international policy. the
antagonism which we have created in Japan would make it diffi-
cult for that country to come to an amicable agreement with us.
According to the Pravada. a Moscow daily. the economic
existence of Soviet Russia is being threatened by an alleged
Hoover-Legge plot . It is reported that the policy of the fe-
deral farm board under the chairmanship of Mr. Alexander Legge
had a single purpose in view. According to Pravada. President
Hoover directed this board to'attempt to create 'a huge store
of wheat. cotton. dried fruit. milk products. meat. wool. tobac-
co. rice. beans and so forth. in order to supply an army which
the French general staff was to throw into Russia during 1950-
19313 57 This fantastic story has been seriously told to the
Russian masses and Just as seriously believed. Though the
authorities of Russia are probably making such reports to h-
facilitate the carrying out of the Five-Year Plan. the deli-
berate attempt of the Soviet authorities to convince the peeple
of Russia that all the rest of the world is planning military
intervention is creating a mass psychology which may someday
MW
56. Ibid.
57. Christian Century. Vol. 48. pp. 532-533.

 

(48)

III

Since the war to end war. it has been more difficult than
ever to secure a lasting peace because of the hate engendered.
war has been recognized as the corollary of independence. the
permitted means by which.in3ured nations protect their terri-
tory and maintain their rights. International law leaves
aggrieved states who cannot obtain redress for their wrongs by
peaceful means to exact it by force. Justification for war. as
recently demonstrated. is ready at hand for those who desire to
make war. There is rarely a case of admitted aggression. or
where on each side the cause is not believed to be Just by the
peOple who support the war.

There is a further difficulty which lies much deeper. There
is no lawgiver for independent states. There is no legislature
to impose its will by majority vote. no executive to give ef-
fect even to accepted rules. The outlawry of war implies a
selfeimposed restraint and free people Jealous of their nation-
al safety. of their freedom of opportunity. of the rights and
privileges they deem essential to their well-being. will not.
forego the only sanction at their command in extreme exigen-

- cies. The restraints they may be willing to place upon them-
selves will always be subject to such conditions as will leave
them able to afford selfbprotection by force. and in this free-
dom there is abundant room for strife sought to be Justified by
deep-seated convictions of national interests. by long stand-
ing greviences. by the apprehension of aggression to be fore-
stalled. The outlawry of war. by appropriate rule of las'making

war a crime. requires the common accord needed to establish and

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(49)

maintain a rule of international law. the common consent to
abandon war; the suggested remedy implies a state of mind in
Which no cure is needed. As the restraint would be self-imposed
it would prove to be of avail only while there is a will to
peace.

It is this difficulty which constantly suggests recourse
to force to maintain peace. Peeples who would engage in war. it
is said. must be compelled to be peaceful; there should be an
international force adequate to prevent aggression and to re-
dress wrongs. The League of Nations. though organized for this
purpose. has been unable to adequately cape with the situation.
largely because the united States has refused to lend her sup- ”
port.

A peeple without muskets or cannon can improvise weapons
fran industrial or other material. If mere limitation of ama-
ments conduced to peace. the era of primitive armament should
have been more peaceful than that of its highest develoment.
but we know that it was not. that it was more warlike. That
partial disarmament does not prevent protracted. vigorous and
costly warfare was shown in our Civil War and is at least sug-
gested by the fitful war which.has been going on for years in
Mexico.

If one side in a contest can be disammed or prevented from
arming. it may be placed at such a disadvantage with respect to
the others that it will not dare go to war. If the side that is
amned does not want war. there will be none. but if it does.
this one-sided armament will cenduce to it.

Let us suppose that the political difficulties involved in

.1'

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an international organization to preserve peace are overcome.
After the troops for the enforcement of international law are
procured. there is still the difficulty of effectively comp
mending a.heterogeneous grand army of levies from a number of
countries. speaking different languages. variously armed.
equipped and organized; trained in different schools of tac-
tics; the officers generally unacquainted with one another and
more or less out of accord as to the objectives and modes of
operation to be adapted.

If such a scheme were to be carried out. it would be
necessary to form.a.union which would be held together from
within. not forced together from outside. In such a union
there must be a civic spirit equivalent. in its unifying in»
fluence. to:military spirit. Suoh a spirit can come only out
of a peoples' life and experiences. It cannot be created or
assured'by a constitution or fame of government. The diffi-
culties standing in the way of such an organization are tre-
mendous. Racial antipathies. differences of language and the
‘present system of protective tariffs are significant obstruc-
tions in the way of such a solution.

‘As a factor of military efficiency national patriotism
cannot be dispensed with as long as war is possible. we are
thus confronted with a conundrum. National patriotism will not
be abolished until world peace is established. and world peace
cannot be established.until national patriotism is abolished.
How then is the world ever to have peace?

It is a lesson of the world's experience that it is in

the interests of peace to localize as far as possible such

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armed conflicts as arise between nations. The right of inter-
vention may. in certain circumstances. be conceded.where a

nation's own peace is menaced by a war on its borders. but
participation in distant wars. where no national interests are
involved. would tend only toward the spread of war and un-
necessary preparation for war. and is essentially inimical to
peace.

A.nation that will not obey a law or keep a contract will
not take the trouble to:make war in another's interest. where
its own interest is not directly involved. A compact to en.
force peace has therefore no more value from the point of view
of honor than a compact to keep the peace. It has the addition-
al handicap. when it comes to questions of action. that going
to war where no national interest is directly affected is an
expensive and unpopular undertaking. and is likely to be post-
poned as much as possible.

we are then forced baok‘to this. that nations that are not
ready voluntarily to accept and obey Just laws cannot be de-
pended upon for any guarantees of peace. Basing their action
solely on national interest as they conceive it. and not upon
uniform: principles of Justice. national interest will eventual-
1y control. and all pledges will be evaded. Each.nation. or at
most each group of nations. will enforce its own peace but will
not sacrifice its own.arms for world peace.

It can not be denied that military preparedness functions
as an obstacle to world peace. Preparedness causes fear and
enmity in other countries and consequently leads to counter-

preparedness. This in turn serves as an excuse for greater

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preparedness and leads to a race of armaments. thus making
an armed camp of the nations. Such a. situation generates fear
and enmity and makes it difficult to establish friendly rela-
tions between nations. Preparedness also necessitates the sup-
port of a body of professional military and naval men who are
highly trained in the art of destruction and whose environment
tends to magnify in their minds the place of armed force and to
decrease confidence in non-military means of maintaining se-
curity and justice. These men exercise considerable influence
over national policies. Preparedness is an integral part of
the war system and tends to be self-perpetuating.

Fear is probably the most powerful factor in producing
. war. The peOples of the earth hate war and desire nothing so
much as to be left in peace. The chief reason why they are
willing to bear the heavy burden of taxation necessitated by
military preparedness and to respond to the call to bear arms
is because of fear of what would happen if their country were
unable to defend itself. The time has passed when governments
can obtain support for a war of cpen aggression. Every govern-
ment now defends its warlike preparations on the grounds of
necessity. The peoples of the earth will no longer support war
on any other basis than self defense or the defense of the
helpless. Pear is the most prolific source of hatred. It has
been said that hate is impossible without fear. There is no
doubt that it was this fear chlex. pervading the mass of the
peeple. that made it possible for the German Government to
maintain its autocratic regime. to impose upon the mass of the
peOple the burdens of militarism. and made it possible for the

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Opposition of the socialists to fail. Fear of aggression.of
military invasion. is the root of all the trouble; that which
alone renders possible and inevitable the flourishing of mili-
tarism. the maintenance of armaments. and the immediate risk of
war. in Spite of the strong desire for peace of the vast major-
ity of all nations. This fear.which was the fundamental cause
of the Great War. has been accentuated rather than quelled by
that disaster.

Wents are the chief cause of fear between nations.
and this fear is the chief cause of war. War produces still
greater fear. and fear in turn produces larger armaments. This
is the vicious circle in which the nations have been traveling
during the past century. with armaments piling higher and high-
er. and fear steadily increasing.

Moreover. huge armaments destroy confidence in other
means of protection and of securing peace. The presence of
large numbers of officers and soldiers . trained to think only
in tems of force. has a profound influence upon public opin-
ion. as we know from the tragic example of Germany. Thus. whole
pepulations cane to depend more and more upon armies and navies
as their only means of protection. This tends to perpetuate
the deification of physical force.

Armamwts are the chief reliance of diplomats and traders
in their exploitation of weaker peoples. The history of Euro-
pean diplomacy during the past century supports this conclu-
sion. without huge armies and navies the spoilation of Africa.
China and other parts of the world would not have been possible

to any considerable extent. This same exploitation of weaker

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peoples is in itself an obstacle to world peace in that it
813011808 the fear and Jealousy of rival powers. I

It is not unusual to hear people say that police are nece-
ssary to keep order within cities and towns and similarly
armies are necessary to keep nations from breaking internationp
al law. This is a naive statement which expresses the average
point of view. No fallacy is more common than that based on the
supposed analogy between police and armies and navies. Much
harm results from inoculatingminds. especially immature minds.
with bad logic based on wrong assumptions. especially when they
concern questions of life and death. All questions concerning
armies and navies have to do with life and death.

Police are necessary. be they city. state. or national
police. That is unquestioned. Police exist for the most part to
performikindly'protective functions. They guide the traffic;
they look after lost children. Perhaps once in two days they
make an arrest. though some good policemen go a,month without
doing so. They do not punish.the.man whom they arrest. They are
permitted to use only the minimum of force to put on the hand-
cuffs.to call up the patrol wagon. and to get their'man before
the judge and.Jury. He is then tried by law made by legislature
or council. The police give their testimony and return to their
beats. A.policeman is himself punished if he uses more force
than is needed.

All the force that a policeman uses is to get a man to
court. Did anyone ever hear of armies or navies taking anyone
to court? Armies and navies are not created to perform.police

functions. Sometimes they are borrowed for that purpose in

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time of earthquake or disaster. But men do not make armor
plate to go through the bayonet drill for the purpose of being
able to carry fuel and food to Messina sufferers when Etna
erupts. or to keep guard in San Francisco when there is an
earthquake. If they are called upon to enforce the law against
rumgrunners. we are told it will lower their'morale. They do
not want to do police duty.

Armies and navies are designed. not for the purpose of
rendering kindly service to civilians. but to be ready to
fight other armies and navies. They do not exist to secure or
carry out Judicial decisions. They are instruments to be used.
if at all. for dueling on a large scale. Police are not rival
bodies. The police of Cleveland are not preparing to defend
themselves against the police of Chicago. The militia.of nas-
sachusetts is not preparing against the militia of Illinois.
But armies and navies are always rival bodies. They exist to
win victory. Their kind of work is destructive of their own
species. Sometimes the victor has more right on.his side than
has the defeated side. but sometimes the reverse is true. Vic-
tory depends largely on which side has the most men. the most
guns and the‘most money.

The war system is built on the.assumption that war is
inevitable. That assumption lies at the basis of all militaris-
tic thinking in the world. It is the fundamental belief taught
in every military and naval school and it is the foundation
stone on which every advocate of war stands. The first article
in the creed of all who extol the virtue and glory of war is 'I

believe in the inevitableness of war.‘

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If you accept that assumption you are in the militarists
hands. If that assumption is sound then nothing that you can

say against big armies and navies is of convincing force. for
if war is inevitable. a nation ought to prepare for it. If war
cannot be escaped we should be ready for it. If it is absolute-
ly certain to come. the government which fails to fortify
against it is recreant to its trust. The preparedness.must be
adequate since inadequate preparation is no preparation at all.
If a nation is to fight. it must fight to win. and no nation ’
can win if only half prepared. The defenses must be equal to
the demands made upon them. and only military and naval experts
can determine what adequacy is. The military policy of a nation
must therefore be turned over to technical specialists who
know the location and.power of every gun on the planet.

In the opinion of all military and naval experts. the
equipment of a nation.must exceed that of its neighbors. For
this reason competition becomes inevitable. The experts spend
their time in computing the comparative strength of rival ar-
mies and navies. and in devising new ways of securing superior
war machines for their home country. If war is inevitable there
is no escape from this competition.

Only two instances in which militarism.is proving an
obstacle to world peace at the present will be cited. In the
first place. from the military standpoint England does not
feel that India is ready to become a selfbgoverning dominion.
The British.have considered the ability to maintain law and
order within its frontiers necessary before such a status can

be granted. The Simon.Report points out two difficulties. The

(5'?)

first is the difficulty involved in raising a corps of Indian
officers..Indians are allowed to enter the Royal Military
College at Sandhurts but it is largely Sikhs and mohammedans
that take advantage of this privilege. The danger that is
involved is increased divergence between the Hindus holding
political power and the Mbhammedans and Sikhs in the arms} 58
Such.an arrangement would not contribute to a peaceful stable
government.

The climate of India is another unfortunate factor. It
seems to sap the vitality of the peOple. They tend to become
fatalists and thinkers rather than workers and warriors. Their
ability to protect their borders and.mmintain peace is seri-
ously open to question. It is for these reasons that the Brit-
ish are unwilling to grant India as complete freedom as the
rising nationalism is demanding.

Secondly. Pascism.seems to be growing more militant. In
its present aspects one cannot fail to regard it as an obstap
cle to world peace. No where is war talked of so much as in
Italy. It is reported that peOple in the trains and cafes talk
of war and mobilization.

One cannot be sure that Fascism.either desires war or
would take the initiative in starting one. but certainly the
extent of its preparation and the prevalence of talk concern-
ing the imminence of war is a dangerous omen. Mussoliniég
speeches are plannedrsto arouse the war spirit of the masses.
The Black-Shirt battalions are the dominating force in Italy.59
58. Current History. Vbl. 34. p. 871.

59. Living Age. Vol. 340, p. 475.

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In addition to the army which now numbers 400,990 men.
there are the police corps numbering 120.000. and the Fascist
militia Which is in itself a veritable duplicate of the regu-
lar army with its own organization. regulations. and arsenals.
A year ago the militia numbered 390.000. Every April forty or
sixty thousand young men are automatically enlisted in the
militia and given arms. The enlistment is no longer voluntary
and the time of service has been extended to ten years. This
makes ahmost a.million.men under arms. In addition. quantities
of premilitary. post school associations aim to give the youth
of the country a military rather than a sport education.6O

There seems to be considerable support for Mussoliniss.war
propaganda. The Duce pretends to believe. and.has.made many of
his countrymen believe. that there is a.Eur0pean conspiracy.
headed by France. against Fascismu At present Fascism.through
its connections with Germany and.Austria threatens to become
international. 61 If the expansion of Fascism.is accompanied
by an equally strong spirit of.militarism. the peace of'Europe
will indeed be insecure.

Europe feels that the proposed Disarmament Conference
will have to be postponed indefinately unless the United States
will play the leading part. EurOpe is today so divided that
there is grave danger that such a conference would be little
Imore than a struggle for prestige.

For example. now that France has spent hundreds of
millions g: dqllars in fortifying both her Rhine and Alpine
60. Ibid.

61. Ibid. p. 476.

 

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frontiers. Italy proposes that all fortifications be de-
molished to a point which would insure the destruction of
French fortifications. 62 This is but another move in the

Franco-Italian rivalry so dangerous to European.peace.

62. Review of Reviews. Vol. 82. p. 59.

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IV

Historically considered we find that most wars have
originated in entirely unexpected and unimportant ways. so
that the immediate dispute is over an altered dispatch. or a
political murder. or some equally accidental affair. But two
nations do not go to war over such matters unless at least one
of them has some better reason than that for wanting the
struggles: and this better reason is. in by far the maJority of
the cases. connected with industry or trade in some important
way. The underlying cause of a great war is. therefore. usually
economic. though the immediate incentive commonly given by
some entirely uneconomic incident gives a better appeal to the
passion and emotions of the populace. ‘

The great danger of economic.motives for were is that
they have such a wide-spread appeal. because severe economic.
pressure is felt directly by the working class throughout the
entire country. It is for this reason that a democratic govern-
ment is even.more liable than an autocracy to be carried into
a war for purely economic reasons. and it is that fact which
lessens the hopes for future peace. 80 long as machine civili-
zation endures. so long will the existing inequalities in na-
tural resources and econauic Opportunities. as between the
countries which are naturally favored and those which are he-
turally limited by their resources. The real danger arises
when the working peOple of a country. rightly or wrongly.
imagine that war offers them a relief from too severe economic
pressure. and when this comes to pass it will be a very remark-

able government indeed which will stand out against the demand.

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The whole modern inlperialistic movement. that is the ef-
forts of all the EurOpean states and of America to secure ad-
ditional colonies. is merely the result of the decline in reve-
nue and of the desire to find a remedy for it; in other words.
it is a derivative of the economic situation. England never an-
nounced the. new imperialism of Chamberlain until she found that
Germany was threatening her supremacy in the textile and metal
industries; while on the other hand. the world politics of
William II shows that the sole aim of Teutonic activity was the
reduction of the commercial power of England. 63 England's
Jealousy of all commerce throughout the world. “and her own mari-
time supremacy rendered a clash between herself and Germany in-
evitable.

“The 'Economist' of July twelfth. 1912. published an arti-
cle showing that for a long time French. German and English
capitalists. greedy for excessive profits. had lent vast sums
to the various Balkan states upon the‘express condition that
the greater part of the money advanced should be expended
for armaments to be furnished by certain firms of Paris. Berlin
and London.“ 64 It was Just this increasing of armaments among
the Balkan states. due to the bankers and commercial houses of
the rest of Europe. which rendered their military Operations
possible. The possiblity of war was actually created by these
transactions; it was economic interests pure and simple which
transformed this possibility into a reality; it was economic
necgssity which brought the Balkan states. hitherto bitter
63. Achille Loria. “The Economic Causes of War“. p. 64.

64. Ibid.

(623)

enemies. into a close alliance and caused them to engage in
war. The necessity of uniting their railways made them put as
side their desire to destroy each other. Serbian pork. Bul-
garian wheat. and Greek commerce were the factors underlying
the so called great religious movement. Serbia itself. which
at first glance seemed to be most fervently animated by the
religious spirit. fought in reality solely for the port of St.
thn of Hedua which her commerce had for a long time coveted.

A large pepulation and an extensive territory endowed
with.mmnifold national resources are essential requirements of
the normal nationality; they are the fundamental conditions of
mental civilization as well as of’material development and po-
litical power. A nation restricted in the numbers of its popu-
lation and in territory. especially if it had a separate lan-
guage. can possess only a crippled literature and crippled in-
stitutions for promoting art and science. A.smmll state can ne-
ver bring to complete perfection within its territory the vari-
ous branches of production. Only through alliances with more
powerful nations. by partly sacrificing the advantages of na-
tionality. and by excessive energy can it maintain. and then
only with difficulty. its independence.

A nation which possesses no coasts. mercantile marine. or
naval power. or has not under its dominion and control the
mouths of its rivers. is in its foreign commerce dependent on
other countries; it can neither establish colonies of her own
nor form a new nation; all the surplus population. mental and
material means which flows from such a nation to uncultivated

countries is lost to its own literature. civilization and

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industry. and goes to the benefit of other nationalities.

The inequalities in average comfort and happiness ex»
isting between the working classes of different countries are
‘due almost entirely to natural and unchangeable differences
in national Opportunity. They cannot be overcome by readjust-
ment of social conditions within the backward nation itself;
the natural way to remedy them.is by a flood of immigrants
from.a country of low Opportunity to one of high.opportunity.
That solution is so natural that it will inevitably be fol-
lowed. provided neither of the countries involved places any
obstacles in its path; if the difference in opportunity of-
fered by the two countries is really very great. the placing
of any such obstacle will be looked upon as a reasonable cause
for war. One of the necessary conditions for universal peace.
then. is absolute freedom of emigration and immigration. It is
a question whether any prosperous country really desires peace
upon such terms. because of the inevitable effect upon the
average well-being of its citizens.

Because papulation is about stationary and because living
conditions are relatively good. many of the French economists
view the position of France with great apprehension. The
reasons for this apprehension are not far to seek. In the first
place. they fear that immigration of peoples with lower stan-
dards of living from surrounding countries will take place on
a large scale. and that these immigrants will multiply so rap-
idly that they will denationalize the French. In.the second
place. they fear that the nations to the east of them.will

soon be able to conquer them.because their pepulations are

(64)

increasing so rapidly. “One need but compare,the pOpulation
pressure in France, Germany. Russia and Japan to realize that
even today the real enemy of the dove of peace is not the
eagle of pride or the vulture of greed. but the stork.‘ 65

Along with the Optimistic view that increasing foreign'
trade is a force making for world peace. we must place the'
pessimistic view that all modern wars are essentially commer-
cial. and that war is in fact. an inevitable concomitance of .
trade expansion. Tariff walls. which are the natural result of
. the protective system. have been of frequent occurence. It is
certain that that policy. carried to excess has at times en-
dangered European peace.

Whereas.exclusive trade tends to-exacerbate international
relations. free trade. by mutually enlisting a number of in-
fluential material.interests in the cause of war. tends to
ameliorate those relations. and thus diminish the-probability
of war. No nation has. of course. the least right to dictate
the fiscal policy of its neighbors. each of which has the
unquestionable right to.make'whatever fisCal arrangements it
considers conducive to their interests.

But the real and ostensible causes of war are not always.
identical. When once irritation begins to rankle and rival
interests clash to an excessive degree. the guns may go off by
themselves, and an adroit diplomacy may confidently be trusted
to discover some plausible pretext for their explosion. Free
trade mitigates. though it is powerless to remove, internation.

' a1 animositiss.

65. J. H. Clark. ”Readings in the Economics of‘War'. p. 16.

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An industrial country with large eXport manufacturing
capacity, can be seriously impoverished by preventing these
goods from entering a natural market for them. Protection must
be guaranteed for the citizens of any country engaged in legi-
timate enterprise in any foreign country. and for the invest-
ments made externally. With the growing necessity for important
and powerful nations to seek greater portions of their raw ma-
terial supplies in other countries. and with the growing ten-
dency to secure such supplies by direct operation instead of
purchase. there will be increasing Opportunities for friction.
This will particularly be the case in the two or three decades
immediately ahead of us. during which petroleum.wi11 be an imp
portantharine fuel for two great countries. neither of which
will be able to supply itself in home territory.

Obstacles.to world peace in the economic sphere can nowhere
be better seen than in the pro-war imperialistic policies of
Europe. A rough formula of what happens in such cases may be
drawn up. A government. for one reason or another. acquires
dominion over a backward people. Nowadays it almost always does
so with the consent of the other powers. The act is proclaimed.
to be a EurOpean stewardship. a disinterested piece of interb
national policy; all nations are promised equal rights. the
'protected' people are promised a benevolent guardian. This:
work is done. not by angels. but by colonial officials. These
all too human beings become associated with contractors. con-
cessionaries. bankers and traders. The officials have big fa-
vors to give - franchise. mining rights. docking privileges etc.
The colonial officials must give them.to somebody. and they

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have to translate the phrase “cpen door" into these concrete
matters. If they are French officials knowing French business
men. what is more natural than that these decisions should go
against the Genman competitors. With the best intentions in the
world it would be hard to maintain equal rights. and these in-
tentions are not always the best in the world. Just such situa-
tions as this were undeniably factors in producing the last war,

Japan is extremely unfortunate as regards domestic sup-
plies of raw materials. This implies that in the future she
must either secure ample coal and iron supplies somewhere. or
find an outlet for her surplus population. The first:means ac-
quisition of Chinese territory; the second might mean difficul-
ties with Australia and to a lesser degree. with the United
States. It is because these economic conditions are so very
serious that the chances of war seem serious also.

The chief incentives to future wars are economic and
industrial and they involve the great industrial nations.
Democracies are peculiarly liable to undertake war as a relief
from economic pressure. Incentives of this dangerous type are
afforded by the desire of Soviet Russia to spread its economic
doctrine. by the desires of the United States and Great Britian
to control the fuel oil supply; by the desire of Japan to se-
cure a continental area for expansion and by the high probabile
ity that China will develop her own industrial resources.—

It is questionable. for example. if the reaction from a
broken-down autocracy in Russia. Germany or Japan will ulti-
mately result in a government democratic in form. for in each

case there are natural artificial limitations on the economic

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possibilities of these nations. These limitations tend to
lower the average of well being and to increase class fric-
tion. We are likely then in the future to face wide differa
ences in political ideas as well as in prosperity. between
the members of two powerful groups of nations.

Though the possibility of war does not seriously trouble
EurOpe at the present. the situation is far from.peacefu1.
EurOpe is in the throes of economic depression. This economic
depression has universally stimulated nationalism. This nation-
alism.is expressed by Germany and Hungary in a passionate de-
mand for a revision of the peace treaties. Millions of Germans
believe that German misery is due to the loss of German torsi-
tories and can be secured only by the restoration of these
lands. 66

Mr. Stimson feels strongly that there is no danger of war
immediately though he recognizes that conditions are very
troublesome. He considers the talk farnmore concerned with
internal politics than with war. At the same time he points-
out that it may take several years before Europe can readjust
herself economically. 67 There is danger in too much Optimism.
Long continued economic depression and reborn nationalimm
must be recognized as inimical to world peace. Though the
class struggle between capital and labor occupies the fore
ground now. such a situation.must be acknowledged as an
obstacle to world peace. .

There seems to be littleggpubt that Germany is gble to
66. Review of Reviews. Vol. 82. p. 58.

67. Ibid.

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pay the reparations demanded of her. In many ways her na-

tional expenses might be considerably lessened. Naval and
military eXpenditures might well be out. But at this idea
the Germans recoil. fearing the danger of a Polish invasion.

Many foreigners criticize Germany's increasing expendi-
tures on museums. parks. model appartment houses. and these
ters. Others believe that increased taxes on inheritance
might yield large sums..A lowering of the tariff wall mdght
so much lower prices in Germany that their ability to pay
their foreign debt would be much greater.

Granting all this. the question still remains; Should
Germany be compelled to pay the reparations? Oswald Garrison
Villard offers several reasons. which I shall briefly sum~
marize. to substantiate his claim.that Germany should not be
forced to pay.

Though the reparations cannot be considered a.maJor
cause of the present economic depression. it has undoubtedly
contributed largely to it. The limit. beyond which no people
can be humanely depressed in their standard of living. has
been practically reached. If the German peOple are still fur-
ther depressed economically. there is grave danger of fierce
internal conflicts. rioting. and the strengthening of the
reactionary elements. Such a situation would be most serious.
If internal conflict. which would affect foreign financial
interests. especially French. should occur. world peace would
indeed be in danger.

The danger of the situation cannot be confined to Ger-

many. It Germany is disorganized. Europe can be but little

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else; a disorganized Europe creates. a maladjusted world. of

which we are of necessity a part. This same economic malad-

justment is now. as ever. one of the largest factors leading
to war. the factor most degratory to world peace.

The coming into power of the younger generation compli-
cates the situation still more. Even in this country. young
men may be heard wishing for a war. thinking of the so called
glory and excitement Of it. Not a few of our vast army of un-
employed are clamoring fora war. which would at least provide
them the means of a livelihood. In Germany also therefis aris-
ing a new generation. with little or no memory of the war. who
feel. the injustice of their being required to pay for the sins
of a government 'twelve years: dead. These German youths are the
followers of Hitler largely because his program pictures a free
Germany. Such an attitude is ominous to the peace of Europe.
The awakening Of an aggressive nationalistic spirit would be
viewed with alarm by the whole world.

Probably no country could have more influence towards
peace than America. but is she using her influence to the best
advantage? A financial authority in Berlin. while talking to
Mr. Villard exclaimed: "Why will not America insist upon a
disarmament conference. a final settlement of the war issues.
and of all the financial questions? As long as these things
continue there can be no peace in Europe. no security. no
happiness. We are drifting steadily toward new war.‘ 68

"Against this drift to chaosno brakes could be so potent

psychologigally as the settlement of the reparations problgg:
68. Ibid. p. 6.0.

 

 

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If the capitalist governments continue to rule EurOpe as

badly as now. MOscow will probably be knocking at the gates of
Berlin in a dozen years. The menace of Russian dumping is in-
significant compared with the bitterness. fear. armament
rivalry. trade warfare and international anarchy which domi-
nate Europe.

At the present the Reich is still governed by a course
geous. realistic. moderate. cool-headed.man. firmly supported
by the Center Party and the SOcial bemocrats. The vital ques-
tion is. will Chancellor Bruning be able to maintain.himself
in power in the face of severe Opposition of the right and
left-wing extremists unless something occurs to prove to the
suffering masses that his policy is the only one under the
present circumstances that can serve their cause. Were Bru-
ning overthrown chaos would follow. and not for Germany alone.
Such an event would be a severe blow at the economic structure
of all civilization.

If France and the United States together took the ini-
tiative to relieve the laboring classes of Germany; and at the
same time if France and Germany make some concrete revelation
of their desire for peaceful cooperation. the atmosphere of the
world at large as well as of EurOpe would be radically changed.
“Industry is suffering from under-consumption." 69 If there is
' a.Justified amount of under-conswmption resulting from.over-
production. there is also an unjustified amount of under-
consumption resulting from fear. If the reasons for this fear
were elimigated. the markets offithgpworld would be given new
69. Living Age. Vol 340. p. 125.

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life.

Economic depression is always accompanied by political
radicalism. When economic distress becomes too severe. the
individual no longer uses his political power to secure the
best interests of the public . but only to serve himself. Once
this sentiment is adapted by a.majority of a nation. any'poli-
tical system is doomed to failure. It is of no avail to tell
the embittered.masses that their political and economic rulers
are not to blame for their sufferings. It is equally useless to
try to prove to them that a revolution would not improve their
situation. but make it unspeakably worse. The world is ruled by
passion rather than reason. When a man is driven to dispair. he
is ready to smash everything in the hOpe of obtaining some-
thing better.

It would appear that the present economic crisis with its
. reduction of-large classes of German pOpulation to the level
of the proletariat and the unemployment of nearly five million
persons. cannot continue for many years without ruining the
German nation as a whole. About one-eighth of those able and
anxious to work have no Opportunity to do so. While those em-
ployed have little possibility of rising to a position where

their abilities will have fuller scape. 70

Still worse. great
numbers can entertain no idea of giving their children an ade-
quate education and thus opening up a way for them to better
their conditions. Vast numbers feel depressed and bitterly
discontented.

The most adverse_factor consists in the increased isgla-

70. Foreign Affairs. V01. 9. p. 436.

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tion of the various countries of the world from one another.
Germany alone is incapable of turning to account and develo-
ping the vital energies of her population. World commerce is
necessary to her. As the needs of the nations increase. as
their dependence on cooperation in the field of international
economics grows greater. the more obstinately they follow nan
tionalism and.prOtectionism. Tariff walls become higher and
higher..At the same time. emigration of the laborers and pea-
sants for whom there is no room in Germany. has stOpped. Thus
Germany is confined within.her own narrow limits. within which
her peOple wear themselves out in fruitless competition.

From both the economic and political point of view. Ger-
many's collapse would mark a long stage on the road leading to
the decay of out modern culture. .

The tariff act of 1930 was an outright contradiction of
the interests and.purposes to which we seemed committed. Many
groups of foreign producers. who were our customers and whose
efforts in many instances we had directly or indirectly fi-
nanced. were impoverished. It closed our*markets to goods pro-
duced by American interests operating abroad. Its swift
wounding of foreign industry intensified the fall in raw.ma-
terial markets from which all American producers suffered..As
a result of industrial depression abroad. the public credit
01’ many ang-induitry Of goverhmmts that are our debtors was
weakened. Now we wait anxiously to see whether Brazil. Austra-
lia. Mexico and Germany can pay their debts. 71

But we would aggravate the situation still:further. Still
71. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 9. p. 400.

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harsher methods for protecting ourselves against competition
of foreign lands are prOposed. “Imports of oil. cOpper and
wheat are to be barred or rationed; all shipments of Russian

72 Restrictions would be exp

products are to be embargoed.”
tended to corn. butter. tobacco. palm oil. dried beans and
eggs. But in seeking isolation we cannot obtain security. We
still own the foreign securities we bought. The capacity of
many Of our own farmers and industries still exceed the a-
mount we are likely to use. Furthermore. our banks. our

marine and ports. our cables. ships and airplanes all need
traffic.

The embargoes placed upon Russian products need to be
considered separately. All Russian exports. whether they are
produced by free or forced labor. present a peculiarlthrOuble-
some problem to the rest of the world. They are exported only
through Official government foreign trade monopoly which has
been able to set the price where it wishes and.modify it as it
wishes. 73 The state trading organization can.if it wishes.
destroy industries built up by patient labor and industry over
a long period of years. even though these industries are well
adjusted to their economic environment and.merit survival on
ordinary economic grounds. The difficulty cannot be surmounted
until some understanding can be reached with Russia concerning
its method of disposing of its eXports. As long as the United
States maintains its policy of non recognition. such under;
standing is unattainable. A ___

72. Ibid.
73. Ibid. p. 401.

('74)

No such problem of special state competition affect the
sufferings faced by other American industries now seeking for-
midable government protection. Because of the acute situation
facing thousands of small producers in Kansas and the south.
western oil fields. embargo or quota restriction is demanded.
They wish by prohibiting imports to bring back the price of
petroleum and petroleumtproducts to the point where production
from.their wells can be continued or enlarged. .

The problem.must be looked at in connection with.the in.
ternational expansion of American economic life. The oil indus-
try is itself an eXporting industry. In 1929. this country'imp
ported 78.933 thousand barrels of crude oil and 29.632 thousand
barrels of refined oils. During that same year. we sold abroad
26.344 thousand barrels of crude oil and 126.377 thousand bar-
rels of refined oils. Since 1921 the volume of the exports has
risen more rapidly than that of the imports. 74 This business
is menaced now by the revival of the industry in Russia. and
the systematic exploitation of the Persian andiflesOpotamian
fields. Naturally. selfhinterested foreign competing groups
are alert to turn increased resentment abroad to their own
advantage. Should the entry into American.market be stopped.
American oil refiners would suffer losses in foreign.markets.

Furthermore. the enterprises4 producing and transporting
the imported Oil are largely sustained by American capital. The
oil which it is prOposed we bar comes from.Mexico. Columbia
and Venezuela. Our government wrestled with the Mexican gov-

ernment. gggsigg them.to revise their legislation. for the
74. Ibid. p. 402.

 

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right to produce this Oil without unreasonable restrictions.75
We cannot abruptly turn our backs upon their actions and in-
vestments without evil consequences. The holders ;. of oil so-
curities would be forced to pay the costs alone. At every cur-
tailment of the oil exports. their public revenues fall. caus-
ing their credit to weaken. Such a policy would result in less
roads for American automobiles. Similarly. their peoPle would
buy fewer of the things our factories produce.

In many ways the cOpper situation is not unlike the oil
situation. The high cost producers lead in the demand for an
embargo or restriction. As in oil. the imports come mainly
from prOperties develOped by American corporations. The a-
mounts imported have. with few exceptions. been less than the
exports. Certainly our foreign customers will not have to buy
American-produced cOpper which is held at a price above that
prevailing in other markets. 76 We import the metals from
Chile. Canada. Peru. Mexico and Africa; in 1929 we imported
487.156 tone; as we possess a great smelting and refinning
industry. much Of the imported copper is for treatment and
export. 77 We have financed not only the copper and nitrate
industries of Chile. but the government railways. public
utilities. mortgage banks. and factories as well. If we a-
bandon our past endeavors to exploit their resources and
build up their economic life. part of the cost will revert
to us. American ownership in the copper industry is dominant
Wd Mexico. and American investments
75. Ibid. p. 402.

76. Ibid. p. 403.
77. Ibid. p. 404.

iwe

(V

(76)

outside the industry are of considerable importance also. We
now have substantial holdings of the Peruvian debt. The con-
nection between Canadian industry and our own needs no comment.
In Mexico the 1930 tariff has already handicapped agriculture.
and oil shipments are menaced. The government would no doubt
feel Justified in abandoning its American debt. and in defend-
ing itself by further tariff action.

Little comment on the prOposed embargo on foreign wheat is
necessary. At present our tariffs against wheat keep out of
this cOuntry all but a small quantity of certain varieties
needed. Our wheat prices are now far higher than in the world
markets. The Farm Board owns and is at a loss to dispose of an
enormous surplus which will be increased by the new crop. 78
The possible gain to a small group of American producers would
be very small. The action would be one more blow against our
neighbor Canada Who is busy smiting us. MOreover. it would en-
courage immitation in plans of Wheat restriction practiced or
being practiced elsewhere. eSpecially in Eastern EurOpe and
between the units of the British Empire. In some countries.
measures as extreme as any contemplated here have already been
taken. “In Germany. the duty on Wheat for bread food is $1.62
a bushel. in France $.85 a bushel. in Italy $.87 a bushel;
some countries have in addition to their tariffs. restricted
the percentage of rmported Wheat that can be used.“ 79 Each
nation. crowded by the other's barriers. feels the necessity
of keeping_alive all forms of economic activity within its
78. Ibid. p. 404.

79. Ibid. p. 405.

(7'7)

borderS. The Farm Board was probably necessary to prevent a
panic. but now the improvement of the wheat situation can be
brOught about only through general liquidation. curtailment of
production. and the Opening of the lanes of world exchange and
cooperation.

The economic position of the Danubian wheat-growers has
become unbearable. World wheat shipments to Europe from August
1, 1930 to February 19,1931 reached the total of 354,000,000
bushels. of which Russia furnished nearly 86,000,000, and it is
estimated that Russian exports may reach double that amount in
19:51-19:32. 80 Moreover. Canada. the United States. and Argenti-
na, always heavy exporters. have unusually large stocks on
hand, the greater part of which is ultimately destined for the
European market. The Federal Farm.Board. to the dismay and an-
ger of the Paris delegates. has announced its purpose to sell
abroad during the next four.months up to 35,000,000 bushels of
the huge stocks that it holds - which plan the Europeans com-
pare with the Russian ”dumping.i The board's action may be
only the first step in getting out of the impossible situation
in which its disastrous effOrts to keep up prices have placed
it. and if the board does decide to liquidate its holdings,
nothing can prevent the inevitable effect on prices. In addi-
tion to all these difficulties, Danubian wheat is of a lower
milling quality than the best of the Russian and overseas sup-
plies; the EurOpean importers. whatever their political sympa-
thies, are ultimately going to buy wheat where they can get it

best and cheapest. and it isgplain that no gonfgrence is going
77. Nation. Vol. 132. p. 257.

V.

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' to be able to keep up prices for the wheat-growers of
France's East European allies and satellites. International
economic organization has become as necessary as it has hither-
to been 11npossible.

No one but a confirmed Optimist could have expected that
the world wheat conference at Rome would be able to dispose of
the difficulties presented by the world wheat situation. The
wheat problem is obviously too complicated to be solved in a
few days deliberation, eventhough representatives of forty-
six countries devote themselves to the task. There should be
no surprise then, that the recomendations of the conference
went no further than well-meant suggestions likely. if adap-
ted. to ease the strain a little without answering any of the
vital questions.

One of the most important results of the conference was
its revelation of the complete lack of agreement. among the
wheat-producing and wheat-consuming nations concerning either
the causes of the present crisis or the means by which it I
might be overcome and its recurrence avoided. Even before the
conference began,p_reliminary discussions demonstrated that a
wide rift existed between those: who insisted that theyworld
was growing too much and those: who insisted that it ias us-
ing too little. Premier Mussolini took the position that the
trouble was not with overproduction but with underconsusqation.
and warned the conference to be cautious about recommending
a general reduction of acreage. especially as so many peOple
were suffering from want of food. Russia not only declared

that Russia would not restrict production. but ridiculed the

(79)

idea of urging people to use more wheat when they had nothing
with which to buy it; the Canadian representative pointed out
that even if a reduction of acreage were desirable. no demo-
cratic government could bring it about by governmental acts.
The outcome of all this debate was a mild pronouncement in
favor of persuasion. 78
The question of underconsumption lent itself no more

readily to practical treatment. The Russian taunt that unemn
ployment and business depression did not go well with an "eat-
more-wheat" policy was unanswerable. The only hOpeful outlook
to be found was in the possibility of develOping a demand for
wheat in countries like China. where it is not used to any
great extent. Accordingly. the conference gave its approval

to prOpaganda; the suggestion that wheat mdght well be sold

79 The method of

to China at a very low price was attached.
handling such a.mixture of economics and.humanitarianism was
not indicated. '

Confronted with the realization that unrestricted.pro-
duction, save for voluntary curtailment, was likely to cone
tinue. and that increased consumption offered no immediate
remedy. the conference next todk up the question of regulating
the wheat trade. Preferential tariffs were demanded by the
Danubian countries as a protection against Russian dumping
and disastrous importations from Argentina and other overseas
producing countries. The Rumanian.Minister of Agriculture pre-
dicted a united c;osing_of Euggpean markets ifoverseas coupe
78. Nation. Vol. 132. p. 399.

79. Ibid. p. 400.

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tries did not cease their most-favored-nation treatment and
allow preferential tariffs to be set up. This disclosed.much
discord. The tariff suggestion especially irritated the Rus-
sians. and caused the Argentine ambassador at Rome to remind
the conference that the world wheat crisis, though attributable
in part to Russia, was also brought about by the economic de-
rangement of Europe by the world war, and by the EurOpean poli-
cy Of high protection. The conference was able to do no more
than to have the tariff issue left to the regular course of
diplomatic negotiations. 80

The conference was overhung by the shadow of Russia from
the beginning. and it was Russia that stood out most conspicu-
ously and threateningly at the close. Behind the resentment at
Russian dumping was the recognition of the fact that Russia,
by doing away with the middleman, had gained a tremendous ad-
vantage over all its competitors, and that as long as Russia
was forced to export large quantities of wheat to pay for
manufactured articles bought abroad, the competition of low-
priced Russian wheat would have to be accepted. In other
words, Western capitalism and Russian collectivism locked
horns. a conflict which rendered the conference hopeless.

The adOption of embargoes and restrictions has been the
last resort of our authorities, and of the foreign authorities
still employing them. While American business was still ex-
panding, we joined an international accord condeming their use.
The United States, in September 1930. ratified the Interna-
tional Convention for the Abolition of Import and,Export Pro-
80. Ibid.

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hibitions-and Restrictions. The American Secretary of State
informed the League that: “The American Government views with
approbation any endeavor to facilitate world wide economic re-
lations and remove discriminatory'economic measures. and has
for this Object signed and ratified the convention for the abo-
lition of export prohibitions and restrictions and has cooperh
ated with other international activities looking to the better-

81 The orig-

ment of economic conditions throughout the world.“
'inal list of eighteen signatory states was shortened when PO-
land withheld its signature in order to better bargain with
Germany. The only states that have ratified:thus far are Great
Britian, Japan. the Netherlands. Norway and Portugal..After
June 1931, each signatory state may withdraw if it so wishes.
The withdrawal of the United States would no doubt deprive the
convention of all force. .

If we continue to impose additional restrictions upon the
trade of other countries with us. we may look for another
iseries of retaliations. Those who find themselves unable to
dispose of the products which American.capital has helped them
to produce, those who cannot raise the funds necessary to pay
their debts to us. will have an easier conscience in legislap
ting against our goods. The governments will be forced to try
to find domestic recompense for the employment we distroy.

The prOposals of tOday are_bringing out the full meaning
of the past half century of tariff history. They are demonstra-
ting that when once nations give the protective tariff an in?

portant place in their arrangements, it developes from its own

81. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 9, p. 405.

(82)

momentum. If one group makes its Opportunity behind a tariff
wall. other groups appear to claim the same Opportunity. Evens
tually the system grows fairly general and it becomes natural
for all to assume that they have a prior right to the home mar-
ket. The producers of raw materials are usually subject to
world competition and are the last to receive protection. Find-
ing themselves handicapped by the high levels of money wages
and the protection given to other industries, they claim an
equal right to protective legislation.

.A vicious circle is unavoidable. Domestic producers claim
practically the WhOle Of the home market. If they make their
claim.effective, they force their countrymen to forego any
expansion in foreign commerce. Each step in this direction
tends to force others in the same direction. This results only
in a minor degree from a desire to retaliate. It is more the
result of political and economic necessity. Whenever a country
loses a foreign market because of tariff action, groups within
the country attempt to save themselves by asserting a new claim
upon their own domestic market. Any country - Great Britian
finds herself in that position now - suffering from.tariff re-
strictions upon the commodities it produces is doubly handi-
capped; the incomes are forced down at the same time that many
peOple are suddenly thrown out of employment. The only hope
usually appears to be in the further preservation of its own
home market. Consequently, tariff increase follows tariff in-
crease.

Close observation of the tariff system as it functions to-

day reveals a further significance. It is perceptibly changing

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the character of the state. Events of recent years. such as
rapid price changes. financial maladjustments, technical im-
provement and eXploitation of previously unknown resources,
have in each country been accompanied by suffering and the
threat of disorder in certain groups. The government is forced
to step in to restore the balance and to provide employment.
By the use of tariffs. embargoes. subsidies and government
purchases the price at which various commodities are exchanged
is actually set.

The use of the government's power is influenced by votes
or political bargaining power. It is applied regardless of the
manifold disadvantages_imposed on other groups both inside and
outside the country. The inevitable outcome of the present
trend of events is the nationally isolated. governmenteoone-
trolled economic system. 82

we are now midway between such a world and the world of
widespread international exchange toward which American capi-
tal has in the past contributed. If we continue to adopt still
more complete protective measures causing still further strain
on our foreign producers, and new anxieties to American inves-
tors, we are rapidly producing a world of embittered and se-
cluded national states, between which capital dare not move
and commerce exists but slightly. Depression would be far:more
widespread than today. Probably our poverty would be comparable
to the riches' of other less self-sufficient peOples. Such
‘poverty and unrest as would result, wOuld be incompatible with

world peace.
82. Ibid. p. 403.

fl" .
a;
’.‘
'9»

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The present Russian situation is very little understood.
Many conflicting reports issue from various sources. Some see
in the Russian Five'Year Plan, grave danger not only to Europe
but to the United States as well. If the present eXperhment
succeeds, if the Soviets possess a political and industrial
concept which will make them stronger politically and economi-
cally than any other power, the United States may then be
compelled to either adopt the Russian system, Which would ne-
cessitate making bondsmen out of nine-tenths of our pOpulation,
or it will have to fight for its very existence as a nation.
Should events necessitate the adoption of one policy or the
other, no doubt the former would be the policy adapted.

It is too early to speculate as to what will happen. The
situation may be more serious than is supposed. There seems to
be some fear that Genmany will follow Russia's lead industrial-
1y. There is a possibility that such economic rivalry might
develOpe that a world struggle would be inevitable. Such a
policy might appeal to millions as necessary to save themselves
from.economic subjection, from sinking to the levels of serf-
dom or slavery.

0n the other hand, if the main.Powers combined to coerce
Russia to change her economic policies so contrary to the in-
terests of the world as a Whole by tariff walls and embargoes,
Russia, organized for modern production, might be stimulated
to build ships and guns, rifles , airships, tanks and deadly
gas equipment and become the aggressor in a conflict which
might become colossal.

From day to day there is fresh evidence of a new drive

(85)

against Russia. London in particular is succumbing to the
current fear. Each London_'Tmmes' contains several articles
which emphasize the menace of the Soviets. At least two leagues
have been formed to protect the English public and.English in-
dustry from.the contamination of slavenmade goods. It is de-
clared that almost all Russian labor is enslaved by Stalin,
and therefore all that comes out of Russia should be boycotted.
The stand taken by the‘United States in.shutting out timber and
pulpwood from northern Russia unless the importer can prove
that it was not produced by convict labor, and the complete
boycott proclahmed by Canada are heartily approved by many in
London and elsewhere. The extreme anti-Russians desire and
insist that the EacDonald Government follow the same course.
They were delighted to learn that the recent visit of Mr.
Bennett, the Prime Minister of Canada, to washington was for
the exclusive purpose of discussing the question of Joint
action of Canada and the United States against Russian hm-
ports. 85
The French are already vigorously at work. Both the
conservative and reactionary forces in France are taking ex-
actly the same position. Two important officials have been
sent on a tour to Central Europe in order to ascertain how
far the various countries, such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia
and others will go toward an international action against
Russia along economic lines. 84 There is an abundance of
evidence elsewhere that there is aggystematic effort on foot
83. Nation, Vol. 132, p. 345.
84. Ibid. . ‘

(86)

to bring about an international economic boycott. A rather
lengthy document urging business men to get behind such a
boycott has been circulating under the auspices of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce. Quite probably within a year
anti-Russian societies like those in England will be organized
in America; very likely a.movement to cease allowing American
engineenaor workers to go to Mbscow to aid in building up the
system which is so hostile to the capitalist world will follow.

Until recently the industrialists and politicians of the
world were sure that Russia need not be taken seriously, be-
cause they were so sure the Five Year Plan would fail and
ultimately Communism as well. They have now all suddenly real-
ized that the Five Year Plan is to be such a tremendous suc-
cess as to menace the very existence of capitalistic society.
The interesting feature of the whole situation is that these
gentlemen would be Just as excited about the Russian menace if
the convict-labor issue had never arisen at all. Moreover,
they are all finite oblivious to the fact, particularly in the
United States, that if conditions get worse in Germany and
that country is forced to continue paying reparations, it will
have to dump even harder to get any income from abroad, and
that that dumping would be far more serious than the compara-
tively little which Russia is undertaking to do.

The seriousness of this move for a united economic boy-
cott of Russia.must not be underestimated. Undoubtedly it
would effectively block the development of Russia all along
the line. Without the aid of foreign capital, it would take
years to industrialize Russia, and the cost would be infinite.

(87)

But the industry of EurOpe is collapsing, and more than one
state will refuse to give up its Russian business. The labor
leaders in Germany will oppose a boycott for they are being
forced to believe that for a long time to come three million
Germans will be idle. 85 In the existing emergency Germany is
turning more and more to Russia.

Quite contradictory views have been presented here re-
garding the so called Russian menace. Each involves dangers
to peaceful international relations; each would in some re-
spects better present conditions. Itis not the purpose of
this thesis to solve such problems, problems which our lead-
ing economists have proven incapable of handling.

It is evident that the chief incentives to future wars
are economic and industrial, and that they involve the great
industrial nations of the world. Among the nations of the
world it is inpossible to find agreement as to what can be
done or what it is advisable to do to escape the present crisis

with its ggfgld dggggrs,
85. Ibid, p. 346.

 

(88)

V

It is not the purpose of this thesis to solve the pro-
blems stated, to settle the questions raised. Many of the
obstacles to world peace are so involved and complicated that
a Bismark could not remove them. The solution of the problems
would necessitate many theses and much original research. The
value of such research would be questionable.

Probably the vast majority of people are convinced that
war is inevitable. Pacifists are inclined to remind them of a
similar attitude/regarding dueling a hundred years ago. Whe-
ther or not war is inevitable, certainly there are innumerable
obstacles in the way of its abandonment. A friend, a student
of international affairs, when informed of the subject of
this thesis remarked; “Your concluding sentence will be, eons
will pass and still wars will occur.“

The impossibility of changing human nature makes the
problem of preventing future wars a difficult one. Though
normally'people are peace loving, it has in the past taken-
little to arouse them to a fever pitch of hate which.has
rendered it impossible to maintain an attitude of neutrality.
When peeple are persuaded that their national honor is at
stake, their economic existence or the safety of home and
family, war is assured. There are always those who, for poli-
tical ambitions or hope of economic advantage, gladly under-
take the circulation of propaganda designed to arouse the war
spirit of the mass. It succeeded only too well in 1917. We
have no reason for believing that should similar circumstances

arise - and the possibility of a serious crisis occuring is a

(89)

real one - we should be any more safe from the disastrous
effects of mob psychology controlled by unscrupulous leaders.
If peOple remained clear-headed and thought sanely in a moment
of crisis, wars would be far less frequent.

The advocates of friendly international relations had
hoped that the narrow nationalism of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries was gone forever, along with the balance of
power system. The League of Nations, the Locarno Pacts, Dis-
armament and Naval Conferences, and Economic Conferences as
well, have pointed the way toward a new diplomacy. However,
the present outlook is not so Optimistic.

Last September the eyes of the world were turned toward
Germany, for the results of her elections were considered to
be of international importance. The recent French presidential
election was no less important. The defeat of Briand was the
defeat of the policy of"moderation and reconciliation.“ It
is a return to aggressive French nationalism which has pro-
vided constant Opposition to Briand's attempts at conciliation
as shown, for instance, in his policy of leaving the Rhine-
land. Virtually, notice has been served that France no longer
believes mutual concession to be the road to international
"good health;' that she intends to follow a purely nationalis-
tic course, regulated only by purely selfish interests. The
men who defeated Briand believe that French security lies in
a solid French bloc - France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugo-
slavia, Roumania - imposing its will on the rest of EurOpe,
and maintaining a sufficient power to enforce that will.’

Already the results are beginning to appear. A recent

(90)

election in the federal state of Oldenburg is no doubt fairly
typical of German public Opinion. The moderates are losing
’ground, the Hitlerites have gained considerably, and there
have been important gains for the Communists as well. And
worse than this, italy is contemplating closer relations with
hungary, Austria and Germany. Russia apparently wishes to Join
the-same camp. Thus aggressive.Freneh nationalism.seems about
to divide Europe into two armed camps.

There seems to be considerable truth in the view that
the world war occured because there were too many men running
around Europe with rifles in their hands. There can be no
doubt but that a similar situation exists today; in fact there
are more under arms today'than'there were at the time of Sara-
Jevo. .

it is not only EurOpe that is preparing for another war.
The united States POlicies Commission.has recently perfected
a.plan which provides for the drafting of the man power and
material resources of the nation for the next war - they no
longer say.;f war should occur. According to this plan.
4,000,000 men would be immediately mobilized and all federal,
state, county and.municipal buildings seized to house and
shelter trOOps. '

Nations do not spend millions and millions for armaments
simply because war.might occur. The nations of the world are
preparing for war because they fear it will come in the near
future and each strives to be better prepared than her neigh-
bor. In 1914 the nations were each fearing the other, each

trying to surpass the other in armaments. It took only a spark

(91)

to start a war which figuratively burned up millions of men
and billions of dollars. Apparently another spark, another
Sarajevo, would precipitate a world struggle incalculably
worse than the recent one.

The economic situation is most serious of all. The pre-
sent crisis has proved so disastrous because it is world wide.
The inequality of the distribution of wealth inevitably causes
jealous and bitter feelings. High tariff walle accentuate the
difficulty. Yet the nations have, so far, refused to lower
their tariffs. In fact some industries suffering from the de-
pression are urging even higher tariffs.

It is not the desire of the writer to engender a spirit
of pessimism. War is not imminent, and probably will not be
in the near future, though any one of the danger spots pointed
out might, in a moment of crisis, precipitate a war.

There are several factors which.make war less apt_to occur
than a generation ago. In the first place, the world is con-
tinually getting smaller. Wireless, radio, airplanes etc.
bring countries closer together and.make their common interests
more apparent. Men do not like to kill their friends, and sure-
ly travel and our modern means of communication are helping
us understand other peoples and.making them.seem.like friends.

MOreover, education is on a.higher plaimitoday. Many of
our teachers have so much broader an outlook than in earlier
days, that they are teaching that French, Germans, Russians
etc. are all very much like us, that we can learn.much from
them and they from us. Many of our text books today are print-

ing the truth about the causes of war. The more peOple know

(92)

about modern diplomacy, the less likely they are to be in-
veigled into war.

Language is perhaps somwhat less of a dividing line be-
ween the nations of the western world than previously. Modern
foreign languages as high school and college subjects are in-
creasing in importance. In fact there is some talk of creating
a common language. Such a step would certainly do much.to
bring the nations of the world closer together in understanding
and thus decrease the probability of war. For we fear most
What'we know least about and it has been pointed out before that

hate, which is a corollary of war, is impossible without fear.

All of these factors have played their part in breaking
dOwn the narrow nationalism of the past. Without an over de-
veloped national consciousness war is impossible, or at least
improbable. It is to be hOped that the old diplomacy, which was
so instrumental in bringing about the past war, is abandoned;
Briand's defeat is at the moment a discouraging omen but may
turn out to be of little consequence.

Perhaps the worst phase of the old diplomacy was the
continual use of secret treaties. Their very secrecy engendered
fear and suspicion which has been shown to be inimical to world
peace. Today that danger is quite largely removed by the require-
ment of the League of Nations that all treaties be filed with
it.

It cannot be denied that the nineteenth century imperia-
limm was a very important factor in bringing about the world
war. The mandate system has removed that danger to a very

large extent. However, the status quo in the Mediterranean is

 

(93)

still a difficult and unsettled problem.

The cost of war, both in money and in lives , is tre-
mendous. Everyone knows that if there is another war it will
be far more costly than the last. Poisonous gases have been
perfected which would wipe out whole cities in less time than it
takes to tell. The peOple have learned that it is they who
ultimately pay the war costs. Today they are beginning to ob-
Ject to the encrmous sums spent by the war department. To a
large extent the hope of the future lies here. If the peOple
would refuse to support the demands of the military leaders for
the billions necessary to maintain forces and equipment to
frighten the rest of the world, there might be an end to this

race Of armaments and the hope of continued peace be realized.

K‘—’_ 51"- H‘...‘ ”3'

-B IBLI OGRAPHY-

BOOKS _

Archer, F. L., "Color Blind Neutrality". (1930)

Bakeless, J. E., “The Economic Causes of Modern War“. (1922)

Benns, F. L., "Europe Since 1914'. (1930)

Bibley, Joseph, "war, Its Unseen Causes and Some of Its
Lessons“. (1925)

Bigelow, John, 'Wbrld.Peace'. (1916)

Brandes, George, “Fundamental Causes". (1923)

Clark, J. M., "Readings in the Economics of War". (1918)

Crosby, 0. T., 'International war, Its Causes and Its Cures“.
(1920)

Demartial, Huebsch, 'Patriotism.and the Responsibility for
the war“. (1918) _

Dickinson, G. L., “Causes of International'War'. (1920)

Eckel, E. 0., 'Coal, Iron and War“. (1918)

Fay, F. B., “The Origins of the World War". Vol. I. (1929)

Lippmann, welter, “The Stakes of Diplomacy“. (1915)

Loria, Achille, “The Economic Causes of the War“. (1918)

Morel, E. D., “Military'Preparations for the Great war". (1922)

Neilson, Frances, "How Diplomats Make War“. (1918)

Rabson, R. W., 'The Future of'World.Peace". (1928)

PERIODIcgpg

Christian Century, Vol. 47. PP. 435-436, 532-533.

Current History, Vol 34.pp. 12-15,24-27,667-671.681-684,720-
728.)

Living Age, Vol 340. pp. 14-15, 124-134, 470-478.

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 9. pp. 224-242, 399-408, 435-440, 487-
495.

Forum, Vol 85, PP. 217-224.

Nation, Vol. 1323, p. 24, 257, 340. pp. 344-346, p. 399.

Review of Reviews, Vol.82. pp. 58-59, 63-65, 74-75.

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