

# OBSTACLES TO WORLD PEACE

THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF M. A.


Constance N. Eck

1931

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#### "Obstacles to World Peace"

Constance N. Eck

-1931-

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Graduate School of Michigan State College.

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Approved for the Department of History and Political Science:

Mary a. Hendrick

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#### -INTRODUCTION-

The Obstacles to World Peace may be conveniently discussed in several categories. In the first chapter political factors incongruous with World Peace are discussed. The second chapter deals with human nature in its psychological bearing upon activities which determine the policy of war or peace at a given moment of crisis. In the third chapter the dangers of militarism are pointed out. Economic conditions inimical to World Peace are discussed in the fourth chapter. The fifth chapter presnts the conclusions drawn.

Needless to say, no one Obstacle to World Peace is purely economic or political. In the last analysis, any specific obstacle will be found to be closely associated with some economic cause. The divisions taken must not be considered as arbitrarily defined. They were adopted by the writer merely to facilitate the presentation of the material.

This thesis does not presume to be a complete study of the subject of Obstacles to World Peace. Books have been written on the topic without exhausting all the material available. This thesis is an attempt to present as unbiased a view as possible of the most important Obstacles to World Peace.

Ordinarily a thesis involves an exhaustive study of source material. The nature of this problem prohibits any such treatment. To be of any value, such a study as this must

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consider primarily those things which are today Obstacles to World Peace, as well as those influences which have in the past proved dangerous to the maintenance of peace. For such movements as the recent attempt to convert the Anschluss into an actual fact, no source material is available. It has been necessary to rely on information obtained largely in such magazines as "Current History", "Foreign Affairs" and ethers of the same nature. Ideas of problems injurious to the best interests of the world have been gleamed from books and pamphlets compiled by the Carnegie Endowment for World Peace.

To the student of World politics, the situation in Germany is the one most dangerous. Since the chaotic condition of her politics is of concern to her neighbors as well as to herself, the attention of the world is focused upon Adolph Hitler.

A brief character sketch of Hitler will emphasize the danger of allowing such a man to obtain governmental supremacy. "Hitler is an unbalanced, temperamental actor, an easily excited neurasthenic who is everwhelmed by the events of the moment. He lacks the capacity for real leadership and the ability to come to a decision at the right time." It has been said that he lacked decisive qualities during the elections of Last September. Certainly in 1923 he struck inopportunely at Munich. He has demonstrated his inability to carry out a firm decision with cool conviction.

The past winter has shown a growing spirit of restlessness in Germany. The air has rung with cries of "Germany
awake, Juda Perish;" and "Hail Hitler;" These outcries come
from the National Socialists or "Nazis." The Communists, ever
hostile to the Nazis have also staged their demonstrations.

Supposedly Germany is at peace, but actually bitter internal warfare is going on. It is a figth to determine whether Germany is to remain a Republic or go over to Fascism with

1. The Living Age. Vol. 340, p. 15.

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a dictator like Mussolini, or whether it is to become a Communist state like Russia. Speculation as to the outcome would be futile.

At present the Maxis is the second strongest party in Germany. Were there another election today, it is very likely that the party would take first place. The party program calls for "a dictatorship, the scrapping of the Treaty of Versailles, the stoppage of reparations payments, repression of the Jews, and the creation of a large German army." Can it be imagined that France would sit by peacefully and watch the adoption of such a program? If the present depression continues to engulf Germany and fill her people with dispair, the Maxis will probably have little difficulty in seizing the government and putting their plans into effect.

This movement is the result of these same forces that produced Fascism in Italy. Among the cooler-headed Germans events have progressed more slowly. It has taken a long time for the Fascism of Hitler to get under way. Though stretched over a much longer period of time, the trend of events in Germany is similar to the march of circumstances which put Mussolini in power in Italy.

The recent German elections were a result of the weakness of parliament. The old Reichstag had been dissolved
by the President because it could agree on nothing. The only
means of avoiding a crisis was to give the cabinet dictatorial

<sup>2.</sup> Forum, Vol. 85, p. 218.

<sup>3.</sup> Ibid.

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powers. The elections only made matters worse. For years the Communists have been growing in numbers and in boldness. At present they are the third largest part in the Reich. There are now one hundred and seven Mazis and seventy-six Communists. The chance of any sort of conservative action is slight.

If business should pick up in Germany, the hopes of the people might be revived and serious trouble avoided. If present conditions centimue there is danger of an uprising of radical elements driven by want and dispair to violent action. If such a thing happens the Maxis will appear as saviors of their country. The Hitler army may be expected to march in force upon Berlin and try to seize the government. 5

With five million unemployed in Germany and with the gloomiest business outlook so far, Hitler's call "Germany awake!" falls on very fertile soil. Hitler's party has fed on the prevalent dispair until it has obtained a great national following. If Hitler strikes again for the dictatorship, as he did in 1923, it will take considerably more to stop him.

If Hitler had a constructive program for betterment, the outlook would not be so pessimistic. Of one thing Hitler is very sure. Juda must perish. The reason for this policy is partly psychological. Somebody in Germany has to be to blame for Germany's troubles, and the Jewish race offers the most convenient point for Nationalist wrath to strike. Their only offense is that they stand for capitalism which is hateful to the Hazis and the Germans as a whole. The German Jew

<sup>4.</sup> Ibid, p. 219.

<sup>5.</sup> Ibid.

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supports the reparations settlement. To him it is simply a "business transaction." 6

The platform of the Maxis hasty has ten main planks, Seven of these are directed against "the rule of Gold." As they concern only German internal affairs, we shall pass to the last three which are imperialistic. 7

- 1. Unification of Germany and Austria.
- 2. Restoration of German colonies.
- 5. Creation of a large standing army.

It is inconceivable that the French, with their present attitude, would allow the working out of such a policy. But will Germany submit to French dictation for ever? Not with a Hitler at the head and a strong Wazis backing him.

Within Germany, the bitterest enemies of the Mazis are the Communists. Though bloody street fighting between the two is a daily occurence, the aims of both these radical parties are very similar. Both are socialist parties, and both desire the communizing of land and industry, and both are militarisatic. The difference is largely one of phrasiology. The Communist doctrine is so worded that it appeals only to the working class, while Hitler has so cleverly worded his pregram that he gets the support of industrialists and landowners as well as of large numbers of workers.

The Nazis call themselves Nationalists and the Communists internationalists. The difference is largely one of degree. No doubt Communism would go much further in the 6. Ibid. p. 221.

<sup>7.</sup> Ibid.

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of degree. No doubt Communism would go much further in the socialization of land and industry than would Hitler. "In practical politics these differences mean only that one party would seek alliance with Russia, whereas the other would ally Germany with Italy."

Either policy would disturb the peace of Europe. Should Hitler ally Germany with Italy, France would be thrown into a panic, in her attempt to secure defensive alliances. With the present militaristic attitude of France, a German-Italian alliance might bring a French declaration of was. A Russo-German alliance would hardly be less disastrous.

Three danger spots now exist in Europe- the Polish-German frontier, the Franco-Italian frontier, and the Italian-Yugoslav frontier. There seems to be nothing like the general dissatisfaction with the status quo among the masses in Italy, France, Yugoslavia, or even Poland, that exists in Germany on the subject of the Pelish Corridor.

Germany considers peace impossible without the corridor. Therefore, the peace of Europe depends considerably on the willingness of Poland to return the territory voluntarily, and the capacity of the Polish to resist force. Germany has presented an ultimatum not only to Poland but to all of Europe, requiring revision as the price of German association in reorganizing European Peace. Consequently much depends on the Polish attitude.

A rather thorough investigation of the status of Polish 8. Ibid, p. 223.

9. Review of Reviews, Vol. 82, p. 63.

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opinion by Frank H. Simonds, assures us that the Polish people are ready to defend the existing frontiers with their lives. They are ready to fight not only against German attach, but also against any effort of Europe as a whole to destroy the Polish Corridor. 10

The situation is paradoxical. Germany does not quarantee to keep the peace as long as Poland has the corridor; if Germany is given, or takes, the corridor, war is inevitable. The situation is still more complicated by the over confidence of each side. Each party views its claims as the only means of escaping war, which neither desires. The Kellog Pact, the Covenant of the League of Mations - all existing national agreements, - are useless in this case since all are designed to prevent war, while at the same time all fortify the Polish situation.

Briefly the situation is this. Two nations, one of 65,000,000, the other of 32,000,000 are facing each other, each resolved to carry out irreconciable programs. An actual struggle is being carried on, a struggle of public opinion, of government and of propaganda. This struggle continually enflames public opinion and national passion. Since the existing frontiers have large numbers of Poles in German territory and an equally large number of Germans in Polish territory, national ambitions are expressed and persecutions follow.

The difficulty of the problem lies in the fact that there seems to be no possibility of a compromise. At present German 10. Ibid, p. 64.

11. Ibid.

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communication with East Prussia by land is at the mercy of Poland; should there be reversion, Polish access to the sea would be largely at the mercy of Germany.

This region has long been an ethnic battleground between Slav and Teuton. No plebescite would illustrate the true condition. There has been a tremendous migration into Germany from Poland. A large proportion of the people in the Polish Corridor today are Poles. 12

The city of Gdynia apparently provides still another paradox. Laws prevent Poles from obtaining land or becoming citizens of Dansig. The Poles have quite largely transferred their industry and commerce from Danzig to Gdynia. Should this policy continue, Danzig will steadily decline in importance. But, on the other hand, if restrictions on Poles be removed, no doubt prosperity would follow, but there would no longer be German culture and control. "Every economic consideration incessantly presses for Danzig surrender, every racial and national instinct imposes resistance." 13 Such a situation is hardly compatible with world peace.

Though the existence of the corridor has placed no real burdens on trade and traffic between Prussia and Germany, the total result has been unfortunate. The sense of insecurity and isolation has produced an atmosphere of almost complete helplessness. The Prussian farmer sees little in the future but the ultimate necessity of selling his land to the Pole at famine prices. The fear is not of an invasion by an army, but the infiltration of a Slavic population accustomed to a lower 12. Ibid, p. 65.

<sup>13.</sup> Ibid.

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standard of living. Economically the Pole has the supreme advantage.

For Germany there seem to be but two methods of avoiding the loss of Prussia. Either Poland must surrender or there will probably be a Polish-German war. Such a war would inevitably involve Russia, France and Italy.

Germany har recently become involved in another problem which appears to threaten the status quo of Europe. While Europe has been debating the possibilities of a general customs union and apparently concluding that it cannot be achieved. Germany and Austria have quietly arranged a customs agreement of their own. The main features of the plan are extremely simple. "Both import and export duties up to minety per cent of the trade between the two countries are to he abolished, and the remaining ten per cent are to disappear within three years. In the meantime, each country will contime to collect tariff duties on other imports. The net proceeds, after providing for the services of the Dawes Plan loan and the League of Nations loan to Austrie will constitute a common fund and will be divided between the two countries according to some plan to be determined later. As long as the Austro-German agreement is unimpaired, each country will reserve the right to conclude trade treaties with other countries. Other nations wishing to join will be welcomed. 14 France, of course, sees in this tariff agreement a long step toward the forbidden union of Germany and Austria.

By their decision to set up a customs union which later would be extended to include other European states wishing to 14. The Nation, Vol. 132, p. 340.

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join, Germany and Austria have issued a challenge to the rest of the Continent that cannot fail to have far reaching consequences. Whether their action leads to a period of strained international relations such as Europe has not witnessed since the World War, or proves to be the necessary first step toward the creation of an economically united Europe depends very largely on the attitude of France and her satellites. If France continues hostile, the probability is that the new customs union will either fail to materialise or will bring the two German nations into a joint defiance of the rest of Europe. If France on the other hand, should modify her present attitude and agree to the customs union in so far as her own economic and domestic interests are not encroached upon, her action might prove the beginning of genuine European cooperation.

Briand can, of course, attack the proposed German-Austrian customs union on political grounds, but the wisdom of such questioning is another matter. There is no good reason to suppose from their published statements that Chancellor Bruning and Foreign Minister Scholur are insincere in declaring the proposed union wholly economic in character. Europe may recall that a somewhat similar customs federation preceded the formation of the German Empire in 1871, but the political situation of today is very different. Then France was relatively a weak country, and the German states were not defeated and disarmed but had just come through two successful wars, and in uniting had established themselves as one of the strongest political units on the continent. No rational observer believes that a union of a disarmed Germany and dismembered Austria could be

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much of a threat to any other group of powers in Europe today. By shifting the emphasis from the economic to the political aspects of the proposed economic union, however, Briand
might indeed force Germany and Austria as a matter of political
defense into the arms of other dissatisfied Powers, including
Russia. Then he would have created that opposition bloc of
states which France and the Little Entente so greatly fear.

Anschluss has aroused the fear of Europe. In 1919 occured the proclamation of Austria's union with the German Republic, a union for which Germany's provisional constitution of the preceding month had likewise provided.

According to racial and economic principles, the consolidation of the two German republics seemed a logical step, and the much-lauded principle of self-determination seemed to point the way. But immediately vigorous protests were raised against the Anschluss, especially in France and Czechoslovakia. The peace conference forbade the union, and in the treaty of St. Germain which Austria was oblidged to sign in September 1919, she agreed not to alienate her sovereignty without the consent of the Council of the League of Mations, and to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly compromise her independence.

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During the years 1927-1928, revival of agitation in favor of the Anschluss reawakened the fears of the Little Entente. The policy of this group of French satalites then and now is to keep Germany and Austria weak and above all to 15. F. Lee Benns, "Europe Since 1914", p. 548.

16. Ibid, p. 192.

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prevent their union. As with French opposition, the danger lies in the unwillingness of Germany, or any other country, to submit to a League or any combination of powers preventing her development along natural racial and economic lines. Resentment of intervention in her affairs is growing in Germany, a resentment which may make itself felt.

Many Austrians believe the Anschluss is far from feasible. They can, however, see no objection to a similar economic union with Hungary. <sup>17</sup> If the old Augsleich were revived, great economic benefit would accrue to both countries. No doubt each would retain its own autonomy, but the dividing customs houses would disappear. The culmination of this plan would not be economic misfortune for other countries. Not only did Vienna banks formerly finance all the Empire's manufacturing, but today her banking facilities greatly exceed her opportunities of service.

Though the French are the stumbling block in the way of the Anschluss, they do not seem to be much excited over the prospect of a reunited Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, the movement has great opposition. To a Czech, Serb or Rumanian, such a proposal arouses the fear of the old Emperial system and their subordination.

The economic situation in middle Europe obviously demands agreement between neighbors. A Danubian readjustment is essential. The re-alliance of Austria-Hungary would be a stepping stone toward economic adjustment, without which political security is unobtainable. It is to be hoped that the Little 17. Review of Reviews, Vol. 82, p. 74.

Entente will not obstruct such a policy. At present, the Anschluss movement, though desirable in itself, would probably seriously threaten the peace of Europe. The probability of the success of the Anschluss would be negligible if the economic union of Austria and Hungary be allowed. If it be not allowed, Germany and Austria are sure to draw closer together; France and the Little Entente would become panicky and the peace of Europe totter.

One would think that after generations of subjection and deprivations, Poland would have learned a lesson of sympathy and toleration for other national groups trying to work out their own destiny as a national unit. The Western World was scarcely able to believe that Poland had actually sent organized raids into East Galicia. For centuries Galicia as a border country has been a sore spot. It has long been a battleground between Poles and Ukrainians.

The Ukrainian country is known as the granary of Europe, but there are other items of vast natural wealth. It has some of the largest deposits of iron and coal in the world. The oil wells are marvelously rich. There are immense quantities of tobacco and sugar beets grown. It would seem that the country would be more fortunate if less rich in natural resources, for its territory is coveted by every powerful neighbor. 18

There was a time when all of Ukraine belonged to the Ukrainians, a separate individual branch of the Slavic race having its own language, history, folklore, culture and political ideals. For nearly a century and a half it has been divided, the larger eastern portion being administered by the 18. Current History, Vol. 34, p. 681.

Russian Czar, and the smaller western part coming under the administration of the Emperor of Austria. In spite of their political division, the Ukrainians have remained "one in culture and political aspirations."

When the Russian Empire collapsed the nations of Russian Ukraine attempted to establish their own republic. At the fall of the Austrian Empire, the Poles, Czechs, Serbs and other nationals included in the Dual Monarchy claimed their right to independence. The Ukrainians of East Galicia proclaimed their freedom and declared for union with the Ukrainian Republic.

But twenty-four days later the Republic of Poland was proclaimed. One of its first acts was the invasion of East Galicia. After nine months of hard fighting the Poles triumphed, established an iron militaristic rule in East Galicia, and pushed on into the Russian Ukraine. The Ukrainians were hemmed in by the Bolsheviki on the north, the Russian monarchists on the south, and the Poles on the west. The Ukrainian leader, Petlura, concluded an alliance with the Poles in order to save his forces from annihilation. He had no other alternative. At the end of the war, March 23, a treaty was signed by which Poland abandoned Petlura, recognized a Russian Soviet Ukraine. In return the Russian Soviets recognized Poland's claims to rule over Galicia and two Ukrainian provinces previously Russian as well. These three provinces are inhabited by 7,500,000 Ukrainians with only small minorities of Jews. Germans, and Poles. 19 The allied recognition of this treaty temporarily crushed the hopes of the Galicians.

<sup>19.</sup> Ibid, p. 682.

Thus, of all the nations formerly subject to Russia or Austria, Ukraine alone failed to achieve independence. Hopes have not altogether been abandoned, Throughout Europe today are scattered nearly 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers, writers and politicians planning for an ultimate independent Ukraine.

While such a national group is prohibited from expressing and acting upon its national desires and aspirations the peace of Europe is none too secure.

Russian Ukraine is semi-independent under Moscow but none the less seething with rebellion. Guerrilla warfare is constantly being carried on. Uprisings are frequent. In the Galician Ukraine an active secret Ukraine military organization exists. In it there are approximately 3,000 Ukraine patriots who have sworn to give their lives to end Polish rule. Fortunately the most significant movement of the Ukraines of Galicia has been along educational rather than military lines. Such a seemingly harmless enterprise as maintaining a University was forcibly forbidden. Drivin from Lemberg, the Ukrainians organized a national university in Prague.

According to original treaty arrangements Ukraine was to have autonomy. 22 Disregarding this, Poland deliberately attempted to Polonize the country. Colinization was first undertaken. The government secured a monopoly of the sale of landed estates and created a special bank. Landlords were required to sell only to this bank, which in turn sold only to 20. Ibid, p. 683.

<sup>21.</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22.</sup> Ibid, p. 684.

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Poles. But this was not enough. Alleged acts of incendiarism provided a mere semblance of justification for sending a punitive expedition into East Galicia. The brutality of the Polish soldiery was unspeakable.

Probably a year ago autonomy, with some responsibility would have been acceptable, but today the Galicians demand complete independence. Guerrilla warfare is still being carried on in Russian Ukraine. Galicia is recognized as the heart of the Ukrainian movement, undeniably dangerous to both Russia and Poland.

The projected Balkan Union is a move regarded with pleasure by those sincerely interested in the maintenance of peace. Greece seems well disposed toward all of her neighbors. Mr. Venizelas considers the tension existing between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as the greatest obstacle to the Balkan Union.

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Yugoslavia and Bulgaria seem to have more serious grounds for dispute than do Greece and Bulgaria. There are a large number of Bulgarians in Serbian Macedonia. The Bulgarians complain loudly of the Yugoslav administration there.

There seem to be two sides to the question. The repeated attempts made by Bulgarian "Komitadjis" upon the railway which unites Greece with the rest of Europe, attacks always on Yugo-slav territory, the assassination of General Kovatchevitch at Shtijs as well as the legal advisors of the Governor of Skoplje and the bomb explosions at Perot, Kriva Palanka and Shumica have so arroused the fury of Belgrade that relations with Sofia 23. Ibid.

24. Foreign Affairs, Vol 9, p. 494.

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are very difficult.

While in these disputes between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, as well as in the less serious ones between Bulgaria and Greece, both the British and French governments have amicably intervened at both Sofia and Belgrade, Italy has been conspicuous for her absence. Belgrade regards Italy as the supporter of Bulgaria. Yugoslavia, being surrounded by a chain of states which either, like Italy, contain Yugoslav minorities, or like Bulgaria, Albania and Hungary, are interested in their kinsman living in their country, naturally desire and need to conciliate these states. The patching up of petty irritations inflicted upon one another is to the interest of all civilization if a second Sarajevo is to be avoided.

The present attitude of certain European countries seems to rather aggravate than heal the greviences. It has been said that if the Balkans were the "powder-magazine" of Europe, the Great Powers had provided the powder. Europe does not seem to have profited much by the lesson of 1912-1914. Though no Great Power possesses Balkan territory as Austria-Hungary previously did, Italy and France are both continually interfering in Balkan questions, and have practically divided up the peninsula into Italian and French spheres of influence. In spite of the experience of their predecessors, each has her own pet Balkan states, pampered and encouraged according to the interests of their respective backers. Nor is the danger of an explosion decreased by the natural jealousy between "the two Latin sisters." The fact that Italy after the war incorporation.

ted within her frontiers a very considerably Yugoslav minority complicates matters, especially as France regards the high military qualities of the Yugoslavs as a valuable asset in the event of trouble between the two countries.\* 26

Though Greece stands aloof from the embarrassing and compromising patronage of any Great Powers, were there a war between Italy and Yugoslavia, her position would be difficult. The Great City of Saloniki contains a Serbian Free Zone. An attempt on the part of Yugoslavia to import war material through the Free Zone and over the Greek railway into Yugoslav territory would make it difficult for Greece to remain neutral.

The tension in Franco-Italian relations has been growing for the last nine months. Though negotiations between Paris and Rome have been in progress for a number of years, they have not yet been brought to any satisfactory conclusion. It is fully realized that the differences between France and Italy must be settled before a general conference on the reduction and limitation of arms can be profitably held.

The natural causes of Jealousy and ill feeling have been aggravated by misunderstandings and misrepresentations in part fostered by newspaper propoganda. The fact that the negotiations have been conducted in strict secrecy has led to futile and mistaken arguments calculated to influence public passions. Of the two probably Italy has been the worst offender in this respect. Seemingly, the campaign waged against France in Italy has had a semi-official character.

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The Italians claim that the promises made to them at the time they entered the war and afterwards have not been kept. France feels that Italy won even more than she in that Italy received her natural frontiers and her traditional enemy was swept from the map of Europe.

Moreover, France does not feel that she alone is to be held responsible for Italian disappointment. In Article 13 of the Treaty of London (April 26, 1915) it was stipulated that should France and Great Britian increase their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, those two powers would agree in principle that Italy might claim some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favor of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritria, Somaliland and Libya and the neighboring colonies belonging to France and Great Britian.

The Franco-Italian agreement of September 12, 1918 was consumated to carry out this agreement. Italy was granted a rectification of the western frontier of Libya whereby the Oases of Ghadames and Ghat passed under Italian sovereignty. France considers this equitable compensation; Italy does not.

In 1928 the French government proposed the cession of the Djado Casis south of Tummon ( which was already an Italian possession ) on condition that Italy accept certain proposals concerning affairs in Tunis. <sup>29</sup> At the time the Italian government was disposed to accept the offer. Today it is re-

<sup>27.</sup> Foreign Affairs, Vol. 9, p. 223.

<sup>28.</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29.</sup> Ibid, p. 224.

garded as far from satisfactory. The residents of the colonies have been aroused, and the reoccupation of Mourzouk by General Graziani only aroused their desires for more. They now demand Belma, Tibesti and northern Barbou. Moreover, they are now demanding access to Lake Chad. Such access would cut all the lines of communication which France has been struggling to establish between West Africa and Equatorial Africa.

Since 1927 Italy has been claiming that she inherited all the rights of Turkey in Tripolitania and the "hinterland" of Tripolitania. 30 Thus any concessions France might make in the direction of Tibesti and Barbou would not be considered as equitable compensation. Though in 1890 the Ottomon government asserted the claim that the "hinterland" of Tripolitania extended as far as the frontiers of the Cameroon, this theory was never justified by continued occupation; nor was it ever recognized by France or England. France refuses to consent to the reopening of the question now. 31

"The status of Italians in Tunis is regulated by FrancoItalian agreements of 1896. Article thirteen of the agreement
for the Establishment of Consulates provides that: 'Italy will
regard as Tunisians and France will regard as Italians, such
individuals as shall have retained Tunisian or Italian nationality in accordance with the laws of their respective countries;
Notice of the repudiation of this article was served on Italy
by France in 1918, but the article has been left in force by
quarter-annual renewals since that time, Italians, therefore,

<sup>30.</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31.</sup> Ibid, p. 225.

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have been escaping application of a French decree of November 8, 1921, which stipulates that 'all individuals born in the Regency of Tunis of parents one of whom was born in the Regency are French.' This decree was modified December 20, 1923, so that any individual in the category mentioned has a right to decline French citizenship, provided he does so within a year of majority; though children born of an individual who has exercised this principle are French. England has accepted this arrangement for her own subjects as well as for her Maltese dependents; Italy regards it as another French attempt to weaken her colonial power.

Two years ago France proposed a scheme for a treaty of arbitration and friendship with Italy. This treaty was designed to revive certain provisions in the treaty which Italy concluded in 1924 with Yugoslavia. This treaty was never renewed. As a result French friendship for the Yugoslavs came to play an important part in her relations with Italy.

Italy has only herself to blame for the failure of the Powers to adhere to the Treaty of London, According to that treaty, Fiume went to Yugoslavia. Italy in demanding Fiume, made the Treaty of London a back number. To this demand, the United States as well as France and England were opposed. By the Treaty of Rapallo (1920) Fiume was made an independent free city. 32 The arrangement was unsatisfactory to both the Italians and Yugoslavs and proved unworkable. The Yugoslavs closed the Zagreb-Fiume railroad in an attempt to cripple Italian commercial interests. As a result Fiume was forced 32. F. Lee Benns "Europe Since 1914", p. 446.

into idleness and the Yugoslav hinterland became economically disorganized.

By the Treaty of Rome, January 27, 1924, the Free State of Fiume was divided between Italy and Yugoslavia. Port Baros went to Yugoslavia while Fiume proper was given to Italy. 33 In March the final annexation of the city which had caused so much controversy was settled. This settlement brought about an improvement in Italo-Yugoslav relations.

But two years later Italy signed the Treaty of Tirana with Albania, marking the close of Italy's policy of concord with Yugoslavia. To the Yugoslavs it appeared that Italy had at last secured the protectorate over Albania which Italian nationalists had been seeking ever since the outbreak of the World War. Excitement in Belgrade was intense. In 1927 the Franco-Yugoslav Treaty was consumated. Italy regarded the treaty as aimed at her, tightened her hold on Albania, and neglected to renew the Treaty of Friendship with Yugoslavia.

Italy chooses to consider the Franco-Yugoslav Treaty as evidence of France's "encircling" policy. Thus friendship between France and Yugoslavia has become a cause of Franco-Italian misunderstanding. "In asking for a formal alliance with Belgrade to the exclusion of all other Powers; in establishing herself in Albania; in concluding alliances with Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria, and in talking of a rapprochment with Germany, Italy has launched forth on a policy of expansion toward the East, a policy that does not foster warm relations on her part either with Yugoslavia, or with

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the Little Entent, or with France. 34

Secret diplomacy by itself is bad enough, but when it becomes associated with publicity stunts and dirt-throwing in the daily press it is considerably worse. The Franco-Italian naval agreement is the latest instance. After days spent in hurrying from London to Paris for an interview with M. Briand arranged by telephone, conversing at high speed at the French Foreign Office, catching the next train for Rome to converse with Signor Grandi and Premier Mussolini, and hastening back to Paris to make sure that France would accept what Italy agreed to, Mr. Henderson, British Foreign Secretary, announced that the controversy between Italy and France had been patched up and that those powers would soon adhere to the London naval treaty. Nothing of the terms of the agreement was divulged, and the newspaper correspondents were left to create hypothetical terms out of hints and speculations. Now, it appears, the agreement is not so perfect, at least, as to keep Great Britian from fearing that its own naval position has been jeopardized and that France conceded less than was supposed.

Naval agreements will soon become a hissing and a byword if they continue to develope such contentions and misunderstandings as have followed recent ones. Now comes the
demand of France for a volume of replacement tonnage by 1936
which Italy regards as preposterous.

The causes of disagreement and antipathy between France and Italy are almost multitudinous. Yet no reduction of arms 34. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 9, p. 231.

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or any enduring peace in Europe can be assured with these differences unadjusted. The prospect is not encouraging.

Spain presents another and different troublesome situation. At present Spain seems to be the victim of almost constant political turmoil. The root of the trouble apparently is the continued existence of an entworn institution - monarchy. Though personally King Alfonso XIII is popular with the majority of his people, he, as king, represents an era which Spain is struggling to outlive. These groups are hardly a minority. Four chief groups, the Intellectuals, the Socialists, the New Industrialists, and the Republicans are opposed to the present regime.

The situation is complicated by the presence of old causes of discontent such as separatism, regionalism, race and language. To each of these groups the monarchy represents something different. To the separatist and regionalist it represents a centralized form of government; to the Socialists and New Industrialists, a landed aristocracy and a national economy better suited to the sixteenth than to the twentieth century; to the intellectuals it personifies the Church and cultural stagnation; to the Republicans it is the symbol of unconstitutional government and militarism.

The opposition composes those who desire a new cultural, political and economic era.

There are certain conditions peculiar to Spain which have been and are contributing to the revolutionary movement. Spain has never really been united. Aragon and Castile were not even units among themselves. This country also lacks unity in race 35. Current History, Vol. 34, p. 24.

and language. Each section has its own individual dialect and the people customarily refer to themselves as "Castellanos" or "Gallegos." The Galician dialect is very unlike the Castilian. Often people in one region cannot understand those in another. Such racial and linguistic prejudices that naturally follow provide fertile soil for the seeds of revolt.

The church is the corner stone of the monarchy and sass such is open to bitter attach. Spain is now as she has been for centuries almost entirely Catholic. Through the centuries the church and state have stood together, the state contributing large sums to the support of the church. Consequently the church is conservative, wishing no change in the system of government. The intellectuals center a considerable part of their attack on the church. It accuses the church of "debasing the confessional to a spy system for the government." 37

The situation is one which engenders rebellion because the present royal family are not the legitimate heirs to the throne of Spain. According to the Republicans the present regione is unconstitutional. The majority of the intellectuals see in the monarchy a permanent barrier to the constitutional parliamentry form of government they desire.

A brief review will be necessary in order to understand the military situation in Spain. In earlier centuries an army career and a Christian life were almost synonymous. The one absorbing occupation of every Spanish gentleman was fighting.

Mone but the serfs worked. A contempt for manual labor devel
36. Ibid, p. 26.

37. Ibid.

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oped. Moreover, Spain became saddled with a military system far worse than either pre-war Germany or present-day France. This militarism was directed at the home government rather than at any external enemy. Spain passed through a period of internal wars which consumed her entire strength. All political activity was directed by the army. Whenever a party failed to win by the ballot it resorted to warfare. Unfortunately, Spain does not seem to have outlived this system.

sent crisis depends. As long as the army holds together in support of the monarchy, Spain will no doubt have a king. Though there is not yet sufficient popular strength to depose him, the government does not rest on strong, long established foundations. Happily the rest of Europe seems little concerned with what happens in Spain. The chances of revolution there throwing the rest of Europe into war are slight. The outlook for internal peace, however, is far from bright.

Revolts in Latin America cause considerable concern to the United States. They affect investments amounting to \$5,000,000, 000, a trade of \$2,000,000,000 annually as well as the security of thousands of our national residents in these countries.

In many cases they are alleged to involve both the Monroe doctrine and the domination of the Canal Zone by the United States.

Secretary of State Simpson, in a recent address, claims justification for the tutorial role of the United States in 38. The predicted revolution has taken place since the writing of this thesis.

39. Current History, Vol. 34, p. 12.

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Central America on the grounds that we have acted at their earnest request and in cooperation with them. These words are misleading. It is the executives of the countries, not the people, who have desired our intervention. Naturally the Presidents of 1923 favored such a policy in order to continue in office.

The right of revolution is a symbol of national integrity. Undoubtedly revolution is unfavorable to world peace. Under certain circumstances its denial is still more dangerous. The policy of the United States in Latin America seems to rest on three assumptions: "that revolutions are not necessary there, that orderly self-government after the manner of England and the United States is possible in the region; and that the United States has the right and duty to maintain order in the Caribbean area. 40 Actually a number of these revolutions have been protests against manifest injustice, oppression and exploitation. For one country to interfere with the attempt of another people striving for governmental reform is apt to foster rather than inhibit the desire for revolution. By denying the right of revolution, we tend to create and maintain in power a succession of dictators, who by oppressing the people bring about the very disorders which our State Department wishes to prevent.

Any attempt at intervention on our part, or on that of any other country, is more apt to bring disorder than lasting peace. Revolutions are most undesirable. The only other methodand the more desirable one - of obtaining needed reforms is through the elections. This method is not without its dangers.

<sup>40.</sup> Ibid, p. 15.

In both Nicaragua and Panama our government has supervised the elections. If, after we have imposed free and peaceable elections, the governments chosen should be unable to cope with the opposition, we would propably feel compelled to send the marines to protect the established government, to see that the government carries on an orderly administration, attends to social justice and promotes the public wellfare. The present policy of the United States exposes it to the charge of using the superior strength to advance the interests of its own capitalists, and of preferring profits and wealth to human liberty.

Recent revolutions in South and Central America are evidence of social progress rather than retrogression. There is much to show that they are largely inspired by sincere patrictism. True, a real democracy is not yet possible in some of these states, and whether the new governments will bring a greater liberalism time alone will tell. With wider and more effective communication, public opinion has come into play as never before; and the appeal to freedom and democracy, even if these ends are not wholly and at once achieved, serves to stimulate the latent political consciousness of the people. Intervention in an attempt to establish democracy functions to stem the rising tide of nationalism, and if irritated too much, may some day turn against those attempting to play the part of benefactors.

For nearly thirty years Juan Vicente Gomez has succeeded in maintaining a brutal dictatorship in Venezuela. He has been materially aided by Dutch, British, and American warships which patrol the coast of the second largest oil producing country in

ship have fled the country; the rest have been exiled, killed or sent to prison. Evidence showing that American oil interests have obtained for Gomez the support of the Department of State was presented to both houses of Congress last year, and resolutions calling for an investigation of our relations with Venezuela were introduced.

So far nothing has been done either to stop the misrule or to withdraw our support of the dictatorial government there.

On a smaller scale than that of the Gomez dictatorship in Venezuela, but equally vicious and despotic, the Trujillo dictatorship in Santo Domingo has been riding "roughshod" over the Dominican people. At least eleven of the opposition leaders have been assassinated and many others have been imprisoned or forced into exile. Primary schools have been closed and the money used to raise an army. It is to be hoped that the people will not long endure such misrule. The present condition must be considered as dangerous to world peace. Santo Domingo is virtually a protectorate. Should revolution occur, the United States would find it difficult to keep her hands clean.

The problem of Nicaragua is difficult. The question is, are we doing more to foster ill will and resentment by intervening in the internal affairs of Nicaragua than we would be if we left them to work out their own salvation, accepting the revolutions that would accompany their attemps.

<sup>41.</sup> Nation, Vol. 132, p. 243.

<sup>42.</sup> Ibid.

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In order to arrive at some conclusion, let us review briefly Nicaragua's recent history. In July 1912 Diaz, feeling himself unable to handle the situation, appealed for assistance against the revolution. The marines had crushed that revolution for him by October of that year. From then until August 1, 1925 a company of marines remained at Nicaragua. During that period of thirteen years no revolution occured. The presence of this small group is said to account for the maintenance of peace. The only ones dissatisfied were the liberals who complained of always losing the elections. Now that they have won two elections since the intervention of 1927, they no longer object to the occupation.

In November 1923, our Government notified the officials of Nicaragua that we intended to withdraw our marines in January 1925. In the meantime, the elections of 1924 were to be held in accordance with a model electoral law drafted by an American expert and recommended by the State Department. Also an efficient constabulary was to be organized under the direction of American instructors. It was thought that the new government would be very strong and capable of managing Micaraguan affairs satisfactorily. The Central American treaty was ratified and the plans materialized as predicted.

In spite of such an encouraging outlook, both the retiring Conservative Government and the incoming Coalition Liberal-Conservative Government requested the retention of the marines. The request was granted in the hope that the organization of the new constabulary would be facilitated. The marines were 43. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 9, p. 498.

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withdrawn August 1. 1925. It was the general opinion in

Nicaragua that this withdrawal would be the signal for a coup

d'etat, probably by General Chamorre.

According to these predictions, Chamorro seized complete control of the Government October 25. On January 16, 1927, he occupied the presidency through congressional proceedings which he chose to call constitutional. The Chamorro government was not granted recognition. In May the new president succeeded in putting down a revolution. In August another revolution broke out. This time the insurgents were aided by Mexican arms and Chamorro was forced to resign.

Former President Diaz assumed the presidency on November 11, and the same day was recognized by the United States. We had hoped thereby to terminate the civil war, but soon another revolution under the leadership of General Moncada developed. The United States Government intervened to the extent of establishing neutral zones favorable to the Diaz Government, selling it United States war materials on credit, and making it a loan of \$1,000,000.

In April 1927, President Coolidge sent Mr. Stimson to Nicaragua in a final effort to secure peace. A letter stating that the United States had accepted the invitation of the Nicaraguan Government to supervise the elections of 1928, with the authority to accept the custody of arms of those willing to lay them down, and to disarm forcibly those who would not do 44. Ibid.

<sup>45.</sup> Ibid. p. 499.

<sup>46.</sup> Ibid.

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so was delivered to General Moncada, who immediately surrendered. The civil war was reported to be definitely at an end.

The following statistics hardly verify that conclusion.

Since May 15, 1927, the American marines have suffered the following casualties: "27 killed in action; 15 dead from wounds;

59 wounded but not fatally; 52 dead from sickness. The Nicaraguans killed have numbered 3,764." In spite of the peace proclamation of May 1927 and the employment of as many as

5,7000 American marines in fields of operation, the pacification of Nicaragua is still unachieved.

Several contributing factors account for this failure. In the first place there are too few roads to allow effective patrolling of the entire sparsely settled area. Bands of natives roam the vast tropical jungles and are able to secure a meager existence safe from American pursuers. Secondly, the organized opponents of our intervention have the sympathies of the masses both in Nicaragua and through Latin America. This fact accounts both for their abundant supplies of arms and for their knowledge of the movements of the marines. From time to time property owners have been raided in order to replenish the war chest and larder.

In order to rid Nicaragua of these bandits, an extensive system of roads and legal administration would be required. Financially Nicaragua is unable to attempt such a project. Though we have attempted to give Nicaragua two fair elections, one in 1928 and again in 1930, we have not been moved to use our resources for material improvements which are a necessary 47. Ibid.

part of any permanent solution. The stage is therefore set for the continuation of present disorders and the repition of recent history.

However, the choice between intervention and non-intervention is not a choice between peace, safety, and trade on the one hand, and disorder and no trade on the other. A Nicaraguan civil war in which the American marines participate differs from a purely Nicaraguan civil war mainly in that one costs us a hundred American lives and good will throughout South America while the other does not. The choice between a Nicaraguan-made peace and an American-made peace is a choice between Chamorro's way and our way of violating the Nicaraguan constitution.

India presents still another problem. To the wast majority of educated Indians, including most of those who are members of the Indian National Congress, freedom means primarily freedom from foreign domination, from alien rule; they are passionately longing for the same political freedom that so many western nations have achieved by force of arms within the last 150 years, and many of them believe that so great a blessing can only be secured by the traditional means of armed revolution. Nevertheless, the illiterate millions of peasants are content to allow Gandhi to lead the movement, and to adopt his non-violent methods of overthrowing the government's authority. But their aim is the aim of all revolutionary nationalists: to destroy the alien government, and to establish in its place an Indian Government, controlled by themselves or their friends.

The position of Mahatma Gandhi is rather different. Naturally he too wants to see India self governing, taking her

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rightful place as a great free people with the other selfgoverning nations of the world. But that hardly seems to be the
dominant motive for his actions. He wants India to become
politically free in order to be economically free. The peasants
in many parts of india have learned from Gandhi and his close
associates that their grinding poverty is not inevitable; that
their land tax is so heavy because the alien government has to
support so many expensive foreign officials; that they can
strike at this evil system by collecting their own salt and so
evading the salt tax, by boycotting the liquor and drug shops
and so reducing the government excise; and as a last resort
they can refuse to pay their land tax and their rents.

Aside from revolutionary activities of this kind, they have been encouraged for years to use their hours of idleness in spinning and weaving their own cotton clothes, instead of buying machine made goods from Lancashire. The villages that have taken up the "khaddar", as it is called, are reported to be better off and morally superior to their neighbors. It is no wonder that the peasants are supporting him, not only in his own province of Gujerat, but in many other parts of India where his disciples have been working.

The business community also supports him. To them economic freedom means tariffs, protection against foreign manufacturers, the right to change the rupes value to suit the interests of India.

Most significant of all, thousands of women of all classes have responded to Gandhi's call. They have proved that freedom means to them, first, freedom from lives of seclusion, but,

beyond that, his emphasis on non-violence, on purity and chastity of life, on sacrifice, on home-crafts; above all, perhaps, something in his own personal life that defies analysis, has rallied them in thousands to his standard.

These are the main forces which have cooperated in the civil disobedience movement, but it has received support from many other sections of the country owing to another cause, temporary but potent. Faced by widespread violation of laws, the government of India began to enact ordinances restricting the right of public meeting, the freedom of the press, and other rights. Fresh demonstrations and more extensive civil disobedience followed until the jails were filled and authorities encouraged officers to disperse the crowds. Often quite orderly crowds were dispersed with anything but gentleness.

Whatever reason may be advanced for such action on the part of the authorities, the effect on Indian public opinion has been unfortunate. Many felt that the Simon Commission completely misjudged the situation, seriouly underestimating the strength of the nationalist movement. Moreover, police repression alienated a large section of opinion. What might have been adopted as a reasonable degree of self-government in 1929 would have no chance of acceptance in 1931.

The round table conference has not fully appreciated this change. The Simon Commission proposed provincial self-government with the central authority reserved in the hands of the viceroy, who would still receive instructions from London. The round table has gone beyond this in that it has recognized 48. Christian Century, Vol. 47, p. 435.

that India is in no mood to accept anything less than responsibility for the central government. This is recognized in principle, but certain restrictions in the nature of "safeguards" have been attached which cannot prove permanently satisfactory to India.

Under the existing conditions, the subjects of defense and external affairs are to be reserved to the governor general and the powers necessary for the administration of these subjects are to be placed in his hands. Since the governor must be able in an emergency to maintain peace within the state and must also be responsible for the observance of the constitutional rights of the minorities, he must be given the necessary powers for these purposes.

England reserves the right to interfere in financial arrangements to the extent that the fulfillment of the obligations incurred under the authority of the security of state and the maintenance of the unimpaired financial stability and credit of India necessitates. Except for these provisions, the Indian government would have full financial responsibility for the methods of raising revenue and for the control of other expenditures. <sup>49</sup> However, if the new constitution works reasonably well, the transfer of financial responsibility should be complete within ten years. If India obtains a constitution according to the lines laid down in the round table conference, the bureaucracy will immediately be under the financial control of a responsible government, and the army should come fully under that control eventually.

<sup>49.</sup> Ibid, p. 435.

<sup>50.</sup> Ibid, p. 436.

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A difficult problem remains. If the control passes into Indian hands, whose hands will they be? Will they be just the princes, landlords, and capitalists, or the high caste Brahmin Hindus, or will the masses of peasants and workers have any voice in the matter? At present the princes rule over 70,000, 000 subjects; some of these may be content with the benevolent despotism of certain rulers, but subjects of other less benevolent rulers are gravely discontent. No one spoke in their behalf in London.

The princes demand for themselves, not for their subjects, a large representation in the central legislature, and probably they will expect to have seats in the central executive. Should this be the case, the condition of the masses, economically and politically would not be perceptibly improved. The danger of revolution would still hang over India.

The proposals are not final. If the influence of the congress can be exerted to shift the balance of the constitution more to the side of the masses, either by further extension of the franchise or by other means, there seems to be nothing to prevent it. If they have to fight for these things, it will be against the priviledged classes in India rather than against the British government.

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William Archer in his "Color-Blind Neutrality" attempts to show that the blame for the war lies entirely in the Central Powers. On pages twenty-nine to thirty-one, he summarizes his interpretation of the responsibility for the World War by comparing Germany and the allies in regard to militarism. For instance he says Germany "Believes ardently in war as the noblest and most beneficent of human activities; a doctrine preached by her most popular historians and philosophers, and everywhere reschoed in literature, journalism and education" while "In every country" of the allies "there is a strong pacifist party, including men of great influence. Every country, whatever war party may exist, derives its whole strength from the constant menace of Germany's military preparations and aggressive temper." Next he says that the allies "have no desire for territorial expansion, least of all at Germany's expense, while Germany contains at any rate a considerable party which openly agitates for large territorial expansion in or out of Europe. 51

This type of propaganda is the most dangerous. It was written, not by one who was war-crazed and incapable of seeing that there are two sides to the question, but rather, it was written in a scholarly manner with as little evidence of emotion as could be found at such a time. It was written for the purpose of showing the United States how unjust and contrary to the interests of humanity her policy of neutrality was. It was written in such a manner as to convince thinking 51. William Archer, "Color-Blind Neutrality", pp. 29-36.

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people that war was necessary. It is bad enough when the mob is swayed by emotional propaganda, but when the thinking element which we must depend upon to maintain a sane national policy in time of crisis, is won over by the appeal of such writers, then there is little hope for maintaining neutrality. When thinking people have presented to them, by some one who has apparently studied the question, what appears to be the truth but in reality is but part of the truth, they too are apt to be convinced and follow the mob. Such is what happened in the United States in 1917. That type of literature was an obstacle to world peace in 1917, and the same sort of thing would be sure to present itself as an obstacle to peace were similar conditions to arise.

In his "Shirking the Issue" William Archer goes even further in his attempt to show the folly of neutrality. He makes such people as Dr. George Brandes, one of the very few who in the excitement of the moment kept his head enough to see that the allies hands were also stained with war guilt and attempted to make that fact clear to America before it was too late, appear as an enemy of civilization, to be avoiding the issue and purposely misrepresenting facts.

The curious thing is that the inhabitants of a country rarely dispute the external sovereignty of their government. They may know as a matter of bitter experience that their rulers are a corrupt, stuped, reactionary group of men. But when these rulers speak to a foreign people, those opinions acquire an almost supernatural importance. They become the "national will" and men will give their lives for them.

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In a consideration of the differences between the psychology of domestic and foreign politics, the most striking difference seems to be this: in domestic affairs we live with and know the men who disagree with us; in foreign countries the opposition lives behind a frontier and probably speaks a different language. Simple and obvious as this sounds, the consequences are enormous. Thus when a nation crystallizes its opinion, it does so practically unopposed. The average man meets almost nobody who disagrees with him. In fact, opposition is about the only incentive we have to practice reason and tolerance. Unless our ideas are questioned they become established. It is only by constant criticism that any of our ideas remain human and decent.

The consequences of the Moroccan crisis were far reaching. National feeling was set loose which extended far beyond the original dispute. Morocco came to mean not money, but bad will, suspician, fear and hatred. Propaganda played on this fear and made it a question of national prestige and even security.

In some such way as that patriotism becomes involved in business. Specific disputes over specific trade oppositualties become the testing points of national pride. Just as a man will fight a law suit at an enormous cost for a trivial sum, so nations will risk war to score a diplomatic victory. They feel that a defeat on one point will exhibit weakness and carry in its train defeat on other points. So they throw their armaments into the scale of decision.

It is a well known fact that within the memory of living
52. Walter Lippmann, "The Stakes of Diplomacy", p. 81.

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men the nations of Europe who fought on opposite sides in the recent war, were friends with their enemies and enemies with their friends. On no theory of racial antagonism, nationality or cultural differences can the fact be explained that until thirty years ago, England was friendly to Germany, and deeply hostile to France and Russia.

It may seem a paradox that the anarchy of the world is due to the backwardness of weak states; that the modern states have lived in an armed peace and collapsed into terrible warfare because in Asia, Africa, the Balkans, Central and South America there are rich territories which invite exploitation, in which the prizes are so great that the competition for them leads to war.

People will not go behind it, however, unless they are made to feel that the subject matter of diplomacy is related to their daily lives. Without some direct and constant interest public opinion ignores foreign affairs until a crisis is reached. Everyone is interested in a dramatic event or a possible war. But the tedious negotiations which prepare the situations leading to crises and wars are not much discussed because they deal with distant and shadowy countries. When the crises arrive public opinion is swayed by the propaganda of the moneyed interests until war becomes inevitable.

In considering the use of international force to secure peace, we are brought to the fundamental necessity of common accord. In the field of conflicting national policies, and what are deemed to be essential interests, when the smouldering fire of old grievances have been fanned into a flame by a passionate

sense of immediate injury, or the imagination of people is dominated by fear of present danger to national safety, or what is believed to be an assault on national honor, what force is to control the outbreak. The trust in force must be in the common agreement behind the force. The application of force when there is a disagreement means war, not peace; and then the basis of confidence, if found at all, is merely in the disparity of arms.

All contrivances for maintaining peace by economic pressure, as well as by military force, depend on the sentiment which will apply the pressure and direct the force when the test comes. The way to peace is through agreement, not through force. The question then is not of any ambitious general scheme to prevent war, but simply the constant effort to find a just and reasonable basis for accord.

It is necessary to reckon with the special difficulties inherent in the democratic organization of government with respect to the endeavor to maintain peace by concluding international agreements to end controversies closely affecting national interests. The more important the agreements, as insuring peace by settling bitter disputes, the more certain it is that they will involve mutual concessions. Thus in each country it is likely to be insisted that the other has gained at its expense, and this gives exceptional opportunity to critics who assume the most extreme positions on patriotic grounds.

There are today certain questions between people which ought to be taken up and settled in order to heal festering sores. But those in charge of foreign affairs do not dare to

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 $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{c}}$  undertake to negotiate agreements because they know that in the presence of attack inspired by political or partisan motives, the necessary adjustment could not receive the approval of the legislative branch. Democracies may be loath to go to war, but they are extremely difficult agencies of international compromise in the interests of peace.

It is sometimes suggested that all would be easy if negotiators would simply tell the public everything that they are doing. But the trouble is that in every negotiation there are preliminary positions to be taken and nothing can be accomplished if every suggestion must be publicly made. Negotiators under such restrictions would inevitably take their positions, not to promote a settlement, but to win public approval by the firmness and vigor of their partisanship. Misleading statements, misapprehensions and unfounded rumors are likely to become current and parhaps make necessary in order to avoid greater difficulties, disclosures which it would be in the interest of successful prosecutions of the negotiations to withhold for the time being.

Perhaps the most troublesome source of irritation are to be found in the subjects which states decline to regard as international in the legal sense. Every state, jealous of its sovereign rights, refuses to permit the intrusion of other nations into its domestic concerns. But in these days of intimate relations, of economic stress, and of intense desire to protect national interests and advance national opportunity, the treatment of questions which from a legal standpoint are domestic, often seriously affects international relations. The

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principle each nation for itself to the full extent of its power, is the principle of war, not of peace. Propaganda accentuates the dangers involved. It does not require gains for the people as a whole to explain war. It is enough if influential classes have a mistaken hope of gains.

In the past, certain officials and writers have striven during wars to make people forget the issues which make war; the reasons given the public for enterring on war were seldom the real reasons; usually the real reasons never reach the mind of the general public. Hence the ease with which governments launch nationals into war.

It was ruled in England in 1915 by certain "leaders of thought" that it was "unwise, unpatriotic, and un-English to suspect the motives of Governments, or waver for a moment in swearing whole-hearted allegeance to the authorities, you must think only of war. If you dare ask for the truth, you are helping the enemy; if you suggest an early peace, you are hindering the militarists who desire no peace until their enemy is utterly crushed." 53

cal to assured world peace. It can not be denied that our exclusion policy has done much to offend and to arouse the ill will of Japan. The psychological effect has been regrettable. The following memorandum from the Japanese Government has been received by our State Department;

"To Japan the question is not one of expediency but of principle. To her the mere fact that a few hundred or thousand 53. Frances Neilson, "How Diplomats Make War", p. 368.

of her nationals will or will not be admitted to the dominions of other countries is immaterial so long as no question of national susceptibilities is involved. The important question is whether Japan as a nation is or is not entitled to the proper respect and consideration of other nations. In other words, the Japanese Government asks of the United States Government simply that proper consideration ordinarily given by one nation to the self-respect of another, which, after all, forms the basis of amicable international intercourse throughout the civilized world. 54

In 1925 Viscount Shibusawa made this statement in reference to the exclusion law; "It is not a closed incident.....We object not because it shuts out our immigrants but because it derogates us to a position separate from and inferior to that of other nations of the civilized world," 55

In the Spring of 1930 former Ambassador Hanihara declared:

"It is not so much a question as to whether one nation should or should not exercise its sovereign rights in regulating matters relating to its domestic affairs, as it is often represented to be. More precisely, it is a question as to whether one people should treat another people sympathetically or unsympathetically, fairly or unfairly.....In that incident the Ambassador of a friendly power was gratuitously accused of the wanton act of using a veiled threat against that very country. Naturally the Japanese Government and people deeply resented this, and that resentment is felt now as it was then.....Nor

<sup>54.</sup> I. A. S. Whitely, "Immigration Problems on the Pacific

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<sup>55.</sup> Ibid, p. 124

will it ever die out so long as the wound remains unhealed." 56

Should the United States Government and the Japanese Government tangle on any question of international policy, the antagonism which we have created in Japan would make it difficult for that country to come to an amicable agreement with us.

According to the Pravada, a Moscow daily, the economic existence of Soviet Russia is being threatened by an alleged Hoover-Legge plot . It is reported that the policy of the federal farm board under the chairmanship of Mr. Alexander Legge had a single purpose in view. According to Pravada, President Hoover directed this board to attempt to create "a huge store of wheat, cotton, dried fruit, milk products, meat, wool, tobacco, rice, beans and so forth, in order to supply an army which the French general staff was to throw into Russia during 1930-1931. This fantastic story has been seriously told to the Russian masses and just as seriously believed. Though the authorities of Russia are probably making such reports to safacilitate the carrying out of the Five-Year Plan, the deliberate attempt of the Soviet authorities to convince the people of Russia that all the rest of the world is planning military intervention is creating a mass psychology which may someday have disastrous results.

<sup>56.</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57.</sup> Christian Century, Vol. 48, pp. 532-533.

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Since the war to end war, it has been more difficult than ever to secure a lasting peace because of the hate engendered. War has been recognized as the corollary of independence, the permitted means by which injured nations protect their territory and maintain their rights. International law leaves aggrieved states who cannot obtain redress for their wrongs by peaceful means to exact it by force. Justification for war, as recently demonstrated, is ready at hand for those who desire to make war. There is rarely a case of admitted aggression, or where on each side the cause is not believed to be just by the people who support the war.

There is a further difficulty which lies much deeper. There is no lawgiver for independent states. There is no legislature to impose its will by majority vote, no executive to give effect even to accepted rules. The outlawry of war implies a self-imposed restraint and free people jealous of their national safety, of their freedom of opportunity, of the rights and privileges they deem essential to their well-being, will not forego the only sanction at their command in extreme exigencies. The restraints they may be willing to place upon themselves will always be subject to such conditions as will leave them able to afford self-protection by force, and in this freedom there is abundant room for strife sought to be justified by deep-seated convictions of national interests, by long standing greviences, by the apprehension of aggression to be forestalled. The outlawry of war, by appropriate rule of law making war a crime, requires the common accord needed to establish and

maintain a rule of international law, the common consent to abandon war; the suggested remedy implies a state of mind in which no cure is needed. As the restraint would be self-imposed it would prove to be of avail only while there is a will to peace.

It is this difficulty which constantly suggests recourse to force to maintain peace. Peoples who would engage in war, it is said, must be compelled to be peaceful; there should be an international force adequate to prevent aggression and to redress wrongs. The League of Nations, though organized for this purpose, has been unable to adequately cope with the situation, largely because the United States has refused to lend her support.

A people without muskets or cannon can improvise weapons from industrial or other material. If mere limitation of armaments conduced to peace, the era of primitive armament should have been more peaceful than that of its highest development, but we know that it was not, that it was more warlike. That partial disarmament does not prevent protracted, vigorous and costly warfare was shown in our Civil War and is at least suggested by the fitful war which has been going on for years in Mexico.

If one side in a contest can be disarmed or prevented from arming, it may be placed at such a disadvantage with respect to the others that it will not dare go to war. If the side that is armed does not want war, there will be none, but if it does, this one-sided armament will conduce to it.

Let us suppose that the political difficulties involved in

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an international organization to preserve peace are overcome.

After the troops for the enforcement of international law are procured, there is still the difficulty of effectively commanding a heterogeneous grand army of levies from a number of countries, speaking different languages, variously armed, equipped and organized; trained in different schools of tactics; the officers generally unacquainted with one another and more or less out of accord as to the objectives and modes of operation to be adepted.

If such a scheme were to be carried out, it would be necessary to form a union which would be held together from within, not forced together from outside. In such a union there must be a civic spirit equivalent, in its unifying influence, to military spirit. Such a spirit can come only out of a peoples' life and experiences. It cannot be created or assured by a constitution or form of government. The difficulties standing in the way of such an organization are tremendous. Racial antipathies, differences of language and the present system of protective tariffs are significant obstructions in the way of such a solution.

As a factor of military efficiency national patriotism cannot be dispensed with as long as war is possible. We are thus confronted with a conundrum. National patriotism will not be abolished until world peace is established, and world peace cannot be established until national patriotism is abolished. How then is the world ever to have peace?

It is a lesson of the world's experience that it is in the interests of peace to localize as far as possible such

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armed conflicts as arise between nations. The right of intervention may, in certain circumstances, be conceded where a nation's own peace is menaced by a war on its borders, but participation in distant wars, where no national interests are involved, would tend only toward the spread of war and unnecessary preparation for war, and is essentially inimical to peace.

A nation that will not obey a law or keep a contract will not take the trouble to make war in another's interest, where its own interest is not directly involved. A compact to enforce peace has therefore no more value from the point of view of honor than a compact to keep the peace. It has the additional handicap, when it comes to questions of action, that going to war where no national interest is directly affected is an expensive and unpopular undertaking, and is likely to be post-poned as much as possible.

We are then forced back to this, that nations that are not ready voluntarily to accept and obey just laws cannot be depended upon for any guarantees of peace. Basing their action solely on national interest as they conceive it, and not upon uniform principles of justice, national interest will eventually control, and all pledges will be evaded. Each nation, or at most each group of nations, will enforce its own peace but will not sacrifice its own arms for world peace.

It can not be denied that military preparedness functions as an obstacle to world peace. Preparedness causes fear and enmity in other countries and consequently leads to counterpreparedness. This in turn serves as an excuse for greater

preparedness and leads to a race of armaments, thus making an armed camp of the nations. Such a situation generates fear and enmity and makes it difficult to establish friendly relations between nations. Preparedness also necessitates the support of a body of professional military and naval men who are highly trained in the art of destruction and whose environment tends to magnify in their minds the place of armed force and to decrease confidence in non-military means of maintaining security and justice. These men exercise considerable influence over national policies. Preparedness is an integral part of the war system and tends to be self-perpetuating.

Fear is probably the most powerful factor in producing war. The peoples of the earth hate war and desire nothing so much as to be left in peace. The chief reason why they are willing to bear the heavy burden of taxation necessitated by military preparedness and to respond to the call to bear arms is because of fear of what would happen if their country were unable to defend itself. The time has passed when governments can obtain support for a war of open aggression. Every government now defends its warlike preparations on the grounds of necessity. The peoples of the earth will no longer support war on any other basis than self defense or the defense of the helpless. Fear is the most prolific source of hatred. It has been said that hate is impossible without fear. There is no doubt that it was this fear complex, pervading the mass of the people, that made it possible for the German Government to maintain its autocratic regime, to impose upon the mass of the people the burdens of militarism, and made it possible for the

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opposition of the socialists to fail. Fear of aggression, of military invasion, is the root of all the trouble; that which alone renders possible and inevitable the flourishing of militarism, the maintenance of armaments, and the immediate risk of war, in spite of the strong desire for peace of the vast majority of all nations. This fear, which was the fundamental cause of the Great War, has been accentuated rather than quelled by that disaster.

Armaments are the chief cause of fear between nations, and this fear is the chief cause of war. War produces still greater fear, and fear in turn produces larger armaments. This is the vicious circle in which the nations have been traveling during the past century, with armaments piling higher and higher, and fear steadily increasing.

Moreover, huge armaments destroy confidence in other means of protection and of securing peace. The presence of large numbers of officers and soldiers, trained to think only in terms of force, has a profound influence upon public opinion, as we know from the tragic example of Germany. Thus, whole populations come to depend more and more upon armies and navies as their only means of protection. This tends to perpetuate the deification of physical force.

Armaments are the chief reliance of diplomats and traders in their exploitation of weaker peoples. The history of European diplomacy during the past century supports this conclusion, without huge armies and navies the spoilation of Africa, thing and other parts of the world would not have been possible to any considerable extent. This same exploitation of weaker

peoples is in itself an obstacle to world peace in that it arouses the fear and jealousy of rival powers.

It is not unusual to hear people say that police are necessary to keep order within cities and towns and similarly armies are necessary to keep nations from breaking international law. This is a naive statement which expresses the average point of view. No fallacy is more common than that based on the supposed analogy between police and armies and navies. Much harm results from inoculating minds, especially immature minds, with bad logic based on wrong assumptions, especially when they concern questions of life and death. All questions concerning armies and navies have to do with life and death.

Police are necessary, be they city, state, or national police. That is unquestioned. Police exist for the most part to perform kindly protective functions. They guide the traffic; they look after lost children. Perhaps once in two days they make an arrest, though some good policemen go a month without doing so. They do not punish the man whom they arrest. They are permitted to use only the minimum of force to put on the hand-cuffs, to call up the patrol wagon, and to get their man before the judge and jury. He is then tried by law made by legislature or council. The police give their testimony and return to their beats. A policeman is himself punished if he uses more force than is needed.

All the force that a policeman uses is to get a man to court. Did anyone ever hear of armies or navies taking anyone to court? Armies and navies are not created to perform police functions. Sometimes they are borrowed for that purpose in

time of earthquake or disaster. But men do not make armor plate to go through the bayonet drill for the purpose of being able to carry fuel and food to Messina sufferers when Etna erupts, or to keep guard in San Francisco when there is an earthquake. If they are called upon to enforce the law against rum-runners, we are told it will lower their morale. They do not want to do police duty.

Armies and navies are designed, not for the purpose of rendering kindly service to civilians, but to be ready to fight other armies and navies. They do not exist to secure or carry out judicial decisions. They are instruments to be used, if at all, for dueling on a large scale. Police are not rival bodies. The police of Cleveland are not preparing to defend themselves against the police of Chicago. The militia of Massachusetts is not preparing against the militia of Illinois. But armies and navies are always rival bodies. They exist to win victory. Their kind of work is destructive of their own species. Sometimes the victor has more right on his side than has the defeated side, but sometimes the reverse is true. Victory depends largely on which side has the most men, the most guns and the most money.

The war system is built on the assumption that war is inevitable. That assumption lies at the basis of all militaristic thinking in the world. It is the fundamental belief taught in every military and naval school and it is the foundation stone on which every advocate of war stands. The first article in the creed of all who extol the virtue and glory of war is "I believe in the inevitableness of war."

If you accept that assumption you are in the militarists hands. If that assumption is sound then nothing that you can say against big armies and navies is of convincing force, for if war is inevitable, a nation ought to prepare for it. If war cannot be escaped we should be ready for it. If it is absolutely certain to come, the government which fails to fortify against it is recreant to its trust. The preparedness must be adequate since inadequate preparation is no preparation at all. If a nation is to fight, it must fight to win, and no nation can win if only half prepared. The defenses must be equal to the demands made upon them, and only military and naval experts can determine what adequacy is. The military policy of a nation must therefore be turned over to technical specialists who know the location and power of every gun on the planet.

In the opinion of all military and naval experts, the equipment of a nation must exceed that of its neighbors. For this reason competition becomes inevitable. The experts spend their time in computing the comparative strength of rival armies and navies, and in devising new ways of securing superior war machines for their home country. If war is inevitable there is no escape from this competition.

Only two instances in which militarism is proving an obstacle to world peace at the present will be cited. In the first place, from the military standpoint England does not feel that India is ready to become a self-governing dominion. The British have considered the ability to maintain law and order within its frontiers necessary before such a status can be granted. The Simon Report points out two difficulties. The

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first is the difficulty involved in raising a corps of Indian officers. Indians are allowed to enter the Royal Military College at Sandhurts but it is largely Sikhs and Mohammedans that take advantage of this privilege. The danger that is involved is increased divergence between the Hindus holding political power and the Mohammedans and Sikhs in the army. 58 Such an arrangement would not contribute to a peaceful stable government.

The climate of India is another unfortunate factor. It seems to sap the vitality of the people. They tend to become fatalists and thinkers rather than workers and warriors. Their ability to protect their borders and maintain peace is seriously open to question. It is for these reasons that the British are unwilling to grant India as complete freedom as the rising nationalism is demanding.

Secondly, Fascism seems to be growing more militant. In its present aspects one cannot fail to regard it as an obstacle to world peace. No where is war talked of so much as in Italy. It is reported that people in the trains and cafes talk of war and mobilization.

One cannot be sure that Fascism either desires war or would take the initiative in starting one, but certainly the extent of its preparation and the prevolence of talk concerning the imminence of war is a dangerous omen. Musselini's speeches are planned to arouse the war spirit of the masses.

The Black-Shirt battalions are the dominating force in Italy. 59

58. Current History, Vol. 34, p. 871.

59. Living Age, Vol. 340, p. 475.

In addition to the army which now numbers 400,990 men, there are the police corps numbering 120,000, and the Fascist militia which is in itself a veritable duplicate of the regular army with its own organization, regulations, and arsenals. A year ago the militia numbered 390,000. Every April forty or sixty thousand young men are automatically enhisted in the militia and given arms. The enlistment is no longer voluntary and the time of service has been extended to ten years. This makes almost a million men under arms. In addition, quantities of premilitary, post school associations aim to give the youth of the country a military rather than a sport education. 60

There seems to be considerable support for Musaclini's war propaganda. The Duce pretends to believe, and has made many of his countrymen believe, that there is a European conspiracy, headed by France, against Fascism. At present Fascism through its connections with Germany and Austria threatens to become international. 61 If the expansion of Fascism is accompanied by an equally strong spirit of militarism, the peace of Europe will indeed be insecure.

Europe feels that the proposed Disarmament Conference will have to be postponed indefinately unless the United States will play the leading part. Europe is today so divided that there is grave danger that such a conference would be little more than a struggle for prestige.

For example, now that France has spent hundreds of millions of dollars in fortifying both her Rhine and Alpine 60. Ibid.

61. Ibid, p. 476.

 frontiers, Italy proposes that all fortifications be demolished to a point which would insure the destruction of French fortifications.

This is but another move in the Franco-Italian rivalry so dangerous to European peace.

<sup>62.</sup> Review of Reviews, Vol. 82, p. 59.

Historically considered we find that most wars have originated in entirely unexpected and unimportant ways, so that the immediate dispute is over an altered dispatch, or a political murder, or some equally accidental affair. But two nations do not go to war over such matters unless at least one of them has some better reason than that for wanting the struggle: and this better reason is, in by far the majority of the cases, connected with industry or trade in some important way. The underlying cause of a great war is, therefore, usually economic, though the immediate incentive commonly given by some entirely uneconomic incident gives a better appeal to the passion and emotions of the populace.

The great danger of economic motives for wars is that they have such a wide-spread appeal, because severe economic pressure is felt directly by the working class throughout the entire country. It is for this reason that a democratic government is even more liable than an autocracy to be carried into a war for purely economic reasons, and it is that fact which lessens the hopes for future peace. So long as machine civilization endures, so long will the existing inequalities in natural resources and economic opportunities, as between the countries which are naturally favored and those which are naturally limited by their resources. The real danger arises when the working people of a country, rightly or wrongly, imagine that war offers them a relief from too severe economic pressure, and when this comes to pass it will be a very remarkable government indeed which will stand out against the demand.

The whole modern imperialistic movement, that is the efforts of all the European states and of America to secure additional colonies, is merely the result of the decline in revenue and of the desire to find a remedy for it; in other words, it is a derivative of the economic situation. England never announced the new imperialism of Chamberlain until she found that Germany was threatening her supremacy in the textile and metal industries; while on the other hand, the world politics of William II shows that the sole aim of Teutonic activity was the reduction of the commercial power of England.

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England's jealousy of all commerce throughout the world and her own maritime supremacy rendered a clash between herself and Germany inevitable.

"The 'Economist' of July twelfth, 1912, published an article showing that for a long time French, German and English capitalists, greedy for excessive profits, had lent wast sums to the various Balkan states upon the express condition that the greater part of the money advanced should be expended for armaments to be furnished by certain firms of Paris, Berlin and London." <sup>64</sup> It was just this increasing of armaments among the Balkan states, due to the bankers and commercial houses of the rest of Europe, which rendered their military operations possible. The possiblity of war was actually created by these transactions; it was economic interests pure and simple which transformed this possibility into a reality; it was economic necessity which brought the Balkan states, hitherto bitter 63. Achille Loria, "The Economic Causes of War", p. 64.

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enemies, into a close alliance and caused them to engage in war. The necessity of uniting their railways made them put asside their desire to destroy each other. Serbian pork, Bulgarian wheat, and Greek commerce were the factors underlying the so called great religious movement. Serbia itself, which at first glance seemed to be most fervently animated by the religious spirit, fought in reality solely for the port of St. John of Medua which her commerce had for a long time coveted.

A large population and an extensive territory endowed with manifold national resources are essential requirements of the normal nationality; they are the fundamental conditions of mental civilization as well as of material development and political power. A nation restricted in the numbers of its population and in territory, especially if it had a separate language, can possess only a crippled literature and crippled institutions for promoting art and science. A small state can never bring to complete perfection within its territory the various branches of production. Only through alliances with more powerful nations, by partly sacrificing the advantages of nationality, and by excessive energy wan it maintain, and then only with difficulty, its independence.

A nation which possesses no coasts, mercantile marine, or naval power, or has not under its dominion and control the mouths of its rivers, is in its foreign commerce dependent on other countries; it can neither establish colonies of her own nor form a new nation; all the surplus population, mental and material means which flows from such a nation to uncultivated countries is lost to its own literature, civilization and

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industry, and goes to the benefit of other nationalities.

The inequalities in average comfort and happiness existing between the working classes of different countries are due almost entirely to natural and unchangeable differences in national opportunity. They cannot be overcome by readjustment of social conditions within the backward nation itself; the natural way to remedy them is by a flood of immigrants from a country of low opportunity to one of high opportunity. That solution is so natural that it will inevitably be followed, provided neither of the countries involved places any obstacles in its path; if the difference in opportunity offered by the two countries is really very great, the placing of any such obstacle will be looked upon as a reasonable cause for war. One of the necessary conditions for universal peace, then, is absolute freedom of emigration and immigration. It is a question whether any prosperous country really desires peace upon such terms, because of the inevitable effect upon the average well-being of its citizens.

Because population is about stationary and because living conditions are relatively good, many of the French economists view the position of France with great apprehension. The reasons for this apprehension are not far to seek. In the first place, they fear that immigration of peoples with lower standards of living from surrounding countries will take place on a large scale, and that these immigrants will multiply so rapidly that they will denationalize the French. In the second place, they fear that the nations to the east of them will soon be able to conquer them because their populations are

increasing so rapidly. \*One need but compare, the population pressure in France, Germany, Russia and Japan to realize that even today the real enemy of the dove of peace is not the eagle of pride or the vulture of greed, but the stork.\* 65

Along with the optimistic view that increasing foreign trade is a force making for world peace, we must place the pessimistic view that all modern wars are essentially commercial, and that war is in fact, an inevitable concomitance of trade expansion. Tariff walls, which are the natural result of the protective system, have been of frequent occurence. It is certain that that policy, carried to excess has at times endangered European peace.

Whereas exclusive trade tends to exacerbate international relations, free trade, by mutually enlisting a number of influential material interests in the cause of war, tends to ameliorate those relations, and thus diminish the probability of war. No nation has, of course, the least right to dictate the fiscal policy of its neighbors, each of which has the unquestionable right to make whatever fiscal arrangements it considers conducive to their interests.

But the real and ostensible causes of war are not always identical. When once irritation begins to rankle and rival interests clash to an excessive degree, the guns may go off by themselves, and an adroit diplomacy may confidently be trusted to discover some plausible pretext for their explosion. Free trade mitigates, though it is powerless to remove, international animosities.

<sup>65.</sup> J. M. Clark, "Readings in the Economics of War", p. 16.

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An industrial country with large export manufacturing capacity, can be seriously impoverished by preventing these goods from entering a natural market for them. Protection must be guaranteed for the citizens of any country engaged in legitimate enterprise in any foreign country, and for the investments made externally. With the growing necessity for important and powerful nations to seek greater portions of their raw material supplies in other countries, and with the growing tendency to secure such supplies by direct operation instead of purchase, there will be increasing opportunities for friction. This will particularly be the case in the two or three decades immediately ahead of us, during which petroleum will be an important marine fuel for two great countries, neither of which will be able to supply itself in home territory.

Obstacles to world peace in the economic sphere can nowhere be better seen than in the pre-war imperialistic policies of Europe. A rough formula of what happens in such cases may be drawn up. A government, for one reason or another, acquires dominion over a backward people. Nowadays it almost always does so with the consent of the other powers. The act is proclaimed to be a European stewardship, a disinterested piece of international policy; all nations are promised equal rights, the "protected" people are promised a benevolent guardian. This work is done, not by angels, but by colonial officials. These all too human beings become associated with contractors, concessionaries, bankers and traders. The officials have big favors to give - franchise, mining rights, docking privileges etc. The colonial officials must give them to somebody, and they

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have to translate the phrase "open door" into these concrete matters. If they are French officials knowing French business men, what is more natural than that these decisions should go against the German competitors. With the best intentions in the world it would be hard to maintain equal rights, and these intentions are not always the best in the world. Just such situations as this were undeniably factors in producing the last war.

Japan is extremely unfortunate as regards domestic supplies of raw materials. This implies that in the future she must either secure ample coal and iron supplies somewhere, or find an outlet for her surplus population. The first means acquisition of Chinese territory; the second might mean difficulties with Australia and to a lesser degree, with the United States. It is because these economic conditions are so very serious that the chances of war seem serious also.

The chief incentives to future wars are economic and industrial and they involve the great industrial nations.

Democracies are peculiarly liable to undertake war as a relief from economic pressure. Incentives of this dangerous type are afforded by the desire of Soviet Russia to spread its economic doctrine, by the desires of the United States and Great Britian to control the fuel oil supply; by the desire of Japan to secure a continental area for expansion and by the high probability that China will develop her own industrial resources.

It is questionable, for example, if the reaction from a broken-down autocracy in Russia, Germany or Japan will ultimately result in a government democratic in form, for in each case there are natural artificial limitations on the economic

possibilities of these nations. These limitations tend to lower the average of well being and to increase class friction. We are likely then in the future to face wide differences in political ideas as well as in prosperity, between the members of two powerful groups of nations.

Though the possibility of war does not seriously trouble Europe at the present, the situation is far from peaceful.

Europe is in the throes of economic depression. This economic depression has universally stimulated nationalism. This nationalism is expressed by Germany and Hungary in a passionate demand for a revision of the peace treaties. Millions of Germans believe that German misery is due to the loss of German territories and can be secured only by the restoration of these lands. 66

Mr. Stimson feels strongly that there is no danger of ver immediately though he recognizes that conditions are very troublesome. He considers the talk far more concerned with internal politics than with war. At the same time he points out that it may take several years before Europe can readjust herself economically.

67 There is danger in too much optimism. Long continued economic depression and reborn nationalism must be recognized as inimical to world peace. Though the class struggle between capital and labor occupies the fore ground now, such a situation must be acknowledged as an obstacle to world peace.

There seems to be little doubt that Germany is able to 66. Review of Reviews, Vol. 82, p. 58.

<sup>67.</sup> Ibid.

pay the reparations demanded of her. In many ways her national expenses might be considerably lessened. Naval and military expenditures might well be cut. But at this idea the Germans recoil, fearing the danger of a Polish invasion.

Many foreigners criticize Germany's increasing expenditures on museums, parks, model appartment houses, and theaters. Others believe that increased taxes on inheritance might yield large sums. A lowering of the tariff wall might so much lower prices in Germany that their ability to pay their foreign debt would be much greater.

Granting all this, the question still remains; Should Germany be compelled to pay the reparations? Oswald Garrison Villard offers several reasons, which I shall briefly summarize, to substantiate his claim that Germany should not be forced to pay.

Though the reparations cannot be considered a major cause of the present economic depression, it has undoubtedly contributed largely to it. The limit, beyond which no people can be humanely depressed in their standard of living, has been practically reached. If the German people are still further depressed economically, there is grave danger of fierce internal conflicts, rioting, and the strengthening of the reactionary elements. Such a situation would be most serious. If internal conflict, which would affect foreign financial interests, especially French, should occur, world peace would indeed be in danger.

The danger of the situation cannot be confined to Germany. If Germany is disorganized, Europe can be but little

else; a disorganized Europe creates a maladjusted world, of which we are of necessity a part. This same economic maladjustment is now, as ever, one of the largest factors leading to war, the factor most degratory to world peace.

The coming into power of the younger generation complicates the situation still more. Even in this country, young men may be heard wishing for a war, thinking of the so called glory and excitement of it. Not a few of our vast army of unemployed are clamoring for a war, which would at least provide them the means of a livelihood. In Germany also there is arising a new generation, with little or no memory of the war, who feel the injustice of their being required to pay for the sins of a government twelve years: dead. These German youths are the followers of Hitler largely because his program pictures a free Germany. Such an attitude is ominous to the peace of Europe. The awakening of an aggressive nationalistic spirit would be viewed with alarm by the whole world.

Probably no country could have more influence towards peace than America, but is she using her influence to the best advantage? A financial authority in Berlin, while talking to Mr. Villard exclaimed: "Why will not America insist upon a disarmament conference, a final settlement of the war issues, and of all the financial questions? As long as these things continue there can be no peace in Europe, no security, no happiness. We are drifting steadily toward new war."

"Against this drift to chaos no brakes could be so potent psychologically as the settlement of the reparations problem."
68. Ibid. p. 60.

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If the capitalist governments continue to rule Europe as badly as now, Moscow will probably be knocking at the gates of Berlin in a dozen years. The menace of Russian dumping is insignificant compared with the bitterness, fear, armament rivalry, trade warfare and international anarchy which dominate Europe.

At the present the Reich is still governed by a courageous, realistic, moderate, cool-headed man, firmly supported by the Center Party and the Social Democrats. The vital question is, will Chancellor Bruning be able to maintain himself in power in the face of severe opposition of the right and left-wing extremists unless something occurs to prove to the suffering masses that his policy is the only one under the present circumstances that can serve their cause. Were Bruning overthrown chaos would follow, and not for Germany alone. Such an event would be a severe blow at the economic structure of all civilization.

If France and the United States together took the initiative to relieve the laboring classes of Germany; and at the same time if France and Germany make some concrete revelation of their desire for peaceful cooperation, the atmosphere of the world at large as well as of Europe would be radically changed. "Industry is suffering from under-consumption." 69 If there is a justified amount of under-consumption resulting from over-production, there is also an unjustified amount of under-consumption resulting from fear. If the reasons for this fear were eliminated, the markets of the world would be given new 69. Living Age, Vol 340, p. 125.

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Economic depression is always accompanied by political radicalism. When economic distress becomes too severe, the individual no longer uses his political power to secure the best interests of the public, but only to serve himself. Once this sentiment is adopted by a majority of a nation, any political system is doomed to failure. It is of no avail to tell the embittered masses that their political and economic rulers are not to blame for their sufferings. It is equally useless to try to prove to them that a revolution would not improve their situation, but make it unspeakably worse. The world is ruled by passion rather than reason. When a man is driven to dispair, he is ready to smash everything in the hope of obtaining something better.

It would appear that the present economic crisis with its reduction of large classes of German population to the level of the proletariat and the unemployment of nearly five million persons, cannot continue for many years without ruining the German nation as a whole. About one-eighth of those able and anxious to work have no opportunity to do so, while those employed have little possibility of rising to a position where their abilities will have fuller scope. To Still worse, great numbers can entertain no idea of giving their children an adequate education and thus opening up a way for them to better their conditions. Vast numbers feel depressed and bitterly discontented.

The most adverse factor consists in the increased isola-70. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 9, p. 436. Germany alone is incapable of turning to account and developing the vital energies of her population. World commerce is
necessary to her. As the needs of the nations increase, as
their dependence on cooperation in the field of international
economics grows greater, the more obstinately they follow nationalism and protectionism. Tariff walls become higher and
higher. At the same time, emigration of the laborers and peasants for whom there is no room in Germany, has stopped. Thus
Germany is confined within her own narrow limits, within which
her people wear themselves out in fruitless competition.

From both the economic and political point of view, Germany's collapse would mark a long stage on the road leading to the decay of out modern culture.

The tariff act of 1930 was an outright contradiction of the interests and purposes to which we seemed committed. Many groups of foreign producers, who were our customers and whose efforts in many instances we had directly or indirectly financed, were impoverished. It closed our markets to goods produced by American interests operating abroad. Its swift wounding of foreign industry intensified the fall in raw material markets from which all American producers suffered. As a result of industrial depression abroad, the public credit of many an industry of governments that are our debtors was weakened. Now we wait anxiously to see whether Brazil, Australia, Mexico and Germany can pay their debts. 71

But we would aggravate the situation still further. Still 71. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 9, p. 400.

harsher methods for protecting ourselves against competition of foreign lands are proposed. "Imports of oil, copper and wheat are to be barred or rationed; all shipments of Russian products are to be embargoed." 72 Restrictions would be extended to corn, butter, tobacco, palm oil, dried beans and eggs. But in seeking isolation we cannot obtain security. We still own the foreign securities we bought. The capacity of many of our own farmers and industries still exceed the amount we are likely to use. Furthermore, our banks, our marine and ports, our cables, ships and airplanes all need traffic.

The embargoes placed upon Russian products need to be considered separately. All Russian exports, whether they are produced by free or forced labor, present a peculiarly troublesome problem to the rest of the world. They are exported only through official government foreign trade monopoly which has been able to set the price where it wishes and modify it as it wishes. The state trading organization can, if it wishes, destroy industries built up by patient labor and industry over a long period of years, even though these industries are well adjusted to their economic environment and merit survival on ordinary economic grounds. The difficulty cannot be surmounted until some understanding can be reached with Russia concerning its method of disposing of its exports. As long as the United States maintains its policy of non recognition, such understanding is unattainable.

<sup>72.</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73.</sup> Ibid, p. 401.

No such problem of special state competition affect the sufferings faced by other American industries now seeking formidable government protection. Because of the acute situation facing thousands of small producers in Kansas and the southwestern oil fields, embargo or quota restriction is demanded. They wish by prohibiting imports to bring back the price of petroleum and petroleum products to the point where production from their wells can be continued or enlarged.

The problem must be looked at in connection with the international expansion of American economic life. The oil industry is itself an exporting industry. In 1929, this country imported 78,933 thousand barrels of crude oil and 29,632 thousand barrels of refined oils. During that same year, we sold abroad 26,344 thousand barrels of crude oil and 126,377 thousand barrels of refined oils. Since 1921 the volume of the exports has risen more rapidly than that of the imports. This business is menaced now by the revival of the industry in Russia, and the systematic exploitation of the Persian and Mesopotamian fields. Naturally, self-interested foreign competing groups are alert to turn increased resentment abroad to their own advantage. Should the entry into American market be stopped, American oil refiners would suffer losses in foreign markets.

Furthermore, the enterprises producing and transporting the imported oil are largely sustained by American capital. The oil which it is proposed we bar comes from Mexico, Columbia and Venezuela. Our government wrestled with the Mexican government, causing them to revise their legislation, for the 74. Ibid, p. 402.

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right to produce this oil without unreasonable restrictions. 75
We cannot abruptly turn our backs upon their actions and investments without evil consequences. The holders of oil securities would be forced to pay the costs alone. At every curtailment of the oil exports, their public revenues fall, causing their credit to weaken. Such a policy would result in less roads for American automobiles. Similarly, their people would buy fewer of the things our factories produce.

In many ways the copper situation is not unlike the oil situation. The high cost producers lead in the demand for an embargo or restriction. As in oil, the imports come mainly from properties developed by American corporations. The amounts imported have, with few exceptions, been less than the exports. Certainly our foreign customers will not have to buy American-produced copper which is held at a price above that prevailing in other markets. We import the metals from Chile, Canada, Peru, Mexico and Africa; in 1929 we imported 487.156 tons; as we possess a great smelting and refinning industry, much of the imported copper is for treatment and export. 77 We have financed not only the copper and nitrate industries of Chile, but the government railways, public utilities, mortgage banks, and factories as well. If we abandon our past endeavors to exploit their resources and build up their economic life, part of the cost will revert to us. American ownership in the copper industry is dominant also in Peru. Canada and Mexico, and American investments

<sup>75.</sup> Ibid, p. 402.

<sup>76.</sup> Ibid, p. 403.

<sup>77.</sup> Ibid, p. 404.

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outside the industry are of considerable importance also. We now have substantial holdings of the Peruvian debt. The connection between Canadian industry and our own needs no comment. In Mexico the 1930 tariff has already handicapped agriculture, and oil shipments are menaced. The government would no doubt feel justified in abandoning its American debt, and in defending itself by further tariff action.

Little comment on the proposed embargo on foreign wheat is necessary. At present cur tariffs against wheat keep out of this country all but a small quantity of certain varieties needed. Our wheat prices are now far higher than in the world markets. The Farm Board owns and is at a loss to dispose of an enormous surplus which will be increased by the new crop. The possible gain to a small group of American producers would be very small. The action would be one more blow against our neighbor Canada who is busy smiting us. Moreover, it would encourage immitation in plans of wheat restriction practiced or being practiced elsewhere, especially in Eastern Europe and between the units of the British Empire. In some countries, measures as extreme as any contemplated here have already been taken. "In Germany, the duty on wheat for bread food is \$1.62 a bushel, in France \$.85 a bushel, in Italy \$.87 a bushel: some countries have in addition to their tariffs, restricted the percentage of imported wheat that can be used." 79 Each nation, crowded by the other's barriers, feels the necessity of keeping alive all forms of economic activity within its

<sup>78.</sup> Ibid, p. 404.

<sup>79.</sup> Ibid, p. 405.

borders. The Farm Board was probably necessary to prevent a panic, but now the improvement of the wheat situation can be brought about only through general liquidation, curtailment of production, and the opening of the lanes of world exchange and cooperation.

The economic position of the Danubian wheat-growers has become unbearable. World wheat shipments to Europe from August 1, 1930 to February 19,1931 reached the total of 354,000,000 bushels, of which Russia furnished nearly 86,000,000, and it is estimated that Russian exports may reach double that amount in 1931-1932. 80 Moreover. Canada, the United States, and Argentina, always heavy exporters, have unusually large stocks on hand, the greater part of which is ultimately destined for the European market. The Federal Farm Board, to the dismay and anger of the Paris delegates, has announced its purpose to sell abroad during the next four months up to 35,000,000 bushels of the huge stocks that it holds - which plan the Europeans compare with the Russian "dumping." The board's action may be only the first step in getting out of the impossible situation in which its disastrous efforts to keep up prices have placed it, and if the board does decide to liquidate its holdings, nothing can prevent the inevitable effect on prices. In addition to all these difficulties, Danubian wheat is of a lower milling quality than the best of the Russian and overseas supplies; the European importers, whatever their political sympathies, are ultimately going to buy wheat where they can get it best and cheapest, and it is plain that no conference is going 77. Nation, Vol. 132, p. 257.

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to be able to keep up prices for the wheat-growers of France's East European allies and satellites. International economic organization has become as necessary as it has hither-to been impossible.

No one but a confirmed optimist could have expected that the world wheat conference at Rome would be able to dispose of the difficulties presented by the world wheat situation. The wheat problem is obviously too complicated to be solved in a few days deliberation, even though representatives of forty-six countries devote themselves to the task. There should be no surprise then, that the recomendations of the conference went no further than well-meant suggestions likely, if adopted, to ease the strain a little without answering any of the vital questions.

One of the most important results of the conference was its revelation of the complete lack of agreement among the wheat-producing and wheat-consuming nations concerning either the causes of the present crisis or the means by which it might be overcome and its recurrence avoided. Even before the conference began, preliminary discussions demonstrated that a wide rift existed between those: who insisted that the world was growing too much and those: who insisted that it was using too little. Premier Mussolini took the position that the trouble was not with overproduction but with underconsumption, and warned the conference to be cautious about recommending a general reduction of acreage, especially as so many people were suffering from want of food. Russia not only declared that Russia would not restrict production, but ridiculed the

idea of urging people to use more wheat when they had nothing with which to buy it; the Canadian representative pointed out that even if a reduction of acreage were desirable, no democratic government could bring it about by governmental acts. The outcome of all this debate was a mild pronouncement in favor of persuasion. 78

The question of underconsumption lent itself no more readily to practical treatment. The Russian taunt that unemployment and business depression did not go well with an "eatmore-wheat" policy was unanswerable. The only hopeful outlook to be found was in the possibility of developing a demand for wheat in countries like China, where it is not used to any great extent. Accordingly, the conference gave its approval to propaganda; the suggestion that wheat might well be sold to China at a very low price was attached. The method of handling such a mixture of economics and humanitarianism was not indicated.

Confronted with the realization that unrestricted production, save for voluntary curtailment, was likely to continue, and that increased consumption offered no immediate remedy, the conference next took up the question of regulating the wheat trade. Preferential tariffs were demanded by the Danubian countries as a protection against Russian dumping and disastrous importations from Argentina and other overseas producing countries. The Rumanian Minister of Agriculture predicted a united closing of European markets if overseas coun-78. Nation, Vol. 132. p. 399.

<sup>79.</sup> Ibid, p. 400.

tries did not cease their most-favored-nation treatment and allow preferential tariffs to be set up. This disclosed much discord. The tariff suggestion especially irritated the Russians, and caused the Argentine ambassador at Rome to remind the conference that the world wheat crisis, though attributable in part to Russia, was also brought about by the economic derangement of Europe by the world war, and by the European policy of high protection. The conference was able to do no more than to have the tariff issue left to the regular course of diplomatic negotiations.

The conference was overhung by the shadow of Russia from the beginning, and it was Russia that stood out most conspicuously and threateningly at the close. Behind the resentment at Russian dumping was the recognition of the fact that Russia, by doing away with the middleman, had gained a tremendous advantage over all its competitors, and that as long as Russia was forced to export large quantities of wheat to pay for manufactured articles bought abroad, the competition of low-priced Russian wheat would have to be accepted. In other words, Western capitalism and Russian collectivism locked horns, a conflict which rendered the conference hopeless.

The adoption of embargoes and restrictions has been the last resort of our authorities, and of the foreign authorities still employing them. While American business was still expanding, we joined an international accord condeming their use. The United States, in September 1930, ratified the International Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Pro-80. Ibid.

hibitions and Restrictions. The American Secretary of State informed the League that: "The American Government views with approbation any endeavor to facilitate world wide economic relations and remove discriminatory economic measures, and has for this object signed and ratified the convention for the abolition of export prohibitions and restrictions and has cooperated with other international activities looking to the betterment of economic conditions throughout the world." 81 The original list of eighteen signatory states was shortened when Poland withheld its signature in order to better bargain with Germany. The only states that have ratified thus far are Great Britian, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal. After June 1931, each signatory state may withdraw if it so wishes. The withdrawal of the United States would no doubt deprive the convention of all force.

If we continue to impose additional restrictions upon the trade of other countries with us, we may look for another series of retaliations. Those who find themselves unable to dispose of the products which American capital has helped them to produce, those who cannot raise the funds necessary to pay their debts to us, will have an easier conscience in legislating against our goods. The governments will be forced to try to find domestic recompense for the employment we destroy.

The proposals of today are bringing out the full meaning of the past half century of tariff history. They are demonstrating that when once nations give the protective tariff an important place in their arrangements, it developes from its own 81. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 9, p. 405.

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momentum. If one group makes its opportunity behind a tariff wall, other groups appear to claim the same opportunity. Eventually the system grows fairly general and it becomes natural for all to assume that they have a prior right to the home market. The producers of raw materials are usually subject to world competition and are the last to receive protection. Finding themselves handicapped by the high levels of money wages and the protection given to other industries, they claim an equal right to protective legislation.

A vicious circle is unavoidable. Domestic producers claim practically the whole of the home market. If they make their claim effective, they force their countrymen to forego any expansion in foreign commerce. Each step in this direction tends to force others in the same direction. This results only in a minor degree from a desire to retaliate. It is more the result of political and economic necessity. Whenever a country loses a foreign market because of tariff action, groups within the country attempt to save themselves by asserting a new claim upon their own domestic market. Any country - Great Britian finds herself in that position now - suffering from tariff restrictions upon the commodities it produces is doubly handicapped; the incomes are forced down at the same time that many people are suddenly thrown out of employment. The only hope usually appears to be in the further preservation of its own home market. Consequently, tariff increase follows tariff increase.

Close observation of the tariff system as it functions today reveals a further significance. It is perceptibly changing •

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the character of the state. Events of recent years, such as rapid price changes, financial maladjustments, technical improvement and exploitation of previously unknown resources, have in each country been accompanied by suffering and the threat of disorder in certain groups. The government is forced to step in to restore the balance and to provide employment. By the use of tariffs, embargoes, subsidies and government purchases the price at which various commodities are exchanged is actually set.

The use of the government's power is influenced by votes or political bargaining power. It is applied regardless of the manifold disadvantages imposed on other groups both inside and outside the country. The inevitable outcome of the present trend of events is the nationally isolated, government—con
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trolled economic system.

We are now midway between such a world and the world of widespread international exchange toward which American capital has in the past contributed. If we continue to adopt still more complete protective measures causing still further strain on our foreign producers, and new anxieties to American investors, we are rapidly producing a world of embittered and secluded national states, between which capital dare not move and commerce exists but slightly. Depression would be far more widespread than today. Probably our poverty would be comparable to the riches of other less self-sufficient peoples. Such poverty and unrest as would result, would be incompatible with world peace.

<sup>82.</sup> Ibid, p. 408.

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Many conflicting reports issue from various sources. Some see in the Russian Five Year Plan, grave danger not only to Europe but to the United States as well. If the present experiment succeeds, if the Soviets possess a political and industrial concept which will make them stronger politically and economically than any other power, the United States may then be compelled to either adopt the Russian system, which would necessitate making bondsmen out of nine-tenths of our population, or it will have to fight for its very existence as a nation. Should events necessitate the adoption of one policy or the other, no doubt the former would be the policy adopted.

It is too early to speculate as to what will happen. The situation may be more serious than is supposed. There seems to be some fear that Germany will follow Russia's lead industrially. There is a possibility that such economic rivalry might develope that a world struggle would be inevitable. Such a policy might appeal to millions as necessary to save themselves from economic subjection, from sinking to the levels of serf-dom or slavery.

On the other hand, if the main Powers combined to coerce Russia to change her economic policies so contrary to the interests of the world as a whole by tariff walls and embargoes, Russia, organized for modern production, might be stimulated to build ships and guns, rifles, airships, tanks and deadly gas equipment and become the aggressor in a conflict which might become colossal.

From day to day there is fresh evidence of a new drive

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against Russia. London in particular is succumbing to the current fear. Each London "Times" contains several articles which emphasize the menace of the Soviets. At least two leagues have been formed to protect the English public and English industry from the contamination of slave-made goods. It is declared that almost all Russian labor is enslaved by Stalin. and therefore all that comes out of Russia should be boycotted. The stand taken by the United States in shutting out timber and pulpwood from northern Russia unless the importer can prove that it was not produced by convict labor, and the complete boycott proclaimed by Canada are heartily approved by many in London and elsewhere. The extreme anti-Russians desire and insist that the MacDonald Government follow the same course. They were delighted to learn that the recent visit of Mr. Bennett, the Prime Minister of Canada, to Washington was for the exclusive purpose of discussing the question of joint action of Canada and the United States against Russian imports. 83

The French are already vigorously at work. Both the conservative and reactionary forces in France are taking exactly the same position. Two important officials have been sent on a tour to Central Europe in order to ascertain how far the various countries, such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and others will go toward an international action against Russia along economic lines.

There is an abundance of evidence elsewhere that there is a systematic effort on foot 83. Nation, Vol. 132, p. 345.

84. Ibid.

to bring about an international economic boycott. A rather lengthy document urging business men to get behind such a boycott has been circulating under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce. Quite probably within a year anti-Russian societies like those in England will be organized in America; very likely a movement to cease allowing American engineers or workers to go to Moscow to aid in building up the system which is so hostile to the capitalist world will follow.

Until recently the industrialists and politicians of the world were sure that Russia need not be taken seriously, because they were so sure the Five Year Plan would fail and ultimately Communism as well. They have now all suddenly realized that the Five Year Plan is to be such a tremendous success as to menace the very existence of capitalistic society. The interesting feature of the whole situation is that these gentlemen would be just as excited about the Russian menace if the convict-labor issue had never arisen at all. Moreover, they are all quite oblivious to the fact, particularly in the United States, that if conditions get worse in Germany and that country is forced to continue paying reparations, it will have to dump even harder to get any income from abroad, and that that dumping would be far more serious than the comparatively little which Russia is undertaking to do.

The seriousness of this move for a united economic boycott of Russia must not be underestimated. Undoubtedly it
would effectively block the development of Russia all along
the line. Without the aid of foreign capital, it would take
years to industrialize Russia, and the cost would be infinite.

But the industry of Europe is collapsing, and more than one state will refuse to give up its Russian business. The labor leaders in Germany will oppose a boycott for they are being forced to believe that for a long time to come three million Germans will be idle.

85 In the existing emergency Germany is turning more and more to Russia.

Quite contradictory views have been presented here regarding the so called Russian menace. Each involves dangers to peaceful international relations; each would in some respects better present conditions. It is not the purpose of this thesis to solve such problems, problems which our leading economists have proven incapable of handling.

It is evident that the chief incentives to future wars are economic and industrial, and that they involve the great industrial nations of the world. Among the nations of the world it is impossible to find agreement as to what can be done or what it is advisable to do to escape the present crisis with its manifold dangers.

<sup>85.</sup> Ibid, p. 346.

It is not the purpose of this thesis to solve the problems stated, to settle the questions raised. Many of the obstacles to world peace are so involved and complicated that a Bismark could not remove them. The solution of the problems would necessitate many theses and much original research. The value of such research would be questionable.

Probably the vast majority of people are convinced that war is inevitable. Pacifists are inclined to remind them of a similar attitude regarding dueling a hundred years ago. Whether or not war is inevitable, certainly there are innumerable obstacles in the way of its abandonment. A friend, a student of international affairs, when informed of the subject of this thesis remarked; "Your concluding sentence will be, eons will pass and still wars will occur."

The impossibility of changing human nature makes the problem of preventing future wars a difficult one. Though normally people are peace loving, it has in the past taken little to arouse them to a fever pitch of hate which has rendered it impossible to maintain an attitude of neutrality. When people are persuaded that their national honor is at stake, their economic existence or the safety of home and family, war is assured. There are always those who, for political ambitions or hope of economic advantage, gladly undertake the circulation of propaganda designed to arouse the war spirit of the mass. It succeeded only too well in 1917. We have no reason for believing that should similar circumstances arise - and the possibility of a serious crisis occuring is a

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real one - we should be any more safe from the disastrous effects of mob psychology controlled by unscrupulous leaders.

If people remained clear-headed and thought sanely in a moment of crisis, wars would be far less frequent.

The advocates of friendly international relations had hoped that the narrow nationalism of the eighteenth and nine-teenth centuries was gone forever, along with the balance of power system. The League of Nations, the Locarno Pacts, Disarmament and Naval Conferences, and Economic Conferences as well, have pointed the way toward a new diplomacy. However, the present outlook is not so optimistic.

Last September the eyes of the world were turned toward Germany, for the results of her elections were considered to be of international importance. The recent French presidential election was no less important. The defeat of Briand was the defeat of the policy of "moderation and reconciliation." It is a return to aggressive French nationalism which has provided constant opposition to Briand's attempts at conciliation as shown, for instance, in his policy of leaving the Rhineland. Virtually, notice has been served that France no longer believes mutual concession to be the road to international "good health;" that she intends to follow a purely nationalistic course, regulated only by purely selfish interests. The men who defeated Briand believe that French security lies in a solid French bloc - France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Roumania - imposing its will on the rest of Europe, and maintaining a sufficient power to enforce that will.

Already the results are beginning to appear. A recent

election in the federal state of Oldenburg is no doubt fairly typical of German public opinion. The moderates are losing ground, the Hitlerites have gained considerably, and there have been important gains for the Communists as well. And worse than this, Italy is contemplating closer relations with Hungary, Austria and Germany. Russia apparently wishes to join the same camp. Thus aggressive French nationalism seems about to divide Europe into two armed camps.

There seems to be considerable truth in the view that the world war occured because there were too many men running around Europe with rifles in their hands. There can be no doubt but that a similar situation exists today; in fact there are more under arms today than there were at the time of Sara-jevo.

It is not only Europe that is preparing for another war. The United States Policies Commission has recently perfected a plan which provides for the drafting of the man power and material resources of the nation for the next war - they no longer say if war should occur. According to this plan, 4,000,000 men would be immediately mobilized and all federal, state, county and municipal buildings seized to house and shelter troops.

Nations do not spend millions and millions for armaments simply because war might occur. The nations of the world are preparing for war because they fear it will come in the near future and each strives to be better prepared than her neighbor. In 1914 the nations were each fearing the other, each trying to surpass the other in armaments. It took only a spark

to start a war which figuratively burned up millions of men and billions of dollars. Apparently another spark, another Sarajevo, would precipitate a world struggle incalculably worse than the recent one.

The economic situation is most serious of all. The present crisis has proved so disastrous because it is world wide. The inequality of the distribution of wealth inevitably causes jealous and bitter feelings. High tariff walls accentuate the difficulty. Yet the nations have, so far, refused to lower their tariffs. In fact some industries suffering from the depression are urging even higher tariffs.

It is not the desire of the writer to engender a spirit of pessimism. War is not imminent, and probably will not be in the near future, though any one of the danger spots pointed out might, in a moment of crisis, precipitate a war.

There are several factors which make war less apt to occur than a generation ago. In the first place, the world is continually getting smaller. Wireless, radio, airplanes etc. bring countries closer together and make their common interests more apparent. Men do not like to kill their friends, and surely travel and our modern means of communication are helping us understand other peoples and making them seem like friends.

Moreover, education is on a higher plane today. Many of our teachers have so much broader an outlook than in earlier days, that they are teaching that French, Germans, Russians etc. are all very much like us, that we can learn much from them and they from us. Many of our text books today are printing the truth about the causes of war. The more people know

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about modern diplomacy, the less likely they are to be inveigled into war.

Language is perhaps somwhat less of a dividing line beween the nations of the western world than previously. Modern
foreign languages as high school and college subjects are increasing in importance. In fact there is some talk of creating
a common language. Such a step would certainly do much to
bring the nations of the world closer together in understanding
and thus decrease the probability of war. For we fear most
what we know least about and it has been pointed out before that
hate, which is a corollary of war, is impossible without fear.

All of these factors have played their part in breaking down the narrow nationalism of the past. Without an over developed national consciousness war is impossible, or at least improbable. It is to be hoped that the old diplomacy, which was so instrumental in bringing about the past war, is abandoned; Briand's defeat is at the moment a discouraging omen but may turn out to be of little consequence.

Perhaps the worst phase of the old diplomacy was the continual use of secret treaties. Their very secrecy engendered fear and suspicion which has been shown to be inimical to world peace. Today that danger is quite largely removed by the requirement of the League of Nations that all treaties be filed with it.

It cannot be denied that the mineteenth century imperialism was a very important factor in bringing about the world war. The mandate system has removed that danger to a very large extent. However, the status quo in the Mediterranean is still a difficult and unsettled problem.

The cost of war, both in money and in lives, is tremendous. Everyone knows that if there is another war it will be far more costly than the last. Poisonous gases have been perfected which would wipe out whole cities in less time than it takes to tell. The people have learned that it is they who ultimately pay the war costs. Today they are beginning to object to the enormous sums spent by the war department. To a large extent the hope of the future lies here. If the people would refuse to support the demands of the military leaders for the billions necessary to maintain forces and equipment to frighten the rest of the world, there might be an end to this race of armaments and the hope of continued peace be realized.

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