-—‘-—'_——— A MUL'HP‘LE S—CALOGRAM ANALYSIS OF UNITED NATIONS VOTING Thesis far file Deqnec of M. A. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY Alicia M. Brown y Bendana 1.9-6.2 Tart-rat's”; J LIBR A R Y Michigan State L.) University (J L ABSTRACT A MULTIPLE SCALOGRAM ANALYSIS OF UNITED NATIONS VOTING by Alicia M. Brown y Bendana Previous studies of bloc politics in the General Assembly of the United Nations have proceeded in a rationa— listic though minimally empirical manner. The purpose of this study was to determine whether results similar to those of previous studies could be obtained more economically and, perhaps more precisely by the use of a mathematical—statistical tool on data provided by voting records in the sessions of the General Assembly. For this purpose, multiple scalogram analysis (MSA) was proposed as a useful method for revealing the nature of national alignments in the Assembly, the issues around which alignments revolve and the differences in the degree of cohesion among Assembly caucusing groups. It was assumed that voting behavior (policies) of countries could be studied much in the same way that attitudes of individuals are studies, i.e., by scaling methods. MSA is a newly developed scaling method which takes dichotomized data and forms unidimensional scales in an Alicia M. Brown y Bendafia empirical manner. The method is capable of quantifying qualitative aspects of voting data in a meaningful way. Due to the policies of different countries on general issues, e.g., self—determination, budget, etc., it is possible to qualify the agreement or disagreement of countries toward specific proposals in regard to these issues. MSA quantifies such qualitative information due to the parameters of order and kind inherent in the method. Ninety-three recorded roll—call votes for the plenary and committee meetings of the General Assembly's thirteenth session were dichotomized and submitted to MSA analysis. Sixty—seven of the 81 members of the UN were in this study. From the scales resulting from the analysis. countries were grouped into sets according to equivalence of their scale scores. Each scale was looked at in terms of the voting blocs, e.g., groups of countries scoring alike on the scale: and the types of issues in the scale. The cohesion of caucusing groups was studied by use of the standard deviation of scale scores for each caucusing group. The cohesion of a group, relative to the other caucusing groups was determined by the ranking of groups according to the sums of their transformed standard deviations over the seven resultant MSA scales. National alignments within scales (Lingoes calls his MSA scales dimensions) were Alicia M. Brown y Bendafia described by use of a group's modal score, the number of deviants from this score, and the standard deviation of the group. It was concluded that, on the basis of results similar to those of previous studies, MSA seemed a useful method for the study of voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly. The study further suggested that: 1. MSA scales ordered roll-call votes in a manner that can be meaningfully and logically interpreted in terms of general issue type content. 2. The cohesion of caucusing groups, as well as national alignments can be uncovered by means of MSA. 3. Voting blocs are not equivalent tolg priori determined caucusing groups, and are dependent upon the issues with which a scale deals. A MULTIPLE SCALOGRAM.ANALYSIS OF UNITED NATIONS VOTING BY Alicia M. Brown y Bendafia A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Psychology 1962 '1 j," C’V'f’lfJ/IJQ r830" g»? Oi flu”) fo‘f. agtfi/‘p \ \.-\.‘ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS To Dr. Charles Wrigley, whose interest in the United Nations and Multiple Scalogram Analysis and to Dr. Alfred Dietze, whose guidance and patience made possible this thesis, I would like to express a deep gratitude. To my committee, friends, and relatives for their understanding and moral support, I would like to express appreciation. The Multiple Scalogram analysis was made possible by MISTIC and the Michigan State Computer Laboratory. ii DEDICATI ON To my parents for their being mine. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 II. PROBLEM AND METHOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 III. RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 IV. DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 V. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 iv LIST OF TABLES Table l. Hypothetical Response Matrix for a MSA . . 2. Reflected Response Matrix for a MSA . . . . 3. Result of MSA Analysis of the Hypothetical Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Results of the MSA Analysis . . . . . . . . 5. Caucusing Group Cohesion: Standard Deviations of Scale Scores . . . . . . APPENDIX TABLES A. Countries Included in the Analysis B. Absences During Roll—Call Votes . . . . . . C. Results of the MSA Analysis . . . . . . . . D. Identification of all Committee and Plenary Roll-Call Vbtes for the 13th Session of the General Assembly . . . . . . . . Page 23 24 26 30 43 63 64 65 88 Chart LIST OF CHARTS Membership of Caucusing Groups Voting Blocs According to Dimension 1 . . . . . Voting Blocs According to Dimension 2 . . . . . Voting Blocs According to Dimension 3 . . . . . Voting Blocs According to Dimension 4 . . . . . Voting Blocs According to Dimension 5 . . . . . Voting Blocs According to Dimension 6 . . . . . Voting Blocs According to Dimension 7 vi Scale Page . . . . . . . . l4 Scores for . . . . . . . . 33 Scores for . . . . . 34 Scores for . . . . . . 36 40 41 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION This study attempts to demonstrate the usefulness of a newly developed scaling technique for identifying voting blocs in the General Assembly of the United Nations, i.e., groups of nations that vote together on particular issues, and to measure the cohesiveness of caucusing groups in terms of the standard deviation of their scaling errors or deviations from perfect agreement in the scaling of the group. For this purpose MSA (multiple scalogram analysis) (Lingoes, 1960) was applied to the recorded votes of the Thirteenth Session of the General Assembly. This method will be described in greater detail in the next chapter. Here will be described the nature of voting practices in the General Assembly, some predetermined facts from previous studies within the context of which the present study was formed, and a synopsis of caucusing groups as they existed at the time of the thirteenth session of the Assembly. Voting Practices in the General Assembly The General Assembly follows the rule of "qualified" majority. Passage of important questions requires a majority of two-thirds of the members present ani voting; other questions require only a simple majority. This consideration together with the broadly representative nature of the Assembly and the limitation of its legislative power to non—binding resolutions recommending courses of action, has encouraged the formation of alliances and coalitions. It seems, there- fore, that bloc politics in the UN came into being immediately with the organization of the General Assembly. The phenomenon of bloc politics occurs mainly in "closed door" sessions of the representatives of groups of countries that caucus. Here votes are traded and gentlemen's agreements are reached in order to assure the passage of resolutions of particular interest to the group by the required majority. Such groups and even a few of the "Powers" are not above the use of pressure tactics to acquire the necessary votes for the passage of a resolution (Ball, 1951; Riggs, 1958). Previous Studies As might be supposed, under these conditions it has become important for practical reasons to know how the various countries vote and particularly which countries support or oppose what resolutions. Voting on the floor of the Assembly is accomplished by a show of hands or by a roll call. UN documents record show-of—hands votes by giving the number of countries voting for or against a resolution. For roll-call votes, however, a record is made oftflmaparticular countries that vote for, against, or abstain. Published studies of group voting behavior in the General Assembly rely on data provided by roll—call records and interviews with diplomats of the various member nations, as well as on numerous other UN documents. A few examples of such studies are described lbelow as illustrations of this methodology. This will be followed by a general summary of their findings. Believing that the "spectre of bloc voting has haunted the United Nations since the Charter was first debated at San Francisco," M. Margaret Ball (1951) studied the voting records of countries to see if they formed blocs. A bloc was defined as any group which consistently votes as a unit on all or on particular kinds of issues. Groups of states were hypothesized to vote together because of one or more of the following reasons: (1) they formally constitute regional groups within the meaning of the Charter, as e.g., the Organization of American States and the Arab League; (2) they are located in the same geographical area, e.g., Asia, Latin America, or the Middle East; (3) they share a common ideology, e.g., the Soviet Bloc; (4) they possess a machinery for consultation in matters of foreign policy, e.g., Benelux, Scandinavia, and the British Commonwealth. The analysis was done on the first five sessions of the General Assembly. Important substantive issues were studied to demonstrate the action of these a priori determined blocs. The technique was to look at the roll-call vote outcomes in terms of pro, con, and abstain within these blocs for the committee of plenary votes. The resultant alignments or lack of alignments, and the coalition blocs formed, were then explained for each particular tqqna of issue in terms of what is known about the self-interest of these groups. These issues involved the following topics: 1. Franco Spain Spanish as a working language Palestine partition, admission of Israel, internation- alization of Jerusalem . Italian colonies Non—self-governing territories . South West Africa East-West issues: LAN \lmU'I-h a. Interim committee b. Threats to the political independence of territorial integrity of China c. Condemnation of war, essentials of peace d. Korea e. United action for peace Soward (1957) talks of the emergence in the United Nations of the type of group veto in the General Assembly which may hamper its effective functioning. He thinks the factors responsible for this are two—thirds majority rule for the passage of important issues and the increase of membership by 1957 to 81. From a study of the pattern of voting in the eleventh session of the General Assembly, Soward thought it possible to divide the 81 member states into five categories in terms of "group voting behavior,‘ as follows: Soviet Bloc Asian-African Latin America Commonwealth States not belonging to a caucus. U'I-wal-d Comparing the pattern of voting in the groups whocaucus and the four countries (United States, China, Israel, Yugoslavia) who do not caucus, Soward arrives at certain general conclusions regarding the voting behavior of these groups on issues such as the cold war, colonialism, etc. Hovet's (1960) book, originally prepared as a contri— bution to the United Nations Project of the Center for Inter- national Studies is at present the most comprehensive analysis of the United Nation's General Assembly bloc voting phenomena. His method was to use roll-call votes in the main committees and plenary committees of the General Assembly as his primary data for analysis. Of the 1,908 roll-call votes from the first to the thirteenth regular sessions of the General Assembly, an "adjusted gross" of 521 was used to assess the nature and extent of bloc voting, together with 66 "significant resolution" roll—calls which were used for assessing the cohesion and division of blocs and groups. Definitions of various types of groupings, e.g., blocs, caucusing groups, geographical distribution groups, regional groups, common interest groups, and temporary groups, were given. The voting was analyzed in terms of percentage "in agreement" with the Assembly majority. These agreement percentages were tabled or graphed over the range of the 13 sessions covered for the various groupings in several ways: (1) total roll calls, irrespective of the subject matter of the resolution voted upon: (2) type of action required, e.g., to supply funds, to supply information, referral to other organs, a general statement, etc.; (3) issues acted upon, especially in terms of generalized subject categories. The subject categories determined with the help of other experts include the following: Collective measures, including regulation of armaments Peaceful settlement Self-determination Economic cooperation Social and cultural cooperation Humanitarian cooperation (i.e., relief and short-term social cooperation) . Human rights Development of international law 9. Administrative, procedural and structural measures. mtfi-hlulurd mu Bailey (1961) examined the General Assembly, emphasiz- ing procedure and practice rather than politics. His sources were documents and private conversations outside the formal UN meetings. The following quotation from his discussion of the political background of the General Assembly is of particular interest in the present connection. ". . . The outstanding fact about the way the states associate in the General Assembly is the tendency of the Member States to affiliate differently for different pruposes" (Bailey, p. 28). In describing the "organized associations" that have developed in the UN, Bailey used a system of regional classification based on Resolution 1192(X11). This resolution he claims, has not only provided representativeness in the General Assembly, but also has provided for distribution of seats according to a fixed pattern. According to him, three forms of associations are recongized, though they may be informal, and for the most part unofficial. These are: 1. ‘Aguhgg coalitions improvised to deal with a particular problem. Such coalitions dissolve with the solution of or the change in character of the proglem, as e.g., the Spanish speaking delegates, the sixteen states administering trust or non-self-governing territories. 2. Associations which arise "when States are organized to meet either regularly or sporadically to exchange ideas on issues of common concern, though without any commitment to act in unison,' as e.g., Latin America, Asian-African, the Commonwealth. 3. Blocs, i.e., groups of states that consult and then act in unison, as e.g., the Soviet Bloc. Synopsis of Caucusing Groups From the writings of the authors cited the following groupings seem to have emerged. A brief description of their nature is given. Hovet's definition of a caucusing group as any group of member states in the Assembly which has some degree of formal organization, holds fairly regular meetings, and is concerned with substantive issues and related procedural matters before the sessions of the General Assembly suffices as a brief description of the groupings considered. African Nation. These countries are mostly new members of the UN, and are also members of the bigger Asian- African group. Hovet has observed the highest agreement of this group with the Assembly majority to be on matters involving human rights and economic cooperation. There appears to be little difference in the voting of the majority of these states from the Assembly majority according to types of recommendations involved in the voting. Trends considered here were limited t>the eleventh through the thirteenth sessions, of the General Assembly, and cohesive forces had not as yet become evident enough to draw conclusions in regard to them. Arab League. Members of this group except for Iraq, are also members of the Asian—African group. The group meets almost daily while the Assembly is in session. There is an office in New York which services and coordinates the activities of the Group. Meetings are secret and limited to the heads of delegations. Chairmanship at meetings is rotated monthly in alphabetical order. Matters considered at meetings are tactics, and joint policies. They concentrate on questions related to the Middle East and the application of the principle of self-determination. The group is not hard—and—fast since there are varying ties to the "Powers" and there is a gulf between the people and their governments, which factors operate as divisive forces of no small conseuqence. The greatest degree of cohesion in this group is shown in the support of the financial aspects of the economic development of underdeveloped countries and on anti-colonial measures. There is a tendency for neutrality on East—West issues, but generally there is no discernable pattern for the group. Iraq is considered as being too pro-British, while Egypt is the mostinfluential member of the group. Asian—African Nations. Permanent representatives of the countries belonging to this group consult throughout the 10 year. The group meets frequently, as needs arise. Meetings are closed to the press and to non-members. No official records are kept, procedure is informal, and the chairmanship is rotated by countries. Effort in these meetings is directed toward reaching informal concensus, i.e., meetings serve mainly as sounding boards. The group is never solid since there are too many differing interests represented as well as diversity of loyalties and attitudes which are influenced by associations with Western Powers. The greatest amount of unity in the group is shown on issues of self-determination, independence, and apartheid. India and Japan generally act as polar states within the group, with Ceylon, Indonesia, Burma, and Ghana following India's lead: and Thailand, the Philippines, and some Middle Eastern states voting as Japan does. A Latin America. This group caucuses weekly while the Assembly is in session and monthly otherwise. The chairman of the caucus for the year is generally the delegate that holds an Assembly vice—presidency. The caucus has tended to become a forum where advocates, upon their own initiative or at the invitation of the caucus, explain and seek support for a measure in advance of its presentation to the Assembly. The group is quite flexible and generally votes with the Assembly majority. There is a moderate amount of cohesion 11 in its voting. About two—thirds of the group votes alike, irrespective of the type of issue under consideration. The extent of the deviation in the group is not great, and there is not much pattern to this deviation. Generally, Mexico, Guatemala, Argentina, Bolivia, and Costa Rica, in the given order, are most likely to deviate from the group. This is most evident when the group majority is supporting the general position of the United States and the Western Powers. As a whole, the group is pro—West, anti-Communist, and normally responsive to American leadership if tactfully exercised. The greatest amount of cohesion is shown in regard to securing representation for the region on committees, councils, or commissions. There is some solidarity on East-West questions and while all except Brazil are anti—colonial, there is no unanimity on dependent area issues. Non-caucusing Group. These countries belong to no caucus group and are included in the study as a group to serve as a reference point in the discussion of the cohesive- ness of groups. It would, however, be hard to ignore the existence of this group entirely since some of the "Powers" are to be found here. Scandinavian Countries. In general, this group is quite cohesive, the countries cooperating closely and abstaining rather than voting against each other. Hovet has found the 12 group to behave consistently except for votes on the representation of China. The most division is seen on pro- cedural issues, the development of international law, and human rights. Agreement is greatest on issues of peaceful settlement, self—determination, and issues of economic, social, and humanitarian cooperation. Soviet Bloc. This group is the most cohesive of the Assembly coalitions. Not much is known about their procedure in caucusing, except that meetings are frequent. These countries comprise the only true bloc in the sense that members vote identically. Any dissension can be attributed to "mixed signals" brought about by the voting procedure in the United Nations. The bloc supports issues requiring little or no bloc commitment and opposes fundamental collective security measures. Russia is the undisputed leader of the group. Yugoslavia, while no longer a bloc member, votes much like the other communist states. On anti—colonial issues, contries who distrust Western imperialism more than Soviet communism generally support the bloc. Western European Nations. Meetings of these nations are held irregularly and without much formality of organization. The initiative for a meeting may come from any member of the group that feels a need for a meeting. The representative from the delegation calling the meeting generally serves as 13 chairman or the discussion leader in an informal manner. Voting behavior is most identical on economic, social, and humanitarian issues and least on collective measures. British Commonwealth Nations. This group has neither geographical nor ideological unity. Its caucuses are very informal discussions and expositions of points of view on issues before the Assembly. These meetings are chaired by the senior British representative, and are held weekly while the Assembly is in session. The harmonizing rule is followed at these meetings. The groupalmost never votes as a unit. Its greatest agreement is reached on procedural, administrative, and structural issues and on issues of social and cultural cooperation. Ceylon, India, and Ghana appear to be at odds with the group. India, and Pakistan appear to have a distinct tendency to vote with the Arab League on issues wherein the latter group is particularly solid. All members are anti— communist, but differ widely on how best to combat it. The Asian part is anti-colonial while the non-Asian part is very pro-West. 14 CHART l MEMBERSHIP OF CAUCUSING GROUPS .Agian-African Commonwealth Scandanavia Afghanistan Australia Denmark Burma Canada Norway Cambodia Ceylon Sweden Ceylon Ghana Ethiopia India _ Fed. of Malaya Fed. of Malaya §§%%§£u Ghana New Zealand lanl? India Pakistan Eu garia , Indonesia United Kingdom ye orUSSla , Czechoslovakia Iran H Japan Latin America uigagy Liberia Argentina PO an. Libya Brazil Rumagla . Ukraine Morocco Chile U S S R Pakistan Colombia ° ' ° ° Philippines Costa Rica Sudan Cuba Wgsfern European Thailand Dominican Rep. Fe gium Tunisia Guatemala rance . . Italy Turkey Haltl Netherlands United Arab Rep. Mexico Yemen Panama m gem Ethiopia Vruguayl Ghana enezue a Liberia . Non-Members Libya . Austria Morocco . China Sudan . . . Finland TuniSia Greece Arab Ireland Iraq Israel Libya Portugal Morocco Spain Sudan United States Tunisia Yugoslavia United Arab Rep. Yemen The Benelux group has been left out. With the elimination of countries due to too many absences, membership of this group has been reduced to two, Beligum and the Netherlands. CHAPTER II PROBLEM AND METHOD The Problem .In the light of the background given in the preceding chapter the specific problem of the present study may now be delineated. It may not be amiss to say that the studies cited proceed in a rationalistic fashion and are minimally empirical. Can similar results be obtained more economically and, perhaps, more precisely by applying a mathematical- statistical tool to data provided by the voting records in the sessions of the General Assembly? Multiple scalogram analysis, as described by Lingoes (1960), seems to offer this possibility. We may ask, therefore, "Given the roll-call voting record in the plenary and committee meeting of the :General Assembly of the United Nations, will multiple scalogram analysis effectively reveal bloc politics in the UN?" It is hypothesized that, with certain restrictions, this is the case. Knudsen (1962) used MSA dimension scores derived from 34 plenary roll-call votes in the twelfth session of the General Assembly to mathematically define voting blocs in the Assembly. She found a definition so derived adequate in terms of actual voting behavior. 15 16 She found MSA to be a particularly useful tool because it allows different blocs to appear as different types of issues come into consideration. It would seem, therefore, that this method is useful in revealing the nature of national align— ments. Since the voting of blocs, except in the case of the Soviet bloc, is not always perfectly consistent, the problem of cohesion in caucusing groups emerges. The method of analysis employed herein provides a measure of deviation from bloc voting in terms of‘scale scores." It is here proposed that the standard deviation of the distribution of dimension scores of the several blocs provides a means of measuring and comparing the cohesion of these blocs in terms of their voting behavior. The major hypotheses, or points at issue, of this present study may, therefore, be formally stated as follows: 1. Multiple-scalogram analysis applied to the voting record of a session of the General Assembly will effectively reveal the national alignments in the Assembly and the issues around which they revolve. 2. The dimension scores derived from a multiple-scalogram analysis of the voting record of a session of the General Assembly will reveal differences in the degrees of cohesion among the several groups. 17 Since MSA as a method for the study of voting behavior is fairly new, this study is of necessity a descriptive, "look-see" type. Conclusions drawn will be based not so much on statistical compariSons, as on comparisons with what is already known about bloc politics from UN documents and other sources, particularly the aforementioned publications about bloc voting behavior in the UN. If, using MSA, it is possible to meaningfully define voting groups and show national alignments, and to determine the cohesion of caucusing groups, then MSA may be said to be a useful method for the study of voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. Or, to generalize beyond the General Assembly, MSA may provide a useful tool for analyzing the nature of coalition in the voting of any legis— lative body. Rationale One of the basic assumptions made here with respect to the voting behavior of countries in the UN General Assembly is that the policies of countries, like attitudes in the case of individuals, mediate their behavior. With this in mind, it seems appropriate to state the scientific bias ascribed to here in regard to the nature and functioning of attitudes and to relate it to the functioning of policies in the behavior of countries. The latter is readily stated by saying that policies 18 of countries serve the same mediating purposes as attitudes do for individuals, or that policies are in a sense the atti- tudes of countries. In as much as MSA has been found useful in the analysis of attitudes the choice of this technique for a study of UNvoting becomes more understandable. Attitude is thought of as a latent variable which mediates or directs the responses of individuals toward significant objects. It is a hypothetical construct abstracted from a large number of related acts or responses that have been observed. Thus it is used to name and explain the consistency or covariation of many responses to stimuli of the same general class. These responses are held to be consistent because they are mediated by the same intervening variable, viz. attitude. Thus the concept of attitude serves to unify as a set of data, the observed responses of an individual. The content of an attitude is, therefore, expressed by the responses which reveal it. In the measurement of an attitude the set of behaviors that express it is sampled. The elements of such a set are responses to specific situations, e.g., state— ments on a questionnaire. In practice, attitudes are inferred from a process of measurement involving such responses. Such measurement assumes attitudes to have, among other things, the characteristics of specific content and of sign, i.e., l9 agreement or disagreement, favor or disfavor, etc. Individuals vary in their attitude relative to some content in the sense that they can be placed at a point, or within a limited range, of a continuum from maximum agreement to maximum disagreement. In the measurement of attitude by scaling methods the objective is to assign individuals to numerical positions along a scale that maps the continuum from extreme approval to extreme disapproval. Such scale positions relative to total range of the scale represents the relative degree of favorableness or unfavorableness of individuals' attitudes. Operationally, then,an attitude is represented by a score or set of scores derived from the application of a particular scale or similar measuring instrument. For purposes of the present study, countries are equated to individuals and policies of countries are equated to the attitudes of individuals. On the basis of this model it is logical to assume that voting behavior (policies) of countries can be studied much in the same way that attitudes of individuals are studied, i.e., by scaling methods. This implies the following assumptions: 1. A country's policy is a latent variable that summarizes and explains the consistency or covariation of its behavior (in the present context voting on resolutions presented in the UN General Assembly). 20 2. Roll—call votes in plenary and committee meetings of the General Assembly are samples of voting behavior of the respective countries that are mediated by their policies (analogous to the check marks in dictating agreement or disagreement with statements onzniattitude scale). 3. Countries vary in their policies regarding issues so that they can be placed (scaled) along a continuum of agreement—disagreement in regard to a set of issues with which they are confronted and upon which they vote. 4. A country's score, or its scores on various scales so concpetualized, represents the position of its policies relative to other countries who have voted on the particular question under consideration. It is believed that the MSA model eminently fits UN roll-call data. Like Guttman's scalogram analysis from which it was derived, MSA is deterministic. UN voting is fairly rigid and predictable due to the positions of countries on issues dictated by their policies. The method should, therefore, be capable of quantifying the qualitative aspects of voting data in a meaningful way. MSA forms unidimensional scales in an empirical way. Due to the policies of different countries on general issues, e.g., self—determination, budget, etc., it is possible to qualify the agreement or disagreement of countries toward specific proposals in regard to these issues. 21 MSA can quantify such qualitative information due to the parameters of order and kind inherent in the method. Practical reasons can also be presented to recommend the method. Thus, since it is an electronic computer technique, large amounts of data can be processed by it easily and speedily. Moreover, it is possible to replicate the method exactly from year to year, making possible trend analysis since UN resolutions deal with the same general type of questions from session to session. Multiple Scalogram Analysis Since MSA is a relatively new technique, a somewhat detailed explanation of it is in order. Its particular use in the present context will follow. MSA was developed by its author at Michigan State University for the purpose of extracting from a collection of data on heterogeneous issues the several scalable dimensions into which they can be organized. It is thus an extension of Guttman's scalogram analysis providing a more objective method for defining the universe of content being sampled than the earlier method. It was developed as an electronic computer technique so that large masses of data could be economically handled. It operates on dichotomous data relative to any number of issues provided by any number of subjects, as e.g., the responses of agreement or disagreement of a group 22 of subjects relative to the items of a questionnaire, or, in the present instance, on the "yes" and "no" votes of members of a legislative body on the various issues which confront it. MSA breaks these responses down into one or more Guttman scales. These scales are formed by throwing into as many subsets as may be necessary items which are homogeneous in the Guttman sense of unidimensionality. The underlying assumption for this procedure is that items belong to the same common scale if they have more common than unique characteristics. Items are brought together into scales using a set approach. The dichotomous (yes-no) responses of all subjects toward any given item constitute a set. Thus, in Table 1 below, the responses of 11 subjects to items are shown, with the digit "1" representing "yes" and zero representing "no. There are, therefore, 9 sets of "responses,' one each for item 1 through 9. Each column, accordingly, represents a set. The first step in analyzing such a table is to count the number of 1's in each column and enter the results in a row of column sums, as has been done in the table. These sums are next examined for the existence of any columns whose sum is less than half of the number of entries in the column. The sums of columns 2, 4 and 8 are such. 23 TABLE 1 HYPOTHETICAL RESPONSE MATRIX FOR A MSA Subject Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A l l 1 l l l l l 0 B l 0 l l 1 l 0 1 0 C l 0 1 l 1 l O O O D 1 O 1 l l 1 1 0 l E 1 0 l 0 l 1 l 0 1 F l 0 l 0 l 1 l 0 l G 0 0 1 O l l l 0 l H 0 0 l 0 l l 0 0 l I 0 0 l 0 l O 0 0 l J 0 0 0 0 l 0 O 0 0 K 0 0 O 0 0 0 l 0 0 Sum 6 l 9 4 10 8 6 2 6 Since the method requires that agreement between adjacent columns be maximized all entries in these columns are reflected to form Table 2, i.e., 1's are changed into 0's and 0's are chaged into 1's. In these columns now l's obviously refer to >"no" and 0's refer to-"yes" responses. A dash is placed over the column heading to indicate that this has been done, as may be seen in Table 2. Reflection is carried out throughout the analysis whenever this will maximize agreement between adjacent columns. The first scale is started by selecting as its focus the column or set with the largest sum. In our example this 24 TABLE 2 REFLECTED RESPONSE MATRIX FOR.A MSA Subject ‘ , Items 1 i 3 Z 5 6 7 § 9 x A 1 0 l O l l l 0 0 B l 1 l 0 1 l 0 0 0 C l l l 0 l l 0 l 0 D l l 1 0 1 l l l l E 1 1 1 1 1 l 1 l 1 F 1 l l l 1 l 1 l l G 0 l l l l l l l l H 0 l l l 1 1 0 l l I 0 l 1 1 1 O 0 1 l J 0 l 0 l 1 0 O l 0 K 0 l 0 1 0 0 l l 0 Sum 6 9 9 7 10 8 6 9 6 is item #5. Agreement scores (McQuitty, 1956) between this ~ initial set and all other sets are now calculated, counting as agreements all identical pairs such as 1,1 and 0,0. The set which has the highest agreement with the initial set is selected from the pool of items remaining as the second set belonging to the scale. In our example item #3 has 10 agreements with #5 and, therefore, becomes the second member of the scale. . The second set is now used to find the next item which will scale. It is the Item which has the highest agreement score with it provided that the error introduced by this set does not exceed some predetermined value. An error occurs 25 when there is a reversal of the 1,0 pattern, e.g., the pattern 1100 is errorless, but 1101 contains two errors (Lingoes uses Goodenough's method of error count). For our example the allowable error is set at the value of 2, or 20 per cent of the number of respondents. Items that introduce more than two errors do not "scale." The above process is continued until it is no longer possible to add a set to the scale without exceeding the error parameter. Left over items now form a reduced pool of items which are treated like the original pool and may form a second scale. This is continued until no more scales or dimensions appear. For our illustrative data the final results turn out as in Table 3. Only one scale has been formed and items #7 and #9 did not scale. The scores of the several subjects are the sums of 1's across rows. No errors appear in the table. Knowing any subject's score and the final ordering of the items in the scale it is now possible to reproduce his responses and from a knowledge of each subject's score it is possible to reproduce the entire response matrix. The reproducibility of such a matrix may be calculated from.the formula Sum of errors) mn R = (l - where R = reproducitility index, m = the number of items in the scale, and n = the number of subjects. R for the present 26 TABLE 3 RESULTS OF THE MSA ANALYSIS Items + + + Subject 5 3 6 1 4 8 2 Score Error A l l l l l l l 7 O B l l 1 l l l 0 6 0 C l l l l l 0 0 5 0 D l l l l l 0 0 5 0 E l 1 l l 0 0 0 4 0 F l 1 1 l 0 0 0 4 0 G l l l 0 0 0 0 3 0 H l 1 l 0 0 0 0 3 0 I l 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 J l 0 O 0 0 0 O l 0 K 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 table is 1.00, i.e., the items included form a perfect scale. It will be observed, e.g., that agreement with item 2, which has been reflected and re—reflected in the course of the analysis, means that the subject agrees with all of the other items of the scale, while disagreement with item #1 means disagreement with all the remaining items. The score of a subject is, consequently, a measure of the subject's position on the dimension represented by the scale. Procedures The Data The data analyzed in this study came from the proceedings of the plenary and committee meetings of the General Assembly 27 of the Thirteenth Session of the United Nations. The documents of these meetings were scrutinized for all roll—call votes. Of these, 33 dealt with resolutions before the plenary meetings of the Assembly and 111 were committee deliberations. Other documents, e.g., Committee Proceedings and the UN Yearbook, were also consulted to determine the nature of the resolutions or issues voted on and the allocation of agenda items. Votes in these documents were recorded by country as: in favor, against, or abstain. Dichotomization of Data MSA operates upon dichtomous data. Delegates were at times absent and no vote was recorded for the country. These facts and the abstensions were handled by throwing abstentions with the minority vote and the absences with the majority so that a "yes" or a "no" was tabulated for each country on every item voted upon. The rationale for this procedure was based on the belief that an abstention denotes dissatisfaction with the apparent outcome of the vote, or incomplete agreement with the resolution being voted upon while an absence was indicative of satisfaction with the apparent outcome, or at least unconcern. The UN had 82 members in its thirteenth session. Of these, the delegates of 15 countries were absent more than 20 times out of the 144 roll—call votes. On the assumption 28 that so many absences are sufficient to bias the stability and representativeness of the voting of these countries if they are counted in with the majority these 15 countries were not included in the analysis. Appendix A presents a list of the member countries of the thirteenth session of the UN whose voting was analyzed in this study. Appendix B presents the frequency of absences of the various countries, including the 15 which were excluded for the present analysis. Further Delimitations and Deletions The 144 items of the roll—calls under consideration are briefly described in Appendix D. Seven of them were procedural in nature such as a motion to give precedence to some resolution in voting (#141) or a motion to adjourn debates. These seven items were analyzed separately from the other items. Analysis The votes on the above 93 important issues, dichotomized as already described, were subjected to multiple scalogram analysis using the program prepared by Lingoes and the facilities of the Michigan State Electronic Computer Laboratory. From the scales resulting from the two MSA's, countries were grouped together according to equivalence of scale scores. 29 When there were errors, the closest errorless response pattern was "consulted" and the erring country grouped with the countries having the score of the closest response pattern. A bloc was defined as being a group of countries with equivalent scale scores on the Same dimension. Each dimension was looked at in.terms of the voting blocs and the type of issue in the dimension. The cohesion;of caucusing groups was studied by use of the standard deviation of scale scores for each caucusing group. Group variances were computed for each scale resulting from the analysis where all 93 issues were collectively analyzed and for the scale resulting from the analysis of the seven procedural issues. From the spread of scores within the group, and the group mode, it was believed feasible to make conclusions as to the "stand" and the cohesion of these caucusing groups as defined by Hovet. The member— ship of all caucusing groups as defined by Hovet, excluding the 15 countries not analyzed for reasons stated, are shown in Chart 1. CHAPTER III RESULTS The multiple scalogram analysis of the 93 "selected" roll-calls resulted in seven scales. The number of items in each scale varied from three to 21. Scale reproductibilities varied from 0.914 to 0.982, with five of these values well above 0.940. Six items remained unscaled. There was a total of 17 reflections. The seven procedural items gave a scale with a reproductibility of 0.940. Five of the seven items scaled, the last two being reflected. These results are summarized in Table 4 below. TABLE 4 RESULTS OF THE MSA ANALYSIS No. of Dimension Scale No. of Items Reflections No. Reproductibility in the Scale in the Scale 1 .982 21 0 2 .954 9 0 3 .951 20 6 4 .932 21 8 5 .914 8 1 6 .970 5 0 7 .970 3 2 "Procedural" .940 5 2 3O 31 Appendix C provides full data on all dimensions as well as the response matrix for the countries included in the analysis. Since the support and the disagreements within the "procedural" dimension deal with the individual countries' interpretation of Charter articles or the General Assembly's rules of procedure, this separate MSA analysis was not studied for national alignments or cohesiveness. The data is available if wanted. Voting Blocs and Issue Content of Dimensions Issues that scale within a dimension are ordered along a continuum that takes into account both the pattern of res— ponses and the amount of endorsement of items. Essentially, it is how countries vote on issues that determine voting blocs as defined by scale scores. It is, therefore, thought necessary to give the dimensional issue content along with voting bloc results. Charts 2 to 8 on the following pages give voting bloc memberships for each dimension. A brief summary of the dimensional issue content follows or precedes each chart. The overview of the seven dimensions shows that within the inconsistency of voting bloc memberships over dimensions, there are definite trends, or consistencies. There is the existence of two major types of bloc groupings. The first type appears on Dimensions 1, 2, 4, and 7. Here, the Soviet 32 Bloc, a number of the Asian-African nations, and a few of the Latin American Group are the highest scoring and biggest voting bloc. The United Kingdom, for Dimension 1; Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden for Dimension 2; Australia, Belgium, Italy, and Portugal for Dimension 4; and a few each of the Asian-African Nations, the Latin American Group, the Non- caucusing Group, the British Commonwealth Nations, and the Western European nations: for Dimension 7 are the lowest scoring countries. The second type of voting bloc grouping appears on Dimensions 3, 5, and 6. Here, countries that are Trust Administrators and a conglomeration of memberships of caucusing groups are the high scoring countries. The Soviet Bloc, and a few Asian-African nations are the low scorers on these three dimensions. The issues that scaled for the dimension below suggests its being a "good—will" dimension. General statements and recommendations are made on issues of economic aid, cessation of Trusteeship Agreements, social and humanitarian questions, human rights, and the apartheid policy. Fifty-six of the 67 countries are in agreement with all 21 items of the scale. Except for New Zealand and the United States, the Colonial Powers are low scoring in this dimension. China and Finland are slightly conservative. The Dominican Republic is surprising in its low scoring on this dimension. The United Kingdom has the lowest score. 33 CHART 2 VOTING BLOCS ACCORDING TO SCALE SCORES FOR DIMENSION 1 Afghanistan Albania Argentina Austria Brazil Bulgaria Burma Byelorussia Cambodia Canada Japan Liberia Libya Mexico Morocco New Zealand Norway Pakistan Panama Peru China Italy Finland Netherlands France Portugal lm lm Ceylon Chile Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Czechoslovakia Denmark Ethiopia Fed. of Malaya Ghana Philippines Poland Rumania Sudan Sweden Thailand Tunisia Turkey Ukraine USSR Spain Belgium Dominican Rep. Australia United Kingdom Greece Guatemala Haiti Hungary India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel United Arab Rep. United States Uruguay Venezuela Yemen Yugoslavia 34 CHART 3 VOTING BLOCS ACCORDING TO SCALE SCORES FOR DIMENSION 2 .2 Afghanistan Cuba Indonesia Albania Czechoslovakia Iran Argentina Ethiopia Iraq Bulgaria Fed. of Malaya Japan Burma Ghana Liberia Byelorussia Greece Libya Cambodia Guatemala Mexico Ceylon Haiti Morocco Colombia Hungary Pakistan Costa Rica India Panama Peru Yugoslavia Poland Rumania Sudan Tunisia Ukraine USSR United Arab Rep. Benezuela Yemen .§ Dominican Rep. 2 Australia 1_ Canada Philippines Belgium Ireland Thailand France New Zealand Israel .1 Brazil Italy Uruguay Netherlands IQ Denmark Portugal Finland ‘6 Chile Spain Norway United Kingdom Sweden 4, Turkey United States ;_ Austria China 35 Dimension 2, while also a "good-will" dimension is much more specific in its recommendations. Issues deal with international law and administration questions; self- determination and independence questions of certain trust territories. Only 31 of the original 56 high scorers are in the first voting bloc. The Dominican Republic, the Philippines, Thailand, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile are slightly less agreeable. Turkey, Austria, and China begin the low scoring trend. The rest of the countries agree to one or two items while Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden agree to no items. Dimension 3 issues require almost full international cooperation for resolution recommendation to be effective. It is essentially a cold-war dimension, dealing with political and security measures plus a few political colonial issues. The first voting bloc, comprised of 11 nations and scoring highest is essentially the low scoring group of the previous Dimension 2. Finland here is in the low scoring range while Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are in the middle—of-the-road range. The Soviet Bloc and most of the Asian and the African countries agree to very few of the items. See Chart 4 for these results. In Dimension 4, the main issues deal with the procedure of administration of recommendations on self-determination, Io IH IN IA Im |< 36 CHART 4 VOTING BLOCS ACCORDING TO SCALE SCORES FOR DIMENSION 3 Albania Bulgaria Byelorussia Czechoslovakia Ukraine USSR Hungary Poland Rumania Afganistan Yugoslavia Ceylon Finland India Indonesia Iraq United Arab Rep. Yemen Burma Cambodia Ghana Libya Morocco Sudan Ethiopia Austria Israel Liberia Sweden Ireland Mexico Tunisia Greece Denmark Norway Portugal Fed. Peru of Malaya Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Haiti Iran Philippines venezuela China Cuba Dominican Rep. Guatemala Japan Netherlands Pakistan Panama Uruguay Australia Belgium Canada France Italy New Zealand Spain Thailand Turkey United Kingdom United States 37 humanitarian economic aid and development, and organizational aspects of two UN Councils. The countries which are voting blocs in the sense of their voting alike on these issues are seen in Chart 5. The isSues in Dimension 5, as in Dimension 3 require international cooperation, but to a lesser degree. The political and security, and colonial issues cover a lesser scope; in terms of countries directly involved in the recom- mendations and in the seriousness of questions debated. More countries, i.e., 31, are in the highest scoring voting bloc. The Soviet countries and then the Asian and African nations are on the low scoring end of this dimension. For Dimension 6, all issues deal with the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force. This, in effect, is the only "pure" dimension in the analysis. Issues in Dimension 7 are strongly debated questions of the Law of the Sea and the Cyprian Question. The dimension is hard to interpret in that Item #l.should scale in either Dimension 3 or 4 and Items #2 and #3 should scale in Dimension 2. The latter two items are the committee consider- ations of the same issue that scaled in Dimension 2. Io lq Im Im 38 CHART 5 VOTING BLOCS ACCORDING TO SCALE SCORES Afghanistan Albania Bulgaria Byelorussia Czechoslovakia Ghana Hungary Indonesia Iraq Libya Costa Rica Cambodia Guatemala Haiti Iran Israel Japan Mexico Uruguay Venezuela Philippines Colombia Cuba Panama Argentina Austria Chile Ireland Pakistan Thailand IN |l—‘ Morocco Poland Rumania Sudan Ukraine USSR United Arab Rep. Yugoslavia Yemen China Canada Denmark Netherlands New Zealand Norway Sweden Turkey United States Brazil Dominican Rep. Finland Peru Spain United Kingdom France Io FOR DIMENSION 4 Burma Ceylon India Liberia Tunisia Ethiopia Greede Fed. of Malaya Australia Belgium Italy Portugal Io IH IN lw lb 39 CHART 6 VOTING BLOCS ACCORDING TO SCALE SCORES FOR DIMENSION 5 Albania .é Bulgaria Byelorussia Czechoslovakia Hungary Iraq Poland Rumania Ukraine USSR |q Venezuela Yemen Im Afghanistan Libya Morocco United Arab Rep. Uruguay Ethiopia Ghana Liberia Guatemala Tunisia Cuba Greece Philippines Indonesia Mexico Sudan Yugoslavia Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia India Panama Peru Australia Austria Belgium Burma Cambodia Canada Ceylon China Costa‘Rica Denmark Dominican Rep. Fed. of Malaya Finland France Haiti Iran Ireland Israel Italy Japan Netherlands New Zealand Norway Pakistan Portugal Spain Sweden Thailand Turkey United Kingdom United States Io IH IA VOTING BLOCS ACCORDING TO SCALE SCORES FOR DIMENSION 6 Afghanistan Albania Bulgaria Byelorussia Chile Costa Rica Cuba Czechoslovakia Ethiopia Guatemala Greece Haiti Mexico Portugal China Dominican Rep. Venezuela Libya Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Burma Cambodia Canada Ceylon Colombia Im 40 CHART 7 Hungary Yemen Iraq Panama Philippines Poland Rumania Tunisia Ukraine USSR United Arab Rep. cont'd Denmark Italy Fed. of Malaya Japan Finland Liberia France Morocco Ghana Netherlands India New Zealand Indonesia Norway Iran Pakistan Ireland Peru Israel Spain Sudan Sweden Thailand Turkey United Kingdom United States Uruguay Yugoslavia lw IN IH 41 CHART 8 VOTING BLOCS ACCORDING TO SCALE SCORES FOR DIMENSION 7 Albania Argentina Brazil Bulgaria Byelorussia Chile Colombia Costa Rica Czechoslovakia Ethiopia Yugoslavia Afghanistan Burma Cambodia Greece Austria Ceylon Guatemala Haiti Ireland Italy Japan Spain Sudan Finland Ghana Hungary India Indonesia Iraq Libya Mexico Morocco Panama Australia Belgium Canada China Cuba Denmark Dominican Rep. Fed. of Malaya France Iran Turkey United Kingdom United States Peru Poland Rumania Tunisia Ukraine USSR United Arab Rep. Uruguay Venezuela Yemen Israel Liberia Netherlands New Zealand Norway Pakistan Philippines Portugal Sweden Thailand 42 Group Cohesion To study the cohesion of the caucusing groups, the standard deviation of the scores of each such group was computed for each dimension resulting from the MSA analysis. Since scales varied in the number of scaled items from 3 to 21, the standard deviation while giving the best measure of dispersion, does not represent the relative dispersion around the means of the various groups in comparable terms. The standard deviation of scales with items less in number than 21 were, therefore, transformed to 21 point scales by multipli- cation with an appropriate factor (F) as seen at the top of Table 5. The cohesion of a group, relative to the other caucusing groups was determined by the ranking of groups according to the sum of the transformed standard deviations over the seven dimensions. These results are summed in Table 5 below which shows not only the rank order (R) of cohesive- ness but also gives a picture of the actual solidarity of the cohesive groups. Beyond doubt, the Soviet group was the most cohesive. Scandinavia was a close second followed by the Western European, Arab, African, Latin American, Asian- African, NonéMembers, and the Commonwealth Nations. CAUCUSING GROUP COHESION: 43 TABLE 5 OF SCALE SCORES STANDARD DEVIATIONS DIMENSION NUMBERS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 CAUCUSING Fa and No. of Items in the Dimension 2 of GROUP F=1 F=2-1/3 F=1 F=l F=2-l/2 F=4 F=5 S.D.'s n=21 n=9 n=20 n321 n=8 n=5 n=3 Soviet 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 Scandinavia 0.00 0.00 1.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.73 western Europe 3.65 0.00 0.50 1.41 0.00 0.00 3.50 9.06 Arab 0.00 0.00 2.51 2.61 5.35 10.08 5.25 25.80 African 0.00 0.00 2.61 3.31 4.30 9.48 8.75 28.45 Latin American 3.74 2.36 2.09 2.90 6.70 9.08 8.47 35.34 Asian- African 0.00 2.54 6.64 6.26 7.85 10.04 9.31 42.64 Non- Members 5.28 7.30 6.46 6.36 2.70 6.80 8.40 43.30 Common- wealth 6.84 9.26 7.53 8.21 4.95 0.00 9.10 45.89 aF is the multiplication factor. bR is the rank order of group cohesion. 44 'National Alignments For this purpose, the score with frequency greater than one-half of the caucusing group number is taken as indicative of the group's alignment on the particular types of issues within the dimensions. The standard deviation of the group and the number of deviants from the "modal" score are also considered in the description of national alignments. African Nations. For issues that scale in the two good—will dimensions, the African nations give full endorse- ment and are in perfect agreement in doing so. They are also in agreement with the Assembly majority in this case. On issues requiring international cooperation but to a lesser degree than what has been termed the cold-war issues, the African nations have no definite common stand, though they definitely endorse only a few of the scaled items. Cold-war issues are hesitantly endorsed. Four of the nations agree to one-fourth of scaled items while the remaining three endorse approximately half of the items. On Dimension 4, where the main issues deal with the procedure of administration of recommendations on self—determination, humanitarian economic aid and development, four countries endorse the full 21 items, two endorse l4 and one endorsed 18. The group is quite cohesive with respect to issues endorsed in Dimension 7. Five countries endorse all 3 items, and the other two endorse l and 45 none. The group is quite favorable to items on the financing of the UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force). Four countries endorse all five items, one 4, and the other two, 0. Arab League. This group of countries is most cohesive on the good-will dimensions. There is perfect cohesion and agreement with the majority. Issues on Dimension 7 are next agreed to in terms of cohesion and endorsement. Six members agreed to all 3 items and the seventh to only 1. The group is favorable to issues dealing with the procedure of administration of recommendations on self—determination, humanitarian economic aid and development, and organizational aspects of two UN councils. Five countries endorsed all 21 items, one 20 and the others, 14. For the financing of UNEF, four countries score O,and the remaining three 4 or 5. On the remaining two dimensions, i.e., 3 and 5, the group is low scoring. The cold-war issues and the "weaker" dimension 5 issues requiring international cooperation are neither well agreed to nor evoke too much agreement in the amount of the low endorsement given. Asian-African Nations. The group is solid on good- will issues in Dimension 1 and almost nearly so for Dimension 2. The countries here are also in agreement with the Assembly majority. 0n the other dimensions, the group is never solid, 46 in fact generally quite spread-out in scoring. Endorsements are low on Dimension 3 (cold-war issues), and sort of evenly split between high and low on the rest of the dimensions. There is even no pattern to these high-low splits-—so not much can be said about the national alignments of this group for issues dealing with: (l) the procedure of administration of recommendations on self-determination, humanitarian economic aid and development; (2) the less encompassing cold-war items of Dimension 5; (3) the financing of UNEF; and (4) the "legal" questions of Dimension 7. Latin American Group. The group is not perfectly cohesive on any dimension. The most cohesion is on.the good— will issues. On Dimension 1 only the Dominican Republic, with its endorsement of 7 items prevents perfect agreement in the endorsement of all 21 items. The group is also quite cohesive on Dimension 2 and in agreement with the Assembly majority in the endorsement of the 9 scaled items. For Dimension 7, the Latin American countries are also quite cohesive and in agreement with the Assembly majority in endorsing the 3 items. Here ten of the countries scored 3, two scored 1 and the remaining two scored 0. On cold—war issues, the group is not too cohesive. While the trend is to endorse most of the 20 items, seven scored 18, five scored 19 and one scored 11. On less encompassing cold-war issues, 47 there is quite a bit of variability ‘though a.trend to score 7 or 8 and, therefore, remain pretty much in agreement with the Assembly majority. Much the same results are seen for the procedural administrative issues of Dimension 4. The greatest amount of variability is seen on the items dealing with the financing of UNEF. Here there is a high-low split and a few in-betweens. Five nations score 5, two scored 3, two score 1, and five score 0. Generally, i.e., across all dimensions, about two-thirds of the countries vote alike. Non-caucusing Group. The group is never perfectly cohesive. While there is a great deal of variability as to how countries vote, there areless over-all differences in voting, in this respect than the British Commonwealth Nations. The greatest degree of similarity in voting is on the less- encompassing cold-war issues in Dimension 5. Here eight of the ten nations score 8 and the other two nations, 6 and 5. There is also some degree of cohesion on the good-will issues of Dimension 1. Here six countries vote with the Assembly majority and endorse 21 items while the other four nations are only half agreeable with their scores of 19, 14, 9, and 8. There is no trend of any stateable sort in the remaining five dimensions. Scandinavian Countries. The group is very cohesive and second in this respect only to the Soviet Bloc. The 48 only dimension there was any disagreement on was Dimension 3. The group fully endorses the good-will issues on Dimension 1 and in Dimension 2. The "cold-war" Dimension 3 is only half- way agreed to while the less encompassing similar-type issues of Dimension 5 are fully agreed to. Three of the 21 items in the "procedural administrative" Dimension 4 are endorsed. All five items on the financing of UNEF are agreed to and none of the items in Dimension 7. Soviet Bloc. This group of countries is the most cohesive. As with the Scandinavian countries, there is perfect cohesion except for the cold-war issues. The bloc either endorses all items in a dimension or none at all. Good-will issues for both dimensions are fully endorsed. This is also true for the procedural-administrative Dimension 4 and for Dimension 7. There is no support given to cold-war items of either dimension nor to the financing of UNEF. Western European Nations. There is perfect cohesion for the good-will issues in Dimension 2, the financing of UNEF, and the less-encompassing cold—war issues of Dimension 5. There is almost perfect cohesion for cold-war issues in Dimension 3. The alignments for these general issue types are; low agreement (score = 2) for Dimension 2, high agreements for Dimensions 3 and 5 (scores = to 20 and 8), and high agreement for Dimension 6. The general trends for the remaining 49 dimensions are: half—agreeable to good—will issues of Dimension 1, almost no support for the procedural-administrative issues of Dimension 4, and no support for Dimension 7 issues. British Commonwealth Nations. The group, in terms of its voting behavior seems to split into two subgroups. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom vote alike on four of the seven dimensions. These countries endorse all the cold-war issues on Dimensions 3 and 5, all the items on financing UNEF and none of the issues in Dimension 7. The Asian members of the group are cohesive on both good-will dimensions and vote as the non—Asian members on financing UNEF. The two subgroups vote pretty much alike on Dimension 5, Ghana is the deviant on this dimension by its endorsement of only 2 of the 8 items. 0n Dimension 2, the Asian part scores high while the four non-Asian members score low; the same trend is apparent for Dimension 4. In general, the two sub- groups tend to be on opposite ends of an agreement continuum, and except for a few dimensions are not completely cohesive in their opposite stands on general issue types. CHAPTER IV DISCUSSION Comparisons with Outcomes of Previous Studies African Nations. MSA showed, as Hovet mentioned, that the highest agreement of the group with the Assembly majority is on human rights and economic cooperation issues. It was not possible to support or deny the statement that MSA also showed there was little difference in the voting of the majority of these nations from the Assembly majority according to types of recommendations involved in the voting. Except for Dimensions 1, 2, and 6 it would be hard to determine, from voting bloc memberships whether there was an Assembly majority on these types of issues, or not. The majority of African nations did vote as the Assembly majority did, on endorsing Dimension 6 items. Except for Dimension 6, MSA shows the African Nations and the Arab League to be quite similar in national alignments. Arab League. On the basis of MSA results, I would venture to qualify the conclusion from previous studies that there is generally no discernable pattern of voting for the group. Dimensions 1, 2 and 4 results support previous studies 50 51 in that the greatest amount of cohesion is shown in support of issues on the financial aspects of the economic development of under—developed countries and on anti-colonial measures. The tendency for neutrality on East—West issues is also evident. MSA further shows perfect cohesion on "good—will" dimensions and a definite tendency to endorse many procedural- administrative issues. Cold-war and financial issues are seldom endorsed and if so, in an irregular manner. If one accepts the tag of "not-too-cohesive" for caucusing groups that are in perfect agreement on less than two dimensions, then the Arab League is not too cohesive. Asian-African Nations. Contrary to Hovet's conclusions that this group is never solid is the perfect cohesion of the group on Dimension 1. There is also a high degree of cohesion on the second good-will dimension. There does not seem to be much justification, in terms of MSA results for the thirteenth General Assembly Session to fear the cohesiveness of this group of nations. On other than "good-will" issues, there is so very little cohesion shown--there are no alignments common to the group as a whole. Latin American Group. This group does generally vote with the Assembly majority, there is a moderate amount of cohesion in the group with about two—thirds of the group voting alike irrespective of the type of issue under consideration. 52 Results of Dimension 6 (financing UNEF issues) tend to contra- dict this statement a bit. The group is generally pro-West and Anti-Communist. The surprising thing about this group is the deviant behavior of the Dominican Republic. Voting bloc results show the tendency of this country to vote as the low- scoring Western European and non-Asian Commonwealth nations. Non-caucusing Group. Very little can be said here as to comparisons. Important (like the U.S.) or "key" countries are in this group. Alignments on general issue categories as determined by the issue content of dimensions can be determined for the individual countries in this group, rather than for the group as a whole. It is interesting to note that both the Asian-African and the British Commonwealth nations show less agreement in their voting behavior than this non- caucusing group. It is also evident that Yugoslavia, while no longer a member of the Soviet Bloc, still votes pretty much like the Soviet Bloc does. The United States, except for Dimension 1 is generally on the same end of the dimension as the United Kingdom and not too different in its scale score value. Scandinavian Countries. These nations seem to be more cohesive than pictured by previous studies. The group is consistent except for votes on fiie cold-war dimension. The Law of the Sea items in Dimension 2 seem to have effectively 53 separated this group from the rest of the nations, reflecting the quite definite stand taken by these countries on this legal question. Soviet Bloc. Results of all previous studies are supported here. It is the most cohesive group and the bloc does support issues requiring little or no bloc commitment and opposes fundamental collective security measures. Western European Nations. This group is more cohesive than previous studies indicated. The previous results of the most identical voting being on economic, social, and humanitarian issues and the least cohesion being shown on collective security measures is contradicted by MSA results. The smallness of the number of countries comprising the group may have been enough to affect scale score standard :deviation values this way--or these results maybe peculiar to this session of the General Assembly. It is suggested that trend studies, i.e., the same MSA method, over sessions of the General Assembly be done so that results may be stated and defended with more conviction. British Commonwealth Nations. Results of previous studies are fully supported. The group almost never votes 'as a unit. The items on financing UNEF is the only general issue category wherein the group voted identically. There is a definite difference in voting behavior of the Asian and 54 non-Asian members. While previous studies suggested this, it was never clearly stated. For this particular General Assembly session, the greatest agreement is not found on procedural, administrative, structural issues; and issues of social and cultural cooperation; but on the issue of financing the United Nations Emergency Force. What all these results and comparison of results suggest is thatifluaproposed methodology is useful for the study of voting bloc cohesion and national alignments. It would be more meaningful and conclusive to do a trend study over sessions rather than to study a session by itself. Also, this might cut down the number of countries that have to be excluded from the analysis because of too many absences. It would make interesting speculation and possibly a future area of study to look at why dimensions like 1 and 2, 3 and 5 that contain similar issue types reverse the degree of endorsement of their high and low-scoring voting blocs. At this point, it might be mentioned that error scores were disregarded in this study and the focus was on the similar- ity of voting response patterns. It is my belief that UN roll—call voting is a well structured phenomenon in terms of voting, and that errors are not real errors but explainable deviations from the expected "perfect" voting response pattern. 55 As such, if errors are given much weight in the determination of voting blocs and in the analysis of the cohesion of caucusing groups, this would distort the interpretation of results rather than serve to point out "deviations" as they very effectively do. A look at Dimension 1 may help clarify these statements. Illustrative Example. On a voluntary basis, all countries agreed to grant economic aid to Somalia. Perfect agree- ment was also given to resolutions prohibiting slave trade, servi— tude, and forced or compulsory labor; ceasement of the inforce- ment of the Trusteeship Agreement approved by the General Assembly on 13 December 1946, upon the attainment of independence by Togoland. The following resolution, no longer agreed to unanimously, dealt with the economic development of under— developed countries. The parts of this resolution were: International Cooperation for Economic Development of Under- developed Countries, UN Capital Development Fund, Promotion of the Proceedings of the Symposium on the Development of Petroleum Resources of Asia and the Far East, and Rosters of Scientific and Technical Personnel of the Less-Developed Countries. Human Rights issues scaled next. The next issues dealt with rights to liberty and security, the prevention of cruel or inhuman treatment, and respect for human rights in a multi—racial society. Following these were mild reprimands 56 and statements directed at the Union of South West Africa for its governmental policies. No direct action was advocated, no threat of any sort made. The majority of member states were "unhappy" at the conditions within the Union. Member states were then reminded that their policies should be in conformity with their obligations as member states of the UN. Scaling next were various resolutions expressing displeasure at the apartheid policy, as this lead to race conflict in the Union of South Africa. An appeal was made to the government of the Union of South West Africa to enter into negotiations with Pakistan and India. Communications with respect to the treat- ment of people of Indian origin in the Union had been left unanswered. The dimension essentially shows an abundance of good will. In regard to the errors in the dimension, Brazil is responsible for two. It was the contention of this country that the general tone of the draft resolutions dealing with the economic development of under-developed countries, and the possible solutions to particular commodity problems were too timid for the seriousness of these issues. Canada's and New Zealand's two errors were for items on the issue dealing with recollecting previous consideration of race conflict in the Union of South West Africa. The countries saw no need to mention this in the draft resolution dealing 57 with race conflict in the Union. Israel's one error was on the item dealing with human rights to liberty and security. No specific reason was given. Israel did propose two amendments that failed to receive the support of the Committee deliberat- ing the issue. Liberia and Libya erred on the human rights item dealing with the prevention of cruel or inhuman treatment. They seemed to be unhappy with the statement of the text (not the content) that had as its aim the outlawing of criminal experimentation without hindering legitimate scientific or medical practices. Italy and the Dominican Republic's two errors are of a different type. They both agreed on the last two items in the scale after having reached their thresholds of agreement several items beforehand. These last two items were the plenary and committee votes on the resolution considering the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa. Apparently, these two countries did not agree with Australia, Belgium, China, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom's views that recommendations on this issue would tamper with the domestic jurisdiction of the nation. What about national alignments? Assuming a continuum of endorsement underlying each dimension as evidenced by the most common scale score of a caucusing group, a note of warning must be said about the interpretation of scale scores. 58 One must remember reflection of items (reflection is indicated in Appendix Table C by a - sign before the item number), and interpret scale scores taking this into account. To make the meaning of reflection a little clearer, an example might be in order. Take Afghanistan's score of 2 and Albania's score of 3 on Dimension 7. If the matter of reflection is forgotten, one would err in assuming Albania to be more favorable than Afghanistan is, to the issues in the dimension. Noting that items #109 and #88 (the first and third items to scaleL this would mean Albania voted "yes" only to the second scaled item while Afghanistan "yessed" both the second and the third scaled items. In other words, while both countries voted no on the first item (the Iranian draft resolution on the Question of Cyprus) and both countries agreed to an amendment to resolution (A/c 6 L. 435) so that the convening of the con- ference on the Law of the Sea would be delayed, Albania voted "no" to the entire resolution as amended, and Afghanistan "yessed" the amended resolution. Therefore, if reflection is considered, Afghanistan is more favorable to the scaled issues in Dimension 7 than Albania is. CHAPTER V CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY Conclusions This study suggests that: 1. MSA scales dichotomized roll—call votes in a manner that can be meaningfully and logically interpreted in terms of general issue type content. 2. Caucusing group cohesion and stands are obtainable from MSA scale scores. 3. Error scores may be: disregarded in determining the voting bloc membership of a country, useful in pointing out deviant "explainable" voting behavior. 4. Voting blocs are: not equivalent to a_priori determined caucusing groups, dependent upon the issue content of a dimension. MSA, therefore, seems to be a useful method for the study of voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly. There are a few suggestions that can be made as to the method of using MSA for this purpose. Voting blocs and caucusing group cohesion could be studied within definite issue categories instead of letting MSA define issue categories 59 60 by the issue content of a dimension. As an example, take the following as possible issue categories: political and security questions, procedural issues, economic and financial resolutions, self-determination questions. These could be analyzed separately. Another possibility is to see if the method can pick out colonial questions from the agenda items allocated to the First Committee and the Special Political Committee. While these items are generally assumed to be mainly political in nature, Riggs considered "colonially" tinged issues to bias voting of essentially political issues. He omitted these colonial questions in his study of the United States influence in the General Assembly. The essence of this suggestion is the possibility of limiting the subjective interpretation of dimensional item content. A greater amount of objectivity is somewhat introduced if categorization, by say Committee Agenda item allocation, is done before submitting the data to MSA analysis. This suggestion leaves open the possibility that it might be more meaningful or empirical to analyze by MSA all the data and define that as the category, and the resultant dimensions as sub-categories. Errors could be effectively employed to pin-point "critical" or atypical issues. Assuming that the method is acceptable, there are some implications as to its utilization. There is a present need 61, for a method of determining caucusing group cohesion. Many United Nations members are concerned at the large increase in membership of certain groups. They believe that the potential of these groups to carrythe.Assembly majority is a matter to cause some worry. Information as to the cohesion of voting or caucusing groups is, therefore, valuable. The standard deviation of scale scores on single dimensions or over several dimensions of relevant issues may be very useful this way. This would be feasible since UN issues are of the same general type, session after session. This same reason would make trend studies of scale score defined voting blocs a possi- bility. The utility of this is no matter of conjecture. Summary The main objective of the study was to explore the acceptability of MSA as a method for studying bloc politics in the United Nations General Assembly. The data analyzed were important roll—call votes in the plenary and committee meetings of the General Assembly's thirteenth regular session. Results suggested MSA to be useful in "pulling out" voting blocs, bringing to light national alignments, and providing a means for the determination of caucusing group cohesion. APPENDIX 63 TABLE A COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS Afghanistan Albania Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Bulgaria Burma Byelorussia Cambodia Canada Ceylon Chile China Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Czechoslovakia Denmark Dominican Republic Ethiopia Federation of Malaya Finland France Ghana Greece Guatemala Haiti Hungary India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japan Liberia Libya Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Norway Pakistan Panama Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Rumania Spain Sudan Sweden Thailand Tunisia Turkey Ukraine U.S.S.R. United Arab Republic United Kingdom United States Uruguay Venezuela Yemen Yugoslavia 64 TABLE B ABSENCES DURING ROLL-CALL VOTES Country No. of Times Absent Guinea (admitted on 12 Dec. 1959) 88 Bolivia 83 Nicaragua 63 Laos 58 El Salvador 56 Iceland 49 Luxembourg 43 Nepal 43 Honduras 35 Paraguay 33 Ecuador 29 Lebanon 27 Union of South Africa 26 Jordan 22 Saudi Arabia 21 cutting Uruguay 19 point Haiti 15 Sudan 15 Yemen 13 Peru 12 Costa Rica 11 Countries above the cutting point were not included in the analysis. Item Item Item Item Item Item Dimension 1 Item No. 18 55 28 137 65 TABLE C RESULTS OF THE MSA ANALYSIS Unscaled items: 15 53 81 83 84 Consideration of words "for the 24th session" of the Trusteeship council and "the Trusteeship Council" in a resolution dealing with the dissemation of information. The reparation of refugees. Consent of individual needed if he is to be sub— jected to medical or scientific treatment. Good Offices Committee on South West Africa invited to renew discussions with the Government. Reproduction and circulation of verbatim record of debate on report by Good Offices Committee on South West Africa. Debate proceedings on Agenda Item #39, its circu- lation, reproduction, and the financial implications of all this. MRP Brief Item Description 1.000 Economic Aid to Somalia. 1.000 Prevention of slavery, slave trade, and enforced labor. 1.000 Ceasement of trusteeship agreement upon the independence of French Cameroons. 0.985 Economic development of under-developed countries.- 0.985 Possible solutions to particular commodity problems. TABLE C.--Continued Dimension 1 Item No. 56 54 104 121 122 123 105 106 125 108 124 107 120 130 131 91 MRP 0.970 0.940 0.940 0.925 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.881 0.866 0.851 0.851 0.821 0.821 0.866 0.866 66 Brief Item Description Rights to liberty and security Prevention of cruel or inhuman treatment. Respect for human rights, in a multi_ racial society. #104 in Plenary. Union of South Africa's governmental policies not consistent with pledges of Member States. Member states asked to bring policies into conformity with obligations under UN Charter. #122 in Committee. #123 in Committee. Race conflict in South West Africa. #125 in Plenary. Reprimand for governmental policies impairing human rights and fundamental freedoms. #124 in Committee. Recollection of previous consideration of race conflict question in South Africa. #120 in Committee. Treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa. #131 in Committee TABLE C.—-Continued 67 The Response Matrix Country Afghanistan Albania Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Bulgaria Burma Byelorussia Cambodia Canada Ceylon Chile China Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Czechoslovakia Denmark Dominican Rep. Ethiopia Fed. of Malaya Finland France Ghana Greece Guatemala Haiti Hungary India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japan Liberia Libya Matrix 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111000000000000000 111111111111111111111 111111100000000000000 111001111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111110011 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111100 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111100000000000011 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111110000000 111111111000000000000 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111000011 111111111111111111111 111111011111111111111 111111011111111111111 Score 21 21 21 21 19 21 21 21 21 19 21 21 19 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 14 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 17 21 20 20 Errors oooooooooooooooooooeooooooooeooooeoooooo TABLE C.--Continued 68 The Response Matrix Country Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Norway Pakistan Panama Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Rumania Spain Sudan Sweden Thailand Tunisia Turkey Ukraine USSR United Arab Rep. United Kingdom United States Uruguay Venezuela Yemen Yugoslavia Matrix 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111100000000 111111111111111110011 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111000000000000 111111111111111111111 111111110000000000000 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111110000000000000000 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 Score 20 20 13 19 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 Errors OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOJfi-OOO TABLE C.—-Continued Dimension 2 Item No. 133 132 59 58 14 74 72 12 11 The Response Matrix Country Afghanistan Albania Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Bulgaria Burma Byelorussia Cambodia Canada MRP 0.925 0.881 0.731 0.701 0.701 0.687 0.701 0.687 0.672 69 Brief Item Description Holding of second conference on the law of the sea. Proposed change in date of holding second conference on law of the sea. International respect for right of peoples and nations to self—determination. The right of peoples and nations to self- determination. Effects of the European Economic Community. Information asked of administering authorities. Economic development of Non-self- Governing Territories. Attainment of Independence by Trust Territories. Speedy creation of preconditions for independence. Matrix Score Errors 111111111 9 0 111111111 9 0 111111111 9 0 110000000 2 0 111000000 3 0 110000000 2 0 111111100 7 0 111111111 9 0 111111111 9 0 111111111 9 0 001111111 7 4 100000000 1 0 TABLE C.—-Continued The Response Matrix Country Ceylon Chile China Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Czechoslovakia Denmark Dominican Rep. Ethiopia Fed. of Malaya Finland France Ghana Greece Guatemala Haiti Hungary India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japan Liberia Libya Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Norway Pakistan Panama Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Rumania Spain 70 Hairy: 111111111 111111000 111000011 111111111 111111111 111110111 111111111 000000000 111111110 111111111 111111111 000000000 110000000 111111111 111111111 111111111 111111111 111111111 111111111 111111111 111111111 111111111 100000101 110000111 110000000 111011011 111111111 111111111 111111111 111111111 110000000 100000000 000000000 111111111 111111111 111111111 111111110 111111111 110000000 111111111 110000000 Score wmwmmoowowmoommqwmwmomowomoowooomoommommm Errors OOOOOOOOOOOOOOODOO‘fiOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOONOOboo TABLE C.--Continued Response Matrix Country Sudan Sweden Thailand Tunisia Turkey Ukraine USSR United Arab Rep. United Kingdom United States Uruguay Venezuela Yemen Yugoslavia 71 Matrix 111111111 000000000 110111110 111111111 111100000 111111111 111111111 111111111 110000000 110000001 111111100 111111111 111111111 111111111 Score \DkOKOflwNKOKDkOJ-E-KOQOKO Errors 0 OOOONOOOOOONO TABLE C.——Continued Dimension 3 Item No. 4 30 136 48 112 129 42 139 90 126 95 -97 -127 -113 115 AL”: 0.910 0.851 0.821 0.821 0.731 0.642 0.642 0.642 0.597 0.567 0.552 0.537 0.522 0.552 0.552 72 Brief Item Description Motion to include in the provisional agenda of the 14th session the question of amending the U.N. Charter. This would be in connection with allowing the in- crease in membership of the Economic and Social Council. French Cameroons to be admitted into the U.N., upon attainment of independence. Promotion of the international flow of private capital. #136 in Committee. Include "the situation in Hungary" in the agenda? The Korean Question. #129 in Committee. Ad hoc committee established to study peaceful uses of outer space. See #139 in Committee. Discontunuance of nuclear weapons testing. Resolution dealing with ceasement of nuclear weapons testing. Reduction of military budgets. Immediate discontinuance of nuclear weapons testing. Amendment to place question of represen- tation of China on Agenda. Exclude from the agenda the question of the representation of China in the U.N. 73 TABLE C.--Continued Dimension 3 Item No. MRP Brief Item Description 117 0.507 The representation of China in the U.N. 116 0.522 The question of the representation of China to be considered at 13th regular session of the General Assembly. -114 0.537 General Assembly will consider proposals regarding the representation of China in the U.N. —89 0.687 USSR and United States asked to cooperate to facilitate the consideration of the peaceful uses of outer space. -47 0.761 The U.N. Capital Development Fund. The Response Matrix Country Matrix Score Errors Afghanistan 11000000000000000000 2 0 Albania 00000000000000000000 0 0 Argentina 11111111111111111100 18 0 Australia 11111111111111111111 20 0 Austria 11111111000000000000 8 0 Belgium 11111111111111111111 20 0 Brazil 10111111111111111100 17 0 Bulgaria 00000000000000000000 0 0 Burma 11111000000000000000 5 0 Byelorussia 00000000000000000000 O 0 Cambodia 11111000000000000000 5 0 Canada 11111111111111111111 20 0 Ceylon 11110000000000000000 4 0 Chile 11111111111111111100 18 0 China lllllllllllllllllllO 19 0 Colombia 11111111111111111100 18 0 Costa Rica 11111111111111111100 18 0 Cuba 11111111111111111110 19 O Czechoslovakia 00000000000000000000 0 0 Denmark 11111111111110000001 14 0 Dominican Rep. 11111111111111111110 l9 0 TABLE C.-—Continued 74 The Response Matrix Country Ethiopia Fed. of Malaya Finland France Ghana Greece Guatemala Haiti Hungary India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japan Liberia Libya Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Norway Pakistan Panama Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Rumania Spain Sudan Sweden Thailand Tunisia Turkey Ukraine USSR United Arab Rep. United Kingdom United States Uruguay Venezuela Yemen Matrix 11111110000000011100 11111111111101110000 11110000000000000001 11111111100011111111 11111000000000000000 11111111111110000000 11111111111111111110 11111111111111111100 10000000000000000000 11110000000000000000 11110000000000000000 11111111111001111100 11110000000000000000 11111111111000000000 11111111000010000000 11111111111111111111 11111111100101111110 11111111110000011100 11111000000000000000 11001111111000011000 11111000000000000000 11111111111111111110 11111111111100011111 11111111111110000001 11111111111011111110 11111111111011111110 11111111111111110000 11111111111111111100 10000000000000000000 11111111111110000011 10000000000000000000 11111111111111111111 11111000011000000000 11111111110000000001 11111111111111111111 11111111111000000000 11111111111111111111 00000000000000000000 00000000000000000000 11110000000000000000 11111111111111111111 11111111111111111111 11111111111111111110 11111111111111111100 llllOOClOOOOOOOOOflnn Score 10 15 17 13 19 18 16 11 20 16 13 11 19 l7 14 18 18 16 18 15 20 20 11 20 20 20 19 18 Errors >OOOOOOOOOONubOOubOOONNNGOObOO‘ONONOOOOOOOOOOO‘NNOW 75 TABLE C.--Continued Dimension 4 Item No. MRP Brief Item Description 16 0.881 Dissemation of information. 17 0.940 Study and training facilities offered to inhabitants of trust territories. 50 0.791 Refugees in Morocco and Tunisia. 119 0.716 Conditions in South West Africa. 82 0.701 #119 in Committee. 13 0.567 Emphasis in tone of draft resolution directed to Trust Administrators. 73 0.537 Information asked of administering authorities. 70 0.582 Who to prepare the summary of opinions on questions of transmission and examination of information. 71 0.597 Transmission and examination of information. 43 0.567 Governing Council membership to be selected by General Assembly. 118 0.567 #43 in Plenary. -44 0.597 Members of Governing Council of Special Fund to be chosen by Economic and Social Council. 142 0.552 Question of Algeria. 93 0.582 #142 in Committee. —l30 0.642 Amend U.N. Charter to increase membership of Economic and Social Council. -2 0.642 Preamble of resolution by the Special Political Committee on the question of increasing the membership of the Economic and Social Council. 76 TABLE C.-—Continued Dimension 4 Item No. MRP -3 0.642 -5 0.672 -143 0.716 —31 0.687 -l34 0.657 Brief Item Description Increased membership of Council needed in view of increased membership of the U.N. Question of increasing membership of Economic and Social Council. Future of the trust territory of the Cameroons under French administration. #143 in Committee. The situation in Hungary. The Response Matrix Country Afghanistan Albania Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Bulgaria Burma Byelorussia Cambodia Canada Ceylon Chile China Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Czechoslovakia Denmark Dominican Rep. Ethiopia Fed. of Malaya Finland France Matrix 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 111110011000000000000 001000000000000000000 111110000000000000000 000000000000000000000 110000000110000000000 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111000 111111111111111111111 111111111100001111000 111000000000000000000 111111111111111111001 110110000000000000000 111100000000000000000 111111000000000000000 111111111100000000000 110111000000000000000 111111111111111111111 111000000000000000000 110000011000000000000 111111111111110000001 111110011111100000000 110000000000000000001 100000000000110000000 Score Errors bNubN-h-OONOOONNOOOOOQOONI-POO TABLE C.—-Continued 77 The Response Matrix Country Ghana Greece Guatemala Haiti Hungary India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japan Liberia Libya Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Norway Pakistan Panama Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Rumania Spain Sudan Sweden Thailand Tunisia Turkey Ukraine USSR United Arab Rep. United Kingdom United States Uruguay venezuela Yemen Yugoslavia Matrix 011111111111111111111 111111111111100000011 110111111000000000000 111111011000000000000 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111001 111111111111111111111 111110111000110000000 111111111111111111111 111110000000100000000 110110011000000000000 010000000000000000000 111111111000000000000 011111111011111111000 111111111111111110111 111111111000000000000 111111111111111110111 111000000000000000000 111000000000000000000 111000000000000000000 111110000000010000000 111111001000000000000 110000100000000000000 111111100000000000000 111111111111111111111 000000000011000000000 111111111111111111111 110000000000000000000 011111111110111111011 111000000000000000000 111110000000000000000 111111111111110000110 111000000000000000000 111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111 011111111111111111111 110000000000000000000 111000000000000000000 111111111000000000000 111111111000000000000 111111111110111111110 111111111111111111111 Score Ni—‘Nl—‘N PM l—‘Oi—‘koi—‘(DGJU'IO M NH womomxor—‘oxm M NH i-‘ N t-‘OWU'ILUCIJNl—‘NI-‘QWQOWUJW Nio P'H 20 Errors OOOOOONOOOOOO-bOOup-OONNNOOONON-boNubNOihONONN-bw 78 TABLE C.—-Continued Dimension 5 Item No. MRP Brief Item Description 52 0.761 The celebration of World Refugee Year. 128 0.687 Financing of the United Nations Emergency Force. 36 0.701 Plebiscite for Southern Cameroons to be discussed at 14th session. 144 0.701 The future of the Cameroosn under British administration. 37 0.701 #144 in Committee. 35 0.567 The details of the plebiscite to be held in northern British Cameroons. 29 0.597 The elections to be held in French administered Cameroons. -86 0.537 Statement that considerable preparatory The Response Matrix Country Matrix Score Errors Afghanistan 10000000 1 0 Albania 00000000 0 0 Argentina 11111110 7 0 Australia 11111111 8 0 Austria 11111011 7 2 Belgium 11111011 7 2 Brazil 11111110 7 2 Bulgaria 00000000 0 0 Burma 01111111 7 2 Byelorussia 00000000 0 0 Cambodia 00111111 6 4 Canada 11111111 8 0 Ceylon 11111111 8 0 Chile 10111110 6 2 China 11111111 8 0 Colombia 11111110 7 0 Costa Rica 11111111 8 0 Cuba 11011001 5 2 work is necessary for a successful conference on the law of the sea. TABLE C.——Continued The Response Matrix Country Czechoslovakia Denmark Dominican Rep. Ethiopia Fed. of Malaya Finland France Ghana Greece Guatemala Haiti Hungary India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japan Liberia Libya Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Norway Pakistan Panama Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Rumania Spain Sudan Sweden Thailand Tunisia Turkey Ukraine USSR 79 Harris 00000000 11111111 11111111 11000010 11111111 11111111 11111111 11000000 11111001 11100011 11111011 00000000 01111110 11111100 11111111 00100000 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11000001 10000000 10111100 10000000 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111010 11111110 10111001 00000000 11111111 00000000 01111111 11111100 11111111 11111111 11100000 11111111 00000000 00000000 Score OCDCD00G)m(fi\JO)G)O(fl~JO\G)m(DCDFJUIH(»CDODGJmIACDO\OiO~dLn0\k)m(DCDLDODG)O Errors C>OOOO