CANADA AND JOINT CONTINENTAL DEFENCE:
A CANADIAN VIEW

Thais for the Degree 05 M. A. '
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY.
Eiizabeth lnSook Camila  
3962

LIBRARY

Michigan State
University

 

CANADA AND JOINT CONTINENTAL DEFENCE:
A CANADIAN VIEW

by

Elizabeth Insook Carella

AN ABSTRACT

Submitted to the College of Business and Public Service
Michigan State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of
‘ the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

1962

Approved

 

Elizabeth Insook Carella

The age of nuclear weapons and of inter-
continental ballistic missiles has imposed upon Canada
a type of cooperation with the United States that
arouses the apprehension of the Canadian people, who
are concerned with the effect upon Canadian sovereignty.
Rapidly advancing technology and the high cost of
military preparedness gradually have diminished Canada's
control over the defence of its territory. The United
States, on the other hand, has increasingly acquired
certain rights in Canada which violate the principle of
sovereignty, and has become the initiator of much of
what is required for an effective defence of the two
countries against a fatal attack. Ultimate security of
Canada is thus bound with the United States and any
dissent which Canada might raise on specific questions
is bound to be limited by the practical consideration of
Canada's security. The problem of retaining Canada's
political sovereignty while preserving the advantages
of collective security has become the daily concern of
the Canadian people.

The shift toward Canada's greater dependency
on the United States for defence, and Canada's political

and psychological response to such development is

ABSTRACT - 2

studied in this thesis in several stages: the
construction of the radar warning system; the integra-
tion of the air defence under NORAD; the scraping of
the Canadian made Jet, the Arrow, for the United States
made missile, the Bomarc; and finally, the move toward
the acquisition of nuclear weapons from the United

StateS.

CANADA AND JOINT CONTINENTAL DEFENCE:
A CANADIAN VIEW

by

Elizabeth Insook Carella

A THESIS

Submitted to the College of Business and Public Service
Michigan State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

1962

3
3

.5!

.,77¢/

I

{

(x
Ex.

I

PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis is to illustrate
the frustration and anxieties of the Canadian people
concerning their intimate relationship in defence with
the United States, a relationship which is seen as
threatening Canada's sovereignty. The thesis also
attempts to point out that this close cooperation in
defence has coincided with the emergence in Canada of
a new spirit of nationalism which has prompted many
Canadians to urge a re-examination of Canada's defence
policy.

The author is aware of the problems and the
limitations which have resulted from the inability to
consult public Opinion data. The opinions studied are,
to a large extent, the reactions of the leadership group
and the articulate public in Canada, rather than of the
mass public. However, the opinion of the mass public
is estimated from the views expressed by the political
leaders, the supposition being that in a democracy
leaders who hope to be elected must, at least to some
extent, reflect and act within the framework set out
by the mood and values of the society.

In the first three chapters I have referred to
the purpose and conduct of Canada's defence policy

vis-a-vis the United States in its historical setting.

‘v—xo

(

 

The subsequent chapters are devoted to the studies of
some of the more controversial issues of recent years
which have particularly aroused the emotions of the
Canadian people. The selection of particular issues
have been made in accordance with the degree of reper-
cussion they have had in Canada. They have been events
which have made many Canadians feel like the man,
quoted by Joseph Barber as saying, "It's like this, you
reach the point every so often where there is nothing
you can do but yell or kick the furniture."1 The events
are examined in chronological order. .

The author wishes to express her gratitude to
Dr. Howard A. Scarrow under whose untiring leadership
this study was conducted. A word of gratitude is also
due to the staff of the Document Room at the Michigan
State University Library for their courteous help. And
finally, my heartfelt thanks go to my husband whose help
and encouragement made the completion of this thesis

possible.

Elizabeth Insook Carella

 

1Joseph Barber, Good Fences Make Good Neighbor
(New York, 1957). Do 160

ii

..A__.4.~.

.—~-_.

 

Chapter

Chapter
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.

Chapter
1.

2.

3.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I: Introduction e e e e e e e e e e e e 1

II: Ptrtnerahip ‘ttQIHCd e o e e e e e 11

Pre-World War II e e e e e e e e e e e 11
The Ogdensburg Agreement . . . . . . . l2
Destroyer-Bases Deal . . . . . . . . . 15

The Hyde Park Declaration and
Other Joint War Efforts e e e e e e e e 16

"Lucky to Escape With Sovereignty" . . .19

Summary 0 e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e 21

IIIe P°.t World War II PCIiOd e e e e e 23

Canada's Hope for Security Through
th. Unith Nations e e e e e e e e e e 23

Canada’s Participation in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization . . . . . 25

Reaffirmation of CanadaaUnited States
Military Cooperation . . . . . . . . . 28

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Chapter IV. Construction and Operation of

1.
2.

3.

Radar Warning Systems . . . . . . . 34
Pinetree and Mid-Canada Line . . . . . 34
The Dew Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Map of the Radar Warning Systems . . . 37

Controversy Surrounding the Radar
Warning Systems in Canada . . . . . . . 39

summ‘ry................50

I ' l -
J " ‘ V ( ~(V ‘
e , -
,._‘. . '
:‘ —-r' F" ' 1
v
. r" .-

‘Y
O U U i -*
L‘T‘rfl ' (._ . -.

I O O O -
h ' T
A 1 C . ,J
‘ A
l ’ l "
I J .
. '3’,“‘_ ’ » I
. . I
. ‘ -l

 

Chapter

1.
2.
3.
A.

5.
6.

7.

Chapter
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Chapter
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

V. NORAD (North American Air Defence
Command) e e e e e e e e e e e e e e

What is NORAD . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Origin of NORAD . . . . . . . . . .
How the Announcement was Received . . .
Government's Arguments . . . . . . . .
What the Formal Agreement Said . . . .

Conservative and Liberal Vote for
NORAD: CC? is Opposed . . . . . . . .

Civilian Control in Defence Matters . .

Summary e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e

v1. The “Arrow" (CF-105) . . . . . . .

The Government’s Overhauling of the
DCfOnCQ Ideas e e e e e e e e e e e e e

Th. BSOkground e e e e e e e e e e e e
Arguments for thc ArrOW e e e e e e e e

Arguments Against the Arrow . . . . . .

52
52
53
55
63
67

7o
75
‘79
81
81
83

.89
93

Political Parties' Stand on the Arrow . .96

summary 0 O O O O O O O O O O C O O O O

VII. The Bomarc Anti-Aircraft Missile .
What is Bomarc . . . . . . . . . . . .
The BaCkground e e e e e e e e e e e e

Controversy Over the Adequacy and the
Availability of the Bomarc . . . . . .

The Policy Revision in Washington and
Its Impact on Canada . . . . . . . . .

The Bomarc Aftermath . . . . . . . . .

100

102
102
104

105

108
119

summary 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 120

iv

‘1

e e e e a K ‘ .
'_
e e e e
* I C
F ' l _
c ' i \ .
» . ’. ‘- { . . ‘ (

O
' 1 r
. 5 .
I '. " V .0
I r, . 'r
I C I O C 0 fl
. D
n_ ‘ '1 C ‘ ‘
I
f
O O O r
I
I e O ‘ ‘
r . I - {' f‘
\
i 9": e
» . f .
- J.
. ‘P s g d ['F’ . .
x '_ -' 1 K
f I!
. ’7 ' .
r Y' r
I I I O O U '

 

Chapter VIII.
1.

2.

Issues on Nuclear Weapons. . .

Canada, in Principle, Accepts
Nuclear Weapons . .

Opinions on Canada's Move Toward the

Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons . . . .

Chapter IX.

BIBLIOGRAPHY .

Summary and Conclusions. . . . . .

121

121

122

130

136

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Mr. D. S. Harkness, the new'Minister of
National Defence of the Conservative Government,
presenting the estimates of the Department of National
Defence to the House Committee of Supply on September
12, 1961, laid out the objectives of the Canadian
defence policy as follows:
The Government's defence policy has two objectives;
first, to maintain peace by preventing a third
global war; and second, to prevent subjection to
a foreign power. Everything we do in defence is
devoted to attaining these two purposes. We
believe they can best be attained by a system of
alliances, and thus we have been strong supporters
of, and have been taking and will continue to
take our full part in, making NATO, NORAD and the
UN effective.‘

Canada's defence policy, therefore, is based on the

principle of collective security, and Canada is

deeply committed to promote the total defence capabi-

lities of the alliance in which Canada has Joined.

This consideration of the total defence capability

of the West, particularly of the North American

continent, requires a close cooperation of two nations

very different in size and power. This fact has led

 

1Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, Sept. 12, 1961,
p. 8221.

 

It

1:
. . _
r
O I
. . . .3
. .
A r
!‘ .
.
. . . '0
y 1 PF
. | I
.1 .l
..
w 1 e v v
a l s u
r:
e. 0,1 .
.
r
. n,
.v v 1
, I. v
. i
.
.
y A
C x
i
(I
f m
7
g
. ‘
i A
v
.
I
.
a . I‘
. . F
C, |
..
le . 1 e
e 17
I I

“"n—

many Canadians to fear that the partnership may
eventually subjugate Canada to a satellite position
or to the loss of her national identity.

The system of collaboration in defence between
Canada and the United States has evolved over two
decades as the result of their proximity and the
frequently paralleled national interests. The informal
Ogdensburg discussion between the heads of the two
governments during the Second World War laid the
foundation for the later and more significant defence
arrangement for the continental defence in the 19503.
In this defence arrangement, the vast difference in
size, resources and the capabilities of the two
countries made it inevitable that one provided more
leadership than the other in their framework of
alliance. One has a pepulation of 185 million people
with an average personal income of $2,150, and the
other has 18 million people with an average personal
income of 81,440. Canada's permanent armed service
forces number 120,000 to the 2,500,000 of the United
States active forces. The former does not practice
conscription while the latter does. Canada's defence
appropriation for 1961 was 81,830,000,000, 40% of
the national budget, while the United States appro-
priation for the same year was at 840 billion, approxi-

' - . - .‘ 7:, :- .
I -
._ t
_ .I , ‘ _. '. ‘ ’ . '
- a . .
e , a g I ' a
r ' ‘ 4
y I
~ ‘ \ .
a. ' '
. ' r‘ _ l
u - .
' .
f , ‘ ~ .
l 1 D C '
,~ . ,—~. , . - ‘-
' l
l u
. I' =- ~ . .- l
. ' ' " I ‘ v
, ' ~ 2 ‘
c ‘- ‘ f‘ . .
s e .
> . \
. , , _
. ‘4 , , r '. 7 r t
. . Y
1 .
I ‘ . .
Q l. ' | r s
o. ' ’ 3 I
t t - - .
.
. " . x. . _ ' I
. . ‘
l .
. ' . . ~
I x ‘
I ' ,
a ‘f
t t e s .
. e ,. .
' V ' S l
u ‘ ‘ ' . 4
( - ~
. I
.

l
V T
_A
s
I
,
' 1.
u
' a
s
l
,\
«J
u
- e
v
C
l V
a-
e
e
g .
.
e
e ‘ '

 

mately 50% of the national budget.

This overwhelmingly dominant position of the
United States in defence matters is observable in
other areas also; notably in the economic and cultural
life of the two countries. Canada is deeply dependent
on American commodity market for the sale of its
exports and for its source of imports. ”The whole
financial structure of Canada,” the Winnipeg Eggg‘ggggg
wrote, "its interest rate, the value of its dollar and
the operation of all its governments are at the mercy
of the American investor's whim."2 Many Canadians get
their information from American magazines, radio and
TV and nearly 75% of Canadians are reported to be
listening only to American stations, and read only
American magazines, some of them published under
Canadian labels.3 Canadians feel that their giant
neighbor is gaining too much authority over their
affairs through investment, commerce, and defence
arrangement. Moreover, the Canadians are positively
hostile against the "unimaginative United States policy"
and their "outright meddling" in the Canadian affairs.
Wheat dumping, oil-cutting, the Norman affair in which

 

6 QEditorial in The Winnipeg Free Press, Feb. 10,
19 O.

‘ 3Editorial in The Globes nd Mail (Toronto),
Jane 5! 1959s

 

 

 

the United States Senate Subcommittee questioned the
character of a Canadian diplomatic official thus
causing his death, the parent office of the United
States Ford Motor Company banning its branch office in
Canada from exporting 1000 cars to China, etc., all
had the effect of stirring a strong anti-Americanism
in Canada.

A deep resentment arising from Canada's heavy
dependency on the United States in economic and defence
field, and a hostility aroused by "arbitrary inter-
ference” of the United States over their national
affairs, strongly colored the results of Canada's
last two elections. ”we have the right," the Conser-
vatives, hitting the cord of Canadian nationalism,
declared in their campaign speech, ”to determine our
own destiny at all times in our own way and without
dictation in any way from any other country.”4"As a
result the ConservativeParty won a crushing majority
both outside and inside Quebec, and nearly destroyed
its major opponent, the Liberals, which had ruled
Canada for 22 years. Other factors, such as the

desire for change and the personal appeal of a dynamic

 

4Mr. Diefenbaker’s speech, reported in
Th: Globe and Mail, April 10, 1958.

Conservative leader, Mr. Diefenbaker, to be sure had
their share of influence, but they could not alone
account for such a smashing victory. Separateness
from the United States had been a central aspect of
Canadian history and Canadians never failed to respond
to the call to protect their identity.

In the field of defence, Canada's defence
planners face a difficult dilemma. Canada must operate
under limited resources of finance and manpower. In
the age of rapid technological changes and a high cost
of weapons, Canada must decide as to the relative value
of its defence efforts._ The trend in the late 1950?;
inevitably, was toward a more and more integrated
air defence of North America and an increasing acceptance
by Canada of the leadership of the United States in
the Joint defence arrangement. Revolting against
this apparent subordination consequent on top-heavy
integration, and the sincere conviction in some quarters
of a more positive role Canada might be able to play
as a Middle Power in the world councils in this critical
time, some Canadians think that Canada should die-
engage herself from the Western coalition and maintain
some form of neutrality. A similar stand is taken by
the COP/New Party. The defence policy of this Canadian

socialist party, as pronounced at its Regina convention

in August 1960, advocated Canada’s withdrawal from
military alliances, work toward disarmament and non-
acceptance of nuclear weapons.5 In the House the
members of the CCF/New Party always stand for a looser
association with the United States and getting out of
an arms race which Canada can 111 afford. "This would
not mean,“ Mr. Herridge, the COP spokesman,once said,
”lower taxes and more pleasure spending, but that we
would divert the money from bombers into food and
technical assistance for the hungry millions of Asia

and Africa."6

Although the CCF/New Party occupies
only eight seats out 208 seats in the Canadian Parlia-
ment, I have given a wider space to its view point,
for its policy differs on fundamental points from the
other two major Canadian political parties.
Neutralism, however, is not compatible with
the facts of modern political life. Geography and
the nature of the next war inevitably tie Canadian
defence activities very closely with those of the
United States. There seems to be a consensus .
in Canada as to what the essense of the Russian

challenge means. Both the Communist world and the

Western world profess and desire a permanent peace,

 

5John Gellner, Saturday Night, Feb. 18, 1961.

6Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, July 28,
1960, p. 7628.

II

r
('.
H
t
g
.. ..
,.4!|,.
(" ,
r.
.r"

”mgr--

7

but one wants total government while the other wants
less of it. The two worlds also interpret and practice
differently the concept of individual dignity. As for
Canada, its history, its geographical position and
the policy of the Soviet Union unitea Canada very
closely with the West.

The performances of the two major Canadian
political parties, especially when they are in power,

attest to this view. Mr. Lester Pearson, the Leader
of the Opposition has said:

There can in my view be no neutralism for Canada
in defence or foreign policy. . . I know that
there are faults, and some dangers, in U.S. policy,
but I think also that there is a basic difference
between the principles that underlie its policy
and those which determine that of the Communist
imperialist system of the Soviet Union. Recog-
nizing, as I do, that difference, I cannot

believe that abandonment of our present policies
for complete neutrality would be a constructive
step in the interest of peace. I think that we
should continue to associate ourselves as closely
as possible with the United States, the United
Kingdom, France and other North Atlantic countries
but that we should direct all of our activities
and policy inside this association to the main-
tenance and strengthening of peace and the ending
of the cold war in a way which would make the
present system of defence through huge armaments
unnecessary.‘ I

The viewpoint of the Conservative Party was expressed

by the Prime Minister in his address to the House of

 

67Canada, ngse 2;,ggmmons erates, July 28, 1960,
P0 7 050

Commons at the opening of the debate on the defence
estimates in June 1961:

To begin at the beginning, let me state emphatically
that in our times there is great need for military
preparedness. There is no peace in the world,

and not the slightest prospect for peace in the
forseeable future. . . . A chasm of enmity divides
the Soviet bloc from the Western. For the
Soviets, this enmity is institutional. It is

at the basis of their ideology. Consequently,
enmity toward the capitalist or imperialist
nations, or whatever else they have been pleased
to call us, has for decades been the cornerstone
of their foreign policy. . . . Belief in democracy
does not in itself entail hostility toward
ideologies which are different. But long years

of having to face up to the aggressive hostility
of the Communist world have brought the Western
democracies to the stage where we counter enmity
with enmity, crusading zeal with stubborn
opposition which at times has also verged on
fanaticism. . . . We may not have wanted it in

the beginning, and we may be loath to admit it
even today, but the fact is that deep down in our
hearts we have recognized that the two inimical
sides really can not tolerate one another. We

do not say, "We will bury you”, as Khrushchev
does, but we do know that if we want to preserve
our way of life, our socio-pclitical system, we
will have to bury theirs. . . . The mission,

then, of the military establishment in any of

the Western democracies is simply this: To keep
us secure from brute, armed aggression while we
get on with the political, social and economic 8
struggle which, unfortunately, we cannot avoid.

The two Canadian major political parties, while
very vocal about the idea of national sovereignty, in
the and bow before the weight of national and inter-

national realities and rationalize along the similar

 

8Quoted in Saturday Night, June 10, 1961,
p. 20c

 

,\

I (I!!! ll Ill!!!
. f «I f (I
e
i . . . .. ,( If
r f. e . .
_ .
. I
Q , . . y t a.
. n
.. . . ,F
r I ‘
. o. . 0 .
t
l
r u \ I o r C 'a
. O
A s
.V .
fl
cl _ . 1
_ .
_
e o
t
l ' _ *l‘
I . .
. u U
f
.. O
a . -
e . e
l
.
l
‘L_ It
I . 1
.
l .
. F
. .
_ r
9'. e
. . r -
I . u
t p a d
r‘ A

lines of what the former Minister of National Defence

had said in the House:

It is not to be expected that each partner

in an alliance should contribute something

to each component of the integrated force but
rather that national characteristics, national
geographic position and national resources
should each be used to the best advantage,
avoiding as far as possible duplication and
overlapping of effort. We do not consider our
defence effort in isolation but rather look at
the general effectiveness of the alliances to
which we are making contributions commensurate
with our ability without placing an undue
strain upon manpower and financial resources.
While the cost of this insurance is heavy I
think Canadians as a whol support the commit-
ments we have undertaken.

The ordinary citizens, in the meantime, are
angry and frustrated. The newspapers and magazines
give unprecedented amount of space and publishes the
readers' viewpoints on defence policy. The Government’s
handling of questions such as NORAD (North American
Air Defence Command), the cancellation of the Arrow
(CF-105, Canada's supersonic Jet aircraft), the
adoption of Bomarc missiles all led to their bewilder-
ment and frustration. ”Perhaps," John Gellner, a
noted writer of Canadian defence policy, wrote in one
of his articles, ”the best way of characterizing the

attitude of the average Canadian toward national

 

90anada, House g;_Commons Debates, August 3,
19600 P0 7523e

f“

“5

10

defence is to say that he does not think much about

it, and get annoyed when he does."10

 

lOJohn Gellner, Saturday Night, Feb. 18, 1961.

 

u . $.03.» r59. .IJ‘ELI till?

CHAPTER II

PARTNERSHIP ATTAINED

1. Pre-World War II.

The history of Canada-United States defence
cooperation is relatively brief. Joint defence of
the continent began to receive the attention of the
two countries only a few years before the outbreak
of World War II. Economic relations, on the other
hand, were unusually close for some years prior to
World War II. Many forces were responsible for such
relationships. There was the proximity of the two
countries; similarities of taste and standards of
living of the two people; and above all, the comple-
mentary character of their economies. -The United
States was in need of raw materials and Canada offered
them in abundance. Canada purchased most of her
manufactured goods from the United States, ranking her
southern neighbor second only to Great Britain in
manufactured exports to Canada. Thus, in some
measures, Canada and the United States had already
maintained economic continentalism prior to their ideas
for defence continentalism which were taking shape

in the latter part of the 19303.

 

1"

'-\

l2
2. The Ogdensburg Agreement

The first signs of efforts toward defence
cooperation came with a series of informal talks which
were held by the President of the United States and
the Prime Minister of Canada in the years between
1937 and 19#0. The threat of the Nazis and Fascists
was mounting in Europe and there was a similar tension
brewing in Asia. These developments had drawn the
leaders of the two countries to deliberate in private
on matters of defence for the Western Hemisphere. In
1937 Prime Minister King had met with President Roosevelt
in Washington and this meeting was followed by the
meetings of staff officers and the Chief of Staffs
of both countries in 1938. The recognition of the
mutually beneficial interests was made clear in the
speech at Queen‘s University in Kingston on August 18,
1938, when President Roosevelt stated that "I give to
you assurance that the people of the United States
will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil
is threatened by any other empire."1 Prime Minister
King in his turn two days later, in the speech at
Woodbridge, Ontario declared: ”We too have our obli-

gations. . . and one of these is to see that. . . enemy

 

'Canada, House 2; Qgggons Debates, Nov. 12,
19#0. pp. 56-7.

13

forces shall not be able to pursue their way either
by land, sea or air, to the United States across
Canadian territory.”2

In the following months the staff officers
met regularly, halted briefly by the outbreak of war.
However, as the course of war took an adverse turn for
the allies, both the United States and Canada began
to recognize the desirability of establishing a more
permanent machinery for defence consultation. Prime
Minister King and President Roosevelt met on August 17,
1940, at Ogdensburg, New York and announced the agreement
to set up a Permanent Joint Board on Defence the next
day. This Board was to “commence immediate studies
relating to sea, land, and air problems including
personnel and material." It was to "consider in the
broad sense the defence of the northern half of the
western hemisphere,” and the Board was to consist of
”four or five members from each country, most of them
from the services."3 The Permanent Joint Board on
Defence was to function purely on an advisory capacity
providing an informal means of reaching agreements

and coordinating the defence plans of the two countries.

 

2Canada, House of Commons Debates, Nov. 12,
1940. De 57c

3D. Dawson, Canada in,Wo;ld Affairs 1212-4;

 

Illllilll.. .1 i

e Is
. . . r
I . .
. f .
l s
.
. . I
. e
v
. u
.
. U
_
a
v e .
‘ f
w A r
' n
I et
a e I
l s I
0‘ e
O ,
‘5 n A
D l
.
r e
A
.
z
.
f
,. :
,
I.
. . .
It
.
. .l
.
av _
r.
-\
. 1
‘ I
.
re. .1 .
(
.
v u o
. I
n
L p K Y.‘
r‘
r t r
.
.\

14

It made strategic recommendations, served as a liason
between the British Commonwealth and the United States
but, above all, it served in providing a sense of
common purpose among the English speaking nations.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defence was a
material expression of the pledges which President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister'King had made two years
before. Some critics of the Canada-United States
Joint defence arrangement spoke of the hastiness in
which the Prime Minister had accepted such arrangements,
especially when he had repeatedly assured the Canadian
people that his government would make no permanent
commitment without the concurrence of Parliament. The
Prime Minister and the President indeed had enjoyed a
cordial relationship on a personal level and shared the
desire for a close cooperation of their two countries.
However, the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board
on Defence was an outcome of the series of discussions
nearly three years preceding the agreement, and Great
Britain had been kept informed all along of the
development.4 The Board was notable for it united a
neutral and a belligerent country in their military
planning.

 

4Ind” pp. 240-241.

15

As the war progressed the American people
became aware of the German menace to their own national
well-being. They started to view their northern
neighbor’s war efforts with growing sympathy. In 1939
and 1940, the Gallup and Fortune Polls tested the
attitudes of the American man on the street by posing
the following question. "If Canada is actually invaded
by a European power do you think the United States
should use its army and navy to aid Canada?” 73.11 said
”Yes" in 1939 and 7h. 2% again said ”Yes” in 1940 when
Canada was already at war. 27% had opposed and 7% was
of no opinion.5 The American government‘s sympathy
for Canada‘s war effort was expressed in the form of
American cooperation and the unstinting assistance
extended to Canada. The United States had amended
its Neutrality Act and the clause of’the "Cash-and-carry"

enabled Canada to purchase quantities of war supplies.
3. DestroyerbBases Deal

A few weeks after the Ogdensburg Agreement,
another step was taken by the United States toward a
better continental defence. The United States took a
step to exchange Canadian-defended Newfoundland bases
for 50 destroyers to Great Britain. The agreement

5F. H. Soward et a1., Canada in World Affairs
E15. PEP—.3 J5$5 (Toronto, 1951), pp. -lll-2.

 

-..JL

l6

placed the base areas in Newfoundland under American
Jurisdiction for a period of 99 years. The agreement
accorded the United States the "right, in the event

of an emergency to make military actions anywhere in
Newfoundland,” though Canada was to be consulted and
the Canadian defence interests were to be expressly
reoognized.6 Subsequently, Newfoundland Joined the
Canadian federation and the 99 year lease held by the
United States on the bases in Newfoundland was modified.
However, the legacy of the wartime arrangement arrived
at between Great Britain and the United States is
still in effect and today the United States maintains
a bulk of its forces and their dependents there.
Canadians are hopeful that further arrangements can

be made between the two countries along the line which

would be more suitable for independent nations.
4. The Hyde Park Declaration and Other Joint War Efforts

Eight months after the Ogdensburg agreement,
the Hyde Park Declaration was made by Canada and the
United States on April 20, 1941. It set up a machinery
to cooperate in the field of armaments and general

economic endeavor. The following paragraph of the

 

6A.M. Fraser, "Newfoundland's Contribution to
Canada," International Journal, IV (Summer 1949), p. 251.

l7

declaration reveals the purpose of the agreement:
It was agreed as a general principle, that in
mobilizing the resources of this continent, each
country should provide the other with the defence
articles it is best able to produce and above all,
produce quickly, and that production program
should be co-ordinated to this end. The existing
and potential capacity in Canada for munitions,
materials, aluminium and ships urgently required
by the United States should fully be made use of.7
The arrangement was successfully realized and the
defence production of the two countries became
integrated. Many Canadian-American cooperative
arrangements such as the Materials Coordination
Committee, and the Joint Economic Committee followed.
During the war several constructions were also under-
taken by the cooperation of the two countries. A
highway was built to Alaska, weather stations in the
Arctic, oil pipelines from the McKenzie River to the
Pacific, and an oil refinery at Whitehouse. The two
countries also constructed several airfields called
the Northwest Staging Route.
The Permanent Joint Board on Defence maintained
its advisory functions throughout the war by recom-
mending new arrangements of defence projects wherever

they were needed, and by inspecting installations.

 

7Don Creighton, A Histo 2;; Canada: 2221.215!
2£.the North (Boston, 1958 , p. 525.

 

.
I
u
’ \ v v
e
.
I ‘ '
4
.
I
| ‘ -
. .~
' m
.
~.
',
. v
,. v
‘ ,. v .
h“, .| I L ‘-
. ’-
.vb.
. _ . l ‘ .
' .
.
.
, so
‘1 1 "l‘ ' V ' .
I
. . ‘ h
v e
. .
. U 5
v ‘ '
., l
_ s
l
,' V-
. A
a . k X
‘- .0" A .
1 5‘
2 ' "

 

' .
‘
s ‘ t
‘
V '—
. '-
..
I ' ‘-
v
. -
- ' ‘ h
.
~ > r
.
o .
‘ .
‘ ‘ > r ‘
F 0-0, . A
.
.
I‘ ‘ ‘ .
' .
,
v ' K k
‘ .
. ' ‘ ' .
f l I ‘ '
- .. K ‘ I ~-
I‘ " , r ‘1 . ‘ ~ ‘ :—
‘ .
a f . .
.
4 ‘ v I I ' ‘ .-
I - v . ’
n A . I
V ‘ ‘ ' r |
c I t _. l
O
r . T \ \' . ’ ~ “
H ' A i > * ' v '
. y ' I . g v. J . \
r I ’ ‘.
. I I y
Y ‘ ' ‘ .
.
J ‘ l ' R g
v ‘ V
: ’ . l ' _. I. l .‘ . ' . ’.
. ' r ‘ r
a ' V ' . -
.“ I i ‘ r
a, ‘ ‘ I a
' ‘ '
9 r ‘. I
s. t, ‘ ' C
a. ‘ ‘ fl
' V J
r r ,,
.
Q ' '
n I ! 1 -
I ‘ .-
‘ .
s
2 ‘ .
.
. .
O > . Q
‘- ~..- _ ‘ l.l'.v'~.‘-- cm-
s ‘ ‘ h
\
l‘ - V
I
s , (
. p .....

I
..,. -.

 

 

18

On the military side, a Special Service Force was
formed which was comprised of the soldiers of both
countries on a 50-50 basis and they served jointly

in Newfoundland, Labrador and in Alaska. Many defence
facilities in Canada were operated by United States
Army personnel. On October 31, 1946, the Minister of
National Defence, Mr. Abott, told the House of Commons
that there were 3,193 United States troops in north-
west Canada "engaged in air staging, maintenance,
handling of stores, disposal of property, airfields
Edmonton to Alaska, Canol project, Alaska Highway,
Yukon-Whitehorse railway." There were 360 more on the
north-eastern air route and in weather stations and
610 more on the Pacific coast. The Canadian people
living in the area referred to these Americans as the

8 Mr. Trevor Lloyd, a Canadian

"forces of occupation."
geographer who has served in the Arctic, wrote: "If
the Canadian peOple had been aware of the extent of
United States undertaking in the North, for example
during 1943, there might have been alarm at their

magnitude and distribution."9

 

8F. H. Soward, Canada in World Affairs: 1244-1246
(Toronto, 1950Ljp. 268.

9Lingard and Trotter, rCanada ;2_World Affairs:
1241-1244 (Toronto, 1950), p. 75.

 

JIIIII .lll'llll 4 .ITIIIIA

\IIIIIIYI ll..l‘l.('nl1f |

I
_
.
.
—
r
e I. —
_
A
;
v
u 'e
_
‘ .
q C
.
. w
\ r
I
(.\ I.
0 .f
r
r\
‘
ft.
\
I
n
O
.l
I. e
F» '
x Q o
.
O
.
r
.1 .
.
.
e
.
a I
. l
I O

19
10
5. "Lucky to Escape With Sovereignty"

The joint efforts in these ventures were not
without irritation and misunderstandings at various
levels. Although on the whole the spirit of "all for
one and one for all“ had prevailed, the Canadians had
some reservations. .The partnership of the two greatly
unequal countries in wealth, and power had caused
some sensitivitieson the part of the smaller country
and many in Canada deeply regretted what they considered
an American intrusion of their country's sovereignty.
Colonel Stanley W. Dzuiban of the United States Army
Iwrote on this subject recently in a book which dealt
with the military relations between the United States
and Canada during the years 1939-1945. "Tens of
thousands of American troops and construction workers
flooded into Canada to man bases and to build airfields,
highways, radar stations and the like," he said.

The substantial American garrison operated in
Canada independently of Canadian control and

legal jurisdiction to an extent considered
unwarranted by many Canadians. This garrison
constructed, maintained and Operated bases and
facilities as if they were on United States

soil. Command organizations with their independent
signal communications systems were established

over segments of Canadian territory. Strenuous

 

10113.2 W Free Press, Jan 22, 1960.

20

American efforts were made to have Canadian forces
placed under American command on Canadian soil. . .
A perennial state of affairs that conditioned

the nature of the relationship was the common
amiable ignorance and disinterest on the part of
the Americans toward the Canadians. . . . Lack

of understanding of the nature of the British
Commonwealth, the Canadian Confederation, and of
the Canadian background, could not fail to
introduce errors and discord in policy considerations
or in the operational handling of problems
concerning American—activities in Canada. Too
frequently, such lapses were compounded by an
ineptitude on the part of American officials

in even the highest positions who violated the
basic rules of "how to win friends and influence
people" . . . 11

After the war, when United States service
personnel were assigned to various installations in
Canada in connection with joint defence operations,
the United States government, perhaps having learned
from the wartime experience of joint work during which
the United States service personnel's apparent .
ignorance of Canada had stirred the ire of Canadians,
took great care to avoid unnecessary offense to
Canadian sensitivities by briefing their men that
Canada is definitely not interested in joining the
United States as a state and that she is not a colony
of Great Britain but a sovereign nation with its own

citizenship and national pride and a strong voice of

11Ibid.

 

.I II .I .Jl

21

its own in world affairs. Information given out in
the pamphlet called ”Neighbours North" has further
stated that "Canada is a partner in the direct defence
of the North American continent and the Western
Hemisphere. It is an ally on whom we count on in
Korea, in the United Nations, in the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization and at home."12

Summary

Changing world conditions and the demands of
war impelled Canada and the United States, the
traditional associates, to devise a continental defence
scheme which unified the military planning of the two
countries. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence which
was the outcome of the political conference between
the representatives of the two countries, was set up
on August 18, 1940, and common defence activities
proceeded and eventually widened in scope to include
collaboration in the field of economics and armaments
and several other schemes of common concern. The
Canada-United States cooperative arrangement often
assumed a tripartite character because of Canada's

relationship with Great Britain.

 

12 he Globe and Mail, Oct. 11, 1955.

 

 

 

 

I- 91'

22

The above policy of integration in defence
efforts increased United States activities in Canada
and in its northern Arctic territory, and in the
closing years of war, it was already apparent that
Canadians were concerned that their country's sovereignty
might be imperilled. Canadian industry was burgeoning
with huge armaments contract and Canada was beginning

to show the attitude of confidence and independence.

 

9?! iwl ? I

CHAPTER III

POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD

1. Canada's Hope for Security Through the United Nations

During World War II, the allied leaders planned
a postwar world which was to be devoid of power
politics and one which would be centered around an
\;international organization. Gone completely were the
days when the United States strove to insulate herself
and championed isolationism. With the conviction that
war could be avoided by joining in collective security,
the United States took an active part and in so
doing improved the chances of success for the latest
model of international organization.

In those early postwar years when the signs
of impending Cold War had already begun to appear in
the forms of political disagreements between the two
former wartime allies, the United States and the
U.S.S.R., Canada nevertheless entertained earnest
hope for peace by arbitration which the United Nations
seemed to offer. Within this framework Canada hoped
to make a creative and constructive contribution
toward a better world, a role which a nation of

limited power and resources like Canada could not

24

hope to play effectively outside such a framework.
Canada's faith in the United Nations was one of the
four cornerstone on which Canada's foreign policy was
to be based. When the new Conservative Government
took office in 1957, it, too, emphasized Canada’s
reliance on the United Nations. Thus, Prime Minister
Diefenbaker, speaking to the United Nations General
Assembly on September 23, 1957, said:

We stand on this question now where Canada has
always stood since April 1945, and I emphasize
this - with the support of the party which is now
in power. So far as Canada is concerned,
support of the United Nations is the cornerstone
of its foreign policy. We believe that the
United Nations will grow stronger because it
represents the inevitable struggle of countries
to find order in their relationships, and the
deep longing of mankind to strive for and attain
peace and justice.

Canada had contributed greatly in creating a United
Nations emergency force and its soldiers had been
playing an important role in many tense and disturbed
areas of the world. Over 900 Canadian servicemen
formed part of the United Nations emergency force in
the Middle East, and supplied some 130 personnel of
her armed services for the truce commission in Indo-
China, the United Nations truce supervisory organi-

zation in Palestine and the truce team in Kashmir.2

 

1U N. General Assembly - Twelfth Session, Plenary
MoetlnE‘ZB} """'

. Sept 23. 1957, p. .

2Canada, House g£_Commons Debates, Dec. 5, 19579
p. 1897.

 

Jill ‘I I." I {1‘
v. _
. I
.
.
, \
u
y a- _ .
v V
l
.I
I
a...
fl ( .
n
I v
e .
./x r‘ .
t ..
.
O
r
P.
.
I
or: .Iv
0 ‘1. v
1 g
. 4 s
- v e a
a .
I r

A‘IOI.

25

2. Canada's Participation in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization

In April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization was formed. Since the United Nations
was made ineffective by the Soviet veto and since
whatever hope there might have been for a friendly
cooperation between the Communist world and the
Western world became shattered by the series of events
that followed the Moscow Conference of March 1947,
the United States undertook the course of "containment“
policy. The first realization of that policy appeared
in the form of Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947,
which gave military and economic aid to Turkey and
Greece. The Marshall Plan which was a program for
European recovery was launched on June 5, 1947, followed
by the Point Four, the technical assistance program
for the underdeveloped countries of the world to raise
their living standards so that they could better
withstand the threat of Communism. To this impressive
array of Western, or the United States' moves, the
Soviet Union replied with its form of alliances and
programs to tighten Eastern Europe. With a Communist
”coup” in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, the Cold

War was now truly on. War seemed imminent. The

!‘

 

 

26

Western world wished to warn the Soviet Union that
an act of aggression against any freenation forming
the NATO would mean a war with all these nations.
NATO was a particularly satisfying organization
from the standpoint of Canada. The organization
seemed to promise to free Canada from the appearance
of a satellite position to the United States and
seemed to provide her an Opportunity to voice her
views more effectively within the constitutional
machinery of this organization. It was an organization
which united all the Western democracies and included
Great Britain, Canada's traditional ally as well as
the United States, her new partner in the North American
defence. It is little wonder then that Canadian
leaders were such ardent advocates of NATO from the
period of its conception. NATO forms another corner-
stone to Canada's foreign policy. The interest of
Canada in this organization is stated by Mr. Lester
Pearson in the following way:
Personally, I am more than ever convinced that
the continuing cohesion of all the Atlantic
powers, not merely the European powers, is
vitally important to the preserving and re-
inforcing of the peace of the world and that no
security and no stability can be achieved
through isolated arrangements, either in North
America or in Europe. Continentalism, whether

of the European or American variety, is not
enough for safety.

 

3Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, Jan. 29,
1954, p. 1587.

27

Canada's contribution to NATO both in terms
of men and material is considerable in proportion to
its size. It has twelve squadrons of intercepters
in Europe equipped with Sabres and CF-lOOs under
SACEUR. They are located mostly in Germany and some
5,800 airmen are employed in flying and servicing
these aircrafts. It also has in Germany an infantry
group made up of over 5000 men, and armoured regiment
equipped with tanks. The naval contribution to NATO
consists of forty fighting ships and fifty maritime
aircraft. Since 1951, Canada has made available to its
allies 81 billion worth of equipment and trained
nearly 5000 pilots and navigators from member nations
of NATO.4

The Canada-United States defence arrangements
came under the NATO umbrella in 1949. Within NATO,
there was to be a system of regional groupings whereby
the nations that fall under the four regions would do
the planning and the administration of each respective
area. The first of these groups consisted of the
Northern regional group with Norway and Denmark with
Great Britain participating; the second group consisted

of the Western European group with Belgium, France,

 

4Canada, House gprcmmons Debates, Dec. 5, 1957.
p. 1897e

 

 

iii. IJ

28

Luxemberg, and Holland, the United Kingdom with the
United States and Canada participating. The third,
the Southern European group, was composed of Italy
and southern France with the United States and United
Kingdom participating. The fourth group consisted of
North American nations, Canada and the United States
with United Kingdom participating. Eventually the
three European regional groupings were integrated
under a joint military command. Thus, within NATO,
Canada and the United States were to collaborate under
the Canada-United States regional planning group as

one of the regional groupings of NATO.5

3. Reaffirmation of Canada-United States Military

Cooperation

As the situation worsened the chances of

arriving at an East-West rapproachment, Canada began
to receive increasing pressure from the United States
for closer defence partnership. It was the new air
age and Canada's geographical location which animated
American military leaders to press for Canada's
closer cooperation. The Arctic frontier had assumed

a new importance, for the region would become a major

 

5Canada, House a; Commons Debates, Nov. 13, 1957,

 

29

area of combat in the event of another war. As
Mr. Pearson, the former Minister of External Affairs
under the Liberal Government and the present Leader
of Opposition, put it, Canada was “in the dangerous
position of being sandwiched geographically between
the U.S.S.R. and the United States."6
As early as June 1945, the discussions for
postwar defence cooperation were held between the
two countries to meet any future contingencies. It
was, therefore, agreed that the Permanent Joint Board
on Defence would be continued. Negotiations were
carried out in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence
and in February 1947, the two governments made a
joint statement concerning the principle which would
govern the arrangements for military cooperation
between the two countries. It stated that:
1. The interchange of selected individuals
in order to increase the familiarity of each
country's defence personnel with that of the
other.
2. The general cOOperation and exchange of
observers in exercises and in testing military
material.
3. The encouragement of common designs and

standards in arms, equipment, organization,
methods of training, and new developments.

 

6Lester Pearson, in an address reported in
The Globe and Mai , Feb. 22, 1947.

V .
I
‘0
.
- e "
.

f A.
. l

.
‘.\O"

' .
I
1 ‘ ’
' J
.
‘ _
J
.
. 1
, .
.
. A
. .
I. ~‘
~ I
,.
' ...‘
.

-1"

 

3O

4. The mutual and reciprocal availability
of military, naval and air facilities in
each country as may be agreed upon in specific
instances.
5. All cooperation to be arranged without
impairing the political sovereignty of either
country ovsr the normal activities in its
territory.
Canada was thus driven to enter into a close
defence partnership with the United States in time
of peace. Uneasiness of Canadian peOple about this
joint enterprise was reflected in the House of Commons'
debate of June 1947. This new arrangement empowered

American military authorities to maintain discipline

over their own forces in Canada. Angry voices
denounced this concession degrading, and the government
worked hard to convince the members of Parliament that
all precautions have been taken to protect national
sovereignty.

Canada's growing emphasis on collaboration
with her neighbor in the field of defence was once
again apparent in her defence policy which the Canadian
government presented in 1948. It stated that the
government of Canada aims to work with Iother free

nations and plans for joint defence based on self-

help and mutual aid as part of a joint effort to

 

7Second Seminar gn_Canada-Ame;;ca Relations,
Assumption University of Windsor, November 10,11,12,
1960.

‘
O
’ O l
I
II F «
e - '
.
I a f
r ’ L‘ '. ' '
. f. r
A O
l r‘ ' ‘ '
1 1 ? I
. \ F
I ' v ‘
a) u "
e
U l r - e .
f A '
, .
’ C v o
_ ' r“ " e - . , r
- q A . ' . ~ . ,
i ‘5 J r l - 1
.- ‘ - . , C' 1‘
. . _‘t
. .
I I
I
a -
j Y
. . s ‘ ‘
‘.. , f .
' l ‘. P
. .
.
. f
5 . r r
f ‘ ; - ' " "
Q
m m P I
1 ’- ' F ’
I
a v 'a ,
"A. u v... 'e- .‘r C I '- —e - 75.!” x ’9

 

31

preserve peace and to restrain aggression." Mr.
Claxton, the then Minister of National Defence, further
observed that "no one country could be fully enough
armed to meet and master the onslaught of modern war."
He said, ”each had its own fraction of power to contribute
to the common defence."8

In the new world which is dominated by the two
big Powers, a middle Power such as Canada was quickly
forced to revert "with disconcerting speed to its
normal position of a weak North American state, over-
shadowed by the United States."9 Canada's geographic
position and the new air age turned Canada‘s northern
hitherto wasteland into a strategically important
region. This development was disconcerting to many
Canadians. "Canada. . . does not relish the necessity
of digging or having dug for her any Maginot Line in
the Arctic ice," explained Mr. Pearson. "Peaceful
development,” he said, "in cooperation with the northern

nations is Canada's sole desire."1O

expressed their desire to develop the areas for peaceful

Canadian statesmen

purposetinmcooperation with the United States (for

 

8Canada, House 2;.Commons Debates, 1948, p. 5785.
gsOWard, 22e Cite, Pa 7e

1OL.B. Pearson, "Canada Looks Down North",
Foreign Affairs, July 1946, p. 644. -

32

Alaska), Denmark (for Greenland) and with the U.s.s.R.“
However, as the international situation deteriorated,
Canada received increasing pressure from the United
States to collaborate in the Canadian north. The
relation with the United States, therefore, has comprised
the major foreign policy problem for Canada in the

years between 1946-1949. The two governments set up

a series of northern weather stations and undertook

joint military exercise under Arctic conditions. The

two governments, later on, began to build gigantic radar

defence systems across northern Canada.
Summary

And now, to summarize: the events of the
postwar years have demonstrated that the basic Canadian
view in achieving security has been through membership
in both multilateral and bilateral military alliances.
Under the pressure of the Cold War, Canada thus has
renewed its wartime joint defence arrangement with the
United States. This returning to the continental
defence system for North America, however, has been
far from satisfactory from Canada's standpoint. It

has been considered difficult to maintain a national

 

11Soward, pp. cit., p. 10.

33

identity in a continent so dominated by the United
States. The next chapter will deal with the gigantic
joint Canada-United States enterprise of building a

continental radar defence system across North America.

CHAPTER 1v

CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF RADAR WARNING SYSTEMS

"In the current phase of collective security,“
stated the Government’s White Paper on National Defence
for 1956-57, “Canada's principle support of the
West's retaliatory striking power is our contribution
towards early warning and air defence on this continent."1
The construction of the chain of radar stations in
North America to provide an early warning of the
approach of enemy aircraft from the north, was a
project which was both expensive and highly contro-
versial. All told three warning lines have been built

by both countries.
1. Pinetree and Mid-Canada Line

The continent's radar defence system began
with the building of the first radar chain, the
Pinetree Line, which was built by Canada and the
United States over the border of two countries along
the 50th parallel. The chain of stations stretches
north-east from Vancouver Island to Alberta and is

located in the territory of both countries. This

 

(Ralph Campney, ”Canada's Defence Programme,
1256-51 , Ottawa, 1956, p. 4.

35

electrically connected system of detection and
warning devices was equipped both to detect the
approaching aircraft and to direct the planes in
interception. The total cost of the Pinetree Line
was estimated at $450 million of which the United
States paid two-thirds. In 1954, the second chain
called Mid-Canada Line was built along the 55th
parallel by Canada alone.

The Mid-Canada Line was only a radar system
and it prompted some critics to question the strategic
value of the Line. Lt. General Guy Simmonds, the
retired Canadian Army Chief of Staff, for instance,
felt that the decision to build the Mid-Canada Line
stemmed from other than strategic considerations and
said that "the United States has pressed the construction
of the Dew Line with such vigor that it is for serious
consideration whether the arguments for the Mid-Canada
Line were not powerfully influenced by a desire to
put to use gadgetry evolved in Canada rather than
consideration of what would provide the best defence."
The official reply to such criticism was made by the
Minister of National Defence who said: "The Mid-

Canada Line has the function of confirming the

 

2Guy Simmonds, ”Where We've Gone Wrong on
Defense", Maclean’s Ma azine, June 23, 1956.

 

36

warning of attack and Of indicating the direction in
which it is heading and alerting the air defence
forces in more detail to get into a position to meet
the attack."3 The Mid-Canada Line cost Canada

$170 million.

2. The Dew Line

The third, the Distant Early Warning Line (Dew
Line) was built by the United States across the
Canadian Arctic. The construction began in late
1954 and was completed in the summer of 1957. It
stretches from Western Alaska across the upper rim
of the continent through Canada to Baffin Island. It
is 3000 miles long and approximately 600 miles inside
the Arctic circle at latitude 70°. The Dew Line is
made up of a series of radar ports isolated from
each other except by electronic connections. The
information gathered by these electronic devices is
relayed through automatic and semi-automatic relay
points to the Continental Air Defence Commands at
Colorado Springs and to the Canadian Air Defence
Command Headquarters at St. Hubert, Quebec. Although

the full cost of construction and Operation came

 

3Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, July 18, 1956,
p. 6118.

37

. Xv; . ”tau:
.3...” to

.. ,. .......,,.w_. Ewe. 9.5.1

 

38

under the responsibility of the United States, many
Canadian firms were awarded contracts and most of the
1000 men needed to operate the Dew Line were to be
Canadians. These three Lines were extended seaward
by the use of specially equipped ships and aircraft
on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.

The agreement to construct the Dew Line by
the two countries contained a long list of conditions
laid down by Canada for construction of the Line.
They included the use, as much as possible, of the
Canadian manufactured electronic equipment; equal
consideration for Canadian and American contractors
in the awarding of contracts; preference to qualified
Canadian labour; and the protection of the Eskimo
population. Paragraphs dealing with Canadian law
and Operation of the system will be mentioned later.

Large aircraft are maintained by both countries
to support these air screens. The airplanes used in
this sentry flight are the largest planes operated
by the Navy and each aircraft carries 23 crew members
and flies 3000 miles non-stop. The planes are packed
with 14,000 pounds of radar. About a hundred of them
costing approximately $5.5 million a piece are reported

to be in operation.4

 

4The Globe and Mail, July 30, 1957.

 

 

 

39

3. Controversy Surrounding the Radar Warning System
in Canada

The criticism surrounding continental defence
based on radar system and defensive aircraft was
varied and bitter in Canada. Some felt that Canada
was not doing enough in this joint effort of continental
defence. Others felt that it was endangering Canada’s
sovereignty by inviting to Canada foreign armed
forces in peacetime. Still others felt that the
system itself was strategically unsound.

Insisting that Canada was not sufficiently
assisting her senior partner, the United States, the
Toronto Globe and Mail asserted:

Who is going to defend Canada? More particularly,

who is going to defend Canada's North? At present,

the task is shared by Canadian and United States

forces. Whether the sharing is proportionate --

whether, that is, each country is doing what it

can reasonably be expected to do -- is a mystery. . .

Reports from Ottawa suggest, however, that we

may soon reach the point where there are more 5

United States airmen in Canada than Canadian ones.
Attacking the manpower shortage in Canada, the Q1223
and Mail wrote that Canada ought to deal with her

manpower shortage in Canada or tell the Americans to

take over the defence of Canada.

 

5The Globe and Mail, April 1, 1955.

 

 

 

40

Another aspect of the continental radar system
which stirred much Canadian opposition concerned
sovereignty. The construction of the Pinetree Line
and especially the Dew Line which were entirely built
by the United States took many Americans to Canada's
northland. In order to offset any undesirable infringe-
ment on Canadian sovereignty and in order to offset
criticisms, the Canadian government had concluded a
detailed agreement with the United States which would
preserve the essentials of Canadian sovereignty. In
spite of this precaution many incidents both true and
false were reported in Parliament and in the press
causing deep resentment. There were reports that
Canadian contractors were being discriminated against
and that American flags were flying where Canadian
flags ought to have flown; that Canadian journalists
were forbidden to cover the story of Dew Line; that
the Americans made it difficult for Canadian Officials
to visit the defence facilities on their own soil.
Some writers moaned that the Canadian peOple were
required to have their credentials processed in a
foreign country before they visit their own locales.
When, for example, Mervyn Hardie, Liberal M.P. for

Mackenzie River, wanted to visit his constituents

41

on the Dew Line, Mr. James M. Minifie wrote in his
book Peacemaker 2g Powder-Monks , Mr. Hardie's permit
had to be processed in Paramus, New Jersey. "By the
wildest stretch of the imagination,” Mr. Minifie went
on to say, ”can you envisage a US congressman allowing
himself to be told by an office set up in Canada when
and whether he may visit his voters in the United
States? You would hear the screams from the forty-
nineth parallel to the Rio Grande, and from longitude
67° west to the international date-line. And rightly."6
The Northern Affairs Minister Alvin Hamilton,
in answering to the questions raised by the Opposition
Leader, Mr. Pearson, said to the House that it was a
matter of national chagrin that Canadian Officials,
including ministers have to obtain United States
permission to visit Canada's Arctic. "I am ashamed
of the fact," Mr. Hamilton said,
that through circumstances beyond the power of
almost anyone here we have had to give all
responsibilities for the defence of our northern
area to a friendly power. . . Employees of the
government of Canada and Even ministers have to
go through a formal procedure of getting permission.
When Canadians have to wait several months to
get permission to go and do their duty in their
own country at the direction of their own minister

I do not apologize to the House or the country for
saying that I am ashamed of the situation.

 

6James M. Minifie, Peacemaker g; Powdgr-Monkey
(McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 19605, p. 103.

7The Winnipeg Free Press, Aug. 15, 1958.

42

The editor of Maclean'g Magazing who had visited
the Dew Line sites made a similar objection in his
article and wrote that his visit to the Dew Line to
cover the story had to be cleared by American officials
in the United States and that he had difficulty in
getting adequate information once he got there.8
As for the United States, the State Department denied
Mr. Hamilton's statement indirectly by saying that
Canadians were free to travel anywhere including the
Dew Line sites without clearance from the United
States authorities.
In the House, Mr. Pearson urged that Canada
take over "at the earliest possible moment, control
of United States defence installations in the Canadian
Arctic. "Throughout the years,” the Prime Minister
said, "I have felt that in the northern defences of
Canada there were in existence situations that could
conceivably derogate Canada's sovereignty. . . .
Following that viewpoint, negotiations have taken
place. . . . A friendly and favorable response has
been the result of the representations made."9
Since the construction of the Dew Line and

the other Northern defence installations had the

 

8Maclean's Ma azine, May 26, 1956.

9Canada, House g£|Commons Debates, Aug. 16,
1958. P. 3652.

43

effect of de facto American control of the Canadian
north, and since it has aroused so much concern in
Canada, paragraphs of the agreement that deal with
Canadian law, Operation and manning, financing, and
the period of Operation of the system will be quoted
here in full.

Paragraph 6. Canadian Law.

Nothing in this agreement shall derogate
from the application of Canadian law in Canada,
provided that, if in unusual circumstances its
application may lead to unreasonable delay or
difficulty in construction or Operation, the
United States authorities concerned may request
the assistance of Canadian authorities in seeking
appropriate alleviation. In order to facilitate
the rapid and efficient construction of the DEW
System, Canadian authorities will give sympathetic
consideration to any such request submitted by
United States Government authorities.

Particular attention is directed to the
ordinances of the Northwest Territories and
Yukon Territory, including those relating to
the following:

a) No game or wildlife shall be taken or
molested in the Northwest Territories. Licenses
to hunt in Yukon Territory may be purchased from
representatives of the Yukon Territorial Government.

b) No objects of archaeological interest
or historic significance in the Northwest
Territories or Yukon Territory will be disturbed
or removed therefrom without first obtaining the
approval of the Canadian Department of Northern
Affairs and National Resources.

Paragraph 7. Operation and Manning

a) The extent Of Canadian participation
in the initial Operation and manning of the DEW
System shall be a matter for later decision by
Canada after full consultation with the United

43

effect of de facto American control of the Canadian
north, and since it has aroused so much concern in
Canada, paragraphs of the agreement that deal with
Canadian law, operation and manning, financing, and
the period of operation of the system will be quoted
here in full.

Paragraph 6. Canadian Law.

Nothing in this agreement shall derogate
from the application of Canadian law in Canada,
provided that, if in unusual circumstances its
application may lead to unreasonable delay or
difficulty in construction or Operation, the
United States authorities concerned may request
the assistance of Canadian authorities in seeking
appropriate alleviation. In order to facilitate
the rapid and efficient construction of the DEW
System, Canadian authorities will give sympathetic
consideration to any such request submitted by
United States Government authorities.

Particular attention is directed to the
ordinances of the Northwest Territories and
Yukon Territory, including those relating to
the following:

a) No game or wildlife shall be taken or
molested in the Northwest Territories. Licenses
to hunt in Yukon Territory may be purchased from
representatives of the Yukon Territorial Government.

b) NO objects Of archaeological interest
or historic significance in the Northwest
Territories or Yukon Territory will be disturbed
or removed therefrom without first obtaining the
approval of the Canadian Department of Northern
Affairs and National Resources.

Paragraph 7. Operation and Manning

a) The extent of Canadian participation
in the initial Operation and manning of the DEW
System shall be a matter for later decision by
Canada after full consultation with the United

1‘

\Q

l‘

44

States. It is understood that, in any event,
Canada reserves the right, on reasonable notice,
to take over the operation and manning of any
or all of the installations. Canada will ensure
the effective Operation, in association with the
United States, of any installations it takes
over.

b) Subject to the foregoing, the United
States is authorized to station personnel at the
sites, and to operate the DEW System, in accordance
with the principles of command in effect from
time to time between the military authorities of
the two countries. The overall manning policy
as between the employment of military and
civilian personnel shall be the subject of
consultation and agreement between the two Govern-
menti.

Paragraph 8. Financing

Unless otherwise provided by Canada, the
costs of construction and operation of the DEW
System shall be the responsibility of the United
States, with the exception of Canadian military
personnel costs if Canada should man any of the
installations.

Paragraph 9. Period of Operations of the System

Canada and the United States agree that,
subject to the availability of funds, the DEW
System shall be maintained in operation for a
period of ten years or such shorter period as
shall be agreed by both countries in the light
of their mutual defence interests. Thereafter,
in the event that either Government concludes
that any or all of the installations are no
longer required, and the other Government does
not agree, the question of continuing need will
be referred to the Permanent Joint Board on
Defence. In considering the question Of need,
the Permanent Joint Board on Defence will take
into account the relationship Of the DEW System
to other radar installations established in the
mutual defence interest of the two countries.
Following consideration by the Permanent Joint
Board on Defence, as provided above, either
Government may decide that the installations in

45

question shall be closed, in which case the
arrangements shown in Paragraph 10 regarding
ownership and disposition of the installations
will apply.

‘ The third type of criticism directed against
the continental defence based on the radar system
concerned strategy. These criticisms came mostly
from the retired members of the General Staff and
some military experts who believed that it was useless
against planes carrying hydrogen bomb some of which
would get through anyway. With the rapid advance in
technology which drastically shortened the warning
time, the civil defence function of the warning system
was relegated to the point where it became meaningless.
Thus a Conservative critic, Mr. George Nowlan, remarked
of the warning chains:

Their real purpose is not to protect the public .

. . but is rather to give the bombers a chance

to get into the air so they will not be destroyed

on the ground and in order that they can launch

a counter measure of massive retaliation. . .

Well, if that is the hope. . . it does not hold

out much comfort for the rest of us, because we 11

are probably going to be burnt to a crisp anyway.
Some like General W.H.S. Macklin, a former Adjutant-
General of the Canadian Army, felt that such a system

of static defence is ineffective against the challenge

 

10"Defence. Establishment of a Distant Early
Warning System. Agreement between Canada and the United
States of America Effected by Exchange of Notes signed
at Washington, May 5, 1955." Canada, Treaty Series, _255,
No
C O 11

Canada, House 2;,Commons Debates, July 18, 1956,
p. 6135.

46

of a diversified nature of Russian armament:
If we put our trust in this counterpart of the
old Wall of China, and fail to provide armaments
that can match our adversaries' in any sort of
war they select, and moreover, if we do not train
our men to use them, communism will go on winning
campaign.after campaign. In the end we may
commit suicide by turning to thermonuclear
weapons in desperation, oi else Just lose the
last campaign by default. 2
The other criticisms against the strategic
value of the radar warning system were concerned with
the utility of the radar warning system itself. The
critics time and again questioned the detection
capabilities of the radar system which tended to lag
behind the improved means of delivery. For instance,
in the summer of 1958, the Defence Minister indicated
that man-operated bombers had already exceeded the
detection capabilities of the defence line.13 Some
modifications of the Dew Line soon followed. However,
it was common knowledge that the Dew Line was useless
against the Russian ICBM. The missile travels at
about 15,000 miles an hour and, at the top of its
trajectory, is about 600 miles above the earth.“ Another
fact which threatened the strategic value of the

warning system in the Arctic came from the rapid

 

12Donald 0. Masters, Canada ig_Wor;d ngairs,
125255. (Toronto. 1959). p. 67.

13$§g,fliggipgg Free Press, July 7, 1958.
14The Winnipeg Free Press, Nov. 13, 1957.

47

development in submarine missile launching capabilities.
Admiral Arleigh C. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations,
USN, for instance, has told a congressional committee

of the possible use of the intermediate range ballistic
missile by submarines off the coast of the United
States.15 Antisubmarine warfare, as a result, was
receiving high priorities.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, Canadian
government steadfastly followed the policy of the
United States government which adopted the system of
a radar screen. "They will buy us time,” said the
Minister of National Defence Campney in the House of
Commons in June 1955, "time to get the big United States
deterrent force of bombers with their nuclear weapons
winging away on their missions should the need arise,
time to get our defence activated, time to prepare our
peoples for impending attack."16 As of the time of
writing the manned bomber, if unopposed, is by far
the best and most effective way of delivering atomic
weaponsirrTherefore, the above statement of the former

Minister of National Defence is still accurate.

 

15Minifie, £2, gi£., p. 15.
16
p. 5211.

Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, June 20, 1956,

17Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, September 12,
1961, p. 8223.

48

In 1958, three ballistic missile detection
stations were built over the Arctic. As early as
July 1956, negotiations were underway to consider
Jointly the measure of defending against the ICBM.
Canadian defence research, collaborating with the
United States Air Force has worked for a new warning
system against ICBM.18Using ultra-range radar, these
stations were able to spot missile launchings a few
minutes after the launching. The flight time for an
ICBM from the Soviet Union to the United States was
now estimated to be approximately 30 minutes providing
15 minutes of warning to the Strategic Air Command
(SAC) to clear the bases.19

The radar warning system, therefore, is now
comprised of two defence net works; one against
bomber and one against missile. This warning system
still is the backbone of the policy of deterrent. Thus
General Thomas Powers, chief of the SAC disclosed in
February 1959, before the house sub-committee as
follows:

The real backbone of SAC's deterrent is our
alert system. As you know, under this system

we maintain a certain percentage of the command
on the alert 24 hours a day, seven days a week,

 

18David McIntosh, "What Are We Getting in our
81.5 billion Defence Package2", Canadian Business,
November 1957.

192g; Globe §n_ Mail, Jan. 18, 1958.

 

 

I V

.1

U
‘ n
I
‘ I
O
.» _
I
4‘
.
- l
L
‘ I
' i
' t
- g i
I - Q
_ b
' v
A
’7 1‘
f
r
" ‘

49

365 days a year. Airplanes are loaded with
bombs; crews sleep close by. They are tested
everyday. . . we can get them rolling in about
five minutes, that is, the first airplane starts
rolling down the runway in five minutes. This

is the only force that a potential aggressor
knows he will have to reckon with, no matter how
cleverly he plans his surprise attack. If that
force is big enough, and if it gets the 15
minutes' warning for which it is tailored, and

if it can penetrate we think an aggressor will

be strongly deterred. If we get that warning, we
can get these airplanes off the ground; therefore,
even though an aggressive launchings missiles
against the US--and nothing can stop them today--
we will still get the retaliatory force off, that
part of it that is on this alert; it will no be
destroyed, and the aggressor will absorb it.

”There is our protection at the present time,” Mr.
Pearson, referring to the SAC's deterrent role, stated,
"That, I suggest, is the purpose, if it has any purpose,
of continental air defence and early warning system.” 21
Canada in 1958 took another step that contributed
to the effectiveness of the SAC. On June 10, 1958,
Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced to the House, the
government's plan to permit the establishment of new
bases in the Canadian north for the United States Air
Force tankers to refuel the bombers of the Strategic
Air Command. These refueling facilities, the Prime
Minister spoke, "will contribute to the effectiveness
of the strategic air command, to its ability to

 

20Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, July 2, 1959,
p. 5366.

211nd. p. 5366.

-—

‘i‘>.rr

50

react quickly in face of the reduced time of warning
which must now be contemplated in the event of
aggression by reason of the recent scientific and

technological develOpments."22

Summary

Since the defensive technology lags behind the
development of offensive weapons, only an effective
retaliatory force: can assure the defence of North
America. The radar warning system which stretches
across Canada's northern territory has been and still
is an important part of the deterrent. A huge sum of
money and skill required to build and operate these
stations, however, was found to be quite beyond Canada's
capability. The United States, therefore, took part
in this gigantic operation and many American personnel
were brought to Canadian soil to build and operate the
stations. Incidents, which Canadians considered as
not in keeping with Canada's sovereignty, were
trickling down to the Parliament and to the press
arousing anxiety and furor in Canada. Later, the
demand of security took the two countries still one

step further in their already close defence cooperation

 

220anada, House 2; Commons Debates, June 10,
1958. p. 998.

51

by integrating the air forces under a single command.

To this we now will turn.

CHAPTER V

NORAD (North American Air Defence Command)

1. What is NORAD

North American Air Defence Command is an
arrangement which Canada and the United States, the
two sovereign nations, arrived at in order to strengthen
the defence capability of the North American continent..
This arrangement places the defence operation of the
Air Forces of the two countries under a single
command headed by an American general. A Canadian
Air Marshall is appointed as his deputy, who in the
absence of the commander, takes a full command over the
operational control of the Air Forces of both the
United States and Canada allocated to NORAD. NORAD
is a defensive arrangement in a sense that it cannot
start a war. NORAD was described by Prime Minister
Diefenbaker as an arrangement, the task of which is
that of maintaining the early warning system and
alerting the United States Strategic Air Command (SAC)
which is the deterrent striking force of the United
States.1 NORAD headquarters is located at Colorado

Springs and a small number of Canadian officers and

 

‘Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, June 10,
1958. p. 999.

53

airmen work side by side with the men of the United
States armed forces.

Decision making machinery of NORAD is vast
and complex. As described in the previous chapter,
the entire radar warning system of the North American
continent was brought under NORAD. It meant that all
'information picked up by the three radar warning systems
were to be communicated immediately to Colorado Springs
by the huge network of nearly 200 short wave radio
and teletype circuits. Canadian Air Defence headquarters
in St. Hubert, Quebec, receives the same information
at the same time. SAGE(Semi-automatic Ground Environ-
ment) system, about which more will be said in the
next chapter, digests all the information coming from
the radar system and works out the probable course
and speed of the enemy aircraft. The rest and the
vital decision of "go" is to be made by the commander

of NORAD.

2. The Origin of NORAD

Both Canada and the United States accept the
fact that North America should be considered as a
single unit for an effective defence. The two countries,

in order to maximize the defence effort of the continent,

4.

 

 

5#

therefore, have for over a decade, studied the ways
and means to improve the air defence system of this
continent. For example, as far back as November 1951,
the then Liberal Government of Canada arrived at an
agreement with the United States providing authority
to intercept and engage hostile aircraft in the
territory of the other. The arrangement for cooperation
in relation to air defence between the air forces of
the two countries, therefore, was already operating
quite effectively when Mr. Pearkes, the Minister of
National Defence, announced the formation of NORAD to
the Canadian press in August 1957.

The establishment of NORAD had been under
consideration for several months under the Liberal
Government, and a Joint military study group, made up
of the officials of the three services as well as the
scientific agencies of both countries, had been set
up in early 1957. This group had recommended the
setting up of the integrated operational controls of
all air defence forces under one Joint headquarters to
enable a better air defence system of the continent.
However, the final decision on this particular type of
arrangement was taken by the Conservative Government
which traditionally abhorred any close ties with the
United States. On August 1, 1957, only a month after

L

d A.

55

the Conservative Government took office in Canada

for the first time in 22 years, the announcements of
NORAD were made simultaneously in Washington and Ottawa
by the defence secretaries of the two countries,
stating that their two governments had ”agreed to the
setting up of a system of integrated operational
control of the air defense forces of the continental
United States, Alaska, and Canada under an integrated
command responsible to the chief of staffs of both

”2 The formal agreement spelling out the

countries.
terms of reference was long in the making, perhaps due
to the throes of political transition which were taking
place in Canada in the latter half of 1957 and the first
half of 1958, and therefore, for nearly ten months

until the Joint defence arrangement was formalized by
the exchange of notes on May 12, 1958, NORAD functioned

under the interim arrangement.
3. How the Announcement was Received

When NORAD was first announced in August 1957,
the logic of it seemed cogent enough and was received
warmly by the Canadian people. The increased speed
and efficiency with which a death blow could be delivered

by the belligerents in case of war, made acute the

 

2The Winnipeg Free Press, August 1, 1957.

56

necessity of quick decision and efficient operation.
Therefore, when the first announcement was made, even
the pro-Liberal paper ghg‘Winnipeg Eggg_§gg§g_hailed
the announcement and wrote: ”The new Government merits
a particular word of congratulation on taking the final
decision."3 The paper also asserted the necessity for
a unified action of the two countries in the face of
threat against the North American continent. In the
subsequent months, however, the NORAD arrangement came
under close scrutiny in the House of Commons and, under
the probing of the apposition groups, the Government
displayed a considerable amount of confusion and created
a painful impression of uncertainty to the Canadian
defence picture.

The nationwide concern over the establishment
of NORAD, as it became apparent in the ensuing months,
was, once again, over the question of how the agreement
of that nature would affect Canadian sovereignty. Some
questions were over the wisdom of the agreement itself
and others were on the procedural aspects in arriving
at such an agreement. Both arguments could be understood
in terms of the Canadian peoples’ deep concern over

the ever increasing and dominant role which the United

 

3 he W nni e Free Press, Dec. 7, 1957.

 

57

States was playing in the life of the Canadian people.
The Canadian people’s uneasiness over the integratiOn
of the air force and over the increasing dependency

and subordination of their country to the United States,
especially on the matter of defence, was well reflected
in the long and heated Common's debates that followed
the Government‘s announcement.

Reactions in the House of Commons were very
critical. The criticisms ran largely along two lines.
The oppositionr in the House, both Liberal and the
COP was concerned first about the degree of power the
United States would have in making independent decisions
within the framework of NORAD. To what degree does
it affect Canada‘s sovereignty? The opposition,
therefore, wanted to know the principles under which
NORAD was operating, and the relations of the two govern-
ments concerning NORAD. The Opposition, led by Mr.
Pearson, asked the Government to table the document of
the agreement of NORAD, and when the Government did,
it turned out that the document was merely an order-
in-council dated July 31, 1957, transferring Canadian
officers and men to Colorado Springs and setting up
the salary of Marshall Slemon, the Canadian deputy to
the United States commander-in-chief at NORAD. NORAD,

it became apparent, went into operation with the Joint

(I

58

statement by the Secretary of Defence of the United
States and-the Minister of National Defence of Canada,
plus the above document which did not spell out even
in general terms the powers or constitution of NORAD.
What was the exact responsibility of the commander-in-
chief of NORAD?

At the time Mr. Pearkes, the Minister of
National Defence, had announced the establishment of
NORAD in August 1957, he had said that an American
officer would be in command of NORAD with a Canadian
officer as his deputy. The two men, Mr. Pearkes had
said, would develop plans for the defence of North
America and would act immediately according to the plan,
in case of an emergency, without referring either to
‘Washington or Ottawa. ’Later, however, both.Mr. Diefen-
baker and Mr. Pearkes backtracked from this statement
and said that NORAD could commit Canadian forces in
combat only after the consultation with the Canadian
Government. '"In the event of a national emergency
occurring," the Minister of National Defence said,
”General Partridge, after consultation with the Canadian
and United States governments, would be able to commit
either American or Canadian forces in the defence of

this country."4 And when the apposition groups had

 

8 4Canada, Housg gf_gommgns Debates, Dec. 5. 1957,
p. l 99.

~"-

59

asked how this consultation would take place, the
Minister of National Defence had replied ”by telephone
or other means."5 This reply was described by Th3
glgbg,gggyMai as "arrant and dangerous nonsense.”
g§g_fli§gipgg|gggg_é£g§§ wrote that such procedure makes
”nonsense of the whole idea of Joint command."7 Mr.
Pearson, the Opposition Leader, pointed out that Mr.
Pearkes had watered down the NORAD command to a purely

planning agency and asked the reasons for ”all the fuss"

about NORAD command if it was merely a planning group
as the Minister of Defence had implied NORAD to be.8

"It seems to me," the Leader of the Opposition, said,
that the crux of the correct Canadian position
could be put into a single sentence: If General
Partridge and the air defence command of the
United States have any authority over Canadian
forces they should have it as officers responsible
not only to the United States but also to Canada.
That is the situation in Paris at the present

time and it has worked very well there in the NATO
command. If, as may be assumed, General Partridge
has to secure the authority of the president
before he launches into the air the forces under
his command - unless an attack has already begun -
and those forces include Canadian forces, then '
surely he must also have authority from the
government of Canada. If this is to be included
in any inter-governmental agreement we would like
to know about it. If authorization is to be given
in advance to act under certain conditions, which
may well be necessary in the circumstances under

 

5Canada, House 23 Commons Debates, Nov. 6, 1957,
p. 812. " ' """""
61h; Globe and Mail, Nov. 11, 1957.

72h; Winnipeg Free Press, Dec. 7, 1957.

8Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, Nov. 26, 1957.
p. 1526.

’1

60

which we live today, then those conditions

must be clearly defined and agreed to by Canada

as well as the United States, through its

constitutional authorities acging in accordance

with constitutional practice.
The exact responsibility of NORAD, which would instantly
become operational in case of an emergency, was
subsequently spelled out in the exchange of notes which
formalized the NORAD agreement.

The second criticism directed against the
government was over the procedural aspects. The
Liberals criticized the fact that the Joint Canada-
United States Air Defence Command was set up and went
into operation without a prior formal agreement and
parliamentary ratification. The agreement, the Liberals
said, embodying the principles under which the head-
quarters of NORAD should act, should have been signed
and tabled in the House of Commons to afford discussion
and decision before NORAD went into operation. Secondly,
the Liberals criticized the fact that the whole matter
was dealt with on a military level and not on the
governmental level as was done in the case of the
Permanent Joint Board on Defence. Since the defence
policy, the Liberals felt, was so closely linked with
foreign policy, the whole plan should have been worked

out in conJunction and consultation with the Department

 

9Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, Nov. 26, 1957.
p. 1526.

61

of External Affairs. However, as the following
statements clearly indicates that was not the course
followed by the Conservative Government. "So far as
this department is concerned," the Secretary of State
for External Affairs spoke to the External Affairs
Committee on December 5, 1957, '. . . and I say this
very emphatically . . . so far as this department is
concerned . . . we have not been brought into this
picture whatever. This has been a discussion on a

military beeie."'°

Mr. Jules Leger, under secretary
for External Affairs told a Senate Committee that when
the NORAD agreement was negotiated “the main points

of substance were naturally made by the Department of
National Defence, which was more concerned than our
Department.”1‘ When questioned by the opposition
groups about the principles under which NORAD was to
operate, the National Defence Minister Pearkes replied
that the top officials of the military organization
were working out the plans under which this integration

(NORAD) would take place.12 In days when decisions

on defence policy meant so much to the nation's future,

 

10
Michael Barkway, Financial Post, Sept. 6, 1958.

1‘Ibm.

13Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, Dec. 5, 1957.
p. 1923.

.l W
.
.
I
.
.
. i e
I. . . r
( I
.u f ._
r a
C . u
u
r. , a
4’ 1 u
. u
1 w
Q . 1 .4; x
A.
a, .4
0.1 . 1.
. 1 I
.
o
e . .
a
a. O
f r
.
‘0
.
- v
w,
. o .
L
r.
e
0 e
u
.
. t. u .
s x or I...
o
. ,
. ,f
r -
e.
r ,
f.

f

62

civilian control over the military leaders, as is

clear from the above statements, had been very weak in
Canada. The Liberals attacked that such a serious
matter which would affect the political well-being

of Canada for years to come was being handled by the
military authorities.13 Implied in this statement

was the fear of erosion in civilian control over defence
matters in Canada.

In accordance with precedence, the Conservative
Government had set up the Cabinet Defence Committee,
but it was apparent, during the course of debates that
the Cabinet Defence Committee was not seriously
consulted. A general impression was that NORAD had
been precipitated by the new Defence Minister, Mr.
George Pearkes, a former general and an old friend of
Mr. Diefenbaker. Connected with this second criticism
was the political leaders and the informed public's
serious concern about the weakened state of the
civilian control over the military leaders in Canada.
The dominant role of the military leaders on the matter
of defence, these people felt, was having the effect
of not adequately balancing the defence policy against
the broader Canadian national policy. This topic is

 

13Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, January 4,
1958. PP- 2853-5.

63

significant in the study of the defence relationship
of Canada and the United States; therefore, it will

be dealt separately at the end of this chapter.

4. Government's Arguments

Government's defence against the opposition
criticisms was made mainly by the Prime Minister and
the Minister of National Defence. The Prime Minister,
in answering the first criticism that NORAD might
endanger Canada’s sovereignty, stated first of all,
that the result of Canadian participation in an arrange-
ment such as NORAD was not the loss of sovereignty,
but ”survival with the maintenance of sovereignty",

and added that none in the House had any monopoly of

the desire to maintain the sovereignty of Canada.” Then,
citing the case of the NATO agreement where no voice

was raised against Canada's participation for the

reason that it diminished Canadian sovereignty, the
Prime Minister questioned the Opposition why so much

was made against the NORAD agreement which, in fact,

was only a part of NATO. NORAD, he said, was associated
with Canada-United States regional planning group

within the NATO framework and, was, therefore, very

 

14Canada, House g£_Commons Debates, June 10,
19589 Pa 994s

64

much a part of NATO. Prime Minister Diefenbaker
concluded that the opposition criticisms were groundless
and were motivated largely by political reasons.
Secondly, the Prime Minister asserted that NORAD was

a Liberal creation. He said the Liberal Government

had formulated and approved NORAD scheme before the
election of June 10, 1957. and added that all that the
Conservative Government did was to carry out the policy
of the previous government. Therefore, the agreement,
he said, which his government entered with the United
States represents, "in almost complete measure that
which had been, to all intents and purposes, agreed

upon by the former Minister of National Defence."15

The argument whether NORAD was indeed a part
of NATO or not continued even after the formal agreement
was announced and tabled in the House on June 10, 1958.
The Liberals accused the Government of attempting to
obscure the bilateral character of the agreement. The
Liberals asserted that the Government felt sensitive
about the reaction in the country to the placing of
part of the RCAF under a United States commander.
Quoting the paragraph of the NORAD agreement which read

 

15Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, June 10,
1958. p. 994.

 

 

65

"The North Atlantic Treaty Organization will continue

to be kept informed through the Canada-United States
regional planning group of arrangements for the air
defence of North America", Mr. Pearson, the Leader of
the Opposition mentioned that, though the statement
referred to the fact that NATO will be kept informed,

it is not a part of the NATO. "It is in the sense of
responsibility to and authority from NATO headquarters,"
he said, "that NORAD has no organic connection with .
NATO at all." "The commander and the deputy commander,”

he said, ”were not appointed by any NATO agency; they

have no authority under NATO and they are not responsible
to NATO, and in that sense to attempt to assimilate

their positions with those of the commanders of NATO
commands is wrong and that attempt, of course, must

break down.". And then he went on to say:

As a matter of fact, I wish this North American
air defence command were under a NATO command, and
I suggest to the government that perhaps this is
something which might be investigated at a
meeting of the North Atlantic council. It is
certainly not now under a NATO command. General
Partridge has no responsibility to NATO of any
kind, and he has indicated that this is the
position in some of the public statements he has
made. He takes no orders from NATO as the NATO
commanders take orders; he does not necessarily
accept the policy laid down by NATO or by SACEUR
and SACLANT.15 *

 

‘6Canada, £22§2.2£.92EE22§.2222$2§’ June 109
1958, p. 1003. SACEUR (Supreme Commander Allied, EurOpe)
SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic)

I'\

.0. -g...

66

The Liberals then backed their contention with the
statement of the secretary general of NATO, Mr. Henri
Spaak, who denied at the press conference that NORAD
was part of NATO.17

At this point, a few words should be said about
the formal agreement itself. The formal agreement was
announced nearly ten months after the interim announce-
ment of NORAD was first made in August 1, 1957. The
formal agreement was preceded by several heated debates
and the final ratification. The NORAD agreement was
made in the form of two letters and some of the principles,
which will be cited below, were set out in the note
sent by Norman Robertson, Canadian Ambassador to the
United States. The agreement was in the form of a
proposal by Canada and the letter of concurrence by
the United States. "If the United States government

concurs,” the Canadian note said, "in the principles
set out above, I propose that this note and your reply
should constitute an agreement between our two govern-
ments effective from the date of your reply." To it
the American note replied: "I am pleased to inform
you that my government concurs in the principles set

forth in your note. My government further agrees with

 

171bid., p. 1004.

r f'

f
K
I i
I.
r ( r
i: _ ..
e ' ‘
v r' r ‘
~a

 

 

67

your proposal that your note and this reply shall
constitute an agreement between the two governments,

effective today."18

The pattern of the agreement,
where the initiative was given to Canada regarding the
terms of the agreement, and a simple note of acceptance
by the United States, indicated that the Conservative
Government was concerned with giving the appearance

that Canada was not a subservient partner in this

bilateral agreement.
5. What the Formal Agreement Said

The terms of the agreement, while obscure about
the procedure to be followed in case of an attack, left,
however, the inference that the Commander-in-chief can
order an attack without prior consultation with American
or Canadian government leaders. The preamble of the
agreement states that

The advent of nuclear weapons, the great improve-
ment in the means of effecting their delivery,

and the requirements of the air defence control
systems demand rapid decisions to keep pace with
the speed and tempo of technological developments.
To counter the threat and to achieve maximum
effectiveness of the air defence system, defensive
operations must commence as early as possible

and enemy forces must be kept constantly engaged.

The agreement states that NORAD is to operate at the

 

18Canada, "Organization and Operation of the
North American AiroDefence Command", House 2; Commons
Debates, Appendix 1958, Vol. I, p.-241.

(I

68

outset of hostilities in accordance with a single air
defence plan approved in advance by national authorities.
Paragraph 6 states that "The plans and procedures to be
followed by NORAD in wartime shall be capable of rapid
implementation in an emergency." Thus at the time of

the agreement the exact procedures to be followed in

case of an attack were not Specifically spelled out.
Paragraph 1 of the agreement outlines the power of the
commander-in-chief:

The commander-in-chief of NORAD will be responsible
to the chiefs of staff committee of Canada and the
Joint chiefs of staff of the United States, who

in turn are reaponsible to their respective govern-
ments. He will operate within a concept of air
defence approved by the appropriate authorities of
our two governments, who will bear in mind their
obJectives in the defence of the Canada-United States
region of the NATO area.

Paragraph 2 reads: "NORAD will include such combat units
and individuals as are Specifically allocated to it by
the two governments. The Jurisdiction of the commander-
in-chief, NORAD, over those units and individuals is
limited to operational control as hereinafter defined."

The above term "operational control" is defined in Para-

graph 3 as follows:

Operational control is the power to direct, co-
ordinate, and control the operational activities
of forces assigned, attached or otherwise made
available. No permanent changes of station would
be made without approval of the higher national
authority concerned. Temporary reinforcement

 

"

69

from one area to another, including the crossing

of the international boundary, to meet operational
requirements will be within the authority of
commanders having operational control. The basic
command organization for the air defence forces

of the two countries, including administration,
discipline, internal organization and unit training,
shall be exercised by national commanders responsible
to their national authorities.

Paragraph 4:

The appointment of the commander-in-chief and

his deputy must be approved by the Canadian and
United States government. They will not be from
the same country, and the staff of the commander
will be integrated Joint staff composed of officers
of both countries. During the absence of the
commander-in-chief the deputy will assume command.

Paragraph 5:

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization will
continue to be kept informed through the Canada-
United States regional planning group of arrange-
ments for the air defence of North America.

Paragraph 6:

The plans and procedures to be followed by NORAD
in wartime shall be capable of rapid implementation
in an emergency. ‘

Paragraph 7:

Changes in the terms of reference for NORAD may

be made by agreement between the Canadian chiefs
of staff committee and the United States Joint
chiefs of staff, with approval of higher authority
as appropriate, provided that these changes are

in consonance with the principles set out in this
note.

Paragraph 8:

The question of the financing of expenditures
connected with the operation of American Air
Defence Command will be settled by mutual agree-
ment between appropriate agencies of the two
governments.

1"

 

7O

Paragraph 9:

NORAD will be maintained in operation for ten

years or for a shorter period as shall be agreed

by both countries in the light of their mutual

interest. . . . The terms of this agreement may

be reviewfd upon request of either country at

any time. 9

NORAD, therefore, was to be an operational

command. The system was to be a Joint stand-by arrange-
ment which would become operational only in case of
emergency when the continent is threatened by enemy
attack. Short of such emergency, therefore, the American
and Canadian forces, although they would cooperate
closely, were to remain separate entities. Prior to
the formation of NORAD the air forces of the two
countries had maintained the closest possible liason
and cooperation. This cooperation included a provision
for a "cross-border intercepts" which meant that the
air force of both Canada and the United States could
intercept enemy aircraft in the territory of the other.
6. Conservative and Liberal vote for NORAD: CCF is

Opposed

With the exception of the COP, there was a

general agreement at the Commons that NORAD was a good

and necessary thing. Strong criticisms which generated

 

19Ibid.

71

a prolonged debate in the House on the part of the
Liberal opposition had to do with the procedure which
the government had adopted in entering into this bi-
lateral agreement. The Speeches and questions which
were made by the two spokesmen of the Liberal Party,
4r. Pearson and Mr. Martin, reveal how very little
difference there actually was between the two maJor
political parties of Canada with regard to their defence
and, therefore, foreign policy of the nation. In fine
speeches both men not only recognized the wisdom of
establishing such defence arrangement but went on to
advocating and defending the principles of NORAD even
better than the government had done. For example, Mr.
Pearson, speaking for the principle of collective defence
in Philadelphia to the World Affairs Council on October
4, 1957: had said:
What, then is the best way, in present conditions
to ensure our security - indeed our survival - for
collective defence? There are, I think, two
principles that must govern the search for the
answer to my strictly military question. First,
defence must be genuinely collective for national
action alone will not be adequate. Second,
recognition that only the United States has now
resources to give the power and leaderggip that is
essential for such collective defence.

And speaking in the House of Commons during NORAD debates,

he said:

 

20Quoted by Mr. Diefenbaker in Canada, Hougg
g; Commons Debates, June 10, 1958, p. 992.

72

Now it is not a question of approving or dis-
approving the setting up of a continental command.
We have previously acted in ways which involve

the abdication, in the interest of our security,
of some of our sovereignty. Perhaps rather than
using the word abdication I should say we have
made our sovereignty work for our security and
that is the only way a country can guarantee its
security in these times. We have shown this by
our participation in the European forces of NATO
and I am sure we would be glad to do the same
thing in respect of our participation in continental
defence if it is found necessary to work in that
way after discussion and approval by this house.2l

Some of the highlights of the Liberal position
on NORAD as were made clear during the months of long
debates will be cited here.

. . . In the first place we should have pressed
for the placing of NORAD under NATO command, for
NORAD becoming part of the Atlantic effort, and
as genuinely collective in that regard as SACEUR
and SACLANT.22

. . . We should have linked the signing of the
NORAD agreement with suitable and equitable

arrangements for pooling defence production and
developing defence resources.

The CCF was completely against NORAD on the
grounds primarily that such a bilateral agreement
between the two very unequal countries such as Canada
and the United States would reduce the sovereignty of
the smaller partner. The GOP was against NORAD on the

 

1000 21Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, June 10, 1958,
p. .

4 8 22Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, March 2, 1959.
pe190

23Ibid.

73

ground also that such a bilateral agreement constituted
desertion from the NATO principle by the two North
American nations. The CCF, therefore, suggested that
NORAD be incorporated under a direct NATO command. "It

would seem imperative, said CCF Spokesman H.W. Herridge

in the House,

from the point of view of preventing the loss of
our political sovereignty to a single power, or
any part of that sovereignty, that ways and means
be explored to make those carrying out North
American defence arrangement directly responsible
and subordinate to the NATO command. . . .
Supersonic Jet bombers and intercontinental
ballistic missiles have made the Canadian north a
key area in the event of war with the Soviet
Union, perhaps Just as important strategically as
any area in EurOpe. An attack over the Canadian
north would involve Canada. It would therefore
seem logical that the defence of the Canadian
north should be brought within the framework of
NATO in the same manner as is the defence of
western Europe. In our opinion, for Canada to
negotiate defence through bilateral arrangements
and, in the process, risk the loss of certain
sovereign rights over its forces to a Single power
seems a retrogressive step. . . . We fear that
this might be an ominous forewarning, a portent
of still more of such arrangements to come, which
will further impair the sovereign rights Bg this
country in relation to the United States.

On June 19, 1958, thirty-nine Liberals Joined
161 Conservatives and voted for NORAD. Bight members
of the COP were still opposed. The heated and prolonged
debate on NORAD in the House was extremely partisan

and legalistic at times, and with uncertain handling

 

24Canada, House QEDCommons Debates, June 10,
1958, p. 1021. m“"'

 

f Igrlllyll".

74

of the agreement of NORAD by the government, the basic
facts which necessitated the agreement were overshadowed.
Nevertheless, it was clear to many people that Canada
is threatened by the possibility of an air attack over
the Arctic and the lack of her sufficient strength to
withstand such an attack alone make such Joint defence
arrangements essential for her national survival. The
United States was putting up nearly ten times more men
and money in this Joint arrangement and it was, therefore,
inevitable that the United States would be the dominant
partner and provide the supreme commander from within
its ranks.

Following the Parliamentary approval, nine
RCAF Jet squadrons were allocated to NORAD by Canada.
They are under the Canadian command, but will come under
full operational control of NORAD in case of war. One
squadron is located at Comox, B.C. and two each at
Bagotville, Quebec; St. Hubert, Quebec; Ottawa and North
Bay. In peacetime, they are available to NORAD for
training exercises. NORAD possesses weapons of both
long-range interceptors and guided missiles with some
having atomic capabilities. According to the ngbglggg
M2i1.there are about 15 known weapons in the NORAD

inventory, eight of them aircraft. These range from

75

Canada's CF-lOO, US's F-89J, F-102, Supersonic Douglas
Skyray, the Boodoo, the Convair F-106 and the F-lO8.
Among the NORAD missile inventory are such weapons as
GAR guided air rocket l, the Hughes Falcon, the Side-
winder, surface air missile, like Nike Hercules, the

Bomarc, etc.25

7. Civilian Control in Defence Matters

4 If the NORAD debate in the House had made clear
to the Canadian public the inevitability of such an
arrangement, it nevertheless, failed to mitigate the
uneasiness and anxiety of Canadians over the possibility
of their being drawn into a Third World War which some
militant U.S. generals might precipitate. The Canadian
public was also afraid that the military generals of
both the United States and Canada might lead to
irresponsible acts which might challenge the civilian
authorities. Many people entertained, and correctly,
the suspicion that it was the service chiefs who shaped
the defence policy and advised the Cabinet on defence
matters in Canada. NORAD was one such case. Therefore,
the wideSpread concern for the strengthening of civilian
control in defence matters, and measures taken toward

it, will also be considered in this chapter.

 

25The Globe and Mail, Dec. 8, 1958.

 

 

76

The NORAD debate, as mentioned above, brought
to the fore the significant roles which the military
generals of both the United States and Canada play in
the making of defence policy. General fear was aroused
over the fact that civilian authority was becoming
secondary to military authority and that most serious
affairs affecting the political well-being of Canada
for years to come were being handled by the military
authorities.: This concern was expressed in the Financial
ngt, a Conservative weekly paper:

Never before has the advice of the chiefs of staff
been accepted so unquestionally, This criticism

is not a political matter. The critics are the

first to say that the Liberal government was also
very slack in its control over the service-especially,
though not exclusively, since Brooke Claxton left

the government. It was under the old government

that the habit grew up, whereby the chiefs of staff
regularly worked out agreements with the United
States forces which the Cabinet knew nothing about

a) until the agreement had reached such an
advanced point that it could not be reversed
without provoking a maJor crisis in Canada-
United States relations - and especially in

the essential cooperation of the defence services:

b) or until the air forces of the two countries
could represent their plans as being so urgent
that even to delay them - let alone reJect them -
would apparently endanger the security of the
country.
It was also under the old government that the
Department of External Affairs virtually lost
control of military agreements between Canada and
the United States.

The situation was bad enough when the Conservative
Government took office. But Liberal ministers had

r.

 

77

at least insisted that military recommendations
should never go to the full cabinet, without full
examination in the defence committee; and they
handled several such recommendations pretty roughly.
The present leader of the Opposition, Mr. Pearson,
was always one of the most insistent about civilian
ministerial control, though Mr. Howe's influence
on the side of the defence people carried the day
against him in several significant decisions.

The experienced people were inclined to assume
that Mr. Diefenbaker and his ministers would get

a firmer grip on defence recommendations and
insist on balancing them against broader (and

more nationalist) aims of Canadian policy. These
are the people who are now utterly disillusioned.
They are bitter, discouraged and angry. They

say that it was bad under the old government, but
is far worse now. Effective civilian control

over the service chiefs has become almost non-
existent, they say. Ministers no longer even take
the trouble to inform themselves about the
implications of their decisions. They accept the
advice of their military advisers--unless they
think it might be unpOpular--and seem to grudge
the time which even the Chiefs of Staff think
necessary to explain their problems.26

A step toward the strengthening of civilian

control was taken in the summer of l958.with the setting

up of a Canada-United States Cabinet Committee on the

Joint defence of North America. Prime Minister

Diefenbaker and President Eisenhower made a Joint state-

ment that the committee was set up ”in furtherance of

the policy of both governments that such matters (relating

to continental defence) shall be subJect to civilian

decision and guidance." It also added that "the committee

will in supervisory capacity supplement but not supplant

 

26Michael Barkway, Financial Post, Sept. 6, 1958.

78

existing Joint boards and committees."27 Prime Minister
Diefenbaker reported to the House of his discussion
with President Eisenhower: "We agreed," he said,
that while existing machinery in the defence
field had served us well in the past and would
undoubtedly continue to do so in the future, we
need to supplement existing channels for consulta-
tion by providing for a periodic review at the
ministerial level of problems which might be
expected to arise. We recognized that decision in
this field would involve not only consideration
of the military aspects of our common defence but
political and economic factors. We thought it
particularly important as well that every step
should be taken to maintain principle and the fact
of civilian control of guidance of these common
military authorities.28
The ministerial committee was to consist for
Canada: of the Secretary of State for External Affairs,
the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of
Finance; and for the United States: of the Secretary
of State, Secretary of Defence and the Secretary of the
Treasury. The committee was also to be attended by
other cabinet members which either government might
designate from time to time on an ad hoc basis. The
meeting was to be held alternately in Washington and
Ottawa under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State
when the meeting is held in the United States and of

the Secretary of State for External Affairs when the

 

27The Winnipeg Free Press, July 10, 1958.

28Canada, House pi_CommonS Debates, July 11,
1958, p. 2141.

79

meeting is held in Canada.

In 1959, a meeting of Canada-United States
interparliamentary group had been held on an unofficial
basis. After that time, gathering of the legislators
from two countries occurred regularly, and the fifth
meeting of the group was held in Washington in the
summer of 1961. SubJects such as Western Hemisphere
cooperation and Defence Production Sharing have been
the topics of discussions of this group. "I think,"
the Prime Minister spoke to the House, "this organization,
unofficial as it is, since its inception two years ago
has made an exceptional contribution to an understanding

by legislators not only of Canada but of the United

States of those problems that affect us."29
Summary

In order to facilitate a more efficient air
defence for North America, the governments of Canada
and the United States decided to set up an integrated
headquarters called North American Air Defence Command
(NORAD). An American general was appointed commanding
officer with a Canadian Air Marshal as his deputy.

Strategic Air Command (SAC) does not come under NORAD

 

29

Canada, House pi Commons Debates, July 5, 1961,
p. 7541.

80

and the Canadian headquarters at St. Hubert, Quebec,
continues to control the Canadian Air Force until an
aerial attack is detected. Thereupon, NORAD's commander-
in-chief, who is reSponsible to the governments of

both countries would take over the operational control

of both air forces.

Controversy in Canada over the establishment of
NORAD revolved around two maJor points. Members of the
Parliament were afraid of the abdication of Canada's
sovereignty where Canada might unnecessarily be brought
into a war which is not of Canada's making or concurrence.
The second point of controversy was concerned with the
political control of the military affairs in Canada.

Fear was expressed in the House that the civilian
authority might be abdicating to the military authority
on the matter of defence with the consequence of not
adequately balancing the defence policy against the
broader Canadian national policy.

NORAD is an extension of cooperation that has
existed between the two countries for many years. Though
many Canadians are afraid of such a close defence
arrangement, the maJority of Canadians believe that the

NORAD arrangement is in the interest of Canada.

CHAPTER VI

THE "ARROW" (CF-105)

1. The Government's Overhauling of the Defence Ideas

On September 23, 1958, Prime Minister Diefenbaker
announced a number of changes in the Canadian defence
policy. The announcement above all indicated the
switch of Canada into the age of missile defence. It
introduced missiles such as Bomarc to the Canadian air
defence system and reduced dependence on manned
supersonic aircraft such as the CF-105 or the Arrow.
Though the final decision was delayed until spring the
following year, the Prime Minister strongly indicated
at this time that the Arrow would be cancelled.

It can be deduced from his announcement that
the decision to cancel Canada's high flying Jet inter-
ceptor was influenced by two maJor factors. One was
the belief on the part of military experts that the
Arrow would certainly be obsolete before it got into
the air. Second was the appallingly high cost of the
Arrow, a cost which would either deprive other branches
of the Canadian armed forces from acquiring the necessary
equipment, or a cost which would necessitate some

drastic increase in taxation which might add an

82

inflationary burden to the Canadian economy. And all
these, the government felt, in the cause of a weapon
which would surely become obsolete in a few years.
Though the September announcement of the Prime
Minister had clearly indicated the eventual shelving
of the Arrow, the announcement to delay the final
decision and to proceed on with 100 Arrow orders to
reequip the RCAF was a course of compromise which the
government was obliged to take. The decision not to
cancel the Arrow entirely was "a measure? the Prime
Minister said, "of insurance with present tensions as
they are.”1 However, one of the main compelling reasons,
as was evident from the Prime Minister's announcement,
was the adverse effect on industry and 15,000 unemployed
which would exacerbate the usual winter unemployment
picture.2
The new defence policy, in addition to the
above, included the establishment of missile bases in
Northern Ontario and Quebec; installment of the SAGE
electronic system in cooperation with the United States;
cancellation of Astra fire-control system and Sparrow

missiles; and a working out with the United States a

production-sharing arrangement on air defence requirements.

 

1The Winnipeg Free Press, Sept. 24, 1958.
2Ibid.

83

It clearly foreshadowed the new concept in Canada's
defence role and heralded the gloomy future for the
Royal Canadian Air Force as a combat flying force.

Its role now would be that of missile operator and such

Jobs as anti-submarine patrol and air transport.
2. The Background

During the ensuing months that followed the
September announcement to curtail and postibly cancel
the Arrow production, the question of air defence and
air defence production produced many statements adding
to the confusion in the Canadian air defence picture.
$400 million were about to go down the drain, taking
with it the Canadian sense of pride in its high technical
achievement of recent years. It was difficult for
many people to witness such prospects with equanimity.
The Arrow was first conceived by the Canadian air force
in 1952, and the government decided to develop and
produce it in 1953. It was an improved model to the
CF-lOO, the Jet interceptor which defended Canada but
was becoming obsolete by the unveiling of the faster
Soviet model. The experts of both the United States
and Canada had anticipated that Russia was building up
the long range bombers in large quantities. The United

States officials who inspected the Arrow were favorably

 

(I:
.
. . r1 .
a . e A l s
I o
I-
.
_ r
. o 0‘
e
x
a l.
.. rt 1.. f .
v I 'I
. V. r e e
I 7 . a.

o
I .
7 u v.
.- , r
m ‘1 o ' .
V A
I f v
e . .
‘. O
on f r r e
.
. r
r .
or t a
.
f . . r .
u t
.
..
v / . 1 f
A . (k i r n
.. e .
. . - .. n .
.ri . rt
. V
L n . r
L 7
r .
.
O
b \
u . o.
f\
7. e I I I
. r . I
a
ex . (I. . H- .
.
. .
‘ . .l
r . r
.
a
O
1 . I
D
.
0
a w .
: ,

84

impressed and had indicated that the Arrow might be
the answer to the latest Russian challenge. Although
no definite commitment was made the United States had
all along encouraged Canada to go ahead with the Arrow
up to 1957. The Canadian government had planned to
build approximately five to six hundred of the Arrow.

In the latter part of 1957, there was a consider-
able change in strategic conditions that had the
bearing on the Western concept of defence. In the
summer of that year (August 1957) the Soviet Union had
fired the first intercontinental ballistic missile and
on October 4, of the Same year it also launched the
first sattelite. These two events had the effect of
altering the whole world strategic picture. The expert
opinions of the West, unlike their previous anticipations,
now was that the Russians were not building quantities
of long range bombers but were turning their efforts to
that of producing missiles. By 1958, the mood of United
States officials had changed and they were now doubtful
and, though no final answer was given to Canada, the
United States Air Force officers were less interested
in the Arrow. Questions were beginning to be raised
as to the possibility of missiles superceding the
fighter bombers before long, and possibly by the time

the Arrow would reach a serviceable stage. It was not

.
g - a \
v _ m ..
. ‘ I - l . . ‘
D — ' r

 

85

only a question of one plane being made obsolete by
another, for here was a prospect of transition from
airpower with the airplane to airpower with missiles.
There was, to be sure, a short marginal period when
bombers would still be the main form of attack to North
America until missiles would completely displace them.
The Arrow was believed to have a considerable lead in
intercepting speed to that of any known aircraft then

in production. If only Canada could interest the United
States in buying some of them! The government approached
the United States as well as some of the other NATO
countries but its effort was singularly unsuccessful.
The eventual cancellation of the Arrow had struck
Southern Ontario deeply and here "the excoriation of

the Government is matched only by.a fresh upsurge of
anti-Americanism." "Were Mr. Dulles. not so sick a man,"
Mr. anrs wrote, "he, rather than Mr. Diefenbaker, would
doubtless be playing his familiar scapegoat's part."3
Such a reaction, however, did not last very long else-
where in the country. The more obJective observers

could see that the government in the United States,
presiding over a democracy, could not ignore the interests

of the United States aviation industry nor the pressures

 

3James anrs, Northern Approaches (Toronto, 1961),
p. 27.

86

from its lobbies.

The opinions with regard to the Arrow were
largely divided into two camps: those who defended
the Arrow and those who advocated its cancellation.
The arguments ranged all the way from political and
strategic to the economic and technological aspects of
Canadian life. These arguments can be understood in
the light of the fact that Canada in recent years has
been giving much attention to the building of a unique

Canadian nation, and some serious efforts have gone

into in several fields to improve and expand the existing

system and assure future Canadian independence. To
that end Canada has been making efforts to reduce her
dependency on agriculture and to improve her industrial
capacity. Moreover, the Canadian industries at present
are largely in the hands of the Americans and therefore
most of the industries in Canada are simply American
subsidiaries so that their research and development

are carried on in the United States. Thus Canadian
scientists not only lack the opportunity for research
but find it difficult to get desirable employment. The
picture, to be sure, has been changing somewhat and

the Canadians have gradually been able to find an
opportunity to get to the top in some industries.

Nevertheless, prOSpects for Canadian scientists remain

a S

I
u
‘ ‘A .
s .
- r
I, ( ‘ ‘
l f
I f .
n
. a
f
1
u
v v . i _
1 / v
I
' - o
I
~ 5
. l
r p.
(.
I
e
7‘ (
' ’ ' m
s
' v
' I
. -'
.' r r
‘ I
v

 

87

gloomy and Canada has been losing many of them to the
United States.

The A.V. Roe Company in Toronto which developed
and produced the Arrow provided a contrast to this
unhappy picture in Canada. The company hired a high
ratio of skilled technical and engineering personnel
in Canada. One in five of the Avro employees were
university graduates and the Avro company, therefore,
absorbed and kept in Canada skilled manpower. Nearly
12,000 families were unemployed when the proJect was
terminated. A multitude of subsidiary supply businesses
induced to set up research, development and manufacturing
in Canada by the Arrow program were going out of business
crippling other related industries throughout Canada.
There are two other aircraft firms in Canada: Canadair
and DeHavilland, of which the former is American and
the latter building simple commercial planes on a small
scale. Therefore, for the former Arrow technicians
opportunities for employment can now be found only in
America where the inducement and opportunity is still
great. "Canadian requirements for aircraft," the Prime
Minister said,

are very small by comparison with this huge

defence operation, and frankness demands that
I advise that at present there is no other work

88

that the government can assign immediately to
the companies that has been working on the Arrow
and its engine. This decision is a vivid example of
the fact that a rapidly changing defence picture
requires difficult decision, and the government
regrets its inevitable impact upon production,
employment, and engineezing work in the aircraft
and related industries.
On the same day the Prime Minister announced
the cancellation of the Arrow pragram, the A.V. Roe

company in Toronto fired 13,800 employees? some of

whom, like Mr. James A. Chamberlain, formerly chief
designer at Avro, left Canada and took Jobs in the
United States. Those who were largely responsible for
the Arrow were assigned along with Mr. Chamberlain to
the United States Mercury man-in-space proJect at
Langley Field in Virginia. The gippp‘gpglggii reported
on April 28, 1959, over a month after the cancellation,
that 8000 former Avro workers were still unemployed and
1000 were applying for entry to the United States.6
Defending the abandonment of the Arrow, Prime Minister
Diefenbaker said: THowever much I might hOpe that the

proJect be continued in the sense of pride of achieve-

ment to avoid immediate dislocations which are

 

4Canada, House 23 Commons Debates, Feb. 20,
1959, p. 1222.

5The Globe and Mail, Feb. 20, 1959.

6The Globe and Mail, April 28, 1959.

 

l
l‘ I
' I
l
: 1 ’ f ' ‘
Q ~
' r. '
'_
i
m a '
r 1 1
I‘ Y
. A , ‘
I
.- I
t ‘ F
i U
1" I’ :
' r.
' ' (7' 1
.
1' ,‘ '
1 .
1 ’- ' I
.
e
. .
1

’W

I.

K ' ‘1
1 a F , '
I A
' e .
E
s
f
r a
r“ f I '
' e
. f f , r
f
I m '
r,
I .' l
C
. I“
s
r\ y a
I s m r e
1‘ . - r ’
., 1

"Y
a e
f U
' 0
e
‘ e
a , f,
1 I 3
v 7 . v .
1 ‘ '
~~v~o
,
C
1
z'
1
u n - -

a
p
e
s
1
9
'.
, .-
' I
-

 

89

regrettable, defence requirement constitutes the sole

Justification for defence procurements."7

3. Arguments for the Arrow

Those who supported saw in the Arrow the symbol
of Canadian sovereignty which could be employed in
Canada's own defence and used for the promotion of her
own national interest. To this group, the termination
of the Arrow production meant discarding the all-Canadian
aircraft for the all-American Bomarc missile with all
the consequent implications for the Canadian economy
and a new pattern of defence both of which, these people
believed, would further threaten Canadian independence
which hitherto was still possible within the framework
of cooperation.

Arguing from a strategic point of view, too,
the defenders of the Arrow held out that the manned
interceptors such as the Arrow would continually be a
military fact for the next five to ten years. They
argued that although the missile age had already arrived,
it would not eliminate the threat of enemy bombers.

"We know," Air Marshal W.A. Curtis, and the vice-chairman

of the board of A.V. Roe of Canada, Limited has argued,

 

7Canada, House‘pi Commons Debates, Feb. 20, 1959.
p. 1222.

90

"that the Russians have been working on a Mach 2 bomber.
The Arrow is designed to meet that kind of threat. As
long as such a threat exists, there will be a require-
ment for an aircraft like the Arrow."8 They held out
the argument that the manned aircraft can patrol and
identify the enemy aircraft, something which no missile
will be able to do. Opinions supporting this view
came from the military experts of both countries. For
instance, in April 1959, two months after the final
cancellation of the Arrow, the United States military
personnel gave briefs to a United States Senate sub-
committee which proved to be in direct contrast to
Canadian rationalization for their decision. General
Nathan F. Twinning, Chairman, Joint-Chief-of-Staffs,
referring to the continued threat from the manned
bomber and the consequent need for the manned inter-
ceptor, said: ”The Russians are now building a new
bomber far beyond the capability of Bear and Bison
(These are more up-to-date Russian Jet planes capable
of 600 mph which are known in NATO code as BiSons and
Bears.) long-range bombers. We do not know what it is

yet, but it is an advanced heavy bomber."9 General

 

8The Globe and Mail, April 12, 1960.
9The Globe and Mail, April 21, 1959.

 

 

91

Earl Partridge, NORAD Chief-of-Staff said: "The aim

of NORAD is to hit an attacker as far away as possible,
i.e., over the Arctic." He said the Bomarc was useless
in this and is good only for "defence in depth" to

give the Strategic Air Command "time to get away" and
provide limited "point defence." He added that the
Early Warning Radar Lines cannot identify radar signals
as intruders or tell the type Of attack. For this, he
said NORAD needed the fastest, highest flying, longest
range interceptors as possible for as long as he could
foresee.10 Air Marshall Slemon, Canadian deputy at
NORAD, stated on November 24, 1958, that manned inter-
ceptors in the RCAF were an inescapable requirement

for the foreseeable future.11 General Partridge, the
Commander-in-chief at NORAD, Shared his deputy's
opinion and said that there was no equivalent available
to the Arrow now and said that NORAD would have used

it if it were available. General Foulkes, like many
other Officials, felt that even in the age Of inter-
continental ballistic missiles there would be a need for
a manned interceptor such as the Arrow. He felt that
although the anti-aircraft missiles would come into

use, they would not entirely supplement the manned

 

102112. 9.1.92 929. £2.13.- Aprn 21. 1959.

llggg‘fliggipgg Free Press, Nov. 25, 1958.

92

interceptor, since the manned interceptor can play
roles such as identifying the planes and informing
the avenues of their real attack to the headquarters
should Russia attempt to fool her enemy. "The missiles
cannot hope to play these important roles,“ he said,
"therefore for sometime to come, we expect to see a
combination of supersonic fighters and ground-to-air
missiles, and at a later stage, several diversified
types of ground-tO-air guided missiles.”12
Economically, the aircraft and its allied

industries had become a maJor sector of the Canadian
economy in the postwar years. The defenders, therefore,
held out that the move to discontinue the Arrow would
hurt the Canadian industry, with heavy loss of skilled
manpower and the opportunities for employment for many
workers. The blow to the aircraft and allied industries,
they felt, would be such that Canada could never again
attempt to develop its own maJor weapons such as the
Arrow, so complex and so advanced in technological
achievement. The gippg gpg_Mgii, referring to the
demise of the Arrow program wrote on February 21, 1959:

We are in no position to Judge the exact merits

or life of the Arrow; on that subJect, there is

a welter of conflicting Opinions. 'But this
Canadian-developed airplane is not the important

 

12Charles Foulkes, "Canadian Defence Policy in_
a Nuclear Age", Behind the Headlines, Vol. XXI, May 1961.

’ r
1
I ‘ ‘ '
‘ .
‘ _ 1
I
, 1
.- r
V
. .
H t . ‘
‘f
‘t'
.
e ‘- 'I 1’ {
r
.. . ”l : 1
. V 7
’.
.’ - _ , e -
. ..-. --
r' ' ' '— r
(e’ 1
f
' .
r.‘ f z’ '
If A I f
‘ .
I e
, or . ' A - 7
.
1‘ ° '
J ' z
, a '1 4 ' ’ _~ 1 e ‘ ~
‘ ‘ F‘
1 A \
. .
. I »‘ I ’
4 I ‘ D
r. , ~ I ‘ ‘ v '
’ .
r ' ' ’ i ’ r
9 r
, .. -
r f ‘ r. ‘v r‘ '

-\ K , I ' ,— . r
a . f‘ ‘ a"
t f
. o . . . , _ . »
‘ . f "1 ~
. ‘ r
r ' ' " F;

5')

93

thing - it might as well have been a Canadian
developed locomotive or automobile. The

important thing, the only important thing, is the
future Of the engineering, technical and researc
establishment that brought the Arrow into being. 3

Furthermore, some of the defenders even argued that

the amount of money spent on the defence orders such

as Arrow is much less in net cost income tax whereas

the amount spent in buying the American weapon such as

Bomarc would be totally lost to the Canadian economy.

4. Arguments Against the Arrow

To those who supported the cancellation Of the

Arrow the consideration Of the country's economy

figured

high. Each plane cost 12 million with Astra

and Sparrow development and 9 million without them.

And when the SAGE system, by which the Arrow would

have been guided from the ground, was added the cost

was appalling. Thus the Prime Minister said that it

was ”questionable whether in any event their (the Arrow)

margin Of superiority is worth the very high cost of

producing them."

program
already

cost an

14 By February 1959. when the Arrow

was cancelled, the develOpment of CF-105 had
cost Canada some $400 million and would have

additional $2 billion in the following three

 

H
U
*3
5‘
(D
G)

lobe an Mail, February 21, 1959.

la

 

 

i 1 Free Press, Sept. 23, 1958.

I?
:1
E

 

 

r r
v
f y
e
I
F
1.
Q
. ‘ h I
a 1
r .I KL. I
.
0
.
I I1
.
a .
C .
rl\
7: .
a
_
I.
'a
.
e. _ .
a

94

years; the time when the Arrow was expected to come
into squadron service. The total defence budget of
the fiscal year 1958-59 was $1,686,000,000. A heavy
expense of 32 billion in one program would have
deprived needed equipment for the Army and Navy,
affecting such Shipbuilding industry as the destroyer
construction program. It would have caused an increase
in taxation also. The vastness of the money involved
in the develOpment and production of the Arrow was
explained to the nation by the Prime Minister in a
speech over the CBC national television network. "If
a man,” he said, "had Started 1,959 years ago to spend
31000 a day he still would not have Spent 8781 million

15 The Prime Minister was

estimated cost of 100 Jets."
referring to the 100 Arrows required for duties between
North Bay and Bagotville, Quebec in order to defend

the heartland of Canada and certain Strategic Air
Command bases in the northern states. To this of course
would have been added the $400 million which had

already been Spent in the development on the Arrow.

However, as has been mentioned above, these 100 Arrow,

too, were later shelved in favor of two Bomarc squadrons

 

15The Globe and Mail, March 10, 1959.

 

 

95

which the Minister of National Defence estimated as
costing $100 million including their missiles Of which
Canada would be providing 820 million. The estimated
expense for 100 Arrows was $781 million which Canada
would have been providing the entire amount itself for
the similar promise of security.

From the strategic point of view, those who
attacked the continuation of the Arrow program felt
that it was not only costly but Obsolescent. Referring
to the approaching obsolescence of the manned bomber,
the Prime Minister held up little hope for a large
number of supersonic planes for the RCAF in the coming
years, "if in fact such aircraft will be required at
all in the 1960's."16 Military veterans also insisted
that the Arrow was costly and Obsolescent. General
Simmonds, a wartime corp commander and the Army's
chief of staff from 1951 to 1955. praised the decision
to cancel the Arrow and said that it was "a sensible
decision not to spend millions or billions on aircraft
which have become Obsolete as far as attack and defence
are concerned." "The day," he added, "of the airplane

is finished as a defence mechanism. It has been replaced

 

1621.12 11.12.111.925 ___..Free __Pres.s. Sept. 23. 1958.

’N

e'

v
" i
r a
r‘ 1
. .
4 -
O Q“
' 1
-‘ Q
.- . .
1
( .
. .
1
r .
f . '\
O .
. '.
t
. “ 1 _ e
e ‘ ‘V
" s Q
r v" . (,r‘ r .
. 0
1 - .. . .__.n -1

 

96

by the missile as the primary weapons."17 General
W.H.S. Macklin, former adJutant-general of the Canadian
Army, not only insisted that the Arrow was costly and
Obsolescent but also attacked the whole concept of
Canada's defence policy. He felt that the principal
role of Canadian airpower should not be based on
interceptors that were soon tO be useless against the
ICBM, but on air transport to make a conventional

force highly mobile for both nuclear base protection

on the one hand, or general conventional purposes on

the other.18
5. Political Parties' Stand on the Arrow

With regard to the decision to develop the
Arrow itself back in 1952, there was a unanimity of
opinion that it was a necessary and a good decision
both from a military as well as from a non-military
point of view. The Arrow would have been an effective
successor to the CF-lOO if the Russian satellite had
not spelled the coming of the new era in defence.
From a non-military point of view, too, it was Justified
for, as noted above, it meant the continued progress

in Canadian aircraft industry and development of a

 

17The Globe and Mail, Feb. 23, 1959.

 

 

e Winnipeg Free Press, Sept. 13, 1958.

 

97

new skilled manpower and wider employment Opportunities
for many Canadians. All Canadians agreed on this.

What the political parties disagreed upon and thus

what made the issue so controversial both in and out

of the Commons, was not so much the cancellation Of

the airplane itself but the way the government handled
the decision.

The Liberal Opposition did not attack the
obJect of the policy to cancel the Arrow. What they
obJected and attacked were the procedures and the delays.
The Liberal leaders accused the government for delaying
the decision for one whole year since the Sputnik.

They criticized the government for its prolonged
inaction, and for letting the matter drift when a
timely decision might have saved Canada nearly $200
million. The Globe and Mail expressed a similar Opinion
in its editorial:
The Diefenbaker government's decision to end the
Arrow aircraft and Iroquois engine development
program without having anything to put in its
place reveals a maJor and widely Spread internal
weakness of that government - - a failure in not
Just one but in several Of its departments to
look and to plan ahead. This weakness has been
apparent Since the government assumed office 20

months ago, but never in t at time has it been
so dramatically disclosed.

 

19The Globe and Mail, December 17, 1958.

 

 

r'

I
V
r
e
s
V
1' .1 r .'
It '- .
‘. I
l
(
f'. ‘
- O

98

On the question Of the Arrow, too, the CCF
wanted an economic defence policy. "Relatively Speaking,"
a CCF spokesman said,

this plane compares favorably with, if it is not
betten1than any other plane Of its type in the
world; but I wonder whether the Canadian people
are in the position of being able to enJoy the
luxury that they appear to have effected for
themselves in the building, the designing and
the development of this particular type of air-
craft. . . . I think the CF-105 points out as
well as anything does the position that canada
is going to find itself in if it looks at the
Situation in terms of our old line thinking on
defence. . . . Over the years the CCF has
advocated a decrease in the expenditures on
national defence. Today we are Spending very
close to one-third of our income to pay for
defence which is inadequate, which cannot by any
stretch Of the imagination protect our maJor
cities from attack by an enemy agent. We suggest
that greater reliance must be put on other phases
of defence. In the United Nations Canada, as a
middle of the road power, should take the lead
and speak for disarmament. . . . We could better
the lot of the Canadian people much more by
Spending a few million dollars on aid to other
countries that need aid and helping the world. 20

The subsequent development in the arsenal
of both East and West indicated that the manned bomber
threat would still continue. In summer of 1961, the
Soviet Union has revealed at a Moscow airshow a bomber
called the Bounder with a Speed of 1,600 miles an hour.
Its ceiling was estimated at 52,000; its range 2,800

 

20
p. 3235.

Canada, House pi Commons Debates, Aug. 8, 1958,

99

miles. The Canadian government had entered into
negotiations with the United States and had accepted
for use by the Canadian Air Force the Voodoo aircraft.
Its fastest record speed was estimated at 1,200 miles
per hour. Canada in 1961, had four weapons for her
defence; the Bomarc, the Starfighter which the Canadian
tr00ps in NATO would use, the Honest John, and the Voodoo.
The unwillingness of the United States to buy
the Canadian made aircraft inspite of the high rating
the Arrow received from the military men and aircraft
experts of both countries has cut deep in the wounds
of the Canadian people. The Arrow was the last chance
in which Canada could have played a useful part in the
Western defence complex. Having abandoned the Arrow,
Canadians are resentful about the fact of having to
accept and rely on the equipment produced in the United
States. The Globe and Mail wrote in its editorial on
December 17, 1958:
Here we have an extreme example of what has been
evident since 1945 the determination of United
States industry to monopolize the defence systems
of the West. This is something Canada does not
have to accept. Certainly, Canada wants to have
integrated defence--but Canada should not accept
an integration that entails economic subordination
or impoverishment. It used to be Washington 8
excuse that it could not share defence production
with Canada because Canada did not have the

necessary skills and industry. Now, after
considerable cost, Canada has them. So now, we

100

hear other excuses. They do not hold water.

The harsh fact is that the United States is
expecting a country running into the red by more
than a billion dollars a year to scrape the
industry which has had a large part in Canada 8
economic growth - and to use the saving, so called, -
to buy United States built weapons at whatever
price the United States wishes to put on them.

In that way we would become completely subservient
to the United States not only in the military
sense1 but, and to greater degree, in the economic
one.

Summary

The Arrow controversy represents a good example
of the dilemmas faced by defence planners in these days
of rapid technological changes. It is impossible to
be adequately equipped with all the up-to-date weapons
to meet the enemy threat especially in the present
situation when the enemy can choose the time for the
attack. This is particularly true in the case of Canada,
facing economic problems, to be adequately equipped
with all the latest weapons. In spite of intelligence,
one can only make an estimation of the attacker's choice
of weapons and, therefore, it is difficult to estimate
Just which weapons would provide maximum defence for
the country at any given time. In addition to above
'is the length of time and the huge sums of money
required to develOp and produce any new weapon. Modern

weapons are so complicated and costly to develop and

 

21 he Globe nd Mail, Dec. 17, 1958.

 

 

101

produce. Without some backing from the United States,
Canada could not afford the Arrow. The degree of
emotion aroused by the cancellation of the Arrow was
well testified by the fact that two years later, the
Canadian government and its opposition groups in the
Parliament were still engaged in a verbal combat about
the subject. The next chapter will deal with the Bomarc
anti-aircraft missile which was adopted by the Canadian

government in place of the Arrow.

CHAPTER VII

THE BOMARC ANTIgAIRCRAFT MISSILE

1. What is Bomarc

The Bomarc (the letters represent Boeing Air-
plane Company of Seattle, Washington, the manufacturer,
and the University of Michigan Aeronautic Research
Center) is a pilotless interceptor with a range of
about 250 miles. The Bomarc has been under development
on and off since l94#, and is a ground-to-air-missile
powered by rockets and Jets and controlled by a complex
electronic system. Its length is 47 feet and it is
3 feet in diameter and is fired off from a ground-fixed
firing rack. It weighs 15,000 pounds at takeoff and
has a range of more than 250 miles and a speed of about
2000 miles per hour. -

The Bomarc missile was designed to track down
and destroy enemy planes and was introduced by the
Canadian government as a cheaper and more effective
alternative to the Arrow. The adaptation of the Bomarc,
which is an anti-aircraft missile, and the continuation
of CF-lOO, a subsonic plane which the Arrow was ‘
supposed to replace, all added up to the fact that the
manned aircraft was still very much a factor in air

defence and offense. The Bomarc carries both the

ra

5'V_

y»:

.p v:

103

conventional and nuclear warheads. With the former,
it will pick out one particular enemy plane and ram
into it. With the latter, it explodes near incoming
enemy planes. The Bomarc is considered effective
mostly with nuclear warheads, and in adopting Bomarc
the government stirred a controversy over the question
of use in Canada of nuclear weapons. Again the
arguments ranged from questions of sovereignty to
questions of neutrality.

The SAGE (The semi-automatic ground environment)
system, which was to go with the Bomarc, is a series
of a radar stations which can be manned or unmanned.
The Pinetree radar stations formed the basis for the
new SAGE system in Canada. The SAGE system collects
all the information from the radar stations in its
Sector and calculates the size, speed, height and
direction of the enemy raid; and then projects its
future course. The Sector Commander having received
this information will press the button and SAGE works
out a collision course for missiles and fighters. The
"data-link code" guides the missiles to their targets.
SAGE thus transfers from men to machines most of the
task of sending interceptors and guiding them against
the attacking aircraft.

(V

f.

."wflrloll

104
2. Background

Canada's participation in the Bomarc program
was a part of an integrated program of the North American
defence under NORAD. The United States Air Force was
developing the Bomarc to deal with enemy bombers that
escaped interceptors farther north. The Bomarc program
included the complementary elements of the improved
radar warning system and the Semi-automatic Ground
Environment. Explaining the adoption of the Bomarc
program to the Canadian air defence program, Mr. Pearkes
said: "As we are participating Jointly with the United
States in the air defence of North America under NORAD,
it is only good sense to equip our air defence forces
with similar weapons so as to permit the most effective
Joint operation."1 The United States established its
portion of the charc system stretching from the
Atlantic to the Pacific, with interlocking stations.
Two stations were allocated for Canada: one near North
Bay, Ontario, and one in northern Quebec to protect the
industrial areas of both Canada and the United States.

Canada’s share in the cost of this new program

was to be $125 million, one third of the total cost of

 

1Canada, Houge g;,Commons Debates, July 2, 1959.
P0 5353s

105

the Bomarc missile program. Missiles and launching
equipment costing 872 million was to be paid by the
United States. Although the government refers to the
Bomarc as only costing Canada :14 million for the
building of the two Bomarc bases in North Bay and
Mount Laurier, when the control system and the related
equipment is taken into account, the total sum of
Canadian contribution was around $125 million. The
Bomarc alone was estimated to cost 820 million for Canada.
Comparing this sun with the estimated sum of 87‘0 million
for the Arrow program, Mr. Pearkes said that Canada
was getting "comparable defence for considerably less
money." The Bomarc was the only effective means of
defencc which Canada could contribute in North American
defence, since the 03-100, though still in operation,
was subsonic and was no match to the supersonic enemy
aircraft.
3. Controversy over the Adequacy and the Availability
of the Bomarc

The Bomarc to which Mr. Pearkes staked Canada's
defence, however, failed to perform satisfactorily in.
the series of testings, and the Bomarc soon became a
subject of controversy in Washington. The effectiveness

of this missile was increasingly being doubted and the

106

United States Air Force was apprehensive about the

close Congressional probings and the possibility of a

cut in the appr0priation for the Bomarc missile program.
In Canada, the going had been very rough for

the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Pearkes, ever

since he announced the adoption of the Bomarc missile

as a Canadian choice of defensive weapon. The opposition

groups in the House have always been sceptical about

the Bomarc missile defence against the bombing planes

and were critical of Mr. Pearkest weapon which was not

yet operational. Citing the miserable performance of

the Bomarc missiles in successive testings, and referring

to some of the serious attacks the Bomarc missile was

getting in the United States, Mr. Pearson, for instance,

suggested to the government in July 1959, to postpone

the final consideration of adopting the Bomarc and the

2 Mre

building of the two Bomarc stations in Canada.
Pearkes, therefore, had the extremely difficult task
of convincing the Parliament and the country, in the
face of the continuous failure of the Bomarc, that the
weapon Canada had chosen was a worthwhile investment.

After almost every test, the Minister had to repeat

his assurance about the basic soundness of the

 

2Canada, House gf'Commons Debates, July 2, 1959.
p0 356#e ‘

_.'_.

- n-

107

capabilities of the Bomarc missile. When, therefore,
the newspapers on February 1, 1960, reported the sixth
failure of the Bomarc out of six tests, Mr. Pearkes
read to the House what Mr. Gates, the United States
Secretary of Defence had replied to his inquiry. ”Mr.
Gates remains confident,” Mr. Pearkes said, ”that the
basic missile design is sound." ”Any failurs is un-
fortunate, but it is a part of any normal missile
development program. The secretary's office indicated
its confidence that the Bomarc B weapon system will
achieve the potential which will make it a vital element
in the air defence system which is being implemented
for the defence of the North American continent."3 Mr.
Winch of the CCF suggested that since the Bomarc was
so good on paper, Mr. Pearkes might propose to the
Americans I'that the next test be the shooting up of
the design instead of the missile."4

On March 5, 1960, the Bomarc missile failed
the test for the 7th time in 7 tries. The Congress,
which had been probing into the Bomarc program for
several months, the officials in Washington felt, was

sure to request some sweeping changes in its production

program. "In view of the seven failures,” Mr. Hardie

 

BCanada, House 2; Commons Debates, Feb. 1, 1960,
p. 547. _ "'"""""'"—"""

4Ibid.

 

m...

a-

.-4

[I‘ll

108

from the Mackenzie River directed a question to the
Minister of National Defence in the House, "and in view
of the speculation that congress will be throwing out
the whole of the Bomarc program, I wonder whether the
minister could give consideration to using the two
launching pads built in Canada as bandstands for the
3.04.3. band?"5

4. The Policy Revision in Washington and its Impact on
Canada

In the beginning of March 1960, the Bomarc as
well as the other aspects of continental defence came
under inquiries and review in Washington. As the result
some revisions were made in the United States air defence
'program. The statement released by the United States
Defence Department on March 26, 1960, indicated that
the United States would hereon place more emphasis on
deterrent strength.6 The cost required for the
strengthening of the United States deterrent capabilities,
the statement indicated, was to be taken from the
proJect known as the Bomarc B. The amount of appropri-
ations for the Bomarc was reduced from its original

sum of $421 million to that of 350 million. The

 

8 5Canada, ngse 2; Commons Debates, March 7, 1960,
De 17 9e

6The Winnipeg Free Press, March 26, 1960.

.
a
- a
.
V .
e

-_“_‘_,

 

109

statement, however, indicated no shift in that part
of the continental defence policy which had been
allocated to Canada. Originally Canada was to pay
$70 million, one third of the $200 million, the estimated
cost for the two Bomarc bases that were to be built in
Canada.

When the Opposition referred to the Washington
dispatch which reported a cut in appropriations for
the Bomarc missile from #421 million to $50 million and
asked the government what effect this United States
announcement would have on the Canadian defence policy,

Mr. Pearkes described the report as "speculative."7

Then five hours later, having been informed by ths
United States Department of Defence during those hours
that the report indeed was accurate, Mr. Pearkes
confirmed the report and added that it would have no
effect on Canadian plans to install two Bomarc bases in
Canada. Mr. Pearson said that "the United States has
changed the kite but the tail remains the same”, and
added that it was the "height of folly" to go ahead

and spend money on Bomarc when the United States

indicated its loss of confidence in the weapon.8 The

 

446 7Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, March 25, 1960,
p. 2 .

8Ib1d.3:Po 2458.

110

Liberals and the CCF were up in arms about the Bomarc
program. The Liberals moved a non-confidence motion
in the government‘s defence policy and the CCF demanded

Mr. Pearkes‘

resignation. Routine House business was
suspended in order to hold an emergency debate on
defence questions and the lack of consultation between
the United States and Canada on the air defence of the
North American continent.
The American announcement came as a hard blow

to Mr. Pearkes and the Conservative Government. Ever
since the Arrow had been cancelled and the Bomarc had
been adopted to meet the threat of the manned bomber,
the Conservative Government has had to weather almost
incessant and sharp criticisms and attacks from the
opposition groups for months as news of the Bomarc
failures in its flight tests trickled in. Mr. Pearkes
had been, however, adamant in his belief that the Bomarc
would ultimately prove itself. The latest United States
policy had placed Mr. Pearkes in an almost untenable
position.

i The latest development had once again puzzled
and confused the anxious Canadian public with regard to
their country's defence policy. The flggt;ggl_§ggg§tg,

a Conservative paper, complained in an editorial:

a"

.
s
C
,_ .
.
r ' - ‘- -
U
f ’ . ‘
1'
e
r l
r r r
x
.
- f
r ' ”a ' '
’3 .1, ' H '
I
.. . .. a
.’ I’ '
U "
r
I "
' r, . I .
I“
.
.
O
.
. e r ,
r ‘ ’ ’- ,
1
i _ .
s r‘
I

 

111

The issue of the Bomarc B has produced almost
complete confusion among the Canadian peOple.
Rarely, in matters of defence, has the want of
understanding between the government and the
people become so wide. The practice of not
taking the people fully and frankly into its
confidence has left the government in a position
where few Canadians understand what 8t is trying
to do, or why it is trying to do it.

Issues in this latest defence debate in the Parliament
were two. They were the opposition charges of: l)
the lack of adequate consultation between Canada and
the United States; 2) government’s insistence on spending
money on the weapon which was drastically cut by the
United States.
In denial of the opposition charge of inadequate
consultation, Mr. Pearkes elaborated to the House about
the machinery of consultation that exists between the
United States and Canada to deal with defence matters.
”There are many means, and there is frequent consultation.”
Mr. Pearkes explained. Then, he cited the NORAD as an .
organization where frequent consultation is being main-
tained between two countries. ”There are," he said:
today some 60 Canadian officers of ths army, the
navy and the air force who are sitting in daily
on various committees at the Pentagon and from
the senior officer - who is Air Vice Marshal Hendrick -

right down through the group of officers, they are
in daily consultation. They keep the chiefs of

 

9ducted by Mr. Martin of CCF in Canada, Housg
2;,Commons Debates, March 28, 1960, p. 2528.

g
I O
, r.r.,u
' . F L:
I
f.
I. 1 " f
I
1’
It
. n
y.
I‘
r r)“ "r
( r‘
n, ry‘
g .

O
V
l V -
O
. I ,
i
D
. r
i
I 'fl" {
r r r
( r
. .
i - (‘1
‘4‘
' l
p
\

 

112

staffs here in Ottawa advised by letter, telegram
and telephone. There is hardly a day but that the
chiefs of staffs are advised as to the plans which
are formulated or which are being developed Jointly
by the Canadian and the United States officers for
the defence of this continent.10
Finally, Mr. Pearkes cited the establishment of a
ministerial committee between the two countries in 1959,
about which a word had already been said in Chapter V.
However, questions were raised not on the
existence of such a machinery but on how effectively
it was being used. As mentioned above, Mr. Pearkes had
dismissed as speculative on the morning of March 25, 1960,
the report of the Bomarc out which was reported in the
newspaper. Then in the afternoon of the same day, Mr.
Pearkes read his explanatory statement which consisted
of the United States Defence Department statement. The
manner in which the announcement was made confirmed
the worst suspicion of the Canadian public about the
inadequacy of consultation between Canada and the United
States. The ngpg gag M2i1,wrote that the sequence of
events suggested that Mr. Pearkes was not informed by
the United States authorities of the development in

Washington. This Conservative paper wrote that it was

"a confession that Canadian defence policy was made

 

1Deanada, House 3; Commons Debates, March 28, 1960,
p. 2508.

7..

J . .
f . _
'1 I I l r
r . .
. l s . I p
e\ r H. rl bro.
n . .
f o 5 . I I!
a
e .(
l.v
, m
. a O
.l
I I l I ,( §
‘w
U 1
pl. .
u r e
. 'l .-
. - ..
r r n F,
v e ’ .l
r.. p . f
e e r.
r .
. I
f r. r
...
. l.
.. v r.
F r1
l r I
.
O
s v . 's _
I F. .. .
. .I ‘f a.
(\ Fa
.r r
. r. e
O I C
. Q. . i O
r.) .v
r‘ - e. . I
. r
a r. I .
we

113

in Washington." "Mr. Pearkes' announcement Friday,” it
went on to say, "had amounted to him saying 'I’ve Just

' 11
got my orders from Washington, here they are.“

The government had always assured the country
about the close consultation the Conservative Govern-
ment had been able to establish with the United States
since it came into power. For example, Mr. Diefenbaker
on March 3, 1959, accusing his critics of being obsessed
with "frenzied fear that cooperation with the United
States means subordination", went on to say: ”I believe
that the United States must be made to realize; . . that
Canada and the United States are partners. We demand
as of right the exercise of those things which are
incidental to the fair and proper discharge of a
partnership."12Faced with another charge of subservience,
therefore, the Prime Minister declared in the House
once again on March 29, 1960, that the days of Canada's
subservience to the United States had ended and days
of consultation between them started in June 1957, when
the Conservatives had come into power.13 To th’
opposition groups in the House, the latest development
was an opportunity to chide the government and to re-

examine the type of relationship that existed between

 

11% 31333; and Mail, March 29, 1960.

2Canada, House 3; Commons Debates, March 3, 1959,

1
3The Winnipeg Free Press, March 29, 1960.

 

114

Canada and the United States. Inspite of the very

happy picture which Mr. Diefenbaker drew, Mr. Paul
Martin of the Liberal Party stated that there was every
Justification for questioning whether proper consultation
had taken place in this particular matter. He suggested
that Canada has not received "from her partner the kind
of cooperation and consultaticn expected between two

.14

nations equal in function if not in power. "We think,"

Mr. Argue, the spokesman for CCF said, “thc Minister of
National Defence should not be merely a messenger boy

of the United States Defence Department, but should

put forward Canada's position in the strongest possible
terms, and he should take Parliament into his confidence."15
He said that the Minister of National Defence had .
further confirmed Canada's inferior role in the
continental air defence partnership. "This,” he said,

"is strictly a made-in-Washington policy in which Canada
has had no effective voice,” and said that reading the
statement of the United States Defence Department by

the Canadian Minister of National Defence was a

"degrading picture."l6 Mr. Argue further declared that

 

14Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, March 28,
1960, p. 2517.

15Ibid., p. 2505.

16Ibid.

 

115

the Canadian government is in the hip pocket of the
United States on defence. "We are called," he said,
”a partner, but we are not s partner. ‘We sre not
partner in policy. We are not a partner in basic
discussions. We are merely the errand boy for the
United States in this defence program. . . . In the eyes
of the world Canada must look like a complete but some-
what unimportant, sattelite of the United States."17
Though Mr. Pearkes insisted that he has been
contacted by Mr. Gates, the United States Secretary of
Defence, the week before, and emphasized the fact that
it was Secretary Gates who phoned the Canadian Minister
of National Defence, it was clear, according to both
the filgbg_gpg.ggil and theWinnipeg 3323,2333; that
Mr. Pearkes had been caught off guard by the timing of

the Washington announcement of March 25, 1960.

The second topic which was the focus of what
the newspapers reported as noisy and desk thumping
debates in the Parliament, had to do with the govern-
ment‘s decision to go on spending money on the Bomarc.
During this debate the government held fast to the

Bomarc as the keystone of Canadian air defence. "We

 

17Canada, House 2£|Commons Debates, March 25, 1960,
p. 2459.

I
l r. . T
.V 1
,i t , \
( 0
s
Q . I
. m I 0
v
y I
.
l
, r
i
i
. . r ,3 , .
. O
r . ' p I
‘ (
a Q
U ' I .
s .
I
r» I
Q I
s
' .
r- r . ‘ A
_ , .
. . - I ' '
' I
r ' F
.g ‘ I
f ‘7 7 I
R I . (\
J a ' V
I (-’
‘ n
if I A

a.
I
Q
0 V
i' r‘
r
1.
' o
r\
r I s
O
I
,__ Y
.

 

116

are not,” declared the Minister of National Defence,
”going tc scrap that sacred agreement with our allies and
give up Just because somebody says there is a possibility
that Bomarc may not be successful. . . . Withdraw these
Bomarcs, ruin that chain of defence and then you have
left, the continent wide open and there would not be a
deterrent to the Russian bombers. . ."18
Mr. Pearkes‘ declaration that he has not lost
faith in the Bomarc and that American Bomarc will
continue to form an "essential“ part of Canada and the
United States air defence has brought forth various
comments in the Housedescribing the Bomarc. "Tried
seven times and seven times found wanting," said Mr.
Pearson. "An adopted child of the United States, still-
born and grotesque," came from Mr. Paul Hellyer, the
Liberal. Mr. Martin of CCF said it was "about as
useful as a BB gun," and Mr. Argue referred to it as
"this dead duck."19. Statements attesting to the in-
sdequacy of the Homarc came also from the United

States Senator Chavez, Chairman of the Senate Appropri-

ations Subcommittee, who said in an interview following

 

182§2,Eiggipgg Free Press, March 29, 1960.
19Ibid.

I
I
r
al.-
r
a!
r
e,
A . .
.I . I
'1 p
t I
{i
F
e .
el

117

the closed-door hearing of the United States Air Force
witness: ”Perhaps we are trying to impose on the poor
Canadians a missile that is so bad we cannot use it. .
. . We ought to respect the Canadians and give them
the best we have, and not something that is not good
enough for us."2o’ Stating also that the fixed Bomarc
bases will be vulnerable to enemy attack, a key United
States Congressional Committee considering the United
States defence appropriation for the following year had
recommended elimination of all the Bomarc production.
"The manned aircraft," the Committee stated,

will have advantages over the Bomarc missile which
will make them very much more desirable from the
standpoint of an over-all defence picture. Manned
fighter aircraft have the flexibility of being
available for shifting about from one spot to
another as they may be needed whereas the Bomarc
missile is spotted in a fixed installation with
no flexibility in this regard.21

And then, too, at this time, unfortunately for Mr.
Pearkes, the British Government announced its decision
to half development of the Blue Streak, a fixed-based
long-range missile. "Vulnerability," said the British
Defence Minister Harold Watkinson to the House of
Commons,
of missiles launched from static sites and the
practicability of launching missiles of considerable

range from mobile platforms have now been established. .
. . In the light of our military advice. . . and the

 

”he 9.1.22.9. am ham. April 12. 1960.

21:11.2. 31122125 2.122 _..__Press. April 26. 1960.

118

importance of reinforcing the effectiveness of
the (nuclear) deterrent, the Government has
concluded that it ought not to continue to
Siviififiefiiaaofli‘ES-E‘i Ze§§§2da.‘i‘%2?fi° that °°“”
The United States under its reduced program had cut
its total number of the Bomarc bases to eight from
the 16 planned in 1959. Two years before, 32 had been
proposed. The entire United States Bomarc program was
now to be concentrated in the northeast corner of the
United States.

The Bomarc question had brought to the fore a
complex problem that had been building up for a long
time, namely, the nature of Canadian participation in
North American defence. Mr. Pearson asserted that the
Washington announcement meant that the United States
was now taking the emphasis off continental defence
to concentrate on deterrence in the hope that a more
powerful deterrence would prevent attack and consequently
no need for the kind of defence the Bomarc was to offer.
It is the defence by deterrence that will assure
survival and this kind of defence can be discharged

only by the United States which has the strategic force

for that purpose. Mr. Pearson said that Canada is

 

. 22"The Bomarc, T009, Editorial, The Globe and Ma; ,
April 11, 1960. '

new”

119

already playing a very important and suitable role in
early warning and contented that some of the money
should be directed to aiding the underdeveloped
countries where it would make a greater contribution

to world peace. Mr. Argue enthusiastically backed

Mr. Pearson's statement. The 91223.2pg_flgi1, too, in
its editorial of April 5, 1960, stated that the funds
could have been diverted to what has become a far more
vital struggle of helping the underdeveloped countries
of Asia and Africa. "Too large a proportion of Canada‘s

defence dollar goes only for outmoded equipment and
u23

defence concepts. It is money down the drains. . .

5. The Bomarc Aftermath

In 1961, the Russians revealed an impressive
array of new Jet bombers and startled the United States
officials. Talk was reported to be going on in
Washington about the building of new mobile Bomarc
bases which could be put on trucks or railroad cars.
Nevertheless, altogether 35 tests have now been made
and the missile is reported to have hit its maximum
range only once and made one interception. So far
only one base has gone into operation at Kincheloe Air
Force Base near Sault St. Marie, Michigan. The second

is at Duluth, Minnesota and the third at the Niagra

 

23The Globe and Mail, April 5, 1960.

 

 

 

 

a.

w\

120

Falls, New York which were estimated to go into
operation shortly. For Canada, the first Bomarc was
expected at North Bay in the winter of 1961. The Bomarc
had been a maJor political issue and the Opposition
groups are still very much opposed to it as is evidenced
by the latest House debates on the defence estimate in
the summer of 1961.

Summary

Canada's participation in the Bomarc program was
a part of an integrated program of the North American
defence under NORAD. However, the failure of the Bomarc
in the series of test flights and the policy revision
in the air defence program of the United States about
which the Canadian government obviously was not adequately
informed gave rise to various stinging remarks on the
floor of the House of Commons and in the nation’s news-
papers. These observations are testimony of the bruised
feelings of Canadian people which erupts to surface
whenever the occasions arise. Sharp criticisms directed
against the Conservative Government were meant, as much,
to the United States who controls and shapes the destiny
of Canada. The next chapter will deal with another
aspect of the Bomarc that aroused the antipathy of many

Canadians over the Bomarc anti-aircraft missile.

) f"
f I
(

A F

D
r-
r

V‘ -

O

I”
= 0
|

'\

 

CHAPTER VIII

ISSUES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. Canada, in Principle, Accepts Nuclear Weapons

The government's decision to introduce the
Bomarc created a new and extremely controversial
problem in Canada. Announcing the adoption of the
Bomarc as a defence weapon in February 1959. the Prime

Minister had stated then:

The full potential of these defensive weapons is
achieved only when they are armed with nuclear
warheads. The government is, therefore, examining
with the United States government questions
connected with the acquisition of nuclear warheads
for Bomarc and other defensive weapons for use
by the Canadian forces in Canada, and the storage
of warheads in Canada.‘
In this announcement, therefore, the Prime Minister had
made clear that the government intended to acquire
nuclear warheads for Canada. The government's stand
on the question of nuclear weapons was also stated by
the Minister of National Defence who said: “I presume
that eventually the Canadian forces will be equipped
with atomic weapons."2 The Bomarc missile requires an
atomic warhead and, as mentioned in the previous chapter,

two such missile bases have been allocated for Canada.

 

"Canada, House g§_Commons Debates, Feb. 20, 1959.
p. 1223.

2T e Globe and Mail, July 5, 1958.

 

’3

'0

i
re
8
I“
Q I‘
r‘. "
. l

,i.

 

 

122

By adopting the Bomarc missile Canada must accept,
at least in principle, the use of nuclear weapons in
Canada. Besides, it was common knowledge that any
new fighter air planes which Canada would procure to
supplement and eventually replace the CF-lOO would
require an air-to-air atomic missile.3
2. Opinions On Canada's Move Toward the Acquisition of

Nuclear Weapons

Since the above announcement of the Prime Minister

on February 20, 1959. it was assumed in Canada that
the Canadian government would decide at some time in
the future to acquire nuclear weapons for Canadian units.
The opinions against such a move in Canada were raised
along two lines. Many people maintained that the best
defence for Canada in this nuclear age came from the
power of retaliation which the United States possesses
and not from the kind of defence which the government
was undertaking to provide the nation. They also felt
that the kind of defence which the Bomarc with nuclear
warheads was to provide for Canada was obsolete and
ineffective in an all-out war. Adoption of that type of

defence furthermore would not only be ineffective, but

 

3Charles Foulkes, ”Canadian Defence Policy in
a Nuclear Age", Behind the~Headlines, May 1961, p. 16.

123

would deprive Canada of the opportunity to play a more
positive role in the interest of peace and the Western
strength. Such thinking out through all segments of
Canadian society regardless of political affiliation.
The Glggg‘ggd.ggil, a newspaper friendly to the
Conservative Government, had the following to say:

We may be an economic satellite of the United

States in many foreign eyes, but we are not yet a
military dependency and our voice still counts for
something in international councils. As a Junior
member of the nuclear club, obliged to get permission
from Washington before acting in our own defence,

we would lose bargaining power in helping to achieve
compromise between the two maJor nuclear powers,

and in our dealings with the underdeveloped
countries which still regard Canada as a trust-
worthy friend. . . . Our resources are better

spent in strengthening conventional forces against
the dangers of limited war, and in bracing ourselves
and our non-nuclear friends for the new (and un-
declared) political, egonomic and propaganda war
with the Soviet Union.

The Conservative premier of Manitoba speaking at the
Couchiching conference expressed a similar thought and
was reported by the Globe and Mail as follows:

Premier Duff Roblin made an incisive appeal here
tonight for a distinctive Canadian role in world
affairs. He suggested that some proportion of
Canadian military expenditures might be more
effectively applied to technical assistance of

a more practical nature for Afro-Asian nations.
He questioned the value of the North American air
defence command. If it abandoned NORAD, then
Canada should also refuse nuclear weapons. "Not
in any holier than thou spirit,“ said Premier
Roblin, ”but because these weapons are not
essential." He said: ”Canada shouldseek leader-
ship among-smaller powers and within the ring of

 

4111: Glcbg and Mail, May 4, 1961.

 

I“;

O
--
.
.
i
,_
r
.
.
.
.
_,
v
,
f'
.7
5"
l
.

I" (
e
s
a
a
f
-
I
' x"
a
o
-47 -

 

124

the United States nuclear deterrent, seek to re-
inforce the United Nations office of secretary
general and rescue it from Soviet meddling. We
should continue to make available to the UN a
substantial and fully mobile soldiery. We should
mobilize independent thinking and give expression
to ideas among smaller nations. We should
gnggugage such UN instruments of peace as the food
a e

The Liberal position as presented by the party's leader,
Mr. Pearson, is:

. . .I feel that the strategic deterrent in the
hands of those who now possess it should be
maintained strong and unimpaired. . . it should be
credible so that in the minds of those who are
tempted to break the peace there should exist no
doubt that it can be used effectively. In that
way the temptation would be removed to bring about
victory through some kind of sneak attack with
immunity from retaliation. But while we take that
view with regard to the strategic deterrent, we

on this side are opposed to dispersal of the
nuclear deterrent. . . beyond the limits of those
three countries which already possess that weapon.
. . . If we are faced with that choice we should
take the choice I have indicated, thereby streng-
thening our position in international affairs, and
making our voice stronger in the only field which
will save us, namely the maintegance\and streng-
thening of international peace.

The latter lines of argument against arming
Canadian units with nuclear weapons was based on the
fact that such a move would damage Canada‘s political
independence. An act of Congress in the United States
prohibited the transfer of nuclear weapons to any foreign

power. Section 92 of the United States Atomic Energy

 

5The Globe and Mail, Aug. 27. 1961.

6Canada, House 2; Commons Debates, Sept. 14,
1961. p. 8354.

125

Act of 1954, as amended in 1958, contains the following
prohibition: "It shall be unlawful. . . for any person
to transfer or receive in inter-state or foreign
commerce, manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire,
possess, import or export any atomic weapon."7 Therefore,
for the United States it is a fixed national policy
that the United States nuclear weapons can be used only
on the specific authority of the President. For instance,
the United States Secretary of Defence Thomas Gates
made statements at a press conference in Ottawa in

July 1959. after a two-day meeting of the Canada-U.S.
Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence. He said that
nuclear warheads could be supplied for Canadian Bomarc
missiles provided they remain under the United States
control. He said the warheads could be used only upon
order from the President of the United States. The
filgp§_gng,ggil reported that Minister of External
Affairs, Howard Green, gave whispered coaching to Mr.
Gates on three occasions during the press conference.
Mr. Gates, thereupon, was reported to have somewhat
modified his earlier statements. The Q1223_gnglggil

also reported Mr. Gates of having said to Finance

 

7The Globe and Mail, March 14, 1960.

 

 

126

Minister Donald Fleming that the matter appeared to be
a controversial issue in Canada.8

The Opposition groups in Canada had long been
criticizing the government's policy of obtaining the
Bomarc missile from the United States on the ground that
it would need a nuclear warhead to be effective and
that if Canada accepts nuclear weapons, Canada could
not possess effective control over the weapons stationed
on Canadian soil. The government's response was that
though the Canadian government could not change the
principle of the United States ownership there would
be Canadian control if and when the government decided
to equip Canadian forces with nuclear weapons.9

The negotiations with the United States
concerning the acquisition of nuclear weapons for
Canadian forces have taken place on the military level
for several years. During these years Canada had made
clear its position that Canada would not be satisfied
with anything less than Joint control. And the United
States has for sometime been gradually coming around
to realizing the Canadian position. In February, 1960,
President Eisenhower, speaking at his press conference,

said that it was in the interest of the United States

 

8The Globe and Mail, July 13, 1959.

 

9The Globe and Mail, March 14, 1960.

 

',
t
, Y
c
r
’ F
s r'
,.
. 1
T
O
O
, l
r "
2
. ’ r

11

 

 

127

to adopt a more liberal law with the allies who would

be sure to stand by the United States in times of
trouble.10 In 1961, Mr. Dean Rusk, the United States
Secretary of State stated that the United States was
now "willing to work out Joint control fully consistent
with national sovereignty."11 The problem of Canadian
political independence being thus solved, it was now

up to the Canadian government to make the next move.

The government, however, had been reluctant to make

any definite move and hoped for pragress in world dis-
armament which would make such an agreement unnecessary.
Therefore, on November 24, 1960, the Prime Minister said
in his speech to the Canadian club in Ottawa: "We have
taken the stand that no decision will be required while
progress toward disarmament continues. To do otherwise
would be inconsistent. When and if such weapons are
required then we shall have to take the responsibility.
In other words, this problem is not one requiring
immediate decision."12

When the disarmament talk failed the government

was once again under pressure from the Opposition as

 

10The Globe and Mail, Feb. 4, 1960.
11”Nuclear Impasse", Time, March 10, 1962.
12Ibid.

128

well as the electorate, who were concerned and divided
on the issue of nuclear weapons in Canada. On September
12, 1961, the Defence Minister made the following
statement in the House:
Defensive weapons with a nuclear capability may
be required to maintain the credibility of the
deterrent, and in the event that the worst happened
would be required to provide an effective defence
against Soviet aggression. . . . The situation is
much the same as that of a man living in a lonely
cabin in the woods who fears he may be attacked by
a bear. He does not wait until the bear actually
attacks him to buy a rifle, but secures it
beforehand and has it ready in the event of need.
. . . The Bomarc will form part of the defences
we must maintain against the manned bomber as long
as there are potentially hostile aircraft in
existence that can be used against us.13
The above statement came close in telling the people
what the government's intentions were with regard to
the acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, six
months later the Time was still quoting the statement
of the Prime Minister on its March 10, 1962 issue who
stated that Canada really prefers to leave her two
Bomarc missile bases unarmed so that Canada can work
freely for disarmament. The American weekly magazine
also reported the Canadian Prime Minister's statement

that Canada could immediately be equipped with nuclear

 

13Canada, House of Commons Debates, Sept. 12,
1961, p. 8223.

129

weapons in case of war. The magazine stated that the
Canadian Prime Minister was claiming the best of two
worlds. The cartoon in the same article depicted Prime
Minister Diefenbaker sitting on top of the Bomarc and
confused birds below representing the people trying

to make out what they see. The captions read: ”Its

a nuclear vireo. . . no. . . its a conventional warhead
warbler. . Er. . No. 0 . . . itssa, ittsa. . non-
.oommital shiny-crested vote catcher!"14 In the next
election which is due in Canada in 1262, the question
of nuclear weapons is sure to come up frequently,
renewing the issue of attrition of Canada‘s independence

arising from the close defence cooperation with the

United States.

 

14"Nuclear Impasse”, Time, March 10, 1962.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As stated in the introduction, the purpose
of this thesis has been to illustrate the frustrations
and anxieties of the Canadian people about their intimate
relationship in defence with the United States which
tends to threaten Canada's sovereignty. The paper has
also sought to point out that this unavoidable develop-
ment which the facts of geography, economics and security
dictate to Canada has coincided with the growth of
confident nationalism in Canada and the newly acquired
role as a Middle Power on a world stage. It finally has
attempted to indicate that though Canadians are un-
mistakably dissatisfied with their relationship with
the United States, which is so complexly intertwined
in all aspects of their national life, it is in their
defence relationship that Canada might assume a somewhat
assertive posture toward the United States. For, while
it is true that Canada depends heavily on the United.
States for her security, the United States, too, must
rely on Canada for effective defence. The two countries
share a most pressing mutual need for the geographic,

personnel, and natural resources, as well as the research

131

and production facilities of each other.

In the field of defence policy, therefore,
there has been a wide and critical discussion over
the government's policy vis-a-vis the United States,

a policy which often seems to subjugate the immediate
interest of Canada. The anxious but asserting mood

of the Canadian people on this subject has been well
reflected in the frequent and heated debates in the
House of Commons, in newspaper accounts, and in articles
of various Journals. I have attempted to illustrate
these points by describing and analyzing some of the
major issues and problems which Canadian policy-makers
were confronted with in recent years. We may now
summarize these problems.

The march of science and Canada's geographic
situation has placed Canada on the front line of any
future war in which missiles will be criss-crossing
over its soil. Unlike in the past, Canada is today,
therefore, vulnerable to an enemy attack. However,
Canada, with a small population and limited military
capacity, cannot hope to attain her goals of peace and
security alone in this age of constant scientific
"break throughs".' Sharing the North American continent

as well as certain fundamental beliefs with the United

132

States about the nature of the Soviet threat and
recognizing interdependency with the United States,
Canada in recent years has been obliged more and more
to regard her defence efforts in terms of the total
defence capabilities of the West. Membership in such

a coalition, however, has required Canada to give up

at times some of her freedom of action. The nature of
present day warfare and the natural supremacy of the
United States in size and power has resulted in the
gradual diminution of Canada's control over its air
defence activities and the increasing acquisition by the
United States of certain rights which normally would be
regarded as belonging to a sovereign nation.

The United States has built the Dew Line and has
been manning it with its own personnel; the United
States has established new bases in the Canadian North
for the United States bombers in order to react quickly
in face of the reduced time of warning; the United States
naval vessels have been operating in the Canadian Arctic
waters: the Canadian.Air Force has been placed under
the operational control of the integrated command which
is headed by an American general; the opportunity for
more positive Canadian contribution to the air power

of the continent has been frustrated by the scraping

.133

of the Arrow, a Canadian made supersonic Jet; and
finally, the adoption of the Bomarc missile which has
been downgraded in the United States has implied the
Canadian acceptance of nuclear weapons without the
assurance of effective Canadian control. In short
continental defence system has come increasingly under
the control of the United States planning, operation,
and production.

Frustration and genuine fear over the dominant
United States position in defence arrangements have
been accentuated by several irritating developments in
the non-military field. They cover economic as well as
cultural aspects of Canadian life. Nearly 51% of Canada's
industries are owned by the United States and the
American investors have been gaining tremendous power
in Canada's financial affairs. Such power has been
reflected in the United States' pressure on Canada's
foreign trade policies which the Canadians Justifiably
interpret as an unpleasant intrusion of the United States
laws and policies into Canada, a sovereign nation. In
addition the United States' wheat disposal program,
import quota on Canada's oil and zinc, and the growing
powers which the American labor leaders exercise in Canada

have all contributed to a sense of fear and resentment

134

that comes naturally to a country which possesses only
1/l4 of the economic strength of her giant neighbor.
Culturally, too, the American radio, magazines, news-
papers and books have influenced the tastes of the
Canadian people and their cultural patterns.

These developments have been paralleled by the
growing awareness in Canada of her elevated status as
an important power in world politics. As a result,
there has developed in Canada an underlying current of
nationalistic sentiment whose logic has pointed to the
necessity of Canada maintaining a national force of
all kinds that befits an independent power, rather than
so heavily integrating its defence with the United
States. However, in this highly dynamic age, to make
such a "positive contribution” to its own as well as
to the collective defence is quite beyond the capability
of a nation such as Canada which must worry about the
cost and the obsolescence of weapons. In defence policy
Canada must adopt measures that will be compatible in
both military and economic terms. This is well reflected
in the Arrow controversy.

Revulsion against the dominant United States
position both in defence and in the non-military field

has also found expression in the advocacy of some form

 

135

of neutralism for Canada. Since Canada, the advocates
of neutralism feel, cannot influence the maJor lines of
United States policy and must acquiesce to a satellite
role, Canada should, they maintain, focus national
effort rather on easing world tensions. Toward this

end Canada, in fact, has made substantial contributions
by taking an active part in truce commissions in the
world's troubled spots. These two currents of Opinion -
independent militarism and independent neutralism - both
spring from the desire of the Canadian people to preserve
their national identity, and both will continue to

influence Canadian politics and policies in future years.

136
BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. BOOKS

Alexander, Fred. Canadians and Forei n Policy. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 19 0.

Barber, Joseph. Good Fences Make Good Neighbors. New
York: The Bobbs- errilI Co. Inc., 195 .

Creighton, Don. A,History 2; Canada: Dominionygf the
North. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958.

Dawson, R.M. Canada in World Affairs: 1222-1241.
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 9 3.

anrs, James. Northern Approaches. Toronto: The
Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1961.

Keenleyside, Hugh L. Canada and the United States.
New York: Alfred I. Knopf, 1952.

.______o,2£,21. The Growth 3; Canadian Policies in
External Affairs. Durham, N.C.: DuEE—UEIVEEEIty
Press, I9 0.

Keirstead, B.S. Canada in World Affairs: 1251-1251.
. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 195 .

Lingard, 0.0 and Trotter, R.G. Canada n World Affairs:
1241-1244. Toronto: Oxford Univers ty Press, I955.

Masters, Donald O. Canada in World Affairs: lgfifi-lgfifi.
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959.

Minifie, James M. Peacemaker g; Powder-Monkey. Toronto:
McClelland & Steward Limited, 19 0.

Scott, F.R. Canada Today. Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1933.

Soward, F.H. Canada in World Affairs: 124b-12fi6.
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950.

, $3.21. Canada in World Affairs: The Prewar

Years. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1931.

 

 

 

r at. Q r
9‘ ..
h u .
(x O O :1 Al: (L V
F.
C s o e a O
f O I! 0
fl.
0 O I
_ 3 0
r9 .
A . . .
. e t.
C . .
s 4.
C n
. r .
. . O
I .M
. .
F v - r
I I It I A r I
I '\ o
r. . Vs I
a.
1 J O
a v .
. . s . . s
. 8 .
s I ~» 0 w
s. 't .1... It
r . s. .
ft on s .
* s ( 1 e
l s s
r f. C .

.g
f
_
. P.
A.
I ,
at
f
. O
r
F\ .
c.
a
.s
I.
O.
C
u s
{I
ct

137

B. PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, LEARNED
SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Campney, Ralph. Canada' s Defence Pro ram1256-1951.
Ottawa, 1956, ~

Canada, House of Commons Debates. 1940-1961. Ottawa:
Queen's Printer and ControlIer of Stationary.

"Defence. Establishment of a Distant Early Warning

. System. Agreement between Canada and the United
States of America Effected by Exchange of Notes
Signed at Washington, May 5, 1955." Canada, Treaty
Series, 1955. No. 8. .

"Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint

- Defence: United States and Canada Conclude Review
of Joint Defence Problems". United States Department
'2; State Bulletin, Augustol, 1950.

Elbrick, C. B. "Reflection on United States-Canada
Relations." - United States Department pf State
Bulletin, Nov. 3, 195 .

Green, Howard. “Canadian View of World Problems."
External Affairs, Vol. 12, 1960.

Merchant, L.T. "The United States Relationship with
Canada" . United States Department of State Bulletin,
June 16,1953.

Second Seminar on Canada-American Relations. Assumption
University of Windsor, Nov. 10, 11, 12, 1960.

UN General Assembly-Twelfth Session, Plenary Meeting
583, Sept. 23, 1957.

C. ARTICLES

Allen, Ralph. ”Will the Dew Line Cost Canada its
Northland?" - Maclean's Magazine, May 26, 1956.

.liillulae

.ai'li I

138

-7 Barkway, M. "Canada's Role in NATO Defence,"
a International Journal, Spring 1959.

5 Brady, Alexander. "The Modern Commonwealth," Canadian
A Journal pf Economics and Political Science, Feb. 1960.

Brown, G.W. "Canadian Nationalism: Historical Approach,"
International Affairs, April, 1954. -

"Canadéan Defence Policy in Trouble," Economist, April 2,
' 19 0. 0

Cohen, M.A. "Partnership Problem for Canada and the
United States," Saturday Ni ht, January 4, 1958.

, "Wanted Now: A Defence Policy," Saturday Night,
anuary 3a 1959. -

 

Daniell, R. "Canada Evolves Pro-Canadianism", New York
Times Ma azine, Nov. 10, 1957. -

"Defense is a Lie", Nations, June 14, 1958.

DePoe, N. "How NORAD Worked in Mid-East Crisis,"
Saturday Night, August 30, 1958. .

"Economic Worry Spurs Canada to Anti-US Moves," Business
. U ek, Jan 7, 1961. '

 

"Evolution of the Canadian Attitude in Inter-American
System", American Journal 2; International Law,
April 1953.

.-.

Fisher, J. and H. MacLennan. "Anti-Americanism in Canada,"
with Editorial Comment by Fisher, Harper , March l96l.~

Foulkes, General Charles. "Canadian Defence Policy in
a Nuclear Age,” Behindothe Headlines, May 1961.

 

"Frank Talk About US and Canada: Interview with Diefen-
. baker," pg News, April, 1958.

Gellner, J. ”Active Air Defense is Obsolete," Canadian
Aviation,-November 1960. -

139

Gellner, J. ”Canada Finds a Real Defence Policy,”
Saturday-Night, June 10, 1961. -

Gutteradge, W.F. "Canada's Foreign Policy," Contemporary
Reviews, Jan. 1959. .

Hessler, W. H. "Canada's Case of the American Jitters,"
Reporter, Feb. 19, 1959. ~

Hutchinson, B. "Why Canadians are Turning Anti-American"
Happer, May 1958. .

Keenleyside, H.L. ”Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on
Degenge, 1940-45,“ International Journal, Winter
19 0 1e '

Kehoe, S.G. ”The Dew Line: Radar Frontier," America,
NOV. 30, 1957. ’ .

Macklin, W.H.S. "Let's Get Our Money's Worth of Defense,”
Saturday Ni ht, Aug. 31, 1957. °

McIntash, D. "What Are We Getting in Our 31. 5 billion
Defense Package?" Canadian Business, Nov. 1957.

McNaught, Kenneth. "Canada Must Get Out of the Arms Race,"
Saturday Ni ht, June 10, 1961. .

Minifie, J.M. "Canada Should be Neutral," Canadian
Commentator, Dec. 1959. -

Munro, R.R. "Let's Keep A-bombs Out of Canada,"
Maclean's-Ma azine, May 7. 1960. .

Mutchmor, J.R. ”Don't Take Canada for Granted,"
Chpistian Centur , Aug. 12, 1959. .

"Nuclear Impasse," Time, March 10, 1962.
"New Role for Canada", US News, July 18,1958.

Parks, H. B. "Satellite to the United States?" Saturday
Review, October 24,1959. -

Pearson, Lester J. "Canada Looks Down North,” For n
Affairs, July 1946. .

Simonds, Guy. "Where We' ve Gone Wrong on Defence,"

Maclean 8 Ma azine, June 23, 1956.

f
a
x
_ u
‘{
f
I. ~ . . .
~
I I
~s - r‘
C
3’ A
t. o
‘ t " ' r‘ f
X
f . . I‘ .
~ 0
I
{I
C U Q
1’ (' ' v
V'
I
l
n
\
.4
O
‘ I
:l
O
. !
r" f
,- .
I

I.

O
o
e
.
I
I?
.
-. .
'l
'.
O

._..---.

e
‘s
I
1
V
o
N
a
O
t
e
0
e
s

..
U

.

C

U

.

A
p

P.
e
x

I
.

t
a

O
f

9

‘_. ._»_

 

 

140

Simonds, G. "Manpower is the Big Problem," Canadian
Business,oDec. 1956. .

Spencer, Robert A. "Canadian Foreign Policy Conservative
Style,” Behind the Headlines, Dec. 1958.

Stanford, Neal. "US, Canada Seek New Paths," Foreign
Policy Bulletin, Aug. 1, 1958. .

Stevenson, J.A. "The Political Situation in Canada,"
Political Quarterly, Jan. 1948. .

Willby, W.R. "Canada-American Defense Cooperation,”
Journal pf-Politics, Nov. 1951. -

D . NEWSPAPERS

Financial Post, January, 1956 - December 1961.

 

The Globe and Mail, January, 1956 - December 1961.

 

The Winnipeg Free Press, January, 1956 - December 1961.

 

"\ «\5'
I

.v‘?

I???

LU:-

'33:,9

' g . v
' . if ' .
‘ J ' ‘-I
a" la. 7‘ g “V1 r .

‘ v 'x u

C’" Y

 

 

 

 

 

R

m

L

V.

.n

S

R

E

w

N

U

E

.l
All
T"2

31

IIHIUWIHH