A mm svamu oi Wfi-aaowwswmce as socssw, Thesis for flu 00ng of M. A. MICHIGAN STATE COLLEGE I. Jame: Perry. Harkness 1953. ‘ This is to certify that the thesis entitled "A Critical Evaluation of Radcliffe- Brown's Science of Society" presented by James Perry Harknesa . has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for _.M.A..__degree infimicflngy. 6.: Anthropoiogy W Major professor A CRITICAL EVALUATIQV Q? RADCLD‘FE-BROJN'S SCIENCE (F SOCIETY By JAMES PERRY HARKNIESS A THESIS submitted to the SchOOI 0f Graduate Studies Of Michigan State Cnllege Of Agriculture and Applied Science in partial fulfillment 0f the requirements for the degree Of MSTER OFAR'I'S Department of Socifilfigy and Anthrfipf‘lngy 1953 THasaS ACKNWS Appreciation is expressed to Dr. Charles P. Ipomis, head of the Department of Sociology and AnthrOpology, who acknowledged the writer's desire to study theoretical sociology and anthrOpology. Gratitude is also expressed to Dr. Charles Russell Hoffer for continual guidance in the graduate program. For Specific guidance as a mJor professor the writer expresses his appreciation to Prefessor Kenneth E. Tiedke. For constructive criticism the writer also owes thanks to Dr. Paul A. Miller, Dr. Christopher Sower and Dr. Lewis K. Zerby. ”1.39 A CRITICAL EVAHJATM 0F mum-mama SCIENCE as socmvfi Acknowledgements I. IntrOduction II. Natural Science and its Relationship to Social Science .A. The Basic Tenents of Natural Science 6 1. The Role of Abstract Science in Natural Science. . . o . . . 9 2. The Importance of Philosophy in Natural Science. . . . . . 110 30 Natural LEV and Reality. 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 10 4. Relations between Events in Reality. . . . . . . . . . . . L4 5. The Use “if Relationships in Classification. . . . . . . o . 15 6. Problems of ClaBSification in SnCial Science 0 o o o o o o 18 7. The Importance Of System and its Rela ions to Classification 0 o o o o o e o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 19 80 System-and Science 0 o o o o o o o o o o o e o o e o o o o 20 9. Relationships Vithin a System. 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o 21 100 Classification and System. s o o o o o o e o o o o o o o o 23 B. Social Science A 24 1. Classification in Social Science. . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2. The Method of Classification in Social Science . . . . . . 27 3. 800181 System.in the Social Science. 0 o e o o o o o o o o 31 it. A Comparison of Psychology and Social Science. . . . . . . 34 5. Conclusion. 0 o o o o o e o o o o e o o e o o o o o o o o 36 III. The Elements of Social Science and the Method of a Social Science A. 'me Elements of Social Science 38 1. Relationships within.a 850181 SyStem-o o o o o o o o o o o 38 2. The SOCial StruCture o e o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 40 \J ? Harlmess, Jams, Perry, A Critical Evaluation Of Radcliffe-Brown's Science of Society, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Michigan State College, 1953, 115 numb. leaves. 3. Social Structure and the Persistence of Natural Systems 41 A}. 30018.]. Structure And Structural Form 0 o o o o o o o o o o “’2 5.300181118889000000000000ooooooooooo4"" 6. $0018]. Usage and Structural Ff‘rm o o e o o o o o o o o o o ’41" 7. Social Usage and the rule behind the Social Usage. . . . . 1+6 8. SOCial Usage and the Causal Explanation. o o o o o o o o o “'9 9o 3°61al system and Society 0 o o o o o o o o o o e o o o o 50 B. The Method of a Social Science 52 1. Measurement in $01.31 36181106 0 o o o e o e o o o o o o o 52 2. The Fundamental PrOblem of Social Science . . . . . . . . 54 3. Classsification of Societies o o o o o o o o e o o o o o o 55 A}. The Establishment 0f Social Types. 0 o o o o o o o o o o o 55 5. The Comparison of Social Types . . . . . . . . . . 56 6. An inconsistency in the Use of Structural Continuity . . . 57 7. A ReView ”f the Methodology 0 o o e o e o e o o o o e o o 59 8. The Elimination of Accifental Chaaacteristics . . . . . . 60 9. An Inconsistent Element in the Methodology . . . . . . . 61 10.C"HCIusion oeooooooooeooooooooooooéu' IV. The Persistence of a Social System: The Idea 0f Emotion And The Persistence of Structural Form A. The Persistence of a Social System 66 l. Persistence of Social System and Structural Form . . . . . 66 2. An Example of the Persistence of a System . . . . 66 B. The Idea of Function 68 1.]3‘1mctionandStmcture...........o......58 2.FunctionandSocialSystem................ 69 3. Inconsistencies Within the Definition of Function . . . . 70 C. The Persistence of Structintal Form - 72 1. Change 0f Type 0 o o o o o o o o o o o e o o o o o o o o 72 2. SOCiety and Change at Type 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o e 73 3. Society and Structural Form 0 o o e o o o o o o o o o o o 73 4. A Possible Explanation 0f the Inconsistency . . . . . . . 74 5. A Further Refutation o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 75 6. 0011011151011 0 o o o e o o o o o o o o o o e o o o o o o o 75 V. The Elements of (hilture And Its Relationship To Social Science VII. A. The Elements of Culture loSnCIalcfiaptatlonoeooooo‘oooooooooooo 2. Relation of Culture to Social Coaptation . . . . . . . . 3. Criticism of Tylor's Definition of culture by Radcliffe- Emeoooooooooooooooooooooooo it. Another Criticims of Tylor by Radcllffe-Brown 50 onlture o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o e o o o o o o B. The Relationship of Culture to the Elements of Social Science 1. The Relationship Betwaen Culture and Social Coap tation . 2. Culture and its Relationship to Social Science . . . . . 3. Conclusion 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o e 0 Functional Consistency and the Structural Principles Systems A. Economic Relations 1.3001810‘apt3t10noeoooooeoooooo ZOMCtinnOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO... 3. Conclusion of Economic Relations . . . . . . . B. Comparative Episcemology 1.SocietyandBeliefs 000.00.00.00 2. Comparative Epistemology and Social Science 3. The Method of Social Science . . . . . . . . 4. Functional Consistency o o o o e o o o o o C. Functional Consistency; Structure and Society leSAClals‘thtmeoeoooooeo 2.SOCIety.oo.........o. D. Structural Principles of Social System 1. The use of Abstractions . . . . 2. Establishment of Social Types . . . 3o Abstracting Types of Behaflor o o o 4. Abstract Structural Principles . . . 5. An Inconsistent use Of Function . . 6. Justice, an hample of a Structural Princ 7. The Connection of Structural Principles 8. Conclusion of the Structural Principle of Justice ol—boccoo P 0 le 9. A Comparison of The Two Types of Abstractions looconCIusion ooooooooooeoooooooo Conclusion of Social 0...... 77 77 77 77 80 82 87 88 100 100 100 102 103 103 105 105 107 108 109 109 Appendix A. Biographical Sketch of AoR. Radcliffe-Brown Appendix B. Bibligraphy of A.R. RadCI1ff e-Broxm Selected BibliOgraphy CEAPI'IEBONE INTRODUCTIGV The difficulty on the part of this writer and fellow graduate students in understanding as well as empirically applying Radcliffe- Brown's ideas has played a maJor role in prompting the writing of this thesis. Lbreover, the added factor of the writer's advisor, Professor Kenneth Tiedke, in pointing up the possibilities of such an undertaking has been no small element in the final decision of writing this work. The min impetus in formlating the initial idea was the knowledge that few people associated with the writer in the fields of sociology and anthropology had a clear understanding of exactly what Radcliffe-Brown had to say and what he explicitly meant in the work analyzed here, _T_h_e_ £23252. 2_f_ 2 Theoretical Natural Science 3f Society.1 With all of these factors considered, a through analysis of this work was undertaken with the hope that a clearer statement of waning could be mde about this work of Radcliffe-Brown. It was in this process of analysis that the inconsistencies found in his work and set forth in this thesis were discovered. Thus the hypothesis: Inconsistent Elements Mitigate the Meaning of Radcliffe-Brown's Theories for Social Science, as found in his work entitled, The Nature of 9. Theoretical Natural Science of Society. ‘1 Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. , The Nature p__f 9. Theoretical Natural Science 93 Societ , Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. ‘ -2- The actual method of analysis involved in this thesis was the careful reading (and re-reading) of Radcliffe-Brown's paper in order to clearly understand each point presented. Completing this a compar- ison was made of each point of develppment as well as the usage of words. Both were compared on the basis of the internal logical struc- ture of his paper. Thus, using this method it was possible to discover the internal inconsistencies within Radcliffe-Brown's work. As a final note on this method it must be nude clear that the method did not involve any comparison of Radcliffe-Brown's ideas with any other schools of throught such as Historical or EvOlutionaey Schools. Rather the method used was a comparison of the internal ideas compared on the basis of logical consistency in thought as well as usage. Something more can be said about the influence of Radcliffe-Brown than the lack of understanding his theories on the part of graduate students. His importance as well as his influence in theoretical and applied anthropology can be readily observed in an investigation of this area. However, before reviewing his influence in the field of anthropology a review of his general position in the field we'll perhaps add some alarification to the extent of his influence. Radcliffe-Brown is generally considered a British social anthro- pologistl with the particular label or school attached to his 1 burdock, George P. , British Social Anthropologlh American Anthro- l ist, Vol. 53, N0- 11, Part 1, October-December, 1951, pp. 455-73. 4 H'l' -3- development termed "1"unctionalist."2 The men usually associated with him in this category are: Evans-Rritchard, Forde, Fortes, Gluckman, Kuper, Nadel, Richards, Schapera, Wilson3 and Malinowskifi Society is viewed by the Functionalist as an ongoing social process with culture considered as, "...an organic whole, to use Malimwdki's favorite phrase, or a configuration, which had to be understood to grasp the significance of single item, whether they were custom, artifacts, or words."5 The main concentration, however, in the study of culture by these men is social behavior as it exists in the setting of social organization.6 Thus, their problem were approched with the viewpoint of social behavior as taking place in organized structures within societies. This viewpoint of society as sets of behavior acts arranged in a structural fashion was formulated in order to explain the tm-fold assertation of the Functionalist. (h the one hand they attempted to 2 Gillin, John, _'l'_h_s m 93 M__e§, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1%, PP. 6M'050 3 m- .922» smock, pp. ass-75. 4 Although Malinowski is not listed in this particular source as a Functionalist in mny other places he is closely linked with the same school. (see, Firth, Raymond, Contemporary British Social Anthropology, American Anthro o ist, Vol. 53, No. ’4, Part 1, October-December, 1951, pp. I$77-$39. At the same time however Malinowski differs from Radcliffe- Brown in term of the area of concentration and also places an emphasis upon areas ignored or emitted by the group cited here. Notable in this respect is Malinowski's emphasis upon psychology and the view that a particular cultom or usage has the function of fulfilling an individual need. (see, g. 333., Gillin, p. 605.) 5 g. 333., Gillin, p. son. 5 1.2.9.- 22.2- ’I -h- establish "natural laws" of society or a natural science of society.7 This point is avowed by the Functionalists as the min purpose or aim of their work and is usually attributed to the influence of Durkheim. "In his general pronunciamentos Radcliffe-Brown clearly and avowedly stems from Dirkheim. 'Social anthropology' or 'conparative sociology' -- the study of group behavior -- is independent of psychology and ignores as irrelevant the indi- vidual as an individual. Its aim is to discover laws.“ 01 the other hand, the Functionalist believe that every social act in any particular structure has9 a purpose or function. 10 In other words, the social actions of nan are not accidental, psychological or a carryover from the earlier practices of a society but rather have a reason or function which can only be understood by an examination of 11 being dealt with in a particular society.12 the particular structure Thus an explanation of human social action is neither historical nor psychological nor is it based upon the social evolution of nan but rather is an explanation which has its basis within the study of a structure of an ongoing society. 7 This in fact is the expressed purpose of the work dealt with in this thesis, the work of Radcliffe-Brown entitled, 5 Theoretical Natural Science 93 Society. 8 Lowie, Robert, 3., £113 Histog 93 Ethnological Theo , New York Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1937, p. 222. (see also, 22. 52.3., erdock, pp. 465-73.) 9 This position has been amended to, “May have a function." (see, LOVie, 920 22-30, P0 2270) 10 Gillin, 22. 22.30, p. 60“. 11 Structure is usually defined by the Functionalist as the ordered arrangement of parts. In social structure these parts are persons in the sense of social persons acting in a society. The arrangement of actual action in a society is referred to as organization. (see, Radcliffe- Brown, LR. , Structure and Function in Primitive Societ , The Free Press, Glencoe, I11., 1952, pp. 9-11. 12 Gillin, 9-2.. 23.2., p. 604’ -5- (he particular point of social action as it is related to social structure which is brought out and carefully examined by this group is the area of kinship.13 The work undertaken in this vein has been acknowledged as one of concrete accomplishment.“ This brief overview of the Functionalist places Radcliffe-Brown in his theoretical setting. The basic viewpoint of the group is a treatment of society as consisting of structurally arranged social actions with the ultimate aim of discovering laws of society. Concurrent with this ultimte goal is the emphasis placed upon the social acts, usages and customs as having a function in relationship to the entire structure. This viewpoint has also led to intensive studies of kinship pattern and the manner in which they are related to the social structure. The influence of Radcliffe-Brown has been felt both in this country as well as abroad. Although generalizations as to the partic- ular people he has influenced are dangerous because of obvious chances of inclusiveness as well as omissions it can be said with the above factor in mind that his stay at the University of ('Ihicagol5 had an effect upon the people there. This effect was mnifest on both the 13 Ibid., pp. 601l-05. 11* Mirdock, pp. 335., pp. #65-73. 15 See Appendix A. -6- staff and student body. 16 His influence has been felt abroad parti- cularly among the so called British social anthropologists.l7 The men he has influenced in this context andthe general theoretical trend of this influence has been previously discussed in this intro- duction. As to the kind of influence he'has exerted on the American scene, opinion quite naturally varies. That it does exist however is without question. in one source18 Radcliffe-Brown is given credit for being the agent in re-awakening the ideas of Durkheim. This tookplace during his stay at the University of Chicago and was mnifested in the translation of, £03 £95132 $13 is methods sociologigue. Other-319 point to his influence in this country on the basis of emphasis placed on a more scientific methodology in social science on the part of ’Amrican anthropologists. In a more critical vein, Louie20 decries the kind of "system building" and ”natural 1aw"theories of Radcliffe-Brown but nevertheless adds his approval along with other plaudits21 to his work and influence in the area of kinship. 15 Eggan, Fred, ed., Social Anthropology g North American Tribes, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1937, pp. vii-xii. Mirdock, pp. _c_i_§., pp. 465-73. 18 Gurvitch, Georges, and Mom, wilber, ed., Twantieth Century Soci- ology, New York, The Philosophical Library, pp. 553-0113. 19 Essen, 22. 31.16... p. 1:. 2° Lowie, op. cit., pp. 221.29. 21 Mead, Margaret, Family, Enc clo aedia of 3313 Social Sciences, New York, Macmillan Company, vol. %, pp. 65-66? -7- As a final remark the following example is given to illustrate perhaps the mst far-flung influence this man has had in terms of physical distance around the globe. In traCing the development of social science as emerging from a framework of social service orientation among students in Chinese Universities, Radcliffe-Brown is cited as influential in the new expression toward social science.22 In summing up the influence of Radcliffe-Brown it can be said that he has left his mark in this country and abroad in the field of theo- retical as well as applied anthropology. With these Wo factors in mind, that of Radcliffe-Brown's influence among the writer's colleagues as well as his influence in the general field of anthropology this thesis has been undertaken. This thesis therefore is an explanation of the main ideas of Radcliffe-Brown's therries for social science as they are developed in his comprehensive work entitled, The Nature 23 3 Theoretical Natural Science 2!. Society. The form of this eXplanation is a critical review, the purpose of which is to establish and point out how inconsistent ideas and statements mitigate the usefulness of his development in social thinking as well as the application of these theories to social science as a method. 22 Barnes, Harry I. and Becker, Howard, Social Thought From Lore _t_o Science, New York, D.C. Heath and Company, Vol. II, 193 , p. 1152 CHAPTER TWO NATURAL SCIENCE AND IDS REIATIONSHIP TO SOCIAL SCIENCE Before Radcliffe-Brown enters upon an explanation of his ideas of social science he sets the background or uses as a basis for his science of society the basic tenets of natural science. The first section of his paper is a review of these basic tenets of natural science as he interprets them. Therefore the first problem of this thesis is an understanding of the basic ideas in natural science as given and at the same time an investi- gation of the relationships which exist between natural science and the science of society as they are set forth in his paper. The point of demonstrating the proposed relationship between natural science and a natural science of society is quite firmly established in the outset of the work. Radcliffe-Brown states that the science of society will apply, '...--the same logical methods that are applied in the physical V and biological sciences, and by that means to attain to scientifically exact formulations of significant and probable generail.izations."23 Therefore, ithis quite obvious that the basic tenets of natural science will become, or are intended to become the basic tenets of a v natural science of society. A. The Basic Tenets of Natural Science What are these basic tenets? First of all it is pointed out by him that the subject matter of science is consrete phenomenal realityen i.e. science deals with that which is observable. 23 Radcliffe-Brown, 22. 25., p. l. 21'- Ibide, Po 2 C I c \ . t e « -9- Secondly, he develops the point of probability and natural law. Natural laws are based upon observable reality, and are statements about fact which have a high degree of probability. Mar-sever, he delineates the different types of scientific practices placing the general systemtic 2 concepts of theoretical science at the upper level of scientific thinging.‘ 5 1. The role of abstract science in natural science. Abstract science is also anii-npertant point in the development of theoretical science in that it is both a useful tool for the solving of problem and that it can be instrumental in the creation of new problems in theoretical natural science.26 Homer, the contrast between natural science and abstract science is primrily delineated by the fact that abstract science is fundamentally based upon the ideas of man rather than upon phenomena, of nature.27 There- fore, in this same context, the propositions of abstract science are certain and absolutely reliable whereas those of natural science dpeend, in the final analysis, upon the observation of concrete phenomena. This comparison points out the type of predictability that is possible in terms of natural science. That is, predictability in natural science is dependent upon fact. 25 Ibid., p. 2. In delineating the types of science he points out that applied science is the application of theoretical science, "...to the practical problem which are met within the practice of the arts.“ 26 Ibide, P. 6e 27 232- an. - 10 - 2. The iyortance of philosophy in natural science. Philosophy also plays an important role in the development of a theoretical natural science of society. He demonstrates mo types of philosophical impacts upon science. (he is historical and functional and the other is a logical relationship. - The first idea merely means that the basic idea of a society or its cosmology has a determining effect upon the entire basis of the science. That is, the basic cosmology of a society (or cosmologies, as the case may be) determines the types of thinking that take place in a society. This influence is extended to the field of science and determines its basis or metaphysics. The other relation of philosophy to science, the logical, is that relation- ship which is comnonly thought of as being the philosophy of science; that is, the relation in a particular society betwaen the philosophy and the science. Here, philosophical thinking my, and does, shape the nation of science as all philosophy does. However, here there is also an amount of "inter-action“ between the two fields; each developing and augmenting the 0131191528 3. Natural law and reality. As it he‘s been mentioned in the introduction of this thesis and carried out through this paper, the idea of natural law is very important to Radcliffe-Brown. Certain inconsistent elements in Radcliffe-Brown's presentation of natural law and its relationship to reality are examined in this following section which deals directly with this problem. 28 3516.0, Po 1". I, -11- Fundamentally, Radcliffe-Brown has tm basic notions of natural law which are mutually exclusive. Since, in the order>of his presentation he confuses these We outlooks on natural law, this order will be ignored as each viewmint is examined and then compared. (he basic viewpoint of natural law held by Radcliffe-Brown is that, "A natural law is imnent in the universe."29 In order to discuss this concept of natural. law it is necessary to mention something about the nature of reality. In relation to this concept of natural law'Radcliffe- Brown.defines reality as “phenomenal reality."3O Now the definition of phenomenal reality as originally conceived by Heraclitus is that reality is constituted, "...solely of events and relations between events."31 These two concepts, that of natural law and phenomenal reality, have an important common aspect; both exist independently from the mind of Iran. That is neither concept is dependent upon the mind of hen for its existence. This idea is acknowledged.by'Radcliffe-Brown in the following manner. This view does not hold a natural law to be convenient merely; once formulated it is always true (within the limits set on that formulation by our knowledge and to the degree that it coincides with phenomenal reality). It is not merely dggcriptive of something observed. Nor do we have to bring in Bed. Here he is definitely documenting his position especially when he says that a natural law is true when formulated by man within the limits of man's mind and to the degree in which this formulation coincides with phenomenal reality. 29 Ibid., p. 7. 30 La? 2.1.:- 31 Ibid., p. 6.. 32 Ride, P. 7. - 12 - Therefore he clearly implies that the observation of reality does not necessarily coincide with phenomenal reality: that phenomenal reality has an existence independent of the mind of nan. Also this applies the the nature of natural law. Its existence therefore is taken to be independent of mn's obsnrvation. Radcliffe-Brown's definition of natural law nukes a complete reversal when he states that an event is an actual or possible occasion of experience.33 Here is inplying that phenomenal reality is dependent upon the observation of the human mind for its existence. This statement leds to the assertaticn that a. natural law has not the validity of abstract science since, in the last instance, events are dependent upon the experience of nan for their existence.3u This second statement of natural law renders his other definition of natural law inconsistent. First it is a denial of the idea that a natural law is 'immnent in the universe". If natural laws were immanent in the universe they would not, as he says, be dependent upon nen's Convienence or God's will. What is more important however is the fact that such a natural law 329.12 have the vlaidity of abstract science since it is inmenent in the universe and not dependent upon man's experience for its existence, a point he denieib 33 IBide, Pa 60 3*! loneli- I" -13.. As soon as he states that, "An event is a possible or actual occassion of experience."35 his concept of concrete phenomenal reality shifts to a viewpoint of “phenomenalisme' In the latter case reality is relative to what Inn observe and redlity is _r_l_o_t_ independent of man's existence. More- over, as soon as Badcliffe-Brown asserts that a natural law has not the validity of abstract science he is no longer adhering to the viewpoint of Heraclitus which states that natural law is inmenent in the universe.36 Another inconsistent statement can be shown to exist in Radcliffe- Brown's presentation as it is related to these two different viewpoints of natural law. Radcliffe-Brown states that he rejects the positivisitic viewpoint of natural law held by Person and others that in part is as follows: “A natural law is simply a statement of something with has been observed. '37 This concept, Radcliffe-Brown asserts, gives no'tbasis for predictability since it is dependent upon men's observation. This criticise of Person and the posititibistic viewpoint of natural law certainly coincides with Radcliffe-Brown's statements that a natural law is immenant in the universe. However, these statements are clearly inconsistent with his other statements that events are actual or possible occasions of experience. Sumdng up Radcliffe-Brown's position on natural law and phenomenal reality it can be said that Radcliffe-Brown is apparently trying to 3_‘IE‘_5 __c.. 2.132- 36 Dido, Pa 7 37 1032.132. -m- incorporate two maor philosophical positions of natural law which are incompatible. By doing so he renders his explanations and criticism of various meanings of natural law viewpoints inconsistent with one another. 1;. t ns two v nts t . At this point another item enters the discussion which is important in them development of the nature of evenis . That is, the types of relationships which exist betwoen events. "The relat- ions are (1) relations of interconnectedness, and (2) logical or mathematical relations..."38 The relations of interconnectedness are spatio-tenxporal, whereas, the logical and mathematical are not connected with space or time.39 This point is held by this writer to be a crucial one in Radcliffe- Bmwn's development of natural science. Crucial, for it allows, or intro- duces an element into the realm of natural science which conflicts with his own statements on the subject. The conflict involves the naming of a relationship between events in phenomenal reJaIity as having a nethematical and gogical relationship. This idea is a denial of one of We ideas. (he, either mthematics and logic are not altogether abstract or We, either the relationship between events in phenomenal reality do not exist in phenomenal reality. If mthemtics and logic are defined as an abstract science with laws which are certain and this science is applied to relationships between events said to exist in phenomenal reality, either the events themselves become abstract by definition, or mathematics and logic are not abstract. 38 1516.0, Pa 7e 39 £9.2- git. -15.. 40 Of course, as it has been mentioned above abstract science, including mathemtics and logic deal with relationships which exist within the mind and not concrete phenomenal reality. Events, as it has Just been mentioned, do deal with phenomenal reality. If abstract relations could be successfully established betwaen actual evmts in phenomenal reality then it would appear that these relaticn- ships could be established as being certain. This of course he denier by saying, ”Natural laws have not the validity of the abstract science. "41 Therefore, it is maintained in the light of the definitions of phenomenal reality and abstract science that relationships between events- in-reality can never assume an abstract character. In doing this Radcliffe- Brown is inconsistent within his own framework. 5. The use of relationships in classification. This mathematical and logical relationship which Radcliffe-Brown proposes is the type of relation- ship which exists ‘betwaen elements within a class. That is, objects in phenomal reality my be classified. The classification is in term of common characteristics or similarities. This is what is meant by a mathemtical relationship. A question asked at this point in his develop- ment is whether one can exercise the liberty of relating elements or characteristics of events in an abstract nanner after one has declared the events to be part of phenommal reality. Certainly this could be done if 140 See page 9. 41 Ibid., p. 6. ‘\ 9 -16.. the nature of events could be predicted. However, it nmst or should be mde clear that relationships in such events do not have the same amount of certainty as the relationships of abstract science. After all, any change in the nature of events would affect a change in the relationship and in that respect the relationship is not always abstract in the sense in which he defines it. As an example it is possible to rake a classifi- cation of certain phenomena in nature into one class, as for instance, lead. Certain common characteristics in this metal could be found; its melting point, mas, specific gravity, etc. Therefore, if this classification is made, relationships of similarity (or what he terms mathemtical) would be found between these various events of lead. However, the certainty of these relationshps would depend upon the events and‘not upon the relation- ships of similarity between the events. Therefore, the relationships are not abstract for they are not independent of space and time. The relation- ships are relative to the events or the characteristics of the events that are being classified. (he ‘1 m such a relationship upon natural phenomena but that does not mean that the relationhhips will be certain in -- the sense that abstract relationships are in nathematics and logic. There- fore these relaticnships will be dependent upon space and time and any otha‘ quality that affects events in reality. For a contrast, consider the relationships which exist in nathenatics. It is possible to state that whenever any whole number is added to another the sum is greater than either of the two. This relationship will always rennin and therefore is certain. The relationship is certain because mthenntics and- logic are based upon relationships rather than upon events. -17.. Therefore, a class or a relationship which exists betwan entities my be based upon relationships of similarity and differences but are not abstract in the sense that they are independent of space and time. The whole arguement here is seemingly reversed, however, when the topic is pursued. That is, the basis of lcassification becomes the sindlar characteristics possessed by different events. A natural class is defined as one nest useful and one that corresponds closest to realityfll What does this mean in term of the relationship between events in a class? It means that these relationships are variable according to the nature of the events classified. The more common elements that can be found between discrete events, the more natural a class becomes. The more natural it becomes, the closer it approaches phenomenal reality and the more useful it beomes to natural science.42 As a point of criticism in the definition of a natural class Radcliffe- Brown is again implying the use of We contraposing philosophical positions. When he states that a natural class is one that is most useful he is certainly suggesting a pragmtic viewpoint of classification. a: the other hand, the linking statemtn that the naturalness of a clean depends upon its correSpondence to phenomenal reality places him with those who view reality as phenomenal reality, existing without the necessary experience of man. . ‘ . E1 Ibid.’ P0 10. 42 .19.?! sit- -18.. 6. Problem of classification in social science. This idea is introduced as it leads to the difficulties of classification in societies. his to the complex nature of society he asserts that difficulties arise in term of finding common characteristics. Not only do societies, and. the malogous case of biology, have complex system but also these system evolve or are not discrete by their nature as those in natural science. Nature, he states, "...has not given us here the ready-nude demrcations she has between silver and other metals."43 Therefore, classification takes onan \ arbitrary element. This element is the demrcation process by nan. There . is a continuum here of evolvtion in the case of biology and social evoluticn' in the case of society.“ / It is interesting to note here that the whole question of time and space re-enters the discussion. That is, classification originally was the denotation of all the elements beWeen events which were similar. This relationship was one of simple mthemtical similarity that did not involve space or time. Now, suddenly, the whole question of time and evolution enter into the explanation and must be taken into consideration for nature has not pmrided for discrete classifications in social evolution. E3 fiide, p. 9e #4 The conclusion at this point that Radcliffe-Brown is an evolutionist on the basis of what is said here would be very hard to substantiate partic- ularly since he explicitly states that he does not view society in the 19th century organic sense. (See page 47 ). ~ -19- The arbitrary element involved is intimately related to time and space as it must be decided where to cut off a certain part of the social evolution in order to make a classification. In other words, the classification procedure that is first proposed from natural science will not hold up in its application to social science. 7. The importance of 4131591“ and its relations to classification. The idea of system is another point of interest both as a fundamental idea in science as well as an important term in classification. System as it is \\ developed by Radcliffe-Brown, becomes the min axis of science.” A system a is natural, or is an idea, “...wh1ch occurs as a natural one in phenomenal /' reality. "#6 Therefore, the description of system, its units and the rela- tionship between its, units is the prime core of all scientific problem}? More than this, is the relationship of system and natural law. Both are immnent in the universe -- inherently there by the nature of natural \ phenomena. Lbreover, ”A ll scientific problem can be reduced to one \ 1 statement: 'A natural law is a statement of the characteristics possessed ; by certain definite class of natural system in the univei:se."""8 / The natural system then is a part of phenomenal reality. lbreover, it is a part of reality that can be conceptually isolated and considered. Win, p. 10. 46 IQE- sil- ‘W 1.02- 22.12. 48 .129- 2.1.2- -20- Another aspect of a natural system which is important to his analysis is the relations which exist betvmen entities in a natural system. For one thing, these relationships fashion the components of a system, ”...to one another as to make a naturally cohering unity. '49 As to the constit- uent entities they, 1"...my be events, or themelves system of events. Such a system is the solar system, an element, an atom, a horse, a falling body. .50 Relationships within system are relationships of real interconnect- 51 That is, these relationships exist in phmomanal reality (as do edness. the relationships betwaen entities in a class). They also mice the system a natural cohering entity which can be isolated [mm the rest of the universe. Bbreover, there is beWeen these entities a functional consist- ency. Finally, the unit (system) is an organic unity or whole which has a structure.52 8. _System and science. The imortance of system is increased by the next idea introduced by Radcliffe-Brown. He states that the met expedient classification of science is on the basis of the class of system with which each science deals.53 This is not an ironclad difinition in the sense that W n. 50 £92- 3333. 51 _I_t_)_i_d., p. 12. 52 log. 5}}. 53 Ibide ’ p. 13 e -21- as new system are discovered new fields in science will be added. 54 Lbreover, in the development of Wo sciences, the consideration of the system that these sciences deal with will lead to an intermediate sciencd.55 Again it is noted in regard to science and system; "The general- iaations of these sciences are statements concerning the characteristics of the system with which each deals."56 \ 9. Relationships within a system. The discussion of mechanical and persist-5 ent system reopen the area concerned with the relationships which exist within a system. Mechanical system are of a temporary nature and they denote certain events and certain relationships betwaen these events. 'Mechanical system are composed of motions and moses in relation. Their unit entities or events are positions of moss at various moments in time, and. their gelations, the intercon- nected relations between these events. This type of system is illustrated by the system or falling bodies created by Galileo. The events are the bodies at certain moments in tins and the relationship is between the falling body and the position at various points in time.58 54 393. 533. 55 £93. 939. 56 _l_o_c_. 333. 57 193. gt. 58 Elia. pp. 13-11;. -22.. A persistent system has two min characteristics; it is dynamic and persistent.59 The characteristic of any persistent system is that it min- tains through a certain lapse of time its structural continuity.6O The idea of structural continuity is important for it demonstrates how these term are related to the relationships which occur between events. 'I'The structure of a system is the specific set of relations between its units."61 The statement of persistence persumably means a persistence of a certain ‘ type of relationship which exists between entities within a system. From this a definition of system is restated. ”A system can be defined by defining We things: (1) what its units are, and (2) what special kinds of relations are that hold between these units which mks up the system. ”62 This, then, leads to the important definition of a social system. In a social system the units are individual humn behavior and the relations are the social relations which exist bettmen these, ”...sets of behavioral events,..."63 Social system then is the system by which social science can be distin~\ r“. guished. The components of a social system are derived from social behavio 59 Ibid. ’ p. 13. 60 Ride ’ P. m. 51 $22- 24.2- 62 las- 21.2. 63 Ibide, PP. M'l5e { cae- 9 a. a. \ Ia ' U ‘0 - 23 - The development of social science has not been preceded by a definition‘ of its units and their interrelations. It will be necessary to distinguish and define these units and relations. The distinction must ultimately be made on the basis of the different ways of acting of human beings; conceivably on the basis of 'inner behavior' or 'economic behavior,‘ at gfitera; I believe, however, on the basis of social behavior." 10. Classification and system. Having established these two elements of classification, the system.and the class, Radcliffe-Brown then explains J J \\ . how science is developed on the basis of classification. "The first step in the development of any science is taxonomic.”65 This mi1ht be called the first basic step in science. As he points out, the zoologist when classifying first tries to find, "...recurrent systems of the same type, and he is defining all systems of one class."66 An example given is the systemrof the lion. In the definition of the lion system, the 2001- ogist, ”...is giving you the characteristics of all systems which fall in the class lion."67 This type of classification is termed the first level of classification.68 The second level of classification entails the examination of the relationships which exist between members of the same system. JHere the scientist attempts to find or establish the relationships between members W 15. 65 ‘EQEQ., p. 18. 66 I_.g_¢_:. git. 67 $22. gig. 68 .122- sis- -24.. of the same species. An instance given for an example of this type of classification is a comparison within the lion species. When, however, the zoologist winttfurther and considered a father lion, a mother lion, a son lion, and their relation- ships, and new eyes that a partimular characteristic is transmitted by certain laws of Mendelian inheritance, he is talking about a.genetic system, in which the unit is no longeréa single lion but a genetically related family of lions. 9 The next step or level involves the examination of the internal characteristics of the lion's physiology, "...not merely as a collection of characteristics, but as a series of characteristics which are definable only when the inner interrelationships of the lion are investigated through periods of time and through a series of reactions."70 B. Social Science Since socialscience can be defined as a natural science, its devel- opment will be analogous to the development of other sciences and neces- sarily will trace the same development in terms of classification. The first step therefore, in the development of social science will be taxon- omic. The classification of social systems will be the actual step that is necessary.71 39 12.2. 2.139.- 70 $29.- 22.2- 71 Ibido, P0 19. - 25 - I propose that no scientific study of societies can get very far until we have made some prqgress tuwards a classification of social systems into whatever types, groups, or classes suggest themselves as eXpedient, that is, likely to lead to valid generalizations with reapect to all societies.72 1. Classification in social science. The wont that has been accomplished thus far in social scienCe, according to Radcliffe-Brown, has not been satisfactory for the kind of classifications which have been male are based upon.what people do and therefore only treat one aspect of the social system. This aspect is, '...-—the relationship between a society and its environment."73 Eramples of such classifications, ”...divtdes man into hunting and collecting, pastoral, tillage, higher agricultural, and indus- trial societies, et cetera.'7u The actual classification of societies at this point is not discussed except to, “...remank that societies are exceedingly'cOmplex.'75 The point he is making here is that the first step in social science will be the establishment of a classification.76 '73 :03. 9333. The idea of expediency, is stated previously as being connected with ”naturelness.' That is the more elements a class has in common the more useful it becomes to the social scientist. Those classes which have the greatest number of elements in common are the most “natural“ and expiedent by his own definition. (See page 17 of this thesis.) 73 ‘52£°.£$§° 7% 2223.233! 75 £2£-.E£E! 76 .EEE'.£$E9 -26- Another point brought out at this time is a comparison of the complexities involved in classifing social systems as opposed to clas- sification in physical science. '--But, in any case, whaterer classifi- cations one gets in physics are inevitably simple; in social science they 'will be inevitably complex.'77 The implications of this last statement are later stated to be one of the first difficulties in the development of a natural science of society.78 Radcliffe-Brown, in summing up the difficulties involved in the development of a natural science of society, states that at one time the subject matter’of natural science was felt to be too complex to classify. The example given is theltphenomena of lightening and thunder which, by the medievalist, was felt to be beyond the scope of human.knowledge as compared to Franklin and modern day electro-physicists, by whom it was and is understood. Therefore, he argues, "The complexisty of the material is not a valid arguement.'79 .Despite this arguement he insists on main- taining that the subject matter of social science will be complex. "The exploration of the f ield of social science, however, requires on the part of the student an acquaintance with such vast numbers of fact, that he must also take into consideration complexisty in the quantitative sense...."80 75* ‘Ibid., p. 20. 78 Ibid., p. 80. 79 I.2£.- 9.1.2- 80 .122- £23 -27- There is a difficulty which arises here in terms of the Consistency of his own statements. How can he foresee with accuracy whether the clas- sification of social science will be "inevitably complex? " In regard to the problem he places himself in the same position in social science as the medievalist was in classifying or understanding thunder and lightening. 2. The method of classification in social science. Some further ideas on the subject of classification in social science can be seen from some general remarks he makes concerning the nature of science. The essence of science, Radcliffe-Brown mintains, is W03: Therefore, the method involved for finding common characteristics of a social system will be the comparative method. This comparison is first seen as a "preceived analogy." It is through analogies that differences and similarities can be first preceived. In other words it consists of a rough comparison. As an illustration of this first step he cites the analogy made between geometric figures, specifically the ellipse. "We perceive between them a certain similarity of shape and certain defferences . ”81 The first step in such a procedure is to give a name to certain figures which have similar shapes, in the case of the illustration, the name ”ellipse.“ The first step is taxonomic. It clas- sifies all geometric figures as having similar shapes under the same name. After this first step in classification has been taken (the same is done 81 Ride, p. 200 -28.. for circles, curves, etc.) the next step is a comparison of the common elements called ellipses from which a definition for all ellipses can be made. '--tAn ellipse is the locus of all points, the sum of whose distances from.two fixed points is constant.'"82 This step goes beyond the first step of taxonomy. It was accomplished by comparison.83 The idea of comparison.leads directly into measurement and experiment which is also important to the topic of classification in social science. Experiment, although not absolutely essential makes possible exact compar- ison in some systems of nature.84 ”The essence of scientific method rests on the discovery of technique of procedure by which one can.neke more and more exact comparisons."85 “Lhasurement” he states, "becomes possible where one has measurable quantities."86 Later in the paper he eXpands upon the idea of the type of measurement used in social science. .At this point he simply states that it is an essential part of comparison. Emperu inent, however, is not essential for if it were, the astronomers would be ' out of luck (as well as the social scientist). "What is important is compar- ison of two or more instances of certain things,"87 W 21. 83 193. gig. 84 333. 533;. 85 _I_gc_:. 333. 86 .322°.EEE° 8? .193- Bit - 29 - The method of science is therefore summarized as follows: To summarize the method of science: There is first the perception of an analogy, then the analysis of that analogy whereby we more precisely define its similarities and differences. I think that that is all there is, is essence, in any scientific problems The procedure is fairly simple if ygg consider a simple system, but complex if the system.is complex. The method of science is thus given. It consists of comparing different 89 social systems. There is something very important to notice in this last statement. Radcliffe-Brown takes the first step in classification,90 the taxonomic step of nannng social system.as the unit which must be compared. This explains why Radcliffe-Brown points out the component parts of a social system.in such great detail. He has established here that the social system.is the first step in the taxonomic classification. The comparison of different social systems is the next step in the method of classification of social science.91 Therefore he sees social systems as analogous to the first step in comparison. The kind of 88 Ibido, p0 22. 89 1:22. £320 90 .Actually'the first taxonomic step is taken when he classifies the units of social systems as behavioral units. However, the actual step of classification of social system.is seen as the "first step” by this writer in attempting to follow the logic of the method being presented. That is, once the classification of system.is made, the next step of comparing systems is presented. 91 gig” p. 22. -30- measurement necessary for this comparison he defers until he more firmly establishes what constitutes the social system. The notion of probability enters into the method of science and he here points out what he calls tm important ideas in this context. The first idea concerns the probability of a generalization and its relation to the hunter of instances which occur. He states, “You do not in general increase the probability of a generalization simply by multiplying the instances."92 Sometimes, he asserts, it is only necessary to demonstrate a few instances to establish a generalization as in the case of Galileo's experiments.93 A second point which is held to be extremely important is that in the establishment of generalizations of a class it is more inportant to consider diverse members of the sub-class then the consideration of my instances of a few of the members of the sub-classes of the class. "It is the diversity of instances rather than their number which is most important toward proving generalizations true. '94 The idea of causality is next mentioned in relationship to the method of classification in social science and it is pointed out that in one area the notion of cause is essential. That area is practical, applied science as well as practical life. To the theoretical scientist however, cause is excluded from consideration. In theoretical science causal explanation is 92 ___ECe 23-50 93 .122- iii- 94 l'bid., p. 23. -31.. replaced by non-causal explanation, for the sake of accuracy. The fol- owing example provides some clarity to theseremarks. For example, we find that a piece of metal is longer when hot than when cold. The immediate cause, we say, is change of temperature. From the scientific point of view you are being more accurate when you say there is a co-variation batman tenperature and length. And you can be still more accurate by defining that co-variation in quantitative terms.95 To sum up this section on the method of science then, it is possible to say that a natural science of society will entail the following; the exact comparison of social system is necessary to form generalizations which will have a gigh degree of probability. 3. Social sEtem in the social science. Since Radcliffe-Brown establishes the social system as the first taxonomic step in the development of a natural science of society he elaborates to a great extent on the natuae of a social system. He restates this incorporation of social system in the science in the following mnner: If we agree that natural science is concerned with natural systems, and can agree that a society is a natural system and one that can be investigated, we can have a natural science of BOC1OtyB96 There is a point here which is well to note at this stage in the development of his ideas. That is, the strong implication is made that a society is the system with which the social scientist is dealing. 95 Ibid., Po 24. 96 Ibid., p. 25. Later it beeches c social scientist i asociety is a see by usage, and fin“. involves us in sci 1321168 treating and that process What is final 8 Social system ca itself is the typ. ative flatbed of B Social BFStE Observed mu 1: Parts: events of or behanor.100 " D. 98 1d" D. 99 id‘» in. 101 Q. Cit -32- .Later it becomes clear that the social system.is the system.in'which the social scientist is more interested. Therefore, the implication is that a society is a social system. This point he later denies, 97 re-establishes by usage, and finally states that; "Ittgcientific investigation of societieé; involves us in scientific procedure -- in analysis, which inevitably implies treating a society as though it were a system or system of system; and that process of analysis is something much more than description."98 What is finally concluded by this writer is thathadcliffe-Brown means a social system.can exist in many places within a society'but a society itself is the type or kind of system.that is ultimately used in the compar- ative method of social science.99 Social system.itself retains the same definition that has been observed early in the work. The social system.is composed of two main parts: events of behavior of hunan.beings and relations between these acts of behavior.100 Here - again - the relationships which exists within a social system.are given "The relations between individuals in.a social system are social relations, and these are real things, parts of phenomenal .101 reality. ‘Important also in the analysis of this relationship is the idea of adjustment of interest. W35. 98 £112.. 19. 38. 99 932., po 31. 100 933., p. 25. 101 £23.. £3.12. O o O O V o . a e O c I e 0 . U C O O J. *1. -33- Two or more organisms are in a social relation as soon as there is some adjustment of their interests batman them. Interest implies purposive behavior. I use the term similarly to the use of the concept of force in physics. Force and interest are not real entities. Force is a logical fiction, a convenient Concept by which we can describe a certain thpe of physical pheno- ena. Interest is a similar logical fiction for describing biolog- ical phenomena; it is a shorthand description of a series of acts of behavior -- not itself a real entity, but valuable in descri- bing phenomenal reality. 102 Tm important ideas are developed here; one, that interest implies purposive behavior and, twO, that interest is a means of describing this kind of phenomena. The nature of adjustment issomawhat more difficult to understand. First, it is pointed out that complete disregard for intesest, as in the case of the lamb and the wolf, is not adjustment. That is, there is apparently no modification of behavior on behalf of the wolf to the interest of the lamb. The wolf is exercising his interest in his attenpt to eat the lamb but does not consider or adjust his interest to the interest of the lamb. This idea is summed up by the following sentence. ”Complete disregard of the interest of one organism by another is unadjusted conflict and precludes social relationship. ”103 Therefore, the complimentary situation of adjustment of interest includes, as one of its main points, modification of behavior in terms of another's behavior or interest. Modification of behavior will exist tither on a voluntary or a non-voluntary basis. 101} Adjustment of interest does, therefore, involve some modification of behavior. 1'05 102 .1522- 23.12- 103 .122- 233.- 1ou Ibid., p. 26. 105 1400. Cit. -34- This idea becomes an important point in the development of a social system. It means that adjustment of interest which takes place in a social relationship within a social system has an effect on behavior. That is, the relationship within a social system has an effect on behavior. This idea is important when considering the comparative discussion of phychology and social science. Before applying this point to the comparison of these txm sciences, a development of the conparison will be analysed. ’4. A cogarison of jsychobgy and social science. Both sciences, that of psychology and social science, observe the same entities; acts of human behavior. 106 The difference, however, lies in that psychology deals with the relationships betwaen acts of behavior within one individual and social science deals with the relationshps between the behavior of bio or more individal'ln.107 The relationships betwaen acts of . behavior of one and the same individual are psychic or mental relations : relations between acts of behavior betwaen info or more individuals are social. 108 The acts of behavior are the observed phenomena in both sciences, the relationship between these acts differentiate the sciences.109 There is an objection to this analysis, not on the grounds that Rad- cliffe-Brown is inconsistent, but on the grounds that the field of psychol- ogy is sorely limited by this definition. 1% LEG. EEO 10? Ibid., pp. 26-27. 108 Ibid., Pa 270 109 Ibid., pp. 26-27. -35- As has been pointed out in the development of social system.the relationship betwaen entities within such a system involves an adjustment of interest. This adjustemw of interest, while it does not necessarily involve consideration of the interest of another, does involve a modific- ation of behavior. This mans that when individual acts of behavior are considered and these individual acts are involved in a social system they will effect or in some respect determine behavior connected with this same social system. This degree of determination is not given, but the important point is that it exists. This means, to the mind of the writer, that any act which takes place within a social system is effected by the relationship which exists within a social system, namely, adjustment of interest. Further, that any consideration of this act as it is related to other system or other relationships such as those which exist in a psychological system must deal with the relationship which exists within a social system. In other words, there is here a degree of interdependence bwtmen acts in socitl system which cannot be separated from the individual acts of behavior by the nature of the definition of social system. Therefore, no successful analysis of a social act could take place without the consider- ation of the relationship within a social system since, here, a degree of determination exists in that the act is dependent upon the relationshp within a social system. [‘5’1' llj -36- Sinply stated than, since the relationship which exists betwaen acts in a social system in some degree determine the nature of an act of behavior, the same act of behavior considered. in a relationship which does not include this determining factor will not result in a complete analysis of the act of behavior. Therefore the psychologist can only successfully deal with such acts of behavior that are not in a social relationship to other acts. It will be well to notice that this objection does not state that psychology cannot deal with any acts of individual behavior. The objection concerns, rather, these acts which exist within a social system and can not be successfully considered by isthe psychologist when dealt within the psychologist's limited system. This entire interpretation, to the mind of the writer, limits the subject matter of psychology below the level of a science. Moreover, it places psychology in an almost useless position in analyzing social behavior; an injustice felt unwarranted by this writer. 5. Conclusion. In this chapter it is revealed how Radcliffe-Brown sets the stage for his science of society by first giving what he believes are some basic tenets of natural science. Along with the explanation of these basic tenets the following inconsistent elements have been brought out in this thesis. In hasing abstract relationships between events- in- raality, Radcliffe-Brown is inconsistent within his own framework of 3363801111380 -37- The second mjor section of this chapter deals with the relationship between social science and natural science. Within this descussion the following inconsistent elements and criticism have been unfolded. First Radcliffe-Brown is criticized for his inconsistent stand in stating that social science will always be conplex. Seconddy, he is implicitly criticized for not making a clear cut stand on the difference between social system and society. The third and last criticism of this particular section deals with the limitations place upon psychology by definition. It is concluded by this writer that the limitations placed upon the field of psychology are unwarranted. III. THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE METHOD OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE A. The Elements of Social Science .Although some of the elements in a social science have already been incountered in this work it is at this stage of the paper in which Radcliffe-Brown begins to regard in detail these factors, the elements of a social science. This explanation is started with a Closer look at the relationships which exist within a social system. 1. Relationships within a social system. In a reconsideration of the relationships which exist within a social system.it is stated that these relationships are classified into two categories.109 The first category includes that type of relationship which is continually repeated; "...as in the acts of behavior, say, between mother's brother and sister's son "110 The other relationship Concerns the categories in an.Australian tribe. of behavior which are similar or alike: "...for example, you finthhree Andaman Islanders, all.nsking bows in the same way, although they may never have seen each other."111 The behaviors are similar in this second category because all men are members of a "traditional system." Traditional system.is a substitute for culture which at this point in the work is avoided but is taken up later. 109 Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., The Nature of a Theoretical Natural Science of Society, Chicago, The University of Chicago,‘l§h8, p. 31. 110 ‘§93.'g£§. 111 Ibid., pp.30-31. - 39 - There is a connection between acts of behavior in this latter category of behavior and it is analogous to the similarity of behavior'which exists within a genetic system.of a species of animals.112 The first category of behavior is not explained at this point but simply stated. That is, no reason is given for the repetition of these acts of behavior'but only that they constitute a category of relationship between diverse individuals. In the definition of social system.that follows it is stated that these relationships between acts of behavior are inferred from behavior. Thus, similarities of acts can be observed and relationships can be determined. The final step is finding certain types of relationships which are common in a society. The important aspect of these two types of categories lies in their similarities. Both are similar in that these relationshps are recurrent. It is this characteristic which.nakes the system.applicable to a natural science of society. "The important logical point is that in thus using the word gygtgm.and applying it to society, we say that science is investigating recurrent events of real interconnectedness."113 Thus it is in the recur- rence of relationships between events or of systems of events that the natural science of society lies. The discovery of natural law is a 112 Ibid., p. 31. 113 112.2% iii- -40- statement, "...of invariant relations in a class of systenn. we are interested in discovering the invariant relations of systems of societies."114 It can be noticed here that the two categories of relationships are used in the analysis of social systems The interConnected or direct relationship as well as relationships of similarity which are also interb connected both appear as part of the social system. Radcliffe-Brown stresses the interconnection between similar acts of behavior and this fact is interesting to note. If he did not do this these acts of behavior could not be Classified as members of a system. but would rather fall into the definition of a class. That is why he stresses the fact that these similar acts of behavior'have a more funda- mental connection than that of simply similar acts of behavior.115 2. The social structure. Social structure is again aterm whose definition rests upon the social relations of individuals. It is in fact, “...the sum.total of all relationships of all individuals at a given moment in time. .116 Since this term.is related to the notion of relationship it is necessary to examine what type of relationship this is; one of interCon- nectedness or one of similarity. Obviously, it is a relationship of inter5 connectedness since it concerns social relationships. Moreover, when social relationships occur they involve adjustment of interest. W ice. .sii- 115 .1522- an. 116 Ibid., Do 32. -41- 3. Social structure and the persistence of natural systems. Now enters an important point. What happens when there is a continuity of these relationships? This leads to the persistnece of natural systsl3.1I7 In other words, if the relationships of adjusted behavior have a degree of continuity then the system.inwolved in these relationships will be persist- ent. This logical interplay leads to the assertation that; 9A social structure is a natural persistent system.“ln8 In as much as social struc- ture is defined as the relationships which exist between all individuals at a given moment of time, how is it.known that these relations will continue or persist? Certainly it can be seen how the continuity of structure would be predicated by the persistence of a.natural system as it is stated above. Here it can be seen clearly that the continuity of relations would constitute the persistence of a natural systems The statement in doubt however, is the one quoted above which equates social structure and a natural persistent system. JRadcliffe-Brown is presuming, then, that all social relationships will persist or have conti- nuity. In other words, social structure ”takes on" more meaning than merely the relations which exist at any one moment of time. He adds the notion that these relations are or have continuity. This, to the writer, is a presumption on his part unless he has examined all the relations which exist in a social system. until one examines all the relations and certifies their continuity, the statement remains a hypothesis or statement of prob- ability, and not a statement of fact. 117 I320 Cit. 113 222- 2.1.1:- 42- Therefore it would have been more Correct. for him to state; if these social relations whihh constitute the social structure have a continuity than the social structure is a natural persistent system. The interjection of the ideas of continuity into the social relations of individuals is particularly bothersome since the proof of the matter lies in an investigation of persistent social relations. From this analysis one might think of the social structure as Consti- tuting the social relations which exist at any particular moment of time. If onw was then able to maintian that same social relationship would persist regardless of the passage of tim then one would have a persistent structure. Therefore it would be logically Correct to say that a persistent social structure is the same as a persistent natural system but not logical to state that a social structure is a persistent natural system until some foundation of proof could be offered as to the persistence of the social relations which comprise the social structure. 1}. Social structure and structural form. Since social structure is almost an inapplicable term by definition, as it involves a complete census of all social relations of all individuals at a given moment of time, its scope necessarily must be, as it is, limited to something of a more applicable nature. This narrowing down is accomplished by the following definition of structural form. -43- Structural continuity implies continuity of structural form over a limited period of time. But this, form is an abstraction. If we regard, in australia, the social relations betwaen ten sets of mother's brothers and sister's sons, we find that these relations actually vary somewhat; but, primarily, we find a common element and establish the structural form for the relation- 8111290119 This idea then Contains a degree of abstraction. The type of abstr- action used here is later referred to as abstracting the Common elements. That is, from the total structural continuity one is able to abstract a common element of Continuity, named here as the structural from. The structural form then would seem to be logically dependent upon the common elements which can be abstracted from the totality of the structural continuity. Radcliffe-Brown, however, does not observe this step in reasoning when he states, “The kinds of relationship people observe will be the same for the period of time in which structural form is maintained... ."120 This criticism forms the general objection to the development of the term social structure and structural form. The idea of social structure is originally built upon all the social relationships which occur at any given moment of time between all individuals. From this framework kthe meaning of the term is shifted so that the persistence of the structure is the persistence of this relationship. Web the same is done in the case of structural from which is obtained by abstracting common elements from an arena of social relationships and than stating that the persistence of the structural form constitutes the persistence of this abstracted form. 119 .122- 23.32- 120 Loc. Cit. -44- In other words, it is first stated that the structural form is obtained from relationships betwaen human beings and then this same relationship is said to be dependent upon the continuance of the structural form. 5. Social usage. The introduction of social structure and structural form lead directly into the discussion of a new term introduced at this point named ”social usage.“ (he of the most important aspects of social usage is its connection to an idea which thus far has been avoided. This idea is the connection beWeen what people think and what they do or how they behave. Behavior, then, through the concept kof social usage, is linked to the idea of values and beliefs which exist within a society. This connection raises some problems for Radcliffe-Brown, one of which is a type of causal explanation for human behavior. He has previously denied, of course, any connection beWeen causal explanation and scientific method.121 However, in the explanation of social usage it is pointed out that there is a definite connection between what people think and what they do or how they behave. 6. Social usage and structural form. What then is exactly the relation- ship between social usage and structural form? It has been stated that the description of the structural form is, "...eXplicit in social usages.'122 121 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 122 Ibid., p. 32. -45- In fact the W0 terns are almost used synonomously. "--The investigation of social usages -- of structural from -- in different social systems we might call social morphology. "123 This means that in discussing social usages Radcliffe-Brown is in some reapects approaching those common elements which are abstracted from the total relationship which exist in a social system. It is worthwhile to note at this point that social suage and structural form (acutally continuity of structural from) cannot be synonomous. It will be recalled that the continuity of a structural from is determined by abstracting the common elements in relations to behavior. Social usage, on the other hand, is a term referring to behavior and not a relatinnship betwen behaviors. Relationships do exist betwaen behaviors called social usages but these relationships do not determine the meaning of social usage in the same reapect as relations betwaen behaviors determine the meaning of continuity of structural from. What Radcliffe-Brown is perhaps referring to here is that these behaviors which make up a relationship within a social structure are called social usages. Here then is a name or category of behavioral events. Social structure is then also a u for relations betwaen events. Therefore the continuity of structural from becomes a category of relations that have a common element and can be abstracted from the totality of all social relations which exist within a social system. 123 LSc. gig. -46- Since there is a conmion relationship which can be abstracted ther is, therefore, a category of behavior that my be abstracted; this behavior is termed social usage. This would explain why a social usage, "...involves acts of behavior of a number of individuals who are integral parts of a single social system. ”124 Therefore, social usages would also be a category of abstracted common elements which it does in fact bacon. It is the name for the common elements of behaviors which are present when the common elements of relaticns are abstracted from the totality of relationships which exist in a. social system. Although the relations beWeen social usages are implied above as existing in the structural form of a social system, relations betwaen these acts of behavior termed social usages themselves constitute a system.]25 7. Social usage and the rule behind the social usage; Returning now to the problem of causal interpretation wich exists in the development of social usage the explanation of the rule behind the social usage is consid- ered. The rule behind the social usage is an integral part of the term for without this rule (its observance and recognition) a social usage could not exist. ”The fact (1) that some or many people observe it, and 12; Ibid., p. 330 125 mess -47- (2) the fact that a large number of people recognize it as a rule consti- tutes the reality of a social usage."l26 There is in this last statementan implication whichcreates some difficulty in understanding what is meant. As it has been interpreted this writer sees this idea of a rule, as it is used here, as the necessary condition for the existence of a social usage. A social usage exists in reality because it is a name for behavior. Here enters an important point. Do these social usages refer to actual sets of behaviors or is it a name for approved ways of acting? The actual usages can be interpreted as being actual sets of behaviors which do exist. Their existence, however, is of a dependent nature. They will}. exist only if ther exists in the minds of a certain number of people the idea that a particular way of behaving is acceptable. In other words, in terms of this interpretation, the choice of the word ”reality“ is poor. What would be more correct in the light of what is said later on in the work would be that these sets of behaviors are dependent for existence upon the rules in a certain number of people's minds, that this is the correct or appropriate way in which to behave. On what grounds is it possible to say that a social usage is real? It is mintained here that a social usage is stated as such because it is .a set of acts of behaviors. Radcliffe-Brown states that social usages are real in several places by the fact that they are acts of behavior. For instance he states: "6"—'—12 Ibid., p'. 32. -48- "What constitutes the reality are the set of behaviors of individuals wh ch are of two kinds: acts of behavior in.which social usages are observed and acts of recognition of these as proper, or, in the breach, impreper."127 Therefore, since social usage is a term which refers to sets of acts of behaviors it refers to acts which exist in reality. ,All RadcliffeéBrown has done here is to imply that the existence of a social usage is dependent upon its recognition by a certain.number of people as being correct or appropriate. It is held by this writer that there exists an important connection between this dependence of social usage and the previous statement of a causal explanation.of social usage. The important point is this, that while the science of society is based upon or finds its material from.acts of human behavior, in the final analysis some causal eXplanation is given for the existence (as well as the persistence) of these acts. This expla- nation rests upon the statement (or implication) that human behavior is dependent upon what people think. The real answer to the existence of a social system.then can not be successfully answered until an analysis is made of what people think in connection to how they behave. The question then becomes; can the science of society use exclusively as evidence the behavior of man or must it necessarily incorporate man's beliefs in connection to his behavior? 127 Ibid., p. 33. "ma-w, .1 -49- 8. Social usage and the causal explanation: In the analysis of a social system.Radcliffe-Brown does incorporate the beliefs of man as can be seen in his development of the method of discovering social usages. The method used in discovering social usages is connected with the basic beliefs people have about appropriate ways of behaving. However, in some cases mere observation can establish a social usage. It may be sufficient in some instances to go and see what all the people are doing to determine a social usage. You see for instance, that all men in the Uhitgd States wear trousers: you have established a social usage.12 This method proves to be the exception however since, “In many instances, however, it is not as simple as that, because you find certain variation in behavior.'129 . .At this point in the development of the method of determining a social usage the causal factor of belief can be clearly noted. What causes these variations of behavior? Or what else besides behavior must be observed in order to establish a social usage? The other factor involved is the rule behind the social usage. "It is the recognition of that rule, together with its observance,'which constitutes the usage."130 To support the first contention made at the outset of this topic it is necessary to explain how the rule is connected with beliefs and values. This point is established by Radcliffe-Brown both here and later in his 12*? 179.2- 2.1.1":- 129 122- 2.11:- 130 2.0.2- 9.1.2- - 5o - discussion when he discusses the relations between culture and social usage: You cannot define a social usage except in terms of what people do and what they think ought to be done. The norm is not estab- E lished by the anthropologist. It is a rule which has an average distribution and a certain standard deviation in its observance; it is characterized by what people sag about rules in a given society and what they do about them.1 1 Therefore, it is maintamsed that he has inadvertently introduced into his science of society through the definition of social usage a causal } explanation for human behavior which is contradictory to what he has previously stated to be the nature of natural science. Later on it will be explained how this point plays an important factor in the final conclusions reached in this thesis. 9. Social system.and society. The comparative discuSsion of social system and society is brief but within it has several conflicting elements. In the case of a social system, a social system.is given to exist whenever two organisms find some adjustment of interest or are in a social relation.132 However, it is established that these aamll systems will not be useful in the development of a science of society. Therefore, the idea of limits is introduced in regard to social systems The task of the social scientist becomes that of finding the most useful or abstracting the most useful.kinds of social systems. ”131 _L22~ si- 132 Ibid., P- 340 - 51 - Immediately following these statements the most eXpedient abstraction of a society is stated. In essence it contains or consists of a territo- rially delimited group of people, ”...wh1ch seems to be not only clearly marked off from other groups, but which is also sufficiently homogeneous in most respects of the behavior of its individuals, if not in all of them, so that the similarities can be discovered and constitute a material which can be adequately described."133 While this "expedient abstraction” closely resembles a social system or at least sets the limits for a social system, the equation of the two terms is denied. "A society than is not actually the same thing as a social system."1'34 .A society is, however, studied, "...-- as a conceptualky isolated system.--...."135 In a further development of his ideas it becomes increasingly difficult to see where the terms differ. The next quotation illustrates that both terms consider the same units of behavior with the same relations between these units. When a relationship exists between two human organisms such that there is some convergence of their interests, we have a relation- ship we can call a social relationship, distinct from.all other relationships in the universe -- in a system.in which human beings are the units. .A human society is constituted of human beings and of what are the relations, defined in this sense, between theml.136 T33 Ibid., p. 35. 134 lea 2.1.1.2- 135 .122 £232. 136 Dido, p. 37 W" I'm-tr . It - 52 - Thus it appears-that a society is a defined social system. It sets the area of convergence of behavior in that it limits the amount of human beings in such a relationship be being territorially delimited and.clarly marked off from other groups as well as including anumber of human beings 'who are, ”homogeneous in most respects of the behavior of its individuals...."137 ! Thus it is maintained that Radcliffe-Brown is saying that a society sets the limits for the most expedient type of abstract social system. “‘3‘.“ ‘ "< B. The Method of a Social Science The method of a social science is extremely important to his paper as 'well as to this thesis. However, before a complete discussion of the methodology is made, for the sake of clarity, the method will be presented as it is developed by Radcliffe-Brbwn. s 1. Measurement in social science. This topic of methodology is introduced by'expladning what is meant by measurement in social science. One of the first significant statements is as follows: .A natural science is possible, first, whenever measurement can be applied to phenomena, and second, whenever relational analysis 69 possible, i.e., systems are identifiable and character- izable.13 13? Ibid., p. 35. 138 Ibid., p. 37. -53- Thus, one of the first premises made is that if it is possible to measure phenomena and amke relational analysis, natural science is possible. A second point to the premise of measurement is that, "Relational analysis even if not metrical, may be mathematical, in the sense that it will apply non-quantitative, relational mathematics."139 In social science the type of mathematics that will be required will not be metrical, "...but will be that hitherto comparatively neglected branch of mathematics, the calculus of relations, which, I think, is on the whole more fundamental than quantitative mathematics. "m0 Therefore, in social science ther is a type of measurement proposed which is not metrical, yet at the same time is mathematical. That is, mathematical in terms of relational mathematics which is non-quantitative. This branch of mathematics is called the ”calculus of relations" and felt to be, "...more fundamental than mutatin nthenticlflml However, how is it possible to compare phenomena which are not placed in metrical terms? This question introduces another idea -- the idea of correlation in terms of non-quantitative mathematics. That is, quantities which are not measurable can have a degree of correspondence. 11}? This idea of correlation takes the form of a scale -- a unilineal scale where ’53? £2.9- sif- 140 .122- 211» 11.11 _Lo__c. cit. 1112 £93. git. -54- the degree of correspondence can be noted as to where an item falls on the scale. This method can be applied to characteristics of societies in the following manner: A.Z x y / B L__1:z_/ On scalelg, characteristic x might fall here and characteristic y there. On scale 2, x and y might come together. You may, with two such scales, proceed to a correlation. .... If such a procedure is valid, correlation can be shown to exist, though not stated quantitatively. 2. The fundamental4prgblem.of social science. In light of the method proposed, that of establishing a correlation on a non-quantitative basis, the fundamental prob“: of this method is observed: ...'How many different kinds of societies are there, and in what respects do they differ from.one another? What is the range of variation, and, more important, what common characteristics are there discoverable by analysis which are characteristic of all human societies2'144 The answer to the last question will yield a series of natural laws&5ai example of which is given as follows: ”...‘Every human society has a system of mloral£=.l."']‘)+6 How is it possible then to prove such a proposition? The statement itself involves a series of sub-problems of the following nature: 1E3 Ibid., PP. 37-38. 1%4 Ibid., p. 38. 1&5 Ibid., p. 39. 146 .122- 9-1.2- - 55 - "'What kinds of societies are there? How do they vary from one another? What, on comparison, do they prove to have in common?'”ln7 These gues- tions in the development of his methodology lead into a discussion concern- ing the typing of societies. 3. Classification of societies. The answer to these questions, these sub-prablems,'will.give a classification of society of the nature that: we shall find human societies characterized in general by the fact that they all belong to one class and that all of them fulfill a certain function, which we can represent by'X.. X is a function that is true of any society -- present, past, and future.148 The fact that certain characteristics vary from.society to society is next established along with the idea that all societies can be subdivided into types, “...such that here is a type possessing certain.ccmmnn.char— acteristics and here a type possessing certain other-33149 #. The establishment of social types. Thus, this leads up to the problem. of establishing social types. The problem.is re-stated in the following manner: Therefore the complete answer to 'What kinds of societies are there?’ is the complete classification of social types -— which at present we have not got. So that we must ask kourselves, 'What are the methods by which we can arrive at a classification of social types?'15O IE7"iSET'EItT 1M8 Loc. cit. 1&9 Loc. cit. 150 Loc. cit. - 56 - The method used for establishing social types is clearly the comparative method. The following statement offers a demonstration of this type of analysis: ‘We establish our type by comparing a number of individual societies. Let us say 5 is the Australian type of social system. By'having taken as many individual societies in.Australia as possible, by studying their characteristics, and eliminating their variations, we have been able to discover what is common to all of them. It is a matter of empirical determination to discover that they all possess certain abstract characteristics in common. This then gives an.explanation of the method used in establishing social types; it is the comparative method, employed by comparing a number of individual societies. This yields the characteristics which each have in common by, ”...abstracting the general characteristics which define that type."152 5. The comparison of social_types. The next step in this comparative method is the comparison of types. "If I compare a series of very diverse types -- as many as I can establish from.all over the world (it is not the number of instances that determine the probability of a conclusion, but the variety), I can discover things which are common to a considerable number of diverse types, possibly to all of them."153 151 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 152 Ibid., p. 40. 153 Les. siza- -57- This is the essence of the method of a social science for it is from this type or kind of analysis that probable generalizations which well lead to natural laws are established. .Although this method explains the steps which are essential in the establishment of social types some further definition is necessary. There is another element involved which has to do with the passage of time. That is, the question arises, how long is a society the same type? This question is dealt with in the following manner: There is no break in continuity from.type to type of society. If you consider the Uhited States from.the earliest days to the present -- it is still, in one sense, the same society. Ybu call themlboth -- the society of one hundred years ago and that of today -- the United States. In what sense? In the sense that there has been a structural continuity involving certain other kinds of continuities, that go along with it, and upon which that primary continuity depends. -- Yet, on the other hand, I would say that there are certain differences between the kind of system which you had in 1837 and the kind you have in 1937. If you are going to compare themu I will say that you have got treat themu not as societies of one type, but as soci- eties of two types. Where does the change come? I would say it does not come precisely anywhere. Where you draw the line is more or less arbitrary. You are facing the same problem.always in all social deveIOpment. 6. An inconsistency in the use of structural continuity. Before concluding this section in the explanation of the methodology of a social science it will be well to point out an inconsistency in this last idea with an idea which is developed in another section of the work. The inconsistency deals 15E Ibid., p . 40-h1. -58- with this statement in the foregoing quotation: "In the sense that there has been a structural continuity involving certain other kinds of contin- uities, that go along with it, and upon which that primary continyity depends."155 In other words, this statement maintains that a change from.one type to another type does not necessarily involve a change in the continuity of the social structure. 0n the other hand, howecer, the same subject is treated in a somewhat different manner in the section.entitled, "The Problemugf How Societies 156 Change their Type," where it is stated that any change of type results in a change of structural form. This is stated as follows: The second I would prefer to call 'change of type.‘ However slight the latter may be, it is a change such that when there is sufficient of it, the society passes fromlone type of social structure to another.157 Therefore, it has been stated how this non—quantitative type of mathematics can be incorporated into a correlation of characteristics of societies and correlated on a unilineal scale. It then has been stated how this method leads to the fundamental problem -- the establishment of the common characteristics which are characteristic of all human societies -- or natural laws. 155 Ibid., p. 40. 156 Ibid., p. 4?. 157 Ibid., p. 48. .. y: 33.1.1 -59.. 72 A.review of the methodology; Going over this methodology and reviewing what are considered here to be the most important parts, the idea of social types will be first considered. The most interesting thing to note about the establishement of social types (taken here as to be one of the crucial points in the methodology) is that he does not explain what comprises these types except to say that they may be established by comparing the common.characteristics of social systems. However, one thing that is known (implied here and stated later) is that these social types do not involve the cosmology of a society. That is, the establishment of these common characteristics which eventually are used to find natural laws are not concerned with the beliefs of a society. It can be readily seen why this must be so in considering the kind of methodology preposed. Beliefs a not the same in societies. They are not part of the common characteristics involved in a social system. iHowever, what does he give as an example of a.natural law? The possibility of every society having a system.of morals. .Although this proposed law may well be connected with human behavior it refers to beliefs. The point is this; if the methodology by the nature of its comparative process must avoid beliefs, the only area left for consideration is behavior. In other words, the nature of these common characteristics, although not stated, must be concerned with human behavior and not human beliefs. There- fore, it is wondered how through a comparison of behavior with the necessary deletion of beliefs, a general statement of belief can be arrived at. - 60 - There is another point of contention that has been brought in the discussion of social usages which fits in at this point. That is, if behavior is dependent upon belief for its existence, how can behavior be considered withoututhe inclusion of belief? It is indeed unfortunate that Radcliffe-Brown does not explain what is involved in the abstracting of these common characteristics in the establishment of social types. It must be remembered that he clearly states that the method does not involve a consideration of the cosmology of a society. 8. The elimination of accidental characteristics. This discussion of methodology now leads to the topic entitled, "Comparison for the Pugposes ‘2; Arriving at Generalizations," which introduces a new problem.in this comparative method. The establishment of a natural law leads to the analysis of types and the whole problem of typing societies. It was stated that the types must be compared in order to discover the common characteristics which existed. From here the task was to establidh the common characteristics found in all societies and thus establish a natural law. The new element introduced at this point in the discussion of the comparative method concerns the accidental characteristics which arise in this type of analysis. Uning languages as an example the following illus- tration is given: - 61 - How does one determine what are the essential and what the accidental characteristics? Obviously it is possible only on the basis of comparison. On that basis we find that there are at least two categories necessary for all language, which Jeepersen named nexus and Junction. Sex genders are accidental, but there is no language without Junction, without nexus. It is necessary to cmopare at least two languages, because you have no other means of eliminating accident. The process of comparison is the process of eliminating accident, in languages, in societies.1 Again this element of comparison as a method of eliminating accident is stressed in the following manner: If we attempt ot arrive at generalizations which must distin- guish between 'what is accidental and what necessary, we cannot possibly succeed unless we co are, in order to eliminate acci- dent, by noting that a characteristic occurs here and does not there.159 9. An inconsistent elgggptin the methodology;.At this point in the discus- sion it is quite clearly established that the methodology consists of two main parts -- that of non-quantitative mathematics and the comparative method. This last section stresses the idea that the comparative method ‘will eleminate accident. Therefore, at first glance this is Just a re-emphasis of the value of the comparative method as a tool in the analysis of society. However, the most important feature of this section is the introduction of the following idea which is held to be invarient in terms of the order in which it is presented -- last. This new idea is stated as follows: 1% TEid-o, PD. 419420 159 Ibid., p. 42. -62- The experimental emthod in itself gives you nothing, and similarly the comparative method alone gives you nothing. (he of the great tasks of anthropology, one which is import- ant, is to determine whether such correlations so discovered are the result of historical accident or not. Are they evidence of necessary or of accidental characteristics of societies, of parallelism or of convergence? The actual solution of the problem is to be found only by rational analysis. I see that procedure as requiring us to isolate problems in the sense to be discussed later -- for example, the problem of determining structural principles of societies, such as that of Justice, and to conduct an analysis of Just what are necessary conditions of this principle and what accidental variations.160 What does this statement do in light of the foregoing analysis of his methodology? .In the first place it places the comparative method as a method of analysis, in a new position. That is, it limits the usefulness of the comparative method in comparing types. Secondly, in regard to this statement it unravels or invalidates all the careful scientific program set foth for the analysis of society to arrive at a natural law. That is, when one sees the comparative method as it is outlined adJuncted here by this idea, one no longer has a clean, useful tool in analyzing societies as it is first presented. Therefore, it is ffiolt that the reader is mislead by something which should have been introduced at the outset of the premise of the methodology. For instance it is very hard to go back and trace exactly where the factors of parallelism and convergence should be considered in the use of the comparative method as it is first presented. m 43. - 63-- .Also it is well to point out here that this historical investigation coupled with the methodology of social science as it is preposed, is inconsistent with statements he makes later about historical thinking in general. The one particular statement which stands out in this context is as follows: my second reason for believing a theoretical science of society a distant possibility seems to me a much more signifi- cant one. It is that there exists one general obstacle to the development of such a science -- the historical fallacy. It is the conception that the proper way to interpret the facts of human behavior is by historical explanation. The historical explanation is held to be the only valid explanatinn, and being valid, sufficient. That is the view of a number of anthrOpol- ogists in.America.and in other'parts of the world. It is the view, naturally, taken by historians. It is so entrenched that , it constitutes a real dbsracle to the deve10pemtn of social / science. The first tendency of almost all of us is to think in historical terms. 1 Therefore, in nght of this last statement and of the reasons which have been cited above, it is felt that this section on methodology is not 'well organized in terms of the arrangement of the ideas. It is certainly poorly arranged by presenting such a big if at the end of the presentation. It throws the reader*into a state of confusion as to what particular’part of this applies to the method, or if it applies to the entire method, Just how it is accomplished. Secondly, the introduction of the historical analysis at the end is inconsistent with what Radcliffe-Brown states about historical thinking in general. 161 Ibid., p. 80. -64.. 10. Conclusion. The first section of the preceeding chapter is a consider- ation as well as an explanation of the elements contained within a social science. In this particular sectinn some inconsistencies have been uncovered amng them being the equation of a social structure and a natural persis- tent system. Secondly an area of confusion which exists between the usage of social structure and structural form is pointed up. In dealing with the rule behind the social usage it is shown how he would have been more logically correct in terms of his own deveIOpment to state that the rule exists as a necessary condition for a socia usage rather than making the social usage “real.” Also pointed out in this first section of the chapter is the introduction of a causal explanation for human behavior. This idea is inadvertently introduced by linking social usage and the beliefs of peOple in a society. 1316 last criticism of this section attempts to show how Radcliffe- Brown confuses the difference in meaning between social system and society. The final stand made by this writer is that the limits of a social system we set by the society. In the second section of the preceeding chapter the main emphasis is placed on explaining the very important method of science. Some inconsist- encies appear in this second section one among them being an inconsistent usage of structural continuity. Another important point considered in the methodology is the incorporation of general law or natural law based upon a belief which is established through a comparison of behavior. Since at this point it is not exactly stated what is compared through his method - 65 - this criticism.cannot be firmly established until later in this thesis. However, this point will be developed more firmly in the final conclusion of this thesis. The final criticism.in this chapter deals with the incorporation of historical reconstruction in the methodology. It is pointed out in this context how Radcliffe-Brown states in the conclusion of his work that he feels that historical thinking in general is one of the main.obstacles in the develOpment of the science he is proposing. IV. THE PERSISTESICE OF A SOCIAL SYSTEM: THE IDEA 0F FUNCTION AND THE PERSISTENCE OF STRUCTURAL FORM A. The persistence of a Social system The persistence of the social system is stated as the next problem. The problem here is much the same as it was defined earlier in the work. 1. Persistence of social system and structural form. The persistence of system is dependent upon the continuity of the structural form through a certain lapse of time.162 The actual relations in a society do change so therefore it is not the actual persistence of the structure that predicates the persistence of 'a system since the structure consists of all the relationships at a given moment of time. Rather it is the continuity of the structural form of a system which involves the persistence of a system. The following statement, however, does not conform to this definition because he is using the word structure as structural form. ”It is quite clear that the system persists only as long as there is what I have already called dynamic continuikty of structure of the society."163 Here again is a case, which is sepecially noticable in the develOpemtn of structural form and structure, where society and system are used as synonomous terns. 2. An example of muemistence of a system. In the example of the persistence of the system of an atom this use of structural form as having a continuity is clearly demonstrated. At one moment in time the 152 Ibid., p. 124. 163 Ibid., p. ill}. -67.. the atom.has a certain structural form; seven protons and three electrons which are in a certain spacial arrangement. .At another moment in time the same atom.has a similar structural arrangement; the same amount of units are there arranged in a slightly different manner but with the same epacial relation. "In other words, you can say the structural'£g§!.is the same at T2 [line] as in T1. "164 From this analogy of the atom he restates the general idea of persistence of system.in the following manner. ”It is this persistnece of the structureal form which constitutes the continuance of the system."165 It will be recalled that the structural form.of a social system.are those relations which by their recurrent and similar nature can be abstr- acted from.the total structure. It is this same structural form which plays the important role in the persistence of a seeial systent ”The persistence of the social system.is ther persistence of that structural form."166 This whole problem.concerning the persistnece of a society (or a social system) is dependent upon the persistence of the structural form.of a social system. The structural forth it will be recalled consists of the abstracted relatios taken from.the total social structure of a social system. 16+ Ibid., pp. 44-45. 165 Ibid., p. 46. 166 M. it. ’ - 68 - B. The Idea of Function What becomes important at this time to Radcliffe-Brown is the fact that when a society is characterized by the manner in which it persists this characterization will be involved with the definition of function. .As it was pointed out in the introduction of this paper, the main goal of Radcliffe-Brown is to establish natural laws of society through an analysis of the societies' structure. Important also to him.is the fact that customs and usages can be eXplained in a "functional" sense. That is, there is a relationship between these acts and usages and the entire social structure. .At this point in his developllnn of the persistence of the structural he introduces this relationship. In order to establish clearly the ideas of him.concerning this idea of function, a brief review of the uses of the term will be stated along with the conclusion that the term.is rendered inconsistent by these usages. From.there a more detailed explanation will follow, tracing each point in the develOpment. 1. Function and structure. First of all the idea of function is related to structure. The exact relationship falls in the area of persistnece of structure. In other words, he defines function as the manner or the characterization of a society in relationship to its persistence. He then, in terms of this writer's interpretation contradicts himself by saying that function consists of a, "...total set of relations that a single -69.. social activity or usage or belief has to the total social system. "167 How this is related to the persistence of asocial system is not given. However, it will be pointed hp here how this change from the relationship of the persistence of a social system to the total social system involves an implied inconsistency. Later on in the develOpment of his ideas it will be pointed up how he again changes the definition of function from the relationship of a single social activity as the social system to a general or abstracted idea of social activity related to the social system. 168 2. Function and social system. The idea of function is also closely related to the persistence of social system. The question of how these system persist consitiutes, as stated, ”...a whole branch or subdividion of the science of society. ”169 The question is important for it involves his first definition of function. When one analyzes a society intterms of how it persists one is then analyzing the society in a functional manner. "You describe, analyze, and form generalizations: what you my be said to be doing is characterizing a society, and not by its form, but by the lay in 3.3.1.92 it nanges to persisty'O This is what he means when he uses the term function. That is, the term hm reference to this type of problem. 157 Ibid., p. 46. 168 Ibid., p. 72. 169 Ibid., p. 141+. 170 Ibid., p. 46 - 7o - The term.function itself is defined as, "...the total set of relations that a single social activity or usage or belief has to the total social 171 This idea is expanded by an example which demonstrates more system.” clearly what he is trying to say. For scientific reasons all the relations do not have to be considered. ' If we take a particular custom, C, which occurs in one form in one society, and in a somewhat defferent formu Xé, in another society, the problem of science is to discover what common funct- ion there is for this custom.in the two or more societies in which it exists. 172 Here then is a presentation of function. Several factors within this definition raise questions as to the cohesion and consistency of this definition as well as the relationship of this definition to other state- ments made in the work. The first question is concerned with the internal cohesion of this definition. Does the definition remain constant or is there a change of meaning which takes place? It is maintained in this thesis that the definition goes through some changes in meaning. 3. Inconsistencies within the definition of function. First of all, function is said to be related to the type of problem.concerned with how societies persist. Since the persistence of a society is stated as depen- dent upon the persistence of the structural form.of a social system.it “In .122- 2.1.19- 172 Ibid., Po 47o - 71 - seems reasonable to assume that the term.functinn would be related to this problem. Therefore, the first statement of function as related to the persistence of a society implies an interconnection with the structural form.of a social system. This implication would therefore infer that function would be related to abstracted characteristics of a social system. Specifically, it would be related to the persistence of these abstracted characteristics. The termlhowever takes on a different meaning when it is stated that function is defined as the relationship a particular custom or usage has to the total social system. of course it is pointed out that all these relationships need not be investigated. Notwithstanding, this definition is not concerned with the abstracted characteristics which have a recurrent nature or with the structural form.of a society. Here the meaning of function changes from.the implied relationship to structural form.to the actual relationships which a particular social activity has to a social system. .A more direct contrast to the first statement of function is the development of the next idea which states that the function of a particular culstom.of one society must be compared with the function of a similar custom.of another society in order to find the common function which exists. In this statement he does not clearly indicate what relationships this particular custom has to the remainder (or certain aspect) of the social system. He merely states that it is necessary to find the “function” of a custonu He has not clearly defined the term.except to deny that it is -72.. not an investigation of how the structural form of a social system persists, which he earlier implies. Therefore his third statement of meaning, which in reality is an explanation of the method involved for finding functional relations, is too sudden a Jump to make in face of the contradictary explanation of the term which is offered. later it will be demonstrated how he reverts back to the original implied explanation of function by stating that function exists within abstracted events. C. The Persistence of Structural Form 1. Chage of Vtfle. The problem of how societies change their type is of interest to the reader for it is again restated that the persistence of a society is dependent upon the persistence of the structural form of a society. A change of type is defined as a change in the social system. "...How do societies change? so that you have one kind and then another? so that you get the passage from one type of social system to another? ”173 It is maintained in this thesis that he does not answer the question of how they charge but points up what is invoked or what happens in such a change of type. To do this he differentiates between the types of change which exist within a structure of a social system and the change which occurs when a new system emerges from a chfie in structural form. -73- 2. Society and change of type. There is a point of implied definition here which enters the discussion. Does a change of structural form mean a different social system and therein a new society? or does a change of type involve a change of social system, although not necessarily a different societylyoinmothdr words, is ther a continuity of structure involved in a change of social system or change of type which exists within the same society? This much is known, or is stated, that a different social system is involved in a change of type. What is implied in this discussion, however is that the same society evolves from this change of structural form, in a change from oone social system to another in a change of type and that some type of structural continuity remains. "However slight the latter may be, change of type , it is a change such that when ther is sufficient of it, the society passes from one tupe of social structure to another." 3. Society and structural form. If this can be interpreted as implying that societies remain as a group regardless of change then some obvious inconsistencies arise between this idea and the definition of persistence of a society. As it was stated, the persistence of a society is constituted by the function which is the persistmce of the structural form of a social system. 175 Therefore, it is logical to reason that a change of structural form of a social system would instigate a change in the society. 174- Ibid., p. 48. 175 Ibid., p. 46. -74- If, on the other hand, it is argued that a change of type as he defined it, does constitute a change in the society and there is no continuity of structural from, than certain other elements in his work are rendered inconsistent. To illustrate the other type of inconsistency a statement made earlier in the work in regard to the methodology of the social sciences is used as a reference. If you consider the United States from.the earliest days to the present -- it is still, in one sense, the same society. You call them both -- the society of one hundred years ago and that of today -- the United States. In what sense? In the sense that there has been a structural continuity involving certain other kinds of continuities, that go along with it, and upon which that primary continuity depends. -- Yet, on the ohter hand, Iwould say that there are certain defferences between the kind of system which you had in 1937 and the kind you have in 1937. If you are going to compare them, I will say that you' have got to treat them, not as societies of one type, but as societies of two bypes. 'Where does the change come? I would say it does not come precisely anywhere. Where you draw the line is more or less arbitrary. You are facing the same problem. always in all history of social development]:7 It is seen then.how on one hand he wants to define a society as a more constant unit than social system and yet on the other'hand places the persistence of a society upon the persistence of the structural form.of a social system. In doing this it is maintained that he creates an inconsistent definition of society. 4. A.possible explanation of the inconsistency. There is another ppssible eXplanation of this inconsistency and it is in the definition of structure. That is, if he is taking the structure of a society to be something different than the structure of a social system.the "structural continuity" would have a different meaning that "persistence of structural form”. - 75 - If this is the case he could not be cited as being inconsistent but could, however, be reprimanded for not pointing out the difference in these terms other than stating that structural continuity involves, "...certain other kinds of continuities, that go along with it, and upon which that Primary continuity depends.”177 5..A further refutation. However, he may still be refuted on other grounds. In the statement immediately following the one Just quoted he states, "-- Yet, on the other hand, I would say that there are certain differences between the kind of system which you had in 1837 and the kind hou have in 78 1937."1 This statement cannot be reconciled with the statement which asserts that the dynamic continuity of persistnece of a system.depends upon the, ”...dynamic continuity of structure of the society.”179 6. Conclusion. In this chapter three main tspics have been discussed. The first maJor topic which explains the factors found in the persistence of social systems has within it the following inconsistent element. Here it is again pointed out that structure and structural form.are confused through usage. 176 Ibid., Pp. #0‘410 177 Ibid., p. 40. 178 Ibid., pp. 40—41. 179 Ibid., p. 44. - 76 - The second meJor section of this chapter which is very important to Radcliffe-Brown's whole development is an explanation of function. Within this explanation it is pointed out how function changes its meaning. The fundamental nature of this change is as follows. First function is used as an explanation of the manner in which a society persists. It is then changed to mean the relationship which a single usage has to the total structure and later in the paper is referred to as the relationship which a general usage has to structure. The third and final portion of this chapter explains the persistence of structural form.as it is related to change of type and society. The inconsistent element in this section is the statement that although a change of type can take place the continuity of structural form.of a society can remain the same. V. THE ELEMENTS OF CUITURE.AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO‘SOCIAL SCIENCE .A. The Elements of Culture Turning now to a further elaboration of the social systemLRadcliffe- Brown enters upon a discussion of social coaptation, culture, and social usage. 1. Social coaptation. The idea of social coaptation to him.looms as one of the most important characteristics of a social system.L80 .Also the "181 idea is as he terms it, ”...essential to any society.... ”Coaptation means 'fitting together.”182 That is, the behavior of members of a society are fitted together in order to maintain their social life.183 Therefore in this sense social coaptation is characteristic of all societies.184 These basic idea about the nature of social coaptation reveal the meaning of the term; it is the fitting together of the social behavior of peOple in a society in order to maintain a social existence.185 The second important aspect of this term concerns the necessary condi- tions which must prevail in order that social coaptation may take place. 180 13219., p. 49. 181.‘!gg.‘git. 182 ‘Egg. git. 183 ‘Egg. 233. 184 _I:_o_9_. cit. 185 £9.9- 2.11% - 77 - The one main requirement necessary for social coaptation is the behavior of individuals within societies be standardized in someway;L86 or as it is stated. "So uniformity, or better, conformity of behavior in some sense is what underlies and is the first necessary condition of social coaptation. "187 2. Relation of culture to social coaptation. The next step in the develop- ment of social coaptation is tracing its relation to culture. The first statesment in this context points up the difference between the use of social coaptation in animal and human societies. The moment we compare animal with human societies we come upon an important distinction. In animal societies social coaptation is by instinct. In human societies, on the contrary, it is by instinct plus culture.188 The most obvious thing that can be said about this statement is that there exists some type of relationship between social coaptation and culture. However, the exact nature of this relationship will await a further develOpment of the term.culture. 3. Criticisms of Tyler's definition of culture by Radcliffe-Brown. Before Radcliffe-Brown's definition of culture is considered his cirticism.of Tylor"s definition warrants examination for within this criticism.Radcliffe- 185 £22- ali- 187 'Egg. cit. 188 Ibid., p. 50. -78.. Brown is inconsistent. It is maintained that Radcliffe-Brown not only makes an erroneous criticism of Tyler's definition on the basis of the evidence he presents but also this criticism is inconsistent with his own statements about culture. The following statement of Tylor's is the quotation upon which I Radcliffe-Brown basis his criticism. The first occassion on which the word [culture] is brought into anthropological discussion is by Tyler, who defined it as 'the habits and capabilities acquired by man as a. member of ‘ society.'189 : looking at this statement on the strength of its own merits it appears that man is acquiring these habits and capabilities and not the society. Therefore, the logical conclusion from this statement would be that culture is characterized by the habits and cgpabilities of men since man acquires these habits and capabilities as a member of society. Radcliffe-Brown, however, sees this as a problem for he states the, ”...definition is, then left rather vague. It is uncertain whether culture in this sense is supposed to be characteristic of an individual or of a society. ”190 Ch the grounds of Magical interpretation, the writer feels that Radcliffe-Brown's statement is inconsistent, or perhaps a better statement of the criticism would be that Radcliffe-Brown is not logically consistent 189 Tbido, p. 510 190 .192. sit- -79.. in his criticism on the basis of the evidence he offers. To impute the meaning which he does from this statement does not follow normal logical lines of thinking. Radcliffe-Brown carries on with his ciriticism of this point by stating, ”And after all, a society does not behave or think. Modes of behavior or thought are things characteristic only of individuflsi'wl The point has been made that Tyler's definition of culture does not include the idea that habits and capabilities are dharacteristic of culture. In light of this, the statement that societies do not think or behavi would not apply to Tylor's definition of culture. Q1 the other hand, how does this statement of Radcliffe-Brown coincide with has own definition of the term culture? It is felt that this criticsim is inconsistent with his definition of culture. Radcliffe-Brown states that culture refers, ”...distinctly to a particular phenomenon which is characteristic of human societies and only of human societies."]'92 Further- more, this phenomenon which is characteristic of societies is a, “...certain standardization of modes of behavior, inner and outer...."]'93 Thus he asserts that these modes of behavior are characteristic of a society -- the ‘bery thing he said was not possible according to Tyler's definition of culture. 191;.Ioc so. 192 Ibid., p. 52. 193 .Iae- 2.132. -80.. Therefore, this criticism of Tylos's definition is unJust or incon- sistent in light of logical reasoning and inconsistent in terms of his own definition of the term culture. In other words the criticism turns out tto be the very thing he proposes -- that modes of behavior are characteristic of a society.194 4. Another criticism of Tyler by Radcliffe-Brown. Radcliffe-Brown makes yet another criticism of Tyler's definition of culture that in the final analysis turns out to be a criticism of his own definition of the term} The criticism involves the methodology entailed in discovering what is meant by Tyler's definition of culture. To Radcliffe-Brown the method of describing culture as it is defined by Tyler will entail finding either the, “...average or the sum total of the culture of all individuals? ”195 Whatever it may be, he asserts, the descritpion involves many problems. in The main problem is illustrated by showing the difficulties the/method involved in finding the average mathematical knowledge in the United States. What would be the average of mathematical knowledge in the United States when you have at one end of the scale simple arithmetic operations, at the other the theory of tensors, and a vague, illassorted middle ground? If you take the sum, that is perhaps a bit easier, You can work it out: so many can carry out simple arithmetical procedure, so many can solve quadratic equations, and a still smaller number can carry out calculations on the theory of tensors. You can add them together and have a W .1252- 2.4.12- 195 Ibid., Po 5].. -81.. statenint of the mathematical culture of the United States in 1937. But you see that the moment you talk of culture in this sense, there is a lack of precision in all reference to it. In order to make 'culture' precise, we must analyze it out and make it much more definite.19 This then is the criticism, the inability to work with Tylor's definition because of the lackiof precision in reference to culture. It is also stated that the term muct be made more definite. Later on in this thesis it will be shown how social usage constitutes culture, as well as the rule behind the social usage. These sets of acts of behaviors which are themselves system operating within the social system mks up the sets of behavior named culture. This idea can be partially documented by the following statement. "It does not much matter whether one regards the social usages as constituting culture or the rule behind them as doing so."197 The reason this connection between social usage and culture is bromht to the attention of the reader at this time is to bpint up the method which Radcliffe-Brown uses to establish these sets of behavior as well as the rule behind them. Since these sets of behavior constitute culture one may safely state that this would be the suggested methodology in determining the culture. The method is presented in the following paragraph and it will be noted how closely this method resembles the very method which is critized by Radcliffe-Brown. 196 $22- 21:2- 197 Ibid., p. 57. ‘fll ' 6 _.J."1‘IB’O'- o - 82 - Any given rule has two aspects, both of them establishing the norm. First ther is the recognition of‘ the rule, and you get at that simply by asking peeple questions. You may find that in a given instance 80 percent of the people will tell you that that is the rule; 15 percent will say, 'I don't know;' and 5 percent will say, 'No'. Second, there is the degree of conformity, and in an instance in which you get 80 percent recognition of the rule, you are likely to get perhaps only 60 percent conformity. Twenty percent may say, 'Ilmow that is what I should do, but I get away without doi it.’ Your norm, therefore, is always of this double nature.1 5. Culture. Culture, as defined by Radcliffe-Brown, has several important aspects, one of which, is its relationship to scoeity. As he states, "I am going to use the word to refer distinctly to a particular phenomenon whih is characteristic of human societies and only of human societies."199 Another important aspect of cluture is its reference to human behavior. This reference is specifically to the standardization of behavior. The word 'culture', then, as I amgoing to use it, is a term which obviously refers to a certain standardization of behavior, inner and outer, in a certain group of human beings, in a $358811! society. That is the primary significance of the word. While culture is characterized by society and is a term which refers to the standardization of behavior in a certain society, it is not a name for this behavior or a term for‘liaehavior. Rather it is a description which refers to behavior. 153 Ibid., p. 33. 199 Ibid., Po 520 200 Ibid., p. 500 -33- As such, sculture' is a very tide tedrm and is, if you will notice, net 9. term for a concrete phenomenal reality; it is for a description. The concrete phenomenal reality to which it refers is behaviorflm- Culture, then, is a descriptinn of behavior, a behavior which is statndardized both inner and outer in a certain group of people. The idea of inner and outer apparently refers to, "...a description of stand- ardized modes of behavior -- of thinking, feeling, and acting."2m To follow this definition a little further; what are the factors which lead to this standardization of behavior? In other words what the factors which lead to the standardization of behavior so that a description of these factors are aprt of culture? The first factor referred to in this context is a set of rules which include both specific and general rules of behavior but between which there is a distinction.293 The specific rules are innumerable. At one ened of the scale we can put techniques -- such specific rules of behavior as those by which an Andaman Islander makes a bow or a bricklayer builds a wall. They are provided by the society. In other words, there is a statndarization about these things which makes their description a part of culture.29* The general type ofi rule is that type which dictates general rules of behavior. It does not tell one how to act in specific situations but gives general rules of conduct or rules of behavior. In other words, these rules establish principles of behaviorfi” ”i Ibid., Po 52c 202 Ibid., PO 530 20a I.2.°.- si- 205 Ibid., p. at. A! I"! -81;- The second factor included in the definition of culture is the existence of, “...certain common symbols and common meanings attached to .206 those symbols. Symbols then.hsve a relationship to behavior in that they provide a meaning for standardized behavior. I The third factor involved in the definition of culture concerns, "...a certain common set‘ways of feeling and a certain set of ways of thinking."207 B. The Relatinnship of Culture to the Elements of Social Science 1. The relationship between culture and social coaptation. Having estab- lished the definition of both culture and social coaptation the relation- ship between these two concepts will be exaimined. It is maintained in this thesis that the term.social coaptation as it is first defined is inconsistent when it is used in relationship to the term.culture. In order to place this tepic in its proper setting a few words will be necessary to establish the meaning of these two terms as well as the meaning of the term.“adJustment of interest.” Social coaptation, it will.be recalled is a name for behavior. Social coaptation.is the name for the fitting together of human behavior. The necessary condition for social coaptation which is given as absolutely 256 Ibid., p. 55. * 20? Ibid., p. 56. -85- essential is that human behavior in a society be standardized in order that social coaptation my occur.208 Culture, on the other hand, is a term which is a description of standardized modes of behavior in a social system. It is not actually the behaviors (these are social usages) but a term describing such stand- ardized behavior. These terms are different as they are initially defined. However, there are instances in Radcliffe-Brown's usage which imply they are synonomous. An example of such a usage is as follows. “Just what does this standardization of behavior called culture, this social coaptation, consist of, and how is it obtained? "209 In another instance he again reverts back to the original definition of the term which establishes these concepts as tw different ideas. "The first aspect of culture, then, is a set of rules. Those rules establish social coaptation by producing a certain uniformity of action. The first condition of fitting human beings together in a social system depends on obtaining a certain uniformity of behavior."21° The la st statement in essence is a restatement of the original relationship which was established between social coaptation and culture. 2% Ibid.,, p. 1‘90 209 Ibid., p. 53. on i.eF-m . P1 . I it I‘ll“ -86.. In summing up his ideas on culture and social usage, Radcliffe-Brown states the problem of science is the investigation of social coaptation. He then defines social coaptation. "Social coaptation in any society is the standardization of the behavior of the individuals in the society. “211 It is within this later definition that the inconsistent element reap- pears. No longer is the standardisation of behavior a necessary condition for the fitting of human social behavior but is in fact standardization of behavior itself. Here he negates or invalidates his original definition of social coaptation. An interesting thing to note in his summary discussion of social coaptation is his reference to the relations which exist betwen acts of behavior termed social coaptation. “Social coaptation implies on the one hand a set of relations between persons, that is, social structure."212 Here, it is maintained, exists the most pronounced understatement in his entire work. The manner in which social coaptation is first defined would necessiate a relationship between persons, most immediate, direct and face-to-face. The problem he is facing is to resolve the difficulty of making standardized behavior interconnected bhhavior. That is why it is necessary to establish this linkage. In doing so, he khas unavoidably erased the, first necessary condition for social coaptation.213 211 Ibide’ p. 59o 212 Loc. git. -87- 2. Culture and its relationship to social science. In the final summing up of culture, Radcliffe-Brown maintains the no science of culture is possible. Culture, he states, must always be considered in its context; that is, within the social structure. “The social structure consists of the social behavior of actual individual human beings, who are 2.22325; to the existence of culture. Therefore if you study culture, you are always studing the acts of behavior of a specific set of persons who are linked together in a social structure."21H Here again is the denial of classification on the basis of similar acts of behavior. He wants to make sure that culture is within a social system.auch that these similar acts of behavior will be positively inter- connected. There is a question of whether all people in the same society are linked together in the manner described. This he never asserts but always implies. The main idea however is to firmly establish that any description of standardized behavior will always involve peOple who are linked together within the same social structure. An interesting point involved here is a slightly different meaning attached to the word social structure. Previously he defined it as, ”...the sum total of all the social relationships of all individuals at a given moment in time.“215 Here he says it, ”...consists of the 2m Ibid., Do 590 215 Ibid., p. 32. -88- social behavior of actual individual human beings...."2]'6 Of course it can be said that social relations exist whenever social behavior occurs, but, nevertheless, this constitutes a loose usage of the word. The reason again is to firmly establish the connection of behavior so that the existence of a relationship becomes primary over similar behaviors. ”I '.I .Afi-r .— 3. Conclusion; This chapter has covered the tOpic of culture pointing up the meaning of the term as well as its relationship to social science. Within the first section which outlines the elements of culture, the major “‘1 inconsistencies deal with Radcliffe-Brown's criticism of Tylor's definition of culture. The second section of the chapter is concerned with the relationship of culture to other elements of a social science. A criticism brought forth in this section reviews the confusion which exists in the usage of the terms, culture, social usage and social coaptation. 215 Ibid., p. 59. VI. FUNCTIQ‘IAL CQVSISTENCY AND THE STRUCTURAL PRINCJPIES CF SOCIAL SYSTEbB Due to the length of material covered in this last chapter concerned with the explanation of Radcliffe-Brown's work it was not possible to incorporate all the major sections in the title of this chapter. At the same time, the two topics, economic relations and comparative espistemology cannot be dealt with separately because they establish the background for the ideas of functional consistency and the structural principles of the social system. Therefore economic relations and comparative epistem- ology are the first two major sections of this chapter. In the discussion of the necessity of having only one social science Radcliffe-Brown points out that only a theoretical science of society can exist. His arguement rests upon the assertation that social science deals with the nature of a social system and these types of systems by definition theoretically include all kinds of human behavior.217 The aim of this theoretical science will be the definition of all social systems.2]’8 A. Economic Relations In explaining how economic relations are social relations he makes several important points which tie up some of kthe loose ends of his previous definitions of culture, social coaptation and adjustment of interest. Moreover, in this statement there is an excellent illustration 217 Ibid., pp. 60-61. 218 Ibid., p. 61. -90- of what he means by functinn when he uses functinn as the manner by which a society persists. 1. Social coaptation. In order to examine this analysis in its full context, it is necessary to return for a moment to some original statements mide in the definition of social coaptation. There is in this initial develOpment, an idea which has not been deveIOped as yet in this thesis for it is felt that a deferment of this idea.until this time would facilitate clearer understanding of the problems Specifically the reference is to a statement.made about the nature 0f social coaptation which maintains that it operates in maintaining the 219 ”The mat characteristic thing about any social life of a society. society, human or animal, is that the individual members of the society have their behavior fitted together in.some way so as to maintain a social life as a result of that fitting together."220 This fitting together as it has been pointed out, obviously refers to a relationship between people. This idea is clearly seen when it is observed that the term.coaptation is used synonomously with adjustment of interest. This idea can be seen in the explanation of how economic relations are social relations. m 1+9. 220 Loc. cit. -91- Are economic relations social relatirns or not? A social relation exists between any two persons or any two gruups the moment there is some adjustement of interest between them. The adjustment 0f interests, or coaptation, takes place in animal societies on the basis of instinct, and in human societies on the basis of culture, or social usages. 221 In the synonomous usage of these terms ther is a convergence of some F of the major ideas he has set forth. Adjustmath of interest involves some modification of human behavior. With the relationship established this means that modification of behavior which takes place within a social -r ', system is the factor which leads to the maintainence of the social life if a society. The necessary condition in order that such behavior will occur is the standardization of behavior described in culture or enacted in a social usage. 2. Function. How is all this related to the idea of function as it has been proposed? (he meaning of function was the study of the manner in which a social system persisted.222 The print then is that these relation- ships wllcih exist in adjustment of interest or coaptation maintains the social life of the society as this investigation will illlustrate the manner in which a society persists. 0r as he states that these relation- ships will be maintained through adjustment of interest. This point is aptly iZLlus trated by the following paragraph. 221 Ibid., p. 62. 222 Ibid., p. #6. -92- Let us take as another example a simple procedure in a primitive society. A man wishing to express his friendship, offers another a gift, which he accepts. The latter feels obligated to return a gift of about equal value (and that appar- ently is where the simplest form of evaluation of goods enters into human life). Sooner or later he returns a gift. What has happened is that there has been an adjustment of interests. You find that exchanges of gifts are difixjitely used as a mechanism for maintaining certain types of relations between certain persors . In a certain tribe you find that brother and sister's son; in andther beWeen son-in-law and father-in-law, etc. You find a set of relations which are definitely social because they are the linking together of individuals; they are social coaptation on the basis 0f exchange of goods.223 The avoidance of structure here is significant as it has also been avoided in the original explanation of function. He does not orplain how the maintenance of these relations are related ot the abstracted relations commnly recurrent in a social system which he has termed structural form. Her certainly implies it when he states that this adjustment of interest, or coaptation, maintains relationships between mother's brother and sister's sons. In other words he is explaining how these economic relations maintain social relations within a society which is certainly an explanation of how these societies persist and therefore the first definition of function.224 He reserves the idea of persistency of structural form for his discus- sion of functional consistency which will be taken up presently. 223 ISid-O ) 630 224 See chapter If of this thesis. -93- 3. ggnclusion of economic relations. In summing up the tOpic of economic relations he falls back on his original idea of how the relationships in a society are mintained and states that it is through this framiwork that the study of economic relations should take place. , This statement exemplifies this idea as it compares the relative importance of the value of studying how goods circulate and how social relations are maintained. -- I would consider that the two problems, of now goods circulate, q and of how relations between individuals are established and kept gOing theregy, should not be isolated from one another. What is mnre, I hold the relations beWeen individuals to be the mnre fundamental of the WC. The distribution of goods is in a sense secondary.22 B. Comparative Epistemology In the discussion 0f economic relations it was seen how several of the ideas in Radcliffe-Brown's paper converged to form a mnre positive statement about the whole question of culture, social coaptation, and function. Much the same can be said about the next section concerning comparative epistemology. 1. Society and beliefs. The topic is introduced by stating particular cosmnlogical schemes which exist in different societies cannot by the anthrOpoligist, be labled ”knowledge." This, he claims , is a misnomer 5‘5 Ibid., p. 64. -94- in the sense that it implies correctness or that this or that particular cosmology is, ”...sound and true."226 Rather the anthr0pologist must consider cosmoIOgies of different societies as being a particular kind of belief and thus avoid all connotions 0f correctness and incorrectness. .Also considered her is the difference between various types of logical thinking. There is a fundamental difference between logic as an investigation of truth, and logic as the subject matter of a comparative study, except that we use logic in pursuing the ;’ latter which otherwise is an‘a priori field.22 There is a relationship between cosmology of a society and the body of beliefs underlying the scientific or technological beliefs of a society. Any study of that relationship does not hinge upon the question of the logical relations between the scientific and cosmological beliefs. But upon the functional relationships between them."228 2. Comparative gpistemolq z_and social science. The point Radcliffe- Brown is attempting to establish in this descussion is that comparative epistemology cannot be reated as a separate science.229 In demonstrating the reason for this statement it is maintained in this thesis that some of the major ddeas of this work converge. 226 Ibid., p. 65. 227 29.2- 2.132- 228 ‘£22.‘212. 229 Ibid., p. 66. -95- He maintains that in order to understand the beliefs of a people one mmst know, "...the total functinning system"230 The reasonoone must know the total functioning system is the dependent nature 0f the system; dependent in last instance upon the beliefs of a society. He demonstrates this statement by citing some beliefs which exist in.Australian aboriginal society. In summdn.up this example he states: Those are particular beliefs held by a particular peOple. At 2 first sight they appear erroneous. Nevertheless, I could demnnstrate to you that on those erroneous beliefs hangs the whole social structure of that tribe. Destroy those beliefs and you destroy the whole structure. The whole system of relation- ships of the people with one another is maintained and lept going by the body of articular beliefs and ideas of whl ch the above are instances.2 1 .A close examination of this particular statement yields some insight into how the major ideas of this entire paper are held together. He, without question, asserts that the beliefs of a system establishes the continuance of the relationships within a society. Here within lies the answer to what constitutes the interdependence between acts of behavior. or be here establishes the comman origin of sets of behaviors along with an explantion as sto their continuance as well as continuity. The body 0f cosmnlogical beliefs certainly are related to behavior in the maintainence of the social structure of a social system.232 230 ' Lei-”“222". 231 les- site. 232 lae- an. -96- Although he might not particularly bsehappy about establishing this point Radcliffe-Brown inadvertently explains his entire problem by saying that the cosmological beliefs are the factors which maintain the particular sets of relations as well as sets of behavior which exist in a particular society. As for the last point of maintaining particular sets of behav- iors (or social usages) the next quotation is offered as significant. ”That is what I mean when I say a cosmology, no matter how erroneous it may be as a view of the universe, is something which rationalizws a set of behaviors which constitute the system of coaptation of that particular society. "233 Therefore, if the cosmological beliefs of a society explain the manner in which the social structure, the social relations of a social system, persist, then it appears sensible to maintain that within this belief lies the functional explanation of a society. 3. The method of social science. How would this interpretation effect what he has said about the method of social science? First of all the question of what does this kind of analysis do in relationship to a society is answered. It mines the structural form of a society or the structure, dependent upon the cosmological beliefs Of a society. That is, the part- icular sets of behaviors which lead to coaptation have as a basis for their existence the beliefs which are in the minds of men. This is the same 2331.2. an. .. 97 - thing which was discussed all along but ”pulled" together.hers in a more orderly fashion. Therefore the particular structural form of a society will necessarily be relative to the cosmology of a society. In the earlier analysis of method, Radcliffe-Brown did not explain what he meant when he stated the common characteristics of societies could be abstracted to form a certain type of system. At this point it is wondered whether this abstraction would involve a statement explaining how various cosmologies form or set a pattern for various types of relations in various societies. We do not want to explain the factual beliefs of a parti- cular society, of the Australian aborigines, for instance, but we do want to compare this dociety with other societies, to determine what is the interrelation between a people's cosmology and their total social structure.234 This statement comes very close to stating what he has developed thus far. However, there is a significant change of emphasis here. Previously he maintained that a particular cosmological belief established a certaan type of social structure, something which in this thesis has been main- tained all along. Here however it is pointed out that in order to estab- lish what type or kind of structure emerges from a particular cosmological belief it is necessary to compare one society with another. It is main- tained here that this remark is inconsistent from all that has been built before hand. Inconsistent on the grounds that the interrelations between a cosmology of a society and the societies' structure has already been established. This interrelation exists within the society; mfest in the zjfi’ Ibid., p. 67. - 98 - social usages, and described by the culture. He in fact calls this inter- ” 235 relation, the structure's consistency. 4. Functional consistency. To carefully examine this point his anguement must be followed into the explanation of the "Functional Consistency 0f the Social Ssytem. "236 Therefore if the structural consistency of a society lies within the framework of the cosmology of that particular society how can a comparison of the relationship, between these two factors with the same relationship to other societies yield anything significant unltss the belief’of the other society involved is the same. .All that can be estab- lished is that there isarelationship between cosmology and structur -- nothing more. What is desired is to establish the fact that all societies are similar in that there is a connection, relation between cosmology and structure so that it can be said that beliefs are related to structure. C. Functional Consistency; Structure and Society .A closer look at functional consistency will then presumably give more insight into what relationship exists between beliefs of a society and the structure of a society. 235 Ibid., p. 68. 236 Ibid., PP. 68'700 - 99 - 1. Social structure. In pointing out the nature of functional consistency Radcliffe-Brown takes as an example the Tlingit society. This society he maintains can be recognized, “...as a perfectly concrete discrete thing. ‘we can determine all those individuals who are and those who are not Tlingit, and that the Tlingit are scattered over a certain delimdnted area.'237 What, he asks, is involved in this description? First the social structure will be described and this will involve the f011owing: "...pointipg out that they have certain localized groups: households collected in.villages; that they have kinship groups: a moiety organization, clans, etc.; and further that there are certain dyadic relations which are regulated and standardized. -- These will give you the social structure in outline.238 Briefly stated then a description of the social structure will involve pointing out all the social relations which exist in that particular society at a given moment of time. There is yet more involved in this description, however, this added element consists of a complete description by, "...describing a set of social usages, and by describing also (if you will make a complete descri- ption) the characteristic inner behavior as far as you can determine it -- the beliefs, sentiments, ideas current in the society...."239 237 Ibid., p. 68. 238 ins si- 239 £9.9- as. Jr.| '9’. -100- The full description of the social structure will involve a descri- ption of all social relations which take place at a given moment of time as well as social acts and beliefs behind these acts. This certainly is a consistent statement with all of the foregoing. However, a mre useful description would be a description of the structural form. 2. Society. A ful description would explain why these relationships exist. What this all leads to is a consistency is involved; here a particular type of consistency (different from a logical consistency) which in this case the structure is reinforced by the reciprocal action in the moiety of the potlach. The important point of the entire analysis is that all the elements in the society function togethvr consistently so as to form a consistent system. D. Structural Principles of Social Systems 1. The use of abstractions. At this pOint in the explanation of the work he introduces an idea which must be individually interpreted. This idea concerns the various uses of the term abstraction. His analysis involves the following statement which is first consid- ered: But the Tlingit system is similar to that of the Haida sough of them. Our analysis will be made more complete by considering the Haida also. The social usages of the Haida varym certain reapects from those of the Tlingit. If we analyze the - 101 - Haida also, compare the two systems, and eliminate the variations, we can define a system of which the Tlingit and Haida are two examples?”0 This statement is quite clear in that it outlines a process which will yield a new system.abstracted from the two mentioned. This is in fact the essence of the method of science as it is first presented and later elaborated. The next statement points out how this type of abstraction does not involve a consideration of cosmological ideas of the two societies. Clearly, we have made an abstraction. The Tlingit and Haida systems are each a highly complex one, and for the purposes of comparison it was necessary to break each down into a large number of abstracted characteristics. But the first sense in which the word.'system! is applied to a society of this sort if not the sense of the totality of these abstracted characteristics but is the sense which assumes there is something which we call functional consistency characteristic of the totality of traits of a given society.241 ’ In other words, the idea of functional consistency is not considered in the abstracted system. If it were used it would mean that the two societies had the same cosmological beliefs and of course this is some- thing he would quickly deny for it would not allow a comparison of very many societies. Therefore this idea of functional consistency must be quickly dropped when comparimg two societies. What however is retained? The abstracted characteristics of the two systems. 2E0 Ibid., p. 700 241 as. Cit. ,102- 2. Establishment of social types. What type of abstraction does this involve and what will it yield? The topic of course has been discussed before. Such a method proposed in the previous analysis or topic entitled, The Method of a Social Science. Here it was outlined that various types of societies can be abstracted to form.one single type which has sommon characteristics. It is well to note that he is careful to state that these common characteristics only deal with the social system. ‘We establish our type by comparing a number of individual societies. Let us say 5. is the Australian type of social systemu By having taken as many individual societies in.Anstralia as possible, by studying their characteristics, and eliminating their variations, we have been able to discover what is common to all of thenu It is a matter of empirical determination to discover that they all possess certain abstract characteristics in common. 2 2 The interesting thing about this entire subject of typing societies is the divorcement of the belief system.of a society. 'Wheras before, ’the Rey aspect of his work, as it has been interpretated in this thesis, is that the determination and continuance of relations as well as standard- ization of behavior have a high degree of dependence Jpon what people ethink or believe. In abstracting common characteristics of a society, this whole field is avoided. Certainly it can be clearly seen why it must logically be avoided. If one abstracted characteristics on the basis of the beliefs or cosmology of a society one could only treat each society independently and no grounds of common characteristics for the purpose of 232 Ibid., pp. 39-40. -103- comparison could be established. Q1 the other hand, it is wondered what is involved in the comparison of these commr'vn characteristics which are being compared. They do not necessarily have any connectinn with the cosmology, social usages and other aspects of the society as he has pointed out which ultimtely depend for their existence and continuance of the beliefs and ideas of men in a society. 3.. Abstracting types of behavior. There is another meaning of abstraction in his work which is not too important ot this analysis. It can be summarized as a denial of the validity 0f the kind of abstraction that thkes place when one type of behavior (e.g. economic behavior) is abstracted from the totality of the social system.243 4. Abstract structural erciples. Returning now to the other meaning of abstraction, that type which is used in establishing structural principles, it will be demnstrated how this is very important to his entire analysis. It is seen as a necessary step in this interpretatinn as a manner in which to use all that he has built up before hand. This abstraction is arrived at by the following manner. Abstraction, in this sense, is a procedure by which we separate out, we abstract from a social system a certain structural principle which we find in this society, and in another, and in another, so that finally, if we have selected our material 21:3 Ibid., p. 70. ,1 -104- rightly, if we have made our abstraction correctly, we can formulate what will be a universal structural principle of all humn societies.21m Since this type of abstraction will involve a "structural principle" of society it will necessarily involve some notion of the cosmology or belief system or what exists in the minds of man as to what is correct or incorrect. Finding particular structural principles in societies that are universal will necessarily involve certain beliefs which are universal in societies. Radcliffe-Brown asserts that he is not wquiped himself to determine such structural principles since their determinatinn necessarily involves an empiric approach rather than a rational one. An example, however, of such a structural principle is offered in his analysis of the abstract principle of Justice. Here he maintains that Justice acts as a factor which maintains the social structure of any society. -- A social structure is a certain arrangement of social relations in which the interests of different individuals and groups are adjusted one to another. It is quite clear that one mechanism for flintaining that adJustment, in any society, is the system of law. You may say the function of law is to maintain the social structure by perpetually readjusting interests beWeen individuals.245 Such systems, then can be abstracted from the total societies to find what factors maintain the structure of that society. This again involves 2min Ibid., p. 71. 245 Ibid., pp. 71-72. - 105- a consideration of what people think and believe. Therefore this type of abstraction necessarily seeks the common principles of belief which will wxist in all societies. In this fashion all the elements that have been defined come into play. 5. An inconsistent use of function. There is a point of definition here that calls for a more detailed examination. The definitinn concerns the us of "function" in this particular context. Here the example of law is used as having a particular function. That is, in essence, a statement of a general type of relatinn used in maintaining adjustment. The system of law is named here as having a function. Earlier in the work, it will be recalled this problem of definition presented itself and it was seen how functinn meant at one moment the general relations between acts (implied in the relatinnship within structural form) and at another moment stated that function meant, "...the total set of relations that a single social activity or usage or belief has to the total social system"246 Clearly the system of law would not constitute a "single activity or usage or belief” but a system of activities. Therefore, the clarity of the term is obscured by his usage and the idea of function is left vague. 6. Justice, an example of a structural principle. Before going into a comparison of these two types of abstraction the idea and examples given for this second type will be eXpanded. 246 Ibid., p. 46. -106- The principle of Justice he states is, ”...the nearest I can come to what I would call an abstract structural principle, which I believe is .247 characteristic of all social systems.... The ethics behind the principle of Justice is not the subJect matter with which the social scientist is concerned. Rather the social scientist, "...is concerned with waht people have done in the past in the way of administering Justice and in organizing their social relations in this reapect. “SHB One of the min ideas connected with the idea of Justice is given as the principle of Just retribution.2b'9 The task of the social scientist is to find out how this principle is applied as a universal principle of social structures.250 ”It is found in some form in erery human society of which we have adequate knowledge, so that we can make an analysis Of societies ‘with this as our'guiding principle.251 Certain other aspects of the society modify this structural principle or supplant it as in the case of the Austrialian tribes where certain relationships are regulated by love rather than Justice.252 247 Ibid., p. 72. 248 323.1313. 249 $93..51§. 25o ggg._g;p. 251 1.2.0: as. 252 222 9.2.2- win» I _ - 107 _ The principle cf equivalent return he also derived from.the structural principle of Justice. "Other forms of this same principle of Justice may be found as they exist in different societies; equivalent return good for good, evil for evil, or, in the last instance, idemnification for inJury."253 In the final analysis these forms resolve into, "...the same funda- mental principle, running though all.human social behavior, but varying "254 from.society to society. 7. The connection of structuralpprinciples. From.this type 0f analysis he states that it will be possible to connect a particular structural 'prrciple with other structural principles. The question then becomes, "...do we get several sciences or one fairly completely unified science out Of these processes?" 255 It becomes a unified system.if it can be shown that these abstracted values can be tied into other abstracted values. The nature of this tie-up would be the prospect of demonstrating how this structural principha of Justice could be related to the "...principle of expiation to give us an adequate account of a.great mass of religious phenomena."256 Then there is the prospect of tying in the economic principle of value andprinc.257 —_:_'_ 253 3939., p. 73. 25h 593. £33. 255 $93. 5:33. 256 .EREE': p. 74 257 .122- 22:- 'rv. 'i.’ h n .l,I PI ‘5'” -= _ 108 .. 8. Conclusion of the structural principle of justice. The structural principle of expiation is then demonstrated. The principle invOlves different methOds of atonement 0f wrongs. These take the form of ritual atonement, religious and magic depending again upon how this value is viewed in different societies.258 In the discussion of economic values he attempts to show that the principle of Justice can be applied to the idea of price and value.259 This analysis is summarized by the notion that one value runs through all d determination of economic exchange and that value is, "...the adJustment of interest on the basis of an equivalent return; that mechanism for exchange of goods is one of correlating interests to produce what I have 260 This again takes different form. "In called social coaptation.: the simplier societies you find gift exchange; in certain ones, barter; and still other, purchase."261 I He then illustrates these different methods of adJustment which take place. All of them, "...revert to one fundamental point: to the need for the adJustment of interests between individuals."262 This adJustment 15 again based upon the value of the society as to what is regarded as Just. 258 £29. £13. 259 lag. 33.3. 260 _I_t_>_i_._d., p. 75. 261 1.3. 11:9. 262 Ibid., pp. 76-77. - 109 - 9..A.c:mparison of the two types of Ebstraction. In comparing the two kinds of abstractions, the one, abstracting the common system and the other abstracting the structural principles, it is wondered whether Radcliffe-Brown is making a logical Jump in reasoning. That is, are these structural principles "natural laws"7 One statement in the method- ology of establishing natural laws certainly leans strongly this way. In concluding the discussion of the method of science which is used to establish natural laws of society, he states; ”I see that procedure as requiring us to isolate problems in the sense to be discussed later -- for example, the problem.of determining structural principles of societies, such as that of Justice....”263 Certainly he could be called inconsistent if he meant that these structural principles were natural laws for the method of arriving at a natural law does not entail the consideration of the beliefs or cosmology of a society. The establishment of structural principles is not possible without the consideration 0f the beliefs of a society. 10. Conclusion. In this chapter it can be seen how some of the main elements of Radcliffe-Brown's science of society converge. This is eSpecially true in the first two sections which are concerned with economic relations and comparative epistemology. ‘- w' 263 Ibid., p. 430 ,I' - 110 - The section on functional consistency explains the term.as well as pointing out its relationship to other elements in the paper. The final section deals with the structural principles of social systems as well as ecplaining the different uses of abstraction. Again it is pointed out that in the construction of social types Radcliffe-Brown is not explicit in demonstrating the method he uses. An inconsistent use of function is also critized in this section. Finally Radcliffe-Brown is criticed for’ making a logical Jump in reasoning when he implies that structural principles are natural laws. VII. CONCLUSIQ‘J The inapplicability 0f Radcliffe-Brown's theories for social science rests upon the assertion by this writer that two of his main ideas are incompatible and therefore render his work inconsistent. These two ideas are the method of a natural science and the analysis of society in terms' of a social system. The method of a social science as establihed by'Radcliffe-Brown has as its foundation the comparison of social systems in order to arrive at social types. These social types are then compared in order to estab- lish natural laws. The establishement of natural laws is theFfinal goal in this method. The second main part of Radcliffe-Brownie develOpment concerns the development of ideas which are related to the internal structure 0f parti- cular social systems and societies as well as to beliefs of man as they are related to behavior as seen in these prescribed units of social systemrand society. His development ultimately points out that there is within the structure of such units a kind of consistency. This consistency is not based upon logic but rather it takes as its basis theoentire belief systent or cosmology of a society. This concept along with the idea of culture is based upon the relationship between human behavior and human beliefs. In a critical comparison of these two main ideas of Radcliffe-Brown described above one of the nnst striking characterities of his method of science is that it has no relationship to the internal consistency of the particular social system which is to be campared. The reason for this is -112- evident in logical terms. The method itself seeks to establish common elements which can be abstracted from social systems. If this abstraction was related at all to the cosmology 0f a society than there would be no common element to be abstracted unless, of course, two societies had the same cosmology. Therefore, although it is not stated in his explanation.what comprises the common characteristics which are to be abstracted from various social systems, it is quite logical to assume (as well as asserted by Radcliffe- Brown) that these characteristics will not involve the cosmology Of the society being dealt with. From.all that has been stated in his paper this necessarily leaves only two principle factors which wouldbe left to abstract; the acts of behavior and the relationship between these acts. Here enter the 'mainpOint 0f contention. Radcliffe-Brown, in estab- lishing the consistency of a social system through the belief system or cosmology 0f a society, has inadvertently placed a causal expoanation upon humn behavior. That is, human behavior is formed altered and made consis- tent through the various tenets and beliefs contained in a particular socflaty. Therefore, therzis a high degree of dependence, in terms 0f beliefs, upon the acts of man. How is it possible to form statements 0f a high degree of predictability (or’natural laws) from.kthe two elements, human behavior and relationships between behavior, when these two elements are dependent upon the beliefs or - 113 - cosmology of a society for their existence? It is the contention Of thas writer that the basis for'his science omits the very thing he has so intimately related to the whole area 0f human behavior: man's beliefsr .At this tine having cOncluded the explanation and criticism 0f V -.. Radcliffe-Brown's science 0f societh it would be well to look at this 1 work in a more comprehensive manner in order to discover the value Of his work to other social scientists. The point has particular signifi- ‘y'--.—. n. —- cance when one considers the influence this man has had upon other men in his field.26u Perhaps the most widely known concept of Radcliffe-Brown is his idea of "function.“ Several significant points of functionalism.can be assertained from.this paper and paramount among these points is the fact that in using the term.one must be sure some clear definition of the term is arrived at before a application is made.. This of cousre is difficult to do since Radcliffe-Brown, as it has been shown in this thesis, changes the meaning of this term.on different occasinns. However, a few general rules can be applied as to the use of this term. First of all the functiai of a particular'usage or behavioral act (or abstracted acts; which ever basis is decided upon) is a treatment of this act as it persists in a social system. In using the term treatment here what is meant is an analysis of these acts as they are able to persist in a social systenk What is of extreme importance is that this type 0f functional explanation 26# See chapter I of this thesis. -1m- gives a reason for the persistence of these acts of behavior. This is not a neason in a simple causal sense nor is it a reason based upon the logic of the social scientists in the abstract sense. The point is this these acts persist as they accur in a particular social system.in relat- ionship to the cosmology of a social system. Thus a functional explanatiqi is nnre than a pure discriptive analysis of social behavior in that it explains the reason for the persisting of such behavior and of course aids in predictability of social behavior as well as side in a more complete understanding of a social system. Another idea can be arrived at from.the critical evaluation of Radcliffe-Brown that has been undertaken in this thesis. This idea is the possibility of further study in the fidld of beliefs as they are related to behavior. It seems readily apparent to this writer that anyone attempt- ing to formulate a science of society entirely on the basis of human behavior and the relationships which are brought about by such behavior without considering the beliefs that initially formulate this behavior is in error. The proposed analysis therefore is very close to what Radcliffe- Brown means by function but fails to carry out in this analysis.265 That is the examination of the relationship between behavior (including persis- tent behavior) and the values, beliefs or cosmology of a social system. 265 Ibid., p. #4. He calls it a separate branch or subdivision of his science. - 115 _ This kind of analysis would certainly involve a historical perpective since cosmologies are things that do not emerge nor manifest as quickly or clearly as human behavior. This idea, however, adjuncted to his functional appraach would, it is felt, yield a more complete and compre- hensive answer to the persistence or human behavior. 1901- O6. 1905. 1906. 1908 . 1908-10. 1910- 12 . 1913 . 191)}. 1916-190 1920-25. APPENDIXA. Biographical Snatch of A.R. Radcliffe-Brown" Student at Trinity College, Cambridge, received first impetus for studying comparative sociology from an acquaintance with Kropotkin. Became W.H.R. Bikers first student in anthropology and also worked with A.C. Haddon, “The Father oil/scientific field work." {wim‘o First visit to South Africa as secretary of the Anthropological Section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. Elected Anthony Wilkin Student in Ethnology at Cambridge, went to Andaman Islands. Wro te priminary report of field work. This was both the basis of Th3 Andaman Islanders, and reason for fellowship of Trinity 00116800 Held newly created post of Reader in Ethnology at the London School of Economics; also lectured at Cambridge on comparative sociology. Re-elected to Hilkin Studentship - allowed We years in western Australia - laid ground-work for "Ihree Tribes of Western Australia." Invited to lecture at Birmingham - theme was the comparative study of human society by the comparative methods of natural sciences and the difference betwaen such studies and those of social philosophers. Went again to Australia with the British Association. Served as Director of Education in the kingdom of Tonga (Friendly Islands) - source of interest in applied anthropology. Chair of Social Anthropology at the University of Cape Town in South Africa. Led fight in using applied anthropology in the settlement of nativistic problems, especially of the Bantu Tribes. " Fortes, Meyer, Social Structure, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1949’ PP. "10 A...» 7l«. 1926-31. 193 1" 37 e 1937 4+2 . 1942‘“ e 1944 --. Chair of Social Anthropology in the University of Sydney in Australia. During his stay in Australia founded the Journal, “0850.180 Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago. During this period visted China as visiting Professor at Yenching University. Chair created for him at University of Oxford, also a fellow of All Souls College. Was first at Oxford to introduce anthropology as an undergraduate study. In 1939, elected president of the Royal Anthropological Institute and served until 1942. Visiting Professor at the University of Sao Paulo; undertaken at the request of the British Govemnant. First professor of sociology in the Farouk I University, Eypt. 1909 . 1910. 1912. 1913. 1911!». 1916. 1918. 1922 . «- ture, APPENDIX B. Bibliography of A.R. Radcliffe-Brown?" "Religion of the Ande Islanders ," Folk Lore, Vol. XX, 3 (1909). ”Puluga: A Reply to Father Schmidt,” E9 x (1910), 17. ”Marriage and Descent, North Australia,” ibid. , 32. ”Marriage and Descent in North and Central Australia,!' ibid., III (1912), 64. “The Distribution of Native Tribes in Part of Western Australia,“ ibid., 75. “Beliefs Concerning Childbirth in Some Australian Tribes.“ ibid., 96. "Three Tribes of Western Australia,” Journal 25 1h: 30:51. Anthro- pological Institute, Vol. 11.111 (1913 . ”Notes 0:): the Language of the Andaman Islands,“ Anthropgs, Vol. IX 1911: . ”The Definition of Totemim,‘I ibid. Review of .'I_'_h_e_ Fami the Australian Aborigines, bf B. Malinowski Man, €19?) , if. . "Relationship System of the Dieri Tribe“, ibid., 33. ’ —-— ”Australian Rafts,” ibid. m (1916), 11. “Notes on kthe Social Organization of Australian Tribes. Part I," Journal 93 the ROE Anthropological Institute, Vol. EVIII (1918’. The Andaman Islanders, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press {-1922, 532 (1933’9 ** {Som)Problens of Bantu Sociology,“ Bantu Studies, Vol. I, No. 3 1922 . Compiled from We sources: Radcliffe-Brown, A.R., Social Struc- azford, Oxford University Press, 199, (Bibliography compiled 'b'y" Ruth Pardee) pp. 226-28: regain, Fred, «1., Social Anthmpo1p§y 93; North American Tribes, micago, The University of Chicago Press, (Bibliography compiled by Ina Corinne Brown) 1937, pp. rv-xvii. * Available from the lree Press, Glencoe, Ill. , 1948. H1?“ aka-rill .. It... PI.’ 1923- 1921}. 1925. 1926. 1927. 1929. 1930. "Methods of Ethnology and Social Anthropology," _Sp__uth African Journal _o__f Science, Vol. XX (1923). "Notes on _the Social Organization of Australian Tribes. Part II" Journal _o_f 511330231 Anthropological Institute, Vol. LIII (1923). "The Mother's Brother in South Africa," South _A_f____rican Journa_______1_ _o__f Sc__i___ence, vol. 111 (1924). "Culture Areas of Africa," Americ_____a_n Anthropologist, LS. , Vol. xva (1925). "Native Dolls in the Transvatl Miseum," Annals _o__f the Transvall M1___§___eum, Vol. II, Part II (1925). Review of A_t____1as Africanus, by Leo Frobenius and Bitter v. Wilml Das unbekannte —Africa, by Loo hobenious; Hadschra Maktube, by Leo Frobenius and Hugo Obermaier, American Anthropologist, 11.8., Vol. xxm (1925). Review of £5.13 2?. Australian Beliefs, by Lambert nir'ilich, ibid. "Father, Mother, and Child, " Man, XXVI (1926), 103. "Arrangements of Stones in Australia," _i_.____bid., 133. "The Rainbow-Serpmt Wth of Australia," Journal o__f_ th__e_Ro 30233.- Anthropological Institute, Vol. LVI (192 "The Regulation of Marriage in mm,“ ibid., Vol. 1m, (1927). "Age Organization-TerMnology,' Man, HI! (1929), 13. ”A M1163? Note on Ambryn," ibide) 35o "Bride Price, Earnest or Indennity," ib__i_d., 96. .Bilatenl DOBCOnt, fl iLid-e, 1570 "Notes on Totemism in hetern Australia," Journal of theBo ROE}. Anthropological Institute, Vol. LIX (1929). "Elitorial," Oceania, Vol. I, No. l (1930). "Fomer Numbers and Distribution of the Australian Aborigines." affical Yearbook _o__f the Commonwealth _o_f Australia, No. 23 (1930). "fiistorical and Functional Interpretations of Culture in Relation to the Practical Application of Anthropology to Native Peoples," (abstract) Proceedgs 93 the Fourth Pacific Science Erase, Java, 1929, Vol. III, Biological Papers ,(Batavia-Bandoeng,19 1930) '"I'he Sociological Theory of Totemism, Lbid. "The Rainbow-Serpent mth in South-East—— Australia," Oceania, Vol. 1, No.3 (1930). "Applied Anthropology," Presidential Address, Australian and New Zealand Association _i_’___or the Advancement of Science, (1930)—__- II System for Notation of Relationships, flan, m (1930) , 93. 9 .\ j . . K 0 1. o ' t 1 ' 1 t 1- ° :\ .\ j g ‘_ 1931. "The Present Position of Anthropological Studies," Presidential Address, British Association for the Advancement of Science (1931 . 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The Free Press, Glencne, I11., 1943. m .‘ 1m .. .t .x . ~\ .\ e. 4 a . a. .x e. t ._ r . a. t. -\ O O O .\ I 7\ .. -.. pt. . o\, O x e a. a\ ex 0 I . a. an ex . I C a a a .. Q .. U u . a\ e, ._ e. I .t ' .x e. O _ A‘ . Ix . . r 1 O ' .. .\ ' e x P\ u. e. O .. ex . e. . . .e D I, . . y .N 0 i a l t O .. . -\ t . a\ . L . w -\ c . Q e. V . .\ I -__-J, “H J O—‘u'v~‘—‘..O—..‘ .‘n.-.. - a__-:1 I 3 1 6; Wu“ Room use 0m ”'TITI'INTIL MIL/Ii! fil’fliflfll’ffliflfli 4111141117!”