


A HISTORICAL CONSIDERATION OF
VALUE FORMATION IN THE AMERICAN
CITY PLANNING EXPERIENCE:
THE REFLECTION OF VALUES IN
PROFESSIONAL ROLES AND THE POLITICAL
INTERESTS WHICH THEY SERVED

Thesis for the Degree of M. U. P.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Mark Daniel Alpers

1973



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ABSTRACT

A HISTORICAL CONSIDERATION OF VALUE FORMATION IN THE AMERICAN CITY PLANNING EXPERIENCE: THE REFLECTION OF VALUES IN PROFESSIONAL ROLES AND THE POLITICAL INTERESTS WHICH THEY SERVED

By

Mark Daniel Alpers

It has long been central to the professional ideology of city planners, as in other professions, that the actions of individual practitioners can be best understood in terms of the "myth of professional neutrality," i.e., that professionals are centrally guided by adherence to the norms of political neutrality, scientific objectivity, and selflessness. Further, given this neutralized frame of reference, the professional thereby becomes capable of serving the "public interest," an ill-defined term usually utilized to describe the inherent benefits of planning, per se, or the lack of partisan political considerations upon which decisions are made as part of the planning process.

This thesis centrally confronts the myth and the concomitant concept of public interest by analyzing selected aspects of the city planner's occupational environment and showing, from a historical perspective, how certain values have been translated into institutional norms not to supplement the professional's ability to act in accordance with the myth, but rather to insure that the technical

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operations of city planners meet the demands of specified client interests which are seen to be overtly political in nature.

Accordingly, these values are seen as having a priori effects in limiting and conditioning the type of changes reflected in plans and programs.

The methodology utilized divides each of the four historical chapters into three sections. The first section provides a discussion of major historical trends relating to planning and identifies the spectrum of values and issue orientations of planners and the variety of social interest groups competing to influence the planning function. On the basis of common values between planners and these groups or through the values implicit in institutional inter-relationships prescribed in law, the clients of the process are tentatively identified in the second section. Client identification is seen to be a function of how successfully these client groups can realize their interests through the process. The final section of these chapters lends depth to the analysis by showing how these common values pervaded the occupational environments of city planners by showing their importance in influencing the performance of roles therein by their translation into functional role demands.

The findings of this study support the basic contention that the myth of professional neutrality is just that, a myth or an ideal, whose realization is precluded by the ability of client groups to influence the workings of the process. In all the historical periods subjected to analysis, the planning function is shown to be evolving

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interdependently with the changing character of socio-economic reality as perceived by political actors. A common theme in all the historical chapters, excluding the first one before the planning function became part of government and before planners saw their own interests in making planning a public activity, is that government itself (different levels of government at different times) has imposed demands within both the technical and institutional realms of professional activity which have superceded the demands of other client interests while varied business interests (commercial, industrial, and financial) have controlled the character of changes proposed in plans and programs.

Although such findings should be in no way considered as profound revelations, the implications of these findings can best be appreciated in view of the lack of a professional consensus as to just what subject matter constitutes the domain of professional expertise. Unlike other professions, planning is seen to lack a coherent identity which delimits the manner in which professional services are applied. Given this void, the profession can only continue to evolve in a manner which inhibits the realization of the myth of professional neutrality since the professional himself has only limited influence in determining priorities and the character of the work he undertakes.

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IN THE AMERICAN CITY PLANNING EXPERIENCE:
THE REFLECTION OF VALUES IN PROFESSIONAL ROLES
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By

Mark Daniel Alpers

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My thanks and appreciation to Professor Sanford Farness, whose advice, criticism, and encouragement were invaluable in the development of this thesis.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The formation of professional values, i.e., their manner of acceptance and the conditions which precipitate their acceptance, is not a subject commonly scrutinized by planners or by other professionals in relation to their professions. In other professions this may not be so important because these values have been consensually approved periodically by professional associations. In the "planning" profession (I am using this word generically), this is not the case. In the past twenty years, there have been substantive disagreements about exactly what constitutes the subject matter treated in the professional domain, a lack of agreement as to what prerequisite skills must be mastered to earn recognition as a professional, and a lack of consensus of how to define the interrelationships between "physical" planners, "environmental" planners, "social" planners, and a myriad of other labels followed by the word "planner." Because consensus has not been achieved on these issues, the profession seems to lack the coherent sense of identity apparent in other professions.¹

The implications derived from this lack of a coherent identity seem relatively straightforward. As it affects the public's perception of the profession it can only be assumed that they have inherited

this sense of confusion. As it influences practitioners, it reflects the collective indecisiveness with which the professional approaches his work and how the professional of the future will confront urban problems.

Discussions between planners about the nature of their professionalism and the political (or apolitical) ends served through planning are not always fruitful. The participants in such debates argue along fairly predictable lines,² but since discussions are generally limited to a few key issues or the general direction in which the profession should move in the future, such debates can only influence questions related to the total value framework of planners in a piecemeal fashion.

It is the express purpose of this thesis to adopt an inclusive frame of reference in identifying the major values which have guided the planning profession over time and to correspondingly identify the social interests in American society which have promulgated these values in trying to influence the direction of planning activities.

In doing this, consideration is limited to city planning, i.e., those activities related to the adoption of a comprehensive plan, master plan, the implementation of these plans, or other administrative and technical duties of the staff members of municipal planning agencies. It should be made clear that this is a study of institutional values, those embodied in the planner's approach to his work as part of the professional-client relationship. Further, the study is historical in nature in which one of the major tasks is to trace changes in the

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institutional value framework explainable in terms of new issues and questions that have arisen in response to changing historical stimuli. The date adopted as the inception of the American city planning movement is 1893, basically because the events that follow the Chicago World's Fair of that year represent the first work of planning professionals. In the pre-1893 era, such activities are considered to be within the domain of other design professionals with a specialized interest in urban development. Prior events, issues, and central values will be analyzed, but only insofar as they influence post-1893 issues.

The central hypothesis to be considered herein is stated as follows: the values translated into institutional norms as part of the professional-client relationships of city planners, i.e., the technical values by which planners judge physical and social relationships and the broader cultural values implicit in guiding professional behavior in the performance of other roles,³ have been supportive of the realization of social change primarily in the interest of the most politically potent client groups. More succinctly stated, the demands placed on the performance of specific roles by client groups have overridden the potential of the profession to implement change to benefit the "public interest."

In essence, then, this thesis will either stand as an attempt to fortify or debunk the so-called myth of professional neutrality dependent on the nature of the conclusions of the study. Professional neutrality is taken to be the state whereby the frame of reference

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of the professional is taken to be wholly scientifically objective, politically neutral, and selfless. This myth is taken to be the ideal basis for professional action in city planning as well as other professions since adherence to these norms is seen to be the basis from which occupational groups establish their identities as professions.⁴ The thesis does not, however, question the assumption that planners' conceive of their activities as being consistent with the concept of professional neutrality; on the contrary, this assumption is probably empirically verifiable. The point here is that the professional's concept of self has little to do with the type of changes implemented through institutional processes. It is these processes, established upon the basis of preferred sets of values, which will be scrutinized herein. The degree to which the above mentioned norms dominate the performance of roles in the occupational environment will be seen as being the determinative factor in concluding whether or not the myth is operable. Hence, the methodology is explicitly designed to compare inter-relationships in the performance of various roles, i.e., to determine qualitatively the degree to which these role relationships are supportive of a "neutral" technical decision-making framework.

A necessary assumption made here in conjunction with the hypothesis is that the planning process is inherently change-oriented and that the professional is always acting as a change agent. The change orientation derives from the fact that plans are attempts to change, at least the physical (spatial) quality of urban life by

recommending future land use schemes. Since this is the conscious use to which plans are put, the process is change-oriented to this degree. To the extent that changes in the spatial form of the city will facilitate or influence changed social and economic relationships, the process is also change oriented. To the extent that professionals participate in the preparation of plans and projects to implement the plan, they are change agents.

Given this concept of social change, the major task to be accomplished through this thesis will be to identify the specific changes advocated in plans and to match these changes with changes advocated by social interest groups who advocated similar or dissimilar types of change through the planning process. Those groups whose ends are satisfied through planning will be labelled as the clients of the process. Much time will be spent explaining the nature of the professional-client relationship both in terms of common values and attitudes held by both professional and client and also by showing how these values were translated into norms of professional behavior which the professional must honor in meeting the demands of a number of roles which he performs in the normal course of his work. The evaluatory framework through which client interests affect the nature of change realized through professional activities will be fully explicated presently.

In substance, this thesis will try to develop a factual basis to substantiate the following statement made by Norton Long:

Plans are policies and policies, in a democracy at any rate, spell politics. The question is not whether planning will reflect politics but whose politics it will reflect; what value and whose values will planners seek to implement.⁵

Evaluatory Framework

Potentially, a number of individuals, groups, and public institutions may generate values internalized by planners. These sources include the ideas of major theorists in planning and related fields, socializing institutions including the family, schools (including professional schools), philosophic, and religious institutions. For the purposes of this study, those values scrutinized will be limited to those which can be identified on the basis of their expressions in inter- and intra-professional activities; in other words, only those values manifest in the professional-client relationship or by the unified action of professional planning associations. Such a limitation is of prime importance given the potential overlap between values which may be considered to be of a "professional" nature⁶ and those values which the professional might hold about urban development or urban problems which will not necessarily be expressed in plans. By considering both sets of values, it should be possible to trace the changes in the institutional structure as to whether planners approved of such changes or not, but this is not the central purpose for doing so. This frame of reference has been adopted solely for the purpose of deriving an expansive value framework both for the professional and client so

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The total thrust of the methodology utilized herein is to set up three levels of analysis. In each historical chapter, the first level will be to identify the major values adopted by planners and to try to show these values fit into the wider spectrum of values being advocated by other social interests groups at the time. Accordingly, the second section of these chapters will make a tentative identification of the client in terms of how various social interest groups' interests were satisfied in the social change orientation apparent in the nature of plans produced during that period. The third section of these chapters will show how these values permeated the occupational environment of planners,⁷ in order to achieve a depth of analysis which will be capable of doing more than simply interpreting the degree of congruence between professional and client values on the basis of historical trends. This last section will be that wherein the tentative conclusions drawn on the basis of the general value comparison in the first section and the tentative identification of clients in the second section will be tested.

The following material is offered to detail the methodology used in the major sections of each historical chapter:

The first section of these chapters, the identification of congruent values between professionals and their clients, will be the major task undertaken. The consideration of values will primarily

focus on those values related to the social change orientation of the profession (as defined earlier), those values related to preferences in the form or direction government should take in relation to structuring the planning function in government, and those values which can explain the normative actions of planners in pursuance of a pre-determined social change orientation. It is the express intent of this section to place the planning movement and the changes in the process in a historical context which considers the relationship of planning to other social movements and major historical trends operative during each period, thereby avoiding the myopic methodologies adopted by many authors of treatises on the history of professional development which consider planning in a historical vacuum.

In those earlier periods before the planning function was institutionalized as part of municipal government (Chapters III and IV), the analysis will proceed subject to the limitations listed above. In the later years (Chapters V and VI), the values reflected in federal policies, i.e., those imposed upon the planning function through legislation, will be identified within the political context of their enactment, i.e., as a response to identifiable social problems and as a response to the interests and values of various social interest groups trying to influence the legislative response of the federal government. The federal government itself may be considered to be a client of the process to the degree which the legislation passed at that level served the purpose of coordinating public

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In the other two sections of these chapters, the examination of the professional-client relationship will be conducted on two levels, the general and the specific. From the generalized level, the influences of the various social interest groups will be differentiated as to the benefits they derived from the social change orientation of planning in each historical period. The frame of reference used here will be to summarize the findings of the first section and to detail how other groups, also trying to influence the workings of the process, were unsuccessful in realizing change in their interests.

The final section of these chapters will show how these values were interwoven into the operations of the process. In order to accomplish this purpose, a modified version of the typology developed by Daland and Parker⁸ will be utilized to show how these influences permeate the occupational environment and influence the planner's orientation toward his work.

Daland and Parker divide professional activities into four roles which should be evident in different proportions under different circumstances. What they label as the technical role of planners shall be used here to indicate those activities guided by the norms of scientific objectivity, political neutrality, and selflessness. Accordingly, the professional must perform these activities in accordance with skills that he monopolizes, those skills, in essence, which

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define the reason for professional existence. Institutional roles are those performed in carrying out primarily (but not exclusively) the administrative duties necessary to insure the functional efficiency desired of the professional working with his client. Institutional roles also refer to technical functions necessary to uphold pre-determined institutional objectives. The educative and politically innovative roles are almost self-explanatory. The former is the degree to which the goal of public education is pursued as part of the process and the latter will reflect the nature of the policy-making role within the process.

By showing how these broader cultural values advocated by various social interest groups and professional planners were translated into institutional norms guiding the performance of these four roles and hence influencing the social change orientation of the process, it should be possible to show how professional behavior has been shaped by these value preferences. If it can be shown that these values play a determinative function guiding such activities and influencing the character of the plans finally adopted, it is felt that the hypothesis will be confirmed.

In selecting a methodological approach on a question which probably defies empirical verification, this writer realizes the dangers inherent in this approach but he also must cite his source of inspiration. In short, this methodology is an attempt to recreate the "occupational milieus" of planners at various points in times in planning history. "Occupational milieu" is a phrase which has been

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developed by the industrial sociologist, Theodore Caplow, who defines it broadly as the occupational culture, i.e., a set of institutions, the nature of these institutions, the conditions from which they develop, and the attitudes which they encourage. These factors, he contends, fix the character of each occupation and determine its effect upon other aspects of life.⁹ C. W. Mills also stresses the importance of studying institutional relationships from a historical perspective in determining the nature of social change realized through institutional processes.¹⁰

It is felt that this methodology represents an acceptable attempt to operationalize Caplow's concept giving emphasis only to the institutional aspects of this concept. Caplow goes further in asserting, for example, that the concept of occupational milieu extends the explanation of consumption patterns of workers in some occupations where the occupational population is excessively concentrated geographically.¹¹ No attempt is made to even infer relationships outside of the institutional environment given the obvious lack of data, or more properly stated, a complete data void.

Additional Methodological Notes

The chapter divisions used here delimit city planning history into a number of time sequences generally coincidental with major periods of 20th Century American history. Chapters I and II are prefatory, explicating the methodology utilized and providing basic definitions and assumptions which should clear up any rhetorical

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problems which might emerge. Chapters three and four, those in which the time sequences diverge from normal divisions of American history, consider those phases of planning history generally referred to as the City Beautiful and City Practical periods wherein the central values by which city planners were motivated are seen as so divergent as to rate separate attention. From the perspective of an American historian (as opposed to that of an urban historian or planning historian), this whole period (1893 through 1929) may be said to constitute the Reform era in American municipal government. The starting date of 1893 is generally recognized as the beginning of the planning movement in the U.S. (the Chicago World's Fair), but this date is used only for the sake of historical "neatness;" the first major section of this chapter deals with the social trends which gave rise to this movement. The cutoff date between Chapter III and IV (1910) has been determined rather arbitrarily, but generally denotes that date at which planners' aspirations for the City Beautiful began to subside and efforts to governmentalize planning assumed a position of preeminence in professional circles.

The other chapter divisions are more easily understood. Chapter V includes the depression years and the World War II period in which the trends generated in the former period were intensified in the latter. Changes within the planner's value framework are seen as being significant but since these changes seem to be a function of changing federal policies with an absence of other change influences apparent, both periods are manageable in terms of the methodology

adapted. The last historical period deals with the whole post-World War II era, a period incomplete in the sense that the significant historical trends as related to the planning function are still operable. Given the lack of historical data in this period, the data base shifts in this chapter from secondary historical sources to journal articles, the proceedings from annual conferences, and attitude studies conducted on city planners. The last chapter presents a summary of the findings and the author expands upon their implications.

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Footnotes

¹Note: Granted this sense of unity in other professions may be essentially illusory, but I am speaking in relative terms. Most other professions can agree on the subject matter of their expertise but this does not seem to be the case in planning.

²See Brooks, Michael P., "Social Planning and City Planning," Planning Advisory Service, Report No. 261 (Chicago: ASP0, Sept. 1970). This work provides an excellent summary of many of the issues related to the overall lack of identity and contains an exhaustive bibliography.

³The description of these roles and the methodological context in which they are used is established under the heading of "Evaluatory Framework" further along in this chapter.

⁴These norms guiding professional activity are seen to the basis of professionalism as defined by Harold L. Wilensky and Charles W. Lebeaux in Industrial Society and Social Welfare (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1958), pp. 298-299.

⁵Long, Norton E., "Planning and Politics in Urban Development," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Nov., 1959, p. 168.

⁶Professional in the sense of adherence to the norms of political neutrality, scientific objectivity, and selflessness. As explained in Wilensky's book (op. cit.), these norms have been the foundations from which professionalism has been judged throughout the twentieth century in the United States.

⁷Most planning history sources seem loathe to attribute changes within the profession to external sources; but irregardless of the virtues or vices of such a perspective, a more expansive historical investigation is necessary for the purposes of this methodology.

⁸Daland, Robert T., and Parker, John A., "Roles of the Planner in Urban Development," in F. Stuart Chapin and Shirley F. Weiss (Eds.), Urban Growth Dynamics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), pp. 194-195.

⁹Caplow, Theodore, The Sociology of Work (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), pp. 100-101.

¹⁰Mills, C. W., The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

¹¹ Caplow, Theodore, op. cit., p. 101.

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CHAPTER II

DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

The following definitions are offered to clarify the usage of certain terminology used herein:

1. Goals.--The idealized purposes for which programs, policies, plans, and other forms of social action are undertaken. Since goals are ideational constructs, their existence or identification, per se, does not imply the use of specific strategies to achieve goals. Oftentimes, a number of groups employ divergent strategies for obtaining a desired goal (e.g., peace).
2. Objectives, Interests.--The perceived benefits of purposive social action. Objectives differ from goals in that the former are concrete ends to be realized through specifically defined means. This means-ends relationship does not apply in achieving goals as noted above. "Objectives" and "Interests," the latter being a colloquial usage for the objectives of social interest groups, will be used interchangeably.

3. Norms.--Social sanctions which gain force in the formalized rules and regulations of institutions or operate interpersonally on the basis of mutually perceived social obligations.¹ Norms are the tools by which institutions impose guidelines on human behavior and are designed in part so that institutions can achieve predetermined goals and objectives. Those norms studied in this thesis are those norms which guide the behavior of professional city planners in the performance of specific roles as differentiated in the first chapter.
4. Occupational Roles.--Roles are said to consist of three factors: structurally determined demands (norms), the individual's orientation or perception of how he should meet these demands, and the individual's actions in pursuance of these demands.² Occupational roles are simply those operative when the professional is acting as an agent of the agency or firm of which he is employed.
5. Physical Planning or Physical Land Use Planning.--The allocation of future land uses and public facilities and services into a scheme which is intended to guide the future development of specifically defined geographic areas. Since the sole methodological concern of physical planning is the manipulation of the types of physical elements listed above, physical planning can be said to be based on the philosophy of

environmental determinism which assumes that such physical change will necessarily produce beneficial changes in the nature of all forms of social interaction influenced by the physical change.

6. Planning Process or Process.--That set of activities leading up to and including actions aimed at implementing a comprehensive development or master plan. The process is made up of various stages (e.g., data collection, goal and policy formulation, plan design, etc.), the number and nature of which have changed over time.
7. Social Change.--The usage of this term in this thesis is limited to include those changes (beneficial or adverse) in the quality of urban life which are the by-products of the implementation of plans and programs.
8. Social Interest Group.--Any group of individuals, formally constituted through the existence of a group charter, constitution, or by-laws, or any group of individuals associated informally who seek to manipulate the decisions of public institutions in accordance with specific group objectives.
9. Social Planning.--That set of activities leading up to and including the administration of the delivery of a set of valued social services.

10. Value, Cultural.--The immaterial, spaceless, and timeless meanings³ of concepts, ideas, or words which express the relationships of "what should be" in any given culture. These values, internalized in individuals through the workings of socializing institutions and influences, function normatively in guiding human behavior and social interaction.
11. Value, Occupational.--As used in this thesis, occupational values are those concepts or ideas with distinctive cultural meanings promulgated by social institutions.
12. Value, Professional.--A value by which an individual is judged to be a professional. As used here this term refers to the values of scientific objectivity, political neutrality, and selflessness⁴ which are said to be those values which contemporary American culture associates with professionalism.

Hierarchical Relationships
between Cultural Values
and Social Institutions

In evaluating the efficacy of the myth of professional neutrality, this thesis focuses upon the manner in which certain cultural values were selected to guide the work of professional planners in a number of occupational settings. Consistent with this purpose, this thesis looks at selected occupational settings, their procedural processes and other structural characteristics, as being

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the product of human design, i.e., planning. This is to say that the nature of these social institutions should not be understood in terms of some obscure, pre-ordained way of structuring faceless, impersonal bureaucracies, but rather as the product of conscious human action by individuals whose basic motive was to insure the production of goods or services (artifacts) in accordance with the perceived demand for same.

Given such a frame of reference and the inherent relatively by which the phrase "perceived demand" can be interpreted (essentially in terms of any concept which may be said to denote social desirability⁵), the establishment of any social institution in its operative form is generally a rather arbitrary process based on the values, goals, and objectives of the designers. Consequently, the norms established to guide social interaction in these institutions and the roles which an employee assumes in conforming to these norms will also be a function of those cultural values which give meaning to both the nature of the institution and the structural-functional components of that institution. It is the specific intent of this thesis to identify these values as they are expressed in institutional norms and to attribute these values to their designers, i.e., those social interest groups with specific social and political objectives which they hoped to realize through structuring the process in a specific manner. By historically tracing the interests of these groups and periodically evaluating changes in the process necessitated by the incorporation of new values, the hypothesis of this thesis can be operationalized.

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Such a view of socio-cultural reality is consistent with that of Pitrim Sorokin who notes that any empirical socio-cultural phenomena consists of three components: (1) immaterial meanings with no expressions in time or space, i.e., cultural values; (2) material vehicles which externalize or objectify these meanings, i.e., social institutions; and (3) human agents that bear, use, and operate the meanings with the aid of the material vehicles.⁶ As this concept of socio-cultural reality is interpreted herein along with the historical analysis from which values are identified, the product of this effort should be a qualitative methodology which is contributive in bringing depth to the historical analysis of professional development.

Footnotes

¹Durkheim, Emile, "The Internalization of Social Control," in Lewis A. Coser and Bernard Rosenberg (Eds.), Sociological Theory (New York: MacMillan Co., 1968), p. 95.

²Levinson, D. J., "Role, Personality, and Social Structure," in Coser and Rosenberg (Eds.), op. cit., p. 284.

³Sorokin, Pitrim A., Sociocultural Causality, Space, and Time (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1943), p. 4.

⁴Wilensky, Harold L., and Lebeaux, Charles, Industrial Society and Social Welfare (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1958), pp. 298-299.

⁵Durkheim, Emile, op. cit., p. 97.

⁶Sorokin, Pitrim A., op. cit., p. 4.

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CHAPTER III

A TRADITION OF ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINISM

AND ITS IMMEDIATE IMPLICATIONS

(1893-1910)

Introduction

One significant difference in the evolution of the city planning profession as opposed to that of other professions is that planning developed from the applications of recognized professional skills--those of architects, landscape architects, and engineers--whereas most other professions evolved from the use of skills which were not always recognized as being "professional" in nature. Consequently, the determination of a starting point of professional activities in the planning profession is somewhat more difficult than for other occupations. To set a precise date, one would have to determine that point in time when these professionals shed their identities as members of the previously mentioned design professions and assumed those of city planning professionals. Formalistic models of the process of professionalization are of little value in this respect since they usually consider the establishment of a professional association as the first step in this process.¹ By this criterion, the 1909 National Planning Conference in Washington, D.C.,

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becomes the likely starting point. Yet, by this point in time important professional uniformities (e.g., the format of early plans and the nature of professional-client relationships) had already been established.

The date 1893 has been chosen here not only because of the popular attention drawn to the profession because of the "White City" exhibit at the Chicago World Fair, but also in view of the effect this event had on solidifying this inter-professional merger. The ceiling date of 1910 in this chapter, on the other hand, represents more of an arbitrarily determined line of demarcation signifying not necessarily a waning point when the influence of the city beautiful movement started to recede on the public level, but rather when these "city planners" started to turn their attention toward other developments which would have a great impact on the profession in the following years.

In the interests of establishing a frame of reference which includes a sense of historical continuity, this chapter will begin with an accounting of major social trends leading up to the city beautiful date of 1893. This prefatory section will also serve to identify the major values brought into professional practice from the design professions and reveal those social interest groups with congruent values. The rest of the chapter will follow upon lines established in the introductory chapter.

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Pre-City Beautiful Influences
(1850-1893)

There is a general sense of agreement among most planning historians that the roots of city planning can best be understood in terms of the "changed mode of living which accompanied the rapid urbanization in the latter half of the nineteenth century"² and the social reaction to the more visual manifestations of perceived urban excesses. This period in American history marks a time when a number of professional groups, namely social workers, housing reformers, architects, and engineers, all decided to participate professionally based on common desires for social reform. Most of the momentum generated for reform is generally seen to be directly related to that which led to the popular acceptance of the city beautiful movement in the 1890's and 1900's and which finally culminated in the widespread reform of municipal governments in later years.

This is not to say, however, that all of these professionals saw themselves as playing complementary roles in ameliorating the ill-effects of congestion. In fact, Robert A. Walker draws a clear line between the design professionals and others when he stated,

When one group of reformers was concentrating its effort upon relieving the immediate consequences of congestion (crowded tenements, contagious diseases, housing densities, pollution, etc.) . . . another group was attacking the problem indirectly by encouraging the development of public parks in which the urban dweller could find light and air which neither his place of work nor his home provided.³

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The latter group is that in which these "early planners" fell and probably the most prominent achievement in this respect was Frederick Law Olmstead's design for Central Park in 1857. It is hard to generalize Olmstead's philosophy of design to one which the rest of the profession accepted but most of his work was consistent with the neo-romantic orientation of landscape architecture at this time. As Simutis states,

He did, however, accommodate this romantic view of scenery to a diverse cluster of pressures from an urban society whose preferences in recreation were not formed by a nostalgia that idealized rural scenery and the harmonious social life it symbolized for the romantic. His park and town designs were not unified scenic vistas placed in the middle of the city. They provided open space in a fragmented set of special use areas, some collective, others individual.⁴

Regardless of whether we consider Olmstead's design philosophy as one of classical romanticism (creating rural settings within the urban environment) or a brand of neo-neoromanticism as Simutis contends, the social philosophy expressed in his work is one which is still dominant in architecture and other design sciences today: environmental determinism. The basic value that underscored this philosophy can be stated as follows: by manipulating certain elements of the physical environment and thereby producing or restoring the aesthetic character of these elements, the general quality of life would be measurably improved.

It should be stated in this regard that the character of the reforms promulgated by other professionals were also consistent with these values. Housing reformers, for example, in perceiving a set

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of problems associated with poor housing, saw mainly physical deficiencies--poor construction and maintenance problems. It was assumed that the social deficiencies, i.e., substandard health and sanitary conditions, were by-products of the physical deterioration. This type of philosophy excludes the assumption that social factors may stimulate physical problems; instead physical dysfunctions are said to have "spin off" effects on social conditions.

One significant difference between these recreational planners (engineers too, as will be shown later) and the other reform interests active in this period was that these designers didn't seek change through political institutions, while others did. The other professionals were more or less forced to, given the nature of their immediate interests, to enact social legislation like child-labor laws, sanitation codes, and the so-called "tenement" laws. As design consultants, the recreational planners were only charged with technical duties, i.e., design. Both the physical design of planners and the legislative design of housing reformers, however, may be considered as reform activities oriented towards the same general end: the amelioration of some of the "congestive" influences of urban life. Working through different institutions, both groups aimed at the production of different artifacts--design plans and legal codes.

Another difference between the design professionals and the others were their clients. Housing reformers, social workers, early labor organizers and other social critics of the congestive effects of the late nineteenth century urban situation through their attempts

to enact important social legislation were acting in a manner superficially similar to that of modern advocacy planners in that they were seeking redistributive⁵ social change, i.e., that type whereby the social groups most immediately affected by social problems (poor housing) could improve their lot to that level enjoyed by other social interests. The design professionals, however, in producing recreation plans for whole cities and metropolitan regions, as became common at the end of the century, or by designing parks on a grandiose scale (e.g., Central Park in New York, Lincoln Park in Chicago) were producing changes in a manner more consistent with the prevalent notion of "public interest" today, i.e., change for the benefit of no particular social group, but that which would benefit all. That these recreation plans would have received the vigorous middle-class support, which they did,⁶ if proposals were limited to providing small parks and playgrounds in immigrant neighborhoods, is debatable.

In the late 1880's and early 1890's city governments were in quite a quandry as to what to do about the congestion brought about by the indiscriminate platting and subdivision of land, oftentimes in the middle of planned right-of-ways. During this period cities tried to challenge the judicial conservatism which upheld the primacy of property rights by enacting general plans for municipal streets and thoroughfares. The talents of civil engineers thus began to be in demand by local governments. Their design preferences had remained relatively constant since L'Enfant had designed the street system of

Washington, D.C., in 1791. The grid system had already become almost a natural feature of the urban landscape and it would continue to be the "magic wand" by which engineers would propose street designs for years to come.⁷ As a design form its checkerboard patterns are the essence of functional efficiency.

In the 1890's and 1900's the demand for professional engineering services increased in municipal governments. Having the backing of the government, the only real opponents of their actions were developers, related real estate personnel and others proclaiming the supremacy of property rights.⁸ Given this political situation, being similar to the architects in that government stood on their side, the design professionals functioned almost exclusively as technicians, improving the physical quality of specified physical elements, i.e., roadways. As opposed to the philosophy of neo-romanticism which guided the normative judgments made by the recreational planners, the most basic goal which guided the engineers was the efficient movement of goods and services. This goal was indicative of the type of "order" engineers were trying to impose on urban landscapes and this was the basis of their normative framework.⁹

City Beautiful Values

The Chicago Exposition of 1893, the event which first drew public attention to city planning, exhibited many of the aesthetic values retained from the previous period as well as some new values reflected in the new physical forms being dealt with. The city

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beautiful designs incorporated the environmental determinism of the landscape architects, the functional efficiency of the engineers, and monumentalistic building designs of public buildings into plans which provided for the separate treatment of the three major elements (civic center designs, streets, and parks) and their physical integration into "grand" design plans. This integration led to the acceptance (public and professional) of an important value upon which the planning profession bases its actions.

Lubove states this value clearly as follows: "From the Exposition came the realization that a city is an organism of inter-related, independent parts whose efficiency depends on planned and orderly growth."¹⁰ Actually, this statement is indicative of two values. The first, the interrelationship of parts to the whole, is the one referred to above; and the other, "planned and orderly growth," is related to the first but also has implications of its own. As Scott states, the assumption of the need for planners' services rests upon the assumption that unrestrained market forces could not produce the amenable physical relationships desired by the people.¹¹

It is important to qualify this last statement. It is possible to consider the city beautiful movement itself as a public reaction to unrestrained growth, but this need not imply that either planners, their clients, or the public held complementary values about ways in which the growth of cities could be restrained or controlled (I am speaking about restraint and control here in the sense of limiting the

size of cities). Whereas it can be stated that there was some acceptance of the principle that uncontrolled growth produced some important dysfunctional relationships, the solutions to these problems were reactions to the "congestive" problems for which concern was evidenced in the pre-city beautiful period and thereby attempts to provide a level of physical amenity to the physical forms of cities, simply by taking the "comprehensive" approach dictated by the adherence to the value that the city was a whole consisting of inter-related parts. Hence, city beautiful planning can be seen as a reaction to the "city ugly" conditions that were apparent. This argument is consistent with the statement cited earlier by Walker that professional attention was focused upon "relieving the immediate consequences" of growth, not with proposing alternative growth patterns.

The preeminence of aesthetic values in the city beautiful can hardly be contested.¹² In the judgment of this writer, city beautiful plans were mostly conceived with the intent of stressing the need for the physical reorganization and beautification of certain parts of the cities, those elements treated in plans. Both physical reorganization and the provision of added physical amenities are reflected both in the designs themselves and in the attitudes evidenced in treating specific land uses. In regards to hierarchy of land uses, Goodman states,

In Burnham's plans, the concept of a hierarchy of uses was elaborated. This hierarchy begins with the idea of the "big

plan" or "strong statement": It also involves breaking the city into a number of "land use" categories like "housing," "commercial," "industrial" and others. The institutional buildings, like city halls and government buildings, are usually at the top of the hierarchy. . . . "Industrial" is at the bottom of the hierarchy since it's usually considered the most obnoxious land use.¹³

Although this concept is not expanded upon by Goodman in an overly articulate manner, the gist of his argument can certainly be validated in impressionistic terms, i.e., that Burnham's hierarchy of uses concept is consistent with the ideology of the times, that the "city ugly" effects were to be eliminated through planning. Industrial uses were potentially the ugliest given their polluting nature at this point in time. The design of parks and public buildings afforded the planner an opportunity to bring beauty. (Note: It is really not that important to hypothesize whether or not these plans, if implemented would have ameliorated the quality of urban life to the degree which they contended. The point is that these plans were conceived as responses to these problems.)

The designs themselves also reflect basic values which, in essence, define the basis of professional response to the perceived societal ills. Different authors have set about the task of analyzing these designs and have come to different conclusions. This is predictable in a sense because the interpretation of design must always be done qualitatively and a major component of any such evaluation is the subjective frame of reference of the interpreter. Consequently, aesthetic evaluations of these plans differ although this is not to say that there aren't important areas of agreement.

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The first such basis of agreement is that these plans utilized Renaissance planning principles.¹⁴ This is reflected both in the monumental scale of the building forms and the nature of the proposed street systems which were designed to dramatize the presence of the public buildings and to provide for efficient movement. Some authors¹⁵ have taken off from such an analysis to point up parallels about how such designs serve to glorify the power of the state and subsequently these designs have been compared to those designs which various authoritarian leaders, notably Hitler, have tried to implement.

Whether such interpretations faithfully recreate the intentions of planners is debatable. It can just as easily be contended that these "grand plans" simply reflected the desires of planners to create accessible focal points in the city which would stand in counter-distinction to the congestive conditions then dominant. The intent could as easily be seen as an attempt to create areas worthy of civic pride (aesthetically speaking) rather than plans which would impress upon citizens the glory of the state. Given the relationship between planners and local politicians of the time (which will be discussed momentarily), it is hard to see why these designs were aimed at enhancing their power.

Regardless of how this debate is resolved, the aesthetic tradition of environmental determinism was certainly maintained in these plans. There is little evidence that these designs were formulated or justified in terms of their potential effects on social or economic

relationships except in limited instances. One such example is Burnham's 1909 Plan for Chicago. The proposals this plan contained included freight terminals for water- and land-based transportation modes, subway and elevated public transit facilities, and a number of other features not generally contained in the "regular package" of plan elements. Accordingly, Walker pays tribute to this plan as a synthesis of physical and social planning too far in advance of the dominant social and political attitudes of the period to gain acceptance.¹⁶ Scott, on the other hand, uses this plan as an example of how client demands influenced the nature of the final product.¹⁷

The only social and political values which we can definitely ascribe to these early planners is a strong antipolitical bias. Reps makes it quite clear that whereas planners were not that detached from society to maintain cooperative relationships with the business groups and civic improvement associations who contracted for their services as consultants, their attitudes toward politics and politicians were dominated by images of the corruptness of both the process and the participants. He states,

The prevailing attitude was that the city government was too dishonest or inefficient or apathetic for such a project, and, in any event, the local officials could be persuaded by one means or another that plans prepared under private auspices should be followed. Local administration was thus viewed with both distrust and disgust. . . .¹⁸

This attitude can be seen as complementary to the position planners adopted in regards to implementing plans. Reps continues,

The history of municipal government is full of similar examples where a new service was first provided by wholly private groups

and later accepted as a proper function of government itself. Thus when private business or civic betterment groups underwrote the costs of early city plans they were following a long tradition in American municipal affairs and one which was perhaps quite inevitable.¹⁹

Hence, implementation was probably not seen as an urgent priority by planners, certainly not so urgent as to hasten their participation in politics. This seems somewhat strange in view of the idealism ("make no small plans. . .") so central to the reform orientation of the movement.

The implications of this antipolitical bias will be more fully discussed at many points throughout this thesis. For the purposes of discussion here, its only relationship to the values of environmental determinism is indirect. Such attitudes reflect a certain degree of detachment between planners and the rest of society. Trained as apprentices in the offices of established planners (i.e., architects), it is reasonable to assume that the planner's approach to these problems was one of an artist (it certainly can't be contended that he approached his designs with scientific objectivity). The degree to which planners tried to stimulate certain forms of social interaction or patterns of social relationships would seem to be directly related to how explicit such assumptions might have been in the design theory and principles he was trying to apply. Given the impossibility to recreate the artist's intentional frame of reference as explicated above, and in lieu of the lack of such data, we can only assume that aesthetic values dominated his perspective, i.e., the need for physical reorganization and the provision of aesthetic amenities were dominant in his value framework.

Before moving to the next section of this chapter, one more major value need be identified which is centrally related to the perspectives of planners and related to the others mentioned above. Simply stated, it is the assumption that the provision of all the suggested improvements included in these plans were public responsibilities. The idealism that spawned the city beautiful movement was from the first qua bono publico and the altruistic motives of the planners seem unimpeachable. This basic value is still adhered to by most planners, but the concept has been altered to meet the contemporary contingencies of institutional life. In this early period, it was an important component of a reformist social movement that was simply seeking a new direction, based on a rather arbitrarily defined conception of "right," I might add, one which emphasized aesthetic change.

Client Relationships

The identification of the client of the city beautiful planning process is somewhat easier for this period than it will be in others. Business groups and civic improvement associations hired planners, as private consultants, to prepare plans and these groups, of course, are considered to be the primary clients. Yet in order to explain the basis of this professional-client relationship in terms of congruent values and coincidental interests, a good deal of elaboration is certainly in order. Once this task is completed, the analysis will show how this relationship influenced the political

positions of other prospective client groups, those with similar values, and also try to show the relationship between the professionals and groups with discordant values.

Firstly, it is necessary to state that while both parties in this professional relationship had identical objectives, i.e., the implementation of the plan, when consulting for business groups this relationship sometimes had to perpetuate itself in spite of divergent values. As Winter stated,

Burnham's creation above all emphasized aesthetics: architecture, fountains, statues, plazas, and malls. As the movement spread across the nation, it became known as the city beautiful movement. Supported largely by architects it was concerned with aesthetic rather than social or economic objectives. Supported just as strongly by businessmen, it was a grandiose advertising campaign. A relatively small area at the core of the city, built in a grand manner, daily revived the confidence of the businessman in himself and his peers. More than that, it gave a ready message to the entrepreneurs abroad: "Here, business is good!"²⁰

To assume a motive other than self-interest for businessmen, during this period, would be quite naive in spite of protestations which might emphasize an element of "civic pride." This latter motive is attributable, however, to civic improvement associations, municipal art commissions and other groups not dominated by business interests. These latter groups supported city beautiful plans in terms of "local patriotism" and "boosterism."²¹

Regardless of the type of group which contracted for professional services, according to Scott, they generally shared the same social values which supported the antipolitical bias as planners. He states,

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Caught up in the Progressivism pervading America, the improvement associations sometimes joined the general drive to revamp governmental institutions, curb the profiteering of trusts, and safeguard natural resources. In a nation greatly affected by its Puritan heritage, citizens could muster tremendous indignation against individual sinners but also against corporate malefactors.²²

Assumedly such indignation could also be easily extended towards incidences of local governmental corruption although such disdain did not preclude their participation in such a corrupt arena in seeking city beautiful reforms (or their own self-interest as the case might have been).

With this shared feeling about government, there must also have been other shared values between professional and client, generally those so basic to the character of the reforms sought by each group that the professional relationship could not have been maintained without such congruence. Foremost among these is a basic faith in the principles of environmental determinism, i.e., that the manipulation of the physical environment could produce desirable changes and that city, as a whole, is an organism made up of inter-related and interdependent parts.²³ Similarly, we can assume a shared value that it was a public responsibility (if not a duty) to improve the quality of life by providing basic services and facilities and a corresponding belief that natural market forces were incapable of providing these basic amenities. It is possible to hypothesize, in this respect, that the client group held identical values in common with professionals at least insofar as they were consistent with their perceived self interest and at most with the intensity of idealism apparent, as part of the rest of the movement.

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Other values, ostensibly those of a purely technical nature, were probably of marginal value in cementing this relationship. For example, it certainly was not necessary for the client to concur with the neo-romantic bent toward park design or the classical precepts that contributed to the selection of the dominant architectural motifs. On the other hand, there is evidence showing that the client sometimes had plenty to say about the basic design concept utilized as a base for suggesting important physical improvements and this will be taken up in the next section of this chapter dealing with the technical role.

It is extremely important to note that the acceptance of these common values as enumerated above also implies a limited form of estrangement from those social and political groups also supporting the basic aims of the city beautiful movement and the dominant reformist ideology which spawned the movement. This would certainly apply to the inter-professional relationships between planners, housing reformers, social workers, and those leading the fight to improve factory working conditions. One apparent difference between the planners and other professionals was that they represented clients vastly different in terms of socio-economic status, cultural interests, income, and just about any other social index one chooses to use as a form of measurement. Accordingly, these client relationships in the end are complementary to divergent conceptions of the public interest with that of the planner being supportive of the "change for the benefit of all" ethic and that of others supportive of a redistributive concept of the public interest.²⁴

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On the basis of the above argument, it is not that difficult to extend the assertion that the city beautiful movement was a middle class response to crises imposed by the rate of urbanization at this point in time. The argument, although based mostly on observational analysis, is based upon themes common in the fictional literature of the period,²⁵ and can probably be best understood in terms of the class-imposed life styles of the day. Simply put, lower class people were confronted with an entirely different set of physical problems, i.e., industrial pollution, health and sanitation problems, and the physical deterioration of their own dwellings, than their middle and upper class counterparts. Since the city beautiful movement was not oriented towards implementing reforms that lower class people considered consistent with priorities aimed at meeting their needs, enthusiasm for such reforms would not be as high among the immigrants as it would be in other class situations where priorities for reform were more consistent with those of planners and their primary clients. It might be considered as taking this point too far, but one could differentiate values implicit in the life styles of Mrs. Martin Arrow-smith and the autobiographical hero of Upton Sinclair's The Jungle to understand the differential orientations toward reform in this period.

Whether these class differences rendered these two reformist tendencies inimical in terms of political interests is debatable. Insofar as other professionals participated in them, the answer is probably no, since their values were basically congruous with those of planners²⁶ except in that they did not show such an intense distaste

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for political action. In addition, it should be pointed out that these professionals (housing reformers, lawyers), in the first decade of the twentieth century, were becoming more involved in initiating reform through the completion of studies and plans to improve, at least, housing conditions and the health and sanitary problems associated with them than they were in earlier times when their primary function was simply to lobby for better conditions in the political arena.²⁷ At any rate, all the apparent professional participation was based on common values of environmental determinism, which were basic to the city beautiful movement.

The non-reformist elements then evident (e.g., local government itself) and the politically dominant ones, based their opposition to the city beautiful movement on a combination of ideological and temporal considerations. On the temporal level, the two most common reactions were phrased in terms of cost and the economic self-interests of vocal opponents. Reps makes it clear that objections to the prospective costs of these plans could be made with or without concomitant objections based on different value orientations simply because these plans, as exceedingly idealistic representations of what planners would like to see, were not formulated to accommodate the existing financial capacities of local government. He states,

That the cost of such planning and much of the responsibility for carrying out any proposals was logically a task for city government was generally overlooked. . . . Clearly the way to accomplish planning was to retain one of the half-dozen persons with some competence in the field, pay them to prepare a plan, and worry later about how it would be received by local officials.²⁸

The self-interest component was brought into play by developers and real estate interests who adamantly opposed attempts to implement street plans and the normal elements of city beautiful plans on the grounds that attempts to enforce street locations infringed on developers' property rights (and economic well-being).²⁹ This attitude was upheld in the courts until 1917.

Correspondingly, proposals to acquire land for development as recreational space would be vehemently opposed by any developer who also had an eye on that land. The economic livelihood of some of these groups (real estate related) was based on widespread societal acceptance of the fundamental belief that land must be valued as a commodity rather than as a natural resource. Although planners at this time didn't challenge that assumption, the liberal provision of recreational space in city beautiful plans and recreational plans being drawn up at the same time hardly represented a move in the right direction as far as real estate developers were concerned: the right of government to reserve land for recreational purposes was opposed by real estate developers even into the mid-1950's. Whether these plans were perceived as substantive threats to the traditional prerogatives of private development to a substantive degree is rather unlikely,³⁰ but the basis for conflict was apparent.

The greatest value difference between planning values and those held by the status quo was that while the former emphasized as given a public responsibility to initiate city beautiful changes, local government placed the highest priority on perpetuating its power

by basing its priorities for public action upon a system of granting favors to those groups which would help them maintain their powers. As stated earlier, the "public interest" component in the professional's value framework must be considered inseparable part of city beautiful idealism. With opposing forces, however, who subscribed to a social philosophy of social Darwinism, an economic philosophy of laissez faire capitalism, and/or a political philosophy based on the ideals of Jacksonian principles of democracy, one could not expect a ready acceptance of such a value.³¹ As will be shown in the next chapter, this value and others were foremost in the confrontation of similar forces when the immediate future of municipal government was at stake. In the city beautiful period, when plans could be dismissed solely in terms of their cost, this value did not constitute as much of a visible threat to those in positions of power.

Professional Roles and Role Demands

Technical Role.--City beautiful plans, lacking any scientific basis of formulation, were expressions of pure design and, hence, the technician was endowed with a substantive amount of artistic license from which he could produce innovative designs, or at least designs consistent with his major values and principles as identified earlier. In fact, the general reliance on monumentalistic building forms, the dominant classical motifs, unified and enclosed public spaces common to most plans, were design principles first determined by Burnham and

his associates in planning the Chicago "white city" of 1893. From this point on, they had an immediate impact on the architectural profession and later, after business groups started to hire consultants to produce plans, this general professional preference found expression in literally all plans of the period.³² As Reps clearly stated, the decision to impose such design forms was clearly a professional prerogative and even professionals who dissented in the process of selection paid heedance to its widespread acceptance by the public in general.

This degree of technical freedom, whereby the professional could impose his own design solutions, at least in reference to the core elements of the plan (civic center proposals, street layouts, and park proposals), was part of a greater freedom: to define the basic substance of the plan and the dominant philosophy embodied in the plans. In regard to this latter point, this is especially important because the basic value of inter-relating the planning of major elements, per se, marked a new direction in planning which had previously viewed planning efforts as single purpose in nature based upon the specialties of different design professionals.³³ All this really implies is that within this technical role, the designer was working in accordance with a direction of his applied skills that he had ultimately defined. Such a condition didn't necessarily hold true in shaping the technical role demands planners worked under in other occupational settings in later periods.

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Institutional Role.--In order to maintain the viability of the professional-client relationship, the consultant, in many instances, had to incorporate the specific interests of the client into plans. This, in a sense, can be considered as an abridgement of the technical freedom used to formulate the plan, but, in essence, it represents more than that. Client interests can be seen as limiting the tendencies of planners to expand plans beyond the core elements except in ways which would accommodate client interests.

There were two exceedingly blatant examples of how the client could limit or expand the focus of the plan and impose technical demands upon the planner. Coincidentally, both these plans, for Chicago and San Francisco, were authored by Daniel Burnham. In the Chicago plan the client demands probably served to expand the technical focus. As Scott stated,

Aside from recommending a union terminal and the elimination of grade crossings, the typical City Beautiful Plan ignored transportation, whereas the plan of Chicago included a system of freight handling for land and water transportation, a scheme for consolidating railroad facilities, and proposals for the creation of elevated, surface, and subway loops around an enlarged business district. The elements of the plan reflected the interests of the members of the Commercial Club in the practical side of urban development.³⁴

By accommodating these interests, the Chicago Plan became known as one of the greatest achievements of early American planning with many of its proposals carried out.

A converse situation arose in San Francisco where his proposals fell upon deaf ears at a time when the San Francisco earthquake offered an unparalleled opportunity to replan a major city. The San

Francisco plan showed Burnham's fascination with diagonal street patterns and circular intersections and a rather loose arrangement of public buildings. Reps considered this plan as a direct test of the planning principles of the Chicago Fair and those introduced in Washington, D.C., in 1901. Both the client (a civic improvement association) and the public as a whole apparently regarded it as an idealistic abstract design rather than a serious proposal for public improvements.³⁵

If the first example is taken to show the degree to which the client could influence the final design product and the second to show the effects of an over-application of professional (technical) skills without regarding client interests, these examples may be seen as indicative of how the technical role of the planner was limited by considerations relating to the maintenance of the professional-client relationship. In the discussions of the two other roles as follows, the relative power exerted over the professional by the client will be made more apparent.

Educative and Politically Innovative Roles.--There was no formalized commitment to public education as part of the consultant's role vis-a-vis the client, at least none that formally necessitated the participation of planners. In this respect, it is quite clear that the basic responsibility for promoting and implementing specific plans was a function assumed by the client group.³⁶ Consequently, professional participation, if any, in these efforts was necessarily consistent with the client's desired ends.

This is not to say, however, that planners did not perceive a need for public education or that the movement did not have an "educational" effect independent from the dominant influences of the client. To the contrary, evidence was cited earlier as to the influences of the Chicago Fair and the McKim Commission Plan for Washington, D.C., commissioned in 1901 by the U.S. Senate, which indicated that these plans apparently had the same catalytic influence in stimulating public interest in planning. In addition, Burnham, Robinson, and others, as nationally recognized leaders of the movement, obviously had unique opportunities, beyond those mentioned above, to influence public opinion.

As was mentioned earlier, planners exhibited no willingness to actively participate in local politics in order to implement plans and most authors generally agree that implementation was a function of the client group's political influence in local government. In this regard, the basic contribution to the implementation of planning proposals by planners was the preparation of plans, a document whose change orientation was explicit.

Conclusion

As prescriptions for social change in the early twentieth century, city beautiful plans were documents aimed at transforming elements of the behavioral (physical) environment in order to lessen the deleterious "congestive" aspects of urban life. As such, they were attempts to relieve the immediate consequences of unrestrained growth

without changing the growth ethic itself. Planning in this period thus accommodated growth by eliminating some of its visually perceivable dysfunctions.

Having recounted the major values and attitudes with which planners approached their work, it would serve no purpose to recant them here except only to remind the reader of their almost purely physical emphasis. There is no evidence indicating that the plans, per se, assumed that the basic character of social, economic, or political institutions need be changed in accordance with the physical changes suggested.

Given this dominantly physical emphasis and the nature of the role demands imposed by their primary clients, which basically relegated the professional to the role of technician while the client group lobbied for implementation, it can only be concluded that the reforms instituted through planning at this time mainly benefited business interests. This is not to say that planners did not have basically altruistic motives; indications are that they did, but to ascribe a dimension of altruism to the client, which would have had to have been evident in the political actions of the client, cannot be done with any degree of assurance. Since the plans themselves were not constrained by perceptions of financial limitations that local governments were operating under, plans were implemented (if at all) in a piecemeal fashion, and it is not that difficult to assume which parts would have had the highest priorities for implementation in accordance with client interests.

In addition to these business groups, however, planning did have a significant constituency within middle class and plans might have been conceivably intended to satisfy their interests rather than those of the primary client. The question of central importance to this thesis, however, is to identify those groups who received direct benefits from planning endeavors and since implementation was generally accomplished through the insistence of the client group, there is no way the benefits of both the client group and the middle class constituency can be considered equal. The physical changes effectuated in the physical form of the cities reflected the priorities of the client, not necessarily those of planners or the middle class public.

Footnotes

¹For example, see Caplow, Theodore, The Sociology of Work (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), p. 136.

²Walker, Robert A., The Planning Function in Urban Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), p. 12.

³Walker, Robert A., "The History of Modern City Planning," in Caplow, Theodore (Ed.), City Planning: A Selection of Readings in Its Theory and Practice (Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing Co., 1950), p. 38.

⁴Simutis, Leonard J., "Frederick Law Olmstead, Sr.: A Reassessment," Journal of the AIP, Vol. 38 (Sept., 1972), p. 277.

⁵Redistributive change is that aimed at serving the public interest by elevating the status or material circumstances of a group or groups whose position is lower in some respect than it should be. See Freiden, Bernard J., "Environmental Planning and the Elimination of Poverty," Journal of the AIP, Vol. 33 (May, 1967), pp. 166-167.

⁶Scott, Mel, op. cit., p. 11.

⁷Winter, William O., The Urban Polity (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1969), p. 427.

⁸Scott, Mel, op. cit., p. 6.

⁹Reps, John W., The Making of Urban America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 497.

¹⁰Lubove, Roy, The Progressives and the Slums (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), p. 218.

¹¹Scott, Mel., op. cit., p. 40.

¹²See Footnote 2.

¹³Goodman, Robert, After the Planners (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), p. 100.

¹⁴Reps, John W., op. cit., p. 502.

¹⁵See Goodman, Robert A., op. cit.

¹⁶Walker, Robert A., "The History of Modern City Planning," in Theodore Caplow (Ed.), op. cit., p. 43.

¹⁷Scott, Mel., op. cit., p. 105.

¹⁸Reps, John W., op. cit., p. 514.

¹⁹Reps, John W., ibid., p. 514.

²⁰Winter, William O., op. cit., p. 428.

²¹Scott, Mel., op. cit., p. 49.

²²Scott, Mel., op. cit., p. 67.

²³Reps, John W., op. cit., p. 524.

²⁴See Footnote 5.

²⁵See especially Sinclair, Upton, The Jungle (New York: Signet Classic, 1905), and Lewis, Sinclair, Arrowsmith (New York: Signet Classic, 1924).

²⁶See Perlman, Robert, and Gurin, Arnold, Community Organization and Social Planning (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), Chapter 2, for information on development of social work profession. Also see Lubove, Roy, Progressives and the Slums (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962) for information about common values of housing reformers, especially pp. 218-221.

²⁷See Walker, Robert A., "The History of Modern City Planning," in Theodore Caplow, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

²⁸Reps, John W., op. cit., p. 514.

²⁹Scott, Mel., op. cit., pp. 5-6.

³⁰See Reps, John W., op. cit., pp. 514, 517.

³¹Lubove, Roy, op. cit., pp. 218-221. See also Hofstadter, Richard, The Age of Reform (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), pp. 148-163.

³²Reps, John W., op. cit., p. 516.

³³Reps, John W., ibid., p. 524.

³⁴Scott, Mel., op. cit., p. 105.

³⁵Reps, John W., op. cit., p. 508.

³⁶Walker, Robert A., op. cit., p. 10.

CHAPTER IV
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE PLANNING FUNCTION
AND THE LOSS OF THE IDEALISTIC PERSPECTIVE
(1910-1929)

Introduction

Although planners continued to prepare city beautiful plans well into the second decade of the twentieth century, the intellectual focus of the profession began to change measurably during this period. During the first decade treated here, two new trends were gaining momentum which were of particular interest to planning professionals and one which involved the cooperative action of planners and others with the same reformist interests. The first two were those to enact zoning ordinances and to increase the role of the planner as a social scientist in the planning process. The broader trend to which those two are related was the social movement to change the basic character of municipal government. Also considered herein is the World War I experience of city planners and the importance it held for planning in later years.

The transition from the city beautiful to this so-called "city practical" period was momentous in terms of new values that were internalized. In retrospect, such changes were essential if city

planning was to retain its importance in influencing the course of municipal affairs. The entrance of the profession into the governmental structure was dependent upon the profession's ability to recognize and work under the fiscal restraints of local government and hence idealism ceased to be a valued commodity, but beyond this, the relatively pure design perspective of the profession had to change before planning could be incorporated into governmental operations. As Wilensky states, the basis of professional status then and now was established through claims of political neutrality and scientific objectivity¹ and neither of these foci were apparent in the designer's technical function in the city beautiful period.

The time sequence used here leads up to the depression years when planning as well as other governmental agencies assumed new roles. It should be noted here that the analysis of the professional-client relationship is done mainly in terms of developments which influenced the consultant's role. Independent planning commissions were first being established throughout this period and proper attention is given to them here, but the analysis will be somewhat deeper in the next chapter, the time period when they achieved dominance.

City Practical Values

In asserting that much public enthusiasm dissipated for the city beautiful movement in the 1910's, it should be made clear that such plans were being prepared throughout this decade in smaller cities and it is reasonable to assume that the degree of local support varied

from place to place. The crucial point here is that other social forces, also part of the broad-based reform movement that spawned the city beautiful movement, were taking on new significance and consequently city beautiful concerns became somewhat obscured. Foremost among these forces was the movement to change the structural form of municipal government.

The social philosophy behind this movement was discussed briefly in the previous chapter when mention was made to the puritan heritage wherein corruption, profiteering, and similar actions formed the basis of the negative reaction to local government.² By the 1910's, proponents of better government had formalized these negative reactions into a more positivistic response emphasizing the need to run government like private businesses. The most basic values behind this movement were desires to achieve economy and efficiency in government. As Walker states,

Without attempting to draw sharply a line of demarcation, it is possible to discern a gradual change in planning from the outlook epitomized in the "city beautiful" to an attitude best described as the "city practical." This change took place in the decade following the publication of the Plan for Chicago (1909) and flowered in 1928 and 1929. The distinguishing feature of planning done in accordance with the second orientation, whether public works planning or zoning, was the necessity for justifying it on an "economic" basis.³

Economy, efficiency, honesty, impartiality, and negative feelings about power as it accrued to the strong executive in most local governments were all key values playing complementary roles in the value frameworks of these reformists.⁴ Clark asserts, however, that a basic political value inherent in this movement was the middle class

ideal of running government in the interests of the city as a whole. He uses this value to expand on what he calls the ethic of "public-regardedness":

All structural manifestations of the public regardedness were elements of the municipal reform movement that began with the twentieth century. Civil service, nonpartisanship, at-large elections, and big districts were principal features of the National Municipal Leagues "municipal program" issued in 1900. Together with the manager plan and city planning, these measures were promulgated in 1916 and reissued several times subsequently.⁵

If this value of running a city in accordance with the "public interest" was of basic importance to these proposed reforms, another major value is also implicit in this reformist ideology. As it affected the movement as a whole through proposals for civil service and the city-manager structure of government, the basic value is that technicians and experts (professionals) should have a substantive role in managing municipal affairs. As this value applies to establishing a planning function in government, Ranney states, "A very basic assumption behind the existence of the planning function of government is that the natural processes of the private market cannot allocate land to uses that benefit the public as a whole."⁶

Using this frame of reference then, the recognition of the need for city planning, whether explicit or implicit, and its subsequent realization as a governmental form, represents a basic change in public policy where heretofore the thrust of planning did not embody such a concept. This is not to say that planners and other reformers did not hold this value earlier, but that this value did not influence

the course of municipal affairs. In other words, the urgency for the structural reform of public institutions had no expression in the professional-client relationship or in the general professional value framework that was maintained in the city beautiful era.

As they are presented here, it is easy to discern the similarities between the values of planners in this period and those of the earlier time. The anti-political bias which was probably first internalized as a particularly professional value which related to the desired social distance that the early architect-planners wished to maintain between themselves and public affairs, was adopted by the rest of the reform movement in its reaction to the politics of the time: bossism. Because of this value overlap, the reform movement tried to isolate planning from politics. As Rawney states,

A concrete manifestation of this attempt is the semi-independent planning commission through which most planning agencies operate today. These commissions were designed to be immune to the meddling of corrupt politicians and special interests.⁷

Other values that did not die with the city beautiful movement and were subsequently translated into law and the institutional structure of municipal governments can be listed as follows:

- 1) Government must assume the responsibility for providing basic amenities to improve the quality of life because natural market forces were incapable of doing so.
- 2) Planners should adopt a non-active role in regards to implementation as this would best be left to the activities of people with status and power, i.e., the planning commission.
- 3) That the professional's analysis of a situation within his designated domain of expertise is inherently "correct," or better than proposals from other sources.⁸

Obviously other values, those not institutionalized in the city practical period, were also carried over from the city beautiful movement, but the attempt above is to list those which survived without substantial modifications. Those which were subject to modifications will be discussed as the text progresses.

The new values internalized as a result of exposure to the reformist ideology were those encouraging efficiency and economy as part of governmental operations. Acceptance of these values led to a scaling down of the "make no small plans" edict of Burnham in the city beautiful period, as will be shown later in this chapter. In fact, acceptance of these values represented almost a complete reversal of the orientation during the city beautiful period when fiscal reality was of little concern. In the city practical period these values were the cornerstones of professional practice.

Although more substantive reasons for this reversal will be offered in the next section of this chapter (inter-group relationships), it is certainly plain that the values of economy and efficiency were intimately related to the reformist ideology since much of their ideological focus was derived from assertions that governmental waste, extravagance, and special favors were some of the most detestable aspects of the boss-ruled cities.

Scientific Values

The conviction of reformers that city government should be run like private businesses and corporations by institutionalizing

the means to achieve efficiency and economy was a prime tenet of early adherents to the principles of scientific management and central to the nascent field of public administration. These ideals, probably based on Weber's "bureaucratic ideal,"⁹ served as the theoretical framework from which to propose the institution of civil service. Implicit in this theory is the contention that the "political" realm of decision-making in government should be diminished so that vital features of government, i.e., the administration of fiscal resources, planning, and other essentially "professional" activities, could be controlled by technical experts. Since city planning was striving to achieve the status necessary to become a governmental function upon this basis, planners, too, evidenced the urge to become "scientific."

It is essential to understand the word "scientific" in its historical context. In this regard Scott states, "City planners, too, wanted to be 'scientific' in their diagnosis of the ills of the city and to base their proposals on arrays of 'facts' and sound deductions drawn therefrom."¹⁰ In this sense the word is analogous to simple data gathering; it did not reflect a commitment to the "scientific method" as we now know it but it did reflect a desire to change planning from its earlier expression as almost pure design by establishing a more rationalistic basis for making decisions.

This rationalistic tendency had been a part of earlier reform efforts since at least 1834. As Walker explains, such an orientation was a viable part of the efforts by housing reformers:

As early as 1834, a sanitary report for New York City called attention to bad housing as a cause of disease. A second report in 1842 was even more detailed and insistent in pointing out the inter-relation between the two. The first tangible result of these studies and the agitation for improvement was the creation of a city health department in 1866 and the first tenement law in 1867.¹¹

As part of the efforts of the early architect-planners in the pre-city beautiful times, a "city survey" usually represented the bulk of data collection that was utilized in plans. Whether these surveys represented more than simple land use inventories in this earlier period is doubtful, but after the turn of the century survey work did become more systematic. Walker hails the Pittsburgh Survey of 1907 as the first comprehensive survey because it related the structural conditions of housing to living conditions.¹² The "Boston-1915" movement, one of metropolitan proportions, was an attempt to draw all the threads of the nineteenth century reform together into a planning movement with the ultimate intent of using science to maximize "public health." Scott cites John Nolen as explaining the purposes which science would serve:

. . . to consider the relation of traffic highways and traffic open spaces to transportation, of transportation to parks and playgrounds, of parks and playgrounds to the homes of people, of the homes of people to manufacturing districts, of manufacturing districts to transportation and on and on, through that unending relationship and inter-relationship which stamps the character of modern life on the profitable and skillful provision for which depends, in many instances, the success or failure of a public improvement and the return or dividend on a public investment.¹³

Inasmuch as these early studies represented attempts to rationalize the basis of technical decision-making, they also

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maintained the emphasis on environmental determinism apparent in the last chapter. The relationship between physical conditions and social and economic conditions was the prime focus of investigation for planners; the basic assumption was that by manipulating the physical components of a city's physical form, certain social and economic deficiencies could also be ameliorated. In this sense the aesthetic analysis of problems of earlier periods was replaced by a more rationalistic analysis, yet it must be stated that there was no "scientific" correlation between the analysis and the proposed solution, i.e., there was no factual basis of knowledge upon which to propose physical solutions, dependent upon the character of deficiencies identified in studies. The basis of proposing change was still essentially inductive.

As this frame of reference affected the planner's orientation toward his work, whether as a consultant or a public employee, it reflects a bias in that environmental determinism is only one of many possible value frameworks possible to use in solving social and economic problems, but again it should be stated that environmental determinism was not only common to planning. As a basis for most social scientific endeavors of the time, it reflected more the fledgling state of consciousness apparent in social science.

That environmental determinism was adopted in other professional fields should not really be a point of contention. The efforts of sociologists and housing reformers led to the presentation of a report from the Urbanism Committee of the National Resources Committee

in 1937. This study inter-related housing conditions with many other social problems such as juvenile delinquency, race, and health. As an input to the social philosophy of planning, this document presents a comprehensive social orientation which Walker claims was eventually assimilated by planners.¹⁴

As the philosophy of environmental determinism was adopted for use in planning, an indirect implication of its application could conceivably have been to foster a utilitarian acceptance of the value of science, per se. The need and desire to make planning more rationalistic might easily have been determined on the basis of planners' desires to become part of government as much as it reflected a desire to become scientific. The strong artistic backgrounds of planners would certainly bear on their willingness to diminish (relatively) the role of pure design in planning and, of course, other variables are related. This question is taken up centrally in the client relationships section of this chapter.

Zoning Values

For the government to control housing densities, impose height restrictions, and impose safety standards on construction through zoning, the basic value of the sanctity of property rights was challenged by the value that government had a right to compromise private prerogatives when it was deemed necessary to protect public health and welfare. As Perloff states,

The latter part of the nineteenth century and the earliest part of the twentieth was a period in which the accepted scope of municipal activity was defined in limited terms and when extensive public control of private property was next to inconceivable.¹⁵

The reformist concept used to confront the absolutism of property rights, however, was not exactly foreign to American society. The "police powers," i.e., the control of property rights in order to promote the general health, safety, welfare, and morals as used to justify the legal basis of their application, is founded both in British Common law regulating nuisances and in John Stuart Mills' philosophy that the freedom of individuals to exercise their rights stops at the point where that exercise infringes upon the rights of others. Ultimately, the police powers can probably be considered as a corollary of the "Golden Rule" adopted to early twentieth century circumstances.

Early attempts to establish this principle in law are traceable to early reform agitation that led to the establishment of the first municipal health department and the first tenement law, both in New York City in the mid-1800's. The impetus for their application as land use controls did not come, however, from the planning profession. Perloff explains,

Practicing lawyers, as well as legal scholars and the courts, laid the foundation for what were to become the major legal tools associated with city planning-zoning and subdivision control through the development of legal concepts centering on the police power and eminent domain.¹⁶

Although planners readily accepted these concepts, the basis of this acceptance is apparently in the negative reaction of planners to the

excesses produced by urbanization and industrialization which formed the basis of reform which predates the city beautiful movement. Thus the planning and the legal profession found themselves in a temporary alliance necessarily aimed at establishing the constitutionality of these powers.

Once the question of constitutionality was resolved in *Euclid vs. Amber Realty Co.* case and the "Save New York" movement demonstrated that business support of zoning could be motivated if it was made clear that zoning could be used not only as a tool to promote orderly growth but also one which could preserve property values,¹⁷ the legal basis of power could be administered.

The success of these efforts not only chipped away at the absolute powers of property owners but also opened the door for confronting the laissez-faire values facilitating the uncontrolled physical growth of cities. It should be remembered that city beautiful plans did not confront this issue; they merely sought to ameliorate some of the worst manifestations of this growth. On the other hand, the legal power to zone and impose subdivision regulations first gave planners the right to prescribe amenable land use patterns for a city, a power with no precedence in American history.

The values by which these patterns were altered are also worthy of attention. Prime among these are the assumptions that land use patterns should be used to stimulate compatible traffic generation relationships and that major land uses should be segregated. Both of these principles were explicit in the theory and designs of Ebenezer

Howard, whose book Garden Cities of Tomorrow was receiving much attention in the United States at this time.¹⁸ Ranney states that these two principles were readily accepted by planners in conjunction with the apparent success of zoning in Germany.¹⁹

Both of these principles would be of major significance in altering land use patterns in the immediate future. In accommodating the demands automobiles were beginning to make on vehicular transitways, the former value could be used to eliminate congestion. The segregation value would radically change development patterns from the hodgepodge of uses that had evolved without controls. One of the most direct implications would be the creation and protection of distinct residential neighborhoods. In 1929 when Perry argued that neighborhoods could be the basic unit in which a sense of community could be created, there was a general acceptance of this assumption. Ranney states,

Although there has been some disagreement over the details of Perry's neighborhood concept, the proposition that the neighborhood ought to be the planning unit and the assumptions behind this proposition have been widely accepted by planners.²⁰

We must remember that these two principles and others apparent in the theories of Howard, Perry, and Stein must have seemed exceedingly radical, even to planners, when they were first introduced. Howard, especially, had developed a cohesive social theory which, in addition to containing these values of pragmatic worth (plus that which encouraged the public acquisition of open space to control development), also included principles of limited size, the general

value of creating decentralized urban centers, i.e., new towns, in which growth was contained, and the socialistic principles which would guide the governance of the new town. This is an extended way of saying that these theories provided a new strain of utopianism within planning, or at least a new strain vastly different from that which was taken for granted in the city beautiful period.

Unfortunately, there are few ways to judge to what degree these more idealistic components of these theories were internalized. Scott does shed some light when he recounts the debates at planning conferences in the early 1920's over what would be the best measures by which to limit densities. He states,

The planners themselves in the trying times of the early twenties were groping for effective means of controlling not only the use of land but also the density of population and character of residential areas.²¹

He also states that planners, in these years, were then generally accepting the principle that different types of housing should be included in separate zones, although some conservative planners apparently thought that the only legitimate use of zoning was to enforce setback requirements to provide light and air without controlling densities.²² Given these pragmatic debates, even if planners accepted the theories of Howard et al., they certainly did not try to translate them into social reality at this point in time.

As the police power value was accepted as a legitimate legal principle and zoning became a part, a major part, of the planner's function in government, it is not hard to see how these values fit

into the reformist ideology. The police power value was consistent with the ethic of "public regardedness" and the related concept of "public interest" which was developing during this period. The administration and enforcement of ordinances was consistent with the two major operational value-goals, economy and efficiency. As Scott states again, "Urban America enthusiastically embraced the new order, and for the sake of economy, efficiency, and reliable long-range planning straitjacketed its growth and development within highly restricted zones. . . ." ²³ If through no other means, the social desirability of zoning was defined through its anticipated palliative effect on past grievances about the "congestive" nature of urban life. Historically, this social welfare goal provided the first stimulus to hasten the acceptance of zoning by early reformers.

World War I Values

As the country prepared to enter World War I, the major federal value of defense gained primacy as planners offered their services to the aid-the-war effort. In May, 1917, Olmstead, Ford, and E. P. Goodrich presented two resolutions passed at the national planning conference calling for the use of planning principles in order to create cantonments for troops and housing for workers in war industries to the chairman of the General Munitions Board of the Council of National Defense. ²⁴

With defense being the prime value, the assertion by planners that government should subsidize the construction of housing immediately

became an issue of pragmatic importance. This importance was not paralleled at the local level where the defense value had great political importance but no opportunity for application. It is also quite clear that municipal governments saw no inherent value in providing housing for social purposes. In explaining that this was true only during the war, Perloff states,

Social scientists brought questions of inadequate housing, slums, and social disorganization to the public eyes in the post World War I period but these were matters which in the 1910's and 1920's were as yet deemed to be largely outside the scope of legitimate municipal activities.²⁵

At the federal level, the compromise legislation eventually passed to enable the construction of publicly financed housing provided for the sale of these units to private entrepreneurs after the war, allaying fears that such housing might be the first step towards socialism. In the World War I years when zoning was still seen by some as an unwarranted intervention of government much limited to property rights, to ask government to include subsidized housing in its "public regardedness" ethic was asking too much politically. Both zoning and public housing compromised the basic values of social Darwinism which emphasized that social problems were the products of individual failures, those of the people confronted by these problems, to better their own social and economic circumstances. Hence public action served no valued public end. Such values were honored in governmental actions until the constitutionality of zoning was affirmed, hence justifying public action in an area not previously subject to public control. During World War I public housing was justified in

terms of the national defense policy aimed at insuring increased productivity to meet war-related needs.

Once the need for housing was established in accordance with the defense effort, planners were given almost autonomous design powers, yet the operationalization of specific housing projects was left to municipalities who were expected to provide public facilities and utilities. Planners were thus in a position to design planned communities and some of these designs became expressions of aesthetic values which planners still held as central in their value frameworks. Scott describes a community designed by Stephen Child as reflecting "technical skill, aesthetic sensitivity, and social consciousness revealed in street systems following the contours of land, the excellent spacing and placing of structures, the grouping of public and semi-public buildings. . . ." ²⁶

The success of these designs was dependent on the local unit's ability to provide services and this apparently led to the frustration involved in this type of planning, given a lack of local financial resources. Still, this experience profoundly influenced the values of those planners involved in that they learned the difficulties of producing a design in which all the essential physical elements were coordinated and inter-related. As Olmstead stated at the 1919 National Conference, he had gained an appreciation of "the few big things" which determine the general healthfulness, convenience, and social well-being of a city: the principal thoroughfares and transportation routes, the main water supply lines, trunk sewers and storm drains,

sites for schools, parks, and playgrounds, and districting (zoning).²⁷

These elements and their inter-relationships which make up what will be called the concept of physical comprehensiveness, first found expression in the World War I situation. At no point in time previous to this could the pragmatic difficulties of providing a totally planned or well planned community be appreciated firsthand, as planners previously had developed plans including only a few of the elements needed in World War I plans. It would be quite some time before such "comprehensive" plans would be produced in conjunction with public clients again. These plans were drastically different from those plans being produced for cities at this time for reasons which will be elaborated upon in the final section of this chapter.

Client Relationships

As planning first became established in this period as a governmental function through the creation of planning commissions (generally unstaffed), the institutional structures created embodied the two operational values of the public regardedness ideology: economy and efficiency, which by the 1920's had replaced the idealistic orientation of the city beautiful plans. Ranney states,

. . . but by 1920 the movement had undergone a shift in emphasis which has been referred to as "city efficient" or "city useful." The "city efficient" advocates rejected the grandiose schemes of Burnham and his associates in favor of more practical plans which dealt with problems of dirt, congestion, and slums directly.²⁸

The clients of this process were many. On the most immediate level there was the commissions themselves and other subscribers to the public regardedness ideology: civic improvement associations, business groups, the federal government, most professionals in other fields (including the clergy), and the middle class constituency as it carried over from the city beautiful period.²⁹ Of these groups only two achieved substantive gains through the administration of planning--city government itself and business groups.

To understand these client benefits, it is essential to understand the relationship between planning and zoning at this time. Throughout the presidencies of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover the order of procedure in most cities was zoning first, city-wide planning second--if at all.³⁰ In preparing zoning schemes it was also quite common to designate excessive amounts of land for various purposes. This was a natural outcome of having no scientific basis to project the future needs of each type of use. As Scott states, the lack of rationalistic means to determine needs made such allocations subject to political pressures:

But not infrequently the allocation of excessive amounts of street frontage for apartment houses and for commercial establishments resulted from the political pressures exerted by particular property owners, relations, and special interests.³¹

All of these groups sought to capitalize on the speculative value on properties in different zones. When unable to do this they could maintain pressure for spot zoning which was characteristic of the early administration of zoning. Spot zoning lessened the effects of

these ordinances in promoting amenable land use patterns, but just as important was the strictness of certain provisions of the ordinance. In their final adopted forms business groups sometimes had a significant say in how certain provisions would read. In the drafting of the first ordinance in New York City, Lawrence Vellier, a planner, refused to sign the final report leading to the ordinance because he felt the restrictions proposed were almost dictated by influences of the major mercantile interests: real estate companies, life insurance interests, title and trust companies, savings banks, and commercial associations.³² Not coincidentally, housing reformers, social workers and civic groups interested in sanitation and health opposed the laxity of the proposed regulations.

These latter groups, generally those who had first given the stimulus to lobby politically for zoning, as secondary beneficiaries, favored the stricter form of zoning desired by planners and other municipal interests. In effectuating even a semblance of a system of segregated uses, reform interests benefited over the system which previously had been dominant. Municipal interests and those private interests (utility corporations, transit companies) who had a stake in public works planning accrued material benefits by saving the money which would have been spent in extending these services (sewers, paving, grading) within a system of uncontrolled uses.

Whether or not planners consciously acknowledged their relationship with the business interests is unclear. It is clear, however, that planners were choosing an expeditious path on an issue

which was very controversial at this time. From the discussion above, in terms of central values of what zoning should accomplish, planners were closer to their secondary clients than the primary ones. But in trying to gain acceptance for the type of change desired, the interests of the financial groups could not be totally neglected. Alan Althsuler, speaking conceptually about achieving such changes, states,

Speaking broadly there are two ways to win political acceptance for new ideas in a stable democratic system. The first is to challenge the theoretical foundation of popular beliefs with which they conflict. The other way is to adopt one's own arguments and objectives to the beliefs, attitudes, and political customs already prevalent.³³

Since political acceptability was the key to accomplishing the desired changes, the second alternative had to be utilized to some degree. Whereas reformist ideology sought institutional changes in government, it was a reform movement whose spirit and principal supporters did not question the efficacy of achieving such changes by entirely legal means. This stance leads to a common dilemma which is common to planners and other public professionals in other situations:

The planner who stirs controversy risks failure, perhaps not only in the particular battle he has chosen to fight but also in budget and program battles for years to come. As a result the idea takes hold that a principle component of "good" planning is political success, the temptation is great to choose easy political paths.³⁴

As Scott points out, political success was not the only benefit that planners gained from this relationship. Occupational status and security within the governmental structure were also by-products of this alliance.³⁵

With business support of zoning, few interests were left to oppose it, but this is not to say that this aspect of reformism was like all others. The establishment of the planning function, itself, in government was vigorously opposed by those forces then occupying government whose value systems were almost diametrically opposed to the ethic of public regardedness. Whereas the chief values of the reformers were economy and efficiency based on the tenet that government should be run like private businesses, the chief value operationalized in the ethic of private regardedness was representation. Government jobs were based on the spoils system, a remnant of the ideals of Jacksonian Democracy, political and administrative powers were centralized in the strong-mayor form of government, and governmental favors were available to those who could reciprocate.³⁶

In the 1910's when the business interests listed above were taking a more negative position vis-a-vis planning interests based on their laissez-faire attitudes toward growth and their uncompromising sanctification of property rights, they made up an active part of the anti-reform forces. Having learned to get what they wanted from the old system and unsure of what "public interest" might come to mean, reformist proposals must have seemed threatening. Although a definitive answer as to why compromises were allowed can't be given, it does seem apparent that the realization that zoning could help preserve property values mollified their ideological opposition somewhat. Theoretically, this realization should have softened the opposition of individual property owners also. In regards to the establishment of

planning commissions and the other institutional changes brought by reformism, this threat was not as substantial as the economic self-interest threat of zoning. As cited earlier, the social philosophy of reformism based on puritan ideals was not antithetical to those social groups. Certainly this sort of morality could compete with the primitive form of social Darwinism that was used to justify governmental corruption and special favors.

As partially disinterested parties to the reform, the foremost were labor organizations seeking to unionize. In terms of the change to be accomplished through reform, labor had always been a supporter in the past, yet their reformist tendencies had always been acculturated to the private regardedness ethic rather than public, i.e., they primarily wanted to elevate their own living conditions and occupational status. At any rate, in the 1910's and 1920's, with their focus of interest centered on unionization, their support to either side was necessarily token.

Professional Roles and Role Demands

Technical Role.--The centrality of plan-making as the main technical function remained constant from the previous period but the scope of plans were measurably enlarged. In part, this expanded scope can be seen as a function of both the new values assimilated by planners during this period and the professional-client relationship then dominant. Scott confirms this when speaking of the plans prepared in the mid-1920's:

The typical plan consisted of only six elements: zoning (generally thought of as a land use scheme), streets, transit, rail and water transportation, public recreation, and civic art or civic appearance. . . . In the business-dominated 1920's his other planning reports made no mention of housing, not because he had changed his ideas about the importance of the subject but because his clients were indifferent.³⁷

The personal reference in the cite above applies to Harland Bartholomew who included a section on housing while doing a plan in Wichita in 1923. John Nolen did the same in Cincinnati in 1925 while working for the Housing Betterment League. George B. Ford, also working on this plan, authored the elements of education and refuse disposal.³⁸ Bartholomew's housing element, as well as the other plan elements listed here, had no immediate impact on the science of plan-making during the period. It wasn't until the depression period, with radically different social circumstances, did such "socialistic" concerns become accepted parts of plans.

The business-oriented focus of plans is further confirmed by Walker, speaking of the major trends of plan-making during the 1920's:

In these contemporary plans there is evident an extension in two directions--to include a widening range of public improvements and to include transit and transportation as major considerations. The significance is that here city planning was being expanded to the field of private enterprise, well beyond the limitation of public lands and public buildings which characterized the first city plans.³⁹

With this new focus and the concomitant infusion of more rationalistic plan-making principles there was a corresponding trend to employ specialists in these fields in planning consulting firms,⁴⁰ and this represents the first indication of how social scientists

(in this period, economists) would gradually increase their roles as planning technicians. Plan proposals during this period also first showed their awareness of the fiscal limitations of municipal governments.

In response to these trends, a new image of the role of the technician emerged from that dominant in the city beautiful period. The following citation is Scott's evaluation of some speeches of George Ford in 1912. Ford was an architect-planner.

Ford tried to make the whole process of planning facile, objective, and 99% technical. He underemphasized the part personal judgment played in determining the kinds of data to be gathered, evaluating data, formulating standards and selecting standards. He was loathe to consider the values of the community, as he indicated by cautioning that "our best laid plans may be interfered with by some political or local prejudice."⁴¹

Accordingly, the staff worker was charged with the following responsibilities:

The staff would be permanently and exclusively dedicated to the job of recording, indexing, and interpreting the city survey and the city plan, discovering the deficiencies of the scheme and amending it by the "deliberate authority in control of the office."⁴²

These predilections of the 1910's became the operable role demands of the 1920's, but in order for these demands to become effective in such professional-client relationships, the idealism of the city beautiful period had to be almost totally submerged. Scott implies that these role demands produced such a submergence with a corresponding ascendance of the value of professional gain.

As long as plans promised reasonable progress in adjusting streets to the requirements of the automobile, providing additional parks and playgrounds, facilitating the shift of

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industry to outlying locations, and protecting residential traffic from stores and factories, city planners could gradually win a more secure place for themselves in American life. But let them march too far ahead of the public and they risked losing much that they had gained by hard work and personal sacrifice.⁴³

Whether or not personal and professional security and material gains were the motivating forces behind the acceptance cannot be determined absolutely. In view of the fact that planners were ardent supporters of enabling legislation to establish planning commissions which would institutionalize the same role demands, it is as easy to postulate that in carving a niche for themselves in local government they were equally motivated by their new-found commitment to the principles of scientific management during this period as they were to their role as design planners in the previous chapter.

Institutional Role.--For all intents and purposes, the technical and institutional roles are so intimately interwoven in this period that they are almost inseparable. The nature of plan-making and interim planning projects as noted above can be seen in terms of their conformance to the two main operative value-goals of this period: economy and efficiency. Accordingly there can be few questions that municipal governments required a brand of planning centered on zoning, subdivision regulations, and plan-making in general that would save the city money in extending services to poorly located and mixed land uses.

In the late 1920's, cities began adopting another tool to increase the degree of economy with which they planned public improvements. It was at this time that long-range financial planning became part of planning, a phenomenon which is still of magnanimous importance today. As Scott says,

One of the new tools they needed to assure the success of their work--long-term financial planning to carry out the master plan--would, of course, benefit society as much as it would bolster better city planning. Fortunately for the planning profession, a movement had been developing throughout the United States to systematize expenditures for planned improvements. By the mid-1920's this movement began to support the efforts of city planning commissions and the planning profession to find dependable financing for effecting the comprehensive plan.⁴⁴

In Minneapolis, Newark, Kalamazoo, San Francisco, and Cincinnati steps were taken to institutionalize such procedures, and in 1928 the national conference on city planning adopted a resolution calling for the thorough budgeting of capital expenditures. Needless to say, long-range financial planning was the logical prerequisite to effective implementation and along with the other tools of the process--zoning, subdivision regulations--it served the logical ends for which it was intended given the ideology of public institutions at that time, which has already been discussed exhaustively. Whether established in planning departments or by city managers, planners had to accept the influences of such planning on the nature of the work that they undertook.

In the 1920's there were few staffed planning commissions as consultants continued to dominate in the field. Whether a planner was publicly or privately employed at this time probably made little

difference in terms of both the technical and institutional role demands imposed upon his work. Since the client defined the scope of work to be accomplished, a more idealistic frame of reference toward work was precluded.

One might expect the development of somewhat of an "intellectual void" to emerge paralleling the overly pragmatic orientation of professional life, but such was not the case. As inferred earlier, Howard's theory of new towns and Lewis Mumford's vociferous endorsement of these views in this country⁴⁵ insured that the pragmatic planners were not totally immune from exposure to limited growth philosophies. The point here is that the dominance of business interests in the professional-client relationship would have precluded the expression of such values even if the members of the profession had accepted them wholeheartedly. Such values were inimical to both business and government. Such an assumption seems consistent with F. Stuart Chapin's definition of the political climate as it affects planning, wherein this climate is deemed able of setting a lower limit on the extent to which planning controls can be utilized.⁴⁶

Educational and Politically Innovative Roles.--There is a thin line, which is usually drawn semantically, to distinguish education and political action. Even if the concept of education is taken to mean educating non-professionals about the nature of planning, just what constituted "the nature" of planning is conceived differently within the profession by different breeds of planners. It should be

remembered that in the 1920's and earlier, when efforts were taken "to educate" the public and politicians about planning, the establishment of planning as a governmental activity was, itself, a controversial issue, and in no sense could such planners be expected to portray an unbiased picture of what planning could do for government. This is not an attempt to ascribe devious means to planners, it is simply a recognition that planners were stating their case and that there was another side of the issue. Any educational programs carried out under such circumstances were in danger of being considered political, ipso facto.

In the period between 1910 and 1929 there were many "politically educative" activities undertaken by city planners, but few which were the outgrowth of those values solely embodied in the professional-client relationship encouraged by the establishment of planning commissions. Outside of these occupational roles, a number of books were written by planners, most of which had at their core a major intent of "selling" planning to the public.⁴⁷ In addition, the most prominent professionals and the major professional association did as much as possible to pass enabling legislation.⁴⁸ In short, while planners still disdained political action in local political arenas, they certainly were not shy about engaging in overtly political acts to achieve their own ends in national and state political circles.

It must also be emphasized that such actions were not always entirely consistent with the interests of their primary client: the business community. The most well known incident concerned the zoning

enabling legislation which as administered in accordance with this law had no formal connection to the planning function. Soon after passage, planners urged reforms to remedy this situation. While planners pressed for these stronger controls, business groups were still taking an ideological stance against zoning. There is also evidence that planners were equally dissatisfied with the character of the 1928 Standard City Planning Enabling Act for a number of reasons adequately explained in the breadth of Kent's book, The Urban General Plan.⁴⁹ Business groups could hardly have been expected to play a supporting role in these cases where a stronger planning function was desired.

The political role of the planner as an active agent in the commission form of government has already been discussed. Simply put, the enabling law formalized this function in accordance with the long-standing "anti-political" bias of planners toward participation in local politics. In spite of this, planners and plans, per se, had to convince the client of the efficacy of plans. As part of this educative function it is hard to deny that the documents themselves had an educational value as Kent contends.⁵⁰ Whether further educative efforts had a noticeable impact on client values and interests is debatable. As substantiated above, the plans of this period reflected the strength of these interests, not those of planners which were advocated outside of this relationship.

At this point, it is probably best to defer the detailed discussion of the semi-independent planning commission until the next

chapter. As accounted for above, the discussion is generalized but should apply to both staff planners and consultants. To seek more detail in differences in the role demands could be beneficial, but it will necessarily be repeated in the next chapter. At any rate, these differences will not bear on the central issues under consideration: the nature of the professional-client relationship and the roles performed therein. In regards to these, the force of client interests on planning values has been well established in the discussion of the technical and institutional roles. In the realms of education and political innovation, planners took action to realize their own interests and those of other reformers, but these interests were not reflected to the desired degree in occupational reality. Ironically, business interests and to a lesser degree those of local governments show through in the professional-client relationship, and in many cases the business interests were based on values and objectives widely divergent from those of planners.

Conclusion

The emphasis of city planning in this period vis-a-vis that evident in the city beautiful period was vastly altered in preparing the planning function to become part of local government. The most evident difference is that the grandiose schemes of the former period (based on the "make no small plans" value of idealism) were foresaken to promote the rationalistic influences of social science. That the adoption of these social scientific values was more suitable than the

pure design focus seems self-evident, since such values are more congruent with the economy-efficiency values of the reform movement with whom planners were affiliated in a more subordinate relationship than was evident in the city beautiful movement wherein planning and planners played the most central roles. If we believe Wilensky, this shift was inevitable. He contends that purely idealistic values are not an adequate basis for professionalism, in themselves. In his words: "Once the process of professionalism is begun, there are forces from within the occupation, which, if they are not incompatible with a reform spirit, at least exert subtle pressure against its full blown development."⁵¹ He labels these influences as those compatible with the norms of objectivity, selflessness, and the necessity to maintain a strong technical orientation.

Another major difference from the city beautiful period is reflected in the widened scope of elements to be included in plans. By the end of the 1920's, planners had a much more comprehensive picture of what it really took to plan the "physical city." As related in the text, the World War I experience of planners had much to do with planners' desires to widen the scope of public facilities, services, and utilities. In terms of planning values, such desires were consistent with one of the most basic values from the city beautiful period: viewing the city as a physical "organism of inter-related parts whose efficiency depends upon planned and orderly growth."⁵²

The state to which this value of physical comprehensiveness had taken hold by the end of this period as it related to the expanded

focus was probably best expressed by Alfred Bettman speaking before the Twentieth Annual National Conference on City Planning in 1928:

A city plan is a master design for the physical development of the territory of the city. It constitutes a plan of the division of land between public and private uses, specifying the general location and extent of new public improvements, grounds and structures . . . and in the case of private developments, the general distribution amongst various classes of uses, such as residential, business, and industrial uses. . . . It should be based, therefore, upon a comprehensive and detailed survey of things as they are at the time of the planning, such as the distribution of existing developments, both public and private, the trends toward redistribution and growth of population and industry and the allotment of the territory of the city in accordance with all such data and estimated trends, so as to provide the necessary public facilities and the necessary area for private development corresponding to the moods of the community, present and prospective.⁵³

This statement, among other things, makes it clear that the physical change emphasis was still dominant although vastly altered from the city beautiful period where aesthetic beautification was a major purpose in planning. It is also quite clear from the above that the philosophy of environmental determinism still held sway with the purpose of data collection being analogous to the determination of the exclusively physical needs of the city. Accordingly, physical remedies would be applied to these problems. In such an orientation towards change the assumption that physical dysfunctions could be manifestations of larger social problems is superfluous to this frame of reference.

In retrospect, it is rather easy to label such a perspective as short-sighted in view of the advances made in social theory and in the development of social scientific methodologies. On the eve of the

depression, such assumptions were consistent with the state of sophistication reached in the social sciences and therein lay the basis of professionalism at that point. Such a realization makes it easier to appreciate the words of Peter Lewis:

The planner was probably one of the few people in city government who had any claim to a systematic way of thinking, or had claim to general experience outside the city in which he worked. . . . So the planner moved into those areas in which there was an intellectual or professional vacuum. The reason he did not get deeply involved in social matters was that the city did not.⁵³

Footnotes

¹Wilensky, Harold L., and Lebeaus, Charles W., Industrial Society and Social Welfare (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1958), p. 298.

²Scott, Mel, The History of City Planning Since 1890 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 67.

³Walker, Robert A., The Planning Function in Urban Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), p. 34.

⁴Clark, Terry N., Community Structure and Decision-Making: Comparative Analyses (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968), p. 162.

⁵Ibid., p. 170.

⁶Ranney, David C., Planning and Politics in the Metropolis (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Morrill Publishing Co., 1969), p. 40.

⁷Ibid., pp. 35-36.

⁸For verification of this last point see Scott's work, op. cit., p. 117. With planners considering politics to be corrupt and there being no pressure at this time for citizen participation, planners developed plans free of these influences (theoretically).

⁹Weber, Max, The City, Don Martindale and Gertrude Neuwirth (trans. and ed.) (New York: Collier Books, 1962).

¹⁰Op. cit., Scott, p. 117.

¹¹Walker, Robert A., "The History of Modern City Planning," in Theodore Caplow (Ed.), City Planning: A Selection of Readings in Its Theory and Practice (Minneapolis: Bargess Publishing Co., 1950), p. 37.

¹²Ibid., p. 39.

¹³Op. cit., Scott, p. 115.

¹⁴Walker, Robert A., The Planning Function in Urban Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), pp. 373-388.

¹⁵Perloff, Harvey S., Education for Planning: City, State, and Regional (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), p. 9.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁷ Op. cit., Scott, p. 152.

¹⁸ In 1925 Unwin was a guest speaker at the National Conference in Philadelphia. In the same year, Howard appeared in New York at the International Federation Conference. See ASPO Index to Proceedings of National Planning Conferences 1909-1961 (Chicago: ASPO, 1962), p. v.

¹⁹ Op. cit., Ranney, p. 33.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 34.

²¹ Op. cit., Scott, p. 197.

²² Ibid., p. 198.

²³ Ibid., p. 198.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 170.

²⁵ Op. cit., Perloff, p. 14.

²⁶ Op. cit., Scott, p. 172.

²⁷ Olmstead, F. L., "Planning Residential Subdivisions," Proceedings of the Eleventh National Conference on City Planning, ASPO, p. 6.

²⁸ Op. cit., Ranney, p. 24.

²⁹ Hofstadter, Richard, The Age of Reform (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), pp. 148-163.

³⁰ Op. cit., Scott, p. 197.

³¹ Ibid., p. 195.

³² Ibid., p. 155.

³³ Althsuler, Alan, The City Planning Process: A Political Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 319.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 356.

³⁵ Op. cit., Scott, p. 252.

³⁶ Op. cit., Clark, 162.

³⁷ Op. cit., Scott, p. 228.

³⁸ Walker, Robert A., The Planning Function in Urban Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), p. 31.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 20.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 27.

⁴¹ Op. cit., Scott, p. 117.

⁴² Ibid., p. 142.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 252.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 255.

⁴⁵ Op. cit., Ranney, p. 32.

⁴⁶ Chapin, F. Stuart, Jr., Urban Land Use Planning (Second Edition; Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965), pp. 60-62.

⁴⁷ As an example of a book that tried to sell planning, see Flavel Shurtleff's Carrying Out the City Plan (1914).

⁴⁸ Op. cit., Scott, pp. 238-240.

⁴⁹ Kent, T. J., Jr., The Urban General Plan (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964).

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 86.

⁵¹ Op. cit., Wilensky, p. 330.

⁵² Lubove, Roy, The Progressives and the Slums (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), p. 218.

⁵³ Bettman as cited in Kent, op. cit., p. 30.

⁵⁴ Lewis, Peter A., "The Uncertain Future of the Planning Profession," in Ernest Erber (Ed.), Urban Planning in Transition (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1970).

CHAPTER V

THE NEW DEAL AND WORLD WAR II: THE FEDERAL-LOCAL PARTNERSHIP IN PRESCRIPTIVE SOCIAL CHANGE (1929-1946)

Introduction

The stock market crash and the general economic confusion that characterized the early days of the depression led to the creation of new organizational forms and new forms of inter-organizational relationships congruent with a new ideology of social change. Known as "welfare capitalism" or simply as the "New Deal," one of the most basic changes affecting the planning function was the programming of social change at the federal level with a degree of local governmental action necessary to execute plans and programs. This federal-local relationship persisted through the World War II years and beyond, but during the sixteen year time frame considered in this chapter the policy objectives at the federal level were relatively unified. During the depression the basic goal was economic recovery; in war the chief goal was victory (or defense, if you please). In the 1950's and 1960's goals at the federal level did not have such a cohesive policy base.

The federal-local partnership in prescriptive social change must be seen primarily as a response to the new social and economic conditions of the period. Although the methods used to effectuate change and the values upon which they were based do not represent a complete break with the past, it is clear that these new conditions provided planners with opportunities to break with the direction in which they were headed before (providing public services and facilities economically) to a direction more compatible with the ideal of comprehensiveness. In regards to this, John T. Howard states:

Somewhere along in the 1920's, there came to be crystallized, if not verbalized, a concept of the function of city planning in society as an attack upon all these problems of the physical environment, so that in the course of time since then, city planning has been evolving, aimed at not any single problem or reform, but at the comprehensive improvement of all aspects of the urban environment.¹

As this chapter will show, the federal-local relationship was the prime stimulus to the realization of a reasonable facsimile of the ideal of physical comprehensiveness in the occupational environment and beneath these changes, of course, were changing values and attitudes whose precipitation was a function of the economic collapse. In the war years, the expansion of the planning function toward the goal of comprehensiveness can be seen in the same terms: federal policy and changed values necessary in support of the goal of defense also brought new degrees of sophistication to planning. Accordingly, this period is labeled by more than one author as the beginning of the "modern era" of city planning.

New Deal Policy and Values

Many volumes have been devoted to documenting the trauma of the depression as it affected the social, economic, political and psychological well-being of the country. For the purposes of this analysis one of the more basic changes wrought was that contributing to the expanded scope of governmental activity. Speaking to this point, Walker states,

It [the depression] accentuated the social problems which have always existed in the city, with the result that federal, state, and local governments have been forced to assume primary responsibilities which were formerly left to individuals and private charities. Consequently the public improvements which played a large part in municipal government during the twenties are no longer its first concern. . . .²

It would be tempting to conclude, as Walker does, that the expanded scope of governmental activity reflected general recognition that blighted areas, slums, and poor housing were now to be permanent objects of concern in public policy.³ Such an argument, however, was not really that central to New Deal policy, or at least not as central as that justifying the purpose of public action in terms of strengthening or stimulating economic activity in the private sector of the economy. Charles Abrahms does a better job of putting New Deal objectives in perspective.

Although federal recovery measures were aimed primarily at resuscitating the credit structure promoting employment, they seemed to be driven, as by destiny, toward correcting maladjustments in the real estate economy. Encouragement of new construction, bolstering of home ownership, aid to mortgages, and incidentally (almost accidentally) the elimination of slums became part of the recovery program. The broad social objectives of slum clearance were, of course, subordinate to the main purpose:

Lubricating construction. But social reform intruded itself into the picture. By the very nature of a public works program, activity is limited to work that does not compete with private enterprise. Aside from public works, the projects which best met the requirement were those with social significance.⁴

Given this frame of reference, public action aimed at restoring the primacy of the free market economy certainly had to be based on a faith in the ultimate efficacy of this type of economic system. Prescriptive social and economic change, then, should be seen as being consistent with Keynesian principles of economics which were based on the same value: public intervention to correct the deficiencies of the free market economy. The social welfare values and goals were made subordinate to economic purposes as were social programs initiated to help achieve these ends such as slum clearance and public housing.

With such a basis for public action, the expanding scope of governmental activities may be understood in much the same terms as the basic reasons for institutionalizing the planning function: the irrational nature of free market forces was recognized⁵ reflecting inherent fallibilities in their operations. Public action was to play a restorative function in achieving efficiency in economic activities.

Another overt similarity between the New Deal policies and the reform ideologies of the earlier period was a reliance on the operational concept of environmental determinism in defining the basic perspective by which social change was effectuated. As Jewel Bellrush makes clear, "Their most important legacy [early housing

reformers], was the notion that better housing was the best way to solve all social problems of an urban community."⁶

The infusion of social welfare goals and values into New Deal programs was, in part, representative of a break with the traditions of social Darwinism, an ideology which lays at the feet of individuals the ultimate responsibility for inequalities in social status, economic wealth, and other material amenities. With few exceptions, the values of this social philosophy had been used in justification of governmental inaction to provide means to ameliorate social problems. The one notable exception to this at the federal level was during World War I when the government first implemented housing programs for the benefit of defense industry workers. With the depression, a crisis of the magnitude of the First World War, the discussion of social programs again became politically feasible.

It is important to note the pre-eminence of economic values in the New Deal ideology because their superordinate position in political value frameworks indicates a more utilitarian adoption of social welfare programs than probably would have evolved if social Darwinism would have been totally forsaken. Unlike those periods when Progressivism and municipal reformism were evident, the downswing in the economy in the Depression contrasts with the earlier years of economic prosperity. Hofstadter sees these economic differences leading to fundamental differences in the reform ideologies of these periods.⁷ The differences here are that while the planning function was devised to achieve social goals in eliminating "congestive"

elements of life, it now would be used to further the attainment of economic recovery, a necessary direction for most public institutions given the necessity to coordinate all public action to meet such a crisis.

From a systemic frame of reference, social reality is an encompassing concept embodying social, economic, and political reality in the everyday application of these three words. Social reality, as defined in the New Deal, established the primacy of economic values. In order to accommodate their values to the New Deal ideology, planners would have had to change their priorities for change to be entirely supportive of the dominant ideology. There is a substantive body of evidence that concludes that this did not happen.

As cited on the first page of this chapter, the value of comprehensiveness was expanded during this period. In addition to this it is clear that the provision of housing, in a variety of dwelling types to meet the needs of varied segments of the population, also became a permanent feature of planning concern in this period.⁸ Complementing these interests were desires to make the planning function coordinative and to expand the scientific base of planning.

That the value of providing housing was seen as essential goal in itself should be almost unquestioned. As Scott states, in seeking the enactment of the National Housing Act of 1934, the most basic priority of government was to use the slum clearance programs to relieve unemployment and to revive the construction industry and allied enterprises. In response to this act, Mumford and friends, the

planning militants of the day, were endorsing programs for low-cost housing programs and trying to elevate the financial allotment for public housing as part of the national act. In addition, at the 1934 conference of the National Association of Housing Officials, a far-sighted program emphasizing public housing, rent subsidies, non-subsidized low-cost housing, and the provision of services for these units was endorsed by a panel of the most prominent planners of the day.⁹

The stances of planners contrasted with the low priority given public housing in the Act and the high priorities given to measures aimed at helping home owners in danger of losing their homes due to foreclosures. The different priorities of both the government and planners did reflect differences in priorities about the relative weight of social and economic values. Implementation of the government program was dependent on the establishment of traditional banking and lending principles in governmental bodies such as the RFC and the FHA. Planners proposed funding through categorical grants from the government.¹⁰ These contrasting proposals are somewhat indicative of the level of social responsibility that planners wanted government to assume and that which government was willing to assume.

The issue of housing and the value differences revealed in reference to this issue were not characteristic of a general break between planners' values and those of the federal government. With other values, such as the utility of social scientific methodologies in planning, the need for planning to play a coordinative function

in local government (through the use of long-range financial planning), and the need for planning to address itself to the social issues of slum clearance and housing, we can assume a substantive degree of value congruence given governmental efforts to strengthen the planning function, or parts thereof related to these points. As will be shown later, these values all found expression in the occupational infrastructure.

To say that common values, however, lead to a harmonious inter-relationship must be qualified somewhat. That two groups have common values is not to say that these values must be ranked similarly in importance by the groups. During the depression, the professional-client relationship completed an important cyclical change with the withdrawal of the consultant from his former position of pre-eminence in professional work and the corresponding solidification of the inter-relationship between planning and government. This change is described by Walker as follows:

Withdrawal of the consultant and of active civic support meant knocking out the two main props of the kind of planning which had been done in the past, and only those agencies which had secured a relatively firm hold of the third support--the administrative structure--have survived in active form.¹¹

The implications of this change cannot be overstated, as it was this change in particular which transformed the very process of value formation from that which had been dominant in past years. During both the city beautiful and city practical, dominant professional values had been formed in accordance with a form of "free agent" status whereby the professional was in a position similar to

other private professionals in making his own (professional, not personal, as far as the distinction applies) perception of his professional "self" dominant in the professional-client relationship. Given this degree of autonomy, the scope of planning and the values expressed in plans could be professionally defined, subject to the limitations described in previous chapters. With the subsequent affiliation between planning and government, two important pre-conditions were placed not only on the definition of the scope and nature of activities undertaken, but also on the future assimilation of values. These pre-conditions simply stated were, and still are, political and bureaucratic feasibility. From this period to the present time these concepts have to be rated as those most central in influencing the basic values and assumptions reflected in plans.

This is not to say, however, that these concepts will be uniform in each period, under one form of organizational structure, or even in one city from year to year. Subsequent work in this thesis will be aimed at showing such variances as a function of organizational form.

If we assume the preeminence of the concept of political feasibility in adjudging the efficacy of both new values and in the nature of plans themselves, it is also hard to deny the importance of this concept in defining the public interest. In the earlier years, the concept of public interest had been evolving in a manner consistent with the public regardedness ethic as discussed in the last chapter. Previous to this, city planning in the city beautiful

movement was considered by planners to be pro bono publico based on a self-perceived belief in the "rightness" of the reforms proposed and ultimately on the professional values which led to the promulgation of the reforms. With the institutionalization of the planning function at the local level of government, the reformist concept was that which gained primacy in government.

In defining the nature of programs to be undertaken by city planners during the New Deal, the federal government gained a share of relative influence in defining the public interest in accordance with values dominant during the New Deal. The crucial point in this regard is that public interest in the past was defined in terms of values of the accepted philosophy of the day and subsequent modifications of this concept that can also be seen in these terms. Correspondingly, value formation and selection were limited during this period, at least to the extent to which certain values were written into law and at most to the degree which government was able to enforce various informal sanctions as part of the planning function. In the space in between, planners remained free to define their own directions consistent with those values, professionally perceived as inherently right in changing cityscapes. In short, the profession in developing a dependency on government, as explained in the Walker quotation cited earlier in this discussion, changed from a state where values could be accepted in accordance with their innovative utility to a state where value formation necessarily became a reactive process. With this change, should the expanded meaning of comprehensiveness, the

search for a more rationalistic base of analysis, the demand for long-range financial planning, and the thrust to provide housing be more fully understood. The utility of these phenomena would now be defined primarily in terms of their bureaucratic value rather than through professional preferences.

In reacting, then, to reforms imposed from above, planners working on a pragmatic level tried to implement social change in accordance with their values wherein social reform rated as a high priority (as discussed previously) and also to expand their basis of action so that important programs could be channeled through the planning process. A good example of the latter type of action was the reaction to the omission of the National Housing Act of 1937 in making local housing agencies seek the advice of planning commissions in the location of PWA housing projects. Planners worked to enact legislation in twenty-four states in making these types of housing conform to planning and zoning laws.¹²

In accepting federally initiated reforms or confronting them pragmatically, substantive changes were implemented in the planning process itself. With the practical emphasis in the 1920's dominated by business interests, housing had no part in the plans of that decade. In the 1930's, the demand "to acquire information about the quantity, quality, and physical condition of housing in order to determine future needs"¹³ was realized through conducting socio-economic surveys and in making housing a common element in master plans. This new form of data collection, while related to the importance

of housing as an issue of importance, was also consistent with a new concept of comprehensiveness expressed in the plans of the 1930's. In this respect it also should be remembered that in the 1920's the land use element of plans usually took the form of zoning maps. In the latter period, however, the words "future land use plan" reflected a concept more consistent with the modern form. As Scott states,

Upon planners fell the obligation of assisting housing agencies by doing the "real and difficult job"--devising a future land use plan not only for housing but for all planning purposes, that would determine and be determined by the structural form of a city as shaped by transportation arteries, underground utilities, parks and other public properties. . . .¹⁴

The changing form of the plan also led to the incorporation of more administrative tasks into the process. Prime among these were the beginnings of capital improvements programming and budgeting.¹⁵ The need for such activities was consistent with the 1920's emphasis on economy and also consistent with the current nature of federal demands which encouraged fiscal responsibility and the development of good management techniques in implementing programs.¹⁶ On the professional level, the assumption of these tasks as part of the process was consistent with the value of "coordination" as it was expressed in the 1929 enabling act.

The institutionalization of the planning function during the New Deal also reinforced the need to increase the rationalistic analytical base as it is doubtful if the simplistic methodologies of city surveys would have sufficed in meeting the demand to establish a professional identity within government. In the 1930's, the socio-economic survey replaced the simple land use inventories of the

previous period. As Perloff states, "It wasn't until the depression of the 1930's had altered both social attitudes and the accepted fields of municipal governmental activity that city planning quite seriously began to draw on the social sciences."¹⁷ In other words, the value of science which had been realized previously became institutionalized in the 1930's. The form of institutionalization is still prevalent today: socio-economic data being collected as a base for projecting future land uses. The theories of the Chicago School of Sociology, those of Park, Burgess, and McKenzie concerning urban growth and locational assumptions about major land uses and concentrations of populations of a varying socio-economic character, were those which found expression in this period, both in plans and in guiding decisions related to the type of data required for the new surveys.

Another professional value expanded in this period concerned the application of the "police powers." As this value was institutionalized in the 1920's, zoning ordinances and subdivision regulations were the basic form of regulations applied. In the 1930's with the existence of federal slum clearance projects, condemnation rights based on the legal concept of eminent domain and the enactment of housing codes became important. In embracing a broader concept of what forms of private development could be made subject to public control, both planners and politicians justified adherence to the expanded concept in terms of implementing plans and programs. With the primary goal of economic recovery in the New Deal ideology,

desires to strengthen the police power certainly should not be understood in terms of values that would limit or curtail either the physical or economic growth of cities.

In adjusting the planning function to meet both federal and local stimuli in the 1930's, planning found a new direction, one which couldn't have been anticipated to evolve without the generation of new values and attitudes facilitated by the traumatic influences of the depression. Again planners came to consciously perceive the planning function as an instrument through which social reform could be accomplished.¹⁸ As in the city beautiful period, change based on the principles of environmental determinism was preferred, i.e., it was assumed that now housing was all that was needed to revitalize the deteriorated stock and no social causes of blight were recognized. Complementing this philosophy is the related value that plans should be only physical expressions of a desired physical structure of an urban form. Accordingly it can be concluded that the value of social scientific methodologies, the expanded concept of comprehensiveness, and the need for financial planning (coordination) all can be categorized as operational values in achieving such reforms.

The basic differences in the nature of the reform movements in the city beautiful and the depression can be seen in terms of differing economic circumstances.¹⁹ The former was a period of prosperity where reform was initiated to provide added aesthetic amenities. In the latter period this reform was aimed in accomplishing distinctly economic goals as initiated from above. This

orientation persisted through the World War II subject to changed values and goals defining the central purpose of public action.

World War II Values

In preparing for war, there was a predictable shift in the nature of federal policies reflective of the changed societal goals and priorities dictated by the immediacy of war. Endless volumes have documented how the productivity of war-related goods--weapons, transportation equipment, food and clothing--must rise to meet the demands of the war-time economy and consequently "industrial planning," i.e., the provision of complementary services and facilities for industrial interests, defined the major purpose of city planning during these years. Theoretically, the intention was to turn cities into "arsenals of democracy."²⁰

As early as 1940, city planning commissions began cooperating with local civil defense agencies in collecting data to meet defense needs. The nature of local labor supplies, the identification of housing shortages, and inventories of industrial sites and the nature of transportation facilities, and levels of public water and sewerage services quickly became items of critical concern. In September of that year the programs of the USHA were expanded so that municipal housing agencies could undertake defense-related projects.²¹

As the war influenced planners, it posed ethical problems as to whether planning should be used to expedite defense programs or to conserve cities.²² Needless to say, the programs to abate blight

through clearance were curtailed, but there was also the threat zoning regulations would be relaxed and plans altered to meet the existent crisis. It should not be surprising that value conflicts arose between "good planning" and patriotism. Patriotism usually won out as zoning ordinances were amended so that city attorneys in many cities were given powers to grant variances in many cities for war-related developments.

Embroided in war-related planning projects, new technical values arose. The need for adequate domestic transportation facilities stimulated many transportation surveys. In effect, every report urged local war-transportation committees to analyze the total problem of movement (all modes)--something that many planning commissions and city planners working with such committees had not actually done before.²³ Consequently with housing the desirability of building new houses near industrial plants or locating new plants near an existing residential area became physical relationships worth encouraging. The most immediate influence of these values in plans was the inclusion of what can be called "modernistic" elements of industry and transportation. Based on data collection techniques which superseded earlier attempts to deal with these topics, the rationalistic base of analysis was accordingly expanded.

During the later years of the war, attention turned to post war planning programs. In these years, many big city planning programs were expanded in anticipation of post-war demands for employment and housing. As Scott suggests, the 1940 census figures first

indicated relative population losses in metropolitan centers in comparison to suburban growth, and this contributed to the desires of these cities to undergo improvements to insure their attractiveness as living centers.²⁴ Inevitably the issue of public housing arose anew and the debate concerning this issue must be considered in some way indicative of the social values of planners.

Generally, there were three stances dominant during this period. The most liberal was that private enterprise should serve housing needs as much as possible and that public housing should provide housing to the extent that private forces were incapable of doing so. This was consistent with the New Deal goal of decent housing for the population and re-expressed the social welfare value that housing, per se, must rate a high priority in government programs because of the inherent benefits to be accrued in housing the population in adequate quarters. Although this argument did not challenge the assumption that private economic forces should provide the basic impetus for housing, conservative opponents of public housing invoked the still commonplace arguments that an aggressive federal role was an unwarranted and undesirable intrusion into local affairs and that the concept of federal subsidies for these purposes conflicted with traditional values of economic freedom.

A middle ground was found by planners who generally supported the notion that "redevelopment" was crucial in revitalizing central cities and stopping sprawl, which was seen as uneconomical.²⁵ The argument forwarded by Seward Moth and Alfred Bettman was that sound

development should proceed in accordance with the "highest and best use of land" rather than just for housing.²⁶ Redevelopment, which also required the federal allocation of substantial subsidies, and offered the same form of government controversy in regards to federal intervention, was also quite controversial. In terms of the philosophy expressed in support of this concept, redevelopment was much more central to the planning tradition of comprehensiveness and environmental determinism than was the exclusive concern with housing.

In this value framework planners were confronting the problem of unrestrained physical growth, which was extending well into suburban areas, in much the same way it was confronted in the city beautiful period, i.e., by providing an added measure of aesthetic amenity to urban life. It was felt that redevelopment would have a revitalizing effect, given the relative absence of deteriorated areas, in restoring the viability of central city areas as residential and commercial centers. If done in conjunction with a plan, congestion and other physical problems could also be ameliorated. Accordingly, the ideal form of redeveloped cities may be seen in terms of encouraging the concentrated growth of urban centers by limiting sprawl but providing compatible land use and traffic generation relationships within these areas to encourage freer movement.

In attacking the growth problem several value assumptions were necessarily made, some of them woefully short-sighted. First was the assumption that free market forces couldn't achieve the desired ends without economic incentives. Given the nature of urban

land values, this was undoubtedly true. Development on the urban fringes was cheaper for just about any use and these private forces were in the midst of a concerted effort to encourage sprawl. Second was the assumption that solely by encouraging the physical reorganization and the provision of aesthetic amenities the problem of sprawl could be solved or at least substantially ameliorated. Again, adherence to such a value highlights the physical orientation of planning as no recognition was made for either identifying or treating social causes of blight. Ultimately, redevelopment was another example of treating the manifestation of a problem, i.e., blight, rather than the problem itself (growth), one with substantive social dimensions. Third, the concept of redevelopment assumes that through physical reorganization there would necessarily be desirable social, economic, and political consequences of the physical change realized. This assumption has been common to planning since its inception. A restatement of the value might emphasize that planners had no scientific way in which they could predict the consequences of their plans and that this reflects some of the unscientific aspects of design activity endemic to the process. Simply stated, both data collected and subjective design decisions have direct inputs to the nature of physical plans and the viability of the plan is just as dependent on the inclusion of subjective data as well as objective data. Since subjectivity is most commonly associated with the plan design phase of the process, there can be few assurances that such choices can be integrated into a scientifically derived picture of the future economic and social relationships encouraged through designs.

In adopting this frame of reference, we can also assume that the value of providing adequate housing for the population was of a lesser priority than that of achieving the successful physical reorganization of cities. In this sense, the redevelopment concept was more consistent with the ideal of serving the "public interest". It is very interesting to note, in this respect, that the issue of public housing in the 1930's and 1940's was associated politically with the problems of the "lower third" of the population²⁷, an implicit recognition that the provision of such housing might not benefit the social lot of all.

It is critical during the war years to distinguish the type of change advocated by planners and that realized through planning. In the World War II years, this distinction is clear because the advocated change was not institutionalized until the passage of the National Housing Act of 1949, a date considered in the next chapter. It is critical to realize that both redevelopment and the defense-oriented planning of the early 1940's were both rationalized in terms of their consistency with accepted values which related to how certain patterns of growth could be stimulated and also what the proper function of different levels of government participating in such programs should be. That planners saw the necessity for public subsidies and federal intervention in urban problems as necessity should be unquestioned.²⁸

The alignment of political forces as they related to planning issues also must be considered in terms of advocating changes and

working for changes dictated from above. In this respect, it must be stated that planners generally took stands in favor of proposed policies both during the depression and the war. The basic changes brought to the planning function as by-products of these programs which were anticipated by planners were those in which the scientific and technical sophistication of the profession was enhanced.

Client Relationships

The identification of potential clients of the planning process is somewhat more difficult in the Depression years than during the Second World War. In making this identification, in the former period we must assume that the economic urgency of New Deal programs overshadowed the social importance,²⁹ but both social and economic beneficiaries shall be considered herein. A major problem which has to be confronted in differentiating potential clients is to what degree they were aided through these problems. In former years this was not of critical importance because planners, to a degree, as private professionals could select their clients on the basis of common values and attitudes. In the Depression years and thereafter, with the institutionalization of the planning function, planners did not have such a choice.

With both the economic and social foci of the New Deal programs those groups most likely to derive material gains from their implementation were the construction industry, the unemployed and those receiving housing through the slum clearance and public housing



programs. In regards to these programs, those people displaced by construction also must be considered. Those groups who benefited less from these programs were planners, since these programs were expressive of their reformist aims, the general public who benefited to the extent to which the programs were effective, and business interests who benefited to the same extent. The federal government itself must also be considered as a potential beneficiary since its assumption of power allowed it to influence social relationships in ways exclusive of the aims of other social groups.

Since it is beyond the scope of this analysis to set up cost-benefit relationships to determine the relative gains of these groups, a more qualitative form of analysis will have to suffice. Yet even in drawing tentative conclusions, however, this paper will have to leave itself open to a considerable amount of second guessing. The determination to be made will be to identify that group which most closely guided the operations of the planning process. The only difference in the analysis is that the effectiveness of certain groups in manipulating the operations of the process will not be considered as analogous to that group's power in realizing social change congruent with their political interests.

From this perspective, it is relatively easy to assert that the federal government itself was the primary client. By imposing technical and administrative requirements within the technical and institutional realms of planning activities, and by having a substantive degree of leverage in determining ends realized through these

programs, their effective power seemingly supersedes that of others. Business groups, deriving their influence in terms of their representation on planning commissions and through informal pressures they could bring to bear on planning commissions,³⁰ had a substantial say in influencing the actual amount of political innovation wrought in local situations. Given federal powers in the technical and institutional realms, the only immediate interests that business groups could achieve was in influencing the character of the programs implemented. In essence, this means that while federal influences determined the focus of planning congruent with their major values, business groups could still impose their interests on the nature of social change realized through implementation. Business groups, of course, took political positions reflective of different values and attitudes from those of federal government and planners.

It can also be hypothesized that planners reaped certain benefits, non-tangible to be sure, irrespective of the power struggle between the above mentioned groups. Resultant from working within an occupational environment wherein the federal government exercised control over the performance of important roles, planners were able to increase their rationalistic basis of analysis in a manner consistent with both their technical goals and values. The modernization of both the housing and land use elements of the plan are evidence of this, as is the initiation of capital improvements budgeting and programming which was done in a manner consistent with the reformist goal of efficiency and the New Deal goal of good public management.³¹

The degree to which federal political interests were frustrated by the power of business interests and other groups opposed to the federal housing programs, planning interests were also frustrated.³²

Since the realization of the political interests of the "lower third" could only be realized through implementation, and since such groups took no measures to influence the nature of programs implemented, through the operations of the planning process, these groups can hardly be considered as the clients of the process in more than an idealized fashion. This seems true in spite of the fact that planners and planning made their first attempts to reach them during this period.³³

During the World War II years, the distinction between congruent values and the degree to which these values influenced institutional procedures and subsequently social reality did not hold true. Due to the fact that all groups (discounting subversives) were allied under a value framework headed by the necessity for defense, implementation was not a problem.

Given the relative strength of this value and the nature of work undertaken during these years, the primary clients of the process without question were both governmental (federal) and industrial. Needless to say, this strength is reflected in every realm of planning activity. In realizing their own interests, however, planners were a bit frustrated.

In order to draw this conclusion, the basic consideration being made here is that in order to react to demands placed on the

planning function planners had to compromise important technical values in the realization of change brought through the implementation of defense programs. They were also able to strengthen other technical values and develop new ones which were immediately realized in the process of implementing change, so distinctions between relative costs and benefits must be carefully made.

As was documented earlier, planning during the war shifted to industrial and transportation planning. In response to the need for such planning, planners were able to increase their technical competency in respect to the new types of surveys which had to be conducted, and this eventually led to the modernization of both the industrial and transportation elements of plans. Such modernizations were consistent both with the planning goal of increasing the base of rational inquiry within the process as well as the goal of attaining physical comprehensiveness in projecting future needs.

In the realization of these goals, the achievement of others was sacrificed. The conversion of single-family homes to multiple-family units under relaxed zoning regulations meant that in effect the value of the police powers had been superseded and the planning goal of influencing population densities was, for a time, forgotten. Given the necessity of an unrestricted physical and economic growth value to pervade defense efforts, the chances of furthering the sprawl pattern, first being recognized by planners at this time as being dysfunctional, was also diminished.

This last statement can best be appreciated if one pays attention to the legacy of transportation planning being established during this period. Subordinate to the value/goal of defense was the operational value of functional efficiency, i.e., that transportation routes should be provided at the lowest cost and for the highest speeds.³⁴ This value and the preference for linear routing led to preference for circulation patterns (still dominant today), which contradicted other values which supported the non-sprawl arguments. Since transportation systems were implemented upon these principles, planning interests certainly weren't realized. Whether or not planners realized the nature of these conflicts at that point in time is another question.

Professional Roles and Role Demands

Technical Role.--By the 1930's the semi-independent commission had replaced private consulting as the basic structure in which planning activities were carried out. The organizational form established satisfied a basic desire of most planners which had been evident since the pre-city beautiful days: to keep politics out of urban development.³⁵ Coincidental with the rise of these commissions was the increased importance of social science in city planning. During the depression and continuing up to the present, the technical role of planners has been increasingly characterized as one wherein the rationalistic tendencies dominate over the contending force of design. Frederick M. Bair, Jr., probably does the best job in citing the ideal:

The prime function of the planner is to apply calm and disciplined reasoning in appraising probable results of courses of action or inaction. . . . There is, in our time, unlimited demand for carefully reasoned public policy of the kind planning promotes, and for statesmen who are leaders rather than followers. The planner must be politically aware, but the public can ill-afford to have planners that are primarily politicians.³⁶

In the establishment of planning commissions, the social distance established between the staff planners and politicians was reflective of planner's distaste for local politics. Still, various authors have contended that even in the application of purely rationalistic assumptions, the structural form of government in question will necessarily lead to "realistic" solutions of problems rather than solutions designed purely from identifiable needs which have been determined through the application of rationalistic actions. As Altshuler contends, one crucial point about rationality is that demonstrations of the efficacy means are only possible to the extent that goals are operational.³⁷

In the 1930's and 1940's the relativity of the type of operationalism encouraged was defined from outside of the process by the federal government who set the agenda for subjects to be studied and imposed technical requirements on the type of analyses planners conducted. The most evident result of such institutional influences in the technical role was the upgrading of certain elements of the plan to a point where social scientific research began to rival design skills in defining the planners' basis to his claim of expertise.

In the commission form, the social distance described above probably facilitated the development of these technical skills. In

the depression years, then, this type of structure might easily have been utilized in serving both planning interests and those of the federal government. In determining the subject matter of planning during this period, the federal government held sway. In being in an occupational setting estranged from other interests, planners could develop their technical skills without other contingent influences.

This sort of situation could also influence the planner's power vis-a-vis the planning commission, given the nature of "freedom" the planner maintained in managing the flow of information. As Leonard Duhl implies, knowledge is power that the planner can use in implementing programs:

What I am really talking about is the concept of the planner as a change agent whose job is very much like that of a psychiatrist. While remaining virtually (or publicly) anonymous, he helps to redefine the problems put to him by the patient (community). He helps his patient see what data is needed. . . . Thus while helping to reformulate the problem he helps the patient make its own decisions.³⁸

In the same document Duhl uses such assumptions to redefine the basis of professional expertise.

Their expertise is in combining and reformulating data and information, in redefining the problem, and perhaps more importantly, in causing others to believe that they must do likewise --simply because of the way in which additional information is presented relative to the issues at hand.³⁹

Such statements relate the planner's technical role with those of education and political innovation, and these topics will be more fully discussed momentarily.

The above discussion is intended to show the relative strengths of the two major clients in the Depression years in influencing the performance of technical roles. It is felt in this respect that the federal government applied most of the leverage herein by determining the subject matter treated by planners and the degree of technical competency demanded to satisfy federally imposed administrative edicts. In addition, due to this influence, technical skills were used for short-range purposes consistent with the purposes of federal programs as opposed to the traditional long-range orientation. In affording planners the opportunity of planners to use their expertise in influencing planning commission decisions, federal interests were also served (if we assume them to be basically congruent with planners in support of public housing and slum clearance). The relative power of business groups can be more fully appreciated in the discussion of political innovation. As such these clients had little control over the way in which the planner applied his technical skills.

During World War II when the interests of both government and industry were almost identical, these clients retained their power to affect the subject matter treated by planners and the interests to be served in the application of these analyses as a basis of decision-making. Hence the interests of both groups was served.

This discussion has consciously avoided the relationship between data collection methods used and the futuristic bent of planning which led to many professional debates over the essential nature of the technical role.⁴⁰ This will be taken up in the next chapter simply because of the time lag between the acceptance of a new role

and the refinement of methodological supports which were necessary to support the new role. In short, planners were beginning to realize the relationship of their technical role, i.e., data collection to that of being a change agent in projecting future uses. Unfortunately, projection techniques still lacked a "scientific" basis through most of this period so this relationship was not fully institutionalized. In this chapter, it would have had few implications in influencing the nature of the professional-client relationship so the postponement of the discussion seems justified.

Institutional Role.--The influence of both local structures and other public institutions related to the planning function in effectuating plans that were realistic or pragmatic has already been elaborated upon to some degree, but a fuller discussion is warranted here. This discussion is seen basically as applying to the semi-independent planning commission structure. It probably could apply to situations where the planning function was located under the executive branch and most certainly in cases where the city-manager's office controlled the planning function but the reasons for this would be different in each case.

The crucial point here is that the institutionalization of the planning function spelled the death of utopian thought in the expression of plans. This statement is a truism given that planning clients ceased to motivate their actions on the basis of idealism years ago, but the implications of this are best stated by Rabinovitz as follows:

In the elimination of utopias (utopian thought), the planner loses a source of influence over the modification and improvement of a city's environment. The creation of new alternatives can provide a mechanism for bringing about political integration and increasing the capacity for action.⁴¹

Not only were utopian plans seen as being outside the realm of feasibility, the feasible alternatives had to rate somewhere between the interests of the federal government and those of the business-dominated planning commissions. With the federal programs defining the focus of attention of the planner and the commission's views determining the chances of implementation, it is easier to see how these interests circumscribed the ability of planners to propose solutions to problems in plans. In addition, these influences belie the technical capability of planners to use the norms of objectivity, political neutrality, and selflessness in formulating solutions: parts of the solution were preordained.

This condition held true in the World War II years where the technical value of functional efficiency was the base from which transportation planning decisions were made. This value, the determining factor in the statement of client interests, is only one of many values that may be used in proposing a circulation system. The exclusive pre-eminence of this value here represents a bias. The only difference between such planning and that performed during the depression was that there were two clients with interests supporting different values.

Other institutional norms also permeated the occupational setting which influenced the nature of planning activities. Prime

among these was the demand that plans and programs reflect fiscal reality as limited by the financial resources of the municipalities and those monies provided through federal sources. With the latter type of funding, projects were necessarily selected in accordance with federal interests and in the former case the planning commissions and local legislative bodies held the purse strings. In either case improvements proposed in plans had to satisfy at least one set of these interests.

Not only did such demands limit the ability of planners to propose solutions in accordance with needs determined through rationalistic procedures; such demands formed the basis of a role demand internalized by planners. In this respect it is only necessary to state that this role demand represents the institutionalization of the operational values of economy and efficiency from the last chapter, but it is also congruent with the New Deal value of good management.⁴²

During both the depression and World War II, it is safe to assume that the client interests served in the institutional realm of activities were those of the federal government. In influencing the nature of the technical role of planners, this seems true for the all-important reason that the government defined the subject matter treated in plans and imposed administrative requirements in terms of the scientific support which had to be used to back up grant applications. Accordingly the development of improved methodologies for analysis can be attributable to these federal influences. During

World War II, the benefit of additional social scientific progress in the elements of the plan emphasized during this period accrued to both clients acting on the basis of nearly identical goals and values.

Education and Political Innovation.--The basis for educative actions as part of the organizational form imposed in the planning commission form can best be understood in reference to one of the originally perceived benefits to be gained from the "apolitical" nature of this structure. In desiring to stay aloof from local politics planners placed themselves in a situation where they assumed both that the political influence of planning commissions would be sufficient to influence public policy and that professional interests would be congruent with those of the commission.⁴³ Given the nature of political reality during these times which led to heated professional debates about the effectiveness of planning during the late 1930's,⁴⁴ there is no reason to think that this was true. (During World War II, the disparity between professional and client interests was not as evident, thus the chances for implementation were increased appreciably.) Rabinovitz describes the professional's role vis-a-vis his clients in describing what she calls the "trustee orientation": Since a civic elite was to use the planner as an adviser who would implement planning proposals in accordance with the general interest, planners themselves could follow viewpoints which were out of harmony with community ideas. Such a posture was legitimate not as much because planning theories would not harmonize with community ideas

if citizens had the facts, as because citizens could not be trusted to know their own interests.⁴⁶

With the exclusion of citizen views from the process in having a significant influence on decision-making, a two-way interactive process between the commission and professionals evolved. In situations where planning commissions' values differed from those of the professionals, the chance for effectiveness lay in the professional's ability to influence commission decisions. As described earlier, part of this power could be realized through the manner in which the professional could manage informational flows. Another means, in conjunction with the first, was to utilize the planner's prestige as an expert. As Altshuler explains, expertise is a viable mechanism through which consensus can be achieved.⁴⁵ In situations where planning commission's views were not monolithic, he could adopt the role of the "broker," which is explained by Rabinovitz as follows:

Consequently the planner had to translate his professional skills and knowledge into tools that would direct the flow of choices toward other outcomes. . . . The term (broker) implies that the planner did more than referee the struggles of existing groups. He also sought to pyramid the support of persons he believed could be beneficially added to the mix and to identify the point which they might agree.⁴⁷

As the cite above and others herein imply, the planner, under the semi-independent commission structure, was encouraged to develop salesmanship skills in order to make his plans effective.⁴⁸ The crucial point about the structure, itself, is that it provides a less monolithic decision-making form than when planning is under the executive branch of government and under such monolithic conditions

the planner has no choice but to accept the political norms and ethics of the dominant political elements.⁴⁹ The development of salesmanship skills in the latter form is not as important.

As applied to the historical periods considered here, it is relatively easy to see how these skills developed. In the World War II years, the development of these skills as a point of political-educational leverage of the professional was probably severely limited given the unanimity between the major political interests of the two clients. In the depression when these clients had divergent interests, the planner could act in accordance with one set of interests (those of the federal government) in trying to implement them. This is not to say that success was assured.

It is critical to mention here that the assumption of such a role is consistent with the internalization of a value which was developing in importance during this period, but one which had not found expression in the nature of professional-client relationships considered up to this point of time. Generally stated the value is one which encourages the planner to assume an active function in guiding development.⁵⁰ In previous periods, the technical and institutional roles dominated planning activities and educational-political roles were only assumed outside of the professional-client relationship. Given such a perspective, the basic technical and institutional roles encouraged the professional to develop only his plan-making skills. Under this new set of circumstances, plan-making skills lost importance proportionally to the increased value of

effectiveness which required the adoption of more diversified skills. In earlier times, plan-making, with an almost exclusive technical orientation, had defined almost the total scope of activities in the professional-client relationship. As will be shown in the next chapter, the immediacy of the need for effectiveness increased during the post-war years, and so did planning efforts to broaden the scope of skills demanded.

It must be understood, however, that the type of educational and political activities a planner could undertake were severely circumscribed by the institutional and technical role demands. Planners were imbued with the notion of political feasibility from these demands and thus his salesmanship skills were only useful in seeking very limited political ends, those dictated within the spectrum of interests defined by his clients. As Altshuler contends, not only was utopianism curtailed as a professional thought process, but the planner could only seek to guide development insofar as he didn't stir up controversies. Accordingly, he concludes that a principal component of "good" planning is political success.⁵¹ In both periods considered here where client interests were strong, the efficacy of assuming various educational and political functions was severely curtailed.

Given the relative strength of the technical and institutional roles vis-a-vis the others, it becomes more clear how the planner's value of comprehensiveness was accordingly limited. As the overall area of focus in plans, the comprehensive physical environment

consisting of all identifiable physical elements retained its primacy, but since the planner must necessarily confine his educational and political activities towards the achievement of political consensus on the planning commission, he could never propose plans that gave all alternative solutions due consideration. Altshuler claims that such an orientation undermines the planner's claim to comprehensiveness,⁵² but it also undermines the degree of objectivity with which the planner can apply his rationalistic form of analysis. Since plans had to reflect the interests of the planning commission and in both of these periods these commissions were dominated by business interests, plans and planning activities had to make conscious recognition of this reality in the performance of political and educational roles.

Conclusion

In the introduction to this chapter, reference was made to planners' desires to utilize a comprehensive frame of reference in solving urban development problems. On the basis of that statement, one might interpret the value of comprehensiveness in terms of its archtypical meaning as it relates to systemic theory, yet this was not the concept which was translated into institutional reality during this period. Actually, there are few indications that planners understood this concept aside from its physical dimensions. During this period, planners were still wedded to the philosophy of environmental determinism, one which precludes a systemic frame of reference given its sole focus on the physical environment.

From this perspective, it might be best to conclude that planning was moving toward a state of physical comprehensiveness, but even in doing so some important qualifications must be noted. The meaning of physical comprehensiveness here is that the city was perceived primarily as a physical unit with certain identifiable spatial parts. The job of the planner (his technical role) was to manipulate these parts so as to achieve a "better" whole. Unfortunately the determination of "better" was (and is) not scientific because one perceives only the physical environment. During this period, planners had no way to predict the social consequences of these physical changes.

During both the depression and the Second World War the social and economic purposes of planning were pre-ordained. Public housing, slum clearance, industrial planning, and transportation planning were initiated to meet pre-determined social needs consistent with the values and goals of client interests. That planning was able to expand its scientific base during this period still must be appreciated in terms of its utilitarian acceptance. Not only must the modernization of plan elements be attributed to the stimuli of client interests, but the use of science was pragmatically limited in terms of the purposes it could serve. Such a situation inhibits the development of the values inherent in the scientific method which are oriented toward the use of science for its "pure," experimental value. Even as an applied science, the technical methodologies adopted in planning did not (and still don't) relate back to a cohesive

theoretical framework which justifies their usage. New methodologies were adopted piecemeal to meet externally imposed demands.

Given these qualifications placed upon the meaning of science, it becomes increasingly difficult to accept this concept of physical comprehensiveness as a basis from which to conduct rational inquiries in conformance with the norms of political neutrality, scientific objectivity, and selflessness which most models of professionalization elevate to a position of primacy. In this period, as in the earlier ones analyzed, the use of scientific results in proposing changes was a self-serving process dictated by the pre-ordained ends which surrounded the utilization of science. These ends, dominated by client interests, were the instrumental forces which determined whether or not a plan, or parts thereof, served the public interest. The role of science was proportionally low in making determination, as was the role of professional expertise.

Footnotes

¹Howard, John T., "City Planning as a Social Movement, a Governmental Function, and a Technical Profession," in Harvey Perloff (Ed.), Planning and the Urban Community (Carnegie Institute of Technology: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1961), p. 152.

²Walker, Robert A., The Planning Function in Urban Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), p. 36.

³Ibid., p. 41.

⁴Abrams, Charles, "The Future of Housing," in Jewel Bell/rush and Murray Hauskrecht (Eds.), Urban Renewal: People, Politics and Planning (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 39.

⁵Ranney, David C., Planning and Politics in the Metropolis (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969), p. 40.

⁶Bell/rush, Jewel, "Housing and the New Deal," in Bellrush and Hauskrecht, op. cit., p. 1.

⁷Hofstadter, Richard, The Age of Reform (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1963), p. 167.

⁸Op. cit., Howard, p. 154.

⁹Scott, Mel, American City Planning Since 1890 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 324-326.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 326.

¹¹Op. cit., Walker, p. 37.

¹²Op. cit., Scott, p. 330.

¹³Ibid., p. 332.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 332.

¹⁵Perloff, Harvey S., Education for Planning: City, State and Regional (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1957), p. 16.

¹⁶Op. cit., Walker, p. 41.

¹⁷Op. cit., Perloff, p. 15.

¹⁸Op. cit., Scott, p. 269.

¹⁹ Op. cit., Hofstadter, p. 167.

²⁰ Op. cit., Scott, p. 375.

²¹ Ibid., p. 379.

²² Ibid., p. 388.

²³ Ibid., p. 391.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 378.

²⁵ Weaver, Robert C., Dilemmas of Urban America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 35.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 36.

²⁷ Op. cit., Abrahms, p. 39.

²⁸ Op. cit., Scott, p. 426.

²⁹ Op. cit., Abrahms, p. 37.

³⁰ Altshuler, Alan, The City Planning Process: A Political Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 323. See also op. cit., Ranney, pp. 39-40.

³¹ Op. cit., Perloff, p. 36.

³² I'm assuming the stand taken at the National Housing Conference of 1934 to be indicative of the social priorities of planners. See op. cit., Scott, p. 323.

³³ Ibid., p. 390.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 373.

³⁵ Rabinovitz, Francine F., City Politics and City Planning (New York: Alherton Press, 1969), pp. 8-9.

³⁶ Bair, Frederick M., Jr., Planning Cities (Chicago: ASP0, 1970), pp. 54-55.

³⁷ Op. cit., Altshuler, p. 333.

³⁸ Duhl, Leonard, "The Parameters of Urban Planning," in Donald Hagman (Ed.), Urban Planning and Controls: Problems and Materials (Los Angeles: UCLA Press, 1969), p. B-6.

³⁹ Ibid., as cited in Sanford Anderson (Ed.), Planning for Diversity and Choice (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1908), p. 68.

⁴⁰ Op. cit., Rabinovitz, p. 96.

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 125-126.

⁴² Op. cit., Perloff, p. 36.

⁴³ Op. cit., Rabinovitz, p. 9.

⁴⁴ Op. cit., Scott, p. 376.

⁴⁵ Op. cit., Altshuler, p. 339.

⁴⁶ Op. cit., Rabinovitz, p. 13.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 96.

⁴⁸ Op. cit., Ranney, p. 54.

⁴⁹ Op. cit., Rabinovitz, p. 80.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 13.

⁵¹ Op. cit., Altshuler, p. 356.

⁵² Ibid., p. 357.

CHAPTER VI

THE CONTEMPORARY ERA: THE RESURGENCE OF
SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS VERSUS
MORE PRAGMATIC DEMANDS
(1946-PRESENT)

Introduction

Planning during the post-war period, unlike that conducted in previous years, has been touched by an uncommon number of change proposals consistent with the values and interests of a greater number of special interest groups, all trying to influence decisions made within the process in accordance with their specialized areas of concern and divergent demands. The impetus for such changes has arisen internally, among intellectual circles within the profession, and externally from an untold number of sources consisting of those who had always tried to influence professional activities (e.g., business interests, the federal government, and other professionals) and those groups whose ascendancy must be seen in terms of the unique social reactions to social, political, economic, and environmental developments which occurred during this time period.

If one is forced to characterize the period itself, both in terms of its effect on planning and on government in general, it is

tempting to label this period as the "Era of Social Consciousness." It should be understood, however, that an expanded consciousness or awareness is meant to characterize the state of mind of individuals,¹ not necessarily that of institutions. As in the earlier chapters, the immediate task at hand will be to document the degree to which institutional relationships changed in response to the character of these new social pressures.

It should be recalled that the major hypothesis of this thesis is to determine the efficacy of the myth of professional neutrality. Given this orientation, consideration here will be limited to the effects of contemporary social movements on the occupational environments within public agencies. Hence, the determination of the basis of professional-client relationships and the differentiation of influences upon role performance will be limited to the semi-independent planning commission and the executive form. Thus, advocacy planning will not be treated as an organizational form, per se, but rather in terms of its effects on public agency planning.

Such a limitation is certainly not intended to denigrate the importance of this form of planning. Instead, it reflects a recognition by this writer, and most others who have dealt with the subject, that oftentimes the modern advocate voices outright rejection of the concept of professional neutrality. Depending on the philosophies of individual advocates, the planner might also reject the contention that he is planning in the "public interest" at all.² With other types of advocates, the concept of public interest takes on an

entirely different meaning than that which has developed from its beginnings as a concept embodied in the reformist ideology of the early twentieth century.³

Federal Governmental Values

The federal-local partnership in prescriptive social change, which was first initiated in the 1930's to ameliorate depressed economic conditions, was perpetuated in the early post-war years, a period when the country was experiencing an unparalleled economic upswing. With these changed economic conditions, the rationale for supporting such programs was redefined implicitly in the nature of new programs, and explicitly in terms of official pronouncements whose character changed with the election of different parties in control of the White House.

The first federal legislative act that influenced the fate of planning was the passage of the National Housing Act of 1949. This law reflected the redevelopment emphasis which planners had pushed in the 1940's which was discussed in the last chapter. Adopted in a highly controversial political atmosphere, its enactment was certainly stimulated by President Truman's definition of the federal role in solving urban problems. As cited in Scott's book, Truman considered the bill consistent with the purpose of furnishing technical and financial assistance to municipalities trying to solve their own problems,⁴ but not with the intention of expanding the regulative powers of government to accomplish these purposes.

This purpose, whether real or contrived, had a number of implications for planners, who had hoped to use the bill in a manner in which urban sprawl could be controlled. The provisions of this act do make it clear that the federal government did consider the revitalization of urban centers a priority item for federally-aided actions, a stance not explicitly stated before, but the inferred position of federal neutrality, as described above, precluded the initiation of policies which would centrally confront the problem of sprawl by curtailing the scope of traditional economic freedom. In this sense, the attitude of the federal government was divergent from that of planners who justified the utility of redevelopment in terms of controlling growth, but who would have likely supported a stronger approach to the problem by the federal government.

The only exception to this was in the federal sanction of the use of the power of eminent domain, a legal concept grounded in the ideology of the public regardedness ethic, wherein the "public necessity" to revitalize urban centers, often for mainly aesthetic reasons, is seen to supersede the rights of property owners to use such land in a manner divergent from the public interest. It is crucial here to see the limitations on the use of this legal tool: it was only designed to stimulate the revitalization of urban centers, and without its acceptance the redevelopment concept itself would have been inoperable.

Also implicit in this bill is a recognition of the efficacy of the philosophy of environmental determinism in solving urban

problems.⁵ This is true in regards to both the form of urban renewal sanctioned in the redevelopment emphasis and in the other housing programs sanctioned under this law. The bill also encouraged the formation of metropolitan planning agencies, which was the first federal recognition of this need and also insisted that public improvements be implemented in accordance with local plans.

The basic social philosophy expressed in the bill was similar to that expressed in similar legislation during the depression era. The concept of enhancing the general social welfare, based on the existence of the police powers and the general goal of providing housing in view of its inherent social worth (to both revitalize the city as a human activities center and in filling the void left by private inaction in meeting a basic social need) provided the basic theoretical justification of this bill. The bill did contain provisions insuring that localized perceptions of need would guide the administration of programs, whereas the federal government had defined for itself a more active role in the depression years. In view of this limitation, the bill should be seen only as a reaffirmation of federal responsibility in meeting a new social need, the revitalization of urban centers, with a changed modus operandi whereby local units of government assumed a more active role in defining a program's suitability for the future growth of that local unit.

The National Housing Act of 1954 expressed the same orientation toward prescriptive social change, but the operational criteria expressed in the legislation were again modified. The workable

program requirements of this bill first institutionalized a citizen participation component in renewal and defined more explicitly the expanded role which local governments would play in renewal vis-a-vis the federal government's defined role. In addition, the bill defined the necessity of making renewal efforts consistent with local comprehensive plans. In fact, the existence of a plan became a prerequisite for initiating renewal projects. The bill further fortified planning interests with the "701" provisions which were designed to extend planning services to localities who couldn't afford to maintain their own professional staffs and there were also provisions to experiment with new renewal techniques.

While further increasing local responsibilities for administering these programs, these federal requirements, which fortified the social utility of city planning as part of the administration of these programs, have to be seen, in part, as being reflective of the increased faith of the federal government in the planning process itself, in solving urban problems. Whether this increased faith indicates federal acceptance of the value of comprehensiveness in guiding social action is debatable, but this is, to a significant degree, supportable in view of existing data. The fact that planners were charged with the responsibility of formulating the "701" administrative guidelines and regulations is that point most persuasive in reaching this conclusion. Given this power, the voluminous nature of these guidelines and requirements can be seen to embody the value of comprehensiveness in the preparation of these plans.

Throughout the Eisenhower era, the dominant philosophical frame of reference in regards to the federal role in solving urban problems was maintained as it wasn't until the Housing Act of 1961, under Kennedy, that the social responsibilities of government in dealing were significantly expanded. The reform of FHA lending procedures in response to planners' pleas that its former operations were encouraging sprawl was another explicit recognition of the existence of the sprawl problem. The urban reconstruction programs of the 1950's, whether labelled as redevelopment, urban renewal, or community renewal, may be considered as implicit answers to the sprawl problem in the sense that such programs reflected the desire to limit sprawl by encouraging the reconstruction and revitalization of urban areas, but if this was the federal response to sprawl, it was based on the same naivete common to planning philosophy blinded by environmental determinism: that simple physical reorganization could create a social environment capable of offsetting the trends facilitating sprawl and unabated growth. From such a value base, the role of free market economic interests was not made subject to an additional degree of public regulation.

From this perspective, federal actions to reform FHA lending procedures should simply be seen as a recognition of the problem and a commitment by federal sources to reorient the procedures of this federal institution so as not to facilitate sprawl through its operations. In this sense the reform is consistent with the value of federal government working as a neutral mediator of public and private

actions. The added degree of social responsibility assumed in this bill can be seen in terms of the categorical grants-in-aid for open space, transportation and other community development purposes.⁶

Even by encouraging grants for open space, the federal government was criticized in conservative circles for encouraging local governments to compete with private sources in the acquisition of land. In such a manner, new ground was forged in limiting the unrestricted rights of private economic forces, but this was done by adding to the powers of public bodies rather than further regulating private options.

Subsequent acts passed in 1964 (housing and transportation) further expanded the types of grants offered at the federal level. The availability of these grants had an immediate effect on planning, as will be described in the next section of this chapter, yet beyond this influence, however, these bills were based on the same basic principles as that act passed in 1961. The only attempt in the new bills to curtail private prerogatives at the expense of increased regulatory powers in the public domain was to insist upon the establishment of local code enforcement programs in order that municipalities could receive housing grants. This program, however, did not call for the establishment of new legal principles; it simply called for the utilization of existing ones. In this sense, its major purpose can be seen as increasing the potential effectiveness of federal programs.

Another trend, initiated in 1959, in the shifted emphasis of renewal from clearance to rehabilitation of blighted areas was significant

because this was the first program whose operational philosophy rejected the principal values of environmental determinism. In studying the factors contributing to "blight" it became evident that the causal factors were social and economic in their derivation and that the remedy of blight involved administering to some of these causal factors through the initiation of social planning programs as well as providing physical improvements. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 stands as the first attempt to initiate such programs.

Aside from the increased degree of social consciousness evidenced at the federal level in the realization that physically-oriented programs, per se, were inadequate to solve the problem of urban blight and the increased degree of social responsibility evidenced in government in stimulating social planning programs, the value base of federal action remained unchanged. For a brief moment, the federal government experimented with the principle of self-determination in the initiation of Community Action Programs,⁷ but later efforts to encourage citizen participation (in the Demonstration Cities Act of 1966) fell back in subordinating that value to the goal of program manageability.

Throughout this contemporary period, federal legislation generally was justified in terms of an expanded concept of "public interest" or "social welfare." In literally all legislative action these concepts served to justify provisions whose enactment challenged traditional conceptions of property rights or other values concerning the use of land. It should be stated, however, that value changes

in this period can hardly be considered as radical as those initiated during the New Deal. In the former period, the initiation of public housing programs plunged government into activities which put them in direct competition with private economic interests; in the modern period the federally perceived purpose of simply providing technical and financial assistance had a mediating effect against initiating such changes of broader dimensions.

In increasing the social responsibility as to what needs should be the subject of federal attention, there were few attempts to usurp traditional private prerogatives except in terms of the same values which had carried over from the New Deal era. Granting public bodies the power to acquire land for future recreational use seems to be the only exception to this. The reservation of the power of government to construct and subsidize housing, the reaffirmation of the efficacy of the legal concept of eminent domain, and the federal desire to activate local code enforcement programs all seem to be based on a value that first became dominant during the New Deal: that public regulation of private economic forces was justified in areas where private forces were incapable of meeting substantive demands or in terms of the police power. Most certainly, the federal government has been unwilling to expand either conception of these values so that substantive action might be taken to deal with urban sprawl. It would seem that such action would inevitably curtail private prerogatives while expanding governmental regulatory powers. Such actions were characteristic of the New Deal years, but have not been so evident in the contemporary period.

Another area in which factors facilitating the unabated physical growth and sprawl were attacked by reform interests was in the area of transportation planning. It should be remembered in this respect that the values and practices apparent in this form of planning were most significantly influenced by that form of planning which dominated the World War II planning environment. Therein, the highest priority social value was that of designing road systems to facilitate the efficient movement of people, goods, and services in sustaining the capability of the economy to meet war-related needs. In the contemporary era reformers tried to influence the provisions of federal legislation on transportation so that such planning would not necessarily facilitate growth irrespective of the social influences of growth and also from a generalistic ecological perspective.

The 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act was that which first operationalized the realities implicit in the early post-war transportation planning experience. As such, it was exclusively oriented toward the facilitation of automotive transit and made the design of the Federal highway system, in terms of route design and location, exclusively a function of federal priorities. Local and metropolitan planning functions had no role in the implementation phases of this program and hence the reputation of transportation planning as a "single-purpose" endeavor began to build up. A wide variety of planners opposed the passage of this act on two grounds: first, on the basis of how such planning would facilitate sprawl and second, the lack of coordination between transportation planning and other forms.⁸ The first crimp made in the administration of this act was in making this form

of planning consistent with local plans and providing for the continuing cooperation of local and federal transportation planners.

Such provisions were spelled out in the provisions of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 and precipitated a headlong rush into this form of planning at both the regional and local levels. Although these provisions did much to draw transportation planning within the realm of physically comprehensive planning at the local level, they did little to combat the perceived ill-effects of transportation planning upon growth. Statutes passed later, however, did contain provisions aimed at remedying some of the ecological defects endemic to such planning. The Highway Beautification Act of 1965 provided funds to enhance the aesthetic character of these roads and the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966 contained provisions aimed at minimizing soil erosion and sedimentation in road construction.

The most important provision of the 1966 Act was Section 4g, wherein the construction of highway right-of-ways over dedicated parklands and historic sites was prohibited. This was the first provision in which the value of environmental preservation as related to these land uses superseded the operational values of economy and efficiency in determining the route design of the Federal Highway System. In subsequent years, the operational philosophy of transportation planning was further modified in the name of environmental preservation. The 1968 Federal-Aid Highway Act required the scheduling of public hearings on route locations, drawing local opinions more closely into the process in an attempt to discern the local economic, social, and

environmental needs of particular communities affected by this construction. The National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (passed in 1970) required the completion of environmental impact statements before land acquisition and road construction could proceed.

Although such provisions do reflect the subordination of the older operational values to the newer consciousness reflecting ecological values, such reforms seem only to reflect minor concessions to the interests wishing to minimize certain overt forms of environmental destruction evident in transportation planning practices. In confronting the ecological dysfunctions of unabated growth in terms of its influence upon land utilization patterns, it can still be contended that transportation planning is still oblivious to many of the ecological problems associated with its use.

On the practical level, the inability of the federal government to ameliorate the ill-effects of growth in regards to transportation planning can be explained in terms of the same historical trends which pre-conditioned the federal response to growth evident in housing policies. In both cases reform proceeded incrementally, if at all. In the area of environmental preservation, reform has probably been more substantial owing, in part, to a general societal acceptance of important ecological values. When, however, ecological values and social welfare values emphasizing the inherent benefits of standard housing have clashed with the economic values of special interest groups, federal policy has generally been most heavily influenced by the latter.

In the case of both types of policy, the existence of a relatively healthy economy and the relative lack of substantive crises on the scale of a depression or a world war has certainly conditioned the federal response. In this regard, an environmental crisis seems more substantial than a crisis in housing. Environmental reform, while incremental, has been continuous with now, for the first time, the federal government is moving towards the encouragement of alternate modes of transit through the passage of the Urban Mass Transit Assistance Act of 1970. The urgency for environmental reform seemingly remains constant at this writing and hence further reforms can probably be anticipated.

On the other hand, housing reformers have not fared so well. In the late 1940's and throughout the 1950's, the economic boom which affected the housing industry certainly must be seen as a reason why these interests could maintain their political clout in limiting allocations for public housing. In 1959, the public housing program was emasculated by these interests with the aid of two presidential vetoes. With a temporary rebirth under subsequent Democratic administrations, in the early 1960's, this program has been halted under the Nixon administration. When the plight of public housing is considered from such a perspective, it is easier to see why bolder actions such as those which might be necessary to combat the problem of urban sprawl have not been even seriously contemplated. The health of the economy undercuts the ability of liberal political forces to create the image that there was a substantive need for such programs.

With conservative forces dominant in the post-war political environment, the federal role of bolstering local capabilities to deal with land use problems, through grants and the expansion of public powers (to the limited degree to which these powers have been expanded), is testimony to both this increased degree of a conservative clout in defining the nature of political reality at this time by chipping away at the remnants of New Deal policies and at the ideology of welfare capitalism in general. Although these forces were not powerful enough to challenge the New Deal assumption that a strong federal role in administering any social needs is necessary, they certainly played a major part in defining the character of the response to such needs and the priorities with which these problems were dealt with.

Scientific Values

Since the early 1940's, the degree to which planning was considered to be a science, i.e., the degree to which the norms of scientific objectivity, political neutrality and selflessness were perceived to dominate the performance of technical roles, became a question of professional concern. Before this period, the use of any social scientific methodology was generally conceived as being synonymous with living up to the ideal of utilizing value-free social science to increase the rationalistic base of planning analysis. After the 1940's, with the introduction of projection techniques so that future needs could be more rationally determined,⁹ this claim could have been extended except that it was during this period that

planners and critics of the profession were trying to reveal the scientific limitations inherent in the social scientific methodologies being utilized.

One of the most scathing criticisms was levelled by Catherine Bauer Wurster in her 1950 address to the AIP Convention.¹⁰ By challenging the principles of the philosophy of environmental determinism, which relegates the use of all social scientific data to the use of determining only the future needs of physical elements, she demanded that planners develop methodologies to realize the social and economic consequences of their plans. In the late 1950's, when criticisms of the renewal process abounded in terms of the social dislocation which was a general by-product of the process, the urge to uncover relationships between physical and social change was renewed.

Scott makes it quite clear that the realization of this scientific inadequacy had its greatest influence outside of the occupational environment, in academic institutions.¹¹ The work of Otis Dudley Duncan, Amos Hawley, and the University of North Carolina Planning Department in the late 1950's and 1960's was aimed at correlating city size with the ability of municipal governments to provide essential public services at reasonable costs, was one direction research took. The development of theories and studies in the field of environmental psychology is a more recent reflection of the desire to utilize social scientific methodologies to study the inter-relationships between design and social behavior and interaction and to plan social relationships on the basis of these analyses.

Other new methodologies have found expression in the occupational environment since World War II. The limited use of systems science, cost-effectiveness analysis, and PPBS is probably attributable to their prohibitive costs, but other tools such as PERTing and Gant Charts have gained widespread use because of the lack of such costs, the inherent simplicity of their application (their use does not require a superordinate amount of specialized knowledge), and their utility in structuring administrative norms in conformance with those institutional norms which had high priority ratings in the occupational environment since the 1920's and 1930's: efficiency and economy.

The use of such tools and the anticipation of the use of more sophisticated methodological technologies might lead in a number of new directions in changing the values of planners as both technicians and administrators, yet none of which can be documented in lieu of the lack of application and study thereof.

One likely implication, central to the assumptions under which these tools have been developed, can be hypothesized with some certainty, however: their use should lead to the incorporation of systems (as opposed to systemic) values in both technical and institutional role demands, i.e., conceiving of technical projects and the administration of these projects and the general operations of public agencies themselves as processes rather than the cumulative results of day-to-day activities. This is not to say that such a value is not already a commonplace belief implicit in the institutional and technical norms

of most public agencies, but rather that the use of such tools could solidify such a value to a degree not possible (or probable) without their use.

The Values and Influences of Ad Hoc Social Movements

The ascendancy of the civil rights movement and other diverse forms of urban unrest in the 1960's, although possibly having major effects on the socio-political attitudes of individual planners, at least to the extent that the mode of advocacy planning became established, had few identifiable effects on the institutional processes of government or the planning function itself. The one notable exception to this would seem to be the increased emphasis now placed on citizen participation. The significance of this new trend is certainly of central importance to this thesis because during this contemporary era, private groups representing divergent social interests tried to gain access to some of the decision-making controls within the process.

Before initiating the discussion on participation, it is necessary to clarify the history of this phenomenon as part of the process and, to a lesser degree, to explain the history of planners' commitment to its incorporation into the process. Needless to say, the derivation of the "need" for the participation of private citizens in the process beyond their presence on planning commissions and their attendance at public hearings has been a relatively recent one. The demand for participation was first institutionalized as part of the

workable program requirements of the National Housing Act of 1954. Previous to this there is little evidence to suggest that planners even perceived it as a responsibility to work with citizens other than in their normal course of interaction between themselves and the commission and other public information functions an agency might have performed.

With the newer emphasis on community organization strategies and with the nearly concomitant emphasis on realizing change to benefit the expressed interests of specific segments of the population, the process was (and is) ill-prepared to accommodate such demands, given the influence of the public-regardedness ethic in shaping the form of institutional outlets for citizen participation and involvement. The situation is further complicated by the reality that some of these groups based change proposals on values which were strictly in conflict with those embodied both within the process and common to the profession itself. The basic contradiction seems to be that many of these groups act on the basis of the belief that their interests are given few expressions in the process and that hence they must achieve power (political power) to gain their ends.¹² As has been explained earlier, the process, through its estrangement from partisan politics and its orientation for planning the city as a unified unit, finds it hard to accommodate the demands of specific groups given the role of both political and bureaucratic feasibility in setting limits on the type of changes which can be realized.

The assumption that "have not" groups can achieve change in their interests, in part through increasing their ability to compete equally in planning decision-making bodies, is basic to the attitudes of most advocate planners as is revealed by Lisa R. Peattie as follows:

The concept of advocacy planning can only be understood in the context of the management of American cities. . . . The shift (of decision-making powers) from poetics to expertise changes the rules of exercising power as well as the structure of effective power. The result may entail a loss of equity, since it can be well argued that those at the bottom of the system--those who are, through lack of educational and technical sophistication, particularly ill-prepared to deal with the presentation of issues in a technical framework.¹³

If one of the basic purposes of advocacy is to make available the services of professionals to "have not" groups who haven't been able to compete with others in planning decision-making forums, the political role of the advocate becomes similar to that of the legal advocate. As Marshall Kaplan states,

His role is to defend or prosecute the interests of clients. The planning advocate links resource and strategy alternatives to objectives and joins issues at the request of clients when others' interpretation of the facts overlook, minimize, or negatively affect his client's interests.¹⁴

Given these basic directions in advocacy planning and the corresponding high priority given by advocates to the value of social justice, advocacy planning and, to a degree, other movements utilizing less radical strategies for change, have given impetus to the rebirth of a new form of the private-regardedness ethic, that ideology which was used to justify the status quo in the early twentieth century. The most basic similarity between these movements is the value placed on the concept of "representativeness," i.e., that the basis of policy

formulation should be amenable to serving the divergent interests of many social elements of the population.¹⁵ Needless to say, the modern concept of social justice is not paralleled in the earlier period. The values of a social Darwinistic philosophy had precedence earlier, whereas in the contemporary era give credence to many tenets of Marxism and other radical philosophies.

It should be noted that it is not my intention to hypothesize a general value framework for these contemporary social movements. As many observers have pointed out, these diverse groups are not unified with a common ideology and the range of values adhered to by different groups can be seen in itself as being a unique facet of the general movement for social reform in this period.¹⁶ On a political level, however, the value differences of these groups vis-a-vis other political groups can be generalized as placing less importance on the sanctity of property rights and thusly elevating the importance of racial equality, a clean environment, free speech, or whatever the cause a group wishes to pursue. Since this movement has established few lasting organizational forms through which the proponents of such causes interrelate, a more detailed explication of common values would become highly speculative. Suffice it to say that in the general name of social justice, as conceived through the eyes of the beholders, this movement has arisen in this time period to become a competitive force in influencing both social legislation at all levels of government and in trying to change the social orientation of various public

and private institutions. Its success, or lack thereof, will be detailed in a later section of this chapter.

Planning Values

The post-World War II years, more than any other period in planning history, has been marked by an increased amount of professional introspection concerning the societal role of planning as a vehicle through which social change could be realized. From the beginning of this period, the image of the planner as a pure technician whose defined area of expertise is in manipulating certain physical relationships of the behavioral environment consistent with the precepts of environmental determinism has been assailed and revised by a number of professional groups seeking to define new emphases for the profession.

One of the most basic stimuli of such criticisms was the social tenor of the times which elevated new issues to positions of importance and made feasible the redefinition of old issues. The post-war economic trends that led to a degree of sprawl unforeseen in earlier years, the perceived failure of urban renewal in the late 1950's and early 1960's, the migration of blacks to urban centers to a degree where interrelationships between planning, race, and poverty could no longer be ignored, and the general dissatisfaction with the social change orientation of public institutions, in general, growing from the "new left" critique of contemporary society in the late 1960's all spawned new responses to perceived deficiencies of

different orders of magnitude. Given the limitations of space and time, these new change orientations will be commented upon somewhat superficially here, with a more detailed consideration being given later of those social change philosophies which had tangible effects on the nature of professional practice. Advocacy planning summarized previously in this context will not be dealt with again herein except to place its evolution in a historical perspective relative to the other forms considered.

One of the first professional reactions to the booming suburban growth and sprawl in the post-war years was to renew efforts to construct new towns. Such a solution to regional growth problems was consistent with planning's heretofore exclusively physical orientation towards social change. A statement encouraging their creation was presented at the 1950 AIP Conference justifying their utility in terms of increasing both the economy and efficiency of both circulation patterns and land utilization patterns.¹⁷ The statement also made it clear that the problem was essentially regional in character and in essence called for a national urban growth policy.

This statement was important for a number of reasons. First, its conceptualization as a regional problem was reflective of a much more cohesive theoretical orientation toward the problem than was evidenced a few years earlier when planners threw their support behind the concept of redevelopment. Unfortunately it is impossible to tell whether this latter concept was promulgated out of faith in the concept itself or for reasons of political pragmatism.

Scott contends that the new towns policy statement also represents a negative reaction to the more incremental approach of influencing amenable land use patterns through the normal use of the common implementation tools¹⁸ and, in general, represented a fresh perspective for looking at urban problems after a long period in which change proposals were imposed upon the profession by government. Yet, still, whereas this statement does represent a new direction, it doesn't seem to reflect a willingness to challenge the basic values which spawned such growth in the past or were perpetuating it; it simply reflects a statement of the optimal physical relationships to be realized through its implementation.¹⁹ It should be noted, however, that its acceptance does reflect the assimilation of values within the profession that did constitute a threat to the unabated growth orientation evidenced earlier; this is implicit in its conceptualization of a regional problem.

Another issue, raised for the first time in the early 1950's, concerned the redefinition of the scope of city planning. John T. Howard²⁰ and Henry S. Churchill²¹ led conservative forces in affirming the primarily physical emphasis of the profession. It should be understood, however, that in addition to rejecting notions of "developmental" planning,²² economic planning and social planning, conservative planners also rejected the notions that fiscal planning and the conservation of natural resources were also definable professional concerns. Scott asserts that conservatives held sway in the profession in response to proposals for redefinition in the early 1950's.²³

Although the redefinition of planning to include economic and social development was not carried through the AIP until the mid-1960's,²⁴ its importance in the early 1950's should not be underrated. A common value statement justifying the reaffirmation of the physical emphasis was that planners would be exceeding the limits of their professional competency in expanding the professional domain.²⁵ This argument ignored the supposed responsibility of planners to understand the social and economic consequences of their plans, another hot issue at the time.

Such arguments were reflective of a narrowly defined emphasis of planning, i.e., comprehensive physical land use planning whose conceptualization precluded the use of the word "comprehensive" on more than the physical level. As Gans states,

Traditional comprehensive planning was (and is) neither comprehensive nor planning as I define it. It was not comprehensive because it dealt only with certain spatial aspects of the city, and ignored many of the economic processes, and almost all of the social, cultural, and political processes. It concerned itself with space but not with people or social groupings, with the location of facilities but not with what went on inside these facilities; with land values but not social values. Instead, it was an attempt to create an ideal urban environment through the advocacy of a set of preordained solutions which put together made up the master plan. Among the most important of these preordained solutions were the separation of land uses by zoning; the mixing of house types and densities in residential areas; the creation of physically bounded and school-centered neighborhoods. . . .²⁶

What Gans was trying to encourage was a form of planning which first gained influence within the profession in the late 1950's, i.e., policy planning. As a divergency from the traditional technical norms of planning, plans were to reflect consensually determined goals,

objectives, and policies of the planning population not only in regards to physical development, but also on matters of social, economic, and environmental development.²⁷ Such an orientation countered the trend orientation of planning wherein the plan was merely a reflection of needs as determined by the various projection techniques being used at the time. The trend orientation was defended in professional journals in terms of its objectivity,²⁸ whereas policy planning can be seen as making planning more responsive to human needs. This dichotomy is, of course, simplistic, but it is actually reflective of more significant value differences. The assertion, by policy planners, that the future urban environment should be shaped by public preferences, contrasts with the fatalism inherent to the trend orientation philosophy. Accordingly, liberal critics have assailed the trend orientation as prediction of what will be instead of shaping what can be.²⁹

The exclusively physical emphasis was again brought under fire during this period in the widespread criticism of the urban renewal process in the early 1960's. Relocation procedures and the general influence of social dislocation through renewal³⁰ probably influenced the politically determined direction of the process from clearance to rehabilitation in the establishment of the Community Renewal Program in 1959. In any event such criticisms pointed to identifiable deficiencies in the exclusive physical focus, and shortcomings in using methodologies short-sighted in terms of their blind adherence to environmental determinism.

In 1965, a proposal to amend the central purpose of planning as stated in the AIP Constitution was presented at the national conference in St. Louis. Although action on it was delayed until 1967, its proposal, per se, reflected the increased pressures which had built up within the profession for reform over the preceding ten year period. As it was adopted in 1967, it reflected the aspiration of members for a comprehensive planning approach in which social development and economic development were integral with but not independent of physical development.³¹ Hence, the acceptance of a much broader concept of "comprehensiveness" became reality on a profession-wide scale.

Previous to the acceptance of this reform, however, planning practices were being criticized by the theorists of advocacy planning who were interested in changing not only the emphasis within the process but the process itself. Taking the views of policy planners to heart, advocacy theory elevates the importance of public preferences concerning future urban development and accordingly de-emphasizes the rationalistic inputs to planning decision-making. Called "pluralistic planning," Davidoff expresses its basic principles:

Where plural planning is practices, advocacy planning becomes the means of professional support for completing claims about how the community should develop. Pluralism in support of political contention describes the process; advocacy describes the role performed in the process.³²

Advocacy planning with this explicit political focus extends that value of policy planning, i.e., that the cityscape should be

changed in conjunction with both professional and public priorities, and denigrates the importance of the professional in lending only technical inputs to the process.³³ Peculiarly, this conforms to the professional ideals of the physical land use planner who sees his client as the planning commission or the "public interest" and his role as that of a technician. The advocate explicitly recognizes his client as the group or constituency whose interests he is advocating. The policy planner, on the other hand, combines his personal perception of the public interest with that of the public groups he works with in determining the final character of the plans. Only in this latter form of planning can "planning interests," i.e., those goals, objectives, and policies deemed worthy by the professional, gain status as interests to be served through the process.³⁴

Another important new concept introduced in advocacy theory is the redistributive value placed in working for the public interest. Simply stated, the public interest is to be realized solely in terms of reducing social and economic inequalities or concentrating professional efforts on the attainment of a level of services equal to those offered to other groups.³⁵ Although this concept has not been instrumental in the determination of public agency projects to date (except maybe in the Model Cities Program), it does retain this potential.

At the present time, new values and concepts abound, promulgated by various interests within the professional sphere; "humanistic" planning, natural land planning wherein land is valued as a resource rather than as a commodity, social planning, and various

other titles followed by "planning" and combinations thereof all constitute proposals whereby the essential scope of planning is to be changed by elevating the importance of new values in contrast to the old orientation. In this state of flux, future directions seem uncertain but the future will determine, if nothing else, the ability of professionals to modify the focus of the profession on their own terms rather than in ways consistent with the motives and intentions of more powerful social forces. In the earlier years of planning history, up to this contemporary period, external social influences and social movements did seem to have the most apparent influence in changing the focus of professional practice.

Client Relationships

Whereas planning in previous periods, with some notable exceptions, generally could be thought of as a progressive force in society, involved intimately with reform-oriented social movements, its role in the contemporary period, as practiced in public institutions, has come to be associated with some of the more conservative elements of the social structure. This shift can be seen as somewhat inevitable since the norms which guided institutional activities were not changed to embody the values and value priorities of new social movements arising in the 1950's and 1960's. Like most public institutions, the two basic operational values of economy and efficiency were not sufficiently flexible into incorporate the "human" values promulgated by the more progressive social groups.

Nowhere was this more obvious than in the case of urban renewal. For a number of years in the late 1950's and 1960's the renewal process came under criticism for a number of reasons. The primary one concerned the social dislocation caused through relocation procedures. Gans has stated that in these years only one and a half percent of renewal budgets were commonly allocated for relocation costs and that the procedures were hardly administered successfully.³⁶ Given the intensive costs of acquisition, disposition, and clearance in such projects, such a low priority placed upon relocation was almost predictable. In terms of the operational values which served as criteria by which the process could be completed efficiently, such values were of paramount importance relative to social welfare values.

A value conflict common to renewal and the planning process in general during this period was in basing the determination of projects on their worth to the city as a whole. This concept of the public interest which was the central justification for non-residential renewal projects and most major redevelopment projects was directly in conflict with those of groups who confronted the process with values supportive of a modernized private regardedness ethic. Such groups tried to maximize their own perceived self-interest on the basis of a redistributive concept of the public interest and for the most part when conflict arose, differences were basically irreconcilable.

It is the contention of this analysis that planning role demands remained basically constant in regards to the groups who structured these roles from the last chapter. One notable exception

here, however, was the increased status of planning interests realized through the formulation of administrative guidelines and regulations through which various pieces of federal legislation and programs were implemented. These guidelines most certainly had monumental effects on the day-to-day activities of professionals since they prescribed the methodologies utilized in the completion of major plans and programs. They also complemented the "projectitis" orientation of this era.

The power to frame these guidelines in the hands of planners should not be underrated and it is this power which basically changed the professional-client relationship. With this power, planners now define the substance of the technical role while the government, through legislation, still defines the form, i.e., the range and scope of projects to be undertaken.

Accordingly, business groups, however, retained their power over the implementation phase of the process and hence maintained their determinative role in influencing the degree and nature of political innovation realized through planning. On the overt political level, such forces were able to debilitate public housing both in the federal legislature and at the local level. In a less obvious manner their economic position in central business districts was potentially fortified in the undertaking of non-residential renewal. Such a position of importance was evident in both semi-independent planning commissions and planning within the executive branch of local government.

On a theoretical level, the introduction of goals and policy formulation into the process also threatens to change this relationship between client groups somewhat. Depending on the degree of specificity of consensually determined policies, the benefactors of the process might change to further increase the power of planning interests. This would be true if the professional had rapport with the group formulating such policies. In any event, policy planning, as discussed earlier, adds to the potential by which "planning interests" (whatever they may be perceived to be) can be more accurately reflected in plans. When planning is performed under the executive branch of government, policy planning is of little utility given the subordinate-superordinate relationship between professionals and politicians.

The analysis in the next section of this paper will make it clear that the values and interests of reform groups have been slighted within both the commission and the executive planning institutional forms. As should be shown, the power potential of these groups is somewhat less than that of planners themselves, since there are fewer institutional outlets to make their power effective than for the professional. In both cases, the type of power commanded is derived from their moral (or technical) authority.

Professional Roles and Role Demands

Technical and Institutional Roles.--The performance of technical functions for commissions changed in a number of ways: some consistently with technical trends that had been building up over the

years, others through the introduction of new methodological technologies, and still others through the enactment of new legislation. One basic characteristic, fundamental to planning during the New Deal and World War II remained constant, namely, the federal role in determining technical needs, at least in terms of defining the subject matter of programs.

The most obvious manifestations of the federal influence were legislated through the Workable Program Requirements and the guidelines under which "701" plans were prepared. Both emanating from the National Housing Act of 1954, each form of legislation had different effects. The Workable Program Requirements facilitated the trend away from the preparation of the master plan as the major technical function toward a more diversified function which required skills in the performance of more varied tasks, especially those related to the implementation component of the process. Scott has tagged this trend as increasing "projectitis,"³⁷ which reflects the practitioner's new found concern with integrating the plan in a vague sense, into specific tasks all related to the completion of major projects. Obviously the management of projects requires both technical and administrative skills and in a survey of planning directors' attitudes in 1954 a majority of responses reflected the need to employ planners with such skills, and if possible, a knowledge of municipal finance.³⁸

The administrative (sic institutional) implications of this orientation will be discussed accordingly, but on the technical level

this orientation required the ability to conceive of projects as totalities and to pre-plan all activities leading up to completion. As such, it reflected the institutional demand for efficiency and the introduction of rational management techniques followed closely after this demand had been established.³⁹ Its major technical effect seems to have been to impose a "process" orientation (rather than a task orientation) upon the planner. Oftentimes this process orientation was in accordance with federal administrative guidelines framed by planners.

In previous years, skills related solely to the preparation of plans were those most marketable, and whereas specialists had been continuously employed in the past to accomplish those skills which required a specialized education, this trend was intensified under the modern influences. From this frame of reference, the project orientation is consistent with the demand of hiring "generalists" with a specialty, the aim of most graduate level professional education programs. The adoption of such an orientation in the educational institutions in the post-war years was to provide a sense of functional integration between such institutions whose purpose, in part, is to be met in the occupational demands of the labor market.

The technical influence of the "701" guidelines can be seen as contributory to both the standardization and elevation of the data needs required in performing technical duties related to the preparation of plans. As a look at any HUD guidelines book reveals, the list of data gathering categories has multiplied appreciably since those

utilized when planning first sought to make use of social science in the early twentieth century. Accordingly, "701" plans cannot be completed without an exhaustive consideration of physical, social, and economic relationships within a community, consistent with the desires of planners. Aside from conforming to the demand that technical functions be carried out from a rationalistic frame of reference instead of using scientific influences for their utilitarian value as was characteristic of earlier periods, the requirement to use various projection techniques is indicative of the desire to bridge the gap between the collection of data and its actual input to the plan in defining the character of future social and economic relationships. As alluded to earlier, the introduction of these techniques were justified in terms of the value of providing a rationalistic basis for projecting future needs. Such methods are preferred in terms of their objectivity relative to the alternative of projecting future needs in accordance with some personal-professional estimate of these needs.⁴⁰

One can easily contend that both of these sets of demands, especially those leading to the project orientation, were consistent with the unstated value of molding planning into a set of activities with a shorter-range impact on the urban environment than was conceived by the early planners. The project orientation and the increasing rationalistic basis by which decisions could be made is consistent with the activities of other departments of local government. Hence plans have become less ideal conceptions of the future and more

"realistic" in the sense that they are more predictive, i.e., trying to foresee and order what will happen instead of trying to shape the urban future in terms of predetermined conceptions. Accordingly, plans then can become the basis for meeting short term needs as stimulated through federal grant programs. As such this orientation further facilitates the establishment of functional interrelationships between planning institutions and other public institutions at the municipal and federal levels.

It seems almost repetitious to point out that the semi-independent commission was not established to meet such modern needs. Its institutional purpose was to isolate the planning function from political decision-making and to limit interaction between professionals, political actors, and the body politic as a whole. Accordingly, plans were to be long-range in nature and could reflect a more idealized perspective. In this respect, policy planning, a means through which goals, objectives, and policies could guide the preparation, stands as the planner's answer to avoid complete entrapment by this "realistic" orientation. By formulating such criteria to guide the plan, the trend orientation (trends can be good and bad) could be countered. Policies planning inherently elevates the efficacy of determining future development patterns through conscious choice rather than submitting to the direction of trends which are seen as being all-important and immutable to human influences. Since the task of formulating and approving policies was most often a task that fell upon the professional working with either the commission or a

similarly appointed citizen body, those values reflected in the policies could be expected to be those of planners or those consistent with the preferences of those making up the citizen group, or a combination thereof.

Conversely, planning in the executive branch of government, an institutional arrangement which was adopted in some cities after the war, was more suited to the short-range project orientation. Familiar arguments in support of this contention have been forwarded by authors such as Ranney, who contends that the lessened social distance between the professional and politicians has generated a trend characterized by a short-range approach.⁴¹ Accordingly, the federal grant-in-aid program made available the means to implement public improvements, i.e., visible evidence of planning which has a political value.

Another argument common to both critics and supporters of this institutional form is that plans, projects, and policies formulated under such a system will inevitably reflect the priorities of the executive in power or those of the special interests groups to whom he owes allegiance. Accordingly, the technical objectivity from which plans are conceived will be compromised and even sacrificed in achieving the added likelihood for the implementation of plans. The political implications of this statement will be explored in the discussion of the appropriate roles, but on the technical level, the project-oriented demands toward "realistic" solutions should be evident in both institutional forms in one case subject

to the judgment of the commissions and in others subject to the preferences of the executive. In either case the ultimate technical function seems to be best described by Altshuler who states, "The expert's job strictly speaking is to measure the effects of action possibilities on variables. His technical conclusions can do no more than to provide a factual basis for non-technical judgments."⁴²

Accordingly the existence of the planning within any institutional hierarchy which insists that plans and programs are operational as determined through political processes cannot even pretend to change urban forms, i.e., social reality, solely on the basis of the unbounded utilization of rationalistic methodologies.⁴³ The relativity of operationalism precludes such a usage.

Planners have come to realize that not all of their technical duties can be accomplished through strict adherence to the professional norms of political neutrality, scientific objectivity, and selflessness.⁴⁴ A survey of planning directors conducted by Rabinovitz and Pottinger reveals that an overwhelming percentage of directors see the inevitability of integrating policy advice and value judgments with their technical recommendations and hence recognize the obsolescence of the wholly technical orientation.⁴⁵ The survey interviewed directors of agencies of both institutional types.

Educative and Politically Innovative Roles.--With the commission form of government, institutional outlets remained constant in allowing the professional to manage the flow of information, that body

of knowledge, in part, which would be utilized as the basis for decisions to be made. Accordingly the development of salesmanship techniques carried over from the previous period. In Adams' survey of 1954, the respondents (planning directors) confirmed this need in the professional repertoire along with that for public speaking skills.⁴⁶ Since it is next to impossible to draw the line as to what salesmanship skills constitute educative roles, and what constitutes political innovation, I will defer from imposing such a distinction and let the reader decide.

It is extremely important to note that most authors agree that in undertaking such roles two preconditions must be met. First, the planner must perceive his basis of both personal and professional judgment, as being desirable for the community, i.e., he must have a conscious goal of effectiveness or he must feel he has a stake, a professional interest, in the types of plans and programs implemented.⁴⁷ Second, he must utilize his prestige within the process as an expert to convey the desired information.⁴⁸ This second statement is necessary because it relates to the manner in which the commission honors his claims as being legitimate. As stated in the last chapter, his ultimate degree of success and the proper choice of the role he assumes then depends on the degree of political unification or fragmentation which exists on the advisory body.⁴⁹ The more unified the commission's view, the less activist the professional should become, since he would have less chance of influencing the successful outcome of decisions.

In the contemporary period, the institutionalization of goal and policy formulation increased the opportunity for planners to influence such changes. In the previous historical period these opportunities were limited to his ability to influence zoning decisions, his presentation of data to the commission in the preparation of the plan, and in the determination of project priorities with the commission. With policy planning, the planner would seem to have the opportunity to influence such decisions in more overt ways. Given the subject matter involved (goals and policies necessarily represent subjective judgments), there would need be less structured relationships between his recommendations and the ultimate decisions made.

Melvin Webber⁵⁰ and others contend that given such circumstances the planner has come to be a political actor in the process. Yet given the institutional means of decision-making, he can hardly be considered as an equal partner with the planning commission members in determining the final character of plans and policies. Since his access to influence seems to be dependent on his established identity as a technical expert, he is precluded from engaging in activities which betray this image unless he feels the determination of an issue warrants him risking his job. Needless to say, individual planners, who do feel they have a stake in determining what changes are to be implemented, will draw the line at different places whereby they would be willing to risk their jobs.

If the above delineates the limits of the planner's political influence, this limitation is compounded given his relationship to the commission and the commission's status as an advisory body vis-a-vis the local legislative body. His influence becomes less if he advocates programs based on the redistributive concept of the public interest, a stance which might become more common given the tenor of the times. Notwithstanding the social composition of most commissions who we have seen to represent business or upper-middle class socio-political influences,⁵¹ the "realistic" influences of planning in this period also work against the establishment of such programs as does the legal concept of public interest as is spelled out in various state laws.

The difference between commissions and executive planning is unique in this respect because with the consent of the executive such programs could be initiated. Given this institutional framework, executive policy is the chief determinant of the utility of various planning programs. Even if the planner successfully influences the commission, the commission, in turn, must be convinced of the worthiness of the proposals to the legislative body. In the executive form, with the social distance decreased between professional and decision-maker, executive policy will act as the lens through which the limits of realism will be interpreted. This could be a boon or impose drastic limitations on the type of programs implemented, depending on the nature of executive policy.

One of the most basic reasons for supporting the establishment of the executive form of planning was to increase the power of the professional as a political actor.⁵² It was felt that the director of such an agency, given that his tenure is determined by the discretionary power of the chief executive, could act as an advocate for innovative programs or at least for fuller implementation of plans. Aside from the fact that such directors seldom choose to assume such a role as is revealed in one of Rabinovitz's studies,⁵³ it should be noted that the power potential of the planner, based on his institutional relationship to the executive, would be no greater than that of other department heads or privileged advisors. According to some studies of decision-making in local governments, admittedly those of the so-called elitist school, the power of such advisors is not seen as being as determinative as that of members of special interest groups, especially those groups to which the executive might owe his ability to successfully run for office.

If executive policy is all-important in influencing the values reflected in plans and the priorities reflected in the type of changes implemented, the political character of planning seems self-evident in the way in which the political values of the executive must be considered preferable to others in determining which values will be reflected in plans and programs. Accordingly the values of the commission and the social interests that members represent should be basically congruous with those reflected in those plans. In either case, a consciousness of the limits of the feasibility or acceptability

works against the ideal of reaching decisions through the careful comparison of all values and goals. The political process pre-selects those which it prefers.

In the contemporary period such influences have worked against the interests of the ad hoc social movements of the time and against the realization of planning interests as promulgated by professional change agents. The value placed on the realization of short-term political gains in the executive form and the project-orientation in both forms mediate against the realization of the more long-term benefits that planners might perceive. Accordingly, policy planning may help to maximize planning interests in the commission form but unless these policies are enacted by the local legislative body there is little chance that these policies will actually guide the character of future development. Ad hoc social movements meet the same fate in confronting the political processes. Their values and priorities are not reflected in the business-oriented ideology which rules the political world.

Actually, the power of these groups to influence the decisions made is probably less than that of planners. Public hearings on plans are the only institutional outlets for their dealings with commissions who under no circumstances are bound to actually incorporate these views into plans. Outside of the institutional sphere, advocacy planning and the reversion to conflict tactics to influence the decisions of commissions or legislature have the potential of making it politically uncomfortable to totally ignore these interests, but

given the track record, such tactics are more effective in frustrating plans proposed by public officials rather than leading the establishment of plans and policies in line with the interests of these groups.⁵⁴

Conclusion

The determined role of the federal government to act as a neutral force in combating the evident dysfunctions evolving from uncontrolled sprawl and the concomitant commitment to offer a variety of grants-in-aid for community development did much to predetermine the types of changes which could be realized in ameliorating the character of the urban landscape. The grants, if only because of the financial discounts offered with them, elevated their importance as part of local priorities for determining what projects were to be undertaken. Given the financial potential of municipal governments and lacking the assurances that other programs (e.g., social planning projects) could be financed as easily, other types of programs were of inherently less value to local governments except per chance that a program might be based on the peculiar preferences of a policy-making body.

Co-existing with the federally-determined preferences for change was the strength of conservative political forces facilitated by a relatively healthy economy. On the federal level these forces have had periodic success in weakening the impact of federally-conceived programs whose explicit social purpose was defined in terms of social-welfare values. On the local level, the existence and

profligation of advocacy efforts is testimony to the existence of irreconcilable conflicts of interests between conservative and radical interests.

In response to the federal legislation, i.e., the character of federal programs legislated during this period, local planning institutions have been forced to reorient their value priorities. The project-orientation with its short-range perspective of change and the strengthened emphasis placed on efficiency and economy in the performance of institutional activities elevated the importance of economic values vis-a-vis social values in ordering the effort to decrease only the immediate social costs of blight.

Whereas the provision of grants for public improvements does not seem to favor one social group over another, it may be contended, since such improvements are the most readily implemented, that these programs do serve the public interest. Unfortunately such arguments often neglect the values most pre-eminent in determining which forms of improvements shall be applied for. The determination must at least be somewhat related to this variable. Given the focus of decision-makers, both on commissions and local legislative bodies, it seems rather naive to assume either that the public interest is a prime motivation for their actions or that services are distributed or administered in a manner that equalizes the social and economic benefits to all groups.

It still might be overstating the case somewhat that the power of various business groups to influence planning decisions has been

as powerful in this era as it was in others. Such an assumption might apply up to 1959 when non-residential renewal was curtailed by shifting the emphasis of renewal from clearance to rehabilitation. Until this date, central business district entrepreneurs and the developers of high-rise office and apartment buildings were the main beneficiaries of the renewal process and hence of planning, per se, in that renewal provided the most visible means of changing the character of urban landscapes. Certainly other social groups benefited from these projects more tangentially.

After 1959, the picture is somewhat unclear. During these years, the availability of grants and the limits of desirable change have functioned to delimit the types of valued changes initiated through implementation. Whereas it is certainly clear that "have not" groups have not benefited appreciably from these limitations, it is hard to label tangible benefits accruing to various elements of the business community from such limitations either. Various business groups still retain their power, however, in insuring the lax enforcement of zoning and subdivision regulations and in ordering capital improvement priorities.

Because of this lack of tangible benefits to these groups, it might be tempting to conclude that planning has finally found a way to order priorities for change in accordance with the public interest solely because the power of business groups seems less visible at this time. The problem with this is that it ignores the client power of the federal government, which, as described above,

has stimulated, through legislation, the peculiar focus of change realized through the provision of grants and thereby contributing to creation of pressures for short-range change. As was shown herein, these influences were central in the creation of institutional demands specific to this period. Since these influences are rather pervasive within the process at present, it seems more rational to attribute an increased power to this client, gained at the expense of the business community in determining the direction of change realized through the process.

To date, the modern reformers have had little success in realizing change in their interests. This seems true at least in relation to their power to shape the process in earlier historical periods. As reformers, policy planners have tried explicitly to change the character of values reflected in plans and programs. Even if their efforts are viewed as successful, their influence in directing the focus of change does little to counter the influences which contribute to change the basic character of the concepts of political and bureaucratic desirability which are those dominant in determining the efficacy of any set of policies and goals. Advocacy planning, which is explicitly aimed at seeking change in the directional focus of planning in making more visible the client demands of previously invisible groups, has probably had less success than policy planning to the degree to which the process can incorporate their demands.

Footnotes

¹In this time period it should be made clear that the expanding "consciousness" of professionals was not paralleled by the institutional reforms necessary to reflect this consciousness.

²See Alinsky, Saul D., Reveille for Radicals (New York: Vintage Books, 1967). Alinsky contends that all plans are reflections of the values and priorities of those who produce them and that they necessarily will benefit certain groups more than others, hence his strategy to fight only for the interests of "have not" groups whose interests are slighted in plans.

³Freiden, Bernard, "Environmental Planning and the Elimination of Poverty," Journal of the AIP, Vol. 33, May 1967, p. 161.

⁴Scott, Mel, American City Planning Since 1890 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 463.

⁵Bellrush, Jewel, "Urban Renewal: A Historical Overview," in Bellrush and Hausknecht (Eds.), Urban Renewal: People, Politics, and Planning (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Books, 1967), p. 2.

⁶The expansion of the grant-in-aid programs was continuous through the National Housing Act of 1964.

⁷See Moynihan, Daniel P., Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding (New York: Free Press, 1969) for a full accounting of the perceived inefficiencies of operationalizing this value.

⁸Op. cit., Scott, p. 54.

⁹Chapin, F. Stuart, Jr., Urban Land Use Planning (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970, 2nd Edition), chapters 4 and 5.

¹⁰Bauer, Catherine, "The Increasing Social Responsibility of the City Planner," Proceedings of a Joint Annual Meeting of the AIP, March 3-5, 1950, pp. 11-12.

¹¹Op. cit., Scott, p. 476.

¹²See Alinsky, op. cit., p. 29.

¹³Peattie, Lisa R., "Reflections on Advocacy Planning," Journal of the AIP, Vol. 34, No. 2 (March, 1968), pp. 80-81.

¹⁴Kaplan, Marshall, "Advocacy and the Urban Poor," Journal of the AIP, Vol. 35, No. 2 (March, 1969), p. 97.

¹⁵ Clark, Terry N., Community Structure and Decision-making: A Comparative Analysis (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968), p. 167.

¹⁶ See, for example, Lipset, Seymour Martin, Rebellion in the University (Boston: Brown, Little, Brown, 1971).

¹⁷ Op. cit., Scott, p. 474.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 475.

¹⁹ This statement was not accompanied by proposed policies and hence I am reticent in ascribing a particular social philosophy to it. On the other hand, it is easy to contend that support of this statement must have included some willingness to limit the free-market relationships which seemingly perpetuate sprawl.

²⁰ Howard, John T., "In Defense of Planning Commissions," Journal of the AIP, Vol. 18, Spring 1952, p. 75.

²¹ Churchill, Henry S., "Some Definitions," Journal of the AIP, Vol. 18, Spring 1952, p. 82.

²² See Tugwell, R. G., and Banfield, E. C., "The Planning Function Reappraised," Journal of the AIP, Vol. 17, Winter 1951, pp. 46-49. Deduced from this definition physical planning is considered as planning only spatial relationships, economic planning is planning to facilitate continued growth, social planning is administering to problems of race, crime, unemployment, etc.

²³ Op. cit., Scott, pp. 482-483.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 593-595.

²⁵ Op. cit., Churchill, p. 83.

²⁶ Gans, Herbert J., "The Need for Planners Trained in Policy Formulation," in Erber, Ernest (Ed.), Urban Planning in Transition (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1970), p. 241.

²⁷ See Fagin, Henry, "Organizing and Carrying Out Planning Activities Within Urban Government," Journal of the AIP, Vol. 25, No. 3 (August, 1959), pp. 109-144.

²⁸ See Branch, Melville C., Jr., "Comprehensive Planning: A New Field of Study," Vol. 25, No. 3 (August, 1959), pp. 115-120.

²⁹ See Weber, Melvin M., "Comprehensive Planning and Social Responsibility: Toward an AIP Consensus on the Profession's Roles and Purposes," Journal of the AIP, Vol. 29, No. 4, for theoretical background.

³⁰ Op. cit., Scott, p. 471.

³¹ Ibid., p. 474.

³² Davidoff, Paul, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning," Journal of the AIP, Vol. 33, November, 1965, p. 372.

³³ Op. cit., Kaplan, p. 99.

³⁴ Webber, Melvin M., "The Roles of Intelligence Systems in Urban-Systems Planning," Journal of the AIP, Vol. 31, November, 1965, p. 289.

³⁵ Op. cit., Freiden, p. 161.

³⁶ Gans, Herbert J., "The Failure of Urban Renewal: A Critique and Some Proposals," in Bellrush and Hausknecht (Eds.), op. cit., p. 468.

³⁷ Op. cit., Scott, p. 474.

³⁸ Adams, Frederick J., Urban Planning Education in the United States (Cincinnati: Alfred Bettman Foundation, 1954), p. 8.

³⁹ Such technique used to meet such a demand is the initiation of the Project Evaluation Review Technique (PERT) which has been used in planning since the mid-1960's.

⁴⁰ Op. cit., Branch, p. 117.

⁴¹ Ranney, David C., Planning and Politics in the Metropolis (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969), p. 40.

⁴² Altshuler, Alan, The City Planning Process: A Political Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 338.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 333.

⁴⁴ Wilensky, Harold L., and Lebeaux, Charles N., Industrial Society and Social Welfare (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1958), pp. 298-299.

⁴⁵ Rabinovitz, Francine, and Pottinger, Stanley J., "Organization for Local Planning: The Attitudes for Local Planning: The Attitudes of Directors," Journal of the AIP, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January, 1967), p. 28.

⁴⁶ Op. cit., Adams, p. 8.

⁴⁷ Duhl, Leonard J., "The Parameters of Urban Planning," in Sanford Anderson, Planning for Diversity and Choice (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), p. 68.

⁴⁸ Rabinovitz, Francine, "Politics, Personality, and Planning," Public Administration Review, March, 1967, p. 20.

⁴⁹ Rabinovitz, Francine F., City Politics and Planning (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), p. 30.

⁵⁰ Op. cit., Webber, p. 289.

⁵¹ Op. cit., Ranney, p. 42.

⁵² Op. cit., Webber, p. 289.

⁵³ Op. cit., Rabinovitz, p. 21.

⁵⁴ Op. cit., Alinsky, p. 6.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

With the intent of this thesis aimed at proving or disproving the existence and operationality of the myth of professional neutrality, it should be clear, at least on prima facie level, that during all the historical periods considered herein constraints have been placed on the ability of the practitioner to use solely his professional judgment to propose changes in the urban form of American cities. Professional neutrality, i.e., adherence to the norms of scientific objectivity, political neutrality, and selflessness, is inoperable in the occupational environments of city planners because the nature of planning institutions and the structured inter-relationships between these institutions have subordinated the utilization of technical skills (irrespective of the "neutral" nature of these skills which is another question entirely) to more temporal concerns. Since the planning function was first institutionalized, political priorities have dictated the types of planning actions undertaken. Professional judgment as to how these politically determined considerations are to be administered to, a power that has accrued to planners most noticeably in recent years as a function of the design of administrative guidelines and regulations of federal

legislation, has afforded the profession the ability to institute technical methodologies consistent with professionally valued means. The ends to which the means are applied are still determined politically.

Speaking metaphorically, this inter-relationship between means and ends would be analogous to a situation in the medical profession where the government outlawed surgery or treatment on certain parts of the body. In some cases (e.g., psychosurgery, abortion) public regulations and decisions prescribe socially acceptable means of solving problems, but the end, health, is a professionally defined end. If one is to substitute "orderly growth" for "health," the analogy breaks down. Even if the planning profession had a consensually determined conception of how to achieve orderly growth, there would still remain constant the state of dependency whereby progress toward orderly growth is contingent upon public financial support.

As this definition of purpose through legislation and other public edicts places constraints on the professional's ability, the actual substance of these constraints has been variable subject to changing social and economic circumstances; yet as it has been evident in this analysis, such constraints as they have guided the direction of the profession are only a form of limitation placed on the degree of autonomy with which the professional city planner proposes solutions to development problems. The following summary recaps those most pertinent trends related to the determination of the social change

orientation of city planning as they influenced the structured roles evident in the occupational environment:

Role Relationships

In both the City Beautiful and City Practical periods, before the planning function had been firmly established as part of municipal government, planners had contrasting degrees of technical freedom in defining the scope and the nature of their work. In the City Beautiful era, the scope of plans, i.e., the number of elements included in plans, was certainly a function of the client's interest as it was in the City Practical; yet in the former period, the professional was applying his skills in a manner in which the client had little control (through design) and in a manner which was consistent with the professional's conception of how a city's form should be changed. This was not the case during the City Practical period.

In the earlier period, the professional had the power to express his design preferences in the selecting of the dominant architectural motif (classical) of public buildings, the scale of development of these buildings (monumental), and the design forms which guided both recreational development and the character of proposed street systems.

Such a degree of freedom in the performance of technical roles was not apparent in the City Practical days. The widening scope of plans to include public improvements and various forms of transportation was seen to be a function of client interests and

the inability of planners to extend this scope to include housing and education, except in rare instances, should also be viewed in a like manner. Likewise, the infusion of social science into the technical role, the methodologies of which were not necessarily taught to planners in any form of professional education which had been established up to that point, represented a new direction in the nature of the application of professional skills more related to the verifiable preference of planners to establish planning within government than to any professionally determined realization that the utility of social science within the process had some inherent value that had been lacking in previous years. Additionally, the power of the client to compromise the potential of early zoning ordinances in providing strict provisions in line with the professional concept of how the health, safety, and welfare were to be served is also testimony to the client's power.

In both periods, before planning became a predominately public activity, the professional, acting as a private consultant, had more power in shaping the nature of his technical role than in the later periods. During the modern era (post-1929), the expanding scope of plans clearly reflected client priorities. The fact that housing was introduced as an element of plans is attributable to both the changed social atmosphere which made the discussion of a public role in housing construction and subsidization a more politically acceptable topic than in years previous to the stock market crash. This changed social

atmosphere and the concomitant determination at the federal level to administer to previously untreated social needs (e.g., housing), were necessary pre-conditions for the profession to shift its emphasis and include housing elements as part of plans. Similarly, the modernization of the land use, transportation, and industrial elements of the plan can be seen primarily in terms of federal governmental interests. Accordingly, the trend away from plan-making skills as those which primarily defined the professional's expertise and the shift toward the various types of work associated with the implementation programs undertaken at various times were also functions of the federal stimulus.

For the most part, the changing nature of the definition of professional expertise on all levels--the subject matter plans and programs dealt with, the methodologies used in plans, and the manner of utilization of special skills--was not subject to professional evaluation except in the most reactive sense. Either these changes were accepted and the planner worked happily as a public employee, or they weren't and the professional ceased to play a vital function in the public sector.

Whether the technical roles of planners would be what they are today if the profession had developed a concise theoretical framework of how to identify development problems and how to solve them, is debatable. Lacking this framework common to other professions, even those professions of a public nature (e.g., teaching, social work), the periodic re-evaluation of just what constitutes

technical expertise seems inevitable in this historical period when professionals are now becoming much more introspective about the roles they perform. Yet without a unified frame of reference toward the development of cities in the present, the profession is still vulnerable to other changes imposed by clients which will again shift the emphasis of how technical skills are applied.

The uniqueness of this situation cannot be overstated because given the reality that planners have little control over what technical skills they are to apply, and given the subtleties and still unknown influences which affect the character of urban development, the planner may be considered to have a lesser claim to professionalism than those practitioners in other professions. One of the most basic criteria of professionalism is that the practitioner must monopolize the application of a specific set of skills, but since a consensus of just what skills should be mastered is lacking, it is hard to logically contend that planners have more than a very obscurely defined professional domain in the first place, let alone that they might monopolize the skills that are applied.

Likewise in performing institutional roles, i.e., those necessary to maintain the viability of the professional-client relationship, there seems to be a congruent trend operating concomitantly with the performance of technical roles: the professional's power to define the nature of this professional-client relationship has been lessened. In part, the nature of the institutional structures, i.e., the interactive processes structured therein, play a substantive

role in conditioning the nature of the professional-client relationship, but these structural influences have certainly not been totally determinative. Institutional roles, like technical roles, have been subject to historical influences.

During the city beautiful period, the institutional demand most evident was the limitation of the scope of plans in conformance with client interests. The essential scope of plans, however, i.e., those elements which made the plans characteristically City Beautiful plans, was based on professional preferences. Hence, the professional retained the power to determine a substantive portion of what would be the social change orientation of these plans when he entered into a contract with a private client. In later years, this was not the case.

When planning was first established as a local governmental activity and the operational values of greatest importance were economy and efficiency, these values, while being central to the public-regardedness ethic which stressed the necessity of running government like private businesses and the necessity for planning measures to save the government money, were new to planners. Not only new, these values were almost opposite to those which were functional in the professional-client relationship during the City Beautiful period. As indicated in Chapter Four, the contrast of this practical orientation whereby zoning, subdivision regulations, the adjustment of street rights-of-way to the standards of the automobile, and the provision of sewerage and water facilities became the most valued technical

activities whose purpose was to meet the demands of a major client, local government itself, with the idealistic orientation of the earlier period is obvious. In the city practical period, local government and a variety of business interests had the power to define the social change orientation of plans with minimal professional inputs.

In the modern periods, institutional demands continued to dictate the nature of the technical role demands and essentially still had the dominant power to define the "mutual obligations" of both parties in professional-client relationships. At no time were these institutional demands stronger than during World War II when public agency planners, for all intents and purposes, were advocates for the interests of large industrial enterprises and transportation related industries. Similarly, the short-range, project-oriented focus of the 1950's and the present day can be explained in terms of an institutional atmosphere primarily created by the client.

The degree of importance these institutional role demands play in contributing to the social change orientation of plans and programs can only be appreciated when the situation of planning is compared to that of another public profession. Social work will be used here for the purposes of comparison, but the conclusions drawn are applicable to other professions. The social change orientation of social work is defined through both professional and public priorities. Government may curtail certain programs, alter legal provisions defining the eligibility of consumers to receive a set of social services from

the public agency, and can establish limits of professional behavior which then guide the practitioner in his manner of interaction with the client. In addition, government must approve of the general methodological approach utilized in the professional-client relationship. Obviously these powers are substantive but even given a stringent application of such demands, the professional retains the power to utilize his professional skills in a manner which conforms to his personal image of the role of the professional. He retains the power to define the nature of how individual consumers will be affected by the institutional processes as those services which his agency distributes are partly a function of the interpersonal relationship between professional and client. Hence, his presence, i.e., his professional existence, is itself a variable in the determination of how the social change orientation of the agency will affect consumers. The case would seem similar in education.

Planners have no such power. The application of technical skills is controlled in a setting where the professional has little or no power in influencing the character of the future urban environment without the acquiescence of the planning commission or some legislative or executive body. Professional judgments in planning are always subordinate to public judgments, and hence the planning professional's existence, per se, has a lesser significance as a variable defining the social change orientation of plans. This was found to be the case in all periods except the City Beautiful.

The assumption of educative and politically innovative roles follows a pattern dictated by the nature of the relative importance of the other roles. In accordance with the demonstrated desires of early planners, the design of the structures of the semi-independent planning commissions limited the amount and the character of interaction between planners and politicians. The values which stimulated this design were those of the reform movement of the early twentieth century, especially those of the advocates of the principles of scientific management who insisted that the workings of professionals be immune from political influences. The establishment of civil service was the major means by which these influences were minimized. Almost contradictorily, however, the design of this institutional structure made the implementation of plans dependent on the political status and influence of the commission members. Those political interests and the values of these members have been documented in preceding chapters, yet the inference that the members or the commission itself would have status is itself an indication of who planners wanted to serve. The fact that commissions rarely command such prestige or that the interests of commission members are not always that similar to those of professionals has led to the assumption of varied educational and political roles of the planner.

In the City Beautiful period there were no notable roles of this nature created by planners because, assumedly, the commission members were acting in a manner consistent with professional preferences. All education and political action by planners in this period was

accomplished outside of the professional-client relationship. Such was the case during the City Practical period as planners were scaling down their perception of what changes could be realized through the practical orientation of planning during this period. In the modern period, when the desire arose for effective planning, the development of salesmanship skills (to sell plans to commissions) first became evident and the demand for professionals skilled in such techniques has been a desired trait in the professional repertoire of skills since then. It is important to note that the effectiveness of such skills and strategies is dependent on the planner's ability to manage the flow of information between professional and the lay commission and this in itself imposes limits on the types of strategies which can or could be applied. Through the assumption of these roles planners gained limited access towards influencing the social change orientation of plans, programs, and policies, but hardly to the point where institutional demands could be negated or even be significantly modified. With success the planner can manipulate the specifics of change proposals but success seems also to be somewhat contingent upon the nature of a number of independent variables which the professional cannot control. Hence, the potential of substantively altering the social change orientation of plans is somewhat limited.

The demand for more effective planning, i.e., plans that would be implemented, also led to the structuring of some local planning departments within the executive branch of government. Although this institutional structure is seen as being more advantageous for

implementation by many, the potential for successful political or educational action by the professional is just as limited as with the semi-independent planning commissions. In the executive form, the limits of potential change to be realized through planning is limited by executive policies and priorities. As with the semi-independent commission form, the ability of the professional to weigh all alternative changes equally, rendering judgments solely on the basis of a completely rationalistic, objective methodology, is limited. Client interests simply make some proposals more politically desirable than others and whether the desirability has been determined by the influences of the structural characteristics of the institution or simply by the values of a client group, the types of changes reflected in plans and those changes proposed by the professional in his educational or political actions must always be formulated with political desirability in mind.

Concluding Notes

From the above it should be exceedingly obvious that city planners have never been able to propose changes exclusively as the by-product of conformance to the norms of scientific objectivity, political neutrality, or from a position of selflessness, those norms which are the basis of the concept of professional neutrality. In terms of causality, the institutional environment, structured by values operationalized to serve client interests, pre-ordained the type of change to be realized through the process. The degree to

which the professional was able to function autonomously in pursuance of the norms listed above or any others which the professional values have been severally circumscribed by the types of changes these institutional structures encourage.

Planning at its inception as a social movement in this country was almost exclusively a design profession in which professional judgments were always, to a degree, subjective. In the past years, the design emphasis has been lessening relative to the increased importance of social science. Accordingly, it is possible to project a date when sophisticated methodological technologies will replace in importance the role of behavioral social science, thereby increasing the potential of professional neutrality in the performance of technical roles, but this trend itself, when culminated, will not mean the beginning of an era of professional neutrality unless the institutional environment is changed. Such methodologies certainly have the potential for the realization of rationally determined change but when the institutional demands are programmed into the parameters of possible change, as they presently are, the same situation as is evident now might easily arise.

The realization of a state of professional neutrality is dependent not only upon changes in the performance of technical roles but upon the inter-relationships between those roles. Accordingly, in order to change the matrix of role relationships to a point where the parameters of the possible roles reflect parameters of verifiable needs would seem to necessitate wholesale institutional reform and

hence the selection and acceptance of new values upon which to order institutional inter-relationships. Necessarily these preconditions plus the development of a cohesive theoretical framework from which to judge the aspects of socio-cultural reality which the profession chooses to address itself to would form the basis by which changes and policies are proposed from a neutral perspective.

Even then technical proposals would necessarily favor one social group over another, as it is naive to assume that class or social interest group interests will somehow merge in the future, but at least this favoritism would not be traceable to the institutional design itself. This analysis has shown that certain groups have benefited from planning to the exclusion of others, thus verifying the basic hypothesis. Until the institutional design of planning institutions is modified and the state of the "science" of planning is elevated to a point where it can stand alone as the determinative factor of neutrality, the prospects for ameliorative social change through planning seem bleak.

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