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An Evaluation of the First Principle
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Modern Thought

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Paul Manson Hurrell

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AN EVALUATION OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF DESCARTES
AND ITS RELEVANCE TO MODERN THOUGHT

AN EVALUATION OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF DESCARTES
AND ITS RELEVANCE TO MODERN THOUGHT

By

Paul Manson Hurrell

.A THESIS
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan
State College of Agriculture and.Applied Science

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF.ARTS

Department of Philosophy
1952

6
a.
E

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my appreciation for the generous
help which was made available to me in the development of
this thesis. Professor Henry 8. Leonard, Head of the Department
of Philosophy, supervised the entire procedure, and was most
patient in cultivating an acceptable presentation from the
crude stages in which the thesis was cast. Associate Professor
Lewis K. Zerby carefully read the manuscript, and suggested
certain improvements which have been incorporated in the
final text. The topic itself was suggested in the course of
my responsibilities as a graduate assistant, which involved
conducting class discussions on Descartes and Berkeley. Mr.
Callaghan, the instructor under whose guidance I carried out
these responsibilities, has been of vital help to me in the
interpretation of Descartes' phiIOSOphy.

For my appointment as a graduate assistant, which directly
opened the possibility of this study, I am deeply grateful to
Michigan State College.

3 The difficult job of typing which was involved in every
stage of the study, was generously undertaken by my wife, Mary

Barbara Hurrell.

***Paul Manson Hurrell

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE
I. AN INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II.cooITogfigflm.........._....... 7
Cartesian Method and the Cogito . . . . . . . 7
A Delimitation of the First Principle . . . . 18
The Cogito as a Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . 27
III. RUSSELL'S ENCOUNTER WITH THE COGITO . . . . . . . 37
The Earlier Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Some Characteristics of Russell's
Early.Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . g . 59
The Subsequent Change , . . . . . . , . . . . 8%
The Recent Criticism , . . . . . . . . . . . g 97
IV.ABRIEFORIENTATION.............,. 101+
Reichenbach's Criticism of the Cogito . . . . 10%
The Cogito and the Thought of Lewis . . . . . 109
Whitehead's Use of the Cogito . . . . . . . . 11H
Planck's Recognition of the Personal
Element in Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
v.ACONCLUSION..............,..._129
LIST OF REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13H

CHAPTER I
AN INTRODUCTION

René'Descartes (1596-1650) has been called the father of
modern philosophy, marking a transition from scholasticism to
the more rigorous application of method which characterizes
modern thought. This is not to say that modern thought is
Cartesian, since his thought has probably met with consider-
ably more disagreement than concurrence, but even in the
disagreement important lines of thought have developed, which
still exert their influence. Among the most important of
these developments has been the tendency to use the appraisal
of immediate experience as a point of departure from which to
evaluate the nature of human knowledge and of reality in
general. This tendency derives much of its impetus from
criticism of the proposition adduced by Descartes as his first
principle, cogito grgg gum. This famous principle, still a
locus of controversy, is the occasion of the present paper.

This thesis shall therefore be concerned with only one
limited area in which Descartes has influenced subsequent
thought, and it should not be thought that the scope of this
paper is intended to be an index to the modern significance of
Descartes' philosophy. An indication of the wide range of

considerations which would have to be treated if such were the

-1-

purpose, may be seen in the following comment of Frank
Sewalls

To the Frenchman, René'Descartes, modern
learning is indebted for some of the most potent
factors in its advancement. These are: in
Mathematics, the invention of the Binomial
Theorem and the application of Algebra to Geometry
in the Analytic Geometry; in Physics, the sug-
gestion of the evolution of the universe through
Vortices and the discovery of the laws of the
Refraction of Light; in Physiology, the doctrine
of the Animal Spirits and the theory of the
Mechanism of the soul's operation in the body;
in Philosophy, the finding of the ultimate reality
in subjective consciousness and the deducting
thence of an argument for, if not a proof of, the
existence of God; in Epistemology, the grounding
of scientific Law on the existence of a true God;
in Ethics, the tracing of evil to the necessary
error arising from judgments based on finite and
therefore imperfect knowledge.

This passage gives an indication not only of the scope of
Descartes' contributions, but also of their controversial
character. And indeed, in addition to disagreement concerning
the validity of his conclusions, there has also been disagree-
ment as to the exact character of his philosophy. J. P.
Mahaffey, for instance, endeavored to distinguish his own
estimate from that of certain historians, and his contrast of
interpretations serves to illustrate the disagreement as to the
nature of Descartes' philosophy. Mr. Mahaffey wrote as follows:

But Descartes' philosophy was the very opposite

of what historians of philosophy have described it--
it was not a system based on the observation of the .

 

1The Methog, Meditations and Philosophy _o_f_‘_ Descartes,
translated from the Original Texts with a new Introductory Essay,
Historical and Critical by John Veitch (New York, [n.dJ ), p. v.
(From the special Introduction by Frank Sewall)

facts of consciousness. It was a deductive system

iiiinaisfiwiifihitiiiéiina‘é‘éfiitiini‘f'ée t° mm“ it

In the philosophy of an able mathematician, one would ex-
pect to find deduction in an important role. However, does
this necessarily mean that the system cannot also be based
upon observation of the facts of consciousness? [An interplay
of both factors is evident in Descartes‘ consideration of the
idea of God. He claimed to have "a clear and distinct idea" of
"an infinitely perfect being." This claim involved a report on
his experience. The idea was considered as an item actually
present in his consciousness, and in that capacity constituted
a pivot for deduction. This is manifest from the very char-
acter of his deduction, in which he considered the question as
to hOW’it was possible for such an idea to be present in his
mind. The idea was plainly considered as a real item in his
experience, and in accounting for this fact of consciousness,
he used deduction to endeavor to find what must necexsarily be
the nature of that idea's source.

There has been no attempt in this paper to elaborate upon
a variety of interpretations of Descartes, since the purpose
is to develop one interpretation in particular, and to relate
it to some of the positions of modern thought. It is appropriate
to this purpose, however, to indicate the nature of the approach

which has been adopted. The endeavor has been made to preserve

 

2J. P. Mahaffey, Descartes (London, 1880), p. 150.

elements both from Mahaffey's criticism and from the view
against which his criticism was directed, utilizing both the
deductive and the empirical aspects of Descartes' approach. What
has been rejected is any arbitrary disconnection between these
aspects, as if the use of either one meant the denial of the
other. That is, it has been granted that Descartes' system is
deductive, but this has not been taken to mean that the system

is not also empirical.

The term "empirical" is often identified entirely with
sense experience, but in this paper, such a restriction has been
rejected. Instead, the term "empirical" has been granted the
range of one‘s entire experience, whether sensory, deductive, or
anything else. This view was adopted on the grounds that any
deduction which human beings ever make must become a part of
human experience, and must therefore be a constituent factor in
the range of the empirical. In this sense, a deduction has been
regarded as presupposing an empirical fact; namely, its own
occurrence and whatever is requisite to its occurrence. Hewh
ever, an empirical fact does not, of course, always involve a
deduction.

While this interpretation has been advanced merely as one
among others, and it is not claimed that this is the correct
interpretation, nevertheless there is support for such an
approach in Descartes' philosophy. It would seem, for instance,
that to characterize his system as deductive without proper re-

cognition of its empirical character would be to betray the

special meaning which Descartes' attributed to deduction. With
respect to this point, S. V. Keeling's treatment of Cartesian
deduction is very good, as the following passages illustrate:
Deductio, then is not syllogistic, but is a
succession of intuitive acts disclosing which terms

depend on which, or what relations hold necessarily
between which terms.

Intuitus and deductio are thus essentially
'contemplative' and exploratory, neither is affir-
mative. They reveal, or make discoveries, and it
was Descartes' objection to syllogistic logic
that it does not--'a syllogism', he says, 'cannot
yield a true conclusion without our having-pre-
viously come to know the gery truth that is de-
duced in that syllogism.‘
It would seem, then, that Cartesian deduction proceeded as
a succession of special kinds of experiences, i.e., intuitions.
Also, the nature of Cartesian deduction was explicitly dis-
tinguished from any over-identification with syllogistic logic.
The present consideration, however, is not a defense of
Cartesian deduction. What has been preserved is the character
of a deduction as an experience, or as a potential experience,
regardless of the exact nature of that experience.
Also, it has been assumed that, even if logic is not a tool
of discovery, one may still make good use of it in affirming and
checking whatever is discovered. That is, while other factors

may give rise to hypotheses, logic is invaluable in appraising

 

38. V. Keeling, "Descartes," Procegdings 2; the Briti h
Academy, Vol. XXXIV (19MB). Reprinted December 151178, Oxford
University Press, p. 3.

the consequences involved in particular hypotheses. Thus, the

view has been adopted that regardless of how the cogito is

discovered, it may be affirmed as a hypothesis with a certain

range of logical consequences. For once something has been

discovered, it may be affirmed, and thus treated as an affirmation.
While these introductory comments have not adequately

described the interpretive viewpoint adopted in the thesis, they

have been advanced as preparatory to the chapters which follow.

It is hoped that the subsequent discussion of the thesis will

more adequately develop the viewpoint which has been introduced

in this chapter.

CHAPTER II

CQQITQEBQQSIM

The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it is
to show that the cogito may be understood as a principle
incurred by a given methodology. Second, it is to clarify
further the nature of the principle by distinguishing it from
derivative lines of thought developed by Descartes. Third,
it is to set forth the interpretation of the cogito which

this paper is intended to support.
Cartesian Method and the Cogito

Disturbed by the abundance of conflicting dogmas in the
world of learning, Descartes sought some method by which
absolute certainty could be achieved, and contradictions be-
tween doctrines could be eliminated. His inquiry led him to
adopt a test of doubt, so that any matter which he could logi-
cally doubt he would not accept as true. This test was funda-
mental to Descartes' whole procedure. He explicitly incorporated
it in the first of his four rules of method, as set forth
in Part II of the Discourse on Method:

The first was never to accept anything for true
which I did not clearly know to be such; that is to

say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice,
and to comprise nothing more in my judgment than

-7-

what was presented to my mind so clearly aRd dis-
tinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt.

By adopting doubt §§,g test, Descartes was committed to a

 

significant combination of logical and empirical considerations.
The test had a logical status in the sense that Descartes was
not interested in maintaining a psychological attitude of doubt
once a truth had been adequately demonstrated. Also, the test
had an empirical status in the sense that Descartes wished to
treat doubt as an actual mental occurrence. The interplay be-
tween these aspects of the situation is vital to the under-
standing of Descartes' conclusions.

Although the first rule of his method, cited above, may
be understood primarily as a logical discipline, one should not
overlook the empirical factors involved. The term, accept,
indicates the empirical occurrence of a person's decision for
a particular belief. Similarly, precipitancy, re udic , and
judgment are terms representing certain characteristics of
experiential behavior. ,Also, to understand anything gigagly
and distinctly requires a particular kind of mental experience.
Finally, the term.goubt itself signifies an attitude which is
one kind of experience, sufficiently common to be recognized
easily.

Doubt as an experience, however, is not sufficient grounds

for rejecting a particular proposition or argument. It is

 

L*Descartes, Veitch ed., p. 161.

possible that a person would doubt in the face of the best
possible evidence. Such doubt would be psychological only, and
would fail to have logical significance. The test which Des-
cartes proposed must be held responsible to a rational standard,
without which it is not a test at all.

Descartes' approach must therefore be understood as a com-
posite of logical and empirical factors, and is easily mis-
understood if one abstracts either set of factors from the
integral situation. Either of these two aspects of the situa-
tion is impotent apart from the other. However valid it may
appear, the test of doubt is a rational standard for no one,
unless it becomes the experience of someone. Likewise, the
experience of doubt is a valid test for no one, unless it
meets some rational standard. In this light, one may think
of Descartes' test as one of rational-empirical doubt.

The function of doubt in Descartes' philosophy leads to
quite different results than does the doubt of skepticism.

This fact was explained by Descartes in the following passage:
Not that in this I imitated the Skeptics who doubt
only that they may doubt, and seek nothing beyond
uncertainty itself; for, on the contrary, my de-
sign was simply to find ground of assurance, and
cast aside the loose earth gnd sand, that I might
reach the rock on the clay.

At firSt, Descartes only tested certain limited matters,

exempting his religious and civil commitments,6 but eventually

 

5Descartes, 22.,gi§., p. 168.

6Descartes, loc. cit.

10

he resolved to doubt everything possible, to determine what
beliefs, if any, could survive the test. If some content of
his beliefs could remain wholly indubitable, he would thereby
have discovered a sure foundation of truth upon which to build.
But to find something wholly indubitable, it would be necessary
to allow doubt its fullest possible range, and thus open the
door to the possibility that no beliefs are trustworthy. This
procedure he explained in Part IV of the Discourse on Method.

I had long before remarked that, in relation to
practice, it is sometimes necessary to adopt, as
if above doubt, opinions which we discern to be
highly uncertain, as has been already said; but
as I then desired to give my attention solely to
the search after truth, I thought that a procedure
exactly the opposite was called for, and that I
ought to reject as absolutely false all opinions
in regard to which I could suppose the least
ground for doubt, in order to ascertain whether
after that there remaingd ought in my belief that
was wholly indubitable.

In pursuit of the "wholly indubitable," then, Descartes
came upon and developed his famous first principle, cogito
gggg.§gm. This principle he considered immune to his adopted
test. He found it impossible consistently to think all things
are false, for an inescapable minimum remained--namely, that
hg thought. Thus Descartes had found the firm basis of knowa
ledge which he had sought:

But immediately upon this I observed that,
whilst I thus wished to think that all was false,

it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought,
should be somewhat; and as I observed that this

 

7Ibid., pp. 170-171.

11

truth, I THINK, HENCE I AM, was so certain and of
such evidence, that no ground of doubt, however
extravagant could be alleged by the Sceptics capable
of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without
scruple, accept it as the first pringiple of the
Philosophy of which I was in search.

The power of this principle can be seen in the very

attempt to deny it, for one often finds that in his very denial

he has recreated the essential pattern of the premise, I think.

Suppose, for instance, that someone rejects the premise,.;
think. In the rejection, the same underlying pattern recurs,
for if someone rejects the premise, it seems reasonable to
suppose that every time he rejects it, it follows that hg
re ect , therefore h§_i§.

0r suppose one makes a different approach. In trying to
estimate the validity of any assertion, including the premise
in question and the cogito as a whole, one generally expects
to encounter one of Several possible results. He may judge
the assertion to be true; he may judge the assertion to be
false; he may judge it to be probably true; or, probably
false; he may judge it to be indeterminate; or, he may simply
not judge it at all. Basically, such alternatives can be
divided into two more general alternatives-—that either he
judges the matter or he does not. Thus, if he judges the

assertion to be true, false, probable, improbable, indeter-

minate, or anything else, he judges, and in so doing demonstrates

 

8Ibid,, p. 171.

12

the essential outline of the premise in the cogitg. As to the
alternative that he simply does not judge the assertion, he
'would not then be involved in the cogito. However, he would be
confined to not judging any matters whatsoever, if he were to
refrain permanently from demonstrating the premise, hg judges.

The same type of situation develops with regard to asserting
the cogito, or asserting anything. If one asserts that the
cogito is true, or asserts that it is false, or that it is orange,
hg assertg, and the premise in the cogitg is simply manifested
in a different form. As in the case of judging, one has the
alternative of simply not asserting anything at all, but either
he must demonstrate the premise, pg asserts, or forever keep
silence.

The consideration of sense experience also lends itself
to the development of the co ito, as Descartes showed in the
Second Meditation:

For if I judge that the wax exists because I see

it, it assuredly follows, much more evidently,

that I myself am or exist, for the same reason:

for it is possible that what I see may not in

truth be wax, and that I do not even possess

eyes with which to see anything; but it cannot

be that when I see, or, which comes to the same

thing, when I think I see, I myself who think am

nothing. So likewise, if I judge that the wax

exists because I touch it, it will still also

follow that I am; and if I determine that my

imagination, or any other cause, whatever it be,

persuades me of the existence of the wax, I will

still draw the same conclusion. And what is here

remarked of the piece of wax, is applicable to all
the other things that are external to me.

 

91bid., p. 233.

13

One of the most persistent problems of phiIOSOphy has been
to assign a proper status to the testimony of the senses. In
dealing with this problem, Descartes indicated that someone
assigns a status to sense testimony, judges in relation to sense
testimony, thinks that he sees something, and so forth. Thus
in assigning any status to sense experience, one attests to the
validity of the cogito. If this be the case, sense experience
should not be assigned any status which contradicts the cogitg.

Someone may wonder, "Why not say that I_§gt, instead of
I_thipk?" Descartes' answer would be that one can doubt that he
acts, whereas he cannot doubt that he thinks. In his reply to
P. Gassendi, theologian and Epicurean philosopher, Descartes
defended the Second Meditation as follows:

When you say that I could have inferred LEE same
conclusion from gny,gf,my other actions, you
wander far from the truth, because there is none
of my activities of which I am wholly certain (in
the sense of having metaphysical certitude, which
alone is here involved), save thinking alone. For
example, you have no right to make the inference:
I walk, hence I, x st, except in so far as our
awareness of walking is a thought; it is of this
alone that the inference holds good, not of the
motion of the body, which sometimes does not exist,
as in dreams, when nevertheless I appear to walk.
Hence from the fact that I think that I walk I can
very well infer the existence of the mind which
thinks, but not that of the body which walks. So
it is also in all other cases.

In this reply, Descartes held his case in good fashion. How-
ever, a point of difference has been adOpted in this thesis, and it

 

10René'DeScartes, "Objections and Replies," Desca t
Selections, edited by Ralph M. Eaton (New'York, 19275, p. 251.

1’+

will be well to distinguish the point now. Descartes adhered
to a concept of absolute certainty, and thus discarded in-
ferences based on "any of his other actions" because he could
not speak of these actions with the same certainty as he could
speak of his thought. The present thesis does not endorse
Descartes' concept of certainty, but is concerned instead with
the consequences of various logical commitments, whether these
are absolutely certain or not. Thus, one might agree that there
is no basis for an absolutely true judgment, "I walk, therefore
I am," and still accept the judgment that "if I walk, then I
am." It does not appear that Descartes would have had any
basis for rejecting such an inference if_the premise were cer-
tain.

It is true that some of the alternatives for premises seem
more justified than others. In view of this fact, it is
important to consider why Descartes restricted himself to
"I think" as an indubitable premise. Here is encountered an
interesting feature of Descartes' argument, namely, the re-
flexive reasoning which he introduced to support it. The
reason "I think" was regarded as indubitable is because that
to doubt such a premise is to demonstrate its validity, since?
doubting is a form of thinking. Descartes reasoned that he
cannot doubt that he doubts, for if he doubts that he doubts,
then he doubts.

Similar reflexives can be developed in any direction of

inquiry. For instance, one cannot think that he does not think,

15

without thinking. One cannot believe that he does not believe,
without believing. One cannot assert that he does not assert,
without asserting. One cannot decide that he does not decide,
without deciding. One cannot imagine that he does not imagine,
without imagining.

Such reflexives exhibit the ego-centric predicament in
some of its aspects, and the remarkable fact is that, instead
of merely trying to side-step it, Descartes put the predicament
to work. He used it to discover what he could think without
contradiction. That is to say, some observer might consistently
think that Descartes did not think, but Descartes was in that
special position, or predicament, from which standpoint hg
could not consistently think that he did not think._

One way to deal with this kind of reasoning would be Simply
to discredit it as a violation of type theory. However, if
Descartes' argument at this point is a genuine fallacy, it
should illustrate the difficulty against which type theory is
directed--name1y, it should lead to a paradox or a contradiction.
However, if the argument be rightly understood, no paradox or
contradiction develops.

To show reason for this contention, it will be necessary to
recur to a distinction which was made at an earlier point, between
two kinds of gggpt. In one sense, doubt may represent a logical
standard, and in another sense, doubt may be merely a psychologi-
cal occurrence. Psychological doubt can be either reasonable

or unreasonable. In methodological doubt, the effort is made to

l6

limit doubt to some rational standard, i.e., we agree to accept
only conclusions drawn under certain conditions. However,
methodological doubt is as much an empirical occurrence as

are undisciplined experiences of doubt. While doubt may occur
without being methodological, it cannot be methodological
without occurring.

This interpretation should occasion no crucial disagree-
ment. At least it seems to be compatible with the following
statement of Bertrand Russell, in which he makes a limited
recommendation of Descartes' procedure: "It is necessary to
practice methodological doubt, like Descartes, in order to
loosen the hold of mental habits."11

In this statement, both elements of the distinction are
present. Mr. Russell refers to both methodological doubt and
the practicg of this doubt, which is an empirical occurrence.

This distinction is helpful in evaluating the statement,
"I cannot doubt that I doubt, for if I doubt that I doubt,
then I doubt." In this statement, the interplay between the
logical and empirical features of doubt must be recognized,
for the empirical character of doubt is used to enforce a limit
upon the logical use of doubt. The point is that no logical
usage can be made at all, unless someone, empirically, makes it.
If doubt is to be used logically, it must pg usgg, empirically.
This means that the logical use of doubt can never rightly be

 

11Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of tth Kernel __11_
(Chicago, 1915), p. 238.

17

directed toward the denial of its own empirical occurrence.

Such is the importance of Descartes' constant logical contact
with the limitations of personal experience. As a logical-
empirical unity, his statement makes sense, because it was
impossible for him to doubt, logically, without actually doubt-
ing, empirically. Thus, the logical connotation of any occasion
of his doubt could not explicitly reject what it implicitly
required--an occasion of doubt. I

Any occurrence or event is sufficient evidence to contra-
dict the assertion that there are no such occurrences or events.
In this sense, any event enforces a limit upon the validity
of assertions. Such a limit was indicated by Descartes, when
he perceived that the occurrence of doubt is required to ggubt
the occurrence of doubt. That is to say--immediately upon
an occurrence of doubt, it would no longer be correct to say
that there are no occurrences of doubt. Consequently, a limit
is imposed upon the rational use to which any occurrence of
doubt may be put, and no occurrence of doubt can be used to
repudiate that very matter which it renders certain--name1y, the
fact that there is an occurrence of doubt.

When one interprets Descartes' reflexive reasoning in terms
of his given procedure and its characteristics, then, he finds
the reasoning entirely consistent and unparadoxical. In fact,
if we lay aside purely linguistic considerations, and consider the
reflexive as expressing a limit inherent in the procedure, we

must conclude that if in this basic sense Descartes' reasoning

18

violates type theory, then so do logical systems in general.
For no logical system can violate the limits imposed by its
own ultimate factors, any more than methodological doubt can
violate the limit imposed by its own occurrence. As a pre-
supposition necessary to a given procedure, methodological
doubt becomes an ultimate factor limiting the procedure.

In the light of the considerations thus far, it shall be
maintained that the cggito lends itself to interpretation as a
principle incurred by a given methodological procedure. This
is not to say that the principle has no other status, but simply
to assert that its relation to a methodology is an important
factor in the nature of the principle.

A Delimitation of the First Principle

It is extremely important to recognize Descartes‘ transi-
tion to derivative considerations, i.e., conclusions subsequent
to the acceptance of his first principle. This crucial transi-
tion is easily obscured, with the result that objections to
Descartes' derivative conclusions are uncritically applied to
his first principle. To show that such objections do not
necessarily apply to the cogito as a first principle is the
purpose of this section.

The first principle accepted by Descartes should be examined
carefully to note that it says nothing directly concerning the
nature of the "I". It asserts what "I" do, but not what "I" am.

In the conclusion of the principle, it is asserted that "I" am,

19

but not HEEL "I" am. The analysis of one's nature is there-
fore a secondary, derivative step, in relation to Descartes'
first principle.

This is important because many a debate concerning the
analysis of what human beings are can rage without in the
least denying DesCartes' first principle. But when the transi-
tion to this phase of analysis is obscured, one may falsely
conclude that, in disposing of Descartes' particular analysis
of his nature, the cogito also has been discredited.

Unfortunately, Descartes did not always keep his readers
clear on this transition, and seemed to over-identify his
primary and derivative conclusions. He proceeded to the con-
cept of himself as a thing which thinks, or a thinking sub-
stance, and developed his philosophic scheme in terms of such
a concept. However, it cannot be said that the transition was
not marked at all, for in the Second Meditation Descartes wrote
as follows:

But I do not yet know with sufficient clearness
what I am, though assured that I am; and hence, in
the next place, I must take care, lest perchance I
inconsiderately substitute some other object in room
giugfiaizis properly myself, and thus wander from the

In this passage, the transition is unmistakably marked.

The discussion of the nature of the self is a derivative consider-

ation, spread over a large portion of the Meditations. However,

 

12Descartes, Veitch ed., p. 226.

2O

Descartes provided a convenient summary in the Discourse on
Method, Part IV, which will serve to illustrate the conclusions
he derived:

In the next place, I attentively examined what
I was, and as I observed that I could suppose that I
had no body, and that there was no world nor any _
place in which I might be; but that I could not there-
fore suppose that I was not; and that, on the con-
trary, from the very circumstance that I thought to
doubt of the truth of all things, it most clearly and
certainly followed that I was; while, on the other
hand, if I had only ceased to think, although all
the other objects which I had ever imagined had been
in reality existent, I would have had no reason to
believe that I existed; I thence concluded that I
was a substance whose whole essence or nature con-
sists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist,
has need of no place, nor is dependent on any material
thing; so that "I", that is to say, the mind by which
I am what I am, is wholly distinct from the body, and
is even more easily known than the latter, and is
such, that although the latter were pot, it would
still continue to be all that it is. 3

This statement is permeated with controversial issues, but
the point is that to reject this doctrine of the self does not
necessarily justify a rejection of the first principle. The
first principle speaks to a different matter--namely, a basis
for concluding logically that "I" am.

werkmeister expressed the opinion that Descartes himself ’
misused the transition indicated:

As far as the first issue is concerned, analysis
of the Cartesian argument shows that its author subtly
discards the proposition "I think, therefore I am,"
and that he replaces it by the assertion, "I am a

thing which thinks," "a mind or a soul." He implicitly
assumes the equivalence of these two formulations but

 

liihid.. pp. 171-172.

21

uses only the latter as the "first principle" of
his philosophy1h_And right here the first diffi-
culties arise.

Whitehead also pointed to the same center of difficulty:

At this point the confusion commences. The emer-
gent individual value of each entity is transformed
into the independent substantial existence of each
entity, which is a very different notion.

I do not mean to say that Descartes made this
logical, or rather illogical transition, in the
form of explicit reasoning. Far from it. What he
did, was first to concentrate upon his own con-
scious experiences, as being facts within the inde-
pendent world of his own mentality. He was led to
speculate in this by the current emphasis upon the
individual value of his total self. He implicitly
transformed this emergent individual value, in-
herent in the very fact of his own reality, into
a private world of passions, or modes, of inde-
pendent substance.1

These references serve to illustrate that not only must the
transition in question be recognized, but also it must be re-
garded as unsatisfactory. 'Werkmeister contended, moreover, that
the transition is not correct even in terms of Descartes'

approach:

The proposition, "I think, therefore I am,"
is undoubtedly an "intuitive certainty"; but can
the same be said of its "equivalent"? Hardly.
The contention that "I am a mind or a soul" is by
no means a direct intuition; and the transition
from the simple affirmation "I am" to the con-
tention "I am a thing which thinks," from cogito,
ergo gym to 232.§EE cogitans--approved though it
was by Spinoza and Leibniz--cannot be justified as
long as WI adhere to Descartes' methodological
approach. 6

 

 

aihgé H. Werkmeister, g Philosophy _o_i_‘ Science (New York, 19%),
pp. - .

15a1rred N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern woyld (New York,
1950), pp. 279-2800

16W'erkmeister, gt. cit., p. 85.

22

It will be considered justified, therefore, to approve
Descartes' first principle without thereby being committed to
the particular categories of thought which characterize his
philosophy. That is to say, one may utilize "I think, there-
fore I am," substituting other concepts of HEEL his nature is
in place of Descartes' concept.

Anyone‘s concept of human nature is certainly subject to
error, as was Descartes' concept, but there is a vital difference
if one's approach does not claim absolute finality as to the
natureof the self. The nature of the self then, may be pro-
gressively investigated, and probably debated. However, wide
ranges of inquiry and diSpute concerning gtgflg nature will
presuppose a prior matter--namely, gtgflg existencg.

But if it is not necessary to follow Descartes in his
doctrine of the nature of the self, must one at least retain
Descartes' analysis of the grounds of validity of the cggito?

In answering this question, it is important to observe that in
Descartes' development of the cogito, the fact of its certitude
was asserted before the ground of its certitude was examined.

In other words, Descartes decided that this particular principle
was true, before he was prepared to explain fully why he was

thus assured. This procedure in itself is not necessarily bad,
as, for instance, men have decided that 1 plus 1 equals 2 before
any thoroughgoing justification for this conclusion was developed.
However, it is not therefore necessary to grant with Descartes

that his principle is as certain as that 1 and 1 equal 2. The

23

following passage, for instance, gives rise to considerable
questions and disagreement:

After this I inquired in general into what
is essential to the truth and certainty of a pro-
position; for since I had discovered one which I
knew to be true, I thought that I must likewise
be able to discover the ground of this certitude.
And as I observed that in the words I THINK, HENCE
I AM, there is nothing at all which gives me
assurance of their truth beyond this, that I see
very clearly that in order to think it is neces-
sary to exist, I concluded that I might take, as
a general rule, the principle that all things
which we very clearly and distinctly conceive
are true, only observing, however, that there is
some difficulty in rightly determining the ob-
jects which we distinctly conceive.17

In this procedure, there were at least three important
characteristics. First, there was the basic element of decision,
which preceded the discussion concerning "the ground of this
certitude." As Descartes had decided that he was, before he
analyzed his nature, he also decided that the cogito was true
and certain, before be analyzed the ground of its truth and
certainty. Second, there was the rejection of any purely
linguistic connection between the moments of the principle.

As Descartes put it, "in the words . . . there is nothing at all
which gives me assurance of their truth beyond this, that I see

very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist. . . .'
Third, there was the adoption of the general principle that all I
matters conceived clearly and distinctly are true.

At this point, as in the case of the nature of the self, a

departure has been made from the first principle-~this time in

‘\
\

 

17Descartes, Veitch ed., p. 172.

21.

the endeavor to elicit from consideration of the cogito a
doctrine of validity. The question is--is it necessary to
concur with Descartes in this matter, any more than in his
doctrine concerning the nature of the self? The contention
of this paper is that it is not.

If one concurs with Descartes in his doctrine that clear
and distinct understandings of matters are true, he could
easily become involved in issues beyond the scope of the
cogito. For this doctrine is really dependent upon a broader
doctrine, without which the clear and distinct understanding
is no guarantee of truth at all. The dependent character of
his initial doctrine of validity was explicitly treated by
Descartes in the Discourse on Method, Part IV:

For, in the first place, even the principle which
I have already taken as a rule, viz., that all
the things which we clearly and distinctly con-
ceive are true, is certain only because God is

or exists, and because he is a Perfect Being,

and because all that we possess is derived from
him: whence it follows that our ideas or notions,
which to the extent of their clearness and dis-
tinctness are real, and proceed from God, must to
that extent be true. Accordingly, whereas we not
unfrequently have ideas or notions in which some
falsity is contained, this can only be the case
with such as are to some extent confused and ob-
scure, and in this proceed from nothing, (par-
ticipate of negation), that is, exist in us thus
confused because we are not wholly perfect. And
it is evident that it is not less repugnant that
falsity or imperfection, in so far as it is im-
perfection, should proceed from God, than that
truth or perfection should proceed from nothing.
But if we did not know that all which we possess
of real and true proceeds from a Perfect and In-
finite Being, however clear and distinct our
ideas might be, we should have no ground on that

25'

account for the assurance that they possessed
the perfection of being true. 8

In a sense, then, Descartes held that his initial decision,
that the cogito is true, was dependent for its validation upon
the subsequent doctrine of God. But to follow Descartes to
this extent would mean possibly to restrict the discussion to
those who believe that God exists, or to attempt to convince
those who do not. Either of these procedures seems highly in-
appropriate to the purpose of this paper.

There is an indication that the cogito does not strictly
require Descartes' doctrine of God in his argument that a
person cannot be logically deceived as to whether or not he
exists. This argument simply asserts that a person must exist
in order to be deceived at all. One encounters then, the
essential structure of the cogito in different words: I am
deceived; therefore I am. Such a revision is not simply a
play on words, but is based on the idea that if a person did
not exist, he could not very well be deceived. When the
cogito is set forth in this manner, it does not seem to be
directly dependent upon Descartes' beliefs concerning God.
Also, it does not seem necessary to base the validity of the
cogito upon the fact that it is clearly and distinctly per-
ceived to be valid, even if this doctrine be divorced from the
consideration of God. While lucidity and exactitude of insight

are greatly to be desired, and are often decisive in profound

 

l81pm., pp. 175-176.

26

issues, it does not appear that the validity of the gogito rests
upon such grounds, even if its discovery was made upon such
grounds. For if one conceives the cogito in rather muddy
fashion, the fact that gt concetyes itat all is the point
which suggests its validity, not the degree of clarity and
distinctness involved in the experience.

In view of the fact then, that both Descartes' doctrine
of the nature of the self and his doctrine of the nature of
validity are subsequent considerations which are not necessarily
involved in the acceptance of the first principle, criticism which
may suffice to vanquish the derivative doctrines does not.
necessarily apply to the cogito. The present thesis, accordingly,
is based on the view that one can accept the cogito without
being bound to the derivative doctrines advanced by Descartes.

Not only is it possible to make this distinction between
the first principle and derivative matters, it is also essential
to the adequate appraisal of the strength of the first principle,
and its adaptability to different modes of thought. When the
distinction is blurred, one may falsely identify the cogitg
with Descartes' modes of thought, and suppose that the former
falls with the latter. Thus it is possible that the o to,
supposed dead, may appear as an unrecognized presupposition in
approaches which have over-identified the principle with
seventeenth century modes of thought. It would seem that if
this first principle is either to be accepted or rejected, it

would be unwise to base the decision on matters which are not

27

"first" but subsequently derived. Therefore, regardless of a
thinker's decision concerning the cogito, it is important to
recognize its bounds sufficiently to extricate it from other
matters.

The principle represents an initial decidion for validity,
not a mature doctrine as to the grounds of validity. It re-
presents an initial commitment to the fact of one's own exis-
tence, not a mature doctrine as to the nature of oneself. As
an initial decision, the principle becomes an ultimate factor
for any subsequent thought based on its acceptance. .As such a
decision, the principle is dangerous if wrong, and therefore is
merely hypothesized in this paper. However, as such a decision,
the principle is unique, for if one decides anything, for or
against the principle, it would seem that at decideg, therefiorg

hala-
The Cogito as a Hypothesis

The present thesis explicitly abandons Descartes' ideal of
absolute certainty, and concerns itself instead with the logical
limits of a given procedure or situation. This is done, however,
in the belief that Descartes reasoned from within the confines of
a given procedure, and faithfully exhibited its inherent limits,
but did not achieve absolute certainty. It is for this reason
that attention has been called to the way in which his first
principle developed out of his methodological approach.

28

In an absolute sense, it is not contended that Descartes
demonstrated that there is any actual occurrence of doubt. At
least he did not dembnstrate this in the reflexive reasoning in
which he asserted that one cannot doubt that he doubts, for
if he-doubts that he doubts, then he doubts. Such reasoning,
is based on the form, ";t_p thgp q," and there is no justifi-
cation for asserting its premise, "he doubts that he doubts."
Suppose one accepts the implication itself as valid, that3tt
one doubts that he doubts, ttgg he doubts. The validity of
such an implication would not provide one iota of evidence that
there has been or ever will be, an empirical occurrence of
doubt. What is affirmed is that if one ever should happen to
doubt, he then would encounter a given logical limit to the
consistent use of doubt. I

.In this sense, the idea that doubt occurs remains in-
dubitable, but the fact that doubt occurs is gtt,apsolutely
geztain. Descartes' reasoning disclosed the inability to
doubt a particular matter, but it does not demonstrate the_
ability to doubt anything. The reasoning is negative, pro-
hibitive, and the prohibition of one application of doubt does
not mean that any doubt ever occurs. Similarly, if one reasons
that he cannot doubt that he thinks, since to doubt would be
to think, he may show that the occurrence of thinking is in-
dubitable, but not therefore that any thinking actually occurs.
He simply has shown that gt,he ever should doubt, thgn he
would be thinking.

29

Regardless of the negative characteristic of the reasoning,
however, its force as defining a procedural or methodological
limit can be retained. For if in fact one ever does doubt,
he does encounter the limit defined by Descartes. .And if any
method which one may empirically pursue will presuppose that
he thinks, he inquires, he judges, he perceives, or he believes,
then such a presupposition is, relative to the method, an
ultimate factor--a criterion which helps to define the limits
of the method. This view is in keeping with the fact that
Descartes worked within a given method, and that he accepted
the fact that he doubted many things on many occasions, before
discovering a limit to the logical use of doubt.

Such an interpretation is, of course, subject to its own
difficulties, but at least it avoids one important error.

The error is to assume that, if Descartes failed to demonstrate
the certainty of doubt or thinking, one will not therefore
incur in empirical procedures the kind of limits, or ultimate
principle, which he exhibited.

One statement of Descartes lends itself especially to the
use of his first principle as a methodological ultimate. In
Meditation II, Descartes remarked as follows:

So that after having reflected well and carefully
examined all things, we must come to the definite
conclusion that this proposition: I am, I exist,

is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it,
or that I mentally conceive it.19

 

l9René'Descartes, "Meditations," Descarte Select ons,
edited by Ralph M. Eaton (New York, 1927 , p. 97.

30

In this statement, Descartes advanced a proposition which
may or may not be true in itself, but which automatically be-
comes true whenever it is asserted or conceived. This does
not prove that it is true always, or that it will ever be
asserted or conceived. But if, in any empirical procedure, one
does assert or conceive it, then he makes it true for that
occasion. Relative to any occurrence of its assertion, then,
the proposition holds, regardless of what is the case when it '
is not asserted. Moreover, for any case of assertion whatever
in the procedure, a limit is defined, such that no case ofkk
assertion should contradict what it presupposes, i.e., that
whoever asserts, exists.

The interpretation here advanced is not intended to deny
the possible persuasiveness of Descartes' discussion of his
first principle. This paper simply leaves that issue open,
and points out that even when Descartes' arguments are re-
jected, one may incur, on a different level of certainty, the
very limits which he discovered. The point which is here
maintained is that the procedural use of Descartes' first
principle need not rest upon the question as to whether or not
his demonstration is satisfactory. The continuing inquiry into
the problem of determining valid beliefs may warrant the hypo-
thesis of the cogitg as a possible criterion, in order to
evaluate the consequences of such a possible criterion. As a
hypothesis, the cogitg should be evaluated in terms of its

propriety to our procedures and to experience in general,

31'

instead of being overly identified with the arguments advanced
by Descartes.

.ln important ideal for criteria of validity is that such
criteria should be public rather than private in character.
However, this ideal often suffers from a lack of clarification.
Consequently, in the zeal to achieve impersonal science, a
tendency to negate the role of the individual develops. In
the eagerness to be "objective," it may seem that the further
science can get the individual out of the picture, the more
objective knowledge will have become.

It is obvious, however, that there is a sense in which
this reasoning can lead to an absurdity. For if science ever
did get the individual completely out of the picture, there
might be something "objective" left, but no one would ever _
know about it. In this misconception of the role of the in-
dividual, the concept, "impersonal," has been confused with
the concept, "gpersonal."’ If the latter concept were realized,
there could possibly be facts, but not gcientific facts, i.e.,
there could be no human knowledge. Science would have been
freed from the "personal limitations"of the scientific ob-
server to such an extent that there could be no scientific ob-
server, observations, or science.

While criteria for validity must be public rather than
private, such criteria must inevitably presuppose some relation-

ship to the experience of the individual. The public character

32

of criteria for validity should be conceived as meaning that

the employment of the criteria can be generalized to determine
valid beliefs for anyone. The problem is, then, not so much
just to apstragt £39m the experience of the individual, but to
generalize £22 the experience of any number of individuals. _
When the present thesis proposes the hypothesis of the cggito

as an ultimate principle, it endeavors to utilize the relativity
of criteria for validity to individual experience without doing
violence to the legitimate ideal of "impersonal" science.

In evaluating such a hypothesis, it is important to ob-
serve the nature of any appropriate estimate of its validity.
If, perchance, the hypothesis should be correct, the ngito
must be regarded as an ultimate principle. Thus, if anyone
should demand a logical proof for the principle, he would have
made a demand which, §,priori, would make acceptance of the
principle impossible. For if the principle could rest on a
logical proof, then it could not have been ultimate. And, if
the principle should not be susceptible to proof, the demand,
3g rior , forbids its acceptance.

The cogito, as it is hypothesized in this paper, is con-
ceived as a principle relating any given experience to a
subject of that experience, so that the presence of the experience
is regarded as involving the presence of the subject. The ex-
perience is not regarded as something separate from the subject.
Instead, the subject which experiences, and any matters which

are experienced, are regarded as constituent factors in the

33

experience. While the principle is applicable to experience in
general, its use as a methodological ultimate would involve
some phases of experience more directly than others. In this
respect, judgment and decision would play dominant roles.

This viewpoint draws heavily from the position of Alfred
North Whitehead, who did not hesitate to anchor decision to
something which makes the decision. The following passage,
illustrates this point and also serves to emphasize the im-
portance of decision in Whitehead's viewpoint:

The ontological principle asserts the rela-
tivity of decision; whereby every decision ex-
presses the relation of the actual thing, for
which a decision is made, to an actual thing t1
which that decision is made. But 'decision'
cannot be construed as a casual adjunct of an
actual entity2 It constitutes the very meaning
of actuality.

It should be pointed out that Whitehead's use of decision
in a generic sense does not forbid its application to the
personal level. Instead, the generic sense includes the per-
sonal, as the following statement shows:

Further, in the case of those actualities whose
immediate experience is most completely open to
us, namely, human beings, the final decision of
the immediate subject-superject, constituting
the ultimate modification of subjective aim, is
the foundation of our experience of responsi-
bility, of approbation or of disapprobation, of
self-approval or of self-reproach, of freedom,
of emphasis. This element in experience is '
too large to be put aside as misconstruction.
It governs the whole tone of human life.21

A

682QA1fred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York, lgel),
p.

21Ibid., p. 7%.

3h

The bearing of Whitehead's viewpoint on the analysis of
propositions is important. What is suggested is that analysis
must take into consideration not only the content of a given
proposition, but also the relation of the proposition to a
judging subject. That there is such a relation to be considered
was stated by Whitehead as follows:

But, since each actual world is relative to a
standpoint, it is only some actual entities which
will have the standpoints so as to include in their
actual world, the actual entities which constitute
the logical subjects of the proposition. Thus
every proposition defines the judging subjects for
which it is a proposition.22

The present thesis endorses the essential character of
this doctrine, but suggests its application beyond the purpose
of metaphysical description. If the reference to a stand-
point from which the proposition may be entertained or judged
is an inherent characteristic of propositions, then it should
be used to deny the validity of any propositions which betray
that characteristic. Thus for instance, the proposition,
"There is nothing at all," could not consistently be judged
valid from the standpoint of anything_at all. But more special-
ized judgments could be affected also, as the following passage
indicates: "Thus, in a proposition certain characteristics are

presupposed for the judging subject and for the logical
subjects."23

 

22Ibid., p. 29%.
231bid., p. 297.

35

When "characteristics" are presupposed for the judging
subject, we see that propositions must be consistent not only
with the fact that the subject (who judges) is, but must also
be consistent with what the particular subject is, or at least
with what a Judging subject is in general. Thus, if the con-
tent of a proposition be such that it contradicts either the
existence of, or the nature of its judging subject, the pro-
position must be regarded as false.

In endorsing such a view, the present thesis is committed
to a rejection of the idea that propositions can be properly
analyzed as self-contained structures of meaning. There is
a limited comparison between the approach here undertaken and
the following doctrine of John Dewey:

The fallacy in the theory of logically original
complete and self-sufficient atomic propositions is
thus an instance of the same fallacy that has been
repeatedly noted: The conversion of a function in
inquiry into an independent structure. It is an
admitted fact that ideally, or in theory, pro-
positions about irreducible qualities are necessary
in order adequately to ground judgment having exis-
tential reference. What is denied is that such
propositions have complete and sElf-sufficient
logical character in isolation.2

The suggested hypothesis of the cogito recognizes Dewey's
doctrine that propositions in inquiry are not self-sufficient,
and interprets their dependence in accord with Whitehead, as

referring to an existential subject. It is held that assertion,

 

21+JohnDewey, The Theory‘gg Inquiry (New York, 19H9), p. 1H9.

36

thought, belief, awareness, etc., require a principle which
maintains the relation of such experiences to an existential
subject. The principle which preserves this relation is re-
ferred to as the principle of subjective reference.

Thus far, then, the cogito has been considered as a de-
velopment relative to a given procedure, distinguished from
derivative doctrines of Descartes, and initially presented as
a hypothesis. The next step will be to test the principle in
relation to a key modern criticism, and in so doing to indi-

cate more precisely its character and strength.

CHAPTER III
RUSSELL'S ENCOUNTER WITH THE COGITO

One of the most influential philosophic thinkers in the
twentieth century has been Bertrand Russell. In view of his
stature alone, he would provide an excellent liason between
the considerations thus far and the temper of modern thought.
There is, however, a more direct relation between the prin-
ciple under consideration and Russell's philosophy. For he
has explicitly rejected Descartes' first principle, and has
elucidated his own approach by contrast with that principle.
Moreover, the type of rejection advanced by Russell does
not represent just one isolated interpretation, but has been
rather typical since the days of Hume. Thus the consideration
of Russell's encounter with the cogito constitutes a key test
for the principle, a test which embodies elements from the
historical development of which Hume was the parent, and which
embodies the critical insight of one of the great figures in
contemporary thought.

In the course of time, Russell‘s position has undergone
changes, especially with reference to points which are the
concern of this paper. One way to have dealt with this fact
would have been to consider only the latest writings of the

-37-

38

philosopher, and to ignore what he had said earlier. However,
this would be to lose sight of the significance of the changes
themselves, and, while some purposes would not be affected, at
least one of the changes is of considerable importance with
respect to the topics under consideration. Consequently, the
historical dimension of Russell's criticism has been taken into
account, sufficiently to show that certain difficulties were
incurred by his earlier approach to the co t , and that these
difficulties exerted some influence in a subsequent transition
of viewpoint. The purpose is not to give a history of
Russell's thought, nor to claim that the difficulties considered
are sufficient to explain the transition in question. How-
ever, it is contended that the difficulties in question were
such as to demand a resolution in terms of certain alternatives,
and that within these alternatives the transition in Russell's
thought did develop.

The procedure which has been adopted is, first, to con-
sider Russell's earlier contrast of his own approach to the
approach of Descartes; second, to consider some of the
characteristics of Russell's approach which seem to be of
consequence for his subsequent thought; third, to consider the
transition of viewpoint in which the existence of an experiencing
subject was repudiated; and fourth, to evaluate a recent critie

cism of the gggitg in the light of the previous considerations.

39
The Earlier Criticism

In.zhg Problems pf Philosophy, 1912, Russell used one's
cognitive relation to a table as a typical example to help
explain his epistemological approach. The consideration of an
external object would seem quite unlike an approach from the
standpoint of the self. However, one need not assume that
there is either a table or a self in order to note a compari-
son between Russell's approach and the one advanced in this
paper. That is, one may simply adopt a questioning attitude
with respect to these items as he might to any others, without
assuming sufficient knowledge either to assert or deny their
reality. Then may be developed the epistemological standpoint
which underlies the present hypothesis of the co to, main-
taining a distinction between knowing phgp‘ppg‘;§ and
knowing wh§3,pp§‘i§. One may then represent this distinction
in terms of two epistemological questions. "Is there a real
self at all?" "If so, what sort of reality can it be?" In
terms of these questions, the similarity between such an
epistemological approach and the approach which Russell used
can be seen. The following passage will illustrate the com-
parison.

It will be remembered that we asked two questions;
namely, (1) Is there a real table at all? (2) If
so, what sort of object can it be? Now both
Berkeley and Leibniz admit that there is a real
table, but Berkeley says it is certain ideas in‘

the mind of God, and Leibniz says it is a colony'
of souls. Thus both of them answer our first

#0

question in the affirmative, and only diverge from
the views of ordinary mortals in their answer to
our second question. In fact, almost all philo-
s0pher§ seem to be agreed that there is a real
table. 5 _

This passage maintains the type of epistemological dis-
tinction which the present thesis seeks to maintain. It also
suggests that, while there may be widespread disagreement in.
answering the second of the two questions, there may be wide-
spread agreement in answering the first. Of course, for
various philosophers to come even to a debate concerning the
second question, they must have given at least a qualified
assent to the first. Such a locus of agreement, presupposed in
a host of disagreements, is important, at least in the sense
that if it be overlooked, needless confusion can arise. Russell
likewise emphasized its importance when he wrote the following:

Now obviously this point in which the philoe

sophers are agreed-~the view that there is a real

table, whatever its nature may be--is vitally im-,

portant, and it will be worth while to consider

what reasons there are for accepting this view be-
fore we go on to the furthgr question as to the
nature of the real table.2

In analyzing the cognitive relation between oneself and
the world, Mr. Russell advocated the view that immediate know-
ledge of sense data does not apprehend the real object, but only

‘appearance‘. On the basis of the appearance, one infers that

 

25Bertrand Russell, The Problems pi Philosophy (London, 1950),
p. 15.

26Russell, log. pit.

#1

some reality is thereby signified. Thus it is implied that
reality is not known by observation alone, butby a com-
bination of observation and inference, at least. ‘Es Russell
put it: I

It has appeared that, if we take any common object

of the sort that is supposed to be known by the

senses, what the senses immediately tell us is

not the truth about the object as it is apart
from us, but only the truth about certain sense-
data which, so far as we can see, depend upon
the relations between us and the object. Thus
what we directly see and feel is merely 'appear-
ance', which we bglieve to be a sign of some

'reality' behind. ,

.En important characteristic of this view is thatit allows,
not so much a mere summation of sense-data and inference, but
a more complex relationship in which one infers not only'fppm
sense data but about sense data. That is, one understands
sense data in terms of an interpretive pattern, assuming that
they are dependent "upon the relations between himself and
the object." Such relations can only be inferred, since they
relate one to something "behind" appearance, and appearance is
all one gets, in this view, from the sense data.

That such an approach should lend itself to a somewhat
favorable relation with Descartes' first principle is not hard
to deduce. For if one cannot know that there is a real table
without the help of inference, he should not think it strange

I
if he needs to employ the Services of inference in deciding

 

27Ibido, p. 160

#2

whether there is a real self. That is to say, the possibility
of inferping that there is a real self is not excluded.

Instead, it would appear that if there is a real self, the

only way it could be found to exist is by the help of inference,
since this seems to be the only means of cognitive access to
any other 'reality'.

However, at this point, Russell is concerned not with
getting‘pp the belief of his own existence, but rather with
getting peyond this belief, which is already assumed as valid:

For if we cannot be sure of the independent exis-
tence of objects, we cannot be sure of the inde-
pendent existence of other people's bodies,'and
therefore still less of other people's minds, '
since we have no grounds for believing in their
minds except such as are derived from observing
their bodies. Thus if we cannot be sure of the
independent existence of objects, we shall be
left alone in a desert--it may be that the whole
outer world is nothing but a dream, and that we
alone exist. This is an uncomfortable possi-
bility; but although it cannot be strictly pppyed

to be false, there is not tgg slightest reason
to suppose that it is true.

The last sentence questions the idea that pe_§;pne exist,
and not the idea that pp exisp. However, if this interpre-
tation seems doubtful at the moment, it is hOped that references
to subsequent passages will establish its soundness. For
immediate comparison, the following statement may be helpful:

Before we embark upon doubtful mattersE let

us try to find some more or less fixed poin from
which to start. .Although we are doubting the

 

28mm; D- 17.

“3

physical existence of the table, we are not doubting
the existence of the sense-data which made us think
there was a table, we are not doubting that, while
we look, a certain colour and shape appear to us,
and while we press, a certain sensation of hardness
is experienced by us. All this, which is psycho-
logical, we are not calling into question. 9

This passage is important because it exhibits an un-
questioned experiential situation, which apparently remains
unquestioned throughout the subsequent developments of Russell's
thought. If this appraisal is correct, it is of assistance
in interpreting changes in.Mr. Russell's views, since the
changes seem to retain in common an ultimate point of reference}

we come now to Russell's explicit relating of his approach
to the first principle of Descartes. He developed the com-
parison as follows:

By inventing the method of doubt, and by showing
that subjective things are the most certain, -
Descartes performed a great service to philosophy,
and one which makes him still useful to all
students of the subject. ’ '

But some care is needed in using Descartes'
argument. 'I think therefore I am' says rather
more than is strictly certain. It might seem as
though we were quite sure of being the same person
today as we were yesterday, and this is no doubt
true in some sense. But the real Self is as hard
to arrive at as the real table, and does not seem
to have that absolute, convincing certainty that
belongs to particular experiences. When I look at
my table and see a certain brown colour, what is
quite certain at once is not ';_am seeing a brown
colour', but rather, 'a brown colour is being seen'.
This of course involves something (or somebody)
which (or who) sees the brown colour; but it does

 

2?;pig.; pp. 17-18.

not of itself involve that more or less permanent

person.whom we call 'I'. So far as immediate cer-
tainty goes, it might be that the something which

sees the brown colour is quite momentary, and not

the same as the something which has some different
experience the next moment.

Thus it is our particular thoughts and feelings
that have primitive certainty. .And this applies to
dreams and hallucinations as well as to normal per-
ceptions: when we dream or see a ghost, we certainly
do have the sensations we think we have, but for
various reasons it is held that no physical object
corresponds to these sensations. Thus the certainty
of our knowledge of our own experiences does not
have to be limited in any way to allow for excep-
tional cases. Here, therefore, we have, for what
it is worth, a solid' asis from which to begin our
pursuit of knowledge.

The cogito may now be regarded as a common center of
reference, from which Russell's viewpoint and the viewpoint
in this paper diverge. Since the decision for a "solid
basis," to use Russell's expression, will determine some
factors as ultimate for any derivative analyses, a divergence
at this point will be reflected throughout subsequent con-
clusions. However, since basic decisions are often assumed,
rather than re-explained, at later points divergences may
develop proportions which make the earlier decisions difficult
to recognize. Thus it will be important to distinguish the
nature of the divergence as early as possible.

In explaining why the cogito says "rather more than is
strictly certain," Russell proceeded immediately to question
the identity of the person in terms of the person's temporal

 

3thlg0: PP. 18-19.

#5

existence. This approach seems to have confused at the outset
the first principle as such and its possible derivative con-.
siderations. That is to say, Russell became involved immedi-
ately in the nature of the self, or in analyzing whap the self
may be. In the light of the previous comparison of epistemo-
logical approaches, it would seem that, whether one is con-
sidering the self or the table, he may try to decide ££§&.it
exists before asking Egg; sort of item it may be. Particu-
larly, when the tOpic in question is Descartes' first principle,
the consideration of the nature of the self is a derivative
issue, and should not be confused with the cogitg. On this
basis, it is asserted that Russell adopted a dangerous approach
to the principle in question-~such that the rejection of a
particular concept of the pature of the ;_would almost ing,
evitably lead to the rejection of the prior consideration-
that the,I exists in some sense. The appraisal at this point
can only constitute an indication of the proposed interpre-
tation of some of Russell's later conclusions, and of course,
will require substantiation.

Returning to the passage cited above, one may observe a
second possible difficulty. Russell asserted that "the real
Self is as hard to arrive at as the real table." It is possible
here that an important matter was minimized. Once it is assumed
that both the self and the table are real in some sense, it may
be at least as difficult to arrive at knowledge of the nature of

the self, as of the table. However, in asking the prior question

#6

as to whether they are real at all, an important difference is
to be noted. In the one case, the problem is to judge whether
there is something putside the realm of one's subjective
experience, as Russell showed us in a passage previously cited.
(See page #2) In the other case, the issue is to decide what
factors are involved in the constitution of the subjective
realm itself, regardless of whether or not one can know of any
existents outside of it. However, in either case oneself is
assumed to be present, whether he is confined to a subjective
realm or whether he is not. If one attains knowledge of an
external world which can have an existence independent of his
experience, one's knowledge of such a world is not likewise
independent of his experience. Any knowledge that one never
experienced could hardly be his knowledge. vThus the self is
present in either of the cases considered, while the table is
not.- It may take many complex factors to justify an asser-
tion that the table has existence as an external object, but,
whether such an assertion is correct or incorrect, if one even
ventures a guess, he exists. In this respect, the self is

not as "hard to arrive at" as the table.

To equate the self and the table as being objects of
knowledge in the same sense, with perhaps a difference in the
degree of proximity, is to obscure an important factor in the
epistemological situation. If it is possible for a table to
be an object of knowledge, the table is still an object of

knowledge relative to some one. If anyone "arrives at" the

1+7

real table, the knowledge is "arrived at" by someone. In

such a situation, someone is present, but not as an object of
knowledge. Relative to someone else, he may be an object, but
from the standpoint of his own experience he is present in the
experience of kpoping the table. This means that in an ex-
perience in which the self and the table may be alike present,
they may not necessarily be alike objects of knowledge. .Also,
the presence of the self in this "non-object" role would appear
to be more certain than the presence of the table as an ex-
ternal object, since in anything which one experiences, he is
present--whether or not the object is as he supposes.

The presence of the self in this role is of important
consequence if a reference to its "non-object" role is to be
maintained in all cases of knowledge, including the case in,
which the self, rather than the table, is an object of know-
ledge. It is exactly such a reference which is proposed in
this paper. To apply this reference would mean that while
the table may be an object alone to someone, the person cannot
be an object alone to himself, since in such a case he is not
only the object "arrived at," but is what "arrives at" the
object. This prohibits equating the self and the table as
being alike objects of knowledge, since the self is always in-
volved in the role of a knowing subject.

It is not necessary here to assume that in investigating
one's own nature, the self as a subject can be completely

identified with the self as an object. One may include such

a complete identification as a possibility, to show that

there should be no exception in such a case to the principle

of subjective reference. However, any lesser degree of
identification merely makes the point more obvious. That is,
if the self which is known cannot be the same as the self
which knows, then the self which knows can never be an object
to itself, and in this respect cannot be equated with the _
table as an object. 5.11mited comparison can be drawn, between
the self which is the object (rather than the subject of the
knowing experience), and the table. But then the self which

is the object is not necessarily the self which is engaged in

a knowing eXperience. .And if at any time someone knows about
the limited comparison, the self which compared with the

table as an object may not be the self which knows about the,
comparison. Thus at any time one knows about such a comparison,
he has the evidence of its falsity, if the comparison purports
to apply to him.

There are cases in which the self which is known is very
probably different from the self which knows, as, for instance,
when one makes an observation about himself which takes time.
For instance, one may notice that his shoe is pinching his
foot. This of course, involves inference as well as mere
awareness, but the point is not affected by that fact. If it
is assumed that the nerve signals from one's foot take some

tiny interval of time to reach his brain, it might be argued

#9

that he is not the same self at the time he first noticed the
shoe pinching as he was at the time when the nerve signal was
first occasioned. The self at the time of the nerve distur-
bance would be temporally removed from immediate experience,
and one has a choice between the view that the same self has
endured temporally and the view that the self which was known
was a different self from the one which knew.

It is easy to exaggerate the problem created bysuch a
time lag. It should be remembered that there is a much greater
time lag in the scientific observation of the external world.
It is commonly assumed that, in the observation of the sun,
the light has taken time to reach the observer. There is,
then, the common acceptance of an observational impasse which
excludes one from knowing what the sun is doing, if anything,
at the present moment. It would seem by comparison that one
is at a considerable time advantage in observing things about
himself, since the data are more intimately related to the
object in question.

The primary issue, however, is not the difference of.
degree in these observational time gaps, but rather an im-
portant difference with respect to standpoint--in which the
principle of subjective reference is significant. In the
observation of the sun, there is nothing which gives us access
to the sun, if it exists, at the present moment. However, in
the observation of matters about oneself, the fact that he is

engaged in the experience of observation gives him a unique

so

link between the object known and the present moment. Since
the sun has been spoken of as if it possibly had a past and
present existence, let it for the moment be assumed that the
self likewise could have a past and present existence. In
this case, the self as a known object would be past, but would
be present as a knowing subject. In this View of self-know-
ledge, the object that one observes is of the past, but the
fact that one observes is of the present. Thus one would not
be cut off from the present by an observational impasse in the
case of the self as in the case of external objects. The
difference is based not on comparative degrees of proximity,
but on the standpoint of knowing. If one knows what the sun
was a while ago, he can only guess whether it exists at the
present. But if one knows what he was a while ago, the fact
that he knows it would seem to indicate that he still exists
at the present.

If one denies both the self and the sun any enduring exis-
tence, and perhaps considers both as historic routes composed
by successive discrete entities, the argument is changed but
not destroyed. For as a person, who is one historic route, ob-
serves the sun, which is another historic route, his experience
of observation is again the factor which is evidence of his
present existence. In the observation of the sun, the subjective
reference is presupposed, but is of no help in telling an
observer on earth whether the historic route which is the sun

is contemporaneous with him. But in the case of the historic

51

route in which the observation occurs, there is evidence for
the fact that the succession of entities is still proceeding,
and the subjective reference to the experience of observing is
an important factor. ,

vThe cogito, taken without derivative considerations, is
indecisive as to whether there is a continuing self or a
discrete succession of selves. As Descartes found, the cogito
is true "at any time" one considers it. This does not im-
mediately disclose what happens between the times when it is
considered. Russell was rightly wary of the "more or less
permanent person whom we call I" as being known with the
certitude of "particular experiences." The self which can
be a factor in immediate experience §p_apy particular moment
is naturally the self ap_phe particglap momenp ip guestipg.

In so far as the moment is an abstraction from the course
of experience, so will be the self and the datum in question.
But there is no more reason to regard the self as pply an
abstraction than so to regard the particular datum. Both
factors may be real occurrences in an interval which itself is
arbitrarily selected. In any arbitrarily selected interval
of experience, the self has equally as much time to be real
as has anything of which we are aware. Thus a subjective re—
ference can be maintained for any particular experience, but the
immediate givenness or presence of the self will be temporally
as "particular" as any other factor in the experience, and as

the experience as a whole.

52

It would seem that exactly this sort of subjective re-
ference was accepted by Russell when he said, "This of course
involves something (or somebody) which (or who) sees the
brown colour; but it does not of itself involve that more or
less permanent person whom we call 'I'." (See pagehh) In .
this statement, Mr. Russell acknowledged an experiencing sub-
ject which seems adequate for the maintainance of the cogito,
and he also excluded what has been termed in this paper a
derivative consideration--the nature of the self as a "more
or less permanent person." Excluding this derivative con- ,
sideration neither affirms nor denies that the self is some-
thing "more or less permanent," but simply recognizes the
absence of a proper basis to decide, when one's attention is
confined to the immediacy of the moment. It is still a pos-
sibility that there is an enduring self which is present at
any moment of one's experience, but to require such a self to
offer ip‘apy momept proof of its duration beyond phap,momenp
seems to be rather futile. One might as well say, "It's
impossible for me to be fifty years old, unless I am able to
find fifty years at any moment."

No end of trouble can result When one forgets that the
principle of subjective reference, as applied to any moment
of immediacy, is thoroughly inconclusive as to whether the self
referred to endures beyond that moment. Forgetting this may

lead one to say much more or much less than is justified.

53

That is, depending on one's point of view, he may be led to
reason falsely that, if there is a subjective reference, it
refers necessarily to a "more or less permanent person,"or
to reason falsely that, if there is no immediate justification
for the "more or less permanent person," there is necessarily
no subjective reference. There is no lack of publicity for
the first of these errors, so the present consideration.will
be limited to the second, which is, besides, the special
concern of this paper.

When attention is directed at the experience of the mo-
ment, one naturally does not find immediate evidence for
anything more permanent than the moment. That is to say,
any self or any data would seem momentary, whether they were
or not, simply because the unit of attention has so decreed.
To forget this is to run the risk of adopting an approach
which §,priori would be incapable of yielding anything except
a momentary self or data, whether these are momentary or not.
In such an approach, the reasoning would run something like
this: "The only self or data which one can find at any moment
seem momentary; therefore the self or data must be inherently
momentary." .Assuming that it is possible for the self or
data to be inherently momentary, such reasoning remains at_
best a lucky guess. The approach, a_ rior , would render one
incapable of recognizing an enduring reality if there was one.
If one confines himself to what he can find at any moment, a

really enduring reality would still have no longer than any

51+

moment to be present to him, and no matter how many times it
might be present in successive moments, each instance, taken
immediately, would yield nothing but a "momentary" reality,
apparently distinct from that of preceding moments. Thus the
momentariness of a moment may be mistakenly interpreted as

the momentariness of the self or data, and may lead one to a
false §_priori rejection of the "more or less permanent" self.
Hence, whether there is such a self, or whether there is not,
one must not expect to determine the answer from the immediacy
of the moment alone.

There is probably a certain arbitrariness in delimiting a
moment of experience, and if so, this characteristic could be
turned to experimental use. That is, instead of looking for
the smallest possible "moment" of immediate experience only,
one could also look for the largest possible "moment" of
immediate experience, before codifying immediacy in terms of
either. The fact that a very fleeting "moment" of experience
may be discoverable by attention does not in the least show
that such a moment is the basic unit of particular experiences,
if a longer enduring moment may be discoverable in the same ‘
manner, i.e., py atteption. If there is a relativity of par-
ticular experiences to attention, such a fact could prove im-
portant as to the continuing identity of a person capable of
focusing his attention. For the person, as a subject, could be
regarded as enduring at least as long as any span of his attention.

As for what span is most nearly true to the conditions of

55

immediate experience, it is difficult to say, but one may find
his attention most unnaturally strained if he tries to catch
one of Hume's "impressions," which Hume said succeed each other
with an inconceivable rapidity.31

It has here been suggested that the cogito can be used in
the study of the nature of the self, as well as in the question
of the existence of the self. However, it is doubtful that
in such a use the same certitude can be maintained, even though
the study of the nature of the self is often more valuable than
is the assertion, however certain, of the existence of the self.‘:'
with Descartes, for instance, we find that even if one accepts
his first principle, he may soon find that he disagrees with
Descartes' derivative conclusions as to the nature of the self.
But the debatable character of a given application of the pogitg
is not a drawback. Instead, there is sufficient elasticity to
allow the use of the cogitp to keep pace with progressing
knowledge of human nature, and while such progress necessitates
one's discarding certain interpretations of phap_he is, the
progress itself, at any stage, presupposes phap he is.

To summarize the appraisal thus far of the problems in --
Russell‘s approach to the cogito, the following items are pro-
bably the most important. First, while Russell distinguished

 

I, Book I, Part IV, Section VI, p. 239.

56

between the problem of knowing phap a table exists and knowing
th3 the table is, he did not maintain a similar distinction

in the case of the self. Second, the failure to maintain this
distinction was followed by a false equation of the self and
the table as "hard to arrive at." While in certain ways one's
knowledge of the table can be compared to his knowledge of
himself, an important difference must be maintained. The dif-
ference lies, not in the comparative proximity of the self as
an object of knowledge, but in the standpoint of knowing.

Thus, to prove that both the self and the table as pbjegts of
knowledge are not immediately present, would not in the least
prove that the self as a pubject is not present in immediate
experience. Third, along with the above two considerations,
was a faulty interpretation of the cogito, such that there was
confusion between the "I" which is limited by the very con-
sideration of immediate experience, and the "I" which could be
a "more or less permanent person." It would seem that ex-
actly the "I" which could be evident within the confines of
:"particular experiences" was, in passing, acknowledged by
Russell when he said, "This of course involves something (or
somebody) which (or who) sees the brown colour; but it does not
of itself involve that more or less permanent person whom we
call 'I'." (See pages h3-MH) What is questioned in this passage
is not the immediate subjective reference, but a derivative es-

timate of one's nature. In this connection, it has been shown

57

that the experiencing subject is not excluded by the view that
experiences are momentary. That it is not excluded was
apparently presupposed by Russell as he continued, "So far
as immediate certainty goes, it might be that the something
which sees the brown colour is quite momentary, and not the
same as the something which has some different experience the
next moment." (See page Rh) This view of Russell's permits
a subjective reference to "the something which sees" at any
given moment, even though the reference may be to a different
something in each case. In such a view, the subject is equally
as immediate as any datum, even though it may not be present
in the same capacity as the datum. .As to whether the self is
"momentary," however, it was pointed out that there is a danger
of attributing to the self a limitation that perhaps only
characterizes ene's unit of attention. This danger should be
kept in mind in view of Russell's further statement: "Thus
it is our particular thoughts and feelings that have primitive
certainty." (See page he) It is difficult to evaluate the
significance of this statement, since Russell goes on to dis-
cuss our partiCplap experiences as plural, and it would seem that
anything which can have mppe,phap‘ppe particular experience can
have some enduring identity.

It is exactly because there is confusion concerning what "I"
is referred to in "the solid basis" developed by Russell that
one must consider the possible significance of his position at

that time in relation to his later thought. For any confusion

58

in discussing a "solid basis" could have a continuing effect
on subsequent changes and refinements of viewpoint. If the
present appraisal has been correct, the "I" of the cogito is
one of the factors in the "solid basis" set forth by Russell.
But his explicit identification of the "I" as a "more or less
permanent person" shows that he did not so interpret the
cogitp, and did not identify the "I" of the cogito as that
factor in his solid basis referred to as "something which sees."
Thus if the present appraisal is correct, it is not only the
presence of the "I" in the solid basis, but its presence in an
unrecognized capacity which seriously endangered Russell's
later approaches to ego-centric considerations. For the "I"
was relegated to a status which could only be highly question-
able, and it would seem only a matter of time until the "I"
would topple from its precarious position, in the quest for a
scientific account of immediate experience. .And after its
rejection, there may remain the question as to which, or how
much, "I" has been properly considered.

Had the "I" of the cogitp been identified with the "solid
basis" instead of having only a dubious capacity, the whole
problem of dealing with it would have been changed. As it was,
the "I" identified as a "more or less permanent person" was
already deprived of certainty, and--exactly because the "I" was
so identified, the "something which sees" was robbed of sig-
nificance. That is, this "something" was an awkward appendage,

being neither the "I" nor a datum. Russell's approach led to

59

Va split in the subjective aspect cf experience; between a ‘
dubious "I" and an extraneous "something which sees." In this
condition, neither factor could stand before sustained criti-
cism. But, in the same way that these two factors lost sig-
nificance when separated, they would have gained it if identi-
fied with each other. The "I" would have appeared more certain,
and the "something" would have appeared more significant. Thus,
Russell would not have been confronted by the same problem in
ego-centric considerations with the "I" and the "something"
combined as he did with them divorced. Criticisms which would
destroy either in isolation, would not necessarily destroy a
mutual identification of the two, since the "I" would have
gained the certitude of being a factor in immediate experience,
and the "something"would have gained the significance of
personality.

This initial appraisal of Russell's approach cannot be
said to have a conclusive bearing on his later thought, of course.
However, it does appear that his interpretation of the ppgitg
was dangerously deficient, and it is at least possible that

the defects could be reflected in subsequent views.

Some Characteristics of Russell's

Early.&pproach

In order to evaluate more adequately Russell's early treat-

ment of the cogito, it is necessary to consider further some

6O

characteristics of his approach which are of relevance to the
topic in hand.

Despite the precarious status of the "I",Russell tended
to accept it as more certain than external objects. It is
hard to see how he could long be satisfied with such an un-.
certain self, but for the time he seemed to regard the exis-
tence of ourselveg and ppy_experiences as within the realm of
certainty, while the existence of external objects required
further consideration. This may be seen in the following:

In one sense it must be admitted that we can
never prove the_existence of things other than
ourselves and our experiences. No logical absur-
dity results from the hypothesis that the world
consists of myself and my thoughts and feelings
and sensations, and that everything else is mere
fancy. . . . There is no logical impossibility in'
the supposition that the whole of life is a dream,
in which we ourselves create all the objects that
come before us. But although this is not logically
impossible, there is no reason whatever to suppose
that it is true; and it is, in fact, a less Simple
hypothesis, viewed as a means of accounting for .
the facts of our own life, than the common-sense
hypothesis that there really are objects indepen-
dent of us, whose action on us causes our sen-
sations.

The way in which simplicity comes in from
supposing that there really are physical objects
is easily seen.32

If the interpretation thus far has been correct, Russell
here tended strongly to accept the self, but on seriously de-
fective grounds. If such be the case, his later reaction to

this acceptance seems hardly surprising.

 

32Russell, The Problems, pp. 22-23.

61

But whether on defective grounds or not, Russell depended
on the use of a subjective reference in his argument for the
existence of objects other than oneself and one‘s experiences.
That is, one's own experience was used as a basis from which
to assign experiences to other beings. Without an inference
based on one's subjective standpoint, Russell believed that
certain sense-data are inexplicable.

If the cat exists whether I see it or not, we can
understand from our own experience how it gets hun-
gry between one meal and the next; but if it does
not exist when I am not seeing it, it seems odd
that appetite should grow during non-existence as
fast as during existence. And if the cat consists
only of sense-data, it cannot be hungry, since no
hunger but my own can be a sense datum to me. Thus
the behaviour of the sense-data which represent the
cat to me, though it seems quite natural when re-
garded as an expression of hunger, becomes utterly
inexplicable when regarded as mere movements and
changes of patches of colour, which are as incapable
of hunger as a triangle is of playing football.

But the difficulty in the case of cats is
nothing compared to the difficulty in the case of
human beings. When human beings speak--that is,
when we hear certain noises which we associate .
with ideas, and simultaneously see certain motions
of lips and expressions of face--it is very dif-
ficult to suppose that what we hear is not the exe
pression of a thought, as w know it would be if
we emitted the same sounds.

The argument of this passage is quite significant for the
maintainence of the principle of subjective reference. The
idea that one's sense-data can sometimes be understood as an
expression of the experience of other beings is based on an
inference from the standpoint ofra participating subject, not
merely on what is immediately observed. One attributes hunger,

for instance, to another being, not because hunger is a factor

 

331nm. , pp. 23-2%.

62

in his observation of another being, but because the data be-'
come understandable by the inference that another being is
behaving as the observer might if he were hungry and were in
its place. One thus infers from his own subjective standpoint
to the subjective standpoint of another.

The admission of such an inference is important for the
interpretation of experience since neither one's subjective
standpoint, nor the subjective standpoint of another being,
is given as an objecp in sense data. This is perhaps most
obvious in the case of a being other than oneself. {As Russell
put it, "And if the cat consists only of sense-data, it can-
not be hungry, since no hunger but my own can be a sense-datum
to me." This significant statement allows only one par-
ticular subjective reference for a particular datum, since
if one is aware of hunger as a sense-datum, it is hi§.hunger
only which is known. On this basis, if one infers that some
other being is hungry, he infers the existence of some other
experiencing standpoint as an existent factor which is not
given as a sense-datum. Also, this inference is based on a
reference to one's own subjective standpoint, in terms of
which alone any hungep can be known at all, much less be at-
tributed to some other being. But one's own standpoint would
seem to be no more a datum than the cat's, since oneis hunger
is a datum to him even when he is not a datum to himself-~if
indeed he ever could be. Thus, one must either conclude that

there are more existents than can ever be present to experience

63

in the capacity of data, or else change the estimate of oneself
and the cat.

To express this immediate sense-experience in Russell's
later style, one might say, "There is hunger." But the
earlier Russell gave good reason to suppose that this formu-
lation omits an important factor—~the explicit reference to
some subject who knows that "there is hunger," because he is
hungry. Without such a reference, the statement can lay no
claim to the certitude of immediate experience. Apart from
some reference to an experiencing standpoint, one has no reason-
for judging the statement true in preference to its negate,
"It is false that there is hunger." One may ask, in accordance
with the earlier Russell, whether the hunger is one's own,
the cat's, or some other being's. Also, is it known immedi-
epely? For any hunger which one attributes to the cat is not
an immediate datum, and any hunger which is an immediate datum
can only be one's own. ‘Without a reference, implicit or ex-.
plicit, to one's own standpoint, there is no basis for asser-
ting that the statement, "There is hunger," expresses a fact
about immediate experience. For whose immediate experience does
one have access to, except his own?

While Russell set forth arguments which tend to support
the principle of subjective reference, these arguments were
interspersed with others in which may be discerned the seeds of
its rejection. .An indication of later developments was contained

. in his definition of acquaintance.

6%

we shall say that we have acguaintance with
anything of which we are directly aware, without
the intermediary of any'gfiocess of inference or
any knowledge of truths.

E.significant characteristic of this definition is that
whatever is known by acquaintance must be known as an object.
There is little provision for a sub ect, except as assumed in
the fact that someone has acquaintance with something. Of
course, in so far as a subject, if any, can be known as an
object, it can be known by acquaintance, but there remains a
question as to what extent this may be possible. Thus, if.
acquaintance is credited with exhausting the factors of im-
mediate experience, a subject which could not be present as an
object would be excluded, a priori, whether it existed or not.
The position of the subject, then, was‘indeed precarious,

When it is said in this manner that knowledge by ac-
quaintance is limited to "objects," what is meant is not neces-
sarily external objects, but data, in the sense that one is
directly éfl§£2.2£ data. .A "subject" would be something which
ie'eyepe of, or ie acquainted with the data. For a time,
Russell accepted such a "subject," but did not provide for the
possibility that the subject might not be fully capable of being
apprehended as an "object."

' _Failure to allow for this possibility becomes important in
the light of the scope which was attributed to acquaintance.
Russell wrote: "All our knowledge, both knowledge of things

 

3"Ih1d., p. #6.

 

e

and knowledge of truths, rests upon acquaintance as its foun-
dation."35

This foundation implies that the totality of objecte of
acquaintance is exhaustive of the realities present in immediate
experience. A subject which could not fully assume the role
of an object is thereby excluded. This was made more explicit
in Russell's treatment of introspection:

The next extension to be considered is acquain-
tance by introspection. we are not only aware of
things, but we are often aware of being aware of them.
When I see the sun, I am often aware of my seeing the
sun; thus 'my seeing ghe sun' is an object with which
I have acquaintance.3 ,

It is clear in this statement that his introspection would
yield only ebjects of acquaintance, and the possibility of a
subject which does not conform to the object-role was not
covered. It is held that the possibility was not covered on
the ground that it could only have been covered elsewhere by
contradicting the scope of the following statement:

This kind of acquaintance, which may be called self-
consciousness, is the source of all our knowledge of
mental things.3

Russell's adherence to the object-status in the two pas-
sages just quoted is rejected in this paper. In the view which

this paper represents, "my seeing the sun" can be regarded as

a fact whether it is an object of acquaintance or not.{ "My

 

35Ipid., p. #8.’
361bid., p. #9.
37mg” I» L+9.

66

seeing the sun" is as much a fact when "I see the sun" as when
"I am aware of my seeing the sun." Furthermore, in the former
of these two cases, "my seeing" ie the immediate experience,
even though it is not the object of acquaintance. But in the
second case, "my seeing" is once removed from the immediate
experience, since what is immediate is py awareness pf "my
seeing."

If "my seeing the sun," and "my awareness of my seeing the
sun" can occur simultaneously, there are still two subjective
references to be considered. The first is to "my seeing,"
which is distinguishable in the sense that it could occur with-
out introspection. The second is to "py awareness of my seeing."
Since, as Russell said, my seeing is an object "with which I
have acquaintance," the subjective reference here must be to
the "I" which has acquaintance. The "I" which sees and the "I"
which is aware of seeing may be identical, but it would seem
uncertain yet whether they are or not.

Until it is known that these two experiencing subjects are
the same, one has no right to assume that the totality of pbjecte
of acquaintance can yield ell the existent factors of immediate
experience. For if the subject which is aware of seeing is
different than the subject which sees, then the totality of
objects of acquaintance cannot exhaust all the existent factors
of immediate experience. At best the object-status could exhaust

all factors except one, i.e., the subject which is acquainted.

67

At this point, the problems incurred by Russell's approach
appear to be rather acute. Assuming the validity of the prin-
ciple of subjective reference, it could be concluded that
Russell's doctrine of acquaintance is deficient, since it ad-
mits objects only, or subjects in so far as they can be objects.
However, without assuming the principle of subjective reference
to be either proved or disproved, it may be noted that Russell
failed to show the adequacy of his doctrine of acquaintance.
For so long as there remains the possibility that there is a
subject, and the possibility that it is always once removed
from the totality of objects in immediate experience, the
doctrine cannot rightly be said to account for the factors
present in immediate experience. These possibilities should
have been considered, since Russell wished to assert that ell
knowledge rests on acquaintance. Before one can justifiably
use ell in this way, he must be prepared to show that ex-
ceptions are impossible. Even one exception would invalidate
such an assertion.

To accept the doctrine of acquaintance is to place the
subject of experience in a very precarious position. The
subject must be completely susceptible to being an object of
acquaintance, or else it must be rejected, since it then.would
be something with which one is not acquainted. Perhaps the
subject could be known by description, but even so, it could not

be regarded as a factor having the certainty of immediate

68

experience, as do objects of acquaintance. The fate of the
subject, then, appears to be determined within the bounds of
very limited alternatives in Russell's approach. For as long
as one can assume that the subject is completely amenable to
the object-status, one may retain both the subject and the
doctrine of acquaintance. However, if one thus assumes that
the object-status be adequate, the subject may soon appear to
be but an unnecessary appendage. For of what use is a subject,
if a totality of objects is adequate to the interpretation of
immediate experience? And if there is no subject, of what use
is it to think of the data as objects? Thus, while the sub-
ject could possibly be maintained in accord with the doctrine
of acquaintance, its status is uneasy at best. It is not only
open to attack, as is any factor, but it is robbed of all
raieon d'etre.

This alternative rests on the assumption that the subject
is completely amenable to the object-status. But the moment
such an assumption seems untenable, one must reckon with another
alternative. In this case, the supposedly exhaustive doctrine
is beset by a left-over factor in immediate experience, i.e.,

a subject with which one can never be fully acquainted as an
object. This means that one must either modify the doctrine of
acquaintance to accomodate such a subject, or reject the subject.
If one simply accepts the doctrine of acquaintance as a criterion,

he automatically, a rio , excludes any item which is not

69

amenable to the object-role. Consequently, maintaining the
doctrine, there would be no room for any subject which is not
available as an object. It is possible that the subject might
be rejected on justifiable grounds, but if one simply invokes
the doctrine of acquaintance as a criterion, he has done no
more than to say, "There is no subject unless it is an object."
In these straits, it is surprising that the "I" fared as
well as it has in Russell's thought, when apparently so much
militated against its survival. The "I" was so conceived as_
to make its acceptance rest on very shaky grounds. Dissatis-
faction with such grounds was almost sure to come, and a
change of position would naturally follow. The question as
to what "I"'is accepted or rejected may harass the course of_
developments, since the early treatment of the "I" seems dan-
gerously confused. Russell's approach has unduly constricted
the alternatives in terms of which the "I" would be accepted
or rejected, and one cannot therefore follow with confidence
either his early acceptance or his later rejection, unless the
difficulties have been overcome. '
There are cases, however, in which Russell does not seem
to have been bound by the constrictions which have been ela-
borated. It is essential then, to consider some of his state-
ments concerning acquaintance, which apparently contradict the
criticism that acquaintance is falsely limited to a totality of
objects. The following statement plainly differentiated the self

from the objects of acquaintance:

70

'we have spoken of acquaintance with the con-
tents of our minds as self-consciousness, but it
is not, of course, consciousness of our selg: it
is consciousness of particular thoughts and feelings.
The question whether we are also acquainted with
our bare selves, as opposed to particular thoughts
and feelings, is a very different one, upon which
it would be rash to speak positively. ‘When we try
to look into ourselves we always seem to come upon
some particular thought or feeling, and not upon

. the 'I‘t which has the thought or feeling. Never-
theless there are some reasons fgg thinking that
we are acquainted with the "I' .

It might seem that here was provided exactly the subjective
reference which the present thesis endorses. However, while
the "I" was accepted, that very acceptance was apparently beset.
by the constrictions which have been cited. The role of the
"I" was still dangerously confused. At one point Russell
spoke of "our bare selves, as opposed to particular thoughts
and feelings." This assumes that there is a self, but on what
basis? .And in what sense is it opposed to particular thoughts
and feelings? In speaking of one's coming upon particular
thoughts and feelings, he mentions "the 'I' which has the
thoughts or feelings." This would seem to identify the "I"
as the "something" which was a factor in his "solid basis."
However, if Russell meant it that way, why would he not have
accepted the "I" of the cogito, instead of claiming that the
cogite asserted "rather more than is strictly certain?" If
there is an "'I' which has the thought," it is as certain as
the thought. Most important, however, is the tentative relation

drawn between the "I" and acquaintance.

 

381pid., p. 50.

71

Russell admitted that one eeepe_not to come upon the "I",
but he did not choose to affirm that one cannot. Instead, he
developed reasons "for thinking we are acquainted with the 'I'."
That he so conceived the problem is significant, for it might
well be wondered what would have been his conclusion had he
believed that one cannot come upon the "I" as an object of ac-
-quaintance. ‘Would he have held to the acceptance of the "I"
despite the belief that it could not be an object of one'e
acquaintance? Had such a possibility been duly considered, it
would have forced a more definite decision regarding the status
of the "I" and the nature of acquaintance. For here was the
possibility of there being something existent in immediate
experience with which one cannot be acquainted. To face such
a possibility, one must either deny the possibility, or else
modify the doctrine of acquaintance. But Russell did not seem
to recognize that a possibility of this kind created a problem
for his approach, since he was content to argue that one
probably has acquaintance with himself, even though it would
be unwise to assert this as certain.39 Thus, while Russell
raised the question as to whether one is acquainted with him-
self or not, he dealt only with the possibility that one is.
This results in a very unsatisfactory status for the "I". It

neither assures one that he can be acquainted with the "I" nor

 

39Ibid., p. 51.

72

tells him what to do with the "I" if he cannot be acquainted
In another statement, Russell described acquaintance as a
subject-object relation, and seemed again to have rendered the
present criticism of acquaintance false:
When I am acquainted with 'my seeing the sun,'

it seems plain that I am acquainted with two dif-

ferent things in relation to each other. On the one

hand there is the sense-datum which represents the

sun to me, on the other hand there is that which sees

this sense-datum. All acquaintance, such as my

acquaintance with the sense-datum which represents

the sun, seems obviously a relation between the per-

son acquainted and the object with which the person

is acquainted."O

Despite the reference here to the person acquainted, the
same question arises—-namely, was Russell's acceptance of the
subject hinged on the possibility of one's having acquain-
tance with the subject as an object?'.As has been pointed out,
it is possible to maintain both the subject and the doctrine
of acquaintance, provided that the subject is available as
an object. But if there is a subject which cannot be caught
as an object, then there is a factor in immediate experience
with which one cannot be acquainted as an object, and the
doctrine of acquaintance should be modified to accomodate that

factor. The question is, then, was Russell's acceptance of

the subject based on the assumption that it could be an object

 

“Clem” p. 51.

73

of acquaintance, and would his acceptance fall with the as-
sumption, if the assumption proved false? So long as the
assumption could prevail, there would be no real test of his
acceptance of the subject. Acquaintance would still yield.
only a totality of objects, but this totality would be ade-.
quate to include the subject. But if the possibility of ac—
quaintance with the subject had been seriously questioned,
would the subject have been maintained regardless? There
would have been a mutual challenge, such that either the
subject must be rejected, or the idea that factors "one is
acquainted with" are adequate to account for immediate
experience.

It would seem that Russell's doctrine of acquaintance
must be given priority over his acceptance of the subject,
so that in a test between the two, the subject must be_the
first to go. The strong propensity for identifying ac-
quaintance in terms of the object—status cannot be ignored,
especially when introspection was concerned. This propensity
is evident in the following passage:

Further, we know the truth 'I am acquainted
with this sense-datum'. It is hard to see how we
could know this truth, or even understand what is
meant by it, unless we were acquainted with some-
thing which we call 'I'. It does not seem neces-
sary to suppose that we are acquainted with a more
or less permanent person, the same today as yes-
terday, but it does seem as though we must be ac-
quainted with that thing, whatever its nature,

which sees the sun and has acquaintance with sense-
data. Thus, in some sense it would seem that we

7%

must be acquainted with our Selves as opposed to‘

particular eXperiences. But the question is dif-

ficult, and complicated arguments can be adduced

on either side. Hence, although acquaintance with

ourselves seems probably to occur, it is flit wise

to assert that it undoubtedly does occur. .

Thus, in dealing with the "I", which could most likely
of all items cause a breach in the adequacy of the object-
status, Russell was content to hope he could get at the "I"
as an object of acquaintance, granting that the "I" also is
a subject of acquaintance. If the object-status is assumed
to be adequate in this extreme case, there can hardly be any
further challenge to its adequacy. .A totality of objects of
acquaintance will then apparently account for the factors of
immediate experience. But if the "probability" of acquain-
tance with the "I" fails, the fate of the "I" is sealed. It
cannot then belong to the totality of factors in immediate
experience.
The interpretation of acquaintance in terms of the ade-
' quacy of the object-status is cemented even more firmly in
the discussion of descriptions:
The fundamental principle in the analysis of
propositions containing descriptions is this: Evegy

proposition which ye can understand must pe com-
posed wholl ‘9; constipuents with which ye are

acquainted. 2

 

"libid., p. 51.
”Zrbld., p. 58.

75

If one cannot be acquainted with himself, i.e., if one
cannot be an object of acquaintance to himself, no term A
referring to him could qualify, then, as a constituent. How-
ever, as long as Russell continued to assume this self-acquain-
tance,)+3 he did not have to face the problem. One can only
note that sooner or later, the problem was bound to exact a
more definite decision as to the status of the subject.

In concluding the consideration of the views expressed in
The Prqbleme e: Philosophy, some mention should be made con-
cerning Russell's description of judgment and belief. In his
views on these points, one is led to wonder further at the
nature of Russell's appraisal of the cogito.

In every act of judgement there is a mind which
judges, and there are terms concerning which it
judges. ‘we will call the mind the subject fig the
judgement, and the remaining terms ob ect

It would seem that this doctrine is based on the same
constituents as the cogito. However, one cannot be sure just
how certain Russell intended the status of the subject of a
judgement to be, in View of his criticism of the cogito. If _
the mind can be identified with the "I" as a more or less per-

manent person, then, "rather more than is strictly certain" has

been claimed for the subject of a judgment. If, on the other

 

1+Blbido, p. 51+.
“mold” p. 126.

76

hand, the subject has a status comparable to the "something
which sees the brown colour," it has the certainty of immediate
experience. In this case, the View suggested in this paper is
that the subject should have been recognized as the "I", making
the "I" a constituent in immediate experience. However, because
of Russell's explicit criticism of the "I" of the cogito, one
must assume that he would similarly have criticized the formu-
lation, "I judge, therefore I am."
The same essential constituents are found in the structure

of belief:

When an act of believing occurs, there is a complex,

in which 'believing' is the uniting relation, and

ifibifiét:223.33Sfitihirieifiifiieififiei1233i:”335”“

It would seem that the subject here would allow one to

say "I believe, therefore I am." But, of course, the same
problem of identifying the subject is still present, and the
same conflict between the approach of this thesis and the
approach of Russell. Russell's approach would lead one to
say that he cannot be sure the subject of belief is the "I".
But the problem of attaining certainty in this matter may be
easily misconceived, for if epe pelieves that the subject of
belief is the "I", he himself thus becomes a subject of belief,
and consequently supports his appraisal of belief. Is this

a mere play on words? Not if anyone actually believes it to

L*5Ih1d., p. 127.

77

to be a play on words. Furthermore, if the subject of one's
believing is not really himself, how could he know that there
is.a subject, since it could only be presented to him as an
object? If it be argued that he could infer it, then on what
basis? He can infer it from his own case only if he is a
eubject. Thus, the failure to identify the subject as the "I"
of the cogitq makes the subject untenable, since it can neither
be observed, nor, once omitted, can it be inferred.

It is contended therefore that Russell improperly criti-
cized the "I" of the co to, and that the error was reflected
throughout his early treatment of the subject-object relation.
The result was to weaken both the status of the "I" and of
the subject-object relation, and to carry a serious predica-
ment to his later thought. For Russell sought both to base
all knowledge on the objects with which one has acquaintance,
and to maintain the subject-relation in experience. Thus,
either there must be reflexive acquaintance with the subject,
or else the subject must become something with which one has
no acquaintance. In the latter case, if one accepts the
existence of the subject, he admits that there exists in im-
mediate experience something with which he has no acquaintance.
Or, if one gives priority to the doctrine of acquaintance, then
he cannot accept the existence of the subject.

In view of the fact that Russell had set forth the theory
of logical types, it seems possible that in his analysis of

experience a reflexive acquaintance might not long prove

78

acceptable, and that Russell could not long avoid encountering
the subject as an item with which one has no acquaintance. For
if oneself involves all of a collection of objects with which
one is acquainted, could oneself be one of the collection? .And_
if oneself is not one of the collection, does the collection ex-
haust the constituents of immediate experience.

However, it is not necessary to assume that abstract
logic exerted an influence in analysis of immediate experience.
fThe difficulty present by adherence to the doctrine of ac-
quaintance may be seen in the following discussion by
‘Werkmeister, in which he indicated the problem of arriving at
the "I" by introspection:

Introspection reveals the experiencing subject only

as an elusive and undefinable "point of reference,"
and no matter how narrowly we restrict our reflec-
tive thoughts to "ourselves," the "I" which reflects
and the "I" reflected upon remain logically dif-
ferentiated. The "thing which thinks, i. e., the

"mind" or "soul, " is as much "object" of reflection

as is a "tree" or a "dream," and it cannot be di-
rectly identified with the "subject" which "reflects."
The "indubitable certainty" of the latter, there-
fore, does Rgt justify deductions which presuppose

the former.

Whether werkmeister is exactly right or not in this state-
ment, it serves to indicate the problem which had been incurred
in Russell's approach. For if Russell were to decide that he
could not catch the "I" as something with which he is acquainted,

another decision would be forced. He must then relinquish the

 

1+6werkmeister, §_Philosophy q; Science, p. 85.

79

"I" as a subject, or else modify the doctrine of acquaintance.
It is contended in this paper that such a decision was probably
forced, on the grounds that had Russell decided he eeplq catch
the "I" as something with which he was acquainted, he would
have had no reason for abandoning his early acceptance of the
"I" as a proper name.

In his famous essay, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and
Knowledge by Description," Russell affirmed his view of ac-
quaintance as a subject-object relation. The following passage
will illustrate:

In the second place, the word acquaintange is de-
signed to emphasise, more than the word resen ation,
the relational character of the fact with which we
are concerned. There is, to my mind, a danger that,
in speaking of presentation, we may so emphasise the
object as to lose sight of the subject. The result
of this is either to lead to the view that there is
no subject, whence we arrive at materialism; or to
lead to the view that what is presented is part of,
the subject, whence we arrive at idealism, and should
arrive at solipsism but for the most desperate con-
tortions. Now I wish to preserve the dualism of
subject and object in my terminology, because this
dualism seems to me a fundamental fact concerning
cognition. Hence I prefer the word acquaintance,
because it emphasises the need of a subject which

is acquainted.

With this passage, the present paper has no explicit
quarrel. It is simply observed that the passage does not tell
us what will happen if the "subject which is acquainted" proves
to be something with which that subject cannot itself be

 

1+7Bertrand Russell, "Knowledge by.Acquaintance and Knowledge
by Description," Myeticism and Legic and other Essays (London,
1921), p. 210.

8O

acquainted. In other words, the problem which has been des-
cribed is simply dormant, for Russell evidently assumed that
acquaintance with the "I" is possible. Had he assumed such
acquaintance impossible, the status of the subject would have
been already challenged.

In at least one case, however, Russell did consider ex-
plicitly the possible case in which the "I" is not a direct
object of acquaintance. He reasoned as follows:

It is plain that we are not only acquainted with
the complex "Self-acquainted-withqA," but we also
kpey the proposition "I am acquainted with A."
Now here the complex has been analyzed, and if "I"
does not stand for something which is a direct
$33?3:3£12°ifiii‘éfiifi‘gehé’instilé.Eiiip‘éi.S‘ffig°8"

The alternatives for the "I" in this passage are important.
If the "I" is not one of the totality of objecte of acquain-
tance, then it is known by description. The effect of these
alternatives is to make the maintainance of the subject as a
factor in immediate experience increasingly difficult. If the
subject cannot be an object, then it cannot have the certi- _
tude of immediate experience. If the subject becomes a deri-
vative consideration, possibly known by description, it still
cannot have the certitude of immediate experience.

However, there was evidence of the tacit acceptance of the

"probability" that there is a reflexive acquaintance. Russell's

argument as to how Bismarck could make a judgment about himself

 

l"3mm” p. 211.

81

as a constituent, with the proper name standing for an object,
not a description, was evidently an argument posited on the
assumption that there is such a thing as acquaintance with
oneself.1+9

The Bismarck illustration shows also the plight of the
"I" if the assumption of reflexive acquaintance fails. For
to others, Bismarck is known by description, and, if reflexive
acquaintance fails, he would be known to himself likewise
by description. In this case, Bismarck could no longer refer
to himself with the proper name standing for an object instead
of a description. There would be no more chance for "I" to
stand as a proper name. Thus, the questionable assumption of
reflexive acquaintance held the key to significant changes.

Russell apparently did not seriously expect to encounter
the breakdown of the assumption of reflexive acquaintance.
For he proceeded on the acceptance of views which are reminiscent
of the co t , and in which the principle of subjective reference
seems quite safe:

To begin with judgments: a judgment, as an oc-

curence, I take to be a relation of a mind to

several entities, namely, the entities which com-

pose what is judged.

But myself and judging are constituents shared by
all my judgments. ‘

 

L9113161., p. 216.

82

many-term relation,

Supposing, like judging, is" O

of which a mind is one term.
But as comfortably established as the subject seems in

these passages, one does not have to proceed one page to be
reminded that the restrictive power of the object-status was
also present:

Thus the principle which I enunciated may be re-

stated as follows: Whenever e relation.e§ supposing

e; judging occurs, the terms 32 which the supposing

. ep_judging mind ie_related py the relation 9:,

supposing_ep judging must pe terms with which the

mind ip question ie eequainted. This is merely to

say that we cannot make a judgment or a supposition

without knowing what it is that we are making our

judgment or supposition about. 1

This last sentence especially sounds so sensible as to

leave one nodding his head in approval; but if one looks
carefully, he may see that judging is bound to a totality of
objects of acquaintance. Also since the judging subject is,
still considered a reality, we may discern again the assump-
tion that this subject will not disturb the adequacy of the
object-status, i.e., that it may have itself as an object
of acquaintance. The extent to which Russell relied on this
assumption may be judged from the following:

And I should hold further that, in this sense, there

are only two words which are strictly proper names of
particulars, namely, "I" and "this." 2

 

5°Ip1d., pp. 2197220.
511b1d., pp. 220-221.
521h1d., p. 22h.

83

It does not seem that Russell would have asserted this if
.he was much worried about the possibility of one's pep being
an object of his own acquaintance. And because self-acquain-
tance was so firmly entrenched in his views, there was as

yet no stirring of the conflict latent in the doctrine of ac-
quaintance and the status of the subject.

There is an instance of agreement between the present
paper and Russell's early approach with respect to a rather
important point. In discussing judgment as an occurence with
a mind as one of its constituents, Russell explained his re-
ference to a pipe as follows:

I use this phrase merely to denote the some-
thing psychological which enters into judgment
without intending to pre'udge the question as to
what this something 15.53

This statement agrees with the suggested view that the
subjective reference can legitimately indicatethe existence
of a subject without fully defining its nature. That is, one
can know ppep a subject is, even if he does not know just peep
it is.

This concludes the consideration of some characteristics
of Russell's early approach, and their possible significance
for his later thought. Among the characteristics noted has

been the precarious status of the subject of experience; Russell's

propensity for accepting it anyway; and the latent clash between

 

53M. 9 p0 2310

8%

the acceptance of the subject and the acceptance of the doctrine

of acquaintance.

The Subsequent Change

 

In.The.Analysi§ 2i Mind, there was a resolution of the
difficulties attending Russell's previous acceptance of the
experiencing subject. The resolution was effected by rejecting
the subject as an existent in immediate experience. To consider
this change of position is the purpose of this section.

The following passage will serve to indicate the change
which had taken place.

The first criticism I have to make is that the
eep seems unnecessary and fictitious. The occurence
of the content of a thought constitutes the occurence
of the thought. Empirically, I cannot discover any-
thing corresponding to the supposed act; and theo-
retically I cannot see that it is indispensable. 'we
say: "I think so-and-so," and this word "I" suggests
that thinking is the act of a person. Meinong's
"act" is the ghost of the subject, or what was once
the full-blooded soul. It is supposed that thoughts
cannot just come and go, but need a person to think
them. Now, of course it is true that thoughts can be
collected into bundles, so that one bundle is my
thoughts, another is your thoughts, and a third is
the thoughts of Mr. Jones. But I think the person is
not an ingredient in the single thought: he is
rather constituted by relations of the thoughts to,
each other and-to the body. This is a large question,
which need not in its entirety, concern us at pre-
sent. .All that I am concerned with for the moment -
is that the grammatical forms "I think," "you think,"
and "Mr. Jones thinks," are misleading if regarded
as indicating an analysis of a single thought. It
would be better to say "it thinks in me," like "it
rains here;" or better still, "there is a thought in
me." This is simply on the ground that what Meinong
calls the act in thinking is not empirically

85

a

discoverable 'or logically deducible from what we
can observe.5" . V ‘ ,

This statement will require detailed attention. First, when
the "act" is regarded as "fictitious," one could simply proceed
to evaluate the reasons, but when the "act" is regarded as
"unnecessary," a certain standard is introduced which bears
watching in itself. "Unnecessary" does not speak to the same
alternatives as does "fictitious." The latter represents
simply an opinion as to whether there really is the act or not.
The former, however, by-passes this direct question, and asks
if a hypothesis (that there is the act) is "indispensable" to
some purpose, such as the rendering of an account of ex-
periences. ‘With respect solely to the question, "Is there
really the act?" the act cannot be "unnecessary." It either
is real or not. 'With reSpect to rendering an account, the
act might seem necessary but have no other reality than as a
factor in explanation; or the act might seem unnecessary and
still be an existent brute fact. Thus, in deciding what ie
real in the experience of thinking, one must remember that the
ability to give an account of thinking which does not include
the "act" still leaves undetermined the question as to whether
there really is the "act."‘ When the existence of a factor is
the point in question, the existence or noneexistence of the

factor determines what account is necessary; the account does

 

S‘IBgrtrand Russell, The Analysie pi: Mind (London, 1921),
Pp. 17"]. O ’

 

86

not determine whether the factor is necessary. This would not
perhaps be important, except for the common tendency to assume
that the account which involves a minimum of factors is best.

This suggests that one should primarily attend to the
direct question, "Is the act fictitious or not?" Since Russell
regarded Meinong's act as "the ghost of the subject," one may
expect that the logical constrictions which have been shown to
beset the subject may also beset the apt, unless, of course,
Russell's development had by that time freed him from these
constrictions. However, to adhere to the direct question
above, and sort out its treatment from the discussion of what
is "necessary" for purposes of theory, one finds essentially
the following: "Empirically, I cannot discover anything
corresponding to the supposed act. . . ."

To this, perhaps Meinong could simply have opposed, "I
can."' However, the present paper is concerned with this.
matter only in so far as it concerns the fate of the sub-
jective reference, which Russell seemed to have considered as
closely related to Meinong's "act." The queStion is--what
ggulg Russell have discovered empirically, within the confines
of his approach? It is hard to believe that the alternatives
incurred by his approach were essentially changed, when he
"found" exactly what its difficulties would have led him to
find. He found exactly what was compatible with a totality of
ijgng of.acquaintanqe. The content of thought seemed adequate.

The subject, previously in a precaridus position, disappeared.

87

It would seem that both the act and the subject were
placed in the predicament that Russell could discover empiri-
cally nothing but objects of acquaintance, and that he had been
forced to abandon the assumption of reflexive acquaintance.

At this point, one can say with assurance that Russell did
abandon the assumption, for otherwise he would have retained
the subject as a constituent of the content of awareness._ The
rejection of the subject also emphasizes the priority which

had been granted to the object-status in acquaintance, for

once acquaintance with the subject was abandoned, Mr. Russell's
previous commitment to the existence of the subject, and his
insistence on the restriction to "what we are acquainted with,"
were brought into direct conflict. The fact that the subject
was rejected indicates the force of Russell's identification

of acquaintance with the object-status, such that a totality

of such objects is assumed to exhaust what is "empirically_
discoverable." However, this conclusion can only be an es-
timate of what happened, of course, since Russell could have
arrived at the conclusions he did for entirely different reasons.

Whether or not one can empirically discover the act or
the subject is a question in which standpoint is of extreme
importance. It seems unlikely that either would be found as
objects only. Kent's views are helpful in this respect, since
he argued that, even though a free act on the part of a moral
agent is possible, the observation of such an act yields only

a sequence of apparently determined causal patterns.' In this

88

sense, whether there is or is not the act, it is not "empirically
discoverable" from an observational standpoint, i.e., a stand-
point which considers only what can be observed. But this
shows an inherent limitation of the observational standpoint,
not necessarily of reality--since such a standpoint could not
yield the discovery of an act if there was one. {And if the
range of what is "empirically discoverable" is identified
with this standpoint, then that range too will be inherently
indecisive as to whether there is, or is not, an act. In such
a case, one would merely be reporting faithfully a limitation
of his standpoint if he said, "Empirically, I cannot discover
anything corresponding to the supposed act."
Forethis-reasonthe present paper maintains the impor-
tance of the standpoint preserved by the principle of sub-
jective reference--the standpoint from which the act is known
through participation, rather than as an object of observationff
From this standpoint, the existence of the act depends on
whether one performs it, not on whether he is ever able to
observe his performing it. It should not be surprising if the
act as an immediate experience disappears upon oneis attempt
to observe it, since in this case immediacy is transferred to
one's observing. When the act, then, is consigned to be either
an object of our observation or nothing, and is not found as an
object, the alternative is obvious. However, there may be an

act which is real but is not an object of observation, since

89

the case that observation itself can be the immediate act is at
least a possibility.

But from a participant's standpoint, can one know that

 

there is an act or a subject? This question itself is in
danger of presupposing the adequacy of the object-status for
the act and the subject. It would seem that if one kpppp
anything, he participates in knowledge. In this sense, one's
participating is not so much an object of knowledge, as a
presupposition of knowledge. .As a presupposition of knowledge,
it is ultimate for knowledge, and must not itself be justified
by appeal to some other "more ultimate" criterion. This view
does not exclude one's knowing about acts or subjects as
objects in some senses. For instance, a factor can be an
object of assertion even when it cannot be an object of
observation, as one can discuss the Kantian act even if he
cannot see it. But the View certainly excludes the identifi-
cation of knowledge of matters of fact with certain uses of
observation as a criterion, such that matters of fact are con-
ceived as a totality of objects of observation.

It is difficult to say to what extent the limits of the
observational standpoint governed Russell's conception of
"matters of fact." For while it appears that such a standpoint
led him to reject the subject as a factor in immediate experience,
one cannot be sure as to how complete a rejection was made. The
rejection seems unequivocable at times, but the subjective

character of individual experience seems to be presupposed

90

throughout. Russell argued that "the person is not an ingre-
dient in the single thought," and that the grammatical form

"I think" is misleading if regarded as indicating the analysis
of a single thought. However, he accepted as a revision,
"there is a thought in me." It would.seem that this revision
still involved some relation between "a thought" and "me,"
even if "I" am a bundle of thoughts. Furthermore, such a
relation must be special enough to make the idea of immediate
experience meaningful. If there are thoughts without thinkers
all over the place, this does not change the fact that for one
to be immediately aware of some, there must be some relation
which leads one to call some of these thoughts his. Immediate
experience involves not only thoughts, but thoughts in the
role of being someone's thoughts at the time. Thus the totality
of thoughts which might exist, or the totality of thoughts
which might constitute a person, are not the same as the
totality of thoughts defined by a given range of immediate
experience.

If immediate experience is in question then, one must use
some principle to distinguish a given range within the host of
thoughts which may exist, or which "come and go." The
principle of subjective reference defines such a range of
thoughts in terms of their being experienced by a subject. The
subject is maintained as a factor in immediate experience on the
ground that if it were removed from immediate experience there

would be an impasse between the experience and whatever is aware

91

of it. .A mediating factor would then be necessary, and the
experience in question would not be immediate to whoever is
supposedly aware of it. If one calls a given range of immediate
experience his, it would seem that a "he-thought" relation
must be maintained. For if there are thoughts which have no
relation to him, they are not certaintly factors which hp
immediately experiences.

Thus, while "I think" may be misleading as to the analysis
of all the single thoughts that may exist, it is not necessarily
misleading as to the analysis of a thought as a constituent of

immediate experience. Perhaps thoughts do not need a person

 

to think them, but whenever anyone has thoughts, there is a
hg-thgught relation. .And this relation will hold for any
thoughts with which one is ever acquainted, or which ever come
within the scope of human knowledge. It is not the same to
discuss the private life of a thought as it is to discuss one's
immediate experience of thoughts. There may be many thoughts
whose acquaintance one will never make, but unless he does,
they can never be constituents of his immediate experience.
Russell did state that thoughts can be collected into
bundles, so that one bundle is "my" thoughts, one is "yours,"
and so on. But one must understand this in relation to the
denial of the subject-thought relation in immediate experience.
It is important to remember here Russell's earlier contrast
between the "more or less permanent person," which now has become

a "biography," and "the something which sees the brown colour,"

92

which now is rejected-~at least as a constituent of immediate
experience. It would seem that in such an approach there is
no satisfactory link between the "biography" concept and
immediate experience. When the "I" is not a constituent of
immediate experience and is identified as a biography, it is
hard to see how one can ever have immediate experience.

As has been true throughout the consideration of Russell's
relation to the cogito, one finds him so near to the acceptance
of its "I," and yet so far away. It seems at some points
that he accepts exactly the ingredients of the cogitg, ahd yet
one is confronted with his explicit rejection. It would seem,
for instance, that the subjective reference is maintained in
the following: "Subjectivity is the characteristic of per-
spectives and biographies, the characteristic of giving the
view of the world from a certain place."55

However, this characteristic is plainly differentiated
from involvement with consciousness, experience, and memory.

It is compared to the function of a photographic plate, and
"56

is called the "'passive' place of a particular. In con-
trast, the present thesis regards the subjective reference as
applying to a participant self in any of the ranges of experience,

active or passive, whether judging, acting, observing, believing,

 

5’5Russell, The Analysis pf Mind, p. 296.
56Russell, loc. cit.

93

feeling, affirming, denying, knowing, or playing baseball, .Any
of these things, as immediately experienced, involve a re-
ference to a self which experiences at the time in question.
Whatever this self is, when it is involved in an experience,

the Cartesian form "I experience" still seems most adequate

to express the subjective reference, since it is applicable

to any participating subject at any time. That is, "I experience"
or "I have experiences" refers to whoever is engaged in the
experience of considering such a proposition. To say, "There
are experiences," tells us nothing definite about a given range
of immediacy. To say, "Someone has eXperiences," may seem
properly impersonal, and would be true if it were so much as
considered by anyone. But if impersonal, it is also indefinite.
While "someone" can by chance refer to the right experiencing
self, "I" refers to no one else than the one who is eXperien-
cing self, "I" refers to no one else than the one who is
experiencing something. Thus, the cogito is closer to eXpres-
sing the relations of immediate experience than any suggestion
which has been found in Russell's approach.

In The Analysis 2; Matter, there seems to be no significant
change in Russell's VieWpoint. In discussing what he con-
sidered to be epistemologically primitive, he listed sense-data,
relations among these items, recollections, and expectations.

He considered that relations among particular experiences effect

9h

"localization in the body,"5‘7 and thus can account for bio-
graphies. Valid knowledge was to consist of these primitive
factors plus legitimate constructs of inference. Russell con-
trasted this view with his former ones as follows:

In the above account, I have omitted many things
which I formerly "knew " and which, apparently, most
other people "know." I have omitted "objects. '
former days, my apparatus of non-inferential know-n
ledge included tables and chairs and books and per-
sons and the sun and stars. I have come to regard
these things as inferences. I do not mean that I
inferred them formerly, or that other people do so
now. I fully concede that I did not infer them.

But now, as the result of an argument, I have be-
come unable to accept the knowledge of them as valid
knowledge, except in so far as it can be inferred
from such knowledge g3 I still consider epistemo-
logically primitive.

It is not clear how far back the "former days" were
supposed to go, but it seemed that in The Problems pi
Philosophy, Russell had already based the knowledge of the
existence of other persons and of the famous cat upon in-
ference. He showed very ably why the cat was not a mere col-
lection of one's sense data, and why one must infer to assign

existence to other people.

The primitive items, plus inferential constructs, could
not, of course, yield another existent factor--such as a sub-
ject of the data, which is not itself one of the data. For
Russell held that nothing existent can imply any other existent

 

57Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Matter (New York, 1927)

581bid., p. 181.

95

59

except a part of itself. Since there was admitted no self
as an ingredient in the particular experiences, none could
later be inferred.

While "objects," meaning the inferred items in the
passage just quoted, are denied, the object-status of exis-
tents still appears to be maintained.

The metaphysic which we have been developing
is essentially Berkeley's: whatever is, is per- .
ceived. But our reasons are somewhat different
from his. we do not suggest that there is any im-
possibility about unperceived existents, but only ‘
that no strong ground exists for believing in them.
Berkeley believed that the grounds against them
were conclusive; we only suggest that the grounds
in their favour are inconclusive. I am not ase
serting thigé I am proposing it as a view to be
considered. ’

From the standpoint of this paper, it is good to read.
that there is at least the possibility of unperceived exis-
tents. However, the important point in this passage concerns
the side of Berkeley's view which is Omitted--that is, the
subjective reference to perception as an experience-~"To ‘
be is to perceive." The omission affects greatly the meaning _
of the side of Berkeley's view which was preferred by Russell--
"To be is to be perceived." These two statements, taken to-
gether, g9 allow for "unperceived existents," which, in Berkeley's
case, were minds. Thus, with respect to some unperceived exis-

tents, Berkeley did not believe that "grounds against them were

 

59Ibid., p. 199._
601bid., pp. 213-21h.

96

conclusive." .But if the two statements are taken separately,
so that one is given additional scope, in the hOpe that it is
adequate, a different totality of existents results. The idea
that "whatever is, is perceived" is not "essentially Berkeley's."
Russell's interpretation changed the range of existents, and
his revision could yield only a totality of objects, where
Berkeley equally provided for a totality of subjects. Of
course, Russell only suggested his view, but the present con-
cern has been with his tendencies of interpretation, which
apparently continued to identify existents with the object-
status only.

It would seem that in the course of time, the object-
status of the items of immediate experience became more 9
firmly entrenched in Russell's thought. Once the subject is
gone, the term "object" loses significance and may be dropped.
However, the resultant status, whatever it is called, is
characterized by an absence of the subject, leaving a totality
of not-subjects. Moreover, it has been shown that a possible
reason for the absence of the subject was present at the time
both subject and object were accepted. At that time, there was
an undue exaggeration of the scope of the object-status. To
interpret the later absence of the subject solely in terms
of what is "empirically discoverable" is hardly justified. For.
of what use is it to report, "I find no subject in immediate ex-
perience," if objects only can appear in one's adopted

standpoint?

97

It is concluded, therefore, that Russell's change of
viewpoint, in which the subject of experience was rejected,
was apparently a natural consequence of the earlier difficul-
ties of his approach. For so long as Russell continued to
adhere to the adequacy of the object-status, as required by
his doctrine of acquaintance, he would be forced to reject any
subject which was not completely amenable to the object-status.
In view of the fact that Russell rejected the subject, it is
evident that he found no subject of the kind that his approach
would permit. However, this does not mean that there is no
subject of any kind, and because Russell's approach would
have excluded, §_priori, any subject which could not be an ‘
object of its own acquaintance, his rejection has been re-

garded in this paper as inconclusive.
The Recent Criticism

In completing the discussion of Russell's approach as it
relates to the cogito, it remains to consider a recent criticism
advanced by Russell, in order to determine whether or not the
considerations developed in this chapter continue to apply.
Russell evaluated Descartes' first principle in.§ History pf
western Philosophy as follows: '

"I think" is his ultimate premise. Here the word
"I" is really illegitimate; he ought to state his
ultimate premise in the form "there are thoughts."
The word "I" is grammatically convenient, but does

not describe a datum. When he goes on to say, "I
am a thing which thinks," he is already using

98

uncritically the apparatus of categories handed

down by scholasticism. He nowhere proves that

Efii‘iigistfiiideicifinfi’; “Shiit‘iiiie r§a§°81t°
g se 5 .

To all appearances, this criticism introduced no factors,
which would serve to alter the applicability of the considera-
tions developed in the course of this chapter. Russell ap— '
parently was still using "the apparatus of categories handed
down" from his own earlier approach. When he pointed out
that the word "I" does not describe a datum, his approach to
immediate experience remained essentially unchanged. It has
been shown that the status which Russell attributed to data
was not adequate to deal with the possibility that there might
be an existent subject.

Russell's statement as to whether thoughts need a thinker
is indeed interesting. First, there is the question as to
whether the problem is conceived correctly. Does the word
"thoughts" represent a correct unit of abstraction from
immediate experience? Once the abstraction is made, it is, of
course, easy to disclaim the need for some factor which has
not been included, and which therefore is already consigned to
appear as an addition to immediacy. Does, then, the word

"thoughts" possibly represent an abstraction from an immediate

experience in which an experiencing subject is involved?

 

61Bertrand Russell, A.History of Western Philospph 1 (New York,
l9h5), p. 567.

99

If one looks only for what is presented in immediate experience,
he may conclude that "thoughts" are the correct units. However,
it is not necessary to assume that only what is presented is
present.

Second, suppose that thoughts do not "need a thinker."
Must one show that they do in order to warrant his acceptance
of the cogito? The question here is not what thoughts in
general may "need," but whether in the consideration of
immediate experience it is proper to omit a reference to the
role of thoughts as immediately experienced by someone. The
omission of such a reference leaves no basis for accepting
the statement "there are thoughts" in preference to its negate,
"it is false that there are thoughts." Of course, a reference
to immediate experience may simply be assumed, but when it is,
one is in danger of hiding the pogitp unrecognized in his .
assumptions. . . .

Third, the statement in question suggests that Descartes
failed to'ppgyg his ultimate premise. It would seem then,
that the principle is placed in a rather peculiar predicament.
If the principle is not proven, it is made to appear unworthy
of acceptance as an ultimate premise. But if it were proven,
it would not be accepted as an ultimate premise, since it would
have been proved in terms of some more ultimate principle. It
would seem that confusion could have arisen from the modes of

thought of Russell's view of immediate experience, in which

100

the "I" could only be an inferential construct. Thus the
alternatives would appear to be, is "the thinker" proven to
exist or not? But if the "I" is an ultimate presupposition of
one's formulation of gay ultimate premises, this suggestion
that there was a need for proof was out of place. Whether

the "I" has such a status or not, the possibility should have
been considered adequately. But adequate consideration is
precluded by the very suggestion of a need for proof in this
case, since the suggestion excludes, g priori, the possibility
that "I think" is an ultimate premise. Else, it seems sig-
nificant that the demand is a natural expression of Russell's
view of immediate experience in which the "I" could only be

a derivative construct.

It may be noted in one example of Russell's pattern of
formulation, that the formulation leads to considerable
communicative difficulty:

Our next problem is: when we notice an occurrence,
how can we formulate a sentence which (in a dif-

ferent sense) we "know" to be true in virtue of
the occurrence? ~

If I notice (say) that I am hot what is the
relation of the occurrence that I notice to the
words "I am hot"? we may leave out "I", which
raises irrelevant problems, and suppose that I
merely say "there is hotness." (I say "hotness,"
not "heat," because I want a word for what can be
felt, not for the physical concept.) But as this
phrase is awkward, I shall go on saying "I 23 hot,"
with the above proviso as to what is meant.

 

62Bertrand Russell 'An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth
(New York, 1940), pp. 6 $5.

101

If such a phrase is "awkward," part of the reason may be
that it is inexpressive of the occurrence in question. One
needs constantly to augment the formulations "there is
hotness," or "there are thoughts," with implicit additions, in
order to relate them to the occurrences they are designed to
describe. Without implicit additions, such a phrase does not
even make a good "proviso as to what is meant." we might better
simply "go on saying 'I am hot,'" or "I think" until a more
adequate formulation comes along.

With respect to the problem of adequate formulation,
Russell made an important distinction by continuing to say
that the problem he was dealing with was proper expression,
and that such a problem arises only after one has assumed
a recognition of the eXperience. In speaking of the ex-‘
perience, Russell did not hesitate to refer to the first-
person experience of hotness:

Let us be clear as to our present problem. we
are no longer concerned with the question: "How can
I know that I am hot?" This was our previous ques-
tion, which we answered--however unsatisfactorily--
by merely saying that I notice it. Our question is
not about knowing that I am hot, but about knowing,
when I know this, that the words "I am hot" express
what I have notéged, and are true in virtue of what
I have noticed.

Thus, one may regard the formulation as a secondary step,

which is to be responsibly derived from the situation. Also,

 

63Ibid., p. 62.

102

it would seem that Russell's formulation presupposes the factors
in our hypothesis: EFor Russell's formulation depends upon the
previous fact that hp kppyp he is hot. Similarly, in the
premise, "There are thoughts," the formulation must depend
upon the previous fact that hp kppyp he is thinking. If such
is the case, the cogito makes a more satisfactory ultimate_
principle, since it expresses what is presupposed in formu-
lations such as Russell's. ‘

The fact that Russell was prepared to proceed beyond the
question, "How do I know that I am hot?"would seem to indi-
cate his readiness to presuppose, "I do know that I am hot."
He remarked that the question may have been answered "unsatis-
factorily," but nevertheless proceeded as if it had been
answered. In this case, the epistemological presupposition.
involves a reference to the first-person experience of some-
one who knows that he is hot. Such a reference is presupposed,
and is therefore ultimate for the approach in question.
However, the reference is not acknowledged in the type of
formulation.which Russell would have one adopt.

There is no question as to Russell's realization as to
the importance of individual experience. In this respect, the

present paper has no criticism of his approach. In the following

passages, Russell would appear to have no quarrel with the

2221402:

103

All theory of knowledge must start from "what
do I know?" not from "what does mankind know?" For
how can I tell what mankind knows?

There is a tendency--not confined to Neurath and
Hempel, but prevalent in much modern philosophy--
to forget the arguments of Descartes and Berkeley.
It may be that these arguments can be refuted,
though, as regards our present question, I do not
believe that they can be. But in any case, they
are too weighty to be merely ignored. In the pre-
sent connection, the point is that my_knowledge as
to matters of fact must be based upon.py percep-
tive experience, through which alone I can asa1+
certain what is received as public knowledge.

While it might seem in such passages that Russell had
little or no quarrel with the cogito, it must be remembered
that Russell claimed that he did, and rejected its reference
to an experiencing "I." Some of the difficulties in his
rejection have occupied the efforts of this chapter. Of
paramount importance is the conclusion which has been drawn
at several points, that Russell's approach runs the danger of
fostering an_g priori rejection of the experiencing subject.
Throughout this "test" consideration, there has developed no
reason to prefer the alternatives offered in the approach of

Russell to one which hypothesizes the validity of the cogito.

 

6"Ibid., pp. 179-180.

CHAPTER IV
A.BRIEF ORIENTATION -

The purpose of this chapter is to broaden the scope of
the considerations thus far by giving attention to four
additional thinkers of modern times. The men selected for
consideration are Hans Reichenbach, Clarence Irving Lewis,
Alfred North Whitehead, and Max Planck. The criticism set
forth by Reichenbach is similar to that set forth by Russell,
and illustrates the fact that the evaluation of Russell's
approach made in Chapter III can be extended and adapted to
other approaches which involve similar appraisals of the
cogito. The references to Lewis, Whitehead, and Planck
are intended mainly to illustrate points of agreement between
the thesis here proposed and the positions under consideration.
From the comparisons drawn, it should be evident that the
thesis does not collide head-on with the temper of modern
thought in general, but that there is a range of philosophical
viewpoints with which the thesis enjoys a considerable degree

of harmony.
Reichenbach's Criticism of the Cogito

In The Rise pf Scientific Philosophy, Reichenbach discussed
the cogito as follows:
401+-

105

Later analysis has shown the fallacy in
Descartes' argument. The concept of the ego is
not of so simple a nature as Descartes believed.
we do not see our own selves in the way we see
houses and people around us. ‘we may perhaps speak
of an observation of our acts of thought, or of
doubt; they are not perceived, however, as the
products of an ego, but as separate objects, as
images accompanied by feelings. To say "I think"
goes beyond the immediate experience in that the
sentence employs the word "I." The statement,,

"I think" represents not an observational datum,
but the end of long chains of thought which un-
cover the existence of an ego as distinct from
the ego of other persons. Descartes should have
said "there is thought," thus indicating the

sort of detached occurrence of the contents of
thought, their emergence independent of acts of
volition or other attitudes involving the ego.
But then Descartes' inference could no longer be
made. If the existence of the ego is not warranted
by immediate awareness, its existence cannot be
asserted with higher certainty than that of other
objects derived by means of plausible additions
to observational data.

It is scarcely necessary to go into a more
detailed refutation of Descartes' inference. Even
if the infggence were tenable, it would not prove
very much.

This criticism is based on the viewpoint that the ego is
not a datum presented to immediate experience, and that "I
think" does not represent an "observational datum." Since the
concept of the ego is derived by means of "plausible additions"
to observational data, the existence of the ego cannot be
asserted with the certainty of matters of immediate experience.

Reichenbach began by saying that the concept of the ego

"is not of so simple a nature as Descartes believed." With

 

65Hans Reichenbach, The Rise pf Scientific Philospphy
(Los Angeles, 1951), p. 35.

 

ullns IV | I {11“ ‘I Illrwllllll’l'l (I n

106

this the present paper agrees, noting that the validity of the
cogito does not hinge on this. The passage continues, "We do
not see our own selves in the way we see houses and people
around us." Descartes could certainly have agreed with this
statement, and never claimed that the self was an object of
perception.

While both Descartes and Reichenbach would agree that the
self is not the datum of observation, Reichenbach considered
this sufficient to invalidate the principle.

Scientific philosophy has constructed a functional

. conception of knowledge, which regards knowledge
as an instrument of prediction and for which sense
observation is t2g only admissible criterion of
non-empty truth.

Notice in the above quotation that sense observation is

 

given a logical status as a criterion. It is obvious that by
assigning this criterion, one has determined, g priori, that

he cannot accept Descartes' principle as "non-empty truth."<
The question is, then, is it proper to assign sense observation
as "the only admissible criterion of non-empty truth?"

If the criterion was self-existent in a vacuum, its scope
might possibly create no difficulty. However, in any given
empirical procedure, the criterion must be assigned, suggested,
or employed, and therefore cannot be given a scope which contra—
dicts any factors necessarily presupposed in its being assigned.

This is not to say that criteria "need" someone to assign them,

 

66Ibid., p. 252.

107

but simply to say that when one's deliberate purpose is to
assign and employ some criterion, he stands in a special
relation to the criterion, and this relation imposes a limit
upon the scope of the criterion. Since no criterion which
one assigns can properly contradict the fact that pg assigps
it, this fact must be presupposed in any procedure in which
one employs criteria, and endeavors to remain consistent with
the facts.

When the scope of Reichenbach's criterion is considered
in relation to the experiential standpoint from which it may
be employed, a difficulty is encountered. For while sense
observation may be invaluable in distinguishing the truth
about the external world, the very fact that it enables us
to distinguish truth from error shows that it represents a
deliberate restriction within the scope of our experience.
However, its very justification in dealing with the external
world indicates its impropriety when applied similarly to
the self. For while one may reason falsely about the world
and imagine all sorts of things about the world which cannot
be verified, and generally live in a dream world, his errors
are still what he has experienced, and from that standpoint
are empirical facts. This unique case poses a problem for
the scope of Reichenbach's criterion, If it is restricted
enough to be of use in distinguishing the truth about the
external world, it is too restricted to cover the scope of the

individual's experiences. Or, if it is to cover the scope of

108

the individual's experiences, it is of no discriminatory value
in dealing with an external world. Thus it is not adequate to
deal with the case in which the individual's entire range of
experience is the fact in question. ,Acknowledging the parti-
cipational standpoint of the cogito seems required if this
case is to be taken into account properly. Moreover, the
cogito does not militate against a consistent use of an ob-
servational criterion, because it does not purport to be a
sole criterion of non-empty truth.

Much that has been said about Russell's approach is
applicable here, especially concerning the object-status of
the factors in immediate experience. Reichenbach limits
these factors to being ppjectg of observation, in the passages
cited., When immediate experience is identified with the
object-status, naturally the cogito goes beyond that identi-
fication of immediate experience. But there is no reason why
this pbject identification is appropriate, as has been shown
before.

When Reichenbach said that the cogito is not an obser-
vational datum, he was right, of course--assuming the object-
status to be eXhaustive. But to say therefore that the gpgipg
"goes beyond the immediate experience" is simply to assume the
object-status as a criterion. Certainly a person has a right to
assume his criteria, but the interpretation of immediate experience

here brings the criterion itself into question, and it is argued

109

that whoever assumes or questions any criterion involves him-
self in the principle of subjective reference, with which his
other criteria should be consistent.

To say that "the existence of the ego is not warranted by
immediate awareness" is again to mean that the ego is not found
among the objectg of awareness, and to assume the ability of
a totality of such objects to exhaust the factors of immediacy.
The cogito is based on the fact phgp we observe, not on.phgp we
observe.

Thus, it is concluded that Reichenbach's criticism, as
Russell's, does not show "the fallacy in Descartes' argument,"
but rather assumes an approach which E priori excludes the
cogito. In so far as the approach does exclude the cogito,
it is excluded by the cogito, if the cogito is maintained;

The Cogitg and the Thought of Lewis

With reference to the thought of C. I. Lewis, there are
some important instances of concurrence with the present thesis
which will be considered. The following passage seems to point
to the possibility of necessary presuppositions in the cognitive
situation:

It may be said that mind, as that which sup-
plies the categorial conditions of experience, is
something which, in the nature of the case, must be
beyond or behind experience and cannot be in it,

but that the existence of such a mind is "presupposed"
by experience in general. If this vague word

110

"presuppose" has any real and pertinent meaning,
I should suppose its connotation would be of an
hypothesis or assumption which is logically neces-
sary to explain the facts in question. But the
difference between an hypothesis which is abso-
lutely required in order to explain a fact, and
direct experience of the thing hypostatized, is
a wholly imaginary difference.67

This vital passage practically spells out the key re-
lationships which have occupied this paper. There was no
evidence, however, of any explicit development of the logical
significance of this "assumption which is logically necessary
to explain the facts in question." Yet the concept has
remained with Lewis, perhaps as something so obvious as to be
not worth emphasizing. In a later work, he used this type
of reasoning in an interesting refutation of a viewpoint in
ethics. Lewis' device was to exhibit a contradiction, not
from the assertion alone, but from a whole, constituted by a
person and his assertion:

In ethics, it is the Cyrenaic who, in words,
repudiates this categorical imperative. He re-_
pudiates concern for any future: tomorrow is
another day. Of course, he contradicts himself--
not formally, but pragmatically. There would be
no logical inconsistency in his hortation, "Have
no concern for the future," if it should be found
engraved by lightning on a rock. But for us to
take seriously one who puts it forward, or for any-
one to take himself seriously in accepting, would

imply exactly such concern as this injunction advises
that we repudiate. The content of the injunction

 

6701arenoe Irving Lewis, Mind and the World Order (New York,
1929), pp. his-n16.

111

is incompatible wigg giving heed to this--or any
other--injunction.

In this passage, Lewis utilized the same interplay be-
tween logic and the experiential situation which can be
elicited from the cogito.

In addition to this instance, there is a comparison
between the thesis and his view, which is much more deeply
significant. Lewis expressed the idea that cognition is as-
sertive; an idea which is important to the interpretation of
knowledge and belief.

First, it is requisite that knowing be an
assertive state of mind; it must intend, point to,
or mean something other than what is discoverable
in the mental state itself. Further, this be-
lieving attitude lays claim to truth; it submits
itself to appraisal as correct or incorrect by
reference to this something which it intends.

Its status as knowledge is, by such intent, not
determinable through examining the state of mind
itself but only by the relation of it to something
else. And again, no believing state is to be
classed as knowledge unless it has some ground or
reason. It must be distinguished not only from
false belief but also from that which is ground-
less and from the merely fortunate hazard of
assertion. Knowledge is belief which not only

is true bgg also is justified in its believing
attitude.

In another passage, Lewis discussed logical validity in
terms of self-commitment and self-accord; showing a basic

inter-relating of logical and pragmatic criteria.

 

68Clarence Irving Lewis, An.Anal sis pf Knowledge and
Valuation (LaSalle, Illinois, 19% , p. 81.

691bid., p. 9.

112

Rationality, in this sense, is not derivative
from the logical: rather it is the other way about.
The validity of reasoning turns upon, and can be
summarized in terms of, consistency. And consis-
tency is, at bottom, nothing more than the adherence
throughout to what we have accepted; or to put it
in the opposite manner, the non-acceptance now of
what we shall later be unwilling to adhere to. we
are logically consistent when, throughout our train
of thought, or our discourse, we nowhere repudiate
that to which we anywhere commit ourselves. Thinking

' and discoursing are important and peculiarly human
ways of acting. Insofar as our actions of this sort
are affected with concern for what we may later think
or wish to affirm, we attempt to be consistent or
rational; and when we achieve this kind of self-
accord, then.we are logical, and what we think or
say, whether true or not, has logical validity.7O

Lewis did not, then, identify consistency with the range
of abstract thought only, but tended to permeate all experience
with its significance. This paper is in agreement with such
an approach, and proposes the cogito as a principle admirably
suited to link together various "compartments" of experience,
such as science, politics, religion, and so on.

When the c0gito is affirmed, for instance, it implies
a certain unity between logic and metaphysics. The complexity
of relations between logic and metaphysics is not denied, but
a key orientation of these fields is afforded. This orienta-
tion is based on the concept of an experiencing person, or self,
and the inherent compatibility of all matters which are capable
of becoming elements in the experience of that person, or self.

This concept, in its general sense, serves to recognize a unity

 

7OIbid., p. #80.

113

common to all phases of human experience. Logic and metaphysics
represent special cases in this general unity of the experience

of the self. These particular cases, however, are more closely

related than some--as, for instance, metaphysics and tennis.

While the cogito permits a distinction between logic and
metaphysics, it does not permit an antithesis between the two.
The cogito does not lend itself, for instance, to the view
that logic is SENSE and metaphysics is NONSENSE, since both
issue from a single, decisive affirmation. Thus both sciences
must come to terms with a common locus of affirmation. If
there is one valid affirmation, common to both fields, it
cannot be said that logic and metaphysics are inherently
contradictory.

There appear to be at least four significant points of
comparison between the views of C. I. Lewis and the present
thesis. First, there is the view that the mind cannot be
_identified solely with its content. Second, there is the
tendency to represent the status of the mind in terms of
presupposition and hypothesis. Third, there is the recognition
of the assertive state of mind, which is a natural accompani-
ment of the cogito. Fourth, there is the close relating of
logical standards to empirical procedures, emphasizing con-

sistency of commitment in a given procedure.

111+

Whitehead's Use of the Cogito

The viewpoint adopted in this paper has drawn heavily
from the philosophic thought of Alfred North Whitehead. The
purpose of this section is to show more adequately the
relation of the thesis to Whitehead's position.

Whitehead's emphasis on the relatedness of elements in .
experience has powerful implications. Some philosophic view-
points, particularly since Hume, emphasize the lack of
necessary connection between "relations of ideas" and "matters
of fact." But Whitehead confronts one with the fact that
there is at least one important characteristic common to both
areas._ Relations of ideas and matters of fact are sufficiently
related and compatible to be components in experience. In
calling attention to the compatibility of various areas of
experience, Whitehead has made a needed emphasis. For in
his view, experience is not just analyzed, but also syn-
thesized. To Whitehead, experience was a vital common denomi-
nator in showing the general relativity of things.

This feature of Whitehead's philosophy is one which lies
at the root of many of his conclusions, which one cannot trace
in this paper. However, the following statement illustrates
the point that experience is viewed as a basis of relatedness.

There is a togetherness of the component elements

in individual experience. This 'togetherness' has
that special peculiar meaning of 'togetherness in

115
experience.‘ It is a togetherness of it? own kind,
explicable by reference to nothing else. 1

In this viewpoint, individual experience becomes a powerful
unifying factor, drawing together the various sciences, and
the sciences as a whole with religion, art, music, and every
phase of experience. Whitehead exemplified such a unification
in his writing and teaching, bringing together a wide range of
interests and learning into a coherent whole. In some ways,
Whitehead's use of individual experience seems reminiscent of
Descartes' belief that the study of the understanding is the
key to science in its entirety. However, Whitehead objected to
any arbitrary disconnection between our eXperience and the
external world, thus extending the unification beyond the
scope of Cartesian mind to the universe in general.

All metaphysical theories which admit a dis-
junction between the component elements of indi-
vidual experience on the one hand and on the other
hand the component elements of the external world,
must inevitably run into difficulties over the
truth and falsehood of propositions, and over the
grounds for judgment. The former difficuigy is
metaphysical, the latter epistemological.

The completeness with which Whitehead hoped to overcome
such a disjunction is indicated in his view that each actual

entity is a locus in terms of which the whole universe is

unified. Thus, the entity can have knowledge of the world by

 

71Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 288.
72Ibid., p. 289.

116

having knowledge of itself. In this doctrine, there is
utilized an ingenious epistemological tool. The nature of
this tool can be seen in the following:

. . . according to this philosophy, the knowable

is the complete nature of the knower at least

ipgfi pgaiigwpggit3as are antecedent to that opera-

Whitehead did not, however, create a Kantian phenomenal
world, in which the knower can never know the thing in itselff
Whitehead did not so much subjectivize the world as objectivize
the knowing process. The knower is not just a spectator
watching reality, but is a participant in reality. The knowing
process is not just something that reports "about" reality,
but knowing is something thatobjectively occurs-—that actually
"happens" in terms of actual occasions. It is not cut off
from the actual world, but is a part of it. Reality is not
something "outside" the mind, but the mind and reality never
get lost from each other. The view suggests the aptness of
Hotspur's phrase, "Thought's the slave of life, . . ."
Whitehead stated the matter as follows:

The philosophy of organism abolishes the detached

mind. Mental activity is one of the modes of feeling

belonging to all actual entities in some degree,

but only amounting to fionscious intellectuality in
some actual entities.‘7

 

731bid., p. 92.
7"Ibid., p. 88.

117

Thus, bypassing the puzzle as to how the facts in the
world can be known by the mind, Whitehead simply concluded
that mental activity is itself one of the facts in the world:
This is an invaluable clue in the search for valid generali-
zations, for one's conscious experience must exhibit char-
acteristics basic to the universe in general. Not only will
the elements of experience exhibit a kindred nature by being
experience, but also by being actual. Whitehead ingeniously
used experience as a locus for the analysis of actuality.

The locus, as actual, serves as a lever for generalizing his
analysis to apply to everything else that is actual.
To be actual must mean that all actual things are
alike objects, enjoying objective immortality in
fashioning creative actions; and that all actual
thiggghigfi ipbgeptzé.ggch prehending the universe

In this significant statement, there is exhibited both
the analysis of experience into its basic character as a
subjective-objective composite, and the generalization of this
analysis to "all actual things." The idea that things must
be alike, in certain respects, in order to be actual, is an
idea which is easily overlooked. Whitehead has called attention
to an important matter almost too obvious to see; that to be

actual, something must satisfy those conditions which are requi-

site to the constitution of all actual occasions alike, and which

 

751bid., p. 89.

118

are exhibited in any one actual occasion. Thus he could analyze
actuality where he found it best exhibited-~in his own ex-
perience, and could utilize individual experience to discern
and describe the nature of the world in general.
This doctrine of organism is the attempt to.

describe the world as a process of generation of

individual actual entities, each with its own ab-

solute self-attainment. This concrete finality

of the individual is notging else than a decision
referent beyond itself.7

It is evident from this passage that even though sub-
merged in reality, the individual does not lose identity as an
individual. ,And with the maintenance of the concept of the
individual, there is also the maintenance of an integral
factor in the determination of the individual--namely, the
factor of decision. Apart from the finality introduced by
this factor, there is no individual.

The following passage well illustrates Whitehead's
unyielding stand on the particularity of experience, both as
content and as activity.

The point to be emphasized is the insistent par-
ticularity of things experienced and of the act of
experiencing. Bradley's doctrine-~Wolf-eating-
Lamb as a universal qualifying the absolute--is a
travesty of the evidence. That wolf eat that

lamb at that spot at that time: the wolf knew it;
the lamb knew it; and the carrion birds knew it.
Explicitly in the verbal sentence, or implicitly

in the understanding of the subject entertaining
it, every expression of a proposition includes

 

76Ibid., p. 9%.

119

demonstrative elements. In fact each word, and each
symbolic phrase, is such an element, exciting the
conscious prehension of some entity belonging to one
of the categories of existence. \

Notice that "the act of experiencing" is an important
element in the passage, in addition to "things experienced."
"The act of experiencing" must certainly be included in the
meaning of "immediate experience," as discussed in the fol-
lowing~passage:

The elucidation of immediate experience is the sole
justification for any thought; and the starting
point for thought is the analytéc observation of
components of this experience.‘7

When one considers an injunction such as this, it would
seem that both Descartes and Whitehead insist on a very similar
"starting point.". Of course, Whitehead regarded the starting
point as flexible, while Descartes regarded it as absolute.
However, there remains significant comparison between Whitehead's
approach and the first principle of Descartes.

Perhaps the most important comparison between Whitehead's
approach and the thesis here advanced is in the relation of
ultimate factors to given procedures of inquiry.. Whitehead
considered schemes of ideas vitally important but transitory,

and pointed to the fact that their function is to serve a more

constant factor--method.

 

77Ibid., p. 69.
78Ibid., p. 6.

120

Secondly, that the true method of philosophical

construction is to frame a scheme of ideas, the

best that one can, and unflinchingly to explore

the interpretation of experience in terms of that

scheme. Thirdly, that all constructive thought,

on the various special topics of scientific in-

terest, is dominated by some such scheme, unac—

knowledged, but no less influential in guiding

the imagination. The importance of philosophy

lies in its sustained effort to make such schemes

explicit, an9 thereby capable of criticism and

improvement. 9

This passage suggests that one should intelligently use
a feature of philosophic construction which, if ignored, will
nevertheless dominate his thought. This procedural feature
is the involvement, implicitly or explicitly, with some scheme
of ideas. Such schemes of ideas, incurred in a given procedure,
are comparable to sets of criteria. For the ideas of "the
scheme" serve to dominate the interpretation of experience,
whether the scheme be implicit or explicit. If such criteria
are left to operate unrecognized, however, inquiry has a
dangerous blind side, and one may have explicitly rejected
factors upon which he has implicitly relied. Consequently,
"the true method" which Whitehead described is one with which
the present thesis seems to have a great deal of accord. For
both the thesis and Whitehead's method aim at making eXplicit
certain factors, which are presupposed in a given methodological
procedure, and which are therefonaultimate for that procedure.

Whitehead's emphasis, however, was on the interpretation of

 

79Ibid., p. x.

121

experience in general, in which case the changeability of
schemes is a dominant note. The emphasis of this paper is
on more constant methodological presuppositions, such as the
fact that whatever scheme one may develop, pg develops it.

The idea of treating the experiencing subject as a con-
stant methodological presupposition, accompanying any scheme
developed within the procedure, can receive only indirect
support by reference to Whitehead. It has, however, been noted
that Whitehead did regard philosophic procedure as involving
implicit schemes of ideas. Also, in his particular scheme,
the experiencing subject is basic. Furthermore, there is evi-
dence that he regarded this Cartesian element as so basic as
to have a continuing influence on the construction of philo-
sophic schemes. Note the following passage:

Descartes modified traditional philosophy in two
opposite ways. He increased the metaphysical em-
phasis on the substance-quality forms of thought.
The actual things 'required nothing but themselves
in order to exist,‘ and were to be thought of in
terms of their qualities, some of them essential
attributes, and others accidental modes. He also
laid down the principle, that those substances
which are the subjects enjoying conscious experiences,
provide the primary data for philosophy, namely,
themselves as in the enjoyment of such experience.
This is the famous subjectivist bias which has '
entered into modern philosophy through Descartes.
In this doctrine Descartes undoubtedly made the
greatest philosophical discovery since the age of
Plato and Aristotle. For his doctrine directly
traversed the notion that the proposition, 'This ,
stone is grey,‘ expresses a primary form of known
fact from which metaphysics can start its generali—
zations. If we are to go back to the subjective
enjoyment of experience, the type of primary

122

starti a point is 'my perception of this stone as
grey.‘

Of course, Whitehead did not adopt both of the "two
opposite ways" that Descartes modified phiIOSOphy, but rather
extricated one from the other. Whitehead considered that the
subjective enjoyment of experience was by no means a factor
confined to the substance-quality categories.

But like Columbus who never visited America, Descartes
missed the full sweep of his own discovery, and he

and his successors, Locke and Hume, continued to con-
strue the functionings of the subjective enjoyment of
experience according to the substance-quality cate-
gories. Yet if the enjoyment of experience was to

be the constitutive subjective fact, these categories
have lost alé claim to any fundamental character in
metaphysics. 1

Thus Whitehead utilized the Cartesian "primary starting
point," without thereby accepting the categories in which
it was born. In one place, Whitehead used the cogitp to
illustrate the climax of the process constituting an actual
entity:

The individual process is now feeling its own com-
pletion:--Cogito, ergo sum. .And in Descartes'
phraseology, 'cogitatig' is more than mere intel-
lectual understanding. 2

In the light of these considerations, it is contended that,
although Whitehead's position does not exhibit a direct appro-

bation of the particular use of the cogito proposed in this

 

801bid., p. 2M1.
811bid., p. 2nl.
82Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 270.

123

paper, nevertheless it exhibits strong indications that such
a use is justified. The extent to which the thesis has
leaned upon Whiteheadian doctrines has been evident in the

course of the paper.

Planck's Recognition of the Personal

Element in Science

The final viewpoint to be considered is that of Max,
Planck, which provides a more direct orientation of the present
thesis to the problems of validity in the physical sciences.

Planck's approach is germane to this thesis, for he treated
the problem of developing gpy science. He thus focused attention
on factors inherent in the procedure requisite to the formation
of any science. In discussing the basic characteristics of
scientific procedure, he arrived at conclusions very similar to
those proposed by this thesis. He wrote as follows:

I propose to begin with a general consideration.
Any scientific treatment of a given material demands
the introduction of a certain order into the material
dealt with: the introduction of order and of com-
parison is essential if the available and steadily
increasing matter is to be grasped; and the obtaining
of such a grasp is essential if the problems are to
be formulated and pursued. Order, however, demands
classification; and to this extent any given science
is faced by the problem of classifying the available
material according to some principle. The question
then arises, what is to be this principle? Its
discovery is not only the first but, as ample ex-
perience proves, frequently the decisive step in the
development of any given science.

It is important at this point to state that
there is no one definite principle available g priori

12%

and enabling a classification suitable for every

purpose to be made. This applies equally to every

science. Hence it is impossible in this connection

to assert that any science possesses a structure

evolving from its own nature inevigably and apart

from any arbitrary presupposition. 3

In discussing the problem of developing science in general,
Planck pointed to several factors which involve the functioning
of the scientist in the development of science. Those factors
mentioned are the introduction of order and comparison, the
grasping of material, the formulation and pursuing of problems,
the classification of material according to some principle, the
discovery of such a principle, the relativity of the principle
to some particular purpose, and the inescapable presence of
some arbitrary presupposition. Such considerations tend to show
that the scientist inevitably interferes in the development
of his science and its criteria.

A.point of difference, however, arises between Planck's
view and that of the present discussion. For Planck, in
accepting the arbitrary element in science, regards it never-
theless as a defect.

Thus every science contains an element of caprice;

and hence of transitoriness in its very structure,

a defect which cannot be eradicated begfiuse it is
rooted in the very nature of the case. ,

 

83Max Planck, The Philosophy pg Physics, translated by W. H.
Johnston (London, 1936), pp. 12-13.

8thid., p. 15.

125

It is agreed that Planck pointed to an element "rooted
in the very nature of the case," but the agreement ends
where he called the element "caprice," and "a defect." The
term "caprice" is apt to suggest irresponsibility. .flctually,
the arbitrary element in question makes irresponsibility
possibleonly by the same token that it makes responsibility
possible. In this sense, the arbitrary element in science
does not authorize caprice.

Another passage from Planck may serve to further il-
lustrate that his conclusions bring him very close to the
conclusions of the present consideration of Descartes' first
principle.

‘we saw above that in dealing with the structure of
any science, and in discussing its most suitable
arrangement, a reciprocal inter-connection between
epistemological judgments and judgments of value
was found to arise, and that no science can be
wholly disentangled from the personality of the
scientist.85

This passage may erroneously be taken to mean simply that
the scientist is always necessary to write down "the facts."
However, a deeper relation than that is implied. The scientist
is not just an ever-present accessory to science, but is a
factor contributing ip principle to the determination of a

science. Planck brought this out in the following passage:

we must go back to the source of every science,
and we do this when we remember that every

 

851b1d., p. 33.

126

science requires some person to build it up and

to communicate it to others. And this means once

again the introduction of the principle of totality.
In principle a physical event is inseparable

from the measuring instrument or the organ of sense

that perceives it; and similarly a science cannot

be separated 1% principle from the investigators

who pursue it. 6

This viewpoint lends itself to the contention set forth in
this paper that the factors regardedas ultimate for any
methodological procedure are incomplete unless they include a
prOper reference to the persons by which and for which the
procedure is developed.

In Planck's View, the reference to the investigator has
deep implications as to the relation between scientific pro-
cedure and faith:

Anyone who has taken part in the building up of
a branch of science is well aware from personal
experience that every endeavor in this direction
is guided by an unpretentious but essential
principle. This pginciple is faith--a faith
which looks ahead.

This passage indicates that there is an element underlying
scientific procedure which is sometimes regarded as an enemy
of science. When faith is identified with superstition, science
appears as an alternative to faith—-an alternative which seems
to replace "faith"’with "proof." Certainly a correction of this

misconception is fundamental to an understanding of the nature

 

861bid., p. 10%.
87Ibid., p. 112.

127

of scientific procedure and of faith. Neither is incompatible

with the other. Moreover, if Planck was right, the two are

vitally related.

The dependence of science on faith, and on a person who is
actuated by faith, was discussed by Planck as follows:

It is said that science has no preconceived ideas:
there is no saying that has been more thoroughly
or more disastrously misunderstood. It is true.
that every branch of science must have an empirical
foundation: but it is equally true that the es-
sence of science does not consist in this raw
material but in the manner in which it is used.
The material always is incomplete: it consists of
a number of parts which however numerous are
discrete, and this is equally true of the tabu-
lated figures of the natural sciences, and of the
various documents of the intellectual sciences.

The material must therefore be completed, and
this must be done by filling the gaps; and this
in turn is done by means of associations of ideas.
And associations of ideas are not the work of the
understanding but the offspring of the investi-
gator's imagination--an activity which may be
described as faith, or, more cautiously, as a
working hypothesis. The essential pOint is that
its content in one way or another goes beyond the
data of experience. The chaos of individual masses
cannot be wrought into a cosmos without some har-
monizing force, and, similarly, the disjointed data
of experience can never furnish a veritable science
without the intellggent interference of a spirit
actuated by faith.

It is not necessary to agree in every detail with this
statement to realize that Planck has set forth an important.
characteristic of scientific procedure. Just how this char-

acteristic should be recognized is a difficult question. But

 

88%. , pp. 112-113.

128

the fact that it should be recognized has been maintained in
this paper.

The historic principle Which seems most suited to recognize
the role of the participant personality is the first principle

of Descartes.

CHAPTER V
A.CONCLUSION

The effort has been made throughout this paper to main-
tain a distinction between the cogito as a first principle
and derivative considerations which are sometimes falsely
identified with it. This distinction is important in evaluating
rejections of the principle, and has consequently determined
the emphasis of much of this paper. However, it is difficult
to maintain the distinction because of the inevitable tendency
to assign to the "I" of the cogito one‘s own view of its
nature. The particular bias of the author, for instance, has
probably become noticeable in the course of the paper. The
difficulty in maintaining the distinction, then, warrants
some consideration.

The present thesis does not deny the necessity, or at
least, the propensity, to think of the "I" in terms of some
estimate of its nature. The point is rather that in making
some estimate, one should honor the presupposition that the
"I," which is in this case himself, exists. This presupposition
can be honored, not necessarily by withholding all concepts
of one's nature, but by recognizing that the presupposition of

one's existence can attend many changing concepts of his nature.

-129-

130

And although, at the moment, one concept of his nature may)
seem quite convincing, one can recognize that it is a deri-
vative estimate, subject to replacement by a better estimate.

While the presupposition of one's existence may seem
innocuous enough, it does define a limit, and thus constitutes
one among other ultimate factors for an adopted procedure.
While it is not probable, it is possible that someone would try
to use an estimate of his nature to deny his existence. For
instance, one might endeavor to interpret human nature by
saying that persons are "nothing but" classes. If he reasoned
that classes have no existence, then he might say that persons,
being classes, have no existence. Such an estimate of human
nature would be excluded by honoring the presupposition that
if anyone ever makes such an estimate, he exists.

The thesis does not propose that the presupposition of
one‘s existence should be uncritically accepted. The principle
of subjective reference suggests a consideration of standpoints,
which may be developed and evaluated in relation to any case
in question,“ In the case of the possible view that persons
are classes-~as long as classes and persons are treated ob-
jectively from an analytic observer's standpoint, the view
might seem adequate. From this standpoint, it remains consis-
tent to say, perhaps, that classes, including those which are
persons, have no existence. But when the participational

standpoint is taken into account, the classes which are persons

131

can no longer be viewed as objects of analysis only, since at
least one of these classes participates in the conduct of the
analysis. Thus, from this standpoint, it is maintained that
any "classes" which analyze, observe, or think, have existence.

The opgitp not only imposes a limit upon estimates of
one's nature through forbidding the denial of one's existence,
but also through forbidding any estimate of one's nature which
contradicts the nature of his participation in experiencef—
That is to say, what lies within the range of one's participation
in experience helps to indicate what his nature is. In every-
day expressions, "Johnny is as Johnny does." Or, "His actions
give him away."' Or, "He's just expressing himself." Whether
one lives in a dream world, or is a red-blooded American, his
range of experience is relevant to the estimate of his nature.

The cogito need not be used merely to negate, but may
also be used to suggest lines of inquiry in derivative
considerations such as the nature of the self. The cOgito
does not automatically present one with a complete doctrine
of the self, but requires that the standpoint of the participant
be taken into account along with any other considerations.

The inclusion of this standpoint calls attention to some
questions which might otherwise not be adequately considered.
For instance, what is the temporal range of one's attention?
Does it indicate that the self is momentary, or of longer dura-

tion? Is one's temporal range of existence sufficient to permit

132

his communication with another being? Or, by the time the
supposed communication takes place, has the self which intended
to communicate ceased its momentary existence, and been re-
placed by a succession of different selves? Does one remain
himself long enough to get an answer from another person with
whom he has tried to communicate? Does one exist long enough
to make a single assertion? Such questions ought to be faced
from the standpoint of a participant as well as from the
standpoint of an analytic observer. The omission of either
standpoint serves to oversimplify the appraisal of the
situation.

In relation to the field of logic, the cogito suggests
certain questions concerning the theory of types. When
Descartes reasoned that one cannot doubt that he doubts, he
prohibited a reflexive application of doubt. The prohibited
reflexive, however, involves a negative element in the sense
that what could be doubted could not be accepted as true.

There appears to be nothing in the cogitp, on the other hand,
which would forbid a reflexive which contains no negative
element, such as, "This is a sentence." In the theory of types,
the reflexive itself is prohibited, whether a given reflexive
appears to be self-confirming or self-contradicting.

The coeito suggests the possibility that the reflexive
relation itself is not the difficulty in vicious-circle fallacies,

but instead that the reflexive relation must include some

133

negating power in order to lead to any contradiction. For
example, when a Cretan makes the assertion, "All assertions
made by Cretans are false," one may ask if this assertion made
by a Cretan is false. But is the reflexive itself the cause of
the difficulty? It would appear that if a similar reflexive is
developed in which there is no negative element, the resultant
assertion is perfectly consistent. In such a case, a Cretan
could say, "All assertions made by Cretans are true." .Are both
these reflexives meaningless, or is one valid and the other
invalid?

To cite one consistent reflexive is of little consequence,
but if it happens to be the case that‘pp reflexive which con-
tains no negative element leads to a contradiction, then it
would appear that the reflexive relation itself is not the
difficulty. In this case, to avoid contradiction by prohibiting
the reflexive would be like avoiding the abuse of a tool by
prohibiting its use.

Thus, by properly distinguishing the limits of the ppgipp,
one does not cut himself off from derivative considerations.
Instead, the principle suggests such considerations. However,
one is in a better position to evaluate derivative considera-
tions once he has endeavored to delimit the bounds of the ppgipp
itself. The purpose of this paper has been fulfilled if it
has contributed to that end.

13%

LIST OF REFERENCES

Descartes, Rene, Descartes Selections, edited by Ralph M.
Eaton, The Modern Student's Library, Philosophy Series,
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927.

__J The Method, Meditations and Philosophy pf_Descartes,
translated from the Original Texts with a New Introductory
Essay, Historical and Critical by John Veitch, New York:
Tudor Publishing Company, Ln. d3.

Dewey, John, The TheQrY'pf Inquiry, New York: Henry Holt, 19%9.

Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2 vols., Everyman's

Library, New York: E. P. Dutton, l9h9.

Keeling, S. V. "Descartes," Proceedin 5 pi the British
Academy, v01. xxxxv, London, 19528. Reprinted at
the Oxford University Press, l9h8.

Lewis Clarence Irving, pp.Analysis pf Knowledge and Valuation,
LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, l9h6.

, Mind and the world Order, New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1929.

Mahaffey, J. P., Descartes, London: wm. Blackwood and Sons, 1880.

Planck, Max, The Philopophy p£_Physics translated by'W. H.
Johnston, London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1936.

Reichenbach, Hans, The Rise 9; Scientific PhiloSOphy, Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 196T.

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Russell, Bertrand, The Analysis p; Matter, New York: Harcourt,

Schuster, l9 .

Brace and Company, 1927.

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, g History 92 Western Philosophy, New York: Simon and

, gp Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, New York: W}‘W.
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, Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays, London:
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, The Problems pf Philosophy, The Home University
Library of Modern Knowledge, London: Oxford University
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, Our Knowledge pf the External world, Chicago: Open
Court Publishing Company, 1915.

werkmeister,'W. H.,.A Philosophy‘pf Science, New York: Harper

and Brothers, I§HO.

Whitehead, Alfred North, Process and Reality, New York:

MacMillan, l9Ml.

5, Science and the Modern world, New York: MacMillan,
19 O.

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