C16x- . A calm EVALUAHON Of NSS‘MMSM Thai: for flu Dam of M. A. MICHIGAN STATE COLLEGE Emmi; Miachad Damian; 5- ”I 1948 IHEb'JS Date This is to certify that the thesis entitled A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF PESSIMISM presented by FRANCIS MICHAEL DONAHUE has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Mdmm W Q. 231, 4.0.... 2.49.45“ / Major professor W247]???- -— -_ I“1 A ‘1“ ‘ ——‘ ——‘ ‘~"~—"—'——“—‘ '——‘ ‘ ' —————— ——"*— —‘———‘ A._‘_- _'___ _ —Is-" 'v ’vTr'T'V—w—__——T'v‘i“ ) I. ‘1? «j ~1va ’1‘: ‘- W’ F. ‘ - - 1.4 - o 'l. A. I ‘ .'_ c . . , 1,344.“;57 0 . L‘, ‘ I A ‘ . f 5 4 l I. I’LL ll [ . II II. [J 'I‘IIIJL‘.{.{ (l ptilfl . u l (“u v ll‘ Illn: .lll.l A.CRITICAL EVALUASICH OF PESSIHI U By mmcxs mm 1991mm A.THESIS Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michige State College of.Agriculture and Applied Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Philosophy 19% \Lll‘lfl'ltu’ll Ill‘ 11 ‘ \(I l lEllfll:LiIr Jl‘lf‘ll l{[.[ .lLl‘ll‘ll‘l’ll‘l/nltl lll' If) \a/ i. L‘: .V as v- “N “l'."/ w"\ ACICIOITLEDGIERT The writer is deeply indebted to Professor John Martin DeHaan, Head of the Department of Philosophy, who gave generously of his time and was a constant source of guidance and inspiration throughout the preparation of this study. His kindness in grant- ing me permission to study the manuscript of his forthcoming Intro- duction to PhilOSOphy,‘A Call to Reflection, has been most helpful. Grateful acknowledgpent is due to Dr. Lewis Kenneth Zerby, Assistant Professor of Philosophy for carefully reading the manu- script and offering invaluable counsel and assistance in its organ- ization and revision. I am also rrateful to Dr. Raymond M. Gonso, Assistant Professor k) of Philosophy for his helpful suggestions for its revision. Sudh an acknowledgment cannot adequately express my indebtedp ness to them for their unfailing encouragement, critical appraisal an generous aid in this work. COZITEL' A a: I THE HISTORY OF PESSIMISfi l Pessimism Defined 3 Pessimism in Ancient Religions 8 modern philosophies of Pessimisn 20 II ETHICS Ann PESSIxIsn 37 The Meaning; of Good "8 Useful Good '0 True Good 1.11 Apparent Good 1’2 Life per se as a Value '6 Scholastic View of Life 50 Sd‘xoperfiiauer's View of Life 50 Suicide 53 LeOpardi's Pessimistic View 58 Consciousness as Value bl Nirvana, the Denial of the Value _ of Consciousness 61+ Voluntarism as Value 65 Value of Pleasure and Pain 69 Material Goods as Value 8 Moral Good as Value 8 II METAPHYSIGAL PESSIMISH 89 The Hindu Outlook 89 The Buddhist Outlook 91 The Hebrew Outlook 95 Christ, the Pessimi st 8 Roman Catholicism and.Pessimism 10h The Calvinistic Outlook 108 IV TEE PROBLEM OF EVIL 113 rEhe Hedonistic Paradox 118 Joseph de Iiaistre's View 120 Kinds of Evil 122 Value of Sickness and Physical Ills 1214» V COKCEUSION: PESSILIISEJ III THE 3mm}: 131 Argmwnts for Pessimism . 133 rI'he Golden Llean 135 BIBLIOGRAPHY 137 CKAPTER I THE HISTORY OF PESSIXISL Diogenes of old went about the streets of Athens, lantern in hand, searching for an honest man, fully convinced in his own mind that he would never find that for which he searched. If philosophi- cal pessimists had a patron saint, I believe Diogenes would qualify for the honor. Like him, philos0phical pessimists of all ages have gone searching for truth, pleasure, honor, courage, and immortality, fully confident in their own.minds that they would find only suspicion, fear, arrogance, treachery and eventual annihilation. Even the Opti- mist Nietzsche deplored the surplus of defective, sickly, suffering, degraded individuals among men and stated that the successful man is always the exception, the "rare exception." Turning back the pages of history, pessimists have felt that civilization has but provided a.veneer of artificiality for man's basic and incurable evils, which are the result of his essentially corrupt human nature. Rousseau declared that human evils follow the spread of the arts and sciences and grow in proportion as cult- ure advances; yet he is considered an Optimist. He points to the examples of Egypt, Greece and Rome and to their eventual decline and decomposition as civilization advanced within them. It is his belief that science and art corrupt morals since they had their birth in corruption and seek its perpetuation. .Astronomy, he said, was born in superstition; oratory springs from ambition, hatred, flattery and deceit; geometry from avarice; physics, from vain curi- DJ osity. The result of a civilization founded upon such corruption, he reasoned, becomes more dangerous and breeds more serious evils the longer it is perpetuated.until eventually it brings about its own destruction. Philosophical pessimism, like many other things, is both old and new. Before our era the pessimistic spirit deeply colored the Buddhist vision of life; and the Hebrew Prophet, a sad and disillusion- ed man, looked forth upon a world full of weariness, a world where all was vanity and a striving after phantoms. hen are influenced by their moods, and they color with them the wider world around them. Under the influence of sorrow, suffering, and disappointment, the optimist becomes for the time being a pessimist, and finds life unprofitable. Thus it was with Eartin Luther, the protagonist of faith; in the end he confessed that he was utterly weary of life and he prayed that the Lord would come and bear him into eternity. If the judgements we pass on our own ex- perience reflect our mood, the same is also true when we pass judgement on the larger experience of men. .A man struggling with poverty and sickness is inclined to think poorly of life in general. The philosophical pessimist is, of course, well aware that if he is to argue his case convincingly, he must do so on wider grounds than those of his personal feeling or emotion. But is it possible to justify pessimism by drawing up a calculus of pleasures and pains, and by show- ing that on the scales the pains and disappointments and sorrows of life are far in excess of the pleasures, satisfactions and joys? The diffi- culties are innumerable, of course, in such an effort. Pessimism is not KN all of one color nor of one kind. There is a need to distinguish between ontolo3fical pessimism and continpent pessim1s1, while con- tin3ent pew1 1a imay oe sue-divided into three tj'pes, namely: materialistic contin3ent_pessimism, li 1t ea continjent jessimism, and unlimited contin3 ent pessimism. There is also another type of pessimism which I shall call psvcholo3ical pessimism, and it is not to be included, strictly speakin3 , among the philosophical types. In direct opposition to these types of philOSOphical pessi- mism there are related types of Optimism and it is with a philosOp her of ontolO3 ical optimic £1, St. Thomas Aquinas, that we shall deal in some of our treatment of the subject of life, per se, as a value. Briefly defining the types of pessimism, we find tliat ont0103ical pessimism is an outlook which re3ards oein3, per se, as evil. Philo- SOphers, (such as Buddha, SchOpenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann) con— sider existence, re 3ardless of con tinL3 ent factors, as necessarily evil. It would be far better that man should not exist, than to live in even the best of earthly cond Hi0 us, for the ont0103ical pessimist claims that the evils in life far exceed the 300d. It is not merely a contin3ent fact that evil triumphs over 300d, but it is in the very nature of thin3s that this should necessarily be the case. Contingent pessimisz, with its three sub-types, holds that being, per se, does not po sess value, but oecomes ei 1er 300d or bad, depend- ing upon circumstances; it is contin3ent upon external and personal actors. It does not look uoon bein3, per se, as evil but being in a certain state or condition of sufferin3 or evil may be undesirable. .The first sub-type, materialistic contin3ent pessimism is the philosophy of those who do not belie rectification or compens ialistic contin3ent pessi of being. It concerned with ev1 a a.practical issue, for a tion in an a: ter—li e. ph ilo scuph i 0° ve in iziuortality and have no hepe for a f" 8. Death to the mater- as C. mist is looked upon finality and cessation 1. LIL to observe let the materialist is seldom prool em but views it rather as concern with the problem of evil presupposes a belief in a deity, as we shall indie ate later in the chapter on The roblem of Evil. Lucretius, the Epicurean, is one philosopher who held this type of pessimism. tingent pessimism, which an immortal existence aft its works and pomp as evil, The second sub—type is that of limited con- -r is accepted by th ‘bose who while believing in er death, vet consider the world with all of J transitory and detrimental to man's eter— nal happiness. There are many ex nples of philosophers who have held to this fonn of pessimism, chief y, Christ, Job, Ecclesiastes, Calvin and Tolstoy and it is typical of monastic institutions w1ich strive to help men and women escape the wickedness of the world, overcome its bla ndisl mients and work out their eternal salvation. The third sub—type is that of unlimited contin3ent pessir1ism, which posits a totally 3loomy outlook of Ce lief in immo an after-life are evil; man should therefore seek Kirval of “Hamlet " , pessimism with which we are concerned includes street who does not conce tricacies of the nature of finds it and stru“‘les with it or is defeated by it. this sort of pessimism is contained in the passa3e from Shane which will be dealt with in Chapter II scepticism and cynicism, as states of mind, rtality but believes that both this world and One example spere's The last type of C u s psych0103ical pe simism which of the man-in-the- ‘ rn himself greatly with the ph ilosophical in- evil, but merely re003nizes ev1l when he Giacomo Leopardi U1 exemplifies this type in his talian poetry. Voltaire, in a psych0103ical pessimistic vein, states the usual outlook of this type of pessimist: "I am a puny part of the er=at whole. Yes: but all animals condemned to live, All sentient thin3s, born by the same stern law, Suffer like me, and like me also die. ....the whole World in every member groans, All born for tornent and for mutual death. 1 o'er this ghastly haos you would say The ills of each make up the good of all! What blessedness! And as, with quaki.3 voice, Hortal and pitiful ye cry, 'All's Well,‘ The universe belies you, and your heart Refutes a hundred times your mind's conceit... What is the verdict of the vaster mind? Silence: the book of fate is closed to us. Kan is a stranger to his own research; He knows not whence he comes, nor Whither goes. Tormented atoms in a bed of mud, Devoured by death, a mockin3 of fate; But thinking atoms, whose far-seeing eyes, Guided by thou3hts, have measured the faint stars. Our being mingles with he iifinite; Ourselves we never see, or come to know. This world, this theatre of pride and wrong, Swarms with sick fools who talk of happiness...." :C‘ I .‘An f- Ue may wonder at the causes of pessimism. hany philosophers, Schopenhauer among them, have regarded selfishness as basic to a phiIOSOphy of gloom. Schopenhauer holds that selfishness is both normal and universal, but the evil that results from it may be beyond all comprehension. The egoist, he feels, is bent upon his own ends and does not hesitate to strike down all who Oppose him; but cruel spitefulness leads men to do harm to others for the pure joy of seeing 1. Selected works of Voltaire, London, 1911, pp. 3-5. others suffer. Cali3ula wished that the whole world had but a sin3le neck so that he mi3ht sever it with one blow. While selfishness may us one of he causes of pessimism, Professor BeEaan asks if other causes might not be found in some physical ailment or in one deficiency of the 3lands. He concludes m after some studv of the point that while some pe essin Hi wt may have glandular disturbances, it is not the cause of pessimism in all cases for there have certainly been philosophers who have espoused the cause of pessimism who have not suffered from any sucn deficiency. 1 In the manuscript of his forthcomin3 tooL, "A Call to Reflection," he writes: "While it is true that a certain type of depression, called 'Involutional nelancholia,‘ is associated with the decrease in wl ndula ractivity, which normally occurs after middle a3e, the fact is the In 0st of the gree ter Tessiri ts 3ave symptoms of their gloomy stre.in in tieir ee .rly youth, or he d already died long before they could possibly heve been afflicted with 'Involut- ionql melancholia.‘ Inadequate factual knowledge often produces faulty thinkin3. Even if it could be demonstrated thet all vi ctir s of 'myzedema' (caused by a markedly under— active thyroid) were pessimists, you could st ill not con- clude that if Bvron was a pessimist he must have lied 'my- :zedema.’ Such thini :in3 ~ mould be a clear—cut example of that type of falls-cy which 103icians call the 'undistriruted middle.'" Pee sin nism has arisen in different countries and at difi erent tirnes, thou3h e veys mder similar conditions end we may presume that it implies the operation of similar causes, general and personal. he find it emer3in3 wherever greet wealth, luxury, "id refinement alonr side of want, fami1ne,s1c23essand the sava3e mood the t these arouse in men. It belongs to times when the forces tha work l DeHeen, John h., "A Call to Reflection", a forthcomin3 Introduction to Philosophy. for evil overpower the individual will and undertake to commend masses of men. Thus a totalitarian re3ime, bein3 contemptuous 1‘ ‘1‘ 1- .. I. ‘, w' a r (K I.‘ l . -- ‘ . ‘- 4 1 p q . J- 01 no intolli once 01 tne mass 5 and ess1m1st1c 01 the ao1lity hj of the common man to secure his own 300d, imposes a dictatorial form of 3overnment upon him. The philos0phy of me1's ability to govern himself 1s an extremely Optimistic one. 1ne phi10s0p1w1;f3loom also sprin3s from the feelin3, Wh ether in a fee or in many minds, niich slay be described as an attitude either of desit ondency or of despair, or the contempt of life. I annot conceive of it as a perfectly normal or healthy feelin3. A.man does not ask, "Is life worth living?" unless he feels that he has reason to doubt that it is. Ordinarily, a man lives his [0 life, or he may try to live it, worthily, and to fill it with uch worth as he himself possesses. It is the men who despairs of life who feels it to be a burden and QUEStiLnS whether it be worth while to 30 throu311 with it. Among the types of Hellenic philosol ahy there is one which closely resembles pessimism, thou 3h it was the o,posite of pessimism in many respects. This is Cynicisn, a belief marked not so much by a contempt for life in th abstract as a contempt for men who did not live worthily. It believed that life was good, and that it beca" bad only when its accidents were taken for its essence. ID believed in a law that bound all men to be virtuous; and it deSpised those who claimed to be 300d men, yet did not obey the law. In marv ways it bore a close resemblance to Stoicism, which also seems to have a 01 pessimistic strain. The Cynic, in h1s scorn of those wh made the accessories into the essence of life, tended to disyense with even what was 300d in these, and to despise refinement as xvell as the lure uries in whi h it ima3ined it seem y and prOper to be clothed, in order the t th e nakedness of the natural man might not be hidc er -. The protest of the Cynic was a “a inst the conventiona habits, the veneer of civ1mlizetion, whidh su3 we sted the shameful and stimulated the sordid they were professedly used to conceal, “y attemptin3 to live as a oaroarian. Thus the element of pessimism in his thou t was due to the clearness with which he saw the evil in existing tendencies, societies, characters and persons. However, so far was he from i“en ifying the hypocricy which he hated with the whole of being which he loved, that he conceived of evil as a contradiction of that law of ri3ht and duty or virtue which was the highest of all la In the realm of reli3ious thought there have been pessimistic nhilosoohies, principally the Buddhist and the Hiniu, but there are also certain pes Csinistic asxects to the Christian reli ious position. Not only are there pessimistic strains in the teachings of hrist Him- s=lf, but in some of the religious interpretations of the Christian religion there have developed clearly pessim11stic characteristics. We merely mention some of them here, for they will be tre ated in greater detail in a later pait of this work. Early Oriental and Occidental monasticism was clearly a limited contingent pessimism; Calvinism, while 1.anifestin3 elements of limited contin3ent pessimism also cone tained e‘tain strains of unlimited con tingent pessimism in that it 0 ’3 held some rxen to es eternallv damned and no eifort on tiieir part would change their fate. y V . A few words about the pessimism of Buddhisn and the Indian religious positions might be useful here since thev form the basis of mucn of the philosophy of Arthur SchOpenhauer. Gotama Buddha, (MS 3.0.) was one of the principal originators of the Vedic or Nyaya philosophy. He was deified by his successors who also wrote down his sayings and transmitted them to posterity. There are no extant Writing of Buddha.himself, just as Christ, Confucius, Zoro- aster .nd other religious founders did not write the scriptures which eventually became the guide and touch-stone of their resoective religious followings. According to Buddha” happiness is attained in freedom which can only be acquired throuri knowledge. This freedom consists in a state of total self-negation. Buddha looking out over the world saw only evil and universal misery. He compared the ideal state which man longs for with the very real and ever present lust, covetousness, pride, anger and woe that results from man's selfi-h r for satisfaction. Ken's misery, he held, is the result of Q raSpin 0‘} 1 51 m too great concern with his own needs, or what he considers his needs. Only through a process of emancipation from this concern for self, a process which would eventually lead to Nirvana or Arhatship, could man be freed of the never—satisfied will that goads him on, never satisfied, never resting. The similarity of this Buddhist con- cept of the supression of will to the philosophic pessimism of Schop- enhauer, is immediately aowarent. 4.44 In Brahmenic India pessimism is fundamental to the religious concept. All finite existence is burdened with evil. The source of evil is generally given as ignorance in Brahmanic writings and 10 as desire or tr irst for external thing s in Buddhistic writings. 4L But since e: :istence to the Brahman is evil and inextricably bound up with woe and misery and insatiable desires. and since the Brahman religion holds to the belief in reincarnation so that a.man can only look forward to a succession of xistences in similar woe and misery, ighest good. This exemplifies 'J non-being is looked upon as the 2 ontological pessimism since to the Brahman being per se is evil, and the highest form of good is not to be. The Roman poet-philo sOpher Lucretius 98-55 3.0.) is an example of a materialistic contingent pessilnist, for he affirmed that everything which exi st s in the universe is ultimately of the same sort as those things which are called material. While he did not deny the existence of the gods, he did hold that they were not concerned with man and his problems. In his poem, "De Rerum Nature," he sets forth the ethics of Epicurus and the physics of Democritus as what a soul-searching and disillusioned man needed to be calm in facing life and death. It is a passage from this work of Lucretius that Schopenhauer used as the Shibboleth to end his lectures: "Qualibus in tenebris vitae quantisque pericles Deg itur hoc aevi quodcumquest'" Moving on to the Hiddle Ages we find that the asceticism of that time had certain principles and features in common with pessi- mism. It held the world too unclean to be a fit dwelling place for a.man of God; therefore, a.place to be forsa“en by him who was inter- ested in saving his soul. The existing order of society was conceived 1 "De Rerum Nature". II. 15 sq.. " In whe t d: rlmess of life, in what great perils, do we Spend our years, few as they are!" ll of as evil, and it was thought better that the good man should take himself out of that order than endanger his own soul by remaining within it. On the metaphysical side it was a doctrine of salvation, but on the material and social side it was a doctrine of annihilation, so far at least,as its attitude signified that the world was so bad that the pious man could neither desire its continuance, nor do anything to promote it. It was in this last respect that it agreed with pessi- mism, for it conceived secular society as so under the power of evil that the happiest thing for it was to pass away and perish. The asceticism of the Middle.Ages held that the interest derived from a maintenance of our physical life as well as the interest result- ing from the maintenance of the life of the entire community are not ends pursued for themselves, but stages and necessary means toward the attainment of man's true end. But, when these stages and means are accepted as true ends and are pursued as such by the will of the free individual that is ignorant of his ultimate and true end, under sudh misconception of truth, it was held, the pursued ends are to be charact- erized as false, while those who are so foolish as to pursue them are to be considered vain and deluded. If the will of man, the medieval philos0pher argued, having remained ignorant of his true end, pursues the secondary and material ends, he is necessarily deluded, labors in vain, and fails to achieve either peace, happiness or salvation. SchOpenhauer further enunciates the importance of the will in pessimism for he regards will as that which is the most immediate in consciousness. Commenting upon this, Radoslav Tsanoff explains: "Will....is prior to the subject-object dualism; and like 12 a magic Spell, it unlocks to us the inmost being of all nature. It germinates in the plant; through it the crystal is formed and the magnetic needle turns to the North; it is manifest in chemical affinities, in repulsion and attraction, decomposition and com- bination, coheasion, gravitation. All these are dif- ferent only in their phenomenal existence, but in their inner nature are identical. Organic or inorganic, conscious or unconscious, as the case may be, the will ever presses for its fulfilment, meeting impact with resistance, adapting means to ends, responding to stim- ulii, seeking the gratification of instincts, acting on motives, on purpose, loving, hating, hOping, fearing, scorning, envying, enthusing, aspiring. Here is a telee elegy prior to and more ultimate than intelligence." In any attempt to understand the pessimism of Schopenhauer, it is important that we understand something of his peculiar psychology, for his writings are his protest gainst the world as he saw it. In evaluating a system we must ever remember its author's personal equat- ion, take into consideration his character and.his intellectual and ethical qualities. This is especially so in attempting to understand the brilliant, many-sided "high-priest" of pessimism, - Arthur SchOpen— hauer. From his youth he evidenced a keen interest in philos0phy and especially of the pessimistic thought that was to make him worldr renowned. But there was an objectivity about his thinking and he sought the counsel of those who might possibly be able to lead him in his search for the answer to the riddles that perplexed him. He went to Berlin and became a.pupil of Fichte, the successor of Kant, but soon tired of the "language of unintelligibility" Fichte affected. In comparing Fichte with Plato and Kant, whom Schopenhauer had studied 1 Tsanoff, Radoslale., The Nature of Evil,_The Hacmillan Co., hew York, 1931, p. 28%. n ‘ assiduously, the Berlin professor appeared a mere pedant. or schelling he had scant praise, calling him a montebanh; while Hegel's philOSOphy appeared to him to be a "crystalized syllOSism; it is an abracadabra, a puff of bombast, and a wish-wash of phrases,“ and all the verbiage led only to confusion and to impossible contra» dictions. Finding no intellect worthy of his attention in his own 'time he turned back to.Aristotle and Spinoza, to Rabelais and Mont— aigne. It was also about this time that he began to devote more seri- ous study to the ancient Indian schools of thought, the Eimamsa and Vedanta, Sankhya.and YOga, Nyaya and Vaisesika and those of Buddhism and Jainisn. ‘ Philos0phical pessimism has been described as "the sense of evil turned into a theory of being and formulated in a law for the regulation and conduct of life." 1 Certainly, it has been found earlier in the Orient than in the western world. In the East, pessi- mism was given philOSOphical eXpression in Buddhism, not in the pepue lar Buddhistic religion, but in the eclectic Buddhist school of thinke ers. On reading Schopenhauer and then studying the Buddhist and Hindu writings, it becomes immediately apparent that the German philOSOpher was profoundly influenced by them. The following passage, spoken by Buddha, might have been written by SchOpenhauer, so perfectly does it seem to express his passionate spiri : "If we live today, it is because we have in some past existence accumulated the merit that calls for reward, or the demerit that cries for punishment. In order to l Fairbairn, A.M., The Philosophy of the Christian Religion, The hacmillan Co., flew York, 1902, p. 117. escape from being we must escape equally from merit and demerit; but to do this we cannot live among.men, where we must do the things which entitle to penalty or reward. We must retire from the world and culti~ate the suppression of the very desire to live, the surrender of the capability to act, the quenching of the thirst that by goading us into action, binds by merit or demerit to the wheel of life. Yhen we have ceased to desire, we shall cease to will, cease to act, or to lose merit." I: To Buddha (and to SchOpenhauer) existence in its very essence seemed to be sorrow; sorrow for misery that had been in the past, or was, or would be, endured by all mortal men who groaned and labored and thirsted after satisfaction. SchOpenhauer was tremendously in- fluenced by the Kantian philosophy but the basis of much of his pessi- mism is distinctly oriental. With the Buddhist and the Brahmin, he shares the belief that in every life there is an indestructible prin- ciple. He gives the name of Will to the force which Indian philOSOphers believe is resurrected with man in each of his successive reincarnations. In noting Schopenhauer's indebtedness to Immanuel Kant, it seems only fair to clarify his relation to that great philosopher. It is true that SchOpenhauer gained much inspiration and stimulation from a study of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," but Kant advanced to the threshold of a truth he dared not enunciate if he would retain a logical conformity to his own philosophy, for in his doctrine of the inscrutibility of the noumenal world, he sets bounds to his own inquiry. The ultimate metaphysical reality he called Ding_an sich, the thinqhin- itself, but he had no explanation to offer beyond postulating the theory. But Schopenhauer was bound by no Kantian periphery of the phenomenal world, he dared to define the Ding an sich. He defined the incomprehens- 1 Carlson, J.F., The Writings of Buddhism, hurray Co., London, 1908, p. 16. "We ible as H111,“ Kent's thingrin-itself. the ultimate of reality. According to SchOpenhauer it is neither mind nor matter, and while he does not attempt to explain it, he descrioes its work'ngs and character as unceasingly impelling, driving, grasping. It is the most immediate part of our consciousness and only upon our recogb nition of this Will as the dynamic force of our existence, can we learn in some measure to control our individual destinies. Schopenhauer explains that Will is not a.moral will but the will-to-live. Our dissatisfaction and frustration results from the perception of the clash of our will-to—live with other things and w th other wills. But the striving and reaching of the Will is doomed to failure of final attainment and herein lies the heart of Schopenhauer's pessimism - for the will is evidenced in man in the form of desire and desire according to Schopenhauer is insatiable, and indestructible. Future generations of human beings, he says, who may differ from us in habits and customs, will yet be impelled onward from conception through the embryotic stages to birth to ad- olescence, maturity, senility and death. The individual man is like a leaf on a tree, which, when autumn comes, deplores the fact that it must fall, envious of the new foilage that will take its place in the spring. Where does this force come from that impells each generation of men, or leaves, or animals onward from birth to death? SchOpenhauer bids us to see that it is the same hidden force that is deathless, the Will-to—live. It is the one invariable, identical and equal force in existence. Will is want and desire and consequently is basic to pain, for pain, he states, is nothing more than not-having — from the desire I. to have. Unsatisfied desire is painful, whether it is for objective wealth, health, love, glory or in ortalit;r. Pleasure is the ’J CD 9 r J ‘9 5 H :1: H E g. 0 H) ECClOHS a" desire, out satis U) {0 ('1' Ho 6’) F') [.3 O C H. O :3 O F I) more infreouent occurance than dissatisfaction. Pain then, is the positive aspect of reality vilile pleasure and good are nothin3 more than the momentary absence of pain and evil. Schooenhauer felt that desire last lon3 and its demands are inf Hit while satis- H 13 ct ion of desire is short and scantily measured out: "It is essentially all the sauna whether 1e pursue or flee, fear injury or seek enjoyment, the care for the constant demands of the will, in whatever form it me v be, continu- ally occupies and sways the consciousness; but without peace no true well-oein3 is possible. The subject of will- ing is tlrus constantly stretched on the revolvin3 wheel of Ixion, pours water into the sieve of the D .aids, is the everhlon3in3 Tantalus." According to SchOp enhauer, the Will, which may be described as the pr’n ciple of ausation, is more a motivated than a mechanical .~ force° it is one and universal, lies outside t1me and space, yet is 7 ever 031°Ctlf"lfl“ its elf in the things that arise within time and space. Will, he considered as inseparable from the person, distribu- ted t111ou3hout the whole organism, and actin3 in it and throu3h it; 4L‘ vv: . L' A ~ -u n‘_' J the or3enism is the incorporated will. It is tnere101e because 01 this Will that we live, and willing is livinc. We create life, he held, by willin3 to live. It is the ultimate reality Will which causes the stones to fall to the earth, the pieces of iron to cling to the magnet or the sun to draw the moisture into the clouds. It is this same Will which attracts or impells the moth to circle the flw .e and causes man to seek food, l SchOpenhauer,.Arthur, The World as Will and Idea, trans. by Haldane and Kemp, Vol. III, p. 253. 17 to seek to 3overn nations or to crave tlie affection of others. But the existence wxieh the Will stru3 g3led to realize ras mise er5; it mes sorrow and would end in death. Schopenhauer conceived of the e1aborate and marni works of creation as bein3 without system of intelli enee or a mechanical order. IIe sr1iC tlat if creation as we know it, life as we possess or under 30 it, were the work of a conscious creator, then he was the greatest of all wron3-doers! He must have been an ill-advised God, who could make no oetter Sport than to objectify his will into so lean and hun3: r5 a world. Schopelhauer, therefore, denied corseious°~1ess to the creator for he could not conceive of ‘1 O xistenee that was mis m' as havin been divinely desi3ned, or its desi3ner would have been 3ui ty of an unpardonable crime, far worse than the sum of d1 human evi il, which would but have its or i3 in in he divine se diam. It vzas Schopenhe uer's contention that this world is so evil that no world would 1a ve been better; it is some 3 that mi3ht better never have been. What then re s to be done with this un- ate miscreancy? SchOpenhauer sincerel" believed that he had "iven the answer to the question of the a3es - since the world could not be mended, it on ht to be brou3ht to an end, for the only to escape from sorrow was by escapin3 from existence. There1ore, in} is works he pre meh a doctrine of resi3nation or abdication of the had its ori3in in will, by extinction of the will it would be possible to bri1n3 about he extinction of bein3. Peace from c1- }. a pJ CD insatiable drive of the will comes when will is denied and renounced. }—J 01 ”A ‘ He never tires o= pointinr out the futility of the endlec 3 craving after what is essentially miserable and unsatisfyin3. Individuals are essentially selfish and coldly ruthless in their dealin3s with others. no matter how the; mey seek to cover their selfi 1ne ss by the veneer of culture and manners. It is the hypo- crisy of men and of nations that SchoPenhauer ridicules; thei: endless wars raged on the pretence of benefitin3 the common man, ‘9 V O the aacniavellian pretences of the rulers tho misled the stunid masse , the inconsistency of men calling themselves Christians U) and followers of a Prince of Peace while th- y n rder their fellow their consciences by ration— Ho :3 01 men, shielding their pride and salv (D ’1 alizing that if tile ey did not kill they would be killed. Homo honini lupus! Hor does he offer any Rousseaun consolation that men was not always so areda tory for in his original state man was noble and free. He will have none of this - his pes Li1ism is thorough- :fi r going and complete! man's existence, he felt, he salv.a;s been charact- I" erized by exploitation, greed, cor1uption and misery and this condition null continue to exist ner ownia specnla saec ‘crrm: w "To this world, to this scene of tormented and aaonized bein who only continue to exist Dy devourin3 ea 1 (as, other, in which, therefore, every avenous beast is the livin3 3‘ave of thousanc.s of others, nd its sell- raintene1ce is a hs.in of . ainful ceeths ent in which the canecity for feelin3 pal n increases with knowled3e and therefore reaches its Lid est de3ree in man, a de3ree which is the hi- her the more intelli3ent man is; to this world it has been sought to apply the system of ontnnisn, 1d demonstrate to us that it is the nest of all possible worlds. The absurdity is 3laring.“ 1 Ibid., p. 392. 13 In his essay on The ani.. o: 1*istCTCC, S1hO' corgeres the stru33les of men to the teamin: movements 0: "in— fusoria" when viewed throu3h a microsco- f cheese, all of which a33ear to bustle about with ea3 ern es and pur; se, *ut which to the and ridiculous. In the microscope of our 0"rn consciousness, 1 xistence We live seems so lar3e and important out Schenenh.1er says that an individual existence is but an indivisihle point drann out and er lar fed by the l nses f Time and Syace. ‘he will in re_ation to a philos enhy of pessimism has three fundanental ends, (1) the percenal or carnal interest, (2) the public or social interest, (3) the metaphysical interest in the soul, and the larger problems of rezlit 3!. These three funda 1ental erests have as the cause of their existence three primary desires H- ¥ }) of the soul, that is, the desire for l e, the desire :or power, and the desire for knowledge, which are develoged successively one after the other as man matures. .ne main power and knowledge, 'herefore, a consciousness of the lack of thes qual’t ie arouses a des1re to acquire them, - the will reaches out H’- to achieve these thin3s which it conceives as necessary for its satisf- action. The livin3 man is sustained in life throu321 the power and knowled3e he mossesses. He is conscious that he lives well or badly xrithin a sr.eci fie d period of time; that he possesses a small and not a great amount of strength; and th 1at sknovledre is quite limited and his i3norance colossal. As a result of his consciousness of this 1. Schopenhauer, Arthur, Essays, ed. T. Bailey, Saunders, Wiley Book . ‘n Compe.y, flew Yorx, l9h2, p. 2%. lack, there 3roxs \ithin h n the desire to acguire the thinvs he does not possess, nd t1 eg‘ seem 300d, desirable to him. From a consciousness of tl1e mi: erablenes and brevity of life there grows in man the desire to live sell and lens; from a consciousness of weakness there syrin3s the desire to be able to accomplish all that f he wills; while from a consciousness o i3norance there comes the g as isre to learn and know every thi113unlmom1. By means of the p1ursical world, the \.'il.l, aided by whatever insi3ht the intellect provides, seeks to satisfy the {esire of a ‘y and lenxtbv lize; by means of the moral world of human society it seeks to s atisfv the desire for power; while bv near.s o? a search for the ori3inal source of all thin3s , the Prime Cousa, it seeks to attain compassion and the absexzce of desire. Hen turns his 3aze to the stars, reaching out for tile en lik a tin" child, and when he fails to touch with h1s fin3 ers the infinity beyond, he sulks and grows despondent and lessim istic. .A 3lance into history reveals to us others of the more prominent philcsoyhers of pessimism, amon3 them Giacomo LeOpardi, EQu rd von {‘7 Eartmei r. and Tolstoy. A brief mention of pessimistic elements in the writings of Rousseau will also be made, alon3 with mention of Voltaire's strains of pes s1rmim1 Jean Jacques Rousseau taujht that reason is not an infallible guide to truth and more.l conduct but in the really imgortant questions of life man should depend upon his etiotion and instincts for he held that the lens of nature are the only infallible guides. He denounced the "thinking man“ as a depraved animel and extolled the life of the 21 ‘ savage. In his campaign to lead maziinn a "oacl: to nature“ he loomed 1.- upon the origin of nrivate property as the primary source of human |> sufferinp and misery. In explanation of this position he states: "The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, could think of saying, This is nine, and found peoyle single enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society. How many cri in s, wars, murders, miseries, and horrors would not have been s_pared to the human race by one who, plucking up tlie stakes, or filling in the trench, should h3ve called out to his fellows: Beware of listenin ng to this imoo ter; you are undone if you forget that the earth belongs to no one, and that its fruits are for all." So thoroughly did he feel that western civilization was decadent and that mankind had degenerated into aoys1al stnuidity that he re- marked that if he were to be a Eigritian Chieftain ruling a native tribe of COfIN11 telv uncivilized savages, he sould have the first Euroyean mi ssi ionary or aLHvoc te of the ideas of occidental civilizar O Q 0 C 2 tion hanged upon entering hlS lands. Living in tlze same era was the inmort: l Voltaire who once wrote to Rousseau that ofter ree ding his work it caused him to feel like walking on all fours, for Roussea u had0 tated thct man closely ajproach- ed the brute. This does not mean that Voltaire was any more Optimistic of man's ability to rise above his brutish nature for he too deSpised the "StUU1lld masses" and felt that they were like dumb oxen fit only for the y he, whip and fodder. Yet, desy it ethis despairing outlook concerning nan, Voltaire spared no com13assion in his efforts to amelior- l. Rousseau, Oeuvres, Vol. I, p. 551; transl. in Xorley,"Rousseau". 2. Tsanoff, Radoslav, The Nature of Evil, The Macmillan Co., H.Y., / 1931: P- 150- ate the condition of those who suffered oppression, nor did he O'. rance alone. his letters, filled with T? ‘ confine his efforts to biting barbs of wit and sarcasm, reached into all parts of the world to voice his protest against the cruel treatment of an individual or a minority. While Voltaire's Candide is an insolent parody on Optimism he does show that the sufferings of men touched him, whether these sufferings were caused by the forces of nature or by man's inhumanity to his fellows. An earthquake at Lisbon stirred him almost as much as though his closest friends had been involved, and one must respect him the more for the passion he shows, for the indisiation with which he rejects the idea that eternal law can ius cents. But France has never been a stronghold of pessimism and Voltaire's Candide was regarded as something novel. It is true that Frenchmen are often cynical in their indifference but he always seems to retain his taste for life and but seldom sinks into the depths of despair. Death is not the timely-topic for morbid discussion in France that it was in Germany. French literature, while lawless and sensational enough in some respects, looked upon life with a smile or a laugh, but seldom with a jeer or a grimace of scorn. Troubadours and trons veres raised their voices in song to their dhatelaine in words of love and occasionally boastfully of their prowess. Rabelais wrote with a laugh that often approached tears but the French generally, had little time for the morbid. l Saltus, Edgar, The Philosophy of Disenchantment, Brentano 00., 1885, pp. 8-0. n) K»: While not ess ntially a.philosopher, though his writings preach a gospel of negation and pessimism, the Italian Count Giacomo LeOpardi, (179 1837) is an example of a psychological pessimist. He lived one of the most distressing xistences among men of genius. Almost blind, hunchbacked, suffering digestive ills, asthma” neurasthenia, dropsy, inflammation of the lungs and the humil- iation of poverty, this stepchild of Fortune wrote some of the most beautiful of all Italian verse, and the pessimistic creed.he taught always seems sublime, deepite the depths of gloom to which it descends. Leopardi anticipated the criticism of posterity which would lay his pessimism to the account of his infirmity of body. In 1332 he wrote to a friend protesting against those who would attribute his pessimism to his poor health: "Before dying I shall protest against this weak and vulgar notion, and beg my readers, instead of blaming my illnesses to turn to the disposal of my observations and reasonings." Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the unhappiness pof his early childhood, the long days spent in veritable seclusion in his father's library, the lack of parental affection, the ridicule of the townspeople of Recanati, the town where the Palazzo LeOpardi had stood for many years, and the hereditary tendency toward rickets and nervous infirmities that afflicted the Leopardi family - all contributed to his gloom state of mind and influenced his writings. _The wonder is that his genius overcame these infirmities and that he was able to become the foremost writer of Italy during his time and l Epistolario, Vol. II, p. #79. Cf. Hjalmar Hahl, Les tendances morales dans l'oeuvre de Giacomo LeOpardi, Helsingforé, 1896, p. 1h. that in the midst of his sufferings and despair he was yet able to write lyrically about love and life. Beneath it all there is the pessimistic strain, of course, but there is a dark beauty about it .Q nonetheless. In one of his works, Zioaldone, Leopardi expresses his pessimism: “Works of genius have this peculiarity that, even when they represent the nothingness of things, even :hen they clearly demonstrate and make us feel the inevitable un- happiness of life, vhen they express the most terrible moods of despair, yet to a great mind, even though it may be in a state of extreme depression, disillusionment, blankness, ennui, and weariness of life, or in the bitter- est and most paralyzing misfortunes (whether with reference to deep and strong feelings or to anything else), they always serve as a consolation, rekindle enthusiasm; and though they treat of and represent no other subject than death, they restore to such a.mind, at least momentarily, that life which it had lost....And the very knowledge of the irreparable vanity and falseness of everything beauti- ful and great is in itself a certain beauty and greatness which fills the soul, when this knowledge is found in works of genius. The very contemplation of nothingncss is a hing in these works which seems to enlarge the soul of the reader, to exalt it and satisf‘ it with itself and its own despair." 1 Leopardi turned with disgust from the present in which he found himself and sought refuge in classical antiquity, in the writings of.Homer and the Latin poets. He was terrified to find himself in the midst of nothingness and he despaired at the thought that amid this futility he himself was nothing. Like Rousseau he blames civ- ilization with its veneer of hypocricy and selfishness for the misery of man, - if only man had been permitted to remain in his original state he could have escaped the bitter disillusionment of a fictitious \ o . s l Leopardi, Giacomo, Zibaldong, Vol. I, pp. 349 ff. edited with Introd— uction and notes and a.Verse-Translation in the metres of the Original, by Geoffrey L. Bickersteth, Cambridge University Press, 1923. modern culture. He saw in the Gospel a pesshnistic other-worldly attitude of Christ Who had said that His kingdom "is not of this world." In the brightness of the dreams of youth, a young man may look into the future with hope and Optimism, reaching for the pleasures, the glories, the greatness that he can build for himself. But LeOpardi warns him that his dream is but an illusion that will soon pass and in its place there will be the grim reality of the evil and nothingness of life. “Men regard life as Italian husbands do their wives: they must needs believe them faithful, although they know them to be other- wise." 1 LeOpardi does not accept an absolutistic concept of ethics in his Zibaldone for he writes that values are relative and that good is merely a matter of custom and mores. Truth and knowledge he des- paired of and called them “unnatural and baneful to man." Even the concept of an infinite God must be dissipated in the cold light of his pessimism, and with it all belief in immortality, for he regards all hOpe of eternal glory a myth men no longer even laugh at. As a final indictment of the world and existence, this lyrical pessimist makes a statement in the concluding volume of Zibaldone: "All is evil. That is, all which exists is evil; that all things' exist, is an evil...." 3 There is no infinite, only plodding, evil, evanescent man and the ruthless nature which encompasses him. l LeOpardi, op. cit., p.351. 2 Tsanoff, Radoslav, The Nature of Evil, p. 235. 3 LeOpardi, op. cit., p. 10“. PO 0\ Despite his perplexity with life and his ready admission that he nor any man may ever comprehend the awful mystery of its futility, (O LeOpardi holds onto life and seeks to live it fully, finding in it mystery a challenge to spur men on to achievement - this is the para- | .L b dox of his philosophy, that he believes all effort futile, yet he would not have any man cease asoirin“ if man has within him the evil genius that will not rest, the insatiable will of which SdhOpenhauer . writes. Commenting upon this aspect of Leopardi's pessimism, Francesco J. de Sanctis writes: "LeOpardi produces the contrary efiect of that which he intends. Hot believing in progress, he makes you desire it; not believing in liberty, he makes you love it. He calls love and glory and virtue illusions, and kindles in your breast an endless desire for them. You cannot leave him without first wishing to pull yourself together and be purified, in order not to have to blush in his presence. He is a sceptic and makes you a believer; and while he sees no possibility of a less dismal future for our native land, he rouses in your breast an ardent love for it and fires your heart for noble deeds. He has so low an estimate of human nature, and his own soul lofty, gentle and pure, honors and ennobles it...." Like many another philos0pher, LeOpardi turns to contemplation, to intuition and imagination as a haven of rest to which we might return occaionally to find surcease from the unending struggle in a life of evil, to help him attain nobility amidst the ignoble. In the 5? axy of pessimistic philOSOphers, Karl Robert Eduard von Hartmann, like SchOpenhauer, xemplifies ontological pessimism, and his philos0phy might be considered a logical continuation of Schopenhauer's position. Born in 18H2 in Germany, Hartmann's child- l Sanctis, Francesco de, Saggi Critici, 30 edition, pp. 297 f. hood, as different from that of Leopardi or Sdhopenhauer, vas a very happy one. In fact, looking into his early and later life, it would be difficult to find any personal frustration or tragedy to which his pesshnistic strain mirnt be attributed. Perhaps it is the result of his sensitive nature and his keen penetration into the problems of existence, rather than any personal suffering, that developed.his pessimism. In fact, it is legendary that the common saying among his friends and aquaintances in Berlin was, "If you want to see really contented and happy faces, then go to the house of the pessimists, the von Hartmanns." Von Hartmann's early training was sporadic and unspectacular. He disliked university regimentation and the type of life of the students but strangely enough did not rebell against the roughness and discipline of army life, for he entered the army and served until an accilent to his knee made it necessary for him to retire once more to private life, at the age of twenty-two. He suffered no serious impairment to his health, however, and there is no evi- dence that the rheumatism which eventually develOped hindered him in living a full life. He married the famous Agnes Taubert, herself an ardent pessi- mist and authoress of the work Der Pessimismus und seine Gegner. After her death in 1877, Hartmann married again and seems to have been just as fortunate in the choice of his second wife, as he had been of his first. Indeed, since his family life was so happy, one must attribute the following statement on the trials ud tribulations D.) O) of married life to his keeness of observation: "Family happiness is even in n ormal circumstances uncertain. Either husband or wife is not of much account, or they are not quite suited to each other, or th e marria3e is c11ildless, o1 el.se yields so rich a crop of cl ildi en that daily care visits the home, or efforts to prevent too many births poison conju3al happiness, or the illnesses of ;a rents or children cast a shadow over the home, or the parents must need bewail the loss of he very children who seem dearest, or else the werry over some blind, dea_-mute, imbecile, epileptic, or otherWise sickly or inv alid c ild emoitters their joy in the others. If the children grovr up, then therschool-.vor1ies over lary or un3ifted children wei 3h over the parents more than over the children, s.d per- haps there is a li3ht-minded, 300d—for-nothin3 among them. Should the hildren all fare well, then suddenly he mother dies, and leaves her husband to worry how with stran3e help he can bring up the children, or else the father himself passes frfm the home circle and leaves the family in sudden need.“ In true Schopenhauerian style, Hartmann follows, in thought, the life struggle of man from the first moment of life to the grim defeat of death and he finds only unadulterated wickedness, misery and evil of every sort. Like Schopenhauer, he finds life's good of brief duration and mixed with evil. He cannot conceive of a pure 300d, for aW1op tin3 some of He 3el's dirlectic, he feels that every 3ood cont: ins within its elf the seed of future evil. Thus a man mi311t enjoy eating or drinking or pleasure of any sensual sort, but his oys 1n experi “c13these goods are shortlived, 1 U for they soon turn into re3ret, shame or diS3ust. Even antic ciiated pleasures rarely meas re up to one' s ex1ectations or if they do, they are of sucl1 slort dur:tion that the loss of them brings with it new desires that cannot be fulfilled or satisfied. 1 Von Hartmann, Eduard, Grundriss der Axiolorie oder Yert v5 gun3plehre, p- 59. ’1' 5n '1‘ r- ., r): -~r A .~ v . -,v . ‘ . n . 5‘ ‘ ”Hat -1, 1 mann re lly ace -1 plish: 11 vas a. nyo. 1u1sation 01 the .. 11-? "‘ ‘1 -1 ‘.,.. 1 “ ”. 1.. ,_ ‘ ‘.1.._,' ,5 ‘, Hosovnic s stens o; nonopennauer and he el, and 1nsp1reu DJ [—4 acneilinr he sou3nt to overcome irrationalism and rationalism my and idea. 11eUr1conscious, he claimed, 3enerates all values in a philosophical sy tem w.i 1 avoids what he considered the error of subjecti e monistic izealism and phenomenalism by means of the solution he believed he had evolved, - transcendental realism. In a manner somewhat reminiscent of Plato and Aristotle, thou3h certainly not a3reein3 with them in the 103ical roral consequences of the civisio11 nortmcnn rec03n'zes three positions of moral develOp- ment: the realm of Nature, which includes animals and man in his natural state; the realm of1' .orrfil y, which includes man in a state of adherence to moral principles or standards of et ics, consciously followed; and lastly, the realm of the super—moral. Each of these three realms contribute toward the true end of the Universe. tan, in his natural state, best tends oaard t21e rezlization of his own destiny and the supreme end of the Universe by followin3 his instincts, rather thou onv conscious dr've, for the Unconscious is the only un— errin3 guide for those who do not possess moral ins i3ht. A more 1 bein3, however, would best promote the true end of the Universe by bein3 moral. Both the 300d and the evil man, accordin3 to Ho Hr monn' s philoso:1hy, promote the end of the Universe, thou3n the morally good man promotes it more. If the moral man does evil, he retards the true end of he Universe which will be attained, but not soon as if he would refrain 1 Fl Iron doing evil. 1 “a 1:.) 4- ' —. , 1 'A Q - A“ T . .1 l Rasndall, nast1n3s, 119 -neory of seed a1a Erilj Cnforu Press, /' ‘ ‘1 -7 lonuon, 192%, pp. 27u—'{o. Hartmann explains his whilosOpny of the Unconscious by "”1e worl H°l€t3 only of a sum 0; activities or W111- acts of the Unconscious, and the e30 c1nsists 01 another sun 0: activities or 1ill-acts of the Unconscious. Only so far as the fervor activities int rse t the latter does *2. ‘ ' 0 he -- th la ter en or Unconscious is OUVOSBC to our on.; it 1H01ld be to our advanta3e not to live, it is to the 1 v adv vanta3e o: to 1e me nscious that we should do so, and that others should oe crou3ht into exist ence 13211101131. us, Ha tnann held. The 'ncz nsoious, therefore, in the securin3 or adv ncement of its aims, a1)" .1 has surrounéed m:n vith such il usions as are cagua him into the belief that life is a pleasant and *esirable thin han's instincts are no hing but the forms whidi conceal this un- J...‘ I 1... , 1.11888 (.61 CeS (.0 Ho reasonin3 desire to live and the unconscious use to inspire men and mould him to its proz* it. In this Way, Hartr 1nn H ‘t ...) (D k. *‘3 O (f t' l 0 (1" H. O :1 O I (D | l v 1 H. U) c I‘ (0 F5 0 (D r man expends :0‘ which but 3ivec him the ri3ht to su1fer; from t; cedes the erroneous idea whi 41 is formed of the pa'n and pleasure derivable from life and the fresh hepes that sorin Steaks 0: one "stupification of the will at the existence of the ‘ A. 1 von Hartne nn, Eduard,F JILOSOPHIE DES UUTEHJSSTEI, transl.by Coupland, Vol. II, p. 2:2. 2. 1.018... g D 830 J. "‘3 3.; Eertnann felt the world-drama to be one of tragedy. As men becomes conscious he knows of the rain and the misery that abounds universe 13. With regard to hni>1ntss, he holds that there are three fonts of illusions: (l) the illusion the. under certain circumstances happiness is chl‘cole in 01; present state on ecrtn- (2) the illusion tht hegpiness can be realized in a futtze state; (3) the illusion thdt napji iness till be discovered in the march of progress through the cor.1in3 centuries. Only when eocn of these three elm “h s1e been dispelled universally, Enrtmann believed, will the world be ready for its great quietus J In drawing up the De ilFL sheet 01 liie, Her menn differs from SchOpenheuer on the question of the purely no“: :tive Chara-cter of pleasure. That pleasure is at times a neeative condition, as in the cessation of pain, he willingly admits, but from his Viceroint it is something else besides. It may be eitiiei positiwe, altnor~~ derived from £1 illusion, es in love; or re: as in art and science. fievertheless, the r‘ecowinence Oi pain over pleasure seems to be fir ly estaoli.hed according to Her tn .enn's svstem. and his examin— ation of this suoject is not without a repellent interest. Like L7 Sc.ooennuder he feels tlat men's quest for one setisfvinv is a use- 9 x.) 1 - 1 SS and vein SC {3‘ TOP... We now turn to Russia which in the late 1850's was in e seething state of turmoil with Opposition brewing to the reactionary reQime of Eicholes I. Peesznt serfdom no longer seemed to answer one needs 0 tLe geople. vestonol fel1 and witL it passel mucL of the Rursian "‘ 'I 1 war“ 'TF( 1 lsenoff, Tne nature of Ev1l, pp. gay-gnu. W'L Mm “La r» at n . . ‘Q A . fly- . -- -‘L a —‘ " tr 0: U1eatn5ss. In cnai1ctexistic 31s21an :Lsnion, e.cr;11*.11U ‘ ‘1'". ‘ J .‘o‘ 1 0 ~ Q “-4-. ' ' '4 vr . . . ‘ v- ‘ -i v 4” '1': ‘ seems. ole ens cmszninQ tns cr1t1c12e1, Otertn1ow 01 sez1oom, 'r‘ W ‘1 1 '. j ‘ ’t‘“ n \“ o ‘r' r . v ~. . «s (‘3‘ ~ . 1-- cou1ts, guo11c eo1cc t1on, Cbuborbnlg, lCCal _ terlnent ens EVCIJ 4? -" ‘ ~vrx ‘ .‘1 . ~ ‘L'.A 4“.‘rL ‘- fi 1“ Ir) "1‘“ q" “*7 - 1 OK“. Of 0011 u I‘OJ. \.-.-..S 13119 OLA—J 80101 u lot). 1.1-1111. SEN-slit U. at, E -1 118ch . In C' 1".- one ranted to make changes enu improvements - to turn thin s unside down. fir-{'1 Count Leo Tolstoy, who has ho‘n on An ust 23, logo, wrote oiling these troubled times and as he grew older his rm 1t 1110s exercised a great inflrence not only upon Russian t'wo ht, but u10n the rest of the world. It may not be preper to sjeak of a To stoyan "yhilOSOph.C£' system" but certainly his pessimistic i‘eologies reflect Quite accu r. ately something of the gloom and passivity of the Rus€1an nontLlitv; it m1 it oe szid that 'Iolstowr has verbalizel the pessinistic philOSO* Tolstoy had every educational advantere Curin; his youth. His mother died ' Zen he was almost two years old, but on the family estate of Yasnaya Polyana, the young Tolstoy received affectionate care from ‘ 1‘ his father, grantmother, aunt aml oth- r members of his 11 oily. One of his favor te Cnestles as a child was to search for a creen b b H. c'ticl: upon which, it was said, was carved the formula for ncl111e s. ~ a All his lire lon~ Tolstoy searchec for the form ula :or happiness ans peace and after his death they buried him in the egot he had selected, L. - tne place where the green stick tas reputedly buried. hidway in his lifetime, Tolstoy found himself adrizt in a sea of ~n "a. ‘r' ‘n («‘1 'x'rnfl ja'r‘ v —-r«_cr~-- 10 ..\:o 1‘1rlt‘.‘ ‘r’r- I',~~"]~v- lng-LClolono {.0 11:: .31.--‘VL.~.(:‘CL 111.: :90: 1651...]. -1.., 11...- 1'.C-;.; -1, 1.111;; .Lc-.ll__~y w 1 r - V... ' 1‘. . - 4’71 a ‘. '- ';- ,1 ‘-. '~-. 4' <--‘1_.; ' . '1. -. - . .3 c4310. ills .LL‘LIE £2.53 €1.11 ElLlU-iOl’ .18 L,S--€C1 11.11.18614. i’~-L~—E 11:01.8 .18 CO-J_L1 (.Li’Slr'e. 7v - q L '- I h: "‘1 'F‘ m '1 ~ 5- O _ Q J— V ‘2 -, I; 1.92. attAanL tut lik‘i.\d11t O1 1 L an autumn L; 8.1.]. stenuazus Lnu. ‘ ct he felt the transiency of all that he possessed. The growing intensita 6 of his spiritual se arch for a religious I ith thzt would solve all his A ‘ - L v~° ii! ~ ~ 11-.~°v - ‘- o - 0"“ “‘5 v- J'“ — nouots “as .ra1L ally oiLhing n1n abaJ 1104 the rnateriel conce1.1s o a g . Q (If f N a o 1 a o 1 life. In narcn loYo, his Wife nau written of her nusoand in he "1 ’11 r F. '73 *3 "Today he ears that he cannot live long in this terrible reli gle in which he has been buried over these last tw years...." But he was repelled by the worldly theologians and by the leer ed of his day. He turned to the poor, siuole, u11lettered folk, nil rims, monxs, sect- arians and Ieasants for a solution to his problem. He was driven to thou Jhts of suicide, but eventually acce;1ted the beliefs of the humble peOple of Russia who had "iven him an inssi slit into the understanding of the meaninr of life. Like them, he felt that he must li"e "godly", and that he must ren01 Luce all the plea sures of life, humole him sel suffer and be merciful. For a time he cs.refully ooserved the fasts e-nd prescriptions of the Russian Orthodox Chuich but in the end had to con:ess that belief in Orthodoxy was inpossiole for him. He \.'ondered thy the priests of his own Church considered the beliefs of all other C11istians heretical. he felt that the conflicting inter- oretations of d1e erious chura es, had nullified the teacnings of Christ Who had ;1 MC wi ed to unite all in one 181th are love and that they had L t succeed.ed in destroying what religion had sought to create. Tolstoy' solution was to acceft the liter 1 crzin; of non- Fron the Sermon on the *‘S (n H) H. U) (—4- E“) 0 (D c f- O (I) ‘4 1 }.Jo H m H, 9 .1: .C H 1'15 d" i 1 (D (4‘ O U) C H U) C ,‘ m A'V . :r ‘ -."-" 'V‘l’ '-- V‘.“ ‘ ‘01- ”' IN N‘ n Mount, -OlStuJ eluc1uLted f »e coanLnenents that he accented :or him self. H (7) ' 1 'J [‘7 1.10 :3 d- 5) Ho .4 .1.) (D $.11 g" 1H (1‘ ‘_ cf- (.3. . '., m 1 t”) O J ‘ t I 5‘ r_l A) 1 . J (1) f‘i f’ l") 1‘6”.”3‘1‘5 £31400. the H core of Christ's teaching, and if n cc» iced mould link reli ion to man's daily life. He saw clearly all their far-reachirg im- plications. For a "(In tho rczuses to swear an oath cannot take any fart in the offices of civi government or serve in the armv; the complete observance of the commandment "resist not him that H. s evil" involves ultimately tl.e entire abolition of comgulsory H {‘1 Q s1 w tion, law courts, police and prisons, as Well as all forcible restraints of man by man; and adherence to "love y ur enemies!" Would mean the end of all wars. But he in ally realized, as he sait- ‘JJ that man is we: h and in aye ble of a strict obse-rance of such pre- cepts as "do not ’13ry" or "Do not lu st“, and to abstain from anger and lust as much as possible, he admitted, was perhans all 1 that our depraved a11im al natures would allow. He regarded man's selfishness as the root of evil. What then could be the solution if man lives amidst the Vic :edness and corruption Tolstoy found on all sides? Has the solution to Withdraw into a hopeless longing for a Rousseauen state 01 man's ori3inal blessedness? Or silould a defe atist at (+- H o ‘3' 5; {L (D be adOpted, - the world is evil and man can do noth n3 to radicallv iolstoy felt that the solution must be one, not only for all men to be able to follow, but one which he lzi elf could immediately put into practice. He anticipated something of the Ru mi.n Communist C 8‘ or harxian tWIeor of aoendonin3 the d sn onest practice of accepting ,IJ unearned increment, of 32inin3 any lezm fit that is not directly and couple clv e6111ed by oneself. he ccndenntd the evil in man which caused him to resort to violence, er103 :.nce, lust, exploit— ation of the humble and the poor, and the 3rcs in3 for power. Juch of his feeling of dee air over civil ization and its evils is contained in his wo"h Pram“ "Peeple say to me, 'uell, Lyof Hi- olaevitch, as far as preaching 3oes, you p1each; out how about your meetice?' The question is a perfectly natural one; it is alW'"s put to me, and it alwty shuts my mouth. Condezzn 19, if you c.100se.- but condemn 13g, and not the path which I am followin 3....If I know the road home, and if I 30 along it drunk, and staggering from side to side, does that prove that the road is not the right one? Do not yourselves confuse and mislead me, and then rejoice over it and cry, 'Look at him! He says he is 30in13 ho:..e, an” he is floundering in the swamp!' Ky he:1t is bre 'Lin3‘ with despair be- ceuse we have all lost the road; and while I struggle tith all my strength to find it, and keep in it, you nstead of pitying me When I go astrev , cry triumph, antly, 'sees He is in the s.”r-..p with us!" 1 Tolstoy saw clearly the evil in the world, and to him it seemed more pervasive than any temporary good that mi3ht be found. K: h of his ‘espair over civilization evolved into a thorou3h3oin3 pessimism of a limited contingent type. The world is evil, he felt; Inan he s no alternative but to make the nest of a very b2 d situation and the best way to do this is to follow the Gospel teaching. Fundamental to each of the foregoing types of pess1mism there has been clearly evident certain value-judgements concernin3 the nature of good and evil. In the attempt to arrive at an under- l Tolstoy, Psvma, Vol. I, pp. 1M2 ff.; transl. in Hcvelock Ellis, "The New Spiri ," 1890, p. 225, quoted by Tsanoff, hature of L'il, n. 170 standing of pessinicn it is necessary to ahe into consideration the types of ethics which give rise to such a despairing attitude. It will also prove useful to investigate certain philosOphiccl positions, such as those of St. Thomas Aquinas, Nicolai Hartmann and H. Noldin, S.J. on the value of life per se; the value of consciousness and the importance given to Kirvana and non-being as Opposed to this value; the evaluation of pleasure and of pain; voluntaris: as a vlaue with the renunciation of will as its anti- hesis; and lastly the value placed upon both material and moral goods as things men seek in their Quest for the satisfying and the lasting in existence. I shall attempt to clarify the meaning 1 some of its aspects in What follows. (‘11 of eood an CEAPTER II ETHICS AL' PESSIXI& Frederick Xietzsche, in his work The Genea103y of horals states that man in the ancient past has called "300d" things which were useful to him and while eventually he for3ot the ori3in of the value-theory, there develOped a habit of pra lS in3 certain thin3s as 3ood or evil. Good, ancient man q thou3ht, was associated with good peOple, and he thought of good people as the intellectually and socially elite. In his comment upon this, Nietzsche writes: “The real homestead of t11e concept '3ood' is sou3ht 1d located in the wron3 place; the jud3ement “good' did not ori 3inate a110n3 tlm se to whom 3oodness was shown.1£uch rather has it been the 300d themselves, that is, the aristocratic, the powerful, the high- stationed, the hi3h-minded, who have felt that they themselves \:ere 300d, and that their actio1'1s were 300d, that is to say of the first o1der, in contra- distinction to all the low, the low—minded, the vul3ar, and the plebian. It wa s out of this pathos of distance th at they first arro3ated the ri3ht to create v dues for their own profit, and to coin the names of such values....The pathos of nobility and distance, as I 1ave said, the chronic and despotic esprit de corps and fundamental instinct of a higher dominant race coming into association with a meaner race, an 'under race', this is the ori3in of the antithesis of 300d and bad." In the case of the above quotation from Nietzsche, ethics or the a::iolQ ical jud3.ement is determined sociolO3ically, by a consensus of Opinions of the "best" people. There is no absolute standard of ethics in such a system, instead the ste.ndard shifts 1 Nietzsche, Frederick, The Geneal_3y of Horals Modern Library Edition, hen York, pp. DEM-635. depending upon the formulated Opinions of a group of individuals who 30 no further than their own actions, setting themselves and heir activities as the "good." Nietzsche is a naturalistic perfectionist who bases his eth cs upon a Darwinian concept of evolution. here natural survival in the Darwinian sense, however, does not satisfy Eietzsche for he believes that the true nature of man is manifested in the will-to- nower. Since the will-tO-power is to be considered good, those thjn3s which contribute to the will-to—power are to be considered as good also, while those which frustrate or inhibit it are evil. But what is "300d"? How are men to know what is 300d and what is evil? From a merely cursory investi3ation it becomes apparent that "good" has a number of meanin3s, some of which I 0 will attempt to discuss. If to the Optimist things seem good while to the pessimist these same things may seem evil, there must be a wide variation in axiOlO31cal jud3ement. Why does the "good" of one man become the "evil" of another? Is the difference intrinsic or extrinsic? In its widest sense, good is defined by many philOSOphers, principally by the Scholastics, as that which is apprOpriate to ‘ thin3, and in a more restricted sense as that whicn is the object 9) of the striving of a thing. Goodness is subject, therefore, to many distinctions. Good is often referred to entitatively. Entitative good or good in the order of being is every reality that has actuality, esse, or xistence. This is St. Thomas Aquinas' view and it is accepted by the Neo-Scholastics of our own time. Entitative good is also called transcendental good beca‘se it transcends every class of being and is co xtentive with being in itself. It is also described by saying that a thi-g is good by reason of the fact that it exists since existence itself, Aguinas holds, regardless of contingent facts, is better than non~existence. Likewise, the very fact of existence, the Scholastic argues, implies a certain perfection which makes it desirable, at least. to itself. 1 In this sense being and good become interchangeable tends. Often, persons dying of some incurable lisease, the Scholastic would point out, even though death is imminent and the dying persons are racked with pain and can survey an ex'stence that offers a superabundance of suffering and misery, will cling to life no matter how disagreeable it might be, for it is difficult to regard non-being as a good. On the other hand, there are philOSOphers who, like the Brahman, hold that non-being is the highest good and they hepe only for eventual annihilation and nothingness to be freed from a disagreeable succession of earthly existences. The suicide prefers non-being to his present disagreeable state of being. Suicide as the denial of life per se as a.value will be discussed in another part of this chapter. '3 ‘- Another type of good is that called Natural Good. This good is defined as the fulness of all that is necessary for the perfection of l Buddhists, of course, hold that the very fact of existence implies an evil. 2 The Bonum Naturals mentioned by St. Thomas Aquinas l-E, XVIII, l,c. ho a being's mode of existence. This goodness exists securdum Quid in a being that lacks some perfection, for then it is only good in so far as the perfections it has are concerned. Commenting upon this type of good, A.C. Ewing writes: "then I talk of somebodv's good, I may only mean what will satisfy his desires. But I may also mean what is 'really to his good', as when I say that it is not to a man's good to have everything lit he wants, and the tw meanings shade into each other so that it is difficult to tell which is intenled. This is becaus {3 fied is for one's real good, provided they are not posit- 'vely inmoral desires. To say that something is for a man's good is to say that it will directly or indirectly result in a part of his life being better in some way (not necessarily hedonistically) than would otherwise be the case without a counterbalancing loss somewhere else in his life." Thus when the pessimist reduces good and evil to pleasure and ain, or to self-denial and self-assertion, or to primitive and to H. c vilized conditions of life, value is mistakenly treated as good- in-itself and as residing in specific things or aspects or condit- ions. If the pessimist adopts the subjectivist viewpoint that moral and aesthetic values represent the subjective feelings and reactions of individual minds and have no status independent of such reactions, it seems inevitable that he should become so ego- centric that he regards himself and his desires as the criteria of good and.evil. Carrying the analysis of the meaning of good still further, there appears a form of good which we can call the Useful Good or the Good of Utilitv. Ewing calls this Good as a means, and it is 1 Ewing, A.C., The Definition of Good, The liacmillan 00.. 19W, pp. lie-113. 1:1 7 desired as a means to some end. An instance of such good would be the desire for food or its us as a means of conserving the strength of the body. This goodness might also be desired for its own sake, because it is in conformity with right reason to want it, as for example, the desire for virtue, and inasmuch as this would be the means of bringing about the haipiness of the individual this good can also be construed as bonum utile. By an extension of this prin- ciple of utility, those things which are inefficient or do not serve a.means to desirable ends, while they may not be intrinsically evil, do produce bad effects. Ewing classifies disease and natural catast- rOphes, hurricanes, floods, droughts, etc. as being bad in this sense, though certainly they are not evil intrinsically. The pessimist is inclined to regard these natural calamities as completely evil, with- out differentiating between intrinsic or extrinsic value. We mir t go deeper into this investigation of good by clarifying Subjective Good and Objective Good; True Good and Apparent Good. Brief- ly, subjective good is that which i1heres in an individual while object- ive good is that which is the object of his faculties. According to St. Thomas, the objective good for man is ultimately the Infinite God. Therefore, God could never be the subjective good of man since the Infinite cannot inhere in him. hen can only possess God in a finite manne I". In commenting upon True Good, or as he calls it, Goodein-itself, Ewing states that for him this means simply "good itself" as distinguisa— ed from good as a means, and that it is goodness in its primary sense ‘71 r- and not merely because of its utilitv. He does not feel Duct True Good and Useful Good are exclusive terms for an object can be both "good-in-itself" and "goodrforbsomething" at the same time. In contradis tincti on to True Good, Apparent Good is that which is in self evil, but is apprehended under the "“‘eurcnces of good, as theft, revenge, etc.. Evil has just as many variations and types. cwing divides a into ten categories ' bi "'Bad' mav mean (1) unpleasant; (2) contrary to that we desire; (3) inefficient in fulfilling certain pur— poses, whether these are themselves good, bad or in- different; (:)I productive of something intrinsically evil; (Z ) in ficiently made; (3) intrinsically bed. in Loore' s sense as applied to particulars; 7) ultimx ately bad as applied to particulars; (8) as applied to Qualities, such as to make what has it bad in the sixth or seventh sense; (9) morzfilir bad as applied to actions; (10) morally bad as applied to persons. — vil is synonrxous with b-d except that it is not customarily used unless the degree of badness is very seriowi s, and it could not, I thi1fi: correctly be applied to tvllat is consid ered bad only1 senses 1,2,3, or 5, except as a apiece of slen=' Itn has therefore, unlike 23%, no purely ne tural_ist sense at all." 2 Of especial importance to philosonhers, Ewinw feels, is the .. .. .L - s.) concept of evil as intrinsically bad when applied to particulars, and ultima ely bad as applied to particulars. These two alone Q cannot be defined, that is, be reduced to any terms used in the natur l sciences and are not dependent upon general approval. Such approval would be merely a contingent accident. Hume in considering the problem of what kinds of thin 1 Ibid., p. 11M. 2 Ibid., p. 117. ‘ 1 0 ~ , 1. ,- ' 1 - 1. ‘.. ' . ‘ 4-, L‘s v- ‘ "4.: . boou anu what Lind. a1e and reduces Ll: SLaTCfl U0 the guest1on: (D 1.. "3 "S c?- O c t- r ) ’D {:9 r- r- 71 U] ”Is there 5n; characteristic connon and p toward which all or most men “eel an enotion of approval, beside the fact that they are the objects of this emotion?" In attemptin to solve the problex he holds that this question can be settled only J- ralization. ‘11 tion followed by an empirical gen Those thin s which generally merit the approval of men are divified into 'wo classes: "Tlose which are i1zn ediately pleasant either to tne1r possessor or to other men; and those vhich are useful, i.e., ultimately and indirectly produ t've of nleasure, either to their ul- nos s_ssor or to other men.“ 1 E: inc feels that everything that 031 b ‘7‘ . . ‘1 .- . . '1 A .5. 4-11 1 r~ a. 0v. ,. -C‘ 4-. -a~ “-1 r' . we lnCllued 1n eltner 01 these c1usses Llll call 1orun aQJLOle in .L‘... C‘ '3 ‘,‘ ""r 1. p ‘."‘_ Qw‘ (‘1 Q. 3“ r3 t n1 1 . .v‘ c-T‘. ~ . (‘1', l1-n-L‘ "V. ‘ -r1 1" C“ an Lin-O 9*; we LO ea-‘LJBr‘enc .4 Ua;\.... ’ cunt; ting; LL 1-... ufllng S h.-Ll val Cal. _'. O .L LL ‘3‘); EC}. .JLLI v a... solicit ajjzoval in all " most men. Commenting upon Zumc‘ theory, Borad points out that this (J) 1 sw: cte em of valuation ‘educes the concept of pood and evil to an ldtlvltuul's m7011070010.]. state. unat Lame mi ht hav sair is that the emotion of CIPTOV81 as called forth by things which we U) consider good depend upon that i hr 1 ieved by the observer to be 'nmediately pleasant or useful. Because unhappiness is dis pleasing to men, most men feel Lisannroval for those things ww1i 41 they believe to be unplee cent or which might contribute to h man misery. But such approval or chi 1uroval does not alter the fact that a thing may be good or e1ril inuep enden tly of m 4'1 s avprovcl or €Lis1v.p1r0"al of it. The mere fact that thousands or millions of men approve an act, such l Broad, C.D., Five Types of Ethical Theory, harcourt, Brace and Co., flew York 61d London, 13 O, p. 37. 2 Ibid. p. 89. u1eory cred ere 13 C19- .8 V l ’3 LI S. ‘ . 4-1.1: *‘AL 0 " l-LC‘ ~.3 S A V 1 a. ‘ f . 7n n ‘ 9 .- Hafiv dA-LL. ivolves c h ‘I‘l. 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Mu .lt no on n.. as “n “M a.” l S w h S o S 0 cc 3 C S e e p a C I C S .t V e .u n G .l C .. .l t . 4.. . .11 F .. o O . u .1 .1 e O r. .1 a .1 l t t w u C n a w” .m t a 8 S C n O O C. C C .l O S 9 «.1. .3 G r. .l e T m C .1 n t r .1 n1 1 n C S 0 no S . .u .l t .l e 8 .31 e n e .l t c 1 C. ~11 W... n u h .1 h t . C E .l O u v. t a E d r S t .l S r... S e 3 an. r a s o .1 e h e n t f f .l t C .01 u r 8 S O O “J." -a' '.L .— ‘ J. — : d Jun' _-. 3 r1. - 11:54-8 ST ilrl oustl L8 ’810 Hz] 21s.. TJOSSlLJle. A icclln: OJ. Veilmle 13 on J. h: inuicntion that conscious Hill has gainsi soznet ’;iin3 more harmonious and satisfyii; than what has gone before. The feeling 0; J ion or approval, are mental states this: secs-me desi;able alld we strive has. 1' '. L‘fi —-- - 1" : W V V"“\ . ‘4‘ ‘~ A 7‘ ' .1 "I . ~ :- fl tOWurL vise..io iLIOSCI t11i1135> mile“. ueCun.e the OJJeCuS Oi VCzlLZE- . ‘ gur3 :erts on be defined by a thinking individual as ends or objects of strivin3. then We think of value we think of satisfaction in tne result of a processor activity; mien we think of end 7e think of the process it- self 1 vin3 to its 3oal. It seems that the end gives stimu .J i"ection to endeavor “hile valire inzicates hat the endeavor nas been satisfactorilv completed. Certainly the bare notion of activity does not connote value but activity is expressed in terms of feeling and the differences of feeling or emotion in response to an external ~ 5 fimulus are the celuti ions whicn 3ive rise to elementary valies. If we (LCCS t the definition of ethical science as the law of kno led 3e of good throU3h which men is able to so and. att in h papines: :, then it mould seer. that the ri 3:1t res son of ethics is not diff e1 rent from that of logic, "ut the some rid ident- ical right reason should be found in ooth branches of plilosophy. In each science the so"e rig3 M1 reason reflects the different out— ard color and es3ect of the known object; for 103ic, throu3h ri3ht reason, c03nizes valiuity; mhile ethics 4. ~ I! ‘1?) 1 3:.) 4'13“ 0 "Tie I‘i ~1‘1t U‘n- .LHU - U‘Le QLJ‘-L 0.- reason co 3ni izes Good. logic air. at the ac.uisition of formal vel- U) stencr, while ethics aims at the use and oen efit to De uerived -rom what is known. There must be an interrelation be- tween the two, logic an& ethics. In both these scienc*s, ri3ht q reason is the one and ide nticol safe low throu:n.v&i h both the y 4 (L\ 10". fi 1‘1“: tflljp 7-“ 5'11 .."-.L‘.ci .D ‘/\.. . 1' TW .- ,I“ ‘\1- —.‘,-. 1‘ L:« A QlCLu glnlC- .-- ...O L—J. u .L v LII...) J6 CU. .C .'.IlO ".1 , (II; k... UJ \.‘- -. C“; b.3{f O a .- ' c‘ J- 'W : _‘ ..~~ 3-3 N‘ ‘- 1.- . "3 : ‘- I a ' O . '5‘-" is well to cons_her thetner tne nessinist in his uniolo- iccl C‘ r l U) cf- 01 U) l-{) p 3') m .J O O :2. H. O *C O O p. c+ O (f- h; L. Ct- p P L; r- 4 EJ- (‘ d 0 <1 H H C C (7 U end the latter oeceuse it oromotes e§3arent instead of actual 3001. .nile lo3ic wa3es a relentless battle grainst sowhistsy cni Celzsion, ethics is bitterly Opposin3 hypocrisy and iecei - that is, those thin3s which apnea to be good while thev are in reclit" and, or those which anoear to as evil but are in fLCb 300d. In this bottle 103ic must oecome the ally of ethics ens or 1e ccm reinforce the other. has the pessimist confused or illO3ical theories of value on some of the most important proolems of existence? Is ; 3nilty o- "J (T: 1 I I muddlec and confused thinkin3 in his ethical views? I believe that he does often commit one error of ar3unent. .As we look into the fol wins ethical proolems it secones apgerent that there is a wide wiver 3encc between the valuationsl concepts of he different positions. to be to deteinine which oositions are ethically ********* One of the most persistent problems facing the pessimist an. the ontimist elige is the question of life per so, as e.velue or non—value. There are :hilOSOpanS which hold life as the most el ementrr" .V Y..’ "—hall 80., lSeo, pp. 7-3. I: f- [—0 (D is $3 ,1 EC 'w‘13 Po 3% ’U I ’D 5... y I c f F). 0 OJ 1 Elect, 4&1, Cri- 13-- _'0/ value . of every tr. in3 :11 e, out fir-‘ ~4 4. 4.? '1. . J-i. .- .5‘ v .-. 7 .—’ «.L L: 9;“. 1 VilLC‘ttf- C‘I o..c, .0133 Milk. 8..-]. SUCHCE‘ 1 L ' 4. ‘.. ' . . r. ‘ '1 .- ell re.etion to ethichl vulue, wit onlJ that View thich is mo1e rest icted in that it re3erd° 1118 as the ontolo 3ical Oasis of an individual, znc onsequently of the moral hein3 and carrier of value, used uyon A:- - "\~ 1 . f or3enism as physical rfr'lr) OOL’. Licolai Hartmann (1 upon life a.velue in the (- c.S fl -, source 1 over against is not only an it also of the ousness I.E£$ of murder, every injur" stemo ‘ . CLO n 1 o ,W‘I -QA— .L U k.’ 59.7.16 ' J- - V1 vi'l ‘ 9 in nesS, in consequent; of those who 111 CL 1‘63 .2. 91: In his tre . -. 113.3 this value been 111' erwlrovel o: evew- thin3t1et a. servetion of A this li . .c‘. U101”.1Cc.l 00.5 hold on ex1 S °filIlLullud, IlCc- ron 12111011 all his Lin- pl of this disvelue the more to life and the elemental deoev, 1.1. viie :ent of life accent e,C_ L‘ - . q ‘ Ulle DUI E1011. carrier. .. .. - .L ) an ontological Optimist, following terms: 1 .5. men, is a 0 R f‘ I t Side 0: inture l “ § I L Of lie 11 uu '— ife in O"f tha koted in The footin3 of value; it is tence, without an in the umed strength is alt death es a disvelue. .e. stand c.. hilation oi physical life, but with griev- 'q \- 1. La ”LULCDII 23 C CH 17 T". ituel end personal. The unique becomes. evident frO' the seri sin "(Linst every anti-value Le'everstion. mental attitu H w-( A. k ucl 33; life. ess of of q \hl C' :{43‘ EVG-j de 'ive or -ioz symptomatic, di v e r and 1111 C 81'. 01:1 i f“). C. Le.t or ce 1 LL -1end ior ethical c "nature‘l" and condu ive L l of tho 5‘ ir >65 :3 L'. .9 4. w n one 1054.811213 Eertnenn, hicolei, pp. 131-132. The Llecsnillen Co., lien Yor-:, l‘ 11- Work for its pro ection. He goints to the ancient r«'o~exve men ielt for those thirgs that are natural and to the revulsion from all that seemed to be a violation of the due order of ne‘ murder would be a disvclue because it unnaturelly violL fl. "fi‘fl L .-J- —.-<- , J. ". ‘- < . ,‘ . . .9 —~ - ’- Pl' .- 2 -' ‘ '-. u «no-‘- Ilqixt uO COnbLinl’L. 8-..].S «31108, ulSuCtSE’. "would Sc! lOuaah 1.1.1.”:L1 LLS 11.441,“ ,0 ural and undesirable because it tlrcete nLd. to shorten life. In the f‘! o - ‘ 9 Q —- Q o o A vnristien etnos and 1n tne Old uestmxent tradition, er“ act 01 a sexual natuz e Ti;ich was done with the deliberate intention of difeat- . . o ‘ q n n in; or preventing co nceot ion, onen1sm,l sonomy,“ or any :ozm CI 1 ‘ I contraception 7&8 look ed u: on es unneture 0l in tna (*- H. (k {‘53 C+ (1- 3 d- (D F1; 0 *1 J accomplished the defeat of procreation. 3 « ~ « L.~ , ‘- I'. . AE‘I ‘.-1~l811 COILte:LL-n) U¢-(«uU "I$—lle P1 4 the individual is be ilt u on the health of the emotional life, the community r:s ts u; on the health of the racial ins finch of “he idea of Mood as that which is heelt 11V or conducive to the well-bein“ of the human body and consequen -y to the rrolonr- ation of life, is to De found in ancient plilOSOrllieS, chiefly among the stoics and Enicuretns and also in some degree in Platonic ethics. Nor T10u1.d oess1riis ts disevree with this conception, generally speehin for pessimists above all other people seem to unctersten tre value of health, life, beauty, goodness, etc., but their desrnir is that these things, while they are good and desirable, cannot be achievel, or possess so -for lon . They look upon the good and desirable things as chimeras that if they seem to be grasped fade before 7e can know the pleasure we had anticioated from having them. So: e me ' diS¢5ree with me when I say that the pessimist is above all others in his 1 Gen. rfixviii, 9. 2 Gen. xviii and x'x. -o \J' reco;nition of values as good and desirable, but I thi.h that the writings of pessimists :ive more stress to the desir oility of the good things of life than the jourials of tie 0;:tiuists. It is the oeautv the loss of ife or its shortness, the paucity of moments of aesthetic pleasure and the feeling that there is no stability except in evil that helps produce a pessimist.- Uith #- he soul of an optinis t the pessimist yearns for beauty and good 1e yearns he rem lLWC s and overemphasizes 3 .35 p. C4 0 "1 3 r-l p. H H. F4) (D c+ m h J he cannot possess them but in d H ,_) (D H) m 0 c f C‘- d- cf C‘J (D 0 (D O r e .- O (—4.- H I a Iinite way. He yearns for infinity but his vision sees only finitude. |._J r se is a.value is {I} Closely related to the view that ife p the belief of sore pliilosophers t1 Lat health becomes the highest good. Hartmann calls this "an unju fia‘ble extension of bio- logical value beyond its limits, a false anal 3y between soul and body, an ethical neturalism." l The emphasis on the value of life per se, invests the physical part of man with a sacred character which soon takes on a Spiritual importance, so that soon the two, the spiritual and th physical, become identified. Thus, according to the Roman Catholic viewpoint, it becomes mortally sinful for a physician to perform a cre.iotomy even if by so doing he preserves the life of the mother, for the Roman Church regards the life of the fetus as sacred and inviolable l Hartmann, Nicolai, 0p. cit., p. 132. from the moment of conception. U} asing their position upon the philosOphy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Roman Catholic apolosists hold that fro n1 revela ion is known that temporal life is a time of preparation, during which man merits or fails to merit eternal life. Therefore, according to this view, it is held that every I1an is ooli _;ed to secure for himself those thin; s which are nece sary for the preservation of life and health, and in time of sickness to resort to the use of medicines and the help of physicians to restore health. Those who refuse to t ‘:e the ordir ary means of preserving and perpetuating life are considered guilty of So pena nier, however, looks upon existence as a ve.nity ard 50 points to the wide aulf between infinite time and space as contrast- 5-) ed with the finite nature of human life. He says that time is merely the infinite condition in which finite man pends his brief span of life and then ceases to exist - alwavs "oecoming vithout 1 "Hon licet occidere infantem in utero matris, etsi nullum aliud suppetat medium servandi matrem, adeo ut operatione omissa mater et infans perituri sint: est enim directa occisio innocentis, more in: antis intendatur tamquam medium ad servan dam matrem... decisionis haec esse videtur, a) hon potest affirmari per cranio— tomiam e: :erceri actionem, ex qua aeque immediate duplex procedit effectus, alter bOIlus, alter malus; sed ipsa potius est actio, directe occidit UrOlL m ad servandam matrem: directa antem occisio innocentis semper es t 11 licita, etsi solum sit acceleratio mortis certo secuturae. 0) Infans non 1wote t considerari ut aggressor obiective iniustus: ipse enim non ponit actionem obiective iniustam C'LUTI D.atio quae cum utens iure suo atque ex naturali rerum cursu matri sit causa mortis, ideoque potius con .arencds sit homini peste infecto aliosoue ~11 inficie nti, guam iniusto a5 ressori. Di énitas enim personee nt-C‘:e, uze finem unicum hecet Deum, impedit...... Ius in vitar.' suam net 10 alteri ita cedere potest, ut unquam directam sui occisionem licite permittere queat." Holdin, E. S.J. De Praeceptis Dei at E0 cclesi iae, Frederick Pustet Co., Ratisbonc, 1926, Quaestio quinta, pp. 329-330. 2 Ibid. p. 311 ever Bein3.“ He points out the fat1ity of life per se, in the be3innin3 of his essay on gge Vanity of 3313; " A.man finds himself, to his 3reet as We ishLen U, suddenly existin? 3, after thousa116.s and thousands years of non- existence: he lives for a vr:1ile; and Uien, a gain, comes an equally long period when he mu st exist no more. 1he heart rebels a3ainst his, an feels that it cannot be true. The crudest intellect anrot speculate on such a subject without havin3 a presentiment that Time is some- thing Ideal in its nature.... Ofe every event in our life we can say onlJ for one moment tr at it is; for ever alter, that it was. Every evening we are poorer 03 a dag. It might, perhn ps, make us sad to see how rapidly our short span of time ebos aw'v: if it were not that in the furthest depths of our bein3 we are secretly conscious of our share in the e::haustible sprin3 of eternityr so that we can al.ays hepe to find life in it a3ain....Je are like a man runnin3 downhill, v.ho cannot keep on his le3; s unle he runs on, and will inevitabl; fall if he steps; or a3ain lice a pol e balanced on the tip of one's fin3er; or liLe a planet, whi J1 would fall into its sun the moment it ceased to "hfrry forward on its wa'. Unrest is the me.rk of eizis ence.’ There is an undercurrent throu3h the essay on The Vgnity of Existence and a careful stufly of it shows clearly that Schopenhauer placed hi311 value on the 3oods of lif.e, and upon life itself as a 300d. "hen he w1Wi es that "every evenin3 we are poorer by a day," he very clearly states that we lose something of value, somethin3 that renders us poorer and less fortunate in possessing a good than we were at the be3innin3 of that da". Here he able, he would st0p the course of Time so that life mi3ht be lived endlessly. Certainly, he valies lif e, even thou3h he re3ards it as an ontolO3ical carrier of miser‘ ml evil. Otherwise, why would he regret its speedy un- vinding, Ht fleetin3 pa .ssa3e that "makes us sad to see how rapidly ‘5 our short span 01 time ebbs away?" 1 Schopenhauer,.A., Op. Cit., in the sect ion Studies in.Pess1mism, pp. 181-200 \‘7 FJ Yet, Schopenhauer considers life to be some kind of mistake. He reminds us tlat men is a complex creature of desires and in- stincts which are hard to wtisfy and that even satisfactian its 1 brin3s with it no real pleasure - only a state of boredom. Does life per se, have any value for SchOQenhauer? He thinks not, for viewing man‘s disappointments "nd states of boredom he concludes "This is direct proo: that existence he s no reazl valu in itself; for what is boredom out the feeling f the emptiness of life? If life - the craving for Which is the very essence of our being - were possessed of any positive intrinsic value there would be no such thin3 as boredom at all; mere existence would sati. fy us in itself, and we would want for nothing." Wlfli e SchOpenhauer loo}:s upon life as of value only if it is a life in which he can find satisfaction, rest, peace and ple.—sure,- Scholastic philosoPhers look'upon life as 300d because it is a 1218 of Opportunity to merit ete..m l salvation. In this view, pain and disappointment and misery can be turr ed into things of real value for by them man may advance himself spiritually. SchoPenhaner's emphasis on the hedonistic form as more import~ ant and of greater va l‘ie tlian life per se, implies an argument some- wh t as follows: Nothing is good or bad in itself, not even life. The only thing that is intrinsically good is happiness, the only thing intrinsically bad unhappiness. All other things and actions are determined in their 3oodness and badness by their instrumental relation to the production of happiness, peace of nir d, security and satiety. But opposed to this philosOPE v, .hi:h seens to lead so asilv to conti n ent pe “Si ism, there is the Forzu dist view, of which ’40 the Thonist and nee-sodolastic fosit ons are good examples. This "l J. philos0phy holds that at least some things and acts are inherentlv right or wrong, good or bad. In this particu ar case, liie itself c. 1er it be because God gave life ”1"- H is an absolute good or value. wiet ‘ f and that gift confers an absolute value, or whether it is, so to n sreaL, in the nature of things, "a law of nature“, the good of lire is intrinsic or absolute. From this follovs the obligation to main- tain life at all costs (an obligation which has generally been con- sidered as absolute in medical ethics) and refusal to maintain life is a violation of that obligation. In contradistinction to the view that life per se is a value, there are those philosophies which wholly or partially reject this view. Schopenhauer, while condoning suicide holds that the ground of all evil and uffering is man's insatiate will-to-live. He does ot hold that the object of the desire is evil, but that the frust- :3 *5 C‘- H. on of the desire is. SchOpenhauer does not suggest that mass a fi 5.1. cide is the solution to the problem of evil. He is far too loge ical to su33est anything so fruitless as that. Suicide, far from being a denial of the will-to-live, is an affirmation of it. The suicide does not take his life simply because he does not value life; he ends his life because he wants to live a life of happiness and what he does not want are the misery and trials attendant on his particular existence. Schopenhauer regards suicide not as a crime, but merely as a.mistake, and.no moral guilt attaches to it: "In my chief work (Die Welt als sine und Vorstellung) I have explained the only valid reason existing against suicide on the score of morality. It is this: that y suicide thwarts the attainment of the hi3hest moral aim by the fact that, for a real release from this world of ise ry, it substitutes one the is merely apparent. But from a sisters to a ggiLe 's a far cry; and it is as a crL: e that t‘1 :1e clerd: ' of Christ- endom wish us to re 3ard SuiCl‘18. Schopenhauer himself etplains suicide by sayin3 that "just because the suicide cannot give‘up w1 illi 1mg, he 3ives up li ring. " 2 But suicide deieats its own pu pose for while it abolishes the individual, and pain and will with it. as the ray to be rid of the pangs should not be denied but the cr av which atrives .fter illusory Joys what it is and once perceived it continue to live, but pounding, drivin3 force of the will. rest, peace and des ireless quiet. will-lessness to be achieved? templation and music, as the twin and peace. In his m jor work, Schopenhauer hol life an indestructible principle. not abolish the race; SChOpen1 strive to (1' Schop enhauer sigge st s art 1 the species continues, 1auer doe not recommend suicide 9S and torments of life. Life itself ines of th will an the will itself and pleasures should be known for should be annihilated. Man should ‘\-Iv dell within h1nse f the persistent, If he succeeds he will find But how is this blessed peace and stic con- keys to unlock the joys 0f serenity g as in every S 1his belief he shares wita the Buddhist, the Brahmin, the ancient Dr“id 1d the early Sc ut1hav1an, historically speakin3, the doctrine is so old that it mi3ht be con- sidered to be wi liout genealoaf. It i closely a lied to the teach— in3 0: metenpsychosis. Schopenhauer 3ives thei u.me of Will to that l SchOpenhauer, Essays, 0p. cit., p. 29. 2 SchOpenhauer, Shh tliche uerhe, edited by Paul Deussen, Vol. II,, p. M72. r." J) cens iilered to re esurrect Ho (0 force vision, in Indian .1-.ilo.-:;ofl1;r, with man across success1ve lives, and with which the horror of ulterior existences rea.mgears. He holds that tile will-to-live advances to consciousness anC eventually reaches the point Where it can decide be MW£8H its continuance or abolition. If, therefore, in the generations to come the appetite ior death has been so hi3h— ly cultivated, and compassion is so generally :rzct ceu 1, that a Widespread and united pity is felt for all thin3s, then throu h C a 8 “cc icisu a state of indiiference will be produced in which the 1 subject and he Object d sapieir and. the world will be delivered from pain, misery, evil and frustration. And so it is that Schop- fl enhauer 1e els tn.w beJOfld SUiCiLB, waicn is not a 311ilosOphic a palliative, is found in art and disinteres the other, a specific, in asceticism or absolute chastity. Were chastity universn , it would drain the source 01 humanitJ, and '1. vv ~~1‘: -.~I~-~- -q o «'9 M .4. 91h ."‘ J-‘n-fi .\. :‘A-‘L 7‘!“ '_’_‘_\fl 0—4“ p 10911:]. 110.11.; leg.'_1\t)€g~r, ;O- 1.1. 1.1.1.3. 1;, 911:, 111J42'uv 1.1g1nl..:_;guc1blon Ol die out , tile K'I‘Bg.:’:er rel Al 8 Ct. 1011 S F:O uld T‘a SS 8:1!1.0{f. In a recent survey conducted at three members of the Chica3o Psycli1t ric Institute, intervi,uin3 lOO peoyle who had unsuccess1ully attempted suicide, it was fovnd the 90 were inst itu asylums for the insane and another 26 were found to require pJJc11l ric care.1 The report states hat in an avera"e year, L2,CCO peeple in the United States commit 11iciie while an additional 100,000 make an r 0" - -- 1 ..fi . ~ . ‘n Ar: fl. - Y T“ “ N La.‘ “ ‘5 . “$- . attempt to end their l1ves Out 1¢1l. 1ne menseis 01 the Ps,cn1atric \ pl If», -0 0 I - [f ,1 . l Accordinr to an account in Time, Augus’ lo, l,~o, p. Uu. ,-f‘ ./\J are F‘ U "fi‘.’\1 ‘ . ‘ L \J'A k.) , a I —». ‘A ‘ r ~_‘LV-4 .‘Q" s.) .. of gable {‘ r“ . A.vra-JL -'-“,' :v‘. & murky. 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CO.» Lhen We have shuffled ff tsis mortal coil, Just "ive us 3 not 2.1:--2es c5132-: 1 For £10 would bee.r th- whips ann scorns of tire, Che oppressor's Wrong, the proud man's contuxcly, '3'? non. of deem sed. love, the law's delay, 3 an .. go r‘fli .\‘.(" 1 n a a ’D h‘fi‘j Ln‘,‘ ...1‘ e l.r.;.O...PIlCe Os. 0:-1CL Gnu. U.-C,‘ 4. u ,- r‘ - + ~ L‘fi H" 4‘ "' J.-LC~U ‘11:; 9.10 11.3” l‘t; UCJ~€AS ’ .Emnilie Iinseli‘rzi iitfnis quictusv me”: Kith a Dare bod.:in? who would fardels bear. To grant and sweat under a weary life, :nt that the arcal of SOI we hing after death, e u.uiscover' d coniitry from shes. tours Lo traveller returns ,p‘zzle: th. will AL; '. .Lzes us ‘:.t1-er oer. t e i ls We have. Than fl” to others that we kgoJ not of?" 1 lent 101‘]. u 0; r. J n.- .J I. 5" ‘1 {4 AV Thus onexesjere has expressed the incecision and the doubt that asse ils those w; find this life hard to bear, ent fear that the next mzy oe just as unbeere.ol e or even more so. There are those V.ho, while lacking the courage or t1 e weakness to to their own life in an effort to escape this Gorl d's ills, ye hose for an en] to consciousness in an afterlife. In his lyric1eg, Leogsrdi profs sees his preference for the utterly unoonsci ocs life of the ginestra, a tin" :lo-er thct blo ms n th e vol can'c slepes f his native Italy. Pessimism, confronted with what it consiéers the utter evil of life, longs to lose the faculty which mules reasoned refle ctio- upon existence' woes a fossiuility, for without conscious— ness, ”tn could sink into tie euli m1 n in which pain and 8V1 l \ould we A.n‘ A meanin"less to him. ther )gilo.s onhers however, nCVC rewarded con- sciousness as a r331 *nlue, one of the highest in the human realm of l Shrkespere, KC: et, Act III, Scene 1, "Ihe Works of William Sheke- . . -?_--- . Y ‘1' u n - > spe “e, " ecitec o; n.G. Clarz, halcyon Ewen se, “e. York, lSeO, yy. f bk; IC-Ck': l 0.1. values. Nicolai Hrrt1enn asserts thut the eninel nature in we is faced “g; the fact that t1ere is within hiz-1 souet211n3 superior UO his snip lit He holds that the uncons_ciou$ness of an aninzl is a “dull, obscure lif a blind hetiening," and the ”above this cert Dec:"round in man rises the 'light' 0* concsiousness the eein3, the knoring life '1 Conscious.es8, .e h lC , is on a level vith th, ejiritual nature of man and out of consciousness rises the world of emotions and out of it sprin3s the evaluat- ’ mind. The peculiar en mi sis belongh without a Lmo. mi erticip- Ab teniercy and ettituce oi un1eelin3, unemotional 3to value is ulvon consciousness are inking, here in etine in thin3s, man would an unth unvaluing ocin 3; alive, but not knowing of 1is own existence. existence, then, titiout consciousness, would be of little or no value, eccoi ding to Esrtn enn and others nno no u irilar views. ken to mean 11y knowled3e D the forms whicn are Con ciousness must not be to. Hurtnenn holds t there are otne underste more penetreti "There are 0t-er ferns of experience union reacn teener, to vwich indeed potentially tne whole inn ner world 0 the life of the soul sten6.s Open. In1.erd beholdin3s of this kind, ouelitatively differenti ted feeling, however non- logicnl it .J be, is a consciousn. s of eQuel value and ull of content, it is a form of it is f tnou'n1 not transmutaole into the l comfureliension, al— e of concepts' 2 , op. cit., p. l l Eartnann, Hicol 2 Ibid. p. 13M. 62 The value of consciousness, Hartmann hol‘s, increases with the degree of its deve10pment. 3y develo:ment he means the am- ount of its penetration, insight, perspicacity, not only in a subjective realm of ideas but also in an objective reflection of the outer world around us and gives a deeper meaning to the given or sensa, a meaning which cannot be the product of the real. Con- sciousness adds a deeper meaning to thin_s perceived than what might be termed the mere ontological basis of reality. From this, according to Hartmann, there evolves a new and higher metaphysical definition of man. He is the one who eval- uates, nor is this to be misunderstood as meaning a narrow sort of valuational subjectivism. In his evaluation man does not give alue to things, but rather they are given to him and through his consciousness he is aware of them. Consciousness assumes an added worth when it is reflected that man can no more create conscious- 1888 than he can create human life. Han, however, has the ability to "enhance its energy and heighten its worth" by education, train- ing and other types of mental activity which tend to deve10p con» sciousness - "these are enterprises for consciousness in conscious- ness itself and they require constructive work by it upon itself." 1 One might reflect that possibly the pessimist, judged by Hart- mann's theory, either nisdirects his consciousness or fails to de- velop it prOperly, so that like the ~aye of a searchlight it penet- rates on y partially into the gloom and does not succeed in dispell- ing the phantasmagoria, which upon closer and more penetrating obser- -1 Ibid. pp. 136—137. f-y vation would no longer appear to be the hob—gobblins imagined. Is the pessimist plarued with short-sightedness or "short—consciousness?” Would his pessimism disuuuear if he were to have a more highly develOped O O S m 0 P o 9 L- U) :3 (D U) U) 0 |> i) '1 9 J i4 H. d" '“1 '0 One answer is given by Julius Bahnsen (lSjOhlSSl) who sees the world as irremediably involved in evil and he contends that no amount of "enlightenment“ or conscious knowledre could possibly improve our understanding of conditions. The highest :isdom would only show that the evils of he world are more serious and far-reaching than we had formerly imagined. It is a deep penetrating consciousness that reveals that man's dream of {ell-being is merely an illusion. Bahnsen denies the possibility of disuroving the reality of unceasing strife, of the "war of all a:ainst all" and of the utter futility of existence. x-J The "Philos0pher of the Unconscious", Karl Robert Eduard von Hartmann, referred to earlier in this work, describes himself as a eudaemonolOSical pessimist and a teleolo;ical—evolutionistic Optimist, and while he is clearly to be classified among pessimists, more specifically among ontological pessimists, it would be unfair not to admit that there are traits of Optimism in his work. While he regards the pursuit of happiness as futile and foredoomed, yet attain its goals even though these woa.s are s) he feels that life ca: 9 tragic ones. While he agrees with Schopenhauer that the satisfac.ions to be der'ved from life are very few and of tragically short duration, he does recognize positive satisfactions. As man's intelligence mat- . . ~~ v ’- ‘\ IMF 'L . '1' l, 'r- r‘ ('3 1“} "D ‘ "‘ ures, as his consciousness beeches hore PBLEtlfiblné, he passes tnioubh 1e disillusionment of the es of development: the first is t hope for individual attainment of happiness in this life: the second $3 is the dissipation of the are 1m of inuortalit;, and more especially of the vain hOpe of a pers nal 1m101talit'° and the tliird and. fina stage in the process 0: diSillESicflflSflt is he modern belief and trust in "pr03ress", throu3h the utilization of the s iences. Con— cerning the last "illusion" Hart:.1a.n su3gested that modern man is even non be3innin3 to reedi se, in true pessimistic pashion, that modern science is but a Pied Piper whose ple s:1nt-voiced flute leads but to cis appointzient and disillusionment. Ur .derlying all of man' s woe is the Unconscious, accordin3 to Hartmonn, - the Un- conscious whi n in its later develOpment becomes consciousness. The only solution to the problem of the insatiable Unconscious, accordin3 to Hartmann, would be the fantastic plan of activelv promot13 the cause of civilization, of en1i3htenment and witl missionary zeal disse:.inatin3 pe am. ,As man became better educated and saw the hopelessness of existence, humanity would then be in a position to 3ive common assent to vote the world out of existence. As an antithesis of the valuation of consciousness there 1. stands the Buddhis Sb philosophy of Nirvana. To the Brahmin, while th 1ere is alaays the hOpe of absorption in the Universal Spirit, life itself is looked upon with disdain as a re3rettable accident. But in Buddhism, pessimism is the beginning, as it is the end. To the Buddhist, there is real ty neither in the future nor .L in the past. To him rue knowled3e consists in the perception of .L the nothingness of all thin3s and in the desire to escape from the evil of existence into the absolute freedom from the bonda3e of the 1 1 intelli3ence. It is the Buddhist philoso:.hv the metempS"cn continues to take place until eventiellv Nirva 1a is achiever. -nere es throuri which a soul must pass before it at .t‘ J Nirvana, or absolute extinction: -irsc, when the soul learns to be severe with itself but compassio11ate t ward otherS' second, is the ‘ 3 sta3e where j1ud3ehent ceases; in the tEi rd sta3 e va3ue sentiments of satisfaction derived from intellectual perfection is eli.m u1a teda in the fourth and la st state, consciousness of identity is lost. Here q Kirvana be3ins. Four11i3her st% es a1e passed be fore the soul finally ac1m1 ves the loss of even t11e perception of nothin3. when Death is 0‘ '4‘ e of the soul throu3h the cycles eaL fimn"3amemh of birth and death, has been achieved and the soul attains mohsa or liberation from the effects of karma, then accordin3 to the Buddhist, the universe will evolve into a mt te of unconscious rest. Unconscious- ness, therefore, is the sunnun bonum of the Buddhist philos Ophy and it entails the denial of the very value many Western philOSOphers con- ‘er the most important, being. Budh‘wi an brou3ht he premise of the cf 88 Ho P3. 817188? 01 nplete and unequivocal ann‘1ilation of self with 11 i and evils. while Budmllism is an on90103ical pessimism, oeli Win that this life and any exi tence or series of existences after death are alike undesirable and evil, yet, it offers a certain cheer, for a soul mev eventually win peace through.total annihilation. CW! The next ""1010: 3ical position to as considered is Voluntarisn and its antithesis, the denial or renunciation of will as value. In scholastic philosophv by Voluntarism is meant that view which defends d1e vill as havin3 the hi””est position and di3nity in the 2 t fi (1 Q 0 w I a _ ‘ T‘ I u hierarcny of man's faculties. ecotus, tie firQnCIScan monx proceeded to a criticue of rational knowledge. Rational knowled;e, of necessit" reneral and abstract, must fail of exhaust'veness, because it LOGS not grasp the concrete individual character of things. ize human will, Scotus pointed out, limits huncn knowledge, in it directs our inte lectuel attention upon certain abstract characters to the neglect of others. Cnlv the infinite will of God can wholly 0 7‘ comprehend nature. There is a familiar rin o: Kantianisn in Duns ' 4. .-. ° .- ,. .H ,. J- '4. "4. .2.--” a, ' ,. IntellQCu or onsc10uSness ireSents o it. at. In mes Aquines, who is a rationalist rather than a voluntarist, calls it the rat- ionrl appetite and holds that ere Wi 1 moves the intellect. The object of the will, ace rain; to some of the Scholastics, is the good. There is only one necessity in the will and that is that the will must always have good as its object; even When the g will elects to do evil, the evil is made to seem good. Tne School- men hold the will to be free in its actions and contend that it -. out V could not be deterrined unless there were srme universal good, since no such universel good is to be found objectively in the world, the will cannot be determined. Freedln of the Will, then is considered as a distinct value by a number of philosOphers. Eicolai Hertnann nroerenu J ecceo / - a. — ‘ .. ' ". .‘.. -'.‘ J-” ..,_° '1 ‘ 4-, 1. J.‘ ,. ' .r' '1 conCernin; tie :reeuom oi the mill. LC states that an thlVluual ') differs from every other ki;d of beizg in that he is not forcefl or .0 an", i .5‘ .1.“ 3 -~:‘ liteli m1“ y .I. either accept or to reject the good. I: a being is not thQPilnPd, he CODtQHLS, the.u it must b: iree to select food or to og;o;e it, otherwise value woul'l rest oowcrless in an ideal Le"on d, Titb mo tou Jiing upon life at any tangible point. T‘ut man nossesses this soeci:l Porer of nositive iecision. Earthenn holds that even if d b» r4 LD *1 (F 6 MS (2‘ F f. O C (1‘) Ho P d' O ,3 9 .3 H) "5 f1, (3 ,1 P :1 O ’4’ .1 F“ H H O O H F: C (E P .4 S C (' l’ r a f—o (f‘ U) there has been so many and va“ieC attemots to give meta: proof to the freedom of the will attests to its value. To renounce the freedom of the will would be tantamount to renunciation of n Freedom of will, how ver, is not an unallo;ed.value Ior it carries with it the oossibility of abuse. Ricnes and power can be abusel, and similarilv freed on of choice can lea“ to the sel- ection of evil in place oi good. Hartmann SQ s that freedom of will is a value n15 up to a ce tain point and begond this 1 becomes a disvalue. Just as a person first e caraule o; nearing #99 v.2 .. -"‘" 1" H ’7‘“ "“1 ' :LW'?”.'IL q ‘L 1 '7 "1’1 :- acorn"; 51.93. c. 8.- 1‘1b Yu' 1 0-101;“ DO lALQ LO A. in L—\4 .. LC. U ’ ~O 0'3 3 ’ L... 3..( n T.nklw -ck.-.v L the inner stcen-th to use this freedom of will. Schonenhauer has been creCited tit A. Q.) '.r . .11. r- -‘3 _‘ J_~_ . _.- o w" _o .- '. 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I ekLL attraction o t1;e CL" .11- C - ‘3 Ci- 1“ O * I ‘ »neqs ., l; I (rs-y rr:.k' ‘\ -, r r» - r AA‘DC’o'; De C‘C ”A -‘ I.’ \.' 4r ‘E‘I‘ :— I , U-L 5110 . :18 t are mere Fl“ . .LA {TY-IO r o l .1ces, 0 SW. 'HC ,. C... i." e l L- J- '4 EC 3 u a. :26 1'1 0 L) L. mi“ is Viex ‘tnann 0 vv '1 'T'V‘ 3“,“ " a ‘~ ilcol inner. v\.. . a 11"" :‘ 11216? SC‘ 1 J. 81‘ \ A. N 0‘61 erent- ism diff a 1 4- v Mil-33.3031 .. . I e L V ’X A ”10101 . .l. i V1 ‘ A “I o..€lLU. or engo O tune but '5‘ 7- ‘0‘ ,pin ‘ 115"?“ vs of linu r fee a.. r: J LA-C 0 i1 U-. Q etween '1 - I Hf‘ d l .1 V . - .J.- ._1 .- . ,. .2 -. J,.- ,, ' goon. Pass1--1stic LillllQSOJNUI‘E. recoVniZe we (”Heel Y‘. .'~‘ ~-.-\§l‘1° ~ 1t J",z.-~¢ 1‘Y\-- Li‘ ‘1“ ‘F‘ .l.""" I“ "‘ S UN, 1- D- 0'? \T“ EuJCI“; lutjilb D‘L LI;LL:~" (-tl.-‘;r’ U--e thfil ;,U1 1 U.“ ’ LilLk- in 0 1C: CC- t” ~59 )’ v i EHLL t1: ‘1 Fri-’1il.:" “0 1 *4" " r“ WW)" *7 4-; titanic- luJ O- OuUcCuivC DOV-LL. -.-t.. U.~_ II- 2.-.- ._ -fi..‘- 3.2, cc; LOlLiuhd one S - — 4" ‘ -~ I‘ '- ~ uo r1“ '7'. \ I‘I . J. L "l‘v u‘ . 1"- -o(*. v 4‘ 4“ . -,x . - -OI' Odvef _ OU‘J. DJ n1-10rll.g lv 90 Stculkl 111 1416 ‘10:] 0). 9:16“. i18._f_1_ 111993: ‘ J- 4. . .3 :. J-:. -. -. r 13. °-—.::.:,‘I.,'1 m- «L .— tnet mldflu result geodecuiqcl; in tne inciri'1 -i. PCILUCU nt,)1n rs . 4-, v~—‘ -. ‘- -r. . . ‘ rt F‘ l ls tne cennonest Cl valu: tion; 1 lueuls. 'H.“ ' . . " 1.. ,- 1- 3-. A —~ ' r . a »\ ~fi r .—-s 1 ._,‘ ’i;iel‘e 19110 (10th tile—LL, where 18 a. I'L' tlun oetweue u. 1;.L.(.’L_‘.S;u..se “nu. .- - 4.2-- ,J 43-,“ .' ,. .., ‘ ..- 4. ,. J- mt, 4.1. , 4....” :5 .L'. ‘vClLe, u..ud-.Jl uncle- .Ls 3.3.1041 Cis mite “S to “halt that? magnie 0. 9.1.8 re- the .ccofirzninant or sign of he A ate 01 consciousness may be a part of any value, but not the value in its entiretv. For hedonis m it oeCOues U 01 H. p. r.) 5 ('1‘ P. (B). C i y l r CD 1 a, 5 F l necessary that both co nce pt ts b consiiered a ('0 ie in its failure to distin wish H U! c?- amental error of vleC-o nis sm seen 0 between the concept of goodness and that object, n£.:o]v pleasure, to 1-.- thich the concept is supwosed uniguely to apply.3 Certaini4,11.e must :1 conclude that hedonism is in: ne quate, for while feelin3 may be one in- :2. }_la cation or criterion of the 300d, without reference to that which pro- ‘uces the feelin3 cannot be considered as equal to value. By extract— ing pleasurnole feelin3 from a type of conduct, we cannot set up the feeling as an adequate criterion of the good. Professor Ur man has summed up the critic1sm of the inadequacy of hedonisn in the followin3 H Hartmann, fiicolai, 0p. cit., pp. 160—162. 2 Urban, nilour 3., “filcrnentnls 0: Ethics, Henry Holt Co., Ken'York, 1930, pp. 31-02. Cf. Reshdall, op. cit., pp. BY-El for a.fuller C.is cu ssion of the comme nsure bility of values KN P“ ,. —' ,. 11-. . ° 1.x, .. .1. M‘- "-.1e 11 #117698 owe-or”; is the “lost 1.1.»: .19. .s.‘ 3 , .7 .‘. l. -1 - ...‘ ,_ ° .. -1" .-. enjlession oi the teleolc11Cel Vie.' o; no I t 0 fl ’ A " f a v3 P'r.‘ r‘"- J _ f. the naolve iorL in thich lany reasonin13on h:ans “nu onus ( v" '0 j ‘q“ ‘_ I 7‘ I .-. 3 -1nos e33ress1on. In all 3iooho111td, 1t “1 ll C“1.tinue to be the idiom in 7hich most men 17ill express their cor ception of the 300d. hen will continue to out th gyrsuit of bagpiness aron :3the hum 113hts Pare1.‘.ts will continue to Lian 10r thelr aii when they mean their hi3 host Welfare. X's-'hen men thus sneak, shall We sag, 'no, you meen not h13niness self-realization?' That would be penantic, as it we" d be f, when men said of the sun that it rises and sets, re hould insist in correcti13 the vernacular terms of the results of our more ana.ytical hnowleu3e. " portant thing is to know that the sun does not real X rise and set. Even more important is it to know that man's highest 300d is not heaviness. m F“ It must be admitted tiat it is in oss iole to dispense with the iiea of pleasur and hagnines ss as values but it is important to realiz t11at ole: wsur is not the whole of the ideal life, but Ho c!- 0 only an element or an aspect of If pleasure becomes a more ho criterion then we mi3ht as Well urre people to taste the forbidden fruit and ju Md 8 :or themselves, thu311411n u1mor.lity and crir e a Ch necessary condition of virtue. The ideal or the good life is an ultima.te conce; tion which hardly admits of any further clarificat- F4) *4. ion or de nition; about all t'e can 6.0 is to ste te 1hat are the 90 toward its composition. Hapoines ss and pleasure elements that 3 are assuredly anon3 these elements, "*t it 1s erroneous to suppose them to be the whole of it. St. Thomas AQu inas in his Sunma contra Ger tile es afiirms that haopiness hoes not cons 1st in bocily pleasures, in Worldly honors, in wealth, power nor even in acts of the moral virtues, but does ultimately consist in contemg lating God. Commenting upon the errors of a ohllosoo.' of heoonism, he w1ites: l Urgan, 0p. cit., p. 93. 1as been shorn th at accordin3 to nature's order t l eleesare is for tile s:.l:e of Opere tion, end not con- versely. Therefore, if an onera tion be not the ul- timete end, the consequent 31- e can n- ither be tb e ulti"ate end, nor accor .51 -v the ultimate end. Low it is manifest that tW1 Operations which are followed by (carnal) pleesures....are not the last enc; for there re directed to certs in me a1i1est end_s; eating, for instance, to the preservation of the oody, and carnal intercourse to the 003ettin3 of children. 1here1ore, the aforesaid pleasures are not the last end, nor do they accomgeny the last end. Therefore, happiness does not consist in them....The hi3hest perk fection of man cannot c011 Hi t in his bein3 united to thin3s 1 wer than hixnself (ca*nal) pleasures consist in man's bein3u *1ited throu3h his senses to thin3.s beneanlilir.1, nz.nely certain sensible thin3s. Theref01e we mus t not assign1‘1aopiness to such oleasure." 1 J. "1 C d‘. ’1 hr We recoil instinctively 1r on pain as a matter of xperi nce. Generally it is an unattracfit'e subject. But accordin3 to the pessi- mist, pain looms large in life, and is more often found than yleasure, which most ness mi mi sts re3 ard as an illusion. The world, in short, .L .L symbolizes pain, even from the fire 0 noemnt when man becomes conscious O H) 5-; :is e: stence. Pessimists have been q uicl: to look upon pain as an evil, but there are some 1n1losooner° who re3erd it as productive of value, thou3n pain, in itself, may be an indifferent thing. If pain be looked uyon from a purely naturalist viewPoint, as destructive of men's health aid mental neace, by a slowly deteriorating effect upon nerve and brain, it is regarded as a natur .l evil. But the auestion with .hich we are here concerned is niether or not it has any ethical value. Let the psych0103ists define pain and tell us What it is, if t1 ey are able. our concern here will be with 1ts axiologicel status Pain as a.value is distinct from pain as a sensation. In the HJ p—J O 13 {‘J :0 . l Aquinas, St. T Senna Contra Gentiles, in "Easic Writings of St. -nomes A nines," iancom house, new York, Vol. II, p. 52, ed. by "1 Anton C. Pegis, lSeL. -4 kn vnsation, without value: [—1- d 1 i.) 'T/ O [(214 D {.0 U] (T3 view of Schopenhauer, pain "However varied the for1 .s that human 1M€ppiness and misery may take, leadin3 man to seek ti e one and shun the other, the meteiial basis of it all is bodily pleasure or bodily oain. This basis is very restricted: it is simply health, food, protect- ion from wet and cold, the satisfaction of the sex- ual instinct; or else t11e absence of these thin3s. Consequently, as fa as real physical pleasure is concerned, the man is not better off than the brute, except in so far as the hi3her possibilities of his nervous system make him more sensitive to every kind of pleasure, but also, it must be remembered to every kind of pain." Looking upon pain as nothin3 more than sensa ion, accepting it in a purely naturalistic way, it is easy to understand how such a theory mi3ht lead to pes simisrn it vie ens the physiolO3ical phenom ena of pain and 300s no further, failing to inquire cui bono? It is much like allowing an aborigine from Tierra del Fue3o to witness the pain experienced oy a pa 1tient in a dentist's chair. He under- 1.. stands nothing of the purpose, nothin of Uhe benefit to be derived from experiencin3 the pain as a.means to an enl. He sees only the wri thin3, agoniz in3 individual suffering excrutiatin3 pain at the hands of a whit mrobed dentist. Le must come back once more to the content ion that the pessimist allow his conscious penetration to so so far and then stoos short of complete understandin: of value. E.) .. 1‘ U There is a.ver" special sort of value in suffering pain, accord— in3 to Nicolai Hart . The knowled3e or rec03nition of this value was notr made by ancient man nor is it to be found even in modern hedon— istic phi ilosop W11 es whici re ard pain as an evil. Christianity has 3ivon l SchOpenhauer, Essevs, op. ci a rec03nition to the sunlimet in3 and liberat'nv efzects of nain in the expiatory sufferin mann comnentin3 upon this, sz; 83 “I11e ve due of suiierin3 glance at the corresno ive on t wi t the impossi ” i . '. ndinr disvclue ray prove ins e incanacity to suf' ;rief and hi isfortuie, coll- ap°e unde1 . in3, a sinkin3, the lowerin3 of the him an be in3, a brittleness and inner inelasticity. When dire misfortune has passed away, it leaves the man who is incapable of suffering broken, morally warped, disfi3ured, weakened; he can no lon3er stand up, he has seen deu:_3ed in his fundamenta worth. For him s11ferin3 is, in fact, only a disvalui. On the other hand, one who has a capacity for sufferin3 is stren3thened in it. His power 0: endirez1ce, his humanity, his moral Bein3, grows under it. His su1ferin3 is of value, for his reaction is the reverse of that 01 the fra3ile and despondin3 (zessinistic) nan. pos itive, ssertive reaction 0: the man unfier the bu of s adverse fate, under the external pO‘UeI‘ a3ains t w“. h's own actiV1tyca1not prevail. This is cl 9211;; an ex oriation of a weakness of one of the pessimistic positions, for Hartmann calls attention to the lack of more. and nhvsical eta nina on the part of the fra ile and despondin3 .0 man, which is character1stic of many oessinists, especially 01 the materialistic cor t1n3 ent pessimist, who in his disbelief in innort- ality, looks upon existence in this world as the be3 innin3' and the end and fines it evil and ful of pain. In clee r—cut contrast to Hartmann's position that sufierin3 is a value, the ant 3'1 03rapiical v.0rk of W. Somerset had nan, which something of an 330103ia.3ro vita sua, or an "autobio3r phy of H. U) Qw- _ _ 9|- . O l nartnann, hi colai, op. Cl cf‘ 03 p. 1390 T? a mind," takes a different View 0: suzzerin; and its V( lie. In his earlier years, haugham studied at St. Thomas's Hospital in London and spent a year of internship in the anbeth slums, Witnessing every itiné of huzm.n misery and Weakness. He feels himself par rticularlv quali fi 1ed as the result of fi1ese excerience to make tiiis comment on t21e value of suffering: " Here I Wa s in contact with what most wanted, ii in Ie the raw...I saw how men died, I saw how t1 e core p ain. I saw that h0pe looked like, fear and reli 1e ; I saw the dark lines that desgaxir drew on a face; I s: w coura *e and stea .fa tness. I saw faith shine in the eyes of those who trusts ed in what I c uld only think was an illusion and I sax-v the 55119111312: that made a man {Test the pro- gnosis of death with an ironic 301 :9 because he r? s too proud to let those about him see the terror of his soul. At that time (a time to most people of suf icient ease, when pe ace seemed certain and prosperity secure) ther was a school of W1 iters who enlarged upon the moral v:lue 0” .0 .L of suffering. -he" claiued that it was salutary. They claimed that it increased sympathy and enhanced the senr sibilities. They cl iraed that it opened to the spirit avenues of oeaut;r and enabled it to get into touch he mystical l-in"dom of God. They claimed that it ' me ned the chcmr cter, purified it from its human 5 s a md Drought to him she did not avoid but sought i a more perfect happiness. Several books on these lines had a great success and the i rauthors, who lived in com- for teole houses, had three meals a dav and were in robust health, gained much re eputation. I set down in my note- books, not once or twice, but in a dozen places, the facts that Ii 1ad seen. I knew that suffering did not ennoble; it deg aded. It made men selfish, mean, petty and sus- picious. It absorbed them in small things. It did not *ahe them more than men; it made them less than men; and I wrote ferociously that we learn resignation not by our on 71 e“*ferixg s, but by the sufferings of others." A The zessimist, of course, see as duly aware o: the fact that if he hopes to make a plausible case for his theories, it must be done objectivelv and not merely upon the grounds of his subjective sensations and feelin Conseque ntl;, he atte.r pts to xvei‘h tie 1'” n ' 1c, ‘__ _~ _ “1 .V. M , , .fi _‘ .__ '. l avauol‘chm, II. S’).l€3I‘S€t, Tne ScLuInlii‘) LP, Pen::ul_'n 500.68, Illa. ’ 1.6”»? YOI‘IZ, \, r \ x, \ ,_ 1940, pp. 4H-43. ‘J l J. ' " " I." R “' . 't- . 4‘." ' —\ 1‘» . «1 "r I . ‘ ~ A - . pleasu1es 0: all s tezce a3a1nst the pains. when he has done tdlS IL b0 his satisfaction he solemnly pronounces that sain is far in 6)" n N r‘ ' ‘ :‘u L F7: " ‘2' ' F'I - u -‘ 3- l ‘."| ‘r‘ " ' 'I. s ' ‘ - - 0* enccss o: ileasuie. JUU slat is the connon measu1e J1 union clone— that 1s without nrOOI. Kor is it always true that - -¢ -. ,- y‘ . -\ a "a (-1 ‘r .— w: .5. -1 . 4“ v '\ 9-9 4-, ‘ r1 ‘— ‘ Juile pleas11e lS I.€Telg’ an aJSCuCG o1 pain, 1or we has that there are many pl eesu res Vii J1 are certsinlv positive and it would tah a CO ”811 raole amount of pessimistic in3enuity to disp “ove it. . ‘ ‘ 0 Pain is out one pa rt of the comglex proolem o: evil, a problem which has teu- zed man' 5 re- 3011in3 powers for countless cent ries. It will be worthrhi e to 3ive some consice ratio n to an amplification of the problem of evil in a later part f this work under a separate chatter. We now turn to a valuatioxial consideration of met e iil good. By material good I mean the several stages or classes of material with the lowest, t31ose Wiich are us :1 as means to a.moie of existence for a particular person s ch as money, land, and similar material possessions: nd eventrating to higher stages ‘ a I suca as eiuca sion, law, he: lth, and me1tal 801 lit 13s or Special (9 *J *4 0’ CD :5. O *f {1 C 1 (D {:11 skills in arts or sciences. Katerial 300d might w under the classification of bonum "tile for it is usually ”esired as a nee s to a material end, and we may consider it as elu‘insic ce as an instrument in pro- Ho for it erives its oei11fron its serv J. motin3 or sustainin3 some more ultimate 300d cn:i fir' 'ally some ul— "5 HI :5 ti1a te s3ood and fin JLly some ultir1e t: o. rrinsie 300d. It is a. «(3:13 r'- " n7" ' n 1 1" ‘7’ ~ arm‘s“ 1.1 VV‘ \‘a.~ Lvel. l N‘ ’ OO¥L ‘01 01);.i~ - .’ ~~ s.‘ 1 - - « 14 V -N.) 31 OT: er and v' n-- q 1.. I - -b O ‘ ,‘ul‘ \- U-.C-“ AL... . r 1 thv—Lc. 81' v 8 A 11:01" J" ' 0 ‘ >quJ .. C‘ .; '1. '3‘ 4 e 1' '5 u. :l' 1.1 '\ was. St 1:21 v 1 r t '0; 1c VJ. 4. T'.‘ L". ‘—- .1 b T u e‘ 1 or recre th 11 .2) T"! ‘J O.- . ' .L‘ ll u h -T ‘ J .‘ 1. v, 1 h. e S CO 11111.3(}: 110 A _, 1., 1‘ L I t E” '4 Sat. ‘rfxfi ' I L-A— ‘ul ‘1 1 J. U "as k.) L.) l of wan unders ’ a 1 U — ~ ’ “I.” l u 8 1n : n n .1 .4 .l . .l l O _ u C .11.. 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C. 83 Parker goes on to state that laws and civil disciplines are needed when man's moral sense breaks down and he acts from motives other than "community love.“ In a vein that would have won the approval of Schopenhauer, Parker castigates the "double standard" or dichotomy of morality in vogue tods‘. In our modern civilization a child is tarsht an absolute ethical system of truthfulness, altru- ism, perfect chastity while he sees a completely different morality practiced by his elders. Friends may be allowed certain liberties and departures from moral codes, while enemies are severely criticized and condemned for even the slightest departure; a young person soon learns that what he is taught is not meant to be practiced totally. Parker contends that this gives rise to duplicity and hypocricy of preaching one thing and practicing another. He points to the wide divergence between the moral standards of the New Testament regarding divorce and the general modern practice; the ascetic ideal of renunr ciation and.non-resistance as opposed to the “practical” morality of the Western world with its wars and subjection of minority peOples. He places the blame for much of the vitiating of every rationalistic and utOpian view of human nature and the social order upon the exist- ence of hate among individuals and among nations. For Parker, harmony is considered the supreme value. While Parker may criticize the modern duplicity in morality, he does not equate his "community love" with Sdhopenhauer's "compassion." According to Schopenhauer, it is pity which is the base of every action that has a true moral value. He states that the soundest and surest guarantee of morality is a compassionate sympathy that unites us with everything that lives. Who possesses compassion, he contends, will be incapable of causing the slightest harm to any one and will cause him to be magnanimous, forgiving, just and charitable. In brief, com- passion is considered by Schopenhauer as the spontaneous product of nature universally known. The idea. hat pervades the subject of compassion in SchOpenhauer's philosophy is that love is sympathy and all love which is not sympathy is selfishness. This would not necessarily eliminate a combination of the two for the selfishness of enjoying the presence of a friend would not xclude a participation in his joys or sorrows. SchOpe hauer re- duces every human action to one, or sometimes to two, or at the most three motives: the first is selfishness, which seeks its own welfare; the second is the perversity or viciousness which attacks the welfare of others; and the third is compassion, which seeks their good. The egoist has but one sincere desire, and that is the greatest possible amount of personal well-being. To preserve his existence, to free it from pain and privation, and even to possess every delight that he is capable of imagining, such is his end and aim. Anything that might stand in the way of his achieving these ends is considered as an enemy or as evil, So far as possible, he would like to possess everything, enjoy everything, dominate everything and when he finds this impossible he turns upon the world and denounces it as an evil illusion. The strange part of Schopenhauer's philosophy is that while he embraces so deep a pessimistic view of man and his capabilities, he could yet form- ulate this exalted.philosophy of compassion which seems so optimistic of man's abilities to rise above his own baser nature. How strange that the philos0pher who wrote the following passage could yet propose 85 and believe possible the compassion of another part of his works: "Let even the youth be instructed betimes that in this masquerade (of life) the apples are of war, the flowers of silk, the fish of pasteboard, and that all things, yes, all things‘- are toys and trifles; and.that of two men whom he may see earnestly engaged in business, one is supplying spurious goods and the other paying for them in false coin. But there are more serious reflect- ions to be made, and worse things to be recorded. Man is at bottom a savage, horrible beast. We know it, E?- only in the business of taming and restraining.him which we call civilization. Hence it is that we are terrified if now and then his nature breaks out. Wherever and When- ever the locks and chains of law and order fall off and give place to anar ‘1, he shows himself for what he is. A.hundred records, old and new, produce the conviction that in his unrelenting cruelt man is in no way inferior to the tiger and the hyaena.” Yet, in the same essay. a few pages earlier he proposes compassion among these "savage, horrible beasts": "I am inclined to lay down the following rule: When you come into contact with a.man, no matter whom, do not attempt an objective appreciation of him according to his worth and dignity.....but fix your attention only upon his sufferings, his needs, his anxieties, his pains. Then you will always feel your kinship with.him; you will sympathize with him; and instead of hatred or bone tempt you will experience the commiseration that alone is the peace to which the Gospel calls us. The way to keep down hatred and contempt is certainly not to look for a.man's alleged 'dignity', but, on the contrary, to regard him as an object of pity.“ 2 Man should be ready to sacrifice himself at all times for the common good, Schopenhauer held. This involves a transition from virtue to asceticism. When he has achieved this ascetic status, it then no longer suffices for him to love others as himself; there arises within him a.horror of the kernel and essence of the world, which recognizably is full of misery, and of which his own is an 1 SchOpenhauer, op. cit., pp. 14-15, (Essay on Human Nature) 2. Schopenhauer, Ibid., p. 3 expression, and therefore derring the nature that is in him, and ceasing to will anything, he gives himself up to complete indifferent- ism to all things. But such indifferentism is clearly incompatible with compassion which must be anything but indifferent. Thus far we have considered life per se as a value and discussed the views of such philosophers as Nicolai Hartmann, St. Thomas Aguinas, Schopenhauer, Leopardi and others on this problem and its development into views on suicide and other forms of killing. We have also surveyed the views of Eduard von Hartmann and Julius Bahnsen on consciousness as a value as Opposed to the Buddhist and SchOpenhauerian view of Nirvana as the summum bonum. Pleasure and pain, the value of the will, material goods and moral values have also been discussed. In most cases, extreme views on each subject have been investigated, while the most acceptable philOSOphy would undoubtedly lie somewhere between the two :idely divergent views of ontolOSical and contingent Opt'mism and pessi- mism. An example of one extreme is the discussion of life per se as a value. There are many instances of human life coming into existence in the most deformed conditions, without consciousness, without mobility, without the barest essentials for its own preservation. Many philos0phers will contend that it were better for all concerned that such life should not exist and that it is without value per 59. Some ethical philos0phers would contend that it would not be morally wrong to deliberately end such a life rather than to permit it to be a burden to itself and to others, for the mere fact of life, without the goods that go with it, is not considered by them a.value. Thus human life becomes cheap, as it was in ancient Rome and in modern totalitarian states where a man's life is worth no more than the value of his services to the state. In 87 ancient Rome, the offspring had no assurance that its life would be protected. The fate of the Child was entirely a andoned to the dis- cretion of the author of his days. When a child was born, he 7a laid at the feet of the father. If the latter took him up into his arms, he was permitted to live; hence the expression: suscioere lib- A n o 2322.‘ to life up the Children. If, on the contrary, the father left the child lying upon the ground, the helpless child was strangled or thrown into the public sewers, or exposed in the public squares, and there left to perish from hunger. Infanticide was universally ad- mitted and practiced among the pre-Christian nations. Tertullian must have been absolutely certain of not being contradicted when he rebuked the p sans of his day for this deed. Quintilian, the Roman rhetorician (a. A.D. 118'), declares the "to 1:111 a man is often a crime, but to kill one's own children is often a very fine action." Euthenasia, which denies life as a.value per se, is receiving pOpular support today from those who accept a "jungle philOSOphy" of the survival of the fittest, or whose emotions run away with their right reason and cause them to seek to justify killing the incurable. Such a.philosophy must be included among the material- istic systems . The problem of suffering and the value of sickness and physics ills will be studied in greater detail in the chapter on the Problem of Evil. Suffice it to say here that pessimism views many of the events of life as with a nagnifying glass, which discloses the evils, while overlooking or minimizing the good. In his ouest for knowledge 4» the pessimist finds tha he cannot comprehend the infinitude of reality with his finite mind, and like a.petulant child he sulks and grows despondent. 89 CHAPTEB.III METAPFYSICAL PESSIMISM Havin“ co onsidered many of the ethical problems involvinc {3 .L :3 a pessimistic philosophy, it ma r be pro_ fits ole to investi3ate the pessimistic aspects in certain of the 3reat reli3ions. In "FO this chapter we will consicier the nindu, Buddhist and Christian philos0phies. Under the survey of Christian philosoihies, it ill be well to view certain pessimistic tr rai Ht in the life of Christ Himself, in Roman and Greek Catholic monasticism, and finally in the Calvinistic teachin3 s of the rejection of worldli- ness and predes tine tion. As a creed, pessiri1sm.found its birthplace on the banks of the Gan3es or fa ar back in the lands of Kepaul. The history of pess1m1sm is, as we have said before, as old as c1v1lized 1:1q Both as a.mood and as a pl Milo ophy it is more native to the East han to the West. In the East it has had its completest expression. The astral religion of the ancient Chaldeans thou3dt of the world as ruled by gods who were actually identified with the planets. They rules the universe almos st mechanically. While their immediate intent- ions were sometimes discernible, their ultimate purposes were inscru- table. For the Chaldeans, religion implied no otherworldly signific- ance; one did not resign himself to calamities in th -is life in order to be justified or saved in the next. The Chaldeans had no interest in a life to come. Submission might bring certain earthly rewards, but in general, as hey conceived it, it was not a means to an end at all. It was rather the expression of an attitude of despair and gloom, of 9O humility in the face of mysteries that could not be understood. Compared with the gods, who dwelt in the stars and 3uided the destinies of the earth, man wa a lowly creature, sunk in iniquity and vileness and hardly even worthy of approaching the gods. The consciousne U) s of sin already present in the Babylonian and Assyr'an religions now reached a sta3e of almost patholO3ical intensity. In the hymns the sons of men were compared to prisoners, bound hand and foot, lan3uishin3 in darkness. Their misery is increased by the fact their their evil nature has prompted them to sin unwittingly.l Never .. Fl .arued as so hOpelessly depraved, nor had reli3~ before had men been re; ion been burdened with so gloomy a view of life. Curiously enou3h, the pessimism of the Chaldeans does not seem to have affected their moral- ity very much. So far as the evidence goes, they indulged in no rigors of asceticism. They did not mortify the flesh, nor did they practice self-denial. Apparently they took it for granted that man could not avoid sinning, no matter how hard he tried. A similar pessimistic view of existence is held by Brahmanic Q Q India which holds that evil is inherent in 7 ll finite existence and P- miser1 and suffering are looked.upon as an integral part of man's life on earth. The doctrine of reincarnation doons man to a long series of rebirths to repent and atone for sins committed in past existences. If his life in his present existence is morally 300d, t will have a beneficial result 11 s me future life, but he has no Ho assurance that it will be in the existence immediately following upon his present one. The only way to salvation and peace is to .L l Jastrow, horris, The Civilization of Babylonia and Assyria, Phila., 1351, p. 217. 91 cease existing‘- hirvana. The philosopher of the Unanishads look .1» upon all finite existence as unreal, as an illusion that deceives man. But man's plight 18 no illusion! He cannot escape the miseries that accompany his journ y throu3h a lon3 series of metemesy hoses. .— It is individual e- ist ence that is evil“ “1d all 0 dier evils proceed irom this primary one. Clearly this is ontolo3ical pes51zian. Buddhism is close y allied to Hinduism and Budda himself arose out of the ancient Indian religion. After the time of the early Up- anishads and the be innin3 of B the ethics of the two great religions was, so far as formal pronouncement goes, almost identical, as may be shown by the circumstances that the main sins are arranged in the same cate.~ories and cornprise the same subjects. Thus, the law book of Manu incorporates the Buddhistic 3roup of sins of thou3ht, speech and deed in inverted order. The rule given in the Buddhist Mahasudassana Sutta is one that wouldb aye appealed equs_ lly to the Brahman: "Do not kill, do not steal, do not be sensual, do not lie, do not drink int xicants; and eat as you have been accustomed to eat." There is, of course, alin.ys the reli3ious difference between the two bodies, the Brahman believes in the sacredness of tradition, in an immort.l soul yet accordin3: to the Upanishads, Hirva na is 100'1 :ed upon as the sunmum bonum; while the Buddhist iconoclast tramples upon tradition, denies the immortality of the soul or the self, and mocking at the notion of the Brahman's Supreme Spirit, rejects these teachings. Siddhartha Sahyarmuni Gautama, which translated into English, means: autama.who belon3s to the Sahye.tribe and who reached the 3pal of perfection, was born of a1 ancient Indian prince five 0 nturies fl before Christ. His earlv lize as a young prince was all too happy and all too unreal in its splendor. At nineteen he married his cousin Yasodhara. But the brilliance of his marriage was darker ed by the shadow of disappointment, for his wife was childless. He began to brood, and made up his mi uto eranine mo re closely the sorrows of life. Why, he asked himself, is the 31ft of life even '5 at its best like a counterieit jewel given to us by a stingy 30d? Why must even the hap Hie t existence be full of the flaws of un- failin3 misery and unfulfilled hOpes? Was life worth the living 9 Q Amon3 the le3ends told about him is the one of the event .7.1icn apparently decided him in his determination to search for truth. While drivin3 one day with his servant he met an a3ed man bent and broken by the wei3 ht of 1.is years. Gautama turned awq v in horror. But his servant .nispered, "This, my prince is the way of life." 1 -9 And before he could absorb the Shock of this discovery, the prince came upon a b M‘ar covered wi th the sores of leprosy. "This, too, is the may of life." said the servant. Ga utama drove on, ponderin3 deeply on what he had seen. And finally, he came upon a naked corpse, swollen, discolored and rotting in the sun. "This," said the servant, "is the end of life.“ Having been brought face to face with the misery O of life, Gautama decided to do sciethin3 about what he had seen. He Questioned wanl erin3 monks and men of 3reat learning, asking them to tell him about the indignities and the deception of the world. In his search for truth, he lei°t his pleasures and his palace and set out to find the answers to the problems that beset him. Gradually, his new philosophy evolved. Gautama tau3ht the joy, not of pessession, but of renunciation. This doctrine of renunciation lies at the very toot of the secret of life, he believed. Human existence represents the soul's journey from earth to heaven. But this journey, he declared, is a successive m13ration of the soul through many bodies. Only he who has learned to subordinate his little personal self to the lar3er self of humanity is read1 at last to end his veary pilgrima3e from life to life and to enter into the Nirvana of eternal rest and nothin3ness. In pessi- mistic strain, Gautama looked upon existence and all of reation as evil. Nirvana, according to Buddha's doctrine, is the complete exp tinction of all bodily desire, - the only possible way for man to have surcease from the eternal striving and frustration that is the lot of mortals. It is easy to understand, comparing this doctrine to that of Schopenhauer, how the latter conceived his pessimistic philosophy. Faced with much the same questions that had confronted Gautama centuries before, SchOpenhauer found a kindred spirit in Buddha and readily accepted his doctrines. The German philosopher found in Buddhism the religious version of his philos0phy and the doctrine of deliverance from the insatiable driving force within the self thidh formed a major part of Buddhistic -hilosophy was readily accepted by Schopenhauer. He embraced the Buddhist doctrine that the ego is the source of selfishness and only by suppressing. the ego is it possible for man to be freed from the illusions that breed the evil of e3oism. In one sense Buddha.may be regarded as continuing Brahmanism rather than reacting sharply against it. The Vedanta philOSOphy had already proclaimed a message of deliverance from the illusions of this earthly experience through knonledge. And Buddha's own gospel was a message of deliverance from the illusions and snares of sense through the enlightenment of which he was the prophet. But while this is so, Buddha silently yet firmly set aside much that was important in the then existing Brahmanism. The system of caste he treated as valueless, and the Brahmanical theology seemed to him futile. The elaborate order of sacrifices he judged to be unnecessary as well as cruel; and self-torture he considered vain. To Gautame the secret of man's sorrow and suffering, and of nis redemption likewise, lay within himself. The way of wisdom lay in recognizing the fact of suffering, in knowing its origin and extinction, and the path which led to its extinction. Like Schopen- hauer centuries later, Buddha believed that the remedy for a world laboring in pain, lay in the overcoming of man's insatiable desire, the suppression of the will to live, and casting away he chains of sense. Though we must admit that there is much that is fine and grac- ious in Buddhism, it has its defects when judged in comparison with Christianity, which disqualify it from attaining the universality at which it aims. There is an eudaemonistic element in Buddhism which expresses itself in the dread of misery and suffering, as if suffering were always an evil to be avoided. The Buddhist practices the virtues of kindness and compassion toward suffering fellow mortals, but he does so in order that he may discipline and perfect himself in the task of extinguishing d sire, not to ameliorate conditions in the world around him. Consequently, his creed is a creed without hope or inspiration. He will die to every desire for all are alike vain and empty - illusions that deceive a man. Certainly the pessimistic Spirit deeply colors the Buddhist vision of life. Schopenhauer's philos0phical system owes its being to external causes, at least in part, for it was the product of two tendencies, as specifically German, and the other distinctly Oriental. The German tendency supplied his thought with its philosophic groundwork, but the Oriental, though it came from an East that was little under- stood in Schopenhauer's day, gave the impulse that built into a system of pessimism the principles he had inherited. Certainly, schopenhauer was greatly influenced by Immanuel Kant and by Fichte, but the impetus which determined the cirection he took was given, largely, by Buddha. But from Buddha Schopenhauer learned the central theme that the will, which was the essence of the ego, because the symbol of the universal cause - it was the root alike of individual and universal life; this universal will to live, as everywhere distributed, was a.passion for being, a struggle to live, a yearning toward realization; but this passion was blind, except as its end was being and the maintenance of being. Turning from Buddhistic pessimism we enter upon a study of the ancient HebreW'philosophies, eSpecially the writings in the Book of Job and the Book of Ecclesiastes in the Old Testament. While the Hebrew philos0phers were not brilliant metaphysicians and constructed no great theories of the universe, they did concern themselves with most of the problems relating to the life and destiny of man. The Hebrew philOSOpli, while containing Optimistic portions is yet largely pessimistic and it is two of the pessimistic writers with which we shall 96 concern ourselves here, with the caution that they are not represent- ative of F brew thought generally. As philosophers the Hebrews were able to stand with the Chinese, Hindu and Egyptian thinkers and while they never attained the great- ness of the Greek seekers after wisdom, they were more advanced in their philosophy than most other peOples in the pre—Hellenic era. The Book of Ecclesiastes is supposedly written by King Solomon. Basically, its philosophy preposes doctrines of determinism, mechanism, scepticism and pessimism. t holds that knowledge of ultimate things is impossible and that there is no evidence of any soul or any life after death. All living things are made of dust and will return to the dust from whence they came, "vanity of vanities, saith the Preach- er, vanity of vanities; all is vanity...I have seen all the works that are done under the sun; and behold, all is vanity and.vexation of spirit." 1 Fame, riches, extravagant pleasures are regarded as snares and delusions in the end. .Although wisdom is better than folly, even it is not a sure key to happiness, for an increase in knowledge brings a keener awareness of suffering. Man and beast alike suffer the same ignominy of death; the rich man who has prop- erty and servants to do his will and satisfy his every desire, look? ing at his position can but conclude that "all is vanity under the sun." Finding that all existence is futile what is Ecclesiastes to do? He would enjoy the things of life and since there is the possi- bility of a judgement after death, he would keep on he safe side and obey the commandments. Tsanoff comments upon this by saying: l Ecclesiastes, Ch. 1; 2 and 1M. 97 "So the mind that had started a dirge of sceptical-cynical weariness ends, or is made to end, on a note of cautious piety. It is a politic conclusion of a calculating philosop.y of life." 1 The Book of Job likewise provides an example of limited contingent pessimism. The Book is a drama of the tragic struggle between man and fate. Its central theme is the problem of evil, how it can be that the righteous suffer while the eyes of the wicked stand out with fatness. Job, the main character, is a man of unimpeadhable virtue, suddenly overtaken by a series of disasters - he is deprived of his prOperty, his children are killed, and.his own body is afflicted with a dread— ful disease. At first he accepts all this with resignation but as his troubles become more and.more grievous he curses the day of his birth and pravs for death. Job enters into a lengthy discussion with his friends over the problem of evil. His friends are inclined to view suffering in the usual Hebraic way‘- as a punishment from God for past sins. But this does not satisfy Job. Despair weighs heavily upon him and he decides that God is an all-powerful Spirit of Evil, who destroys without mercy and without purpose. In his misery he appeals to God to reveal Him- self and His ways to him. The answer he receives convinces Job of his own insignificance and.of the power and glory of God, but there is no solution offered for the problem of evil and the Deity makes no effort to refute the pessimism of Job. The same note of weariness and cosmic disenchantment pervades the Book of Job and Ecclesiastes as well. 1 Tsanoff, Nature of Evil, 1). 36. In a direct continuation, since much of he New Testament is based upon the Old, is the philosophy of Christ. LeOpardi continually stressed the pessimistic strain in the philosOphy of Jesus, returning time and time again to the fact that Jesus reCOgnized the natural and miserable proclivity of man toward evil and by calling it "the World" emphasized the wide difference "H, between Spiritual or supernatural virtue and worldly nature: m {ingdom is not of this world." Schopenhauer commenting upon what he considered the pessimism in the New Testament says: 'The New Testament must be in some way traceable to an Indian source: its ethical system, its ascetic view of morality, is pessimism, and its Avatar, are all thoroughly Indian....the view taken by Christ- ianity in common with Buddhism (is) the world can no longer be looked at in the light of Jewish Opt- imism, which found 'all things very good': nay, in the Christian schemeg’the devil is named as its Prince or Ruler, 5/6”wa T071 (03744.00 rat/7'00,” (John: 12,33) To Schopenhauer, Christ is the symbol or personification of the negation of the will to live. Nietzsche, however, takes an opposite view and lays many of the evils of the world at the feet of Christ, and blames Him for the misery, suffering, incompetence, etc., in the world today: "This Jesus of H.2areth, the incarnate gospel of love, this 'Redeemer' bringing salvation and victory to the poor, the sick, the sinful - was he not really tempt- ation in its most sinister and irresistible form, tempt- ation to take the tortuous path to those very Jewish values and those very Jewish ideals.“ 1. SchOpenhaner, Essays, "The Christian System", 0p. cit.,,PP- 92-93- 2 Nietzsche, Frederick, The Geneaology of Morals, Modern Library, New York, p. 9+5. 99 There have been varied views 0 the aha acter of Christ; the Roman Catholic view of the helpless Babe of Bethlehem and the Infant of Prague Who draws all men to Himself by His simplicity, His help- lessness and His humaneness, yet possessing infinitude, power and divinity; there is the Protestant concept, relying upon the Medieval reformers, who have made a reformer of Christ, comparable to John the Baptist; the philosophers of the scholastic era have stressed th wetaphysical aspects of His character, while Protestantism has stressed the moralistic aspects. Protestant ChristolOgists, despite their evident sincerity, seem inclined to expect Christ to advance the cause of their party and they are forced to view Jesus in their own narrow way. Man has made Christ in the image and likeness of man. Even in the realm of art, there has been a wide variety of im- pressions of Christ, apparently creating a Christ to suit the ideals of the particular age or philos0phy of the time or place. The ihons of the Eastern Orthodox Church have a gothic weariness and angularity about them, giving an almost cadaverous appearance to their images 01 Christ. Michelangelo gives Him a muscular appearance while Raphael makes Him fleshy. .About many of the paintings and works of sculpture there is an effeminate quality about Christ, a quality of weakness and supineness; other artists depict Him as a terrible avenger, a mighty and powerful judge; while the Spanish artists give to Him a Quality of suffering, - to them Christ appears all mangled, bruised, bleeding and dying. In the midst of all this confusion concerning the real character of Christ, vriters such as Leopardi and Schopenhauer point to the 100 pessimism of Christ. They deplore the effort of those who attribute to Christ the Optimistic characteristics of human thinkin3, pointin3 out tlat Optimism is but a poor medicine for the Christ Who was immers— ed in 3rief and fully alive to the contradictions of life. Optimism, they point out, means that one must be so uncritical as to accept life and the universe at the face-value and that Christ refused to take all things for granted. Optimism of this sort would imply a blindness to the existence of the remote and the ideal. t is easy to point out, from a study of the Gospel narratives, that Christ did not preach a 3ospel of success, as so commonly underb stood in worldly terms. 1 He gave no praise to those who tried to solve the problems of this world by any method of exteriorization. He preach- ed to the poor, the maimed, the blind, and the world-veary to prepare them for eternity, "Ky Kingdom is not of this world!" But miristians have metamorphosized Christianity and its pessimi u of the verity of this world. Occidente;l Christianity is able to accept Christ and His Gos 381 today only oec.use men have Chang ed it, overlooked its true meaning and minimized its mes sa3e of contempt for the things of earthly e} :istence. How else could Protestant and Catholic accept the Sermon on the Hount with its philos0phy of non-resistance and non-resentment? 1 Bruce Barton in his book, 'Tne hen Hobo“v Knows" ta”es a contrary view, the t Christ was a successful business executive and a shrewd advertising and puolicity mana3er, Whose ability in business and social relations was responsible for the relatively swift spread of Christianity. The book was written, we mi3ht recall, in an era when business and "success“ in financial enterprises almost became a reli3ion with many America us. R .H. Tasney, in his book, ‘Heli 3ion and the Rise of Capitalism, ” (Pen3uin Book 3, Inc. N.Y., 19L?) dis- cusses the influence of Calvinism on western thou3ht and the pos si- bility that Calvinism exercised a lar3e influence on the western striviL3 ior material success, as a sign of predestination ori3inally, and later this attitude became habitual, even after its reli; ious ori3in and motivation was for3otten. 101 How else could modern Christians ignore the counsel to seek no treasure in the finite order, fear not those who kill only the body, fear not to cut Off the hand or pluck out the eye, if they Offend the interior spirit, hate the life of sense and love the life of spirit? 1 Certainly these are evidence of the transvaluation of values effected by the limited contingent pessimism of Christ. In His pessimism of worldly values, Christ insisted upon the supremacy of the inner soul and denounced the attempts to subju3ate the soul to material ends. He stressed the nothinqness of worldly glory, wealth, power and pleasure, "For what doth it profit a man if he gains the rmole world yet suffers the loss of his immortal soul?" Weighed in the balance, the world is made to appear of little value when compared with the value of but one soul. Christ decides against the Optimism which places man in the world as a thing among things, and decides for a pessimism which drives the soul be h into itself, for He wa anxious to be loyal to the soul and to eternity and thus He repudiates the world, rejects it as unworthy of the soul. Yet, Jesus was not lacking in a sense of metaphysical or moral responsibility when He rejected the material order of things in both nature and humanity. On the contrary, when He was permitted to in- dulge His own interpretation of things and persons, He showed extra- ordinary appreciation of the spectacle which was passing before Him. 1 Dr. Paul HonigSheim of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Michigan State College has pointed out in his lectures that the philOSOphies of the world's great religious leaders are soon changed by their followers when religion becomes bureaucratic and men become unwilling to form their lives according to the purity of the master's teaching. They grow insistent upon minimizing the more severe doct- rines, accepting only those that meet with more pOpular approval. It is usually the small sect that insists upOn preserving the purer forms Of the creed, for example, the Mennonites, Quakers, Old Catholics, and certain religious orders in the Roman Church. 102 In His limited contingent pessimism, He found it necessary to proceed f from the soul, from tile self outm Ltoward the world and the social state; in doin this Christ was ever discontented with the way in 1‘ 5 “ "iich the tliings of nature and th e subjects of the state had been orsanized into artific1al svstezs. Elie perception of birds and 1 flowers, of children and simple people pleased Him and won His approval, l i but He became indi51ant at the nJoocricv,.nd formalism of legalistic / / / groups Within the Jewish religion. In His pessimism, Christ upheld tile noole di wslty to the world. It was the idea of he north of the soul which.served Jesus in brin5in5 aoout the emancipation of the human self from the thin5s of the world. The soul has an intrinsic value which 5ives it di5ni v; from this position of di5nity, the soul cannot be displaced by any hing in the outside world. In the morale of Christ, one must hate the things of the world. True, Hi sGospel rm s a Gospel of Love, but love of neighbor is even cleansed of its humai aspect of love and lust for He expanded them into ideals of non-resistance and non-resent- ment,ahd the highest type of love was that based upon a sense of duty, not merely upon emotion. To Jesus these ideals seemed obvious but to the modern "Christian" non-resistance and non-resentment are either ignored, watere d— down or casuistically rele5- ated to the works to be done by saints or the chosen few. Christ was anxious to put an end to the bandyin5 about of the terms good and band. In order to make Himi elf unders tood.he showed His disoaorov l of the couuonly a.ccepted values. He had no desire to place the seal of His approval upon those Who v.'ere in the position 103 of earthly greatness. Thus, He dismissed Caesar with a witticism concerning the Caesarian image on the coin, called Herod a fox, and treated Pontius Pilate with silence. Parties came in for a . similar condemnation. Pharisaism was suomitted to the most strident form of crit'cism by Him Who showed His scorn by avoiding Scribes and Pharisees and consorting with Publicans and sinners. Christ condemned the social order so dear to the hearts of the Pharisees and He accused them of making the outside of the cup Cleo while the interior was filled with rottenness and corruption. There is no thought of the meliorism peculiar to "social Christianity" - no ideal of "civic ri5hteousness;“ there is nothing but pessimistic condemnation of the morality of mediocrity. Christ's limited con- tingent pessimism is strong and virile in the face of wars and death and sickness and corruption, - "let not your hearts be troub— led," - "Blessed are they who suffer persecution," - "Come to he all ye who labor and are heavily burdened and I will 5ive you rest," but His peace is not the sort of peace the world might give. It was this pessimistic view of the world that led early mystics to leave the worldly pursuits of other men and seek refuge in deserts or caves, where 'n the practice of austerities, they could bring under subjection the driving will to live and the desire for material things. Christian ascetics have regarded the world as evil; as filled with temp— tations that can bring destruction to the soul, and they avoided all worldly contacts, insofar as this was possible. They strove to be {£3 the world, but not 9: it." Indicative of this pessimistic outlook is the beast of St. Aloysius Gonzaga that he had never looked into the eyes of his mother for fear that he mi5ht be led to entertain impure 1014 thoughts. then Christian motherhood is regarded as evil, pessimism of a deep dye is certainly evident. In most Christian monastic communities, members are forbidden to own any prOperty, even the clothing on their backs, in order to avoid worldly contacts as much as possible. To subdue the flesh, they are urged to practice penance and plvsical discipline. All great religions have praised asceticism, and in consequence it we not difficult for Schopenhauer to cite, in support of his theory that chastity is the best alternative to suicide, a number of texts from the 5nostics, the early fathers of the church, the mystics and the Quietists, together with pertinent extracts from the Bible and the sacred books of the Orient. Beyond suicide, Which is not a phil- osophic solution, there are but two remedies for the misery of life, SchOpenhauer felt. One of these remedies, a palliative, is found in art and disinterested contemplation; the other, i asceticism or absolute chastity. He felt that if chastity were universal, it would drain the source of humanity anC pain would disappear, for if man is the highest manifestation of Will, if he were to die out, the weaker reflections would pass away. But while chastity for the ascetic is a.means to the exaltation of personal purity and the renunciation of worldly pleasures, to SchOpenhauer, the value of asceticism consists in the fact that it could lead to deliverance; it can prepare the world for the annihilation of pain and misery. SchOpenhauer did not indicate how all men are to be p rS'aded to embrace a life of celibacy, nor how all women are to be convinced that their greatest service to mazkind would be to refuse to bear children. However, it is not the province of philosophy to prOpose how this should be done. 105 medieval asceticism as practiced in monasteries and convents had certain features in common with pessimism. It thought, as did the early coenobites and hermits, that the world was wrong, too unclean to be a fit home for a holy person; therefore, a.place to be forsaken if a man would save his own soul. The existina order of Q '4- society was conce ved as evil, and it was thought better that the good man should take himself out of that order than endanger his soul by remaining within it. "Flee from the wiCkedness of the world!"- became the hue and cry of the medieval ascetic. On its personal side, this was a doctrine of salvation, and is limited contingent pessimism, t on its social side it was a doctrine of annihilation, so far at least as its attitude signified that the world was so bad that the pious could neither desire its continuance, nor do anything to pro- mote it. It was in this latter aspect that it agreed with pessimism, for it conceived secula society as so under the power of evil that the happiest thing for it was to pass away and perish. This tendency is typical of tie lessimistic mood that is never very remote from any of us. The first impulse of a man who is ang_y m it the emptiness and unrealities of human life, is t O "5 93 2 (D 9.) ch Ho d E" U) all vanity and vexation of spirit. And in the burst of first fervor in his n w—found Spiritual belief, man is inclined to forsake a world ésidi is absorbed in the enjoyment of temporal things and to retire to a solitude where he may cultivate his fears and where, from a safe distance, he may watch the march to destruction of those who are too blind to see. Or he may consider it his destiny to devote his life to prayer for those who are so engrossed in material things. This type of contingent pessimism looks upon the world as filled with evil, 106 but longs for immortality where there will be a rectification or compensation for the miseries endured in this life. t clearly takes its cue from Christ Who urged His disciples to leave father and mother and wife and.all things, to follow Him. The idea of an evil world brought about by man's wilful selfishness, and.the consequent advocacy of the rejection of worldliness and the denial of self as essentials of godliness, Characterize the medieval conception of life. One exp ample of such disdain of the world and human life is the work of Pope Innocent III, in which he quotes Ecclesiastes and Job in his attempt to show the utter'vanity of existence and the worthlessness and futil- ity of man's life on earth. One passage will illustrate the possi- mism of the work: "Han is made of dust, of mud, of ashes; verse yet, of the foulest seed; conceived in the itch of the flesh, in the heat of passion, in the stench of lust; and worse, in the depths of sin; born to labor, to dolor, to horror; more miserable still, to death. He acts wickedly, offending God, offending his neighbor, offend- ing himself; he acts infamously, polluting; fame, pollut- ing conscience, polluting character; he acts vainly, neglecting the useful, neglecting the necessa . He is food for fire ever blasing and burning unguenched; food for worms, ever gnawing and eating without end; a mass of putrescence, ever noisome and horribly foul." It belongs to the medieval mind to substitute physical contin- ence for chastity, and to believe that the former is a practical aim and a.virtue, whereas it is often a disease. Catholic educators often leave youth in false conscience, suffering them to regard as unchaste and sinful things that are perfectly inevitable and quite normal. The very conception of "angelic purity" (a much used phrase in pious books) is misleading. ,Angels were (speaking the language of l Innocent III, Pope, De Contemptu Mundi, sive De hiseria Conditionis Humanae, highs, "Patrologia.Latina,"7Vol. CCXVII, Paris, 1889, pp. 107 concepts) sexless, passionless, and an ideal put before humans as attainable which does not make allowance for human passion and the physiology of sex is, to say the least, unsound. Catholic phiIOSOphy of sex, based as it is upon medieval anatomical studies, does not take into account the part which the secretions of the sex glands play in the organism as a whole. Nor does it adapt itself to the findings of science to the effect that without sexelife full emotional, mental, and physical maturity is impossible. Such an ethical system gives to youth the vision of sex as a kind of devil within his loins, bent upon his destruction, implacably hostile to his welfare. He comes to regard himself as conceived in evil and born in iniquity. fter a life of weary struggle he discovers that in itself, sex is no more demoniacal than digestion or reSpiration; or he becomes despondeut and pessimistic at his repeated failures to live the "angelic life“ enjoined upon monastics. One of the contributing factors in the devclOpment of a.philo— sophy such as that of POpe Innocent III mentioned above, is the teach- ing of the Roman Church that marital intercourse, no matter how holily performed is still looked upon with suspicion as potentially unbecoming, and displeasing to God, for pious couples are warned to abstain before receiving Communion. Greek Catholic priests, who are duly married according to the Eastern rite and discipline, are supposed to "abstain" for three days before they celebrate mass. After childbirth, a Catholic woman must be "churched", that is, ritually purified, as though she were in some way spiritually contaminated by the experience she had undergone in giving birth to her child. In fact, in the mind of the (mindwgf the Church, sex whether lawfully indulged in or not, whether 1 involuntarily (and therefore sinlessly) experienced, as in sleep, or voluntarily and sinfully experienced, always contaminates more or less. Only little children who know no sex are perfectly pure 1 What are pen- and acceptable and.holy in the eyes of the Church. itents to conclude from such advice but that sex-phobia is a virtue, and asexuality an ideal? Certainly these attitudes lead to a pessi- mistic outlook on life, magnifying into enormous evil, perfectly . i natural acts whicn are ethically moral and good. Catholicism, however, is not alone in inculcating a pessimistic attitude of contempt for the world and despair of man's ability to refrain from evil. Calvinism, with its doctrine of predestination has done much to cause men to look gloomily at life here and hereafter, and question its worth by calling into doubt cosmic justice. The Spiritual revolution thus engendered took as its Shibboleth the phrase, "contemptus muhdi amor Christi.’l npo, the will of man is ever A According to St. Augustine of Hi perverse and prone to evil, helpless except for God's grace. Calvin accepted and stressed this Augustinian concept and rejected all forms of sacramentalism, holding that no matter what a man does or may not do he is unable to merit his salvation. man is helpless in working out his own salvation and even for the elect, there would be no sal- vation but for God's grace, gratuitously given. Calvinistic absolute predestinarianism held the man's fall from original grace was a con- seQuence of God's decree of reprobation. It affirmed that God does not 1 Freud would criticize this view that it is possible for even small children to be asexual, for he contends that sex plays a very im- portant part even in the develOpment of infants. 109 nave a true vill to save all mankind but merely the elect and that salvation or damnation depends on the will of God alone, irreSpective of the action of the free will of the saved or the damned, or of their forseen merits or demerits. Though Calvin stressed the necessity to continue working and conforming to the will of God by living a moral life, even though no man could know for certain whether he was destined for heaven or hell, this doctrine certainly leads men to doubt the beneficence of God and makes them pessimistic of their own abilities to contribute toward their eternal salvation. It leaves the dilemma of undeserved suffering unanswered. We will deal with this problem in the next Chapter on the Problem of Evil. Are natural catastrOphes, floods, hurricanes, epi- demics and all the ills to which mankind is heir the consequence of Adam's sin? If so, does an Eternally Beneficent God lovingly elect some undeserving mortals to happiness and damn others, both in this life and in eternity to atone for the inherited consequences of.Adam's fall in which they had no part? Calvin preached a doctrine of renunciation of the world and all citizens of Geneva were compelled to tame an oath of confession to the Protestant faith. Showy dress was forbidden and overseers went from house to house to report on the morals of the peeple and to con- vince themselves that the laws were being carried out. Three men were imprisoned for laughing during one of Calvin's sermons. Dancing was banned as evil. Taverns were closed and in the approved "refreshment houses" the customer was obliged to say grace before and after meals. Because of his extreme pessimism concerning man's ability to avoid evil, alvin had established a police system to enforce morality. 110 Arnold J. Toynbee sums up the pessimism of the Calvinistic philOSOphy as follows: "The disillusioned.predestinarian who has been taught by harsh experience that his God is not, after all, on his side is condemned to arrive at the devastating conclusion that he and his fellowhhomunculi are 'But helpless pieces in the game He plays Upon this dheQuer—board of nights and days, Hither and thither moves and hacks and slays, And one by one back in the closet lays.'“ l Calvinism is a.philos0phy of determinism. Opposed to it is the doctrine held by the Scholastics and others of free will as the capability of self-determination. We know the fact of free will by direct consciousness, just as we know our own identity. We believe that we can freely guide our own thoughts, selecting, if we choose, the least attractive. We believe that when two alternative courses of action lie before us, we can freely del- iberate upon their respective merits, reflecting, inquiring, and examining the reasons for each side. Spinoza, however, holds to a philos0phy of determinism in contradiction to this Scholastic position. In his hpistles he says that if a stone which has been projected through the air had consciousness, it would believe that it was moving of its own free will. But Spinoza denied that either the stone or a philos0pher possess free will for he places freedom not in "free decision but in free necessity." He holds that every "individual thing is necessarily determined by some external cause to exist and Operate in a fixed and determinate manner." 2 1 Toynbee, Arnold J., A.Study of History, Oxford University Press, New York, 191:7, p. 1450 with the quotation from the Rubaiyat. . 2 Spinoza, Baruch, The Philoscphy of Spinoza. Letter LXII. trans. QY Pal-1.1:. Elwes, Tudor Publishing Co., N.Y., pp. 395—398. 111 The moral consciousness of mankind, in Opposition to the Calvinistic teachings, points to the freedom of man. The sense of moral obligation is written in every man's heart; it is as certain as the uniformity of nature. Man believes that he is absolutely free to avoid evil and to choose good. But the deteIh minist will tell us that these beliefs are mere illusions. The evil that perplexes the pessimist, is not merely physical evil, however, but moral evil as well. Crime, vice, sin, the lusts that in their search for pleasure make pain, the passions, and the brutalities that make men desolate, are the evils that create despair, for they do not inflict mere physical suffering, but devestate man's soul. There is small consolation in the belief that God.has no pleas- ure in the death of the wicked, but wills that all men should be saved, for the Question arises, - Why then is His will so impotent? Our perplexity is further increased when we ponder the fact that Theism creates the so-called problem of evil. If men did not believe in. a good God, or if they had not the disposition that this belief has created in humanity, they would not feel this Question of evil to be so insoluble a mystery. .A man who believes in mechanical necessity, or a fixed fate, will accept every fact of life, including its evil, but then his conscience will not be burdened, nor will he be perplexed, as if he believes in a free and good God. For where there is no choice there can be no morality, and where there is no morality there can be no responsi- bility nor condemnation. But if a man believes that there is a powerful and righteous God, the Creator and Ruler of the universe, he is, in the very degree that he is thoughtful, certain to be perplexed by the problem 112 that will rise time and time again, "‘.‘.'hy has He permitted evil to ad st?" It is with this Problem of Evil that we shall be concerned in the following dapter. 113 CHAPTER Iv THE PROB i OF EVIL hilos0phy has no more difficult or obstinate question for the consideration of its votaries than that connected with the origin and the existence of evil. It takes no keen intellect or perspic— acious spirit to discern the presence of evil, and both Optimist and pessimist have sought a solution to the problem. If man believes that there is an omnipotent and just Deity; in the course of his contemplation on the events of life, he will be confronted by the question of how this God could allow evil to exist. And as man dwells on this paradox, he reasons somewhat as follows: 'God, being all-powerful, either could.have prevented evil from existing in the world, and would not prevent it; or He desired to prevent it, but did not possess the power to do so. If I embrace the first alter- native I must conclude that while He is omnipotent, He is not per- fectly Good; and if I embrace the second alternative, I must con— clude that while He may be a God of perfect Goodness, He is a being of imperfect power. But either conclusion leaves me with a proposit- ion which denies the perfection of God, for I must conclude that a perfectly good being would not have permitted so much evil in a world He created.‘ Symbolically, the problem may be expressed in the following a, reductio ad aosurdum type of argument: Let G 'God 0 =omnipotence J =justice E -evi1 111; Then G -—)o and J o as J —-——>E' o and J ———)E and E‘ G *-‘,'O and J G‘-—-)E and E' G! The presence of evil thus forms one of the most serious prob- lems confronting a man who would believe in a personal God. Opti- .ite of the evil found in it, uh mism, conceives existence as good in - wh‘le pessimism as a philos0phy gives expression to the belief that life is undesirable, hateful, or purposeless because of its evils. Thus both pessimist and optimist concern themselves with the prob- lem of evil: the Pess'mist seeks to learn the answer to the Quest- ion of the ultimate nature of evil and how best to escape it, - while the optimist ponders the paradox of why a fundamen ally good and perf- ect world should include evil and how best to adjust to it and mini- mize it. As has been said before, the problem of evil arises only in a theistic philosOphy. In atheistic philosophy, there is no "problem" of evil, for the philos0pher who rejects the belief in the existence of a God is not concerned with moral purpose or final causes in a cosmic sense, but merely with the fact of the existence of evil; he does not 0 u N n o q o 1 9‘ v4 a 3| give praise or olame Ior things as me finds them to any transcendent beiiv His concern with evil is an empirical one, for he believes to. 115 hat when evil is found, it reS“ ts from an arre Sement inimical to human values, or a maladjustment to purely material thin.s. Since Immanuel Kent's CritiQue of Pure Reason, philos0phers have almost been compelled, if they would rise above the narrowh ness of dolmatism, to orush aside purely me 5rd ysical speculations a1d concern themselves with analytical, linzuistic, lo pical and em- i-ations, leavinr pure speculation to speculative U pirical inves scientists, and it is in accord nee with this attitude of Kent tlm I shall attempt to concern myself primarily with 51h at is known, leeyb in; he theolOgians to s: Mecul ate about the problem of evil and its possible solution. I do not deny that metaphysics is a legitimate field of philosophical endeavor. I simply state that the problem of evil is a transcendental one and philOSOphy should not attempt .L to prOpose a dojnatic solution to theC Hue tion of its me ure. It is understandable to see how Giacomo LeOpardi turned to grim des air of the goods of life by the time he had reached nine- teen years of age for he felt thatl 11s happiness he d been wrecked by ill health which deprived him of one of his greatest joys, that of engag -ing in study; almost blind, hemmed in on almost every side by restrictions and parental objections to his hopes and dreams, he regs rded himse elf as merely bidding his time until he would 11nd re- lease in deatl. Any adeguate study of his pessimism must take into account his own unhappy life, for certainly the jud e 1ent he passes on life was not an impersonal one, but a result of 11is own tra3ic experience. Philo of Ale:r.ndria an ontolo;ical pessimist, writing in a mystic-reli3ious tradition, is clearly pessimistic in his attitude 5 inextr icably bound up He toward existence for he felt that evil with every man‘s life. Lhe soul, tied down to the body with all of its propensities toward evil, is never free. He felt that life, which is the ont0103ical ‘as1s for an individual's existence, is also the medium of evil. It is only by asceticism and a denial of world- liness, that man can rise above the evils of the world. ‘\ 0 Clearly, many pn110s0p11ers in studying life and its varied moral problems will agree with p ssimists in their acco" ts or descriptions of the evils that exist. Even the most pronounced Optimist would not deny the existence of the lon 3 lists of physical and moral evils of which Schopenhauer writes. F w men ccn live in the world and not be deeply touched by its sufferings, by man's selfish- ness toward man, by the seeming injustice of morally evil men gain- in; wealth and honor and r1any other me aterial goods while men of good moral character often suffer a plenitude of ills and material evils. In our own time it was an occasion of perplexity to many that a totalitarian nation, e.g. Nazi Germany, often appeared to thrive on injustice a.d evil while nations 1.hich professed Christian and democratic principles were often beset with evils that threatened their very existence. For a time England seemed to be going down in defeat while Germa.ny rode mater over one EurOpea n country after another. Deepotism, which according to many value judgements is an evil, apparently increases, t.'hile democracy (which of course can be variously defined and has been apgalied to (we crioe ever;: extreme form 117 of government from the most dictatorial to the most d mocratic) must struggle to preserve itself against the onslaughts of elements seek- n: its destruction. “x Fl- L own, ror dictatorial governments are extremely pessimistic of the f the people of a nation to govern themselves. They annot {‘3 O H. H H. C+ k: 0 J. regard the ponulace as intelligezt enough to choose the good, nor possessed of sufficient character to resis the enticements of demap gosy; while the pepulace, deSpairing of their own ability to preserve peace 0 find security, look with Optimism to the dictator for leader- H h ‘ a snip. Th problem 01 the violat'o ignts of men to govern t5 0 H) (P r. . H (D '1 themselves is clearly a moral proolem. So is the question of discrim- ination against minority rroups, the question of war, the question of a) 1 state seizure of property of individuals, and the whole gamut of sini- lar problems which are raised in discussing the relative value of one form of government over another. There is little or no problem of evil for man in the lower levels of culture. The presence of evil in his environment is accepted with- out asking whether such a condition could have been avoided. The nai and pressing concern is to overcome or evade the evils which threaten him in his struggle for existence, but for the existence of evil in general, or for trying to understand its causes or its relation to mankind in general, he has no great concern. The growth of reflection, the formation of the idea of a worldpsystem and a social order, provoked a study into the origin and meaning of evil within this order. In primitive cultures material evils are exclusively dealt with, 118 and the religion which is thought to deliver from these 1s conceived q . I o L in a.naterial fashion. There 15 no areas difficulty for the savage _) to eXplain dle reason for the e::istence of the evils that beset him. He simply reasons that the goods and evils of life have their corresp- onding sources in the pir it world; and if there are beneficient spirits who are able and willing to help man, there are also evil spirits to J those hostile actionn rbe traced the evils that ems suffers. In man's early develOpment there is little difficulty with the problem of evil, for man spealcs of evils rather than of evil and.he has little difficulty unders tandinr it. he simply imputes evil to evil gods. But with a monotheistic religion, and the idea of a personal and ozini- potent Deity who is considered to possess the attributes of perfection, the proolem of evil comes into existence. Even the materialist is faced with t’n e hedonistic paradox. If he embraces a hedonistic philosophy, holding that the only good is ‘I pleasure and one ought always to seek it, he is confronted with ne fact that wlienever pleasure itself is the object sought it cannot be found. Human nature is such that pleasure normally arises as an accomp minent of satisfaction of desire for an end ex :cept when that end is pleasure itself. Paradoxically, the way to attain pleasure is not to seek for it, but for something else which when found will have yielded pleas‘re through the finding. And similarly, one should m. iot seek to av moidn p-in, but only actions which produce pain. inere is a psycholo; ice.l reason for this. leasure normally follows upon A the sat 'i: 3fc;ction of desires. But the pursuit or pleasure, for its .0 own sake, means the deliberate stimulation 01 the instir ctive and sensuous tendencies that underlie these desires, and such deliberate 119 stimulation results inevitc oly in satiety and the dm lling of our 0 stimuli. 1here is a great WlSdOH in rec03nizing, Fl) H sens1tivit uy as did Epicurus, he truth that what we call happiness is a by- product of a ri ah and fully lived e: :istence, and to tuin from life itself to its by-products brings with it dtime tely disillus- ionment and pes w1.ism. If we define a paradox as an Opinion or an event that appears self—contran He tory, 1e undeserved su11er1n s of the innocent is pared xical. "hen we view the relation of Yahveh to His peeple, the problem of evil becomes especially perplexing in later Hebrew thought. What explanation can be given for th apparently undeser- veE sufferine of rifiiteous men? This is the central problem in th ‘LA Book of Job as Tsanoff indicates: "If, with Job's three friends, we judge the t affliction is always puni hment for sin, we reason a3 ainst plain and ab- undrm at experience in men' s lives. If, with Satan, we spec~ ulate that God brin n3s calamity to men in order to test their rirhteousness, we mev be mel1~n1ng God, Whose omnipotence would scarcely seem to rec lire, or His perfect goodness to permit, any uch experiments at good men's expense. But Satan's ques tion me; yet be the decisive one:'Doth Job fear God for nought?‘ Though the tragedy of Job remains in his anguished search for a theodicy, for a view of God‘s treat— ment of him that would not reflect on God's unwavering just- ice, yet Job's own un shaken moral resolution reveals that he does not serve God for nou~et. Unable to grasp a new view of God nor yet to fbandon th‘ e old one, he holds fast to his rig hteousness." We should face the fact, I believe, based upon empirical obser» vation, that prosperity is not always the lot of the wicked, and misery always the portion of the good, as some pessimists so falselv generalize. Ilany :;ood.pe0ple enjoy hee.lth, wealth, social and political preeminence, l Tsanoff, horel Ideals of Our Civilization, E.P. Dutton Co., 19MB, P 120 while nary wicked people suffer sickness, poverty, diS5race, imprison- ment aid painful death. Happiness is not always to be measured by mere externals. Poverty does not always mean suffering, nor does wealth always insure happiness. It would be interesting to know the ratio of suicides among the wealthy as compared wi h that among the middle-income and lower-income groups. It would not be surprisina to learn that the number of suicides among the wealthv was as larse or even larger preportionately, than the n‘nber of uicidal deaths among the lower income groups. One of the answers to the problem of why a just God.permits innocent men and women to suffer ruin and every sort of evil, and why wicked men often seem to prosper, has been given by Joseph de Maistre (lYBM-lSZl) a.French philosopher of the romanticist school. He reasoned that God had established certain necessary relations between the natural and the moral order. This life is a tine of trial, during which a man must prove himself worthy of the eternal happiness that God metes out to those who serve Hit. The sufferings of the good, therefore, are to be regarded as punishment for sin. De Maistre held that this punishment was meant for mankind, not specifically for any individual. Just as soldiers may not all die in battle but all are yet there to die, so all men are subject to certain ailments which may not afflict every man. Should man expect a.miracle in return for his goodness of life, demanding that the just man drink poison with no ill effects, or the wicked man, because he is wicked, should be struck dead by the remedy that should normally heal his body? God does reward and punish, with perfect justice, de haistre contended, but not in such haste as to disrupt the natural order which He has established. Not all prosperity is divine blessing, nor all suffering a punishment for sin. This answer I cannot accept as satisfactory, however, for as long as one innocent pprson, out of all the worldls millions, bears injustice, misery and other evils, the problem still remains unanswered. Catholicism, which de Maistre sought to revive in eirhteenth century France” does not pretend to give an adequate solution to the problem of evil. Her philosophers and theologians consider it a mystery not to be understood in man's earthly existence. But Catholi- J. cism condemns, in no uncertain terms, what she considers false solut- ions to the problem of evil; the dualism of ancient Zoroastrianism, which taught the existence of two equal principles, a good and a bad, combating continually against each other; the fundamental pessimism of schopenhauer and.Von Hartmann, which declared the world too evil to be the product of a good God; the metaphysical Optimism of a Leib— niz, which held that this evil-stained universe was the best of all absolutely possible worlds; the will-to-power Optimism of Kietzsche which denounced Christianity as a slave moralitv. TheolOgians contend that God certainly does not intend physical evils for their own sake, for an Infinitely Intelligent God cannot mistakenly apprehend evil as good, and an Infinitely Good God cannot take pleasure in the misery and ferings of His creatures. .9 SILL Gandhi, the Hindu mystic, commenting upon the problem of suffering stated that it is the mark f the human tribe, an eternal law. The mother suffers so that her child may live. Life comes out of death; the condition of wheat growing is that the seed grain should perish. 122 No country has ever risen without being purified through the fire of suffering; progress is to be measured by the amount of suffering undergone, the purer the suffering, the greater is the progress. But Gandhi makes God the author of evil; " I cannot account for the existence of evil by any rational method. To want to do so is to be co-equal with God. I am therefore, humble enough to rec03nize evil as such, and I call God long-suffering and pat- ient precisely because He permits evil in the world. I know that He has no evil in Himself, and yet if there is evil He is the author of it and vet untouched d by it." Let us consider evil as of two kinds: evil that may be suffered and evil that may be done. The evil that mav be suffered we will call physical evil; that whi h may be done, moral evil. Actually, it may be impossible to disjoin the two, but for our present discussion we will consider them separately, for they belonr to distinct categories, ‘3 physical evil may be cons1dered incidental, occasional or relative and we might term it negative or privative. Moral evil, on the other hand, is positive and is actual rather than relative. Taken in a large sense of embracing the historv of a peeple or the collective fortunes of a race, physical evil may be endured or suffered either by the innocent or by the guilty, and its being and function may be, in both cases, equally natural and necessary. Physical evil 2 may be divided into three classes: First, those shidh arise from man's relation to nature and nature's to man: Second, ‘ 0 those which are native to his own being: Third, those inflicted upon him by inflicted upon him by his fellow man, whether ancestors or contemp- oraries. 1 Quoted in John Gunther's book, Inside Asia, Harper &2Bros., 1939, p.367. 2 For much of data I am indebted to Professor DeHaan for ermission to follow the material in his forthcoming boox,.A Call to eflection. 123 To the first class belong those evils whidh result from the dest- ructive forces of nature; storm, hurricane, earthquake etc.. The terrible disasters caused by Japanese earthquakes or a South Pacific tidal—wave raise m- v doubts as to the wisdom or goodness of God and are more damaging than the scepticism of the eighteenth century philo- sophers. When nature fails to respond to the work of man, famines result. Droughts, insect invasion, and soil-erosion may destroy man's efforts to provide himself with food. then man neglects nature, and refuses to obey her laws, pestilence and epidemics of disease follow with death in a.hundred forms of slow or swift certainty. It is important that in considering natural or physical evils we hesitate before deciding that nature acts alone. We should consider just how far nature is reSponsible and how far man may be held to blame in the evils that develop. The number of evils caused by man's own ignorance or deliberate violation of natural laws constitutes an ends less series. Soil-erosion often results from man's greed or his lazi- ness; pestilences are usually man's fault; accidents are usually ere plicable in terms of man's own failure to exercise caution. Even the natural forces which often work to man's disaster, can be turned into his most beneficent aids if he will but study and master them, and the more man studies the secrets of nature the greater the mastery he attains. We cannot but marvel wzen we reflect how man has arnessed the forces of nature and set limits upon its destructive pow— er. But before he an control these forces, he must learn obedience to natural laws. Much of civilization is the result of this educative process, man learning to obey the laws of nature and then in turn com- manding nature by obeying her own laws. By imitating the methods of nature and by calculating her forces, man has learned how to navigate upon the seas of earth; to fly the sky-lanes; to sow and reap the harvest. The awful power of a bolt of lightening and the surge of mighty rivers have been harnessed and turn- ed to man's use, to light his cities and to provide heat and p wer to 1 add to his comfort and to lessen his labors. It cannot be denied, however, that nature can also inflict suffer- ing on ma.. But these sufferings have also helped to educate him so that he has become more humane. He has learned that he must help his fellow men who suffer at nature's hands. When pestilence comes, or when shipwreck or disaster strikes, man is able to brave nature's wrath because, knowing her amful power and the fear that she can strike into the hearts of those she smites, man can brave danger in pity for those who are threatened. Famine has taught man to share his goods with those less fortunate and it is only the most perverted and self- iSh who will refuse aid to those who bear nature's wrath. In medieval times pestilence was dreadful, for it aroused, by the fear of contagr ion and the horror of death, the fiercest passions that can burn in man's breast, but the more men have penetrated into nature's secrets, the more they have learned their community of interests and that u.at affects their neighbor can easily affect them for no man can isolate himself entirely from the society in which he moves. No man is ever completely isolated but is always a group member, and as such he is affected by the group and in turn originates action to them. Nature has indeed been here a great educator in human pity and helpfulness; the very suffering he has inflicted has disciplined man and turned him to compassiOn. The people who enslaved the negro learned through 125 the penal consefluences tiat followed to thems lves from their own act the humanity of the men they had enslaveL. fie slowly discover he men who dis- F!) that the secrets of nature are not the property 0 covered tlem, but of the whole race. I must cunit, however, that this poses but a feeble answer to the problem. In the second class, the evils that are native to man‘s own being, we can include thirst, desire, hunger, birth pangs and death H struggle and through all of man's earthly existence the insatiab e yearning for happiness and peace. One of the greatest frustrations ('1‘ man experiences is the result of his knowledge the his life is so brief, - many of the lower animals live longer on earth than he does, and such inanimate objects as stones 2 d trees and brooks endure long- er on the face of the earth than his short span. Death seems man's greatest ignominy, - to know that one day the body which houses our inner being must be placed beneath the earth and become the food of worms, a thing to rot and decay until nothing but a handful of dust that can be scattered by a gust of breeze remains, - this is the most ( 1‘ painful sting of mortality. Death strikes not only the individual who e life is ended, but it toudhes with its pall of gloom and lonli- U) ness innocent and helpless lives that would otherwise probably be appy. Is not death the greatest irony of mortal existence? What man, whether he looks to an eternity or whether he regards death as the complete and absolute end of his being, can await with calmness and equanimity the certain approach of the hour of his own demise? But is death an evil? To those philosophers who do not regard life per se as a.value, death cannot be a disvalue, for if they refuse to recognise life as ‘ a good, then death, which is the natural ending of that life, cannot be re3arded as evil. Schopenhauer regards existence as an evil, yet he bemoans tile fact that "every evening we are poorer by a day." Should he not have said that we are "ridher" as each day passes, for with the passing of each day man approaches the end of life, which to the pee si— mist is so unpleasant and undesirable, bringing man closer to SchOpen- hauers hope and dream, Nirvana. But let us consider, empirically, if death has brought any values with it; I will not even attempt to prove thatd ath is not an evil - let tliose who look ulon it as good defend their own proposition. While deaths per se is evil, if we accept life per se as good, for it is the privation of existence or at least of the ontological base or carrier of other goods, it must be admit ted that it has acCentm ted certain v Jues that man mirit otherwise i3nore Death gives a new meaning to life; time takes on a new value; affection, because of its brevity takes on a nobler aspect; and the simplest things of life stand out in oold relie e1 as bein3 good. A man who expects that the nex t m's sunrise will be his last, but who suddenly receives a reprieve at the last moment, can treasure such simple things as the morning dew on the grass, or the smell of newamown he‘, or the glory of an autumn sunset, whereas, all his life long he may have looked upon these thin3s as commonplace or without value. The pe miaist finds life boring and dull, either because of neurotic or other physiological conditions, or because he anticipates economic hardships bece .use of over—population, mechani- aation, or rampant utilitarianism; or he may hold a despairing attitude because of lack of religious faith which usually turns a.man's attention L from his present woes to a.hone for future amelioration. 127 Death can breathe into life a sgirit out or which all tra 3ic and heroic thin3s can come, and it can add a glory and grandeur to life that will give it new meaniz 3. Even the thoug 1t of the loss that death brings to those who must remain behind, touches with tenderness all the relations of life, for before loss can be felt, possession must first have been felt. Hi3§1t it not be true that those who love the livin3 feel life to De the more va uaole oecaus e it is so trans- itory? Death does no injustice to the individual because no man is exempt from it. We turn our consideration to the third class of evils, those men s"ffers from his fellowhm an. Serious reflection will serve to convince the ooserver that these are indeed infinitely va1ster, darker and more terrible the- the s*tu ferin3 s man suffers from the hand of nature. Greed, vanity, lust, ambition and ne3lect are just as devast- I ature' s evils. When the atom bomb blasted the life to P1 1 e 1 O H) :3 I"1 at1n3 a out of hiroshima in an 11stant of hell and pain, it was man's inhuman- ity to man, not any act of nature, that brought thiseyil into existence. And no amount of rationali ation or casuistry can ever justify the sla 3hter of innocent beings in time of war, for war is never just, unless it is permis aole to do positive evil that a problematic and highly controversial "good" may result. has any direct act of nature, in her most deva statin3 fury equaled the evil that man's own greed for territory,\ trealth, po 7er and political and economic dominance has forced upon mankind! While these th n3< s may be physical in form, they are ethical in their si3n11ficance and in their conseQuences. J. ”9 mi_ht enumerate other evils of a 1331021 Htur that are 128 ihilicted on men.by man; evils that result from the relations of the sexes; evils that Sprin3 from the social constitution an) civil re- lations of man as he is organized into communities, states and nations; evils that develOp out of man's need to work that he might live, and the economic and industrial complications that result from this need. Chile it must be admitted that mankind has not yet learned the ways to live at peace and in concord with his fellowhman, it must be admitted that the 3rowth in civilization may be measured by the limit- ations tEat lave been progressively laid upon his power to harm others. The sense of the harm man could do to man has possessed the individual conscience with fear, and has armed the social conscience with all its sanCtions and almost all its terrors. But while evil and pain do exist, they do have a purpose. It is this problem that has occupied the attention of Moritz Schlick who proposes that he calls "the lav of contrast." .As he has formulated it, this porposition states that "neverhending c‘tates of pleasure could not be felt as such (thus really would not be such) unless they were interrupted by pain: as, for example, the Pytha3oreaus supposed that we did not hear the music of the spheres, solely because they sounded a continuous monotone." 1 He continues to develop this dea as follows: Ho "......even thou3h here we cannot offer a proof, it still seems to be a fact of experience (I am of course not altogether sure of it) that the most profound joys of life are actually not possible unless, previously, 3rave feelings of pain have been experienced. It seems l Schlich, 3., Problems of Ethics. Prentice-Hall. H'Y" 19 129 that the soul reguires then in order to become receptive of the sublinest pleasures....A life "Ifinr such as the modest poet fibrike placed for: Wollest nit Freuden Und sollest mit Leiden Mich nicht fibers hfltten! - dooh in der Mitten Liegt Holdes Bescheiden.... could not be truly great, not because it lacked the deepest suffering, but because of the absence of the greatest joys, the path to which seems indeed to lead only through pain." Contending that the value of suffering was unknown to the ancients, Eicolai Hartmann states that when judged from the point of view of the hedonist, suffering and pain must be considered t03ether as evil, and that Christianity is largely responsible for the view of suffering as producing an elevating and liberat- ing effect. Hartmann writes that suffering leaves the man in- capable of suffering “broken, warped morally, disfigured and weakened" and that for him suffering is a disvlaue. But for the man who has a capacity to suffer, his power of endurance, his "humanity" and his morality grow under it: "Suffering is the energy-test of a moral being, the load—test of his elasticity. hot only is there no prostration, but suffering also leads to no more resistance, or endurance or moral elf-assertion; there is much rather an actual liberation, an awakening of a deeper moral power - a might of a.hi3her order, as compared with that of activity. For exactly when all activity is destroyed, then sgrength sets in, the positive ability to suffer." In facing the problem of evil and attempting to give an 1 Ibid., pp. l35§136 2 Hartz'.1ann, Nicolai, op. cit., pp. 139-1140. answer to the Question, "How an it be possible that a good and onnipotent Deity allows evil to exist in the worlC.?", St. Tho.t1as Acui— q nas holds that evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental 4. cause; that evil "which consists in the lefecu of action is always caused by the defect of the agent." 1 But, Aquinas argues, since God is perfect, He cannot be the cause of evil. He contends that God did not intend physical evils for their own sake, for an Infinitely Intell- i pent God neces 11y loves His own goodness. han's service is a free service; he is not a mere automaton or slave. The freedom of the will that man possesses necessarily involves the possibility of evil. Creat- ures by their very existence involve evil, as shadows are involved by the existence of objects that intercept the light of the sun. There- fore, even an Omnipotent God could not exclude evil from creation, though He is not its direct c uuse. While these contentions tend to 1i; Hte the burden of divine responsibility for moral evil, it does not completely solve the mystery of its presence in the world. The problem of evil still remains unsolved by the Scholastic writers. arena v COHCLUSICH: P3333 II SI.I I THE BALANCE It is common enough to characterize pessimism as an error and therefore as a philosophy to be assiduously avoi Me , as though it were a thing of evil. If we are objective in our evaluation of pessimism as a philosoghy, we must admit that it certainly has elements of worth. It takes a serious view of the vils of life, and that is a.matter on which too serious a.view is hardlv possible. There is something admirable in nor al in nation againSt sufferin3 and ev vil and in the protest against many of the admittedly ineQuitable events of life Then too, we should rec03nize thct a pessimist like SchOpenhauer has not simply inC Mu ing his own cynical mood, nor merely initatin3 the ideologies of the Orient, but representing a deep underlying philos0phy of his time. Our idea of the necessity of things, our belief in physical law 31d order, and the 1nexorable connection between cause and effect, has seriously affected our view of life and of evil. It would be an error to ignore the fact that there is little q anpiness for a lar e part of the world's inhabitants toCov. Few ,. {3‘ peOple have the keenness of ins1i3ht or he moral sensitivity to realize that evils abound. ,A shallow and superficial optimism in national and international conditions toC ay may be the worst possible philosOphy for a people who hope to live in freedom, eq:ality and justice As Professor DeHaan has observed,1 there are other things to 1 In the chapter on The Problem of Evil, in his forthcoming book. be said for the pessimistic philosophy: frus retiozl is usrally more keenly felt than satisfaction; there are more numerous desires tbs saticfa ctiozms man has the tendency to idealize things, rather than facing reality, and this often results in Lisillusionment; m3 often reaps the rewards of his labors when it is too late for him to enjoy them suf‘1icient y. Admitted; , these facts are often to be found in even the most pleasant life, ye et evil usually merges into good, - pe miiiszi often turns to Optimism. Somerset haugham has ooserved t1 lat it is a mistake to characteriz men as being of one nature or temperament, and it would be wrong to imagine that a pessimist is never Optimistic, or an Optimist ever pessimistic: "”he normal is w113t you find but rarely. The normal is an ideal. It is a picture that one fabricates of the avera e c.m -‘acteristics of men, and to find them all in a single man is hardly to be expected....this (is) a false pi ture...sclfi3s1ness and kindlines s, id.ealism and. sensuality, vanity, slmrness, disinterest- edness, courage, laziness, nervousness, oos tina , and diffidence, they can all exist in a single person and form a.plausible harmony....I suppose it is a natural prepossession of mankind to take peOple as though they were homogeneous. It is evidently less trouble to make up one‘s mind about a man one way or the other and dis- miss suspense with the phrase, hgfs one of the best or he's a dirty do.. It is disconcerting to find that the saviour of his country may be stingy or that the poet who has Opened new horizons to our consciousness may be a snob." Certainly, the se 11s is true of pes simists, unless they are pathological; it is uncommon to find philosophers who will accept the extremest type of pessimism, and even the philosophical Optimist, may in some aspects tend toward pessimism. While Christianity has a dism 1 view of the phenomenal world because of ori 3inzl sin, it also ultimately emerges as optimistic. As Tsanoff comments on the . all 1 La gham, op. Clto. PP- ho_49 "‘1 O pessimism of SchOpenhauer, “it is a mystery of good, and its solution demands a thoroughgoing revision of his metaphysics and cosmology. Deeper and more ultimate than Schopenhauer‘s pessimism is his doctrine of salvation." 1,As has been stated previously, under the influence of sorrow, suffering, and disappointment, the optimist becomes for the time being a.pessimist, and finds life unprofitable. The endeavor to justify pessimism by drawing up a calculus of pleasures and pains, and by showing that on the balance the pains are far in excess of the pleasures, is not successf‘ . The difficult— ies in the way of formulating such a calculus are impossible to sur- mount. Nor will it help matters to venture on the generalization that pain is the positive element, and that pleasure merely denotes the absence of pain. Psychologically, this theory is false. Many pleas- ures are certainly positive. In this respect, Schopenhauer errs, for every human being has experience of weariness and suffering; but there are few who cannot set over against this times of great hag;iness, hours of satisfaction with tasks being completed. Heed does not necessarily mean misery; and there ma* be a pleasure in satisfying wants although the satisfaction is not final and complete. Usually, it is not desire that makes men unhappy, but desire for the wrong things and people do not become pessimistic because they have hoped and striven, but because they have done so in vain. Schopenhauer attempts to just- ify his pessimism by pointing to the Spectre of endless desire. But We have only to ask ourselves whether human beings would enjoy a.hi§her d gree of well-being were there nothing left to desire, to see the error. A human life devoid of striving and aspiration would not be l Tsanoff, The Nature of Evil, pp. 301 -302. Q great or good, - it would be mean and brutisn. r] U) 1 -3 O i- l) P i) H. 0‘) Ho L5 0 (3 d O U) P. d. H o 0 w to this last view and takes a "grad- atioaal view of evil" and holds that there is no coming to terms with it. But he finds that pessimism may have an Opposite effect than that anticipated: "The only view of the world that might justify pessimistic despair would be a view that perceived no evil in it, no- thing perverse, nothing lower to surmount or overcome, and therefore nothing higher to challenge our endeavor: no problem, no task, no hazard of defeat or frustration: dull, placid monotony! There is a reported saying of Machiavelli: 'The worst misfortune in life is not sickness, nor poverty, nor grief; but tediousness.' Pessimistic philosophy... may have the reverse effect of that intended by the pessimist: it may be a goad to the sluggish. Evil and the perception of it are conditions for’heroic recognition and pursuit of Value, be it truth, beauty, goodness; for 'powers subjected to no strain...atrophy and eventually disappear.‘ In this sense evil is always only relative to good; but paradoxically, if we refuse to perceive and resist it as evil, then it be- comes evil absolute and utterly damns the very man who makes his peace with it." The pure Optimist steadily regards the other side of the picture and minimizes the evils of life. That there are evils he cannot deny, but suffering he thinks, is easily outweighed in the scale of happi- ness. There are several considerations, however, which the Optimist overlooks. For one thing it is not by any means clear, that the era perienced feeling of happiness increases sdth civilization. To us the life of the savage seems short and brutish, but the savage him- self does not feel it to be so, and he is probably as happy in his own way as the civilized man in his wax. heither would willingly change places with the other. We must also remember that while advancing civilization enables man to satisfy we.ts which, at an h N ‘ ‘ ‘ l Tsanorf, The dature of Evil, pp. LOO-401 135 earlier and ruder sta3e, he could not do, it does not follow that this means a net increase in huian happiness. rO3ress in civil- ization creates new desires calling for satisfaction, and modern man is made m1s able and frustrated by the absence of some luxury or comfort which his ancestors were perfectly content to do vithout. With all the at tempts at meliorism, the sufferin3s caused by Op1ression, so familiar in the ancient and medieval world, have not been banished from modern society - they have merely taken on new forms. When riot and anarchy break loose in a civilized community today, we catch a glimpse of the primitive passions that slumber not far beneath the "prOper" appearing surface of society. Consciousness of these things should m&”e us wary of exuberant Optimism. What then is the solution to the problems posed by the pessimist, if solution there be? C,.n I hOpe to give an anSt er to the riddle of the ages when such great minds as the Hebrew prOphets, Christian apolo- gists, medieval Scholastics, Schopenhauer, Taubert, von Hartmann, Leo- H pardi and hosts Of others have failed to provide a sati “I ctory sol ution? To attempt to do so would indeed be intri b1ing , but to presu axe to clai any original and satisfactory solution would be presumptious and fool- hardy. I can but point to a philosopher who seems (to me at lea st) to come closest to providing a solution, - Aristotle. While there is no evidence that Aristotle himself would.apply his "Golden Mean“ to the conflict bet veen Pessimism and Optimism, I would like to propose that it betsed to avoid the extremes of thought, which like extremes in virtue or vice, lead to an unbalanced and unhappy life. The extremes of pessimism and of Opti..ism oot11 seem inadeQuate and fail to view 1136 Truth seems to stand some- existence in all of its varied aspects. where between these two extremes, and an application of Aristotle's "Golden Mean" appears most satisfactory. ********#* BIBLIOGRAPHY 137 BIBLIOGRAPHY Bickersteth, Geoffrey L., Zibaldone, CambriQ ge University Press, 1923 Black, hex, Critical T31nkin3, Prentice—Hall Compzry , er York, H.Y., 1946 Broad, C.D., Five Types of EthicalT 1heoryg Harcourt-Bra ce and Co., New York and London, 1930. Carlson, J.F.. The Writings of Buddhism, hurray Compa.*, London, 1908. up Clark, W.C., The Works of Sharespere, Halcyon House, heV'Yorl,n.Y., 19s . 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