THE POLITICAL WROSWY
OF WM GODWEN

Thai: for tho Boyce-o d M. A.
WCHSGAN STATE UNNERSETY
RichaM 5’. Brock
E95?"

THESIS

  
 

LIBRARY

Michigan Sta tc
University

 
  

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
OF
WILLIAM GODWIN

BY
RICHARD P. BROOK

AN ABSTRACT
Submitted to the College of Business and Public Service
Michigan State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science
1957

Approved flaw W m

Richard P. Brock

This thesis is divided into four chapters. In the
first chapter there is a brief presentation of Godwin's
life and the times in which he wrote. His major works are
mentioned, and emphasis is placed on the main events and
circumstances of his life; such as his marriage to Mary
WOllstonecraft, his role as the father-inelaw of Shelley,
and his life-long financial difficulties.

The second chapter presents, in detail, Godwin's
political philosophy as expressed in his major work, An
Egggigproncerning Political Justice and Its Influence on
General Virtue and Happiness, published in 1795. Section
A is devoted to his basic principles; which include the
theory of perfectibility and the proposition of "universal
benevolence," the value of sincerity, the doctrine of necessity,
and other principles. Section B sets forth Godwin's belief
that men's actions are governed by reason alone, and that
moral improvement can result only from the effects of per-
suasion and free discussion. This section also describes
various types of interference that Godwin believes are
detrimental to free discussion and therefore to pregress.
Section 0 presents Godwin's objections to the use of coercion
in any form, but especially in the form of punishment, and
to the law as an agent of coercion. Section D includes
Godwin's unfavorable opinions on the history and basis of
all government; his description of monarchy, aristocracy,

and democracy; and his recommendations for the dissolution

Richard P. Brock

of government. Section E sets forth.what Godwin considers
the "genuine system" of property; which is, that each man
should receive according to his need.

The third chapter mentions the revisions in Godwin's
political thought as expressed in his later work. These
revisions reflect his higher regard for emotion and the
domestic affections, his recognition of physical inequality
and the consequent repercussions on his theory of perfect-
ibility, and his discussion of the "delusive sense of
liberty" and how it effects the doctrine of necessity.

This chapter also mentions the books in which Godwin's
revisions are most clearly shown.

Chapter four contains a criticism of Godwin's political
philosophy, which states; one, that although man is capable
of improvement, serious reservations must be made as to
the process as set forth by Godwin; two, that Godwin over-
looks the role played by emotion in men's actions; and three,
that some government is needed for security against violence
and for the regulation of complex affairs that arise in
an advanced civilization. This chapter also presents a
more sympathetic view of Godwin's life than the one that
generally prevails, and points out the significance of some

of his ideas.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
OF
WILLIAM GODWIN

BY
RICHARD P. BROCK

A THESIS
Submitted to the College of Business and Public Service
Michigan State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

1957

 

Approved OK” “790‘“ W?

6? 44-57
{kn/14’?»

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank Professor Christian Bay
for his encouragement and helpful criticism
during the preparation of this thesis

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
I. LIFE AND TIMES

A. Early Life
B. Years of Transition
C. Later Years

II. POLITICAL JUSTICE
A. Basic Principles

1. Perfectibility

2. "Universal Benevolence"
5. Sincerity and Necessity
4. Other Principles,

B. Public Opinion

1. Freedom from Interference
2. Direct Interference
5. Indirect Interference

C. Coercion and Punishment

1. The Use of Force
2. Law

D. Political Institutions

1. History

2. Monarchy

5. Aristocracy and Democracy
4. Defects of Democracy

E. Property

1. The "Genuine System"
2. Objections

III. LATER THOUGHT

A. The Domestic Affections
B. Reason and Feeling

C. Perfectibility

D. Necessity

II 1]" III! l I I"

IV. CRITICISM

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

Gwnmsmm
Three Basic Ideas
Perfectibility
Opinion
Government
Conclusion

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION

For a brief period in English history, William Godwin's
literary star shone brightly, only to shatter with sudden
swiftness and descend into oblivion. He is little re-
membered today. For those to whom his name does bring
some glint of recognition, he is usually remembered only
as the father-in-law of Shelley.

When Godwin published Political Justice, in 1795,
he became a celebrity almost overnight. William Hazlitt
said, "Tom Paine was considered for the time as a Tom Fool
to him, Paley an old woman, Edmund Burke a flashy sophist.
Truth, moral truth, it was supposed, had here taken up its
abode, and these were the oracles of thought."1

Political Justice was written during that brief period
in the 1790's, when the French Revolution had stimulated a
reform movement in England. The Godwinian theory rode the
crest of this wave, and set forth.many known and also many
original and sometimes rather startling propositions. Start-
ing from a utilitarian position, that the greatest happiness
of the greatest number should be the goal of society, it
proposed that men were capable of infinite perfectibility,

 

lWilliam Hazlitt, "William Godwin" The Spirit of the Age,

in his Werks, J. M. Dent & Sons LtET,London, v. 11, p. 17.

and that the proper way to realize this was through the

use ef reason and private judgement. Godwin never deviated
fron.the strictest logic in arriving at the ultimate effects
dictated by his basic premises. "His belief in the greatest
happiness ef the greatest number and in the mathematically
equal a prieri worthiness of each individual led him to a
number of unorthodox conclusions, nest of which gave credit
to his will to consistency and his courage than to his

2 Perhaps the most famous con-

realism and common sense."
clusion is the illustration involving seventeenth-century
archbisop Penelon and his chambermaid trapped in a burn-
ing building. If only one could be saved, then it must be
Ibnelen, as he is the most valuable to society; and.this
conclusion would not be altered even if the chambermaid
were the rescuer's mother.

J. B. Bury calls Political Justice the "most important
speculative work of the time."5 "He (Godwin) was the oracle
of the young generation of many schools; and men as
different as Wordsworth, malthus, Shelley, Crabb Robinson,
Chalmers the Scotch theologian, and Place, the Iondon
Radical tailor,‘were altered for better or worse by reading

'Iilliam.GodIin.'4 What, then, caused the rapid decline of

 

2Christian Bay, Freedom.of ngression, unpublished Ph.D.

Thesis, Univers y o o, , p. 2.52.

3J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress, macmillan Co., new York,
1952, p. 224.

Philip.A. Brown, The French Revolution in English History,
.Allen &‘Unwin Ltd., Iondon, 1925, p. 44.

Godwin’s reputation? In 1876, an anonymous author wrote
in the Nation, "The sentiment changes, and the man who has
given it expression thereupon loses his power."5 Godwin
was caught in the downdraft of the reaction to the French
Revolution. The return to conservatism caused him to lose
favor almost as quickly as he had gained it. Since that
time Godwin's name has evoked little notice, and in 1926
Martin Armstrong wrote, "He is of interest to us today.not
because of his works, but because of his curiously contra-
dictory character, and because he is an incident in the
lives of a number of brilliant persons."6

Lately however, there has been a revival of interest
in Godwin, both in his life and in his theories. In this
study, although I have felt it necessary to give a back-
ground sketch.of Godwin's life and the times in which he
wrote, I have tried primarily to analyze his political
philosophy as developed in Political Justice and in his
later work. I believe that Godlin's ideas are very much
worth such an analysis, especially today. In 1951 Angus
Wilson put it this way, "His principal work, Political
Justice, so influencial in its own day, has been once
more re-estimated and found, despite its quaint air of

 

5"William Godwin, ' in the Nat___i___on, 1876, p. 278.

6Martin Armstrong, "Godwin, " in Bookman, April, 1926,
v. 70, p. 14.

pedantry applied to life, to be a valuable statement of the
fundamental liberties which humanity must always protect
against the drive for increased power that inevitably lies
beneath the claims of rulers of whatever political shade."7

This study is a continuation of that re-estimation.

 

7m Wilson, "The Novels of William Godwin,” in World
Review, June, 1951, p. 40.

CHAPTER I
LIEE AND TIMES

7A. Early Life

William Godwin was born at Wisbech in 1756. His
father and grandfather were both.dissenting ministers, and
Godwin was brought up in an extremely religious environ-
ment. He was a pious child with a great deal of intellect-
ual curiosity, and decided early in life to enter the
ministry. He completed his studies in 1778 and spent the
next five years serving several dissenting congregations.

When Godwin first became a minister, he was a strict
Calvinist. He was, in fact, a believer in the Sandemanian
dogma, which damned nine out of ten Calvinists, as the
Calvinists had damned nine out of ten of mankind. After
reading Rousseau, Helvetius, and d'Holbach, however, his
faith was considerably shaken. Finally, in 1785, Godwin
left the ministry and went to London to earn his living
as a writer. '

He had originally planned to open a small school at
Epsom, for‘which.he had written an interesting pamphlet
setting forth his ideas on education, and also several
propositions that figured prominently in his later polit-
ical theories. When this plan failed for want of pupils,
Godwin turned entirely to literary work. He had previously

published, at his own expense, a biography of William Pitt,
and he now produced a Life of Chatham, some novels, and
several articles for Whig periodicals. He also gained
valuable experience by writing the "British and Foreign
History" section in the New Annual Register from 1784 until
1791.8

In 1789, events occured in France which were beginning
to stir the world. As one author puts it, "we have reached
a stretch in the stream of time which is broken by the
cataract of the French Revolution."9 The spirit of liberty
was in the air. Old things seemed to be passing away, as

 

8This corrects an error made by C..K. Paul on page 101

of his book, William Godwin, His Friends and Contem oraries,
as pointed out By Jth W. Marken.in his article, “WiIIiam
Godwin's writing for the New Annual Re ister," printed

in Modern Len a e Notes, November, 19 , vol. 60, p. 477-9.
PauI states tEat GodeE began writing for the New Annual

Re ister in 1785, and this error has been repeated 5y
otger EIographers; but Paul also states that Godwin wrote
the section entitled, ”The History of Knowledge, Learning
and Taste in Great Britain," which would deny Godwin the
valuable political experience he obtained from.writing

the "British and Foreign History" section. This is well
worth noting, as it was due to this experience that Godwin
obtained much background work for his major production,

An Enquir Concerning Political Justice and its Influence
on Genera irtue and HEppiness, published in 1795. For
those interested, marken has published in another article
a complete list of Godwin's early works, not all of which
are mentioned by Paul. This article is entitled, "The
Canon and ChronolOgy of William Godwin's Early Works,"

and is found in Modern Language Notes, March, 1954, vol. 69,
P e 176-80 e

9Herbert J. C. Grierson and J. C. Smith, A Critical Histor
of English Poetry, Chatto and Windus, London, IgEV, p. 23%.

the pathway to a glorious future beckoned. It was this
spirit which inspired Godwin to desire to make some great
contribution to the welfare of mankind. In 1791 he began
writing Political Justice, finishing it in 1795. The work
met with instant success, despite its rather high price of
three guineas. Working men combined their resources to
purchase it, and it became their bible. Ybung men, such
as Wordsworth and Southey, were inspired by it. William
Hazlitt said, "No work in our time gave such a blow to the
philesophical mind of the country as the celebrated Enquiry
concerning Political Justice."10 Godwin rode the crest

of the times; he was the outstanding spokesman for the
disciples of the new freedom.

There had been many pamphlets written to refute Edmund
Burke's conservative stand in his Reflections on the
Revolution in France, but Godwinls work was of a larger
scope. It was written mainly for the purpose of correcting
‘ the work of Montesquieu, but also to redefine and make
clear for all time the basic principles of man, society,
and government. One of the most influencial men who helped
Godwin in the clarification of these principles was Thomas
Heleroft; and yet he was only one of "the four oral

instructors" that Godwin felt indebted to for the improve-

 

109p. cit.

ment of his mind, the others being George Dryson, Jbseph

11 Godwin.was a man who valued

Fawcot, and Coleridge.
friendship highly, and his conversations with such men
as Charles Lamb, Wordsworth, and Coleridge, among others,

did a great deal to stimulate his thinking.

B. Years of Transition

At one of these gatherings with his friends, Godwin
made the acquaintance of Mary Wellstonecraft. This occured
during November, in 1791, by which time she had already
‘written her reply to Burke, Vindication of the Rights of
Man. She is more famous, however, for her later work,
Vindication of the Rights offiWbmen,‘which became the fore-
runner of the feminist movement.

Godwin was not impressed with Nary Wollstonecraft
at the time, but changed his mind after he renewed his
acquaintance with her in 1796. During this time she had
been living with Gilbert Imlay in France. Imlay, an
American, proved unfaithful, and she left him to return to
London with.her daughter, which she had borne Inlay out
of wedlock. She found happiness with Godwin, and although
they both felt that marriage was an.unnecessary institution,
they married in march, 1797, out of consideration for the

 

11

 

C..K. Paul William Godwin His Friends and Contemporaries,
Henry S. King“E‘C5T7'LEEEBHT'IB7BT'VT‘IT‘E. 17;

approaching birth of their child. His wife's love did
much to cause Godwin to appreciate the importance of

affection and emotion, which he had discounted in Political

 

Justice. Their happiness was short-lived however, as
Mary Godwin died in September of the same year.

"With the death of Nary Wollstonecraft in 1797, ended
all that was happy and stimulating in Godwin's career."12
According to George Woodcock, Godwin's most important work
had been completed by the end of 1798, and the rest of his
life is interesting from a purely biographical viewpoint
alone.13 Also it was around this time that the reaction
to the French Revolution had begun in.Eng1and, which was
the main cause of the decline in Godwin's popularity.

In 1794 he had followed up his success with a novel,
Things as thez_are: Or, the Adventures of Caleb Williams,
and a political pamphlet, Cursor; Strictures on the Charge
delivered by:Lerd Chief Justice Eyre to the Grand Jury, -
October 2, 1794. In Caleb Williams, Godwin's best known
novel, he attempted to translate his political and social
beliefs into story form, and the success of the book in-

creased his reputation as a man of literary talent. The

Cursory Strictures was written in defense of several of

 

12 .
H. N. Brailsford, Shelley, Godwin,_and their Circle,

Henry Holt and Co., ew ork, p. 154.

13George Woodcock, William Godwiné A Biographical Study,
The Porcupine Press, n on, , p. .

10

Godwin's friends, who were active in London reform societies,
and who were accused of treason. Gedwin's pamphlet was
instrumental in their acquittal, and he was thought by many
to have made a substantial contribution to the prevention

of unwarranted governmental prosecution in England.

Two other works which Godwin completed around 1798
were The Enquirer: Reflections on Education, manners, and
Idterature, and the memoirs of Man14Wollstonecraft. The
first was a series of essays mainly important for illustrat-
ing Godwin's views on education. The latter was a moving
tribute to the memory of his wife, in which he softened
the emphasis he had made in Political Justice on reason
alone as a guide for living, and revised his opinion of the
domestic affections.

The Memoirs, however, was written with great frankp
ness and sincerity, and the results of this caused many
people to regard Godwin with loathing. David Fleisher
states that “the English public was incensed against the man
who, in a last excess of immorality, had brazenly offered
to the world the eulogy of an abandoned woman, the mistress
first of Inlay and then of Godwin.'14 This was only part
of the public reaction against Godwin at this time, a reaction
caused primarily by the change in public opinion concerning

 

 

l“David Fleisher William Godwin° A Stu in liberalism,
Allen & Unwin Ltd., Landon, 1951, p. %U.

11

the French.Revolution. Disgust at the internal policies of
the Revolution, and alarm over possible French aggression
in Europe caused the English people to rise up against the
proponents of liberalism. Godwin, the foremost spokesman
for the new Philosophy, was assailed on all sides.

His only reply was published in 1801, Thoughts occasioned
by the Perusal of Dr. Parr's Spital Sermon. David Fleisher
sells it, "an able and just defence, remarkable for dignity,
eloquence, and restraint."15 In it Godwin defended the
basic principles that inspired Political Justice and pro-
tested against the spirit of the charges made against him.

During this same year, Godwin.married a widow with
two children, Mrs. Mary Jane Clairmont. Including Fanny,
the child Mary Wbllstonecraft had borne Inlay, and Mhry,
their own child, Godwin now was responsible for the support
of four children. Hrs. Clairmont was quite different from
Mhry‘Wollstonecraft; she was bad tempered and envious, and
Godwin's old friends began to see him.1ess frequently.

In 1805 a fifth child, a son, was added to the family.

During this period Godwin wrote three plays, a novel, and

a life of Chaucer, which.were not successful enough to

enable him to handle his increased family responsibilities.
So in 1805 he and his wife went into the business of publish-

 

15Ibid. , p. 42.

12

ing children's books. They took promises first in Runway
Street in London, and two years later moved to 41 Skinner
Street, where The Juvenile Library struggled along until
Godwin was dudared bankrupt in 1824.—

These were mostly years of financial crisis, and in
desperation Godwin borrowed heavily from his friends;
especially from.Shelley, whom he had.met in 1812. It is .
here that Godwin's character is shown at its worst, and many
writers remembered him only for the incessant demands for
money he.made on his friends. His publishing business
never really prospered, in spite of the fact that he pub-
lished Charles and mary Lamb's Tales from.Shakespeare.

The Juvenile Library was under his wife's name, and Godwin's
I literary reputation reached rock bottom. Hazlitt called

him.'to all ordinary intents and purposes dead and buried."16

C. ‘Dhter Tears
In 1811 Shelley wrote Godwin in order to form his
acquaintance. so states in this letter that he had "enrolled
Godwin's name on the list of the honorable dead," and that
he had learned with "inconceivable emotion" that Godwin
was still alive.17 Shelley became a fervent disciple of

 

16 . cit.
17c. r. Paul, William Godwin His Friends and Contem oraries,
Qp. cit., v. 2, p. 252.

l3

Godwin's ideas, and acted accordingly by sloping with
Godwin's daughter Mary in 1814, when his marriage with
Harriet wesbrook began to disintegrate. Although Political
Justice had condemned marriage, Godwin had changed his mind
on this subject, and heartily disapproved of Shelley's
action. However, to his discredit, Godwin continued to
borrow heavily from Shelley. This caused friction between
the two from time to time, although Shelley never ceased

to believe in Godwin's genius/and. in his philosophy.

After the collapse of the Juvenile Library, Godwin
moved to a modest home on Gower Place, where he continued
with his literary efforts. From 1824 until 1828 he occupied
himself with writing a Histogy of the Commonwealth. The
work was well received at the time, although it has since ;
become supercoded by authors with new material. Godwin
'was growing old now, and perhaps felt that a revival of
his liberal views was not worth more vilification. .Also
he was writing this book in order to make money, and there-
fore found it necessary to write faster and more super-
ficially. At any rate, the book was a conventional history,
paying more attention to battles and statutes than to social
conditions.

Still Godwin did not receive enough income to provide
for his old age, and he continued to write. These works
included a novel, and a collection of essays called Thoughts

on man: His Nature, Productions and Discoveries. This

14

latter book was the only one that approached the level of
his early work in style and content, and in it Godwin in-
dicates that he remained true to his basic principles to
the last.

In April, 1855, Godwin was offered the post of Yeoman
Usher of the Exchequer by the new ministry that was estab-
lished under the Reform Bill. The office was a sinecure,
providing Godwin with a small house and income. This saved
him.from ending his days in miserable poverty, and yet
his tasks were not enough to keep him from his pen. He
finished another novel, among other works, and was writing
a group of religious essays when he died in 1856.

This, very briefly, presents a picture of Godwinis
life. However, the purpose of this study is primarily
to examine Godwin's political philosophy, so let us now
turn to these ideas, mainly as set forth in his masterpiece,
Political Justice.

CHAPTER II
POLITICAL JUSTICE

Godwin's philosophical ideas are not all original,
nor does he pretend that this is the case. He himself
states that his belief "that monarchy was a species of
government unavoidably corrupt” was owed to the reading
of Swift and the Latin historians.18 He also owed a debt
to Hume and Hartley, as well as to Rousseau, Helvetius,
and d‘Holbach. Sir Leslie Stephen said, "The Political
Justice is an attempt to frame into a systematic whole
the principles gathered from these various sources, and may
by regarded as an exposition of the extremest form of
revolutionary dogma. Though Godwin's idiosyncrasy is per-
ceptible in some of the conclusions, the book is instructive
as showing, Withi‘ clearness paralleled in no other English

writing, the true nature of those principles which excited

 

18william Godwin, An En uir Concerni Political Justice
and its Influence on ggneraI VIrtue and HEppiness, lFIEst
Editionjas oditEd and abridged by—Raymond A. Preston,
Alfred A. Knapf, New York, 1926, v. 1, p. x1 of the Preface.
All future references will be to this edition unless
otherwise indicated. Godwin published two other editions
in 1796 and 1798, but in neither one are his principles
stated with.such force and clarity as in the original.
Mr. Prestonfs abridgement omits principally the meta-
physical, and not the political speculation, which Godwin
himself indicated the reader might pass over as unessential.

16

the herror of Burke and the Conservatives."19

Sir Leslie is right in calling Godwin's theory revo-
lutionary, but it must be remembered that Godwin did not
advocate the use of force; he favored a gradual revolution
obtained through the use of persuasion for the attainment
of his objectives. Perhaps the primary claim of Political
Justice to being revolutionary and original, lies in the
extreme conclusions at which it arrived by following through
on ideas and principles already proposed by less courageous

writers.

.A. Basic Principles

1. Perfectibility

To express an important assumption which underlies
all his thought on government, Godwin used the following
quotation from the first page of Thomas Paine's Common Sense.
"Society and government are different in themselves and
have different origins. Society is produced by our wants,
and government by our wickedness. Society is in every state
a blessing; government even in its best state but a necessary
20

evil."

Godwin, however, carried this principle to its logical

 

1981:- Leslie Stephen, Histo of En lish Thou t in the
Eighteenth.Centurz, PSBer BRIEF, New YorE, I359, p. 266.

2°Pblitioal Justice, v. 1, p. 39.

17

conclusion, something which Paine did not do; Godwin wanted
to do away with government entirely. He felt that any
external constraint whatsoever was an unwarranted infringe-
ment on the individual personality. For a short time,
perhaps, it may be suffered as a necessity; but Godwin
believed that human society should eventually reach a point
where there would be no need of government at all.

In order to effectively work toward the goal of the
greatest happiness for the greatest number, Godwin believed
that reason and private judgement must be exercised freely.
“To a rational being there can be but one rule of conduct,
justice, and one mode of ascertaining that rule, the exercise

21 Godwin believed in the Socratic

of his understanding."
principle that knowledge is virtue, and that vice is only

an error in judgement; and he also believed that for men

to gain knowledge they must exercise their faculties in-
dependently.

Government interferes with the independent intellectual
and.mora1 improvement of men, according to Godwin, and he
cites two examples of this tendency. First, he says, govern-
ment may furnish me an additional motive to do good, but
by furnishing a personal reward for my action the nature

of it is changed. No longer do I do it because of its

 

alIbid. , p. 72.

18

intrinsic excellence, but because of personal advantage.
Secondly, government may inform me as to what actions are
right and which are wrong. But for me to believe a state-
ment without having all the reasoning and the evidence
present in my mind, is not really to know it at all. I
an merely accepting a statement on grounds of authority,
and this, says Godwin, makes "dwarfs" of man.

By using reason and private Judgement to discover vir-
tue and truth, man is on the way to moral improvement.
This is the Godwinian theory of perfectibility; that men
are capable of indefinite perfection (never, however, reach-
ing perfection, because then they would not be capable of
further improvement). To illustrate this, Godwin traces
the development of man and then asks, "Is ‘it possible for
us to contemplate what he has already done without being
impressed with a strong presentiment of the improvements
he has yet to accomplish? There is no science that is not
capable of additions; there is no art that may not be carried
to a still higher perfection. If this be true of all other
sciences, why not of morals? If thisbe true of all other
arts, why .not of social institution?"22

The theory of perfectibility depended on Godwin's
theory of human nature. He believed that "the moral characters

 

221bid., p. 27.

19

of men are the result of their perceptions."23 men are
shaped by their environment; improve their environment
through education,-literature, and the practice of political
justice, and.men will improve.

The nature of government, however, is such that it
tends to block such progress. Godwin doubts "whether error
could ever be formidable or long lived if government did

24 "It is farther evident that though

not lend it support."
the duty of every man to exercise his private judgement

be unalterable, yet so far as relates to practice, wherever
government subsists, the exercise of private judgement is
substantially intrenched upon...That government therefore
is the best which in no one instance interferes with the

exercise of private judgement without absolute necessity."25

2. "Universal Benevolence"

For Godwin, political justice was the fulfillment of
moral duty; To be consistent with utilitarian ethics then,
our moral duty is to do that action which is most conducive
to the general good. "If justice have any meaning, it is
just that I should contribute everything in my power to

 

25Ibid., p. 11.
24“" '
Ibid., p. 14.

251bid., p. 126.

20
the benefit of the whole."26
It is here that Godwin reaches some of his most ex-
treme conclusions, which have demonstrated to many people,
says D. H. Munro, "the absurdities tO‘WhiCh philosophers
are driven through trying to be logical."27 A good example
of this is the case of archbishop Fenelon and his chamber-

28’ What difference should it make if the chambermaid

maid.
happens to be my mother, says Godwin? "What magic is there
in the pronoun 'my' to overturn the decisions of everlasting
truth? my wife or my mother may be a fool or a prostitute,
malicious, lying or dishonest. If they be, of what conse-
quence is it that they are nine?"29

thitheugh this proposition seems cold and cruel, we
must rememher that Godwin was facing a difficult situation.
As Munro says, "Nb really satisfactory solution of the fire
problem is possible, because the situation is inherently
evil."50 It is a problem involving a choice between our
own happiness and that of society; and if we cannot have

both, we must choose society.

This is the Godwinian theory of "Universal Benevolence."

 

261nm. , p. 40

25D. H. Munro, Godwin's moral Philosophy, Oxford University
Press, London, , p. .

28See above, p. 2.
29Political Justice, v. 1, p. 42.

30%. cit., p. 12.

21

we must treat all human beings as equally worthy of our

good intentions, regardless of their relationship to us.
Godwin also believes that the intention is the most im-
portant element in any action. He says, "If the disposition
by which a man is governed have a systematical tendency

to the benefit of his species, he cannot fail to obtain *
our esteem, however mistaken he may be in his conduct."31
nevertheless, Godwin does not excuse erroneous conduct,

‘and therefore, for him, virtue consists in a constant search
for knowledge on the subject of right and wrong.

This brings us back to the conclusion that virtue is
knowledge, and vice only error. If you add that this
knowledge can best be obtained through the exercise of
individual iniative and private judgement, and that by
this process man is capable of perpetual improvement,
you have, as H. N. Brailsford says, the “promise (in which)
lies already the whole of philosophic anarchism...For if
truth.is omnipotent, why trust to laws?”32 Godwin is often
credited with being the first anarchist. ‘William A. Dunning
states, "The Frenchman.Eroudhon, in 1840, was apparently
the first to assume formally the name of anarchist. The
substance of the doctrine that justified the name however,

 

31Pelitica1 Justice, v. 1, p. 52.
52920 cite, Po 104'-5o

22

had been pretty fully set forth half a century before by

the Englishman William Godwin, in his Political Justice."35
It is not quite true that Godwin was an anarchist;

he cautions us that "anarchy as it is usually understood

and a well-conceived form of society without government

are exceedingly different from each other...Anarchy in its

own nature is an evil of short duration}?t Godwin believed

that the immediate dissolution of government would cause

a brief period of anarchy which would terminate when “justice,

reflection, and enquiry" had had time to establish public

restraint and control.

5. Sincerity and necessity

Since Godwin regarded truth.with such high esteem, it
was only natural that he should place great importance on
the value of sincerity. If, therefore, I have knowledge
of truth, virtue, or anything else that may be of benefit
to my neighbor, it is my duty to communicate it to him.
If an action deserves praise, I am obliged to give it;
neither can I withhold criticism or blame when it is due.
I'How extensive an effect would be produced," says Godwin,

"if every man were sure of meeting in his neighbour the

 

33Williams. Dunning, A Histor of Political Theories from
Rousseau to Spencer, EEcmiIIan 50., Kew York, 1923, p. 3 .

34golitical Justice, v. 2, p. 184-5.

25

ingenuous censor, who would tell to himself and publish
to the world his virtues, his good deeds, his meannesses
and his follies?'55

Godwin believed that knavery would be stopped before
it had barely begun if sincere public opinion were brought
to bear upon the offender, and that it was more cowardice
that allowed countless errors to continue to exist in the
world. He states, "If every man today would tell all the
truth.he knows, three years hence there would be scarcely
a falsehood of any magnitude remaining in the civilized
world.”6 He also believes that this sincerity would not
degenerate into sadistic brutality, because the only motive
I would have to tell my neighbor an unpleasant truth would
be for his own benefit.

Godwin again reaches some extreme conclusions in his
emphasis on the value of always telling the truth. He
discusses an incident concerning a hunted man being dis-
covered by his pursuers; not recognizing him, they ask for
information concerning their prey's whereabouts. Godwin
admits that this is an extreme case, but still feels that
it would be more important to admit the truth.in a case
like this, than to "violate the majesty of truth,"even if

 

35Ibid., v. 1, p. 155.
36Ibid., p. 155.

24

the victim were innocent of any wrongdoing. Godwin con-

tinues, "would he not have done an honour to himself, and

afforded an example to the world that would have fully

compensated the calamity of his untimely death?“57 This

is indeed asking a great deal of the average hunted man.
Godwin's theory taken as a whole would imply the

doctrine of necessity, even if he had not mentioned it.

If, given the proper environment, man is certain to improve,

it follows that "if we form a just and complete view of all

the circumstances in.which a living or intelligent being

is placed, we shall find that he could not in any moment

of his existence have acted otherwise than he has acted."58
This determinism.goes a long way toward explaining

Godwin's theory of punishment. For if a man could not have

 

371bid.,_,_p. 158.

58Ibid., p. 161. In this area, Godwin drew heavily on the
philosophy of David Hume. In an article on the subject,
Frank B. Evans III points out that, "not only is the
doctrine of necessity unoriginal with Godwin, but Shelley
himself drew as much from Godwinls source. This source
is sections IV to VIII of David Humes's En uir Concerning
Human Understanding." Evans continues, "Both Godwin and
Hume proceed along the following path of argument: Every-
one acknowledges that matter is actuated by a necessary
force; the basis of this belief is the observed uniformity
of events in nature, and the consequent inferences made
by the mind about causes and effect." Frank B. Evans III,
"Shelley, Godwin, Hume and the Doctrine of Necessity,"
in Studies in Philology, October, 1940, vol. 37, p. 652-5.

25

done otherwise than what he has done, how can we blame
him, or even punish.him? we should instead try to change
his environment to allow the development of truth. Godwin
makes his point clear with this statement, "As long as we
admit of an essential difference between virtue and vice,
no doubt all erroneous conduct, whether of ourselves or
others, will be regarded with disapprobation. But it will
in both cases be considered, under the system of necessity,
as a link in the great chain of events which could not
have been otherwise than it is. 'we shall therefore no more
be disposed to repent of our own faults than of the faults
of others."39

Godwin's discussion of free will is not complete
enough to really establish his position. George moLean
Harper writes, "The many pleas in favor of free will which
have suggested themselves to philosophers, as well as to
humbler thinkers, he (Godwin) almost wholly fails to take
into account."“° Perhapi Godwin anticipated this, for he
states at the beginning of his discussion on.necessity that
the reason.he did not discuss it solner was to make clear
to the believers in free will that his basic principles
did not need the doctrine of necessity to make them.valid,

 

”Ibid. , p. 185.

George McLean Harper, "Rousseau, Godwin, and Wordsworth,"
in the Atlantic Monthly, may, 1912, vol. 109, p. 646.

26

but only that it leads ”to a bold and comprehensive view
of man in society, which cannot possibly be entertained

by him who has embraced the opposite opinion."41

4. Other Principles

Another one of Godwin's basic principles is that all
men are equal, if not physically, then certainly morally.
By physical equality, Godwin meant equality of the mind
and body. While admitting that there is some basis for
believing men not to be equal in this respect, he would
remind us that this inequality is much greater now than it
‘was originally, and also states that, "There is no such
disparity among the human race as to enable one man to
hold several other men.in subjection, except so far as they
are willing to be subject."42

Moral equality is easier to maintain, says Godwin,
inasmuch as all of us "are partakers of a common.nature,
and the same causes that contribute to the benefit of one
contribute to the benefit of another...We are all of us
endowed with reason, able to compare, to judge and to infer.
The improvement therefore which is to be desired for the
one is to be desired for the other."45 Godwin emphasises

 

41
42
45

Pelitioal_§ustice, v. 1, p. 160.

Ibid., p. 57.
Ibid., p. 58.

27

that prejudice and "arbitrary distinction" must not inter-
fere with the freedom for everyone to exercise and develop
his talents to the best possible advantage, and this idea .
is certainly in keeping with modern democratic thought.

more unorthodox, however, is Godwin's position on
human rights. He believes that men have no rights of a
discretionary nature, involving the power of choice, that
would enable them to do or not to do something without
becoming liable to censure. I have no right to the free
use of my money if there is a duty that compels me to give
it to someone more in need than myself.

"It is impossible for intellectual beings to be brought
into coalition and intercourse without a certain mode of
conduct, adapted to their nature and connection, immediately
becoming a duty incumbent on the parties concerned...there
can neither be opposite rights, nor rights and duties hostile

44 Godwin here correlates rights with duties,

to each other."
and says that my only right consists in that another should
act in accordance with.his duty where I am concerned; or,
putting it the other way, if it is my duty to act in a cer-
tain manner towards another, then that other person has a
right to demand this from me. Godwin would say that this

man has a claim upon me, but not a right, at least not a

 

MIbide, Pe 60-1e

28

right in the discretionary sense of the word. If I have
any rights at all, any discretionary power, it is small
indeed, because "it must be proved that my choice on one
side or the other can in.no possible way contribute to the
benefit or injury of myself or of any other person in the
world."45

This rigid adherence to duty and justice enables Godwin
to reach an unusual conclusion concerning promises. If I
must always do the thing which is best and most preferable
for the common good, then any promises I may have made to
do the contrary while lacking sufficient knowledge cannot
be binding. “If every shilling of our preperty, every hour
of our time and every faculty of our mind have already
received their destination from the principles of immutable
justice, promises have no department upon which for them
to decide."46

Godwin does not believe that this should interfere
with.the affairs of the world because a promise should be
"understood merely as declaratory of intention and not as
' precluding farthur information.'47 At any rate, if my
neighbor were fair and honest, he should not expect me to

live up to a promise if I was bound by duty and justice

 

451bid., p. 62.

46Ibid., p. 98.

471bid.

29

to act otherwise.

Before concluding this section, I think it might be
well to restate two of Godwin's principles which I have
already mentioned. These principles generally come to
mind in connection with Godwin's name; one of them is his
conception of human nature, and the other is his desire for
a gradual revolution, achieved without the use of force or
violence.

Godwin believed that men were born into the world with
no "innate principles,” and thus were entirely molded by
their environment. He also believed that men were basically
good, and were not under the taint of original sin; because
if men were not basically good, then the improvement of their
surroundings would not necessarily improve their actions,
and environment would not then be the controlling factor
in men's lives. In such a case, men would not be perfectible
after all.

But since Godwin believes that improving the environ-
ment will guarantee the improvement of mankind, he also
believes that there is then no justification for a violent
revolution to be waged in order to bring about a more de-
sirable state of society. He says, “The true instruments
for changing the opinions of men are argument and persuasion
...When we descend into the listed field, we of course de-
sert the vantage ground of truth and commit the decision

to uncertainty and caprice. The phalanx of reason is in-

50

vulnerable; it advances with deliberate and determined

pace; and nothing is able to resist it. But when we lay
down our arguments and take up our swords, the case is alter-
ed. Amidst the barbarous pomp of war and the clamorous

din of civil brawls, who can tell whether the event shall

8 It was just this emphasis

be prosperous or miserable?'4
on nondviolence that helpedisave Godwin from later pro-

secution by the British government.

B. Public Opinion
1. Freedom.from Interference .

Since Godwin believed that men were capable of infinite
improvement and that this could only be obtained through
the use of reason and private judgement, than public opinion
would necessarily have a large part to play in his phil-
osophy; It is the proper use of public opinion that will
do away with the need for political institutions by acting
as a check.on individual behavior, and it is through the
influencing of Opinion that men will reach true understand-
ing. .As stated by H. N. Brailsford, "He (Godwin) was con-
cerned to insist that men's voluntary actions originate
in opinion, that he might secure a fulcrum for the leverage
of argument and persuasion.'49 If men are living in error

 

48Ibid., p. 135.
4992. cit., p. 105.

51

because of the lack of proper knowledge, this error can be
corrected by persuasion. Thus it is opinion that should
rule, and not governmental force.

One of the reasons why government should not interfere
with opinion is that society is made up of many individuals,
and its acts cannot be considered as that of a single en-
tity, but as a combination of the acts of now one person
and then another. men who attempt to act in the name of
society as a whole will find themselves hampered by the
conflicting interests of the individuals composing that
'society. "They are fettered by the prejudices, the humours,
the weakness and the vice of those with.whom.they act; and
after a thousand sacrifices to these contemptible interests
their project comes out at last distorted in every joint,
abortive and monstrous."5O

Since the acts of society are but the total of the
acts of each individual, they will lack wisdom as well as
efficiency; Godwin asks, "Has society then any particular
advantage in its corporate capacity for illuminating the
understanding?...If so why have not societies of men written
treatises of morality, of the philosophy of nature, or the
philosophy of mind? Why have all the great steps of human
improvement been the work of individuals?"51

 

5°l=olitical Justice, vol. 2, p. 76.
51Ibid., p. 77.

52

Godwin also believes that intervention by society in
its corporate form for the prOpagation of truth and virtue
is not only unnecessary but harmful. "Truth and virtue
are competent to fight their own battles."52 Since men al-
‘ways act in the manner they feel most conducive to their best
interests, no superintendence is necessary; in fact it may
be harmful by causing obsolete tendencies to persist, because
even though corporate interference "be inadequate to change,
it is powerful to prolong."53
Not only must government not interfere with opinion
in a positive way, says Godwin, but it must not interfere
in a negative way; that is, it must not suppress erroneous
Opinion. The argument in favor of this kind of supervision
is that since the opinions of men are varied, some will be
eccentric and perversions of truth; therefore it is the duty
of government to "prevent their ascendancy." But, replies
Godwin, "Ignorance is not necessary to render men virtuous.“54
If we continue to speculate, we shall correct our errors
and proceed to the truth, but if all opinions that clash

with someone's preconceived notion of what is true and what

is false are suppressed, all science and knowledge surely

 

52Ibid., p. 81.
53Ibid., p. 85.
5"lipid. , p. 100.

35

will cease.

Neither is it true that differenceSLOf opinion will
threaten the peace of society. According to Godwin, it is
only when the government supports one or the other that
militant opposition arises. Let authority remain neutral,
and these many sided sects and creeds will live side by
side in sufficient harmony.

2. Direct Interference

Godwin uses religious establishments as an example
of direct interference with opiniOn. He states that "the
systen.of religious conformity is a system of blind suba
mission."55 Clergymen must subscribe to "precise and dog-
matical assertion upon almost every subject of moral and
metaphysical enquiry."56 If they believe all these asser-
tions, they must have small powers of independent thought;
if they do not, what a fraud is then perpetuated upon their
unsuspecting countrymen. "They (the congregations) are
bid to look for instruction and morality to a denomination
of men formal, embarrassed and hypocritical, in whom.the
main spring of intellect is unbent and incapable of action."57
Such.interference with public opinion, the factor upon which
the improvement of mankind depends, is, according to Godwin,

 

55Ib1d., p. 92.
561b1a.

57Ib1d., p. 95

54

one of the.most prominent forms of evidence showing the
evil effects of political and politically supported in-
stitutions.

If William Godwin were alive teday, he would very
likely be a member of the group that oppose the signing
of loyalty oaths. He believed that requiring men to swear
to their fidelity was unnecessary and ineffectual; and his
argument, as set forth in his chapter "0f Tests", is so
concise and to the point as to warrant reproducing it in
full.

"Duty and common sense," says Godwin, “oblige us to
watch the man we suspect, even though he should swear he
is innocent. Would not the same precautions which.we are
still obliged to employ to secure us against his duplicity
have sufficiently answered our purpose without putting him
to his purgation? Are there no methods by which we can
find out whether a man be the proper subject in whom to
repose an important trust without putting the question to
himself? ‘Will not he who is so dangerous an enemy that we
cannot suffer him at large discover his enmity by his conduct
without reducing us to the painful necessity of tempting
him to an act of prevarication? If he be so subtle a
hypocrite that all our vigilance cannot detect him, will he
scruple to add to his other crimes the crime of perjury?"58

 

581bid., p. 108.

55

Not only is an oath ineffective in uncovering men
with.evil intentions, but Godwin believes that it is an,
insult to a man of good will with an unblemished record.
Godwin considers that the practice of administering oaths
in a court of law informs the witness that his word is not
sufficient for him to be believed. To a virtuous man it
is treatment with contempt, and to the ignorant it encourages
the notion that "veracity in the affairs of common life (is)
a thing unworthy to be regarded."59 Surely then, concludes
Godwin, the use of tests and oaths is extremely'harmful
in the promotion of virtue.‘ _

In continuing his assault upon interference, Godwin
goes so forces to advocate the abolishment of libel laws.

In the first place, says Godwin, the libeller would receive_
his proper punishment from public opinion, and in the second
place, the absence of libel laws would encourage men to

be sincere. If I feel that a man is vicious, it is my duty
to so represent him, even though I could not prove it to

the satisfaction of a court of law. If I am wrong, the
truth will be discovered, if I am right, Justice has been
served. The main thing, Godwin.feels, is that truth will
overcome error if given an equal hearing, but that "the

law of libels usurps the office of directing me in my daily

 

591nm. , p. 114.

56

duties, and by perpetually menacing me with the scourge of
punishment undertakes to render me habitually a coward,
continually governed by the basest and most unprincipled

motives."60

3. Indirect Interference

Godwin mentions three other methods by which govern-
ment interferes with opinion more indirectly; by the use
of constitutions, national education, and pensions and
salaries for public office.

By establishing a constitution, a group of men impose
their views on justice on all future generations. Godwin
uses the French constitution of I789 as an.example, in
which the makers stated that no change could be made for
ten years, and after that only if very rigorous procedures
were followed.. For Godwin this is pure folly. "It is to
say to a.nation, 'Are you convinced that something is right,
perhaps immediately necessary to be done? It shall be done
ten years hence.'"61 Ihe pe0ple, says Godwin, should be
allowed to make their own decisions, and not be forced to
rely on the Judgement of past generations.

Godwin objects to national education because he feels

 

601bid., p. 124.
611bid., p. 130

37

that this will give to our schools a tendency to have an
aversion to change, and says that "public education has
always expended its energies in the support of prejudice;
it teaches its pupils not the fortitude that shall bring
every proposition to the test of examination, but the art
of vindicating such tenets as may chance to be previously

62 He is also afraid that national education

established."
would be a tool for the government to use in strengthening
its own hand. Perhaps Godwin's fear that national education
would keep the schools a hundred years behind the times
has not been borne out, but his premonitions of the alliance
between.the government and education, as pointed out by
George Wbodcock, have been amply illustrated in our times
when education has become a formidable weapon for the use
of a dictator in the indoctrination of the people.63

Another method mentioned by Godwin that the government
uses to influence Opinion is to provide salaries and pensions
for public office. Godwin feels that public service is
thwarted when rewarded with a salary or a pension, and
that the office will be desired for the sake of the reward

and.not for the chance of contributing to the general good.

Iet the office holder be supported by private individuals,

 

621bid., p. 140.

6392. cit., p. 80.

38

if his personal resources are insufficient. "I ought to
receive your superfluity as my due while I am employed in
affairs more important than that of earning a subsistence,
but at the same time to receive it with a total indifference
to personal advantage, taking only precisely what is necess-

64 Only under such a system,

ary for the supply of my wants."
believes Godwin, can we have public servants who will be
zealous in the discharge of their duties for the welfare

of society.

0. Coercion and Punishment

1. The Use of Force

Godwinds theory of necessity dictated his views on
punishment. If a man cannot help what he does, then.what
blame can be assigned to him? “The assassin cannot help
the murder he commits any more than the dagger."65 Godwin
believes, therefore, that there can be no point in punishing
a man on the grounds of retribution, because he could not
help what he did. The only basis left for punishment is
on the grounds of utility, for the protection of any acts
he may commit against society in the future.

But punishment cannot correct a man's tendency to

 

6“Political Justice, v. 2, p. 146.
65Ibid., p. 155.

59

commit crime, according to Godwin's basic principles.
Vice is error, and can only be corrected through the use
of reason. ”Let us reflect for a moment upon the species
of argument, if argument it is to be called, that coercion
employs. It avers to its victim that he must necessarily
be in the wrong because I am more vigorous and cunning
than he. ‘Iill vigor and cunning be always on the side of
truth?"66 '(Coercion) cannot begin with convincing; it is
no argument. It begins with producing the sensation of
pain and the sentiment of distaste. It begins with violent-
ly alienating the mind from the truth with which.we wish
it to be impressed.'67

If, then, punishment is unjust treatment for what a
man has done in the past, and it is ineffective for pre-
venting him from committing crimes in the future, is there
any other basis on which we can justify punishment? Godwin
mentions coercion for the purpose of deterring others by
setting an example, but he does not go into this possibility
very thoroughly. He seems to feel that coercion is unjust
no matter what its purpose, and that force is intrinsically
evil and never serves a good purpose.

There are some instances, however, in which Godwin

 

661bid., p. 163

67Ibid., p. 165

40

does sanction the use of coercion, though very relunctantly.
Two such instances in which Godwin feels the use of force
may occasionally be justified are the defense of country
and defense of self. "I ought to take up arms against the
despot by when my country is invaded, because my capacity
does not enable me by arguments to prevail on him to desist,
and because my countrymen will not preserve their intellect-
ual independence in the midst of Oppression. For the same
reason I ought to take up arms against the domestic spoiler,
because I am unable either to persuade him to desist, or
the community to adopt a just political institution, by
means of which security might be maintained consistently

68 It must be remembered

with the abolition of coercion."
however, that Godwin favored loyalty to one's fellow man
rather than to patriotism as such. "'The vindication of
national honour' is a very insufficient reason for hostil-
ities."69 He also states that self defense should be used
only when absolutely unavoidable, "where time can by no
means be gained, and the consequences instantly to ensue

are unquestionably fatal.”0

2. Law
In the same way that he would like to abolish coercion

 

681bid., p. 184.
69Ibid., p. 46.
7°Ib1d., v. 1, p. 128.

41

and punishment, Godwin would like to abolish law. In
the first place, says Godwin, law attempts to classify
cases and rules, whereas in reality, "every case is a rule
to itself. No action of any man was ever the same as any
other_action, had ever the same degree of utility or in-
juryx"71 Therefore it is necessary that new laws be made
to attempt to classify new cases. This leads, according
to Godwin, to a multitude of "tedious, minute, and cir-
cumlocutory" rules and statutes.

The result of all this infinitude of law, continues
Godwin, is uncertainty. This destroys the very aim.of the
law, which.is to put an end to uncertainty. It is imposs-
ible for any lawyer, much less a layman, to predict what the
law will decide in any given situation. "It is a labyrinth
without end; it is a mass of contradictions that cannot be
extricated."72 While this may be true in some areas of
the common law, Godwin did not consider that this is not true
necessarily in.nost areas of statutory law. Godwin would
reply, however, that regardless of this fact, the law places
an institutional restraint on the people which inhibits
the independent use of their own private judgement, and
thus hinders the advancement of virtue.

 

7lij-de, Y. 2’ p. 207-8
721bid., p. 209.

42

Net only is the law itself a pernicious institution,
but Godwin.also believes that those who practice it cannot
escape contamination. ”A lawyer can scarcely fail to be
a dishonest man. He that is habitually goaded by the in-
centives of vice will not fail to be vicious. He that is
perpetually conversant in quibbles, false colours and
sophistry cannot equally cultivate the generous emotions
of the soul and the nice discernment of rectitude."73
Even considering it possible that there can be such a thing
as an.honest lawyer, adds Godwin, in reality he would do
more harm than a dishonest one by covering up and softening
the genuine effect of an erroneous institution.

The theory that men are creatures of passion and there-
fore law is necessary to provide a suitable monitor does
not convince Godwin. Our imperfections, he states, can
be removed only by the introduction of knowledge. As long
as we look for guidance to anything but the independent
Operation of our own mind, we cannot gain in understanding.
The only solution is to throw off the shackles of the law,
and tell men ”that they have passions, are occasionally
hasty, intemperate and injurious, but they must be trusted
with themselves...The effect of this disposition of things
will soon be visible; mind will rise to the level of its

 

73Ib1d., p. 210-1

45

situation; juries and umpires will be penetrated with the
magnitude of the trust reposed in them."74

To the uncertainty of the law, says Godwin, is added ‘
the uncertainty of punishment, resulting from the present
practice;~ of the law in granting pardons. Although Godwin
disapproved of punishment as a means of reforming character,
he admits that there are occasions when the good of society
will demand the confinement of a criminal. "What then is
clemency? It can be nothing but the pitiable egotism of
him who imagines he can do something better than justice.
Is it right that I should suffer constraint for a certain
offense? The rectitude of my suffering must be founded in
its tendency to promote the general welfare. He therefore
that pardons me, iniquitously prefers the imaginary interest
Of an individual and utterly neglects what he owes to the
whole."75 This point is particularly interesting in that
it shows that Godwin.was not in every respect a soft hearted
liberal who would do away with all restraint and unpleasant-

11983.

D. Political Institutions
1. History

we have examined some of Godwin's basic principles

 

741b1d., p. 214.

75Ib1d., p. 218.

first because it is on these principles that he bases his
political, economic, and social system. As pointed out
by C. H. Driver, 'A.man's political theory when he sets
out to cOnstruct a system is to a large extent determined
by his basic conceptions (be they held consciously or un-
consciously) concerning the nature of man and the nature
of the general world process...In the case of Godwin we
are dealing with a man who consciously and deliberately
deduced the whole of his political ideas from these assump—
tions, and who makes that fact clear beyond a doubt in al-
most every one of his eighty chapters. He reiterates his
position to an almost wearisome degree and recurs to his
first principles with every specific problem."76

. Godwin considers government to be the most important
influence in man's environment. He goes into great detail
in outlining the unfortunate effects of political institu-
tions upon the history of the human race. He states that,
I'W’ar has hitherto been considered as the inseparable ally
of political institution."77 The great masses of men have
been forced into subjection and poverty, and vast numbers
now live in a state of great deprivation and want. Godwin

believes that this can be remedied only through increased

 

760. H. Driver,"William Godwin" in The Social and Political
Ideas Of Some Representative Thinkers of one fievolutionagy
. C. Hearnshaw (ed), Barnes and NO51e*Inc.,

New wYork, 1950, p. 155-4.
77Political Justice, v. 1, p. 6.

45

freedom.for the individual to exercise his faculties in
contributing to the common good. He denies montesquieu's
proposition that it is difficult to establish a free govern-
ment in warm.climates, and states that climate is not a
hindrance to the proper use of freedom.

Having established the importance of the subject of
government, Godwin proceeds to analyze previous hypotheses
‘which have been used to establishma foundation for political
government. The system of force and the system of divine
right he dismisses quickly. The use Of force, he says,
"appears to proceed upon the total negation of abstract
and immutable justice, affirming every government to be
right that is possessed of power sufficient to enforce its
decrees...The second hypothesis...either coincides with the
first...or it must remain totally useless till a criterion
can be found to distinguish those governments which.are
approved by God from those which cannot lay claim to that
sanction.'78

He spends more time on the third system, the social
contract, but he dismisses it as well by asking a series
of questions. _Am I bound by a system of government contracted
for by my ancestors? 0r must the contract be renewed, and

if so, when? How is my consent to be determined? How long

 

fii

78Ibid., p. 90.

46

am I bound by my cOnsent; is it to be for my whole life
regardless of any increase in my wisdom? To what do I

give my consent, "the laws of England in fifty volumes
folio?" Net finding satisfactory answers to these questions,
Godwin rests in the belief that the foundations of govern-
ment must be based on the common and present consent or

deliberation of the people.

2. monarchy

After discussing the basis of political authority,
Godwin spends a great deal of time in analyzing the three
traditional forms of government; monarchy, aristocracy,
and democracy. He appears, however, to be more concerned
with.moral desirability than with operational efficiency.
F..E.JL. Priestley comments, "His preoccupation is not with
the political or economic efficiency of each form, but with
its moral tendencies; he is, as might be expected, seeking
-the form.which encourages virtue, not pleasure Or luxury."79

Godwin believes that a king is not in a proper position
to govern. From.childhood he is surrounded by those whose
only duty is to know his whim, to flatter him and sing his
praises. He has no opportunity to see things for himself,
and therefore he must take the word of his ministers who

 

791a his edition of Political Justice, University of Toronto
Press, 1%6, v. 3, p. 58.

47

are invariably concerned only with the advancement of their
own ambitions. Even if a monarch be a wise and virtuous man,
he still will not be able to attend properly to all the
affairs that require his attention, and he cannot entirely
escape from being served by ministers who are corrupt and
hypocritical.

One of the most unfortunate aspects of a monarchu says
Godwin, is the effect it has on its subjects. In the first
place, a king's power, as all institutional power, is based
on falsehood. He has no intrinsic superiority over his
subjects, and he pretends to supervise affairs of which
he cannot possibly be completely informed. To cover up
this imposture, the king is equipped in ornamental splendor
and his inflated titles fill our ears. Everything is done
in the royal name of the king; he is "Our Sovereign Lord
the King." Can a man, asks Godwin, "be persuaded that the
imposition is salutary? Be willingly assumes the right
of introducing similar falsehoods into his private affairs.
He becomes convinced that veneration for truth is to be
classes among our errors and prejudices, and that so far
from being, as it pretends to be, in all cases salutary,
it would lead, if ingenously practised, to the destruction
of mankind.'80

 

BoPolitical Justice, v. 1, p. 228.

48

Not only does monarchy lead its subjedts away from
truth, it breaks their spirit, their self esteem, and their
energy. "What conscious dignity and virtue can there be
among a peeple who, if deprived of the imaginary guidance
of one vulgar mortal; are taught to believe that their
faculties are benumbed and all their joints unstrung?...He
that cannot speak to the proudest despot with a conscious-
ness that he is a man speaking to a man, and a determination
to yield him no superiority to which.his inherent qualifi-
cations do not entitle him, is wholly incapable of sublime
virtue."81

Godwin describes three variations of monarchy; elective
monarchy, limited monarchy, and a president with regal
powers. They are all found wanting. in elective monarchy
is impractical; every election would not present a man with
the necessary virtue and genius to rule; but even so, his
election would be rendered.precarious by the lack of wisdom
among the electorate. A.limited monarchy has a king whose
main duty is to be idle. He may not express his Opinion,
appoint officers, or hear any advisers other than his own.
The more he is deprived of his proper duties, the more
unreasonable will he become. There would be no one to whom

responsibility could be assigned. ”The measures are mixed

 

811bid., p. 230.

49

and confounded as to their source beyond the power of human
ingenuity to unravel."82
The third alternative, a president with regal powers,

has the same disadvantages under another name. No one man
is able or has the right to exercise the power that is
delegated to him.under such a system. "A king is the well-
known and standing appellation for an office which...has
been the bane and the grave of human virtue. Why endeavor

to purity and exercise what is entitled only to execration'l"85

3. Aristocracy and Democracy

Both.monarchy and aristocracy depend upon.ignorance
for their continued existence. Aristocracy is apposed
to what Godwin believes is the true nature of things, in
that it "implies neither less nor more than a scheme for
rendering more permanent and visible by the interference
of political institution the inequality of mankind."84
The principle supporting this scheme, according to Godwin,
is that of hereditary distinction. Political Justice
devotes a chapter to refuting this principle, and asks,
"What are the sensations that the lord (or the noble) exp
periences in his mother's womb by which his mind is made

 

82Ibid., p. 245.

851bid., p. 25}
84Ibid., v. 2, p. 14.

50

different from that of the peasant? Is there any variation
in the finer reticulated substance of the brain by which
the lord (or noble) is adapted to receive clearer and
stronger impressions than the husbandman or the smith?"85

Godwin believes that the only proper basis for dis-
tinction is that of personal merit; and that whenever this
principle is ignored, them that "unfortunate wretch who
with.nnremitted labour finds himself incapable adequately
'to feed and clothe his family has a sense of injustice
rankding at his heart,"86 and jealousy and hatred are spread
among the people.

It appears then, that monarchy and aristocracy inflict
great evils on mankind, and must therefore be shunned if
justice is to prevail. Only one type of government remains
to be discussed, that of democracy. If democracy is as bad
as monarchy and aristocracy, the future would look dim indeed,
but Godwin.does not believe that this is the case. He
states, "Supposing that we should even be obliged to take
democracy with all the disadvantages that were ever annexed
to it, and that no remedy could be discovered for any of
its defects, it would be still greatly preferable to the

exclusive system of the other forms."87

 

ssggiéei P- 5'4-
Ibid., p. 10.
87Ibid. , p. 24.

51

Godwin proposes some of these disadvantages which he
feels are factors hindering a democracy. He says that the
‘wise are outnumbered by the ignorant, and therefore the
welfare of the whole is endangered. The crafty politician
has more opportunity to deceive the unsuspecting multitude.
A.democracy is inconsistant and unstable; it wavers with
each wind of changing opinion, and outstanding men of pub-
lic service are soon accused of seeking after power.

In answering these arguments, Godwin points out that,
"In the estimate that is usually made of democracy one of
the most flagrant sources of error lies in our taking man-
kind such as monarchy and aristocracy have made them and
from thence judging how fit they are to legislate for them-

"88 Democracy does not undermine the virtue of

selves.
its subjects as do other types of government, according to
Godwin. ”Democracy restores to man a consciousness of his
value, teaches him by the removal of authority and oppression
to listen only to the dictates of reason, gives him con-
fidence to treat all other men.as his fellow beings, and
induces him to regard them no longer as enemies against

whom to be upon his guard, but as brethren whom it becomes

him to assist."89

 

881bid., p. 25
891bid., p. 26

52

It is clear, then, that although Godwin grants that
a democracy has certain failings, he believes that it offers
the greatest opportunity for the advancement of virtue,
in particular the virtue of equality. He does not,however,
entirely approve of existing forms of democratic governp
ment, and goes to great lengths to suggest various improve-

ments.

4. Defects of Democracy
The system of "checks and balances” rediscovered by
Mbntesquieu and incorporated into the American constitution,
is condemned by Godwin as dividing a nation against itself.
The proposed reason for such a system.is that by dividing
governmental power among several bodies, “rash" proceedings
will be eliminated, and the clash of various interests will
result in moderate and agreeable compromise. It was just
such compromises that Godwin opposed, as he believed that
any conclusion not reached by reason and sound evidence,
no matter how radical, is an injury and not a benefit.
If a check is necessary, it should be found, according to
Godwin, through the use of a cautious and deliberate pro-
ceeding prescribed by the representative assembly itself.
Godwin also gives a critical examination to the prin-
ciple of representation. By the act of choosing a repre-
sentative, a man delegates his judgement to another, some-

thing that Godwin believed could never be accurately and

53

truly done. Also, claims Godwin, the fact that a majority
of representatives vote a certain.way does not mean that
they have grasped eternal truth.

In this second criticism Godwin brings up oneof the
persistent problems of a democracy, the problem of the
tyranny of the majority. He believes that truth must pre-
vail, but this truth "cannot be made more true by the number
of its votaries."90

Godwin would like to correct this difficulty by doing
away with legislation. "Legislation," he says, "as it has
been usually understood, is not an affair of human competence.
Reason.is the only legislator, and her decrees are irrevoc-
able and uniform."91 This implies that governmental respon-
sibilities rest in executive power, and so Godwin believes.
"Administration...is a principle of perpetual application.
80 long as men.shall see reason to act in a corporate
capacity, they will always have occasions of temporary
emergency for which.to provide. In proportion as they'
advance in social improvement, executive power will, come
paratively speaking, become everything, and legislative
nothing."92

Still, until ~ . man reaches a more advanced state

 

9°Ibid., v. 1, p. 105.
911bid., p. 107
921bid., v. 2, p. 55.

of social improvement, some organization is necessary.
Godwin preposes what he feels might be a possible plan
for future organization; however his principal aim is to
guarantee the importance of the individual as opposed to
society in a corporate form; and since this is his only
real concern, we should not, as F. E. L. Priestley points
out, attach.too much emphasis on his sample scheme.93
Godwin would divide the country up into small parishes
in which a jury would supervise the administration of justice.
A.national assembly would be elected only on special occasions
to consider special emergencies. Even this very informal
structure will become unnecessary, states Godwin, as men
gradually improve in wisdom and virtue.
Godwin.now has followed his thought to its logical
end of‘enlightened anarchism, and concludes with.enthusi-
astic optimism, "With.what delight must every well-informed
friend of mankind look.forward to the auspicious period,
the dissolution of political government, of that brute
engine which.has been the only perennial cause of the vices
of mankind, and.which, as has abundantly appeared in the
progress of the present work, has mischiefs of various

sorts incorporated with its substance, and no otherwise to

be removed than by its utter annihilation.'94

 

94Politicsl Justice, v. 2, p. 71.

55

E. .Property _

l. The "Genuine System?

Godwin devotes a complete section of golitical Justice
to the subject of property, "containing," notes H. S. Salt,
"an epitome of his social doctrines."95 Godwin himself
states, ”The subject of property is the keystone that com—
pletes the fabric of political justice. According as our
ideas respecting it are crude or correct, they will enlighten
us as to the consequences of a simple form of society without
government, and.remove the prejudices that attach us to
complexity."96

In discussing the problem of property, Godwin is con-
cerned more with ethics and morals than with economic prob-
lems as such. as does not enter into problems of interest
to a scientific economist, but considers some of the basic
principles which are'implied by these problems. It is necess-
ary to keep this in mind when analyzing his theory, because
as pointed out by F. E. L. Priestley, "To submit Godwin to
judgement as an economist is manifestly unfair. His approach
is not the scientific approach of the economic investigator;
it is the ethical approach of the moral philosopher.'97

Godwin's ”genuine system" of property is governed by

 

95Godwin's Political Justice, H. 3. Salt (ed), Allen &
UanE 1553., Endon, I959, p. 10.

96Political Justice, v. 2, p. 223.
7---7-———-—---
9 22¢ Olto, P0 630

56

the same principle that runs throughout his work, the.
principle of justice. Applying this principle to property,
Godwin asks the following question, and supplies his own
answer.' "To whom.does any article of property, suppose
a loaf of bread, justly belong? To him who most wants it,
or to whom the possession of it will be most beneficial."98
Godwin felt that it was unjust for any man to have more than
he needed, while there was any other man in existence who
was in want. luxury was of no use to the wealthy man, and
any expense beyond his needs is ostentation. “The nobleman
'who should for the first time let his imagination loose
to conceive the style in which.he would live if he had
nobody to observe and no eye to please but his own, would
no doubt be surprised to find that vanity had been the first
mover in all his actions."99
This inequality of wealth leads to evils greater than
any he has mentioned, says Godwin. First of all it creates
a sense of dependence among the poor. "Observe the pauper
fawning with abject vileness upon his rich benefactor, and
speechless with.eensations of gratitude for having received
that which he ought to have claimed with an erect mien and
with a consciousness that his claim was irresistible."loo

Secondly, the established system of property displays a

 

98Political Justice, v. 2, p. 224.
991bid., p. 227.
1° Ibid, p. 252.

57

perpetual spectacle of injustice. The importance placed

on.wealth leads men to look upon it as the most desirable

of all objects, and rich men are made the subject of "general

esteem.and deference.“ 'Godwin believes that all riches

"are to be considered as the salary of a sinecure office,

where the labourer and the manufacturer perform the duties,

and the principal spends the income in luxury and idleness."101
Godwin anticipates the argument that since men differ

in ability and industry, they should receive different

rewards. But, answers Godwin, what if by working hard

you gain a hundred times more wealth than you need. What

good will this be to you? "He that looks at his property

‘with the eye of truth.will find that every shilling of it

has received its destination from the dictates of justice.'102
Godwin describes the great benefits that would come

with the equal distribution of wealth. “Every man would

have a frugal yet wholesome diet; every man would go forth

to that moderate exercise of his corporal functions that

would give hilarity to his spirits; none would be made

torpid with fatigue, but all would have leisure to cultivate

the kindly and philanthropical affections of the soul and .

 

101mm... p. 256.
102mm, p. 250.

to let loose his faculties in search of intellectual im-
provement."103 Not only would there be intellectual im-
provement, but moral improvement as we ll. There would be
no occasion for crime, because each man would possess in
abundance what he desired. The vices of oppression, envy,
and selfishness would cease to exist, andthe history of
war would be at an end.

George Saintsbury writes that in Political Justice,
"there are germs of the worst results of Bolshevism it-
self."104 A reply to this accusation is made by G. D. H.
Cole, who feels that Godwin was not a Socialist in the wide
sense of the word, he merely anticipated doctrines that
contributed to the making of Socialist movement. He
didn't want to make property collective, he wanted to do
away with the very conception of it}05 And according to
F. E. L.- Priestley, equality does not mean collectivism.
"Godwin's system might be described as a voluntary commun-

ism 0f “89; Production remains private."106

2. Objections
After outlining his system of property, Godwin gives

 

lmGeorge Saintsbury, Collected Essa s and Papers, J. M. Dent
8: Sons Ltd., London, I923, p. 3'75.

105G. D. H. Cole,

10692. citl, p. 72.

 

59

his answers to various objections that might be raised.

One of these objections is that it is luxury that has made
civilization possible; and it is the "elegant voluptuary"
that employs thousands to produce goods for his enjoyment,
and provokes nations to engage in commerce for the same
reason. Godwin answers this by repeating his arguments
showing the ill effects of luxury and inequality of wealth;
he believes that these evils overbalance any good that
luxury can accomplish. "If mind be to be preferred to more
animal existence, if it ought to be the wish of every
reasonable enquirer not merely that man but that happiness
should be propagated, then is the voluptuary the bane of
the human species."no7 .

Another objection is that Godwin's system would put
an end to industry. If no man can keep more than what is
of use to him, he will not exert himself and will become
slothful. Godwin refutes this by reminding us that by the
time his system would have come about, men would have made
tremendous intellectual strides and would occupy themselves
eagerly in refined pursuits of various kinds. Besides,
the amount of labour required by that time would only amount
to a half hour a day per person, and all necessary wants

would be supplied. Who would shrink from this small amount

 

107Political Justice, v. 2, p. 24-6.

of work, asks Godwin? He refutes the argument that his
system could not be made permanent in the same way. man
would have advanced to such a point that he would not slide
back to the old system under anycircumstances.

Neither should his system be incompatable with in-
dependence, says Godwin. He defines two types of independ-
ence, natural and moral; natural independence being the use
of private judgement, and moral independence being the lack
of giving or receiving aid and assistance from.one's neigh-
bore.

floral independence is undesirable anyway, says Godwin.
"What could be more beneficial than for each man to derive
every possible assistance for correcting and moulding his
conduct from.the perspicacity of his neighbour?"108 But
an equal system of property should not interfere with
personal independence and the use of private judgement;
there is no need for common meals and common storage houses.
In fact, Godwin is opposed to cooperation in all forms,
going to unusual extremes in his conclusions. For example,
he believes that we will not have music concerts or
theatrical performances in the future, because it "seems

to include an absurd and vicious cooperation."109

 

1°81bid., p. 265.
1°9Ibid., p. 269.

61

Some of these conclusions have drawn much abuse upon
Godwinls head; for example the following statement made by
George Saintsbury. "When a man decides, as Godwin does,
that exactly half an hour's work per diem on the part of
everybody will satisfy all the reasonable wants of the
human race, he.is beyond argument; you can only laugh at

him or shut him up."110

Such criticism places itself be-
yond argument, and makes any examination of Godwin's ideas
difficult. It might be wiser to remember a remark made

by H. S. Salt, ”It is easy to ridicule and caricature such
speculations by applying, or rather misapplying, the criticism
of today to views which have reference solely to a future,
period; but it is well, nevertheless, that our thoughts

should be sometimes directed toward this final and ultimate

goal of human aspirations."111

 

11OQp.'cit., p. 572.
1119p. cit., p. 11.

CHAPTER.III
LATER THOUGHT

.A. The Domestic Affections

Godwin revised many of his ideas after the publication
of Political Justice, and some of those revisions form
important enough appendages to his thought to be discussed
in some detail. In the later editions of Political Justice,
published;in 1796 and 1798, he toned down the vigorous
expression of much of his philosophy, and the work lost
a great deal of its force. .According to F. E. L. Priestley,
however, the third edition is superior in that the crudities
of the earlier work have been corrected, and the reasoning

112 At any rate,

has been reduced to greater accuracy.
neither of the later editions greatly modified the idea

and spirit behind the original, although a few minor changes
were made.

In the third edition, Godwin placed slightly more

 

112 . cit., p. 82. The full title of Priestley's edition
8 An En ui Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence
on General Virtue and Morals b WIIIIam Godwin; a Photo-
a hic Facsimile of the Third Edition. In these three
volumes Priestleyihas used the third edition of Godwin's
work, but has reprinted all of the variations in the

first and second editions, making it a handy reference
for the comparison of all three editions.

 

 

65

emphasis on the importance of feeling and emotion. This
was due primarily to his marriage with mary‘Wollstonecraft
in 1797, and his revision of thought on this subject is
even more marked in his later writings. In his memoirs
of Mary‘wollstonecraft, he discards his cold logical writing
style, and pens a tender narrative about the life of the
woman who gave him one of the happiest periods of his life.
He appears to have completely changed his mind about the
value of the domestic affections by this time, and in describ-
ing mary‘wollstonecraft he says, "She felt herself formed
for domestic affection, and all those tender charities,
which.men of sensibility have constantly treated as the
dearest band of human society.'115

In a diary note written in 1798, Godwin says, "The
bunfits we can confer upon the world are few, at the same
time that they are in their nature, either petty in their
moment, or questionable in their results. The benefits
we can confer upon those with whom we are closely connected
are of great magnitude, or continual occurrence."114
Apparently Godwin now felt that charity begins in the home,
and that by demonstrating benevolence and kindness there,

a man will be made more prompt in.the service of the general

 

 

113Memoirs of Mar Wollstonecraft b ‘William Godwin, Richard
ET'EEEEE Ific., New York, 1935. p. 653

114a. K. Paul, @. cit., v. 1, p. 294.

public.

In 1799 Godwin published a novel, St. loan, which
gave high praise to the domestic affections. Godwin even
found it necessary to write a brief preface explaining the
change in his attitude. He said that for four years he
had been anxious to change some of his opinions of this
subject as expressed in Political Justice, and that he
now believed that the domestic affections were natural
to man, and were not incompatible with justice and virtue.

In his Thoughts occasioned by the Perusal of Dr. Parr's
Spital Sermon, published in 1801, he took a somewhat differ-
ent view of the question involving Fenelon and his chamber-
maid. He had already reached the opinion.that the domestic
affections were of undoubted importance in furthering the
general happiness of mankind. It becomes a question then,
of which choice will most be for the benefit of society
as a whole. If I were to rescue Penelon I would be con-
tributing most directly to the general good, but by ignoring
the fact that the chambermaid is my.mother, I will be
ignoring a motive which, says Godwin, is normally essential
to the welfare and happiness of humanity.

In this same work, however, Godwin points out that the
value of these domestic and private affections exists only
to the extent that they are conducive to the public good.

It appears then, that this change in his attitude did not
involve any change in.his basic conception of virtue. He

65

still believes that the proper goal of society should be
the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and that the
domestic affections are to be considered valuable only
inasmuch as they contribute to this goal. In other words,
I must not love my mother to the extent that it will in-
terfere with my contributions to the general welfare.

In Godwin's book of religious Essgys, which he was
working on at the time of his death, there is further
evidence to show that his brief happiness with fiery Wollstonecraft
had convinced him of the necessity for the domestic affections.
In essay number VIII, "0n.the Character of Jesus," Godwin
quotes some biblical sayings of Christ. These sayings
state that a man must come to Jesus hating his father and
mother, wife and children; also that a man must not be slow
in following Jesus because he must bury his father, but
that he should "let the dead bury their dead."

Godwin here says, "It must be confessed that in all
these exaggerations there is a noble and a gallant spirit,
which leads us in some degree to admire the speaker (Jesus).
But when we consider him as endeavoring to lay down an
everlasting code of morals, what he says under these heads
is worthy of distinct and unhesitating censure."115

When Godwin expressed his views on the domestic affections

 

115nssfiys bf the late William Godwin, Henry s. King 8. Co.,
n on, 9 Po -

66

in Political Justice, he was writing and thinking from

an ivory tower. He did not write from practical exper-
ience, but from.the reflections of solitary meditation.

It is only natural to suspect that under such circumstances
he might tend to overemphasize the part that reason plays
in the lives of men, and to neglect the importance of
familial love and emotion in general as motives for

action.

Although his marriage did not change his basic
utilitarian principles, it softened his rigid intellect-
ualism considerably; and in the second edition of his memoirs
of mary‘Wollstonecraft he writes, "A.sound morality requires
that nothing human should be regarded by us with.indiffer-
once; but it is impossible that we should not feel the
strongest interest in those persons, whom.we know most
intimately, and whose welfare and sympathies are united
to our own. True wisdom will recommend to as individual
attachments; for with them our minds are more thoroughly
maintained in activity and life than they can be under
the privation of them...True virtue will sanction this
recommendation, since it is the obJect of virtue to produce
happiness, and since the man who lives in the midst of domest-
ic relations, will have many Opportunities of conferring
pleasure, minute in the detail, yet not trivial in the
amount, without interfering with the purposes of general

67

benevolence.'ll6

B. Reason and Feeling

Godwin also revised his opinion concerning the in-
fluence of feeling and emotion on the actions of men. He
came to feel that emotion played a greater part in determin-
ing the motives of men's actions than he had realized.
Even before the publication of the Memoirs, he had stated;
in The Enguirer in 1797, "There is no motive more power-
ful in its Operations upon the human.mind, than that which
originates in sympathy."117

In his later novels, Godwin injects emotion and feeling
in large quantities. In fact, it is difficult at times to
believe that the author of the cold, logical Political
Justice, and the author of the later emotionally portrayed
novels, are one and the same. Angus Wilson states, perhaps
rather extremely, "There is a frightening chasm, a night-
mare association between.the gloomy tortured lives of Godwin's
heroes and the sweet reasonableness, the universal good
sense of Political Justice."118

Godwin's apparent inconsistanoy in this respect .

 

11692. cit., p. 127.

117William Godwin, The Enquirer; Reflections on Education
Manners, and Literature, S—impkinWB,
Pe w.

118%2. cit., p. #0. For another article illustrating Godwin's
a or use of sentiment in his novels, see B. Sprague Allen,
"William Godwin as a Sentimentalist," PMLA, March, 1918,

vol. 1, p. 1-29.

 

68

is somewhat difficult to understand. One reason is, of
course, Godwin's revised attitude toward feeling; he had
changed his mind and wanted to show that he had. The form
of the novel as a means of communication probably had some—
thing to do with.it. Since novels are built around characters
and situations, it is easier, in fact almost necessary, to
bring emotion and feeling into the picture. Another possible
explanation might be that Godwin was writing these novels to
make money; and since emotional and romantic novels have
more commercial appeal than philosophical treatises, Godwin
might have wanted to inject more emotion into his work than
he otherwise would.
Another illustration of Godwin's recognition of the
importance of emotion can be taken.from his book, Thou ts
on Man, finished in 1851. "We are prepared by the power
that made us for feelings and emotions; and unless these
come to diversify and elevate our existence, we should waste
our days in melancholy, and scarcely (be) able to sustain
ourselves."119
What impact does this development have on the Godwinian
theory? The basic element of that theory is perfectibility.
Vice is really an error in understanding; correct a man's

thinking, and you will correct his vice. But if a man

 

119William Godwin, Thou ts on man His Nature Productions
and Discoveries, Effingfiam WiIson, RoyaI Eibfiange, Ionian,

1851, p. 254.

69

can be motivated by his feelings, then something more than
reason would be necessary to lead the way to virtuous con-
duct. This indicates a conflict with Godwin's theory that
knowledge is virtue and that in order to improve men's

moral actions you need only to improve their understanding.

To discover Godwin's solution, we must turn to the
"Summary of Principles'that he prefixed to the third edition
of Political Justice. In the"Summary“ is stated the new
principle that the voluntary actions of men are directed
by their feelings, and that reason has "no tendency to
excite us to action." But it goes on to say that although
our actions do not originate in reason, they are governed
and regulated by reason. In other words, although feeling
is what motivates our acts, reason selects the right and
proper conduct "according to the worth it ascribes to
various excitements." Therefore reason is still the key
to perfectibility, and it is to reason we must appeal for
the further improvement of man‘s character.

We can gather from.this, then, that Godwin did not
change his fundamental position concerning the relative
merits of reason and feeling at all. As David Fleisher
notes, "What he (GodwinDdid in effect was not to alter the
fundamental relationship of feeling and reason, but simply

to emphasize the part which feeling played in that relationshiprla

 

12°92. cit., p. 117-8.

70

How far does Godwin's revision go toward solving the prob-

lem? He apparently believes that by emphasizing feeling

he is placing it in a more equal relationship with reason.

But in reality nothing is changed. Feeling and emotion

are still subordinate to reason, and although feeling

motivates our actions, Godwin still believes that reason

is the headmaster who selects the actions we will take.
Godwin had to maintain his fundamental position.here,

because if feeling could prompt us to act regardless of

the dictates of reason, moral conduct could not be improved

by the use of persuasion and free discussion. This problem

is a basic one that goes to the root of the Godwinian theory.

John Middleton murry makes an attempt to explain it in

this fashion, "Godwin's 'reason' is the concept of a recluse,

which in reality contains under one conventional label

a whole host of instincts and emotions. He has done what

most men dO'WhO entertain a like purpose-—namely, rationalized

his own 'values.? Godwin's 'universal benevolence‘ is not

a deduction, but an assumption; he is trying to find a

reason for the emotion which.he felt, and the ideal of which

he dreamed.“121

C. Perfectibility
Godwin also modified his views on intellectual per-

 

lelJOhn Middleton Murry, Countries of the Mind, Oxford
University Press, London, 1951, p. 183.

71

fectibility. His original belief was that men were born
with negligible variation in intellect and ability. They
were all equally malleable, and it was due to the differ-
ences in envirOnment and stimulation to learn that one man
‘would outstrip another. However, in the same diary note
in which.he corrected his views on emotion and the domestic
affections GOdwin said, "I am...desirous Of retracting the
opinions I have given favourable to Helvetius' doctrine
Of the equality Of intellectual beings as they are born
into the world, and of subscribing to the received Opinion,
that, though education is a most powerful instrument, yet
there exist differences of the highest importance between
human beings from the period or their birth."122
This view is supported by Godwin in_Thoughts on man.
”But as in the infinite variety of human beings no two
faces are so alike that they cannot be distinguished...
there are internal varieties in the senses; the organs,
and the internal structure of the human species..."123
Elsewhere in the same work Godwin comments on the different
talents that students bring to their instructors at school.

He concludes that each man cannot deveIOp equally as well

in any field, but can reach his highest perfection in the

 

12299. cit., v. 1, p. 265.
123920 Cite, Po 50-1e

72

field for which.he is most suited.

It is not, however, upon physical equality and per-
fectibility that the bulk Of Godwin's theory rests. His
philosophy is primarily concerned with morality. What
impact, then,,does the variation Godwin makes in his theory
of physical perfectibility have on his theory of moral
perfectibility?

As stated earlier, Godwin originally considered the
fact Of moral equality more certain than that Of physical
equality. It is perhaps for this reason that he does not
seem.to revise his theory of moral perfectibility to any
great extent, even in spite Of his concessions in the area Of
physical inequality. It is true that in his religious Essays
he states that "some men seem born to love, and others to
hate,"124 but he does not seem to believe that this is
prevalent to such an extent that it cannot be overcome by

the power Of education.

D. Necessity
The last revision of Godwinls thought to be discussed
here has to do with his doctrine of necessity. In Thoughts
on man, Godwin introduces what he considers an answer tO

the principal difficulties the believer in necessity en-

 

12492e Cite, Pe 64’e

75

counters. He admits that "...every man, the necessarian

as well as his Opponent, acts on the assumption of human
liberty, and can never for a moment, when he enters into

the scenes Of real life, divest himself of this persuasion."l25
How can this be explained? It would seem that this would

be a powerful argument for the proponents Of free will.
However, Godwin remains persuaded that every action has

a cause, perhaps not known, but a cause nevertheless, that
will not permit us to do otherwise than what we do.

He surmounts the difficulty by calling this assumption
the "delusive sense Of liberty." In reality we are governed
by necessity, says Godwin, but we cannot escape the feeling
that our actions are free. "...we have demonstration, all
the powers Of reasoning faculty, on one side, and the feeling
Of our minds, an inward persuasion of which.with all our
efforts we can never divest ourselves, on the other."126

This situation is not an unfortunate one, continues
Godwin. It is this "delusion" that gives us our conscience,
and a sense Of right and wrong. Its absense would have
a most harmful effect; it is this feeling that our will is

free that gives us enthusiasm, a determination for moral

exdrtion, and fills us with a vigorous energy for right

 

12592. cit., p. 228.

126Ibid., p. 230.

74

action. Here Godwin reverses his belief set forth in
PODitical Justice, that a man cannot be blamed for his
misdeeds. However, it is difficult to determine whether
the blame Godwin would assign is based on truth or delusion.
As pointed out by David Fleisher, "...it is surprising
that a philosopher who equated truth with virtue and error
with.vice should yet in this instance have spoken with
enthusiasm Of virtues which are engendered by a universal
delusion."127
Of what value, then, is the knowledge of the truth
of necessity, if all men act on the assumption that their
actions are free? It will still have uses, according to
Godwin, and he points out some of them. "It will moderate
our excesses, and point out to us that middle path Of
judgement which the soundest philosophy inculcates...and...
we shall view with pity, even with sympathy, the men whose
frailties we behold, or by whom crimes are perpetrated,
satisfied that they are parts Of one great machine, and,
like ourselves, are driven forward by impulses over which
they have no real control."128

It appears that Godwin's later revisions did not change
his basic theory to any great extent. The basic principles

 

12792. cit., p. 126.
128William Godwin, Thoughts on man, O . cit., p. 241-2.

75

and scope of Political Justice remain untouched. It can
accurately be said then, that Godwin's contribution to
political philosophy was based almost entirely on one bOOk.
In fact, without Political Justice, Godwin's work might
very well have passed almost entirely unnoticed in the

history Of literature .

CHAPTER IV
CRITICISM

A. Godwin's Life

With the advantage of hindsight and the knowledge
we have gained since Godwin's time, it is easy to dismiss
many Of his ideas as ridiculous an unrealistic. But the
men who wrote during the time Of the French Revolution
lived under conditions that might plausibly have led some
of them to believe that a new world of perpetual prOgress
was in the making, and that they were laying the foundation
stones for a new concept of political and social develop-
ment. As pointed out by Christian Bay, "Not only must
we forgive them if we find that they entertain what we
would consider Odd value preferences, as well as unrealistic
conceptions of human nature and other empirical phenomena;
but we must also remember that the complexities of their
own times must have placed their heavy impact on political
thinkers in all countries."129

William Godwin's life and personality have been con-
sidered by many to be the most interesting thing about him.

Many conflicting positions have been taken in this respect,

 

129%. cit., p. 227.

77

and it might be well at this point to try to establish
as fair a picture as we can with regard to Godwin as a
man, keeping in mind the circumstances of his life and the
times in which he lived.

J. R. Sutherland writes, "Godwin is at once a shrewd

150 A.more extreme view is taken

Observer and a crank."
by A. Edward Newton, who believes that Godwin ”was a cold,
hard, self-centered man who did good to none and harm to
many. As a husband, father, friend, he was a complete
failure."151
On the other hand, Jehn Middleton Murray writes that
Godwin was "one Of the most human figures Of his time.
The quality that is diffused through his whole work is

152 J. B. Bury says, "Rousseau

rare and human and tender.”
and Godwin are the two great champions in the eighteenth
century of the toiling and suffering masses."155

There are, I think, several reasons that help explain
such.differing Opinions. One Of these reasons might be
the political atmosphere during the reaction to the French

Revolution. When the revolution had.reached the height

 

130J. R. Sutherland,"Peace in the Age Of Wars and Revolution,"
Bookman, December, 1951, vol. 81, p. 156.
151

At Edward Newton, "A Ridiculous Philoso her,” Atlantic
Monthl , September, 1917, vOl. 120, p. 90.

132John Middleton Murray, "William Godwin," Heroes of Thought,
Julian Messner Inc., now IOrk, 1958, p. 257.

13392. cit., p. 225.

78

of its popularity, no man was held in higher esteem than

William Godwin. The decline Of his reputation and the many

aspersions cast against him were the result, I believe,

of the changing political feeling more than reaction against

Godwin himself or his work. Many Of Godwin's closest friends

later became staunch conservatives and felt obliged to

sternly criticize Godwin and his theories. That such

personal criticism was largely unmerited is supported by

the pangs of conscience felt by Coleridge when he wrote

in the margin of his copy Of Godwin's reply to Dr. Parr's

sermon, "Though I did it in the zenith of his reputation,

yet I feel remorse egg; to have only spoken unkindly of

such a man."134
Another reason for the abuse heaped upon Godwin is

that many felt that his own actions were not directed by

his philOSOphy. The fact that he did not live up to his

principles is pointed out by those who note as examples

his marriage with Hary'WOllstonecraft and his acceptance

of a sinecure position from the government near the end

of his life. In The Encyclopedia Americana Arthur H. Nason

writes that both Godwin and mary'Wollstonecraft ”held that

a legal marriage was undesirable; but, lacking the courage

of their convictions, they were married 29 march 17973455

 

154Quoted by David Fleisher, 9p. cit., p. 42.

135Arthur H. Nason, "William Godwin," The Encyclopedia
Americana, 1955, v. 12, p. 750.

‘79

However, for a long period previous to the marriage,
they had lived as man and wife, thereby being consistant
with their principles. But Godwin had always felt that a
man could bring himself and those around him a great deal
of grief by single-handedly opposing the beliefs held by
a majority of society, even if society were wrong. It was
for this reason that he and Mary WOllstonecraft married; it
‘was a matter of sacrificing a principle for the sake Of
their unborn child. I don't believe they can be criticized
to any great... extent for wanting to protect their child
from.the misery involved.in denying convention. Their
marriage then, I believe, was more a matter of placing one
principle above another, rather than a lack Of moral courage.
Later on, of course, Godwin changed his mind concerning
the institution Of marriage; and I think it is recognized
that men have the right to, and occasionally do, change
their minds.

The conditions Of Godwin's life explain a great deal
of his inconsistency, He accepted a salaried Office from
the government when he had but a few years to live. Who
can begrudge an Old man from choosing to live out his life
in reasonable comfort instead Of racking poverty? Godwin
felt that compensation from a governmental position was
wrong, true enough, but his theory called for charity tO
spring directly from the hearts Of the individuals composing
the public. If the public was not ready for this teaching,

80

I think Godwin can be justified in accepting this means
Of Obtaining a livihood.

The conditions Of his life explain another reason for
much criticism that has been directed against Godwin; that
he sponged incessantly off his friends. Yet it cannot be
denied that Godwin worked hard during his lifetime; his
literary production was enormous, and even Old age did
not keep him from sustained effort. However, the ill repute
Of his name and the lowered quality of his work prevented
him from being able to make an adequate livihood. What
is a man to do when he has a wife and five children to
support? Godwin's own philosophy said that if a man was
in need he should request necessary assistance from those
'who are able to afford it ”with an erect mien and with a
consciousness that his claim was irresistible."156 Neither
should it be forgotten that Godwin was as generous with
others to the extent of his means as he felt others should
be with.him.

Shelley was the friend that Godwin made most of his
demands.on. But few look upon the other side of this coin
and realize that Shelley owed most Of the ideas on.which
he based his poetry to Godwin. Considering Godwin's cir—

cumstances, the fact that Shelley was a member Of the family,‘

 

136See above, p. 56.

81

and the fact that Shelley got most Of his ideas from Godwin,
is it unreasonable for Godwin to expect some assistance
'when.he was so sorely in need Of it? John Middleton Murry
writes, "At a modest estimate three quarters of (Shelley‘s
work) is Godwin in poetry...(Godwin) gave Shelley his ideas
and expected Shelley to give him his money. was it really
so monstrous?"157
It is unfortunate that Godwin's personal life was such-
as to cause so great a distraction from his ideas. I think
it is time to view with some sympathy the difficulties
under which he worked, and give closer attention to the

theories that so startled his own world, and offer a con-

siderable basis for speculation today.

B. Three Basic Ideas

Before we plunge into an analysis of Godwin's political
philosophy, it might be convenient to set forth what might
be considered the three basic ideas Of his thought.

(1) men.is capable of infinite perfeetibiligz. Knowledge
is received through perception, and at the time of their
~birth.individuals are equally capable Of improvement through
the shaping of their environment; this follows from the law
Of necessity which holds that each action is governed by a

previously determined cause. If this environment encourages

 

W

1579p. cit., p. 181-2.

82

the use Of reason and private judgement with perfect sin-
cerity in communication, truth will be promoted; and since
knowledge is virtue and vice only error, mankind will
gradually approach a state Of moral perfection in which

the greatest happiness of the greatest number will be advanced
through the practice Of universal benevolence, where justice
will dictate that each.man supply, equally and without
discrimination, the needs of his neighbor.

(2) "The voluntarygactions Of men originate in their
Qpinions." In order that man may progress on this road to
moral perfection, his Opinions must be influenced; for what
men do depends on what they think. Persuasion and free
discussion should not be interfered with or hampered, then,
by such things as religious dogma, libel laws, loyalty
oaths, previous constitutions, national education, and
salaried political Office. Neither should erroneous Opin-
ion be suppressed, because it is only through the unhampered
exchange Of Opinion that truth can be discovered and men's
actions improved.

(5) Government interferes with the discovery of truth
and the free exchange Of opinion and should therefore be

abolished. AAll systems Of government are based on falsehood

 

and must support error for the continuance of their own
existence, and by the use Of coercion and the support of
inequality of wealth and property they interfere with the
free exchange Of Opinion and the welfare of the people.

83

Although democracy is preferable to monarchy and aristocracy,
as now practised it too contains serious errors as illustrated
by the theories Of checks and balances and representation;

for the benefit of society, therefore, the power of all
existing forms Of government should be gradually reduced

and finally dissolved.

C. Perfectibility

It would be sad indeed if we could not say that man
‘was capable Of improvement. The important questions are,
of course; how is this to be achieved, to what extent is
it possible, and how fast can it be expected?

Although men are indeed subject to change for the
better, I believe that Godwin overlooks the enormous com-
plexity involved. He assumes that the free exercise Of
reason and private judgement will always bring men to the
truth; ignoring the extreme difficulty Of arriving at the
truth by any process, and then knowing when it has been
found. Even if this can be accomplished, there is no
guarantee that men will want to act in accordance with
the truth they have found. There are many desires and
irrational processes that interfere with behavior even
when the truth is known, and such perceptions upon which
we base our judgement Of truth tend to be affected by these

138

same desires and irrational processes. Godwin also

 

138The same point is raised by Christian Bay, Op. cit., p. 2.44.

ignores the difficulty involved in applying abstract truth
to the practical affairs of everyday life.

In spite Of these difficulties though, it is possible
to go along with the basic idea Of perfectibility. But
there are other considerations in Godwin's conception of
this process that need to be examined. His theory that
men are equally capable Of moral improvement through.environ-
ment is one of them. Godwin himself revised his opinion
.on this matter in his later work. He states that he has
come to believe that there are considerable differences
possible in children at birth, and that this will result
in different talents and aptitudes in later life; but he
still believes that the susceptibility for moral improvement
is largely unaffected by these intellectual differences.

But if men vary intellectually at birth, and their actions
are governed by Opinions derived from their intellect,
then.it seems to me that men are not equally capable of
moral improvement. The more intelligent will be better
able to understand their environment and absorb instruction,
and thus be in a better position to select proper moral
actions than their less intelligent neighbors.

There appears to be some conflict in Godwin's belief
in necessity and his conceptiOn of the utility of praise
and blame. Although he believes that men's actions are
governed by necessity and thus they are not responsible

for their deeds, yet he insists that the merit of a deed

85

depends upon the motive of the door.139 G. D. H. Cole
explains this conflict by stating that for Godwin knowing

140 In this case, if

and doing the good are identical.
a man does wrong he cannot be blamed, because he lacked
the proper knowledge; if he had had the proper knowledge,
he would not have done the deed. If a man knows the good,
according to Godwin, he will automatically be motivated
to achieve it; but if a man does good accidentally, he
cannot be praised, because he lacked the proper motive.
The proper motive necessitates the proper act, but the
motive must be the proper one to acquire merit, and presto!
the dilemma is solved; the belief in the utility of praise
and blame is reconciled with the belief in determinism.

It is not quite this simple, however, for what merit
can a motive acquire if it is determined by a previous
cause and in turn determines the act? Godwin would say
that the merit is involved merely because the motive is
there and the act is not accidental. This connection between
motive and act may be desirable, but the door can claim
little merit, since whether or not the motive is there
was determined in the first place.

Godwin dismisses free will too lightly, and avoids

 

139See above, p. 21.
14092. cit., p. 25.

86

discussing a topic that has been a highly controversial

issue throughout the history of philosophy. It was essential
for Godwin to assume determinism to avoid the possibility

Of wilful action interfering with the moral progress of

man achieved by the attainment of greater knowledge. Since
free will might prove ruinous to his theory, Godwin rather
arbitrarily denies it; and although there is much that

could be said on.both.sides Of this issue, Godwin believes

he has firmly established his position after one short
chapter.

By’what criteria does Godwin.measure the state Of man's
moral development? Where does the road lead? Godwin believes
that improvement is indicated by man's tendency to promote
the greatest happiness Of the greatest number. This is
the basis Of philosophic radicalism, and the soundness of
this principle as the proper goal for society can be earnest-
1y debated. Strictly interpreted, it delegates any values
that do not promote the general welfare to a secondary
position.

Godwin does just this, and sometimes follows k his
logic to such extreme lengths that his conclusions become
completely unacceptable. Leslie Stephen says, ”He (Godwin)
dealt in what is called inexorable logic: That is to say,
that whenever he ran his head against a lamp-post, he
calmly asserted that it did not exist."141 Unfortunately

 

1'

141Leslie Stephen, "Studies of a Biographer, The Knickerbocker
Press, London, 1907, p. I21.

8’7

there is more truth than humor in this statement, as illus-
trated by Godwin's case of Fenelon and his chambermaid.

TO reach the conclusion that he must save Fenelon, in spite
Of the fact that the chambermaid is his mother, Godwin
completely overlooks the values Of personal love and grati-
tude. In fact Godwin condemns gratitude as a sin if it
results in an act not otherwise dictated by the general

we lfare . '

It is true that Godwin later had doubts about his
choice Of saving Fenelon, but his other conclusions still
show the difficulty of making utility the sole basis of
justice and moral duty; for example, his belief that promises
are not binding if the public welfare later demands a
different action. Such a proposition would undermine
day to day transactions and would result in a chaos of
uncertainty.

Such extreme conclusions prompted H. N. Brailsford
to say that "...his (Godwin's) honesty provided the perfect
refutation Of his premises. The reasoning was sound but
the conclusions were impossible. Clearly then, the premises
were at fault. Political Justice is the reductio ad absurdum

142

Of individualism." I think it might be better to say

that Godwin's reasoning was sound as far as it went; if he

 

142H. N. Brailsford, "William Godwin," in Great Democrats,
A. Barratt Brown (ed), Ivor Nicholson & Watson, Landon,

1954., p0 352e

88

had included more factors in the consideration of his basic
.premises, I think his conclusions might not have been so
extreme.

One other criticism of the perfectibility theory that
should be made here is a basic one that must be mentioned
in any discussion of perpetual improvement or progress.

It was originally stated by Thomas Robert malthus in 1798
as a reply to Godwin. "Population," says malthus, "when
unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence
increases only in an arithmetical ratio."143 If this be
true, then society is faced with an almost insurmountable
Obstacle to future improvement. Godwin originally answered
Malthus in his reply to Dr. Parr's sermon in 1801, and
stated that by the time population became a threat tO
existence, men would have acquired the capacity for moral
restraint sufficient to reduce the danger. In his book

0f Population, written in 1820, Godwin attacked the malthusian
ratios which he had previously accepted, and now concludes
that population could never outstrip the power of improve-
ment made possible by the human intellect.

The population argument remains a vital one, however,

to all theories of progress, especially in our own time

 

145Thomas Robert Melthus, First Essa on Population, reprinted
by Macmillan & CO, Ltd., London, 926, p. 14.

89

as the problem.looms before us with ever increasing urgency.
we have come to accept Halthus' supposition, and are now
turning our attention more to the solution to the problem
of overpopulation. Much controversy has arisen over various
solutions that have been proposed, especially around the
issue of birth control; and it begins to look as though
this problem might turn out to be the most crucial obstacle
to the theory of perfectibility and progress.

D. Opinion

Godwin's belief that the voluntary actions of men
originate in their Opinions is open to serious question.

In fact I believe that it is the most fundamental Objection
that can be made to his whole theory. Godwin recognized

. the importance Of doubts that could be cast in this area,
and attempted to revise his statement in his later work.

He said in the third edition of Political Justice that
action originates in feeling and not in Opinion, but he
nevertheless retained his belief in the superiority of
Opinion by stating that reason selects the most desirable
action suggested to our minds by feeling and emotion.

If action can be motivated by feeling without regard
to reason, then the improvement Of the understanding will
not necessarily result in virtuous action; and it is commonly
accepted by modern psychology that feeling does have a part,

and a very large part, in determining our actions. It is

90

really impossible, however, to separate the causes of any
action and say that this or that cause was the primary factor.
Irving Sarnoff, Daniel Katz, and Charles MOOlintock have written
an article which illustrates the complexity Of attitudes and
motivation. "A.major difficulty in the field Of attitude
research," say the authors, "has been the oversimplification
of problems in terms of a narrow theory Of motivation."144
They suggest that there are three basic types Of motivational
patterns, which interplay in determining individual human be-
havior; sometimes one pattern predominates at the expense of
the other patterns. These are the three patterns: the rational
or making-sense-of-one's world pattern, the reward and punish-
ment or social acceptance pattern, and the ego defense or
anxiety-reducing pattern.

In all these three.reason and emotion can be interwoven
in countless variations. It is consequently misleading to
state, as Godwin does, that reason will always be the deciding
factor in all our actions; clearly it is not, nor is it nec-
essarily desirable for it to be. .Much good can result from
actions springing from an appropriate emotion.

Persuasion can be successful in improving people's

emotional responses as well as their understanding, as pointed

out by Sarnoff, Katz, and HeClintock. "The great bulk

 

1"'tflrvingSarnoff, Daniel Katz, and Charles mcClintock,
"Attitude-Change Procedures and Motivating Patterns," in

Public gpinion and Propaganda, Daniel Katz et. al. (eds.),
ry en ess, ew or , , p. 505.

91

of the efforts to change attitudes in the world of affairs
is through persuasion and argumentation, in which an appeal
is made to existing value structures."145 Godwin would
very likely reply that if a person's emotional responses
have been improved, it is because he has increased in
understanding. I think that the best explanation of Godwin's
position is given by Jehn Middleton Murry, when he says
that Godwin has "rationalized his own 'values'” and uses
reason as a label to include a "whole host of instincts
and emotions."146

If man is capable of action based on emotion and passion,
then the elimination of all interference would not be a
wise step to take. Established constitutions, wisely con-
structed to allow room for improvement, counterbalance
emotional demands for changes not based on sound judgement.
Our experience in this country tends to add emphasis to
this point. The difficulty of amending our constitution
allows time to cool hot heads; and the result is, generally
speaking, that when changes are made, they have a better
chance to be based on reflection and long consideration.

This reasoning also supports the existence Of libel

laws. men.would then learn to pause in the heat of anger

 

145mm,, p. 309.

146See above, p. 70.

.92

and consider the results of hasty statements. Religious
restrictions have the same effect; by establishing certain
beliefs and econtictions based on sound reflection and past
experience, they impose checks on the passions of the faith-
ful. Of course it is possible for religious convictions

to become unreasonable, but the point remains that such
restraints on matters of faith and morals are not necessarily
harmful.

The matter Of taking oaths has been a bone of contention
for many peOple. The Bible enjoins us "not to swear at all,"
on the theory that our word must be taken for what it is.

The opponents Of this theory state that if a man is innocent

of any wrong, he should not Object tO taking an oath. If

a man Objects, he casts a reasonable doubt upon his reliability;
and if he lies he may be made to suffer a conviction of
perjury, whereas otherwise no penalty may be possible.

For purposes of convenience in administering justice, such
reasons as the latter indicate that the taking of oaths

may be made to serve a useful purpose.

Godwin's position on national education has certainly
not been substantiated by the experience we have had Of it
up to the present time in our own country. It is true
that in the hands of an all-powerful dictator it may become
a potent weapon, but under such conditions any institution
could be used to strengthen the government's position. As

‘we know it, national, or socialized education has been a

1“
I‘ll‘l

 

93

powerful factor in the progress of culture and civilization,

and is concrete evidence Of Godwin's error in this respect.
Godwin's Objection to salaried governmental offices

is Open to a-very practical criticism, and one which.was

realized in his own life. His belief that individuals

should support public Officials who are in need does well

to point out the value Of the services such Officials render,

but the hard fact remains that individuals do not do this.

Of course they do it indirectly through taxes, but Godwin

opposed this as an unequal burden upon the poor; however,

the graduated income tax of today has removed this inequality.
A.stronger criticism to Godwin's proposal is that people

do not.seek public Office for monetary reward instead Of

public service. Salaries are low enough so that public

service is one of the primary incentives that can be ad-

vanced to interested parties, thus realizing Godwin's desire.

In the light Of this situation, it would be better to have

some monetary reward attached to public Office than to

take the extreme position of having none at all.

E. Government
If one accepts Godwin's theory of necessity, it would
be difficult to find fault with his general view Of puns
ishment. It would be useless to punish a man for retri-
butive purposes if he could not help what he did. But
Godwin himself opens the door on this subject by admitting

in his later work that in fact people do act in all their
dealings as if they were capable Of choice. He calls this
the "delusive sense of liberty," and states that from this
feeling comes our conscience and concepts of right and
wrong. By admitting this, it i3 possible to punish a
criminal for failing to heed this sense of liberty, delusive
though it may be.

Even if we do not consider the question of necessity,
it is possible to punish by confinement for the sake of
the future security Of society, because we have now es-
tablished that some actions are governed by feeling and
not opinion. If this is true, enlightening the criminal's
understanding will not necessarily result in his rehabilita-
tion. In fact it is in the case of the criminal that passion
is most likely to subordinate reason, and confinement may
be necessary to cool these passions or to keep them.under
control.

It is this type Of security against the violent acts
Of men.that Godwin does not take into proper consideration.
This is also evident in his view on law. Law is unnecessary,
he says, because men should be ruled by Opinion. It is
because they are not so ruled that law ig necessary. If
the law is sometimes confusing and uncertain, think of
the confusion that would reign without its protective mantle.
Countless instances of administrative matters that do not

even involve passion but are only questions of convenience

95

would be unresolved, not even considering the fear of prob-
able violence that would result from the absence Of law
enforcement agencies.

This same argument would also require the existence
of some form of government. If there is need for a re-
straining power, there must be some agency that can supply
it. Not only is government necessary for the existence Of
courts of law, it is essential for control and regulation
Of countless other situations that develop in the kind
Of complex society that result from.the progress of civiliza-
tion. Civic administration, economic regulation, and foreign
relations are only examples of the many areas needing some
type Of governmental action.

As long as some such agency is required, an established
government has certain advantages over other types Of
institutions, because it at least is under some form of
control by the electorate. There are many kinds Of agencies
'which are not, such as business monopolies, unions, and
pressure groups of all kinds. Godwin fails to consider,
as Christian Bay observes, that "the abolition Of state
power, if it would have any effects that can be predicted
with certainty, would result in the immediate substitution

of other, and probably even more obnoxious power hierarchies."l45

 

”701:. cit., p. 2.45.

96

Since it seems necessary, then, that some form Of
government be formed, , I believe we can go along with
Godwin's belief that democracy is the best available sys-
tem, as it seems to Offer the most freedom for the individ-
ual while still providing the required control and restraint.
Although Godwin Objects to the theory of representation,

I believe it presents the most desirable method Of allowing
the individual to take a part in government. It would be
wildly impractical to expect any sense or order from a
council of all the citizens formed to decide upon laws

and matters of state, even if such a thing were possible.
It is true that a representative cannot act exactly as each
and every one Of his electors would, and many times the
operations Of practical politics interfere; with the voice
of the people; nevertheless,constituents have enough in-
fluence over their representatives to allow their wishes

to be expressed in many matters Of public interest.

Godwin Objects to the system.of checks and balances
because it results in tOO much compromise, and because it
Splits a country against itself. He believes that com-
promise thwarts the discovery Of truth, and that truth can
only be discovered by the use of uncompromising reason.

It might again be pointed out here that truth is a complex
thing indeed, and it is no easy matter to discover it

or recognize it when found. The only authority for such
recognition is the Opinion of men, and men differ in their

97

Opinions.l Who is to say what is true? At least a compromise
is a method by which the clash of conflicting Opinions.

can be reconciled to a workable program. The truth of this
is illustrated by the compromises which made possible the

making of our own constitution.

Godwin's theory of property involves an area tOO vast
for detailed discussion here; however, a few comments may
be appropriate. Godwin believed that government supports
the inequality Of wealth and that legislation favors the
rich. This is not necessarily true, as seen by the Operation
of government today. The income and the inheritance tax
are only examples of governmental action tending to re-
distribute wealth, and indicate that the very reverse Of
Godwin's proposition may be true; that government may
function in such a manner as to help the poor and bring
about to a great extent Godwin's desire for economic equality.
Godwin's assumption that man's progress toward moral
perfection will cause him to suppr the needs of his neigh-
bor may be true tO some extent, but tends to oversimplify
human nature. Passion and emotion are strong ingredients
in man's desire to keep what he has earned. Perhaps a
more realistic system would take advantage of these tendencies
by providing suitable conditions for the poor to raise their
economic standards through equality of opportunity.

98

F. Conclusion

Let us now see what conclusions we can make in view
of our criticism of the three basic ideas Of Godwin's
political philosophy.

(1) man is capable of infinitegperfectibilitz. The
statement that man is capable of improvement cannot be
denied, but serious reservations must be made as to the
process as set forth by Godwin. Most of his assumptions
can be questioned, particularly when he states that men
are molded entirely by their environment and that they
are equally capable of moral improvement. He overlooks
the complexity of knowing and applying abstract truth and
assumes too lightly the doctrine of necessity. Finally,
his assumption Of utility and universal benevolence as
criteria for measuring morality is highly debatable.

(2) "The voluntagy actions of men originate in their
opinionsd' This is only partly true, as many times the actions
Of men are governed entirely by their emotions. This being
the case, outside interference is not always undesirable;
and constitutions, religious dogma, and libel laws can be
made to serve a good purpose. Godwin's conclusions regard-
ing the taking of oaths, national education, and salaried
governmental Offices is open to criticism on grounds of
practicality and the conflicting evidence of past experience.

(5) Government interfere with the discovery Of truth

and the free exchange Of opinion and should therefore be

99

abolished. This conclusion must be rejected entirely. The
passions of men require some security against violence;
government is able tO provide this check, and to do much
good in other areas as well. The absence of state power
would only bring some other less desirable organization

into control. Godwin's conclusions regarding representation
in a democracy and the system Of checks and balances may
also be criticized, and his belief that government always

supports inequality Of wealth is erroneous.

From this summary it appears that most Of Godwin's
political views are open to strong criticism. Has history
been right then, in consigning Political Justice to the
realm.of forgotten literature? In spite of the manwaeak-
nesses in his theory, I believe that Godwin pointed out
many wrongs and potential dangers to his age that have
significance and meaning to men of any era. As JOhn Bowls
states, "Whatever the psychological misconceptions on which
his remedies are based, and however fatuous his belief in
the rationality Of mankind, who can.deny the vast iniquities
which he so briskly pointed out?"148

Net only did he point out injustices in areas that
needed attention, but he contributed a great deal to the

 

148John Bowle, Politics and gpinion in the lgph Century,
Oxford Univers y as, aw, or , , p. .

lOO

concepts of freedom and progress which were being formed
at that time, and to which we living now owe a considerable
debt for the political and economic advantages we take for
granted today.

B. Sprague Allen notes that "...the conception Of
society, not as inflexible or static, but as capable of
growth and infinite change, was one Of the most valuable
contributions of philosophical radicalism to that of the
l8th.century."149 We should not forget those who are promi-
nent in the struggle for a better world, merely because we
are able to look back and point out their mistakes.

In this study I have tried to emphasize certain political
ideas Of Godwin that have not previously received a great
deal Of attention; and I have hoped, in this process, to
show that he was a political thinker Of some weight. I
believe that a re-examination Of Godwin's work would be
especially significant today, when the problem of freedom
has become an issue of vital importance and a subject Of
extreme controversy. Despite various weaknesses in his
thinking, Godwin's Political Justice remains a sincere
and vocal reminder of man's aspiration for freedom and his

inherent capacity for improvement.

 

149B. Sprague Allen, "Minor Disciples of Radicalism in
the Revolutionary Era,” in Modern Philolog, February,
1924, vol. 21, p. 277.

 

 

I'll. All!

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———————. The Enquirer? Reflections on Education manners
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R. Smith IEc., I950.

. Thoughts on Man, His Nature, Productions and
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