

A MULTIPLE SCALOGRAM ANALYSIS OF
UNITED NATIONS VOTING

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ABSTRACT

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Previous studies of bloc politics in the General Assembly of the United Nations have proceeded in a rationalistic though minimally empirical manner. The purpose of this study was to determine whether results similar to those of previous studies could be obtained more economically and, perhaps more precisely by the use of a mathematical-statistical tool on data provided by voting records in the sessions of the General Assembly. For this purpose, multiple scalogram analysis (MSA) was proposed as a useful method for revealing the nature of national alignments in the Assembly, the issues around which alignments revolve and the differences in the degree of cohesion among Assembly caucusing groups. It was assumed that voting behavior (policies) of countries could be studied much in the same way that attitudes of individuals are studied, i.e., by scaling methods.

MSA is a newly developed scaling method which takes dichotomized data and forms unidimensional scales in an

empirical manner. The method is capable of quantifying qualitative aspects of voting data in a meaningful way. Due to the policies of different countries on general issues, e.g., self-determination, budget, etc., it is possible to qualify the agreement or disagreement of countries toward specific proposals in regard to these issues. MSA quantifies such qualitative information due to the parameters of order and kind inherent in the method.

Ninety-three recorded roll-call votes for the plenary and committee meetings of the General Assembly's thirteenth session were dichotomized and submitted to MSA analysis. Sixty-seven of the 81 members of the UN were in this study. From the scales resulting from the analysis, countries were grouped into sets according to equivalence of their scale scores. Each scale was looked at in terms of the voting blocs, e.g., groups of countries scoring alike on the scale; and the types of issues in the scale. The cohesion of caucusing groups was studied by use of the standard deviation of scale scores for each caucusing group. The cohesion of a group, relative to the other caucusing groups was determined by the ranking of groups according to the sums of their transformed standard deviations over the seven resultant MSA scales. National alignments within scales (Lingoes calls his MSA scales dimensions) were

described by use of a group's modal score, the number of deviants from this score, and the standard deviation of the group.

It was concluded that, on the basis of results similar to those of previous studies, MSA seemed a useful method for the study of voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly. The study further suggested that:

1. MSA scales ordered roll-call votes in a manner that can be meaningfully and logically interpreted in terms of general issue type content.
2. The cohesion of caucusing groups, as well as national alignments can be uncovered by means of MSA.
3. Voting blocs are not equivalent to a priori determined caucusing groups, and are dependant upon the issues with which a scale deals.

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DEDICATION

To my parents for their being mine.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study attempts to demonstrate the usefulness of a newly developed scaling technique for identifying voting blocs in the General Assembly of the United Nations, i.e., groups of nations that vote together on particular issues, and to measure the cohesiveness of caucusing groups in terms of the standard deviation of their scaling errors or deviations from perfect agreement in the scaling of the group. For this purpose MSA (multiple scalogram analysis) (Lingoes, 1960) was applied to the recorded votes of the Thirteenth Session of the General Assembly. This method will be described in greater detail in the next chapter. Here will be described the nature of voting practices in the General Assembly, some predetermined facts from previous studies within the context of which the present study was formed, and a synopsis of caucusing groups as they existed at the time of the thirteenth session of the Assembly.

Voting Practices in the General Assembly

The General Assembly follows the rule of "qualified" majority. Passage of important questions requires a majority of two-thirds of the members present and voting; other questions require only a simple majority. This consideration together with the broadly representative nature of the Assembly and the limitation of its legislative power to non-binding resolutions recommending courses of action, has encouraged the formation of alliances and coalitions. It seems, therefore, that bloc politics in the UN came into being immediately with the organization of the General Assembly.

The phenomenon of bloc politics occurs mainly in "closed door" sessions of the representatives of groups of countries that caucus. Here votes are traded and gentlemen's agreements are reached in order to assure the passage of resolutions of particular interest to the group by the required majority. Such groups and even a few of the "Powers" are not above the use of pressure tactics to acquire the necessary votes for the passage of a resolution (Ball, 1951; Riggs, 1958).

Previous Studies

As might be supposed, under these conditions it has become important for practical reasons to know how the various countries vote and particularly which countries support or

oppose what resolutions. Voting on the floor of the Assembly is accomplished by a show of hands or by a roll call. UN documents record show-of-hands votes by giving the number of countries voting for or against a resolution. For roll-call votes, however, a record is made of the particular countries that vote for, against, or abstain. Published studies of group voting behavior in the General Assembly rely on data provided by roll-call records and interviews with diplomats of the various member nations, as well as on numerous other UN documents. A few examples of such studies are described below as illustrations of this methodology. This will be followed by a general summary of their findings.

Believing that the "spectre of bloc voting has haunted the United Nations since the Charter was first debated at San Francisco," M. Margaret Ball (1951) studied the voting records of countries to see if they formed blocs. A bloc was defined as any group which consistently votes as a unit on all or on particular kinds of issues. Groups of states were hypothesized to vote together because of one or more of the following reasons: (1) they formally constitute regional groups within the meaning of the Charter, as e.g., the Organization of American States and the Arab League; (2) they are located in the same geographical area, e.g., Asia, Latin America, or the Middle East; (3) they share a common

ideology, e.g., the Soviet Bloc; (4) they possess a machinery for consultation in matters of foreign policy, e.g., Benelux, Scandinavia, and the British Commonwealth. The analysis was done on the first five sessions of the General Assembly.

Important substantive issues were studied to demonstrate the action of these a priori determined blocs. The technique was to look at the roll-call vote outcomes in terms of pro, con, and abstain within these blocs for the committee of plenary votes. The resultant alignments or lack of alignments, and the coalition blocs formed, were then explained for each particular type of issue in terms of what is known about the self-interest of these groups. These issues involved the following topics:

1. Franco Spain
2. Spanish as a working language
3. Palestine partition, admission of Israel, internationalization of Jerusalem
4. Italian colonies
5. Non-self-governing territories
6. South West Africa
7. East-West issues:
 - a. Interim committee
 - b. Threats to the political independence of territorial integrity of China
 - c. Condemnation of war, essentials of peace
 - d. Korea
 - e. United action for peace

Soward (1957) talks of the emergence in the United Nations of the type of group veto in the General Assembly which may hamper its effective functioning. He thinks the

factors responsible for this are two-thirds majority rule for the passage of important issues and the increase of membership by 1957 to 81. From a study of the pattern of voting in the eleventh session of the General Assembly, Soward thought it possible to divide the 81 member states into five categories in terms of "group voting behavior," as follows:

1. Soviet Bloc
2. Asian-African
3. Latin America
4. Commonwealth
5. States not belonging to a caucus.

Comparing the pattern of voting in the groups who caucus and the four countries (United States, China, Israel, Yugoslavia) who do not caucus, Soward arrives at certain general conclusions regarding the voting behavior of these groups on issues such as the cold war, colonialism, etc.

Hovet's (1960) book, originally prepared as a contribution to the United Nations Project of the Center for International Studies is at present the most comprehensive analysis of the United Nation's General Assembly bloc voting phenomena. His method was to use roll-call votes in the main committees and plenary committees of the General Assembly as his primary data for analysis. Of the 1,908 roll-call votes from the first to the thirteenth regular sessions of the General Assembly, an "adjusted gross" of 521 was used to assess the nature and extent of bloc voting, together with 66 "significant

resolution" roll-calls which were used for assessing the cohesion and division of blocs and groups. Definitions of various types of groupings, e.g., blocs, caucusing groups, geographical distribution groups, regional groups, common interest groups, and temporary groups, were given. The voting was analyzed in terms of percentage "in agreement" with the Assembly majority. These agreement percentages were tabled or graphed over the range of the 13 sessions covered for the various groupings in several ways: (1) total roll calls, irrespective of the subject matter of the resolution voted upon; (2) type of action required, e.g., to supply funds, to supply information, referral to other organs, a general statement, etc.; (3) issues acted upon, especially in terms of generalized subject categories. The subject categories determined with the help of other experts include the following:

1. Collective measures, including regulation of armaments
2. Peaceful settlement
3. Self-determination
4. Economic cooperation
5. Social and cultural cooperation
6. Humanitarian cooperation (i.e., relief and short-term social cooperation)
7. Human rights
8. Development of international law
9. Administrative, procedural and structural measures.

Bailey (1961) examined the General Assembly, emphasizing procedure and practice rather than politics. His sources

were documents and private conversations outside the formal UN meetings. The following quotation from his discussion of the political background of the General Assembly is of particular interest in the present connection. ". . . The outstanding fact about the way the states associate in the General Assembly is the tendency of the Member States to affiliate differently for different purposes" (Bailey, p. 28). In describing the "organized associations" that have developed in the UN, Bailey used a system of regional classification based on Resolution 1192(XII). This resolution he claims, has not only provided representativeness in the General Assembly, but also has provided for distribution of seats according to a fixed pattern. According to him, three forms of associations are recognized, though they may be informal, and for the most part unofficial. These are:

1. Ad hoc coalitions improvised to deal with a particular problem. Such coalitions dissolve with the solution of or the change in character of the problem, as e.g., the Spanish speaking delegates, the sixteen states administering trust or non-self-governing territories.

2. Associations which arise "when States are organized to meet either regularly or sporadically to exchange ideas on issues of common concern, though without any commitment to act in unison," as e.g., Latin America, Asian-African, the

Commonwealth.

3. Blocs, i.e., groups of states that consult and then act in unison, as e.g., the Soviet Bloc.

Synopsis of Caucusing Groups

From the writings of the authors cited the following groupings seem to have emerged. A brief description of their nature is given.

Hovet's definition of a caucusing group as any group of member states in the Assembly which has some degree of formal organization, holds fairly regular meetings, and is concerned with substantive issues and related procedural matters before the sessions of the General Assembly suffices as a brief description of the groupings considered.

African Nation. These countries are mostly new members of the UN, and are also members of the bigger Asian-African group. Hovet has observed the highest agreement of this group with the Assembly majority to be on matters involving human rights and economic cooperation. There appears to be little difference in the voting of the majority of these states from the Assembly majority according to types of recommendations involved in the voting. Trends considered here were limited to the eleventh through the thirteenth sessions, of the General Assembly, and cohesive forces had not

as yet become evident enough to draw conclusions in regard to them.

Arab League. Members of this group except for Iraq, are also members of the Asian-African group. The group meets almost daily while the Assembly is in session. There is an office in New York which services and coordinates the activities of the Group. Meetings are secret and limited to the heads of delegations. Chairmanship at meetings is rotated monthly in alphabetical order. Matters considered at meetings are tactics, and joint policies. They concentrate on questions related to the Middle East and the application of the principle of self-determination. The group is not hard-and-fast since there are varying ties to the "Powers" and there is a gulf between the people and their governments, which factors operate as divisive forces of no small consequence. The greatest degree of cohesion in this group is shown in the support of the financial aspects of the economic development of underdeveloped countries and on anti-colonial measures. There is a tendency for neutrality on East-West issues, but generally there is no discernable pattern for the group. Iraq is considered as being too pro-British, while Egypt is the most influential member of the group.

Asian-African Nations. Permanent representatives of the countries belonging to this group consult throughout the

year. The group meets frequently, as needs arise. Meetings are closed to the press and to non-members. No official records are kept, procedure is informal, and the chairmanship is rotated by countries. Effort in these meetings is directed toward reaching informal consensus, i.e., meetings serve mainly as sounding boards. The group is never solid since there are too many differing interests represented as well as diversity of loyalties and attitudes which are influenced by associations with Western Powers. The greatest amount of unity in the group is shown on issues of self-determination, independence, and apartheid. India and Japan generally act as polar states within the group, with Ceylon, Indonesia, Burma, and Ghana following India's lead; and Thailand, the Philippines, and some Middle Eastern states voting as Japan does.

Latin America. This group caucuses weekly while the Assembly is in session and monthly otherwise. The chairman of the caucus for the year is generally the delegate that holds an Assembly vice-presidency. The caucus has tended to become a forum where advocates, upon their own initiative or at the invitation of the caucus, explain and seek support for a measure in advance of its presentation to the Assembly. The group is quite flexible and generally votes with the Assembly majority. There is a moderate amount of cohesion

in its voting. About two-thirds of the group votes alike, irrespective of the type of issue under consideration. The extent of the deviation in the group is not great, and there is not much pattern to this deviation. Generally, Mexico, Guatemala, Argentina, Bolivia, and Costa Rica, in the given order, are most likely to deviate from the group. This is most evident when the group majority is supporting the general position of the United States and the Western Powers. As a whole, the group is pro-West, anti-Communist, and normally responsive to American leadership if tactfully exercised. The greatest amount of cohesion is shown in regard to securing representation for the region on committees, councils, or commissions. There is some solidarity on East-West questions and while all except Brazil are anti-colonial, there is no unanimity on dependent area issues.

Non-caucusing Group. These countries belong to no caucus group and are included in the study as a group to serve as a reference point in the discussion of the cohesiveness of groups. It would, however, be hard to ignore the existence of this group entirely since some of the "Powers" are to be found here.

Scandinavian Countries. In general, this group is quite cohesive, the countries cooperating closely and abstaining rather than voting against each other. Hovet has found the

group to behave consistently except for votes on the representation of China. The most division is seen on procedural issues, the development of international law, and human rights. Agreement is greatest on issues of peaceful settlement, self-determination, and issues of economic, social, and humanitarian cooperation.

Soviet Bloc. This group is the most cohesive of the Assembly coalitions. Not much is known about their procedure in caucusing, except that meetings are frequent. These countries comprise the only true bloc in the sense that members vote identically. Any dissension can be attributed to "mixed signals" brought about by the voting procedure in the United Nations. The bloc supports issues requiring little or no bloc commitment and opposes fundamental collective security measures. Russia is the undisputed leader of the group. Yugoslavia, while no longer a bloc member, votes much like the other communist states. On anti-colonial issues, countries who distrust Western imperialism more than Soviet communism generally support the bloc.

Western European Nations. Meetings of these nations are held irregularly and without much formality of organization. The initiative for a meeting may come from any member of the group that feels a need for a meeting. The representative from the delegation calling the meeting generally serves as

chairman or the discussion leader in an informal manner.

Voting behavior is most identical on economic, social, and humanitarian issues and least on collective measures.

British Commonwealth Nations. This group has neither geographical nor ideological unity. Its caucuses are very informal discussions and expositions of points of view on issues before the Assembly. These meetings are chaired by the senior British representative, and are held weekly while the Assembly is in session. The harmonizing rule is followed at these meetings. The group almost never votes as a unit. Its greatest agreement is reached on procedural, administrative, and structural issues and on issues of social and cultural cooperation. Ceylon, India, and Ghana appear to be at odds with the group. India, and Pakistan appear to have a distinct tendency to vote with the Arab League on issues wherein the latter group is particularly solid. All members are anti-communist, but differ widely on how best to combat it. The Asian part is anti-colonial while the non-Asian part is very pro-West.

CHART 1

MEMBERSHIP OF CAUCUSING GROUPS

<u>Asian-African</u>	<u>Commonwealth</u>	<u>Scandinavia</u>
Afghanistan	Australia	Denmark
Burma	Canada	Norway
Cambodia	Ceylon	Sweden
Ceylon	Ghana	
Ethiopia	India	
Fed. of Malaya	Fed. of Malaya	<u>Soviet</u>
Ghana	New Zealand	Albania
India	Pakistan	Bulgaria
Indonesia	United Kingdom	Byelorussia
Iran		Czechoslovakia
Japan	<u>Latin America</u>	Hungary
Liberia	Argentina	Poland
Libya	Brazil	Rumania
Morocco	Chile	Ukraine
Pakistan	Colombia	U.S.S.R.
Philippines	Costa Rica	
Sudan	Cuba	<u>Western European</u>
Thailand	Dominican Rep.	Belgium
Tunisia	Guatemala	France
Turkey	Haiti	Italy
United Arab Rep.	Mexico	Netherlands
Yemen	Panama	
	Peru	
<u>African</u>	Uruguay	
Ethiopia	Venezuela	
Ghana		
Liberia	<u>Non-Members</u>	
Libya	Austria	
Morocco	China	
Sudan	Finland	
Tunisia	Greece	
	Ireland	
<u>Arab</u>	Israel	
Iraq	Portugal	
Libya	Spain	
Morocco	United States	
Sudan	Yugoslavia	
Tunisia		
United Arab Rep.		
Yemen		

The Benelux group has been left out. With the elimination of countries due to too many absences, membership of this group has been reduced to two, Belgium and the Netherlands.

CHAPTER II

PROBLEM AND METHOD

The Problem

In the light of the background given in the preceding chapter the specific problem of the present study may now be delineated. It may not be amiss to say that the studies cited proceed in a rationalistic fashion and are minimally empirical. Can similar results be obtained more economically and, perhaps, more precisely by applying a mathematical-statistical tool to data provided by the voting records in the sessions of the General Assembly? Multiple scalogram analysis, as described by Lingoes (1960), seems to offer this possibility. We may ask, therefore, "Given the roll-call voting record in the plenary and committee meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, will multiple scalogram analysis effectively reveal bloc politics in the UN?" It is hypothesized that, with certain restrictions, this is the case. Knudsen (1962) used MSA dimension scores derived from 34 plenary roll-call votes in the twelfth session of the General Assembly to mathematically define voting blocs in the Assembly. She found a definition so derived adequate in terms of actual voting behavior.

She found MSA to be a particularly useful tool because it allows different blocs to appear as different types of issues come into consideration. It would seem, therefore, that this method is useful in revealing the nature of national alignments.

Since the voting of blocs, except in the case of the Soviet bloc, is not always perfectly consistent, the problem of cohesion in caucusing groups emerges. The method of analysis employed herein provides a measure of deviation from bloc voting in terms of "scale scores." It is here proposed that the standard deviation of the distribution of dimension scores of the several blocs provides a means of measuring and comparing the cohesion of these blocs in terms of their voting behavior.

The major hypotheses, or points at issue, of this present study may, therefore, be formally stated as follows:

1. Multiple-scalogram analysis applied to the voting record of a session of the General Assembly will effectively reveal the national alignments in the Assembly and the issues around which they revolve.

2. The dimension scores derived from a multiple-scalogram analysis of the voting record of a session of the General Assembly will reveal differences in the degrees of cohesion among the several groups.

Since MSA as a method for the study of voting behavior is fairly new, this study is of necessity a descriptive, "look-see" type. Conclusions drawn will be based not so much on statistical comparisons, as on comparisons with what is already known about bloc politics from UN documents and other sources, particularly the aforementioned publications about bloc voting behavior in the UN. If, using MSA, it is possible to meaningfully define voting groups and show national alignments, and to determine the cohesion of caucusing groups, then MSA may be said to be a useful method for the study of voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. Or, to generalize beyond the General Assembly, MSA may provide a useful tool for analyzing the nature of coalition in the voting of any legislative body.

Rationale

One of the basic assumptions made here with respect to the voting behavior of countries in the UN General Assembly is that the policies of countries, like attitudes in the case of individuals, mediate their behavior. With this in mind, it seems appropriate to state the scientific bias ascribed to here in regard to the nature and functioning of attitudes and to relate it to the functioning of policies in the behavior of countries. The latter is readily stated by saying that policies

of countries serve the same mediating purposes as attitudes do for individuals, or that policies are in a sense the attitudes of countries. In as much as MSA has been found useful in the analysis of attitudes the choice of this technique for a study of UN voting becomes more understandable.

Attitude is thought of as a latent variable which mediates or directs the responses of individuals toward significant objects. It is a hypothetical construct abstracted from a large number of related acts or responses that have been observed. Thus it is used to name and explain the consistency or covariation of many responses to stimuli of the same general class. These responses are held to be consistent because they are mediated by the same intervening variable, viz. attitude.

Thus the concept of attitude serves to unify as a set of data, the observed responses of an individual. The content of an attitude is, therefore, expressed by the responses which reveal it. In the measurement of an attitude the set of behaviors that express it is sampled. The elements of such a set are responses to specific situations, e.g., statements on a questionnaire. In practice, attitudes are inferred from a process of measurement involving such responses. Such measurement assumes attitudes to have, among other things, the characteristics of specific content and of sign, i.e.,

agreement or disagreement, favor or disfavor, etc. Individuals vary in their attitude relative to some content in the sense that they can be placed at a point, or within a limited range, of a continuum from maximum agreement to maximum disagreement. In the measurement of attitude by scaling methods the objective is to assign individuals to numerical positions along a scale that maps the continuum from extreme approval to extreme disapproval. Such scale positions relative to total range of the scale represents the relative degree of favorableness or unfavorableness of individuals' attitudes. Operationally, then, an attitude is represented by a score or set of scores derived from the application of a particular scale or similar measuring instrument.

For purposes of the present study, countries are equated to individuals and policies of countries are equated to the attitudes of individuals. On the basis of this model it is logical to assume that voting behavior (policies) of countries can be studied much in the same way that attitudes of individuals are studied, i.e., by scaling methods. This implies the following assumptions:

1. A country's policy is a latent variable that summarizes and explains the consistency or covariation of its behavior (in the present context voting on resolutions presented in the UN General Assembly).

2. Roll-call votes in plenary and committee meetings of the General Assembly are samples of voting behavior of the respective countries that are mediated by their policies (analogous to the check marks in dictating agreement or disagreement with statements on an attitude scale).

3. Countries vary in their policies regarding issues so that they can be placed (scaled) along a continuum of agreement-disagreement in regard to a set of issues with which they are confronted and upon which they vote.

4. A country's score, or its scores on various scales so conceptualized, represents the position of its policies relative to other countries who have voted on the particular question under consideration.

It is believed that the MSA model eminently fits UN roll-call data. Like Guttman's scalogram analysis from which it was derived, MSA is deterministic. UN voting is fairly rigid and predictable due to the positions of countries on issues dictated by their policies. The method should, therefore, be capable of quantifying the qualitative aspects of voting data in a meaningful way. MSA forms unidimensional scales in an empirical way. Due to the policies of different countries on general issues, e.g., self-determination, budget, etc., it is possible to qualify the agreement or disagreement of countries toward specific proposals in regard to these issues.

MSA can quantify such qualitative information due to the parameters of order and kind inherent in the method. Practical reasons can also be presented to recommend the method. Thus, since it is an electronic computer technique, large amounts of data can be processed by it easily and speedily. Moreover, it is possible to replicate the method exactly from year to year, making possible trend analysis since UN resolutions deal with the same general type of questions from session to session.

Multiple Scalogram Analysis

Since MSA is a relatively new technique, a somewhat detailed explanation of it is in order. Its particular use in the present context will follow.

MSA was developed by its author at Michigan State University for the purpose of extracting from a collection of data on heterogeneous issues the several scalable dimensions into which they can be organized. It is thus an extension of Guttman's scalogram analysis providing a more objective method for defining the universe of content being sampled than the earlier method. It was developed as an electronic computer technique so that large masses of data could be economically handled. It operates on dichotomous data relative to any number of issues provided by any number of subjects, as e.g., the responses of agreement or disagreement of a group

of subjects relative to the items of a questionnaire, or, in the present instance, on the "yes" and "no" votes of members of a legislative body on the various issues which confront it. MSA breaks these responses down into one or more Guttman scales. These scales are formed by throwing into as many subsets as may be necessary items which are homogeneous in the Guttman sense of unidimensionality. The underlying assumption for this procedure is that items belong to the same common scale if they have more common than unique characteristics.

Items are brought together into scales using a set approach. The dichotomous (yes-no) responses of all subjects toward any given item constitute a set. Thus, in Table 1 below, the responses of 11 subjects to items are shown, with the digit "1" representing "yes" and zero representing "no." There are, therefore, 9 sets of "responses," one each for item 1 through 9. Each column, accordingly, represents a set.

The first step in analyzing such a table is to count the number of 1's in each column and enter the results in a row of column sums, as has been done in the table.

These sums are next examined for the existence of any columns whose sum is less than half of the number of entries in the column. The sums of columns 2, 4 and 8 are such.

TABLE 1

HYPOTHETICAL RESPONSE MATRIX FOR A MSA

Subject	Items								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
B	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
C	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
D	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
E	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
F	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
G	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
H	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1
I	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1
J	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
K	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Sum	6	1	9	4	10	8	6	2	6

Since the method requires that agreement between adjacent columns be maximized all entries in these columns are reflected to form Table 2, i.e., 1's are changed into 0's and 0's are changed into 1's. In these columns now 1's obviously refer to "no" and 0's refer to "yes" responses. A dash is placed over the column heading to indicate that this has been done, as may be seen in Table 2. Reflection is carried out throughout the analysis whenever this will maximize agreement between adjacent columns.

The first scale is started by selecting as its focus the column or set with the largest sum. In our example this

TABLE 2
REFLECTED RESPONSE MATRIX FOR A MSA

Subject	Items								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0
B	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0
C	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0
D	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
E	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
F	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
G	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
H	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
I	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
J	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0
K	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0
Sum	6	9	9	7	10	8	6	9	6

is item #5. Agreement scores (McQuitty, 1956) between this initial set and all other sets are now calculated, counting as agreements all identical pairs such as 1,1 and 0,0. The set which has the highest agreement with the initial set is selected from the pool of items remaining as the second set belonging to the scale. In our example item #3 has 10 agreements with #5 and, therefore, becomes the second member of the scale.

The second set is now used to find the next item which will scale. It is the item which has the highest agreement score with it provided that the error introduced by this set does not exceed some predetermined value. An error occurs

when there is a reversal of the 1,0 pattern, e.g., the pattern 1100 is errorless, but 1101 contains two errors (Lingoes uses Goodenough's method of error count). For our example the allowable error is set at the value of 2, or 20 per cent of the number of respondents. Items that introduce more than two errors do not "scale." The above process is continued until it is no longer possible to add a set to the scale without exceeding the error parameter.

Left over items now form a reduced pool of items which are treated like the original pool and may form a second scale. This is continued until no more scales or dimensions appear.

For our illustrative data the final results turn out as in Table 3. Only one scale has been formed and items #7 and #9 did not scale. The scores of the several subjects are the sums of 1's across rows. No errors appear in the table. Knowing any subject's score and the final ordering of the items in the scale it is now possible to reproduce his responses and from a knowledge of each subject's score it is possible to reproduce the entire response matrix. The reproducibility of such a matrix may be calculated from the formula

$$R = (1 - \frac{\text{Sum of errors}}{mn})$$

where R = reproducibility index, m = the number of items in the scale, and n = the number of subjects. R for the present

TABLE 3
RESULTS OF THE MSA ANALYSIS

Subject	Items							Score	Error
	5	3	6	1	4	8	2		
A	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	0
B	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	6	0
C	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	5	0
D	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	5	0
E	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	4	0
F	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	4	0
G	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0
H	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0
I	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
J	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
K	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

table is 1.00, i.e., the items included form a perfect scale. It will be observed, e.g., that agreement with item 2, which has been reflected and re-reflected in the course of the analysis, means that the subject agrees with all of the other items of the scale, while disagreement with item #1 means disagreement with all the remaining items. The score of a subject is, consequently, a measure of the subject's position on the dimension represented by the scale.

Procedures

The Data

The data analyzed in this study came from the proceedings of the plenary and committee meetings of the General Assembly

of the Thirteenth Session of the United Nations. The documents of these meetings were scrutinized for all roll-call votes. Of these, 33 dealt with resolutions before the plenary meetings of the Assembly and 111 were committee deliberations. Other documents, e.g., Committee Proceedings and the UN Yearbook, were also consulted to determine the nature of the resolutions or issues voted on and the allocation of agenda items. Votes in these documents were recorded by country as: in favor, against, or abstain.

Dichotomization of Data

MSA operates upon dichotomous data. Delegates were at times absent and no vote was recorded for the country. These facts and the abstentions were handled by throwing abstentions with the minority vote and the absences with the majority so that a "yes" or a "no" was tabulated for each country on every item voted upon. The rationale for this procedure was based on the belief that an abstention denotes dissatisfaction with the apparent outcome of the vote, or incomplete agreement with the resolution being voted upon while an absence was indicative of satisfaction with the apparent outcome, or at least unconcern.

The UN had 82 members in its thirteenth session. Of these, the delegates of 15 countries were absent more than 20 times out of the 144 roll-call votes. On the assumption

that so many absences are sufficient to bias the stability and representativeness of the voting of these countries if they are counted in with the majority these 15 countries were not included in the analysis. Appendix A presents a list of the member countries of the thirteenth session of the UN whose voting was analyzed in this study. Appendix B presents the frequency of absences of the various countries, including the 15 which were excluded for the present analysis.

Further Delimitations and Deletions

The 144 items of the roll-calls under consideration are briefly described in Appendix D. Seven of them were procedural in nature such as a motion to give precedence to some resolution in voting (#141) or a motion to adjourn debates. These seven items were analyzed separately from the other items.

Analysis

The votes on the above 93 important issues, dichotomized as already described, were subjected to multiple scalogram analysis using the program prepared by Lingoes and the facilities of the Michigan State Electronic Computer Laboratory.

From the scales resulting from the two MSA's, countries were grouped together according to equivalence of scale scores.

When there were errors, the closest errorless response pattern was "consulted" and the erring country grouped with the countries having the score of the closest response pattern. A bloc was defined as being a group of countries with equivalent scale scores on the same dimension. Each dimension was looked at in terms of the voting blocs and the type of issue in the dimension. The cohesion of caucusing groups was studied by use of the standard deviation of scale scores for each caucusing group. Group variances were computed for each scale resulting from the analysis where all 93 issues were collectively analyzed and for the scale resulting from the analysis of the seven procedural issues. From the spread of scores within the group, and the group mode, it was believed feasible to make conclusions as to the "stand" and the cohesion of these caucusing groups as defined by Hovet. The membership of all caucusing groups as defined by Hovet, excluding the 15 countries not analyzed for reasons stated, are shown in Chart 1.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

The multiple scalogram analysis of the 93 "selected" roll-calls resulted in seven scales. The number of items in each scale varied from three to 21. Scale reproductibilities varied from 0.914 to 0.982, with five of these values well above 0.940. Six items remained unscaled. There was a total of 17 reflections. The seven procedural items gave a scale with a reproductibility of 0.940. Five of the seven items scaled, the last two being reflected. These results are summarized in Table 4 below.

TABLE 4

RESULTS OF THE MSA ANALYSIS

Dimension No.	Scale Reproductibility	No. of Items in the Scale	No. of Reflections in the Scale
1	.982	21	0
2	.954	9	0
3	.951	20	6
4	.932	21	8
5	.914	8	1
6	.970	5	0
7	.970	3	2
"Procedural"	.940	5	2

Appendix C provides full data on all dimensions as well as the response matrix for the countries included in the analysis. Since the support and the disagreements within the "procedural" dimension deal with the individual countries' interpretation of Charter articles or the General Assembly's rules of procedure, this separate MSA analysis was not studied for national alignments or cohesiveness. The data is available if wanted.

Voting Blocs and Issue Content of Dimensions

Issues that scale within a dimension are ordered along a continuum that takes into account both the pattern of responses and the amount of endorsement of items. Essentially, it is how countries vote on issues that determine voting blocs as defined by scale scores. It is, therefore, thought necessary to give the dimensional issue content along with voting bloc results. Charts 2 to 8 on the following pages give voting bloc memberships for each dimension. A brief summary of the dimensional issue content follows or precedes each chart. The overview of the seven dimensions shows that within the inconsistency of voting bloc memberships over dimensions, there are definite trends, or consistencies. There is the existence of two major types of bloc groupings. The first type appears on Dimensions 1, 2, 4, and 7. Here, the Soviet

Bloc, a number of the Asian-African nations, and a few of the Latin American Group are the highest scoring and biggest voting bloc. The United Kingdom, for Dimension 1; Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden for Dimension 2; Australia, Belgium, Italy, and Portugal for Dimension 4; and a few each of the Asian-African Nations, the Latin American Group, the Non-caucusing Group, the British Commonwealth Nations, and the Western European nations; for Dimension 7 are the lowest scoring countries. The second type of voting bloc grouping appears on Dimensions 3, 5, and 6. Here, countries that are Trust Administrators and a conglomeration of memberships of caucusing groups are the high scoring countries. The Soviet Bloc, and a few Asian-African nations are the low scorers on these three dimensions.

The issues that scaled for the dimension below suggests its being a "good-will" dimension. General statements and recommendations are made on issues of economic aid, cessation of Trusteeship Agreements, social and humanitarian questions, human rights, and the apartheid policy. Fifty-six of the 67 countries are in agreement with all 21 items of the scale. Except for New Zealand and the United States, the Colonial Powers are low scoring in this dimension. China and Finland are slightly conservative. The Dominican Republic is surprising in its low scoring on this dimension. The United Kingdom has the lowest score.

CHART 2

VOTING BLOCS ACCORDING TO SCALE SCORES FOR DIMENSION 1

<u>21</u>	Afghanistan	Ceylon	Greece
	Albania	Chile	Guatemala
	Argentina	Colombia	Haiti
	Austria	Costa Rica	Hungary
	Brazil	Cuba	India
	Bulgaria	Czechoslovakia	Indonesia
	Burma	Denmark	Iran
	Byelorussia	Ethiopia	Iraq
	Cambodia	Fed. of Malaya	Ireland
	Canada	Ghana	Israel
	Japan	Philippines	United Arab Rep.
	Liberia	Poland	United States
	Libya	Rumania	Uruguay
	Mexico	Sudan	Venezuela
	Morocco	Sweden	Yemen
	New Zealand	Thailand	Yugoslavia
	Norway	Tunisia	
	Pakistan	Turkey	
	Panama	Ukraine	
	Peru	USSR	
<u>19</u>	China	<u>8</u>	Spain
<u>15</u>	Italy	<u>7</u>	Belgium
			Dominican Rep.
<u>14</u>	Finland	<u>6</u>	Australia
<u>13</u>	Netherlands	<u>5</u>	United Kingdom
<u>9</u>	France		
	Portugal		

CHART 3

VOTING BLOCS ACCORDING TO SCALE SCORES FOR DIMENSION 2

<u>9</u>	Afghanistan	Cuba	Indonesia
	Albania	Czechoslovakia	Iran
	Argentina	Ethiopia	Iraq
	Bulgaria	Fed. of Malaya	Japan
	Burma	Ghana	Liberia
	Byelorussia	Greece	Libya
	Cambodia	Guatemala	Mexico
	Ceylon	Haiti	Morocco
	Colombia	Hungary	Pakistan
	Costa Rica	India	Panama
	Peru	Yugoslavia	
	Poland		
	Rumania		
	Sudan		
	Tunisia		
	Ukraine		
	USSR		
	United Arab Rep.		
	Benezuela		
	Yemen		
<u>8</u>	Dominican Rep.	<u>2</u> Australia	<u>1</u> Canada
	Philippines	Belgium	Ireland
	Thailand	France	New Zealand
		Israel	
<u>7</u>	Brazil	Italy	
	Uruguay	Netherlands	<u>0</u> Denmark
		Portugal	Finland
<u>6</u>	Chile	Spain	Norway
		United Kingdom	Sweden
<u>4</u>	Turkey	United States	
<u>3</u>	Austria		
	China		

Dimension 2, while also a "good-will" dimension is much more specific in its recommendations. Issues deal with international law and administration questions; self-determination and independence questions of certain trust territories. Only 31 of the original 56 high scorers are in the first voting bloc. The Dominican Republic, the Philippines, Thailand, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile are slightly less agreeable. Turkey, Austria, and China begin the low scoring trend. The rest of the countries agree to one or two items while Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden agree to no items.

Dimension 3 issues require almost full international cooperation for resolution recommendation to be effective. It is essentially a cold-war dimension, dealing with political and security measures plus a few political colonial issues. The first voting bloc, comprised of 11 nations and scoring highest is essentially the low scoring group of the previous Dimension 2. Finland here is in the low scoring range while Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are in the middle-of-the-road range. The Soviet Bloc and most of the Asian and the African countries agree to very few of the items. See Chart 4 for these results.

In Dimension 4, the main issues deal with the procedure of administration of recommendations on self-determination,

CHART 4

VOTING BLOCS ACCORDING TO SCALE SCORES FOR DIMENSION 3

<u>0</u>	Albania	<u>10</u>	Liberia	<u>20</u>	Australia
	Bulgaria		Sweden		Belgium
	Byelorussia				Canada
	Czechoslovakia				France
	Ukraine	<u>11</u>	Ireland		Italy
	USSR		Mexico		New Zealand
			Tunisia		Spain
<u>1</u>	Hungary				Thailand
	Poland	<u>13</u>	Greece		Turkey
	Rumania		Denmark		United Kingdom
			Norway		United States
<u>2</u>	Afganistan		Portugal		
	Yugoslavia				
		<u>16</u>	Fed. of Malaya		
<u>4</u>	Ceylon		Peru		
	Finland				
	India	<u>18</u>	Argentina		
	Indonesia		Brazil		
	Iraq		Chile		
	United Arab Rep.		Colombia		
	Yemen		Costa Rica		
			Haiti		
<u>5</u>	Burma		Iran		
	Cambodia		Philippines		
	Ghana		Venezuela		
	Libya				
	Morocco	<u>19</u>	China		
	Sudan		Cuba		
			Dominican Rep.		
<u>7</u>	Ethiopia		Guatemala		
			Japan		
<u>8</u>	Austria		Netherlands		
	Israel		Pakistan		
			Panama		
			Uruguay		

humanitarian economic aid and development, and organizational aspects of two UN Councils. The countries which are voting blocs in the sense of their voting alike on these issues are seen in Chart 5.

The issues in Dimension 5, as in Dimension 3 require international cooperation, but to a lesser degree. The political and security, and colonial issues cover a lesser scope; in terms of countries directly involved in the recommendations and in the seriousness of questions debated. More countries, i.e., 31, are in the highest scoring voting bloc. The Soviet countries and then the Asian and African nations are on the low scoring end of this dimension.

For Dimension 6, all issues deal with the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force. This, in effect, is the only "pure" dimension in the analysis.

Issues in Dimension 7 are strongly debated questions of the Law of the Sea and the Cyprian Question. The dimension is hard to interpret in that Item #1 should scale in either Dimension 3 or 4 and Items #2 and #3 should scale in Dimension 2. The latter two items are the committee considerations of the same issue that scaled in Dimension 2.

CHART 5

VOTING BLOCS ACCORDING TO SCALE SCORES FOR DIMENSION 4

<u>21</u>	Afghanistan		Morocco	<u>18</u>	Burma
	Albania		Poland		Ceylon
	Bulgaria		Rumania		India
	Byelorussia		Sudan		Liberia
	Czechoslovakia		Ukraine		
	Ghana		USSR	<u>14</u>	Tunisia
	Hungary		United Arab Rep.		Ethiopia
	Indonesia		Yugoslavia	<u>13</u>	Greede
	Iraq				Fed. of Malaya
	Libya	<u>20</u>	Yemen		
<u>10</u>	Costa Rica				
	Cambodia	<u>4</u>	China		
<u>9</u>	Guatemala	<u>3</u>	Canada	<u>0</u>	Australia
	Haiti		Denmark		Belgium
	Iran		Netherlands		Italy
	Israel		New Zealand		Portugal
	Japan		Norway		
	Mexico		Sweden		
	Uruguay		Turkey		
	Venezuela		United States		
<u>7</u>	Philippines	<u>2</u>	Brazil		
			Dominican Rep.		
<u>6</u>	Colombia		Finland		
	Cuba		Peru		
	Panama		Spain		
			United Kingdom		
<u>5</u>	Argentina				
	Austria	<u>1</u>	France		
	Chile				
	Ireland				
	Pakistan				
	Thailand				

CHART 6

VOTING BLOCS ACCORDING TO SCALE SCORES FOR DIMENSION 5

<u>0</u>	Albania	<u>6</u>	Indonesia	
	Bulgaria		Mexico	
	Byelorussia		Sudan	
	Czechoslovakia		Yugoslavia	
	Hungary			
	Iraq	<u>7</u>	Argentina	
	Poland		Brazil	
	Rumania		Chile	
	Ukraine		Colombia	
	USSR		India	
			Panama	
	Venezuela		Peru	
	Yemen			
		<u>8</u>	Australia	Dominican Rep.
<u>1</u>	Afghanistan		Austria	Fed. of Malaya
	Libya		Belgium	Finland
	Morocco		Burma	France
	United Arab Rep.		Cambodia	Haiti
	Uruguay		Canada	Iran
			Ceylon	Ireland
<u>2</u>	Ethiopia		China	Israel
	Ghana		Costa Rica	Italy
	Liberia		Denmark	Japan
<u>3</u>	Guatemala		Netherlands	United States
	Tunisia		New Zealand	
			Norway	
<u>4</u>	Cuba		Pakistan	
			Portugal	
<u>5</u>	Greece		Spain	
	Philippines		Sweden	
			Thailand	
			Turkey	
			United Kingdom	

CHART 7

VOTING BLOCS ACCORDING TO SCALE SCORES FOR DIMENSION 6

<u>0</u>	Afghanistan	Hungary	Yemen
	Albania	Iraq	
	Bulgaria	Panama	
	Byelorussia	Philippines	
	Chile	Poland	
	Costa Rica	Rumania	
	Cuba	Tunisia	
	Czechoslovakia	Ukraine	
	Ethiopia	USSR	
	Guatemala	United Arab Rep.	
<u>1</u>	Greece	<u>5</u> cont'd	
	Haiti		
	Mexico	Denmark	Italy
	Portugal	Fed. of Malaya	Japan
		Finland	Liberia
<u>3</u>	China	France	Morocco
	Dominican Rep.	Ghana	Netherlands
	Venezuela	India	New Zealand
		Indonesia	Norway
<u>4</u>	Libya	Iran	Pakistan
		Ireland	Peru
<u>5</u>	Argentina	Israel	Spain
	Australia		
	Austria	Sudan	
	Belgium	Sweden	
	Brazil	Thailand	
	Burma	Turkey	
	Cambodia	United Kingdom	
	Canada	United States	
	Ceylon	Uruguay	
	Colombia	Yugoslavia	

CHART 8

VOTING BLOCS ACCORDING TO SCALE SCORES FOR DIMENSION 7

<u>3</u>	Albania	Finland	Peru
	Argentina	Ghana	Poland
	Brazil	Hungary	Rumania
	Bulgaria	India	Tunisia
	Byelorussia	Indonesia	Ukraine
	Chile	Iraq	USSR
	Colombia	Libya	United Arab Rep.
	Costa Rica	Mexico	Uruguay
	Czechoslovakia	Morocco	Venezuela
	Ethiopia	Panama	Yemen
	Yugoslavia		
<u>2</u>	Afghanistan	<u>0</u>	Australia
	Burma		Belgium
	Cambodia		Canada
	Greece		China
			Cuba
<u>1</u>	Austria		Denmark
	Ceylon		Dominican Rep.
	Guatemala		Fed. of Malaya
	Haiti		France
	Ireland		Iran
	Italy		Turkey
	Japan		United Kingdom
	Spain		United States
	Sudan		
			Israel
			Liberia
			Netherlands
			New Zealand
			Norway
			Pakistan
			Philippines
			Portugal
			Sweden
			Thailand

Group Cohesion

To study the cohesion of the caucusing groups, the standard deviation of the scores of each such group was computed for each dimension resulting from the MSA analysis. Since scales varied in the number of scaled items from 3 to 21, the standard deviation while giving the best measure of dispersion, does not represent the relative dispersion around the means of the various groups in comparable terms. The standard deviation of scales with items less in number than 21 were, therefore, transformed to 21 point scales by multiplication with an appropriate factor (F) as seen at the top of Table 5. The cohesion of a group, relative to the other caucusing groups was determined by the ranking of groups according to the sum of the transformed standard deviations over the seven dimensions. These results are summed in Table 5 below which shows not only the rank order (R) of cohesiveness but also gives a picture of the actual solidarity of the cohesive groups. Beyond doubt, the Soviet group was the most cohesive. Scandinavia was a close second followed by the Western European, Arab, African, Latin American, Asian-African, Non-Members, and the Commonwealth Nations.

TABLE 5

CAUCUSING GROUP COHESION: STANDARD DEVIATIONS
OF SCALE SCORES

		DIMENSION NUMBERS								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
CAUCUSING	F ^a and No. of Items in the Dimension								Σ of	R ^b
GROUP	F=1	F=2-1/3	F=1	F=1	F=2-1/2	F=4	F=5	S.D.'s		
	n=21	n=9	n=20	n=21	n=8	n=5	n=3			
Soviet	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	1	
Scandinavia	0.00	0.00	1.73	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.73	2	
Western Europe	3.65	0.00	0.50	1.41	0.00	0.00	3.50	9.06	3	
Arab	0.00	0.00	2.51	2.61	5.35	10.08	5.25	25.80	4	
African	0.00	0.00	2.61	3.31	4.30	9.48	8.75	28.45	5	
Latin American	3.74	2.36	2.09	2.90	6.70	9.08	8.47	35.34	6	
Asian- African	0.00	2.54	6.64	6.26	7.85	10.04	9.31	42.64	7	
Non- Members	5.28	7.30	6.46	6.36	2.70	6.80	8.40	43.30	8	
Common- wealth	6.84	9.26	7.53	8.21	4.95	0.00	9.10	45.89	9	

^aF is the multiplication factor.

^bR is the rank order of group cohesion.

National Alignments

For this purpose, the score with frequency greater than one-half of the caucusing group number is taken as indicative of the group's alignment on the particular types of issues within the dimensions. The standard deviation of the group and the number of deviants from the "modal" score are also considered in the description of national alignments.

African Nations. For issues that scale in the two good-will dimensions, the African nations give full endorsement and are in perfect agreement in doing so. They are also in agreement with the Assembly majority in this case. On issues requiring international cooperation but to a lesser degree than what has been termed the cold-war issues, the African nations have no definite common stand, though they definitely endorse only a few of the scaled items. Cold-war issues are hesitantly endorsed. Four of the nations agree to one-fourth of scaled items while the remaining three endorse approximately half of the items. On Dimension 4, where the main issues deal with the procedure of administration of recommendations on self-determination, humanitarian economic aid and development, four countries endorse the full 21 items, two endorse 14 and one endorsed 18. The group is quite cohesive with respect to issues endorsed in Dimension 7. Five countries endorse all 3 items, and the other two endorse 1 and

none. The group is quite favorable to items on the financing of the UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force). Four countries endorse all five items, one 4, and the other two, 0.

Arab League. This group of countries is most cohesive on the good-will dimensions. There is perfect cohesion and agreement with the majority. Issues on Dimension 7 are next agreed to in terms of cohesion and endorsement. Six members agreed to all 3 items and the seventh to only 1. The group is favorable to issues dealing with the procedure of administration of recommendations on self-determination, humanitarian economic aid and development, and organizational aspects of two UN councils. Five countries endorsed all 21 items, one 20 and the others, 14. For the financing of UNEF, four countries score 0, and the remaining three 4 or 5. On the remaining two dimensions, i.e., 3 and 5, the group is low scoring. The cold-war issues and the "weaker" dimension 5 issues requiring international cooperation are neither well agreed to nor evoke too much agreement in the amount of the low endorsement given.

Asian-African Nations. The group is solid on good-will issues in Dimension 1 and almost nearly so for Dimension 2. The countries here are also in agreement with the Assembly majority. On the other dimensions, the group is never solid,

in fact generally quite spread-out in scoring. Endorsements are low on Dimension 3 (cold-war issues), and sort of evenly split between high and low on the rest of the dimensions. There is even no pattern to these high-low splits--so not much can be said about the national alignments of this group for issues dealing with: (1) the procedure of administration of recommendations on self-determination, humanitarian economic aid and development; (2) the less encompassing cold-war items of Dimension 5; (3) the financing of UNEF; and (4) the "legal" questions of Dimension 7.

Latin American Group. The group is not perfectly cohesive on any dimension. The most cohesion is on the goodwill issues. On Dimension 1 only the Dominican Republic, with its endorsement of 7 items prevents perfect agreement in the endorsement of all 21 items. The group is also quite cohesive on Dimension 2 and in agreement with the Assembly majority in the endorsement of the 9 scaled items. For Dimension 7, the Latin American countries are also quite cohesive and in agreement with the Assembly majority in endorsing the 3 items. Here ten of the countries scored 3, two scored 1 and the remaining two scored 0. On cold-war issues, the group is not too cohesive. While the trend is to endorse most of the 20 items, seven scored 18, five scored 19 and one scored 11. On less encompassing cold-war issues,

there is quite a bit of variability though a trend to score 7 or 8 and, therefore, remain pretty much in agreement with the Assembly majority. Much the same results are seen for the procedural administrative issues of Dimension 4. The greatest amount of variability is seen on the items dealing with the financing of UNEF. Here there is a high-low split and a few in-betweens. Five nations score 5, two scored 3, two score 1, and five score 0. Generally, i.e., across all dimensions, about two-thirds of the countries vote alike.

Non-caucusing Group. The group is never perfectly cohesive. While there is a great deal of variability as to how countries vote, there are less over-all differences in voting, in this respect than the British Commonwealth Nations. The greatest degree of similarity in voting is on the less-encompassing cold-war issues in Dimension 5. Here eight of the ten nations score 8 and the other two nations, 6 and 5. There is also some degree of cohesion on the good-will issues of Dimension 1. Here six countries vote with the Assembly majority and endorse 21 items while the other four nations are only half agreeable with their scores of 19, 14, 9, and 8. There is no trend of any stateable sort in the remaining five dimensions.

Scandinavian Countries. The group is very cohesive and second in this respect only to the Soviet Bloc. The

only dimension there was any disagreement on was Dimension 3. The group fully endorses the good-will issues on Dimension 1 and in Dimension 2. The "cold-war" Dimension 3 is only half-way agreed to while the less encompassing similar-type issues of Dimension 5 are fully agreed to. Three of the 21 items in the "procedural administrative" Dimension 4 are endorsed. All five items on the financing of UNEF are agreed to and none of the items in Dimension 7.

Soviet Bloc. This group of countries is the most cohesive. As with the Scandinavian countries, there is perfect cohesion except for the cold-war issues. The bloc either endorses all items in a dimension or none at all. Good-will issues for both dimensions are fully endorsed. This is also true for the procedural-administrative Dimension 4 and for Dimension 7. There is no support given to cold-war items of either dimension nor to the financing of UNEF.

Western European Nations. There is perfect cohesion for the good-will issues in Dimension 2, the financing of UNEF, and the less-encompassing cold-war issues of Dimension 5. There is almost perfect cohesion for cold-war issues in Dimension 3. The alignments for these general issue types are; low agreement (score = 2) for Dimension 2, high agreements for Dimensions 3 and 5 (scores = to 20 and 8), and high agreement for Dimension 6. The general trends for the remaining

dimensions are: half-agreeable to good-will issues of Dimension 1, almost no support for the procedural-administrative issues of Dimension 4, and no support for Dimension 7 issues.

British Commonwealth Nations. The group, in terms of its voting behavior seems to split into two subgroups. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom vote alike on four of the seven dimensions. These countries endorse all the cold-war issues on Dimensions 3 and 5, all the items on financing UNEF and none of the issues in Dimension 7. The Asian members of the group are cohesive on both good-will dimensions and vote as the non-Asian members on financing UNEF. The two subgroups vote pretty much alike on Dimension 5, Ghana is the deviant on this dimension by its endorsement of only 2 of the 8 items. On Dimension 2, the Asian part scores high while the four non-Asian members score low; the same trend is apparent for Dimension 4. In general, the two subgroups tend to be on opposite ends of an agreement continuum, and except for a few dimensions are not completely cohesive in their opposite stands on general issue types.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

Comparisons with Outcomes of Previous Studies

African Nations. MSA showed, as Hovet mentioned, that the highest agreement of the group with the Assembly majority is on human rights and economic cooperation issues. It was not possible to support or deny the statement that MSA also showed there was little difference in the voting of the majority of these nations from the Assembly majority according to types of recommendations involved in the voting. Except for Dimensions 1, 2, and 6 it would be hard to determine, from voting bloc memberships whether there was an Assembly majority on these types of issues, or not. The majority of African nations did vote as the Assembly majority did, on endorsing Dimension 6 items. Except for Dimension 6, MSA shows the African Nations and the Arab League to be quite similar in national alignments.

Arab League. On the basis of MSA results, I would venture to qualify the conclusion from previous studies that there is generally no discernable pattern of voting for the group. Dimensions 1, 2 and 4 results support previous studies

in that the greatest amount of cohesion is shown in support of issues on the financial aspects of the economic development of under-developed countries and on anti-colonial measures. The tendency for neutrality on East-West issues is also evident. MSA further shows perfect cohesion on "good-will" dimensions and a definite tendency to endorse many procedural-administrative issues. Cold-war and financial issues are seldom endorsed and if so, in an irregular manner. If one accepts the tag of "not-too-cohesive" for caucusing groups that are in perfect agreement on less than two dimensions, then the Arab League is not too cohesive.

Asian-African Nations. Contrary to Hovet's conclusions that this group is never solid is the perfect cohesion of the group on Dimension 1. There is also a high degree of cohesion on the second good-will dimension. There does not seem to be much justification, in terms of MSA results for the thirteenth General Assembly Session to fear the cohesiveness of this group of nations. On other than "good-will" issues, there is so very little cohesion shown--there are no alignments common to the group as a whole.

Latin American Group. This group does generally vote with the Assembly majority, there is a moderate amount of cohesion in the group with about two-thirds of the group voting alike irrespective of the type of issue under consideration.

Results of Dimension 6 (financing UNEF issues) tend to contradict this statement a bit. The group is generally pro-West and Anti-Communist. The surprising thing about this group is the deviant behavior of the Dominican Republic. Voting bloc results show the tendency of this country to vote as the low-scoring Western European and non-Asian Commonwealth nations.

Non-caucusing Group. Very little can be said here as to comparisons. Important (like the U.S.) or "key" countries are in this group. Alignments on general issue categories as determined by the issue content of dimensions can be determined for the individual countries in this group, rather than for the group as a whole. It is interesting to note that both the Asian-African and the British Commonwealth nations show less agreement in their voting behavior than this non-caucusing group. It is also evident that Yugoslavia, while no longer a member of the Soviet Bloc, still votes pretty much like the Soviet Bloc does. The United States, except for Dimension 1 is generally on the same end of the dimension as the United Kingdom and not too different in its scale score value.

Scandinavian Countries. These nations seem to be more cohesive than pictured by previous studies. The group is consistent except for votes on the cold-war dimension. The Law of the Sea items in Dimension 2 seem to have effectively

separated this group from the rest of the nations, reflecting the quite definite stand taken by these countries on this legal question.

Soviet Bloc. Results of all previous studies are supported here. It is the most cohesive group and the bloc does support issues requiring little or no bloc commitment and opposes fundamental collective security measures.

Western European Nations. This group is more cohesive than previous studies indicated. The previous results of the most identical voting being on economic, social, and humanitarian issues and the least cohesion being shown on collective security measures is contradicted by MSA results. The smallness of the number of countries comprising the group may have been enough to affect scale score standard deviation values this way--or these results maybe peculiar to this session of the General Assembly. It is suggested that trend studies, i.e., the same MSA method, over sessions of the General Assembly be done so that results may be stated and defended with more conviction.

British Commonwealth Nations. Results of previous studies are fully supported. The group almost never votes as a unit. The items on financing UNEF is the only general issue category wherein the group voted identically. There is a definite difference in voting behavior of the Asian and

non-Asian members. While previous studies suggested this, it was never clearly stated.

For this particular General Assembly session, the greatest agreement is not found on procedural, administrative, structural issues; and issues of social and cultural cooperation; but on the issue of financing the United Nations Emergency Force.

What all these results and comparison of results suggest is that the proposed methodology is useful for the study of voting bloc cohesion and national alignments. It would be more meaningful and conclusive to do a trend study over sessions rather than to study a session by itself. Also, this might cut down the number of countries that have to be excluded from the analysis because of too many absences.

It would make interesting speculation and possibly a future area of study to look at why dimensions like 1 and 2, 3 and 5 that contain similar issue types reverse the degree of endorsement of their high and low-scoring voting blocs.

At this point, it might be mentioned that error scores were disregarded in this study and the focus was on the similarity of voting response patterns. It is my belief that UN roll-call voting is a well structured phenomenon in terms of voting, and that errors are not real errors but explainable deviations from the expected "perfect" voting response pattern.

As such, if errors are given much weight in the determination of voting blocs and in the analysis of the cohesion of caucusing groups, this would distort the interpretation of results rather than serve to point out "deviations" as they very effectively do. A look at Dimension 1 may help clarify these statements.

Illustrative Example. On a voluntary basis, all countries agreed to grant economic aid to Somalia. Perfect agreement was also given to resolutions prohibiting slave trade, servitude, and forced or compulsory labor; ceasement of the inforcement of the Trusteeship Agreement approved by the General Assembly on 13 December 1946, upon the attainment of independence by Togoland. The following resolution, no longer agreed to unanimously, dealt with the economic development of underdeveloped countries. The parts of this resolution were: International Cooperation for Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries, UN Capital Development Fund, Promotion of the Proceedings of the Symposium on the Development of Petroleum Resources of Asia and the Far East, and Rosters of Scientific and Technical Personnel of the Less-Developed Countries. Human Rights issues scaled next. The next issues dealt with rights to liberty and security, the prevention of cruel or inhuman treatment, and respect for human rights in a multi-racial society. Following these were mild reprimands

and statements directed at the Union of South West Africa for its governmental policies. No direct action was advocated, no threat of any sort made. The majority of member states were "unhappy" at the conditions within the Union. Member states were then reminded that their policies should be in conformity with their obligations as member states of the UN. Scaling next were various resolutions expressing displeasure at the apartheid policy, as this lead to race conflict in the Union of South Africa. An appeal was made to the government of the Union of South West Africa to enter into negotiations with Pakistan and India. Communications with respect to the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union had been left unanswered. The dimension essentially shows an abundance of good will.

In regard to the errors in the dimension, Brazil is responsible for two. It was the contention of this country that the general tone of the draft resolutions dealing with the economic development of under-developed countries, and the possible solutions to particular commodity problems were too timid for the seriousness of these issues. Canada's and New Zealand's two errors were for items on the issue dealing with recollecting previous consideration of race conflict in the Union of South West Africa. The countries saw no need to mention this in the draft resolution dealing

with race conflict in the Union. Israel's one error was on the item dealing with human rights to liberty and security. No specific reason was given. Israel did propose two amendments that failed to receive the support of the Committee deliberating the issue. Liberia and Libya erred on the human rights item dealing with the prevention of cruel or inhuman treatment. They seemed to be unhappy with the statement of the text (not the content) that had as its aim the outlawing of criminal experimentation without hindering legitimate scientific or medical practices. Italy and the Dominican Republic's two errors are of a different type. They both agreed on the last two items in the scale after having reached their thresholds of agreement several items beforehand. These last two items were the plenary and committee votes on the resolution considering the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa. Apparently, these two countries did not agree with Australia, Belgium, China, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom's views that recommendations on this issue would tamper with the domestic jurisdiction of the nation.

What about national alignments? Assuming a continuum of endorsement underlying each dimension as evidenced by the most common scale score of a caucusing group, a note of warning must be said about the interpretation of scale scores.

One must remember reflection of items (reflection is indicated in Appendix Table C by a - sign before the item number), and interpret scale scores taking this into account. To make the meaning of reflection a little clearer, an example might be in order. Take Afghanistan's score of 2 and Albania's score of 3 on Dimension 7. If the matter of reflection is forgotten, one would err in assuming Albania to be more favorable than Afghanistan is, to the issues in the dimension. Noting that items #109 and #88 (the first and third items to scale), this would mean Albania voted "yes" only to the second scaled item while Afghanistan "yessed" both the second and the third scaled items. In other words, while both countries voted "no" on the first item (the Iranian draft resolution on the Question of Cyprus) and both countries agreed to an amendment to resolution (A/c 6 L. 435) so that the convening of the conference on the Law of the Sea would be delayed, Albania voted "no" to the entire resolution as amended, and Afghanistan "yessed" the amended resolution. Therefore, if reflection is considered, Afghanistan is more favorable to the scaled issues in Dimension 7 than Albania is.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY

Conclusions

This study suggests that:

1. MSA scales dichotomized roll-call votes in a manner that can be meaningfully and logically interpreted in terms of general issue type content.
2. Caucusing group cohesion and stands are obtainable from MSA scale scores.
3. Error scores may be disregarded in determining the voting bloc membership of a country, useful in pointing out deviant "explainable" voting behavior.
4. Voting blocs are: not equivalent to a priori determined caucusing groups, dependent upon the issue content of a dimension. MSA, therefore, seems to be a useful method for the study of voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly.

There are a few suggestions that can be made as to the method of using MSA for this purpose. Voting blocs and caucusing group cohesion could be studied within definite issue categories instead of letting MSA define issue categories

by the issue content of a dimension. As an example, take the following as possible issue categories: political and security questions, procedural issues, economic and financial resolutions, self-determination questions. These could be analyzed separately. Another possibility is to see if the method can pick out colonial questions from the agenda items allocated to the First Committee and the Special Political Committee. While these items are generally assumed to be mainly political in nature, Riggs considered "colonially" tinged issues to bias voting of essentially political issues. He omitted these colonial questions in his study of the United States influence in the General Assembly. The essence of this suggestion is the possibility of limiting the subjective interpretation of dimensional item content. A greater amount of objectivity is somewhat introduced if categorization, by say Committee Agenda item allocation, is done before submitting the data to MSA analysis. This suggestion leaves open the possibility that it might be more meaningful or empirical to analyze by MSA all the data and define that as the category, and the resultant dimensions as sub-categories. Errors could be effectively employed to pin-point "critical" or atypical issues.

Assuming that the method is acceptable, there are some implications as to its utilization. There is a present need

for a method of determining caucusing group cohesion. Many United Nations members are concerned at the large increase in membership of certain groups. They believe that the potential of these groups to carry the Assembly majority is a matter to cause some worry. Information as to the cohesion of voting or caucusing groups is, therefore, valuable. The standard deviation of scale scores on single dimensions or over several dimensions of relevant issues may be very useful this way. This would be feasible since UN issues are of the same general type, session after session. This same reason would make trend studies of scale score defined voting blocs a possibility. The utility of this is no matter of conjecture.

Summary

The main objective of the study was to explore the acceptability of MSA as a method for studying bloc politics in the United Nations General Assembly. The data analyzed were important roll-call votes in the plenary and committee meetings of the General Assembly's thirteenth regular session. Results suggested MSA to be useful in "pulling out" voting blocs, bringing to light national alignments, and providing a means for the determination of caucusing group cohesion.

APPENDIX

TABLE A
COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS

Afghanistan	Finland	Panama
Albania	France	Peru
Argentina	Ghana	Philippines
Australia	Greece	Poland
Austria	Guatemala	Portugal
Belgium	Haiti	Rumania
Brazil	Hungary	Spain
Bulgaria	India	Sudan
Burma	Indonesia	Sweden
Byelorussia	Iran	Thailand
Cambodia	Iraq	Tunisia
Canada	Ireland	Turkey
Ceylon	Israel	Ukraine
Chile	Italy	U.S.S.R.
China	Japan	United Arab Republic
Colombia	Liberia	United Kingdom
Costa Rica	Libya	United States
Cuba	Mexico	Uruguay
Czechoslovakia	Morocco	Venezuela
Denmark	Netherlands	Yemen
Dominican Republic	New Zealand	Yugoslavia
Ethiopia	Norway	
Federation of Malaya	Pakistan	

TABLE B

ABSENCES DURING ROLL-CALL VOTES

Country	No. of Times Absent	
Guinea (admitted on 12 Dec. 1959)	88	
Bolivia	83	
Nicaragua	63	
Laos	58	
El Salvador	56	
Iceland	49	
Luxembourg	43	
Nepal	43	
Honduras	35	
Paraguay	33	
Ecuador	29	
Lebanon	27	
Union of South Africa	26	
Jordan	22	
Saudi Arabia	21	cutting point
-----	-----	
Uruguay	19	
Haiti	15	
Sudan	15	
Yemen	13	
Peru	12	
Costa Rica	11	

Countries above the cutting point were not included in the analysis.

TABLE C

RESULTS OF THE MSA ANALYSIS

Unscaled items:

Item 15	Consideration of words "for the 24th session" of the Trusteeship council and "the Trusteeship Council" in a resolution dealing with the dissemination of information.
Item 51	The reparation of refugees.
Item 53	Consent of individual needed if he is to be subjected to medical or scientific treatment.
Item 81	Good Offices Committee on South West Africa invited to renew discussions with the Government.
Item 83	Reproduction and circulation of verbatim record of debate on report by Good Offices Committee on South West Africa.
Item 84	Debate proceedings on Agenda Item #39, its circulation, reproduction, and the financial implications of all this.

Dimension 1

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>MRP</u>	<u>Brief Item Description</u>
18	1.000	Economic Aid to Somalia.
55	1.000	Prevention of slavery, slave trade, and enforced labor.
28	1.000	Ceasement of trusteeship agreement upon the independence of French Cameroons.
137	0.985	Economic development of under-developed countries.
6	0.985	Possible solutions to particular commodity problems.

TABLE C.--Continued

Dimension 1

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>MRP</u>	<u>Brief Item Description</u>
56	0.970	Rights to liberty and security
54	0.940	Prevention of cruel or inhuman treatment.
104	0.940	Respect for human rights, in a multi-racial society.
121	0.925	#104 in Plenary.
122	0.896	Union of South Africa's governmental policies not consistent with pledges of Member States.
123	0.896	Member states asked to bring policies into conformity with obligations under UN Charter.
105	0.896	#122 in Committee.
106	0.896	#123 in Committee.
125	0.881	Race conflict in South West Africa.
108	0.866	#125 in Plenary.
124	0.851	Reprimand for governmental policies impairing human rights and fundamental freedoms.
107	0.851	#124 in Committee.
120	0.821	Recollection of previous consideration of race conflict question in South Africa.
130	0.821	#120 in Committee.
131	0.866	Treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa.
91	0.866	#131 in Committee

TABLE C.--Continued

The Response Matrix

<u>Country</u>	<u>Matrix</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Errors</u>
Afghanistan	11111111111111111111	21	0
Albania	11111111111111111111	21	0
Argentina	11111111111111111111	21	0
Australia	11111100000000000000	6	0
Austria	11111111111111111111	21	0
Belgium	11111100000000000000	7	0
Brazil	11100111111111111111	19	4
Bulgaria	11111111111111111111	21	0
Burma	11111111111111111111	21	0
Byelorussia	11111111111111111111	21	0
Cambodia	11111111111111111111	21	0
Canada	111111111111111110011	19	4
Ceylon	11111111111111111111	21	0
Chile	11111111111111111111	21	0
China	11111111111111111100	19	0
Colombia	11111111111111111111	21	0
Costa Rica	11111111111111111111	21	0
Cuba	11111111111111111111	21	0
Czechoslovakia	11111111111111111111	21	0
Denmark	11111111111111111111	21	0
Dominican Rep.	11111100000000000011	9	4
Ethiopia	11111111111111111111	21	0
Fed. of Malaya	11111111111111111111	21	0
Finland	11111111111110000000	14	0
France	11111111000000000000	9	0
Ghana	11111111111111111111	21	0
Greece	11111111111111111111	21	0
Guatemala	11111111111111111111	21	0
Haiti	11111111111111111111	21	0
Hungary	11111111111111111111	21	0
India	11111111111111111111	21	0
Indonesia	11111111111111111111	21	0
Iran	11111111111111111111	21	0
Iraq	11111111111111111111	21	0
Ireland	11111111111111111111	21	0
Israel	11111111111111111111	21	0
Italy	1111111111111000011	17	0
Japan	11111111111111111111	21	0
Liberia	11111011111111111111	20	0
Libya	11111011111111111111	20	0

TABLE C.--Continued

The Response Matrix

[illegible]

TABLE C.--Continued

Dimension 2

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>MRP</u>	<u>Brief Item Description</u>
133	0.925	Holding of second conference on the law of the sea.
132	0.881	Proposed change in date of holding second conference on law of the sea.
59	0.731	International respect for right of peoples and nations to self-determination.
58	0.701	The right of peoples and nations to self-determination.
14	0.701	Effects of the European Economic Community.
74	0.687	Information asked of administering authorities.
72	0.701	Economic development of Non-self-Governing Territories.
12	0.687	Attainment of Independence by Trust Territories.
11	0.672	Speedy creation of preconditions for independence.

The Response Matrix

<u>Country</u>	<u>Matrix</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Errors</u>
Afghanistan	111111111	9	0
Albania	111111111	9	0
Argentina	111111111	9	0
Australia	110000000	2	0
Austria	111000000	3	0
Belgium	110000000	2	0
Brazil	111111100	7	0
Bulgaria	111111111	9	0
Burma	111111111	9	0
Byelorussia	111111111	9	0
Cambodia	001111111	7	4
Canada	100000000	1	0

TABLE C.--Continued

The Response Matrix

<u>Country</u>	<u>Matrix</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Errors</u>
Ceylon	111111111	9	0
Chile	111111000	6	0
China	111000011	5	4
Colombia	111111111	9	0
Costa Rica	111111111	9	0
Cuba	111110111	8	2
Czechoslovakia	111111111	9	0
Denmark	000000000	0	0
Dominican Rep.	111111110	8	0
Ethiopia	111111111	9	0
Fed. of Malaya	111111111	9	0
Finland	000000000	0	0
France	110000000	2	0
Ghana	111111111	9	0
Greece	111111111	9	0
Guatemala	111111111	9	0
Haiti	111111111	9	0
Hungary	111111111	9	0
India	111111111	9	0
Indonesia	111111111	9	0
Iran	111111111	9	0
Iraq	111111111	9	0
Ireland	100000101	3	4
Israel	110000111	5	6
Italy	110000000	2	0
Japan	111011011	7	4
Liberia	111111111	9	0
Libya	111111111	9	0
Mexico	111111111	9	0
Morocco	111111111	9	0
Netherlands	110000000	2	0
New Zealand	100000000	1	0
Norway	000000000	0	0
Pakistan	111111111	9	0
Panama	111111111	9	0
Peru	111111111	9	0
Philippines	111111110	8	0
Poland	111111111	9	0
Portugal	110000000	2	0
Rumania	111111111	9	0
Spain	110000000	2	0

TABLE C.--Continued

Response Matrix

<u>Country</u>	<u>Matrix</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Errors</u>
Sudan	111111111	9	0
Sweden	000000000	0	0
Thailand	110111110	7	2
Tunisia	111111111	9	0
Turkey	111100000	4	0
Ukraine	111111111	9	0
USSR	111111111	9	0
United Arab Rep.	111111111	9	0
United Kingdom	110000000	2	0
United States	110000001	3	2
Uruguay	111111100	7	0
Venezuela	111111111	9	0
Yemen	111111111	9	0
Yugoslavia	111111111	9	0

TABLE C.--Continued

Dimension 3

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>MRP</u>	<u>Brief Item Description</u>
4	0.910	Motion to include in the provisional agenda of the 14th session the question of amending the U.N. Charter. This would be in connection with allowing the increase in membership of the Economic and Social Council.
30	0.851	French Cameroons to be admitted into the U.N., upon attainment of independence.
136	0.821	Promotion of the international flow of private capital.
48	0.821	#136 in Committee.
112	0.731	Include "the situation in Hungary" in the agenda?
129	0.642	The Korean Question.
42	0.642	#129 in Committee.
139	0.642	Ad hoc committee established to study peaceful uses of outer space.
90	0.597	See #139 in Committee.
126	0.567	Discontinuance of nuclear weapons testing.
95	0.552	Resolution dealing with ceasement of nuclear weapons testing.
-97	0.537	Reduction of military budgets.
-127	0.522	Immediate discontinuance of nuclear weapons testing.
-113	0.552	Amendment to place question of representation of China on Agenda.
115	0.552	Exclude from the agenda the question of the representation of China in the U.N.

TABLE C.--Continued

Dimension 3

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>MRP</u>	<u>Brief Item Description</u>
117	0.507	The representation of China in the U.N.
116	0.522	The question of the representation of China to be considered at 13th regular session of the General Assembly.
-114	0.537	General Assembly will consider proposals regarding the representation of China in the U.N.
-89	0.687	USSR and United States asked to cooperate to facilitate the consideration of the peaceful uses of outer space.
-47	0.761	The U.N. Capital Development Fund.

The Response Matrix

<u>Country</u>	<u>Matrix</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Errors</u>
Afghanistan	11000000000000000000	2	0
Albania	00000000000000000000	0	0
Argentina	11111111111111111100	18	0
Australia	11111111111111111111	20	0
Austria	11111110000000000000	8	0
Belgium	11111111111111111111	20	0
Brazil	10111111111111111100	17	0
Bulgaria	00000000000000000000	0	0
Burma	11111000000000000000	5	0
Byelorussia	00000000000000000000	0	0
Cambodia	11111000000000000000	5	0
Canada	11111111111111111111	20	0
Ceylon	11110000000000000000	4	0
Chile	11111111111111111100	18	0
China	11111111111111111110	19	0
Colombia	11111111111111111100	18	0
Costa Rica	11111111111111111100	18	0
Cuba	11111111111111111110	19	0
Czechoslovakia	00000000000000000000	0	0
Denmark	11111111111110000001	14	0
Dominican Rep.	11111111111111111110	19	0

TABLE C.--Continued

The Response Matrix

<u>Country</u>	<u>Matrix</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Errors</u>
Ethiopia	11111110000000011100	10	6
Fed. of Malaya	11111111111101110000	15	2
Finland	11110000000000000001	5	2
France	11111111100011111111	17	6
Ghana	11111000000000000000	5	0
Greece	11111111111110000000	13	0
Guatemala	11111111111111111110	19	0
Haiti	11111111111111111100	18	0
Hungary	10000000000000000000	1	0
India	11110000000000000000	4	0
Indonesia	11110000000000000000	4	0
Iran	11111111111001111100	16	0
Iraq	11110000000000000000	4	0
Ireland	11111111111000000000	11	0
Israel	11111110000100000000	9	2
Italy	11111111111111111111	20	0
Japan	11111111001011111110	16	6
Liberia	11111111110000011100	13	6
Libya	11111000000000000000	5	0
Mexico	11001111111000011000	11	4
Morocco	11111000000000000000	5	0
Netherlands	11111111111111111110	19	0
New Zealand	11111111111000111111	17	6
Norway	11111111111110000001	14	2
Pakistan	11111111111011111110	18	2
Panama	11111111111011111110	18	2
Peru	11111111111111110000	16	0
Philippines	11111111111111111100	18	0
Poland	10000000000000000000	1	0
Portugal	11111111111110000011	15	4
Rumania	10000000000000000000	1	0
Spain	11111111111111111111	20	0
Sudan	11111000011000000000	7	4
Sweden	11111111110000000001	9	2
Thailand	11111111111111111111	20	0
Tunisia	11111111111000000000	11	0
Turkey	11111111111111111111	20	0
Ukraine	00000000000000000000	0	0
USSR	00000000000000000000	0	0
United Arab Rep.	11110000000000000000	4	0
United Kingdom	11111111111111111111	20	0
United States	11111111111111111111	20	0
Uruguay	11111111111111111110	19	0
Venezuela	11111111111111111100	18	0
Yemen	11110001000000000000	5	~

TABLE C.--Continued

Dimension 4

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>MRP</u>	<u>Brief Item Description</u>
16	0.881	Dissemination of information.
17	0.940	Study and training facilities offered to inhabitants of trust territories.
50	0.791	Refugees in Morocco and Tunisia.
119	0.716	Conditions in South West Africa.
82	0.701	#119 in Committee.
13	0.567	Emphasis in tone of draft resolution directed to Trust Administrators.
73	0.537	Information asked of administering authorities.
70	0.582	Who to prepare the summary of opinions on questions of transmission and examination of information.
71	0.597	Transmission and examination of information.
43	0.567	Governing Council membership to be selected by General Assembly.
118	0.567	#43 in Plenary.
-44	0.597	Members of Governing Council of Special Fund to be chosen by Economic and Social Council.
142	0.552	Question of Algeria.
93	0.582	#142 in Committee.
-130	0.642	Amend U.N. Charter to increase membership of Economic and Social Council.
-2	0.642	Preamble of resolution by the Special Political Committee on the question of increasing the membership of the Economic and Social Council.

TABLE C.--Continued

Dimension 4

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>MRP</u>	<u>Brief Item Description</u>
-3	0.642	Increased membership of Council needed in view of increased membership of the U.N.
-5	0.672	Question of increasing membership of Economic and Social Council.
-143	0.716	Future of the trust territory of the Cameroons under French administration.
-31	0.687	#143 in Committee.
-134	0.657	The situation in Hungary.

The Response Matrix

<u>Country</u>	<u>Matrix</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Errors</u>
Afghanistan	11111111111111111111	21	0
Albania	11111111111111111111	21	0
Argentina	11111001100000000000	7	4
Australia	00100000000000000000	1	2
Austria	11111000000000000000	5	0
Belgium	00000000000000000000	0	0
Brazil	11000000011000000000	5	6
Bulgaria	11111111111111111111	21	0
Burma	11111111111111111000	18	0
Byelorussia	11111111111111111111	21	0
Cambodia	11111111100001111000	14	0
Canada	11100000000000000000	3	0
Ceylon	11111111111111111001	19	2
Chile	11011000000000000000	4	2
China	11110000000000000000	4	0
Colombia	11111100000000000000	6	0
Costa Rica	11111111110000000000	10	0
Cuba	11011100000000000000	5	2
Czechoslovakia	11111111111111111111	21	0
Denmark	11100000000000000000	3	0
Dominican Rep.	11000001100000000000	4	4
Ethiopia	111111111111110000001	15	2
Fed. of Malaya	111110011111100000000	11	4
Finland	110000000000000000001	3	2
France	100000000000110000000	3	4

TABLE C.--Continued

The Response Matrix

Country	Matrix	Score	Errors
Ghana	01111111111111111111	20	2
Greece	111111111111100000011	15	4
Guatemala	110111111000000000000	8	2
Haiti	111111011000000000000	8	2
Hungary	11111111111111111111	21	0
India	111111111111111111001	19	2
Indonesia	111111111111111111111	21	0
Iran	111110111000110000000	10	4
Iraq	111111111111111111111	21	0
Ireland	111110000000100000000	6	2
Israel	110110011000000000000	6	4
Italy	010000000000000000000	1	2
Japan	111111111000000000000	9	0
Liberia	011111111011111111000	16	4
Libya	111111111111111110111	20	2
Mexico	111111111000000000000	9	0
Morocco	111111111111111110111	20	2
Netherlands	111000000000000000000	3	0
New Zealand	111000000000000000000	3	0
Norway	111000000000000000000	3	0
Pakistan	111110000000010000000	6	2
Panama	111111001000000000000	7	2
Peru	110000100000000000000	3	2
Philippines	111111100000000000000	7	0
Poland	111111111111111111111	21	0
Portugal	000000000011000000000	2	4
Rumania	111111111111111111111	21	0
Spain	110000000000000000000	2	0
Sudan	011111111110111111011	18	4
Sweden	111000000000000000000	3	0
Thailand	111110000000000000000	5	0
Tunisia	111111111111110000110	16	0
Turkey	111000000000000000000	21	0
Ukraine	111111111111111111111	21	0
USSR	111111111111111111111	21	0
United Arab Rep.	011111111111111111111	20	2
United Kingdom	110000000000000000000	2	0
United States	111000000000000000000	3	0
Uruguay	111111111000000000000	9	0
Venezuela	111111111000000000000	9	0
Yemen	111111111110111111110	19	0
Yugoslavia	111111111111111111111	21	0

TABLE C.--Continued

Dimension 5

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>MRP</u>	<u>Brief Item Description</u>
52	0.761	The celebration of World Refugee Year.
128	0.687	Financing of the United Nations Emergency Force.
36	0.701	Plebiscite for Southern Cameroons to be discussed at 14th session.
144	0.701	The future of the Cameroons under British administration.
37	0.701	#144 in Committee.
35	0.567	The details of the plebiscite to be held in northern British Cameroons.
29	0.597	The elections to be held in French administered Cameroons.
-86	0.537	Statement that considerable preparatory work is necessary for a successful conference on the law of the sea.

The Response Matrix

<u>Country</u>	<u>Matrix</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Errors</u>
Afghanistan	10000000	1	0
Albania	00000000	0	0
Argentina	11111110	7	0
Australia	11111111	8	0
Austria	11111011	7	2
Belgium	11111011	7	2
Brazil	11111110	7	2
Bulgaria	00000000	0	0
Burma	01111111	7	2
Byelorussia	00000000	0	0
Cambodia	00111111	6	4
Canada	11111111	8	0
Ceylon	11111111	8	0
Chile	10111110	6	2
China	11111111	8	0
Colombia	11111110	7	0
Costa Rica	11111111	8	0
Cuba	11011001	5	2

TABLE C.--Continued

The Response Matrix

<u>Country</u>	<u>Matrix</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Errors</u>
Czechoslovakia	00000000	0	0
Denmark	11111111	8	0
Dominican Rep.	11111111	8	0
Ethiopia	11000010	3	2
Fed. of Malaya	11111111	8	0
Finland	11111111	8	0
France	11111111	8	0
Ghana	11000000	2	0
Greece	11111001	6	2
Guatemala	11100011	5	4
Haiti	11111011	7	2
Hungary	00000000	0	0
India	01111110	6	2
Indonesia	11111100	6	0
Iran	11111111	8	0
Iraq	00100000	1	2
Ireland	11111111	8	0
Israel	11111111	8	0
Italy	11111111	8	0
Japan	11111111	8	0
Liberia	11000001	3	2
Libya	10000000	1	0
Mexico	10111100	5	2
Morocco	10000000	1	0
Netherlands	11111111	8	0
New Zealand	11111111	8	0
Norway	11111111	8	0
Pakistan	11111111	8	0
Panama	11111010	6	2
Peru	11111110	7	0
Philippines	10111001	5	2
Poland	00000000	0	0
Portugal	11111111	8	0
Rumania	00000000	8	0
Spain	01111111	7	2
Sudan	11111100	6	0
Sweden	11111111	8	0
Thailand	11111111	8	0
Tunisia	11100000	3	0
Turkey	11111111	8	0
Ukraine	00000000	0	0
USSR	00000000	0	0

TABLE C.--Continued

Response Matrix

<u>Country</u>	<u>Matrix</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Errors</u>
United Arab Rep.	10000000	1	0
United Kingdom	11111111	8	0
United States	11111111	8	0
Uruguay	10011000	3	4
Venezuela	00011000	2	4
Yemen	00000000	0	0
Yugoslavia	11111100	6	0

TABLE C.--Continued

Dimension 6

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>MRP</u>	<u>Brief Item Description</u>
101	0.642	Secretary General requested to consult member states on the financing of the UNEF in the future.
100	0.612	Special contributions to UNEF and the 1959 assessments.
99	0.642	Rounding off of the amount of the maximum appropriation for UNEF.
102	0.582	Financing the UNEF.
138	0.567	#102 in Plenary.

The Response Matrix

<u>Country</u>	<u>Matrix</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Errors</u>
Afghanistan	00000	0	0
Albania	00000	0	0
Argentina	11111	5	0
Australia	11111	5	0
Austria	11111	5	0
Belgium	11111	5	0
Brazil	11111	5	0
Bulgaria	00000	0	0
Burma	11111	5	0
Byelorussia	00000	5	0
Cambodia	11111	5	0
Canada	11111	5	0
Ceylon	11111	5	0
Chile	00000	0	0
China	11100	3	0
Colombia	11111	5	0
Costa Rica	00000	0	0
Cuba	00000	0	0
Czechoslovakia	00000	0	0
Denmark	11111	5	0
Dominican Rep.	11100	3	0
Ethiopia	00000	0	0
Fed. of Malaya	11111	5	0
Finland	01111	4	2
France	11111	5	0

TABLE C.--Continued

The Response Matrix

<u>Country</u>	<u>Matrix</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Errors</u>
Ghana	10111	4	2
Greece	10000	1	0
Guatemala	00000	0	0
Haiti	10000	1	0
Hungary	00000	0	0
India	01111	4	0
Indonesia	11111	5	0
Iran	11111	5	0
Iraq	00000	0	0
Ireland	11111	5	0
Israel	11111	5	0
Italy	11111	5	0
Japan	11111	5	0
Liberia	11111	5	0
Libya	11110	4	0
Mexico	10000	1	0
Morocco	11111	5	0
Netherlands	11111	5	0
New Zealand	11111	5	0
Norway	11111	5	0
Pakistan	11111	5	0
Panama	00000	0	0
Peru	11111	5	0
Philippines	00000	0	0
Poland	00000	0	0
Portugal	10000	1	0
Rumania	00000	0	0
Spain	11111	5	0
Sudan	11111	5	0
Sweden	11111	5	0
Thailand	11111	5	0
Tunisia	00000	0	0
Turkey	11111	5	0
Ukraine	00000	0	0
USSR	00000	0	0
United Arab Rep.	00000	0	0
United Kingdom	01111	4	2
United States	11111	5	0
Uruguay	11111	5	0
Venezuela	11100	3	0
Yemen	00100	1	2
Yugoslavia	11111	5	0

TABLE C.--Continued

Dimension 7

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>MRP</u>	<u>Brief Item Description</u>
-109	0.612	Iranian draft resolution on the Question of Cyprus.
87	0.522	Delay in the convening of the conference on the law of the sea.
-88	0.537	Conference on the law of the sea.

The Response Matrix

<u>Country</u>	<u>Matrix</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Errors</u>
Afghanistan	110	2	0
Albania	111	3	0
Argentina	111	3	0
Australia	000	0	0
Austria	100	1	0
Belgium	000	0	0
Brazil	111	0	0
Bulgaria	111	3	0
Burma	110	2	0
Byelorussia	111	3	0
Cambodia	110	2	0
Canada	000	0	0
Ceylon	100	1	0
Chile	111	3	0
China	000	0	0
Colombia	111	3	0
Costa Rica	111	3	0
Cuba	000	0	0
Czechoslovakia	111	3	0
Denmark	000	0	0
Dominican Rep.	000	3	0
Ethiopia	111	3	0
Fed. of Malaya	000	0	0
Finland	111	3	0
France	000	0	0
Ghana	111	3	0
Greece	110	2	0
Guatemala	100	1	0
Haiti	100	1	0
Hungary	111	3	0

TABLE C.--Continued

The Response Matrix

<u>Country</u>	<u>Matrix</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Errors</u>
India	111	3	0
Indonesia	111	3	0
Iran	000	3	0
Iraq	111	3	0
Ireland	100	1	0
Israel	000	0	0
Italy	100	1	0
Japan	100	1	0
Liberia	000	0	0
Libya	011	2	2
Mexico	011	2	2
Morocco	111	3	0
Netherlands	000	0	0
New Zealand	000	0	0
Norway	000	0	0
Pakistan	000	0	0
Panama	111	3	0
Peru	011	2	2
Philippines	000	0	0
Poland	111	3	0
Portugal	000	0	0
Rumania	111	3	0
Spain	100	1	0
Sudan	100	1	0
Sweden	000	0	0
Thailand	000	0	0
Tunisia	111	3	0
Turkey	000	0	0
Ukraine	111	3	0
USSR	111	3	0
United Arab Rep.	111	3	0
United Kingdom	000	0	0
United States	000	0	0
Uruguay	111	3	0
Venezuela	111	3	0
Yemen	111	3	0
Yugoslavia	111	3	0

TABLE C.--Continued

For the seven procedural issues, the following results were obtained: one scale, R equal to 0.940, five scaled items, two reflections (the last two items). Two items failed to scale. These were items 19 and 21. Item 19 was a request that the four petitioners make further statements and answer questions with respect to the Trust Territories of the Cameroons. Item 21 was a request by Mr. Moumie for a hearing before the General Assembly. A brief overview of the resultant scale is given below.

DIMENSION 1

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>MRP</u>	<u>Brief Item Description</u>
76	.806	Hearings granted Mr.s Kerina and Scott with respect to Good Offices Committee report on Question of South West Africa.
75	.612	#76 but with respect to report of Committee on South West Africa.
7	.522	Hearing granted Mr. Kale, an individual petition from Ruanda-Urundi.
-20	.507	Motion; adjourn debate on future of Trust Territories of Cameroons till delegates ready to come to a vote on the question.
-141	.522	Motion; take separate votes on parts of resolution dealing with Question of Algeria.

TABLE C.--Continued

The Response Matrix

<u>Country</u>	<u>Matrix</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Errors</u>
Afghanistan	11111	5	0
Albania	11111	5	0
Argentina	11000	2	0
Australia	00000	0	0
Austria	10000	1	0
Belgium	00000	0	0
Brazil	10000	1	0
Bulgaria	11111	5	0
Burma	11111	5	0
Byelorussia	11111	5	0
Cambodia	11100	3	0
Canada	10000	1	0
Ceylon	11111	5	0
Chile	10000	1	0
China	10000	1	0
Colombia	10000	1	0
Costa Rica	11110	4	0
Cuba	11000	2	0
Czechoslovakia	11111	5	0
Denmark	10000	1	0
Dominican Rep.	00000	0	0
Ethiopia	11111	5	0
Fed. of Malaya	11101	4	2
Finland	10000	1	0
France	00001	1	2
Ghana	11111	5	0
Greece	11111	5	0
Guatemala	11110	4	0
Haiti	11100	3	0
Hungary	11111	5	0
India	11111	5	0
Indonesia	11111	5	0
Iran	11111	5	0
Iraq	11111	5	0
Ireland	10001	2	2
Israel	11000	2	2
Italy	00000	0	0
Japan	00001	1	2
Liberia	11110	4	0
Libya	11111	5	0
Mexico	11110	4	0

TABLE C.--Continued

The Response Matrix

<u>Country</u>	<u>Matrix</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Errors</u>
Morocco	11111	5	0
Netherlands	00000	0	0
New Zealand	00000	0	0
Norway	10000	1	0
Pakistan	11001	3	2
Panama	11000	2	0
Peru	10000	1	0
Philippines	10110	3	2
Poland	11111	5	0
Portugal	00000	0	0
Rumania	11111	5	0
Spain	01000	1	2
Sudan	11111	5	0
Sweden	10000	1	0
Thailand	00000	0	0
Tunisia	11011	4	2
Turkey	00011	2	4
Ukraine	11111	5	0
USSR	11111	5	0
United Arab Rep.	11111	5	0
United Kingdom	00000	0	0
United States	10000	1	0
Uruguay	11100	1	0
Venezuela	11110	4	0
Yemen	11111	5	0
Yugoslavia	11111	5	0

TABLE D

IDENTIFICATION OF ALL COMMITTEE AND PLENARY ROLL-CALL
VOTES FOR THE 13th SESSION OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY

(Items 1 to 111 are committee roll-calls,
items 112 to 144 Plenary roll-calls.)

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION
1*	Amendment to draft resolution regarding formulation of special policies related to economic development. Adopted [by roll-call vote of] 28, 25, 14. Annexes, 12, p. 8.
2	Adoption of preamble of draft resolution (A/SPC/L.29 and Add. 1) by Special Political Committee. The question of increasing membership of Economic and Social Council. Adopted [by roll-call vote of] 47, 9, 16. Annexes, 12, p. 13.
3	O.P.#1 of preceeding resolution. Increase in membership of Council needed in view of increased membership of United Nations. This to enable Council to preserve its "expeditious conduct" in its work. Adopted by roll-call vote of 47, 9, 16. Annexes, 12, p. 13.
4	O.P.#2 of same resolution. Include in provisional agenda of 14th General Assembly the question of amending United Nations Charter to allow the increase in membership of Economic and Social Council. Adopted by roll-call vote of 66, 0, 6. Annexes, 12, p. 13.
5	Entire draft resolution (A/SPC/L.29 and Add. 1). Adopted by roll-call vote of 49, 9, 14. Annexes, 12, p. 13.
6	Possible solutions to particular commodity problems. Second Committee recommendations for the economic development of under-developed countries. Adopted, 67, 1, 0. Annexes, 12, p. 19.

* Issue not included in analysis.

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION
7 ^P	Granting of hearing to Mr. John Kale, an individual petitioner from the trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi. Approved, 36, 23, 16. Annexes, 13, p. 6.
8*	U.S.S.R. amendment assuring speedy achievement of independence within limit of 5 years for Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi. Rejected by roll-call vote of 34, 18, 19. Annexes, 13, p. 7.
9*	Chilean amendment, rewording of a paragraph on the speedy creation of preconditions for attainment of independence pursuant to requests of Trusteeship Council of the General Assembly. Rejected by roll-call vote of 33, 26, 12. Annexes, 13, p. 7.
10*	U.S.S.R. amendment to insure achievement of preconditions for independence within a period of no later than three years. Rejected by roll-call vote of 31, 22, 18. Annexes, 13, p. 7.
11	Paragraph on speedy creation of preconditions, without amendment. Approved, 46, 9, 16. Annexes, 13, p.7.
12	Entire draft resolution, as revised. The attainment of independence by Trust Territories. Approved, by roll-call vote of 47, 18, 6. Annexes, 13, p. 8.
13	Question of emphasis in draft resolution directed to Trust Administrators. Approved by roll-call vote of 39, 20, 13. Annexes, 13, p. 8.
14	Entire draft resolution mentioned in issue #13. Approved by roll-call vote of 50, 17, 5. Annexes, 13, p. 8.
15	Words "for the twenty-fourth session of the Trusteeship Council" and "the Trusteeship Council" in draft resolution below. Approved, 29, 1, 41. Annexes, 13, p. 9.
16	The dissemination of information on United Nations and International Trusteeship System in Trust Territories. Approved, 61, 3, 9. Annexes, 13, p. 9.

^P Issues categorized as "Procedural."

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION
17	Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Trust Territories. Approved, 65, 0, 4. Annexes, 13, p. 10.
18	Economic aid to Somalia. Approved, 67, 0, 0. Annexes, 13, p. 11.
19 ^P	Four petitioners "invited" to make further statements and answer questions during general debate of Fourth Committee, without being retained on the floor; this in connection with the Future of the Trust Territories of the Cameroons under French Administration and the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration. Approved by roll-call vote of 34, 9, 27. Annexes, 13, p. 12.
20 ^P	Motion to adjourn debate on item of future of Trust Territories mentioned in issue above until such a time as delegations were prepared to come to a vote on resolutions. Rejected by roll-call vote of 34, 29, 9. Annexes, 13, p. 13.
21 ^P	Mr. Felix Roland Moumie, representative from Union des populations du Cameroun, to be granted hearing. Approved, 34, 17, 9. Annexes, 13, p. 27.
22*	Proposed revisions in resolution of Fourth Committee
23*	regarding the future of Trust Territory of Cameroons
24*	under French Administration. In order, roll-call
25*	votes are as follows: Rejected, 45, 30, 6.
26*	Annexes, 13, p. 30. Rejected, 42, 28, 11. Annexes,
27*	13, p. 30. Rejected, 47, 27, 7. Annexes, 13, p. 30. Rejected, 46, 28, 7. Annexes, 13, p. 30. Approved, 58, 11, 12. Annexes, 13, p. 31. Approved, 53, 10, 17. Annexes, 13, p. 31.
28	Ceasement of Trusteeship Agreement of December 13, 1946 upon independence of Cameroons under French administration. Approved by roll-call vote of 81, 0, 0. Annexes, 13, p. 31.
29	O.P.#2, without revision. Confidence expressed for elections to be held, soon after independence to form new Assembly in Cameroons formerly under French Administration. Approved by roll-call vote of 48, 0, 33.

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION
30	O.P.#3. Recommend admittance to membership in United Nations, upon independence, of Cameroons under French administration. Approved by roll-call vote of 71, 0, 10. Annexes, 13, p. 31.
31	Resolution discussed from item 22 to 30. Approved by roll-call vote of 56, 9, 16. Annexes, 13, p. 32.
	Issues 32 to 37 deal with: The future of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration. 32, 33, and 34 are amendments to manner in which plebiscite will be carried out. 35 and 36 are operative paragraphs of the unrevised resolution text, 37 the entire draft resolution.
32*	"On the basis of adult human suffrage" to be inserted in O.P.#2. Rejected by roll-call of 34, 25, 22. Annexes, 13, p. 33.
33*	Deletion of phrase providing for plebiscite to be conducted on basis of electoral register then being compiled for elections to the Federal House of Representatives. Rejected by roll-call vote of 43, 21, 17. Annexes, 33, p. 34.
34*	Redraft 'Are you in favor of deciding the future of the Northern Cameroons at a later date?' to 'Do you wish to unite with an independent Cameroons?' Rejected by roll-call vote of 43, 21, 17. Annexex, 13, p. 34.
35	O.P.#2. Recommendation that plebiscite in northern part of territory take place about middle of November, 1959, to be conducted on basis of electoral register then being prepared. Questions to be asked of people the ff. (a) Do you wish the Northern Cameroons to be part of the Northern Region of Nigeria when the Federation of Nigeria becomes independent? or (b) Are you in favor of deciding the future of the Northern Cameroons at a later date? Approved by roll-call vote of 47, 2, 32. Annexes, 13, p. 34.

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION
36	O.P.#4. Alternatives of voting qualifications for natives in southern part of territory to be considered at 14th session of General Assembly. Approved by roll-call vote of 55, 1, 25. Annexes, 13, p. 34.
37	Entire draft resolution. Approved by roll-call vote of 67, 0, 11. Annexes, 13, p. 35.
*	Issues 38 to 41 are respectively issues 2, 3, 4, and 5. These were given in a report of the Special Political Committee on the third of December, 1958, in connection with agenda items 21, 22, and 23; which the General Assembly decided to consider at its 14th session.
42	The Korean Question. Adopted by roll-call vote of 52, 9, 18. Annexes, 24, p. 6.
43	Amendment to provide that members of the Governing Council of the Special Fund be selected by General Assembly and not the Economic and Social Council as suggested by Preparatory Committee. Rejected by roll-call vote of 46, 29, 1. Annexes, 28, p. 3.
44	Members of the Governing Council to be chosen by Economic and Social Council. Adopted by roll-call of 44, 26, 4. Annexes, 28, p. 4.
45*	Amendment to urge the early achievement of conditions that would make practicable the speedy establishment of a United Nations Capital Development Fund. Rejected by roll-call vote of 47, 8, 21. Annexes, 28, p. 7.
46*	The above to be accomplished "within the framework of the United Nations." Rejected by roll-call of 43, 16, 17. Annexes, 28, p. 7.
47	Draft Resolution B dealing with the United Nations Capital Development Fund. Adopted by roll-call vote of 58, 0, 18. Annexes, 28, p. 8.
48	Draft Resolution C dealing with promotion of the international flow of private capital. Adopted by roll-call vote of 53, 9, 3. Annexes, 28, p. 9.

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION
49*	Amendment to resolution on the establishment of an international administrative service. Assistance to be provided with regard to improvement of public administration and not as originally stated "to perform duties of an executive or operational character as may be defined by the requesting governments." Rejected by roll-call vote of 48, 11, 26. The resolution as later on amended was adopted by a vote of 62, 0, 13.
50	Refugees in Morocco and Tunisia, need for more assistance. Adopted by roll-call vote of 57, 2, 15. Annexes, 31, p. 2.
51	U.S.S.R. amendment to resolution dealing with celebration of World Refugee Year, stressing the importance of voluntary reparation of and eliminating use for diversionist activities of refugees. Rejected by roll-call vote of 42, 19, 12. Annexes, 31, p. 3.
52	Resolution dealing with the celebration of World Refugee Year, focus interest in refugee problem, encourage solutions. Adopted by roll-call vote of 56, 8, 9. Annexes, 31, p. 4.
53	Second sentence of article of Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, no one to be subjected to medical or scientific treatment without his free consent. Adopted, 39, 0, 29. Annexes, 32, p. 4.
54	Entire article mentioned above. Prevention of torture or cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Adopted by roll-call vote of 64, 0, 4. Annexes, 32, p. 4.
55	Article 8 of Draft Covenant; prevention of slavery, slave trade, being held in servitude, required to perform forced or compulsory labor unless required by law. Adopted by roll-call vote of 70, 0, 3. Annexes, 32, p. 5.
56	Article 9 of Draft Covenant. Insurance of rights to liberty and security. Adopted by roll-call vote of 70, 0, 3. Annexes, 32, p. 9.

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION
57*	Resolution prepared by Economic and Social Council, recommendations concerning international respect for the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination. Rejected by roll-call vote of 48, 16, 8. Annexes, 33, p. 6.
58	Subject matter same as above. Vote on preamble of Draft Resolution I prepared by Commission on Human Rights as drafted by said commission in 1955. Adopted by roll-call vote of 50, 16, 5. Annexes, 33, p. 6.
59	Entirety of resolution mentioned above. Adopted by roll-call vote of 52, 15, 4. Annexes, 33, p. 7.
60*	Procedural proposal on draft convention of freedom of information, immediate examination of, to limit debate. Rejected by roll-call vote of 32, 32, 4. Annexes, 35, p. 2.
	Issues 61 to 64 deal with amendments to draft resolution of freedom of information.
61*	Soviet oral amendment, insert "accurate and undistorted" between phrase "the free flow of" and "news and information." Adopted by roll-call vote of 43, 9, 22. Annexes, 35, p. 3.
62*	Problems of freedom of information to be instead, problems of providing technical assistance to under-developed countries in field of information. Adopted by roll-call vote of 30, 21, 24. Annexes, 35, p. 3.
63*	Insert "accurate" between "free flow of" and "information". Adopted by roll-call vote of 32, 8, 35. Annexes, 35, p. 4.
64*	Insert "accurate" between "free flow of" and "news and information." Adopted by roll-call vote of 48, 7, 19. Annexes, 35, p. 4.

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION
65*	Amendment to draft resolution on future discussion of draft convention on freedom of information, detailed discussion of text of draft convention to be at such time as prospect is substantial for acquiring general support. This in lieu of proposed discussion at the 14th session of General Assembly. Rejected by roll-call vote of 49, 14, 10. Annexes, 35, p. 5.
	Issues 66 to 69 deal with information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter. These deal with social and other conditions in the territories. All issues here are amendments.
66*	Change in 3rd preamble paragraph, merely a matter of form. Adopted by roll-call vote of 39, 17, 12. Annexes, 36, p. 42.
67*	Call for stronger implementation of resolution 644 (VII). 644 (VII) invites administering authorities of Non-Self-Governing Territories to abolish discriminatory laws and practices in the territories. Rejected by roll-call vote of 24, 21, 24. Annexes, 36, p. 42.
68*	Attempt to insure more precision in meaning; payment of constant attention to resolution 644 (VII). Adopted by roll-call vote of 38, 11, 20. Annexes, 36, p. 43.
69*	Addition of a 3rd O.P. asking for inclusion in annual reports of a special section on measures taken in implementation of resolution 644 (VII). Adopted by roll-call vote of 31, 21, 17. Annexes, 36, p. 43.
70	Amendment to resolution dealing with general questions relating to transmission and examination of information. Summary of countries' opinions not to be prepared by committee of 6 members elected by Fourth Committee but by Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. Adopted by roll-call vote of 40, 29, 5. Annexes, 36, p. 43.
71	Resolution above, in entirety, as amended. Adopted by roll-call vote of 41, 29, 4. Annexes, 36, p. 43.

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION
	Issues 70 to 74 still deal with information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter.
72	Economic development of the N-S-G Territories. Invitation to administering authorities to consider advisability of adopting an investment polity that would bring about a progressive increase in <u>per capita</u> income in the territories. Adopted by roll-call vote of 49, 5, 16. Annexes, 36, p. 45.
73	Consideration of words "with concern" in 3rd preambular paragraph as administering authorities had not as then submitted information on the possible effects of the European Economic Community on their territories. Adopted by roll-call vote of 34, 18, 17. Annexes, 36, p. 45.
74	Entirety of resolution mentioned above. Asks for information from administering authorities to be considered at 14th session. Adopted by roll-call vote of 48, 16, 5. Annexes, 36, p. 45.
75 ^P	Hearing to be granted to Mr. Mburumba Kerina and Rev. Michael Scott. This in connection with consideration by Fourth Committee of Good Offices Committee report on the question of South West Africa. Adopted by roll-call vote of 45, 19, 9. Annexes, 39, p. 13.
76 ^P	Same issue but with regards to report of the Committee on South West Africa. Adopted by roll-call vote of 60, 5, 9. Annexes, 39, p.13.
	Issue 77 and those following to 81 deal with the report of the Good Offices Committee on South West Africa.
77*	Amendment, O.P.#2. Insert "mandated" between "the" and "territory" in (A/C.4/L532). Adopted by roll-call vote of 71, 0, 2. Annexes, 39, p. 15.

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION
78*	Chilean amendment to preambular paragraph of resolution mentioned above. This to call attention to and show appreciation for accomplishment of difficult task by Good Offices Committee on its report on South West Africa. Adopted by roll-call vote of 28, 21, 24.
79*	Not to consider partition and annexation of any part of South West Africa as a basis to solution of problem. Adopted by roll-call vote of 57, 0, 16. Annexes, 39, p. 15.
80*	Find means whereby it possible to continue South West Africa's international status. Adopted by roll-call vote of 57, 1, 15. Annexes, 39, p. 15.
81	O.P.#2 as amended, i.e., Committee invited to renew discussions with Government of the Union of South Africa. This to find basis for an agreement that would continue to accord to the mandated territory as a whole, an international status and which would be in conformity with purposes and principles of the United Nations. Adopted by roll-call vote of 52, 9, 12. Annexes, 39, p. 16.
82	O.P.#3 of (A/C.4/L533/Rev.1/Add.1 and 2). Expression of deep concern for the social, economic, and political situations prevailing in the Territory of South West Africa. Adopted by roll-call vote of 46, 2, 18. Annexes, 39, p. 16
83	Verbatim record of debate on report of Good Offices Committee on South West Africa to be mimeographed and circulated. Adopted by roll-call vote of 30, 17, 21. Annexes, 39, p. 17.
84	Proposal by U.S. representative that Fifth Committee's report to General Assembly on financial implications of mimeographing and circulation of proceedings in debates on Agenda item 39 should include: the committee's recommendation against the adoption of the draft resolution in its present form on administrative and budgetary grounds. Rejected by roll-call vote of 26, 20, 10. Annexes, 39, p. 20.

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION
85*	Scale of assessments for apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations. France's proposal that scale be adopted for the years 1959-1960 instead of 1959, 1960, and 1961. Rejected by roll-call vote of 32, 17, 14. Annexes, 47, p. 4.
	Issues 86 to 88 deal with the convening of a second U.N. conference on the law of the sea.
86	Addition of preambular paragraph stating necessity of considerable preparatory work to insure reasonable probability of success. Adopted by roll-call vote of 37, 35, 8. Annexes, 59, p. 7.
87.	Amendment; delay convening conference on the law of the sea. When to hold to be deliberated on at 14th session of the General Assembly. Rejected by roll-call vote of 38, 37, 5. Annexes, 59, p. 7.
88	Resolution (A/C.6/L.435) as amended. (See issue #86). Early convening of conference to reach suitable agreement, representatives to be of all State Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies, etc. Adopted by roll-call vote of 42, 28, 9. Annexes, 59, p. 7.
89	Question of the peaceful use of outer space. Resolution by Burma, India, and United Arab Republic. Request First Committee to ask U.S. and U.S.S.R. to consider: urgent need for positive and constructive steps in field of peaceful uses of outer space, report to First Committee on an agreed and practical approach to the problem. Rejected by roll-call vote of 25, 14, 42. Annexes, 60, p. 8.
90	Establishment of <u>ad hoc</u> committee to report to 14th General Assembly on: activities and resources of U.N. and specialized agencies with regards to peaceful use of outer space, area of international co-operation to be involved and programmes possible, etc. Adopted by roll-call vote of 51, 9, 21. Annexes, 60, p. 8.

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION
91	Treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa. Appeal to Union to negotiate with Pakistan and India. Adopted by roll-call vote of 62, 0, 9. Annexes, 62, p.3.
92*	Question of Algeria. Amendment restating recognition of right of the Algerian people to independence. Preambular paragraph #4. Rejected by roll-call vote of 48, 13, 19. Annexes, 63, p. 3.
93	Entire draft resolution on the question of Algeria. Negotiations between parties concerned urged; to reach solution in conformity with Charter of the United Nations. Adopted by roll-call vote of 36, 18, 25. Annexes, 63, p. 3.
	Issues 94 to 98 deal with Agenda items 64, 70, 72. These are: Question of Disarmament, The Discontinuance of Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons Test, The Reduction of Military Budgets.
94*	Motion by U.S. to give priority in voting to draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205). Approved by roll-call vote of 45, 25, 11. Annexes, 64, 70, & 72, p. 26.
95	Entire draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205). Urge discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests while negotiations in progress. Adopted by roll-call vote of 49, 9, 23. Annexes, 64, 70, & 72, p. 26.
96*	O.P.#1 of (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and Add. 1 and 2). Call for immediate discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons testing until agreement reached by states concerned in regard to technical arrangements and necessary controls. Rejected by roll-call vote of 36, 26, 19. Annexes, 64, 70, & 72, p. 26.
97	U.S.S.R. draft resolution relating to reduction of military budgets (A/C.1/L 204). Rejected by roll-call vote of 39, 10, 32. Annexes, 64, 70, & 72, p. 26.

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION
98*	<p>Second paragraph of Irish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.206). Recognition of danger, in existence, that increase in number of states possessing nuclear weapons may occur, aggravating international tension and endangering the hoped for agreement for disarmament. Adopted by roll-call vote of 37, 0, 44. Annexes, 64, 70, & 72, p. 27. Withdrawn as no method of dealing with contents that delegation could offer.</p> <p>Issues 99 to 102 deal with the United Nations Emergency Force.</p>
99	<p>Amendment by U.S. to round maximum of \$19,369,000 for the continuing operation of the Force to \$19,000,000. Adopted by roll-call vote of 35, 1, 25. Annexes, 65, p. 39.</p>
100	<p>U.S. amendment that would allow special contributions, as special assistance by certain countries to 1959 UNEF expenses, to be taken into account in the 1959 assessments. Adopted by roll-call vote of 39, 0, 28. Annexes, 65, p. 39.</p>
101	<p>Argentine amendment, add O.P. requesting the Secretary General to consult with governments of Member States concerning manner of financing Force in future, and to submit a report together with replies to General Assembly at 14th session. Adopted by roll-call vote of 43, 9, 17. Annexes, 65, p. 39.</p>
102	<p>Entire draft resolution (A/C.5/L.545) as amended, the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force. Adopted by roll-call vote of 38, 9, 22. Annexes, 65, p. 39.</p> <p>Issues 103 to 108 deal with Agenda item 67; question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of <u>apartheid</u> of the Government of the Union of South Africa. For the resulting draft resolution (A/SPC/L.251 Add. 1 and 2), a roll-call vote was taken on the preamble, each operative paragraph, and the entire draft resolution.</p>

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION
103	Preamble; recalled previous consideration of question and of calling upon Government of South Africa to observe its obligations under the Charter. Adopted by roll-call vote of 65, 5, 7. Annexes, 67, p. 3.
104	Consideration of O.P.#1. Repetition of declaration that in a multiracial society harmony and respect for human rights and freedoms and peaceful development of a unified community is best assured when patterns of legislation and of practice are directed toward ensuring equality before the law of all persons; and when the economic, social, cultural and political participation of all racial groups is on a basis of equality. Adopted by roll-call vote of 73, 0, 4. Annexes, 67, p. 3.
105	O.P.#2. Governmental policies not directed toward goals mentioned in issue #104, are inconsistent with pledges of members of the U.N. under article 56 of the Charter. Adopted by roll-call vote of 70, 3, 4. Annexes, 67, p. 3.
106	O.P.#3. Call to member states to bring their policies into conformity with obligations under Charter to promote observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Adopted by roll-call vote of 70, 2, 5. Annexes, 67, p. 3.
107	O.P.#4. Expression of regret and concern that Government of the Union of South Africa had not responded to General Assembly appeals asking reconsideration of governmental policies impairing right of all racial groups to enjoy same rights and fundamental freedoms. Adopted by roll-call vote of 67, 5, 5. Annexes, 67, p. 3.
108	Entire resolution. Adopted by roll-call vote of 68, 5, 4. Annexes, 67, p. 3.
	Issues 109 to 111 deal with various draft resolutions on the Question of Cyprus.

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION
109	Amended Iranian draft resolution. Conference of three governments concerned and representatives of Cypriots to discuss interim arrangements for administration of Cyprus, a final solution to problem, this to be accomplished according to principles and purposes of Charter. Adopted by roll-call vote of 31, 22, 28. Annexes, 68, p. 18.
110*	Colombian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.225). Three countries to resume and continue negotiations, refrain from extending encouragement or support to violence in Cyprus, . . . set up an observation group to promote the negotiations, after an on-the-spot study of the political, social, and economic situation on the island. If appropriate, observation group to assume functions of a good offices committee and to report to General Assembly through Secretary General on its work. Not adopted due to roll-call vote of 17, 17, 47. Annexes, 68, p. 18.
111*	Belgian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.229). Noting with concern the continuance of terrorism in Cyprus; calls upon those concerned to put stop to this. Recommendation to resume continuance of effort in cooperative spirit to reach solution to problem in accord with principles and purposes of U.N. Charter. Rejected by roll-call vote of 22, 11, 48. Annexes, 68, p. 18.
112	Consideration of whether to include the situation in Hungary in the Agenda. Adopted by roll-call vote of 61, 10, 0. Plenary, 8, p. 55.
	Issues 113 to 117 deal with the question of the representation of China in the U.N.
113	Amendment to draft resolution (A/3926) that essentially would place the question of the representation of China in the U.N. on the Agenda. Rejected by roll-call vote of 40, 29, 12. Plenary, 8, p. 106.
114	Amendment that would delete paragraph recommending the non consideration of any proposal excluding the Chiang Kaishek government or the seating of representatives of the Central People's Republic of China, at the 13th regular session. Rejected by roll-call vote of 41, 29, 11. Plenary, 8, p. 106.

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION
115	Consideration of paragraph in draft resolution. The exclusion of the question of the representation of China in the U.N. Adopted by roll-call vote of 40, 28, 13. Plenary, 8, p. 106.
116	Paragraph recommending no proposal to exclude the Chiang Kaishek government or to seat representatives of Central People's Republic of China should be considered at the 13th regular session. Adopted by roll-call vote of 42, 28, 11. Plenary, 8, p. 106.
117	Entire draft resolution dealing with representation of China in the U.N. Adopted by roll-call vote of 44, 28, 9. Plenary, 8, p. 107.
118	Amendment providing that election of members of governing council of the Special Fund are to be chosen by the General Assembly (See issue #43). Rejected by roll-call vote of 45, 30, 3. Plenary, 28, p. 387.
119	Conditions in the Territory of South West Africa. Expression of deep concern for economic, social, and political conditions. Adopted by roll-call vote of 59, 2, 18. Plenary, 39, p. 410. (See issue #82).
	Issues 120 to 125 are respectively issues 103 to 108. These are the separate roll-call votes on the resolution resulting from consideration of the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of <u>apartheid</u> of the government of the Union of South Africa.
120	Preamble. Adopted by roll-call vote of 65, 5, 8. Plenary, 67, p. 412.
121	O.P.#1. Adopted by roll-call vote of 72, 0, 6. Plenary, 67, p. 413.
122	O.P.#2. Adopted by roll-call vote of 70, 3, 5. Plenary, 67, p. 413.
123	O.P.#3. Adopted by roll call vote of 70, 2, 6. Plenary, 67, p. 413.
124	O.P.#4. Adopted by roll-call vote of 68, 5, 6. Plenary, 67, p. 413.

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION
125	Entire resolution. Adopted by roll-call vote of 70, 5, 4. Plenary, 67, p. 413.
126	Urge discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests while negotiations in progress. (See issue #95). Adopted by roll-call vote of 49, 9, 22. Plenary, 64, 70, & 72, p. 430.
127	Issue #96 essentially. Rejected by roll-call vote of 41, 27, 13. Plenary, 64, 70, & 72. p. 430.
128	Financing the UNEF, recommendation of cost apportionment among Member States use same scale as applied for annual contributions of members to U.N. budget. Adopted by roll-call vote of 51, 9, 17. Plenary, 65, p. 443.
129	The Korean question, see issue #42. Adopted by roll-call vote of 54, 9, 17. Plenary, 24, p. 451.
130	Draft Resolution II from report of the Special Political Committee. Question of amending U.N. Charter to increase membership of Economic and Social Council (see issue #5). Adopted by roll-call vote of 52, 9, 17. Plenary, 21, 22, 23, and 12, p. 464.
131	Treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa. (see issue #91). Adopted by roll-call vote of 69, 0, 10. Plenary, 62, p. 467.
132	Proposed change in date of holding second conference on the law of the sea. Later date suggested. Adopted by roll-call vote of 68, 6, 3. Plenary, 59, p, 478.
133	Entirety of resolution dealing with the proposed conference on the law of the sea. Adopted by roll-call vote of 70, 0, 6. Plenary, 59, p. 478.
134	The situation in Hungary. Draft resolution (A/L.255). Adopted by roll-call vote of 54, 10, 15. Plenary, 69, p. 546.
135*	Economic development of under-developed countries and the U.N. Capital Development Fund. Draft Resolution B. (see issue #47). Adopted by roll-call vote of 67, 0, 14. Plenary, 28 and 12, p. 565.

NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION

- 136 Economic development of under-developed countries, the promotion of international flow of private capital. Draft Resolution C (see issue #48). Adopted by roll-call vote of 69, 8, 4. Plenary, 28 and 12, p. 565.
- 137 Economic development of under-developed countries, entirety of Draft Resolution 1, A to E. Adopted by roll-call vote of 80, 1, 0. Plenary, 28 and 12, p. 565.
- 138 United Nations Emergency Force, report of the Fifth Committee. Essentially issue #102. Adopted by roll-call vote of 42, 9, 27. Plenary, 65, p. 598.
- 139 The peaceful use of outer space Resolution establishing ad hoc committee of 18 countries to study and report on peaceful uses of outer space. Adopted by roll-call vote of 53, 9, 19. Plenary, 60, p. 621.
- 140 Question of Algeria. Seventh preambular paragraph, "Taking Note of the willingness of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic to enter into negotiations with the Government of France." Adopted by roll-call vote of 38, 0, 43. Plenary, 63, p. 623.
- 141^P Motion that separate votes be taken on draft resolution dealing with the question of Algeria. Rejected by roll-call vote of 36, 8, 37. Plenary, 63, p. 627.
- 142 Resolution dealing with question of Algeria, minus 7th preambular paragraph. Roll-call vote: 35, 18, 28. Resolution not adopted as lacking the required two-thirds majority. Plenary, 63, p. 637.
- 143 The future of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under French administration. See issues #22 to 31. Adopted by roll-call vote of 56, 0, 23. Plenary, 13, p. 642.
- 144 The future of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration. See issues #32 to 37. Adopted by roll-call vote of 56, 0, 24. Plenary, 13, p. 642.

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