

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled


THE PARISIAN REFORMS OF ETIENNE
MARCEL AND BISHOP LECOCQ, 1351-1358

presented by

Herbert LeRoy Haney

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Master of Arts degree in History


Major professor

Date May 28, 1952

THE PARISIAN REFORMS OF ETIENNE MARCEL AND
BISHOP LECOQ, 1351-1358

By

Herbert LeRoy Haney

A THESIS

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of
Michigan State College of Agriculture and
Applied Science in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for
the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1952

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. LOUIS X THE HEADSTRONG AND PHILIP VI OF VALOIS.....	7
III. JOHN II THE GOOD TO THE EVE OF POITIERS.....	14
IV. POITIERS AND THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH....	26
V. THE ACME OF THE REFORM ERA AND ROYAL COUNTERSTRATAGEM.....	52
VI. PARISIAN REBELLION AND THE PEASANTS' SOCIAL INSURRECTION.....	88
VII. THE CLOSE OF THE PARISIAN REBELLION.....	105
VIII. REWARD, REVENGE, REACTION.....	120
IX. CONCLUSION.....	126
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.....	141
APPENDIX.....	154

CHAPTER I

Introduction

There occurred in the city of Paris in the fourteenth century an attempt to create what was, in effect, a limited monarchy. It was one of the earliest, if not the first in France, that can be considered modern in social, economic, and political aspects. In general, this movement of 1351-58 is an early link in an almost Darwinian evolutionary chain which culminated in 1789, and similiar demands would be echoed and re-echoed even after that.

Like all upheavals in the history of mankind, such periods of dramatic reformation and revolution are often considered by some to originate from what might be called spontaneous generation rather than definite causes. Few, if any, such eras of social unrest ever have proved, upon closer examination, to be either a result of inexplicable spontaneity or capable of vanishing from history without results. The reform period of Etienne Marcel and Bishop Robert Lecoq is certainly no exception!

Its short duration was dramatic and had its share of excesses; its results are not yet fully realized; and its reasons for occurrence were a manifold of economic, political, military, and social events.

The work of the French reformers, Etienne Marcel and Bishop Lecoq, occurred in the first phase of the Hundred Years' War, that is 1337-60. These reformers, with their predecessors in Italy, Spain, Flanders, and England, are responsible for the continuation of what might be called a middle-class democratic reform movement. This study is planned to present a detailed history of a portion of this movement, that is, the period from 1351 to 1358.

The first thing to be understood is the fact that this Parisian reformation movement was not an isolated event in its era. Secondly, that this was not primarily a rising of the proletariat--if some dramatic, yet entirely ineffectual, events are excepted; and such exceptions will be dealt with in the proper chronological order of events. It was a continuation of what has been called the European social struggle of noble versus the non-noble:¹ a struggle mainly conducted by the bourgeois

1. This appears to be a very simple, yet adequate, description of the general European trend in the fourteenth century as examined by French historians. The part played by the proletariat, of course, varied in different countries.

against an aristocracy of noble birth in which the proletariat, when employed, was merely the necessary tool of revolution or resistance against it; consequently, the masses seem to have been employed just about as often by one faction as by the other. In the third place, during this period, nationalism was not evidenced as we see it today. Nationalism existed only among the very high nobility, if it existed at all. Men of the Ile-de-France considered themselves loyal Frenchmen; but if the remainder of the French were nationalists, they were nationalists subject first to their social rank then to their duchy, province, or town and finally to France. The only common bond that even approached the emotion of nationalism was their loyalty to the king which will be found more powerful than it seemed at certain times. Many areas, although tied traditionally by feudal contract to France, had such powerful outside interests that when a choice of allegiance became necessary, they were as apt to choose England as France and frequently did so.

Finally, such a period of reform as Paris produced in 1351-58 can be considered one of the first in France, but it must not be treated as an early or isolated movement in Europe. The contest between noble and non-noble had long been practically

decided in favor of the bourgeois in most of the Italian communes. The nobility had either surrendered their traditional rights of supremacy to the commercial middle class or had joined them.¹ The non-noble was in control in Flanders for varying lengths of time that were mainly conditioned by the sympathies of their Count for them and the strength or weakness of the current French king to whom he owed feudal homage. Prior to 1337, the non-nobles had been completely curtailed by their defeat by the French king at Cassel in 1328 only to recoup during the prosperous period under their merchant leader, Jacob van Artevelde, during the eight years he controlled Flanders.² In Spain,

1. See any reliable source on the Italian commune movement: Henri Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe (N.Y., n.d.; trans. by I. E. Clegg), pp. 55-57; H. A. Taine, Italy, Florence and Venice (N.Y., 1889), passim; F. Schevill, History of Florence, Siena (N.Y., 1909); Villani's Chronicle (N.Y., 1907, trans. by Rose E. Self).

2. Henry S. Lucas, The Low Countries and the Hundred Years' War, 1326-1347 (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1929), pp. 227-557, passim. The similarity between aspects in the careers of the Flemish merchant, van Artevelde, and the Parisian, Etienne Marcel, is remarkable. The works of the Belgian historian, Henri Pirenne, or the medieval works of the well-known Sir John Froissart are also valuable on the Flemings of the fourteenth century.

1350 to 1400 was the high period of control and limitation to the monarch by the Spanish Cortes.¹ Surrounded by such examples of bourgeois liberty, the object-lessons were not lost to some Frenchmen, as will be evident during the years of 1351-58.

It is beyond the scope of this study to more than mention the decisive battles of the Hundred Years' War occurring before Poitiers. It is sufficient to mention that the hostilities began with some piratical raids on the southern coast of France and the French royal invasions into Guienne, the remnant of the Angevin Empire. Edward III now prepared,² retaliated with archers firing from the decks of his fleet in the naval victories off Cadzand in 1337 and Sluys (Ecluse) in 1340.³ War was formally declared in 1339, and Edward, after suffering the inevitable loss of his

1. Roger Bigelow Merriman, "The Cortes of the Spanish Kingdoms in the Later Middle Ages," American Historical Review, vol. 16 (1910-11), p. 484.

2. See the excellent account of the methods used by Edward III to raise immediate funds in George Sayles, "The 'English Company' and a Merchants Oath," Speculum, vol. 6 (1931), pp. 177-205. He farmed the collection of customs, borrowed from Lombard bankers, and entered into the wool trade himself, and gave further concessions to his parliament for war subsidies.

3. H. R. Clinton, From Crecy to Assye: Being Five Centuries of Military History of England (London, n.d.) pp. 13-17. Hereafter cited as H. R. Clinton, Military History. A history of the military carefully gleaned from the contemporary chroniclers but subject to their exaggerations.

mercenary allies, won the decisive battle of Crecy-en-Ponthieu on 26 August 1346. It was a battle of a small, well-organized English force equipped with potent "secret weapons," the yeoman and his longbow, against a French chivalry employing exactly the same valorous, yet inefficient, crusader-type tactics against a foe which was neither infidel nor disorganized.¹ The loss to the French military was great, but not irreplaceable, but the loss in prestige by the noble class--in the eyes of the bourgeois, at least--was tremendous. When coupled with the rising use of artillery, it becomes extremely significant in the period following. By the decisive French defeat at Crecy, this study is placed correctly in historical chronology.

1. Chronicles of England, France, Spain, and the Adjoining Countries, from the Latter Part of the Reign of Edward II, to the Coronation of Henry IV by Sir John Froissart (N.Y., 1880; trans. by Thomas Johnes), chaps. 127-131, pp. 80-83. Hereafter cited as Froissart, Chronicles.

CHAPTER II

Louis X the Headstrong and Philip VI of Valois

Prior to the Hundred Years' War of 1337-1453, France had been quite prosperous; in fact, so prosperous that Philip VI had seriously considered a crusade in 1332. After 1440, however, conditions became worse, and the progressive ravages of the war and the constant threat of a return to anarchy brought a mounting inefficiency not only in the conduct of the war but also in governmental administration. It was from this realm-wide corruption and inefficiency that the desire for reform was to spring. True, there had been mild efforts in the direction of limiting Capetian absolutism before; but these efforts had been localized, for the most part, in commercially developed Norman regions. The earliest assembly that could be called a States-General, seems to have occurred in Philip IV's reign.¹ The traditional

1. F. D. Secousse, ed., Ordonnances des roys de la troisieme race, recueillies par ordre chronologique (Paris, 1732, 1734), I, 354-355. Hereafter cited as Ordonnances des roys.

local-type assemblies, held in Normandy in March¹ and July² 1315, are more significant to this study in that they specifically limited Louis X the Headstrong by decreeing that extraordinary revenues would be levied only in case of dire necessity³ and judicial cases decided in Rouen are not to be carried to parlement in Paris.⁴ The Ordinance of July 1315 appears to be the first to consider aide for war expenses before the actual imposts were allowed, and this ordinance was to be known as the famous Norman Charter granted to Normandy, Brittany, Burgundy and Picardy. Taken in all, the charter was comparatively weak, for no method of enforcement was provided; nevertheless, the house of Harcourt,⁵ led by the doughty Godfrey d'Harcourt, was destined to insist repeatedly that the early Valois kings respect the charter. When they did not,⁶ he was

1. Ibid., pp. 551, 552.

2. Ibid., pp. 585, 587.

3. Ibid., p. 551.

4. Ibid., p. 551, 552.

5. In Normandy. See Map III

6. Roland Delachenal, ed., Les Grandes Chroniques de France: Chronique des Règnes de Jean II et de Charles V (Paris, 1810), I, pp. 89-90. Hereafter cited as Grandes Chroniques; Simeon Luce, ed., Chroniques de J. Froissart: Depuis les préliminaires de la bataille de Poitiers jusqu'à l'expédition d'Edouard III en Champagne et dans l'île de France (Paris, 1862), VI, 74-78. Hereafter cited as Chroniques de J. Froissart (Luce).

to ally with their enemies and fight them intermittently, but furiously, to the end of his life.¹ Just as the corruption and inefficiency within France from 1337 to 1351 brought the desire for reform so the Norman charter of 1315 set the precedent.

The States-General system was used at irregular intervals throughout the reign of Philip VI of Valois, and an assembly in 1342 instituted the gabelle,² the despised salt tax which was to endure to 1789. Another States-General of 15 February 1346 was to enact thirteen articles demanding concessions before aide.³ This ordinance was soon followed by the French defeat at Crecy, but demands before taxation were to continue from these thirteen in 1346 and twenty-one in 1348 to sixty-one contained in the Grand Ordinance of 1357.⁴ The evolution toward a limited monarchy in France had begun.

1. T. Rymer, ed., Foedera, conventiones, littarae, et cujuscunque generis acta publica inter reges Angliae et alios quosvis imperatores, reges, pontifices, principes, vel communitates (London, 1816-30), III, 44. Hereafter cited as Foedera.

2. Ordonnances des roys, II, 179.

3. Ibid., pp. 238, 241.

4. Dupont-Ferrier, ed., Etudes sur les institutions financières de la France a la fin du moyen âge (Paris, 1932), I, 62-63. Hereafter cited as "Les institutions financières de la France."

Customary to all these early assemblies were royal letters of invitation. Each of the towns, the bonne villes, were to send three or four men. Often, in case the king made what they considered unreasonable tax demands, they would resort to a convenient excuse: they must return home for further instructions. As "home" in France was frequently at a considerable distance, the time thus consumed usually compelled the king to seek other methods of getting the money. This refuge or tool, however, was soon removed by Philip VI. He decreed in 1347 that the representatives were to be fully instructed and to have full powers of action before they came to any future assemblies.¹ This date appears to mark the beginning of the pre-instructions or cahiers of French representatives.

The many methods used to try to raise the necessary imposts for this period started with a sales tax in many of the rural villages of four deniers per livre--two deniers by the vender and two by the buyer.² By 27 October 1337 Paris was

1. Varin, Archives Administratives de la Ville de Reims (Paris, 1843) II, 1161-1162. Cited in Charles Holt Taylor, "An Assembly of French Towns in March, 1318," Speculum, vol. 13 (1938), p. 301.

2. A. Vuitry, ed., Etudes sur le régime financier de la France avant le révolution de 1789: Quatrième Etude Le Régime Financier de la France sous les Trois Premiers Valois (Paris, 1879-83), I, 11. Hereafter cited as La régime financier de la France.

covered by a similar tax. Even at this early period, although Paris offered four hundred men-at-arms equipped for six months, they stipulated the offer was good if, and only if, the king made war in person.¹ Here, also, is encountered a stipulation which was continued throughout the period of 1351-58. No ranks of society were tax-exempt. Exemptions were allowed by an ordinance to the university members, ecclesiastics, and civil servants; but these persons were immediately made liable for a special impost ranging from one per cent of annual income for the lowly sergent to one silver mark on the higher incomes.²

It is also in the reign of Philip VI of Valois that the royal Grand Council first becomes the Secret Conseil. It would be retained in full strength by John II and the Dauphin Charles, and would be one of the principle targets of the reformers of 1351-58. Of importance in later events are Simon de Buey and Jean Chauveau who are specifically mentioned as members of Philip VI's Secret Conseil at this time.³ Proof of the

1. Ibid., p. 14.

2. Ibid., p. 15.

3. Noel Valois, ed., Inventaire des arrêts du conseil d'état; règne de Henri IV (Paris, 1883), I, Introduction p. xxiii. Hereafter cited as, N. Valois, Inventaire des arrêts. du Conseil d'Etat.

continued use by John II of the Secret Council is found in the official ordinances of the realm. One states quite definitely that Simon de Bucy, the Duke d'Athens, Jean de Clermont, and others are members of "nostre Secret Conseil."¹

Philip VI of Valois, of course, bore the brunt of the English attacks after Flanders, for it was he who led the pride of the French chivalry against the English archers in 1346 at Crecy with little apparent preparations for facing their yeoman troops with their longbows.² Massed on the decks of the English ships at Cadsand (1337) and Sluys (1340), these yeoman troops had decisively aided in the victories over the Flemish and French, and now they turned Crecy into a disastrous defeat for the French chivalry.³

Philip VI also started the process of alienating the house of Evreux-Navarre⁴ by reclaiming certain of the lands allotted to the daughter of Louis X who was the mother of Charles the Bad. This started a policy which was destined to be quite significant during the reform era of 1351-58.

1. Ibid., xxiv.

2. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 129, pp. 81-82.

3. Ibid.

4. See Map III.

In 1348-49 the war stopped while the people of England and France struggled through the severe epidemic called the Black Death. Philip lost his wife during the plague,¹ and married the young sister of the Charles the Bad of Evreux-Navarre. Had this marriage been allowed to endure perhaps a reconciliation between the house of Evreux-Navarre and the Valois kings might have been possible; but just seven months after the marriage, on 22 August 1350, Philip died; and this reconciliation, unfortunately for France, was not achieved.

1. Helen Robbins, "A Comparison of the Effects of the Black Death on the Economic Organization of France and England," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 36 (1928), p. 449.

CHAPTER III

John II the Good to the Eve of Poitiers

John, the duke of Normandy, ascended to the French throne on 26 September 1350 as Philip VI's eldest son only to receive as a legacy a realm partly devastated by war, greatly troubled by the after-effects of the plague, and aggravated by a financial crisis hardly to be paralleled in French History. The realm needed a strong and able leader. John II the Good was not that man! One of his first acts was to execute Raoul, the Count of Eu and Guines, who had been an English captive since the capture of Caen.¹ When the English had allowed the count to return to get his ransom, John II immediately tried him for treason presumably so he could advance a favorite, Charles of Spain,² to the

1. Chroniques de J. Froissart (Luce), IV, Introduction, p. xiviii.

2. Charles of Spain was the second son of Alfonse X of Spain, and grandson of Alfonse de la Cerda who was the son of Ferdinand de la Cerda of Castile and Blanche, daughter of Louis IX of France. This made Charles the great grandson of Louis IX. He was a refugee in France due to the usurpation of his uncle, Sancho IV. F. T. Perrens, Etienne Marcel, prévôt des marchands, 1354-1358 (Paris, 1874), p. 65 n. 1. Hereafter cited as F. T. Perrens, Etienne Marcel.

Count of Eu's post of constable of France.¹ John did make Charles of Spain the constable of France in January 1350 and, by continuing his father's policy, he alienated the heir of the house of Evreux-Navarre, Charles the Bad, by giving his lands in Champagne and Brie to the new constable.² The tempers of John II and Charles the Bad had already clashed when John unsuccessfully plotted against Charles and his two brothers,³ and this new complication did nothing to placate Charles. On 6 or 8 January 1354, Charles of Spain was assassinated while hunting about twenty miles from Nonnancourt in Evreux, which was promptly

1. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 153, pp. 97-98; C. W. Previte-Orton, A History of Europe from 1198 to 1378 (N.Y., 1937), pp. 284-285. Another assumption is possible. The Count of Eu had so ingratiated himself with the English that his ransom was reduced, and he was allowed to return to collect it. John, with or without proof, may have thought that the count had ingratiated himself at the expense of France; however the assumption that the execution was really for John II's political favorite can not be so easily discounted.

2. Ibid.

3. Jules Viard and Eugène Déprez, eds., Chronique de Jean Le Bel (Paris, 1907), pp. 208-209. Hereafter cited as Jean Le Bel; Simeon Luce, ed., Chronique des Quatre Premiers Valois (1327-1393) (Paris, 1862), p. 35. Hereafter cited as Chronique des Quatre Valois.

ascribed to the orders of Charles the Bad.¹ This, of course, aggravated John thoroughly, in turn; but, upon the insistent avowal by Charles the Bad that he had been justified²--and influenced by John's knowledge of the potential power of Charles and the possibility of further alliances with the English enemy or other malcontents within France³--John pardoned Charles the Bad by the treaty of Mantes on 22 February 1354. This appears to be the first time Bishop Robert Lecoq, who had been, since 1353, a member of John II's Grand Council, encountered Charles the Bad personally.

1. Roland Delachenal, ed., "Premières négociations de Charles le Mauvais avec les Anglais," Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des chartes, LXI (1900), p. 353. Hereafter cited as Negotiations de Charles le Mauvais avec les Anglais; Noel Valois, Le Conseil du Roi aux XIV^e, XV^e et XVI^e siècles: Nouvelle recherches suivies d'arrêts et de procès-verbaux du conseil (Paris, 1888) p. 11. Hereafter cited as Procès-verbaux du conseil du Roi. Versions differ on this assassination. Froissart, Chronicles in chapter 153, p. 98; Matteo Villini, I, III, c. xvc, Rer, Italic. script. t., xxiv, col. 220; as cited in F. T. Perrens, Etienne Marcel, p. 67. Both assert the marshal was killed in bed. The version used in this study seems more logical.

2. "Lettres Closes, en forme de circulaire, de Charles-Le-Mauvais, Roi de Navarre, Relatives a l'assassinate de Charles d'Espagne, Connetable de France," Société de l'histoire de France Bulletin, I (1834), pt. 2, pp. 25-27. Hereafter cited as Lettres closes, de Charles-Le-Mauvais, relatives à l'assassination de Charles d'Espagne. Letters were sent by Charles the Bad to various towns of the realm and to the Grand Council of the king of France.

3. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 153, p. 98.

He represented the king, and arranged the Treaty of Mantes with Charles the Bad.¹ The price demanded from Charles the Bad was further royal encroachments on his Evreux-Navarrese holdings, but he was given pardon and promised annuities.²

These concessions did not satisfy Charles the Bad. It was not until Edward III was actually scheduled to invade France in alliance with Charles that John was again able to draw Charles away by the treaty of Valognes on 10 September 1355 plus the promise of his daughter,³ Jeanne, in marriage when she reached the proper age.⁴ This appears more logical in as much as the eldest son of John II was only three or four years younger than Charles the Bad; and, despite the fact that Froissart

1. Douët-D'Arcq, ed., "Act d'Accusation contre Robert Le Coq, Evêque de Laon," Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des chartes, II (1940-41), p. 362. Hereafter cited as Act d'Accusation.

2. Ibid., p. 355.

3. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 153, p. 98. He writes "sister" of John; but as Charles the Bad was only three or four years older than John's son, the Dauphin, it seems unlikely he would marry a sister of John. Most chronological tables maintain he married the daughter of John. Charles the Bad was born in 1332, the Dauphin Charles in 1336 or 1337. Froissart contradicts himself in the following paragraph by maintaining the king of Navarre was married to the "king of France's daughter."

4. Negotiations de Charles le Mauvais avec les Anglais, p. 270.

maintains that Charles the Bad was married prior to the treaty of Mantes in 1354,¹ Jeanne was the fifth child of John, and if the Dauphin reached his majority in 1358,² a fifth child could not have been more than betrothed to Charles the Bad. John was momentarily successful, for Edward III arrived in 1355, and could stay for only a short time.³

Then by a succession of negotiations from 26 August 1355 to the culmination of a formal alliance in May of 1356, John II allied France with the Emperor, Charles IV.⁴ By June of 1356, less than three months from Poitiers, John II appeared to have solved his military problems.

-
1. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 153, p. 98.
 2. Grandes Chroniques, I, 161.
 3. Jean Le Bel, II, 212; Simeon Luce, ed.
 4. B. Mendl and F. Quirk, eds., "Les relations politiques entre l'empereur et le roi de France de 1355 a 1356," Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, VIII (1929), pp. 472, 503-513. Hereafter cited as Les relations entre l'empereur et le roi de France.

John II, as it has been mentioned, faced in 1350 a difficult financial situation. He had inherited his father's debts; and immediately, he was forced to confiscate the goods and securities of foreign merchants and to decree a moratorium on 26 September 1351 on payments of the royal debts.¹ He had to continue all the imposts of his father; and from 1328 to 1355 the currency was modified at least 22 times² while his enemy, Edward III, with all his economic problems, was only to modify the pound sterling three times.³ On the eve of Poitiers, John II's financial problems were no nearer solution than they had been in 1350.

John II, at his accession, also faced a problem within his own family and among his advisers which was, in the end, to prove as serious as any. According to an anonymous, contemporary document of the day,⁴ John's eldest son, the Dauphin Charles,

1. Ordonnances des roys, II, 449.

2. Helen Robbins, "Comparison of Black Death of France and England," p. 457.

3. In 1345 the pound sterling was inflated 8 per cent or from 20 shillings to 22; 1347, inflated 1 per cent or 4 deniers; 1354, inflated to 25 shillings or 8 per cent. Earl of Liverpool, Coins of the Realm (London, 1880), p. 39; Rotuli Parliamentorum: ut et petitiones et placita in Parlamento tempore Edwardi R. III, II, 18. Cited in Helen Robbins, "Comparison of Black Death of France and England," p. 460.

4. Act d'Accusation, p. 368.

then only seventeen, was persuaded by a civil official of the king, Robert Lecoq, to join Charles the Bad and the Harcourt family in a plot on the life of the king. There is considerable doubt that either Robert Lecoq or the Dauphin were implicated or that the plot even existed; for the document, though contemporary, is undated, anonymous, and article twenty-two which contains the plans has not been substantiated elsewhere.¹ The fact remains that the suspicion of such a plot caused John to make one of the most costly blunders he was to commit for himself and for France. Just after the able Count Godfroy d'Harcourt had made the new duke of Normandy--now the Dauphin Charles--reaffirm the Norman Charter of 1315, an apparently innocent baptism ceremony was scheduled at Beauke-Beauvais. To the ceremony the Dauphin Charles had invited Charles the Bad, a relative about his own age, the Harcourt family, and other Norman nobles. They were interrupted by a warning from someone, probably Robert Lecoq who was in John II's council,² that the king and his troops were on the way.

1. The document is very valuable in other aspects, however, but it constantly overstates facts which can be substantiated elsewhere. Others, as this one, can not be proved at all.

2. Ordonnances des roys, III, 682.

The party fled to Mainneville then on to Rouen on 6 April 1356. John hurried after them; seized the castle, and beheaded three Normans and a nephew of Jean d'Harcourt without any pretense of a trial.¹ The townspeople of Rouen, a very old commune with extensive and independent municipal rights,² and most of Normandy viewed this extralegal act of royal absolutism as a very unfriendly gesture. It can be recalled that the Norman Charter of 1315 strictly forbade any interference with local justice in Normandy.³ For some time in the future they were to raise a very active opposition to the Valois house stemming partly from this act.

So far as John--or France for that matter--was concerned, he was only successful at Rouen in part, for the wily Godfroy d'Harcourt had warned his family to stay away from the ceremony, and had wisely remained afar from the trap himself. John did, however, lead the troublesome Charles the Bad off to prison in Paris--also without trial; and his provost of merchants, Etienne Marcel, appears to

1. Act d'Accusation, p. 369.

2. Dating from the age of Philip II Augustus. Joseph Strayer, The Administration of Normandy under Saint Louis (Cambridge, Mass., 1932), p. 86.

3. Ordonnances des roys, I, . 551, 552.

have been in full accord with the king's actions at this time.¹ In this act John probably considered himself quite successful, but it was to cause his Dauphin far more difficulty than it ever settled. He did nothing at this time--or at any time, for that matter--to Bishop Robert Lecoq or the Dauphin which is strong indication that he did not find that they were in any way implicated in the plot. The bishop of Laon, Robert Lecoq, was retained in his official capacity. The Dauphin continued in his good graces. He was even allowed twenty-six thousand livres, for the proposed trip to visit his uncle, the Emperor Charles IV. The trip which the "Act d'Accusation contre Robert Lecoq, Eveque de Laon" maintained was for the purpose of enlisting the aid of Charles IV in a plot against John II's life.² The Harcourts and the house of Navarre were definitely implicated, if not in a plot on his life, at least in alliances with the English. On 24 June, 1356 Philip of Navarre and Godfroy of

1. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 155, pp. 99-100; Roland Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V (Paris, 1909), I, 165 n. 4. Hereafter cited as R. Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V.

2. Ordonnances des roys, III, 47; R. Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V, I, 119, n. 5.

Harcourt went to England under safe-conduct to discuss further alliances.¹ By his foiling of the plot at Rouen--if plot it was--John II thought he had solved his family dissension and the internal difficulties of France by 1356 and Poitiers.

In the line of administrative improvement, John II's first act after his coronation in September 1350 was to call, by royal letter to the Bishop of Laon--the predecessor of Bishop Robert Lecoq--a States-General made up of "...prelates, dukes, counts, barons, townsmen and other wise persons of his realm..." to meet at Paris 16 February 1351.² At this time a States-General called anywhere in France was an admission of defeat by the monarch. In other words, the government admitted to the people that it was incapable of coping with existing conditions, and called for the aid of the people. This was always a dangerous practice in a France still bordering on anarchy with a nobility so fearful of any possible increase in the application of the theory of the sovereignty of the people, such as was stirring around them and across the channel, that it had been afraid to use bourgeois troops

1. Foedera, III, pt. 2, p. 331.

2. Ordonnances des roys, III, Introduction p. xxi.

to defend the realm. The king must have feared the calling of a States-General which would include a powerful third estate with exactly this same aristocratic fear, for he certainly could see the increase in the number of concessions demanded at each succeeding assembly, but conditions in France left him no other alternative. This will be even more apparent during the 1350's.

The fears were not groundless, for the States-General of February 1351 was a definite link between the early local assemblies of Normandy and France and the later reforming assemblies. Robert Lecoq¹ attended this States-General still as a member of the king's Grand Council.² Robert Lecoq's parents had been of the bourgeois class in Montdidier. His father, who was in the service of Philip VI, gave his son an excellent civil and canon law education,³ and having spent his youth among the officials of Philip VI, he was appointed an advocate for the king on 17 October 1347.⁴

1. The sole source for the life of Robert Lecoq prior to his advent as an enlightened spirit at this States-General is the Gallia Christiana in provincias ecclesiasticas distributa (Paris, 1751), IX, 548. Hereafter cited as Gallia Christiana. It is quoted by all writers discussing Bishop Lecoq.

2. Ordonnances des roys, II, 397.

3. Act d'Accusation, p. 365.

4. Ibid., p. 395.

He was destined to serve as royal adviser for Philip VI, John II, and the Dauphin Charles until 1358. The work of this States-General of 1351 was scarcely what John would have preferred, for the deputies demanded thirty-two concessions before they would authorize an aide to be raised by a sales tax of six deniers per livre,¹ and in the same ordinance, the members of the Grand Council were forbidden commercial affiliations of any type.² Paris agreed to a similar sales tax.³ Was Robert Lecoq, the future reformer, more than a royal civil servant and observer at this States-General?⁴ The nature of the limitations on the royal prerogatives seen in the articles of the ordinance would seem to bear this out; but in the absence of other evidence, it can only be conjectured.

1. Ordonnances des roys, II, . 393, 422-423.

2. Ibid., pp. 425-426.

3. Ibid., pp. 423, 425.

4. John II writes of him as his "trusty friend."
Ordonnances des roys, II, 393.

CHAPTER IV

Poitiers and the Immediate Aftermath.

It is difficult to visualize a king of France who faced a more foreboding task than did John II at his accession to the throne in 1350 directly in the shadow of the Black Plague and facing an inevitable resumption of the Hundred Years' War which certainly came in 1355. Faced with the new low in devaluation to 130^e pied¹ of his currency which followed this English invasion, he was forced to call another States-General for the next feast of St. Andrew, 30 November 1355.²

At this assembly Jean de Craon was the leader of the clergy as the Archbishop of Reims; Gauthier de Brienne and the duke d'Athenes led the noble order; but the provost of merchants, Etienne Marcel, was the leader of the third estate.³ Here is encountered,

1. F. de Sauley, ed., Recueil de documents relatifs à l'histoire des monnaies frappées par les rois de France depuis Philippe II jusqu'à François I (Paris, 1879-92), I, 344. Hereafter cited as Recueil des monnaies. Pied taken as of 9 November 1355. See Appendix, IV, V.

2. This was only the States-General of the Langue d'oïl of northern France distinctly separate from those of the South, the Langue d'oc. The line of separation was formed by the Dordogne and Garonne Rivers.

3. Grandes Chroniques, I, 56.

for the first major time, the second of the principal reformers of the period. He had been only a cloth merchant until his election to the provostship, but he had dealt often with the royal household in the pursuit of his trade.¹ This connection with the crown lends credence to the assertion that he was acquainted with the royal family.² Actually this representative of the tradesmen of Paris came from an old family of drapiers.³ He had married well; his first wife was a wealthy bourgeoisie, Jeanne de Dammartin; his second was an extremely wealthy daughter of the Essarts Family, and his children were intimates of the Dauphin Charles.⁴ His home in Paris was directly across from the Palace of Justice and on the corner of the street of the Vieille Draperie between Pont-au-change and Pont-Notre-Dame which was very advantageously situated for the part he was destined to play.⁵

At John II's States-General of 1355, however, Etienne Marcel was not yet a rebellious spirit, for his individual participation there was not even outstanding enough to warrant description in the

1. L. Douët-D'Arcq, ed., Comptes de l'Hotel des rois de France aux XIV^e et XV^e Siecles (Paris, 1865), passim. Hereafter cited as Douët-D'Arcq, Comptes de l'Hotel.

2. Jules Tessier, Etienne Marcel (Paris, 1889), p. 17. Hereafter cited as Jules Tessier, Etienne Marcel.

3. F. T. Perrens, Etienne Marcel, pp. 36-37.

4. M. de Wailly, Vie de St. Louis (Paris, n.d.), p. 129.

5. Jules Tessier, Etienne Marcel, p. 16. See Map I.

Grandes Chroniques; therefore, it must have been minor and mild indeed. The deputies were still avidly loyal to the king and the continuation of their war, but they were definitely of a reform-mind regarding the inefficiencies of the administration. They lost no time in passing the Ordinance of 28 December 1355.¹

This Ordinance included the work of earlier assemblies, and was a definite link toward the Grand Ordinance of 1357. Only a brief summary of the provisions of the Ordinance of 1355 will be given here, because everything found of use in it was included by the reform element of Paris in the sixty-one provisions of their Grand Ordinance. The articles of 1355 provided for nine superintendents-general, three from each order, who were to be the senior officials over the actual collectors of the taxes² (later to be called, élus). From all ranks of society were to come the necessary imposts,³ a gabelle on salt and an eight denier sales tax on each livre, for the war expenses.⁴ There were to be no further royal forced loans,⁵ no further dual

1. Ordonnances des roys, III, 19.

2. Ibid., art. 2, p. 22.

3. Froissart, Chronicles, chap., 154, p. 99.

4. Ordonnances des roys, III, art. 1, p. 22.

5. Ibid., art. 14, p. 29.

office holding,¹ and a curbing of the royal seizures of land for hunting preserves was requested.² The currency of the realm was to be stablized³ at 6 livres to the silver mark.⁴ This was a change from the inflationary 120^e pied to 24^e pied; and as far as the people were concerned, it reduced all cash on hand or debts to one fifth of their previous values. To the States-General, of course, it was an attempt to stablize the royal currency.

Of far greater importance in the light of the events which were to follow, were several other stipulations: The money collected for the war was to be handled by deputies not royal officials;⁵ article six provided for the States-General to be reconvened on 1 March 1356 by its own volition.⁶ Heretofore assemblies met only when and where the king desired. It also stipulated that no peace was to be concluded with the English without the deputies' permission;⁷ and that every man of the realm was to arm in accordance with his social rank.⁸ Here the nobles were able to insert a clause forbidding the

1. Ordonnances des roys, III, art. 21, 22, p. 32.

2. Ibid., art. 19, p. 31.

3. Ibid., art. 8, p. 26; art. 14, p. 28.

4. Approximately 8 oz. of silver.

5. Ordonnances des roys, III, art. 29, p. 35.

6. Ibid., art. 6, pp. 24-25.

7. Ibid., art. 27, p. 34.

8. Ibid., art 32, pp. 36-37.

mobilization of the rear-ban¹ of the people except in the gravest danger which, it will be seen, was to be never in their eyes. Had this latter handicap to the defense of France been omitted, compelling the French chivalry to lower its military prestige sufficiently to employ rear-ban infantry against longbowmen, the story in 1356 at Poitiers might have been quite different, for bowmen were middle-class.

Even this brief survey of the December Ordinance allows an assumption that if it had been successfully executed there might not have been a Grand Ordinance, a reformation or revolution of 1356-58, or conceivably many of the other Parisian revolutions to follow. Nevertheless, it was not successful chiefly due to the fact that the people refused to pay taxes or debts with a newly deflated currency devalued to one fifth of its pre-ordinance value.² For example, the Count d'Harcourt in Normandy and authorities in Evreux absolutely refused to collect the new imposts. From results such as these, the deputies obviously could not furnish the money nor the men-at-arms they had promised as concessions to John II for his relaxation of the royal power.³

1. The rear-ban was roughly analogous to the Anglo-Saxon fyrd or the later militia.

2. Recueil des monnaies, I, 344. The pied had been 1000 sous per mark in October, 1355; rose to 1200 sous per mark 9 November 1355 at Edward III's invasion; and now it had been suddenly changed to 240 sous per mark.

3. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 154, p. 99.

The States-General met again as scheduled on 12 March 1356¹ fully realizing that their last attempts had failed. They abolished all the sales taxes and the gabelle,² but they substituted a single income tax which seems very modern even when its schedules are examined today. It was levied on noble, burger, and ecclesiastic. It was an income tax based on all incomes of the people of the realm. Those having less than ten livres annual income paid a uniform ten sous, and those having over one hundred livres paid four livres with the remainder paying according to a graduated scale.³ Oddly it was not to be levied nor collected by royal officials but by the people themselves.⁴ This new method of collecting the imposts was to select a commission of three deputies composed of one from each estate in each locality. This commission was to select local collectors from each parish to accompany them into each home. There the householder was to declare the number residing with him and to evaluate his own property for the purpose of determining the amount of income tax due the crown.

1. Ordonnances des roys, IV, 171. By the old calendar, 1355.

2. Ibid., art. 8, pp. 172, 174.

3. Ibid., arts. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, pp. 171, 172, 173, 174, 175.

4. Ibid., art. 10, p. 175.

If the declaration seemed in conformity with the surroundings, the commissioners were to leave content; however, if not, they could summon the householder before the local authorities. There they could require such oaths before the parish priest as were necessary to determine his true worth. Should anyone in the cities, towns, or villages refuse to take the oath demanded, the commission could assess the property according to the general opinion of his neighbors.¹

The States-General then adjourned, but before this new method of taxation could be tested, France was to be reduced to an extremely low ebb; for the disastrous battle of Poitiers was to precede the next States-General.

This reduction followed the historic battle that took place on the plains of Maupertuis near Poitiers on the nineteenth of September in 1356. It was a military disaster, but it was outshadowed in that aspect by its effects politically, economically, and socially upon the future of France. This battle is by far the most important event leading to the revolution of 1356-58.

1. Ibid.

Briefly, Edward the Black Prince had been dispatched by his father, Edward III, to Guienne in the preceding year, November of 1355, with a small force presumably as a part of a vague plan for a three-pronged assault designed to place Edward III in Cambresis, the Earl of Lancaster in Brittany, and the Black Prince in Aquitaine.¹ After meeting little resistance at Carcassonne, Narbonne and Montpellier, the prince spent the winter of 1355-56 at Bordeaux. During that time, John II convoked his States-General of November, 1355; raised an army, and was able to drive the Earl of Lancaster back to Cherbourg, Normandy. In August of 1356 John heard that the Black Prince was marching toward Paris;² therefore, he turned from the North, and marched to cut off the prince from his winter base at Bordeaux.³ When the two armies neared each other in Poitou, John was so confident that he dismissed his bourgeois infantry.⁴ After a vain effort by Innocent VI's legate, the Cardinal of Perigord, to prevent the slaughter,⁵ the Black Prince would not accept John's harsh terms.

1. H. R. Clinton, Military History, pp. 51-56 passim.

2. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 156, p. 100.

3. H. R. Clinton, Military History, pp. 51-56 passim.

4. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 160, p. 102.

5. Ibid.

The following battle was very similar to Crecy (1346); but should not be considered the same, as it frequently is by most general histories, for the French military had learned the value of caution and rest; they had learned to use dismounted knights against bowmen; but they had not learned under what conditions a valorous cavalry charge could be successful.¹ Their first and second lines of mounted knights were practically decimated by the English archers stationed in the hedgerows. The Dauphin Charles, his brother, and the remnants of the second line soon retreated toward Paris taking with them eight hundred unused reinforcements. This left John with his troops dismounted, as per the new strategy, to hold the third French line. Although the king fought bravely, his troops were badly defeated by the lances of the Black Prince who had adopted some of the traditional French cavalry tactics, but knew when to use them.²

1. Auguste et Emile Molinier, eds., Chronique Normande du XIV^e Siècle (Paris, 1882) as analyzed by T. F. Tout, "Some Neglected Fights between Crecy and Poitiers," English Historical Review, 20 (1908), pp. 221-7.

2. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 163, 105-6; F. D. Secousse, ed., Recueil de pièces servant de preuves aux mémoires sur les troubles excités en France par Charles II, roi du Navarre et comte d'Evreux, surnomme le Mauvais (Paris, 1755), pp. 33-35, 44. Hereafter cited as Recueil de preuves.

Throughout, the French certainly could have used the bourgeois auxiliaries which John had dismissed so lightly, either because of the numerical superiority of his forces or as a concession to the social and military pride of his order, the chivalry, prior to crossing the Loire River for battle. Whatever can be conjectured, the fact remains that John and his fourth son, Philip, were captured.

Despite the habitual inaccuracy of the chroniclers concerning numbers of troops in the battles of the Middle Ages, some of the more reliable must be accepted. J. H. Ramsay, after a careful analysis, maintains the French could not have had over fifteen thousand, the English not over five thousand at Poitiers,¹ for Robert of Avesbury writes thirty-four hundred² plus auxiliaries, and Henry Knygton estimates four thousand³ for the English forces. When compared to Froissart's forty-eight thousand for the French,⁴ and two thousand men-at-arms and six thousand archers⁵ for the English, the discrepancy of Froissart can be suspected if J. H. Ramsay's analysis is accepted. If the estimates of

1. Chronicle of Henry Knygton, II, 14. Used by J. H. Ramsay, "The Strength of English Armies in the Middle Ages," English Historical Review, vol. 29 (1914), pp. 223-24.

2. Ibid. He quotes from Robert of Avesbury, Scalacron, p. 175.

3. Ibid. He quotes from the Chronicle of Henry Knygton, II, 14.

4. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 159, p. 102. Sixteen thousand in each of three lines of battle.

5. Ibid., chap. 156, p. 100.

the French forces are reduced proportionately, then Froissart's figures for the French losses can be accepted as sufficient cause for a defeat such as the French suffered at Poitiers.¹ He maintains that seventeen earls; an unspecified number of barons, knights, and squires; and, in all, some five or six thousand killed and ten thousand captured.² When allowance is made for his probable exaggeration in this also, the loss of a monarch and any such proportion of the French troops would certainly render the defeat by the small English force more acceptable in a military light. A defeat of some fifteen thousand troops by five thousand is far more likely. Such a loss for the second time within ten years by the French chivalry, when considered from all angles, is practically immeasurable. This time the losses of the nobility were so heavy that, with the exception of the bourgeois troops sent back and those deserting with the Dauphin, France was defenceless. Politically, she was without a monarch; economically, a king's ransom was to be obtained in a chaotic financial state of affairs; socially, the ruling class was completely discredited

1. Ibid., chap. 165, pp. 106-7.

2. Ibid.

by the bourgeoisie and by the lower classes to whom they would be unable to extend feudal protection or to enforce feudal discipline.¹ France now had all the combustible materials necessary for reform or revolution. It would not be long before they were ignited.

Why the Black Prince, with France at his feet, did not march directly against Paris can only be surmised. Probably he did not realize just how defenseless his opponent was at the time. Second, he had been short of supplies even before the battle. Third, he had only what remained of five thousand troops to march against a city of two hundred thousand. Whatever the combination of reasons which persuaded Prince Edward to continue to Bordeaux were, Paris certainly expected an immediate attack! Here the provost of merchants, Etienne Marcel, is seen at work, for it was he who directed the rebuilding of the old city walls of Philip Augustus.² There is no indication at this time of anything but complete understanding between the provost and the Dauphin Charles. Etienne was merely performing his customary duties among which were the charges of administering certain revenues, inspecting and

1. Henri Pirenne, A History of Europe from the Invasions to the XVI Century (N.Y., 1936, trans. by Bernard Mall), pp. 431-433.

2. Jules Tessier, Etienne Marcel, p. 19. See Map I.

maintenance of streets and gates, and to maintain the ramparts.¹

Here too Bishop Lecoq, the other reformer, is encountered again as the confidant of the Dauphin.² It should be recalled that they had been friendly enough in Normandy to be accused of a plot to murder John II. It should be realized that there was nothing in the manner, physical appearance, or experience of the Dauphin Charles to inspire respect from the Parisians. The day when the French were to title him, Charles le Sage,³ was for the future. He was a thin, weak-appearing young man not yet out of his adolescence who was accused of having just deserted his father at Poitiers;⁴ in fact, Paris had been so scornful of the returning troops that it was only with difficulty that they were allowed to enter the city.⁵ As a result, the Dauphin was practically without either military or civil supporters. The only thing he could do was call a States-General for 15 October 1356, and potential reformers were quite available to dominate it.

1. F. T. Perrens, Etienne Marcel, p. 34.

2. Act d'Accusation, p. 368.

3. S. Solente, Le livre des fois et bonnes meurs du sage Roy Charles V par Christine de Pisan, II (1930), passim.

4. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 161, p. 104.

5. Ibid., chap. 169, p. 109.

It was in the representation at this States-General that the first serious effects of Poitiers were visible so far as the prestige of the crown and the nobility was concerned.

The nobility were too thoroughly discredited by their defeat, as well as by the obvious reduction in their class, to attend in numbers sufficient to exercise their usual potent power. Witness the fact that they were led by a twenty-year-old uncle of the Dauphin, Philip of Orleans.¹ The peasant and craftsman were, as usual, only represented through any friends they may have had among the bourgeoisie. There is a slight distinction between the bourgeoisie and the remainder of the third estate.² This is seldom made, but should be noted as a distinction between the commercially wealthy bourgeoisie and the scholars, lawyers, civil servants, and small landholders included in the remainder of the third estate; however, for this discussion, their aims were similar enough to be grouped together under the term, bourgeoisie. This bourgeois representation was led in Paris by Etienne Marcel; his father, Giles, and his spokesman, the échevin, Charles Toussac.³

1. Grandes Chroniques, I, 76.

2. E. Boutaric, "Les Etats-Généraux de France," Revue des Questions Historiques, XIII (1873), pp. 262-63.

3. F. T. Perrens, Etienne Marcel, p. 34.

Échevins were assistants appointed entirely at the discretion of the provost of merchants and, in general, analogous to London aldermen. The representation also included deputies from Amiens, Orleans, Bourges, Sens, Vermandois, Senlis, Champagne, Brie, and La Rochelle.¹

The ecclesiastical representation, little reduced by Poitiers, was numerous with its superior clergy there almost to the man. They were led by the enlightened Archbishop Jean de Craon of Reims--ably seconded by Bishop Lecoq of Laon.² The clergy, as an order, seem to have been just as disgusted with the state of affairs and as eager for reform as the bourgeoisie.

These were the leaders of the some eight hundred deputies who met at the request of the Dauphin Charles in the Great Hall of Parlement on the fifteenth of October in 1356.³ Seldom has France presented a darker situation to her representatives than the one which confronted them there. Although by examination it has been seen that the aide voted by the previous States-General had failed principally because the people had refused to pay, very serious

1. Act d'Accusation, pp. 382-383.

2. Ibid., pp. 350-387 passim.

3. Ordonnances des roys, III, 88-89, 99-110.

consideration must be given to Sir John Froissart's contemporary account of the state of public opinion at the time,¹ for this was the significant thing for what happened rather than any later historical analysis of the events. The opinion of the public at the time determined the events that were to follow. He states that all the people inquired "what had become of the great sums of money that had been raised in France by great vexations, for the army had been badly paid, and the kingdom was poorly defended; but there was no one who could give account of it--especially the chancellor, or the president of parlement, Simon de Bucy."² Indicating quite clearly that the people considered their government corrupt and mismanaged.

The Dauphin, himself, may have realized that the administrative system must be corrected if France was to survive, for he definitely allowed his friend, Robert Lecoq, to advocate reforms.³ Also he soon yielded to the demands of the deputies that they elect a smaller committee of eighty to facilitate deliberation. After the inconvenience of separate meetings and the vote by order of the

1. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 169, 109.

2. Ibid., chap. 169, 109.

3. Act d'Accusation, p. 362; Ordonnances des roys, II, 393. Bishop Lecoq was in the Grand Councils of Philip VI, John II, and the Dauphin as late as February of 1358.

larger groups were apparent, the Dauphin accepted an early ultimatum by the committee to remove his royal advisers from their deliberations.¹ The reform spirit evidenced by the States-General of 1356 extending back to that of 1315 and 1351 should not be interpreted as disloyalty to the crown but rather as a determination to do something about the glaringly obvious mismanagement of the war which was focussing attention on corruption and inefficiencies extending throughout the realm.

In any event on 17 October 1356,² Bishop Lecoq was given an opportunity to use his most powerful tools, a legal education and eloquent oratory. Force was never his tool! In a rousing speech he advocated a return to stable currency and an honest and efficient justiciary and government.³ He emphasized that the first task facing the States-General was a thorough purification of all royal offices.⁴ He claimed the mint officials had been notoriously harmful and of no worth to the realm and guilty of villainous sins and evils.⁵ Deputies

1. Act d'Accusation, pp. 370-371.

2. Roland Delachenal, ed., "Journal des Etats généraux réunis à Paris au mois d'octobre, 1356," Nouvelle revue historique de droit français et étranger, XXIV (1900), pp. 341-459 passim. Hereafter cited as "Journal des Etats généraux."

3. Ibid.; Grandes Chroniques, I, 76.

4. Ibid., p. 431.

5. Ibid.

should be elected to advise on alliances or the conduct of the war, and that the States-General be adequately represented on the council for determining and controlling the aide.¹ The Dauphin Charles, Duke of Normandy, was humbly asked to lead his court into the ways and manners of honest men.² The Grand or Secret Council, the Parlement, and the Chambre des Comptes should be investigated.³ The Chamber of Accounts is believed to have evolved from the old Chambre of Deniers about 1309. Officially, but frequently not in actuality, it was independent of the parlement. It had many duties: to examine all public accounts and those of the king, to determine the rights to pay, to receive acts of homage to the king, to determine the ecclesiastical relations with the king, and other duties. At this time there were at least sixty-two members.⁴ Bishop Lecoq in his speech thundered further against the ignorance and malice of six officials, "...who were working only for their own profit, acquiring great possessions and riches, and who have advanced their friends to the poverty and injustice of the people."⁵ They were the following: Simon de Bucy, member

1. "Journal des Etats généraux," p. 432.

2. Ibid., p. 443.

3. Ibid.

4. E. Boutaric, "La Chambre des comptes de Paris," Reveu des Questions Historique, XV (1874), pp. 601-609.

5. "Journal des Etats généraux," pp. 451-454.

of the Grand Council and president of Parlement; Robert de Lorris, chamberlain; Nicholas Braque, master of the accounts, at this time; Engerran du Petit-Celier, treasurer of France; Jean Poillevillain, master of mints; and Jean Chauveau, treasurer of the war.¹ These malpractices were entirely without the knowledge of the king according to Bishop Lecoq who was using a theory analogous to the English idea that the king can do no wrong.² Reforming commissions should be set up with full authority to deal with this odious corruption.³ Finally, the deliverance of Charles the Bad from prison for the following reasons: his royal blood, his marriage to the Dauphin's sister, to render service to the crown, and--most important--to bring peace with Navarre and Normandy.⁴

As concessions, rewards were offered to the Dauphin: thirty thousand men fully equipped for land or sea duty for one year; an aide to be collected from all classes at the rate of ten-and-one-half per cent on all income of nobility, clergy, and bourgeoisie; the people in general to provide one man for each one hundred households.⁵

1. Grandes Chroniques, I, 78-79.

2. "Journal des Etats généraux," p. 455.

3. Ibid., p. 433.

4. Ibid., pp. 456-459; Grandes Chroniques, I, 80.

5. Ibid., pp. 456-459.

Following the speech the commission, which the Dauphin had allowed the States-General to elect, adopted Bishop Lecoq's suggestions, and reported back to the fully assembled States-General. The Dauphin was informed of the royal councilors^{that} the commission wished removed for trial before a group of thirty-six men¹ to be elected by the States-General. This group of thirty-six commissioners were to have "...power to do and order everything in the kingdom, just like the king himself, as well for the purpose of appointing and removing public officers as for other matters." The Dauphin procrastinated, and was then threatened with a public and solemn session to bring the matters before all the people. This delay was occasioned by the show of royal support afforded at an assembly of the South (Langue d'oc) in Toulouse that offered a levy of five thousand men-at-arms and four thousand auxiliaries plus a public mourning for John II.² The demands of the States-General of the North (Langue d'oïl) carried far too many restrictions on the royal power for the Dauphin

1. Froissart, Chronicles, chap., 169, p. 109; Inventaire des arrêts du conseil d'Etat, I, Introduction LXXXV.

2. Grandes Chroniques, I. 86-87; Jules Tessier, Etienne Marcel, p. 46.

to tolerate despite his dire need for troops and money. The proposed reforms were defeated by the Forêt-Bucy-Lorris faction who were the three most important officials accused in the Grand Council,¹ and the Dauphin dismissed the States-General on the second of November, 1356.² The States-General, however, refused to be dismissed, and they met illegally on the third of November at the Franciscan Convent.³ Here, after Bishop Lecoq had spoken again, the Dauphin was offered troops and aide, but he would promise nothing beyond an attempt to stabilize the currency,⁴ a promise that he was to violate within a month.

After adjourning the States-General of 1356, the Dauphin left^{for} the Imperial Diet to be held by his uncle, Charles IV at Metz. Whether the Dauphin Charles realized the full consequences which would result from the last act planned by his Grand Council before he left Paris or not, he signed a very controversial currency regulation on the fifth of the month. It was to be proclaimed on the tenth of December 1356--just five days after the Dauphin was to leave Paris.⁵ He left Paris on the fourth

1. Act d'Accusation, p. 373.

2. Grandes Chroniques, I, 88.

3. Act d'Accusation, p. 378; Grandes Chroniques, I, 87-89.

4. Grandes Chroniques, I, 88-89.

5. Recueil des monnaies, I, 366.

of December, and he arrived at Metz on the twenty-second and left there on the twenty-eighth.¹ But just why the Dauphin chose to leave Paris in the first place is questionable; but, finding himself in such an embarrassing position, he may have desired the advice of his older and more experienced uncle who had apparently just solved the problem of restlessness in the Empire by his standardization of the Imperial elections and a solution of the bourgeois uneasiness by his famous "Golden Bull."² The Grandes Chroniques merely state that the Dauphin went "to talk to him and have his counsel concerning the government of France and the imprisonment of the king, his father, and several other things."³ There must have been a definite connection between the visit and the negotiations and alliance the Dauphin's father had just concluded in May of 1356 with Charles IV.⁴ Possibly the Dauphin even expected

1. Grandes Chroniques I, 91; R. Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V, I, 268-283 passim.

2. This assumption is derived from "The Golden Bull of Charles IV, 1356" as found in Oliver J. Thatcher and Edgar Holmes McNeal, eds., A Source Book for Medieval History: Selected Documents Illustrating the History of Europe in the Middle Ages (N.Y., Chicago, Boston, 1905), pp. 283-308. Charles IV had issued part one of his Golden Bull in January 1356, and part two was to be issued while the Dauphin was at Metz.

3. Grandes Chroniques I, 91.

4. "Les relations entre l'empereur et le roi de France." pp. 472-511 passim.

1. The first step in the process of creating a new product is to identify a market need. This involves conducting market research to understand the preferences and behaviors of potential customers. Once a need is identified, the next step is to develop a concept that addresses this need. This concept should be unique, valuable, and feasible.

2. After developing a concept, the next step is to create a prototype. A prototype is a preliminary model of the product that allows the team to test and refine the design. This can be done using various materials and techniques, depending on the nature of the product. The prototype is used to gather feedback from potential users and to make necessary adjustments to the design.

3. Once the prototype is refined, the next step is to conduct a feasibility study. This study evaluates the technical, financial, and market viability of the product. It involves assessing the resources required for production, the potential costs, and the market demand. This study helps the team to make informed decisions about whether to proceed with the product development.

4. If the feasibility study is positive, the next step is to develop a business plan. A business plan is a document that outlines the company's goals, strategies, and financial projections. It serves as a roadmap for the business and is used to attract investors and secure funding. The business plan should include details about the product, the market, the competition, and the company's financial needs.

5. The final step in the process is to launch the product. This involves manufacturing the product, distributing it to the market, and promoting it to potential customers. The launch is a critical moment for the product, as it determines its initial success or failure. The team should monitor the product's performance in the market and be prepared to make adjustments as needed.

6. After the product is launched, the team should continue to monitor its performance and gather feedback from customers. This feedback is used to make improvements to the product and to develop new products. The product development process is an iterative one, and it is important to remain flexible and open to change.

7. In conclusion, the product development process is a complex and multi-step process that requires careful planning and execution. It involves identifying a market need, developing a concept, creating a prototype, conducting a feasibility study, developing a business plan, and launching the product. By following these steps, a team can increase the chances of creating a successful new product.

military support against his rebellious Parisians. At Metz the Dauphin may have obtained advice, but there appears to be no evidence that he accomplished anything other than rendering his uncle homage for the Dauphine.¹ While he was away, however, Paris was seething. The twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth of December were days of severe rioting because of the publication of the Dauphin's currency ordinance of the tenth of December. Here, as the business man, the provost of merchants, Etienne Marcel, began to take a very active part. As previously seen, he had served in the States-General from December 1355, and it is safe to assume that he had agreed to the reforms, but he had certainly been far overshadowed by the orator, Bishop Lecoq. Nevertheless, this last devaluation of the silver mark² was too much for the prevost, the other merchants, the wage earners, and the taxpayers of France to bear.³ To provide adequate funds for his trip to Metz the Dauphin had changed the pied to 48⁶ on December fourth; that is, he had arbitrarily modified the

1. The Dauphiné was located in the Imperial kingdom of Burgundy or Arles. It had been acquired by Philip VI for the eldest son of the king of France by relieving the reigning Dauphin, Humbert II, of his debts and providing the wherewithal for his proposed crusade of 1349.

2. The profit of the crown would naturally be only temporary, for any change in the currency was always reflected back to the crown when the fixed rents and imposts due began to be paid in the newly valued currency.

3. Grandes Chroniques, I, 92.

value of the silver and gold coinage of the realm so that any four silver deniers he had on hand were now worth twelve and any five gold sous tournois on hand were now worth six. Etienne Marcel had no difficulty in raising a disgusted Parisian mob on the twelfth of December. He marched at the head of the mob to the Louvre to petition the Count of Anjou, the Dauphin's brother, regent while he was at Metz, to demand that he rescind the royal order concerning the currency. It took two more days of rioting and marching before the Count acquiesced.¹

This was the state of affairs that greeted the Dauphin when he returned from Metz on the fourteenth of January 1357.

Needless to say, when the Dauphin returned to Paris in January of 1357, the infringement of the royal authority forced by the Parisians was not appreciated; however, again, he was in no position to force anything.² The Dauphin had had no military support of any consequence from the time he led the remnants of his troops back from Poitiers. His remonstrances to his provost of merchants only

1. Grandes Chroniques, I, 92; G. M. R. Picot, Histoire des Etats généraux (Paris, 1872), I, 61.

2. Compare chap. IV, p. 38.

resulted in threats by Marcel to the effect that all work would cease and Paris would arm if he did not repeal the currency ordinance. These were the demands: to issue no new coinage, to remove the corrupt officials, to imprison the officials that had been censured until they could be tried by John II, and to allow the States-General to meet whenever the deputies should designate. That the wily businessman Etienne Marcel got written proof of these concessions is suspected,¹ but the proof is not available. Then, apparently helpless² under the control of his adviser Bishop Lecoq or intimidated by the mob behind Etienne Marcel, the Dauphin was persuaded that another States-General was essential.³

On 5 February 1357, the deputies of the States-General who had been dismissed in 1356 returned full of reform vitality. The leaders were Robert Lecoq; Jean Piqueigny, who was definite partisan of Charles II the Bad of Navarre,⁴ and was from the commercial area of Artois, but with a Nicholas le Caucher leading the third estate.⁵ In February or March,⁶

1. Francois Pierre Guillaume Guizot, A Popular History of France: from the Earliest Times (Boston, n.d., trans. by Robert Black), II, 338. Hereafter cited as F. Guizot, History of France.

2. Grandes Chroniques, I, 95-99.

3. Act d'Accusation, p. 352.

4. Archives Nationale J.J. 89, fol. 101v^o cited in Procès-verbaux du conseil du Roi, p. 48.

5. Grandes Chroniques, I, 99, 101-105.

6. Ibid., 101, n. 1. There is a question on the exact date it was delivered.

Bishop Lecoq, in the presence of all the estates, the Dauphin, and his brothers, delivered another discourse demanding his usual reforms. In this speech, however, he designated twenty-two by name as being the corrupt officials who must be removed.¹ Many prominent royal officials are listed: Pierre de la Forêt, lord cardinal and chancellor; Simon de Bucy, president of parlement; Nicholas Braque, master of the mints; the treasurers of war and finances, the bishop of Paris, the chamberlain, the notary of parlement; Regnaut d'Arcy, the king's advocate in parlement; the master of the Chambre des Comptes; Pierre d'Orgemont, the one of the chroniclers of the Grandes Chroniques;² and various others all very close advisers to the crown.³ Many of these men were later mentioned in a complimentary sense frequently enough in the contemporary, but anonymous and undated, document entitled, Act d'Accusation contre Robert Lecoq, Evêque de Laon, to allow the assumption that they were responsible for this medieval "smear" campaign against the reformer.

1. Ibid., 102-104.

2. Ibid., 102-103; J. Tessier, Etienne Marcel, pp. 25, 54.

3. Act d'Accusation, pp. 350-387 passim.

CHAPTER V

The Acme of the Reform Era and Royal
Counterstratagem

The sixty-one articles of the famous Grande Ordonnance were passed 3 March, 1357.¹ The provisions were very radical for the era when collected in one ordinance, but they contained little new other than the articles found useful, or expected to be useful, in all the reforms by the assemblies from the date when the Bishop of Laon was found among the representatives of the States-General of 1351, and a few extending as far back as the Norman Charter of 1315. Conspicuous by its absence, however, is the unique tenth article of the ordinance of March 1356 which gave the people the right to estimate their own worth for the purpose of income tax.

Among the provisions are found many noteworthy for the enlightened spirit of reform revealed.

1. Ordonnances des roys, III, 121. Old calendar March 1356.

Bishop Lecoq's remedy for the mismanagement of the realm, a reforming commission, almost unlimited power provided for by the selection of nine men given supreme power of arrest, reform, and re-appointment of officials.¹ The war subsidy was controlled by six deputies-general, two from each estate.² The twenty-two accused royal advisers were named and deprived of their duties,³ and none of their replacements were to engage in commerce.⁴ The members of parlement were to handle only official cases,⁵ and they were to start work at daybreak;⁶ when working, they were to finish each piece before proceeding to another to prevent cases being delayed for months or even years as they had been.⁷ If they were negligent in these matters, they were to forfeit their salaries!⁸ The Chamber of Accounts was to be reformed;⁹ and their accounts, as well as those of the tax-collectors, were to be periodically audited.¹⁰

1. Ibid., arts. 2, 3, 53, pp. 121, 126-127, 143-144; Grandes Chroniques, III, 75-81; R. Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V, I, 76-81.

2. Ibid., arts. 2, 3, pp. 121, 126-127.

3. Ibid., art. 11, pp. 122, 13.

4. Ibid., art. 31, pp. 123, 138.

5. Ibid., arts. 7, 10, pp. 121, 129, 130.

6. Ibid., art. 43, pp. 123, 141.

7. Ibid., arts. 7, 10, pp. 121, 129, 130.

8. Ibid., art. 8, pp. 121, 129-30.

9. Ibid., arts. 13, 14, pp. 121, 131-2.

10. Ibid., arts. 13, 14, 20, pp. 121, 131-2, 134.

Mobilization of the rear-ban was again regulated,¹ to cases of dire necessity, under the control of the States-General, and the war was to be continued with no truces or alliances without the consent of the States-General.² Of great importance were several highly significant provisions: The regulation of the currency ratio was to become one of the duties of the provost of merchants;³ the royal court expenses were to be curtailed and controlled;⁴ and all men were to arm themselves as fitted their estate,⁵ but any soldiers used were never to be allowed to pillage or board without paying.⁶ If they did, the people could raise the "cry," assemble their neighbors, and could legally resist.⁷ The deputies, mindful of past failures, detailed a method of raising money and men outlined in eight articles of a letter issued to the French subjects by the king on the same day as the Grand Ordinance of 3 March 1357.⁸ They were not without utopian visions, however, for they banned sale of positions, corruption in office, absentee

1. Ibid., art. 32, pp. 123.

2. Ibid., art. 39, pp. 123.

3. Ibid., art. 15, pp. 121, 131-132.

4. Ibid., art. 49, pp. 124, 142.

5. Ibid., arts. 37, 38, pp. 123, 139.

6. Ibid., arts. 37, 38, pp. 123, 138, 139.

7. Ibid., art. 17, pp. 133, 134.

8. Ibid., IV, 183.

officers, or dual officeholding;¹ and they outlawed corruption and bribery.² For these utopian schemes they decreed that the royal protection be guaranteed them; and, in event the king's peace might not provide for all emergencies, they allowed each deputy to hire legally a bodyguard of six men.³

The Grand Ordinance further provided for two or more meetings that could be scheduled at the will of the deputies without any interference by the crown.⁴ The number of government clerks or officials was regulated and the wage scale set.⁵ The chancellor's duties were carefully outlined, and it was decreed that he attend strictly to official business instead of concerning himself with the affairs or appointments of friends and relatives. Appointments, in the future, would be by merit.⁶ Grand Council members were warned, just as the members of parlement had been, that they must attend all meetings constantly and on time unless excused.⁷ There were articles, however, which maintained the loyalty of the deputies for the crown, for they immediately provided the aide

1. Ibid., III, arts. 8, 26, 29, pp. 121-122, 129-130, 136, 137.

2. Ibid., arts. 9, 26, 29, pp. 121-123, 130, 136, 137.

3. Ibid., art. 52, pp. 124, 143.

4. Ibid., art. 5, pp. 121, 127-128.

5. Ibid., arts. 12, 14, pp. 121-122, 130-131.

6. Ibid., arts. 44, 47, pp. 124, 141, 147-148.

7. Ibid., arts. 42, 43, pp. 123, 140-141.

for the continuation of the war;¹ that all villages were to aid the war effort,² and that all men were to fight under the banner of the king.³

The only article that appears capable of interpretation in favor of Charles the Bad is the one decreeing the return of all lands illegally seized by the crown since the time of Philip IV.⁴ The Grand Ordinance as a whole creates a strong case for an assumption that Charles was not very active in the reform movement before March 1357.

As was to be expected, there were numerous and vertiginous repercussions from such a curtailment to the traditional French royal supremacy. The princes were helpless; the more cautious deputies left Paris; and the reformer element, in truth, took over the government of France. On the tenth of March 1357 they instituted the executive council; replaced the more odious members of parlement and of the chamber of accounts; and added six members to the Grand Council of the Dauphin.⁵

1. Ibid., arts. 1, 2, pp. 121, 125-127.

2. Ibid., art. 56, pp. 124, 144.

3. Ibid., art. 33, pp. 123, 138.

4. Ibid., art. 41, pp. 123, 140.

5. Act d'Accusation, pp. 382-383. They were the bishop of Laon, Robert Lecoq; the governor of Artois, Jean de Piqueigny; the Parisians, Etienne Marcel, Charles Toussac, and Giles Marcel; and the Master of Divinity and advocate of parlement, Robert de Corbie.

The twenty-two officials were deprived of their offices, and most of them found it suddenly quite necessary that they be elsewhere.¹ A reforming commission was duly elected; and, although the States-General of February 1357 was adjourned 25 April, the reformers were in control from March to August of 1357. During that time, it must be said that they labored sincerely to stabilize the money, to remove the corruption from the royal administration, and to definitely correct the minting scandal.² The French banker and royal mint master, Nicholas Braque, presents a vivid picture of the corruption prevalent among many of those accused by Bishop Lecoq. He, with his agents, had cornered the purchase of precious metal by the mints. He allowed only his agents to sell ore to the mints thereby compelling the producers to sell to his agents--at a discount, of course. Through his agents, he had purchased the outstanding debts

1. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 169, p. 109; Grandes Chroniques, I, 111-112; Foedera, III, pt. 2, 348 Simon de Bucy and Robert de Lorris sent to England; Procès-verbaux du conseil du Roi, p. 27.

2. Noel Valois, ed., "Notes sur l'histoire de la révolution parisienne de 1356-58: la revanche des frères Braque," Memoires de la Société de l'histoire de Paris, X (1883), pp. 100-126 passim. Hereafter cited as La revanche des Braques.

of Philip VI, John II, and then those of the Dauphin Charles at a discount of over fifty per cent.¹ It should not be assumed that such obvious corruption can now be proved of all of the twenty-two. For example, French scholars have been unable to locate evidence of dishonesty for Pierre de la Forêt, the chancellor, even to this day. Nevertheless, the Bishop of Laon, Robert Lecoq, had been in the presence of royalty and the royal advisers from adolescence; and, as a civil servant in manhood, he certainly was in a position to know the administration from the inside. Obviously, he being human, it had been suggested that he included on the list certain personal enemies, such as Simon de Bucy, and his brother-in-law, Robert de Lorris.

With the Grand Ordinance, France was well on the way to a limited monarchy but, in one fatal aspect, the reformers failed. They could not collect enough aide to furnish the Dauphin with the thirty thousand men-at-arms they had promised him. The people either were not able, because of the devastation of the war and the Black Plague, or were not willing, because of a natural repugnance coupled with a genuine disgust, to pay the prescribed

1. Ibid., pp. 112-126.

imposts. This, added to the instability of the currency, was too much for the reformers; and as John II, from his captivity at Bordeaux, had sent word on the twenty-second of March that all the work of the States-General was invalid,¹ it seemed that the reform movement was crushed thoroughly. Such was not the case, for the Dauphin had to send the king's messengers out of the city to save them from the mob which, at this point, was not above venting their fury on any royal messengers, innocent or not. Then he had to call the new States-General for 30 April 1357² even though his father had expressly forbidden it. This was actually the meeting scheduled by the preceding States-General for the twenty-fifth entirely at their own volition.³ This assembly accomplished only two acts of note: they extended the taxes for the aide for four months, and scheduled a July States-General. Then the Dauphin surrendered Paris to the reformers, and set out to recoup his influence in Normandy.⁴

By July the reforming tide had ebbed, for the commission found certain of their members in prison

1. Foedera, III, pt. 2, pp. 348-351.

2. Grandes Chroniques, I, 108-110.

3. Ordonnances des roys, III, art. 5, p. 121, 127-128.

4. Act d'Accusation, p. 355.

for over-zealous prosecution of certain important officials despite the obvious corruption.¹ When the deputies assembled in July of 1357, they were forced to admit that they had failed to provide the necessary aide.² This was the opportunity the Dauphin was awaiting; consequently, in August, he returned and informed Etienne Marcel and Bishop Lecoq that he now was capable of resuming control of the kingdom. The deputies were sent home;³ the archbishop of Reims, Jean de Craon, joined the Dauphin's faction;⁴ Etienne resumed his duties as mere provost of merchants rather than a member of the royal Grand Council; and Bishop Lecoq returned to his bishopric at Laon.⁵ The Dauphin proceeded to reinstate the dismissed officials to royal favor.⁶ To all intents and purposes the reformation was over.

The August triumph of the Dauphin was extremely short-lived, for he stumbled over exactly the same block which had ruined the reformers: the people

1. La revanche des Braques, pp. 112-115.

2. Paul Viollet, "Les Etats de Paris en février, 1358," Memoires de l'academy des inscriptions et belles-lettres, XXXIV (1895), pt. II, pp. 284-285. Hereafter cited as, "Les Etats de Paris en 1358."

3. Grandes Chroniques, I, 111-113.

4. Ibid., I, 111-112.

5. Act d'Accusation, p. 361.

6. Procès-verbaux du conseil du Roi, p. 66.

were of no more mind to pay the imposts to the Dauphin's élus than they had been to the reformers', for there is no indication that the Dauphin's trip to Normandy prior to August 1357 gained any support for him or the aide.¹

France was back exactly at the point from which she had started at Poitiers. Soon the Dauphin was forced to call another States-General and to recall the zealous deputies under Bishop Lecoq.²

This States-General met in November of 1357. Over seventy towns were represented thus making it the most representative of the series to be considered in this study. Within a few days, one of the most persistent demands of the States-General was solved, but in a rather extralegal manner. Charles II of Navarre, called, le Mauvais, escaped. He was aided by the prominent leader of the reformers in the noble class, Jean de Picqueigny, his brother of Artois and twenty-nine men--mainly burghers of Amiens--who scaled the walls of the Chateau of Arleux in Cambresis on the night of eighth or ninth of November.³ Charles II, after his capture at Rouen by John II on 5 April 1356,

1. Act d'Accusation, p. 355; Grandes Chroniques, I, 115.

2. Grandes Chroniques, I, 113-115.

3. Ibid., pp. 115-119.

had been imprisoned at the Gaillard Castle on the twenty-fourth then at the Louvre. He was later transferred to the prison of Chatelet, to the Chateau of Crevecoeur, and finally to the Chateau of Arleux, Picardy, sometime after September of 1356. It was from this last prison that he was rescued by the de Picqueignys.¹ A third reformer now had entered the fray, but was destined to play a very dubious role--to say the least.

Naturally enough the Marcel-Lecoq faction was thought to be implicated.² They may well have been, but the implication can not be accepted without further proof. For the purpose of judging what followed, it is enough to realize that their contemporaries thought they did. The proofs that the chroniclers write offer evidence of the contemporary viewpoint, but their views do not seem to prove Etienne Marcel's direct implication.³ The de Picqueignys of Artois had been staunch followers of Charles the Bad long before they became reformers.⁴ In any event, persuasion by Etienne Marcel, Bishop Lecoq, and Robert Corbie,

1. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 179, p. 112; R. Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V, I, 323-328.

2. Grandes Chroniques, I, 118.

3. Jean Le Bel, II, 251-253; Froissart Chronicles, chap. 179, p. 112; Grandes Chroniques, I, 118.

4. Ordonnances des roys, p. 146; Archives Nat. JJ 89, fol. 101v.⁸ Used by Procès-verbaux du conseil du Roi, p. 48.

a deputy from Amiens,¹ resulted in a safe-conduct granted to Charles by the Dauphin.² The Dauphin may have been influenced by the fact that Charles the Bad had been a guest, as well as a friend, when he was captured at Rouen. Charles the Bad returned to Paris on 29 November 1357, and an amicable agreement was arranged between the two by the twelfth of December in which Charles was promised the return of all his lands.³ Charles II's claims to the lands had sprung from the gifts by the crown to Jeanne, the daughter of Louis X the Headstrong,⁴ and her husband, Philip of Evreux. Their heir, Charles, who was born in 1332, thus had a claim to the crown through his mother that was augmented by his marriage to Jeanne, the daughter of John II plus his claim, through his father, as the great grandson of Philip III the Bold. The house of Evreux thus held Navarre, Evreux, and other towns, such as Cherbourg, Meulan, Mantes;⁵ and claims to portions of Champagne and Brie. The family was

1. Act d'Accusation, p. 387. A Master and perhaps an instructor in divinity.

2. Grandes Chroniques, I, 118.

3. Act d'Accusation, p. 355.

4. The crown of Navarre had been held by Louis X since 1 October 1307. Jules Viard, ed., Les Grandes Chroniques de France: Philip III le Hardi, Philippe IV le Bel, Louis X Hutin, Philippe V le Long (Paris, 1934), VIII, 225-226.

5. See Map III.

allied with the Harcourts of Normandy who were habitual enemies to the centralizing ambitions of French monarchs.¹ By reclaiming parts of these lands in 1328, the crown started a process of alienation of the house of Evreux-Navarre which was continued in John II's favoritism to Charles of Spain. It was for the return of these lands that Charles the Bad constantly clamored.² The lands confiscated by John II from his other victims at Rouen were also to be returned to the heirs³ by the agreement of 12 December 1357.

As a potential reformer, Charles the Bad spoke to the people of Paris in the Pré-aux Clercs⁴ complaining about his imprisonment and loss of his family's lands.⁵ At a memorial service for those executed by John, he spoke again in a similar vein at Rouen.⁶ On this same day, 11 January 1358, the Dauphin spoke to the assembled people of Paris at the Halles.⁷ He promised faithfully to protect the capital, and to die with the people if necessary.⁸

1. Compare chap. II, p. 12.

2. Act d'Accusation, pp. 354-357; F. T. Perrens, Etienne Marcel, pp. 58-60.

3. Grandes Chroniques, I, 124-125.

4. See Map I.

5. Grandes Chroniques, I, 116-119; Jean Le Bel, II, 253; J. Tessier, Etienne Marcel, pp. 78-81.

6. Act d'Accusation, p. 357.

7. See Map I.

8. Grandes Chroniques, I, 136-137.

Evidently he made such a favorable appeal to the traditional love of the French for their royalty that it was necessary for the reformers to arrange for counter oratorical measures to combat this emotion when the Dauphin tried to speak again, this time at the Church of Saint-Jacques de l'Hôpital.¹ Here is seen excellent evidence that Bishop Lecoq was the reforming orator only before the States-General, and Etienne Marcel was no orator at all; for, in this case, it was the échevin, Charles Toussac, who had to convince the people of the necessity of continued support to the reformers as well as to succeed in rousing them sufficiently to drown out any attempts at oratory by the Dauphin.²

Now one of the many ironic political maelstroms of this era should be analyzed. In January 1358 Etienne Marcel, still outwardly loyal to the crown, is allied with the Parisian mob and sympathetic to the reformer, Bishop Lecoq; Charles the Bad is posing as one of the reform element while under agreement to the Dauphin, and since 1355, has been frequently involved in negotiations with the English;³

1. Ibid., pp. 136-138.

2. Ibid., pp. 135-136; Act d'Accusation, p. 358; J. Tessier, Etienne Marcel, pp. 82-92.

3. Foedera, III, 329; "Negotiations de Charles le Mauvais avec les Anglais," pp. 264-266.

Bishop Lecoq, apparently quite deserving of his title, la bezague (the double-bitted mattock), was adviser to the States-General, the ecclesiastics, Etienne Marcel, Charles the Bad, and still the chief adviser of the Dauphin.¹

Charles the Bad soon left the active ranks of the reformers to return to Normandy to claim his lands promised in December of 1357.² Meanwhile, on the twenty-fourth of January in 1358, the States-General had to devaluate the currency³ by about one half which, of course, was resented by those with cash or fixed incomes. The need for stable finances was indeed a pressing one at the time, because Paris was seriously threatened by the ravaging forces of the Free Companies⁴ and Philip of Navarre, brother of Charles the Bad, who had become an active enemy allied with the English since the time of his brother's imprisonment.⁵ When the treasurer of France, Jean Baillet, made the necessary announcement

1. Grandes Chroniques, I, 129.

2. Ibid., pp. 129-130.

3. Ibid., p. 133.

4. Jean Le Bel, II, 249-254; Heinrich Denifle, La désolation des églises, monastères, et hôpitaux en France pendant la Guerre de cent ans (Paris, 1899), II, 226. Hereafter cited as, Desolation en France.

5. Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 67.

of the change in the currency ratio on the twenty-fifth, he was murdered by one Percin Marc,¹ a junior toll collector.² This is an example of mob emotion which was vented on an apparently completely innocent official. The murderer immediately fled to the sanctity of the monastery of Saint-Merry. Soon the Marshal of Normandy, Robert de Clermont, violated this protection; took the man, and had him executed.³ The Bishop of Paris immediately excommunicated the legitimately acting, but impetuous constable,⁴ and the mob proclaimed the murderer as a martyr to their cause. From that time the marshal was a marked man.⁵

The danger which surrounded Paris at this time was a far more serious matter than the murder of one man, for the raiding freebooters had practically isolated the city. The road from Paris to Orleans was practically impassible. These were the predecessors of the Free Companies which were to plague Charles V and his marshal, Bertrand du Guesclin.⁶ Etienne Marcel, again as his duty,

-
1. Grandes Chroniques, I, 142.
 2. Recueil des monnaies, I, 377.
 3. Chronique des Quatre Valois, pp. 67-68; Grandes Chroniques, I, 142-143; J. Tessier, Etienne Marcel, p. 93.
 4. Grandes Chroniques, I, 142-143.
 5. Chronique des Quatre Valois, pp. 67-68.
 6. Froissart, Chroniques, chap. 177, p. 112; Desolation en France, p. 226.

began to install machines of war, to dig moats, to forge iron chains, and to rebuild the walls.¹

At this same moment, a desperate Dauphin called out the dreaded rear-ban on the same date that the States-General met, that is, 14 January 1358. He brought about two thousand troops into the Louvre for protection, he stated, against the threatening Free Companies. The threat was real enough; but the Parisians mis-interpreted his motives, if true motives they were; and, as a mob always interprets the arrival of troops, were aroused to the danger of royal intimidation possible to the States-General; for, supposedly, no armed men were allowed in Paris.²

In the meantime Charles the Bad, who had returned satisfied to Normandy to reannex his lands after the agreement of December 1357, had been frustrated by the refusal of certain garrisons to surrender; that is, Bretenil, Pacy-sur-Eure, and Pont-Audemir. He was angry and not without a certain amount of legitimate suspicion that the Dauphin was implicated; however, the refusal was

1. H. Gueraud, ed., Chronique de Jean de Venette (Paris, 1843), pp. 245-247. Hereafter cited as Chronique de Jean de Venette.

2. Grandes Chroniques, I, 129-130; Jean Le Bel, II, 252. D. F. Secousse, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de Charles II, roi de Navarre et comte d'Evreux, surnommé le Mauvais (Paris, 1758), pp. 142-143. Hereafter cited as Charles II roi de Navarre et comte d'Evreux.

probably due to independent motives of garrison leaders.¹ But, as yet, he was not sufficiently angry to send military aid to the Parisian reform element. He was, nevertheless, bold enough to send Jean Picqueigny to Paris to demand the surrender of the fortresses and the payment of the forty thousand florins he had been promised.²

The components for the almost inevitable excesses which follow unsuccessful reform were now gathered together on 22 February 1358. Immediately following another change in the currency, Etienne Marcel assembled the tradesmen and craftsmen into armies which wore the distinctive red and blue hoods they had adopted for identification on 1 January 1358.³ He led them toward the Louvre, collecting with him as he went a typical mob of some three thousand additional malcontents.⁴

Apparently purely by coincidence, the mob met an advocate of parlement, Regnaut d'Arcy; pursued him into a pastry shop, and murdered him.⁵ In the

1. Ibid., pp. 128-130.

2. Ibid., pp. 144-145.

3. Ibid., p. 130.

4. Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 68; Grandes Chroniques, I, 148; Jean Le Bel, II, 25; Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 178, p. 112; R. Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V, I, 356.

5. Grandes Chroniques, I, 148-149.

eyes of the mob, he was not an innocent victim, for he was a royal client, quite wealthy, and had constantly fought the decisions of the States-General.¹ He had been among the few more honest, or more foolhardy, of the twenty-two accused by the reformers to remain in Paris; but throughout he had opposed the University of Paris.² Viewed objectively, he appears less guilty than the principal offenders, for he had not fled Paris after the Grand Ordinance as had others.

A number of the mob led by the provost broke into the very bedchamber of the Dauphin.³ Most of his advisers escaped; but two marshals, Robert de Clermont of Normandy and Jean de Conflans of Champagne were, in the opinion of the people, important. They were accused of advising resistance to reform. As the Dauphin was yet an inexperienced young man, oscillating between conservative and reformatory advisers, the marshals might well have been advising against the reform. True or not, they were so considered by the mob;⁴ and, for the moment,

1. Chronique des Quatre Valois, pp. 68-70.

2. Grandes Chroniques I, 145-147. Throughout the period, the University seems to have favored the reform movement.

3. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 178, p. 112; Grandes Chroniques, I, 149. All sources consulted agree.

4. Chronique des Quatre Valois, pp. 68, 69; Grandes Chroniques, I, 149. As the chronicler admits the invention of the conversation, I can see no reason why he would not do so by reflecting the opinion common at the time.

this was the important point, as it cost them their lives! They were murdered at the feet of a very terrified Dauphin.¹

Exactly what the demands of Etienne Marcel and the mob were is questionable, but they appear to have been asking for protection from the ravaging Free Companies² and no further changes in the currency ratio.³ At any rate the Dauphin insisted, naturally and truthfully enough,⁴ that he did not have the wherewithal to combat the freebooters. This led to the heated words that resulted in the murders.⁵ It should be recalled, however, that

1. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 178, p. 112. Froissart is incorrect in assigning the death of Simon Bucy to this incident. He was completely restored to royal favor and ennobled as late as 1369. Of the twenty-two accused officials, only Enguerran du Petit Cellier and Regnault d'Arcy had died by May of 1359. Simon de Bucy, at the same time, was given three thousand livres damages for his estates destroyed during the period of revolution. Chroniques des Quatre Valois, p. 68; R. Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V, I, 352-365. Procès-verbaux du conseil du Roi, p.;. 69-70.

2. Ibid.; Chroniques des Quatre Valois, pp. 68-70.

3. R. Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V, I, 59.

4. Jean Le Bel, II, 252.

5. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 178, p. 112.

Robert de Clermont had been a marked man since violating the monastery and executing the murderer of the treasurer of France which has been noted before.

Even the Dauphin seems to have been spared only because Etienne Marcel exchanged his own red and blue hood for the royal gold-fringed hood.¹ A great deal more ado is characteristically raised by the chroniclers over this supposed king-playing by the provost than the obvious fact that he risked a great deal in saving the Dauphin in the face of a rampant mob which, at that point of emotional stress, could not have been trusted to respect any personages.²

The provost then struck an agreement with the Dauphin and his consort, Jeanne; and had the murders justified by the city and the States-General.³ At this point Etienne Marcel can be considered the most powerful man in Paris or, conceivably, France. He had Robert de Corbie state his demands: abolish the Secret Council, dismiss the corrupt officials again, and stabilize the currency. All these the Dauphin granted.⁴

1. Grandes Chroniques, I, 149-150.

2. Jean Le Bel, II, 249-254; Grandes Chroniques, I, 148-153.

3. Grandes Chroniques, I, 150-152.

4. Ibid.; Inventaire des arrêts du Conseil d'Etat, I, 66.

Charles the Bad and his consort returned to Paris about 26 February,¹ and the triumvirate of Etienne Marcel, Bishop Lecoq, and Charles II dealt with the Dauphin until the seventh or eighth of March while the people remained under arms.²

The new States-General that had gathered on 11 February 1358, was, in actuality, almost one of only two estates;³ for those who had not deserted the reform movement had been prevented attendance. The dangers presented to any deputies attempting to reach Paris from the south or west due to the ravaging Free Companies were almost insurmountable. But the States-General did pass an ordinance of nineteen articles which put the Grand Ordinance of 1357 back in effect.⁴ The commission of reform was re-established;⁵ the offending officials were again dismissed;⁶ and the six reformers were reintroduced among the royal advisers.⁷

Charles the Bad finally returned to Mantes, but not until he had been granted on 12 March 1358 perpetual rents for certain lands around Toulouse,

1. Ibid., pp. 153-155.

2. Ibid., pp. 155-156.

3. "Les Etats de Paris en 1358," p. 262.

4. Procès-verbaux du conseil du Roi, pp. 66-71; "Les Etats de Paris en 1358," p. 261.

5. Ibid., p. 66; Ibid., pp. 261-262.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.; "Les Etats de Paris en 1358," p. 261.

and the castle-ward of Moret had been granted to his sister, Blanche.¹ It was she who had married Philip VI just seven months prior to his death.

At this point, 14 March 1358, the Dauphin again showed that he was beginning to be more formidable, for he publicly declared that he had reached his majority. The Ordonnances des Roys confirm this;² nevertheless, the date of his birth is questionable. It was 21 January 1336 or 1337. He assumed the title of regent³ in place of lieutenant de Roi. This act of resistance was not even timed as successfully as his temporary triumph of August 1357. The reformers did not relinquish a single demand nor would they go home. In fact, the provost appealed by letters to the other towns of France in an effort to make the reformation realm-wide.⁴ For a short time he, with Bishop Lecoq, Robert de Corbie, and Jean d'Isle, dominated the royal council and were the real rulers of France with the Dauphin virtually a prisoner in his own city. Obviously, he was soon

1. For the grants see Recueil de preuves, pp. 73-76. Charles II, roi de Navarre et comte d'Evreux, pp. 39, 110

2. Ordonnances des roys, III, 211-212; Grandes Chroniques, I, 161.

3. He assumed the title of "Karlos premogenitus regis Francorum regnm regens..." Grandes Chroniques, I, 161; J. Tessier, Etienne Marcel, p. 108;
R. Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V, I, 370.

4. Ibid., pp. 157-158.

thoroughly incensed with a secondary role, and he did not long remain a prisoner--if prisoner he was. If the Dauphin ever had any idea of cooperating with the reformation of the administration, the situation was far too radical now for him to continue; yet there was not a state of open civil war in Paris even at this time. The reformers had no intention of actually deposing a king or his son! There is little reason to believe that the Dauphin Charles could not have remained to share the rule had he so chosen, for none of the ordinances passed by the reformers had ever intimated that they had any desire of deposing either the Dauphin or John II.

Supposedly, rescue attempts were made by royal sympathizers through one Phelipot de Repenti in March 1358.¹ He later confessed,² just before his decapitation by the city, that he and companions had surrounded the palace for the purpose of rescuing their Dauphin.³ The Dauphin did leave Paris for Saint Ouen on seventeenth and reached Senlis in

1. Ibid., pp. 162-163.

2. J. Tessier, Etienne Marcel, pp. 108-109. Jules Tessier maintains, as a contrary opinion, that there is considerable doubt that Phelipot or Philippe Repenti was decapitated or even existed. Certainly the name has the definite ring of propaganda, and the Grandes Chroniques are not absolutely certain. Grandes Chroniques, I, 162-163.

3. Grandes Chroniques, I, 162-163; Act d'Accusation, p. 359.

Champagne by 25 March. By what method is still a mystery, for the Grandes Chroniques state merely that the Dauphin went to Senlis. There is no word concerning any escape.¹ He immediately attended an assembly on 25 March which included nobles of Picardy, Artois, and upper Normandy without the other two orders² which was a violation of article five of the Grand Ordinance³ and the ordinance of February 1358.⁴ Charles the Bad--from motives suspect, but undeterminable--sent word that he was ill in spite of the fact that he had called the assembly.⁵

This assembly evidenced mild loyalty; promised aid and men, but advised him to seek more military support in the other sections.⁶ The Dauphin moved on and convened a States-General at Champagne at Provins on 9 April which,⁷ in so far as the Parisian ordinances of 1357 and 1358 were concerned, was illegal.⁸ Paris sent Pierre de Rosny and Robert de

1. Ibid., pp. 162-163.

2. Ibid., p. 163; Leon Lacabane, "Memoire sur la mort d'Etienne Marcel," Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des chartes, I (1839-40), p. 79. Hereafter cited as L. Lacabane, "Memoires sur la mort d'Etienne Marcel."

3. Ordonnance des roys, III, art. 5. pp. 127-128.

4. "Les Etats de Paris en 1358," p. 262.

5. Grandes Chroniques, I, 163.

6. Ordonnances des roys, III, preface, p. lxxvii.

7. Grandes Chroniques, I, 165.

8. Ordonnances des roys, III, art. 5; pp. 127-128; "Les Etats de Paris en 1358," p. 262.

the first of these is the fact that the
the second is the fact that the
the third is the fact that the
the fourth is the fact that the
the fifth is the fact that the
the sixth is the fact that the
the seventh is the fact that the
the eighth is the fact that the
the ninth is the fact that the
the tenth is the fact that the
the eleventh is the fact that the
the twelfth is the fact that the
the thirteenth is the fact that the
the fourteenth is the fact that the
the fifteenth is the fact that the
the sixteenth is the fact that the
the seventeenth is the fact that the
the eighteenth is the fact that the
the nineteenth is the fact that the
the twentieth is the fact that the
the twenty-first is the fact that the
the twenty-second is the fact that the
the twenty-third is the fact that the
the twenty-fourth is the fact that the
the twenty-fifth is the fact that the
the twenty-sixth is the fact that the
the twenty-seventh is the fact that the
the twenty-eighth is the fact that the
the twenty-ninth is the fact that the
the thirtieth is the fact that the
the thirty-first is the fact that the
the thirty-second is the fact that the
the thirty-third is the fact that the
the thirty-fourth is the fact that the
the thirty-fifth is the fact that the
the thirty-sixth is the fact that the
the thirty-seventh is the fact that the
the thirty-eighth is the fact that the
the thirty-ninth is the fact that the
the fortieth is the fact that the
the forty-first is the fact that the
the forty-second is the fact that the
the forty-third is the fact that the
the forty-fourth is the fact that the
the forty-fifth is the fact that the
the forty-sixth is the fact that the
the forty-seventh is the fact that the
the forty-eighth is the fact that the
the forty-ninth is the fact that the
the fiftieth is the fact that the
the fifty-first is the fact that the
the fifty-second is the fact that the
the fifty-third is the fact that the
the fifty-fourth is the fact that the
the fifty-fifth is the fact that the
the fifty-sixth is the fact that the
the fifty-seventh is the fact that the
the fifty-eighth is the fact that the
the fifty-ninth is the fact that the
the sixtieth is the fact that the
the sixty-first is the fact that the
the sixty-second is the fact that the
the sixty-third is the fact that the
the sixty-fourth is the fact that the
the sixty-fifth is the fact that the
the sixty-sixth is the fact that the
the sixty-seventh is the fact that the
the sixty-eighth is the fact that the
the sixty-ninth is the fact that the
the seventieth is the fact that the
the seventy-first is the fact that the
the seventy-second is the fact that the
the seventy-third is the fact that the
the seventy-fourth is the fact that the
the seventy-fifth is the fact that the
the seventy-sixth is the fact that the
the seventy-seventh is the fact that the
the seventy-eighth is the fact that the
the seventy-ninth is the fact that the
the eightieth is the fact that the
the eighty-first is the fact that the
the eighty-second is the fact that the
the eighty-third is the fact that the
the eighty-fourth is the fact that the
the eighty-fifth is the fact that the
the eighty-sixth is the fact that the
the eighty-seventh is the fact that the
the eighty-eighth is the fact that the
the eighty-ninth is the fact that the
the ninetieth is the fact that the
the ninety-first is the fact that the
the ninety-second is the fact that the
the ninety-third is the fact that the
the ninety-fourth is the fact that the
the ninety-fifth is the fact that the
the ninety-sixth is the fact that the
the ninety-seventh is the fact that the
the ninety-eighth is the fact that the
the ninety-ninth is the fact that the
the hundredth is the fact that the

Corbie as two representatives to plead their cause. They were not successful.

Another assembly was held in Champagne at Vertus on 29 April. It was here that Robert de Corbie spoke in an attempt to justify the murder of the marshal, Jean de Conflans,¹ who had been murdered with Robert de Clermont by the mob in the Dauphin's bedchamber. From the nobility of Champagne, led by Simon de Boucy the Count de Brene,² came a query to the Dauphin: had their marshal been justly murdered? The answer was in the negative,³ and from that point, the States-General refused to consider the cause of the Parisians.⁴

The Dauphin, encouraged by the success of his extralegal assemblies moved on in Champagne to attempt to build support for himself. Between this assembly and the next in the chain of counterreformation moves by the Dauphin, Etienne Marcel, apparently entirely as his own agent, wrote one of his few letters on 18 April 1358, which is still existent.⁵ He complained to the Dauphin concerning a Paris now surrounded on

1. Compare chap. V, p. 70.

2. Grandes Chroniques, I, 165-166.

3. Ibid., p. 167.

4. Ibid., pp. 168-170.

5. Kervyn de Lettenhove, ed., Oeuvres de Froissart; publiees avec les variantes des divers manuscrits (Brussels, 1868), VI, 462, MSS. Hereafter cited as Oeuvres de Froissart, avec des divers manuscrits.

all sides: by freebooters, either free lance or nominally under one or the other leaders of the house of Navarre; by English or French pillagers;¹ by the royal troops that had moved into the fortresses at Meux, Montereau, and Corbeil to complete the blockade of the Seine, Yonne, Loing, and Marne river lines of supply for Paris.² Etienne Marcel, either not realizing the purpose or believing the troops of the Dauphin to be the least of the evils, wrote the above-mentioned letter to the Dauphin 18 April. He asked him to move nearer to Paris to protect it. Throughout, he had criticized the Dauphin for not protecting his city. You owe your people protection and defense; they must give you honor and obedience; but if ~~one~~ party violates the contract, the other is no longer liable. In this vein, he wrote.³ It is scarcely necessary to mention that the Dauphin with

1. He must have been referring to the members of the house of Harcourt; the Englishman, James Pipe; a Welshman, Ruffin; the French-Breton, Foulques de Laval; and others. Desolation en France, I, 225-227.

2. Oeuvres de Froissart, avec des divers manuscrits, VI, 462, MSS; Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 185, p. 114; R. Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V, I, 384-385.

3. Ibid.

his nobles paid no heed to this appeal to their feudal duties; consequently, the letter accomplished nothing, but the fact that it was dispatched at all under the existing conditions is indicative of several important conclusions. First, it could mean that Etienne Marcel was either threatening, engaging in vain hope, or more logically, that he and the reform party still were loyal to the crown. Second, the letter adds credence to the simple statement in the Grandes Chroniques¹ that the Dauphin merely left Paris and did not dramatically escape. Finally, this does not seem to be the letter of a traitor or a radical attempting, at this time, to create a social war as it is intimated by most general histories.

In the meantime, the Dauphin Charles fanned the flame of counterrevolution violently. He reassigned, by personal letter,² the States-General of Langue d'oïl scheduled to meet 1 May 1358 in Paris to Compiègne, fifty miles to the north. On the fourth of May, this States-General met. It included, this time, representatives of the three estates; but was selected mainly from the more loyal North. The States-General had already promised, as had those previously held

1. Compare chap. V, p. 76.

2. Grandes Chroniques, I, 173.

outside Paris, devotion and subsidies for the crown.¹ In the ordinance of 14 May,² three main points should be noted above others: aide for the continuance of the war;³ deliverance of John II which was discussed for the first time since the southern assembly at Toulouse in a letter from the Dauphin to Etienne Marcel;⁴ and continued control of the finances by the States-General.⁵ Thus the representatives instituted an administration exclusive of the Parisians, but when considering the ordinance as a whole, it contained little that had not been included before in the more enlightened ordinances. In the way of returning rights to the crown, little was guaranteed that had not been traditionally granted to the crown. The latter will be considered as a group in the following analysis. The reform commissions which existed were dissolved, but a smaller commission that included the Dauphin was organized to travel about the realm to investigate all suspected corruption.⁶ The leaders of the troops

1. Ibid., p. 172; Ordonnances des roys, III, art. 3, pp. 219, 222-223.

2. Ibid.; Ibid., p. 219.

3. Ordonnances des roys, III, arts. 3, 16, pp. 219-221, 222-223, 228-229.

4. Ibid., p. 221.

5. Ibid., p. 219; Grandes Chroniques, I, 172.

6. Ibid., art. 4, pp. 219, 223.

would be selected by the Grand Council.¹ The control of the Grand Council was returned to the Dauphin, but any sessions would be held in the presence of three members selected by the States-General;² and, although the use of the collections was intended for war expenses,³ the Dauphin could select the commission of three, one from each estate, that was going to control the fund.⁴ Also he was allowed to confiscate the Lombardian debts⁵ or to repossess any lands alienated from the crown since the time of Philip IV the Fair unless they have been given to the princes or the church.⁶ This article, if interpreted strictly in favor of the brothers of the Dauphin, would void any concessions of land that the crown had made to Charles the Bad. Letters of remission were allowed, but they were to be used with discreteness.⁷ Finally, he could expect aid in securing the release of his father, John II, if his letter to the provost of merchants of Paris is a true analysis of his success at this States-General.⁸

1. Ibid., art. 6, pp. 219, 224.

2. Ibid., art. 11, pp. 220, 226.

3. Ibid., art. 23, pp. 220-231.

4. Ibid., art. 17, pp. 221, 229-230.

5. Ibid., art. 7, pp. 219, 224-225.

6. Ibid., art. 10, pp. 220, 225-226.

7. Ibid., arts. 13, 19, pp. 220-221, 226-228, 230.

8. Ibid., p. 221.

On the other hand, there are evidences of the spirit of reform included in the ordinance. The usual income tax is provided to raise the aide¹ with no one exempt other than the mendicant friars, although the inhabitants of devastated areas are to pay less. Imposts collected were to be used for defense, but the Dauphin was allowed one-tenth for his expenses if he would lead against the foe in person.² Apparently there were some memories of Poitiers among the deputies, for it was clearly stated that "the bourgeoisie of the villages are not to be refused service in the armed forces of France."³ Royal forced loans or seizures were definitely forbidden.⁴ One article appears quite innocent when taken literally, but was destined to be quite significant. This article five⁵ was intended to strengthen the defense of France by compelling the proprietors of all castles and fortresses to repair and maintain them. A captain and three deputies would see that this was done.⁶ Whatever was intended, it was interpreted in quite another light by the rural folk.

The States-General of May 1358 was counter-revolutionary, but the deputies were still quite

1. Ibid., art. 14, pp. 221, 227.

2. Ibid., art. 16, pp. 221, 228-229.

3. Ibid., art. 24, pp. 220, 231-232.

4. Ibid., art. 18, pp. 221, 230.

5. Ibid., art. 5, pp. 219, 224.

6. Ibid.

conscious of the maladministration within the realm and the devastation of France. It is a mistake to assume, because they were thoroughly alienated from the reform movement in Paris, that they were more than mild in their enthusiasm for the capabilities of the Dauphin. He was allowed only one-tenth of the funds collected by the taxes for his administration,¹ and the deputies retained many of the reform articles even while returning the royal prerogatives.

From the time that the Dauphin left Paris in the hands of the Parisian mob and the reformers on 17 March 1358,² the actions of the orator, Bishop Lecoq, are obscure. It can be safely assumed, nevertheless, that he remained in the graces of the Dauphin, for Charles had recommended him to the pope as a candidate for the sacred college in February 1358;³ and, until the States-General at Compiègne in May 1358, the bishop was able to continue his usual role of the bezagne. He is rediscovered at this States-General apparently still heading the Grand Council, but this appearance was destined to end the moderate portion of his career.

1. Ibid., art. 16, pp. 220, 228-229.

2. Compare chap. 5, p. 75.

3. Recueil de preuves, p. 130; Charles II roi de Navarre et comte d'Evreux, p. 179. Pope Innocent VI.

Whether it was the Dauphin or the body of the deputies who were antagonistic to the bishop is debatable; but the fact remains that he was not popular at the assembly. Several of the nobles threatened his safety¹ to such an extent that he fled to Charles the Bad at St. Denis. The arrival of Bishop Lecoq at St. Denis marks the first recorded point at which he had cooperated with the Parisians without the approval of the deputies of the general assemblies; but, from this time forward he often met with the reformers.²

The fact that the Dauphin allowed his friend and adviser, Bishop Lecoq, to be intimidated by the nobility at Compiègne raises a strong suspicion that the anonymous, undated Act d'Accusation contre Robert Lecoq, Evêque de Laon, which has been mentioned as probably constituting the work of the Bucy-Lorris-Forêt-Braque faction, was written and circulated among the deputies at this States-General. The sudden antagonism of certain of the deputies at Compiègne is then logically explained. This must remain an assumption, however; but the Response³ attached, also anonymously, to the document leaves little doubt that

1. Act d'Accusation, p. 362.

2. Recueil de preuves, pp. 100-102.

3. Act d'Accusation, pp. 380-382.

the Bishop's accusations throughout the period against the faction and the administration were quite justified. In the Response the author or authors have attempted to blame all the administrative difficulties upon the devastation of war. Thus they substantiate the very malpractices which they have just accused the Bishop of inventing.¹ The contradiction is obvious. By their rebuttal they have destroyed their case, and added credence to the charges of corruption and mismanagement mentioned by Bishop Lecoq in his many addresses before the general assemblies.

A potentially powerful ally now joined the Parisians once more, for Charles the Bad disagreed again with the Dauphin on 2 May 1358, because the Dauphin refused to consider a reconciliation with the Parisians.² On the fourth of May 1358 Charles the Bad marched into Paris at the head of his troops.³ The Parisians honored him for some twelve days, and appointed him captain for the first time.⁴ It is only at this point that he began to aid the Parisians

1. Ibid., pp. 350-379.

2. Grandes Chroniques, I, 173-174.

3. Ibid.

4. Jean Lemoine, ed., Chronique de Richard Lescot: Religieux de Saint-Denis (1328-1344). Suite de la continuation de cette chronique (1344-1364), (Paris, 1896), p. 126. Hereafter cited as Chronique de Richard Lescot. Religieux de Saint-Denis, continuation.

with any degree of consistency. It should be recalled that he had merely made speeches at Rouen and Paris in January after his escape of November 1358, and these speeches contained more personal grievances than theories for reform.¹ On the twelfth of December 1357, he had reached an agreement with the Dauphin for the return of his lands,² and again had left the Parisians to their own devices. When again the Dauphin was powerless under the mob-rule following the murders of the constables on 22 February 1358, he had returned to share in the spoils.³ By March 1358, he had received further concessions from the Dauphin in the form of perpetual rents.⁴ In fact, at no time preceding his entrance into Paris on 4 May 1358 does it appear that he paid a great deal more than lip-service to the reform movement. Of course, his constant conspiracies against the French royal family, while seldom carried to completion,⁵ must have presented a constant threat to the crown. This, no doubt, was resistance of some worth to the reform

1. Compare chap. V, p. 61.

2. Compare chap. V, p. 64.

3. Compare chap. V, p. 71.

4. Compare chap. V, p. 73.

5. Compare chap. III, pp. 16, 17. Witness the ease with which he was drawn away from alliances with Edward III by the concessions given him by the treaties of Mantes and Valognes.

movement, but this study has revealed little evidence of any active military aid prior to this time. His assistance in the future, it will be seen, will be of the same unreliable quality. Charles left Paris this time in less than a month.¹

1. Grandes Chroniques, I, 175; Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 185, p. 114.

CHAPTER VI

Parisian Rebellion and the Peasants'
Social Insurrection

In May of 1358, Paris, Etienne Marcel, and the reformers faced a dark future indeed. In addition to their own bourgeois army and the Parisian mob, they could only rely on the very dubious support of their new captain, Charles the Bad. His army was a motley collection of Navarrese, French, Norman,¹ and English² adventurers obviously of doubtful loyalty or worth. Faced with such an inadequate defense, Etienne Marcel had attempted to lure or to threaten the Dauphin into returning to Paris with his letter of April³ which has been previously noted.⁴ In this letter he had warned of the restlessness of Paris; complained of the occupation of Meaux and Montereau by royal troops who were thus blockading the Seine, Marne, and Yonne Rivers; and he begged the Dauphin to move his troops

1. Ibid., pp. 185-186.

2. Ibid., pp. 174-175. Charles the Bad was allied openly with the English pillager, James Pipe.

3. Oeuvres de Froissart, avec des divers manuscrits, VI, MSS, pp. 462-464.

4. Compare chap. V, pp. 77-78.

against the pillagers in the area between Chartres and Paris.¹ He closed his letter by staunchly maintaining the loyalty of the Parisians.² As has been noted, the Dauphin ignored the request; and, aided and advised by the nobility of the North, he had completed the blockade of the supply arteries of Paris.³ Again it can be noted that the effects of the losses to the chivalry at Poitiers in 1356 were still quite significant, because the Dauphin and the nobility could not risk open conflict against a city so inadequately defended, but must besiege it by a blockade. Most of the future conflicts in 1358 will be forced upon the noble troops by the non-noble troops that are the more aggressive at this time.

The reformers of Paris now faced royal troops to the north and east, Free Companies to the south,⁴ and the troops of Philip of Navarre and the Harcourts to the west.⁵ The provost of merchants tried again

1. Oeuvres de Froissart, avec des divers manuscrits, VI, MSS, p. 462.

2. Ibid., p. 463.

3. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 185, p. 114.

4. Supplement Urbani V, n° 40 fol. 45h, ad. an. 1364, Martii, 16. A note in Desolation en France, I, 228. "There was total desolation from these companies: the total revenues were alienated, the houses ruined; the lands and vineyards remained without cultivation...."

5. A constant threat throughout the period as has been noted.

to reach a settlement with the Dauphin. This time he sent representatives of the University of Paris to the Dauphin.¹ The Dauphin received them honorably, but he demanded that ten or twelve of the men suspected of the murders of his constables be sent to him.²

Inasmuch as Etienne Marcel had witnessed the murders, it is very easy to believe that he could have selected a dozen to be sent to the Dauphin as hostages. The very fact that he did not choose such a step to extricate himself is possibly indicative of his character. Either he no longer had faith in the word of princes or he was not willing to expose twelve men from a mob which had acted under his sanction. At any rate, the Parisians refused the Dauphin's terms.³

The final stages were soon reached after the failure of these negotiations, for the new currency change reached Paris in July of 1358. The pied was set at 54^e but Etienne Marcel took over the control of the mints; changed the pied to 64^e; ⁴ and designated the immediate profits to be used for bolstering the means of defending the city. This was a very serious step. It was a direct reversal of his past policy

1. Chronique de Richard Lescot, pp. 123-124.

2. Froissart, Chroniques, chap. 185, p. 114.

3. Chronique de Jean Venette, II, 225. Cited by R. Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V, I, 393.

4. F. de Saulcy, ed., Histoire monetaire de Jean le Bon (Paris, 1880), pp. 67-69.

in which he had always demanded a stable currency; and, while it was definitely a violation of the traditional minting rights of the crown, he probably considered it legal for two reasons: the necessity of increasing the fortifications of the city,¹ and because the fifteenth article² of the Grand Ordinance of 1357 had given him the power to regulate the currency. In the eyes of the Parisians, the Grand Ordinance was still in force despite articles one and two of the Dauphin's ordinance of Compiègne that had returned this royal prerogative.³ The actual legality of the provost's action is thus impossible to determine.

To much of the realm, however, the Parisians were practicing treason, and at this point open civil war began. There was no further claim by any faction that their aims were the same or that they faced the same enemies. The rebellious reformers were now in open hostility to the Dauphin and the rest of the realm.

1. Ibid.

2. Ordonnances des roys, III, art. 15, pp. 131-132.

3. Ibid., arts. 1, 2, p. 222.

Additional fuel was soon added to the flames of civil strife; for, on 28 May 1358,¹ Jacques Bonhomme,² annoyed to an extreme by intolerable conditions, once again arose. It was at this point--and only at this point--that the reform movement extended down into the villein classes and soon degenerated into a violent class rebellion of the lowest type.

The peasants of Beauvais, and the towns of Saint-Leu d'Esserns, Nointel, Cramoisy in Oise, started open rebellion by killing some nine men at Saint-Leu,³ that is, four knights and five squires.⁴ They asked a William Cale, who is sometimes called William Charles, Karl, Calles, or Cales, Carle, to be their leader against the nobility, but he declined. Then, possibly because one of the John Bereniers⁵ of Saint Pol was

1. Grandes Chroniques, I, 177; Jean Le Bel, p. 254; Chroniques des Quatre Valois, p. 71; Chronique Richard Lescot: Religieux de Saint-Denis, continuation, p. 126.

2. Merely the rural designation of the French peasant in general. Meaning either Jack Goodfellow in a sense of indicating the abuse to which he was subjected constantly or a term springing from the jacque, or short tunic, usually worn by the peasant. It is not to be confused with the "king" of the peasants, James Goodman, that Froissart invented in the absence of the correct name for their leader. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 181, p. 113.

3. See Map I.

4. Grandes Chroniques, I, p. 177; Jean Le Bel, pp. 255-256.

5. R. Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V, I, pp. 403-404. He writes that there were two John Bereniers, one of Saint Pol and one of Montataire. John of Saint Pol was the one killed while the other served with Cale, and later became a captain for Charles the Bad.

murdered when he also refused, Cale reluctantly accepted the leadership.¹ The fact that he was a veteran of the wars seems to be the qualification he had for such leadership. He later showed a considerable amount of native ability in military affairs, but had just enough peasant credulity to accept a king's word as will be obvious later in the proper sequence of events.

It would be of small value to this study to probe deeply into the excesses of the Jacquerie, for it was just one of those recurrent protests by the peasantry against the nobility. Naturally the rural nobility would suffer first and most extensively. Nobles were massacred or roasted; women were violated;² and castles were destroyed³ by some among the army of about five or six thousand peasants involved in the uprising.⁴ Nor is it necessary or possible to examine all the causes which led to the uprising. There were,

1. Chroniques des Quatre Valois, p. 71; Jean Le Bel, pp. 255-256; Grandes Chroniques, I, 177.

2. Jean Le Bel, p. 256.

3. August et Emile Molinier, eds., Chronique Normande du XIV^e siecle (Paris, 1882), pp. 127-128. Hereafter cited as Chronique Normande.

4. H. Moranville, ed., Chronographia Regum Francorum (Paris, 1893), II, 171. Hereafter cited as Chronographia Regum Francorum; Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 181, p. 112. This time Froissart's estimate is in agreement with the more reliable Chronographia Regum Francorum.

of course, the traditional feudal services,¹ but certain causes are visible in the material covered by this study, and these should be noted. The Battle of Poitiers had reduced the noble class to such an extent that they were unable to protect its peasants from either the English troops or the ravaging freebooters. This, of course, forced the peasant to either desert his lands, join the Free Companies, or provide for his own defense. At the time of the Jacquerie in May of 1358, it can be assumed that they had learned to appreciate their own power in the face of such an obvious lapse in feudal protection and discipline.

Another cause is easily determined. As soon as the peasant began to realize and to utilize this weakness of the noble class, he naturally would resent any attempt to restore the power. When article five² of the ordinance at Compiègne ordered the proprietors of all castles or fortresses to restore them for the common defense of the kingdom, the attempts

1. For an excellent account of the services required from the peasant at this time see F. Robiou "Les Populations rurales en France de la fin des Croisades à l'avènement des Valois," Revue des Questions Historiques, XVIII (1875), pp. 380-445. Pages 390-392 cover the customs of the North just prior to the uprising.

2. Ordonnances des roys, III, 219, 224.

to obey were interpreted by Jacques Bonhomme as efforts toward restoring the feudal disciplinary controls. He did not submit meekly.

The final spark, as it were, was provided by the troops of the Dauphin. It has been noted that they were in garrison at various fortresses on the rivers surrounding Paris, and it can be safely assumed that they lived from the produce of the surrounding areas without paying, for such was the military custom of the day. This was, of course, in direct violation of articles thirty-seven and thirty-eight¹ of the Grand Ordinance which forbade seizure of supplies by troops without payment which certainly would not have been included in the ordinance had such not been the practices. By article seventeen² the people were allowed to organize and resist if the troops disobeyed this restriction. This explains the first attack by the peasants against the Dauphin's soldiers in May of 1358.³ There were many other underlying causes, of course, but they are not useful in this study.

1. Ibid., arts. 37, 38, pp. 123, 138, 139.

2. Ibid., art. 17, pp. 133, 134.

3. Grandes Chroniques, I, 177; R. Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V, II, 401.

It should be noted that there seems to be no evidence, other than the pro-Dauphin Chroniclers, such as Jean Le Bel¹ and J. Froissart,² that links Etienne Marcel, Bishop Lecoq, or the Parisian reform movement as a whole with the origin of the Jacquerie. In fact Etienne states quite clearly in his letters to the towns of Picardy and Flanders in July of 1358³ that the good people of Paris are not villeins, as the rebellious peasants as well as the bourgeoisie of Paris have been classed by the nobility, but are good and loyal citizens. Nor are they responsible for the villainies of the peasants.⁴ In effect, the provost is complaining bitterly of the campaign of adverse propaganda being conducted throughout the realm against the Parisians; nevertheless, the good provost is engaging in some exaggeration of facts himself, for by July he had completed the walls of Paris,⁵ and had sent troops to aid the Jacquerie

1. Jean Le Bel, pp. 258, 260. Anti-bourgeoisie throughout.

2. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 183, p. 113. Anti-bourgeoisie throughout.

3. Oeuvres de Froissart, avec des divers manuscrits, VI, MSS, pp. 462-472. Errors in the numbering of the pages: 465 is duplicated; 463 is missing; and 464 is out of order.

4. Ibid., p. 464.

5. See Map I; Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 183, p. 113.

at Meaux.¹ These discrepancies allow only two conclusions: either the provost is opposing adverse propaganda with the same, or the sources are confused. The Chroniques de Saint-Denis maintains that Etienne Marcel had sent fourteen hundred troops to aid the peasants on 9 May.² This is before the date of May twenty-eighth written for the beginning of the uprising in the Grandes Chroniques.³ Neither exonerates the provost, for by 9 June⁴ the Parisians are definitely allied with the peasants who, by this date, have frightened some three hundred or more noble ladies into the fortress of the Marché at Meaux in Brie.⁵ The bourgeois troops of Paris were, without question, definitely allied with the Jacquerie.⁶

Although it is thus certain that Etienne Marcel did aid the peasants, he constantly objected to both the excesses of the nobles as well as the peasants.⁷ The more reliable sources clearly indicate that he had sent, at the maximum, about three hundred⁸ troops

1. Oeuvres de Froissart, avec des divers manuscrits, VI, MSS, pp. 462, 464.

2. Ibid., p. 464

3. Grandes Chroniques, I, 177.

4. Ibid., p. 177.

5. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 184, p. 113.

6. Grandes Chroniques, I, 181-184.

7. Oeuvres de Froissart, avec des divers manuscrits, VI, MSS, p. 468; Jean Le Bel, II, 261.

8. Chroniques de Richard Lescot: Religieux de Saint-Denis; continuation, p. 128; Chronique Normande, pp. 130-131; Grandes Chroniques, I, 181.

under the command of his assistants, Jean Villiart and Pierre Gilles, to aid the peasants at Meaux.¹ The town, which was poorly fortified, offered no significant resistance,² but the fortress on the Marché was a formidable fortification.³ The marché was a contemporary name that applied to all the lowlands below the plateau and between the Marne River on the north and the Cormillon canal on the south.⁴ Apparently the fortress which stood on this land was also called the Marché. The fortress was connected with Brie by a bridge across the Cormillon canal and with Meaux by a bridge across the Marne.⁵ It was the bridge across the Marne which was stormed by the allied Parisians and peasants on 9 June 1358.⁶ They may have hoped to capture the Dauphin at the Marché, but he was no longer there, because he arrived at Sens on the same day of the attack.⁷ Inasmuch as Froissart is frequently reliable when he details a military engagement, that is, if the chronology or

-
1. Chronographia Regum Francorum, II, 274; Chronique Normande, p. 131; Jean Le Bel, II, 260-261.
 2. Grandes Chroniques, I, 182.
 3. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 184, pp. 113-114.
 4. R. Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V, I, 411.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 184, pp. 113-114; Grandes Chroniques, I, 181-182.
 7. Chronique Normande, p. 132; Grandes Chroniques, I, 180-181.

numbers are disregarded, his account of the actual battle¹ will be used as a basis with the probable exaggerations noted. Gaston Phébus,² the earl of Foix; his cousin, the captal of Buch; and the Duke of Orleans,³ the young uncle of the Dauphin, moved toward the fortress with fifteen men at arms.⁴ On the way they were joined by nine thousand troops, Froissart writes,⁵ but more reliable sources indicate that there were not more than fourteen hundred.⁶ In any event, there were enough royal troops to foil any attempt to cross the bridge that led into the Marché.⁷ The engagement ended in rout of the Jacquerie and the Parisians.⁸ Froissart's estimate gives seven thousand killed⁹ for the allies, either in the battle or in the ensuing flames that destroyed most of the town of Meaux.¹⁰ It should be noted that

-
1. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 184, pp. 113-114.
 2. Chronique Normande, p. 131; Grandes Chroniques, I, 183.
 3. Jean Le Bel, II, 260.
 4. Grandes Chroniques, I, 183. Froissart's 60 lances notwithstanding. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 184, p. 113.
 5. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 184, p. 113.
 6. Chronique Normande, p. 131; Jean Le Bel, II, 261; Grandes Chroniques, I, 184.
 7. Ibid.; Grandes Chroniques, I, 181.
 8. Grandes Chroniques, I, 184; Chronique Normande, pp. 130-131; Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 184, p. 114.
 9. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 184, pp. 113-114.
 10. Chronique de Richard Lescot: Religieux de Saint-Denis, continuation, p. 128; Chronographia Regum Francorum, II, 274; Chronique Normande, p. 131.

no other source considered has estimated the Jacquerie forces as over six thousand.¹

On the fifteenth of June, just following the allied attempt to force the bridge at the Marché, Charles the Bad arrived at Paris.² Through the efforts of the échevin, Charles Toussac, he was again proclaimed captain by the Parisian mob.³ This was a more serious action than ever before; because Charles, following this appointment of 15 June,⁴ spoke to the populace. He promised, as had the Dauphin earlier, "...to live and die with the people..." He bemoaned the maladministration of the realm, and promised to govern them and aid the administration, because "...his mother had been the sole daughter..." of Louis X, the Headstrong.⁵ Etienne Marcel then designated Charles as captain-universal of the realm.⁶ This appears to be the first time that Charles the Bad had openly claimed to head the government of France. This brash assumption of power soon brought repercussions that indicated the loyalty to the crown was

1. Compare chap. VI, p. 93.

2. Grandes Chroniques, I, 185. He had become a captain before on 4 May, 1358. See Grandes Chroniques, I, 173-174.

3. Ibid., p. 185.

4. Chronographia Regum Francorum, II, 275; Grandes Chroniques, I, 186.

5. Grandes Chroniques, I, 185-186; Chronographia Regum Francorum, II, 275.

6. Ibid., p. 185.

not as weak as it seemed. Certain nobles deserted Charles the Bad,¹ the Dauphin moved troops into Provins,² Chateau Thierry, and Gandelus to tighten the blockade of Paris,³ and any future reconciliations between the Dauphin and Charles the Bad appeared impossible--but Charles the Bad is never quite unreconcilable.

Immediately preceding the attack on Meaux and the Marché in June, Charles the Bad had disagreed with the Dauphin and was openly allied with the Parisians⁴ who were, in turn, openly allied with the Jacquerie.⁵ Also before 9 June 1358, the main body of the peasant troops led by William Cale had taken the Chateau of Ermenonville;⁶ and had destroyed the estates of Robert Lorris,⁷ Simon de Bucy, Pierre d'Orgemont, and Jack la Vache.⁸ All these were possessions of men included among the twenty-two accused royal advisers. Then on 9 June, the same day that the other peasant troops had assaulted the

1. Ibid., p. 188.

2. See Map II.

3. Grandes Chroniques, I, 186-187.

4. Ibid., p. 184.

5. Ibid. pp. 181-182.

6. Chronique Normande, p. 130.

7. Chronographia Regum Francorum, II, 273;
Chronique Normande, p. 130.

8. R. Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V, I, 408.

Marché, Cale had arranged his troops on the plateau near Clermont in Beauvais¹ in two lines of two thousand troops each² to meet the combined chivalry of Beauvais, Vermandois, Hainault, Ponthieu, Ginois, Flanders, and Artois.³ Prominent among the chivalry were a Harcourt and a De Picqueigny, and leading the chivalry was the turn-coat ally of the Parisians, Charles the Bad.⁴ A thousand knights at Clermont⁵ faced peasant troops very well arrayed on the plateau,⁶ in fact, they had been so skilfully deployed by William Cale that Charles the Bad invited the peasant leader to his encampment ostensibly for an interview designed, he said, to procure a truce.⁷ Cale had just shown his military ability; he now illustrated his peasant credulity. He accepted the king of Navarre's word, and arrived for the interview without taking the precaution of requiring hostages for the king's good faith.⁸ In this manner Charles the Bad removed the military leadership from the Jacquerie, for Cale did not long survive the interview.⁹

1. See Map II.

2. Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 73.

3. Oeuvres de Froissart, avec des divers manuscrits, VI, MSS, p. 468.

4. Chronique des Quatre Valois, pp. 72-73.

5. Ibid., p. 74.

6. Ibid., p. 73.

7. Ibid., pp. 74-75.

8. Ibid., p. 75.

9. Grandes Chroniques, I, 184; Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 75.

The peasant army could not withstand the loss of their leader or the onslaughts of the chivalry. This defeat, when coupled with the repulsion of their other forces at the bridge of the Marché, meant the end of the class rebellion known as the Jacquerie.

All that remained was the reaction. No doubt, Froissart exaggerated in his jubilation. He writes that Charles the Bad killed Cale¹ and three thousand of his men² on the 10 June,³ the probable day of the battle at Clermont;⁴ and that before the reaction was over, some one hundred thousand⁵ peasants had been slaughtered. Other sources⁶ either do not give an estimate or list the numbers slain in separate forays;⁷ nevertheless, all agree that the slaughter was great⁸ and indiscriminate.⁹ It was the revenge of an incensed knight-errantry quite conscious of the prerogatives it had lost to the lower classes since Poitiers. Of course the excesses of both classes, brutal as they may seem to the modern humanitarian,

1. Ibid., pp. 181-182; Ibid.

2. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 183, p. 113.

3. Ibid.; Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 75; Grandes Chroniques, I, 181-182.

4. Grandes Chroniques, I, 181-182.

5. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 183, p. 113.

6. Chronique Normande, pp. 121-123; Chronique de Richard Lescot: Religieux de Saint-Denis, continuation, pp. 126-127.

7. Chronique des Quatre Valois, pp. 75-76.

8. Chronique Normande, pp. 121-123; Chronique de Richard Lescot: Religieux de Saint-Denis, continuation, pp. 126-127.

9. Oeuvres de Froissart, avec des divers manuscrits, VI, MSS, pp. 466-467.

were quite in accord with the age in which they occurred; but the ironic fact remains that, at that point, the Parisians were deprived of a powerful ally by Charles the Bad, their pledged leader, who had just led the conservative chivalry to a victory over that same ally!

CHAPTER VII

The Close of the Parisian Rebellion

By July of 1358 the towns in Picardy, Artois, and Flanders must have received the slightly hypocritical letters of the provost of Paris in which he submitted his justification, and pleaded for their aid.¹ Bishop Lecoq is again mentioned as working with Etienne Marcel and the Parisians on 1 July.² Charles the Bad, fresh from the massacres³ of the Jacquerie, had been proclaimed a captain-universal by the Parisians,⁴ and the Dauphin was at Chelles, near Paris with ten to twelve thousand loyal northern troops.⁵ Immediately the diplomatic Charles the Bad began to make arrangements for another reconciliation.⁶ At that time, he was aided by Jeanne, his aunt and widow of Charles IV the Fair,⁷ and Pope Innocent VI.⁸ They, apparently from purely humanitarian motives, had constantly tried to end the

1. Compare chap. V, pp. 77-78.

2. Jean Le Bel, II, 265.

3. Chronique des Quatre Valois, pp. 75-76.

4. Grandes Chroniques, I, 185.

5. Chronique Normande, p. 132.

6. Grandes Chroniques, I, 187-189.

7. Ibid., p. 187, 189, 190, 191, 198; Chronique Normande, pp. 132-133.

8. Ibid., p. 187.

internal strife of France. The result of these negotiations was two conferences; one on the eighth of July 1358 and one on the nineteenth. The meeting of the eighth¹ was held at Montreuil just northeast of Paris, but this was only a peace conference between Charles the Bad and the Dauphin.² The results were very favorable to Charles,³ for he was guaranteed lands to the value of ten thousand livres, four thousand florins, and royal moneys for some of the devastated lands.⁴ The agreement was bound by solemn oath before the Bishop of Lysieux.⁵

At the other conference on the nineteenth, the Parisians were represented by Jean Belot and Colin le Flament,⁶ the échevins, and ten others. Charles the Bad and the Dauphin were there of course; but despite the presence of the Queen Jeanne⁷ and three papal legates⁸ the conference was held in a state of mutual suspicion on a boat moored between Carrieres and Vitry on the Seine River.⁹ They did, however,

1. Ibid., p. 190.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., pp. 191-192.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 191.

7. Chronique Normande, pp. 132-133; Chronographia Regum Francorum, p. 276.

8. Archbishops of Lyons and Paris and the prior of Saint-Martin des Champs. Grandes Chroniques, I, 198.

9. Jean Le Bel, II, 265.

agree upon an armistice. The Dauphin would raise the blockade by the twenty-fourth,¹ and the Parisians would provide six hundred thousand écus in the coin of Philip VI toward the ransom of king John II.² When the truce was declared, the royal troops were disbanded.³

In Paris the cessation of hostilities was not regarded with any degree of seriousness, for they remained under arms.⁴ Any royal officials who endeavored to enter the city were greeted by locked gates and the cry, "valez à vostre duc!"⁵ The duke to whom they were urged to return was, of course, the Dauphin, the Duke of Normandy. Paris was by no means ready for capitulation.

A definite reason is easily found to explain this reluctance in Paris to accept the Dauphin's pledges: prior to the armistice, the three⁶ to six thousand men of the royal army had devastated the area around Paris,⁷ and had destroyed over five hundred villages as well as cutting off the food

1. Grandes Chroniques, I, 199.

2. Ibid., pp. 198-199, 191-193.

3. Ibid., p. 199.

4. Ibid., p. 200.

5. Ibid.

6. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 185, p. 114.

7. Jean Le Bel, II, 462.

supplies of the city.¹ While the Parisian leaders had no faith in the Dauphin's word and remained defiant,² it can be suspected that the populace was, in turn, losing faith in its leaders;³ because an Ideal is seldom, if ever, victorious over Starvation. Paris must depend on Charles the Bad for allies. He had been moving intermittently between Paris and St. Denis for over six weeks.⁴ In his employ were the infamous freebooters, Pipe, Sandon, Plantin, Jouel, Kain, and Zillers.⁵ It is scarcely to be expected that the people of Paris could trust such an unsavory crew of pillagers to be valuable allies; nevertheless, their captain-universal constantly assured them that he and his troops were staunch defenders of the Parisian cause.⁶ As a result, there were some two to three hundred "English"⁷ archers within the city at the time the armistice was proclaimed.

1. Ibid.

2. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 185, p. 114.

3. Grandes Chroniques, I, 199.

4. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 185, p. 114.

5. Chronique des Quatre Valois, pp. 80-81; Jean Le Bel, II, 265; Chronique Normande, p. 133; Chronographia Regum Francorum, p. 275.

6. Grandes Chroniques, I, 202; Jean Le Bel, II, 264.

7. The word "English" applied to all pillagers in France regardless of their native land. Many were actually French. Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 81; Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 185, 186, pp. 114-115.

Some of these mercenaries were destined for a highly significant role in future events, for they began to have the characteristic troubles that frequently plague foreign troops in a city under siege.¹ They were blamed for any outrage committed either inside or outside the city.² The riots that followed resulted in many of them leaving the city and about sixty deaths within their ranks.³ The basic unity of the revolution was beginning to be disturbed.⁴

On 22 July 1358, Charles the Bad, Etienne Marcel, and Bishop Lecoq met with other leaders of the city presumably to formulate future plans.⁵ It would be of considerable historical value if it were known what occurred within that closed meeting or what other leaders attended. Apparently no record was kept. Certain chroniclers maintain the John Maillart and Pepin de Essars were at the meeting,⁶ and that these men, by their own personal opinion, decided that

1. Chronique de Richard Lescot: Religieux de Saint-Denis, continuation, p. 131; Chronique Normande, pp. 133, 315; Jean Le Bel, II, 226.

2. Chronique Normande, pp. 134-135; Grandes Chroniques, I, 201.

3. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 185, 186, pp. 114-115; Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 81.

4. Chronique Normande, p. 134.

5. Grandes Chroniques, I, 202; Chroniques de J. Froissart (Luce), p. 115.

6. Chronique des Quatre Valois, pp. 83-85; Chronique Normande, pp. 134-135.

the proceedings were treasonable.¹ The conference may have been, but some chroniclers are noncommittal² or state that the treason was discovered by a quirk of destiny or by the Grace of God.³ What the actual proceedings were none seem to mention, but what took place outside the meeting is easily obtainable.⁴ Charles the Bad and Etienne Marcel, in agreement with the other leaders of the city, told the assembled people that it would be a "bad thing" to massacre the "English" remaining in the town because certain kindred freebooters were pillaging outside.⁵ The people were not satisfied; in fact, they raised such a clamor that Etienne Marcel and Charles the Bad were forced to promise to lead the Parisian troops out of the city against the "English" ravagers. The same evening the Parisians sallied forth in three columns; and, in all, they totaled some sixteen thousand men-at-arms and eight thousand foot soldiers, if the Grandes Chroniques can be trusted.⁶ The three columns encountered no enemy to assail as they marched

1. Chronique Normande, pp. 134-135.

2. Grandes Chroniques, I, 206, 207.

3. Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 83; Chronique de J. Froissart (Luce), p. 115.

4. Grandes Chroniques, I, 203-204.

5. Ibid., p. 203.

6. Ibid., pp. 203-204. The Grandes Chroniques are frequently the most acceptable in estimates but this is indeed a huge force to be raised in one afternoon.

through the pillaged area, and two of the columns never did; but the third, while quite carelessly wandering back to Paris, was surprised by an "English" detachment lying in ambush in the woods of St. Cloud.¹ Six² or eight hundred Parisians died in the resultant slaughter.³

This defeat, of course, did nothing to soothe the populace regarding their leaders. Charles the Bad seems to have decided that further efforts to convince the people that his "English" troops were loyal allies would be inopportune; therefore, he returned to St. Denis on the same day.⁴ Etienne Marcel and the leaders remaining in Paris had to imprison the mercenaries that had been abandoned by their leader. They were placed in the Louvre to save them from the fury of the Parisian mob.⁵

By the twenty-seventh of the month, the din raised against the mercenaries kept under the protection of the provost necessitated prompt action, for the tension of the mob was such that the men were no longer safe even in the Louvre. Etienne Marcel

1. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 186, p. 114; Grandes Chroniques, I, 203.

2. Grandes Chroniques, I, 201.

3. Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 82; Chronique Normande, p. 133.

4. Grandes Chroniques, I, 204.

5. Ibid., p. 205.

sent two hundred of his crossbowmen and men-at-arms to the Louvre to escort the "English" safely out of the city. They were led to the gate of Saint Honor through a thoroughly incensed mob that was held at bay only by the archers of the military escort.¹ Froissart seems to be alone in maintaining that the prisoners were kept over the bastides at the gates and that they were allowed to escape at night.² The Chronique Normande does present the plausible explanation that the escape was engineered at night but from the Louvre not the gates.³

By the recording of the protection and the release of the prisoners by the provost, the chroniclers again inadvertently give a possible clue concerning the character of their villain, Etienne Marcel. In reflecting the public censure cast on the provost for his actions, they allow a certain amount of speculation. They do not state that there were over thirty-two mercenaries to be released, nor do they give the names of any prominent prisoners.⁴ Thus they almost eliminate any possibility that the provost was motivated by the fear that Charles

1. Ibid.

2. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 186, p. 114.

3. Chronique Normande, pp. 133, 314. A very strong possibility.

4. Ibid., p. 133; Grandes Chroniques, I, 204.

the Bad would be totally alienated by the loss of any valuable lieutenants; and raising the possibility, strongly indicated before in the letters of the provost against excessive bloodshed, that the provost may have had some good qualities also. To be sure, Etienne Marcel must have been cognizant of his waning appeal to the people. It is quite conceivable that the blood of thirty-two not-so-innocent mercenaries might have restored his popularity with the people. Others have slaughtered far more to achieve far less. Of course, Paris appeared to be doomed, and the people were starving.¹ He could scarcely have retained favor for long unless some decidedly miraculous aid was forthcoming. The chroniclers, however, by their over-zealousness have destroyed at least a portion of his villainousness. But the fact remains that after what may or may not have been purely unselfish motivation, Etienne Marcel's popular support dwindled rapidly. He was held responsible for the unfortunate foray at St. Cloud and his friendliness with Charles the Bad;² he was blamed for not controlling the pillaging of the freebooters and the royal troops outside Paris;³ he was, no doubt,

1. Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 84.

2. Chronique Normande, p. 133; Grandes Chroniques, I, 205.

3. Grandes Chroniques, I, 201-206.

censured for the blockade and the resultant starvation;¹ and, in view of future events, he was certainly opposed by the traditionally royalist sentiments held silent by a portion of the people of Paris.

On the thirty-first day of July 1358,² Etienne Marcel with a group of fully armed followers, which included Joceran de Mâcon, ex-treasurer to the queen Jeanne and perhaps to Charles the Bad,³ started a circuit of inspection to all the gates or bastides of the city. It should be recalled that this was one of the regular duties of the provost of Paris;⁴ but the chroniclers, without exception, ignore this and assume the souspechion⁵ of treasonable intent that they have inducted into the meeting of Charles the Bad, Bishop Lecoq, and Etienne Marcel which had been held at noon of the twenty-first.⁶ It should not be assumed, however, that the suspicions were completely unfounded; for after Saint Cloud, Philip of Navarre who had been ravaging to the south and west of Paris for over two years, visited his brother Charles the

1. Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 84.

2. Grandes Chroniques, I, 206 ff.; Chroniques de J. Froissart (Luce), p. 115.

3. Ibid., p. 206 n.

4. Compare chap. IV, pp. 37-38.

5. Jean Le Bel, II, 267.

6. Ibid.; Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 187, p. 115; Grandes Chroniques, I, 202; Chroniques de J. Froissart (Luce), p. 115.

Bad at Saint-Denis just before 31 July.¹ Philip was in the company of several notorious freebooters² and many men-at-arms from Brittany, Navarre, and Normandy.³ While the author of the Chronique Normande shows some doubt as to the provost's treasonable designs, he asserts that the people thought he intended to betray the city.⁴ The Grandes Chroniques and others record that the provost told Charles the Bad to assemble his men and to return outside the city walls at night.⁵ Yet, unfortunately for definite historical analysis, they differ on many other essential details; and not one consulted offers any concrete proof other than the reliance that can be placed on their word or on their above-mentioned souspechion of evil intent.

Be that as it may, Etienne Marcel and his group went to the bastide of Saint-Denis in the morning.⁶ There they had some rather vague difficulty with the guards, and may or may not have been successful in obtaining keys.⁷ While other chroniclers maintain

1. Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 83.

2. Robert Knolles, Hugh de Karvelley, M. d'Anselme, and M. Requis.

3. Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 83.

4. Chronique Normande, p. 134.

5. Grandes Chroniques, I, 204-205; L. Lacabane, "Memoires sur la mort d'Etienne Marcel," 80; Chroniques de J. Froissart (Luce), p. 115. These agree with the Chroniques.

6. Ibid., p. 206.

7. Chronique Normande, p. 135; Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 187, pp. 114-115; Grandes Chroniques, I, 206.

that the provost carried two boxes of letters¹ of a treasonable nature from Charles the Bad rather than keys, none offer any reason why the provost would be carrying letters from Charles the Bad to this same Charles who, they say, was to be let into a city marked building by building for selective pillaging purposes.² At the gate of Saint-Denis, a typical rabble-rousing cry was raised by the three men; John Maillart, a trusted échevin of the provost;³ Jean de Charny; and Pepin de Essars, a knight.⁴ During the day they rode about the city⁵ waving royal banners and shouting, Montjoye⁶ au riche roy et au duc son fils le regent.⁷ "By the blood of the Martyr Saint-Denis, to the opulent king and to the duke his son the regent" or words to the same effect.⁸ By the

1. Chronographia Regum Francorum, pp. 279-280; Chronique Normande, p. 135; Grandes Chroniques, I, 208.

2. Jean Le Bel, II, 266; Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 83; Chroniques de J. Froissart (Luce), p. 115.

3. Chronique Normande, pp. 134-135; Jean Le Bel, II, 266.

4. Simeon Luce, "Du rôle politique de Jean Maillart en 1358," Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des chartes, LVIII (1857), p. 415; L. Lacabane, "Mémoires sur la mort d'Etienne Marcel," p. 80; Grandes Chroniques, I, 206.

5. Grandes Chroniques, I, 206.

6. Montjoye was a war cry taken from the name of a hill outside Paris; but was based on the martyrdom of Saint-Denis on that hill.

7. Chronique Normande, pp. 134-135.

8. Chronique de Richard Lescot: Religieux de Saint-Denis, continuation, p. 132; L. Lacabane, "Mémoires sur la mort d'Etienne Marcel," pp. 80, 85; Meum goudium! Sancte Dyonisi Regi et duce; Chronographia Regum Francorum, pp. 379-380; Montjoie regi magno et duci regenti!

time that the provost reached the gate of Saint Antoine at an undetermined hour, Maillart's efforts had roused sufficient malcontents from the populace to challenge the party of the provost.¹ Froissart, in his romantic literary style, sets the hour at midnight, puts the keys to the bastide in the hands of the provost, makes no mention of the treasonous letters; and provides the exact dialogue which took place:

John Maillart said to him...: 'Stephen, what do you here at this hour of the night; The Provost replied: 'John, why do you ask it? I am here to take care of, and to guard the city, of which I have the government.' 'By God,' answered John, 'things shall not go on so: you are not here at this hour for any good, which I will now show you!' addressing himself to those near him; 'for see how he had got the keys of the gate in his hand, to betray the city!' The Provost said, 'John, you lie.' John replied, 'It is you, Stephen, who lie:' and rushing on him, cried to his people, 'kill them, kill them: now strike home, for they are traitors.'²

Most of the other chroniclers venture to record no actual conversation, but one has written another version.³ The provost is speaking:

Why do you wish to do me ill. You do evil. That which I have done, I have done for your well-being as well as for mine. And rather than I undertake

1. Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 85; Chronique de Richard Lescot: Religieux de Saint-Denis, continuation, p. 132; Chronographia Regum Francorum, p. 279; Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 187, p. 114 and p. 114 alternate MSS.

2. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 187, p. 115 and alternate MSS.

3. Jean Le Bel, II, 266-267; Grandes Chroniques, I, 206-210.

anything, you may make me swear that what the ordinance of the third estate has decreed that I have maintained from my power.¹

Both versions seem plausible; both can not be correct.

A man facing a leader he has just deserted and that leader faced by a trusted lieutenant who has raised the mob against him might well be expected to produce a confused dialogue. It is far more likely that neither recorded dialogue is more than verbal hearsay consigned to history, for exact conversations are seldom recalled verbatim. The latter version makes no mention of the time of day or night. Froissart may have been correct in assigning the incident to midnight although certain more recent historians state that Froissart fabricated the dialogue, and moved the hour to midnight so that he could portray the incident by the light of torches.² The sources consulted for this study neither support the more recent historians nor completely refute Froissart. How long did the provost's party take to move from bastide of Saint-Denis to that of Saint Antoine? The chroniclers consulted do not answer that question.

1.Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 85.

2.Jules Tessier, Etienne Marcel, p. 190; R. Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V, I, 453.

Whether by the light of torches or by daylight, Etienne Marcel and six¹ or eight of his party were killed and fifteen captured² by Maillart and his followers at the gate of Saint Antoine on 31 July. 1358.³ Once again in history the same proletariat used by radicals earlier had been used as a tool by the reactionaries.

1. Philip Giffort, Giles Marcel, Simon Parnes, Jean de Lille the younger, and others. Chronique Normande, p. 135.

2. Jean Le Bel, II, 266-267; Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 85.

3. Chronique de Richard Lescot: Religieux de Saint-Denis, continuation, p. 133; Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 187, p. 114; Grandes Chroniques, I, 209; Chronographia Regum Francorum, p. 280. There exists a great deal of natural confusion among the chroniclers as to where and when certain of the provost's followers were killed.

CHAPTER VIII

Reward, Revenge, Reaction

On 1 August John Maillart successfully defended his actions to the populace by proclaiming the treason of the provost,¹ and he sent his brother Simon, E. Alphonse,² and John Pastorel³ to the Dauphin, who was either at Meaux⁴ or Chareton,⁵ to offer the surrender of the city. The Dauphin naturally welcomed such an inexpensive victory, and by 4 August he granted pardons to all those adherents of the provost who had combined to free his capital.⁶ Conceivably, this could have been sufficient motivation for the desertion of the brothers Maillart, for they had long been trusted members of Etienne Marcel's faction.⁷

If the chroniclers have recorded a true picture of the events, the Dauphin Charles entered the city

1. Grandes Chroniques, I, 210; Chronographia Regum Francorum, p. 281.

2. Jean Le Bel, II, 267.

3. Froissart, Chronicles, chap. 187, p. 115.

4. Chronographia Regum Francorum, p. 281.

5. Jean Le Bel, II, 267.

6. Grandes Chroniques, I, 211.

7. Chronique Normande, pp. 134-135; Jean Le Bel, II, 266.

on 2 August 1358 amid a tremendous ovation.¹ A number of decapitations followed:² Charles Toussac and the treasurer of Charles the Bad on the second;³ Pierre Gilles, the governor, and Caillart, the keeper of the Louvre;⁴ and in the next two days Jean Godard, Jean Prevost, Peter Le Blont, Peter de Puyeux, and Peter de Puisieux were executed.⁵ Bishop Lecoq was not among those punished.

The banker and corrupt mintmaster, Nicholas Braque, and his brother d'Amaury, were soon rid of one of their enemies, the honest but over-zealous reformer-general, Michael de Saint Germain, who had been an active member of Bishop Lecoq's reforming commission.⁶ He was immediately arrested. His guilt had been nothing more than a vigorous personal effort to remove the corruption and inefficiencies from the royal mints. Even his contemporaries attest to his honest character. The revenge of the Braques was soon achieved, for Michael was forcibly drowned in the Seine River on the third of August without the formality of a trial.⁷ For the obvious financial

1. Grandes Chroniques, I, 210; Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 86.

2. Ibid.; Ibid.

3. Chronographia Regum Francorum, p. 28; Grandes Chroniques, I, 210; Chronique de Richard Lescot: Religieux de Saint-Denis, continuation, p. 133.

4. Chronique des Quatre Valois, p. 85.

5. Chronique Normande, p. 135; Chronique de Richard Lescot: Religieux de Saint-Denis, continuation, p. 134.

6. La revanche des Braque, p. 106.

7. Ibid., pp. 106-107.

scandal¹ and murder, the Braques were rewarded with letters of remission legally cleansing them of all evil or corruptive intent by letters instigated by Simon de Bucy,² and issued by the crown in June of 1361.³

After his triumphal entrance on the second of August, the Dauphin began to reward all those who participated in the Parisian reaction with royal pardons.⁴ He then confiscated most of Etienne Marcel's properties, and gave it for a short time to the home for the blind,⁵ the Quinze Vingts.⁶ It was withdrawn almost immediately.⁷ The house and possessions of Pierre Gilles were given to another supporter of Maillart,⁸ and a member of the Essars' line got the properties of Charles Toussac, the provost's

1. Compare chap. VI, pp. 57-58; La revanche des Braque, pp. 112-115.

2. La revanche des Braque, p. 121.

3. Ibid. Nicholas Braque, pp. 121-122 and d'Amaury Braque pp. 118-121.

4. L. Lacabane, "Memoires sur la mort d'Etienne Marcel," p. 93; Grandes Chroniques, I, 211.

5. Simeon Luce, "Examen critique de l'ouvrage intitule Etienne Marcel, par F. T. Perrens," Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des chartes, XXI (1860), p. 76. Hereafter cited as S. Luce, "Examen critique, Etienne Marcel."

6. See Map I.

7. Ordonnances des roys, IV, 348-349.

8. Simeon Luce, "Pièces relatives à Etienne Marcel, et à quelques-uns de ses principaux adherents," Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des chartes, XXI (1860), p. 74. Hereafter cited as, Pièces relatives à Etienne Marcel et adherents.

orator.¹ John Maillart was also rewarded. In August 1358 he received lands to the value of five hundred livres for life;² by 1364 he was granted forest privileges and the rents from the Hôtel de Léroy near the Pont de l'Arche;³ and in 1372 the Dauphin, then Charles V, ennobled Maillart.⁴

However, the Dauphin was no harsh, vindictive prince; for he released many of the Marcel faction by October of 1358,⁵ and included among them was Jean, the younger brother of Etienne Marcel.⁶ The Dauphin also provided for the provost's widow, and her eldest daughter was assured of her inheritance.⁷ This was made official by the crown on 13 January 1360, apparently by an act of parlement rather than the States-General.⁸

Charles the Bad, having retreated to Melun from Saint-Denis after the death of Etienne,⁹ was drawn away from Edward III again by the promise of the

1. Ibid., p. 83.

2. Regis, pieces, 96 année, 1364, piece 55. Cited in L. Lacabane, "Memoires sur la mort d'Etienne Marcel," pp. 94-95 n.

3. L. Lacabane, "Memoires sur la mort d'Etienne Marcel," p. 95.

4. Ibid., p. 96.

5. Grandes Chroniques, I, 221-222.

6. Pieces relatives a Etienne Marcel et adherents, p. 81.

7. Ibid., p. 14.

8. Ibid.

9. Grandes Chroniques, I, 212-213.

usual concessions guaranteed him by the crown in a treaty arranged at Pontoise on 21 August 1359.¹ Charles the Bad was again reconciled with the crown. Needless to say he did not remain reconciled. The difficulties with Charles the Bad were by no means over.

Bishop Robert Lecoq, who had escaped from Paris to Charles the Bad by unrecorded means, was denied pardon by the Dauphin and the States-General on 28 May 1359,² and was transferred by the pope to a small bishopric on the border of Castile.³ There appears to be no further recorded efforts of the bishop to interfere in the administrative affairs of the State.

The reform spirit within the deputies of the States-General was not quite exhausted. When John II signed the Treaty of London on 24 March 1359⁴ by which most of western France was destined for English control and his ransom set at four million deniers of gold in the coin of Philip VI, the States-General of

1. Ibid., pp. 238-239, 242 f., 244 ff.

2. Ibid., p. 237.

3. All writers cite the same conclusion from the same source, Gallia Christiana, IX, 549.

4. Charles Petit-Dutaillies and Paul Collier, "La Diplomatie Francaise et le Traté de Britegny," Le Moyen Age: Bulletin Mensuel D'histoire et de Philologie, vols. 10-11 (1897-98), p. 5.

May repudiated the terms. The deputies, however, repealed most of the reforms of their predecessors, and restored the twenty-two royal officials.¹ The Treaty of Bretigny,² which followed, contained similar terms to the Treaty of London. It was signed by May of 1360. Charles le Mauvais and Edward III remained to harass France, but the peasant insurrection was over; the Parisian rebellion was over; and the deputies' efforts toward establishing a limited monarchy were over for their era.

1. La régime financier de la France, I, 512; Grandes Chroniques, I, 237.

2. Grandes Chroniques, I, 257 f., 259 ff.

CHAPTER IX

Conclusion

The period of Parisian administrative reform and rebellion that culminated between 1351 and 1358 was only a portion of a trend that had been evolving for over forty years in France. It may have started before that time, but this study has rather arbitrarily started the examination with the Norman Charter of 1315.¹ As a matter of fact, the entire French tendency was in itself only a relatively late development in a general European evolution toward bourgeois independence, but it contained a germ of the sovereignty of the people that was destined to develop from such precedents.

In 1315 limitation to the powers of the crown was decidedly mild and only local in scope; nevertheless, it was a limitation to the Capetian absolutism. By the time that the practice of calling general assemblies was a necessity in providing the financial needs of the Valois kings,

1. Compare chap. II, p. 8; Ordonnances des roys, I, 551 ff.

the precedent of limitation had been set in Normandy. This Norman Charter that came from the small local assembly of 1315 was a contract with the French king; and its most important limitations were those stipulating that the king should not interfere in the Norman system of justice and that any levy for extraordinary revenues should be only in case of dire necessity.¹ From this mild beginning the limitation grew to the thirteen concessions demanded by the States-General of February 1346.² The effects of this States-General can not be determined, for the disastrous French defeat at Crecy followed immediately. But the assembly did continue the system of sales taxes and the gabelle that had been established in 1342.

In 1347 Philip VI of Valois, by ordering that the deputies arriving for his general assemblies should be fully authorized not only to represent their areas but also to act as financial agents, inadvertently placed the necessary power for reform into the hands of the deputies.³ This was the power which was destined to create the legislation of the period of 1351-1358.

1. Ibid.; Ordonnances des roys, I, 551 ff.

2. Compare chap. II, p. 9; Ordonnances des roys, II, 179 ff.

3. Compare chap. II, pp. 9-10.

By February of 1351, the practice of calling deputies to a States-General had become a custom; and with the new financial power in the hands of the deputies of the third estate,¹ John II was forced to ask for their aid. He faced financial difficulties which were insurmountable without the wealth of the third estate. The deputies of this States-General were loyal; they tried desperately to provide the aide for the war with England; none the less, they demanded thirty-two limitations before granting this aide.²

Another States-General was called by John II in December of 1355. Again it evidenced loyalty, but the demands for control were increased. The power of the crown was definitely threatened. Superintendents-general were appointed to collect and deputies were assigned to supervise the disbursing of the funds collected; the currency was stabilized, and the deputies scheduled a future States-General entirely on their own volition. The latter was a definite violation of the traditional royal prerogative. The assembly further decreed that forced loans, royal forest privileges,

1. Compare chap. III, p. 23; Ordonnances des roys, III, p. xxi.

2. Compare chap. III, p. 25; Ordonnances des roys, II, 393 ff., 422 ff.

favoritism in royal appointments, and royal seizures of lands or supplies should cease.¹ This December Ordinance failed to raise the necessary aide, but the deputies tried again on 12 March 1356.² They abolished the sales taxes and the gabelle, and substituted a graduated income tax based on estimates made by the individual taxpayer regarding his annual income and the value of his property.³ In so far as this study has been able to determine, this was the only time during this era that the States-General tried such a unique scheme. Apparently it had never been attempted before, and it was not repeated. The success or failure of such a scheme was never tested, for the costly Battle of Poitiers followed on 19 September 1356.

After Poitiers the Dauphin Charles was completely dependent on his adviser Bishop Lecoq and on the third estate of the realm. The Bishop advocated a scheme to a States-General of October 1356 designed to correct the corruption and inefficiencies of the administration.⁴ The deputies

1. Compare chap. IV, pp. 27-30; Ordonnances des roys, III, 19 ff.

2. Compare chap. IV, p. 31.

3. Compare chap. IV, p. 31; Ordonnances des roys, IV, 171 ff.

4. Compare chap. IV, pp. 40-46.

accepted his suggestions; but the Forêt-Braque-Lorris faction, which included the royal officials accused by the crusading bishop and the deputies, was able to completely defeat the proposed changes.¹

Soon the conditions within the realm again forced the Dauphin Charles to convoke the States-General in February of 1357,² and again Bishop Lecoq's oratorical efforts echoed the deputies' cry for change and reform. The famous Grand Ordinance followed on 3 March 1357.³ It was the culmination of the gradual tenor toward a limited monarchy in France. Legal methods were provided for the reformation of the royal administrative system, and the reformatory commissioners were given almost supreme power. The finances of the kingdom would be collected, controlled, and disbursed by representatives from the States-General. Twenty-two royal officials were dismissed, and the Grand Council received members of the reform element. The judiciary were ordered to be diligent, efficient, and honest or be subject to dismissal or forfeiture of salary. The States-General would be

1. Compare chap. IV, p. 46.

2. Compare chap. V, pp. 50-56; Grandes Chroniques, I, 95-99.

3. Compare chap. V, pp. 52-56; Ordonnances des roys, III, 121 ff.

responsible for subsidizing and conducting the war effort. Mercenaries and royal troops would be compelled to act within the law throughout the realm. The people could legally resist if the soldiers did not do so; and finally, the deputies provided for future general assemblies without any interference by the crown.¹

The Grand Ordinance failed principally because it could not collect the necessary aide. This study has found little evidence to support the theory which maintains that it failed because it was too radical and too advanced for its age. The examination of the ordinances of the preceding general assemblies of Philip VI, John II, and the Dauphin Charles has revealed that the Grand Ordinance contained little of a radical nature that had not already been decreed. True, the Ordinance created a limited monarchy and a bourgeois independence in Paris; and had it been more successful, France might well have been spared many of the violent revolutions which were to follow. She might even have preceded England in the development of parliamentary government. The Grand Ordinance was not too advanced or too radical for its age; in fact, chronologically speaking, it was far in the wake of the general European inclination toward bourgeois independence.

1. Ibid.

The Grand Ordinance failed; and principally from this failure, the realm was plunged into violent social insurrection and a defiant Parisian rebellion. Etienne Marcel, the provost of merchants of Paris is usually given most of the credit or censure for this violent climax to the reformative evolution; however, he was only one of several men who were implicated at that moment. Taken as a whole, the reformative movement was merely a part of the general effort of the commercial classes to gain independent control over the municipal affairs in the commercial cities of France. There is no reason to believe that the provost and Robert Lecoq, both of bourgeois stock, did not fully realize that France and Paris were lagging behind Europe in commercial freedom and development.

Bishop Robert Lecoq, Etienne Marcel, William Cale, and Charles the Bad were not great men of destiny; they did not create the spirit of reform or rebellion in France. They were but men of current value within their small area of space and time, and merely provided the necessary elements for reformation; insurrection, and rebellion. Charles the Bad provided the promise of military aid; William Cale gave military experience and provided the leadership for the peasant's insurrection,

however reluctantly he may have performed the duties of his position. Bishop Lecoq provided the oratorical skill and authoritative knowledge of the need for administrative modification. Etienne Marcel was a businessman from the third estate who first represented the Parisians at the States-General of 1355.¹ He thus represented a class that was loyal to the government, in the main, but had begun to be powerful enough to demand a share in the government. When they realized that the subsidies were not being utilized for the purpose of war and when they saw the disastrous results of the mismanagement and corruption within the royal administration, they responded with businesslike efforts to curtail the malpractices and to regulate the use of the subsidies. Etienne Marcel, their representative, in his first appearance at the States-General does not seem to have been a reformer. Financially he had little to gain by opposing the crown, and had a great deal to lose by disloyalty. The actions of the provost that have grown with his legend seem to have been a coincident or, at the best, results forced on him by his official duties as provost of Paris. It should

1. Compare chap. IV, pp. 26-27; Grandes Chroniques, I, 56.

be recalled that even in April of 1358, he professed full loyalty to the crown by first appealing to the Dauphin for succor.¹ Then when that was refused, he appealed in June and July to the towns of France, but still he insisted that the people of Paris were loyal citizens.² He appears but an alert businessman fully conscious of the dangers which faced Paris. Only in the States-General of 1355, did he come in contact with the reform element and Bishop Lecoq, and there is no proof that he was anxious for administrative reform even at that time. It took a series of annoying changes in the royal currency ratio to put the provost into full action with the reform element.³ Undoubtedly the numerous changes in the legal currency rates must have been exasperating for any tradesmen or dealers in money whose daily business and credit transactions must be performed with constantly changing currency. A currency in which the value of the coin might and did vary from month to month or week to week. Marcel collected and led the disgusted Parisian tradespeople and the Parisian mob that followed them into active opposition to these financial decrees of the crown.

1. Compare chap. V, pp. 77-78.

2. Compare chap. VI, pp. 88, 96-97, 103.

3. Compare chap. IV, pp. 46-48; V, 66-67, 69-71; VI, 88.

It was a currency change or a threat to the safety of Paris that always roused the provost and his Parisian adherents to violent action.¹ Currency change, the threat of sack or pillaging, commercial blockade, and royal indifference to the dangers which beset Paris and the realm were the reasons for the provosts final alienation from the crown, and these forced the provost to the side of the reformers.

Under different political, military, and social circumstances, Etienne Marcel probably would have been little other than an efficient, loyal provost of merchants in Paris. The Parisians were extremely conscious of the mismanagement of the war and the corruption within the royal administration. They were eager for reform and change. Had they not been so it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the provost and his orator, Charles Toussac to rouse them to a violent stage of resistance by mere words.

Prestige and official capacity demanded that Bishop Robert Lecoq be heard by the deputies of the general assemblies, but had he spoken to an assemblage

1. Ibid.

of deputies not already disgusted with the failures in their government, or had he complained of inefficiencies and corruption within that governmental administration which were not generally realized by the majority of those deputies, he probably would have failed. When he spoke, however, he spoke with full authority and with full knowledge of the corruption of which he spoke, and he was heard by deputies in full accord with the spirit of change and reform that had been long instilled in them.¹ After this sympathetic audience was removed from the orator by the nobility of the States-General at Compiègne in May of 1358,² the Bishop was finished; for he was a man of words not force. In another age before another group of deputies, he probably would have been just another witty, brilliant orator haranguing an assembly not interested in change or reform.

Orators and men of action appear to be necessary elements for change or rebellion; but seldom, if ever, can they create a desire for that change or reformation in the minds of those to whom the reason and the desire for that change has not already occurred.

1. Compare chap. IV, pp. 40-46, 51; V, 61.

2. Compare chap. V, p. 79.

All that remains is a brief recapitulation. The members of the royalty often stood as antagonists during the period prior to 1360. The title, chameleon, has been applied to many men throughout history, but it would be difficult to find a more suitable candidate for that title than Charles the Bad, the King of Navarre and Duke of Evreux. Any effort to analyze the man or his motives is instantaneously confused by a manifold of contradictions. He has been accused, and perhaps justly so, of being a traitor to France; but the accusation is made in an era in which it is now extremely difficult to distinguish the traitor from the reformer, the rebel, or the patriot. Was Bishop Lecoq a traitor for disturbing the royal administration to such an extent that the resultant disunity left France almost defenseless before her enemy, Edward III? Was John II a traitor because he accepted terms for his personal ransom that practically ruined his country? Was Etienne Marcel a traitor at the time that he fortified Paris, intimidated the Dauphin, aided the Jacquerie, or defied the royal authority? Was John Maillart a traitor at the time that he raised a mob against

the Parisian cause presumably to gain royal rewards and to save his life? Were the Dauphin and his northern nobility traitors in passing new ordinances to void the legal Parisian ordinances and in blockading the city rather than aiding Paris and the realm in the struggle against the ravages of the English and the Free Companies? Even allowing for inability and strong possibilities of undue duress, it is indeed difficult to attach the title, traitor, to anyone in this period with any degree of certainty.

Hence any analysis of the actions or character of Charles the Bad fails. He appears as neither rebel nor traitor nor pretender during this period. He frequently allied with the enemy, but he just as frequently was reconciled to the French crown by mere promises of concessions which, in so far as it has been possible to determine, were never fulfilled. Charles the Bad accepted reconciliation with a Dauphin practically defenseless when he might have profited immeasurably had he remained in alliance with either the enemy or the reformers. Conceivably, he might well have made good a claim to the crown; yet, he never pushed his advantage beyond the request for the lands and annuities due his parents. Only on one occasion did he attempt to govern, and then only

.

in the very precarious role of the captain-universal for the city of Paris.¹ Although he claimed allegiance from time to time to the Parisian cause, he hesitated not one whit to lead the reactionary forces in completely annihilating the Jacquerie, the peasant ally of the Parisians. Yet he and his brother, Philip, may have been ready to aid Etienne Marcel on a full military scale on the day of the death of Etienne Marcel. This has remained unresolved in this study. Only one consistency is visible in his policy throughout: the desire for the return of his lands which he, at least, considered rightfully his inheritance.

In the end the crown was completely victorious over all the reformers; however, the royal internal absolutism was retained at the cost of the financial ruin of France and the humiliating Treaty of Bretigny while the external opponent, Edward III, won the first phase of the Hundred Years' War at the cost of repeated concessions to the English parliament and middle-class. The Dauphin Charles, the man who seemed least likely to survive the internal strife of France, emerged completely victorious over the general assemblies and the reformers.

1. Compare chap. VI, pp. 100-101.

Whether he succeeded by a stroke of good fortune, by skill, or by mere persistence is a moot question, but the fact remains that he succeeded in modifying the course of the general evolution toward bourgeois independence. For the years remaining in his life, the French portion of the evolution halted, or rather it might be said that it paused or slumbered.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

I. Documentary Material

The Ordonnances des roys de France de la troisième race, recueillies par ordre chronologique (12 vols., Paris, 1732) as edited by F. D. Secousse have been of inestimable value in the research for this study. Volumes one through four cover the period analyzed. The arrangement is chronological with added supplements. The volumes provide exact texts of the ordinances and relevant royal decrees and letters, orders concerning modifications of the currency, communications with various towns of the realm, and significant dates. They are extremely well edited with copious notes and pertinent documentary material included or cited. Douet-D'Arcq has edited and published a valuable document in Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des chartes, II (1940-41), pp. 350-387 that is entitled, "Act d'Accusation contre Robert Le Coq, Evêque de Laon." It is maintained that this is a genuine document of the period 1356-1358. Unfortunately, however, it is anonymous and undated, but it is an accusation against Bishop Lecoq who was active as a reformer only from 1355 to 1358. The royal officials mentioned and the events described leave little question to its authenticity, and allow a very reasonable clue to the exact authors and date. It has been used with great caution, but it has been as valuable for what was omitted as for what it contains. The Response attached is strong indication of the justification and proof of Bishop Lecoq's charges of corruption in the administration.

"Lettres Closes, en forme de circulaire, de Charles-Le-Mauvais, Roi de Navarre, relatives à l'assassination de Charles d'Espagne, connétable de France" are published in Société de l'histoire de France Bulletin, I (1834), pt. 2, pp. 25-27. The letters offer Charles the Bad's explanation of the death of the favorite of John II on Charles the Bad's land. They were circulated to his towns, and a copy was sent to the king and Grand Council. Undoubtedly they were instrumental in procuring the royal pardon issued to Charles in the Treaty of Mantes. T. Rymer, ed., Foedera, conventiones, littariae, et cujuscunque generis acta publica inter reges Angliae et alios quosvis imperatores, reges, pontifices, principes, vel communitates (3 vols., London, 1816-30) is a classic source for the public

agreements, acts, treaties, letters, and miscellaneous official documents between the kings of England and the pontificate, princes, and other rulers. The arrangement of the documents is chronological but the editing is not on a par with the usual French type. It is, of course, invaluable for consulting primary texts, confirming chronology, or locating or identifying personages.

The negotiation leading to the treaty arranged in 1356 between the Emperor Charles IV and John II has been published in Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, VIII (1929), pp. 469-512 by B. Mendl and F. Quick, eds., under the title, "Le relations politiques entre l'empereur et le roi de France de 1355 à 1356." Copies of the treaty are also included in German, Latin, and French. The material has been valuable in clearing the mystery surrounding the motive for the Dauphin's trip to Metz in December 1357. Simeon Luce, ed., "Pièces relatives à Etienne Marcel et à quelques-uns de ses principaux adherents," Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des chartes, XXI (1860), pp. 73-92 is valuable for documents, letters, pardons, and relative material concerning the provost. The dispositions of the rebels' properties, the pardons, and the rewards following Marcel's death are included as well as those issued in the future by the Dauphin Charles. "Notes sur l'histoire de la révolution parisienne de 1356-58: la revanche des frères Braque," Mémoires de la Société de l'histoire de Paris, X (1883), pp. 100-126 contains invaluable documents which proved conclusively that the Braque brothers were corrupt, and it seriously implicates numerous others among the accused twenty-two royal officials. The variations to the text of Froissart's works and the documents and letters in the back of all volumes in Kervyn de Lettenhove, ed., Oeuvres de Froissart: publiées avec les variantes des divers manuscrits (25 vols., Brussels, 1867-77) are of inestimable value for research on the fourteenth century. Authentic letters of Etienne Marcel are found on pages four sixty-two to four sixty-seven of volume six of this work (note paging errors at this point). Other reproductions of materials from chroniclers contemporary to the age are included as well.

F. de Saulcy, ed., Recueil de documents relatifs à l'histoire des monnaies frappées par les rois de France depuis Philip II jusqu'à Francois I (4 vols., Paris, 1879-92) has been an invaluable source for clarifying the very complicated economic aspects of the period. It is excellently compiled. Volume one

covers the period of this study. Douet-D'Arcq, ed., has published the official records of the royal expenditures in Comptes de l'Hotel des rois de France aux XIV^e et XV^e siècles (Paris, 1865). It is valuable for tracing the activities of the bourgeois merchants who would not otherwise be mentioned. Also it is a record of the actual expenses of the kings. No editing has been done other than a complete alphabetical index of places and names. The transactions are listed item by item. A text of the ordinance of February 1358 is published in Paul Viollet's "Les Etats de Paris en février, 1358," Memoires de l'academy des inscriptions, XXXIV (1895), pt. II, pp. 273-292. Most of the proceedings of the States-General of 1356, including a full speech by the Bishop of Laon, are published in Nouvelle revue historique de droit français et étranger by Roland Delachenal, ed., "Journal des Etats généraux reunis a Paris au mois d'Octobre, 1356." Copies of the treaties by Charles the Bad with the English in August of 1358 and the Treaty of Mantes with John II in February 1354 are published in Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des chartes, LXI (1900), pp. 264-267, 261-262 as well as other negotiations edited by Roland Delachanel, in "Premières négociations de Charles le Mauvais avec les Anglais," pp. 252-282. F. D. Secousse, ed., Recueil de pièces servant de preuves aux memoires sur les troubles excites en France par Charles II, roi du Navarre et comte d'Evreux, surnomme le Mauvais (Paris, 1755) is of great use for tracing Charles the Bad; in fact, this collection and Secousse's other works appear to have provided the proof of the dealings with the crown in France from which the name "Bad" came to Charles II, king of Navarre and count of Evreux. The source is also valuable for financial data on the fourteenth century. Pertinent manuscripts and variations of the text are published in Simeon Luce, ed., Chroniques de J. Froissart (14 vols., Paris, 1869-99). The manuscripts and text of volume five, Chroniques de J. Froissart: Depuis les préliminaires de la bataille de Poitiers jusqu'a l'expédition d'Edouard III en Champagne et dans l'Ile de France, have been consulted. See listing with chroniclers for discussion of text.

The text from portions of Chroniques de Saint-Denis; variant texts of Froissart; and royal remissions, confiscations, and rewards have been utilized from "Memoire sur la mort d'Etienne Marcel" by Leon Lacabane in Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des chartes, X (1839-40), pp. 79-98. Contemporary

illustrations published by Jules Tessier, Etienne Marcel (Paris, 1889), have been consulted; and a fourteenth century map of Paris, taken from this source, has been reproduced in the appendix of this study. For use of text see secondary sources. The Golden Bull of Charles IV, pp. 283-305, published among the selected documents by Oliver J. Thatcher and Edgar Holmes, eds., A Source Book for Medieval History: Selected Documents Illustrating the History of Europe in the Middle Ages (N.Y., Chicago, Boston, 1905), has been consulted as a possible explanation for the motive, or motives, behind the Dauphin's visit to the Empire in December of 1356. The source contains a fine collection of historical documents, but the range covered is too wide to be of further documentary use in this study. F. T. Perrens has included the texts of the Compègne Ordinance and the letters of April and July, 1358, written by Etienne Marcel, and he lists representatives at the States-General of 1356 in his work entitled, Etienne Marcel, prévôt des marchands, 1354-1358. See secondary sources for discussion of text by the author. A document entitled, A Merchant's Oath, is included with excellent notes by George Sayles, "The 'English Company' and a Merchant's Oath," Speculum: A Journal of Medieval Studies, vol. 6 (1931), pp. 177-205. For methods used by Edward III to raise his subsidies for war, see discussion under secondary source articles.

II. Other Primary Sources

Les Grandes Chroniques de France: Chronique de Règnes de Jean II et de Charles V (vol. 1 of 4 vols., Paris, 1910-20), a source excellently edited by R. Delachenal, was the most valuable chronicle source available for this study. The style is factual and evidences no qualities of literary style whatsoever, but the brevity of the presentation allows greater detail to be included than found in the more elaborate sources. Dates are always given in each section. The small amount of prejudice that is present is, of course, aristocratic; however, the prejudice apparently does not extend to facts or figures. Personages are dealt with in as impartial a manner as can be found among any of the contemporary sources consulted. It is thus invaluable for the correction of the average chroniclers' exaggerations. Events, dates, and personages always appear in order. A French manuscript, Bibliothèque

nationale, 2813 is the basis for the editor's edition. There are no names for the chroniclers available, as they were royal civil servants or ecclesiastics, but many sources maintain that Pierre d'Orgemont, one of the royal officials dismissed by the reformers, was one of the chroniclers. Jules Viard and Eugene Depres, eds., Chronique de Jean Le Bel (2 vols., Paris, 1907) is an account contemporary to the fourteenth century, for the chronicler was born about 1290 at Liege and died about 1370. His parents were bourgeoisie, and Jean was an échevin of the town. He wrote his chronicle for Jean de Hainault, seigneur de Beaumont, until 1356 and then apparently for others of the noble class. Volume two was valuable for this study. The style is more elaborate than that in the Grandes Chroniques and the facts are handled in a more biased manner, but not enough to make the chronicle defective. When conducting research into fourteenth century European history, it is utterly impossible to omit the works of the historian, Sir John Froissart, prince of storytellers. Chronicles of England, France, Spain and the Adjoining Countries, from the Latter Part of the reign of Edward II, to the Coronation of Henry IV by Sir John Froissart, edited and translated by Thomas Johnes (4 vols. in 1, N.Y., 1880). All manuscripts of Froissart are of great use for military and social detail, public opinion, knight-hood and its pursuits, and descriptions of areas and fortifications in the fourteenth century. In those fields Froissart has no equal in the fourteenth century. All manuscripts are, nevertheless, subject to the same defects. Froissart was a favorite of the royalty, and he wrote for a limited clientele who were interested more in a good tale than accurate history. This, plus his aristocratic bias, must be acknowledged, if his works are to be utilized. Coupled with these are his utter unreliability in chronology, estimates of numbers, and legal detail. Any information capable of distortion because of these defects should be substantiated elsewhere; however, if used with reasonable care, the works are of inestimable value. Froissart was born in Valenciennes, Hainault; his works cover the period from the coronation of Edward III in 1326 to 1400. He was an employee of Edward III's wife, Philippa of Hainault, during the years 1346-1369--the period important to this study. He served John II during that French king's captivity in England. The chronological system of the editor is occasionally erroneous.

Simeon Luce, ed., Chronique des Quatre Premiers Valois (1327-1393), (Paris, 1862) is based on a manuscript in the imperial library, n° 107 du Supplement francais written during the second half of the fourteenth century possibly at Rouen by chroniclers whose identity is not certain. As the chronicle covers a period of sixty-nine years in one volume, detail suffers; but the style is objective and the facts appear authentically treated.

Chronique de Richard Lescot: Religieux de Saint-Denis (1328-1344): Suive de la continuation de cette chronique (1344-1364), (Paris, 1896) is a Latin source edited by Jean Lemoine, and is attributed to one of the minor clergy at Saint-Denis. It is taken from Bibliothèque nationale, 5005c which is a continuation of Gerard de Frachet. Richard Lescot's death is recorded only by the month and day without the year. His portion of the chronicle is written with a definite prejudice against Charles the Bad. The author of the Continuation--significant to this study--is unknown, but is thought to have been Jean de Venette. The details included are very brief, and the chronicle was used mainly to substantiate other sources. H. Gueraud, ed., Chronique de Jean de Venette (Paris, 1843) apparently has not been translated from the original Latin into French or English which is unfortunate, for the chronicler is purported to be the most sympathetic to the reform movement. As a contrast, at least, it would be a very valuable source. August et Emile Molinier, eds., Chronique Normande du XIV^e Siecle (Paris, 1882) is a source very objectively written by a chronicler well versed in military affairs if he was not actually a soldier, but his identity has not been determined. The value to this study has been the story of the period covered from a Norman view. The text by the expert, Kervyn de Lettenhove, editor of Froissart's works has been little used in this study but should be mentioned as an excellent collection entitled, Oeuvres de Froissart: publiees avec les variantes des divers manuscrits (25 vols., Brussels, 1867-77). See documentary sources for the discussion concerning the related manuscripts published with the text. H. Moranville, ed., Chronographia Regum Francorum (vol. 2 of 3 vols., Paris, 1893) is a Latin source that covers the period, 1328-1380. The style is that of a narrative, and it has far more interesting detail than the other Latin sources consulted. It covers the period of the reform, insurrection, and rebellion quite adequately. As so many others, the identity of the chronicler is doubtful. The

text of volume five, as well as the manuscripts included, has been consulted occasionally in Simeon Luce's, ed., Chroniques de J. Froissart: Depuis les préliminaires de la bataille de Poitiers jusqu'à l'expédition d'Édouard III en Champagne et dans l'Île de France (vol. 5 of 12 vols., Paris, 1869-99). Jules Viard, ed., Les Grandes Chroniques de France: Philip III le Hardi, Philip IV le Bel, Louis X Hutin, Philippe V le Long (vol. 8 of 9 vols., Paris, 1920-19--) is an excellent edition of the earlier chronicles. Volume eight was used only once for determining a fact in Louis X's reign. S. Solente, ed., Le Livre des fais et bonnes meurs du sage Roy Charles V par Christine de Pisan (vol. 2 of 2 vols., Paris, 1930) covers the period of the Dauphin Charles as Charles V. It was used only to substantiate the fact that Charles was called le sage after he became king.

Etudes sur le régime financier de la France avant le revolution de 1789: Quatrième Etude de le Régime Financier de la France sous les Trois Premiers Valois (2 vols., Paris, 1877-83), A. Viutry, ed., has been of great worth in the analysis of the financial crises that the Valois kings faced during the first phase of the Hundred Years' War. It allows a reasonable evaluation of the reign of John II, and does John a great justice by exposing the financial difficulties he faced when he became king in 1350. Volume one has the material used for this study. Noel Valois's collections have been of inestimable value in the research for the very significant story of the Grand Council of the Valois kings of France. Le conseil du Roi aux XIV^e, XV^e, et XVI^e siècles: Nouvelle recherches suivies d'arrêts et de procès-verbaux du conseil (Paris, 1888) contains an excellent story of the orders and discussions of the royal advisers in so far as they are available. His Inventaire des arrêts du Conseil d'Etat; règne de Henry IV (vol. 1 of 2 vols., Paris, 1883) contains a memorable coverage of the development of the Grand Council from its earliest known existence. La desolation des églises, monastères, et hôpitaux en France pendant la Guerre de cent ans, (2 vols., Paris, 1899), a collection, by Heinrich Denifle, of ecclesiastical materials, such as the Supplements of Urbani and Clement VI. Its value is in the proof of the devastation by the freebooters during the Hundred Years' War. Volume two contained the best material for this study. F. de Saulcy, ed., Histoire Monétaire de Jean le Bon (Paris, 1880) is a

detailed collection mainly concerned with the financial problems of John II. It is a valuable source for economic history, and also is indicative of the financial difficulties faced by France. Gallia Christiana in provincias ecclesiasticas distributa (vol. IX, Paris, 1751) was not available for this study other than from other sources. Apparently it is the only source for the life of Bishop Robert Lecoq before and after his brief term of glory as a reformer. Joseph Strayer, The Administration of Normandy under Saint Louis (Cambridge, Mass., 1932) includes good contemporary material in the appendix: the names and salaries of the medieval Viscounts and Baillis and other manuscripts. See discussion of the text under secondary sources.

III. Secondary Sources

F. D. Secousse, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de Charles II, roi de Navarre et comte d'Evreux, surnommé le Mauvais (Paris, 1758) has been of great value despite his royal prejudice and his treatment of Charles the Bad as an unqualified traitor, in fact, Secousse is probably responsible for the title, le Mauvais, as always found in the more recent histories. The material is based on original sources some of which are not now generally available and on his personal collections of documents of the fourteenth century. It is invaluable in any judgement of Charles the Bad.

The classic history of Charles V of France is Roland Delachenal's Histoire de Charles V published in La Société de L'Ecole des chartes (5 vols., Paris, 1909). It is not a general history but a full history of the life of the Dauphin Charles as youth, regent, and king. The detail is of the best, and is based exclusively on original sources. Volume one covers the period that Charles V was the Dauphin.

Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe (N.Y., n.d.; trans. by J. E. Clegg) is a valuable source for the rise of the bourgeoisie class in Italy, Flanders, Germany, and France by the famous Belgian historian Henry Pirenne. H. R. Clinton has carefully compiled a military history from the time of the Battle of Crecy. From Crécy to Assye: Being Five Centuries of the Military History of England (London, n.d.) is valuable for military detail unencumbered by social or economic history, but the estimates as to the number of troops participating in the medieval battles seem exaggerated. Paul Viollet, "Les Etats de Paris en février, 1358," Memoires de l'academy des inscriptions et belles lettres, XXXIV (1895) pt. II, pp. 361-292 contains valuable notes on the States-General as well as the published documents. Valuable information concerning the sources of royal revenue, forest privileges, and prerogatives are available in The Administration of Normandy under Saint Louis (Cambridge, Mass., 1932). Also included is the early development of the communes of Normandy. The commune of Rouen is an example mentioned as indicative of the strong localism traditional to the system of justice in Normandy that was significant to this study. The author is Joseph Strayer.

Jules Tessier has published an excellent monograph on the life of the provost of merchants of Paris. Etienne Marcel (Paris, 1889) in the Collection Picard de Bibliothèque d'Education Nationale. The source is definitely prejudiced in favor of the Marcel legend, and was valuable as a contrast to the many against the provost. It is based on original sources, and includes reproductions of contemporary illustrations of the fourteenth century. Etudes sur les institutions financiers de la France à la fin du moyen âge (2 vols., Paris, 1932) by G. Dupont-Ferrier is a scholarly study on the financial history of France. F. T. Perrens, Etienne Marcel, prévôt des marchands, 1354-1358 (Paris, 1874) published in Histoire Generale de Paris: Collection de Documents has valuable notes, as well as documents, but it must be used with care for F. T. Perrens favors the Marcel legend. Simon Luce, "Examen critique de l'ouvrage intitule Etienne Marcel par F. T. Perrens" is an analysis of the text of Perren's above-mentioned work published in the Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des chartes, XXI (1860), pp. 241-282.

A History of Europe from the Invasions to the XVI Century (N.Y., 1936; trans., by Bernard Maill) has been used only once for an interesting hypothesis. Henri Pirenne, the author, has fallen far below his usual high standard in covering the period 1351-1358, for the facts of the period as found in the original sources are confused in this portion of the book. William Langer, ed., An Encyclopedia of World History (Boston, 1948) has been consulted regarding certain confusing genealogies. The very modern A History of Europe from 1198 to 1378 (N.Y., 1937), volume three of eight volumes, by C. W. Previté-Orton is a valuable secondary source written for the reader of today. The facts are fully and objectively covered, and the genealogical tables are valuable. A Popular History of France (Boston, n.d.; trans. by Robert Black) is based on original sources, but unfortunately it has no footnotes; therefore, it is of no value to scientific study. N. de Wailly, Vie de St. Louis (Paris, 1888) is a good secondary work on the life of Louis IX of France and the customs and traditions that were carried over into the fourteenth century. Henry S. Lucas, The Low Countries and the Hundred Years' War, 1326-1347 (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1929) is a complete work on the Flemish lands in the second quarter of the fourteenth century. As well as its

value for the early period of the Hundred Years' War, it was found valuable as a basis for the connection between the rising bourgeois liberty in Flanders that preceded the period covered by this study and the efforts of the bourgeoisie in Paris. An explanation of the French monetary system of the fourteenth century has been found in John S. C. Bridge, A History of France from the Death of Louis XI (Oxford, 1921). George Marie René Picot, Histoire de Etats généraux (4 vols., Paris, 1872). A source which contains valuable information on the financial system as well as the States-General. Volume one covers the fourteenth century. The work is based on the author's collection entitled Documents relatives au Etats généraux. H. A. Taine's book entitled Italy, Florence and Venice (N.Y., 1889) is valuable for the story of the rise of the bourgeoisie in the Italian communes as one of the precedents for similar efforts in Paris.

IV. Articles

The role of the échevin, Jean Maillart, who raised the Parisians against Etienne Marcel and caused the provost's death has been fully examined and analyzed by Simeon Luce's article, "Du rôle politique de Jean Maillart en 1358" in Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des chartes LVII (1857), pp. 415-426. It has aided in the determining of the motives of the échevin. See discussion in documentary sources. Significant details concerning the negotiations which led to the Treaty of Bretigny are fully covered in an article entitled "La Diplomatie Française et le Traté de Britegny" published in Le Moyen Age: Bulletin Mensuel d'histoire et de Philologie, vols. 10-11 (1897-98) by Charles Petit-Dutailles and Paul Collier. An interesting account of the means used by Edward III of England in procuring the subsidies necessary for war against France has been found in Speculum: A Journal of Medieval Studies, vol. 6 (1931), pp. 177-205. This article was written by George Sayles, and is entitled, "'The English Company' and a Merchant's Oath." The "Merchant's Oath," a document, is published in the article. Discussion of the oath is found under documentary sources.

E. Boutaric's article "La Chambre des Comptes de Paris" published in Reveu des Questiones Historiques, XV (1874), pp. 601-609 was found useful

in tracing the development and duties of the French chamber of accounts that was one of the principle targets of the reformers. An explanation of the French tactics employed at the Battle of Poitiers was found in the article by T. F. Tout, "Some Neglected Fights between Crecy and Poitiers," English Historical Review, vol. 20 (1908), pp. 726-731 which is based exclusively on the Chronique Normandy du XIV^e Siècle. See discussion among chronicles. Leon Lacabane has provided another monograph on the provost of Paris. "Memoire sur la mort d'Etienne Marcel," Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des chartes, I (1839-40), pp. 79-98. It contains letters and documents also; see documentary sources. Roger Bigelow Merriman's article "The Cortes of the Spanish Kingdom in the Later Middle Ages," American Historical Review, vol. 16 (1910-11), pp. 476-495 has been of value for an excellent story of the development of the cortes in Spain. It is based exclusively on original Spanish sources, and has been used to aid in the support of the general-evolution hypothesis concerning bourgeois independence.


"Les Etats Généraux de France" by E. Boutaric that is found in Revue des Questions Historiques, XIII (1873), pp. 259-265 is a valuable account of the history of the States-General system. J. H. Ramsay examined a great many estimates by the chroniclers of the number of troops participating in the medieval battles in his article "The Strength of the English Armies in the Middle Ages," English Historical Review, vol. 29 (1917), pp. 221-227. The use of the estimates by the chroniclers that he considered the most reliable has provided a logical conclusion possible regarding the relative strength of the English and French forces at the Battle of Poitiers. Charles Holt Taylor, "An Assembly of French Towns in March, 1318," Speculum: A Journal of Medieval Studies, vol. 13 (1938), pp. 295-303 is valuable for the facts that can be authenticated through his unusually excellent source material not available elsewhere. It is not limited to 1318 as the title indicates, but includes materials relevant to the reign of Philip VI of Valois. F. Robiou's article "Les Populations rurales en France de la fin des Croisades à l'avenement des Valois," Revue des Questions Historiques, XVIII (1875), pp. 380-445 is a good article on the conditions of the peasants just prior to the Jacquerie. It has been quoted as a source for possible enlargement on a subject not pertinent,

but valuable none the less, in this study. Helen Robbins, "A Comparison of the Effects of the Black Death on the Economic Organization of France and England," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 36 (1928), pp. 447-479 is an excellent article, but it is predominantly an article on the Black Death in England. It is a good economic analysis based on some original sources, but it was of small value to this study.

APPENDIX

MAP I


PARIS IN FOURTEENTH CENTURY



1. Gate of St. Denis
2. Gate of St. Antoine
3. Wall of Philip Augustus
4. Etienne Marcel's home on the
Rue de la Vieille Drapiers
5. Palace of Justice
6. Pré aux Clercs
7. Quinze-Vingts (home for blind)
8. Louvre
9. Halles (the market place)
10. Hotel de ville (city hall)
11. Wall of Etienne Marcel
12. Gate of St. Martin
13. Les Cordeliers
14. Abbey St. Germain-des-Prés
15. Seine River


After: Jules Tessier, Etienne Marcel.

MAP II
PARIS AND VICINITY



MAP III

FRANCE



IV. FRENCH MONETARY SYSTEM OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

Condensed from John S. C. Bridge, A History of France from the Death of Louis XI (Oxford, 1921), pp. 253-255.

The monetary system of the ancien regime is intricate and confusing. The system was a dual one, being based upon ideal or fictitious, and upon real or actual, money. The former was employed as a means of computation; the latter was the medium in which payments were made.

The fictitious money was known as monnaie tournois, and consisted of livres, sous, and deniers, 12 deniers making one sou, and 20 sous one livre. It was in this money that prices were fixed, debts reckoned, and financial and commercial calculations made; but the livre, sou, and denier were merely conventional symbols, with no material existence in cash, and served only as a monnaie de compte.

The monnaie reelle or monnaies sonnantes, the actual or metallic currency or cash in circulation, consisted of pieces in gold, silver, and base metal minted in the realm, and of foreign coins admitted to circulation within it. The French pieces were very numerous, and varied from time to time--the golden ecu and, in silver, the blanc, grand blanc, and teston.

The intrinsic value of a coin depended upon the number struck from the mark, i.e. upon its weight, and upon the 'fineness' of the metal of which it was composed, i.e. upon the amount of alloy. In both respects coins were subject to frequent variations. The mark of gold was worth about 32d. 10s., and the mark of silver about two guineas, the mark of argent le Roi containing one part of alloy in twenty-four. Theoretically, the mark was minted into such a number of coins as would amount collectively to its own exact weight; but the prospect of illicit profit by minting a larger number offered a temptation which the Government did not always resist; and even when its honesty got the better of its cupidity, the processes of assaying metals and minting coins as then practiced fell short of the standard of accuracy requisite for ensuring precision in weight and purity. Thus were introduced the complications known as remede de poids as regards weight and remede de loy or d'alloy as regards purity.

The legal value of a coin depended upon its statutory valuation as expressed in monnaie tournois, that is to say, upon the amount for which it was legal tender under the terms of the ordinance in force at the time. There being nothing in the form or denomination of the coin to denote its legal value, it was easy to alter that value by a new ordinance without any corresponding change in the weight or purity of the piece; and not only was the purity of the metal unreliable, and the number of pieces coined from the mark constantly changing, but the legal value of every coin as expressed in livres, sous, and deniers, was also subjected to incessant modification. It would seem that a system not in itself simple, and rendered doubly confusing by irregular fluctuation, must have placed a severe strain upon the rudimentary machinery of finance and commerce.

Yet a further complication was introduced by the fact that, in addition to monnaie tournois, monnaie paris was also occasionally employed as a monnaie de compte. On the collapse of the Carolingian empire the establishment of monetary systems and the minting of coins had, like other Royal prerogatives, become matters of seigniorial privilege, with the result that an immense diversity of systems and currencies had come into being, and in different districts livres tournois, livres paris, livres angevins, bordelais, poitevins, toulousains, and many others had possessed a local validity. Monnaie paris had originally consisted of the coins minted in Paris by the Dukes of that city, and had become the Royal money upon the accession of the first Capetian sovereign. The theoretical value of the livre paris was higher than that of the livre tournois, the relations between them being as 5 is to 4.

The value of monnaie tournois was never fixed by ordinances or other acts of the public authority, and must be calculated either from the intrinsic value of the equivalent amount of metallic currency or from the value in commodities or services which a given sum would command. But it is when we try to assign a value to any given coin, or to any amount expressed in livres, sous, and deniers, that the real difficulty of an inquiry into the French monetary system is encountered, and this difficulty is increased when we attempt to express the result in terms of our own standard of money values.

V. FORMULA FOR PIED OF CURRENCY

$$\text{Pied} = \frac{n \cdot d}{5 \cdot \frac{t}{12} \cdot 12} = \frac{n \cdot d}{5 \cdot t} \quad \text{Example: pied } 48^e = \frac{80 \times 12}{5 \times 4}$$

n = the number of tailles or poids (pieces) to the silver mark by weight. Normally 245 grains of fine silver.

d = le cours or the current or market value of the unit in terms of money of account as designated by ordinance.

5 = a constant number

t = le titre or purity of the silver at 12 deniers per sou.

n . d = number of deniers tournais in a mark d'argent-le-Roi monnaye.

12 = number of deniers in a sou.

variable number = the mark d'argent-le-Roi monnaye.

After: F. de Saulcy, ed., Recueil de documents relatifs a l'histoire des monnaies frappees par les rois de France depuis Philippe II jusqu'a Francois I, I, Introduction p. xiv; Grandes Chroniques I, p. 92 n.4.

ROOM USE ONLY

ROOM USE ONLY

NOV 11 1984