CANADA AND JOINT CONTINENTAL DEFENCE: A CANADIAN VIEW

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.

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Elizabeth Insook Carella

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CANADA AND JOINT CONTINENTAL DEFENCE: A CANADIAN VIEW

by

Elizabeth Insook Carella

AN ABSTRACT

Submitted to the College of Business and Public Service
Michigan State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

1962

Approved_____

Elizabeth Insook Carella

The age of nuclear weapons and of inter-continental ballistic missiles has imposed upon Canada a type of cooperation with the United States that arouses the apprehension of the Canadian people, who are concerned with the effect upon Canadian sovereignty. Rapidly advancing technology and the high cost of military preparedness gradually have diminished Canada's control over the defence of its territory. The United States, on the other hand, has increasingly acquired certain rights in Canada which violate the principle of sovereignty, and has become the initiator of much of what is required for an effective defence of the two countries against a fatal attack. Ultimate security of Canada is thus bound with the United States and any dissent which Canada might raise on specific questions is bound to be limited by the practical consideration of Canada's security. The problem of retaining Canada's political sovereignty while preserving the advantages of collective security has become the daily concern of the Canadian people.

The shift toward Canada's greater dependency on the United States for defence, and Canada's political and psychological response to such development is

studied in this thesis in several stages: the construction of the radar warning system; the integration of the air defence under NORAD; the scraping of the Canadian made jet, the Arrow, for the United States made missile, the Bomarc; and finally, the move toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons from the United States.

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PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis is to illustrate the frustration and anxieties of the Canadian people concerning their intimate relationship in defence with the United States, a relationship which is seen as threatening Canada's sovereignty. The thesis also attempts to point out that this close cooperation in defence has coincided with the emergence in Canada of a new spirit of nationalism which has prompted many Canadians to urge a re-examination of Canada's defence policy.

The author is aware of the problems and the limitations which have resulted from the inability to consult public opinion data. The opinions studied are, to a large extent, the reactions of the leadership group and the articulate public in Canada, rather than of the mass public. However, the opinion of the mass public is estimated from the views expressed by the political leaders, the supposition being that in a democracy leaders who hope to be elected must, at least to some extent, reflect and act within the framework set out by the mood and values of the society.

In the first three chapters I have referred to the purpose and conduct of Canada's defence policy vis-a-vis the United States in its historical setting.



The subsequent chapters are devoted to the studies of some of the more controversial issues of recent years which have particularly aroused the emotions of the Canadian people. The selection of particular issues have been made in accordance with the degree of repercussion they have had in Canada. They have been events which have made many Canadians feel like the man, quoted by Joseph Barber as saying, "It's like this, you reach the point every so often where there is nothing you can do but yell or kick the furniture."[1] The events are examined in chronological order.

The author wishes to express her gratitude to Dr. Howard A. Scarrow under whose untiring leadership this study was conducted. A word of gratitude is also due to the staff of the Document Room at the Michigan State University Library for their courteous help. And finally, my heartfelt thanks go to my husband whose help and encouragement made the completion of this thesis possible.

Elizabeth Insook Carella

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[1]Joseph Barber, Good Fences Make Good Neighbor (New York, 1957), p. 16.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Mr. D. S. Harkness, the new Minister of National Defence of the Conservative Government, presenting the estimates of the Department of National Defence to the House Committee of Supply on September 12, 1961, laid out the objectives of the Canadian defence policy as follows:

> The Government's defence policy has two objectives; first, to maintain peace by preventing a third global war; and second, to prevent subjection to a foreign power. Everything we do in defence is devoted to attaining these two purposes. We believe they can best be attained by a system of alliances, and thus we have been strong supporters of, and have been taking and will continue to take our full part in, making NATO, NORAD and the UN effective.[1]

Canada's defence policy, therefore, is based on the principle of collective security, and Canada is deeply committed to promote the total defence capabilities of the alliance in which Canada has joined. This consideration of the total defence capability of the West, particularly of the North American continent, requires a close cooperation of two nations very different in size and power. This fact has led

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[1]Canada, House of Commons Debates, Sept. 12, 1961, p. 8221.



many Canadians to fear that the partnership may eventually subjugate Canada to a satellite position or to the loss of her national identity.

The system of collaboration in defence between Canada and the United States has evolved over two decades as the result of their proximity and the frequently paralleled national interests. The informal Ogdensburg discussion between the heads of the two governments during the Second World War laid the foundation for the later and more significant defence arrangement for the continental defence in the 1950s. In this defence arrangement, the vast difference in size, resources and the capabilities of the two countries made it inevitable that one provided more leadership than the other in their framework of alliance. One has a population of 185 million people with an average personal income of $2,150, and the other has 18 million people with an average personal income of $1,440. Canada's permanent armed service forces number 120,000 to the 2,500,000 of the United States active forces. The former does not practice conscription while the latter does. Canada's defence appropriation for 1961 was $1,830,000,000, 40% of the national budget, while the United States appropriation for the same year was at $40 billion, approxi-

mately 50% of the national budget.

This overwhelmingly dominant position of the United States in defence matters is observable in other areas also; notably in the economic and cultural life of the two countries. Canada is deeply dependent on American commodity market for the sale of its exports and for its source of imports. "The whole financial structure of Canada," the Winnipeg Free Press wrote, "its interest rate, the value of its dollar and the operation of all its governments are at the mercy of the American investor's whim."[2] Many Canadians get their information from American magazines, radio and TV and nearly 75% of Canadians are reported to be listening only to American stations, and read only American magazines, some of them published under Canadian labels.[3] Canadians feel that their giant neighbor is gaining too much authority over their affairs through investment, commerce, and defence arrangement. Moreover, the Canadians are positively hostile against the "unimaginative United States policy" and their "outright meddling" in the Canadian affairs. Wheat dumping, oil-cutting, the Norman affair in which

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[2]Editorial in The Winnipeg Free Press, Feb. 10, 1960.

[3]Editorial in The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Jan. 5, 1959.

the United States Senate Subcommittee questioned the character of a Canadian diplomatic official thus causing his death, the parent office of the United States Ford Motor Company banning its branch office in Canada from exporting 1000 cars to China, etc., all had the effect of stirring a strong anti-Americanism in Canada.

A deep resentment arising from Canada's heavy dependency on the United States in economic and defence field, and a hostility aroused by "arbitrary interference" of the United States over their national affairs, strongly colored the results of Canada's last two elections. "We have the right," the Conservatives, hitting the cord of Canadian nationalism, declared in their campaign speech, "to determine our own destiny at all times in our own way and without dictation in any way from any other country."[4] As a result the Conservative Party won a crushing majority both outside and inside Quebec, and nearly destroyed its major opponent, the Liberals, which had ruled Canada for 22 years. Other factors, such as the desire for change and the personal appeal of a dynamic

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[4]Mr. Diefenbaker's speech, reported in The Globe and Mail, April 10, 1958.

Conservative leader, Mr. Diefenbaker, to be sure had their share of influence, but they could not alone account for such a smashing victory. Separateness from the United States had been a central aspect of Canadian history and Canadians never failed to respond to the call to protect their identity.

In the field of defence, Canada's defence planners face a difficult dilemma. Canada must operate under limited resources of finance and manpower. In the age of rapid technological changes and a high cost of weapons, Canada must decide as to the relative value of its defence efforts. The trend in the late 1950's inevitably, was toward a more and more integrated air defence of North America and an increasing acceptance by Canada of the leadership of the United States in the joint defence arrangement. Revolting against this apparent subordination consequent on top-heavy integration, and the sincere conviction in some quarters of a more positive role Canada might be able to play as a Middle Power in the world councils in this critical time, some Canadians think that Canada should disengage herself from the Western coalition and maintain some form of neutrality. A similar stand is taken by the CCF/New Party. The defence policy of this Canadian socialist party, as pronounced at its Regina convention

in August 1960, advocated Canada's withdrawal from military alliances, work toward disarmament and non-acceptance of nuclear weapons.[5] In the House the members of the CCF/New Party always stand for a looser association with the United States and getting out of an arms race which Canada can ill afford. "This would not mean," Mr. Herridge, the CCF spokesman, once said, "lower taxes and more pleasure spending, but that we would divert the money from bombers into food and technical assistance for the hungry millions of Asia and Africa."[6] Although the CCF/New Party occupies only eight seats out 208 seats in the Canadian Parliament, I have given a wider space to its view point, for its policy differs on fundamental points from the other two major Canadian political parties.

Neutralism, however, is not compatible with the facts of modern political life. Geography and the nature of the next war inevitably tie Canadian defence activities very closely with those of the United States. There seems to be a consensus in Canada as to what the essense of the Russian challenge means. Both the Communist world and the Western world profess and desire a permanent peace,

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[5]John Gellner, Saturday Night, Feb. 18, 1961.

[6]Canada, House of Commons Debates, July 28, 1960, p. 7628.

but one wants total government while the other wants less of it. The two worlds also interpret and practice differently the concept of individual dignity. As for Canada, its history, its geographical position and the policy of the Soviet Union unite Canada very closely with the West.

The performances of the two major Canadian political parties, especially when they are in power, attest to this view. Mr. Lester Pearson, the Leader of the Opposition has said:

> There can in my view be no neutralism for Canada in defence or foreign policy. . . I know that there are faults, and some dangers, in U.S. policy, but I think also that there is a basic difference between the principles that underlie its policy and those which determine that of the Communist imperialist system of the Soviet Union. Recognizing, as I do, that difference, I cannot believe that abandonment of our present policies for complete neutrality would be a constructive step in the interest of peace. I think that we should continue to associate ourselves as closely as possible with the United States, the United Kingdom, France and other North Atlantic countries but that we should direct all of our activities and policy inside this association to the maintenance and strengthening of peace and the ending of the cold war in a way which would make the present system of defence through huge armaments unnecessary.[7]

The viewpoint of the Conservative Party was expressed by the Prime Minister in his address to the House of

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[7]Canada, House of Commons Debates, July 28, 1960, p. 7605.



Commons at the opening of the debate on the defence estimates in June 1961:

> To begin at the beginning, let me state emphatically that in our times there is great need for military preparedness. There is no peace in the world, and not the slightest prospect for peace in the forseeable future. . . . A chasm of enmity divides the Soviet bloc from the Western. For the Soviets, this enmity is institutional. It is at the basis of their ideology. Consequently, enmity toward the capitalist or imperialist nations, or whatever else they have been pleased to call us, has for decades been the cornerstone of their foreign policy. . . . Belief in democracy does not in itself entail hostility toward ideologies which are different. But long years of having to face up to the aggressive hostility of the Communist world have brought the Western democracies to the stage where we counter enmity with enmity, crusading zeal with stubborn opposition which at times has also verged on fanaticism. . . . We may not have wanted it in the beginning, and we may be loath to admit it even today, but the fact is that deep down in our hearts we have recognized that the two inimical sides really can not tolerate one another. We do not say, "We will bury you", as Khrushchov does, but we do know that if we want to preserve our way of life, our socio-political system, we will have to bury theirs. . . . The mission, then, of the military establishment in any of the Western democracies is simply this: To keep us secure from brute, armed aggression while we get on with the political, social and economic struggle which, unfortunately, we cannot avoid.[8]

The two Canadian major political parties, while very vocal about the idea of national sovereignty, in the end bow before the weight of national and international realities and rationalize along the similar

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[8]Quoted in Saturday Night, June 10, 1961, p. 20.



lines of what the former Minister of National Defence had said in the House:

> It is not to be expected that each partner in an alliance should contribute something to each component of the integrated force but rather that national characteristics, national geographic position and national resources should each be used to the best advantage, avoiding as far as possible duplication and overlapping of effort. We do not consider our defence effort in isolation but rather look at the general effectiveness of the alliances to which we are making contributions commensurate with our ability without placing an undue strain upon manpower and financial resources. While the cost of this insurance is heavy I think Canadians as a whole support the commitments we have undertaken.[9]

The ordinary citizens, in the meantime, are angry and frustrated. The newspapers and magazines give unprecedented amount of space and publishes the readers' viewpoints on defence policy. The Government's handling of questions such as NORAD (North American Air Defence Command), the cancellation of the Arrow (CF-105, Canada's supersonic jet aircraft), the adoption of Bomarc missiles all led to their bewilderment and frustration. "Perhaps," John Gellner, a noted writer of Canadian defence policy, wrote in one of his articles, "the best way of characterizing the attitude of the average Canadian toward national

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[9]Canada, House of Commons Debates, August 3, 1960. p. 7523.

defence is to say that he does not think much about it, and get annoyed when he does."[10]

[10]John Gellner, Saturday Night, Feb. 18, 1961.

CHAPTER II

PARTNERSHIP ATTAINED

1. Pre-World War II.

The history of Canada-United States defence cooperation is relatively brief. Joint defence of the continent began to receive the attention of the two countries only a few years before the outbreak of World War II. Economic relations, on the other hand, were unusually close for some years prior to World War II. Many forces were responsible for such relationships. There was the proximity of the two countries; similarities of taste and standards of living of the two people; and above all, the complementary character of their economies. The United States was in need of raw materials and Canada offered them in abundance. Canada purchased most of her manufactured goods from the United States, ranking her southern neighbor second only to Great Britain in manufactured exports to Canada. Thus, in some measures, Canada and the United States had already maintained economic continentalism prior to their ideas for defence continentalism which were taking shape in the latter part of the 1930s.

2. The Ogdensburg Agreement

The first signs of efforts toward defence cooperation came with a series of informal talks which were held by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada in the years between 1937 and 1940. The threat of the Nazis and Fascists was mounting in Europe and there was a similar tension brewing in Asia. These developments had drawn the leaders of the two countries to deliberate in private on matters of defence for the Western Hemisphere. In 1937 Prime Minister King had met with President Roosevelt in Washington and this meeting was followed by the meetings of staff officers and the Chief of Staffs of both countries in 1938. The recognition of the mutually beneficial interests was made clear in the speech at Queen's University in Kingston on August 18, 1938, when President Roosevelt stated that "I give to you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire."[1] Prime Minister King in his turn two days later, in the speech at Woodbridge, Ontario declared: "We too have our obligations. . . and one of these is to see that. . . enemy

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[1]Canada, House of Commons Debates, Nov. 12, 1940, pp. 56-7.

forces shall not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or air, to the United States across Canadian territory."[2]

In the following months the staff officers met regularly, halted briefly by the outbreak of war. However, as the course of war took an adverse turn for the allies, both the United States and Canada began to recognize the desirability of establishing a more permanent machinary for defence consultation. Prime Minister King and President Roosevelt met on August 17, 1940, at Ogdensburg, New York and announced the agreement to set up a Permanent Joint Board on Defence the next day. This Board was to "commence immediate studies relating to sea, land, and air problems including personnel and material." It was to "consider in the broad sense the defence of the northern half of the western hemisphere," and the Board was to consist of "four or five members from each country, most of them from the services."[3] The Permanent Joint Board on Defence was to function purely on an advisory capacity providing an informal means of reaching agreements and coordinating the defence plans of the two countries.

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[2]Canada, House of Commons Debates, Nov. 12, 1940, p. 57.

[3]D. Dawson, Canada in World Affairs 1939-41 (Toronto, 1943), pp. 310-11.

It made strategic recommendations, served as a liason between the British Commonwealth and the United States but, above all, it served in providing a sense of common purpose among the English speaking nations.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defence was a material expression of the pledges which President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King had made two years before. Some critics of the Canada-United States joint defence arrangement spoke of the hastiness in which the Prime Minister had accepted such arrangements, especially when he had repeatedly assured the Canadian people that his government would make no permanent commitment without the concurrence of Parliament. The Prime Minister and the President indeed had enjoyed a cordial relationship on a personal level and shared the desire for a close cooperation of their two countries. However, the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence was an outcome of the series of discussions nearly three years preceding the agreement, and Great Britain had been kept informed all along of the development.[4] The Board was notable for it united a neutral and a belligerent country in their military planning.

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[4] Ibid., pp. 240-241.

As the war progressed the American people became aware of the German menace to their own national well-being. They started to view their northern neighbor's war efforts with growing sympathy. In 1939 and 1940, the Gallup and Fortune Polls tested the attitudes of the American man on the street by posing the following question. "If Canada is actually invaded by a European power do you think the United States should use its army and navy to aid Canada?" 73.1% said "Yes" in 1939 and 74.2% again said "Yes" in 1940 when Canada was already at war. 27% had opposed and 7% was of no opinion.[5] The American government's sympathy for Canada's war effort was expressed in the form of American cooperation and the unstinting assistance extended to Canada. The United States had amended its Neutrality Act and the clause of the "Cash-and-carry" enabled Canada to purchase quantities of war supplies.

3. Destroyer-Bases Deal

A few weeks after the Ogdensburg Agreement, another step was taken by the United States toward a better continental defence. The United States took a step to exchange Canadian-defended Newfoundland bases for 50 destroyers to Great Britain. The agreement

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[5]F.H. Soward et al., Canada in World Affairs The Prewar Years (Toronto, 1941), pp. 111-2.

placed the base areas in Newfoundland under American jurisdiction for a period of 99 years. The agreement accorded the United States the "right, in the event of an emergency to make military actions anywhere in Newfoundland," though Canada was to be consulted and the Canadian defence interests were to be expressly recognized.[6] Subsequently, Newfoundland joined the Canadian federation and the 99 year lease held by the United States on the bases in Newfoundland was modified. However, the legacy of the wartime arrangement arrived at between Great Britain and the United States is still in effect and today the United States maintains a bulk of its forces and their dependents there. Canadians are hopeful that further arrangements can be made between the two countries along the line which would be more suitable for independent nations.

4. The Hyde Park Declaration and Other Joint War Efforts

Eight months after the Ogdensburg agreement, the Hyde Park Declaration was made by Canada and the United States on April 20, 1941. It set up a machinery to cooperate in the field of armaments and general economic endeavor. The following paragraph of the

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[6]A.M. Fraser, "Newfoundland's Contribution to Canada," International Journal, IV (Summer 1949), p. 251.

declaration reveals the purpose of the agreement:

> It was agreed as a general principle, that in mobilizing the resources of this continent, each country should provide the other with the defence articles it is best able to produce and above all, produce quickly, and that production program should be co-ordinated to this end. The existing and potential capacity in Canada for munitions, materials, aluminium and ships urgently required by the United States should fully be made use of.[7]

The arrangement was successfully realized and the defence production of the two countries became integrated. Many Canadian-American cooperative arrangements such as the Materials Coordination Committee, and the Joint Economic Committee followed. During the war several constructions were also undertaken by the cooperation of the two countries. A highway was built to Alaska, weather stations in the Arctic, oil pipelines from the McKenzie River to the Pacific, and an oil refinery at Whitehouse. The two countries also constructed several airfields called the Northwest Staging Route.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defence maintained its advisory functions throughout the war by recommending new arrangements of defence projects wherever they were needed, and by inspecting installations.

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[7]Don Creighton, A History of Canada: Dominion of the North (Boston, 1958), p. 525.



On the military side, a Special Service Force was formed which was comprised of the soldiers of both countries on a 50-50 basis and they served jointly in Newfoundland, Labrador and in Alaska. Many defence facilities in Canada were operated by United States Army personnel. On October 31, 1946, the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Abott, told the House of Commons that there were 3,193 United States troops in north-west Canada "engaged in air staging, maintenance, handling of stores, disposal of property, airfields Edmonton to Alaska, Canol project, Alaska Highway, Yukon-Whitehorse railway." There were 360 more on the north-eastern air route and in weather stations and 610 more on the Pacific coast. The Canadian people living in the area referred to these Americans as the "forces of occupation."[8] Mr. Trevor Lloyd, a Canadian geographer who has served in the Arctic, wrote: "If the Canadian people had been aware of the extent of United States undertaking in the North, for example during 1943, there might have been alarm at their magnitude and distribution."[9]

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[8]F. H. Soward, Canada in World Affairs: 1944-1946 (Toronto, 1950), p. 268.

[9]Lingard and Trotter, Canada in World Affairs: 1941-1944 (Toronto, 1950), p. 75.

5. "Lucky to Escape With Sovereignty"[10]

The joint efforts in these ventures were not without irritation and misunderstandings at various levels. Although on the whole the spirit of "all for one and one for all" had prevailed, the Canadians had some reservations. The partnership of the two greatly unequal countries in wealth, and power had caused some sensitivities on the part of the smaller country and many in Canada deeply regretted what they considered an American intrusion of their country's sovereignty. Colonel Stanley W. Dzuiban of the United States Army wrote on this subject recently in a book which dealt with the military relations between the United States and Canada during the years 1939-1945. "Tens of thousands of American troops and construction workers flooded into Canada to man bases and to build airfields, highways, radar stations and the like," he said.

> The substantial American garrison operated in Canada independently of Canadian control and legal jurisdiction to an extent considered unwarranted by many Canadians. This garrison constructed, maintained and operated bases and facilities as if they were on United States soil. Command organizations with their independent signal communications systems were established over segments of Canadian territory. Strenuous

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[10] The Winnipeg Free Press, Jan 22, 1960.

> American efforts were made to have Canadian forces placed under American command on Canadian soil. . . A perennial state of affairs that conditioned the nature of the relationship was the common amiable ignorance and disinterest on the part of the Americans toward the Canadians. . . . Lack of understanding of the nature of the British Commonwealth, the Canadian Confederation, and of the Canadian background, could not fail to introduce errors and discord in policy considerations or in the operational handling of problems concerning American activities in Canada. Too frequently, such lapses were compounded by an ineptitude on the part of American officials in even the highest positions who violated the basic rules of "how to win friends and influence people" . . . [11]

After the war, when United States service personnel were assigned to various installations in Canada in connection with joint defence operations, the United States government, perhaps having learned from the wartime experience of joint work during which the United States service personnel's apparent ignorance of Canada had stirred the ire of Canadians, took great care to avoid unnecessary offense to Canadian sensitivities by briefing their men that Canada is definitely not interested in joining the United States as a state and that she is not a colony of Great Britain but a sovereign nation with its own citizenship and national pride and a strong voice of

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[11] *Ibid.*



its own in world affairs. Information given out in the pamphlet called "Neighbours North" has further stated that "Canada is a partner in the direct defence of the North American continent and the Western Hemisphere. It is an ally on whom we count on in Korea, in the United Nations, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and at home."[12]

Summary

Changing world conditions and the demands of war impelled Canada and the United States, the traditional associates, to devise a continental defence scheme which unified the military planning of the two countries. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence which was the outcome of the political conference between the representatives of the two countries, was set up on August 18, 1940, and common defence activities proceeded and eventually widened in scope to include collaboration in the field of economics and armaments and several other schemes of common concern. The Canada-United States cooperative arrangement often assumed a tripartite character because of Canada's relationship with Great Britain.

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[12] The Globe and Mail, Oct. 11, 1955.

The above policy of integration in defence efforts increased United States activities in Canada and in its northern Arctic territory, and in the closing years of war, it was already apparent that Canadians were concerned that their country's sovereignty might be imperilled. Canadian industry was burgeoning with huge armaments contract and Canada was beginning to show the attitude of confidence and independence.

CHAPTER III

POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD

1. Canada's Hope for Security Through the United Nations

During World War II, the allied leaders planned a postwar world which was to be devoid of power politics and one which would be centered around an international organization. Gone completely were the days when the United States strove to insulate herself and championed isolationism. With the conviction that war could be avoided by joining in collective security, the United States took an active part and in so doing improved the chances of success for the latest model of international organization.

In those early postwar years when the signs of impending Cold War had already begun to appear in the forms of political disagreements between the two former wartime allies, the United States and the U.S.S.R., Canada nevertheless entertained earnest hope for peace by arbitration which the United Nations seemed to offer. Within this framework Canada hoped to make a creative and constructive contribution toward a better world, a role which a nation of limited power and resources like Canada could not

hope to play effectively outside such a framework. Canada's faith in the United Nations was one of the four cornerstone on which Canada's foreign policy was to be based. When the new Conservative Government took office in 1957, it, too, emphasized Canada's reliance on the United Nations. Thus, Prime Minister Diefenbaker, speaking to the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 1957, said:

> We stand on this question now where Canada has always stood since April 1945, and I emphasize this - with the support of the party which is now in power. So far as Canada is concerned, support of the United Nations is the cornerstone of its foreign policy. We believe that the United Nations will grow stronger because it represents the inevitable struggle of countries to find order in their relationships, and the deep longing of mankind to strive for and attain peace and justice.[1]

Canada had contributed greatly in creating a United Nations emergency force and its soldiers had been playing an important role in many tense and disturbed areas of the world. Over 900 Canadian servicemen formed part of the United Nations emergency force in the Middle East, and supplied some 130 personnel of her armed services for the truce commission in Indo-China, the United Nations truce supervisory organization in Palestine and the truce team in Kashmir.[2]

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[1] U.N. General Assembly - Twelfth Session, Plenary Meeting 683, Sept 23, 1957, p. 64.

[2] Canada, House of Commons Debates, Dec. 5, 1957, p. 1897.



2. Canada's Participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

In April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed. Since the United Nations was made ineffective by the Soviet veto and since whatever hope there might have been for a friendly cooperation between the Communist world and the Western world became shattered by the series of events that followed the Moscow Conference of March 1947, the United States undertook the course of "containment" policy. The first realization of that policy appeared in the form of Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947, which gave military and economic aid to Turkey and Greece. The Marshall Plan which was a program for European recovery was launched on June 5, 1947, followed by the Point Four, the technical assistance program for the underdeveloped countries of the world to raise their living standards so that they could better withstand the threat of Communism. To this impressive array of Western, or the United States' moves, the Soviet Union replied with its form of alliances and programs to tighten Eastern Europe. With a Communist "coup" in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, the Cold War was now truly on. War seemed imminent. The

Western world wished to warn the Soviet Union that an act of aggression against any free nation forming the NATO would mean a war with all these nations.

NATO was a particularly satisfying organization from the standpoint of Canada. The organization seemed to promise to free Canada from the appearance of a satellite position to the United States and seemed to provide her an opportunity to voice her views more effectively within the constitutional machinery of this organization. It was an organization which united all the Western democracies and included Great Britain, Canada's traditional ally as well as the United States, her new partner in the North American defence. It is little wonder then that Canadian leaders were such ardent advocates of NATO from the period of its conception. NATO forms another cornerstone to Canada's foreign policy. The interest of Canada in this organization is stated by Mr. Lester Pearson in the following way:

> Personally, I am more than ever convinced that the continuing cohesion of all the Atlantic powers, not merely the European powers, is vitally important to the preserving and reinforcing of the peace of the world and that no security and no stability can be achieved through isolated arrangements, either in North America or in Europe. Continentalism, whether of the European or American variety, is not enough for safety. [3]

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[3]Canada, House of Commons Debates, Jan. 29, 1954, p. 1587.

Canada's contribution to NATO both in terms of men and material is considerable in proportion to its size. It has twelve squadrons of intercepters in Europe equipped with Sabres and CF-100s under SACEUR. They are located mostly in Germany and some 5,800 airmen are employed in flying and servicing these aircrafts. It also has in Germany an infantry group made up of over 5000 men, and armoured regiment equipped with tanks. The naval contribution to NATO consists of forty fighting ships and fifty maritime aircraft. Since 1951, Canada has made available to its allies $1 billion worth of equipment and trained nearly 5000 pilots and navigators from member nations of NATO.[4]

The Canada-United States defence arrangements came under the NATO umbrella in 1949. Within NATO, there was to be a system of regional groupings whereby the nations that fall under the four regions would do the planning and the administration of each respective area. The first of these groups consisted of the Northern regional group with Norway and Denmark with Great Britain participating; the second group consisted of the Western European group with Belgium, France,

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[4]Canada, House of Commons Debates, Dec. 5, 1957, p. 1897.

Luxemberg, and Holland, the United Kingdom with the United States and Canada participating. The third, the Southern European group, was composed of Italy and southern France with the United States and United Kingdom participating. The fourth group consisted of North American nations, Canada and the United States with United Kingdom participating. Eventually the three European regional groupings were integrated under a joint military command. Thus, within NATO, Canada and the United States were to collaborate under the Canada-United States regional planning group as one of the regional groupings of NATO.[5]

3. Reaffirmation of Canada-United States Military Cooperation

As the situation worsened the chances of arriving at an East-West rapproachment, Canada began to receive increasing pressure from the United States for closer defence partnership. It was the new air age and Canada's geographical location which animated American military leaders to press for Canada's closer cooperation. The Arctic frontier had assumed a new importance, for the region would become a major

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[5]Canada, House of Commons Debates, Nov. 13, 1957, p. 1060.

area of combat in the event of another war. As Mr. Pearson, the former Minister of External Affairs under the Liberal Government and the present Leader of Opposition, put it, Canada was "in the dangerous position of being sandwiched geographically between the U.S.S.R. and the United States."[6]

As early as June 1945, the discussions for postwar defence cooperation were held between the two countries to meet any future contingencies. It was, therefore, agreed that the Permanent Joint Board on Defence would be continued. Negotiations were carried out in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and in February 1947, the two governments made a joint statement concerning the principle which would govern the arrangements for military cooperation between the two countries. It stated that:

> 1. The interchange of selected individuals in order to increase the familiarity of each country's defence personnel with that of the other.
>
> 2. The general cooperation and exchange of observers in exercises and in testing military material.
>
> 3. The encouragement of common designs and standards in arms, equipment, organization, methods of training, and new developments.

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[6]Lester Pearson, in an address reported in The Globe and Mail, Feb. 22, 1947.

> 4. The mutual and reciprocal availability of military, naval and air facilities in each country as may be agreed upon in specific instances.
>
> 5. All cooperation to be arranged without impairing the political sovereignty of either country over the normal activities in its territory.[7]

Canada was thus driven to enter into a close defence partnership with the United States in time of peace. Uneasiness of Canadian people about this joint enterprise was reflected in the House of Commons' debate of June 1947. This new arrangement empowered American military authorities to maintain discipline over their own forces in Canada. Angry voices denounced this concession degrading, and the government worked hard to convince the members of Parliament that all precautions have been taken to protect national sovereignty.

Canada's growing emphasis on collaboration with her neighbor in the field of defence was once again apparent in her defence policy which the Canadian government presented in 1948. It stated that the government of Canada aims to work with "other free nations and plans for joint defence based on self-help and mutual aid as part of a joint effort to

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[7] Second Seminar on Canada-America Relations, Assumption University of Windsor, November 10,11,12, 1960.



preserve peace and to restrain aggression." Mr. Claxton, the then Minister of National Defence, further observed that "no one country could be fully enough armed to meet and master the onslaught of modern war." He said, "each had its own fraction of power to contribute to the common defence."[8]

In the new world which is dominated by the two big Powers, a middle Power such as Canada was quickly forced to revert "with disconcerting speed to its normal position of a weak North American state, overshadowed by the United States."[9] Canada's geographic position and the new air age turned Canada's northern hitherto wasteland into a strategically important region. This development was disconcerting to many Canadians. "Canada. . . does not relish the necessity of digging or having dug for her any Maginot Line in the Arctic ice," explained Mr. Pearson. "Peaceful development," he said, "in cooperation with the northern nations is Canada's sole desire."[10] Canadian statesmen expressed their desire to develop the areas for peaceful purpose in cooperation with the United States (for

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[8]Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1948, p. 5785.

[9]Soward, op. cit., p. 7.

[10]L.B. Pearson, "Canada Looks Down North", Foreign Affairs, July 1946, p. 644.

Alaska), Denmark (for Greenland) and with the U.S.S.R.[11] However, as the international situation deteriorated, Canada received increasing pressure from the United States to collaborate in the Canadian north. The relation with the United States, therefore, has comprised the major foreign policy problem for Canada in the years between 1946-1949. The two governments set up a series of northern weather stations and undertook joint military exercise under Arctic conditions. The two governments, later on, began to build gigantic radar defence systems across northern Canada.

Summary

And now, to summarize: the events of the postwar years have demonstrated that the basic Canadian view in achieving security has been through membership in both multilateral and bilateral military alliances. Under the pressure of the Cold War, Canada thus has renewed its wartime joint defence arrangement with the United States. This returning to the continental defence system for North America, however, has been far from satisfactory from Canada's standpoint. It has been considered difficult to maintain a national

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[11]Soward, op. cit., p. 10.

identity in a continent so dominated by the United States. The next chapter will deal with the gigantic joint Canada-United States enterprise of building a continental radar defence system across North America.

CHAPTER IV

CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF RADAR WARNING SYSTEMS

"In the current phase of collective security," stated the Government's White Paper on National Defence for 1956-57, "Canada's principle support of the West's retaliatory striking power is our contribution towards early warning and air defence on this continent."[1] The construction of the chain of radar stations in North America to provide an early warning of the approach of enemy aircraft from the north, was a project which was both expensive and highly controversial. All told three warning lines have been built by both countries.

1. Pinetree and Mid-Canada Line

The continent's radar defence system began with the building of the first radar chain, the Pinetree Line, which was built by Canada and the United States over the border of two countries along the 50th parallel. The chain of stations stretches north-east from Vancouver Island to Alberta and is located in the territory of both countries. This

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[1] Ralph Campney, Canada's Defence Programme, 1956-57, Ottawa, 1956, p. 4.



electrically connected system of detection and warning devices was equipped both to detect the approaching aircraft and to direct the planes in interception. The total cost of the Pinetree Line was estimated at $450 million of which the United States paid two-thirds. In 1954, the second chain called Mid-Canada Line was built along the 55th parallel by Canada alone.

The Mid-Canada Line was only a radar system and it prompted some critics to question the strategic value of the Line. Lt. General Guy Simmonds, the retired Canadian Army Chief of Staff, for instance, felt that the decision to build the Mid-Canada Line stemmed from other than strategic considerations and said that "the United States has pressed the construction of the Dew Line with such vigor that it is for serious consideration whether the arguments for the Mid-Canada Line were not powerfully influenced by a desire to put to use gadgetry evolved in Canada rather than consideration of what would provide the best defence."[2] The official reply to such criticism was made by the Minister of National Defence who said: "The Mid-Canada Line has the function of confirming the

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[2]Guy Simmonds, "Where We've Gone Wrong on Defense", Maclean's Magazine, June 23, 1956.

warning of attack and of indicating the direction in which it is heading and alerting the air defence forces in more detail to get into a position to meet the attack."[3] The Mid-Canada Line cost Canada $170 million.

2. The Dew Line

The third, the Distant Early Warning Line (Dew Line) was built by the United States across the Canadian Arctic. The construction began in late 1954 and was completed in the summer of 1957. It stretches from Western Alaska across the upper rim of the continent through Canada to Baffin Island. It is 3000 miles long and approximately 600 miles inside the Arctic circle at latitude 70°. The Dew Line is made up of a series of radar ports isolated from each other except by electronic connections. The information gathered by these electronic devices is relayed through automatic and semi-automatic relay points to the Continental Air Defence Commands at Colorado Springs and to the Canadian Air Defence Command Headquarters at St. Hubert, Quebec. Although the full cost of construction and operation came

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[3]Canada, House of Commons Debates, July 18, 1956, p. 6118.


Arctic Ocean
NORTH POLE
SOVIET UNION
PROPOSED ARCTIC PICKETS
KAMCHATKA
ALEUTIAN IS.
ALASKA
DEW RADAR LINE
CANADA
MID-CANADA RADAR LINE
PINETREE RADAR LINE
GREENLAND
ICELAND
UNITED KINGDOM
NORWAY
PORTUGAL
AZORES
NEWFOUNDLAND
OFF SHORE PICKETS
RADAR ISLANDS
Atlantic

under the responsibility of the United States, many Canadian firms were awarded contracts and most of the 1000 men needed to operate the Dew Line were to be Canadians. These three Lines were extended seaward by the use of specially equipped ships and aircraft on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.

The agreement to construct the Dew Line by the two countries contained a long list of conditions laid down by Canada for construction of the Line. They included the use, as much as possible, of the Canadian manufactured electronic equipment; equal consideration for Canadian and American contractors in the awarding of contracts; preference to qualified Canadian labour; and the protection of the Eskimo population. Paragraphs dealing with Canadian law and operation of the system will be mentioned later.

Large aircraft are maintained by both countries to support these air screens. The airplanes used in this sentry flight are the largest planes operated by the Navy and each aircraft carries 23 crew members and flies 3000 miles non-stop. The planes are packed with 14,000 pounds of radar. About a hundred of them costing approximately $5.5 million a piece are reported to be in operation.[4]

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[4]The Globe and Mail, July 30, 1957.

3. Controversy Surrounding the Radar Warning System in Canada

The criticism surrounding continental defence based on radar system and defensive aircraft was varied and bitter in Canada. Some felt that Canada was not doing enough in this joint effort of continental defence. Others felt that it was endangering Canada's sovereignty by inviting to Canada foreign armed forces in peacetime. Still others felt that the system itself was strategically unsound.

Insisting that Canada was not sufficiently assisting her senior partner, the United States, the Toronto Globe and Mail asserted:

> Who is going to defend Canada? More particularly, who is going to defend Canada's North? At present, the task is shared by Canadian and United States forces. Whether the sharing is proportionate -- whether, that is, each country is doing what it can reasonably be expected to do -- is a mystery. . . Reports from Ottawa suggest, however, that we may soon reach the point where there are more United States airmen in Canada than Canadian ones.[5]

Attacking the manpower shortage in Canada, the Globe and Mail wrote that Canada ought to deal with her manpower shortage in Canada or tell the Americans to take over the defence of Canada.

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[5]The Globe and Mail, April 1, 1955.

Another aspect of the continental radar system which stirred much Canadian opposition concerned sovereignty. The construction of the Pinetree Line and especially the Dew Line which were entirely built by the United States took many Americans to Canada's northland. In order to offset any undesirable infringement on Canadian sovereignty and in order to offset criticisms, the Canadian government had concluded a detailed agreement with the United States which would preserve the essentials of Canadian sovereignty. In spite of this precaution many incidents both true and false were reported in Parliament and in the press causing deep resentment. There were reports that Canadian contractors were being discriminated against and that American flags were flying where Canadian flags ought to have flown; that Canadian journalists were forbidden to cover the story of Dew Line; that the Americans made it difficult for Canadian officials to visit the defence facilities on their own soil. Some writers moaned that the Canadian people were required to have their credentials processed in a foreign country before they visit their own locales. When, for example, Mervyn Hardie, Liberal M.P. for Mackenzie River, wanted to visit his constituents

on the Dew Line, Mr. James M. Minifie wrote in his book Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey, Mr. Hardie's permit had to be processed in Paramus, New Jersey. "By the wildest stretch of the imagination," Mr. Minifie went on to say, "can you envisage a US congressman allowing himself to be told by an office set up in Canada when and whether he may visit his voters in the United States? You would hear the screams from the forty-nineth parallel to the Rio Grande, and from longitude 67° west to the international date-line. And rightly."[6]

The Northern Affairs Minister Alvin Hamilton, in answering to the questions raised by the Opposition Leader, Mr. Pearson, said to the House that it was a matter of national chagrin that Canadian officials, including ministers have to obtain United States permission to visit Canada's Arctic. "I am ashamed of the fact," Mr. Hamilton said,

> that through circumstances beyond the power of almost anyone here we have had to give all responsibilities for the defence of our northern area to a friendly power. . . Employees of the government of Canada and Even ministers have to go through a formal procedure of getting permission. When Canadians have to wait several months to get permission to go and do their duty in their own country at the direction of their own minister I do not apologize to the House or the country for saying that I am ashamed of the situation.[7]

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[6]James M. Minifie, Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey (McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1960), p. 103.

[7]The Winnipeg Free Press, Aug. 15, 1958.

The editor of Maclean's Magazine who had visited the Dew Line sites made a similar objection in his article and wrote that his visit to the Dew Line to cover the story had to be cleared by American officials in the United States and that he had difficulty in getting adequate information once he got there.[8] As for the United States, the State Department denied Mr. Hamilton's statement indirectly by saying that Canadians were free to travel anywhere including the Dew Line sites without clearance from the United States authorities.

In the House, Mr. Pearson urged that Canada take over "at the earliest possible moment, control of United States defence installations in the Canadian Arctic. "Throughout the years," the Prime Minister said, "I have felt that in the northern defences of Canada there were in existence situations that could conceivably derogate Canada's sovereignty. . . . Following that viewpoint, negotiations have taken place. . . . A friendly and favorable response has been the result of the representations made."[9]

Since the construction of the Dew Line and the other Northern defence installations had the

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[8]Maclean's Magazine, May 26, 1956.

[9]Canada, House of Commons Debates, Aug. 16, 1958, p. 3652.

effect of de facto American control of the Canadian north, and since it has aroused so much concern in Canada, paragraphs of the agreement that deal with Canadian law, operation and manning, financing, and the period of operation of the system will be quoted here in full.

Paragraph 6. Canadian Law.

> Nothing in this agreement shall derogate from the application of Canadian law in Canada, provided that, if in unusual circumstances its application may lead to unreasonable delay or difficulty in construction or operation, the United States authorities concerned may request the assistance of Canadian authorities in seeking appropriate alleviation. In order to facilitate the rapid and efficient construction of the DEW System, Canadian authorities will give sympathetic consideration to any such request submitted by United States Government authorities.
>
> Particular attention is directed to the ordinances of the Northwest Territories and Yukon Territory, including those relating to the following:
>
> a) No game or wildlife shall be taken or molested in the Northwest Territories. Licenses to hunt in Yukon Territory may be purchased from representatives of the Yukon Territorial Government.
>
> b) No objects of archaeological interest or historic significance in the Northwest Territories or Yukon Territory will be disturbed or removed therefrom without first obtaining the approval of the Canadian Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources.

Paragraph 7. Operation and Manning

> a) The extent of Canadian participation in the initial operation and manning of the DEW System shall be a matter for later decision by Canada after full consultation with the United

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Paragraph 7. Operation and Manning

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States. It is understood that, in any event, Canada reserves the right, on reasonable notice, to take over the operation and manning of any or all of the installations. Canada will ensure the effective operation, in association with the United States, of any installations it takes over.

b) Subject to the foregoing, the United States is authorized to station personnel at the sites, and to operate the DEW System, in accordance with the principles of command in effect from time to time between the military authorities of the two countries. The overall manning policy as between the employment of military and civilian personnel shall be the subject of consultation and agreement between the two Governments.

Paragraph 8. Financing

Unless otherwise provided by Canada, the costs of construction and operation of the DEW System shall be the responsibility of the United States, with the exception of Canadian military personnel costs if Canada should man any of the installations.

Paragraph 9. Period of Operations of the System

Canada and the United States agree that, subject to the availability of funds, the DEW System shall be maintained in operation for a period of ten years or such shorter period as shall be agreed by both countries in the light of their mutual defence interests. Thereafter, in the event that either Government concludes that any or all of the installations are no longer required, and the other Government does not agree, the question of continuing need will be referred to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. In considering the question of need, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence will take into account the relationship of the DEW System to other radar installations established in the mutual defence interest of the two countries. Following consideration by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, as provided above, either Government may decide that the installations in

> question shall be closed, in which case the arrangements shown in Paragraph 10 regarding ownership and disposition of the installations will apply.[10]

The third type of criticism directed against the continental defence based on the radar system concerned strategy. These criticisms came mostly from the retired members of the General Staff and some military experts who believed that it was useless against planes carrying hydrogen bomb some of which would get through anyway. With the rapid advance in technology which drastically shortened the warning time, the civil defence function of the warning system was relegated to the point where it became meaningless. Thus a Conservative critic, Mr. George Nowlan, remarked of the warning chains:

> Their real purpose is not to protect the public . . . but is rather to give the bombers a chance to get into the air so they will not be destroyed on the ground and in order that they can launch a counter measure of massive retaliation. . . . Well, if that is the hope. . . it does not hold out much comfort for the rest of us, because we are probably going to be burnt to a crisp anyway.[11]

Some like General W.H.S. Macklin, a former Adjutant-General of the Canadian Army, felt that such a system of static defence is ineffective against the challenge

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[10] "Defence. Establishment of a Distant Early Warning System. Agreement between Canada and the United States of America Effected by Exchange of Notes signed at Washington, May 5, 1955." Canada, Treaty Series, 1955, No. 8.

[11] Canada, House of Commons Debates, July 18, 1956, p. 6135.

of a diversified nature of Russian armament:

> If we put our trust in this counterpart of the old Wall of China, and fail to provide armaments that can match our adversaries' in any sort of war they select, and moreover, if we do not train our men to use them, communism will go on winning campaign after campaign. In the end we may commit suicide by turning to thermonuclear weapons in desperation, or else just lose the last campaign by default.[12]

The other criticisms against the strategic value of the radar warning system were concerned with the utility of the radar warning system itself. The critics time and again questioned the detection capabilities of the radar system which tended to lag behind the improved means of delivery. For instance, in the summer of 1958, the Defence Minister indicated that man-operated bombers had already exceeded the detection capabilities of the defence line.[13] Some modifications of the Dew Line soon followed. However, it was common knowledge that the Dew Line was useless against the Russian ICBM. The missile travels at about 15,000 miles an hour and, at the top of its trajectory, is about 600 miles above the earth.[14] Another fact which threatened the strategic value of the warning system in the Arctic came from the rapid

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[12]Donald C. Masters, Canada in World Affairs, 1953-55 (Toronto, 1959), p. 67.

[13]The Winnipeg Free Press, July 7, 1958.

[14]The Winnipeg Free Press, Nov. 13, 1957.

development in submarine missile launching capabilities. Admiral Arleigh C. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, USN, for instance, has told a congressional committee of the possible use of the intermediate range ballistic missile by submarines off the coast of the United States.[15] Antisubmarine warfare, as a result, was receiving high priorities.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, Canadian government steadfastly followed the policy of the United States government which adopted the system of a radar screen. "They will buy us time," said the Minister of National Defence Campney in the House of Commons in June 1956, "time to get the big United States deterrent force of bombers with their nuclear weapons winging away on their missions should the need arise, time to get our defence activated, time to prepare our peoples for impending attack."[16] As of the time of writing the manned bomber, if unopposed, is by far the best and most effective way of delivering atomic weapons.[17] Therefore, the above statement of the former Minister of National Defence is still accurate.

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[15]Minifie, op. cit., p. 15.

[16]Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 20, 1956, p. 5211.

[17]Canada, House of Commons Debates, September 12, 1961, p. 8223.

In 1958, three ballistic missile detection stations were built over the Arctic. As early as July 1956, negotiations were underway to consider jointly the measure of defending against the ICBM. Canadian defence research, collaborating with the United States Air Force has worked for a new warning system against ICBM.[18] Using ultra-range radar, these stations were able to spot missile launchings a few minutes after the launching. The flight time for an ICBM from the Soviet Union to the United States was now estimated to be approximately 30 minutes providing 15 minutes of warning to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to clear the bases.[19]

The radar warning system, therefore, is now comprised of two defence net works; one against bomber and one against missile. This warning system still is the backbone of the policy of deterrent. Thus General Thomas Powers, chief of the SAC disclosed in February 1959, before the house sub-committee as follows:

> The real backbone of SAC's deterrent is our alert system. As you know, under this system we maintain a certain percentage of the command on the alert 24 hours a day, seven days a week,

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[18] David McIntosh, "What Are We Getting in our $1.5 billion Defence Package?", Canadian Business, November 1957.

[19] The Globe and Mail, Jan. 18, 1958.

> 365 days a year. Airplanes are loaded with bombs; crews sleep close by. They are tested everyday. . . we can get them rolling in about five minutes, that is, the first airplane starts rolling down the runway in five minutes. This is the only force that a potential aggressor knows he will have to reckon with, no matter how cleverly he plans his surprise attack. If that force is big enough, and if it gets the 15 minutes' warning for which it is tailored, and if it can penetrate we think an aggressor will be strongly deterred. If we get that warning, we can get these airplanes off the ground; therefore, even though an aggressive launchings missiles against the US--and nothing can stop them today--we will still get the retaliatory force off, that part of it that is on this alert; it will not be destroyed, and the aggressor will absorb it.[20]

"There is our protection at the present time," Mr. Pearson, referring to the SAC's deterrent role, stated, "That, I suggest, is the purpose, if it has any purpose, of continental air defence and early warning system." [21]

Canada in 1958 took another step that contributed to the effectiveness of the SAC. On June 10, 1958, Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced to the House, the government's plan to permit the establishment of new bases in the Canadian north for the United States Air Force tankers to refuel the bombers of the Strategic Air Command. These refueling facilities, the Prime Minister spoke, "will contribute to the effectiveness of the strategic air command, to its ability to

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[20]Canada, House of Commons Debates, July 2, 1959, p. 5366.

[21]Ibid. p. 5366.

react quickly in face of the reduced time of warning which must now be contemplated in the event of aggression by reason of the recent scientific and technological developments."[22]

Summary

Since the defensive technology lags behind the development of offensive weapons, only an effective retaliatory force can assure the defence of North America. The radar warning system which stretches across Canada's northern territory has been and still is an important part of the deterrent. A huge sum of money and skill required to build and operate these stations, however, was found to be quite beyond Canada's capability. The United States, therefore, took part in this gigantic operation and many American personnel were brought to Canadian soil to build and operate the stations. Incidents, which Canadians considered as not in keeping with Canada's sovereignty, were trickling down to the Parliament and to the press arousing anxiety and furor in Canada. Later, the demand of security took the two countries still one step further in their already close defence cooperation

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[22]Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 10, 1958, p. 998.

by integrating the air forces under a single command. To this we now will turn.

CHAPTER V

NORAD (North American Air Defence Command)

1. What is NORAD

North American Air Defence Command is an arrangement which Canada and the United States, the two sovereign nations, arrived at in order to strengthen the defence capability of the North American continent. This arrangement places the defence operation of the Air Forces of the two countries under a single command headed by an American general. A Canadian Air Marshall is appointed as his deputy, who in the absence of the commander, takes a full command over the operational control of the Air Forces of both the United States and Canada allocated to NORAD. NORAD is a defensive arrangement in a sense that it cannot start a war. NORAD was described by Prime Minister Diefenbaker as an arrangement, the task of which is that of maintaining the early warning system and alerting the United States Strategic Air Command (SAC) which is the deterrent striking force of the United States.[1] NORAD headquarters is located at Colorado Springs and a small number of Canadian officers and

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[1] Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 10, 1958, p. 999.

airmen work side by side with the men of the United States armed forces.

Decision making machinery of NORAD is vast and complex. As described in the previous chapter, the entire radar warning system of the North American continent was brought under NORAD. It meant that all information picked up by the three radar warning systems were to be communicated immediately to Colorado Springs by the huge network of nearly 200 short wave radio and teletype circuits. Canadian Air Defence headquarters in St. Hubert, Quebec, receives the same information at the same time. SAGE(Semi-automatic Ground Environment) system, about which more will be said in the next chapter, digests all the information coming from the radar system and works out the probable course and speed of the enemy aircraft. The rest and the vital decision of "go" is to be made by the commander of NORAD.

2. The Origin of NORAD

Both Canada and the United States accept the fact that North America should be considered as a single unit for an effective defence. The two countries, in order to maximize the defence effort of the continent,

therefore, have for over a decade, studied the ways and means to improve the air defence system of this continent. For example, as far back as November 1951, the then Liberal Government of Canada arrived at an agreement with the United States providing authority to intercept and engage hostile aircraft in the territory of the other. The arrangement for cooperation in relation to air defence between the air forces of the two countries, therefore, was already operating quite effectively when Mr. Pearkes, the Minister of National Defence, announced the formation of NORAD to the Canadian press in August 1957.

The establishment of NORAD had been under consideration for several months under the Liberal Government, and a joint military study group, made up of the officials of the three services as well as the scientific agencies of both countries, had been set up in early 1957. This group had recommended the setting up of the integrated operational controls of all air defence forces under one joint headquarters to enable a better air defence system of the continent. However, the final decision on this particular type of arrangement was taken by the Conservative Government which traditionally abhorred any close ties with the United States. On August 1, 1957, only a month after

the Conservative Government took office in Canada for the first time in 22 years, the announcements of NORAD were made simultaneously in Washington and Ottawa by the defence secretaries of the two countries, stating that their two governments had "agreed to the setting up of a system of integrated operational control of the air defence forces of the continental United States, Alaska, and Canada under an integrated command responsible to the chief of staffs of both countries."[2] The formal agreement spelling out the terms of reference was long in the making, perhaps due to the throes of political transition which were taking place in Canada in the latter half of 1957 and the first half of 1958, and therefore, for nearly ten months until the joint defence arrangement was formalized by the exchange of notes on May 12, 1958, NORAD functioned under the interim arrangement.

3. How the Announcement was Received

When NORAD was first announced in August 1957, the logic of it seemed cogent enough and was received warmly by the Canadian people. The increased speed and efficiency with which a death blow could be delivered by the belligerents in case of war, made acute the

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[2]The Winnipeg Free Press, August 1, 1957.

necessity of quick decision and efficient operation. Therefore, when the first announcement was made, even the pro-Liberal paper The Winnipeg Free Press hailed the announcement and wrote: "The new Government merits a particular word of congratulation on taking the final decision."[3] The paper also asserted the necessity for a unified action of the two countries in the face of threat against the North American continent. In the subsequent months, however, the NORAD arrangement came under close scrutiny in the House of Commons and, under the probing of the opposition groups, the Government displayed a considerable amount of confusion and created a painful impression of uncertainty to the Canadian defence picture.

The nationwide concern over the establishment of NORAD, as it became apparent in the ensuing months, was, once again, over the question of how the agreement of that nature would affect Canadian sovereignty. Some questions were over the wisdom of the agreement itself and others were on the procedural aspects in arriving at such an agreement. Both arguments could be understood in terms of the Canadian peoples' deep concern over the ever increasing and dominant role which the United

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[3]The Winnipeg Free Press, Dec. 7, 1957.

States was playing in the life of the Canadian people. The Canadian people's uneasiness over the integration of the air force and over the increasing dependency and subordination of their country to the United States, especially on the matter of defence, was well reflected in the long and heated Common's debates that followed the Government's announcement.

Reactions in the House of Commons were very critical. The criticisms ran largely along two lines. The opposition in the House, both Liberal and the CCF was concerned first about the degree of power the United States would have in making independent decisions within the framework of NORAD. To what degree does it affect Canada's sovereignty? The opposition, therefore, wanted to know the principles under which NORAD was operating, and the relations of the two governments concerning NORAD. The Opposition, led by Mr. Pearson, asked the Government to table the document of the agreement of NORAD, and when the Government did, it turned out that the document was merely an order-in-council dated July 31, 1957, transferring Canadian officers and men to Colorado Springs and setting up the salary of Marshall Slemon, the Canadian deputy to the United States commander-in-chief at NORAD. NORAD, it became apparent, went into operation with the joint

statement by the Secretary of Defence of the United States and the Minister of National Defence of Canada, plus the above document which did not spell out even in general terms the powers or constitution of NORAD. What was the exact responsibility of the commander-in-chief of NORAD?

At the time Mr. Pearkes, the Minister of National Defence, had announced the establishment of NORAD in August 1957, he had said that an American officer would be in command of NORAD with a Canadian officer as his deputy. The two men, Mr. Pearkes had said, would develop plans for the defence of North America and would act immediately according to the plan, in case of an emergency, without referring either to Washington or Ottawa. Later, however, both Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Pearkes backtracked from this statement and said that NORAD could commit Canadian forces in combat only after the consultation with the Canadian Government. "In the event of a national emergency occurring," the Minister of National Defence said, "General Partridge, after consultation with the Canadian and United States governments, would be able to commit either American or Canadian forces in the defence of this country."[4] And when the opposition groups had

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[4]Canada, House of Commons Debates, Dec. 5, 1957, p. 1899.

asked how this consultation would take place, the Minister of National Defence had replied "by telephone or other means."[5] This reply was described by The Globe and Mail as "arrant and dangerous nonsense."[6] The Winnipeg Free Press wrote that such procedure makes "nonsense of the whole idea of joint command."[7] Mr. Pearson, the Opposition Leader, pointed out that Mr. Pearkes had watered down the NORAD command to a purely planning agency and asked the reasons for "all the fuss" about NORAD command if it was merely a planning group as the Minister of Defence had implied NORAD to be.[8] "It seems to me," the Leader of the Opposition, said,

> that the crux of the correct Canadian position could be put into a single sentence: If General Partridge and the air defence command of the United States have any authority over Canadian forces they should have it as officers responsible not only to the United States but also to Canada. That is the situation in Paris at the present time and it has worked very well there in the NATO command. If, as may be assumed, General Partridge has to secure the authority of the president before he launches into the air the forces under his command - unless an attack has already begun - and those forces include Canadian forces, then surely he must also have authority from the government of Canada. If this is to be included in any inter-governmental agreement we would like to know about it. If authorization is to be given in advance to act under certain conditions, which may well be necessary in the circumstances under

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[5]Canada, House of Commons Debates, Nov. 6, 1957, p. 812.

[6]The Globe and Mail, Nov. 11, 1957.

[7]The Winnipeg Free Press, Dec. 7, 1957.

[8]Canada, House of Commons Debates, Nov. 26, 1957, p. 1526.

> which we live today, then those conditions must be clearly defined and agreed to by Canada as well as the United States, through its constitutional authorities acting in accordance with constitutional practice.[9]

The exact responsibility of NORAD, which would instantly become operational in case of an emergency, was subsequently spelled out in the exchange of notes which formalized the NORAD agreement.

The second criticism directed against the government was over the procedural aspects. The Liberals criticized the fact that the joint Canada-United States Air Defence Command was set up and went into operation without a prior formal agreement and parliamentary ratification. The agreement, the Liberals said, embodying the principles under which the headquarters of NORAD should act, should have been signed and tabled in the House of Commons to afford discussion and decision before NORAD went into operation. Secondly, the Liberals criticized the fact that the whole matter was dealt with on a military level and not on the governmental level as was done in the case of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. Since the defence policy, the Liberals felt, was so closely linked with foreign policy, the whole plan should have been worked out in conjunction and consultation with the Department

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[9]Canada, House of Commons Debates, Nov. 26, 1957, p. 1526.

of External Affairs. However, as the following statements clearly indicates that was not the course followed by the Conservative Government. "So far as this department is concerned," the Secretary of State for External Affairs spoke to the External Affairs Committee on December 5, 1957, ". . . and I say this very emphatically . . . so far as this department is concerned . . . we have not been brought into this picture whatever. This has been a discussion on a military basis."[10] Mr. Jules Leger, under secretary for External Affairs told a Senate Committee that when the NORAD agreement was negotiated "the main points of substance were naturally made by the Department of National Defence, which was more concerned than our Department."[11] When questioned by the opposition groups about the principles under which NORAD was to operate, the National Defence Minister Pearkes replied that the top officials of the military organization were working out the plans under which this integration (NORAD) would take place.[12] In days when decisions on defence policy meant so much to the nation's future,

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[10] Michael Barkway, Financial Post, Sept. 6, 1958.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Canada, House of Commons Debates, Dec. 5, 1957, p. 1923.



civilian control over the military leaders, as is clear from the above statements, had been very weak in Canada. The Liberals attacked that such a serious matter which would affect the political well-being of Canada for years to come was being handled by the military authorities.[13] Implied in this statement was the fear of erosion in civilian control over defence matters in Canada.

In accordance with precedence, the Conservative Government had set up the Cabinet Defence Committee, but it was apparent, during the course of debates that the Cabinet Defence Committee was not seriously consulted. A general impression was that NORAD had been precipitated by the new Defence Minister, Mr. George Pearkes, a former general and an old friend of Mr. Diefenbaker. Connected with this second criticism was the political leaders and the informed public's serious concern about the weakened state of the civilian control over the military leaders in Canada. The dominant role of the military leaders on the matter of defence, these people felt, was having the effect of not adequately balancing the defence policy against the broader Canadian national policy. This topic is

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[13]Canada, House of Commons Debates, January 4, 1958, pp. 2863-5.

significant in the study of the defence relationship of Canada and the United States; therefore, it will be dealt separately at the end of this chapter.

4. Government's Arguments

Government's defence against the opposition criticisms was made mainly by the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence. The Prime Minister, in answering the first criticism that NORAD might endanger Canada's sovereignty, stated first of all, that the result of Canadian participation in an arrangement such as NORAD was not the loss of sovereignty, but "survival with the maintenance of sovereignty", and added that none in the House had any monopoly of the desire to maintain the sovereignty of Canada.[14] Then, citing the case of the NATO agreement where no voice was raised against Canada's participation for the reason that it diminished Canadian sovereignty, the Prime Minister questioned the Opposition why so much was made against the NORAD agreement which, in fact, was only a part of NATO. NORAD, he said, was associated with Canada-United States regional planning group within the NATO framework and, was, therefore, very

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[14]Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 10, 1958, p. 994.

much a part of NATO. Prime Minister Diefenbaker concluded that the opposition criticisms were groundless and were motivated largely by political reasons. Secondly, the Prime Minister asserted that NORAD was a Liberal creation. He said the Liberal Government had formulated and approved NORAD scheme before the election of June 10, 1957, and added that all that the Conservative Government did was to carry out the policy of the previous government. Therefore, the agreement, he said, which his government entered with the United States represents, "in almost complete measure that which had been, to all intents and purposes, agreed upon by the former Minister of National Defence."[15]

The argument whether NORAD was indeed a part of NATO or not continued even after the formal agreement was announced and tabled in the House on June 10, 1958. The Liberals accused the Government of attempting to obscure the bilateral character of the agreement. The Liberals asserted that the Government felt sensitive about the reaction in the country to the placing of part of the RCAF under a United States commander. Quoting the paragraph of the NORAD agreement which read

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[15]Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 10, 1958, p. 994.

"The North Atlantic Treaty Organization will continue to be kept informed through the Canada-United States regional planning group of arrangements for the air defence of North America", Mr. Pearson, the Leader of the Opposition mentioned that, though the statement referred to the fact that NATO will be kept informed, it is not a part of the NATO. "It is in the sense of responsibility to and authority from NATO headquarters," he said, "that NORAD has no organic connection with NATO at all." "The commander and the deputy commander," he said, "were not appointed by any NATO agency; they have no authority under NATO and they are not responsible to NATO, and in that sense to attempt to assimilate their positions with those of the commanders of NATO commands is wrong and that attempt, of course, must break down." And then he went on to say:

> As a matter of fact, I wish this North American air defence command were under a NATO command, and I suggest to the government that perhaps this is something which might be investigated at a meeting of the North Atlantic council. It is certainly not now under a NATO command. General Partridge has no responsibility to NATO of any kind, and he has indicated that this is the position in some of the public statements he has made. He takes no orders from NATO as the NATO commanders take orders; he does not necessarily accept the policy laid down by NATO or by SACEUR and SACLANT.[16]

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[16] Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 10, 1958, p. 1003. SACEUR (Supreme Commander Allied, Europe) SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic)

The Liberals then backed their contention with the statement of the secretary general of NATO, Mr. Henri Spaak, who denied at the press conference that NORAD was part of NATO.[17]

At this point, a few words should be said about the formal agreement itself. The formal agreement was announced nearly ten months after the interim announcement of NORAD was first made in August 1, 1957. The formal agreement was preceded by several heated debates and the final ratification. The NORAD agreement was made in the form of two letters and some of the principles, which will be cited below, were set out in the note sent by Norman Robertson, Canadian Ambassador to the United States. The agreement was in the form of a proposal by Canada and the letter of concurrence by the United States. "If the United States government concurs," the Canadian note said, "in the principles set out above, I propose that this note and your reply should constitute an agreement between our two governments effective from the date of your reply." To it the American note replied: "I am pleased to inform you that my government concurs in the principles set forth in your note. My government further agrees with

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[17] Ibid., p. 1004.

your proposal that your note and this reply shall constitute an agreement between the two governments, effective today."[18] The pattern of the agreement, where the initiative was given to Canada regarding the terms of the agreement, and a simple note of acceptance by the United States, indicated that the Conservative Government was concerned with giving the appearance that Canada was not a subservient partner in this bilateral agreement.

5. What the Formal Agreement Said

The terms of the agreement, while obscure about the procedure to be followed in case of an attack, left, however, the inference that the Commander-in-chief can order an attack without prior consultation with American or Canadian government leaders. The preamble of the agreement states that

> The advent of nuclear weapons, the great improvement in the means of effecting their delivery, and the requirements of the air defence control systems demand rapid decisions to keep pace with the speed and tempo of technological developments. To counter the threat and to achieve maximum effectiveness of the air defence system, defensive operations must commence as early as possible and enemy forces must be kept constantly engaged.

The agreement states that NORAD is to operate at the

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[18]Canada, "Organization and Operation of the North American Air Defence Command", House of Commons Debates, Appendix 1958, Vol. I, p. 241.

outset of hostilities in accordance with a single air defence plan approved in advance by national authorities. Paragraph 6 states that "The plans and procedures to be followed by NORAD in wartime shall be capable of rapid implementation in an emergency." Thus at the time of the agreement the exact procedures to be followed in case of an attack were not specifically spelled out. Paragraph 1 of the agreement outlines the power of the commander-in-chief:

> The commander-in-chief of NORAD will be responsible to the chiefs of staff committee of Canada and the joint chiefs of staff of the United States, who in turn are responsible to their respective governments. He will operate within a concept of air defence approved by the appropriate authorities of our two governments, who will bear in mind their objectives in the defence of the Canada-United States region of the NATO area.

Paragraph 2 reads: "NORAD will include such combat units and individuals as are specifically allocated to it by the two governments. The jurisdiction of the commander-in-chief, NORAD, over those units and individuals is limited to operational control as hereinafter defined." The above term "operational control" is defined in Paragraph 3 as follows:

> Operational control is the power to direct, coordinate, and control the operational activities of forces assigned, attached or otherwise made available. No permanent changes of station would be made without approval of the higher national authority concerned. Temporary reinforcement

from one area to another, including the crossing of the international boundary, to meet operational requirements will be within the authority of commanders having operational control. The basic command organization for the air defence forces of the two countries, including administration, discipline, internal organization and unit training, shall be exercised by national commanders responsible to their national authorities.

Paragraph 4:

The appointment of the commander-in-chief and his deputy must be approved by the Canadian and United States government. They will not be from the same country, and the staff of the commander will be integrated joint staff composed of officers of both countries. During the absence of the commander-in-chief the deputy will assume command.

Paragraph 5:

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization will continue to be kept informed through the Canada-United States regional planning group of arrangements for the air defence of North America.

Paragraph 6:

The plans and procedures to be followed by NORAD in wartime shall be capable of rapid implementation in an emergency.

Paragraph 7:

Changes in the terms of reference for NORAD may be made by agreement between the Canadian chiefs of staff committee and the United States joint chiefs of staff, with approval of higher authority as appropriate, provided that these changes are in consonance with the principles set out in this note.

Paragraph 8:

The question of the financing of expenditures connected with the operation of American Air Defence Command will be settled by mutual agreement between appropriate agencies of the two governments.

Paragraph 9:

> NORAD will be maintained in operation for ten years or for a shorter period as shall be agreed by both countries in the light of their mutual interest. . . . The terms of this agreement may be reviewed upon request of either country at any time.[19]

NORAD, therefore, was to be an operational command. The system was to be a joint stand-by arrangement which would become operational only in case of emergency when the continent is threatened by enemy attack. Short of such emergency, therefore, the American and Canadian forces, although they would cooperate closely, were to remain separate entities. Prior to the formation of NORAD the air forces of the two countries had maintained the closest possible liason and cooperation. This cooperation included a provision for a "cross-border intercepts" which meant that the air force of both Canada and the United States could intercept enemy aircraft in the territory of the other.

6. Conservative and Liberal vote for NORAD: CCF is Opposed

With the exception of the CCF, there was a general agreement at the Commons that NORAD was a good and necessary thing. Strong criticisms which generated

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[19] Ibid.

a prolonged debate in the House on the part of the Liberal opposition had to do with the procedure which the government had adopted in entering into this bilateral agreement. The speeches and questions which were made by the two spokesmen of the Liberal Party, Mr. Pearson and Mr. Martin, reveal how very little difference there actually was between the two major political parties of Canada with regard to their defence and, therefore, foreign policy of the nation. In fine speeches both men not only recognized the wisdom of establishing such defence arrangement but went on to advocating and defending the principles of NORAD even better than the government had done. For example, Mr. Pearson, speaking for the principle of collective defence in Philadelphia to the World Affairs Council on October 4, 1957, had said:

> What, then is the best way, in present conditions to ensure our security - indeed our survival - for collective defence? There are, I think, two principles that must govern the search for the answer to my strictly military question. First, defence must be genuinely collective for national action alone will not be adequate. Second, recognition that only the United States has now resources to give the power and leadership that is essential for such collective defence.[20]

And speaking in the House of Commons during NORAD debates, he said:

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[20]Quoted by Mr. Diefenbaker in Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 10, 1958, p. 992.

> Now it is not a question of approving or disapproving the setting up of a continental command. We have previously acted in ways which involve the abdication, in the interest of our security, of some of our sovereignty. Perhaps rather than using the word abdication I should say we have made our sovereignty work for our security and that is the only way a country can guarantee its security in these times. We have shown this by our participation in the European forces of NATO and I am sure we would be glad to do the same thing in respect of our participation in continental defence if it is found necessary to work in that way after discussion and approval by this house.[21]

Some of the highlights of the Liberal position on NORAD as were made clear during the months of long debates will be cited here.

> . . . . In the first place we should have pressed for the placing of NORAD under NATO command, for NORAD becoming part of the Atlantic effort, and as genuinely collective in that regard as SACEUR and SACLANT.[22]

> . . . . We should have linked the signing of the NORAD agreement with suitable and equitable arrangements for pooling defence production and developing defence resources.[23]

The CCF was completely against NORAD on the grounds primarily that such a bilateral agreement between the two very unequal countries such as Canada and the United States would reduce the sovereignty of the smaller partner. The CCF was against NORAD on the

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[21]Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 10, 1958, p. 1000.

[22]Canada, House of Commons Debates, March 2, 1959, p. 1498.

[23]Ibid.



ground also that such a bilateral agreement constituted desertion from the NATO principle by the two North American nations. The CCF, therefore, suggested that NORAD be incorporated under a direct NATO command. "It would seem imperative," said CCF spokesman H.W. Herridge in the House,

> from the point of view of preventing the loss of our political sovereignty to a single power, or any part of that sovereignty, that ways and means be explored to make those carrying out North American defence arrangement directly responsible and subordinate to the NATO command. . . . Supersonic jet bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles have made the Canadian north a key area in the event of war with the Soviet Union, perhaps just as important strategically as any area in Europe. An attack over the Canadian north would involve Canada. It would therefore seem logical that the defence of the Canadian north should be brought within the framework of NATO in the same manner as is the defence of western Europe. In our opinion, for Canada to negotiate defence through bilateral arrangements and, in the process, risk the loss of certain sovereign rights over its forces to a single power seems a retrogressive step. . . . We fear that this might be an ominous forewarning, a portent of still more of such arrangements to come, which will further impair the sovereign rights of this country in relation to the United States.[24]

On June 19, 1958, thirty-nine Liberals joined 161 Conservatives and voted for NORAD. Eight members of the CCF were still opposed. The heated and prolonged debate on NORAD in the House was extremely partisan and legalistic at times, and with uncertain handling

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[24]Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 10, 1958, p. 1021.



of the agreement of NORAD by the government, the basic facts which necessitated the agreement were overshadowed. Nevertheless, it was clear to many people that Canada is threatened by the possibility of an air attack over the Arctic and the lack of her sufficient strength to withstand such an attack alone make such joint defence arrangements essential for her national survival. The United States was putting up nearly ten times more men and money in this joint arrangement and it was, therefore, inevitable that the United States would be the dominant partner and provide the supreme commander from within its ranks.

Following the Parliamentary approval, nine RCAF jet squadrons were allocated to NORAD by Canada. They are under the Canadian command, but will come under full operational control of NORAD in case of war. One squadron is located at Comox, B.C. and two each at Bagotville, Quebec; St. Hubert, Quebec; Ottawa and North Bay. In peacetime, they are available to NORAD for training exercises. NORAD possesses weapons of both long-range interceptors and guided missiles with some having atomic capabilities. According to the Globe and Mail there are about 15 known weapons in the NORAD inventory, eight of them aircraft. These range from

Canada's CF-100, US's F-89J, F-102, Supersonic Douglas Skyray, the Boodoo, the Convair F-106 and the F-108. Among the NORAD missile inventory are such weapons as GAR guided air rocket 1, the Hughes Falcon, the Sidewinder, surface air missile, like Nike Hercules, the Bomarc, etc.[25]

7. Civilian Control in Defence Matters

If the NORAD debate in the House had made clear to the Canadian public the inevitability of such an arrangement, it nevertheless, failed to mitigate the uneasiness and anxiety of Canadians over the possibility of their being drawn into a Third World War which some militant U.S. generals might precipitate. The Canadian public was also afraid that the military generals of both the United States and Canada might lead to irresponsible acts which might challenge the civilian authorities. Many people entertained, and correctly, the suspicion that it was the service chiefs who shaped the defence policy and advised the Cabinet on defence matters in Canada. NORAD was one such case. Therefore, the widespread concern for the strengthening of civilian control in defence matters, and measures taken toward it, will also be considered in this chapter.

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[25]The Globe and Mail, Dec. 8, 1958.

The NORAD debate, as mentioned above, brought to the fore the significant roles which the military generals of both the United States and Canada play in the making of defence policy. General fear was aroused over the fact that civilian authority was becoming secondary to military authority and that most serious affairs affecting the political well-being of Canada for years to come were being handled by the military authorities. This concern was expressed in the Financial Post, a Conservative weekly paper:

> Never before has the advice of the chiefs of staff been accepted so unquestionally. This criticism is not a political matter. The critics are the first to say that the Liberal government was also very slack in its control over the service-especially, though not exclusively, since Brooke Claxton left the government. It was under the old government that the habit grew up, whereby the chiefs of staff regularly worked out agreements with the United States forces which the Cabinet knew nothing about
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> a) until the agreement had reached such an advanced point that it could not be reversed without provoking a major crisis in Canada-United States relations - and especially in the essential cooperation of the defence services:
>
> b) or until the air forces of the two countries could represent their plans as being so urgent that even to delay them - let alone reject them - would apparently endanger the security of the country.
>
> It was also under the old government that the Department of External Affairs virtually lost control of military agreements between Canada and the United States.
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> The situation was bad enough when the Conservative Government took office. But Liberal ministers had

> at least insisted that military recommendations should never go to the full cabinet, without full examination in the defence committee; and they handled several such recommendations pretty roughly. The present leader of the Opposition, Mr. Pearson, was always one of the most insistent about civilian ministerial control, though Mr. Howe's influence on the side of the defence people carried the day against him in several significant decisions. The experienced people were inclined to assume that Mr. Diefenbaker and his ministers would get a firmer grip on defence recommendations and insist on balancing them against broader (and more nationalist) aims of Canadian policy. These are the people who are now utterly disillusioned. They are bitter, discouraged and angry. They say that it was bad under the old government, but is far worse now. Effective civilian control over the service chiefs has become almost non-existent, they say. Ministers no longer even take the trouble to inform themselves about the implications of their decisions. They accept the advice of their military advisers--unless they think it might be unpopular--and seem to grudge the time which even the Chiefs of Staff think necessary to explain their problems.[26]

A step toward the strengthening of civilian control was taken in the summer of 1958, with the setting up of a Canada-United States Cabinet Committee on the joint defence of North America. Prime Minister Diefenbaker and President Eisenhower made a joint statement that the committee was set up "in furtherance of the policy of both governments that such matters (relating to continental defence) shall be subject to civilian decision and guidance." It also added that "the committee will in supervisory capacity supplement but not supplant

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[26]Michael Barkway, Financial Post, Sept. 6, 1958.

existing joint boards and committees."[27] Prime Minister Diefenbaker reported to the House of his discussion with President Eisenhower: "We agreed," he said,

> that while existing machinery in the defence field had served us well in the past and would undoubtedly continue to do so in the future, we need to supplement existing channels for consultation by providing for a periodic review at the ministerial level of problems which might be expected to arise. We recognized that decision in this field would involve not only consideration of the military aspects of our common defence but political and economic factors. We thought it particularly important as well that every step should be taken to maintain principle and the fact of civilian control of guidance of these common military authorities.[28]

The ministerial committee was to consist for Canada: of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Finance; and for the United States: of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defence and the Secretary of the Treasury. The committee was also to be attended by other cabinet members which either government might designate from time to time on an ad hoc basis. The meeting was to be held alternately in Washington and Ottawa under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State when the meeting is held in the United States and of the Secretary of State for External Affairs when the

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[27] The Winnipeg Free Press, July 10, 1958.

[28] Canada, House of Commons Debates, July 11, 1958, p. 2141.

meeting is held in Canada.

In 1959, a meeting of Canada-United States interparliamentary group had been held on an unofficial basis. After that time, gathering of the legislators from two countries occurred regularly, and the fifth meeting of the group was held in Washington in the summer of 1961. Subjects such as Western Hemisphere cooperation and Defence Production Sharing have been the topics of discussions of this group. "I think," the Prime Minister spoke to the House, "this organization, unofficial as it is, since its inception two years ago has made an exceptional contribution to an understanding by legislators not only of Canada but of the United States of those problems that affect us."[29]

Summary

In order to facilitate a more efficient air defence for North America, the governments of Canada and the United States decided to set up an integrated headquarters called North American Air Defence Command (NORAD). An American general was appointed commanding officer with a Canadian Air Marshal as his deputy. Strategic Air Command (SAC) does not come under NORAD

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[29]Canada, House of Commons Debates, July 5, 1961, p. 7541.

and the Canadian headquarters at St. Hubert, Quebec, continues to control the Canadian Air Force until an aerial attack is detected. Thereupon, NORAD's commander-in-chief, who is responsible to the governments of both countries would take over the operational control of both air forces.

Controversy in Canada over the establishment of NORAD revolved around two major points. Members of the Parliament were afraid of the abdication of Canada's sovereignty where Canada might unnecessarily be brought into a war which is not of Canada's making or concurrence. The second point of controversy was concerned with the political control of the military affairs in Canada. Fear was expressed in the House that the civilian authority might be abdicating to the military authority on the matter of defence with the consequence of not adequately balancing the defence policy against the broader Canadian national policy.

NORAD is an extension of cooperation that has existed between the two countries for many years. Though many Canadians are afraid of such a close defence arrangement, the majority of Canadians believe that the NORAD arrangement is in the interest of Canada.

CHAPTER VI

THE "ARROW" (CF-105)

1. The Government's Overhauling of the Defence Ideas

On September 23, 1958, Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced a number of changes in the Canadian defence policy. The announcement above all indicated the switch of Canada into the age of missile defence. It introduced missiles such as Bomarc to the Canadian air defence system and reduced dependence on manned supersonic aircraft such as the CF-105 or the Arrow. Though the final decision was delayed until spring the following year, the Prime Minister strongly indicated at this time that the Arrow would be cancelled.

It can be deduced from his announcement that the decision to cancel Canada's high flying jet interceptor was influenced by two major factors. One was the belief on the part of military experts that the Arrow would certainly be obsolete before it got into the air. Second was the appallingly high cost of the Arrow, a cost which would either deprive other branches of the Canadian armed forces from acquiring the necessary equipment, or a cost which would necessitate some drastic increase in taxation which might add an

inflationary burden to the Canadian economy. And all these, the government felt, in the cause of a weapon which would surely become obsolete in a few years.

Though the September announcement of the Prime Minister had clearly indicated the eventual shelving of the Arrow, the announcement to delay the final decision and to proceed on with 100 Arrow orders to reequip the RCAF was a course of compromise which the government was obliged to take. The decision not to cancel the Arrow entirely was "a measure," the Prime Minister said, "of insurance with present tensions as they are."[1] However, one of the main compelling reasons, as was evident from the Prime Minister's announcement, was the adverse effect on industry and 15,000 unemployed which would exacerbate the usual winter unemployment picture.[2]

The new defence policy, in addition to the above, included the establishment of missile bases in Northern Ontario and Quebec; installment of the SAGE electronic system in cooperation with the United States; cancellation of Astra fire-control system and Sparrow missiles; and a working out with the United States a production-sharing arrangement on air defence requirements.

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[1] The Winnipeg Free Press, Sept. 24, 1958.

[2] Ibid.

It clearly foreshadowed the new concept in Canada's defence role and heralded the gloomy future for the Royal Canadian Air Force as a combat flying force. Its role now would be that of missile operator and such jobs as anti-submarine patrol and air transport.

2. The Background

During the ensuing months that followed the September announcement to curtail and possibly cancel the Arrow production, the question of air defence and air defence production produced many statements adding to the confusion in the Canadian air defence picture. $400 million were about to go down the drain, taking with it the Canadian sense of pride in its high technical achievement of recent years. It was difficult for many people to witness such prospects with equanimity. The Arrow was first conceived by the Canadian air force in 1952, and the government decided to develop and produce it in 1953. It was an improved model to the CF-100, the jet interceptor which defended Canada but was becoming obsolete by the unveiling of the faster Soviet model. The experts of both the United States and Canada had anticipated that Russia was building up the long range bombers in large quantities. The United States officials who inspected the Arrow were favorably

impressed and had indicated that the Arrow might be the answer to the latest Russian challenge. Although no definite commitment was made the United States had all along encouraged Canada to go ahead with the Arrow up to 1957. The Canadian government had planned to build approximately five to six hundred of the Arrow.

In the latter part of 1957, there was a considerable change in strategic conditions that had the bearing on the Western concept of defence. In the summer of that year (August 1957) the Soviet Union had fired the first intercontinental ballistic missile and on October 4, of the same year it also launched the first sattelite. These two events had the effect of altering the whole world strategic picture. The expert opinions of the West, unlike their previous anticipations, now was that the Russians were not building quantities of long range bombers but were turning their efforts to that of producing missiles. By 1958, the mood of United States officials had changed and they were now doubtful and, though no final answer was given to Canada, the United States Air Force officers were less interested in the Arrow. Questions were beginning to be raised as to the possibility of missiles superceding the fighter bombers before long, and possibly by the time the Arrow would reach a serviceable stage. It was not

only a question of one plane being made obsolete by another, for here was a prospect of transition from airpower with the airplane to airpower with missiles. There was, to be sure, a short marginal period when bombers would still be the main form of attack to North America until missiles would completely displace them. The Arrow was believed to have a considerable lead in intercepting speed to that of any known aircraft then in production. If only Canada could interest the United States in buying some of them! The government approached the United States as well as some of the other NATO countries but its effort was singularly unsuccessful. The eventual cancellation of the Arrow had struck Southern Ontario deeply and here "the excoriation of the Government is matched only by a fresh upsurge of anti-Americanism." "Were Mr. Dulles not so sick a man," Mr. Eayrs wrote, "he, rather than Mr. Diefenbaker, would doubtless be playing his familiar scapegoat's part."[3] Such a reaction, however, did not last very long elsewhere in the country. The more objective observers could see that the government in the United States, presiding over a democracy, could not ignore the interests of the United States aviation industry nor the pressures

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[3]James Eayrs, Northern Approaches (Toronto, 1961), p. 27.



from its lobbies.

The opinions with regard to the Arrow were largely divided into two camps: those who defended the Arrow and those who advocated its cancellation. The arguments ranged all the way from political and strategic to the economic and technological aspects of Canadian life. These arguments can be understood in the light of the fact that Canada in recent years has been giving much attention to the building of a unique Canadian nation, and some serious efforts have gone into in several fields to improve and expand the existing system and assure future Canadian independence. To that end Canada has been making efforts to reduce her dependency on agriculture and to improve her industrial capacity. Moreover, the Canadian industries at present are largely in the hands of the Americans and therefore most of the industries in Canada are simply American subsidiaries so that their research and development are carried on in the United States. Thus Canadian scientists not only lack the opportunity for research but find it difficult to get desirable employment. The picture, to be sure, has been changing somewhat and the Canadians have gradually been able to find an opportunity to get to the top in some industries. Nevertheless, prospects for Canadian scientists remain

gloomy and Canada has been losing many of them to the United States.

The A.V. Roe Company in Toronto which developed and produced the Arrow provided a contrast to this unhappy picture in Canada. The company hired a high ratio of skilled technical and engineering personnel in Canada. One in five of the Avro employees were university graduates and the Avro company, therefore, absorbed and kept in Canada skilled manpower. Nearly 12,000 families were unemployed when the project was terminated. A multitude of subsidiary supply businesses induced to set up research, development and manufacturing in Canada by the Arrow program were going out of business crippling other related industries throughout Canada. There are two other aircraft firms in Canada: Canadair and DeHavilland, of which the former is American and the latter building simple commercial planes on a small scale. Therefore, for the former Arrow technicians opportunities for employment can now be found only in America where the inducement and opportunity is still great. "Canadian requirements for aircraft," the Prime Minister said,

> are very small by comparison with this huge defence operation, and frankness demands that I advise that at present there is no other work

> that the government can assign immediately to the companies that has been working on the Arrow and its engine. This decision is a vivid example of the fact that a rapidly changing defence picture requires difficult decision, and the government regrets its inevitable impact upon production, employment, and engineering work in the aircraft and related industries.[4]

On the same day the Prime Minister announced the cancellation of the Arrow program, the A.V. Roe company in Toronto fired 13,800 employees;[5] some of whom, like Mr. James A. Chamberlain, formerly chief designer at Avro, left Canada and took jobs in the United States. Those who were largely responsible for the Arrow were assigned along with Mr. Chamberlain to the United States Mercury man-in-space project at Langley Field in Virginia. The Globe and Mail reported on April 28, 1959, over a month after the cancellation, that 8000 former Avro workers were still unemployed and 1000 were applying for entry to the United States.[6] Defending the abandonment of the Arrow, Prime Minister Diefenbaker said: "However much I might hope that the project be continued in the sense of pride of achievement to avoid immediate dislocations which are

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[4]Canada, House of Commons Debates, Feb. 20, 1959, p. 1222.

[5]The Globe and Mail, Feb. 20, 1959.

[6]The Globe and Mail, April 28, 1959.



regrettable, defence requirement constitutes the sole justification for defence procurements."[7]

3. Arguments for the Arrow

Those who supported saw in the Arrow the symbol of Canadian sovereignty which could be employed in Canada's own defence and used for the promotion of her own national interest. To this group, the termination of the Arrow production meant discarding the all-Canadian aircraft for the all-American Bomarc missile with all the consequent implications for the Canadian economy and a new pattern of defence both of which, these people believed, would further threaten Canadian independence which hitherto was still possible within the framework of cooperation.

Arguing from a strategic point of view, too, the defenders of the Arrow held out that the manned interceptors such as the Arrow would continually be a military fact for the next five to ten years. They argued that although the missile age had already arrived, it would not eliminate the threat of enemy bombers. "We know," Air Marshal W.A. Curtis, and the vice-chairman of the board of A.V. Roe of Canada, Limited has argued,

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[7]Canada, House of Commons Debates, Feb. 20, 1959. p. 1222.

"that the Russians have been working on a Mach 2 bomber. The Arrow is designed to meet that kind of threat. As long as such a threat exists, there will be a requirement for an aircraft like the Arrow."[8] They held out the argument that the manned aircraft can patrol and identify the enemy aircraft, something which no missile will be able to do. Opinions supporting this view came from the military experts of both countries. For instance, in April 1959, two months after the final cancellation of the Arrow, the United States military personnel gave briefs to a United States Senate subcommittee which proved to be in direct contrast to Canadian rationalization for their decision. General Nathan F. Twinning, Chairman, Joint-Chief-of-Staffs, referring to the continued threat from the manned bomber and the consequent need for the manned interceptor, said: "The Russians are now building a new bomber far beyond the capability of Bear and Bison (These are more up-to-date Russian jet planes capable of 600 mph which are known in NATO code as Bisons and Bears.) long-range bombers. We do not know what it is yet, but it is an advanced heavy bomber."[9] General

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[8]The Globe and Mail, April 12, 1960.

[9]The Globe and Mail, April 21, 1959.

Earl Partridge, NORAD Chief-of-Staff said: "The aim of NORAD is to hit an attacker as far away as possible, i.e., over the Arctic." He said the Bomarc was useless in this and is good only for "defence in depth" to give the Strategic Air Command "time to get away" and provide limited "point defence." He added that the Early Warning Radar Lines cannot identify radar signals as intruders or tell the type of attack. For this, he said NORAD needed the fastest, highest flying, longest range interceptors as possible for as long as he could foresee.[10] Air Marshall Slemon, Canadian deputy at NORAD, stated on November 24, 1958, that manned interceptors in the RCAF were an inescapable requirement for the foreseeable future.[11] General Partridge, the Commander-in-chief at NORAD, shared his deputy's opinion and said that there was no equivalent available to the Arrow now and said that NORAD would have used it if it were available. General Foulkes, like many other officials, felt that even in the age of intercontinental ballistic missiles there would be a need for a manned interceptor such as the Arrow. He felt that although the anti-aircraft missiles would come into use, they would not entirely supplement the manned

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[10] The Globe and Mail, April 21, 1959.

[11] The Winnipeg Free Press, Nov. 25, 1958.

interceptor, since the manned interceptor can play roles such as identifying the planes and informing the avenues of their real attack to the headquarters should Russia attempt to fool her enemy. "The missiles cannot hope to play these important roles," he said, "therefore for sometime to come, we expect to see a combination of supersonic fighters and ground-to-air missiles, and at a later stage, several diversified types of ground-to-air guided missiles."[12]

Economically, the aircraft and its allied industries had become a major sector of the Canadian economy in the postwar years. The defenders, therefore, held out that the move to discontinue the Arrow would hurt the Canadian industry, with heavy loss of skilled manpower and the opportunities for employment for many workers. The blow to the aircraft and allied industries, they felt, would be such that Canada could never again attempt to develop its own major weapons such as the Arrow, so complex and so advanced in technological achievement. The Globe and Mail, referring to the demise of the Arrow program wrote on February 21, 1959:

> We are in no position to judge the exact merits or life of the Arrow; on that subject, there is a welter of conflicting opinions. But this Canadian-developed airplane is not the important

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[12]Charles Foulkes, "Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age", Behind the Headlines, Vol. XXI, May 1961.

> thing - it might as well have been a Canadian developed locomotive or automobile. The important thing, the only important thing, is the future of the engineering, technical and research establishment that brought the Arrow into being.[13]

Furthermore, some of the defenders even argued that the amount of money spent on the defence orders such as Arrow is much less in net cost income tax whereas the amount spent in buying the American weapon such as Bomarc would be totally lost to the Canadian economy.

4. Arguments Against the Arrow

To those who supported the cancellation of the Arrow the consideration of the country's economy figured high. Each plane cost 12 million with Astra and Sparrow development and 9 million without them. And when the SAGE system, by which the Arrow would have been guided from the ground, was added the cost was appalling. Thus the Prime Minister said that it was "questionable whether in any event their (the Arrow) margin of superiority is worth the very high cost of producing them."[14] By February 1959, when the Arrow program was cancelled, the development of CF-105 had already cost Canada some $400 million and would have cost an additional $2 billion in the following three

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[13] The Globe and Mail, February 21, 1959.

[14] The Winnipeg Free Press, Sept. 23, 1958.

years; the time when the Arrow was expected to come into squadron service. The total defence budget of the fiscal year 1958-59 was $1,686,000,000. A heavy expense of $2 billion in one program would have deprived needed equipment for the Army and Navy, affecting such shipbuilding industry as the destroyer construction program. It would have caused an increase in taxation also. The vastness of the money involved in the development and production of the Arrow was explained to the nation by the Prime Minister in a speech over the CBC national television network. "If a man," he said, "had started 1,959 years ago to spend $1000 a day he still would not have spent $781 million estimated cost of 100 jets."[15] The Prime Minister was referring to the 100 Arrows required for duties between North Bay and Bagotville, Quebec in order to defend the heartland of Canada and certain Strategic Air Command bases in the northern states. To this of course would have been added the $400 million which had already been spent in the development on the Arrow. However, as has been mentioned above, these 100 Arrow, too, were later shelved in favor of two Bomarc squadrons

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[15]The Globe and Mail, March 10, 1959.

which the Minister of National Defence estimated as costing $100 million including their missiles of which Canada would be providing $20 million. The estimated expense for 100 Arrows was $781 million which Canada would have been providing the entire amount itself for the similar promise of security.

From the strategic point of view, those who attacked the continuation of the Arrow program felt that it was not only costly but obsolescent. Referring to the approaching obsolescence of the manned bomber, the Prime Minister held up little hope for a large number of supersonic planes for the RCAF in the coming years, "if in fact such aircraft will be required at all in the 1960's."[16] Military veterans also insisted that the Arrow was costly and obsolescent. General Simmonds, a wartime corp commander and the Army's chief of staff from 1951 to 1955, praised the decision to cancel the Arrow and said that it was "a sensible decision not to spend millions or billions on aircraft which have become obsolete as far as attack and defence are concerned." "The day," he added, "of the airplane is finished as a defence mechanism. It has been replaced

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[16]The Winnipeg Free Press, Sept. 23, 1958.

by the missile as the primary weapons."[17] General W.H.S. Macklin, former adjutant-general of the Canadian Army, not only insisted that the Arrow was costly and obsolescent but also attacked the whole concept of Canada's defence policy. He felt that the principal role of Canadian airpower should not be based on interceptors that were soon to be useless against the ICBM, but on air transport to make a conventional force highly mobile for both nuclear base protection on the one hand, or general conventional purposes on the other.[18]

5. Political Parties' Stand on the Arrow

With regard to the decision to develop the Arrow itself back in 1952, there was a unanimity of opinion that it was a necessary and a good decision both from a military as well as from a non-military point of view. The Arrow would have been an effective successor to the CF-100 if the Russian satellite had not spelled the coming of the new era in defence. From a non-military point of view, too, it was justified for, as noted above, it meant the continued progress in Canadian aircraft industry and development of a

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[17] The Globe and Mail, Feb. 23, 1959.

[18] The Winnipeg Free Press, Sept. 13, 1958.



new skilled manpower and wider employment opportunities for many Canadians. All Canadians agreed on this. What the political parties disagreed upon and thus what made the issue so controversial both in and out of the Commons, was not so much the cancellation of the airplane itself but the way the government handled the decision.

The Liberal Opposition did not attack the object of the policy to cancel the Arrow. What they objected and attacked were the procedures and the delays. The Liberal leaders accused the government for delaying the decision for one whole year since the Sputnik. They criticized the government for its prolonged inaction, and for letting the matter drift when a timely decision might have saved Canada nearly $200 million. The Globe and Mail expressed a similar opinion in its editorial:

> The Diefenbaker government's decision to end the Arrow aircraft and Iroquois engine development program without having anything to put in its place reveals a major and widely spread internal weakness of that government - - a failure in not just one but in several of its departments to look and to plan ahead. This weakness has been apparent since the government assumed office 20 months ago, but never in that time has it been so dramatically disclosed.[19]

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[19]The Globe and Mail, December 17, 1958.

On the question of the Arrow, too, the CCF wanted an economic defence policy. "Relatively speaking," a CCF spokesman said,

> this plane compares favorably with, if it is not better, than any other plane of its type in the world; but I wonder whether the Canadian people are in the position of being able to enjoy the luxury that they appear to have effected for themselves in the building, the designing and the development of this particular type of aircraft. . . . I think the CF-105 points out as well as anything does the position that Canada is going to find itself in if it looks at the situation in terms of our old line thinking on defence. . . . Over the years the CCF has advocated a decrease in the expenditures on national defence. Today we are spending very close to one-third of our income to pay for defence which is inadequate, which cannot by any stretch of the imagination protect our major cities from attack by an enemy agent. We suggest that greater reliance must be put on other phases of defence. In the United Nations Canada, as a middle of the road power, should take the lead and speak for disarmament. . . . We could better the lot of the Canadian people much more by spending a few million dollars on aid to other countries that need aid and helping the world. [20]

The subsequent development in the arsenal of both East and West indicated that the manned bomber threat would still continue. In summer of 1961, the Soviet Union has revealed at a Moscow airshow a bomber called the Bounder with a speed of 1,600 miles an hour. Its ceiling was estimated at 52,000; its range 2,800

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[20] Canada, House of Commons Debates, Aug. 8, 1958, p. 3235.

miles. The Canadian government had entered into negotiations with the United States and had accepted for use by the Canadian Air Force the Voodoo aircraft. Its fastest record speed was estimated at 1,200 miles per hour. Canada in 1961, had four weapons for her defence; the Bomarc, the Starfighter which the Canadian troops in NATO would use, the Honest John, and the Voodoo.

The unwillingness of the United States to buy the Canadian made aircraft inspite of the high rating the Arrow received from the military men and aircraft experts of both countries has cut deep in the wounds of the Canadian people. The Arrow was the last chance in which Canada could have played a useful part in the Western defence complex. Having abandoned the Arrow, Canadians are resentful about the fact of having to accept and rely on the equipment produced in the United States. The Globe and Mail wrote in its editorial on December 17, 1958:

> Here we have an extreme example of what has been evident since 1945 the determination of United States industry to monopolize the defence systems of the West. This is something Canada does not have to accept. Certainly, Canada wants to have integrated defence--but Canada should not accept an integration that entails economic subordination or impoverishment. It used to be Washington's excuse that it could not share defence production with Canada because Canada did not have the necessary skills and industry. Now, after considerable cost, Canada has them. So now, we

> hear other excuses. They do not hold water. The harsh fact is that the United States is expecting a country running into the red by more than a billion dollars a year to scrape the industry which has had a large part in Canada's economic growth - and to use the saving, so called, - to buy United States built weapons at whatever price the United States wishes to put on them. In that way we would become completely subservient to the United States not only in the military sense, but, and to greater degree, in the economic one.[21]

Summary

The Arrow controversy represents a good example of the dilemmas faced by defence planners in these days of rapid technological changes. It is impossible to be adequately equipped with all the up-to-date weapons to meet the enemy threat especially in the present situation when the enemy can choose the time for the attack. This is particularly true in the case of Canada, facing economic problems, to be adequately equipped with all the latest weapons. In spite of intelligence, one can only make an estimation of the attacker's choice of weapons and, therefore, it is difficult to estimate just which weapons would provide maximum defence for the country at any given time. In addition to above is the length of time and the huge sums of money required to develop and produce any new weapon. Modern weapons are so complicated and costly to develop and

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[21] The Globe and Mail, Dec. 17, 1958.

produce. Without some backing from the United States, Canada could not afford the Arrow. The degree of emotion aroused by the cancellation of the Arrow was well testified by the fact that two years later, the Canadian government and its opposition groups in the Parliament were still engaged in a verbal combat about the subject. The next chapter will deal with the Bomarc anti-aircraft missile which was adopted by the Canadian government in place of the Arrow.

CHAPTER VII

THE BOMARC ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE

1. What is Bomarc

The Bomarc (the letters represent Boeing Airplane Company of Seattle, Washington, the manufacturer, and the University of Michigan Aeronautic Research Center) is a pilotless interceptor with a range of about 250 miles. The Bomarc has been under development on and off since 1944, and is a ground-to-air-missile powered by rockets and jets and controlled by a complex electronic system. Its length is 47 feet and it is 3 feet in diameter and is fired off from a ground-fixed firing rack. It weighs 15,000 pounds at takeoff and has a range of more than 250 miles and a speed of about 2000 miles per hour.

The Bomarc missile was designed to track down and destroy enemy planes and was introduced by the Canadian government as a cheaper and more effective alternative to the Arrow. The adoptation of the Bomarc, which is an anti-aircraft missile, and the continuation of CF-100, a subsonic plane which the Arrow was supposed to replace, all added up to the fact that the manned aircraft was still very much a factor in air defence and offense. The Bomarc carries both the

conventional and nuclear warheads. With the former, it will pick out one particular enemy plane and ram into it. With the latter, it explodes near incoming enemy planes. The Bomarc is considered effective mostly with nuclear warheads, and in adopting Bomarc the government stirred a controversy over the question of use in Canada of nuclear weapons. Again the arguments ranged from questions of sovereignty to questions of neutrality.

The SAGE (The semi-automatic ground environment) system, which was to go with the Bomarc, is a series of radar stations which can be manned or unmanned. The Pinetree radar stations formed the basis for the new SAGE system in Canada. The SAGE system collects all the information from the radar stations in its Sector and calculates the size, speed, height and direction of the enemy raid; and then projects its future course. The Sector Commander having received this information will press the button and SAGE works out a collision course for missiles and fighters. The "data-link code" guides the missiles to their targets. SAGE thus transfers from men to machines most of the task of sending interceptors and guiding them against the attacking aircraft.



2. Background

Canada's participation in the Bomarc program was a part of an integrated program of the North American defence under NORAD. The United States Air Force was developing the Bomarc to deal with enemy bombers that escaped interceptors farther north. The Bomarc program included the complementary elements of the improved radar warning system and the Semi-automatic Ground Environment. Explaining the adoption of the Bomarc program to the Canadian air defence program, Mr. Pearkes said: "As we are participating jointly with the United States in the air defence of North America under NORAD, it is only good sense to equip our air defence forces with similar weapons so as to permit the most effective joint operation."[1] The United States established its portion of the Bomarc system stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, with interlocking stations. Two stations were allocated for Canada: one near North Bay, Ontario, and one in northern Quebec to protect the industrial areas of both Canada and the United States.

Canada's share in the cost of this new program was to be $125 million, one third of the total cost of

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[1]Canada, House of Commons Debates, July 2, 1959, p. 5353.



the Bomarc missile program. Missiles and launching equipment costing $72 million was to be paid by the United States. Although the government refers to the Bomarc as only costing Canada $14 million for the building of the two Bomarc bases in North Bay and Mount Laurier, when the control system and the related equipment is taken into account, the total sum of Canadian contribution was around $125 million. The Bomarc alone was estimated to cost $20 million for Canada. Comparing this sum with the estimated sum of $740 million for the Arrow program, Mr. Pearkes said that Canada was getting "comparable defence for considerably less money." The Bomarc was the only effective means of defence which Canada could contribute in North American defence, since the CF-100, though still in operation, was subsonic and was no match to the supersonic enemy aircraft.

3. Controversy over the Adequacy and the Availability of the Bomarc

The Bomarc to which Mr. Pearkes staked Canada's defence, however, failed to perform satisfactorily in the series of testings, and the Bomarc soon became a subject of controversy in Washington. The effectiveness of this missile was increasingly being doubted and the

United States Air Force was apprehensive about the close Congressional probings and the possibility of a cut in the appropriation for the Bomarc missile program.

In Canada, the going had been very rough for the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Pearkes, ever since he announced the adoption of the Bomarc missile as a Canadian choice of defensive weapon. The opposition groups in the House have always been sceptical about the Bomarc missile defence against the bombing planes and were critical of Mr. Pearkes' weapon which was not yet operational. Citing the miserable performance of the Bomarc missiles in successive testings, and referring to some of the serious attacks the Bomarc missile was getting in the United States, Mr. Pearson, for instance, suggested to the government in July 1959, to postpone the final consideration of adopting the Bomarc and the building of the two Bomarc stations in Canada.[2] Mr. Pearkes, therefore, had the extremely difficult task of convincing the Parliament and the country, in the face of the continuous failure of the Bomarc, that the weapon Canada had chosen was a worthwhile investment. After almost every test, the Minister had to repeat his assurance about the basic soundness of the

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[2]Canada, House of Commons Debates, July 2, 1959, p. 3564.

capabilities of the Bomarc missile. When, therefore, the newspapers on February 1, 1960, reported the sixth failure of the Bomarc out of six tests, Mr. Pearkes read to the House what Mr. Gates, the United States Secretary of Defence had replied to his inquiry. "Mr. Gates remains confident," Mr. Pearkes said, "that the basic missile design is sound." "Any failure is unfortunate, but it is a part of any normal missile development program. The secretary's office indicated its confidence that the Bomarc B weapon system will achieve the potential which will make it a vital element in the air defence system which is being implemented for the defence of the North American continent."[3] Mr. Winch of the CCF suggested that since the Bomarc was so good on paper, Mr. Pearkes might propose to the Americans "that the next test be the shooting up of the design instead of the missile."[4]

On March 5, 1960, the Bomarc missile failed the test for the 7th time in 7 tries. The Congress, which had been probing into the Bomarc program for several months, the officials in Washington felt, was sure to request some sweeping changes in its production program. "In view of the seven failures," Mr. Hardie

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[3]Canada, House of Commons Debates, Feb. 1, 1960, p. 547.

[4]Ibid.

from the Mackenzie River directed a question to the Minister of National Defence in the House, "and in view of the speculation that congress will be throwing out the whole of the Bomarc program, I wonder whether the minister could give consideration to using the two launching pads built in Canada as bandstands for the R.C.A.F. band?"[5]

4. The Policy Revision in Washington and its Impact on Canada

In the beginning of March 1960, the Bomarc as well as the other aspects of continental defence came under inquiries and review in Washington. As the result some revisions were made in the United States air defence program. The statement released by the United States Defence Department on March 26, 1960, indicated that the United States would hereon place more emphasis on deterrent strength.[6] The cost required for the strengthening of the United States deterrent capabilities, the statement indicated, was to be taken from the project known as the Bomarc B. The amount of appropriations for the Bomarc was reduced from its original sum of $421 million to that of $50 million. The

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[5]Canada, House of Commons Debates, March 7, 1960, p. 1789.

[6]The Winnipeg Free Press, March 26, 1960.

statement, however, indicated no shift in that part of the continental defence policy which had been allocated to Canada. Originally Canada was to pay $70 million, one third of the $200 million, the estimated cost for the two Bomarc bases that were to be built in Canada.

When the Opposition referred to the Washington dispatch which reported a cut in appropriations for the Bomarc missile from $421 million to $50 million and asked the government what effect this United States announcement would have on the Canadian defence policy, Mr. Pearkes described the report as "speculative."[7] Then five hours later, having been informed by the United States Department of Defence during those hours that the report indeed was accurate, Mr. Pearkes confirmed the report and added that it would have no effect on Canadian plans to install two Bomarc bases in Canada. Mr. Pearson said that "the United States has changed the kite but the tail remains the same", and added that it was the "height of folly" to go ahead and spend money on Bomarc when the United States indicated its loss of confidence in the weapon.[8] The

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[7]Canada, House of Commons Debates, March 25, 1960, p. 2446.

[8]Ibid., p. 2458.



Liberals and the CCF were up in arms about the Bomarc program. The Liberals moved a non-confidence motion in the government's defence policy and the CCF demanded Mr. Pearkes' resignation. Routine House business was suspended in order to hold an emergency debate on defence questions and the lack of consultation between the United States and Canada on the air defence of the North American continent.

The American announcement came as a hard blow to Mr. Pearkes and the Conservative Government. Ever since the Arrow had been cancelled and the Bomarc had been adopted to meet the threat of the manned bomber, the Conservative Government has had to weather almost incessant and sharp criticisms and attacks from the opposition groups for months as news of the Bomarc failures in its flight tests trickled in. Mr. Pearkes had been, however, adamant in his belief that the Bomarc would ultimately prove itself. The latest United States policy had placed Mr. Pearkes in an almost untenable position.

The latest development had once again puzzled and confused the anxious Canadian public with regard to their country's defence policy. The Montreal Gazette, a Conservative paper, complained in an editorial:



> The issue of the Bomarc B has produced almost complete confusion among the Canadian people. Rarely, in matters of defence, has the want of understanding between the government and the people become so wide. The practice of not taking the people fully and frankly into its confidence has left the government in a position where few Canadians understand what it is trying to do, or why it is trying to do it.[9]

Issues in this latest defence debate in the Parliament were two. They were the opposition charges of: 1) the lack of adequate consultation between Canada and the United States; 2) government's insistance on spending money on the weapon which was drastically cut by the United States.

In denial of the opposition charge of inadequate consultation, Mr. Pearkes elaborated to the House about the machinery of consultation that exists between the United States and Canada to deal with defence matters. "There are many means, and there is frequent consultation." Mr. Pearkes explained. Then, he cited the NORAD as an organization where frequent consultation is being maintained between two countries. "There are," he said:

> today some 60 Canadian officers of the army, the navy and the air force who are sitting in daily on various committees at the Pentagon and from the senior officer - who is Air Vice Marshal Hendrick - right down through the group of officers, they are in daily consultation. They keep the chiefs of

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[9]Quoted by Mr. Martin of CCF in Canada, House of Commons Debates, March 28, 1960, p. 2528.

> staffs here in Ottawa advised by letter, telegram and telephone. There is hardly a day but that the chiefs of staffs are advised as to the plans which are formulated or which are being developed jointly by the Canadian and the United States officers for the defence of this continent.[10]

Finally, Mr. Pearkes cited the establishment of a ministerial committee between the two countries in 1959, about which a word had already been said in Chapter V.

However, questions were raised not on the existence of such a machinery but on how effectively it was being used. As mentioned above, Mr. Pearkes had dismissed as speculative on the morning of March 25, 1960, the report of the Bomarc cut which was reported in the newspaper. Then in the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Pearkes read his explanatory statement which consisted of the United States Defence Department statement. The manner in which the announcement was made confirmed the worst suspicion of the Canadian public about the inadequacy of consultation between Canada and the United States. The Globe and Mail wrote that the sequence of events suggested that Mr. Pearkes was not informed by the United States authorities of the development in Washington. This Conservative paper wrote that it was "a confession that Canadian defence policy was made

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[10]Canada, House of Commons Debates, March 28, 1960, p. 2508.

in Washington." "Mr. Pearkes' announcement Friday," it went on to say, "had amounted to him saying 'I've just got my orders from Washington, here they are'."[11]

The government had always assured the country about the close consultation the Conservative Government had been able to establish with the United States since it came into power. For example, Mr. Diefenbaker on March 3, 1959, accusing his critics of being obsessed with "frenzied fear that cooperation with the United States means subordination", went on to say: "I believe that the United States must be made to realize. . . that Canada and the United States are partners. We demand as of right the exercise of those things which are incidental to the fair and proper discharge of a partnership."[12] Faced with another charge of subservience, therefore, the Prime Minister declared in the House once again on March 29, 1960, that the days of Canada's subservience to the United States had ended and days of consultation between them started in June 1957, when the Conservatives had come into power.[13] To the opposition groups in the House, the latest development was an opportunity to chide the government and to re-examine the type of relationship that existed between

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[11] The Globe and Mail, March 29, 1960.

[12] Canada, House of Commons Debates, March 3, 1959, pp. 1548-1549.

[13] The Winnipeg Free Press, March 29, 1960.

Canada and the United States. Inspite of the very happy picture which Mr. Diefenbaker drew, Mr. Paul Martin of the Liberal Party stated that there was every justification for questioning whether proper consultation had taken place in this particular matter. He suggested that Canada has not received "from her partner the kind of cooperation and consultation expected between two nations equal in function if not in power."[14] "We think," Mr. Argue, the spokesman for CCF said, "the Minister of National Defence should not be merely a messenger boy of the United States Defence Department, but should put forward Canada's position in the strongest possible terms, and he should take Parliament into his confidence."[15] He said that the Minister of National Defence had further confirmed Canada's inferior role in the continental air defence partnership. "This," he said, "is strictly a made-in-Washington policy in which Canada has had no effective voice," and said that reading the statement of the United States Defence Department by the Canadian Minister of National Defence was a "degrading picture."[16] Mr. Argue further declared that

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[14]Canada, House of Commons Debates, March 28, 1960, p. 2517.

[15]Ibid., p. 2505.

[16]Ibid.



the Canadian government is in the hip pocket of the United States on defence. "We are called," he said, "a partner, but we are not a partner. We are not partner in policy. We are not a partner in basic discussions. We are merely the errand boy for the United States in this defence program. . . . In the eyes of the world Canada must look like a complete but somewhat unimportant, sattelite of the United States."[17]

Though Mr. Pearkes insisted that he has been contacted by Mr. Gates, the United States Secretary of Defence, the week before, and emphasized the fact that it was Secretary Gates who phoned the Canadian Minister of National Defence, it was clear, according to both the Globe and Mail and theWinnipeg Free Press that Mr. Pearkes had been caught off guard by the timing of the Washington announcement of March 25, 1960.

The second topic which was the focus of what the newspapers reported as noisy and desk thumping debates in the Parliament, had to do with the government's decision to go on spending money on the Bomarc. During this debate the government held fast to the Bomarc as the keystone of Canadian air defence. "We

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[17]Canada, House of Commons Debates, March 25, 1960, p. 2459.

are not," declared the Minister of National Defence, "going to scrap that sacred agreement with our allies and give up just because somebody says there is a possibility that Bomarc may not be successful. . . . Withdraw these Bomarcs, ruin that chain of defence and then you have left, the continent wide open and there would not be a deterrent to the Russian bombers. . ."[18]

Mr. Pearkes' declaration that he has not lost faith in the Bomarc and that American Bomarc will continue to form an "essential" part of Canada and the United States air defence has brought forth various comments in the House describing the Bomarc. "Tried seven times and seven times found wanting," said Mr. Pearson. "An adopted child of the United States, still-born and grotesque," came from Mr. Paul Hellyer, the Liberal. Mr. Martin of CCF said it was "about as useful as a BB gun," and Mr. Argue referred to it as "this dead duck."[19] Statements attesting to the inadequacy of the Bomarc came also from the United States Senator Chavez, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, who said in an interview following

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[18]The Winnipeg Free Press, March 29, 1960.

[19]Ibid.



the closed-door hearing of the United States Air Force witness: "Perhaps we are trying to impose on the poor Canadians a missile that is so bad we cannot use it. . . . We ought to respect the Canadians and give them the best we have, and not something that is not good enough for us."[20] Stating also that the fixed Bomarc bases will be vulnerable to enemy attack, a key United States Congressional Committee considering the United States defence appropriation for the following year had recommended elimination of all the Bomarc production. "The manned aircraft," the Committee stated,

> will have advantages over the Bomarc missile which will make them very much more desirable from the standpoint of an over-all defence picture. Manned fighter aircraft have the flexibility of being available for shifting about from one spot to another as they may be needed whereas the Bomarc missile is spotted in a fixed installation with no flexibility in this regard.[21]

And then, too, at this time, unfortunately for Mr. Pearkes, the British Government announced its decision to half development of the Blue Streak, a fixed-based long-range missile. "Vulnerability," said the British Defence Minister Harold Watkinson to the House of Commons,

> of missiles launched from static sites and the practicability of launching missiles of considerable range from mobile platforms have now been established. . . . In the light of our military advice. . . and the

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[20] The Globe and Mail, April 12, 1960.

[21] The Winnipeg Free Press, April 26, 1960.

> importance of reinforcing the effectiveness of the (nuclear) deterrent, the Government has concluded that it ought not to continue to develop as a military weapon a missile that could be launched only from a fixed site.[22]

The United States under its reduced program had cut its total number of the Bomarc bases to eight from the 16 planned in 1959. Two years before, 32 had been proposed. The entire United States Bomarc program was now to be concentrated in the northeast corner of the United States.

The Bomarc question had brought to the fore a complex problem that had been building up for a long time, namely, the nature of Canadian participation in North American defence. Mr. Pearson asserted that the Washington announcement meant that the United States was now taking the emphasis off continental defence to concentrate on deterrence in the hope that a more powerful deterrence would prevent attack and consequently no need for the kind of defence the Bomarc was to offer. It is the defence by deterrence that will assure survival and this kind of defence can be discharged only by the United States which has the strategic force for that purpose. Mr. Pearson said that Canada is

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[22]"The Bomarc, Too", Editorial, The Globe and Mail, April 11, 1960.



already playing a very important and suitable role in early warning and contented that some of the money should be directed to aiding the underdeveloped countries where it would make a greater contribution to world peace. Mr. Argue enthusiastically backed Mr. Pearson's statement. The Globe and Mail, too, in its editorial of April 5, 1960, stated that the funds could have been diverted to what has become a far more vital struggle of helping the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. "Too large a proportion of Canada's defence dollar goes only for outmoded equipment and defence concepts. It is money down the drains. . ."[23]

5. The Bomarc Aftermath

In 1961, the Russians revealed an impressive array of new jet bombers and startled the United States officials. Talk was reported to be going on in Washington about the building of new mobile Bomarc bases which could be put on trucks or railroad cars. Nevertheless, altogether 35 tests have now been made and the missile is reported to have hit its maximum range only once and made one interception. So far only one base has gone into operation at Kincheloe Air Force Base near Sault St. Marie, Michigan. The second is at Duluth, Minnesota and the third at the Niagra

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[23]The Globe and Mail, April 5, 1960.

Falls, New York which were estimated to go into operation shortly. For Canada, the first Bomarc was expected at North Bay in the winter of 1961. The Bomarc had been a major political issue and the opposition groups are still very much opposed to it as is evidenced by the latest House debates on the defence estimate in the summer of 1961.

Summary

Canada's participation in the Bomarc program was a part of an integrated program of the North American defence under NORAD. However, the failure of the Bomarc in the series of test flights and the policy revision in the air defence program of the United States about which the Canadian government obviously was not adequately informed gave rise to various stinging remarks on the floor of the House of Commons and in the nation's newspapers. These observations are testimony of the bruised feelings of Canadian people which erupts to surface whenever the occasions arise. Sharp criticisms directed against the Conservative Government were meant, as much, to the United States who controls and shapes the destiny of Canada. The next chapter will deal with another aspect of the Bomarc that aroused the antipathy of many Canadians over the Bomarc anti-aircraft missile.

CHAPTER VIII

ISSUES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. Canada, in Principle, Accepts Nuclear Weapons

The government's decision to introduce the Bomarc created a new and extremely controversial problem in Canada. Announcing the adoption of the Bomarc as a defence weapon in February 1959, the Prime Minister had stated then:

> The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads. The government is, therefore, examining with the United States government questions connected with the acquisition of nuclear warheads for Bomarc and other defensive weapons for use by the Canadian forces in Canada, and the storage of warheads in Canada.[1]

In this announcement, therefore, the Prime Minister had made clear that the government intended to acquire nuclear warheads for Canada. The government's stand on the question of nuclear weapons was also stated by the Minister of National Defence who said: "I presume that eventually the Canadian forces will be equipped with atomic weapons."[2] The Bomarc missile requires an atomic warhead and, as mentioned in the previous chapter, two such missile bases have been allocated for Canada.

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[1] Canada, House of Commons Debates, Feb. 20, 1959, p. 1223.

[2] The Globe and Mail, July 5, 1958.



By adopting the Bomarc missile Canada must accept, at least in principle, the use of nuclear weapons in Canada. Besides, it was common knowledge that any new fighter air planes which Canada would procure to supplement and eventually replace the CF-100 would require an air-to-air atomic missile.[3]

2. Opinions On Canada's Move Toward the Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons

Since the above announcement of the Prime Minister on February 20, 1959, it was assumed in Canada that the Canadian government would decide at some time in the future to acquire nuclear weapons for Canadian units. The opinions against such a move in Canada were raised along two lines. Many people maintained that the best defence for Canada in this nuclear age came from the power of retaliation which the United States possesses and not from the kind of defence which the government was undertaking to provide the nation. They also felt that the kind of defence which the Bomarc with nuclear warheads was to provide for Canada was obsolete and ineffective in an all-out war. Adoption of that type of defence furthermore would not only be ineffective, but

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[3]Charles Foulkes, "Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age", Behind the Headlines, May 1961, p. 16.

would deprive Canada of the opportunity to play a more positive role in the interest of peace and the Western strength. Such thinking cut through all segments of Canadian society regardless of political affiliation. The Globe and Mail, a newspaper friendly to the Conservative Government, had the following to say:

> We may be an economic satellite of the United States in many foreign eyes, but we are not yet a military dependency and our voice still counts for something in international councils. As a junior member of the nuclear club, obliged to get permission from Washington before acting in our own defence, we would lose bargaining power in helping to achieve compromise between the two major nuclear powers, and in our dealings with the underdeveloped countries which still regard Canada as a trustworthy friend. . . . Our resources are better spent in strengthening conventional forces against the dangers of limited war, and in bracing ourselves and our non-nuclear friends for the new (and undeclared) political, economic and propaganda war with the Soviet Union.[4]

The Conservative premier of Manitoba speaking at the Couchiching conference expressed a similar thought and was reported by the Globe and Mail as follows:

> Premier Duff Roblin made an incisive appeal here tonight for a distinctive Canadian role in world affairs. He suggested that some proportion of Canadian military expenditures might be more effectively applied to technical assistance of a more practical nature for Afro-Asian nations. He questioned the value of the North American air defence command. If it abandoned NORAD, then Canada should also refuse nuclear weapons. "Not in any holier than thou spirit," said Premier Roblin, "but because these weapons are not essential." He said: "Canada should seek leadership among smaller powers and within the ring of

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[4]The Globe and Mail, May 4, 1961.



> the United States nuclear deterrent, seek to reinforce the United Nations office of secretary general and rescue it from Soviet meddling. We should continue to make available to the UN a substantial and fully mobile soldiery. We should mobilize independent thinking and give expression to ideas among smaller nations. We should encourage such UN instruments of peace as the food bank.[5]

The Liberal position as presented by the party's leader, Mr. Pearson, is:

> . . .I feel that the strategic deterrent in the hands of those who now possess it should be maintained strong and unimpaired. . . it should be credible so that in the minds of those who are tempted to break the peace there should exist no doubt that it can be used effectively. In that way the temptation would be removed to bring about victory through some kind of sneak attack with immunity from retaliation. But while we take that view with regard to the strategic deterrent, we on this side are opposed to dispersal of the nuclear deterrent. . . beyond the limits of those three countries which already possess that weapon. . . . If we are faced with that choice we should take the choice I have indicated, thereby strengthening our position in international affairs, and making our voice stronger in the only field which will save us, namely the maintenance and strengthening of international peace.[6]

The latter lines of argument against arming Canadian units with nuclear weapons was based on the fact that such a move would damage Canada's political independence. An act of Congress in the United States prohibited the transfer of nuclear weapons to any foreign power. Section 92 of the United States Atomic Energy

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[5]The Globe and Mail, Aug. 27, 1961.

[6]Canada, House of Commons Debates, Sept. 14, 1961. p. 8354.



Act of 1954, as amended in 1958, contains the following prohibition: "It shall be unlawful. . . for any person to transfer or receive in inter-state or foreign commerce, manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire, possess, import or export any atomic weapon."[7] Therefore, for the United States it is a fixed national policy that the United States nuclear weapons can be used only on the specific authority of the President. For instance, the United States Secretary of Defence Thomas Gates made statements at a press conference in Ottawa in July 1959, after a two-day meeting of the Canada-U.S. Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence. He said that nuclear warheads could be supplied for Canadian Bomarc missiles provided they remain under the United States control. He said the warheads could be used only upon order from the President of the United States. The Globe and Mail reported that Minister of External Affairs, Howard Green, gave whispered coaching to Mr. Gates on three occasions during the press conference. Mr. Gates, thereupon, was reported to have somewhat modified his earlier statements. The Globe and Mail also reported Mr. Gates of having said to Finance

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[7]The Globe and Mail, March 14, 1960.

Minister Donald Fleming that the matter appeared to be a controversial issue in Canada.[8]

The opposition groups in Canada had long been criticizing the government's policy of obtaining the Bomarc missile from the United States on the ground that it would need a nuclear warhead to be effective and that if Canada accepts nuclear weapons, Canada could not possess effective control over the weapons stationed on Canadian soil. The government's response was that though the Canadian government could not change the principle of the United States ownership there would be Canadian control if and when the government decided to equip Canadian forces with nuclear weapons.[9]

The negotiations with the United States concerning the acquisition of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces have taken place on the military level for several years. During these years Canada had made clear its position that Canada would not be satisfied with anything less than joint control. And the United States has for sometime been gradually coming around to realizing the Canadian position. In February, 1960, President Eisenhower, speaking at his press conference, said that it was in the interest of the United States

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[8]The Globe and Mail, July 13, 1959.

[9]The Globe and Mail, March 14, 1960.

to adopt a more liberal law with the allies who would be sure to stand by the United States in times of trouble.[10] In 1961, Mr. Dean Rusk, the United States Secretary of State stated that the United States was now "willing to work out joint control fully consistent with national sovereignty."[11] The problem of Canadian political independence being thus solved, it was now up to the Canadian government to make the next move. The government, however, had been reluctant to make any definite move and hoped for progress in world disarmament which would make such an agreement unnecessary. Therefore, on November 24, 1960, the Prime Minister said in his speech to the Canadian club in Ottawa: "We have taken the stand that no decision will be required while progress toward disarmament continues. To do otherwise would be inconsistent. When and if such weapons are required then we shall have to take the responsibility. In other words, this problem is not one requiring immediate decision."[12]

When the disarmament talk failed the government was once again under pressure from the Opposition as

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[10] The Globe and Mail, Feb. 4, 1960.

[11] "Nuclear Impasse", Time, March 10, 1962.

[12] Ibid.

well as the electorate, who were concerned and divided on the issue of nuclear weapons in Canada. On September 12, 1961, the Defence Minister made the following statement in the House:

> Defensive weapons with a nuclear capability may be required to maintain the credibility of the deterrent, and in the event that the worst happened would be required to provide an effective defence against Soviet aggression. . . . The situation is much the same as that of a man living in a lonely cabin in the woods who fears he may be attacked by a bear. He does not wait until the bear actually attacks him to buy a rifle, but secures it beforehand and has it ready in the event of need. . . . The Bomarc will form part of the defences we must maintain against the manned bomber as long as there are potentially hostile aircraft in existence that can be used against us.[13]

The above statement came close in telling the people what the government's intentions were with regard to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, six months later the Time was still quoting the statement of the Prime Minister on its March 10, 1962 issue who stated that Canada really prefers to leave her two Bomarc missile bases unarmed so that Canada can work freely for disarmament. The American weekly magazine also reported the Canadian Prime Minister's statement that Canada could immediately be equipped with nuclear

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[13]Canada, House of Commons Debates, Sept. 12, 1961, p. 8223.

weapons in case of war. The magazine stated that the Canadian Prime Minister was claiming the best of two worlds. The cartoon in the same article depicted Prime Minister Diefenbaker sitting on top of the Bomarc and confused birds below representing the people trying to make out what they see. The captions read: "Its a nuclear vireo. . . no. . . its a conventional warhead warbler. . Er. . No. o . . . itssa, ittsa. . non-commital shiny-crested vote catcher!"[14] In the next election which is due in Canada in 1962, the question of nuclear weapons is sure to come up frequently, renewing the issue of attrition of Canada's independence arising from the close defence cooperation with the United States.

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[14]"Nuclear Impasse", Time, March 10, 1962.



CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As stated in the introduction, the purpose of this thesis has been to illustrate the frustrations and anxieties of the Canadian people about their intimate relationship in defence with the United States which tends to threaten Canada's sovereignty. The paper has also sought to point out that this unavoidable development which the facts of geography, economics and security dictate to Canada has coincided with the growth of confident nationalism in Canada and the newly acquired role as a Middle Power on a world stage. It finally has attempted to indicate that though Canadians are unmistakably dissatisfied with their relationship with the United States, which is so complexly intertwined in all aspects of their national life, it is in their defence relationship that Canada might assume a somewhat assertive posture toward the United States. For, while it is true that Canada depends heavily on the United States for her security, the United States, too, must rely on Canada for effective defence. The two countries share a most pressing mutual need for the geographic, personnel, and natural resources, as well as the research

and production facilities of each other.

In the field of defence policy, therefore, there has been a wide and critical discussion over the government's policy vis-a-vis the United States, a policy which often seems to subjugate the immediate interest of Canada. The anxious but asserting mood of the Canadian people on this subject has been well reflected in the frequent and heated debates in the House of Commons, in newspaper accounts, and in articles of various journals. I have attempted to illustrate these points by describing and analyzing some of the major issues and problems which Canadian policy-makers were confronted with in recent years. We may now summarize these problems.

The march of science and Canada's geographic situation has placed Canada on the front line of any future war in which missiles will be criss-crossing over its soil. Unlike in the past, Canada is today, therefore, vulnerable to an enemy attack. However, Canada, with a small population and limited military capacity, cannot hope to attain her goals of peace and security alone in this age of constant scientific "break throughs". Sharing the North American continent as well as certain fundamental beliefs with the United

States about the nature of the Soviet threat and recognizing interdependency with the United States, Canada in recent years has been obliged more and more to regard her defence efforts in terms of the total defence capabilities of the West. Membership in such a coalition, however, has required Canada to give up at times some of her freedom of action. The nature of present day warfare and the natural supremacy of the United States in size and power has resulted in the gradual diminution of Canada's control over its air defence activities and the increasing acquisition by the United States of certain rights which normally would be regarded as belonging to a sovereign nation.

The United States has built the Dew Line and has been manning it with its own personnel; the United States has established new bases in the Canadian North for the United States bombers in order to react quickly in face of the reduced time of warning; the United States naval vessels have been operating in the Canadian Arctic waters; the Canadian Air Force has been placed under the operational control of the integrated command which is headed by an American general; the opportunity for more positive Canadian contribution to the air power of the continent has been frustrated by the scraping



of the Arrow, a Canadian made supersonic jet; and finally, the adoption of the Bomarc missile which has been downgraded in the United States has implied the Canadian acceptance of nuclear weapons without the assurance of effective Canadian control. In short continental defence system has come increasingly under the control of the United States planning, operation, and production.

Frustration and genuine fear over the dominant United States position in defence arrangements have been accentuated by several irritating developments in the non-military field. They cover economic as well as cultural aspects of Canadian life. Nearly 51% of Canada's industries are owned by the United States and the American investors have been gaining tremendous power in Canada's financial affairs. Such power has been reflected in the United States' pressure on Canada's foreign trade policies which the Canadians justifiably interpret as an unpleasant intrusion of the United States laws and policies into Canada, a sovereign nation. In addition the United States' wheat disposal program, import quota on Canada's oil and zinc, and the growing powers which the American labor leaders exercise in Canada have all contributed to a sense of fear and resentment

that comes naturally to a country which possesses only 1/14 of the economic strength of her giant neighbor. Culturally, too, the American radio, magazines, newspapers and books have influenced the tastes of the Canadian people and their cultural patterns.

These developments have been paralleled by the growing awareness in Canada of her elevated status as an important power in world politics. As a result, there has developed in Canada an underlying current of nationalistic sentiment whose logic has pointed to the necessity of Canada maintaining a national force of all kinds that befits an independent power, rather than so heavily integrating its defence with the United States. However, in this highly dynamic age, to make such a "positive contribution" to its own as well as to the collective defence is quite beyond the capability of a nation such as Canada which must worry about the cost and the obsolescence of weapons. In defence policy Canada must adopt measures that will be compatible in both military and economic terms. This is well reflected in the Arrow controversy.

Revulsion against the dominant United States position both in defence and in the non-military field has also found expression in the advocacy of some form

of neutralism for Canada. Since Canada, the advocates of neutralism feel, cannot influence the major lines of United States policy and must acquiesce to a satellite role, Canada should, they maintain, focus national effort rather on easing world tensions. Toward this end Canada, in fact, has made substantial contributions by taking an active part in truce commissions in the world's troubled spots. These two currents of opinion - independent militarism and independent neutralism - both spring from the desire of the Canadian people to preserve their national identity, and both will continue to influence Canadian politics and policies in future years.

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

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

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

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