

POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, CITIZENS' MOBILIZATION, AND LEADERS' SURVIVAL

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ABSTRACT

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Leader survival has been addressed mainly by international relations students, while regime survival and government survival have been dealt with mainly by comparativists. Most studies that examine leaders' survival neglect how their constituents (both voters and nonvoters) view the leaders' competence, parties' representation and accountability of political systems, and how the electorates' behaviors, both conventional and unconventional, instigate political instability that may substantially increase the risk of deposition. I adopt a theoretical structure of the selectorate theory proposed by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), but adapt it as well by focusing on the role of the masses. By using individual-level data sets such as the World Values Survey, Afro-Barometer, and Asian-Barometer (Chapter 3), and the Korea Social Science Data (Chapter 4), the effect of electoral politics on political trust and a leader's survival is examined; and the leaders' data of *Archigos* and other country-level data (Chapter 5) allow me to examine leaders' survival.

Chapter 2 reviews literature about the *potential* causes of leaders' survival by focusing on elections, perceived legitimacy, and political movements. First, political legitimacy is viewed as both a consequence of voters' perception of the selectorate institutions and as a cause for leaders to secure the support of citizens. Finally, leaders' survival is understood in the context of mass political movement and voters' electoral behavior.

Chapter 3 argues that the loyalty norm for each leader provides an institutional context for voters to perceive how legitimate their system is. For the mass public, a multilevel analysis shows that the institutional legacy of the loyalty norm matters for electoral winners and non-partisans as much as the short-term loyalty norm for electoral losers. This is because the mass public's attitudes rely on their memory of how often leadership turnover has occurred

in the polity while the leader's behavior is more based upon the short-term loyalty norm.

In Chapter 4, South Korea's impeachment experience illustrates how electoral politics and partisan status affect the citizen's perception of a president's impeachment at the individual level. Admitting a limitation of the validity of variables measured at the aggregate level, especially for the loyalty norm measure, I take advantage of the unique experiment-like impeachment process in South Korea in 2004. South Korea's recent experience of the impeachment provides differing responses by partisans and non-partisans. Loyalty to the Uri Party and partisan status influence voters' impeachment support. As partisans are more likely to have any preferences for the issue of impeachment, they are labeled ranging from "loyal", to "dissenting", to "defecting". In contrast to partisans' wide range of impeachment support, non-partisans' moderate level change of the impeachment support illustrates two types of non-partisans: sympathetic and ideological non-partisan. This means that ideology matters when a fledgling incumbent party tries to hold non-partisans' interests in the conservative party system.

Chapter 5 supposes that stability in leader survival is the key interest to a leader herself although it may not provide an accountable leader. The hypothesis to test in this chapter is whether leader longevity is influenced by mass movement that is indicated as electoral behavior, or depends on a leader's strategy of survival determined by the loyalty norm institution. Based on a composite data set that provides information on electoral politics and the winning coalition institution, I employ three measures of electoral and social stability – the level of mass threats, electoral non-participation, and electoral competition – to test these hypotheses. The empirical findings indicate that electoral non-participation and mass threats are key determinants to the risk of leader deposition, while the leader herself has room to manipulate the risk by constraining the level of mass media.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

On March 12, 2004, South Korea witnessed an unprecedented political event when the opposition-controlled National Assembly impeached President Roh Moo-hun by a vote of 193 to 2, suspending all his presidential powers. As he was elected as the 16th President of South Korea with a razor-thin margin in December 19th, 2002, the liberal president was afflicted by the lack of legitimacy that had often been a challenge to himself and his supporting coalition. Until Kim Dae Jung became his predecessor from 1998 to 2002, conservative parties had dominated Korean politics through either three conservative party merge or through inveterate interregional rivalry since the authoritarian Chun Doo Hwan regime had agreed to step down from the people's uprising in June, 1987.

Against the dominant conservative rule of South Korea (hereafter Korea), "Roh's personal background, political style, and electoral constituents amount to something radically new" to Korean politics (Hahm and Kim, 2005: 28). Roh and his reform-minded followers defected from the incumbent Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) that was founded by Kim Dae Jung, and the defection clearly represented their awareness of the citizens' yearning for political reform and innovation. Roh's presidential campaign also relied on class and generational politics that had a basis of political reform. His defection culminated in his followers' inauguration of a new political party, the Open Uri Party (i.e., Open Our Party).

Although the legislative impeachment was initiated when Roh publicly supported the new Open Uri Party (Uri Party, hereafter) to gain more legitimacy and support for his reform drive as well as the victory in the upcoming general election, Roh's tendency of appealing directly or populistically to the citizens, rather than pursuing existing institutional channels, had really troubled the opposition parties including now the MDP. As the Korean

election law prohibits public officials from openly supporting a particular political party,¹ his audacious support for the Uri Party is believed as his calculated strategy to provoke the opposition parties intentionally. Within a week, a constitutional agency of the National Elections Committee (NEC) formally ruled that President Roh violated his duty to stay in electoral neutrality. However, Roh defied the state agency and its rule on his pre-election “influences”. Roh’s refusal to apologize for the violation of election law provoked the opposition parties that then seriously initiated impeachment proceedings. The opposition parties that dominated the Assembly with over two-thirds of the seats wielded their constitutional power of impeachment only about a month before the National Assembly election.

On March 9, President Roh’s opponents in the National Assembly introduced an impeachment motion. By allowing the president to have 72 hours to defuse the situation, his foes might have been placated by his simple apology and a promise of maintaining neutrality until the 17th general election. On March 11, however, Roh characteristically refused to back down, giving a nationally televised speech.

Why were there candle vigils in South Korea to support the quite unpopular president’s reinstatement? In a counterfactual statement, would the Court’s decision be different if the opposition parties could win the 17th general election and get a majority in the National Assembly?² Beyond the Korea case, how is the risk of deposition understood by looking at the relationship between electorates’ perception of the political system and their protest potential? The determinants to explain leader survival may include presidencies being interrupted, prime ministers losing a vote of confidence, and even parties transferring power to the opposition.

¹Until May 2004, President Roh was not yet formally a member.

²In the counterfactuals, we may pose a similar question of why Roh was willing to take the risk of impeachment by refusing to accept the opposition’s demand for an apology. Many political leaders, we assume, try to keep power rather than risking it.

1.1 Research Question and Argument

Scholars explaining leaders' survival frequently deal with the effects of political institutions on whether political leaders and the parties in power can maintain their time in office. Based on the predominant institution-based explanation of leaders' survival, domestic institutions ascribe different goals or interests to incumbent leaders and challenging candidates. Both competing sides should be aware of the constraints given by institutions and the immediate institutional reforms.

Leaders' maximization of political survival is argued to be largely constrained and influenced by institutional characteristics that affect a leader's and opponents' electoral strategies and outcomes. These include the regime types, partisan resources in the assembly, president's share of first-round vote, and different party goals between presidential and parliamentary systems (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Maeda and Nishikawa, 2006; Kim and Bahry, 2008). Regarding postwar leadership turnover studies in international relations, highly stressed is the impact of domestic regimes, significantly interacting with conflict outcomes such as war costs, and also in the context of rivalry relationships (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Goemans, 2000a; Colaresi, 2004b; Skocpol, 1979).

Most studies that examine survival of political leaders tend to neglect how their constituents (both voters and nonvoters) view the leaders' competence, parties' representation and accountability of political systems, and how electorates' behaviors, both conventional and unconventional, instigate political instability that may substantially increase the risk of deposition. Although the effect of electoral and mass politics on leaders' tenure seems to be an inherently important concern, the relatively recent development of comprehensive leader survival data sets has paid more attention to the institutional and structural determinants, rather than electorates' behavior and attitude.

Unlike leader survival literature, however, regime transition literature highlighted the role of mass protests that were preceded by the stages of liberalization and further democratization during the Third Wave – which started from Southern Europe, to Latin America, to

Asia, to post-communist Europe and to sub-Saharan Africa, and thus ended many autocrats' rule (Huntington, 1993; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; McFaul, 2002).

While what is focused in the 'transitology' literature is political elites' response to mass politics at a critical juncture of the democratic transition (Colomer, 2000; Przeworski, 1991, 1992; Karl, 1990; O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986; Rustow, 1970; on democratic breakdown, Cohen, 1994; Linz, 1978*a*), the effects of mass politics on leader survival have been regarded as a by-product of the macro-political phenomena of regime transition. The literature largely has focused on regime survival but not on leader survival (Bernhard, Nordstrom and Reenock, 2001; Bernhard, Reenock and Nordstrom, 2003; Svolik, 2008). Therefore, it is puzzling why the literature on the survival of political leaders has paid little attention to the citizens' perceived political legitimacy and the electorates' voting behavior that could stabilize political system, thereby extending the leaders' survival.

In this sense, this dissertation is an effort to link the disjointed literature of mass politics and leaders' survival, especially in chapter 5. Before focusing on this, chapter 3 addresses what causes citizens' perceived legitimacy that can be a key indicator of protest politics, and focuses on how the selectorate institutions determining leaders' survival can also contribute to the understanding of citizens' perception. As citizens' perception/attitude toward political institutions in chapter 3 is not well translated into their electoral behavior of non-voting in chapter 5, these two chapters of the cross-national large-N studies do not entail an intervening variable of political legitimacy between the effect of selectorate institutions and leaders' survival. This is because there exists a difficulty to make a proxy for perceived legitimacy as a determinant for leaders' survival because of limited public opinion data. Instead, chapter 5 centers on the electorates' non-voting behavior to incorporate mass politics in an explanation of the survival theory.

Some Implications from Regime Change Theory

Legitimacy is dependent upon the leaders' competence, parties' representation and accountability of political systems. It has been witnessed that people's voice can induce many processes of liberalization and further democratization that shortened many autocratic leaders' survival since the Carnation Revolution in 1974 of Portugal. However, there exists the literature on democratic breakdown (i.e., democratic survival, not leaders' survival) that deals with dissatisfaction with democracy and lack of confidence in institutions (Lagos 2003, Valenzuela 2004).

By re-examining the actor-centric, pact-making, and top-down explanation of the third-wave democracy, other key democracy scholars center on the role of mass politics and 'democracy from below' by focusing on political participation and competition and the balance of power between old elites and oppositional masses during the transitional period (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; McFaul, 2002). Similarly, during democratization and regime breakdown, there may have been a higher correlation between discontent with existing regimes and lack of confidence in political institutions, and there might have been resultant outcomes of mass protests and even military coups (Lagos, 2001; Valenzuela, 2004; Carlin, 2006).

Borrowing from the aforementioned regime transition arguments centering on the interaction between mass politics and electoral outcomes, my theory centers on the finding that the leader's survival literature lacks consideration of mass threats either from electoral or non-electoral politics, while focusing heavily on the institutional and external constraints given to leaders. A highlight on electoral and mass politics may be also appropriate for the study of leader survival in a sense that a leader's response to mass protests may include a democratic transition to secure her survival. An old leader's deposition could be catalyzed by democratically committed masses under favorable institutions that allow for the opposition's mobilization against the ancien régime elites. On the other hand, with unfavorable institutions for the masses and (maybe the resultant) lack of mass mobilization for demonstrations and protests against the ancien régime, some postcommunist countries such as Turkmenistan

and Uzbekistan kept their presidents from within the old communist elites, i.e., the former first secretaries of the Communist Party.

While regime change need not result in automatic leadership change, it inherently bears high probabilities of leadership turnover, more often with revolutionary changes and decolonization processes. Having revolutionary threats from a popular uprising, leaders consider some useful measures such as previous electoral outcomes and protest potentials that could indicate that leaders are at risk of deposition. With no experience of free and fair elections and mass demonstrations, in contrast, old regime elites could mistakenly accept liberalizing processes and the founding elections in which they could not win. Therefore, the risk of deposition of leaders is argued to be a function of citizen’s electoral behavior in chapter 5, especially voters’ non-voting behavior.

1.2 Electorate’s Beliefs and Behaviors in the Selectorate Theory

This dissertation analyzes the associations between political trust and the selectorate institutions (chapter 3), and between mass political movements and leaders’ survival (chapter 5) by revisiting “selectorate theory”. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) propose a simple and elegant theory of the winning coalition and the selectorate to explain key political outcomes such as corruption, war and peace, and leaders’ survival. Even though the new concept and measurement of the main variable of winning coalition has raised many controversies over their conceptual understanding (Clarke and Stone, 2008; Kennedy, 2009), the leader’s coalition of the winning or ruling system seems to provide useful measures for both the leader herself and citizens to perceive whether their political playground is favorable for the former or leveled out for the latter.

Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) define *the selectorate* as “the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government’s leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government’s leadership” (p. 42): They defines the *winning coalition* as “a subset of the se-

lectorate of sufficient size such that the subset's support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the selectorate as well as over the disenfranchised members of the society" (p. 51). If measured appropriately, the size of the winning (or in autocracy, ruling) coalition is supposed to be translated into a mechanical evaluation of the leader's available resources, which in turn could determine whether the leader wages wars or maintains peace, whether she may be liable to be corrupt to secure her limited resources or accountable for the electorate, and thus whether she could secure the winning coalition's support for her survival or not.³

Consequently, the *smaller* ratio of the winning coalition size (W) to the selectorate size (S), which implies *greater* "loyalty norms", gives the leader more chance to secure her incumbency.⁴ This is because the small size of winning coalition would not consume all the resources from her coffer that the leader uses for the coalition's support for her survival while maintaining the loyalty norms. Therefore, as it is reasonable to assume that the leader always has limited resources to meet her coalition's demands, the smaller ratio of W to S facilitates a greater loyalty norm, thereby reducing the leader's burden of resource allocations and extending her survival.

This top-down, mechanical and institution-focused selectorate theory of leaders' survival, however, neglects the important role of the citizens' perceived political legitimacy that can be expressed in public opinion data and can be captured in electoral behavior. Borrowing the concept of the loyalty norm, not in a mechanical and structural sense but in a psychological and behavioralist context, in Chapter 3, I first focus on whether and how two categories of the electorate, such as electoral losers and non-partisans differently, perceive the political system from electoral winners. Similar to the findings of the political trust literature (Anderson et al., 2005), I find that both segments of this non-winning electorate have lower trust levels than

³Leader is referred to as female pronoun here while challenger/opposition is referred to as male pronoun, as Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) did.

⁴While the ratio of W to S is defined as the loyalty norm, increased size of W means less loyalty to leaders. That is, the small group of winning coalition usually carries strong and focused support for their leaders.

winners. More interestingly, both non-winners are sensitive to the levels of the loyalty norm in a different manner. While political institutions are negatively perceived by non-winners, it is argued that the increased chances of being winners, i.e., the greater size of the winning coalition and equivalently the smaller loyalty norm to a specific leader, may translate the negative perception of electoral losers into more positive belief in government. Specifically, political institutions characteristically defined by the loyalty norm provide an interactive relation with non-partisan's perception of the system since non-partisan's psychological traits of distrust, or more accurately alienation, can be rather influenced by long-term accumulation of the loyalty norm, instead of short-term changes.

In Chapter 4, I discuss the aforementioned South Korean impeachment case in more detail. Korea's impeachment case in the year 2004 provides a supporting example for the previous chapter's key finding that electoral losers' consent with political institutions complies with the short-term changes of the loyalty norm while non-partisans' political trust appear to be relatively insensitive to this kind of the loyalty variation.⁵ This chapter deals with the relationship of the support for the party in power (President Roh's URI party) as the independent variable and the support for President Roh's impeachment trial as the dependent variable according to different partisan status, and finds that electoral losers' support for impeachment, like trust level of political institutions, appears to change more extremely than non-partisans' when the support for the Uri Party changes in the short-term. Furthermore, an election survey that was done between Roh's step-down following the impeachment vote and the final decision of the Constitutional Court allows for a rare opportunity for me to provide an illustrative example for more extended examination of the relationship between electoral politics and leader survival in the next chapter.

My final theoretical results and contribution center on the findings in Chapter 5. The findings suggests that political alienation measured by an increased number of non-voters is more likely to bring about frequent mass political movements, which in turn destabilizes

⁵The long-term loyalty can not be examined in a single survey data.

the incumbent's tenure and thus risks her deposition. A measure of the non-voter's non-voting behavior as a proxy for political alienation in aggregate-level data is unavoidable and requires me to shift my focus from non-partisans to non-voters. While a discussion of the appropriateness of this shift is found in Chapter 5, other than for the purpose of analysis the non-voter's measure is more appropriate to examine the behavioral outcomes of mass political events.

In the concluding chapter, I review the main findings and implications from each chapter, and discuss future projects that can be derived from this dissertation.

Chapter 2

THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss how selectorate theory has been developed from and developed into studies on beliefs and behaviors. I highlight both the literature on social values and perceptions, considering how citizens' perception and behavior affect political survival in certain political systems, and whether perceived legitimacy can be also shaped by institutional conditions and then affect leaders' survival. Therefore, I review both the literature on political trust and on leaders' survival, as these are the variables of interest. I review the related theoretical arguments and discussions on these topics.

Trust in political institutions can be viewed as a dependent variable and considered as one of key indicators of political legitimacy. Political trust has been a key concept for many scholars in political science to explain democratic development. After defining political trust, the consequences of political trust on voting and mass political movements is surveyed in light of system stability and leader survival. Then, electoral de-participation and its aftermath of mass movements is discussed in terms of the proxy of political distrust. Finally, the consequences of electoral de-participation and mass political movements on leader survival are discussed as a final causal explanation.

2.2 Political Trust Revisited: Election and Selectorate Politics

For an understanding of how the non-winning electorate, i.e., electoral losers and non-voters, in a certain institutional context evaluate and threaten a leader, the general perception of the political system by the electorate must be carefully examined. Trust or confidence that citizens place in political institutions is an important indicator for this kind of general

perception and a key to political development that can be based on a mature citizenship. Whether in advanced industrial countries or in democratizing countries, political trust allows citizens to be involved in their own governing systems, while government that represents citizens establishes the stability and legitimacy of its democratic representation and policies (Bianco, 1994; Levi and Stoker, 2000).

2.2.1 What is Political Trust?

Since Easton's seminal work on support for the political system in the late 1960s, political support and trust have been key concepts in understanding political development. Easton (1965; 1975) and Gamson (1968) proposed, and the concept was empirically tested and specified by Miller (1974a; 1974b) and Citrin (1974).

Easton (1965) provided a relatively clear definition of political trust and differentiated the types of the support for the political system. By differentiating two types of input - demands and support - into the political system, the political system produces policy outputs, which again affect subsequent demand and support. He defines support as "an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favorably or unfavorably, positively or negatively [...] support refers to the way in which a person evaluatively orients himself to some object through either his attitudes or his behavior" (436). Therefore, support is a key attitudinal variable that can be easily translated into behavioral consequences in the working of the political system.

Two types of support were distinguished by Easton (1975): specific support and diffuse support. Specific support entails citizen's relatively fleeting satisfaction with performance of the political authorities. He noted that specific support entails the satisfaction obtained by members of a system resulting from the perceived policy outputs and performance of the political authorities.

Diffuse support is defined as "the reservoir of favorable attitudes and good will" for the objects of the political system. With that, citizens can accept and tolerate undesirable

outputs produced by their political system. Unlike specific support, it is closely associated with generalized attitudes and perceptions toward three political objects, the community, regime, and authorities.

The main idea about political trust as an intervening variable between electoral politics (election winner/loser/non-partisan) and job security of a leader inherently faces a limitation of research design. Macro-level leader survival analysis does not allow for direct measurement of the individual-level psychological effect. In this situation, borrowing from existing theory and research from political psychology, I employ the construct of *accessibility* that plays an important role in sorting out institutional effects on an individual's attitude to the political system.

Here, accessibility can be defined as “the extent to which information or attitudes are retrieved from memory and used in making judgments or decisions” (Fazio, 1986; Chanley, 2002: 480). In this vein, political trust toward government (parliament, president, judiciary, army, police, etc) is argued to be more accessible in *memory* than an individual's less strongly held feelings (Fazio, 1986). As I will discuss in the first part of my theoretical causality model in chapter 3, citizens' perception of a system's institutions and their attitudes to the trust level of the institutions could be sensitive to the institutional development since its history. When political trust as an attitude is accessed from the citizen's memory of the institutional development (i.e., historical loyalty norm (W/S)), it can produce different individuals' perception of the political institutions than the current institutional context (i.e., short-term loyalty norm (W/S)). Thus, citizens may consider political institutions in evaluative terms relying on their own memory.

Specifically, research in social and political psychology contends that attitudes that are to affect decisions, judgements, or behavior must be both available and accessible from memory (Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida, 1989; Higgins and King, 1981). Fazio's (1986) model of attitude accessibility posited that more accessible attitudes are more prone to guide the processing of relevant behavior and information. Individuals' attitudes to the

political institutions accessible from their memory of institutional development are in this context hypothesized to be of substantial importance in understanding the attitudinal effect of political alienation and its *subsequent* effect of nonvoting behavior on leader survival. I will discuss the second part of this causal chain in chapter 5.

2.2.2 Political Trust, Policy, and Participation

2.2.2.1 Trust and Policy Attitudes

Trust in government has long been considered to be connected to citizens' satisfaction with government's policies. In this sense, if citizens' expectations of government policies are achieved, trust in government can be expanded (Miller 1974a; Hetherington 1998). However, very few have focused on the other direction; i.e., political trust can have an impact on the formation of policy attitudes. Hetherington (2005) posits "why trust matters" in light of the consequences of political trust/distrust, while noting that many have already tried to identify the causes of this political attitude since the 1970s (Citrin, 1974; Miller, 1974a,b). Likewise, exceptions include Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn (2000), Hetherington and Nugent (2001), and Hetherington and Globetti (2002).

An individual's ideological beliefs have long received attention in the study of welfare policy attitudes, despite well-known reservations regarding the individual's capability to engage in ideological thinking (Converse 1964). The ideology argument presumes that attitudes toward the welfare state are rooted in more general value systems regarding the proper relationship between the individual, the state and other institutions such as labor markets and voluntary organizations (Feldman and Zaller 1992). These contradictory values and beliefs, which have been labeled achievement and equality by Lipset (1963) and economic individualism and social equality by McClosky and Zaller (1984), can provide the ideological justification for either supporting or opposing welfare programs.

In support of the welfare state is the belief that all citizens have basic social rights

including the right to an acceptable level of economic welfare and security and the right to live according to prevailing social standards. In opposition to the welfare state is the concept of economic individualism, which assumes that each person is responsible for his or her own welfare, and which understands individual well-being to be an outcome of hard work. According to this view, citizens are expected to do what they can to be economically self-sufficient. The welfare state undermines this principle by excusing some citizens from their economic responsibilities and by fostering inappropriate behavior among recipients of benefits.

Several studies support the thesis that attitudes toward the welfare state are connected to more general ideological dispositions. Jacoby (1994) found a more coherent structure in public attitudes toward social welfare expenditure than other government expenditures, which he hypothesized reflected stronger ideological conflict over this issue. Both Sears et al. (1980) and Hasenfeld and Rafferty (1989) found that endorsement of the concept of social rights was a key predictor of welfare state support. Similar findings were reported in open-ended interviews conducted by McClosky and Zaller (1984). And analysts find that ideology shapes spending attitudes across a wide range of issues (Jacoby 1994, 2000) and is particularly influential among those whose ideological orientations are more accessible (Huckfeldt et al. 1999).

Hetherington (2005) develops a theory designed to explain the conditions under which political trust will influence citizens' policy attitudes. Citizens are more likely to support an expansion of services when the government that will deliver those services is perceived as trustworthy. While this theory seems to assume a simple "feed back" or reciprocal effect between political trust and policy attitude, his key argument lies in the activation of the trust heuristic that is tied to perceived sacrifice or risk associated with a particular policy; specifically, political trust is expected to be activated when individuals are asked to sacrifice their own material interests for the advancement of political minorities. He argues that increasing political distrust, not increasing conservatism, explains why policy agendas have

become more conservative in the United States. His understanding of political trust/cynicism in terms of a cost-benefit perspective regarding the policy agenda is well described in the following statements: “people do not need to trust the government much when they benefit from it [...] [P]eople need to trust the government when they pay the costs but do not receive the benefit” (4).

In this context, Rudolph and Evans (2005) successfully pick up where the previous ideology-government-spending literature left off. They provide significant support to Hetherington’s “sacrifice-based theory of political trust” by looking at the moderating effect of ideology on political trust. In doing so, while Hetherington shows that political trust figures more prominently in shaping public support for redistributive spending than distributive spending, their analysis demonstrates that that ideological stance of citizens conditions the effects of political trust on attitudes toward distributive as well as redistributive spending. The revised ‘cost-benefit analysis’ in political attitudes is linked with the ideological stance of citizens, which implicitly signifies how political trust can be strongly associated with sacrifice, not only from economic benefits, but also from political benefits, the latter of which include ideological costs (i.e., sacrifice). Conservatives tend to have more pronounced effects of political trust on support for government spending than liberals (Rudolph and Evans, 2005).

In the following sub-section, I review the literature connecting between trust and vote, and between trust and mass political movements, mainly focusing on the consequences of political trust/distrust. Specifically, if one is alienated from the political system, the strength of alienation should be greater: “perceptions of the polity are far more powerful factors in producing alienation than social background variables” (Schwartz, 1973: 11). The consequences of political trust, as represented by the link of distrust-alienation, can be citizens’ behavioral outcomes such as political participation, either conventional or unconventional (Barnes et al., 1979). Borrowing from Inglehart’s distinction, these participatory acts can be divided into two distinguishing ones: the first one is elite-directed and expressive participa-

tion such as voting; and second one is citizen-directed and instrumental participation such as mass political events (Inglehart, 1997). Below, political trust has different consequences according to these two participatory acts, and in addition, empirical analyses focus on these two effects on leader survival in chapter 5.

2.2.2.2 Trust and Voting

Early theorizing about political alienation and disaffection suggests that distrust might bring about a lack of political engagement (Almond and Verba, 1963; Finifter, 1970), especially seeming to be the case when decline of voting turnout in the United States coincided with the decline in political trust. Contrasting to these early theories, many scholars find no relationship between trust and vote turnout (Miller, 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). The weakening of partisanship and declining belief of “external” efficacy, not political trust, are largely considered as two major reasons for the decline of electoral participation in the U.S. (Abramson and Aldrich, 1982). Similarly, Miller, Goldenberg and Erbring (1979) suggests that political confidence affects participation in presidential elections, only with an indirect effect through external efficacy.

Many scholars have discussed whether citizens’ perception of trust in government is a prerequisite for democratic governance (Stokes, 1962; Citrin, 1974; Miller, 1974a; Citrin et al., 1975; Abramson and Finifter, 1981; Nye, Zelikow and King, 1997; Warren, 1999; Pharr and Putnam, 2000; McDonald Michael and Popkin Samuel, 2001; Mackenzie and Labiner, 2002; Dalton, 2004). Miller (1974a) argued that in the United States low levels of trust in government represented a prevailing and enduring dissent with government, which might be “increasing the potential for radical change” (951). And, he interpreted the persistent drop of political trust and political efficacy as an indication of “a situation of widespread, basic discontent and political alienation” (915). Political trust to Miller was centered on the difference between citizens’ utilitarian motives and their expressive expectations; as the discrepancy between motives and expectations grows, more public discontent prevails.

With a rejoinder, Citrin (1974) accepted Miller’s main conclusion that “policy-related discontent is a source of political cynicism” and proceeded to focus on the following three issues: “(1) The meaning of political trust as measured by the Trust in Government Scale; (2) the independent impact, if any, of *attitudes* of political cynicism on political *actions* at the individual level; and (3) A re-examination of the claim that a continuation of “centrist” policies will inhibit the restoration of public confidence in the political process” (1974, original *italic*). Yet, “political cynics” who focus their dissatisfaction on incumbent authorities may support political regime, thereby bearing negative evaluations of the *incumbent* national administration, rather than general political regime.

Regarding the link between cynicism and uncustomary/unconventional political action, Citrin found that increased cynicism was not strongly correlated with any “oppositionist” political behavior of protest and with withdrawal from electoral politics, although admitting that “political mistrust or alienation intervene between a sense of discontent and “oppositionist” actions requires [...] that cynical and trusting respondents differ in their behavior, particularly at high levels of policy dissatisfaction” (1980) (cf. Citrin and Green, 1986; Chanley, Rudolph and Rahn, 2000, 2001).

Yet, the null finding of a relationship between trust/distrust and participation using the National Election Studies (NES) does not correctly suggest the effects of the distrustful and even alienated voter’s attitudes on voting patterns with a different trust index (Seligson, 1983; Muller, Jukam and Seligson, 1982). Seligson’s use of both the NES trust index and Muller’s (1977) “Political Support-Alienation” (PSA) index in survey data gathered in Mexico allows scholars to re-examine the relationship between trust and vote turnout. This finding suggests not only strong evidence against the validity of the widely-used NES trust index, but also shows a strong relationship between political distrust and low vote turnout.

Regarding political trust and vote choice, Hetherington (1999) argues that politically distrustful voters cast their votes more for candidates from the nonincumbent major party in two-candidate races, while in the situation of three viable candidates, third-party candidates

get most benefits from declining political trust at the expense of two major parties. Similarly, Miller and Listhaug (1990) suggest that voters channel distrust through support for protest parties in multiparty systems.

In contrast, Koch (2003) argues that “political cynicism is not causally prior to third party candidate preferences” (57). When using an instrumental variable of partisan independence “as measured 2 years prior to the election” for third party support, he finds a significant effect of third party support on political cynicism. The use of the instrumental variable of non-partisan status is confirmed by finding in the ANES data that “it is the third party candidacy that joins independence and political cynicism, two sets of political attitudes that are otherwise unrelated to each other” (58). Citizens less likely to be partisan appear to better embrace what a third party candidate criticizes about policies and social issues, thereby deepening political cynicism. For example, the citizens who supported and were involved in Perot’s 1992 presidential campaign were found to be far more distrusting than the average citizens (Atkeson et al., 1996).

The aforementioned endogeneity of political trust/cynicism implies two things in this dissertation: first, non-partisan status may tend to lead to political cynicism with the help of viable alternatives that may entail opposition actors or supporting institutions; second, how *viable* alternative actors/institutions are matters in linking partisan status and political trust. These are discussed in chapter 3 in the form of the winning coalition and the selectorate that may engender some viable alternatives to the non-winning electorate.

2.2.2.3 Trust and Mass Political Movements

While Seligson’s finding may be more applicable for non-US populations or only in Mexico, the null finding from the NES trust index may cover another important consequence of political trust. More trusting voters in the United States may not be likely to go to the ballot box, but distrusting voters may be likely to engage in unconventional political participation such as protests and anti-government demonstrations. Gamson (1968) noted that “a combination

of high political efficacy and low political trust is the optimum combination for mobilization – a belief that influence is both possible and necessary” (48).

Borrowing from Gamson’s (1968) argument of the relationship between discontent and system-challenging behavior, many scholars focused on the possibility of increased unconventional participation caused by distrust and alienation. Most research on this hypothesis lies in survey analysis during the 1960s’ and 1970s’ turmoil that found mixed results for the link of distrust and protest activity/potential (Aberbach, 1969; Jackson, 1973; Citrin, 1977; Pierce and Philip, 1989; Muller, Jukam and Seligson, 1982). Earlier than Gamson’s work, Easton (1965) specified two types of political discontent; diffuse and specific discontent, like diffuse and specific support. Diffuse political discontent is also considered to afford a strong incentive for aggressive political disobedience or violence. This is so because diffuse alienation from the political system “provides a normative incentive for aggressive political participation” (Muller and Jukam, 1983: 172).

More specifically, Muller, Jukam and Seligson (1982) contended that only regime-oriented diffuse discontent, and not incumbent-focused fleeting dissatisfaction, were significantly associated with aggressive anti-system behavior (e.g. Citrin, 1974, 1977). The use of diffuse support/discontent implies that more general measures of political trust should be considered in examining the system stability that eventually affects leadership stability. Alienated citizens thus seem to be no good for a leader’s security if they are accumulated.

In a narrower range of countries’ examples, Tarrow (2000) finds that loss of confidence in government due to the government’s provision of misinformation is often a key cause of political activism, and thus distrusting citizens are more prone to involve themselves in contentious politics. However, distrusting but engaged citizens build up some kind of “working trust” in government officials. In a somewhat similar context, Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst (2005) complements Tarrow’s argument of translation of “discontent into constructive ... political engagement” in a similar context of postindustrial society’s protest politics (Hall, 1999: 455). In the 1999 Belgian-Flanders general election study with a series

of surveys of protestors engaged in seven different demonstrations in Belgium, while the authors disconfirm the *Crisis of Democracy* argument concerned about anti-state protests characterized by unconventional political participation (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki, 1975), they regard demonstrations as conventional in Belgian politics, and demonstrators are not considered as “anti-state radicals who belong to socially marginal groups or who despise conventional forms of political participation. By contrast, they are more similar to the Belgian population as a whole than civic joiners and party members” (203).

2.3 Non-voting and Mass Mobilization: Risky for Leader?

Alienated citizens involved in abstention from elections are reasonably assumed to be prone to find some alternative ways to express their voices if they can be mobilized. Hence, scholars raised the following question: How is electoral abstention and de-participation derived from a lack of political trust translated into mass political events? In the next sub-section, I review the literature to attempt to answer this question. Conceivably, answering this question raises another important question of how electoral de-participation poses the risk of leaders’ deposition.

2.3.1 Who is an Anti-system Non-voter?

Nonvoting is conventionally viewed as an individual-level phenomenon, as discussed in the previous literature. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) focus on the three key individual-level explanations for nonvoting: (1) because they do not want to, (2) because people are not able to, and (3) because they are not mobilized to vote (see also Verba, Nie and Kim, 1987; Oppenhuis, 1995; Dalton, 2006). Thus, nonvoting results from ignorance, indifference, dissatisfaction, or inactivity (Ragsdale and Rusk, 1993). This dissertation examines how nonvoting behavior can be translated into anti-system “nonbehavior” in an aggregate form in terms of its impacts on mass political movements and eventually the risk of leader’s

deposition. Thus, how can nonvoting be understood, and how does it have an aggregated form of expression such as mass political movements?

Non-voters can be understood in two ways: using a the cultural/sociological approach or an economic approach (cf. Barry, 1970).¹ While the economic approach to voting behavior emphasizes voters' calculation of costs and benefits of voting (Downs, 1957; Olson, 1974; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968), the sociological approach highlights the social context that confers normative and habitual voting behavior on voters (Almond and Verba, 1963; Lipset, 1960). Similarly, the sociological approach appears to bear a strong relationship with "elitist" theories of democracy (Dahl, 1954; Almond and Verba, 1963), and the economic approach has much in common with the "institutional/constitutional" approach to democracy (Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974; Shepsle, 1979).

The economic approach to nonvoting is more centered on the political system, rather than beliefs and attitudes, and entails institutional/constitutional reforms. The nonvoting paradox was first introduced by Downs (1957) and developed by Riker and Ordeshook (1968), who proposed innovative ideas of the nonvoting dilemma at the individual-level parameters of the utility function. They focused on the concept of the "D term":

$$E(U) = (P * B) - C + D$$

where $E(U)$ represents the expected utility of voting; P represents the probability that the individual's vote will actually affect the outcome; B is the expected benefit from the preferred candidate's winning the election; C is the cost of voting including being informed about the campaign and going to the ballot box; and D represents the intrinsic benefit of the act of voting including psychological satisfaction resulted from fulfilling one's civic duty. As the D term is not influenced by the probability of P , and C can be complemented by a larger D , the expected utility of voting can be positive. Thus, some institutional conditions

¹Other than this distinction, the propensity for non-voters or minority groups to over-report can be another important concern in the literature of non-voting behavior survey (Silver, Anderson and Abramson, 1986; Abramson and Claggett, 1991).

were suggested to explain how a certain institution provides increased selective benefits that increase the size of the D term (Aldrich, 1993), how to reduce the costs C of voting through registration laws and polling hours (Rosenstone and Wolfinger, 1978), and why more competitive elections increase the perception of P (Cox and Munger, 1989).

Under the rubric of a sociological approach, Dahl’s elitist theory assumes that the existence of non-voters is a healthy sign of citizen’s satisfaction with the political system and democracy, and high rates of participation, on the other hand, indicate polarization and extremism (cf. Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Schattschneider, 1960). Unlike the optimistic view of nonvoting, pessimists such as Edelman and Walker suggested that nonvoting is an inevitable response to “symbolism” and political culture that are applied by elites who engender alienated masses and make them “acquiesce” in the elite’s decisions (Edelman, 1964, 1971; Walker, 1966). Thus, for these political scientists, a substantial increase of abstention in voting would threaten democratic stability.

This dissertation suggests a hybrid approach between the economic and sociological schools, which admits the importance of institutional conditions and constraints and individual electorate’s attitudes and behaviors toward state institutions of winning coalitions and the selectorate. Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) conceptualization of the winning coalition and the selectorate in terms of leader survival is argued to provide an institutional environment for the electorate’s perception of political alienation. Hypothetically, as the winning coalition size allows for excluded groups (either non-partisans or non-voters) to perceive how much their institutions are likely to alienate them, those excluded groups’ alienation can be strengthened (in greater W) or weakened (in smaller W) by the winning coalition size. This is one of the hypotheses that will be tested in chapter 3.

2.3.2 Why are Non-voters Mobilized?

A classical dilemma between mobilization and political participation for a ruling elite in developing countries was suggested Samuel Huntington (1968). Huntington argued that

when political participation is too great for institutional capabilities to assimilate it, system instability can result. Indeed, he contended that “the political essence of revolution is the rapid expansion of political consciousness and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics at a speed which makes it impossible for existing political institutions to assimilate them. Revolution is the extreme case of the explosion of political participation” (266). While he restricted the term revolution to the rapid and widespread transformations of whole societies, “a fundamental continuity between revolution and lesser forms of conflict” exists in his formulation of revolution (Tilly, 1978: 434). Therefore, to Huntington (1968), any imbalance resulting from violence or “other forms of disorder” is argued to account for revolution (358).²

Charles Tilly criticized Huntington, arguing that while Huntington did not make any distinction between pre-revolutionary participation and participation in revolutions themselves, “we must disaggregate revolutions into its components instead of treating it as a unitary phenomenon ... and we must specify and trace the relations of each major segment to the changing structure of power” (436-7). Tilly’s centering on disaggregation and tracing major segments suggests an alternative mode of specifying revolution to Huntington’s emphasis on mobilized groups and their preceding structural changes (cf. Moore, 1966; Skocpol, 1979). A prominent explanation of an aggregate psychological hypotheses could provide a useful frameworks to understand revolution and political violence (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970; Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966).

Thus, why should we focus on nonvoters? As described in the optimistic views in the “elitism” approach (Dahl, 1954; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Schattschneider, 1960; Schumpeter, 1952), political quiescence is regarded as an important benefit to elites as well as to leaders. With political quiescence, the leader extracts taxes without serious resistance, maintains no opposing “voices” to the party in power, implements her policies that may contribute the state’s economy, and thus protects the political legitimacy of her rule

²Huntington coupled violence with this kind of “other forms of disorder”.

(cf. Davenport, 2007). Even so, the pessimist view of the “elitism” approach raises questions of the benefits, since widespread abstention from voting indicates a lack of regime support that could be extended to threats to leaders (Edelman, 1964, 1971; Walker, 1966).

The aforementioned study by Seligson (1983) also noted the problem of widespread abstention from voting, in part due to the lack of political support. He observed that “Mexican political leaders repeatedly make reference to the ‘problem of abstentionism’ and, in recent years have waged vigorous campaigns against it. There is little question that elites view growing abstention from the vote as a clear sign that support for the Mexican system of government is declining” (13). Earlier, Milbrath and Goel (1977) suggested that political support is strongly related to institutionalized political participation such as voting. They also pointed out that when socio-economic status was controlled for, the relationship between political affect and participation tended to disappear. This is so because low SES and political alienation seemed to be highly correlated.

Economically alienated citizens are also often categorized as politically alienated ones. This notion is related to one of two main models of political violence: the relative deprivation model and the rational action model. In the relative deprivation model mainly suggested by Gurr (1970), many scholars found a strong relationship between inequality and mass violence (Muller, 1985; Muller and Seligson, 1987; Gurr, 1968a, 1970) and between potential separatism and rebellious movements (Muller and Weede, 1990). Minority groups in terms of either socio-economic or ethnic status tend to be liable to become involved in mass political movements, either at the national level or state/province level (cf. Wilkinson, 2004). According to rational action models, costs of protest/rebellion are also dependent on the structure of the political system and the leader’s behavior in response to protest (Muller and Weede, 1990; Lichbach, 1998).

In a somewhat similar vein, Green (1984), while confirming Karl Deutsch and Myron Weiner’s notion of a “crisis of participation”, argues that political non-participation should be considered as an important factor explaining revolutions and other kinds of mass political

movements. “Popular involvement in the Iranian upheaval was inextricably linked to the absence of participation before it began. It can be argued that a greater awareness on the part of the Shah to the politicization accompanying Iranian development might have helped him to preserve his throne.”

From both models, non-voters may be alienated economically and ethnically, and non-voters’ alienation may be translated into their mobilization for protest, which could be facilitated by institutional conditions such as the winning coalition size. Hypothetically, increased size of the winning coalition can be argued to result in less isolation of the alienated non-voters from the benefits of a leader’s policy provisions, thereby decreasing political alienation for non-voters. This is also one of the hypotheses that will be tested in chapter 3.

2.4 Unpacking Leader Survival: The Electorate in Selectorate Politics

Leadership turnover has been continuously intriguing scholars in both comparative politics and international relations to examine in diverse contexts such as regime type, war costs, election timing, and domestic institutional settings. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995) found in a systematic fashion that different regime types and war costs were key determinants of leadership turnover during post-war periods. Goemans (2000a) similarly showed that “only leaders of mixed regimes are likely to lose power and suffer additional punishment [in the form of exile, imprisonment, or death] whether they lose a war moderately or disastrously” (555).

Focusing on the rivalry context of international relations, Colaresi (2004b; 2004a) adroitly suggests that after war, job security of a leader can be more secured in the context of international rivalry than in one outside of rivalry, thereby a ‘hawkish’ leader in the rivalry context being less likely to be deselected from power. These findings claiming that “wars in many cases lead to violent revolutions and leadership turnover” were largely derived from

previous work of Skocpol (1979) and Tilly (1996) (Colaresi, 2004b: 713).³ Therefore, war outcomes were theorized and tested to breed political violence and thus leadership turnover.

Other possible progenitors of political violence, other than war outcomes and costs, should center on delving into leadership replacement. As Norpoth (1987) argued that “war and economics have few rivals when it comes to making or breaking governments” (949), the provision of ‘butter’ should thus be considered as another key progenitor of political violence that could threaten the job security of a leader. Similar to economic growth, inequality was suggested as a predictor of political violence and leadership replacement (Midlarsky, 1988; Muller, 1985; Muller and Seligson, 1987; Muller et al., 1989).

The theory and analysis developed from the relationship between inequality and violence put forward a specific referent of those who may feel deprived relative to other citizens in the society. Land’s and income’s patterned inequality do not seem to change at a fast rate, and thus relatively deprived citizens seem to be liable to be economically alienated and to be the sources of political violence, which may turn into political alienation. Slow-changing patterns and perpetuated socio-economic conditions are reasonably assumed to produce the alienated who may initiate every-day forms of resistance such as peasants’ ‘foot-dragging’, and perhaps rebellious against a ruling elite as well as against their system (Scott, 1985, 1990; Midlarsky, 1988; Muller and Seligson, 1987).

In the following sub-sections, I survey the components that influence job security of a leader, first votes and mass threats to leadership tenure, and selectorate politics for the electorate.

2.4.1 The Electorate and Mass Threats to a Leader

How should the alienated or the powerless be examined based on more regular and dynamic circumstances than unchanged socio-economic conditions, both in terms of their likelihood

³The reverse causal explanation from revolution to war is also suggested by Stephan Walt (1996).

of becoming involved in political violence and in their support for the leader? Elections and the electorate's behavior can provide scholars with rich data sources. Recently, evident is the identification of the relationship between fighting and voting, that is, linking "two research programs, one on the sources of democratic consolidation and the other on the causes, consequences, and dynamics of internal conflict" (Dunning, 2011: 2).

Dunning (2011) points to work in Jack Snyder's *From Voting to Violence* (2000), which links fighting and voting and also connects comparative politics and international relations. To Dunning and other scholars contributing to the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, elections can be understood as either substitutes for fighting, complementing fighting, or suppressing fighting. In the recent special issue of the journal, Chacon, Robinson and Torvik (2011) imply that increased electoral competition engenders more fighting between parties and groups that have an equal chance of winning elections. This is based on their assumption of higher costs of being involved in fighting than participating in elections. If parties lack widespread popular support, they also have a low probability of winning a civil war. Therefore, less electoral competition may result in more peace.

In contrast, Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi (2011) in the same issue of the journal argue that "actors who see little or no chance of having their interests taken into account in the formal decision-making process are more likely to take to their plights to the streets" (347). Arguably confirming the earlier work of Milbrath and Goel (1977), they show that the aggregate number of street protests at the national level is negatively associated with measures of "institutional quality", which is indicated by the effectiveness of lawmaking bodies, the degree of judicial independence, and the stability of the party system. Their finding coincides with the argument advanced by Przeworski (1991) who convincingly suggested that "compliance depends on the probability of winning within the democratic institutions. A particular actor i will comply if the probability it attaches to being victorious in democratic competition, $p(i)$, is greater than some minimum; call it $p^*(i)$. . . the more confident the actor is that the relationship of political force will not take an adverse turn within the

democratic institutions, the more likely is this actor to comply; the less risky the subversion, the less likely are the potential antidemocratic forces to comply” (30).

In a similar vein, Vreeland (2008) argues that civil war onset is assumed to be a function of the political participation components of Polity IV, rather than the chief executive components of it. His admission of the importance of political participation by the citizens highlights that an unstable political system characterized by civil conflicts and wars can be a function of the instability of political participation by the citizens.

2.4.2 The Electorate in Selectorate Politics

Regime change and leadership turnover have been carefully examined by scholars of democracy. Specifically in sub-Saharan Africa, Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) highlight democratic transitions in Africa to occur more commonly from below. “Of twenty-one cases of transition in sub-Saharan Africa between November 1989 and May 1991, the initiative to undertake political reform was taken by opposition protesters in sixteen cases and by incumbent state leaders in only five cases” (461). With this notion, they argue that “when rule is built on personal loyalty, supreme leaders often lose touch with popular legitimacy. They lack institutional ties to corporate groups in society that could alert them to the strength of their popular support” (462). The founding elections of sub-Saharan African new democracies suggest that cohesive opposition movements in Zambia and Niger were strong enough to trounce the ruling parties and deprive them of control of the legislatures (Bratton, 1997).⁴

For the sake of leadership survival, which is not uncorrelated with regime change, fear of rivals and opposition protesters may drive leaders to emasculate the very state institutions that secure their loyal support (Migdal, 1988); or conditional on the free resource availability and the extant size of winning coalition, the leader may expand or suppress the size of the winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). Bueno de Mesquita and Smith

⁴Regarding the review and the role of election boycotters will be discussed in chapter 5’s theoretical part.

(2009) show that increasing the winning coalition size can be in the interests of political outsiders as well as leaders and coalition members when mass political movements especially characterized by revolutionary threats are threatening to a leader. By increasing the size of the winning coalition, it can satiate potential revolutionaries by incorporating them into political domains, and the leader's policies can be rationalized in terms of rewarding supporters.

Regarding the electorate's response to the leader's policy and institutional reforms derived from mass movements from below, Przeworski (1991) formally modeled the self-enforcing democratic equilibrium. He concludes that "[d]emocracy will evoke generalized compliance, it will be self-enforcing, when all the relevant political forces have some specific minimum probability of doing well under the particular system of institutions" (30-31). Further, Weingast (1997) highlights the role of the electorate by incorporating it into Przeworski's model. In his extension of Przeworski's model, democratic stability that is a function of restrictions on governing elites is only possible "if there exists a citizen consensus to react against tomorrow's incumbents if they attempt to rig elections" (255). His notion of the citizens' or the electorate's consensus signifies the important roles of electorate politics.

Chapter 3

THE PARTISAN-W/S NEXUS OF POLITICAL TRUST

3.1 Introduction

A recent study on political survival or leader longevity by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) proposes a simple and elegant institutional condition to explain political leaders' survival in a variety of political contexts such as presidentialism, parliamentarism and mixed (semi-presidential) systems. The key institution is the loyalty norms, measured by the ratio of the size of winning coalition (W) to the size of selectorate (S). Conceptually, the loyalty norms have a negative relationship with the ratio of W to S , however: The higher the W/S ratio, the less private goods distributed to each winner in the coalition; and equivalently, the smaller the loyalty norms, the less they are loyal to the incumbent leaders.

Measuring a winning coalition is heavily dependent on the Polity indicators. As described in Appendix A, Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues use regime type (military/civilian-military/civilian), competitiveness of executive recruitment (XRCOMP), openness of executive recruitment (XROPEN), and the competitiveness of participation (PARCOMP).¹ These indicators are appropriate measures for a winning coalition in a sense that the indicators are mainly based on the ways of executive recruitment and electoral participation for that recruitment. Using these indicators, their model entails that both the leader and challengers offering policy benefits intend to form a coalition large enough to maintain or take power. These elites should appeal to both groups of the winning coalition and the selectorate: the selectorate is defined as those who "have a government-granted say in the selection of leaders" (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003: 42); and the leader should form a supporting coalition of enough citizens to maintain and stabilize her tenure through a winning coalition (W), "a subset of the selectorate of sufficient size such that the subset's support endows the leadership

¹ My revised measure of the winning coalition is described in Appendix A.

with political power over the remainder of the selectorate as well as over the disenfranchised members of the society" (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003: 51).

What matters most to winners of a winning coalition is the degree to which a leader can secure her power and tenure by spending enough resources for the supporting the fcoalition against challengers who would propose better policies in pursuit of getting more defectors from the leaders' winning coalition. Bueno de Mesquita et al. focus on how a leader can avoid defection of the winners to challengers by taking into account the affinity between leaders and the selectorates, focusing on the size of W .

While some researchers contend that selectorate theory cannot capture the multifaceted concept of democracy, others argue that the size of winning coalitions may tap only into the presence/absence of competitive elections (Clarke and Stone, 2008; Kennedy, 2009). Moreover, Bueno de Mesquita et al. pay little attention to the effect of protests on political survival. Contrary to the limited institutional approach to explain leader's survival, Kathryn Hochstetler (2006) highlights the importance of public opinion and argues that the effect of public opinion on the probability of street protest should be included in the political survival literature.

Selectorate theory looks mostly (if not only) at the effects of political elites' behavior and citizens' behavior, which seems independent of the effect of mass public attitudes. So the disjuncture of selectorate theory and mass public attitudes is inevitably severe, and it ends up missing another key part of the causal relation that includes mass public attitudes toward the system and political elites. Furthermore, a leader and challengers interact with each other according to their respective utility maximization, which this chapter argues should be based upon both the size of the winning coalitions and the selectorate and on the citizens' basic attitudes toward the system such as the partisan status of the selectorate (Anderson et al., 2005).

In a similar vein, citizens' attitudes toward the system are considered key factors in explaining feelings about the incumbent leaders and thus whether leaders can succeed or not

(Hetherington, 1998). While Bueno de Mesquita et al. highlight the elites' behavior mechanically determined by the loyalty norm, they ignore the importance of culturally defined functions of the loyalty norm; that is, they do not attend to how both electoral winners and electoral losers in the selectorate view the institutions of the loyalty norms as well as elites' behavior and how non-partisans support the system. Moreover, the culturally defined loyalty norms can interact with the effects of partisan status on political legitimacy. It entails how selectorate theory explains the variance of political trust among winners and losers in selectorate.

Therefore, this chapter develops an important link between two disjointed literatures by using macro-/micro-level data to confirm that both literatures will contribute to each other.² The next section examines the literature concerned with political trust and relates it to research on leadership stability. I introduce a theoretical connection between the loyalty norm and partisan's preference in terms of political legitimacy. Next, issues of measurement and data analysis are discussed. After presenting the results from the multilevel analysis with robust check, I discuss the importance of the loyalty norm in partisan support for regime and spell out avenues for potential research in leader survival literature.

3.2 Selectorate Theory of Electoral Politics: Explaining Political Trust

Political support has been a key concept for cultural theory of democracy, along with social capital (Almond and Verba, 1963; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1994). High institutional confidence in a civic culture often emphasizes diffuse political support and is positively associated with current regime legitimacy and the effective function of institutions (Easton, 1965, 1975; Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson, 1995; Gibson, Caldeira and Spence, 2003). Unlike

²Scholars contributing to political consent literature argue that satisfaction with democracy and confidence in institutions vary between winners' and losers' status (Anderson et al., 2005; Anderson and Guillory, 1997). Their main institutional variables are the effective number of parliamentary parties, the disproportionality between seats and votes, and 'alternation in power'.

institution-oriented scholars, culturalists give more stress to identity, values, and norms, thereby individuals' rational evaluation of government performance being less important (see, e.g., North, 1990; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).

Despite much interest in institutional theories of democracy, system support scholars have reinvigorated cultural arguments and even have incorporated institutional theories in the study of democratic institutions and citizens' behavior (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008; Rothstein, 2009; Uslaner, 2003; Hooghe and Stolle, 2003). Socially trusting individuals tend to have more significant levels of political trust (Almond and Verba, 1963) while Bahry and Silver (1990; 1987) show that greater social trust was associated with greater citizen activism in both regime complaint and regime critical political action. Some theorists have had difficulty finding significant partial correlations between political trust and social trust at the individual level, while aggregate-level analyses show stronger correlations (Mishler and Rose, 2005; Rothstein, 2002; Uslaner, 2002; Newton and Norris, 2000; Wright, 1976).³ Brehm and Rahm (1997) also find significant effects of social trust on confidence in government by controlling for 13 other variables in the US data. With a more inclusive country sample, Freitag and Bühlmann (2009) contend that the positive effect of more power-sharing institutions on social trust is magnified for the individuals having "bridging" social capital and the positive effect of income equality on social trust is also strengthened for people having more life satisfaction.

While many students of political support try to disentangle the concepts of socially and politically engaging attitudes and behavior, most (if not all) admit that contextual variables matter in generating political support, and thus we need to attend to associated micro- and macro-level determinants causing public support in a certain context. Regarding micro-level constraints, the political consent literature has emphasized the distinction between

³By using rescaled 11-point social trust and political trust variables, recent study on the relationships between political trust and social trust, and between satisfaction with democracy and social trust shows a significant correlation at individual-level (Zmerli and Newton, 2008).

winners and losers of elections; losers naturally tend to have lower evaluations of their own system, depending upon the electoral systems (Anderson and LoTempio, 2002; Anderson and Guillory, 1997); individuals having left ideology are also less likely to accept governing authority to the extent that inequality is able to reinforce their discontent (Anderson and Singer, 2008). In addition, when the political consent literature focuses on the variation among individuals, compliant and unconventional political activities in the context of a repressive regime implies that variations of political activism have different impacts on the citizens' level of public support (Bahry and Silver, 1987, 1990).

Macro-level constraints usually appear in combination with micro-level characteristics; for example, the effects of electoral systems and income inequality in a country on political support depend on individuals' characteristics. For the latter, the Soviet Union's repressive regime itself allowed variations of political activism to occur, although people's psychology better explains the variations of political activism (Bahry and Silver, 1987, 1990). This incorporation of micro- or individual-level variables into the study of formal rules/institutions has been supported by Douglas North (1990), who states that more study of culturally derived norms of behavior and their interaction with formal rules/institutions represents "beginning the serious study of institutions."

With a surge of research that integrates both individual- and country-level characteristics in mass political support, diverse combination has been possible for a limited contextual country sample; that is, the studies are focused either on the established or on the new democracies (Anderson et al., 2005; Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Cho and Bratton, 2006; Cho, 2010, see Anderson and Singer, 2008 for an exception⁴). Moreover, while institutional or generally contextual variables can be either structural, institutional, or cultural in nature (Kedar and Shively, 2005), most contextual parameters focus mainly on the current institutional impact on system support. This may end up ignoring how system support is also influenced by long-term contextual parameters. Therefore, in the study of political

⁴Besides their use of multi-level analysis, they include both Western and Central-Eastern Europe while they are all European countries.

support, students are tempted to have more inclusive countries including established and new democracies with appropriate institutional history variables in their models. This kind of temptation is more pronounced when leader's interests (mainly, her⁵ survival and stable governance) do not seem to be unrelated with the mass public's levels of political support not only in the established countries but also the new democracies.

Connecting public support with leadership and institutional stability has been tried in a limited context, mainly in Latin America (Hochstetler, 2006; Helmke, 2010). It is intriguing to know that while leaders' survival study across countries attends to the statistical significance of public protest and social mobilization in explaining interrupted presidents (Kim and Bahry, 2008), what directly instigates citizens to be dissatisfied with leaders is missing. A more mechanical institution-based explanation of leaders' tenure stability has been done by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). To better explain how the leadership and institutional instability occur across countries, analysis with individual-contextual parameters along with historical or cultural components is helpful and even necessary.

Political trust is regarded as a good empirical indicator of how much citizens would legitimize their political institutions and leaders' tenure. Citizens' legitimization of the political system is expected to be critically dependent upon the relation between political elites and the citizens' vote choices. Without understanding the variation of individual-level perceptions, political confidence may still be left out as an *explanandum* in the mechanical limitations of institutional "*explanans*".

3.3 Partisans, Loyalty Norm, and Political Trust

According to Easton (1965, 1975), political support has been analyzed at three levels of the political system, i.e., authorities, regimes, and communities (Dalton, 1999, 2004). Especially, in the Miller-Citrin debate, it has been evident that both authorities and regime

⁵Here I follow the usual use of gender pronoun as seen in many survival literature; leaders are female while challengers are male (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).

become important predictors of trust in government. More specifically, while Miller and colleagues referred to unresponsive political processes as a key predictor of declining trust in government, Citrin and colleagues argued that incumbent authorities are key sources of trust (Miller, 1974a;1974b;Miller and Listhaug, 1990;?;Citrin and Green, 1986). More recently, Keele (2005) found that the effect of authorities (i.e., partisan loyalties) matters for trust in government relative to evaluations of the political process, while Hetherington (1998) contends that regime support has stronger impact on authority support rather than the reverse.

Under the same community level, therefore, system support measured by citizens' evaluation of their basic public institutions implies two aspects of the regime level, namely trust in politicians/authorities and institutional performance. The authority level refers to specific support based on partisanship, while the latter regime level with diffuse support or political confidence. Scholars contributing to the system support literature explain institutional confidence by using the effects of partisan status as a main predictor of political support and institutional legitimacy. This is because trustworthy institutions and stable leadership are two inter-connected pillars of democracy.

As the voluminous literature in the American context has uncovered, political trust is more associated with political winners and losers, rather than social winners and losers (Abramson, 1983; Putnam, 1995; Orren, 1997). Przeworski (2005) contends in a similar vein that citizens' preference for democracy, being independent of income, affects elites' calculation of losers' rebellion. Hence, the losers' levels of institutional legitimacy matter more than those of the other sides, i.e., winners and non-partisans. This is because the most deprived and dissatisfied group is the losers, especially the repeated losers of elections.

Institutional legitimacy ensures that despite the economic performance of the government, state institutions can be viewed by electoral winners as trustful and valued, and are accepted in principle (Gerber and Huber, 2010, 2009). Significantly high levels of perceived legitimacy among the mass public seem to come from either repetitive elections (i.e., the

experience of democracy) or the quality of elections (i.e., the fairness of elections) (Dahl, 2006; Manin, 1997; Dahl, 1991). While losers with low levels of political trust may tend to actively engage in attempts to overthrow the existing regime (Przeworski, 1991;2005), partisans' evaluation of the system does not simply reflect voters' partisan status resulting from an election outcome. Instead, the winner-loser gap in institutional legitimacy has been noted as an important predictor of institutional legitimacy in the advanced industrial democracies (Anderson et al., 2005; Anderson and Guillory, 1997; but, see also for exceptions Moehler and Lindberg, 2009; Cho and Bratton, 2006).

As the level of perceived legitimacy varies according to partisan status, the losers' consent literature raises appealing arguments to the declining trends of political trust in the advanced industrial democracies. As long as most elections are not blatantly unfair and stopped, citizens (including electoral losers) tend to regard the election outcomes as possibly legitimate in both electoral (i.e., illiberal) and liberal democracies. Electoral losers among politicians themselves as well as the mass public who supported them would not readily protest against 'unfavorable outcomes' to them (e.g., Esaiasson and Göteborg, 2009).

Therefore, losers in elections can give at least moderately credible signs for regime legitimacy and political stability in a certain institutional context, regardless of the levels of democracy. The losers' consent argument is based upon how partisan status interacts with institutional traits such as party system, electoral institutions, and 'alternation effect' (Moehler and Lindberg, 2009; Anderson et al., 2005; Bratton, 2004). These findings confirm that political trust is strongly associated with citizens' preference for open and responsive government.

Representation and Implementation

While many political theorists have emphasized electoral democracy that provides equal representation and procedural fairness in a democratic regime, they mainly deal with the representation side of the political system (Dahl, 2006; Manin, 1997; Dahl, 1991). Beetham

(1991) noted, however, the output-side legitimating process of the government's production of goods and services as one of four important mechanisms of power legitimation (Beetham, 1991). Easton's much earlier system analysis of political life had also noted the reinforcing effect of system "output" on system support (Easton, 1965). Recently, some empirical findings in both advanced industrial democracies and transitional democracies show that political legitimacy measured by institutional trust can also be achieved by the implementation side of the political system (Rothstein, 2009; Levi, Sacks and Tyler, 2009).

Regarding the implementation side, Rothstein (2009) presents an alternative legitimacy-providing mechanism through the "quality of government." Moreover, even to create effective representation, the quality of government may matter more than the representative capacity of electoral systems. In a similar context, using three implementation institutions of the police, courts, and tax departments in sub-Saharan African countries, Levi, Sacks and Tyler (2009) contend that administrative competence along with procedural justice and government performance plays the most effective roles of generating the mass public's legitimating belief in political system.

While losers tend to focus more on the chances of becoming winners, winners care about the benefits after validating "home team effects" to their candidates (Anderson and LoTempio, 2002). During this process, losers as well as winners would legitimize the political process such as elections, especially after turnovers of power take place. Losers can readily concede their defeat by having a prospective win in the next elections, realizing they would get more private goods from the potential winning in the future, thereby helping democracy to be sustained (O'Donnell, 2007; Przeworski, 1991). Besides the "home team effects" of winners' significant system support, the winners' positive evaluation of system also varies depending upon how well winning itself can translate into their preferable policies in a certain context, especially when their historical experience of policy implementation could reflect meager provision of private and public goods.

Hence, I can expect that there should be some drops of the winners' levels of perceived

legitimacy depending upon whether or how well the electoral outcomes are converted into preferable policies, not only through their current representation but also through their *historical experience of resource allocation* institution. While current institutional implementation effects are important, it is also important to conceive long-standing characteristics of institutional heritage in the analysis of the effects of institutional constraints on citizens who usually bear institutional history in mind. Scholars are starting to incorporate this characteristic into measures of governing institutions (Gerring et al., 2005; Gerring, Thacker and Moreno, 2008).

Despite widely accepted interactive effects of the representation side of political institutions (i.e., electoral rules) and partisanship on legitimating beliefs, non-partisans' (or independents') institutional interaction has not been well studied in the losers' consent literature. Usually, non-partisans are considered the reference category and easily assumed to have moderate effects between two opposing groups of partisans.⁶ If the implementation side as well as the representation side can be incorporated in the analysis, students of political consent can understand better how non-partisans as well as losers interact with diverse contextual country-level effects. This is because non-partisans are arguably more sensitive to implementation than representation.

In conjunction with the political consent literature, Colomer's (2003) comparison between plurality rule and majority rule for single-winner political systems helps us to understand how losers under plurality could mute their negative feelings of losing elections. He argues that "plurality rule is most vulnerable to losers' strategies" (99). This can be understood in the context of the ratio of W to S. The plurality rule requires only one-quarter or less of the selectorate to win so that losers might have a chance to be winners in future coalitions (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).⁷

⁶Recent focus on non-partisans, however, includes Anderson and Paskeviciute (2009).

⁷Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) implies that oversizing leader's coalition can be induced by higher chance of her winning coalition's defection to a new challenger. Also, the chance of defection depends upon "the risk of exclusion in the challenger's winning coalition" and "the risk of exclusion from the leader's winning coalition if the challenger fails to come to

For example, as a plurality rule entails a smaller W/S or greater loyalty norms than majority rule whose W/S is about $1/2$, election losers or the minority in a plurality rule would be less likely to be included in the winning coalition than losers in majority rule, thereby making leader's welfare provision more likely to take the form of private goods. Losers could introduce "relatively few new issues or create a few new alternatives" (99) and incumbent leaders would need to recruit their supporters from outside of a winning coalition to suppress supporters of challengers (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003: 345). Thus, I propose that losers in small winning-coalition institutions will have less leeway to be included in the future winning coalition even in single-winner political systems.

Another good example illustrates regarding the relationship between electoral systems and the budget spending. More refined distinctions of electoral systems between single-member district (SMD) and proportional representation (PR) are suggested for their effects on the budgetary cycle that do not seem to unrelated with political elites' calculation of the political system. In the political business cycle (PBC) literature, politicians prefer to use a specific form of budgetary cycle under certain electoral incentives; Eric C. C. Chang (2008) finds that under SMD systems budgetary cycles take the form of more district-specific spending to attract their loyal supporters, while proportional representation systems are more associated with higher social welfare spending and expanding public goods, rather than assembling loyal supporters.

Therefore, my argument extends the mechanism of electoral representation to more general institutions involving resource allocation for selectively represented voters. It is also an extension in a sense that the loyalty norm institution broadly considered as the difference between SMD (i.e., understood as large W/S with small loyalty) and PR (i.e., understood as small W/S with greater loyalty) is a more comprehensive contextual variable with greater explanatory power by considering the interaction of voters' characteristics and elites' resource allocation. Thus, the interaction of mass public and political elites accounted for by power" (p.278-9). W 's defection, therefore, is more likely when W/S is small and the loyalty norms are great.

the loyalty norm institutions and the voters' consent permits examination of how resource allocation is contingent on electoral incentives in explaining citizens' beliefs about political legitimacy.

3.4 Connecting (Non-)Partisans and the Loyalty Norm

The loyalty norms allow a leader to better understand how to satisfy her winning coalition, stabilize the polity, extend her tenure and even care for her post-exit political life. As the leader's utmost interests lie in keeping her incumbency, current or short-term W/S seems to be critical to her. With a limited time-span expectation of her tenure, she can calculate how much resources are needed for her coalition. Yet at the same time, the loyalty norms provide an institutional context for the selectors and the disenfranchised to perceive how legitimate their system is. For the mass public, institutional history of the loyalty norms matters as much as the current level of the loyalty norms. This is because the mass public's attitudes rely on their memory of how frequently leadership turnover has occurred in the polity while the leader's behavior is more based upon the short-term W/S.

3.4.1 Partisans with the short-term loyalty norm

It is important for selectors to perceive whether or how much welfare services can be available to them. In particular, partisans are important actors in the short-term loyalty norm context because partisans would feel either satisfied with welfare gaining by winning representation or feel deprived of welfare loss by losing representation. Regarding the citizens' perception, this implies that most private goods will be distributed to the represented, i.e., to the winners in elections according to the winning platform, although as shown above the amount of welfare depends upon the winning coalition size.

From the short-term loyalty norms, partisans' levels of perceived legitimacy can vary, referring to political elites' short-term and biased representation through office-seeking ten-

dency, rather than to their consistent and impartial policy implementation through policy-seeking tendency (e.g., Strom, 1990; Erikson and Romero, 1990; Adams, 2001*b,a*). Instead, barely attached to parties are non-partisans who are not expected to have significant interests (at least according to their lack of party affiliation) in getting more welfare via the winning coalitions in the future. Thus, the short-term W/S is more associated with partisans and political elites' office-seeking, rather than with non-partisans' interests in fair implementation of public goods.⁸

Winners in a small short-term loyalty norms are expected to have higher levels of political trust because of increased party loyalty from electoral victory (i.e., "home team effect"). In contrast, losers in the small short-term W/S have lower levels of political trust as their weakened party loyalty from electoral defeat translates into lower levels of political trust. However, the loyalty of winners to their leader is not automatically translated into trust in political institutions. The winners' loyalty in the winning coalition perceived as strong in *small* size of W/S by leaders can be regarded as no more than temporary "support" for her survival, and she may readily replace the current winning coalition with a greater size of future winning coalition if she has a hard time getting support from the current winners (i.e., if more chances of defection of W to challengers are noticed).

An increase of short-term loyal norms (i.e., a small size of W/S) would have winners maintain their existing amount of welfare through high loyalty to, and high affinity with the leader, and thus give more leverage to leaders than to her challengers who are not able to initiate any institutional reform. The leader may manipulate the size of the winning coalition and the selectorate to secure her tenure, and it will lead to the winners' defection to her opponent (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003;278). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003;333) suggest that "as in rigged electoral systems, the selector's preferences are very close to those of the disenfranchised. The small value of W/S in these forms of governance means selectors outside of W have little prospect of entering a future coalition when a new leader takes

⁸Being a non-partisan seems to be more associated with public goods preference, rather than private goods that is more likely to be represented by being partisan.

office.”

Decreasing loyalty to the leader and her party leads to low levels of political trust among winners (Keele, 2005; Anderson and Paskeviciute, 2009), especially when the leader may be put into a situation where she has to include more winning coalitions (i.e., oversizing winning coalition) or even replace repeated winners with repeated losers. This situation is more likely to occur when old winners’ welfare needs cannot be met with the incumbents’ limited resources, when old winners can find more affinity with the challenger who may be more competent, or when the size of the selectorate is large enough for the leader to replace the current W whose demands cannot be met by her resources with losers and non-partisans. However, the short time frame of current loyalty norms does not provide voters with full historical memories of winner-loser rotation.

In the large short-term loyalty norms context⁹, the leader may not have enough leverage to manipulate the size of winning coalition. Both winners and losers will calculate the probabilities of changed affinities with the leader and her opponents, and winners calculate the risks of being excluded in a future coalition after they defect to one of her challengers. As the increased chance of being included in the future winning coalition is more visible in the large short-term W/S, increasing as well as replacing the winning coalition will dilute the winners’ affinity with the incumbent leaders which may in turn decreases winners’ “home team effects”. This is because the increased or replaced W will decrease the amount of winners’ private goods by diverting original winning platforms. Hence, the old winners who can remain in the winning coalition do not have exclusive welfare provisions while managing to keep the “home team effect” with weakened party loyalty.

In contrast, losers in small short-term loyalty norms are now able to become winners with more private goods, thereby gaining party loyalty and obtaining more legitimacy in the system. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) note that especially when both the winning coalition and the selectorate are small, losers and non-partisans might have strong attachment to their

⁹This includes the situation when W and S are both small.

own institutions. If selectors outside of the winning coalition can become winners, they will have significant stream of private goods as was done to old winners. Moreover, the high ratio of W/S (or lower loyalty norms) means frequent leadership turnover, which increases the probability of becoming new winners. The short-term loyalty norms, however, are not able to allow voters to realize how frequently the leadership turnover has really taken place.

3.4.2 Non-partisans with Historical Loyalty Norms

Many institutionalists tend to ignore the cumulative effects of institutions except for the recent works by Gerring and his colleagues (Gerring, Thacker and Moreno, 2008; Gerring et al., 2005; Gerring, Thacker and Moreno, 2005; Moehler and Lindberg, 2009). The institutional effects should be considered to “cumulate over time as new institutional rules begin to condition actions and expectations” (Gerring, Thacker and Moreno, 2005). As the variable of interest in this section entails the causal effect of the long-term historical W/S, the measurement of W/S centers not only on a country’s current levels of W but also on its institutional experience and history. Especially, the cumulative effects seem to be more significant for the impacts on citizens as people’s memory matters for their political attitudes. “[T]he collective memory about the actual operations of the institutions” accounts for trust in institutions of law and order (Rothstein, 2000, p.493).

In the political consent literature, Moehler and Lindberg (2009) use Huntington’s “two-turnover-test” as a key contextual variable to condition sub-Saharan African citizens’ levels of perceived legitimacy. Although they do not use a direct cumulative effect of turnover, *turnover experience* conditioning citizens’ perceived legitimacy is well connected to citizens’ cumulative memories of contextual changes. Repeated losers and winners tend to narrow their legitimacy gap, respectively, by being new winners and new losers through the *experience* of the power alternation (see also, Bratton, 2004).

Historical loyalty norms are a historically accumulated stock of W/S and provides a long-term institutional experience by which citizens evaluate their own institutions. Hence,

historical loyalty norms provide a long-term collective memory of the institution by which citizens evaluate leadership legitimacy. Unlike short-term loyalty norms, historical loyalty norms are helpful in distinguishing different levels of legitimacy between partisans and non-partisans because citizens' memory derived from historical loyalty norms can tell how much political elites have been accountable and how much political institutions have been inclusive or exclusive. Current and prospective levels of perceived legitimacy can be better reflected through a historical measure of the loyalty norms, rather than the short-term loyalty norms.¹⁰ In small historical loyalty norms, partisans are likely to have experienced *more* frequent leadership turnover and thus have more chances of being either winners or losers. In large historical loyalty norms, however, *less* frequent leadership turnover has taken place, which in turn allows partisans to be either repeated winners or repeated losers.

Winners in large historical loyalty norms are expected to have the highest levels of political trust among partisans and non-partisans. It would result from high party loyalty and high affinity with the incumbents because winners' *repeated* winning status enabled by large historical loyalty norms (i.e., small size of historical W/S) is likely to provide the most loyal coalition to the leader and guarantees a future stream of private goods. In large historical loyalty norms, repeated winning and losing can be expected unless losers have new issues and alternatives to make the leader defect to repeated losers or to allow a competent challenger to take advantage of the new situations.

As with repeated electoral victories in small stock of historical winning coalition (i.e., in large loyalty norms to winners), repeated defeats make losers lose affinity with the failing challenger. The oversizing winning coalition that opens a window of opportunity for repeated losers to become new winners could have been unnecessary to the leader and thus has not been expected in the small stock of historical winning coalition. The potential rebellion by repeated losers and the challenger could have forced the leader to provide some welfare provisions to the selectorate outside of her coalition.¹¹ It could have occurred more often

¹⁰More weights should be given to prospective levels of legitimacy in the leader's stability.

¹¹The disenfranchised may be more likely to immigrate, rebel, or even support civil war

than not when both the winning coalition and the selectorate are small since the small size of the selectorate guarantees more private goods for new winners.

From repeated electoral defeats in small historical winning coalition, losers are left with either “exit” or “voice” option (Hirschman, 1970). With the limited resources, co-optation of loser by oversizing the winning coalition is not costless for leaders (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007). The “voice” as political dissents and protests by repeated losers, however, can enforce leaders to provide rewards to the selectors outside of her coalition. Especially, oversizing winning coalition is likely to happen and even necessary in the process of democratization with increasing the size of the selectorate, which still continues the context of small stock of historical winning coalition.

The leader in this context has also incentives to bind the non-winning groups (losers and non-partisans) to the political system with moderate levels of political trust. This is because the incumbents’ survival by maneuvering the small stock of historical winning coalition has been supported by making repeated losers and non-partisans pay taxes, rather than protests or anti-government demonstrations, for the leader’s resources distributed to her winning coalition and to appropriate public good spending. This was evident in South Korea during the democratic transitional period: President Kim Young Sam allocated disproportionately more pork-barrel benefits to the western provinces, Cholla province (Honam), as well as to his own turf, Kyongsang province (Youngnam), to assuage the complaints from the repeated losers in the presidential elections as well as to guarantee his “graceful retirement” (Horiuchi and Lee, 2008; see also Kwon, 2005).

In the case of large stock of historical winning coalition, the experience of rotation of winner-loser is expected to increase *partisans*’ efficacy and the system’s representation. Policy implementation is more party-oriented, with competition of many political parties. Specifically, public goods for partisans and non-partisans are available in case of a large historical stock of the winning coalition and the selectorate. Losers among partisans are

(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).

likely to have experienced being winners despite the fact that the good memories of electoral victory have faded out due to a frequent leadership turnover. If insignificant benefits from public goods can be compensated for by their experience of political representation, which is often the case in a large stock of historical winning coalition,¹² both partisans of winners and losers are expected to have no effects of the historical stock of winning coalition and selectorate on political legitimacy.

New winners in a small historical loyalty norms (i.e., a large stock of historical W/S) lack high affinity with the new leaders because of their experience of old leaders' manipulation of the winning coalition and defection to selectors outside of the winning coalition. Moreover, oversizing winning coalition has occurred at least once when historical stock of W/S is close to one¹³, which could have disabled old winners from taking advantage of more private goods. Through partisans' experience of the leaders' defection for elites' own sake and of losing (the chances of)¹⁴ significant private goods, partisans would not have full confidence in the changed system, as well as having new leaders who would exclude partisans in any coalition in the future. To partisans, an increased stock of historical W/S provides more information about how the political elites' strategies could decrease the partisans' interests. Regarding the welfare provision side, more stock of historical W/S means less private goods and more general but insignificant public goods. Therefore, partisans are hypothesized to have decreased levels of political trust as the accumulated stock of W/S is increasing, with the proviso that winners would have higher confidence than losers.

Compared to partisans' decreasing legitimacy in the small historical loyalty norms, non-partisans' legitimacy level is expected to decrease and to be prompted to politicize when the size of historical winning coalition increases. In a small historical winning coalition,

¹²This is because frequent rotation with a limited time of winning experience still provide external efficacy to partisans.

¹³If the increased historical W/S results from decreasing size of the selectorate, voters in high historical W/S are expected to have low trust levels of political institutions. This is because voters have experienced to become the disenfranchised in their institutional (i.e., constitutional) history.

¹⁴These chances are for losers.

non-partisans currently would have no chances to get the benefits given to winners such as being represented and having private goods. Moreover, non-partisans' who lack affinity with any opposition parties and their leaders would put themselves in a psychologically marginal status, thereby leaving themselves particularly cynical toward institutions over time (Abramson, 1983). Therefore, the leader would not pay much attention to them when securing her winning coalition. Through the long history of exclusion and alienation, increased stock of historical winning coalition instead strengthens a decreasing level of non-partisans' political trust (see also Keele, 2005).

Therefore, the hypotheses below will be tested;

- H1a (Winner discontent hypothesis): *Electoral winners have decreasing levels of political trust as short-term loyalty norms decrease* (i.e., as a short-term W/S increases).
- H1b (Losers/non-partisan consent hypothesis): *Electoral loser/non-partisans have increasing levels of political trust as short-term W/S increases*.
- H2a (Partisan Hypothesis): *Electoral winners/losers have moderate levels of political trust as historical loyalty norms decrease* (i.e., as a historical W/S increases).
- H2b (Non-partisan Hypothesis): *Electoral non-partisans have decreasing levels of political trust as historical loyalty norms decrease*.

Confidence in institutions is used for key variables in this study. The effects of partisan status allow us to examine how differently partisans interpret their losing/winning status in different levels and types of W/S. As the political consent theory would implies (Anderson et al., 2005), a small short-term winning coalition indicates less inclusive political representation for losers/non-partisans through more private-good policy implementation to winners, while a large short-term winning coalition indicates more inclusive representation to losers/non-partisans through less private-good provision to winners (H1a and H1b; see Figure 3.1).

[Figure 3.1 & Figure 3.2]

Unlike the theory of political consent, historical stock of winning coalitions and historical perception of the loyalty norms allow citizens to rely on their memories of institutional changes and thus makes the non-partisans' system legitimacy distinct. By considering historical memories of the loyalty norms and the interaction with partisan status, I suppose that large historical winning coalition will aggravate non-partisans' alienation and exclusion from the political system, thereby leading to a significant legitimacy drop for non-partisans. With this long-term perception of a historical winning coalition, partisans and non-partisans diverge in their legitimization of political institutions (H2a and H2b; see Figure 3.2).

3.5 Data and Measures

Combining country-level contexts and individual-level behavior in the empirical analysis is the key in the research questions of this chapter. Citizens' attitudes and behavior data should be sufficient across a significant number of countries. I use three survey data sets from the World Values Survey (hereafter, WVS) conducted in 1999-2004 (the 4th wave), the Afrobarometer (AFB) in 2002-2004 (the 2nd round), and the East Asian Barometer (EAB) in 2001-2003 (the 1st round). Countries used in the empirical analysis are shown in Table B.1 in Appendix B.

3.5.1 Dependent variable

I examine attitudes toward the political system by focusing on confidence or trust in public institutions (i.e., political trust). To measure how much confidence the respondents have in public institutions, the survey questions directly ask their trust levels accorded to various institutions. As each data set has political trust indicators on different institutions, I could come up with six major institutions such as parliament, president, government, the police, the armed forces/military, and civil services.¹⁵ After combining the three data sets, I recoded

¹⁵In case of the WVS, parliament, civil service, the armed forces, and the police compose the four basic institutions as government question includes many missing observations.

political trust variable into the interval scale ranging from 0 to 1.0.

Summary statistics show that there are significant variations of the citizens' attitudes toward political institutions across countries. Specifically, while most countries' levels of political trust range between 0.45 and 0.57 with about 0.12 Inter-quartile Range and 0.5 of mean, there are 8 country-year samples that have less than 0.4, and 3 countries more than 0.7, respectively. The lower mean countries includes Mexico, Peru, Argentina, the Czech Republic, Macedonia, Greece, Lithuania, and Nigeria in 2003; the higher mean countries are Mali, Senegal, Tanzania in 2001, and Bangladesh.

Regarding more rigorous findings of systematic difference of the citizens across countries, the variance of the political trust variable can be decomposed by ANOVA model into inter- and intra-country variations. As many comparative political behavioralists contend, both levels of analysis should be appropriately executed with multi-level analysis for rigorous statistical findings about citizens' attitudes toward government institutions (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Anderson and Singer, 2008). The ANOVA model results are shown in Table 3.1.

[Table 3.1]

From the one-way random-effects ANOVA, the incorporation of country-level analysis is legitimized through the measure of intra-class correlation (ICC). Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) recommend the ICC for a preliminary step in a multilevel analysis. As ICC can be calculated by the ratio of the country-level variance to the total variance of political trust (i.e., the total variance between and within countries), the ICC in the analysis will be $0.0103/(0.0103+0.0432) = 0.193$. So the between-country variability takes about 19.3% of the variance in political trust. The ANOVA model, therefore, indicates that individual-level

However, government was added to the basic four institutions in the EAB while in the AFB, president question replaces the civil service question that does not exist in this wave of the survey. (see Appendix A for question wording)

variables cover more variance (about 81%) of the dependent variable while the country-level variables also account for a significant portion of the variance.

3.5.2 Main independent variables

At the individual level, partisan status, i.e., winner-loser in election and non-partisan independents, is considered key variable explaining the variation of political trust. It is measured by using survey questions on the respondents' vote intention, reported votes cast, and party affiliation (see Appendix A for coding of each data set). These three components of partisan status from each data set could lead to an inconsistent measure, especially for the measure of reported votes cast, because after election voters would support opposition parties or be independent while they voted for a incumbent party. However, this potential inconsistency will be minimal considering that changed partisan status will not be substantial until the next coming election. Moreover, through the use of the loyalty norm as another key variables of interaction terms in this study, the W/S in either short-term or in historical context provides more expanded time frame than the partisan status.

One key variable of interest in the country-level variables is short-term W/S in each country. As Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) admit that their selectorate theory “remains a primitive theory in need of enrichment with more institutional details and improved measurement,” the measurement of the loyalty norm (W/S) in this chapter

Basically, I followed Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s measurement of selectorate and winning coalition size by using the POLITY data (Jagers and Gurr, 1995) and Arthur Banks' data set. The winning coalition (W) and selectorate (S) are appropriate proxies for institutions for policy implementation and representation; W is measured by two Polity indicators on executive recruitment (openness and competitiveness), and two other indicators are for competitiveness of participation from the Polity and regime type from Arthur Banks' data. But I revised W by adding 0.5 into the dichotomous components of the measure of W. For example, I coded “factional” and “transitional” as 0.5, rather than 0, in the PARCOMP (i.e.,

competitiveness of participation), which is one of four components of W. By having detailed measure of W, I refined the regime characteristic more clearly. For the short-term measure of W, I use the recent 5-year mean of W for each country (see Appendix A for coding).

There is considerable variation of the new measure of short-term W across the countries sampled in this chapter.¹⁶ The average short-term W is .83. And the highest level of 1 in the short-term W was found in all the advanced industrial countries and the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovenia and Taiwan, while the lower levels less than two standard deviations from the mean (about $<.47$) include Ghana and Nigeria in 2001.

Another primary variable of interest is historically stocked measure of W, S and W/S, which I called historical W, S and W/S. Historical measures of W/S have been divided into two variables; one is for accumulated measure of 100 years up to a year before the surveys year; the other for accumulated measure of 100 years up to the year that five year the short-term W/S was calculated. I assume that recent history matters more with higher weights as suggested by Gerring et al. (2005). The latter historical measure should be used in order to avoid overlapping period of time in the final models. Descriptive statistics of dependent variable and main independent variables are listed and summarized in Table 3.2 below

[Table 3.2]

3.5.3 Covariates

I also sought to control for associated variables with political trust found in the previous analyses. At the individual-level, I controlled for the level of political interest, perceived measure of personal economy, and standard demographic variables (age, gender, education). Social capital variables such as social trust and membership in voluntary associations are

¹⁶Regarding short-term S, there are only four countries that has less than 1; they are Nigeria in 2000, Pakistan in 2001, Algeria in 2002. In the case of Algeria in 2002, there is no Arthur Banks' data for the regime type between 2000 and 2002. So I had to code all the components of W and S up to 1999 for Algeria. This is not a problem in the use of the survey data (the WVS) because Algerian presidential election occurred in 1999 and therefore I could still use the individual data for the partisan status.

intentionally deleted from the models. Both variables seems to be correlated with systemic variables, not with individual-level variables (Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Chapter 5).

At the country-level, both representation and implementations sides of political institutions were controlled for. These include level of economic development, level of democracy, variation of electoral system (Effective Number of Parliamentary Party and Gallagher's Disproportionality Index between seats and votes), and government structure (Federalism/Unitarism and Parliament/Presidentialism/Semi-presidentialism). Coding procedures for all variables are listed in Appendix A.

3.6 Method

The multilevel analysis entails one nesting higher level of variables (i.e., country-level) and the other nesting lower level variables (i.e., individual-level). This analysis is based upon widely-accepted concerns that statistical techniques for nested data structures need to take into account the strong likelihood that observations within groups or nesting units are more alike than observations from different groups or nesting units. Even using fixed effect models, the inference will be limited to the samples by ignoring random variability involved with group-level context (Luke, 2005). If these are theoretical reasons for using multilevel analysis, there are some statistical problems arising if one ignores the multilevel nature of the data such as underestimation of standard errors, clustering, and non-constant variance (Snijders and Bosker, 1999).

The first step for the multilevel models is to specify the individual-level model. For example, I model confidence in political institutions at the respondent i in the country j as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} PolTrust_{ij} = & \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}(Loser)_{ij} + \beta_{2j}(Nonpar)_{ij} + \beta_{3j}(Educ)_{ij} + \beta_{4j}(Age) + \beta_{5j}(Female)_{ij} \\ & + \beta_{6j}(Interest)_{ij} + \beta_{7j}(Economy)_{ij} + r_{ij} \end{aligned} \quad (3.1)$$

The models the political trust levels of partisans and non-partisans explained by country mean of β_{0j} and individual variations from the country mean specified with the individual level's independent variables and the individual error term r_{ij} .

Then, the second step entails modelling the country mean as a function of the country-level characteristics that are specified in the Eq. (3.2).

$$\begin{aligned}\beta_{0j} = & \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(histW/S)_j + \gamma_{02}(shortW/S)_j + \gamma_{03}(ENPP)_j \\ & + \gamma_{04}(Disproport)_j + \gamma_{05}(Unitary)_j + \gamma_{06}(Parliament)_j \\ & + \gamma_{07}(Democracy)_j + \gamma_{08}(GDP/cap)_j + \gamma_{09}(AdvDem)_j \\ & + u_{0j},\end{aligned}\tag{3.2}$$

Taking advantage of the multilevel models, I included several cross-level interactive terms in the combined models as shown in the Model 3, 4, 7, 8, 11 and 12 (see Table 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5). The cross-level interactive effects can provide more information regarding how partisans and non-partisans view their respective political institutions in the institutional context of the short-term loyalty norms levels as well as in the historical loyalty norms. My expectations are as follows: the positive effect of a large short-term winning coalition on political trust will be significant for election losers since losers can share benefits of private goods with winners in the short run; the negative effect of a large historical winning coalition on citizens' attitudes toward their own political institutions will be significant for non-partisans since non-partisans' alienation can be worsened in the long run.

In the framework of multilevel modeling, these political support hypotheses can be tested by modeling the effect of individual's partisan status in country j that has both a current level of W/S and a institutional history of W/S. More specifically, I can simultaneously estimate Eq.(3.3) and Eq.(3.4), which has the estimated political trust gap between losers and winners (β_{1j}) and between non-partisans and winners (β_{2j}) in country j :

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}(histW/S)_j + \gamma_{12}(shortW/S)_j + u_{1j}\tag{3.3}$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}(histW/S)_j + \gamma_{12}(shortW/S)_j + \gamma_{13}(ENPP)_j + \gamma_{14}(Disproport) + u_{1j} \quad (3.4)$$

This equation is combined into the Eq. (3.1) to test the hypothesis that the effect of both kinds of the loyalty norms (W/S) is strengthened for electoral losers. Hence, the combined model tests the gap between how winners and losers evaluate their country's political institutions changes with changes in the short-term loyalty norms.

Similarly, I also test how the effect of long-term historical winning coalition is dependent upon (non-)partisan status by including another set of cross-level interactive terms in the combined model that estimate cross-country variations in the effect of (non-) partisan status on political trust as a function of historical winning coalition levels. Essentially, the combined model also tests the difference between how winners and non-partisans evaluate their political system will increase with changes in the long-term institutional history of winning coalition.

$$\beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20} + \gamma_{21}(histW/S)_j + \gamma_{22}(shortW/S)_j + u_{2j}, \quad (3.5)$$

$$\beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20} + \gamma_{21}(histW/S)_j + \gamma_{22}(shortW/S)_j + \gamma_{23}(ENPP)_j + \gamma_{24}(Disproport) + u_{2j}, \quad (3.6)$$

It is assumed that there is a constant effect across countries for all of the other individual-level variables. Equations below are combined into the individual-level equation, Eq. (3.1), to be the full model.

$$\beta_{3j} = \gamma_{30}, \quad \beta_{4j} = \gamma_{40}, \quad \beta_{5j} = \gamma_{50}, \quad \beta_{6j} = \gamma_{60}, \quad \beta_{7j} = \gamma_{70}. \quad (3.7)$$

The models are estimated with centering variables in both levels. Except for the dummy variables of winners, losers, and non-partisans, all the other individual-level variables are

centered at their country mean (Enders and Tofighi, 2007). This is because centering at group-mean allows the estimates to be free from the effect of country-level differences in the mean values. Every country-level variable except the variables of interest, i.e., short-term W/S and historical W/S, is centered at its grand mean so that the intercepts in the models can be the overall conditional mean for the sample countries. Two loyalty norms (W/S) variables are coded as they are for the easy interpretation of interaction terms.

3.7 Estimation Results

The results of the multilevel analysis appear in Table 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5. Four models from each set of sampled countries estimate the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable, i.e., citizens' level of political trust. In Model 3 and Model 4, I include the interaction terms between two types of W/S and *Election Loser* and *Non-partisan* and measure the effect of W/S on the citizens' level of political trust for the average electoral winners in the sample.

The cross-level interaction terms derived from Eq. (3.3) through Eq. (3.6) is to test the two hypotheses that the election losers' level of political support is increased in the higher short-term W/S while the non-partisans' level is decreased by higher historical W/S. Moreover, two electoral system variables (*ENPP* and *Disproportionality*) appear to be significant with expected signs in the interaction with losers, while only non-partisans' trust level appears to increase with more disproportional electoral system.¹⁷

¹⁷Election losers and non-partisans are expected to be more sensitive to the levels of disparity between vote and seat than winners. However, the direction of sign could be ambivalent: for a negative sign, we suppose that more disparity worsens losers' dissent against political institutions (although all models show insignificant positive signs). As the disproportionality, unlike relatively obvious number of parties (ENPP), can be better perceived by losers who are more sensitive to election outcomes, disproportionality is expected to worsen losers' dissent. For a positive sign of non-partisans as it is the case in the models, more disparity ameliorates non-partisans dissent. Given that disproportionality is more noticeable in a more accountable electoral system such as SMD plurality, non-partisans' dissent could be alleviated by clarity of responsibility derived in part from the disparity. Besides, non-partisans' alleviated dissent results from their status itself. Less representative electoral system would

[Table 3.3]

I also test the same hypotheses by including an individual-level variable of *Perceived personal economy*. The variable appears to be significant, meaning more economically satisfied respondents tend to trust more in their political institutions. Although it reveals all the same statistically significant signs except for *Female*, the number of country is decreased down to 41 from 59 due to the missing observations. While *Democracy level* and *Real GDP/cap* is not statistically significant in all the models, the direction of signs are unexpected negative signs. With more limited country sample, *Real GDP/capita* appears statistically significant and negatively associated with political trust in Model 9 in Table 3.5.¹⁸

[Table 3.4]

I excluded all the advanced industrial countries to make sure the previous findings are confirmed although I estimate the models with the dummy variables of region. In Model 9-12, the results confirm the robustness of the findings in the previous models with the sample that does not include the advanced industrial democracies. Regarding the regional dummy variables, *African & Middle East* variable is used as a reference, so it is deleted in the models in Table 3.5. Latin America countries and post-communist countries in the sample appear to be lower trust levels than Africa and Middle East countries.

[Table 3.5]

A robust check was done by controlling for two influential countries by using the Cook's distance measure. As a rule of thumb, a cut-off value given for the Cook's Distance is $4/n$ justify why non-partisans remain independent. Thus, the signs of non-partisan's interactive term with disproportionality is expected to be positive.

¹⁸As real GDP per capita is based on the purchasing power parity conversion of the GDPs, "the real per capita GDP of low-income countries relative to that of high-income countries is greater than is indicated by comparisons based on exchange rate conversions of GDPs to a common currency", which composes the nominal GDPs (Kravis, Heston and Summers, 1978). This explains in part why high political trust levels in the low-income countries are pronounced.

in which n is the number of groups in the level-2 factor under evaluation, i.e., 59 countries (Van der Meer, Te Grotenhuis and Pelzer, 2010). Therefore, the cut-off value is 0.068, which makes Nigeria in 2003, Mali and the U.S. be influential cases across robust-check analyses. After controlling for these countries, the results still hold, as shown in Model C.1 and Model C.2. (see also the Cook's distance in Appendix C).¹⁹

Regarding the individual-level control variables, perceived level of political trust increases with age, political interest, and personal economy situation. As people become older, they tend to conform authority and prefer the status quo, thereby having more trust in political system. People's interest level in politics and perceived level of personal economic well-being are also positively associated with support level. However, trust declines with education.

Losers and non-partisans show significantly lower trust levels than winners. This confirms the arguments of political consent literature. Besides, the cross-level interaction models of historical W/S for non-partisans (Model 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, and 12) support the hypothesis of strengthening negative effect on the perceived level of political trust. Another cross-level interaction of short-term W/S for election losers appears to be statistically significant across the models with strengthening positive effect on the levels of trust. On average, non-partisans in countries with lower historical W/S have higher levels of political confidence in their political institutions, while election losers with higher short-term W/S have higher levels of political trust. And, the short-term W/S levels for electoral winners do not even appear to be statistically significant across all models, although the positive signs appear as expected.

Both figures illustrate the results. Short-term W/S does not even appear to be statistically significant in how electoral winners perceive political institutions' legitimacy. However, electoral losers are more sensitive to levels of short-term W/S, i.e., more increasing legitimacy occurs to electoral losers (see Fig. 3.3). Historical W/S levels have a statistically significant effect on how electoral winners perceive their own country's political institutions.

¹⁹As shown in Appendix C.3, Model 3 does not have influential values with the 0.098 (=4/41) of cut-off value.

While electoral losers do not have a significant difference from winners' sensitivity to levels of historical W/S, non-partisans are more sensitive to the levels than partisans, i.e., more decreasing legitimacy occurs to non-partisans (see Fig. 3.4).

[Figure 3.3 & Figure 3.4]

Model 8 predicts that electoral losers in the highest short-term W/S country in the sample, i.e., all the established democracies and 5 new democracies (1.00)²⁰, will be about 8.1% higher than electoral losers in the lowest short-term W/S country in the sample, Ghana (0.45).²¹ Regarding the conditional effects of historical W/S, Model 3 predicts that non-partisans' trust level in the lowest historical W/S country in the sample, i.e., Namibia (0.346), will be about 14.3% higher than the level of trust for non-partisans in the highest historical W/S country in the sample, i.e., the U.S. and Lesotho (1.00).²²

Therefore, historical W/S, on average, has significant effects of decreasing confidence for non-partisans in the basic political institutions while, on average, increased short-term W/S increases election losers' perceived levels of political trust. Specifically, from the models in the Table 3.4, I expect the negative effect of historical W/S to be greater for those who do not have party affiliation, and the positive effect of short-term W/S will be more pronounced among electoral losers. Under the different time frames of W/S context, citizens would have different evaluations of their political system across partisan or non-partisan status.

²⁰5 new democracies include Algeria, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Taiwan. The mean difference of political trust between the established democracies and 5 new democracies is 0.08 (8%) by which the established democracies have more.

²¹The calculation is derived from the following formula; for losers' trust gap, $((.687 + (-.054 * 1) + (.202 * 1 * 1)) - (.687 + (-.054 * .45) + (.202 * .45 * 1))) = .081$

²²The predicted values of the differences are calculated as follows: For the gap between non-partisans, $((.687 + (-.110 * .346) + (-.109 * .346 * 1)) - (.687 + (-.110 * 1) + (-.109 * 1 * 1))) = .143$

3.8 Conclusion

The results reported above suggest following important inferences. First, the loyalty norms, implying relative size of winning coalitions out of the selectorate, matter in two different ways: short-term preferences and long-term experiences. With both the limited and extended time frame in the citizens' psychological schema, contextual variables of short-term loyalty norms and historical loyalty norms matter for how citizens perceive their political institutions in relation with political elites' interests in those contexts. In particular, election losers evaluate institutions more positively in countries with a higher short-term winning coalition and low loyalty norms to a leader. This is so because strong loyalty norms by election winners can turn into a 'shared and low loyalty norm' by both winners and losers in election; and alienated citizens such as non-partisans view the system more negatively in countries with a large historical winning coalition. In the shared loyalty norms by partisans (winners and losers only), non-partisans are excluded and alienated from political system throughout their experience under multiple institutional changes.

Second, the models confirm that voters do not uniformly perceive the political system. Electoral losers are significantly more confident than other voters in political institutions if the size of winning coalition recently increases (that is, small but shared short-term loyalty norms): As their expectations for winning in future elections increases due to the increased size of the winning coalition, losers can expect that they will get a significant addition of their future welfare provision. Unlike the short-term loyalty norms, non-partisans are prompted to politicize and to have significantly decreasing confidence in the historical loyalty norms where non-partisans can get access to their memory of being alienated in that institutional history.

Thus, two different concepts derived from the same institutions of loyalty norms produce the heterogeneous responses from citizens, contingent upon their partisan status. Short-term loyalty norms are most sensitive among electoral losers while historical loyalty norms allow citizens to perceive how political elites maximize their benefits from political system, and

constrain non-partisans in terms of political alienation.

The results support the hypotheses that large short-term loyalty norms increase support for the political institutions among electoral losers (*H1b* for electoral losers only), and large historical loyalty norms undermine support for the system among partisans (*H1b*), especially more among non-partisans (*H2b*). Although winners show negative sign in the increased short-term loyalty norms, it is not statistically significant (i.e., disconfirming *H1a*). These findings are also robust. Sampling the new democracies and controlling for influential countries confirm the results.

Tables & Figures for Chapter 3

Table 3.1: ANOVA of Variance in Political Trust Across Levels (Model 1 - Model 4)

Fixed Effect		Coef. Est.	Std. Err.
Average Country Mean (β_{00})		0.506**	0.013
Random Effect	Variance Component	N	
Country Effect (τ_{00})	0.0103**	59	
Individual Effect (σ^2)	0.0432**	63,423	
Log Likelihood	9,446		

Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variable and Main Independent Variables (Model 5 - Model 8)

	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min.	Max.
Political Trust	46330	0.508	0.245	0.000	1.0
Short-term W	41	0.774	0.184	0.156	1.0
Short-term S	41	0.946	0.172	0.200	1.0
Short-term W/S	41	0.818	0.121	0.450	1.0
Historical W	41	21.598	11.363	3.675	46.49
Historical S	41	29.743	12.715	4.900	46.49
Historical W/S	41	0.726	0.183	0.346	1.0

Table 3.3: Multilevel Linear Model of Partisanship and W/S: Dependent Variable: Political Trust

	Model 1(A)	Model 1(B)	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Individual-level Variable					
Election Loser	-0.064*** (0.002)	-0.064*** (0.002)	-0.064*** (0.002)	-0.264*** (0.057)	-0.211*** (0.057)
Non-partisan	-0.088 (0.002)	-0.088*** (0.002)	-0.088*** (0.002)	-0.083* (0.042)	-0.054 (0.044)
Education	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.008*** (0.000)	-0.008*** (0.000)
Age	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Female	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Interest in Politics	0.019*** (0.001)	0.019*** (0.001)	0.019*** (0.001)	0.018*** (0.001)	0.018*** (0.001)
Country-level Variable					
W	0.032 (0.153)				
S	0.043 (0.141)				
Historical W/S	-0.181* (0.081)	-0.186* (0.080)	-0.166* (0.070)	-0.134† (0.075)	-0.116 (0.075)
Short-term W/S		-0.003 (0.137)	-0.040 (0.120)	-0.137 (0.125)	-0.119 (0.125)
ENPP	0.004 (0.012)	0.004 (0.012)	0.022† (0.011)	0.022* (0.011)	0.008 (0.012)
Disproportionality	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)

Continued...

Table 3.3 (cont'd)

	Model 1(A)	Model 1(B)	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Democracy level	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)
Real GDP/cap	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Africa & Middle East			0.029 (0.057)	0.034 (0.056)	0.032 (0.056)
Asia			-0.002 (0.054)	0.011 (0.053)	0.013 (0.053)
Latin America			-0.162** (0.056)	-0.156** (0.054)	-0.157** (0.054)
Post-Communist			-0.099* (0.050)	-0.092† (0.049)	-0.093† (0.049)
Cross-level Interaction					
Loser*Historical W/S				-0.032 (0.052)	-0.062 (0.050)
Non-partisan*Historical W/S				-0.065† (0.039)	-0.086* (0.038)
Loser*Short-term W/S				0.254*** (0.074)	0.218** (0.070)
Non-partisan*Short-term W/S				0.053 (0.054)	0.038 (0.053)
Loser*ENPP					0.026** (0.008)
Non-partisan*ENPP					0.015* (0.006)
Loser*Disproportionality					0.003† (0.002)
Non-partisan*Disproportionality					0.003*

Continued...

Table 3.3 (cont'd)

	Model 1(A)	Model 1(B)	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
					(0.001)
Constant	0.617*** (0.138)	0.691*** (0.127)	0.726*** (0.118)	0.776*** (0.120)	0.747*** (0.120)
Variance of Random Effect					
Country-level	0.010	0.010	0.006	0.007	0.007
Election Loser	n/a	n/a	n/a	.004	.004
Non-partisan	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.002	0.002
Individual-level	0.041	0.041	0.041	0.040	0.040
AIC	-22,196	-22,200	-22,200	-23,200	-23,200
BIC	-22,051	-22,100	-22,000	-23,000	-22,900
Log-Likelihood	11,114	11,114	11,117	11,637	11,624
N. of Respondent	63,423	63,423	63,423	63,423	63,423
N. of Country	59	59	59	59	59
†p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001					

Table 3.4: Multilevel Linear Model of Partisanship and W/S: Dependent Variable: Political Trust (Perceived Personal Economy included)

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8(A)	Model 8(B)
Individual-level Variable					
Election Loser	-0.075*** (0.002)	-0.074*** (0.002)	-0.246** (0.079)	0.082 (0.087)	-0.212** (0.077)
Non-partisan	-0.086*** (0.003)	-0.086*** (0.003)	-0.059 (0.058)	0.065 (0.073)	-0.030 (0.056)
Education	-0.012*** (0.000)	-0.012*** (0.000)	-0.011*** (0.000)	-0.011*** (0.000)	-0.011*** (0.000)
Age	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Female	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.004† (0.002)	-0.004† (0.002)	-0.004† (0.002)
Interest in Politics	0.020*** (0.001)	0.020*** (0.001)	0.019*** (0.001)	0.019*** (0.001)	0.019*** (0.001)
Perceived Personal Economy	0.015*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)
Country-level Variable					
W				0.046 (0.166)	
S				0.163 (0.149)	
Historical W/S	-0.198* (0.098)	-0.174† (0.089)	-0.127 (0.096)	-0.102 (0.094)	-0.110 (0.096)
Short-term W/S	0.077 (0.165)	-0.008 (0.147)	-0.074 (0.155)		-0.054 (0.154)
ENPP	-0.000 (0.016)	0.022 (0.017)	0.027 (0.016)	0.011 (0.017)	0.008 (0.018)

Continued...

Table 3.4 (cont'd)

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8(A)	Model 8(B)
Disproportionality	0.004 (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
Democracy level	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.009)
Real GDP/cap	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Africa & Middle East		0.010 (0.106)	0.031 (0.102)	0.011 (0.099)	0.019 (0.101)
Asia		-0.020 (0.095)	0.001 (0.091)	-0.019 (0.089)	0.001 (0.090)
Latin America		-0.172† (0.091)	-0.165† (0.087)	-0.186* (0.085)	-0.174* (0.086)
Post-Communist		-0.127 (0.110)	-0.104 (0.106)	-0.140 (0.104)	-0.116 (0.105)
Cross-level Interaction Term					
Loser*W				0.200* (0.089)	
Non-partisan*W				0.031 (0.065)	
Loser*S				-0.295** (0.101)	
Non-partisan*S				-0.094 (0.078)	
Loser*Historical W/S			-0.023 (0.067)	-0.055 (0.063)	-0.041 (0.064)
Non-partisan*Historical W/S			-0.091† (0.050)	-0.117* (0.049)	-0.109* (0.047)
Loser*Short-term W/S			0.221*		0.202*

Continued...

Table 3.4 (cont'd)

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8(A)	Model 8(B)
			(0.094)		(0.089)
Non-partisan*Short-term W/S			0.048		0.033
			(0.070)		(0.065)
Loser*ENPP				0.030**	0.027*
				(0.011)	(0.011)
Non-partisan*ENPP				0.022*	0.019*
				(0.008)	(0.008)
Loser*Disproportionality				0.002	0.002
				(0.002)	(0.002)
Non-partisan*Disproportionality				0.004*	0.004*
				(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.623***	0.713***	0.713***	0.463**	0.687***
	(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.159)	(0.160)	(0.157)
Variance of Random Effect					
Country-level	0.011	0.008	0.010	0.010	0.010
Election Loser	n/a	n/a	0.006	0.005	0.005
Non-partisan	n/a	n/a	0.003	0.002	0.002
Individual-level	0.044	0.044	0.043	0.043	0.043
AIC	-12,900	-12,900	-13,700	-13,607	-13,600
BIC	-12,700	-12,700	-13,400	-13,292	-13,300
Log-Likelihood	6,454	6,454	6,855	6,839	6,842
N. of Respondent	46,330	46,330	46,330	46,330	46,330
N. of Country	41	41	41	41	41
†p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001					

Table 3.5: Multilevel Linear Model of Partisanship and W/S: Dependent Variable: Political Trust (Democratizing countries only)

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12(A)	Model 12(B)
Individual-level Variable					
Election Loser	-0.077*** (0.003)	-0.077*** (0.003)	-0.273** (0.099)	0.091 (0.093)	-0.229* (0.094)
Non-partisan	-0.085*** (0.003)	-0.085*** (0.003)	-0.103 (0.070)	0.048 (0.074)	-0.075 (0.064)
Education	-0.013*** (0.001)	-0.013*** (0.001)	-0.012*** (0.001)	-0.012*** (0.001)	-0.012*** (0.001)
Age	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Female	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)
Interest in Politics	0.020*** (0.001)	0.020*** (0.001)	0.019*** (0.001)	0.019*** (0.001)	0.019*** (0.001)
Perceived Personal Economy	0.014*** (0.001)	0.014*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)
Country-level Variable					
W				0.045 (0.169)	
S				0.148 (0.150)	
Historical W/S	-0.261** (0.095)	-0.211* (0.087)	-0.168† (0.101)	-0.141 (0.096)	-0.149 (0.099)
Short-term W/S	0.165 (0.158)	0.062 (0.143)	-0.065 (0.163)		-0.045 (0.159)
ENPP	0.011 (0.016)	0.029† (0.017)	0.036* (0.016)	0.013 (0.017)	0.011 (0.018)

Continued...

Table 3.5 (cont'd)

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12(A)	Model 12(B)
Disproportionality	0.004 (0.003)	0.007* (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
Democracy level	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.008)
Real GDP/cap	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Asia		-0.030 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.046)	-0.014 (0.046)	-0.003 (0.046)
Latin America		-0.165** (0.058)	-0.171** (0.055)	-0.171*** (0.054)	-0.168** (0.055)
Post-Communist		-0.138* (0.057)	-0.129* (0.055)	-0.142** (0.055)	-0.129* (0.055)
Cross-level Interaction Term					
Loser*W				0.212* (0.106)	
Non-partisan*W				0.075 (0.074)	
Loser*S				-0.306** 0.108	
Non-partisan*S				-0.118 (0.081)	
Loser*Historical W/S			-0.021 (0.075)	-0.066 (0.069)	-0.044 (0.071)
Non-partisan*Historical W/S			-0.080 (0.053)	-0.105* (0.051)	-0.098* (0.048)
Loser*Short-term W/S			0.257* (0.113)		0.229* (0.105)
Non-partisan*Short-term W/S			0.100		0.086

Continued...

Table 3.5 (cont'd)

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12(A)	Model 12(B)
			(0.081)		(0.073)
Loser*ENPP				0.033**	0.031**
				(0.011)	(0.011)
Non-partisan*ENPP				0.022**	0.021**
				(0.008)	(0.008)
Loser*Disproportionality				0.003	0.003
				(0.002)	(0.002)
Non-partisan*Disproportionality				0.004**	0.004**
				(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.534***	0.664***	0.727***	0.515***	0.687***
	(0.150)	(0.136)	(0.151)	(0.136)	(0.149)
Variance of Random Effect					
Country	0.010	0.007	0.010	0.010	0.010
Election Loser	n/a	n/a	0.006	0.005	0.005
Non-partisan	n/a	n/a	0.003	0.002	0.006
Individual	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.044	0.045
AIC	-10,200	-10,200	-10,900	-10,905	-10,900
BIC	-10,100	-10,100	-10,700	-10,602	-10,600
Log-Likelihood	5,131	5,131	5,502	5,487	5,490
N. of Respondent	41,350	41,350	41,350	41,350	41,350
Number of Country	36	36	36	36	36
†p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001					

Figure 3.1: Hypothesized Citizen's Trust (Short-term W/S)




Figure 3.2: Hypothesized Citizen's Trust (Historical W/S)




Figure 3.3: (a) Predicted Probability of Political Trust by the Loyalty Norm and Partisanship (Short-term W/S)





Figure 3.4: (b) Predicted Probability of Political Trust by the Loyalty Norm and Partisanship (Historical W/S)



Chapter 4

SOURCES OF PRESIDENT'S SURVIVAL IN SOUTH KOREA

4.1 Introduction

From Chapter 3, political trust is conceived as citizens' attitude toward an aggregated political institution, that is, a whole political system. By looking at the cause of political trust in the light of citizens' partisanship and a winning coalition and selectorate institution (i.e., the loyalty norms), I argue that the leader's institutional change through either expansion or contraction of the size of winning coalition derives citizens to perceive their political system generally (cf. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). With respect to both the short-term and the historically accumulated loyalty norms, citizens' attitude toward political institutions is not independent of a current and previous leader's institutional change.

From the findings in Chapter 3, just as the institutional change made by a leader and party in power can affect citizens' attitude toward political institutions, I suppose that micro-level variables such as partisan status derived from electoral politics should be directly linked to the perception of leader survival and stability, especially in a critical time period like an impeachment process. Thus, in order to understand leader's survival in micro perspective, it should be a next logical step to examine leader's survival in terms of the citizens' loyalty to the leader and her party. Basically, this step seems to require us to examine the citizens' attitude toward leader's survival in the consideration of citizens' different partisan status and their loyalty to the leader. If all of this is possible, we can test and verify more direct causal relationship between leader survival and the interaction of partisan status and the loyalty norms at the individual level.

Moreover, with the benefit of using individual level data, we may control for citizens' different attitudes toward specific political institutions so that the effect of partisan status and the loyalty norms on leader survival can be better examined. For example, the level of

citizens' trust in president is affected by citizens' attitude toward an incumbent president while the approval rating of an incumbent prime minister is more associated with citizens' trust in parliament than with trust in other institutions. Therefore, in explaining leader's survival at an individual level data, I need to include disaggregated political institutions so that I can sort out some confounding effects in resulting from close association of leader and a specific institution.

In this context, the South Koreans' experience of an impeachment process seems to provide an unique opportunity to examine the role of citizens' perception of a leader and the party in power. Specifically, the Constitutional Court's reinstatement of the impeached president by the National Assembly was believed to be substantially influenced by the 17th General Election's outcome, which means that voter's attitude directed to the impeached president eventually had a say in the impeachment process. Presidency in South Korea is characterized as a significantly strong presidential system, similar to the French semi-presidential system.¹ Although the South Korean Constitution allows constitutional mandate for both the presidency and the legislature, the legislature (i.e., the National Assembly) tends to be subordinate to the president in the policy-making process (Tavits, 2007; Mo, 2001). From this, relatively greater clarity of responsibility is one of main characteristics in the strong presidency of South Korea. A presidency with clarity of responsibility requires more substantial support than less noticeable policy-makers from both political elites and the mass public.

Under the strong and responsible presidency in South Korea, citizens' support for the leader varies depending on their partisan status and their levels of loyalty norms to their parties. In democratizing countries like South Korea wherein the party system is not stable but volatile in terms of the duration of party existence, the support for an incumbent party

¹Unlike definitional semi-presidential system, however, Korean president can avoid collective responsibility of the prime minister and the cabinet by only allowing individual PM responsibility when the legislature (i.e., the National Assembly) requires accountability of the executive branch.

can be well translated into the loyalty norms to the party's leader: The president in South Korea thus can not be dissociated with a figure as the leader of the party in power. Moreover, although the party system is very much personalized, on average, partisans tend to be more confident toward their political systems than non-partisans (e.g., Anderson and Paskeviciute, 2009).

In this chapter, I use a case study of impeachment to evaluate and illustrate both the strength of the presidency and the roles of key partisan groups in presidency support for this institution. The contrast between partisans and non-partisans is a focus in a sense that the loyalty of the selectorate has a conditional influence on the mass perception of the impeachment process and its legitimacy. Especially, the difference in the perception between winners and non-partisans implies the importance of a stable party system and its function during the course of consolidating democracy.

This case study focuses on events surrounding the impeachment of President Roh Moo-hyun in 2004. In brief, the sequence of events is following; One of the presidential candidate of Roh Moo-hyun, who was self-educated human rights lawyer, was elected in November, 2002. Relatively weak legitimacy earned by the victory with razor-thin margin provided not only a great challenge to the "honeymoon period" of his governance, but also a motivation for him to found his own party, the Uri Party. With President Roh's defection of his own then-incumbent Millennium Democratic Party, two major opposition parties could secure the majority in the National Assembly. As result, both parties could accuse President Roh of his pre-electoral intervention with the impeachment motion, which had been aggravated by his continually inappropriate remarks and his aids' subsequent corruption scandals.

Yet, President Roh survived the legislative attempt of impeachment after obtaining legitimacy from the decision made by the Constitutional Court on May, 2004. Before the Court's decision was finalized, the newly founded Uri Party had won majority in the National Assembly after the 17th general election in April, 2004. The election seemed to be a

referendum-like election against the impeachment attempt.²

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, leader legitimacy in South Korea will be examined from the perspective of mass politics. Then, I will discuss how party politics in South Korea after the 2002 presidential election has changed the existing region-based party system wherein the party loyalty has been easily translated into the loyalty to the party leader who has the corresponding regional power. Also, the generational gap in the party loyalty will be discussed. Thirdly, the abnormal case of the President Roh's period and his also abnormal experience of the impeachment process provides a distinct opportunity to test the effect of partisan status and the loyalty norm to the president on the mass perception of the leader's survival. Lastly, the conclusion discusses how unstable political parties' competition for the strong and accountable president across the regions of South Korea and the generations has isolated non-partisans from the political arena.

4.2 Elite Politics and Regionalism in South Korea

Authoritarian rule, with the exception of a more democratic parliamentary system briefly before the General Park's military coup, showed a stark contrast with democratization era after 1988. Heo and Stockton (2005) show the major differences as follows. First, the ruling party's dominance in the legislature has ended. Second, the proportional representation system has expanded in the electoral system. Third, with the PR system, the number of effective parties has also increased. And lastly, the parties' life, on average, is shorter in the democratization era (p.680).

A democratic transition process in Korea triggered by massive pro-democracy demonstra-

²In 2003, however, President Roh suggested holding an national referendum asking a vote of confidence, while the Korea Constitution only limits the use of referendum to "important policies relating to diplomacy, national defense, unification, and other matters relating to the national destiny" (Article 72) and to part of procedure for amending the constitution (Article 130). Later, the Court dismissed the case "with warning that efforts such as Roh's to bend the constitution in a plebiscitarian direction could become a cover for authoritarianism" (Hahm and Kim, 2005; p. 35).

tion, especially in June, 1987, resulted in Chun's concession, named the June 29th Declaration by Roh Tae Woo who was handpicked as would-be successor to then President Chun. Korea's democratic transition culminated in a new constitutional reform heralding the Sixth Republic (Park, 2002). The ruling party of the DLP (Democratic Liberal Party) founded by the '3-party merger' in 1990 showed a clear example of how critical "leadership compatibility" is in determining party behavior (Kim, 1997).³ While the merging parties allied in accordance with their conservative ideology, two major figures had the same Youngnam regional base.

Another example of an elite pact occurred between the two Kims. The 1997 elite pact initiated by Kim Dae Jung induced coalitions between progressives and hard-core conservatives, which in turn seemingly resulted in a more narrowed ideological gap between them. Kim Dae Jung (DJ) and Kim Jong Phil (JP)'s coalition (a.k.a. DJP coalition) derived from an agreement on the constitutional reform, mainly including the shift from presidentialism to a parliamentary system, was an irresistible incentive to JP, as JP's regional base of Choongchung consists of relatively small number and less loyal support for its regional leader of JP.

Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung had been figures representing Honam and Youngnam regions, respectively, "maintaining commanding positions within their own parties and tended to magnify the rivalries and animosities between the regions" (Lee, 1999:p. 214 ; see also, Horiuchi and Lee, 2008). Although both Kims could become presidents consecutively, many in the Honam region felt that they had been discriminated against during the successive authoritarian rules by the Youngnam region. This evinces the complicated regional and personal-based party system in Korea, which has induced constant disappearance and reshuffling of parties between elections to maximize their electoral fortune.

Many scholars ascribe the weak Korean party system to inveterate regionalistic cliques

³More than a year later, main two opposition parties of the New Democratic Party, "led by the top opposition figure Kim Dae Jung, and the small Democratic Party, led by Lee Ki Taek." (New York Times, Sept. 11th, 1991)

and a personalized party system (Lee, 1998; Kang, 2005). Regionalism has been an inveterate cause of the failure of party politics in new democracies. Hahm (2008) points out that political elites' pack-making in 1991 "led to a major ideological reconfiguration in Korean politics - from authoritarianism versus democrats to conservatives versus progressives...also strengthened another major cleavage in Korean politics - regionalism." (p. 135) With these peculiarities, the system of shortened party longevity compared to other similarly democratizing countries seems to be clear in Korea. A stable party system has not been settled upon as personalized parties have frequently emerged, merged, been renamed, or disappeared. After competitive legislative elections restarted in 1985, no opposition party ran in consecutive elections except for a minor party, the United Liberal Democrats, which ran in both the 1996 and 2000 elections(Heo and Stockton, 2005).⁴ Korea's average party longevity, for example, is 4.9 years, which is much lower than Taiwan's party system (32.2 years) that has taken similar path of democratization and socio-economic development (Lee, 2009).

Lee (2009) traces the origin of personalism in the Korean party system back to the authoritarian era. With shortened life span of parties through party mergers and political calculations, the early democratizing period witnessed that regional and personal-based party system has strengthened party loyalty that is well converted to the voter's loyalty to the party leaders. However, this results in a large share of non-partisans in their party affiliation, although there seems to vary across regions (see Table 4.1), and partisan loyalty can be easily converted to the loyalty to the party leaders, rather than loyalty to party ideology and party organization.

[Table 4.1]

⁴However, there were two military backed parties of the Democratic Republican Party (1963–78) and the Democratic Justice Party (1981–91) that ran in consecutive elections during the authoritarian and transitional periods.

4.3 The Leader-Party Nexus and Partisan Support

Since democratization, the long-standing fault-line of authoritarian (military) and democratic (civilian) has converted into a newer fault-line, i.e., the progressive-conservative ideology in the 17th general election (Kim, Choi and Cho, 2008; see Kim, 1998). Although ideologically-oriented parties did not develop at the beginning of the democratic transition in 1987, voters' diverse demands beyond the developmental state argument and across generations have been substantial. Specifically, the ideological gap was dramatically drawn along generational differences in the presidential election in December, 2002. With an existing dimension of a regional cleavage, the new dimension of a generational cleavage between the old and the young made partisan politics in Korea look more complicated (see Fig.1 below). This gap, for example, was delineated with the strong contrast of both major parties' candidates, Roh Moo-hyun from the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP, hereafter) and Lee Hoi-chang from the Grand National Party (GNP, hereafter).

Owing to the younger generations' and the progressives' support, President Roh achieved victory in the 16th presidential election in 2002. Moreover, in the preliminary election he had relied on populist strategies and had appealed to his career as a human rights lawyer to be a big surprise to the major groups of the party as well as to the public. Many Koreans started to believe that Roh's electoral victory marked the 'end of three Kims' era (Im, 2004). Yet, the razor-thin victory in the presidential election did not give President Roh full leverage and legitimacy for his progressive policies and innovative pledges.

President Roh had neither leadership skills nor the power for party discipline within the MDP. President Roh was the first president who defected, rather than renaming, his own incumbent party to found a new political party, Open Uri Party (Uri Party, hereafter). His defection was considered by his supporters as an essential move because his campaign slogan had been heavily based on departure from existing corrupt political powers such as the MDP and the GNP, the major opposition party.

The Uri Party was a symbol for the liberals and the progressives. So it had a reputation

representing the young reforming group of the 386 generation, and Roh was believed to lead this whole group and its penultimate organization of the Uri party. Therefore, Roh tried to make the party more salient among the public even before the 17th general election campaign was officially started.

So how would the attempt at impeachment likely be viewed by different groups of voters? Supporting the Uri Party could reflect how loyal the voters were to the ideas of liberal reform and to President Roh as well. This was especially the case for the election winners in the previous presidential election who felt close to the newly founded Uri Party. They are the group who still supported the Uri Party, confirming the leader-party nexus. They were likely to strongly oppose the impeachment attempt motioned by the National Assembly, thereby voting for the Uri Party in the general election in April, 2004. The majority of election losers from the GNP may have been frustrated with the temporary “impeachment coalition” with the MDP, which could have instigated more support for both the leader and the Uri Party (see Tab. 4.2 & Fig. 4.1.’s lower-right quadrant).

In contrast, among those who supported President Roh in the presidential election, the founding of the Uri Party could be considered to be a defection to the then-incumbent party of the MDP. These frustrated winners could be expected to support the impeachment motion.⁵ They might feel closer to the previous incumbent MDP that had strong regional support from the Honam region, rather than to the more progressive-reform-oriented Uri Party. These winners’ view on the impeachment attempt could be expected to be more supportive than loyal winners to the Uri Party. To loyal losers to the GNP, the response to the impeachment could be expected to be more supportive than any other partisan status. They could believe that the “impeachment coalition” of the major opposition GNP and the previous ruling MDP was a necessary step for them to regain power. (see Tab. 4.2 & Fig. 4.1’s lower-left quadrant).

[Table 4.2]

⁵In Table 4.1, more than 10% of winners can be regarded as “dissent winners”.

Non-partisans are more likely than partisans to see a liberal and progressive young party such as the Uri Party be a good alternative to the old style politics. As a number of scholars assume that the nexus of partisanship and system support exists, non-partisan status tend to bear dissent of the existing party system (Holmberg, 2003; Torcal, Gunther and Montero, 2002; Dalton, 1999; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Budge, Crewe and Farlie, 1976). Specifically, for those who are not identified with any existing parties, more diverse parties are preferable within a wider ideological spectrum. In this vein, non-partisans who especially experienced the conservatives' '3-Party Merger' and the strategic 'DJP coalition' could be expected to welcome the progressive and liberal newcomer of the Uri Party to the conservatively-skewed party system (see Tab. 4.2 & Fig. 4.1.'s upper-right quadrant).

Finally, non-partisans are expected to support the impeachment motioned by mainly the two opposition parties (the GNP and the MDP) that these non-partisan may not have felt close to.⁶ While they could be expected to have as little affiliation with the Uri Party as with any existing parties, they are hesitant to support the impeachment motion against the legitimately elected president. Non-partisans' sympathy for President Roh is expected to be greater than partisans who lack loyalty to the Uri Party. This kind of sympathy may not fit with current and direct public provisions of the ruling party's public services. Instead, the non-partisans reject any existing parties including the Uri Party. Their preferences are more oriented to the leadership itself, instead of party and ideology (see Tab. 4.2 & Fig. 4.1's upper-left quadrant).⁷

[Figure 4.1]

⁶Lee (1999) pays attention to party non-identifiers' apathy and their threats to fledgling democracy in Korea.

⁷This category of non-partisans would have contrasting preferences toward the leader and the party. This is especially because of the ambivalence of non-partisans' support for the progressive ruling party and their low confidence in President Roh. Thus, non-partisans' conflictual attitudes toward the leader and the party is expected to have a positive impact on the perceived support for the passed impeachment motion.

4.4 Data and Measures

I use data from a Korea Social Science Data Center Survey, conducted in April, 2004, about a month after the impeachment motion was accepted by the National Assembly and right after the 17th general election. The data, therefore, reflects well how the voters think of the legitimacy of the impeachment and whether they could make their voice heard to this unprecedented process.

4.4.1 Dependent Variable

There are two questions regarding the impeachment process: Q.33 (whether impeachment is agreeable or not) and Q.34 (whether the respondents participated in the anti-impeachment vigils or not). The four category question of Q.33 is chosen for the dependent variable, and its distribution can be found in Table 4.1.

I collapsed the “Supportive” and “Strongly Supportive” categories. This is because it is accepted to collapse categories containing small numbers (about 5% of the samples in this data) so that collapsing categories improves the asymptotic approximations. It also improve the fit of the model, especially when the data apparently deviate from the parallel regression assumption (Murad et al., 2003; p. 155).

Besides, a cultural response effect may be involved here. As Javeline (1999) proves, more acquiescence (i.e., agreement) bias in a polite culture as in Kazakhstan results in the propensity of individuals to agree with an assertion regardless of its content. Like in Kazakhstan, Korean respondents in the survey may have been hesitant to reveal their strong opinion on the impeachment. Since the whole society is aware of the mood of anti-impeachment rallies through the media, the difficulty in responding lies not so much in respondents’ strong opposition to the impeachment as in their moderate support for the impeachment. For those who support the impeachment, therefore, acquiescence bias can be found, yet at the same time the strongly supportive respondents may not be different from moderately supportive

respondents. Some significant number of the moderately supportive respondents tend to be more acquiescent in the balanced question design by assigning themselves to the “supportive” category.

4.4.2 Main Independent Variables

Support for the impeachment reflects both partisans’ and non-partisans’ perception against the leader and the party. Based on their partisan status, their expectation of the incumbent party and leader will vary. This is especially the case for democratizing countries where election winners who are the beneficiaries from the leader’s private goods. Instead, those of the selectorate out of winning coalition, i.e., election losers and non-partisans, are expected to have fewer benefits directly from the leader and the incumbent party, except that they still enjoy the public goods.

Winning coalition is not equal to the total number of people supporting the leader. It is the number of supporters who “are essential to maintaining the leader in power and who receive policy concessions and/or personal benefits in return for their support” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2010). The minimal necessary number of future winners are pursued by the leader and the incumbent party as well. Therefore, in democratizing countries, a newly founded party may try hard to get as many supporters as possible from the normal voters.

In the Korea case, two characteristics could be attractive to voters, especially to non-partisans, during the course of the development of the Uri Party: First, as the catch-all party has been prevalent in the advanced industrialized countries, which is well explained by the median voter theorem (Black, 1948; Downs, 1957), the newly elected young president may as well expand a skewed ideological spectrum of the conservatives to include the more liberal and progressive ends of it. In a country of the NICs (the Newly Industrial Countries) since late 1970s, way before the democratization process started in mid-1980s, diverse needs should be met and various voices are expected to be heard in the new millennium. Therefore, the newly elected party, the Uri Party, was thought of as a good experiment for the expansion

of the ideological spectrum.

Second, President Roh was viewed as a symbolic figure to socio-economic “outsiders” as well as to election losers. The former could become new winners in their representing process of democracy while successfully voting out a serious conservative contender of the region-based GNP. However, this kind of new representation was possible not mainly by the existing other region-based MDP, but primarily by the self-educated human rights lawyer. Especially, for non-partisans and the younger generation, the new young symbolic figure must have been a good inducer to the ballot box in the 2002 Presidential Election.

Therefore, I include two variables, loyalty to the Uri Party and partisan status, as key independent variables in explaining the variation in the dependent variable, the support for the impeachment. The loyalty to the Uri Party can be measured by two types of question. One is a direct measure of the loyalty, asking the feeling thermometer about the Uri Party in a scale of 0-10 range. Another assesses comparative loyalty by comparing the two major opposition parties, the MDP and the GNP. I operationalize the concept by subtracting the sum of the loyalty of two opposition parties from the direct measure of the Uri Party loyalty. Then, the scale of the range is from -10 to 10, implying that zero is the ideal position of no loyalty to any of the three parties. Moreover, I expect that the interactive relationship between loyalty and partisan status will be an important mechanism to explain impeachment support.

The histogram of the distribution can be shown in Figure 4.2 - 4.7 below. Election winners in both the measures of loyalty appear to be left-skewed, while election losers appear to be right-skewed. Non-partisans consistently centers on the middle in the distribution of both the measures.

[Figure 4.2 - Figure 4.7]

4.4.3 Covariates

Political trust in specific institutions can be found in Q.39 (1) through Q39. (4). After priming the impeachment issue by preceding Q.33 (whether impeachment is okay or not) and Q.34 (whether the respondents participated in the anti-impeachment vigils or not), the generalized institutional trust can be perceived as specific institutional support during the course of the impeachment process. Then, how diffuse support can be measured in this data is the question. Therefore, I include each institution's trust level of specific support as control variables in the models.

Another important control variable set should be respondents' region. For the expediency of the analysis, there exist five regions: Capital Seoul and its neighboring Kyunggi region, Choongchung region, Honam region, Kangwon region, and Youngnam region. By making the Seoul and Kyunggi region as a reference region, I specify four other regions in the models.

Last but not least, the usual demographic variables of Age, Gender, and Education should be included. For example, the Age variable can be differently specified in the models. According to the Age-Period-Cohort model (Mason, Winsborough and Poole, 1973), Cohort (year of birth) is identified by subtracting Age (year since birth) from Period (current year). Thus, I should exclude the Age variable when I include the Cohort dummy variable to avoid the identification problem caused by the mentioned additive and linear relations among the three variables (Winship and Harding, 2008). The democratic transition in 1987 was an important moment especially to the younger generation that is susceptible to the externally given critical juncture during the process of political socialization. This political crystallization time period affected by critical events is expected to heavily impact the individual's voting patterns (Hyman, 1959; Ventura, 2001). Thus, I coded four dummy variables according to the critical events including the 1950 Korean War cohort, the 1987 democratic transition cohort, the 1997 financial crisis cohort, and the 2002 Presidential election cohort.

I calculated each cohort with different methods as all four contexts have different implications to the respective cohorts. First, the respondents who reached age 20 in 1987 were

assigned to the 1987 democracy cohort as explained by many political socialization literature. Second, the respondents who reached age of 46 through age of 65 are considered most heavily inflicted by the 1997 financial crisis that plummeted stock prices. According to the life cycle hypothesis (Ferson and Harvey, 1991; Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954), this age group had used their substantial amount of saving to invest in share of common stock. However, I coded the 1997 financial crisis cohort up to age of 60 so that the 1950 War cohort can be covered from age of 68, i.e., age of 14 in 1950. This is because the Korean War continued until July, 1953 and is regarded as one of the most catastrophic events.⁸ Lastly, the 2002 Presidential Election cohort is coded from age of 18 to age of 36 so as to cover the Age variable exhaustively.⁹ Each cohort is well distributed along the Age variable, and a nonparametric scatter plot appears below (see Figure 4.8). A cross-tabulation on support for impeachment by partisanship is summarized in Table 4.3.

[Table 4.3]

4.5 Method

Ordered logit or probit models can be used for the ordinal dependent variable (Long, 1997). As the support for impeachment attempt of the dependent variable has four categories, coded as 1 = Strongly Opposed, 2 = Opposed, 3 = Agreed, and 4 = Strongly Agreed, either estimation method can be employed. However, with parallel regression assumption being frequently violated in the real world, I need to test the assumption by using either a Log-likelihood Ratio test or a Wald test (i.e., Brant test)(Long and Freese, 2006). Both tests confirm that the parallel lines assumption (or proportional odds assumption) is violated at the 0.001 level. Specifically, Brant test shows that the violations are for the variables of *Youngnam* region and *Loyalty* (also *Comparative Loyalty*).

⁸More discussion can be found below in the conclusion section.

⁹When I recoded this relatively extended age cohort (19 years) by splitting in half, the results hold the same in both the direction and the statistical significance.

To relax the parallel regression assumption in the ordinal dependent variable case, generalized ordered logit models can be an alternative to the constrained ordered logit/probit models. Two generalized ordered logit models exist. First, Fu's(1998) program, `gologit`, was designed to estimate the model, although it only allowed the least constrained model with relaxing the parallel lines assumption for all the independent variables. Second, `gologit2` developed by Richard Williams (2006) can estimate Partial Proportional Odds Models (PPOM), where the parallel regression assumption is only violated by one or a few of the variables (see also Peterson and Harrell, 1990).¹⁰

Therefore, we can say that the parallel lines model estimated by an ordered logit model is a special case of the generalized ordered logit model. As the parallel lines model has the same β coefficients for all values of j , the model can be written as

$$P(Y_i > j) = g(X\beta) = \frac{\exp(\alpha_j + X_i\beta)}{1 + [\exp(\alpha_j + X_i\beta)]}, j = 1, 2, \dots, M - 1 \quad (4.1)$$

Unlike the parallel lines model, the partial proportional odds model has the same β coefficients in some variables for all values of j , while others can differ. If the model can be written as

$$P(Y_i > j) = g(X\beta) = \frac{\exp(\alpha_j + X1_i\beta1 + X2_i\beta2 + X3_i\beta3_j)}{1 + [\exp(\alpha_j + X1_i\beta1 + X2_i\beta2 + X3_i\beta3_j)]}, j = 1, 2, \dots, M - 1 \quad (4.2)$$

, the $\beta1$ and $\beta2$, for example, are the same for all values of j but the $\beta3$ are different from the two.

As mentioned earlier, the variables of Youngnam region and Loyalty/Comparative Loyalty appear to be free to differ from the other variables in the results of the Brant test (see Appendix). This legitimizes the use of the PPOM.

¹⁰Another possibility for estimation is using a multinomial logit model. By allowing the variable of interest to be in nominal categories, the violation of parallel line assumption will not be a concern any more. Also, the advantages of this estimation include that each category can be estimated according to their respective effects from a base category. The results of the multinomial logit model appear in Appendix G, and the base category is "strongly opposed" to impeachment. The estimation results is not different from the PPOM model.

4.6 Estimation Results

According to the survey after the election, partisanship and the perceived levels of impeachment appear to be strongly correlated, meaning that winners in the presidential election in 2002 tend to show strong objection to the impeachment attempt while losers and non-partisans show some support for it (see Table 4.1). However, the simple cross-tabulation does not give us a full picture of the relationship between partisan status and support for impeachment.

Before specifying the models according to the variables mentioned above, a nonparametric scatter plot produced by STATA's regression discontinuity package of `rd` provides a legitimate reason for including the cohort dummy variables, replacing the Age variable. The jump between the 2002 election cohort and the 1987 transition cohort signifies the lower support of the impeachment by the transition cohort. Although the older 2002 cohort appears to support the impeachment, the younger 1987 transition cohort bears relatively strong opposition to the impeachment. The latter's political crystallization of the transition period seems to give legitimacy to the democratically elected president and thus opposes the old-style politics.

[Figure 4.8]

In Table 4.4, Election Loser and Non-partisan variables appear to be statistically significant with positive sign as expected. As the PPOM model produces two result panes for the binary dependent variable¹¹, the variables' trend across the category can be traced. For example, compared to the reference category of Seoul and Kyunggi region, the Honam region variable shows strong opposition to the impeachment with the odds of (relatively)

¹¹The first result pane is Strongly Opposed as 0 and Opposed and collapsed Supportive as 1, and the second one is Strongly Opposed and Opposed as 0 and collapsed Supportive as 1.

supporting impeachment being decreased by a factor of 0.454¹², holding all other variables constant. While Youngnam region tends to be more supportive with positive but marginally significant support for the impeachment, it turns to be negative in the second result pane. This means that when considering Comparative Loyalty that allows the party loyalty to the existing opposition parties, Youngnam region respondents shows moderate opposition to the impeachment with statistical significance at the .05 level (see Table 4.5). This reflects public moods of anti-impeachment rallies, widely spread across the country.

[Table 4.4]

Regarding the interaction terms between partisan status and two kinds of the loyalty to the Uri Party, Model 3 and Model 6 consistently show positive and significant coefficients across both result panes in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. The positive signs across the models imply the non-partisans' consent to the ideological orientation of the Uri Party while having increased support for the impeachment by the factor of 1.23 or 23%, holding all variables constant (see Table 4.2's upper-right quadrant).¹³ At the same time, relative opposition to the impeachment by non-partisans, compared to the "loyal losers" to the MDP and the GNP and "dissent winners", seems to be derived from the non-partisans' preference for President Roh (see Table 4.2's upper-right and upper-left quadrants). This, for the non-partisans, indicates the conflictual attitude towards the leader and the party.

Both partisans of winners and losers in the 2002 Presidential election appear to strongly oppose the impeachment. These are "defecting losers" and "loyal winners" to the Uri Party. These partisans seem to perceive a highly correlated relationship between the leader and the party. After the momentous 2002 Presidential Election, election winners as well as election

¹²As the moderately Opposed is also coded 1, the supporting impeachment can be said as relatively surprising impeachment. Besides, this factor decrease is equivalent to the decreasing odds of (relative) supporting impeachment by 54.6%, holding all other variables constant. And, the factor of .454 is calculated by the exponent of the coefficient of -0.790 according to the logit regression estimation.

¹³Non-partisan's ideological distribution also support this argument.

losers were frustrated by the corruption scandals of the president's relatives and aides and also by an unlawful election intervention made by President Roh himself.¹⁴ These winners tend to see the nexus of the leader and the Uri Party, that is, president's close relationship with the Uri Party, and their loyalty norm was settled down even during the time of the controversial pre-election intervention before the 17th general election.

Regarding election losers, they tend to show more opposition to the impeachment if they have more sympathy for President Roh. This sympathy seems to result from election losers' frustration of the super majority of two opposition parties' wielding power and from their perception of a spillover from the sympathy of Roh into preference for the Uri Party, that is an example the leader-party contrast.

[Table 4.5]

Following Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 illustrates clearly more extreme change of partisan's levels of impeachment support than non-partisan's level along the loyalty to the Uri Party. The gap between the winner's and loser's support for the impeachment increases in Fig. 4.9, while the gap between the winner's and non-partisan's support for the impeachment gets wider than one between two partisans. Relatively more supportive non-partisans than "loyal winners" and "defecting losers" has been argued above as ideological non-partisan. In contrast, (person-based) sympathetic non-partisans show clear contrasting preferences between the President Roh and the Uri Party, having as low confidence in the Uri Party as do "dissent winners" and "loyal losers."

[Figure 4.9 & Figure 4.10]

¹⁴The reason for the opposition parties' impeachment mainly focused on the President's support for the Uri Party in the upcoming 17th general election. Under the Korean election law, it is prohibited for public officials to openly support a particular party. Although the GNP and the MDP's majority in the National Assembly posed a threat to President Roh, he denied the opposition's requests of apologies, and it facilitated the GNP and the MDP's impeachment process.

4.7 Conclusions

South Korea's recent experience of the impeachment provides various responses of partisans and non-partisans. With specific political contexts of regionalism and personalism, the citizens in South Korea are highly influenced by these "background factors"(Caporaso, 2009). Honam region and Choongchung region appear contrasting supporting levels for the impeachment against the reference category of Seoul and Kyunggi, while the specific Partial Proportional Odds Models show changing pattern of Youngnam region in a sense of comparative loyalty. That is, compared with Seoul and Kyunggi, Youngnam region is more likely to moderately oppose or to support the impeachment than to strongly oppose it. In the binary Comparative Loyalty of "Strongly Opposed/Opposed"(0) and "(Strongly) Supportive"(1), however, the negative sign of Youngnam implies more prevalent moderate opposition to the impeachment in this region.

Loyalty to the Uri Party and partisan status result in variations of impeachment support. As partisans are more likely to have any preferences for the issue of impeachment, they are labeled ranging from "loyal", to "dissent", and to "defecting". Contrasting wider range of partisans' supporting levels of the impeachment, non-partisans' moderate level of the impeachment support change illustrate two types of non-partisans; (person-based) sympathetic and ideological non-partisan. The survey also implies that there are more increased non-partisans during the process of the impeachment. Both non-partisans show more liberally-oriented ideological spectrum. This means that ideology matters when a fledgling incumbent party try to grip non-partisans' interests in the conservative party system.

Regarding the Cohort dummy variables, there exist some additional findings: If I added age of 68-72 (i.e., age of 61-65 in 1997) to the 1997 Financial Crisis cohort and excluded it (i.e., age of 14-18 in 1950) from the 1950 War cohort, the estimation results still hold in both coding methods, except for the 1950 War cohort dummy variable. According to the estimation results in Table 6.1. and Table 6.2, this dummy variable appears to be statistically significant at the 0.10 and at the 0.50 level, respectively.

Specifically, in both measures of loyalty to the Uri Party, the 1950 War cohort appears to be more supportive to the impeachment attempt than the 2002 election cohort. While the 1997 crisis cohort appears consistently to be more supportive than the election cohort, however, the shrunk War cohort does not appear to be statistically different from the election cohort. That is, this cohort, like the loyal election cohort to the Uri Party, seem to oppose the impeachment attempt.

I suppose this is resulted from another cultural aspect. The aged respondents seem to bear a paternalistic and Confucian view on President whose image can be reflected as a king in a country or a father in a family. Then, it would be difficult for them to support the impeachment attempt. Although the election cohort and the war cohort compose the “loyal cohorts” to the Uri Party, additional model specification including squared term of the Age variable does not appear to be significant. Besides, omitting the Age variable and the Cohort variable does not change the results in terms of the direction and the statistical significance.

Tables & Figures for Chapter 4

Table 4.1: Partisanship by Region (%)

Partisanship	Region					Total
	Soodokwon	Choongchung	Honam	Kangwon	Youngnam	
Election Loser	237	34	2	20	222	515
	(32.83%)	(22.67%)	(1.20%)	(41.67%)	(53.75%)	(34.33%)
Non-partisan	182	37	26	10	79	334
	(25.21%)	(24.67%)	(15.57%)	(20.83%)	(19.13%)	(22.27%)
Election Winner	303	79	139	18	112	651
	(41.97%)	(52.67%)	(83.23%)	(37.50%)	(27.12%)	(43.40%)
Total	722	150	167	48	413	1,500
	(100.00%)	(100.00%)	(100.00%)	(100.00%)	(100.00%)	(100.00%)

*Source:*Korea Social Science Data Center: Interviewed in April, 2004

Table 4.2: The Leader-Party Nexus/Contrast & (Non-)Partisan Support: Expected Response to Impeachment

Impeachment Support Change (Δ)	Loyalty to the Uri Party	
	(Low)	(High)
Moderate (Non-partisan Type)	Non-partisan's Contrast (Sympathetic Non-partisan)	Non-partisan's Consent (Ideological Non-partisan)
Extreme (Partisan Type)	Partisan's Dissent (Loyal Loser/Dissent Winner)	Partisan's Nexus (Defecting Loser/Loyal Winner)

Table 4.3: Support for Impeachment by partisanship (%)

Support for Impeachment	Partisanship			Total
	Loser	Non-partisan	Winner	
Strongly Opposed	105 (21.92%)	113 (37.54%)	359 (57.44%)	577 (41.07%)
Opposed	155 (32.36%)	133 (44.19%)	194 (31.04%)	482 (34.31%)
Agreed	164 (34.24%)	45 (14.95%)	57 (9.12%)	266 (18.93%)
Strongly Agreed	55 (11.48%)	10 (3.32%)	15 (2.40%)	80 (5.69%)
Total	479 (100.00%)	301 (100.00%)	625 (100.00%)	1,405 (100.00%)

Source: Korea Social Science Data Center: Interviewed in April, 2004

Table 4.4: Partial Proportional Odds Models of Impeachment Support

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Strongly Opposed vs. Opposed/(Strongly) Supportive			
Honam Region ^a	-0.790*** (0.239)	-0.759** (0.239)	-0.773** (0.241)
Youngnam Region ^a	0.341† (0.199)	0.330† (0.199)	0.334† (0.199)
Choongchung Region ^a	0.380 (0.261)	0.360 (0.260)	0.309 (0.263)
Kangwon Region ^a	0.596† (0.340)	0.567† (0.342)	0.533 (0.343)
Education	-0.004 (0.045)	-0.003 (0.046)	-0.008 (0.047)
Female	0.000 (0.143)	-0.011 (0.143)	-0.016 (0.143)
Age	0.033*** (0.006)		
Trust in President	-1.122*** (0.132)	-1.114*** (0.132)	-1.123*** (0.133)
Trust in Nat'l Assembly	0.755*** (0.144)	0.747*** (0.144)	0.752*** (0.145)
Trust in Party	0.190 (0.142)	0.199 (0.143)	0.222 (0.145)
Election Loser	0.634*** (0.184)	0.640*** (0.184)	0.068 (0.431)
Non-partisan	0.479* (0.197)	0.396* (0.193)	-0.776 (0.484)
Loyalty (Uri Party)	-0.255***	-0.257***	-0.334***

Continued...

Table 4.4 (cont'd)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.050)
1987 Demo. Cohort (Born in 1953-1968) ^b		0.685***	0.723***
		(0.165)	(0.166)
1997 Fin. Crisis Cohort (Born in 1938-52) ^b		0.988***	0.995***
		(0.235)	(0.237)
1950 War Cohort (Born in & before 1937) ^b		1.160*	1.295*
		(0.561)	(0.573)
Loser*Loyalty			0.093
			(0.072)
Non-partisan*Loyalty			0.203**
			(0.077)
Constant	0.937†	1.827***	2.315***
	(0.517)	(0.444)	(0.500)
Strongly Opposed/Opposed vs. (Strongly) Supportive			
Honam Region ^a	-0.790***	-0.759**	-0.773**
	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.241)
Youngnam Region ^a	-0.375	-0.385	-0.356
	(0.239)	(0.238)	(0.239)
Choongchung Region ^a	0.380	0.360	0.309
	(0.261)	(0.260)	(0.263)
Kangwon Region ^a	0.596†	0.567†	0.533
	(0.340)	(0.342)	(0.343)
Education	-0.004	-0.003	-0.008
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Female	0.000	-0.011	-0.016
	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)

Continued...

Table 4.4 (cont'd)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Age	0.033*** (0.006)		
Trust in President	-1.122*** (0.132)	-1.114*** (0.132)	-1.123*** (0.133)
Trust in Nat'l Assembly	0.755*** (0.144)	0.747*** (0.144)	0.752*** (0.145)
Trust in Party	0.190 (0.142)	0.199 (0.143)	0.222 (0.145)
Election Loser	0.634*** (0.184)	0.640*** (0.184)	0.068 (0.431)
Non-partisan	0.479* (0.197)	0.396* (0.193)	-0.776 (0.484)
Loyalty (Uri Party)	-0.366*** (0.044)	-0.370*** (0.044)	-0.461*** (0.063)
1987 Demo. Cohort (Born in 1953-68) ^b		0.685*** (0.165)	0.723*** (0.166)
1997 Fin. Crisis Cohort (Born in 1938-52) ^b		0.988*** (0.235)	0.995*** (0.237)
1950 War Cohort (Born in & before 1937) ^b		1.160* (0.561)	1.295* (0.573)
Loser*Loyalty			0.093 (0.072)
Non-partisan*Loyalty			0.203** (0.077)
Constant	-0.512 (0.529)	0.398 (0.446)	0.945† (0.520)
Pseudo R-Square	0.256	0.255	0.259
Number of Cases	928	928	928

Continued...

Table 4.4 (cont'd)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
^a Omitted category is Seoul and Kyunggi Region ^b Omitted category is the 2002 Presidential Election Cohort (Born in & after 1969) [†] p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001			

Table 4.5: Partial Proportional Odds Models of Impeachment Support (Comp. Loyalty)

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Opposed/(Strongly) Supportive			
Honam Region ^a	-0.682** (0.248)	-0.653** (0.248)	-0.654** (0.248)
Youngnam Region ^a	0.371† (0.212)	0.363† (0.212)	0.369† (0.213)
Choongchung Region ^a	0.566* (0.264)	0.552* (0.263)	0.555* (0.264)
Kangwon Region ^a	0.535 (0.350)	0.522 (0.351)	0.514 (0.351)
Education	-0.004 (0.047)	-0.004 (0.048)	-0.005 (0.048)
Female	0.038 (0.148)	0.029 (0.148)	0.036 (0.149)
Age	0.026*** (0.006)		
Trust in President	-0.990*** (0.140)	-0.985*** (0.139)	-0.981*** (0.140)
Trust in Nat'l Assembly	0.479** (0.149)	0.474** (0.149)	0.461** (0.150)
Trust in Party	0.158 (0.150)	0.164 ancial (0.150)	0.175 (0.151)
Election Loser	0.261 (0.195)	0.270 (0.196)	0.207 (0.218)
Non-partisan	0.398† (0.204)	0.326 (0.201)	0.067 (0.249)
Comparative Loyalty (Uri Party)	-0.286*** (0.031)	-0.288*** (0.031)	-0.315*** (0.041)

Continued...

Table 4.5 (cont'd)

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
1987 Demo. Cohort (Born in 1953-68) ^b		0.523** (0.171)	0.524** (0.172)
1997 Fin. Crisis Cohort (Born in 1938-52) ^b		0.659** (0.245)	0.632* (0.247)
1950 War Cohort (Born in & before 1937) ^b		1.098† (0.570)	1.111† (0.572)
Loser*Comp. Loyalty			-0.011 (0.063)
Non-partisan*Comp. Loyalty			0.116† (0.063)
Constant	0.516 (0.498)	1.212** (0.415)	1.289** (0.424)
Strongly Opposed/Opposed vs. (Strongly) Supportive			
Honam region ^a	-0.682** (0.248)	-0.653** (0.248)	-0.654** (0.248)
Youngnam Region ^a	-0.511* (0.257)	-0.517* (0.257)	-0.522* (0.259)
Choongchung Region ^a	0.566* (0.264)	0.552* (0.263)	0.555* (0.264)
Kangwon Region ^a	0.535 (0.350)	0.522 (0.351)	0.514 (0.351)
Education	-0.004 (0.047)	-0.004 (0.048)	-0.005 (0.048)
Female	0.038 (0.148)	0.029 (0.148)	0.036 (0.149)
Age	0.026***		

Continued...

Table 4.5 (cont'd)

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	(0.006)		
Trust in President	-0.990***	-0.985***	-0.981***
	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.140)
Trust in Nat'l Assembly	0.479**	0.474**	0.461**
	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.150)
Trust in Party	0.158	0.164	0.175
	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.151)
Election Loser	0.261	0.270	0.207
	(0.195)	(0.196)	(0.218)
Non-partisan	0.398†	0.326	0.067
	(0.204)	(0.201)	(0.249)
Comparative Loyalty (Uri Party)	-0.440***	-0.443***	-0.464***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.056)
1987 Demo. Cohort (Born in 1953-68) ^b		0.523**	0.524**
		(0.171)	(0.172)
1997 Fin. Crisis Cohort (Born in 1938-52) ^b		0.659**	0.632*
		(0.245)	(0.247)
1950 War Cohort (Born in & before 1937) ^b		1.098†	1.111†
		(0.570)	(0.572)
Loser*Comp. Loyalty			-0.011
			(0.063)
Non-partisan*Comp. Loyalty			0.116†
			(0.063)
Constant	-1.493**	-0.790†	-0.716†
	(0.505)	(0.416)	(0.426)
Pseudo R-Square	0.302	0.301	0.303
Number of Cases	905	905	905

Continued...

Table 4.5 (cont'd)

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
^a Omitted category is Seoul and Kyunggi Region ^b Omitted category is the 2002 Presidential Election Cohort (Born in & after 1969) [†] p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001			

Figure 4.1: Hypothetical Relationship between Loyalty and Impeachment




Figure 4.2: Distribution of the Loyalty by Election Winner (For interpretation of the references to color in this and all other figures, the reader is referred to the electronic version of this dissertation)




Figure 4.3: Distribution of the Loyalty by Election Loser




Figure 4.4: Distribution of the Loyalty by Non-partisan




Figure 4.5: Distribution of the Comparative Loyalty by Election Winner




Figure 4.6: Distribution of the Comparative Loyalty by Election Loser




Figure 4.7: Distribution of the Comparative Loyalty by Non-partisan




Figure 4.8: Discontinuity of Impeachment Support by Cohort in 2004




Figure 4.9: Predicted Probability of Impeachment Support (Strongly Opposed vs. Opposed/(Strongly) Supportive): Loyalty




Figure 4.10: Predicted Probability of Impeachment Support (Strongly Opposed vs. Opposed/(Strongly) Supportive): Comparative Loyalty




Figure 4.11: Predicted Probability of Impeachment Support (Strongly Opposed\Opposed vs. (Strongly) Supportive): Loyalty





Figure 4.12: Predicted Probability of Impeachment Support (Strongly Opposed\Opposed vs. (Strongly) Supportive): Comparative Loyalty



Chapter 5

CITIZEN'S MOBILIZATION AND LEADER'S SURVIVAL

5.1 Introduction

On every Monday between September 25, and December 18, 1989, German citizens in Leipzig in East Germany continued anti-government demonstrations that had been inspired by the Nikolai Church's peach prayers on Mondays since 1982. During this time, the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED)'s general secretary, Erich Honecker, resigned, and on November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. The mass demonstrators demanded political liberalization, open borders, and German unification.

The Monday demonstrations in Leipzig triggered a huge wave of mass political movements across East Germany to express the public's long-standing discontent, mainly caused by the lack of political freedom and poor standard of living. Although elections were held regularly, no opposition party existed, and election results were often manipulated. Moreover, with limited information access by the mass public, only some high-level authorities could sense a precipitous drop in public support for the regime throughout 1980s. However, the ignition of the people's silent dissent had been searching for a right place and right time, and the spark was made in Leipzig.

In addition to the mass protest in Leipzig in East Germany, the on-going process of the "Jasmine Revolution" in Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia and in Cairo in Egypt in 2011 as well as the other "Colored Revolutions" highlights the roles of mass dissent toward regimes and leaders. The Tunisian mass protest was also ignited by a young street vendor whose self-immolation dramatically aroused other silent dissenters in Tunisia and eventually deposed 23-year-long dictator of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. The spillover effect of mass protests went over the border to oust another long-standing dictator, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt.

Mass threats of demonstrations and protests have been good litmus indicators for lead-

ers to read how well their regimes and governments are doing for their citizens. In either advanced democracies or hybrid regimes such as electoral democracies and competitive authoritarian countries, mass threats seems to involve a direct risk to the incumbent leaders.

In the previous chapters, I have focused on the differential attitudes of potential discontent dissenters (i.e., election losers and non-partisans) from loyal supporters (i.e., election winners) toward political institutions (Chapter 3) and toward a leader who experienced a most risky situation of an impeachment trial in South Korea (Chapter 4). In this chapter, I will examine whether and how the election losers' and nonvoters' changes in their electoral behavior can be translated into mass behavior such as general strikes, anti-government demonstrations, riots and even revolutions. As the two illustrative cases exemplified at the beginning of this chapter, mass political movements can reflect citizens' discontent toward the existing political systems. The differential behavior among partisans and between voters and nonvoters signifies substantially different results in mass political movements, thereby resulting in the risk of deposition of leaders.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, the electoral and behavioral building blocks of selectorate theory are introduced. I derive how electoral politics characterize the effect of a leader's winning coalitions on mass political movements. By focusing on the changes in electoral competition (represented as election loser's size) and participation (represented as nonvoters' size), the core electoral and behavioral building blocks complement what the structure of selectorate theory is missing in its wide application to political phenomena. I highlight how important it is to incorporate individual-level's determinants into selectorate politics. Moreover, the interaction effects of electoral behavior and free press are discussed in the selectorate politics institution, as well as how mass political movements are affected by these interaction effects.

The second stage discusses in more detail the direct and indirect effects of electoral politics on leader survival and the direct effect of mass threats on leader survival. More interestingly, the increase in the size of population, the non-voting coupled with mobilization

in mass political movements, seems to be more likely to increase the risk of deposition.

5.2 Selectorate Theory of Electoral Politics Revisited

5.2.1 From Electoral Politics to Mass Threats to Leader Survival

In chapter 3, we saw how election losers and non-partisans view political systems through the different institutions of loyalty norms (i.e., W/S) to leaders. While election losers are sensitive to short-term changes of W/S, non-partisans rely on long-term changes of W/S as their attitudinal reference point. That is, election losers trust a system that allows more opportunities of being winners derived from the *increased* winning coalition within recent years (i.e., short-term W/S). With this, they can get the benefits of private goods, although the amount of private goods decreases with expanded winning coalition size.

A leader's increase in winning coalition size in response to the demand for liberalization from strong opposition parties may end up appealing to election losers through favorable policies and thus trying to include them in the winning coalition. In this case, non-partisans, being solely excluded from the winning coalition, tend to be isolated and alienated in the political community.¹ As state resources spent by a leader to obtain support from her winning coalition are now extended to election losers, non-partisans are not beneficiaries for increased amount of public spending. In this sense, non-partisans tend to be less alienated and thus trust political institutions when they perceive that a leader's winning coalition has been rather constrained and kept small for a long time. Therefore, while having stayed alienated from the system during the course of the increasing winning coalition, non-partisans' perception of political trust is more likely to be related to the *accumulated experiences* of the loyalty norms, i.e., historical or long-term loyalty norms (W/S) than to the short-term loyalty norms (W/S).

¹ Non-partisans can also be identified as they feel apathetic to and satisfied with the system. We will discuss this aspect when the link of nonvoters and non-partisans are discussed below.

In this chapter, I will bring up the causal logic of how perceived system legitimacy such as political trust can be indicated by electoral participation, and nonvoters' electoral behavior stemming from the outcome of alienated non-partisans can be associated with mass political movements and leader survival. Following Abramson and Aldrich's (1982) and Finkel's (1985) notions that decline of vote turnout in the U.S. largely results from the combined effect of the weakening partisanship and the lack of "external" political efficacy, *non-partisans'* government trust or efficacy shown in the previous chapters may well be indicated by the changed size of *nonvoters* in this chapter.

Based on the aforementioned close association of non-partisans' attitude and nonvoters' behavior, we need to make following two assumptions: (1) if non-partisans do not vote, non-partisans are considered as alienated voters, rather than apathetic and satisfied; (2) among electoral behaviors derived from non-partisans' attitudes, non-partisans' distrust of the system is largely translated into non-voting. These assumptions sound plausible for the following reasons. As discussed in Chapter 3, non-partisans' distrust of political institutions is significant only with *accumulated historical* winning coalition (W), which suggests that non-partisans' distrust can have mainly originated from perceived political alienation, rather than apathy and satisfaction, through the experience of accumulated history of W's expanding.

For the second assumption, non-partisans' distrust of the system results largely in non-voting behavior since nonvoters have no supporting parties and no trust in political institutions. As the purpose of this concluding empirical chapter is to see whether and how non-partisans' attitudes toward the system affect mass movements and eventually influence the deposition risk of the leader, the use of nonvoters' variation in size as an indicator of non-partisans' attitudinal change sounds plausible. The origins of non-partisan's attitudes and the outcomes of nonvoters' behavior, therefore, can be characterized as a conceptual distinction illustrated in Table 5.1. Here I use non-partisan and nonvoters, with a caveat that non-partisan denotes attitudinal aspects while nonvoter indicates behavioral aspects,

both of which imply political alienation when they are combined as shown in lower-right quadrant of Table 5.1.

[Table 5.1]

From the Table 5.1, I distinguish four different types of voters and nonvoters whose attitudes can be understood in terms of their party identification. Partisan voters can be either winners or losers in elections through which party identification will determine which side voters belong to, and thus they can be labelled as ‘allegiant voters’ to their affiliated parties. Pragmatic voters are those who may have specific policy goals when they vote. While they do not have any party identification, strongly policy-oriented voting behavior is expected. Inefficacious nonvoters are those whose behavior is not committed to voting while their attitude is affiliated with a certain party.² From dissatisfaction with the incumbent performance of their traditional party, inefficacious/boycotting nonvoters would reveal either allegiance or dissent to the party system and would tend to make their voice by going to the polls, rather than taking to the street. As political alienation can be better referred to as an enduring orientation than as transient feelings of discontent, non-partisan nonvoters who appear to be consistent in terms of electoral behavior and partisan attitude signify consistent and enduring orientation of citizens’ alienation from political system as well as from candidates in the elections (cf. Citrin et al., 1975). Thus, they can be labelled as ‘alienated nonvoters’.

More specifically, both winners and losers are not alienated from political systems, and thus have a chance to be included in the winning coalition (W), especially when W’s size gets large. In chapter 3, we can see that the short-term W can increase the loser’s political legitimacy significantly in the cross-country multilevel analysis. For non-partisan voters, they have some potential involving protesting since they are pragmatic in terms of their specific policy goals. In that sense, the characteristics of their participation in mass political events

²If inefficacious nonvoters boycott in the elections, those affiliated parties are mainly opposition parties.

could be highly focused in terms of policy goals, and demonstrations are regarded as another conventional political participation or civic expression, rather than as unconventional participation that can destabilize the political system and ultimately risk a leader's deposition (cf. Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2005; Dalton, 2000; Inglehart, 1997, 1977).

Regarding partisan nonvoters, they are eventually a part of nonvoters. As they are committed to a certain party identification, their rejection of the electoral process is temporary or rather in a fickle fashion since they are supporters of a certain party that is likely to boycott elections and then rejoin future elections to get the seats in the parliament. Or, they are erstwhile supporters for a disappointing party. Thus, through election boycotting either organized by opposition parties or motivated by partisan individuals, partisan nonvoters do affect electoral participation.

In this vein, election boycotters, when identified as partisan nonvoters, can be mobilized not to vote only during a limited time period, thereby dropping turnout sharply and then boosting it dramatically; For example, in Ghana in 1992, the opposition initiated a major election boycott after declaring that the incumbent party had snatched a victory from the opposition by electoral unfairness. This resulted in a substantial turnout drop by 26.4 percent of registered votes in the December parliamentary election from the previous presidential election in November, 1992. However, when the opposition came back to the electoral process in 1996 without boycotting, turnout went up to 78 percent. Similarly, Bangladesh in 1996 also witnessed the same trend of plummeting and soaring of turnout during the two elections in 1996 (Beaulieu, 2006). In both cases, partisan boycotters were mobilized, either in confronting a flawed electoral process or in a strategic "ruse by opposition parties that concluded that they stand no chance of winning" (Bratton, 1998: 53). A sudden drop of voting turnout resulting from election boycotting is, therefore, not caused by boycotters' political alienation from the electoral process.³

³Another example of nonvoters involves election suspension resulted from military coups and civil wars. In either case, it is reasonable to assume that all voters including loyal winners to a previous incumbent leader become alienated nonvoters.

Moreover, the risk of deposition seems to be hardly influenced by easily recovered turnout after boycotting. Rather, election boycotting provides a leader with useful information whether to increase or decrease the size of winning coalition, depending upon how much the leader can utilize free resources that could be available to her to purchase support from boycotting opposition parties (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). In this sense, I center on the role of non-partisan nonvoters as ‘alienated nonvoters’ in explaining the causes of mass political movements *and* the risk of deposition.

5.2.2 Alienated Nonvoters

Many political stability scholars suggest that a combination of efficacy and trust in the political system matter in understanding citizens’ collective dissent (Lipset, 1959: 86; Gamson, 1968; Wrong, 1979; chap.5; Barnes et al., 1979; Gamson, 1990). William A. Gamson argues that “[p]olitical alienation includes both an efficacy (or input) dimension and a trust (or output) dimension. ... The efficacy dimension of political alienation refers to people’s perception of their ability to influence; the trust dimension refers to their perception of the necessity for influence” (1968: 42). Similarly, Finkel (1985) notes in his panel survey study that participation enhances political trust and external efficacy and vice versa (for a cross-sectional study with similar reciprocal results, see Barnes et al. (1979)). His findings imply that non-participation is a function of the lack of political trust and external efficacy.

From these studies, citizens’ dissent and political alienation seems to be closely associated with political participation. Electoral participation, i.e., voting itself, may provide policy benefits that election losers and nonvoters may have missed in past elections.⁴ In order to examine the nonvoters’ attitudes, Finifter’s dimensions of political alienation seem to be useful in understanding the consequences of nonvoters’ either voluntary or involuntary alienation (1970). She distinguished four dimensions of alienation: political powerlessness,

⁴Nonvoters become either to be apathetic to political outcomes or to be stressful with the cross-pressure of real conflict that can force voters to lose interest in the election (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944).

political meaningfulness, perceived political normlessness, and political isolation.⁵ As long as election losers show their partisan status in the existing party system, they can still engage in the political process not only through elections, but also through demonstrations as another mode of civic expression (Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2005). In contrast, at the individual-level explanation of electoral behavior, nonvoters' disengagement from the election largely results from their lack of resources for participation, the lack of interest to engage in politics, or their lack of social capital for participation (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1987; Oppenhuis, 1995; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Dalton, 2006). That is, nonvoting results from ignorance, indifference, dissatisfaction, or inactivity (Ragsdale and Rusk, 1993).

And yet, other scholars of political participation consider vote avoidance as a political activity in the context of a small-coalition institution such as communist China and the Soviet Union (Shi, 1999; Roeder, 1989). In a somewhat similar vein, when voters cannot freely 'voice' in elections in a small winning coalition and constrained system, non-partisan nonvoters may abstain from voting "without revealing that they planned to do so", which can be termed as 'silent boycott' (Bratton and Lambright, 2001). The election boycott of Uganda's Referendum 2000 on the introduction of multiparty competition was mainly organized by the opposition parties. But, nonvoters were mainly "unwilling to side publicly with a stay-away organized by established political parties", although the results of Referendum 2000 on the surface suggested that citizens supported for the Museveni's inclusive, no-party, 'movement system'. Thus, the multiparty sympathies were mutely voiced by non-partisan nonvoters .

Related to non-partisan's perception affected by leader's manipulation of the key institution of the winning coalition size, their political alienation from the existing party system may well be expressed as a nonvoters' 'exit' from the system. Political participation such as

⁵Finifter's four types are developed from Seeman's (1959) four meanings of alienation. He originally included one more type of self-estrangement. Political meaningfulness involves "an individual's inability to distinguish any meaningful political choices consequently, [one cannot] use [choices' probable outcomes] to change social conditions" (p. 390). Therefore, meaningfulness implies more frustrated 'powerlessness'.

campaigning, voting, communal activity, and personalized contacts matters as potential precursors of mass political movements (Verba and Nie 1972). Among these activities, as voting seems to bear its highest stake in terms of leader survival, whether the election is nominal in competitive authoritarianism or substantial in advanced democracies, we now need to see how citizens' non-voting mediates the relations between non-partisans' alienation and mass mobilization.

Following his distinction of trust in a specific leader, national government, and country, Citrin (1974) argues that a sense of alienation from the political community level leads people to be "oppositionist" *and* to withdraw from electoral politics. He also argues that it does "not [automatically] imply that increased cynicism about the incumbent national administration will reduce turnout at presidential election" (979). Although he notes that the feeling of alienation and cynicism about the political community may not affect turnout in a presidential election, the changes of turnout, especially a significant drop of participation in elections, is a good predictor for political alienation and dissent about the existing political system.

Electoral politics provides a venue where continuity and volatility of membership in a certain institution can be understood in a context of partisan membership. As political parties are a quintessential political institution and organizations that mediate the state-society relation, voters' and nonvoters' behavior should be a key variable in explaining political upheaval and decay resulting from party and electoral politics. Elections provide a legitimating process for both election winners and election losers to perceive whether the institutional procedures secure a fair selection of leaders or not (Moehler and Lindberg, 2009: 347). Participating in elections itself arouses citizens who legitimize the existing political systems. Therefore, non-participation or non-voting behaviors should be an variable of interest to political stability scholars, too.

5.2.3 From Votes to Violence

The central argument in this chapter is that the lack of electoral participation and a decline in partisanship represents high risk of mass political movements and thus poses greater risk of a leader's deposition. This kind of electoral behavior is said to be derived from citizens' political apathy, and furthermore the lack of perceived legitimacy in their political system (Kaase and Barnes, 1979; Kaase, 1988). This argument is aligned with Campbell et al.'s earlier findings on partisanship; at the individual level, partisan status provides more motivations to vote, to attend to the election campaign, and attend to the election outcomes (1960).

Voters' non-participation in the elections may not be a dangerous signal for leaders or may be considered as even a favorable situation for their survival. With an apathetic and satisfied citizens' non-voting, leaders take advantage of the citizens' political quiescence (Edelman, 1971). Earlier, E. E. Schattschneider (1960) warns of a form of full participation that "if everybody got into the act the unique advantages of this form of organization would be destroyed, for it is possible that if all interests could be mobilized the result would be a stalemate" (35). However, as threatening citizens' behavior to the political system has long been considered as the main target of government repression, political quiescence is considered a major benefit to leaders. For example, quiescence includes supporting the extraction of taxes, contributing to the state's economy, and delivering no opposing 'voices' to the party in power, thereby being a major part of the political authorities' legitimacy as a protector (Davenport, 2007). Defined as a "law of coercive responsiveness", the repressive state's actions are reasonable responses to the citizens' potential threat to the political authorities.⁶

Related to the political quiescence literature, in unconsolidated democracies where demo-

⁶Reversed causal relationship from mass threat to repression is also discussed. That is, the state's repression may also lead to a form of response of mass threats; however, it is characterized as highly inconsistent findings by many repression scholars (Hibbs, 1973; Lichbach and Gurr, 1981; Muller, 1985; Gurr and Moore, 1997).

cratic practices are easily violated by the incumbent leaders, “a healthy dose of political skepticism . . . is associated with greater attitudinal resistance to [democratic] breakdown in the form of a military coup” (Seligson and Carrión, 2002: 58). Contrary to the conventional belief of a negative relationship between system support and approval of coups, the V-curve between system support and approval of military coups found in the Peruvians’ attitude proves that uncritical support for a system represents those who might well accept the violation of democratic practices in unconsolidated democracies such as Peru.

Nonvoters’ attitude toward regime stability can be induced from Seligson and Carrión’s work. As high levels of support for coups is significantly associated with both extremes of system support and non-support, those who are expected to support coups are either alienated nonvoters identified as low system supporters or apathetic nonvoters identified as satisfied (if not strong) system supporters. Similarly, some scholars note that a decline in partisanship indicates either increased political apathy or the rising concerns of protest behavior, both of which may pose a similar potential threat to the incumbent government as well as to the existing political order, or both (Barnes et al., 1979; Kaase, 1990).

Not only for the characteristics of system support in unconsolidated democracies, but also the excessive changes of electoral participation have been considered a major threat to political development and institutionalization in the emerging democracies. Competitive elections with excessive participation are also considered to contribute to the increase of protest involving other complicated issues such as resource allocations and ethnic cleavages and liberalization processes. However, increased electoral ‘departicipation’ by voters will be a good predictor for increased protest levels, as discussed in more detail below.

5.3 Hypotheses on Nonvoter, Protester, and Revolutionary

What if any political system cannot embrace either extremist parties or democratic transition, that is, it cannot try to keep a small size of the winning coalition? Do existing political parties of the incumbent and opposition parties facilitate mass political movements while

keeping the size of winning coalition as it used to be? This is because as described above elections' role of a forum for participation can incorporate potential dissidents including election losers as well as nonvoters.

According to the literature on contentious politics, there are three so-called master variables of the social movement literature: resource mobilization and organizational forms or "mobilizing structures", framing strategies, and political opportunities and context. These ways of understanding mass mobilization of political movements are useful but developed in the context of long-standing liberal democracies. While we consider both advanced and new democracies and even competitive authoritarianism, the fact that we focus on the effects of elections on mass movements and on leader survival allows us to narrow our perspective to one of the frameworks. This is because through a 'political opportunities and constraints' framework we can see the interaction of masses and elites.

Tarrow (1998) lists five dimensions of opportunity and suggests that rising protest can be expected according to the following conditions: (1) the opening of access for new actors; (2) the evidence of political realignment within the system; (3) the appearance of influential allies; (4) emerging discord among the elite; and (5) a decline in the state's capacity or will to repress dissent (Tarrow, 1998: 76). I will focus on conditions (1), (2), (3) and (5) in this section. The condition (4) and (5) have more implications for the interaction between masses and leaders will be discussed in the next section.

Voting turnout is regarded as a key and sole mechanism for political participation that involves a majority of the citizens. Mostly, voters have some or substantial affiliations with certain political parties. Joseph Schumpeter (1952) suggested that limited citizens' participation was sufficient to bring stable and accountable government, only when these are free and fair elections contested by parties and politicians legitimize governments' representation at regular intervals. Later, E. E. Schattschneider (1960) defined party's organization influenced by "some kind of political bias ... *is itself a mobilization of bias in preparation for action*" (p. 30: italicized originally).

Regarding resource distribution through elections and parties, many analysts view elections and parties as the most important tool to ease diverse forms of distributional conflicts in intra-elite relations as well as in the state-society relations. This is the case not only in democracies but also in autocracies where leaders provide electoral markets to incorporate potential dissenters and thus strengthen the political hold by using these “autocratic survival strategy” (Geddes, 2005; see also Blaydes, 2011; Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009)⁷.

By using vote buying and turnout buying, i.e., by rewarding unmobilized voters (supporters), parties in authoritarian regimes are able to mobilize their potential supporters (Stokes, 2005). Electoral authoritarianism can be disaggregated into “hegemonic electoral authoritarian” regime and “competitive authoritarian” regime (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky and Way, 2002). Electoral authoritarianism can develop either into durable authoritarianism or into opportunities for democratization (Brownlee, 2007). Liberalization through elections can be seen as either using “a safety valve for regulating social discontent and confining opposition ... [or as] turn[ing] a regime’s pressure valve into a springboard for entering government” (8). Brownlee (2007) makes an interesting comparison between Egypt and Malaysia for the former cases and Iran and the Philippines for the latter cases. The characteristics of elite unity and uncompetitive elections led to durable authoritarianism in Egypt and Malaysia, while the opposite characteristics of elite discord and contested elections resulted in opportunities for democratization.

Therefore, selectorate theory can be extended in this sense: a small winning coalition characterized by competitive elections and elite discord in authoritarianism could have more potential to be expanded, thereby being a good indication for democratic transition. In contrast, a small winning coalition with uncompetitive elections and elite unity could result in a more constrained the size of winning coalition, which also perpetuates the existing authoritarian regime as well as the autocrat.

⁷Brownlee focuses on the effectiveness of parties while the role of election is highlighted in Blaydes.

Similar to liberalizing impacts on leader survival in electoral authoritarian regime, democratic elections are also expected to bring divergent outcomes depending on the elite structure (i.e., winning coalition structure) and electoral competitiveness. Since mass mobilization is more freely accepted in a democratic regime than in an authoritarian counterpart, the role of mass threats through protest, riots, demonstrations, and even revolutions should be included in the explanation of democratic leader survival.

Furthermore, in many non-advanced democracies, mobilization of voters is highly associated with organizing supporting networks for a party through vote buying and even turnout buying. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) suggest that voters go to the polls because they tend to overestimate the tiny chances of being decisive voters or receiving some large direct benefits from their paradoxical act of voting. Also, party mobilization of nonvoters can be found more frequently in new democracies, rather than old democracies (Karp and Banducci, 2007). However, for the voters in developing countries, especially for the poor voters, clientelistic practices force voters to be susceptible to the benefits of consumption goods or other substantial private goods more directly than the wealthy voters or the voters in advanced democracies. In a somewhat similar context of welfare spending literature, Hicks and Swank (1992) contend that increased electoral turnout is usually from among poor voters, so increased welfare spending is due to increased turnout.

Thus, what are the elements in electoral non-participation and competition that create problems for regime stability if vote and turnout buying is not successful? To answer this question, I will survey the existing literature on electoral non-participation and competition and their consequences on mass political movement. During this survey, the key relationship between electoral non-participation/competition and mass political movement will be theorized, and specific testable hypotheses will be developed.

5.3.1 Vanishing Voters and Mass Movements

Tarrow's condition (1) implies a political opportunity in which the dissidents are able to gain partial access to participation. This incentive should be great for them to engage in a mass political movement since the narrower participation level in the preexisting rules could force the dissidents to use an alternative unconventional participation of protests and demonstrations. As a mass movement usually represents an extremist view of politics, the political interest of nonvoters can be awakened by a mass movement (Lipset, 1960). Therefore, a good indication for this, I argue, is significant changes of nonvoter's size between election years.

The most famous decisive role of nonvoters in risking the regimes as well as leaders has been Reinhard Bendix's "radicalization of the electorate", i.e., the mobilization of 'apolitical' segments such as nonvoters and the young in the late 1930 and 1932 during Germany's Weimar Republic period. Following the divergent notions of Bendix (1952) and Lipset (1960) on the surge of German National Socialism, both apolitical nonvoters' radicalization and the impoverished middle-class's mobilization seem to matter in understanding the success of Hitler and the failure of the previous regime (see also Linz, 1978*a*, 1976; O'Lessker, 1968).

Although nonvoters' radicalized and thus mobilized elections risk deposition of leaders, nonvoters' "losing interest" in elections itself also poses substantial threats to leaders.⁸ This is because they can be mobilized with more compatible political parties. Therefore, substantial increase of electoral non-participation derived from a decline in partisanship would either indicate rising political apathy, or the increase of protest potential (Kaase and Barnes, 1979; Kaase, 1988; Craig and Maggiotto, 1981; Muller, 1979; Muller, Jukam and Seligson, 1982; Cheles, Ferguson and Vaughan, 1995).

By using actual voting data across ten advanced democracies, Przeworski (1975) highlights a significant destabilizing effect of electoral non-participation on the pattern of voting

⁸Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1944) argues that nonvoters would escape from any real conflict resulted from cross-pressures and thus lose interest in the election.

behavior and democratic stability. Borrowing Huntington's concept of "developed" political system and political institutionalization, Przeworski (1975) demonstrates that institutionalization of the party system regarding voting patterns along with electoral (de)mobilization is based on variations in the membership of political institutions. Although Huntington (1968) argues rapid and excessive increase of mass mobilization is a threat to political development and thus leads to political decay, he posits that "*demobilization* of groups has a much sharper destabilizing effect upon patterns of voting than incorporation of new voters" (65; italicized added).

Yet, contrary to Huntington's (1968) negative outcomes of increasing political participation, he does not seem to worry about the potential instability caused by incorporation of new voters, but is more concerned about the danger of rapid and abrupt increases of electoral apathy or non-participation. He notes that "when groups cease to play according to the institutionalized rules, alternative forms of political mobilization may emerge: "parties" become replaced by "movements"" (p.67). He suggests that the real threat to a democratic system as well as political elites is posed by non-participation or withdrawal of voters from the electoral process, thereby losing the legitimized process of elections as a form of conflict resolution in a society.

Anderson and Mendes (2006) contend that while individuals who identified themselves as nonvoters are expected to have more negative attitudes towards a political system that implies more protest potential⁹, their multilevel analysis across old and new democracies shows that nonvoters tend to show less protest potential, compared to voters.¹⁰ The aforementioned Finkel's (1985) finding suggests that more electoral participation leads to system support and feeling of trust and external efficacy, and vice versa. Both research designs seem appropriate in consideration of limited data resources; for the former, their dependent

⁹See their footnote 32 in p. 102

¹⁰Moreover, election losers among those voters have more increased protest potential than winners, and the increasing effects are strengthened in the new democracies. With specific focus on ethnic violence in India, Wilkinson (2004) highlights state-level electoral competition as the main cause of ethnic violence.

variable is limited to protest potential, rather than real mass threats to the system.¹¹ For the latter, the U.S. case with a panel data design provides strong internal validity, while lacking external validity. At the individual-level survey analysis, by contrast, previous studies suggest inconclusive results in terms of the effects of electoral participation on system legitimacy and stability.

These inconclusive results about the effect of electoral non-participation on system stability illustrate ambiguous causal relations between election participation and protest potential. This is so because we do not focus on how much citizens are politically alienated, thereby understanding less of the attitudes of the alienated and frustrated toward the political system and its consequences for protest potential.

The conceptual dimensions of political alienation can represent relative deprivation or ‘anti-system radicalism’ in their attitudes toward political system (Gurr, 1968a,b; Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki, 1975). Latent attitudinal frustration can be translated into aggression and thus protest potential. Moreover, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) found that the fewer the number of participants in political activities, the greater the inequality in political participation (238). These kinds of frustration and inequality largely can be found among the more disadvantaged nonvoters who are disengaged from conventional political activities such as working in election campaigns, contacting authorities, and contributing money to candidates or parties. Regarding unconventional political participation such as demonstrations, protests, strikes, and revolutions, alienated and frustrated nonvoters are more likely to get involved in such anti-system movements than advantaged citizens.¹² We

¹¹This is legitimate in their study since they use survey-based method, but we may still be interested in knowing if real mass threats can be a function of nonvoter’s and election loser’s variation in terms of their respective sizes.

¹²The more advantaged citizens are said to be more engaged in different kinds of unconventional political participation than the disadvantaged citizens (Marsh and Kaase, 1979: 112-26). These includes boycott, rent and tax strikes, blocking traffic, and occupying buildings. These activities are not directly related with ‘anti-system radicalism’ or derived from relative deprivation. More specifically, Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst (2005) shows that Belgium’s demonstrations reflecting diverse social issues do not verify the relative deprivation hypothesis. They complement earlier the Political Action Study by identifying strategic

can hypothesize that electoral non-participation can facilitate alternative unconventional participation if nonvoters' alienation can no longer be tolerable any more.

The first hypothesis follows:

H1: As nonvoters' size change increases positively, the level of mass political movements will increase.

5.3.2 De-mobilized Nonvoters

Politically alienated parties can exist as much as nonvoters since political parties can be organized by the dissenters' dissatisfaction with the status quo (cf. Schwartz, 2000). For example, ideologically extremist parties represent a barometer of citizen alienation as voters' support for the extremist parties reflects their discontent with major parties and the working of democracy. According to Tarrow's condition (2), shifting electoral alignments open a new possibility of contention.

Yet, while the existence of the extreme parties is associated with *executive*, not legislative, instability and the extreme party voters are significantly associated with rioting, "none of the extremist party measures was associated with riots or protests, once account was taken of citizen alienation ... the presence of extremist parties tended to dampen rather than exacerbate turmoil in the streets" (Powell, 1981; Powell, 1986b:372). By including more voices in the democratic system either by incorporating the extremist parties or by increasing their chances of sitting at the bargaining table with leaders (i.e., both are increasing the size of W), the magnitude of mass movements can be lessened with greater legitimacy of the regime (Gurr, 1968a).¹³ Hence, if there is no such party to engage with nonvoters or potential dissidents, the increased size of nonvoters should not be an ignorable thing to leaders.

resource of the *advantaged, not alienated*, citizens in more frequent involvement in the unconventional political participation (see also Inglehart, 1977, 1997; Dalton, 2000).

¹³Gurr (1968) suggests three intervening societal variables of the loyalty of coercive forces, institutionalization, and facilitation, and legitimacy of the political regime (1104–1106). Facilitation is the only variable that strengthens the magnitude of civil strife while all the other lessen it.

In the context of restricted political rights, an election itself can be viewed as an institutionalized mechanism to provide a forum for political participation, thereby channeling political dissent and discontent away from protest events (Powell, 1986a). For example, Hipsher (1996) suggests that mass de-mobilization can be ironically obtained by the patience of the marginal population (the poor) so that democratic transition can be completed without substantial provocation of the Right into reversing the transition process. Restoration of democracy was well characterized by mass de-mobilization and institutionalization of the protesters' agenda in the Chilean shantytown movement in 1990 and the Spanish neighborhood movement in 1977. The close link between neighborhood organizations and the Communist party in Spain in mid-1970s provide a favorable political opportunity structure that allowed both to use contentious collective strategies by the movement.¹⁴

In the case of Chile, the shantytown dwellers had the political space to involve themselves in mass protest when the 1982 economic crisis brought on elite discord in the authoritarian regime and when the government was indecisive about how to deal with the mass movement. Besides, the opposition party supported the shantytown dwellers' protest either to restore democracy or to at least bring the situation to the bargaining table with the authoritarian incumbent. This eventually emboldened the movement and facilitated more mobilization.

From both cases, we can expect increased possibilities of a decline in mass movement if nonvoters could be beneficiaries of institutional change such as expanded political and civil rights and economic redistribution. Hence, if there is an increased size of the winning coalition and thus more risk of deposition of leader exists, political rights expansion through democratic elections works to the advantage of the dissenters or the marginal population and leads to the mass de-mobilization of nonvoters.¹⁵

¹⁴These favorable opportunity structure included the death of Franco in November 1975, a expanded militant labor movement, and the increase of elite opposition within both society (mainly the church) and the state (Hipsher, 1996).

¹⁵Bermeo (1990) highlights the marginal changes of electoral participation as a meaningful and substantial changes for the marginal population. She argues that "even marginal changes can have great meaning if you are living at the margin, and if you are given to dissent, the difference between democracy and dictatorship can literally be the difference between life

So, the second hypothesis is:

H2: The increased winning coalition size will decrease the effect of nonvoter's size change on mass political movements.

5.3.3 Free Press as a ‘Mobilizer’

In this sub-section, I will describe the role of free press as a facilitator of nonvoters’ mass mobilization in movements. The Frustration-Aggression hypothesis based on psychological motivations of political alienation appears to explain whether and how nonvoters’ frustration can be expressed behaviorally in terms of aggression such as mass political movements, especially anti-system movements. Along with other contextual variables of the winning coalition size, the diverse resource structure for mobilization should be considered. Norris (2011) argues how excessively negative news, and extensive sexual scandals and financial corruption, can suppress citizens’ satisfaction with the system which leads to a longer ‘democratic deficit’. In this context, a free press is regarded as one of public goods that facilitates mass movements.

In pluralist democratic systems, a free press is mainly supported by political elites as a main component of democratic principles. It is in nondemocratic systems that the role of the free press has substantial outcomes in mass mobilization. In the Tarrow’s condition (3) of influential allies, mass media is regarded as a key ally for the dissidents. As a well-known history of the Reformation that was rapidly facilitated by Johan Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press aptly describes, a free press helps to trigger contention by multiplying “the impact of any one event throughout the society” (Huntington, 1974: 165). Rustow (1970) has contended that the political transition is catalyzed as a result of the appearance of a new elite that brings political arousal of the alienated and frustrated social groups into being mobilized for concerted action. Then, free press takes a role of a ‘mobilizer’ for the new elites to arouse these leaderless group in the transitional periods.

and death” (p. 374).

As for nonvoters, they represent the apolitical segment of population. Unlike election losers, they are not largely represented by any political party, at least based on their electoral behavior. Until their agendas can be expressed through a new party or even a new regime, electoral non-participation cannot easily result in protest and demonstration. Their frustration can be translated into aggression and thus contention through a channel of free mass media.

The aforementioned Leipzig case illustrates how mass protests facilitate the leader's risk of deposition. Why did the protest occur in Leipzig and lead to such substantial outcomes? Lohmann (1994) listed four reasons; first, the citizens in Leipzig and its environs experienced a more moribund industrial structure that was exacerbated by more severe environmental problems. Second, there was no secret police to monitor, thus lack of state repression. Third, thanks to the Leipzig trade fair, more access to international media coverage was available for dramatic protest events in Leipzig. And, finally, Leipzig's geographical location could provide a focal point where frustrated and dissenting masses were willing to participate in mass protest without being able to identify other participants (see also Opp and Gern, 1993). As Lohmann shows in the third condition, news communications have had a major influence on collective action such as the Monday demonstrations.

Regarding elections' effects on mass political movements, Davenport (1997; 1998) argues that national elections have significant association with less restriction on mass media as well as those placed on citizens, especially in non-democratic systems. The role of relatively free mass media seems to be critical in reducing the state's repression, which can lead to more protests by the dissidents in the society. This is also related to Tarrow's fifth condition, and it can be restated as follows: a decline in the state's capacity or will to repress mass media opens more chances of the dissidents' rising. More recently, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) consider free press as a special kind of public good, i.e., "coordination goods". When a leader has enough free resources such as oil and international aid and non-taxable income, and at the same time when a leader faces mass threats, she is expected to contract

coordination goods (i.e., repress the free press) in a small size of W or to provide coordination goods to buy off revolutionaries.

As shown in both works above, some limitations can be found in terms of the relations between electoral politics and leader survival. For Davenport's work, highlighted is the role of elections in explaining the leader's or the state's repression of mass media for leadership or regime stability. However, specific components of electoral politics are missing. Especially, the role of potential dissidents composed of electoral losers and nonvoters was not dealt with. For the Bueno de Mesquita and Smith's work, while they extended the former work's argument by specifying the causal logic of endogenous institutional changes, i.e., leaders' change of the winning coalition size depending on the levels of mass threats and the existing winning coalition size, they did not give any attention to the role of electoral politics, which critically and frequently determine the leader's longevity.

Therefore, the third hypothesis follows:

H3a: The more freedom of press, the stronger the positive effect of nonvoter's size change on the level of mass political movements.

All the hypotheses regarding the determinants of mass political movements are summarized in Table 5.2.

[Table 5.2]

5.3.4 Leader Survival, Mass Threats and Nonvoters

Regarding the leaders' responses to mass threats and elevated alienation and frustration, Tarrow's fourth condition of the elite's disunity implies that breaches of the elite's unity may provide the mass movements' legitimacy to protest against the party in power and to counter-protest. For example, many Latin American countries' successful democratic transitions were characterized by pacted transitions in which the elite's unity was maintained between "seceding Rights" and "accommodating Left" (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986). This unity eventually increases the size of winning coalitions through the founding

elections, which includes the alienated citizens in the winning coalition, thereby leading to less risk of mass threats.

In contrast, a leader under unpacted democracy may want to secure her tenure until at least the second election, rather than instigating another wave of mass mobilization and thus authoritarian reversals. As democratic breakdown studies showed, the greatest threat to democratic transition derives from “a backlash by elements of a hard-line faction, most commonly when the military executes a reactionary coup” (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; 460).¹⁶ Therefore, the disunity of elites is more likely to facilitate mass movements and to risk leader deposition.

Related to the leader’s capacity to control the elite’s disunity, Tarrow’s last condition of a decline of a state’s will or capacity to repress mass mobilization also represents a leader’s responses to demands of mass movements such as expanding the winning coalitions size. In this vein, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) highlight the role of free resources to prevent breaches of unity among elites. By taking advantage of free resources such as oil, international agencies’ aid, and nontax revenues, a leader is expected to either buy off revolutionaries’ demands when the leader cannot control the elite’s disunity (i.e., the previous winning coalition is large) or to reduce coordination goods such as free press when the leader is able to control the discord (i.e., the previous winning coalition is small).

From the previous analyses, nonvoters’ non-participation appears to be a significant key predictor of mass mobilization for political movements. We now turn our focus to the consequences of anti-system movements mobilized by alienated and frustrated citizens. Many have tried to know the determinants of voter turnout and revealed that some institutional mechanisms can increase turnout, such as less restrictive registration rules, proportional representation systems, relatively infrequent elections, and compulsory voting (Gosnell, 1930; Tingsten, 1975; Franklin, Eijk and Oppenhuis, 1996; Jackman, 1987; Jackman and Miller, 1995; Powell Jr, 1980; Powell, 1986a).

¹⁶Many unpacted democracies in Latin America have been reversed to authoritarian regime, with the exception of Costa Rica (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986: 45).

Among them, Powell (1986a) notes that electoral participation provides “some channeling of citizen discontent out of the street” and “legitimate political channels without loss of executive stability” (37). As his dependent variable is voter turnout, he contends that less frequent citizens’ riots, protests, and various kinds of turmoil are believed to increase voter turnout. This association only focused on unidirectional causality without considering a possibility of reverse causality. As discussed above, mass political movements can be seen as citizens’ behavioral outcome originated from their deep-seated feelings of alienation and dissent, and political alienation can be uncovered by looking at the variation of nonvoting levels throughout elections. Therefore, voter turnout can tell leaders how stable the leaders’ tenure is. If we assume the interaction relations of mass movements and non-voting behavior in terms of the chief executive’s stability from both the previous section’s analysis and Powell’s implication, leader survival can be better understood.

Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) examine the causal relationship from revolutionary mass movements to leaders’ institutional changes. Reducing the size of the selectorate can be well found in the course of revolutionary regime changes. They show that each stage of revolution (i.e., at the outset, during, and at the end) discourages an increase in selectorate size when a leader has a larger coalition (378). The larger the winning coalition the leader has who is facing (or heading) revolutionary stages, the less incentives she has to expand the selectorate for her political survival.

While implicitly ignoring the nature of electoral participation by mass public or limited number of the franchised citizen, however, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) focus more on a post-hoc variable of mass political movements, rather than paying attention to an (in)direct but more fundamental effect than mass threats on leader survival by way of mass involvement in the revolutionary movements (see also, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010).

So, the final hypotheses regarding the determinants of the leader’s deposition are described below and summarized in Table 5.3:

H4a: The more mass threats from mass political movements, the greater the leaders’ risk

of deposition.

H4b: The more nonvoters' size change increases positively, the greater the leaders' risk of deposition.

H4c: The effect of mass threats on the risk of deposition will be strengthened by an increased change of nonvoters' size. (i.e., increased alienation and frustration)

[Table 5.3]

5.4 Methodology and Data

In this section, I will test the hypothesized effects on both the levels of mass political movements and leader survival. Thus, the dependent variables are separately composed of mass political movements and leader's risk of deposition. I will first describe each dependent variable's measure and how to construct the variables. Then, key independent variables of nonvoter size, mass threats, and free press will be discussed.

5.4.1 Dependent Variables: Mass Political Movements and Leader Survival

5.4.1.1 Mass Political Movements

To test the first stage of relations of nonvoters and mass political movements, a measure of the revolutionary threat should be first developed. I construct a measure of the occurrence of antigovernment demonstrations, riots, strikes, and revolutions by using data drawn from Banks (2000). Unlike the previous study of revolutionary threat found in selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), I give different weights on the four different components of a mass political movement measure in order to make this variable compatible with the concept of anti-system revolutionary threat. When giving weights, I follow Banks's weights found in his combined variable of the domestic conflict event data (the variable *domestic9*).

After giving weights, I create an Index of Mass Political Movements by borrowing Bueno de Mesquita and Smith’s standardized version of the variable. That is, $z = (\ln(1 + x) - \text{mean}(\ln(1 + x)))/(\text{std.dev.}(\ln(1 + x)))$, where $x = (\text{demonstrations, riots, strikes, revolutions})$. By summing the four standardized variables and dividing by four, the weighted political mass movement variable is created.

5.4.1.2 Leader Survival

I use Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza’s *Archigos* data set for a measure of leader survival (2009). The existing leader longevity data suffer from some measurement problems such as overlapping ruling time periods by two or more leaders, and significant gaps in the order of leaders in power. The main variables from *Archigos* for the analysis are entry and exit dates of each leader across countries.

5.4.2 Main Independent Variables

Main independent variables include nonvoter’s size, mass threat derived from mass political movements, and free press as ‘mobilizer’ or ‘facilitator’. First, I include the variable of the election loser’s size, conceptualizing electoral competition that inherently affects the risk of deposition through electoral politics. Then, the operationalization of key independent variables is described.

5.4.2.1 Election Loser

I use Vanhanen’s (2000) measure of democracy data. It consists of electoral participation and electoral competition, based on Robert Dahl’s polyarchy concept (Dahl, 1971). I use Vanhanen’s variable of electoral competition to measure the size of election losers. He conceptualizes electoral competition by using “the percentage share of the votes for the smaller parties and independents in parliamentary elections, or of the seats in parliaments” (2000: 253).

The election loser's size variable provides a measure of electoral competition in each nation in each year.¹⁷ However, each nation has different electoral and party systems, and for example, the proportional representation system with multiparty and coalition government may be more associated with smaller size of election losers and nonvoters. In order to ameliorate the country-specific differences, I construct an index on the *changed* size of election losers (and also nonvoters below), rather than using the *level* of election loser's size.

The changed size of election losers is largely incorporated into the electoral volatility literature. The standard measure of electoral volatility is the index of deinstitutionalization conceptualized by Przeworski (1975). This accounts for changes in votes for each party across elections. The Pedersen index described below represents well the variation of electoral volatility.

$$V_i = (1/2) * \sum |V_{p(t+1)} - V_{pt}|, \text{ where } p \text{ represents party and } t \text{ represents year.}$$

And, this party-specific electoral volatility can be rewritten in a country-specific expression as follows:

$$2 * V_i = \sum |LV_{i(t+1)} - LV_{it}| + \sum |WV_{i(t+1)} - WV_{it}|, \text{ where } i \text{ represents country, } t \text{ represents year, } LV \text{ represent loser's vote, and } WV \text{ represents winner's vote.}$$

From a revised expression of Przeworski's deinstitutionalization (or volatility) index, if the absolute value of the election loser's component contributing to deinstitutionalization increases, then the winner's component will decrease, given the fact that deinstitutionalization of voting patterns (expressed as in $2 * V_i$) is only affected by the both sizes of partisans. By using an aggregate voter concept with the absolute terms, the concept of election volatility explicitly hides the election loser's voting patterns as well as election winner's patterns. Specifically, when we are required to consider some interaction effects of voter's behavior

¹⁷If there is no election in a nation in a certain year, the previous size of election losers is used in the subsequent years. This also applies to the size of nonvoters below.

with institutional variables, the hidden components should be uncovered to separate out different behaviors of voters. That is, ignoring the election loser's (i.e., potential system dissenter's) voting patterns would result in confounding the effects of election volatility on leadership stability as well as regime stability. Therefore, the changed size of election loser can be written as follows:

$$\Delta LV_{it} = LV_{it} - LV_{i(t-3)}^{18}$$

Moreover, we can see that election volatility is not the only cause of political decay and deinstitutionalization. If election losers contributing to political decay with their volatility may 'exit' the domain of electoral politics due to the low chance of being winners, they may turn to being nonvoters in the next election cycle. Then, it seems that nonvoters' role as well as election losers' role should affect significantly the levels of political decay in terms of voting patterns.

5.4.2.2 Nonvoters

As we discussed in chapter 2, nonvoters are ones who cannot, are not willing to, or are not asked to participate in the electoral process (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). Thus, it is not easy to measure nonvoting electoral behavior. Considering the expected association with our dependent variable of mass political movements and even the risk of leader's deposition, the nonvoting measure should reflect changed electoral behavior between elections.

Electoral participation can be revised from the earlier application of Przeworski (1975) as follows:

$$M_i = \sum (Voter_i / Population_i), i = 1, 2, \dots, n, \text{ where } i \text{ represents country.}$$

¹⁸Other than three-year differences, I consider one- and five-year difference and obtain similar substantive results. This applies to following variables of the changed size of nonvoter and the changed level of mass political movement.

As the nonvoter's size can be defined as $1 - M_i$ and the size varies in each election year, the non-participation can be written as follows:

$$NV_{it} = 1 - M_{it} = \sum [1 - (Voter_{it}/Population_{it})], i = 1, 2, \dots, n; t = 1, 2, \dots, m, \text{ where } i$$

represents country and t represents year.

The ratio of voters to the total population, however, can be decomposed as follows: $Vote/Population = Eligible/Population \times Vote/Eligible$.¹⁹ As discussed above in the election loser measure, the *changed* size of nonvoter is used to measure electoral non-participation:

$$\Delta NV_{it} = NV_{it} - NV_{i(t-3)}$$

The use of this changed size also ameliorates the aforementioned confounding effects of the electoral system difference across countries. However, the electoral changes within a country may cause another measurement problem. Thus, I use a big change of nonvoters as an alternative measure to test the hypothesis (Appendix H). Not only for pluralist democracies, but also in a state-controlled election systems, a newly introduced semi-competitive election can change the incentive structure of electoral officials who used to coerce voters to vote.

¹⁹Przeworski (2009)'s recent revisit of earlier discussion on political mobilization deals with potential biases, owing either to the variations derived from the registration issue in electoral process or to the aging of the population (Przeworski, 1975). He admits that the latter issue is related with the scarcity of the aging composition data. For the former, in the context of a newly-introduced registration process in a country, the withdrawal of the extant voters or the influx of the new voters to the elections may introduce a bias to my electoral mobilization measure. This is because the additional registration process will make the potential nonvoters easily withdraw from the election and prevent them from participating in the election.

Yet, as we concern only the *differences* of nonvoter's size in terms of their effects on mass political movements in a country, the bias problem will only arise when we see a changed electoral rules regarding the registration process. Therefore, the electoral mobilization measure that merges the registered and the eligible is not too vulnerable to this bias. Moreover, if a country has high registration rate as in most countries (mostly above 90%) except for the U.S. (68% in 2006), Bahamas (75% in 2007), and South Africa (77% in 2009), the bias should not be serious (Rosenberg, Chen and for Justice, 2009).

Consequently, some *drop* of vote turnout can be expected with a little addition of democracy (Shi, 1999). These problems can be ameliorated with the use of the big change of electoral ‘departicipation’, measured as a 5% increase.

When the voting-eligible population data is not available across countries and times, voting-age population (VAP) can be considered (?). However, the historical records of VAP are not reliable in any available data for a comprehensive set of country cases and time periods, which makes the total adult population as an alternative measure for the purpose of analysis.²⁰ Further, Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde contend that correcting the denominator only results in “relatively small differences in the overall estimate of turnout” (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde, 1998: 68). Therefore, I also use Vanhanen’s electoral participation measure, which is “the percentage of the adult population that voted in elections” (2000: 253).

Specifically, a lowering of the voting age in most democracies occurred in the 1970s. Powell (1986a) observed that ‘the age level increased turnout in the 1960s by a small amount, but decreased it about 2% in the 1970s, with the American lowering of voting age and the age bulge among the young’ who are usually considered as being less interested in politics (Niemi, Stanley and Evans, 1984). Other scholars suggests that the enfranchisement of 18, 19, and 20 year olds decreased overall turnout by only one percentage point (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). Taking into consideration these concerns, I set a 5% of nonvoter increase as a critical and substantial change of nonvoters in the later analysis.

5.4.2.3 Winning Coalition (W)

As discussed in the previous chapters, the winning coalition size can be derived from four variables (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). These are the regime type, the executive recruitment’s openness, the executive recruitment’s competitiveness, and a competitive party

²⁰Even the IDEA (Institute for Democracy and Election Assistance) data seems to bear errors. For example, some country-election-year cases show that voting-age population (VAP) is smaller than registered voting population (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis, 2005).

system. The regime type is from Arthur Banks's Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive and is measured on a 3-point scale (Civilian, Military-Civilian, Military regime). The other three variables from Polity IV data (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2009).

Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues' (2003) construction of the winning coalition size and selectorate size is described in chapter 3. I use Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s original measure for this chapter, rather than using the revised measure of W which is adopted in chapter 3. The reason is twofold. First, with the more rough original measure of W , the empirical test can be more conservative in terms of the effect of the winning coalition size. Second, as this chapter relies only on the country-level variables, unlike chapter 3's multilevel analysis, all the country-level variables may not require more refined measure of W .²¹

5.4.2.4 Mass Threats

As Banks's measure of domestic conflict events data rely on media coverage, the variable of mass political movement suffers from reporting biases, societal norms, and regime stability (cf. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). Reporting biases mainly result from the variations of media coverage across countries. Advanced democracies usually have better reporting media to fully cover the occurrence of protest than new democracies where media coverage favors the government or the party in power. Societal norms of more contentious behaviors in citizens demands, such as French farmers, should be considered, too. Lastly, regime stability involves the fact that some countries such as democratizing countries 'from below' are more likely to see citizens protest in the streets more frequently than other advanced democracies.

Similar to the indexes of the changed sizes of election loser and nonvoter, I construct a variable of the changed level in mass political movements. The changed level of mass political movements, that is mass threat, can be formulated as follows:

²¹In contrast, chapter 3's individual level dependent variable of political trust may need more refined measure of W as described in chapter 3. This is so because each individual respondent can be better understood in a more refined contextual measure of the winning coalition than in a rough original measure of W .

$$\Delta mass = mass_t - mass_{t-3}$$

This variable of mass threat can tell us whether leaders face increasing or decreasing mass threats from the changed level of mass political events.

5.4.2.5 Free Press

The free press measure is constructed from Freedom House's (2007) measure of press freedom. Like Bueno de Mesquita and Smith's construct of coordination good²², two separate time periods of press freedom are combined into a single variable. From 1980 through 1988, Freedom House has separate scores for print media and broadcast media. For the later years 1989 through 2000, more direct measure of press freedom can be found on a 3-point scale (0 = "not free," 1 = "partially free," 2 = "free"). For the purpose of analysis with an extended time frame, I create averaged values of two separate scores of broadcast and print media from the earlier time period and combine this average with the score from the later time period of post-1988.

5.4.3 Covariates

Other than main independent variables, I need to control for some confounding effects on both dependent variables of mass political movement and leader survival.

5.4.3.1 Mass Political Movements

When examining the causes of mass political events, I create a lagged variable of mass political movements since previous mass movements are expected to have a strong influence on subsequent events. I control for unexpected natural disasters that are beyond a leader's control. Using data on earthquakes, I employ Brancati's (2007) data compiled from the

²²Coordination goods is referred to as public goods that help people coordinate and organize for mass political movements (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2006). Other coordination goods include transparency and easy communication.

Centennial Earthquake Catalog (Engdahl and Villaseñor, 2002). From 0 for no major earthquake to 3 for the most disastrous quakes, the earthquakes beyond 5.5 on the Richter scale are recorded since 1975. The direct measure of the quake's intensity is independent of the government's preparedness for disaster and its efficiency in dealing with disasters. With the independence of the effect of quakes, I control for population size, economic growth, and income (per capita GDP). All these control variables come from the World Bank's (2005) *World Development Indicators*.

5.4.3.2 Leader Survival

When assessing the consequences of mass threat and electoral politics on leader survival, I control for selectorate size since selectorate size is the denominator of the leader's institution of the loyalty norm (W/S). As the leader can pick her supporters from a larger pool, the loyalty norm can be secured by her manipulation of the selectorate, thereby improving her survival.

Other control variables include leader's age, economic growth, and income (per capita GDP). When autocrats age and become ill, their institution of small winning coalition cannot expect further private goods provision and thus the risk of deposition increases. The *Archigos* data provides the information on leader's age. Economic growth and income may compensate for the age effect. Natural resources of oil exports and international agency's aid are also considered as control variables. These free resources are available from the World Bank's (2005) *World Development Indicators*. The variable Oil measures net fuel exports and imports that is calculated as a percentage of merchandise exports and imports. The variable Aid is measured by the Official Development Assistance from the World Bank's indicators.

5.5 Empirical Results

As this chapter consists of two stages of analysis to test the aforementioned hypotheses, two sub-sections for each stage are discussed below. The first sub-section deals with the causes of mass political movements, and the second sub-section covers the consequences of mass threats and electoral politics on leader survival. To control for panel data problems, I estimate fixed-effects models that include country-specific dummy variables.

5.5.1 Mass Political Movements, Nonvoters and Free Press

From Table 5.4, the hypotheses can be empirically confirmed. Compared to election winner's size, nonvoter's increased size positively affects the level of mass political movements from Model 1 through Model 3, which supports for the hypothesis H1.²³

As Hypothesis *H2* theorized regarding de-mobilized nonvoters, increased nonvoters do not increase the level of mass political movement when faced by a large-coalition leadership. The statistically significant and negative coefficients of the interaction term of the *W* and

²³I also include a variable of election suspension as a dummy variable for the robust tests. All the models including the dummy variable of election suspension show positive effects of Δ Nonvoter on mass movement while some models turn out to have non-significant Δ Nonvoter and *W*. All the interaction terms appear to have the same directions and statistical significance as the results found in Table 5.4. The inclusion of the variable election suspension, however, may raise some doubts because the variable Winning Coalition (*W*) directly captures the definition of election suspension to a great extent (cf. Kennedy, 2009). The correlation of the *W* and the variable Election Suspension is -0.630.

Theoretically speaking, including this variable in the models does not seem to be necessary. After military coups' extended rule stops scheduled elections, for example, the increased size of nonvoter reflects the previous winner's frustration, and this alienation may become non-voting behavior under the new elections by the military. Therefore, we can also expect counter-revolutionary movements in the military's extended rule. Another example can include small-coalition leader's election suspension. For the loyal supporters for the leader in the small *W*, the increased size of nonvoters up to 100% resulted from election suspension may not mean that winner's political alienation come into play regarding mass movement immediately. Rather, election suspension reflects aggravated alienation and frustration of existing nonvoters and losers who even now lose their future expectation of electoral participation as their civic expression. In both cases, the Δ Nonvoter measure does not cause any biased measurement on political alienation due to the excluded variable of election suspension.

nonvoters' size change imply that nonvoters' dissent expressed by increased nonvoters turns out to be dampened by the increased winning coalition size (*H2*). This is illustrated in Figure 5.1 below. For example, elections in China were based on a plebiscitary state-controlled system in which the only serious dissidents or challengers expressed their discontent by abstaining from voting. This was a common phenomenon in other former communist countries (Jacobs, 1970; Linz, 1978*b*; Hermet, Rose and Rouquie, 1978). After being transformed to a limited-choice election system, the Chinese Communist Party election allows for a turnout boost, departing from the dissidents' vote avoidance (Shi, 1999). In doing so, these "de-participated" voters became 'one-party' voters, similar to the framework in Table 5.1 for non-partisan voters (Roeder, 1989). Moreover, they could punish corrupt local officials, thereby elevating their internal efficacy. And, the level of revolutionary movement could be naturally suppressed in the electoral politics at least to a certain extent.

[Figure 5.1]

These empirically supported hypotheses imply that advanced democracies where voter turnout drops often reflect political apathy and satisfaction that could secure leader's tenure (see Figure 5.1). However, small-coalition leaders would not ignore the increased size of nonvoters and take these vanishing voters as a result of citizen's frustration and relative deprivation (*H1*). This is because the frustrated citizens feel strong doubt about the effects of elections as a legitimizing tool. To many autocrats, (even nominal) elections can 'buffer' societal and political conflicts derived from frustration of the alienated either from economic or from political issues (Blaydes, 2011; Brownlee, 2007). For example, the plebiscitary one-party system in sub-Saharan Africa encourages a high degree of electoral participation through which "the regime employs a party machine to distribute patronage to a fairly wide array of economic and regional interests" (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 78).

Regarding election loser's increased size, which represents a more competitive election, the increased size of election losers does not impact the level of mass political movements.

This suggests that losers may postpone their unachieved demands in either policies or in patronage until the next round of elections. In doing so, election losers may prefer to stay in the polls, rather than to protest in the street. This scenario is plausible when electoral losers' demands are considered as achievable either through the incumbent's policy changes or through substantial possibilities of the opposition's winning in the next election. The competitive elections faced by large-coalition leaders would make the incumbent leaders and parties more accountable to the constituencies including election losers. Therefore, mass political events are not much expected in this situation, as revealed by the negative significant sign of the interaction term of the W and loser's change in Model 2 in Table 5.4.

Another possible scenario regarding the effect of electoral competition on mass political movements can be found in inter-ethnic conflict situations around electoral politics. In an interesting work on votes and violence in India, Wilkinson (2004) argues that high electoral competition and party fractionalization (at least 3 and more parties in the Indian electoral context) results in less ethnic violence because the state governments and the majority party politicians will try hard to appeal to the minorities' votes to win upcoming elections by providing public security. That is, "[i]f minorities are pivotal to electoral outcomes, politicians will increase the supply of security and prevent riots in order to attract their votes." The importance of minority's votes to the party in power indicates that a leader or the party in power needs to consider increasing the size of the winning coalition (W). Increased size of W with minorities' inclusion in India, therefore, results from the leader's responses in policy changes in terms of protecting the minority's security. Through the increased election loser's size, India's Muslim minority is protected, and frustrated Hindu majority's riots and protests against state governments can be prevented.

Unexpected natural disasters such as earthquakes appear to positively influence anti-governmental activities. With increased chances of coordination through gathering in shelters and refugee camps, protests and anti-government demonstrations facilitate the downfall of authoritarianism and incumbent presidents (Preston and Dillon, 2005; Bommer, 1985).

Achen and Bartels (2004) similarly contend that “voters regularly punish governments for acts of God, including droughts, floods, and shark attacks . . . The electorate will take out its frustrations on the incumbents and vote for out-parties” (1). Yet, the earthquake’s coefficient does not appear to be significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level in both Model 1.B and Model 3, holding three demeaned variables of Free Press, GDP per capita, and Population constant at their means while holding the other control variables constant at 0.²⁴ In the interaction terms of earthquakes and the W, large winning coalition countries such as advanced democracies do not have any effects, and it suggests that they are not vulnerable to these unexpected disasters that facilitate coordination of protests in the small winning coalitions such as autocratic countries (Quiroz and Smith, 2010).

Population size appears to be positively associated with mass political movements in Model 1. The more population a country has, the more likely a critical number of dissidents can get a demonstration off the ground (cf. Marwell, 1970). This appears to contradict what many collective action theorists argued for the positive relation of small group and collective action, if one consider a country’s population as a whole (Olson, 1974); but empirically, more population can provide more resources in terms of creating a critical mass. For example,

²⁴The demeaning process is adopted here to avoid too much multicollinearity in the interaction models (Model 2 and Model 3) that seriously inflates the standard errors, and makes the estimated regression coefficient unreliable. By using the command `-collin-` in Stata and looking at reported Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), I detected these three variables that cause multicollinearity. With many interaction terms, the models are inherently vulnerable to the multicollinearity issue. After demeaning these three variables, most variables stay under the 10 VIF, which indicates no serious collinearity. The VIFs are reported in the Appendix I.

Unlike Bueno de Mesquita and Smith’s (2010) finding, the effect of Earthquake does not appear to be significantly different from 0. It suggests that although the variable Earthquake may become to be significant if all the control variables are hold constant at 0, the corrected standard error by demeaning does not still make the coefficient of Earthquake be statistically significant.

The standard error of Earthquake before demeaning is 0.082, which is greater than the reported S.E. in Model 2.B. It suggests that Bueno de Mesquita and Smith’s (2010) models for mass political movements may experience high multicollinearity issue. The potentially inflated standard errors of the variable Earthquake in their models, however, still make the variable significant.

more populous Afro-Americans have become involved in more social movements than other minority groups in the United States (Oliver and Marwell, 1988). However, after controlling for Free Press and Earthquake, Population becomes insignificant in Model 2.

[Table 5.4]

The key independent variable of Free Press appears to increase the level of mass political movements, as previous studies show (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010).²⁵ The interaction term of the W and Free Press suggests that increased freedom of press will not lead to more mass political events to large-coalition leaders. As large-coalition leaders would prevent mass threats by increasing the size of W that could include the alienated nonvoters into the winning coalition, any, if not all, potential dissidents may have less incentive to get coordinated by free press for mass mobilization.

In Model 3, the interaction term of Nonvoter and Free Press supports Hypothesis *H3a*. While election losers as ‘allegiant voters’ are participating in electoral politics with the expectation of being winners in the next round of election, the insignificant coefficient of the interaction term of the changed size of loser and Free Press suggests that freedom of press would help only to update loser’s information regarding the parties and candidates, rather than facilitating political movements. Nonetheless, nonvoters’ size mainly consisting of the alienated non-partisans is sensitive to the level of freedom of press in their country. With the coordination good of a free press, the frustrated nonvoters can be politically aroused and coordinated for mobilization of mass political movements.²⁶

²⁵Free press is regarded as an important coordination good for the citizens to coordinate and organize. As the data covers from 1962 to 2000 (for Model 1) and from 1980 to 2000 (for Model 2 & Model 3), the role of social network coordination in revolutionary movements that are currently observed in the middle east is not a concern for this chapter. Although it seems important now and this study also has some implication for this, electoral politics derived from nonvoters and potential dissidents from election losers is the focus of this study.

²⁶In an extra model, I could test how these three variables of freedom of press, alienated nonvoters, and the winning coalition institution. If a free press is provided by small-coalition leaders, the type of mass political movement is also likely to result in a revolutionary movement when the alienated nonvoters increase. This is so because the politically alienated mass

[Figure 5.2]

Finally, one possible concern is an endogeneity of electoral politics and the level of mass political movements. As mass political events may affect the level of voter turnout, and then the levels of election competition and participation may vary, electoral politics is influenced by the level of mass political movements. To lessen this concern, I use lagged measures rather than the contemporaneous measures for both the concepts of competition and participation.

5.5.2 Leader Survival, Revolutionary Threats and Nonvoters

As leader survival can be analyzed as the hazard rate over time in office and the decline in the risk of deposition can also be expected in small-coalition institutions, a revised Cox proportional hazard model is adopted in the second stage of the analysis. The Cox proportional hazard model is based on a subtle assumption of proportional hazard over time that should be tested to reflect the effects of election loser's and nonvoter's changed sizes on leader survival. The assumption of proportional hazard is that the effect of the independent variables is constant over time. That is, over the time of a leader's tenure, independent variables have standard effects. However, we see the effects of both changed sizes should be stronger over time, as the outsiders to her winning coalitions may be mobilized for protest after elections at which moment the leader does not realize the changes seriously or even

in the small-coalition institution could prefer to have new regimes as well as new leaders if they can threaten the leader's deposition through the coordination good of free press. In the case of a large-coalition institution, in contrast, the elevated level of the revolutionary movement derived from the combination of increased nonvoters and free press is expected to be weakened.

The three way interaction term for nonvoters is illustrated in Appendix J.1. As illustrated, more substantial changes of the revolutionary movements can be found in a small-coalition institution. This suggests that a small-coalition autocrat would tend to suppress any potential coordination goods that can facilitate revolutionary movements easily. The risk of deposition, therefore, is expected to be significantly associated with the increased size of the alienated nonvoters and its effect of revolutionary movement. This is the topic that the second stage analysis in the next sub-section will cover.

think of the increased nonvoters as a favorable sign to her tenure (Powell, 1986a).²⁷

I ran the global test of proportionality, based on Schoenfeld residuals (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter and Zorn, 2003; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001). The model specifications in the tables reflect a significant level of disproportionality. Harrell's rho test on each covariate suggests that the changed sizes of election losers and nonvoters have a changing impact over time ($p < 0.05$). In order to control for the effect of disproportionality, time-by-covariate interaction terms are included in the proportionality models in Table 5.5. The offending covariates found in the Harrell's rho test are interacted with the natural log of leader's time in office and both variables are specified to make additional disproportional models.

Three empirical questions are discussed concerning the relationships between mass threats and leader survival. First, in order to examine leader survival, I show how the institution of winning coalition and the nature of electoral competition and participation can be key factors in determining whether leaders survive. As discussed earlier, the nature of electoral competition and participation can be considered key origins for a country's mass politics that should be based upon its institutional contexts. The following tests show how electoral politics affect a leader's longevity and the extent to which mass threats moderates the effects. I show that the effect of this mass threat measure on leader survival is conditioned by the mass public's electoral participation and competition as well as by "a leader's winning coalition institution and her access to free resources." (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010: p.939)

First, an increase in the size of nonvoters increases the risk of deposition in small-coalition institutions, but not in large-coalition ones. A one percentage point increase in the size of nonvoters over the previous three years increases the leader's risk of deposition by about 3% in Model 4 and Model 5 ($\exp(2.703 \times .01) = 1.027$ & $\exp(2.667 \times .01) = 1.027$, respectively).²⁸ Yet, an increasing size of nonvoters has decreasing effects on the risk of the leader's survival

²⁷Among the more industrialized countries in his data, Powell contends that high level of voter turnout has association with less durable executive's tenure (37).

²⁸As appeared in Appendix H, The big increase of 5% of nonvoter's size as a dummy variable results in 40% increase in the risk of leader's deposition, on average. ($\exp(.337) = 1.401$).

in large-coalition institutions. For example, when the winning coalition is at maximum as 1, Model 7 and Model 8 estimate that there is about 3.5% and 3.1% decrease in the risk of deposition, respectively ($\exp(-8.206 \times .01 + 4.643 \times .01) = .965$ & $\exp(-7.271 \times .01 + 4.111 \times .01) = .969$). As Figure 5.2 illustrates, the winning coalition's decreasing effect of the hazard of deposition seems to be clear.

[Figure 5.2]

Regarding the effect of election losers' changed size on leader survival, I expect an opposite effect to the nonvoters' effect. That is, increased size of election losers are expected to dampen the effect of mass political movements on leader survival by broadening the political arena in which the dissents from election losers make their "voice" at the voting booth, not in the street. However, Model 4 in Table 5.5 indicates that a one percentage point increase in the size of election losers (or electoral competition) over the previous three years increases the risk of deposition by about 7% ($\exp(6.845 \times .01) = 1.071$). In Model 5-8, the effect is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Regarding free resources of Oil and Aid, the variable Oil only appears to be significant across Model 5 through Model 8. With more free resources, a leader is expected to extend her tenure more securely than one who lacks these resources. Income growth decreases the risk of deposition to small-coalition leaders while the effect of income growth is not significant to large-coalition leaders.

As Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) contend from their analysis of mass threat to the risk of deposition, my data also shows that a one standard deviation increase of revolutionary political movements increases the risk of deposition by about 25-35%. Unlike the minimal effects of W in reducing mass threats to leaders shown in their work, across Model 6 through Model 8, the interaction term appears to be consistently significantly different from 0 and shows a decreasing effect of the increased size of the W. Moreover, the decreasing effect size is also distinguishable from 0. This is so because I used the revised variable of mass

political movements to have a revolution-weighted movement variable for my analysis, and hence the variable Δ Mass Threat (now represented as revolutionary threat) seems to be more sensitive to the size of W. The increased size of W, for example up to W=1, decreases the risk of a leader's deposition who faces revolutionary movement by 25%, according to Model 8 ($\exp(.859 - 1.147 \times 1) = .750$). However, increasing the W's size up to 0.75 does not provide any benefits to the leader ($\exp(.859 - 1.147 * .75) = .999$).

[Table 5.5]

5.6 Conclusion

A leader faces many threats such as revolutionaries, protesters, and anti-government demonstrators. While considering these concerns, small-coalition leaders are more attentive to legitimizing the existing regime by being re-elected in corrupt elections or even by providing limited-choice electoral systems, rather than focusing resources on suppressing mass political events. This may be true especially if some election outcomes may indicate the mass public's frustration and even anger, thereby resulting in vanishing voters. Even in pluralist democracies, large-coalition leaders pay heed to the effect of institutional reform when they consider the significant interaction effect of the winning coalition in mass movements and electoral politics.

From the two stages of leader survival analysis, mass threats to leader survival, more exactly revolutionary threats, are largely derived from the electoral (de)participation, rather than electoral competition. While both dimensions of democracy defined by Dahl matter in explaining democratic transition in the waves of democracy, revolutionary threats associated with leader survival appear to have strong association with the number of nonvoters.

The empirical data shows that all of the listed hypotheses are supported. Electoral (de)participation and revolutionary threats are key predictors to explain the leader's survival while free press affects indirectly via mass threats. And, these determinants have different

effects on leader's survival according to the winning coalition institution. Increased size of winning coalition dampens political alienation and mass threats in the short run.²⁹

²⁹Regarding the long-term effects of increased size of winning coalition, an aggregate level data is not appropriate to test how individuals perceive political institutions, which result from a leader's change of winning coalition change over time.

Tables & Figures for Chapter 5

Table 5.1: Party Identification and Voting Behavior in Elections

	Partisan	Non-partisan
Voter	Winners or Losers (Allegiant/Loyal Voters)	Non-partisan Voters (Pragmatic/Policy-oriented Voters)
Nonvoter	Partisan Nonvoters (Inefficacious/Boycotting Nonvoters)	Non-partisan Nonvoters (Alienated Nonvoters)

Table 5.2: Hypothetical Effect of Voters/Nonvoters on Mass Political Movements with the Low or High Press Freedom Interaction

	Main	2-way Interaction
ΔWinner	–	
ΔLoser	+	
$\Delta\text{Nonvoter}$	+	
Winning Coalition Size (W)	–	
Free Press	+	
$W \times \Delta\text{Loser}$		–
$W \times \Delta\text{Nonvoter}$		–
$\Delta\text{Loser} \times \text{Free Press}$		+
$\Delta\text{Nonvoter} \times \text{Free Press}$		+

Table 5.3: Hypothetical Relationship of Leader Survival: The Effect of Nonvoters and Mass Threat on Leader Deposition

	Effect on Leader Deposition
Mass Threats	+
Δ Nonvoter	+
Winning Coalition Size (W)	+
Mass Threats $\times$ Nonvoter's Size	+
W $\times$ Mass Threats	-
W $\times$ Δ Nonvoter	-

Table 5.4: The Effect of Nonvoter Size on Mass Political Movements

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Lagged Mass	0.282** (0.015)	0.273** (0.020)	0.271** (0.020)
Winning Coalition Size (W)	-0.265** (0.058)	-0.180 [†] (0.098)	-0.178 [†] (0.105)
Δ Nonvoter	0.353** (0.112)	0.301 [†] (0.156)	0.897** (0.316)
Δ Loser	0.259 (0.245)	0.078 (0.310)	-0.103 (0.910)
Free Press		0.026 (0.035)	0.277** (0.086)
Earthquake		0.066 [†] (0.034)	0.106 (0.079)
Ln(GDPpc)	-0.062 (0.038)	-0.100 (0.211)	0.138 (0.092)
Growth	-0.009** (0.002)	-0.010** (0.002)	-0.010* (0.005)
Ln(population)	0.184** (0.045)	0.134 (0.101)	-0.484* (0.214)
2-Way Interaction			
W * Ln(GDPpc)			-0.503 (0.330)
W * Growth			<0.000 (0.008)
W * Ln(population)			1.443** (0.528)
W * Earthquake			-0.059 (0.103)

Continued...

Table 5.4 (cont'd)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
W * Nonvoter			-1.433** (0.544)
W * Loser			-0.048 (1.247)
W * Free Press			-0.440** (0.138)
Nonvoter * Free Press			0.806* (0.342)
Loser * Free Press			0.134 (0.651)
Intercept	0.185** (0.037)	0.133 (0.062)	0.133* (0.066)
N	4185	2439	2439
Adj.-R ²	0.280 ^a	0.350 ^a	0.361 ^a
Fixed effects	149-country	144-country	144-country
^a Adjusted-R-squared was obtained by -areg- command in STATA (version 11.2). †p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01			

Table 5.5: The Effect of Nonvoter Size and Mass Threat on the Risk of Leader's Deposition

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Winning Coalition (W)	1.751** (0.272)	2.022** (0.363)	-1.254 (2.339)	-1.823 (2.313)	-0.795 (2.358)
Selectorate	-1.442** (0.202)	-1.710** (0.263)	-1.364** (0.296)	-1.385** (0.307)	-1.346** (0.313)
Age	0.024** (0.005)	0.026** (0.007)	0.038* (0.018)	0.033 [†] (0.018)	0.042* (0.018)
Δ Nonvoter	2.703** (0.666)	2.667** (0.912)	-0.078 (0.885)	4.643** (1.360)	4.111 [†] (2.164)
Δ Loser	6.845** (1.180)	0.585 (4.699)	-7.355 [†] (4.074)	4.967 (3.250)	7.729 [†] (4.233)
Δ Loser_ ln(t)		4.031 (2.554)	7.041** (2.152)		
Δ Mass Threat	0.311** (0.068)	0.239** (0.082)	0.911** (0.181)	0.880** (0.181)	0.859** (0.190)
Oil		-0.065* (0.028)	-0.135* (0.056)	-0.119* (0.054)	-0.193** (0.058)
Oil_ ln(t)		0.026* (0.013)	0.059* (0.024)	0.051* (0.023)	0.093** (0.026)
Aid as %GDP		-0.021 (0.016)	-0.093 [†] (0.053)	-0.102 [†] (0.054)	-0.069 (0.055)
Growth	-0.021* (0.009)	-0.037** (0.014)	-0.066* (0.031)	-0.061* (0.031)	-0.068* (0.031)
Ln(GDPpc)	0.003 (0.039)	0.037 (0.071)	-0.278 (0.171)	-0.299 [†] (0.171)	-0.251 (0.177)
2-Way Interaction					
W * Age			-0.020 (0.027)	-0.011 (0.027)	-0.104** (0.035)

Continued...

Table 5.5 (cont'd)

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
W * Age_ln(t)					0.043** (0.010)
W * Oil			0.195* (0.098)	0.166 [†] (0.096)	0.287** (0.102)
W * Oil_ln(t)			-0.088 [†] (0.046)	-0.072 (0.045)	-0.141** (0.049)
W * Aid			0.114 (0.074)	0.130 [†] (0.074)	0.082 (0.077)
W * Growth			0.064 (0.050)	0.053 (0.049)	0.070 (0.050)
W * Ln(GDPpc)			0.546* (0.250)	0.555* (0.250)	0.563* (0.256)
W * ΔMass Threat			-1.276** (0.280)	-1.288** (0.276)	-1.147** (0.300)
W * ΔLoser				-1.928 (4.570)	-6.118 (6.073)
W * ΔNonvoter				-8.206** (2.338)	-7.271* (3.365)
ΔLoser * ΔMass Threat			-0.732 (1.331)		-1.673 (1.854)
ΔNonvoter * ΔMass Threat			2.051** (0.646)		0.942 (0.979)
N	2894	1515	1515	1515	1515
Log-likelihood	-2021.998	-1043.064	-1004.333	-1007.46	-996.257
χ^2	183.873	118.555	196.017	189.764	212.171
[†] p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01					

Figure 5.1: Predicted Effects of Electoral Mobilization on Revolutionary Movements (2-way interaction)





Figure 5.2: Estimated Baseline Cumulative Hazard (Stratified by W in Model 7)



Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

In the nineteenth century, Karl Marx forcefully contended that the proletariat, the modern working class, were not only victims but also could be actors against the development of the bourgeoisie, i.e., capital (Marx, Engels and Jones, 2002). Marx focused on the proletariat's role as a historical force facilitating revolutionary movements against expanding capitalist production and control of the state. As is widely known, Marx's prediction was not fulfilled, but his idea of the basic mode of dialectical analysis seems to be right. For him, the struggles of ordinary people are constrained by institutional arrangements, but the institutional logic can be challenged by mass threats. Historically, facilitating institutional and societal arrangements favorable to revolutionary movements were lacking due to conditions that had minimized economic alienation and thus relative deprivation, at least within industrial societies: "the spread of imperialism helped to produce the surpluses that would raise working-class material standards in the mother countries; the balkanization of modern industry helped to fractionalize the working class; new institutions such as public education helped to ensure capitalistic ideological hegemony" (Piven and Cloward, 1977: x).

The dialectical process between people's struggles and societal and economic institutions during the course of capitalist development sheds light on our understanding of political leaders' stability. In this dissertation, I argue that mass political movements, and more importantly, mass political attitudes and voting behavior, are fundamental causes to explain leader survival. But, mass attitudes and behavior interact with institutional forms in complex ways to affect leader survival.

6.1 Concluding Remarks

Interestingly, *leader* survival has been addressed mainly by students of international relations, while *regime* survival and *government* survival have been dealt with by many comparativists. In order to complement what is lost by ignoring domestic politics, political trust and electoral behavior have been used here as intervening variables in determining leader survival. In Chapter 3, mass political attitudes toward political institutions are affected by electoral politics characterized by the election winners', losers', and non-partisans' perceptions of the system. In hierarchical (or multi-level) models using multiple public opinion data sets, political trust measured by confidence in the army, police, parliament, and president is a function of a voter's partisan status.

More specifically, I have theorized an interactive relationship of partisan status with winning coalition and selectorate size. For non-winning voters in elections, a small winning coalition size does not provide a satisfactory institutional arrangement, because a non-winning voter's consumption of state resources is limited by the leader's support for her winning group with private goods. Furthermore, the limited resources provided to non-winning voters in a small winning coalition divides the alienated groups into two types – election losers and non-partisans – according to their different levels of partisan status and their different perceptions of the winning coalition institution. I will discuss how election winners, losers, and non-partisans perceive their political system in the context of winning coalition and selectorate size.

- *Election Winners:* In a small winning coalition, winners get most benefits from a leader who can provide substantial and stable private goods. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) contend that if with limited resources a leader can satisfy her coalition, she is able to meet winners' demands and thus secure the loyalty norms from her supporting group in a small size of winning coalition given a fixed size of the selectorate. By providing sufficient private goods to her coalition, the leader is able to prevent winners from

defecting to her challengers. Moreover, the leader who faces revolutionary threats can utilize free resources such as foreign aid and natural resources in order to reduce the extant small size of the coalition (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). Hence, in such a small coalition, winners' support for the leader is directly associated with policy benefits and the provision of private goods, rather than with diffuse consent to political institutions.

In responding to demands for liberalization and democratization, a leader's effort to increase the size of winning coalition makes the leader's tenure unstable. As the leader has limited resources, election winners cannot obtain the same level of private goods (per individual) in a large winning coalition institution. Decreased benefits raise the chances that winners will defect to her challengers who promise to provide more welfare. This leads winners to have lower specific loyalty to leaders, which is not necessarily extended to diffuse political dissent from the system. In Hypothesis *H1a*, I hypothesized that election winners have decreasing levels of political trust in the system as the short-term loyalty norms (W/S) increase. This hypothesis is disconfirmed.

- *Election Losers*: Other than election winners in the winning coalition, non-winning groups such as election losers and non-partisans are temporarily or persistently excluded or disadvantaged in accessing the benefits of private goods provided by a leader's public policy making. Election losers affiliate with opposition parties. With their affiliation with existing parties and thereby their tendency to accept the political institutions such as the electoral system, losers are well aware of which institutions work for their benefits in terms of political representation and policy implementation (cf. Anderson et al., 2005). That is, losers are more sensitive to the imminent and current size of the winning coalition and the loyalty norms (i.e., the ratio of winning coalition to the selectorate).

Consequently, a small size of short-term winning coalition arrangements aggravates

the extant losers' dissent from the political system. This is so because losers' strong affiliation with opposition parties reduces their prospect of winning an election in a small size of coalition and the losers' perception of political institutions is mainly dominated by the short-term institutional context of the winning coalition.

Hence, a more expanded size of a winning coalition allows short-sighted losers to have more chances of becoming winners, which can be translated into diffuse trust in political institutions at least in the short run. In other words, election losers are vulnerable to a leader's co-optation strategies such as increasing the winning coalition size. Losers' short-sighted perception of the political system can be compatible with a short-term winning coalition institution. Hypothesis *H1b* is that election losers/non-partisans have increasing levels of political trust as the short-term loyalty norms increase. Empirically, this hypothesis is confirmed, not for non-partisans, but for election losers.

- *Non-partisans:* The other non-winning group of non-partisans is prompted to *politicize* when partisan independence is constrained by historical and long-term institutional arrangements of the winning coalition, rather than by a short-term winning coalition institution. Without having affiliated with a specific opposition party, non-partisans tend to 'exit the scene' of electoral politics, and there exists no motivation for non-partisans to be sensitive to the chances of becoming or joining the winning coalition unless the perceived alienation is great enough for non-partisans to take remedial action such as revolutionary movements (see Chapter 5). As non-partisans tend to be apathetic and indifferent to their leader and the political system from which they get few of the spoils provided by the government, it is hard for non-partisans to be politicized in the absence of persistent perception of political alienation.

In this context, non-partisans' politicization depends on their sustained or persistent political alienation resulting from a continuously increasing winning coalition and their accessible memory of alienating coalition institutions, i.e., there being a large historical

winning coalition from which they are excluded. The cumulative size of the winning coalition can activate non-partisans' sense of exclusion and alienation, and the level of non-partisans' political alienation is worsened when the cumulative size of the winning coalition expands: With a historically increased size of the winning coalition, non-partisans feel more alienated from the political system that could have provided a more inclusive system to losers with increased coalition size, and yet have excluded non-partisans from it. Hypothesis *H2b* in chapter 3 was confirmed empirically, which states that non-partisans have decreasing levels of political trust as historical loyalty norms among electoral winners and losers increase. Non-partisans' distrust of political institutions is a direct effect of the interaction between partisan independence and institutional memory, measured by accumulated size of the winning coalition.

In Chapter 4, South Korea's impeachment process illustrates how selectorate politics and partisan status affect differently the citizens' perception of leader's impeachment. With individual-level survey data, this case study allows me to examine a more direct causal relationship between leader survival and the interaction effect of partisan status and individual level loyalty norms. That is, as we may admit a potential limitation of the validity of the loyalty norms measured only at the aggregate and institutional level, the individual level loyalty norms of each partisan status address directly how winners, losers, and non-partisans perceive the leader. South Korea's unique experience of the impeachment process could benefit from the experiment-like survey in 2004 South Korea that was done between the 17th general election and the final decision of the Constitutional Court on the impeached President Roh. By employing a direct measure of the individual's loyalty norms and the perception of the impeachment from a timely-executed survey, I found that non-partisans' politicization is *not* apparent in a sense that non-partisans' impeachment support appears to be moderately changing according to individual level's loyalty norms toward the incumbent leader and party.

I argue that as the conflict between the opposition parties of a conservative 'old pol-

itics' and the incumbent party of a progressive 'young politics' led to an unprecedented impeachment process in South Korea's constitutional history, this abnormal situation of an impeachment process and the timing of the 2004 general election provided citizens with an opportunity for voters to perceive increased internal efficacy. With increased internal efficacy in general, the impeachment process reduces non-partisans' political alienation and politicization, rather than aggravating them. Specifically, to citizens, the loyalty to the Uri party allows for only a short-term loyalty norms since the party was founded in 2003. Consistent with the findings in disconfirming non-partisans' politicization in Hypothesis *H1b*, non-partisans who are constrained by individual-level loyalty norms in a short-term institutional context are not prompted to politicize. Thus, they are expected to appear less responsive to the loyalty norms to the incumbent leader.

These findings are based on a specific understanding of the leader-party nexus in South Korea. As South Korea's case has revealed a strong nexus between a party and its leader, partisans' support for a party can translate well into the loyalty norms to their leader. Both respondents who supported *and* did not support President Roh appear to support Roh's reinstatement when their loyalty toward Roh's Uri party is at a higher level. However, non-partisans' de-politicization entails that their support for the reinstatement decreases even when the non-partisans' loyalty for the liberal and progressive Uri party increases. Consequently, partisans, including both election winners and losers, show more extreme changes of impeachment support while non-partisans appear to have a moderate change in the perception of impeachment support.

Non-partisans' sensitivity to the historical and long-term winning coalition institution cannot be tested in Chapter 4 since an individual level survey data on the loyalty norms does not provide an opportunity to measure the cumulative effect of the institutional arrangements on the loyalty norms. Without a measure of the historical arrangements, both measures of the loyalty norm (one compared to all participating opposition parties) and the comparative loyalty norm (one compared to two major opposition parties) show non-

partisans' de-politicization in moderate changes of the impeachment support. Like the finding in Chapter 3's multi-level cross-country analysis that non-partisans' political trust does not respond to the short-term institutional context, non-partisans' impeachment support in South Korea in 2004 appears to result in a de-politicization in the interaction of non-partisans' support for the short-lived incumbent party.

Chapter 5 concludes by examining the final causal relationship between political alienation and leader stability. This chapter tests whether and how nonvoting resulting from non-partisan's political alienation can affect the two key variables of mass political movements and leader survival. In this analysis, increased size of nonvoters induces more frequent mass mobilization such as protests, anti-government demonstrations, riots, and revolutions. More importantly, even controlling for mass threats to a leader resulting from mass mobilization, non-voter's increase, as a proxy for increased political alienation, is associated with greater risk of a leader's deposition.

Consistent with the findings of non-partisans' de-politicization in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 in the short-term loyalty norms' context, nonvoters appear to be less alienated in the presence of a larger winning coalition and small loyalty norms. Increased size of the short-term winning coalition appears to dampen the positive effect of increasing the size of aggregated nonvoters on mass political movements (Figure 5.1). In a more inclusive institutional arrangement of a large winning coalition, the alienated appear to suppress their persistent perception of relative deprivation. In contrast, a free press can facilitate the effect of political alienation on mass threats to the leader, thereby leading to more politicization of nonvoters. And its politicizing effect can be strengthened in the context of a small winning coalition (Figure 5.2). That is, in a limited and constrained situation of information in a small winning coalition, the alienated can mobilize with a small addition of freedom of the press, thereby threatening the leader's deposition.

6.2 Limitations and Extensions

Given that the relationship between political distrust/alienation and leader survival is hypothesized and tested here, I point out some related limitations below. Research on leader survival mainly focuses on a cross-time analysis. In this context, individual-level data on political trust is not easily available across the range of historical time in which leader survival can also be examined. Hence, my interest in the effect of citizens' attitudes toward the political system on leader survival required me to come up with an alternative measure of political trust, which is non-voting as a proxy for political alienation. If we had more appropriate measures of political alienation in the light of voting behavior, they could provide us with interesting new findings. Related to that, the measure of nonvoters should also be revised with richer and more accurate information on election results. Especially, data on the number of registered or eligible voters is not reliable across time and regions.

Another limitation involves data coverage on mass political movements. Since the years covered range from 1980 through 2000 in the specific causal relation between political alienation and mass political movements in Chapter 5, the turmoils in the 1960s and the 1970s could not be included. If free press data could be measured by appropriate proxies during this time period, more interesting results may be expected. Furthermore, since 2000, the 'internet revolution' and 'mobile revolution' would result in different patterns of mass mobilization. How to examine these effects in authoritarian regimes could be an appealing subject in the future.

In this dissertation, I include only national elections where the "politically alienated" would be more likely to be nonvoters. But in local-level elections it is more likely for the alienated as well as voters on the whole to perceive the effect of their voting as relatively substantial and thus to stimulate their participation in the decision-making process. In such a situation, the alienated nonvoters are provided an opportunity to make their voice heard, thereby being translated into voters. By focusing on local-level elections, I could examine how nonvoters can turn into voters and compare both the changes of national elections and

local elections. Moreover, appropriate measures of nonvoters at both levels would provide a chance to test a potential hypothesis that increased size of nonvoters at local level elections is more associated with alienated citizens than one at national level elections.

Finally, the effect of leaders' strategies on political alienation and mass threats could be another extension of this dissertation. A leader can either reduce potential mass threats by suppressing her constituents or buy off revolutionary threats by expanding public goods, depending on the size of available free resources (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010: 946). The effects of each strategy to manage mass threats end up either reducing or increasing the size of winning coalition.

As was confirmed in Table 5.4 and Figure 5.1, this dissertation deals with *variation of nonvoters' size*, rather than the absolute size of nonvoters, considering the changes of the nonvoter's size as a variable to control for the contextual difference of the nonvoter's size in each country and each year. Yet, a closer examination of a direct effect of the size of winning coalition on the absolute size of nonvoters could be useful in knowing how leaders' strategies on political alienation and nonvoting work when facing mass threats. Possible hypotheses include that as a leader increases the size of winning coalition, more electoral participation is expected, and a decreasing number of nonvoters could lessen the intensity of political alienation among the whole population.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

CHAPTER 3: CODING

- *Political Trust.* In the WVS and the East Asian Barometer, “(F)or each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?”; In the AFB, “(H)ow much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?”; The EAB uses trust word instead of confidence. Respondents were coded on an interval scale ranging 0 to 1.0.
- *Partisan Status.* In the WVS, “If there were a national/general election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote?” For non-partisans, two answers of the question, “I would not vote” and “I would cast a blank ballot”, were used; In the AFB, “Do you feel close to any particular political party?” and “which party is that?” were used, so non-partisans are unaffiliated citizens with any party; In the EAB, “Which parties (or candidates for president if it was presidential race) did you vote for?” was used. Then, among the missing observations, I used the questions of “Among the political parties listed here (SHOWCARD), which party if any do you feel closest to?” to impute the missing values.
- *Perceived Personal Economy.* In the WVS, “How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?”; In the AFB, “Your own present living conditions?”; In the EAB, “As for your own family, how do you rate your economic situation today?”
- *Interest in Politics.* In the WVS and the EAB, “How interested would you say you are in politics?”; In the AFB, “How interested would you say you are in public affairs?” Very (4); quite (3); hardly (2); not at all (1)
- *Female.* Male (0), female (1)

- *Age*. Actual age of respondent.
- *Education*. “What is the highest level of education you have achieved?” Respondents were coded on a 0 to 8 scale, where 9 denotes the highest level of education.
- *Historical W/S*. See Appendix B
- *Short-term W/S*. 5-year mean of the recent adjusted W/S. The adjusted W was calculated by refining the categories of all four indicators of the Polity data and Arthur Banks’s data. Giving transitional period more weights, the W was re-coded: Dual/Transition in XRCOMP was recoded as 0.5, rather than 1.0; Dual Executive-Designation in XROPEN was recoded as 0.5, rather than 0; Factional and Transitional in PARCOMP were recoded as 0.5, rather than 0; Military-Civilian regime type in Banks’s polity02 variable was recoded as 0.5, rather than 0 (see Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p.134-5 for the original coding of W/S).
- *ENPP*. Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties. Source: Michael Gallagher’s Election Indices (http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/) and Matt Golder’s data (<http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/elections.html>).
- *Disproportionality*. The disparity between the distribution of votes at the election and the allocation of seats. Source: Gallagher’s least square index (http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/lsq.php).
- *Parliamentarism*. Governance type. Direct presidential (0); Strong president elected by assembly (1); Parliamentary (2). Source: The World Bank’s Database (<http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40>).
- *Unitarism*. Average of Nonfederalism and Nonbicameralism. Federal (0); Semifederal (1); Nonfederal (2). Strong bicameral (0); Weak bicameral (1); Unicameral (2). Source: Gerring, Thacker and Moreno (2005) (<http://www.bu.edu/sthacker/data.htm>).

- *Democracy Level.* Average of Freedom House (0-10 scale) and revised Polity (0-10 scale). Source: Hadenius and Teorell (2005)
- *Real GDP per capita* (purchasing power parity US\$), 2000. Source: Gleditsch (2002) (<http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html>).

Appendix B

CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL W/S FORMULA

The following formula is for the historical W/S measure;

$$W_t = \sum_{s=(t-99)}^t \left(\frac{s - (t - 100)}{100} \right)$$

For example, in order to calculate historical stock of W up to 1999 and up to 2003, I used following equations;

$$W_{1999} = \sum_{s=1900}^{1999} \left(\frac{s - 1899}{100} \right) * R_s = \frac{1}{100} R_{1900} + \frac{2}{100} R_{1900} + \cdots + \frac{100}{100} R_{1999}$$

$$W_{2003} = \sum_{s=1904}^{2003} \left(\frac{s - 1903}{100} \right) * R_s = \frac{1}{100} R_{1904} + \frac{2}{100} R_{1904} + \cdots + \frac{100}{100} R_{2003}.$$

Appendix C

CHAPTER 3: ROBUST CHECK FOR INFLUENCE CASE

The following models are estimated by using *R* package *Influence.ME*. This is originally a MlwiN macro translated into R by R. Nieuwenhuis (Van der Meer, Te Grotenhuis and Pelzer, 2010).

Table C.1: Chapter 3: Multilevel Linear Model of Partisanship and W/S Controlling for Influence Cases (Nigeria and Mali), Dependent Variable: Political Trust

	Model C.1	Model C.2
Individual-level Variable		
Election Loser	-0.211*** (0.057)	-0.219*** (0.076)
Non-partisan	-0.054 (0.044)	-0.040 (0.056)
Education	-0.008*** (0.000)	-0.011*** (0.000)
Age	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Female	0.001 (0.002)	-0.004† (0.002)
Interest in Politics	0.018*** (0.001)	0.019*** (0.001)
Country-level Variable		
Historical W/S	-0.036 (0.067)	-0.135 (0.094)
Short-term W/S	-0.167 (0.108)	-0.005 (0.149)
ENPP	0.003	0.022†

Continued...

Table C.1 (cont'd)


	Model C.1	Model C.2
	(0.014)	(0.017)
Disproportionality	0.002	0.005†
	(0.002)	(0.003)
Democracy level	-0.005	0.000
	(0.006)	(0.008)
Real GDP/cap	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Africa & Middle East	0.022	-0.019
	(0.047)	(0.093)
Asia	0.021	-0.023
	(0.045)	(0.084)
Latin America	-0.163***	-0.187**
	(0.046)	(0.079)
Post-Communist	-0.093*	-0.154
	(0.041)	(0.097)
Cross-level Interaction Term		
Loser*Historical W/S	-0.062	-0.041
	(0.050)	(0.064)
Non-partisan*Historical W/S	-0.084*	-0.107*
	(0.039)	(0.047)
Loser*Short-term W/S	0.218***	0.202*
	(0.070)	(0.089)
Non-partisan*Short-term W/S	0.036	0.041
	(0.053)	(0.065)
Loser*ENPP	0.026***	0.027**
	(0.008)	(0.011)
Non-partisan*ENPP	0.015**	0.019*
	(0.006)	(0.008)

Continued...

Table C.1 (cont'd)


	Model C.1	Model C.2
Loser*Disproportionality	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Non-partisan*Disproportionality	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.002)
Constant	0.731*** (0.104)	0.695*** (0.151)
Mali Influence	0.929*** (0.128)	
Nigeria Influence	0.465*** (0.131)	
USA Influence		0.941*** (0.177)
Variance of Random Effect		
Country-level	0.004	0.003
Election Loser	0.002	0.002
Non-partisan	0.001	0.001
Country-level (alternative)	0.001	0.006
Election Loser	0.002	0.003
Non-partisan	0.001	0.002
Individual-level	0.040	0.043
AIC	-23,179	-13,608
BIC	-22,817	-22,000
Log-Likelihood	11,630	6,844
N. of Respondent	63,423	46,330
N. of Country	59	41
†p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001		

Figure C.1: Influence Country Robust Check for Model 4



Two outliers, indicated as red triangle, are Nigeria (2003) and Mali (2002).

Figure C.2: Influence Country Robust Check for Model 8



* indicates additional country-year either from Afrobarometer or East Asian Barometer.

Appendix D

CHAPTER 3: COUNTRY CASES

Table D.1: Chapter 3: Countries (59 country-year samples)

Africa & Middle East	Asia	Latin America	Post-Communist	Industrial Society
Algeria	Bangladesh	Argentina	Albania	Austria†
Botswana	India	Chile	Bulgaria†	Canada
Ghana	Indonesia	Mexico	Czech Republic†	Denmark†
Kenya	Pakistan	Peru	Lithuania†	Finland†
Lesotho	Philippines	Venezuela	Moldova	France†
Malawi	South Korea		Poland†	Germany†
Mali	Taiwan		Slovenia†	Greece†
Mozambique	Thailand		Macedonia	Iceland†
Namibia				Ireland†
Nigeria*				Italy†
Senegal				Japan*
South Africa*				Luxembourg†
Tanzania*				Netherlands†
Turkey				Spain
Zambia				United Kingdom†
Zimbabwe*				United States
				Portugal†

* includes two country-year samples;

† indicates missing countries due to the inclusion of perceived economy variable.

Appendix E

CHAPTER 4: BRANT TEST

Brant Test for the generalized ordered logit is shown below.

Table E.1: Chapter 4: Brant Test for Loyalty & Comparative Loyalty

Variable	chi2	p>chi2	df
All	22.06	0.055	13
Honam region	0.31	0.577	1
Youngnam region	9.31	0.002	1
Choongchung region	0.99	0.319	1
Kangwon region	0.92	0.337	1
Education	0.05	0.815	1
Female	0.45	0.501	1
Age	2.76	0.097	1
Trust in President	1.56	0.212	1
Trust in the Nat'l Assembly	0.70	0.404	1
Trust in Party	0.05	0.826	1
Loser	0.32	0.573	1
Non-partisan	1.43	0.231	1
Loyalty (Uri Party)	4.52	0.034	1

Variable	chi2	p>chi2	df
All	28.33	0.008	13
Honam region	0.05	0.826	1
Youngnam region	12.54	0.000	1
Choongchung region	0.28	0.595	1
kangwon region	1.12	0.289	1
Education	0.05	0.818	1
Fmale	0.76	0.385	1
Age	1.12	0.291	1
Trust in President	2.94	0.086	1
Trust in the Nat'l Assembly	1.34	0.247	1
Trust in Party	0.02	0.899	1
Loser	0.23	0.628	1
Non-partisan	1.85	0.174	1
Comparative Loyalty	8.21	0.004	1

Appendix F

CHAPTER 4: COMPREHENSIVE COMPARATIVE LOYALTY MODEL

All the parties are considered in the Comparative Loyalty variable by including all other opposition parties, i.e., Democratic Labor Party, United Liberal Democrats, and People Unity 21. The estimated models considering all 5 opposition parties are shown below.

Table F.1: Chapter 4: Partial Proportional Odds Models of Impeachment Support (Comparative Loyalty)

	Model F.1	Model F.2	Model F.3
Opposed/(Strongly) Supportive			
Honam region ^a	-0.624*	-0.613*	-0.622*
	(0.293)	(0.293)	(0.293)
Youngnam region ^a	0.586*	0.589*	0.597*
	(0.248)	(0.249)	(0.250)
Choongchung region ^a	0.243	0.272	0.283
	(0.298)	(0.296)	(0.297)
Kangwon region ^a	0.429	0.416	0.412
	(0.388)	(0.387)	(0.386)
Education	0.004	0.001	-0.000
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.055)
Female	-0.111	-0.142	-0.129
	(0.171)	(0.170)	(0.171)
Age	0.026**		
	(0.008)		
Trust in President	-1.068***	-1.077***	-1.070***
	(0.162)	(0.161)	(0.162)
Trust in Nat'l Assembly	0.455**	0.440*	0.428*
	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.174)

Continued...

Table F.1 (cont'd)

	Model F.1	Model F.2	Model F.3
Trust in Party	0.233 (0.173)	0.256 (0.174)	0.267 (0.175)
Election Loser	0.515* (0.218)	0.533* (0.218)	0.522* (0.260)
Non-partisan	0.299 (0.236)	0.222 (0.231)	-0.049 (0.289)
Comparative Loyalty (Uri Party)	-0.307*** (0.041)	-0.315*** (0.042)	-0.342*** (0.054)
1987 Demo. Cohort (Born in 1953-68) ^b		0.773*** (0.195)	0.782*** (0.196)
1997 Fin. Crisis Cohort (Born in 1938-52) ^b		0.858** (0.280)	0.839** (0.283)
1950 War Cohort (Born in & before 1937) ^b		1.235 (0.755)	1.193 (0.762)
Loser*Comp. Loyalty			-0.036 (0.085)
Non-partisan*Comp. Loyalty			0.142† (0.085)
Constant	0.503 (0.570)	1.143* (0.462)	1.206* (0.474)
Strongly Opposed/Opposed vs. (Strongly) Supportive			
Honam region ^a	-0.624* (0.293)	-0.613* (0.293)	-0.622* (0.293)
Youngnam region ^a	-0.540† (0.301)	-0.544† (0.299)	-0.584† (0.304)
Choongchung region ^a	0.243	0.272	0.283

Continued...

Table F.1 (cont'd)

	Model F.1	Model F.2	Model F.3
	(0.298)	(0.296)	(0.297)
Kangwon region ^a	0.429	0.416	0.412
	(0.388)	(0.387)	(0.386)
Education	0.004	0.001	-0.000
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.055)
Female	-0.111	-0.142	-0.129
	(0.171)	(0.170)	(0.171)
Age	0.026**		
	(0.008)		
Trust in President	-1.068***	-1.077***	-1.070***
	(0.162)	(0.161)	(0.162)
Trust in Nat'l Assembly	0.455**	0.440*	0.428*
	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.174)
Trust in Party	0.233	0.256	0.267
	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.175)
Election Loser	0.515*	0.533*	0.522*
	(0.218)	(0.218)	(0.260)
Non-partisan	0.299	0.222	-0.049
	(0.236)	(0.231)	(0.289)
Comparative Loyalty (Uri Party)	-0.307***	-0.315***	-0.342***
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.054)
1987 Demo. Cohort (Born in 1953-68) ^b		0.773***	0.782***
		(0.195)	(0.196)
1997 Fin. Crisis Cohort (Born in 1938-52) ^b		0.858**	0.839**
		(0.280)	(0.283)
1950 War Cohort (Born in & before 1937) ^b		1.235	1.193
		(0.755)	(0.762)
Loser*Comp. Loyalty			-0.036

Continued...

Table F.1 (cont'd)

	Model F.1	Model F.2	Model F.3
			(0.085)
Non-partisan*Comp. Loyalty			0.142†
			(0.085)
Constant	0.503	1.143*	1.206*
	(0.570)	(0.462)	(0.474)
Strongly Opposed/Opposed vs. (Strongly) Supportive			
Honam region ^a	-0.624*	-0.613*	-0.622*
	(0.293)	(0.293)	(0.293)
Youngnam region ^a	-0.540†	-0.544†	-0.584†
	(0.301)	(0.299)	(0.304)
Choongchung region ^a	0.243	0.272	0.283
	(0.298)	(0.296)	(0.297)
Kangwon region ^a	0.429	0.416	0.412
	(0.388)	(0.387)	(0.386)
Education	0.004	0.001	-0.000
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.055)
Female	-0.111	-0.142	-0.129
	(0.171)	(0.170)	(0.171)
Age	0.045***		
	(0.010)		
Trust in President	-1.068***	-1.077***	-1.070***
	(0.162)	(0.161)	(0.162)
Trust in Nat'l Assembly	0.455**	0.440*	0.428*
	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.174)
Trust in Party	0.233	0.256	0.267
	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.175)

Continued...

Table F.1 (cont'd)

	Model F.1	Model F.2	Model F.3
Election Loser	0.515* (0.218)	0.533* (0.218)	0.522* (0.260)
Non-partisan	0.299 (0.236)	0.222 (0.231)	-0.049 (0.289)
Comparative Loyalty (Uri Party)	-0.452*** (0.058)	-0.464*** (0.059)	-0.483*** (0.076)
1987 Democracy Cohort (Born in 1953-68)		0.773*** (0.195)	0.782*** (0.196)
1997 Financial Crisis Cohort (Born in 1938-52)		0.858** (0.280)	0.839** (0.283)
1950 War Cohort (Born in & before 1937)		1.235 (0.755)	1.193 (0.762)
Loser*Comp. Loyalty			-0.036 (0.085)
Non-partisan*Comp. Loyalty			0.142† (0.085)
Constant	-2.103*** (0.626)	-0.722 (0.465)	-0.664 (0.479)
Pseudo R-Square	0.297	0.294	0.297
Number of Cases	692	692	692

^a Omitted category is Seoul and Kyunggi Region

^b Omitted category is the 2002 Presidential Election Cohort (Born in & after 1969)

†p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Appendix G

CHAPTER 4: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL WITH IDEOLOGY VARIABLE

Table G.1: Chapter 4: Multinomial Logit Models of Impeachment Support (Loyalty)

Strongly Opposed : Base Outcome				
Strongly Opposed vs. Opposed				
	Model G.1		Model G.2	
Honam	-0.635*	(0.271)	-0.712**	(0.276)
Youngnam	0.493*	(0.223)	0.482*	(0.224)
Choongchung	0.537	(0.341)	0.518	(0.346)
Kangwon	0.737	(0.471)	0.637	(0.478)
Education	-0.066	(0.059)	-0.076	(0.059)
Female	0.196	(0.181)	0.211	(0.183)
1987 Democracy Cohort	0.255	(0.205)	0.241	(0.208)
1997 Financial Crisis Cohort	0.180	(0.326)	0.158	(0.329)
1950 War Cohort	0.231	(0.866)	0.198	(0.854)
Trust in President	-0.823**	(0.165)	-0.820**	(0.166)
Trust in Nat'l Assembly	0.440*	(0.187)	0.425*	(0.189)
Trust in Party	0.274	(0.183)	0.288	(0.185)
Loser	0.598*	(0.282)	1.425	(0.935)
Non-partisan	0.351 [†]	(0.205)	-0.642	(0.766)
Loyalty to the Uri Party	-0.191**	(0.042)	-0.264**	(0.076)
Loser*Loyalty(Uri)			-0.029	(0.128)
Non-partisan*Loyalty(Uri)			0.159 [†]	(0.095)
Ideology(Conserv.)	0.116**	(0.043)	0.162*	(0.067)
Loser*Ideology			-0.163	(0.121)
Non-partisan*Ideology			0.008	(0.095)
Intercept	0.842	(0.570)	1.187	(0.737)

Continued...

Table G.1 (cont'd)

	Model G.1		Model G.2	
Strongly Opposed vs. Supportive				
Honam	-1.565**	(0.551)	-1.571**	(0.553)
Youngnam	-0.207	(0.334)	-0.212	(0.337)
Choongchung	0.230	(0.470)	0.266	(0.477)
Kangwon	0.861	(0.587)	0.814	(0.588)
Education	-0.094	(0.085)	-0.096	(0.086)
Female	0.145	(0.267)	0.142	(0.269)
1987 Democracy Cohort	0.927**	(0.300)	0.908**	(0.303)
1997 Financial Crisis Cohort	1.166**	(0.425)	1.152**	(0.428)
1950 War Cohort	0.764	(1.283)	0.788	(1.238)
Trust in President	-1.845**	(0.257)	-1.868**	(0.261)
Trust in Nat'l Assembly	1.058**	(0.264)	1.047**	(0.267)
Trust in Party	0.625*	(0.277)	0.631*	(0.278)
Loser	0.284	(0.373)	0.581	(1.144)
Non-partisan	-0.581 [†]	(0.320)	-1.681	(1.078)
Loyalty to the Uri Party	-0.525**	(0.062)	-0.492**	(0.109)
Loser*Loyalty(Uri)			-0.136	(0.167)
Non-partisan*Loyalty(Uri)			-0.016	(0.144)
Ideology(Conserv.)	0.287**	(0.062)	0.198 [†]	(0.102)
Loser*Ideology			0.076	(0.157)
Non-partisan*Ideology			0.214	(0.158)
Intercept	1.637*	(0.797)	1.989*	(0.981)
Strongly Opposed vs. Strongly Supportive				
Honam	-0.372	(0.738)	-0.237	(0.748)
Youngnam	0.380	(0.474)	0.373	(0.491)
Choongchung	1.254*	(0.628)	1.498*	(0.639)
Kangwon	0.003	(1.166)	0.064	(1.171)
Education	-0.052	(0.124)	-0.037	(0.127)

Continued...

Table G.1 (cont'd)

	Model G.1		Model G.2	
Female	-0.489	(0.409)	-0.584	(0.417)
1987 Democracy Cohort	0.925 [†]	(0.488)	0.997*	(0.500)
1997 Financial Crisis Cohort	1.699**	(0.582)	1.709**	(0.604)
1950 War Cohort	1.801	(1.384)	1.666	(1.387)
Trust in President	-2.220**	(0.389)	-2.263**	(0.390)
Trust in Nat'l Assembly	0.794*	(0.395)	0.923*	(0.407)
Trust in Party	0.440	(0.392)	0.331	(0.396)
Loser	0.845	(0.588)	-0.106	(1.727)
Non-partisan	-0.064	(0.556)	-3.009 [†]	(1.720)
Loyalty to the Uri Party	-0.466**	(0.090)	-0.312 [†]	(0.172)
Loser*Loyalty(Uri)			-0.459 [†]	(0.247)
Non-partisan*Loyalty(Uri)			0.041	(0.215)
Ideology(Conserv.)	0.272**	(0.090)	-0.242	(0.203)
Loser*Ideology			0.594*	(0.255)
Non-partisan*Ideology			0.657*	(0.260)
Intercept	-0.103	(1.203)	1.201	(1.523)
N		835		835
Log-likelihood		-715.395		-703.575
$\chi^2_{(48/60)}$		525.222		548.864

^a Omitted category is Seoul and Kyunggi Region

^b Omitted category is the 2002 Presidential Election Cohort (Born in & after 1969)

[†]p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Appendix H

CHAPTER 5: MODELS FOR NONVOTER'S SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES (OVER 5% INCREASE)

Table H.1: Chapter 5: Models for Nonvoter's Substantial Changes

	Model H.1	Model H.2	Model H.3	Model H.4	Model H.5
Winning Coalition (W)	0.227 (0.720)	-0.493 (0.992)	1.062 (2.194)	0.776 (2.209)	2.465 (3.270)
W_x	0.848* (0.353)	1.468** (0.533)			-0.978 (1.562)
Selectorate	-1.405** (0.189)	-1.679** (0.241)	-1.383** (0.279)	-1.449** (0.281)	-1.411** (0.282)
Age	-0.005 (0.016)	0.019** (0.006)	0.051** (0.016)	0.047** (0.016)	0.045** (0.017)
Age_x	0.014 [†] (0.008)				
5% Nonvoter Dummy	0.337** (0.115)	0.347* (0.142)	0.225 (0.152)	1.043** (0.344)	0.793* (0.391)
ΔMass Threat	-0.265 (0.212)	0.223** (0.080)	0.954** (0.181)	1.027** (0.170)	0.898** (0.189)
ΔMass Threat_x	0.301** (0.110)				
Oil		-0.087** (0.029)	-0.072* (0.031)	-0.066* (0.032)	-0.070* (0.032)
Oil_x		0.036** (0.014)	0.034** (0.013)	0.032* (0.013)	0.033* (0.013)
Aid as %GDP		-0.019 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.046)	-0.022 (0.047)	-0.021 (0.047)
Growth	-0.032**	-0.035**	-0.051 [†]	-0.047	-0.044

Continued...

Table H.1 (cont'd)

	Model H.1	Model H.2	Model H.3	Model H.4	Model H.5
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Ln(GDPpc)	0.035	0.281	-0.259	-0.281 [†]	-0.252
	(0.118)	(0.182)	(0.169)	(0.170)	(0.172)
Ln(GDPpc)_x	-0.016	-0.113			
	(0.057)	(0.093)			
2-Way Interaction					
W * Age			-0.109**	-0.099**	-0.120**
			(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.041)
W * Age_x			0.035**	0.033**	0.047*
			(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.022)
W * Oil			-0.007	-0.008	-0.007
			(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)
W * Aid			0.012	0.019	0.018
			(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.066)
W * Growth			0.034	0.027	0.023
			(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.047)
W * Ln(GDPpc)			0.524*	0.552*	0.516*
			(0.243)	(0.244)	(0.247)
W * ΔMass Threat			-1.520**	-1.481**	-1.400**
			(0.254)	(0.261)	(0.270)
W * 5% Nonvoter				-1.162*	-0.847
				(0.497)	(0.547)
5% Nonvoter * ΔMass Threat			0.393*		0.288 [†]
			(0.158)		(0.173)
N	3198	1713	1713	1713	1713
Log-likelihood	-2286.499	-1220.863	-1185.853	-1186.237	-1184.535
χ^2	199.314	128.479	198.501	197.732	201.135

Continued...

Table H.1 (cont'd)

	Model H.1	Model H.2	Model H.3	Model H.4	Model H.5
†p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001					

Appendix I

CHAPTER 5: VARIANCE INFLATION FACTOR

Table I.1: Chapter 5: VIF from Model 2

(a) Before Demeaning (Free Press, GDP pc., Population)		(b) After Demeaning (z_Free Press, z_GDP pc., z_Population)	
Variable	VIF	Variable	VIF
Lag Mass	1.12	Lag Mass	1.06
W	183.87	W	1.51
Δ Nonvoter	6.01	Δ Nonvoter	5.96
Δ Loser	13.42	Δ Loser	12.54
Free Press(F.P.)	15.43	z_Free Press(F.P.)	5.58
Earthquake	7.63	Earthquake	6.83
GDP pc.	8.68	z_GDP pc.	5.66
Growth	4.35	Growth	4.33
Population	7.28	z_Population	4.41
W*GDP pc.	66.29	W*z_GDP pc.	5.97
W*Growth	4.70	W*Growth	4.70
W*Population	164.59	W*z_Population	4.74
W*Free Press	31.96	W*z_Free Press	5.67
W*Earthquake	7.56	W*Earthquake	7.03
W* Δ Nonvoter	8.96	W* Δ Nonvoter	5.77
W* Δ Loser	19.28	W* Δ Loser	12.80
Δ Nonvoter*F.P.	4.97	Δ Nonvoter*z_F.P.	1.78
Δ Loser*F.P.	7.64	Δ Loser*z_F.P.	2.02
Mean VIF	31.32	Mean VIF	5.46

Appendix J
CHAPTER 5: GOODNESS OF FIT

Figure J.1: Predicted Effects of Electoral Mobilization on Revolutionary Movements with the Low or High Press Freedom Interaction (3-way interaction)




Figure J.2: Goodness of Fit (Model 4)




Figure J.3: Goodness of Fit (Model 5)




Figure J.4: Goodness of Fit (Model 6)




Figure J.5: Goodness of Fit (Model 7)





Figure J.6: Goodness of Fit (Model 8)



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