

ISLAM AND PUBLIC HEALTH: FRENCH MANAGEMENT OF THE *HAJJ* FROM
COLONIAL SENEGAL AND MUSLIM RESPONSES BEGINNING IN 1895

By

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ABSTRACT

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In this dissertation, I assess the political, social and economic foundation, unfolding, and impact of the surveillance apparatus traced from western surveillance blueprints French authorities implemented to monitor the Mecca pilgrimage, or *Hajj*, in colonial Senegal. I focus mainly on the clash between the *Hajj* institution and the mechanisms of the colonial state, and on the consequences of that encounter in colonial context to emphasize the relationships between public health policies, colonialism and *Hajj*, and unlock the dilemmas and strategies French authorities and colonial Senegalese Muslims both involved in “public health diplomacy” faced. I look at the shifting class and gender status, and at the long-lasting consolidation of urban *Hajj*-based culture and elites in the light of the monopolizing of the *Hajj* business and culture by colonial Senegalese Muslim women. In doing so, I wish to shed new light on the effects of surveillance on the local meaning, and on the ways in which colonial Senegalese Muslims made the *Hajj*. I also examine the worldwide process of diffusion of medicine alongside modern forms of government to which surveillance of colonial Senegalese Mecca pilgrims also belonged. State intervention in the *Hajj* business has repercussions to this day as Muslims seek to maintain their autonomy and practice in the face of globalization, of the modern requirements of international exchanges, and of the shortcomings linked to the very nature of postcolonial states. This dissertation contributes to the base of knowledge in Islam and the history of the public health of sub-Saharan Africa generally, and of Senegal particularly. It also informs policy makers on the origins of current government regulations that owe a lot more to the colonial past than to modern epidemiology.

To my father and my little sister,
May your souls rest in peace.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The idea behind this dissertation on Islam and public health developed as a result of persistent efforts to comprehend gender relations within the predominantly Senegalese Muslim society. As other scholars before me (e.g. Christian Coulon), I have always questioned the widespread assumption that Muslim women belong to the “twilight zone” of Islam. In this dissertation, I have essentially relied on oral and archival material to document an example which belies such assumptions despite my participant/observer status within Senegalese society. At first, I meant to investigate the political, the social and the religious impacts of the management of the *Hajj* by non-Muslim powers made aware of the global security issues embodied by *Hajj*-related cholera, and involved in the attendance of the *Hajj* each year by thousands of Muslims from all around the world. I expected to come up with a scenario of intransigence versus resistance in which colonial Muslims opposed the French involvement in their religious business on various grounds, and in various ways.

Rather, I found out that *Originaire* colonial Muslims generally played the French citizen card to obtain preferential treatment, and also to participate in *Hajj* affairs decision-making. In contrast, colonial women invaded the religious arena through progressive appropriation and re-invention of the *Hajj* business in order to make it fit their agenda. The journey towards the completion of this study was very long and difficult. However, I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to all the scholars, informants, and friends who helped me reach this milestone. I am particularly indebted to my major advisor, Professor David Robinson, who has been supportive beyond my own expectations throughout the process. Also, to Professor Leslie Moch, Professor Walter Hawthorne, and Professor Emine Evered who all kindly accepted such a difficult challenge. Professor Ann V. Millard is now away from MSU, but she remains in my thoughts. Also I would like to extend my gratitude to my good friend, “classmate”, and my number one cheerleader Shannon Vance, now Harris.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADFAT	Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
AMI	Assistance Médicale Indigène
ANS	Archives Nationales du Sénégal
AOF	Afrique Occidentale Française
BCEHSAOF	Bulletin du Comité d'Etudes Historiques et Scientifiques de l'Afrique Occidentale Française
BIFAN	Bulletin de l'IFAN
GGAOF	Gouvernement Général de l'Afrique Occidentale Française
JOAOF	Journal Officiel de l'Afrique Occidentale Française
JOS	Journal Officiel du Sénégal
SUNY	State University of New York Press

NOTES ON TRANSLATION AND SPELLING

As regards languages other than English, I have also used the French language in this dissertation. In today Senegal, French is still used in the administration and in the education system, as well. In some places in the dissertation, I have kept some excerpts of the archival material in French, in which they were originally written, because I believe translating the excerpts of the epistolary exchanges between members of the colonial administration might alter the spirit, more than the meaning, of the messages French authorities tried conveying in their writings and official cablegrams. That spirit often transpires both in the colonial rhetoric and in the way of writing, as well. I have maintained as such all excerpts of publications, legal notices, or cablegrams from various colonial offices, in French. I have also relied on Wolof, which is the most spoken local language in Senegal. The informants I approached during field reconnaissance and fieldwork spoke Wolof, except for a few of them. For the transcription of the terms and expressions in Wolof, I have used the “Wolof-French dictionary” by A. Fal, R. Santos and J. L. Doneux (Paris: Karthala, 1990).

INTRODUCTION

This study examines the evolution of the Mecca pilgrimage, hereafter the *Hajj*, in Senegal. Precisely, I consider the three different elements consisting in a set of religious standards, rituals and beliefs, which make up the *Hajj* institution per se; the *Hajj* business understood as a group of *Hajj*-related profit-making enterprises; and the rich *Hajj* culture epitomized by the *pèlerin* mentality and ways of life which emerged in colonial Senegal, and still thrive in Senegal today. This dissertation is primarily concerned with the evolution of the *Hajj* institution which came under the influence of European powers interested in bringing - at least from a sanitary standpoint – under control the *Hajj*, which is the fifth, and not least important, pillar of Islam. One may think that such involvement would have had a negative effect on an institution such as the *Hajj*. Yet, in colonial Senegal, non-Muslim involvement in the *Hajj* business in the name of hygiene and public health gave the *Hajj* a hybrid dimension.

I began investigating this research topic guided by the following questions. First, we know that non-Muslims are strictly forbidden to enter the sites of celebration of *Hajj* rituals in Mecca and Madina. How do we make sense of the non-Muslim – precisely the European - involvement of the *Hajj* business following the first large-scale outbreaks of cholera in the 1830s? Second, we also know that French colonial authorities generally attached great value to the religious integrity of their colonial subjects who played major roles, especially during World War I and World War II. What was the specific rationale for the French management of the *Hajj* business in colonial Senegal? Third, the concern for a twin ideological and bacteriological infection of Muslims attending the *Hajj* every year was widespread in Europe in the late nineteenth century and twentieth century. Was the fear of twin infection the motivation behind the French management of the *Hajj* business in colonial Senegal? Last but not least, how did French West African Muslims, and precisely how did colonial Senegal Muslims respond in practice to the French management of the *Hajj* beginning in 1895?

In the 1830s, the first outbreaks of cholera were documented in Europe, and in other areas of the world. The outbreaks were said to have spread from Arabia, then epicentre of a power struggle within the Wahhabiyya, precisely between the Rashid and the Saud clans, for the control of the Hijaz. The conservative reform movement launched by Muhammad Abd Al Wahhab (1702-1792) advocated the return to a more puritanical practice of Islam in the Muslim world namely through the abandonment of the cult of saints. Wahhabiyya-like conservative reform movements were not foreign to West Africa. In eighteenth century Hausa land already, Usman Dan Fodio (1754-1817) launched an Islamic reform movement which called for the “Revitalization of the Sunna and the Elimination of Innovation.”¹ After 1920, such movements prevailed in West Africa with the rise of the Hamalliyya and Wahhabiyya, especially in French Sudan (present-day Mali) and French Guinea.

Around the same time, cholera, once believed to be prevalent around the Ganges River in British India, was reported in other areas of the world, including in France where cholera outbreaks brought about significant social unrest, especially during the epidemic crises of the Restoration (1814-1830) and the July Monarchy (1830-1848). By 1894, many Europeans feared that Muslim pilgrims going to Mecca potentially exposed themselves to a “twin infection”²: ideological infection, because Mecca pilgrims went to the Hedjaz, which was then the site of a power struggle between Ottomans, Egyptians and Wahhabiyya adepts advocating the return to pure Islam; bacteriological infection, because the *Hajj* came to be viewed as a sheer threat due to its association with the spread of cholera and various communicable diseases to the rest of the world, including Europe and the colonies, after 1831.

¹R. Loimeier. *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria*. (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1997), 11.

²W. Roff. “Sanitation and security: Imperial powers and the nineteenth century *Hajj*.” *Arabian Studies*, 6, (1982): 143-160.

Broadly speaking, this dissertation considers the evolution of the international surveillance of the *Hajj* devised at the 1851 Paris International Sanitary Conference, and progressively implemented once the role of the *Hajj* and Mecca pilgrims as main mediums for the spread of cholera and other communicable diseases to the rest of the world was clearly established. Precisely, I examine how France applied on the ground, mainly in colonial Senegal, the suggestions and recommendations on public health issues and on *Hajj* surveillance European health professionals and authorities devised at several international sanitary meetings held between 1895 and 1960, which also coincided with the colonial era in French West Africa. While taking that timeframe as the backbone of this dissertation, I go back in time as far as the year 1830, in order to address the debate around cholera outbreaks around the world, and the effects of international standards on the ground as well. I also meant to follow the evolution of the *Hajj* in its administrative dimensions and map out the main shifts in the French views of Islam and the *Hajj*, particularly in colonial Senegal.

Furthermore, I consider the evolution of the *Hajj* institution and *Hajj* affairs beyond 1960 in order to better address and assess the long-term impact of the French management of the *Hajj*, and the impact in current Senegal of Muslim responses to the management of the *Hajj* during colonial rule. As such, the *Hajj* business³ in Senegal today cannot be measured otherwise than in relation to the involvement of the colonial administration in its management until the end of the colonial era, in 1960. In fact, the current management system of the *Hajj* business in present day Senegal is the replication of the centralized *Hajj* administration plan implemented by the French colonial administration in French West Africa in order to monitor and regulate the attendance of the *Hajj* each year by French West African Muslims.

³ In this dissertation, I use the concept *Hajj* business to emphasize simultaneously the three main dimensions of *Hajj* affairs impacted by the management initiative: the administrative dimension, the medical dimension, and the commercial dimension of *Hajj* affairs. However, I insist more on the administrative and medical dimensions.

Clearly, current Senegal *Hajj* organization system owes much of its importance and particularity within the Senegalese religious landscape to the steady involvement of French colonial authorities in its regulation beginning in 1895. In the global context of the search for explanations as to why cholera was spreading to the rest of the world, the French move to regulate the *Hajj* from French West Africa in 1895 came one year after the Paris 1894 International Health Conference deemed a “milestone in [health] conferences”⁴, which advanced the work of the 1892 Venice International Health Conference. At the 1894 conference, Europeans expressed the need to contain cholera at its sources mainly through the requirement of medical examinations for all prospective Mecca pilgrims and the enforcement of quarantine at various stations prior to undertaking *Hajj*. At the intermediate level, in West Africa, the 1894 Paris Health Conference came one year before French central authorities in Paris made the decision to bring under one group the newly pacified territories under their rule referred to as *Afrique Occidentale Française* (hereafter AOF), or French West Africa.

In 1895, the colonies of Senegal, *Soudan Français* (French Sudan), *Guinée Française* (French Guinea), and *Côte d’Ivoire* (Ivory Coast) made up the AOF territory. The central administration was based in the city of Saint-Louis (colony of Senegal). The headquarters of the colonial government were later moved to Dakar in 1902. In 1904, the *Soudan Français* was included in the *Haut-Sénégal-Niger* unit, and added to the AOF territory along with Mauritania and Dahomey. In 1919, the AOF group reached the limit of eight territories with the addition of the *Haute-Volta* (Upper Volta) and the Togo mandate. The 1895 decree appointed a *Gouverneur Général de l’AOF* (hereafter Governor General) endowed in AOF with the same powers and duties as the President of the French Republic back in France.

⁴D. D. Long. *The Hajj today: A survey of the contemporary pilgrimage to Mecca*. (New York, SUNY, 1979), 73. W. Roff. “Sanitation and security: Imperial powers and the nineteenth century Hajj.” *Arabian Studies*, 6, (1986): 143-160.

As far as the *Hajj* management was concerned, each year, and ahead of the opening of *Hajj* season, the Governor General granted (or denied) authorizations to organize *Hajj* caravans upon the request from the heads of colonies, or *Lieutenant-Gouverneurs*. With such prerogatives, until the end of the colonial era, AOF governors were fully equipped to extend to the AOF territory the rules applicable to all Mecca pilgrims and pilgrim embarkations, and the provisions of laws pertaining to the regulation of the *Hajj* as well. For example, in 1904 and in 1909 they respectively extended to AOF, the provisions of the 1902 French law on the protection of public health and the provisions of the 1907 French law on maritime hygiene. The provisions of the 1984 International Sanitary Convention were progressively made applicable to French West African Mecca pilgrims as France incorporated into its empire a significant Muslim population after 1895. The 1894 International Health Convention was also the turning point in the regulation of international movement of people and goods.

In regards to the regulation of international movement of people and goods at the world scale, French West Africa General Governors found abundant material to work with because of the existence of a very ancient *Hajj* tradition still in full swing in 1895 and beyond. For centuries, West African Muslims maintained strong relationships with the Muslim world generally, and with North African Muslims particularly. The purposes of their visits in North Africa, and in the Orient, were of two main types. First, West African Muslims travelled eastward namely to acquire knowledge of Islam and related topics in famous learning centres such as the Al-Azhar University in Cairo (Egypt).⁵ Second, many among them periodically visited the friends and acquaintances they made throughout the Muslim world.⁶

⁵ Al-Naqar U. "Takrūri: The History of a Name." In, Journal of African History, X, 3 (1969): 365-374.

⁶ Kane O. "Les relations entre la communauté Tijane du Sénégal et la Zawiya de Fès." In, Fès et l'Afrique: Relations économiques, culturelles et spirituelles, (1993): 13-24.

It is also established that, “lower (West African Muslim) classes” did not wait for princes “to take the roads of Hedjaz”, even if the most publicized case of *Hajj* trip remains the travel of Malian King Sakoura in 1300.⁷ The role of *Hajj* in the spread of cholera was recognized at the 1894 Paris Conference. Europeans drafted an international agreement to contain cholera at its sources (Ganges River and Hedjaz) and extend the health regulations meant to monitor the *Hajj* traffic and implement quarantine regulations for all Mecca pilgrims. Once the link between the recurrent cross border spread of cholera and the *Hajj* became obvious in the minds of Western policy-makers, French colonial authorities recognized that colonial Muslims could be under the threat of major health threats. That is why the French government, which pioneered the international drive toward *Hajj* regulation, promptly instructed the central government in AOF to steadily enforce *Hajj*–traffic regulation.

Each year, the AOF Governor processed local requests to organize *Hajj* caravans from AOF. Concession was the rule. *Hajj* authorizations were generally only denied in cases of improper health status or political turmoil in the Orient.⁸ Also, Mecca pilgrims were required to have medical exams performed by authorized physicians, and to receive several injections of mandatory vaccines against cholera, yellow fever and smallpox. In addition, the government required cash guarantees of up to 2,000 Francs.⁹ Due to such requirements, colonial Senegalese Muslims refrained for a while from going to Mecca. Many continued going to Mecca “on foot” across the desert in spite of the restrictions. Even beyond the nineteenth century, pilgrims from North Africa and West Africa had followed overland desert passageways to the Red Sea and embarked on pilgrim boats bound for Mecca.

⁷ A. Gouilly. *L'Islam dans l'Afrique Occidentale Française*. (Paris, Larose, 1952), 185.

⁸ P. Marty. *L'Islam au Sénégal: Les doctrines et les Institutions*. (Paris, Maison Ernest Leroux, 1917). A. Gouilly. *Idem*, 192.

⁹ P. Marty. *Idem*.

Therefore, for a long time, the *Hajj* remained a predominantly male business for various reasons and for centuries in West Africa. In the past, making *Hajj* required more than just untainted religious conviction and strong will. Women and children a priori did not have the necessary physical strength to survive the hardships of the trip on foot to Mecca in very arid and hostile environments. In that respect, non-Muslim observers often wondered where Mecca pilgrims travelling on foot drew the strength to survive in lunar landscapes where rocks were the most visible resource available as far as the eye can see.¹⁰ Prior to the establishment of sea and air government-chartered convoys to Mecca, prospective pilgrims would set out for Mecca on foot several months prior to the opening of the *Hajj* season. Survivors reached Mecca long after departure from the homeland after several stops in places on the way to the Suakin harbour in British Sudan where they embarked for Jeddah. On the way to Mecca, many worked to raise money for the trip, or even started new families.

The introduction of modern travel rules and public health standards in the *Hajj* business under the aegis of French authorities progressively extended access to *Hajj* opportunities to Muslim women. By 1952, Gouilly mentioned the progressive ways in which AOF female pilgrims, especially from colonial Senegal, broke into the once quite hermetic *Hajj* business. In his reference book, he claimed that the number of pilgrims for the AOF group which was about 230, half of which came from the colony of Senegal, could have been doubled if the number of pilgrims for AOF and North Africa was not limited to 1,600 Mecca pilgrims per year. Out of the 230 seats allotted to AOF Mecca pilgrims on yearly government-chartered convoys, only 30 seats were reserved for colonial Muslim women undertaking *Hajj*.¹¹

¹⁰ F. Duguet. *Le Pèlerinage de la Mecque: Au point de vue social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Editions Rieder, 1932). F. Borel. *Choléra et Peste dans le Pèlerinage Musulman, 1860-1903*. (Paris, Masson & Cie, 1904).

¹¹ Gouilly A. *L'Islam dans l'Afrique Occidentale Française*. (Paris, Editions Larose, 1952), 192.

Yet, that was only the beginning of a steady and well-established process marked by the emergence and consolidation of a specific *Hajj* culture pioneered by colonial Muslim women. Gouilly argued that AOF female Mecca pilgrims disrupted a well-established Muslim rule, in which Muslim women should always travel in the company of a male parent (e.g. spouse or brother). To him, the presence of AOF female Mecca pilgrims travelling on their own in official *Hajj* convoys testified to a “greater hold of Islam on women, and to the commitment of black women to keep their autonomy intact.”¹² It is true that the greater presence of colonial women within the colonial Senegalese pilgrim population presupposes major changes not only in the local perceptions of Islam and the *Hajj*, but also in the status of women within colonial society. It is believed that Muslim women are generally voiceless and marginalized in Islam. A widespread idea is that Muslim women play only minor roles and operate on the margins in Islam, even within the quite autonomous spaces of local Sufi brotherhoods.¹³

This study of the *Hajj* in the colonial context, and in postcolonial context as well, tells a different story. The *Hajj* experiences of Dakar, Rufisque, and Saint-Louis *Mbootay* women I describe in this dissertation reveal that modern transportation (e.g. boats, planes, cars) and health standards (e.g. ongoing medical assistance) which made *Hajj* trips much shorter and safer are not enough to explain the growing representation of colonial Muslim women in a religious endeavour in which they used to play secondary roles in the shadows of their male relatives or their spouses. In colonial Senegal, the *Hajj* really became more widespread among colonial Muslim women after World War II with the emergence of ways of being and ways of doing entirely oriented toward the acquisition of the revered status of *Adjaratou* - or *Adja* - linked to *Hajj* participation and adherence to the quite exclusive “*Pèlerin club*.”

¹² A. Gouilly A. *L'Islam dans l'Afrique Occidentale Française*. (Paris, Editions Larose, 1952), 192.

¹³ C. Bop. “Roles and the position of women in Sufi brotherhoods in Senegal.” *Journal of American Academy of Religion*, 73 (4), (2005): 1099-1119.

We must keep in mind the fact that World War I, and to a greater extent World War II, brought radical changes to the status of women in the world generally, and in colonial Senegal particularly. During both wars, which lasted much longer than everyone anticipated, women were initially expected to wait at home for the return of their heroes (e.g. spouses and male relatives). However, as the conflicts and their absence extended, women gradually took the place of men within the private sphere as breadwinners, and within the public sphere where they helped keep the world economy running through their work in offices and factories. In so doing, women gradually gained the recognition of their male counterparts within society, and secured the right to vote (in 1919 in the UK; in 1920 in the US; in 1944 only in France). Despite their role in the Resistance movement until 1945, French women waited longer than most of their European counterparts to obtain the right to fully participate in elections.

In French West Africa, the situation was even more challenging. From the very beginning, and namely in Saint-Louis, the African population backed the initiative of colonization carried out by the representatives of France, such as André Brûe (1654-1738) head of the *Compagnie du Sénégal*. So much so, that the best gift that France could offer to its male and female African allies of Saint-Louis, Dakar, Gorée and Rufisque, identified as *Originaires*, was the gift of French citizenship with all the privileges attached to that status. In that respect, the October 19, 1915 and the September 29, 1916 laws granting *Originaire* Muslims French citizen status came under fire of opponents. For them, both laws granting the status of French citizens to native Muslims, while allowing them to retain the privileges attached to their religious status appeared as “nonsense and a paradox.” In fact, opponents to those laws questioned the capacity of natives to incorporate such values.¹⁴

¹⁴L. Guéye. *De la Situation Politique des Sénégalais Originaires des Communes de Plein Exercice: telle qu'elle résulte des lois des 19 Octobre 1915, 29 Septembre 1916 et de la jurisprudence antérieure*. (Paris, Editions de « La Vie Universitaire », 1922), 1.

As elsewhere, Male *Originnaire* Muslims reaped the benefits of French citizen status in practice mainly through their involvement in political life. That particular status allowed *Originnaire* political figures such as Blaise Diagne (1872-1934) and Lamine Guèye (1891-1968) to face French traders and the *Métis* (mixed race) on the political scene in Dakar and Saint-Louis. Nevertheless, female *Originnaire* Muslims remained on the sidelines of religious and political life in which they played secondary roles in a society where women were primarily perceived as mothers and spouses subordinated to men. That was even truer for married Muslim women expected under Islamic law to stay out of the spotlight. It should be noted that the colonial regime did not help level the inequity. Colonial authorities organized education for girls in the early twentieth century. Yet, the curricula (e.g. child care, nursing) tailored for girls leads one to believe that colonial authorities meant to maintain colonial women in the roles of caregivers for colonial societies in need of organization.¹⁵

The April 21, 1944 order granted French women the right to vote. Yet, colonial authorities were reluctant to extend the benefits of that law to Saint-Louis, Dakar, Rufisque and Gorée *Originnaire* women mainly because native women were not considered sufficiently *évoluées*. It was not until June 6, 1945, that *Originnaire* women, backed by key local political figures such as Lamine Guéye, the local SFIO party leader, were recognized as full citizens and obtained the right to vote and to be elected. But even then, *Originnaire* women remained in the background of political life where they appeared, mainly, to rally the votes of their fellow *Originnaire* women in favour of local politicians. For instance, *Originnaire* women played major roles in the struggle for leadership between Guéye and Senghor in 1948.

¹⁵ D. Bouche. "L'enseignement dans les territoires Français de l'Afrique Occidentale de 1817 à 1920. Mission civilisatrice ou formation d'une élite?" (Lille, Atelier de Reproduction des Thèses, 1975). P. M. Diop. "L'enseignement de la fille Indigène en AOF, 1903-1958." In, C. Becker, S. Mbaye et I. Thioub (Eds.). *AOF : Réalités et Héritages. Sociétés Ouest-Africaines et Ordre Colonial, 1895-1960*. (Dakar, Archives Nationales du Sénégal, tome II, 1997), 1081-1095.

Nevertheless, colonial Senegal women had leverage on public life in spite of their entrenchment in the private sphere due to their status as caring mothers and obedient Muslim women dependent upon their spouses. Entertainment activities provided them a convenient outlet they used in various ways to fully express their power, and the complexity of their “milieu [which was] no longer African only, [but] also French.”¹⁶ In fact, colonialism had brought about the redefining of the rules of the game within colonial society, due to the influence of various actors “in a body of constraints and interstices of freedom, and in a permanent game between continuity and rupture.”¹⁷ The complexity of the colonial milieu is best measurable in the public, religious and private celebrations so typical to the Four Communes. In fact, memories of local celebrations of public holidays such as “Soordelang” (New Year’s Eve), and December 24 “Fanal” processions are still vivid in the communes.¹⁸

In the Four communes all social, political and religious events were pretexts for rich celebrations with strong hints of the dual aspects (African/French) of the *Originnaire* ways of life. The celebration of religious events (e.g. major Muslim holidays) was no exception to the rule. Also, the return to the colony of Mecca pilgrims was the pretext for a display of wealth and creativity in which *Originnaire* women enriched by their education, and their newly acquired political rights served as leading figures. I have documented the specific example of pilgrim homecoming among the Dakar-Plateau women, which served as a catalyst for the emergence of long-term pilgrimage tradition and urban pilgrimage culture among women.

¹⁶ L. S. Senghor quoted in, J. Vaillant. “The problem of culture in French West Africa: “Assimiler, ne pas être assimilés.” In, C. Becker, S. Mbaye et I. Thioub (Eds.). *AOF : Réalités et Héritages. Sociétés Ouest-Africaines et Ordre Colonial, 1895-1960*. (Dakar, Archives Nationales du Sénégal, tome II, 1997), 683.

¹⁷ O. Goerg (Ed.). *Fêtes urbaines en Afrique: Espaces, identités et pouvoirs*. (Paris, Karthala, 1999), 6.

¹⁸ M. M. Dieng. “Naissance et évolution d’une fête: Saint-Louis du Sénégal et son fanal.” In, O. Goerg (Ed.). *Fêtes urbaines en Afrique: Espaces, identités et pouvoirs*. (Paris, Karthala, 1999), 38.

The *Originaire* Muslim women I documented in this dissertation, found in the *Hajj* a convenient way to enter the impenetrable religious sphere through the establishment of sorority-like structures (*Mbootay*) and money saving systems (*tontines*) articulated around *Hajj* accomplishment and codes (medals ceremonies) meant to emphasize the merit of women pilgrims while fostering their pilgrim status. As such, they gradually took over the *Hajj* business and culture and fostered a whole new *Hajj* culture. Still today, the *Hajj* provides Senegalese female Muslims a convenient springboard to achieve social and financial promotion. In the process of securing social and financial comfort for themselves within the male-oriented colonial society, colonial Senegalese Muslim women positioned themselves as breadwinners and iconic figures of the Senegalese economic and social landscape. Under the impetus of colonial Senegalese Muslim women involved in the *Hajj* business, the all-female *Mbootay* system, and *Hajj*-devoted *tontine* system became standard structures in Senegal.

The Dakar-Plateau *Mbootay* women led by *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne I analyzed in this dissertation were the perfect prototypes of the *Originaire* women I have described earlier. Those colonial women made the most of their dual status as French citizens and as French colonial subjects, as well. However, I must point out the fact that *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne and many Dakar-Plateau *Mbootay* women were not average *Originaire* women. Most of them belonged to the Dakar Lébou community elite by their birth, marriage, or their personal financial fortunes. For instance, *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne and her Friend *Adja* Marème Ndir were respectively heirs to wealthy Lébou contractors Mathurin Diagne from Saint-Louis and Dakar-Plateau Lébou landowner Alassane Ndir. Also, *Adja* Nafi Mbaye was the wife of Joseph Mbaye, former Minister of *Economie Rurale* between 1957-1952. As such, the Dakar-Plateau *Mbootay* women enjoyed great financial autonomy, which certainly allowed them to manage the significant expenses attached to the accomplishment of the *Hajj* one a yearly basis, or to the accomplishment of the *Hajj* several times during their lifetime.

In this dissertation, I capture the main markers of the evolution of the *Hajj* institution in time and in space to map out the colonial legacies of the colonial system of *Hajj* management on the *Hajj* business and *Hajj* culture in today Senegal. I have used major works in social sciences dealing with cultural encounters in the colonial context,¹⁹ with modern government methods and surveillance theories and concepts,²⁰ and with Islam in differing contexts, as well.²¹ I have also intersected quantitative and qualitative research methods to assess my findings. For instance, to assess the epidemiological situation of Mecca pilgrims generally, I used the numerical data available in the reports of physicians (1947-1957). Likewise, I examined five meaningful *Hajj* experiences to highlight the main points of the *Hajj* business and culture at the apex of the vogue for *Hajj* during the colonial era, and until 2008.

When I returned in Senegal in 2005, the information I collected was less significant compared to the data I had collected during the reconnaissance phase between 2001 and 2003. Therefore, I essentially went back to informants I met during the reconnaissance phase. Many had passed away in 2005 (i.e. *Adjaratou* Pine Guéye). Until 2007, I focused on archival research to document the system the colonial administration established to carry out the process of regulation of the *Hajj* in French West Africa, and to assess the colonial legacies on the *Hajj* management system of today's Senegal. I mainly used the accounts from physicians of the Egypt Quarantine Board, or physicians on duty in pilgrim convoys during *Hajj* seasons.

¹⁹ M. Adas "Scientific racism and colonial education in British India and French Senegal." In, T. Meade & M. Walther (Eds.). *Science, Medicine, and colonialism*. (New York, Saint-Martin's, 1991), 4-35. F. Cooper & L. A. Stoler. *Tensions of Empire: Colonial cultures in a bourgeois world*. (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997).

²⁰ D. G. Horn. *Social bodies: Reproduction and Italian modernity*. (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1994).

²¹ L. Manger. *Muslim diversity: Local Islam in global contexts*. (Richmond, Curzon Press, 1999). Eickelman D. and Piscatori J. (Eds.) *Muslim travelers: Pilgrimage, migration, and the religious imagination*. (London, Routledge, 1999).

I also obtained from the family of *Adjaratou* Mame Yacine Diagne about one hundred pictures depicting the *Pèlerin* elite social life and the lively culture which emerged around the *Hajj* after 1946, and continued beyond the end of the colonial era. I obtained unique pictures of Originaire *pèlerin* women's reunions from *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye in the summer of 2003, at a time when I was losing hope of ever being able to document the responses of colonial Senegalese Muslims to the French management of the *Hajj*. In fact, literature regarding that topic was quite nonexistent. Indeed, archival records said very little about such issues, except for mentions of the duplicity of Originaire male Muslims trying to take advantage of the *Hajj* management system (see the case of Cheikhou Diop in chapter four). Obtaining the pictures was not easy, but *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye felt that "the work of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne in regards the promotion of Islam in Senegal needs to be publicized."²² I made the decision to shift the focus of this dissertation to local responses to the French management of the *Hajj* business more in line with the spirit of the moment.

The archival data was not as relevant to this study as I first anticipated. I found little material regarding the context which witnessed the implementation and structuring of the *Hajj* surveillance apparatus. At some point, I thought French colonial authorities did not communicate locally on that issue. I thought France kept strictly confidential a significant part of the colonial policy consisting, for instance, of devising good strategies for *Hajj* business regulation, or of how to implement the clauses of the various international hygiene conventions toward the *Hajj*. That made sense since we are dealing with actions likely to affect the religious agency of individuals already under foreign domination. I came to the conclusion that the archival material regarding issues of *Hajj* regulation in French West Africa is probably kept in other locations (e.g. in the Aix-en-Provence repository).

²² I discussed such issues with *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye, Oumy Diagne and Souleymane "Jules" Guéye. (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).

Yet, at the National Archives I found official orders instructing colonial officers to refrain from authorizing *Hajj*, and preventing colonial Muslims from going to Mecca. However, if the instructions, correspondence and telegrams provide some background information on the reasons why *Hajj* should be discouraged or prohibited in a given year, ministerial and gubernatorial orders and decrees are on the contrary quite direct. For this dissertation, I did focus on the cities of Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis for two reasons. First, I made that choice for the sake of convenience. Conducting oral surveys in more places to document the issue would have been time consuming. Second, I did want to focus on Islam in the context of the Four Communes. I enjoyed the experience despite the challenges embodied by the deficient and selective memories of witnesses, and the scarcity of recorded accounts and informants. For instance, *El Hadj* Galaye Fall was very sick when I met him back in June 2002. He had long decided to “push his experience in the back of his mind, because he never thought [such issues] could be of any interest to anyone.”

This dissertation contributes to the research on Islam, and on public health and hygiene in a colonial context. Pioneer African scholars dealing with the history of medicine often left aside the similarities between western and colonial health and hygiene regulations, and disease prevention methods. They remained within the limits of the geographical frameworks of their studies. However, bias has certainly played a role in the ways France handled *Hajj* regulation in colonial Senegal. Proving this are, the unflattering comments of health professionals on the carelessness of “*Libano-Syriens*”, *Indigènes* and “Africans” toward basic hygiene standards, compared to *Européens* and *Assimilés*, and *Originaires*. In fact, *Hajj* regulation methods largely drew on similar methods in effect elsewhere. The major contribution of this study to social sciences is the outlook on the life colonial Senegalese Muslim women created around the *Hajj*. The Dakar *Plateau* pèlerin pictures are indicative of the rich culture which developed against a background of purely religious obligations.

CHAPTER 1. Background

In this dissertation, I decipher the process of management of the Mecca pilgrimage - or *Hajj* - France established in French West Africa, particularly in colonial Senegal, in the early twentieth century. I suggest that, while restrictive in scope the apparatus of management of the *Hajj* also falls within the modern framework of the understanding of disease and its prevention. More specifically, I situate the impetus of surveillance of the Mecca pilgrimage from colonial Senegal within the worldwide nineteenth century and early twentieth century global contexts of disease containment in the context of the emergence of cholera in various countries of the world. That same impetus prompted the development of medical knowledge regarding disease identification and containment. To outside observers, non-Muslim scrutiny over the interactions of Muslims during *Hajj* was the rationale behind the French project consisting of monitoring the *Hajj*. Yet, although significant, surveillance in order to collect information on potential Muslim resistance attempts is only the tip of the iceberg.

We must go beyond such limited views in order to better understand the broad rationale and the specific stakes involved in the surveillance of the *Hajj* in French West Africa, including in colonial Senegal. Rather, we must consider the global socio-political context of the nineteenth century and twentieth century epitomized by the strengthening of control over individuals in the name of maintaining public health and modern hygiene standards. Since, the *Hajj* management process in French West Africa can be compared to similar processes in other parts of the world. However, what I have in this dissertation is not a system. Here, I take the word system to mean a set of facts arranged in well-defined and precise order. Indeed, I know the picture I draw is far from the exhaustive one I wished to paint when I started documenting this topic. I am aware that this interdisciplinary dissertation only provides the reader with possible answers to the issues of *Hajj* management generally, and management over Mecca pilgrims particularly, within the colony of Senegal.

A. General contribution of this study to the field of history

The *Hajj* as a religious endeavor, which followed the course of technological advancement, has already been the object of scholarly inquiry. For instance, many Africanist and African scholars have examined the relocation of pilgrim communities in interstitial spaces. A standard conclusion is that such processes are direct outcomes of the enforcement of modern travel regulations.²³ In this dissertation, I explore the issues of medical surveillance and the administrative surveillance of the *Hajj* business, and the issues of *Hajj* in the specific context of colonial Senegal, as well. While in line with the works of scholars for whom all historical processes fit in a spatio-temporal continuum, I explore new venues in social sciences.²⁴ I delineate the main occurrences which led non-Muslim policy-makers to enforce regulations in order to codify the most sacred pillar of the Muslim faith: the *Hajj*.

While some scholars looked at the long-term collateral processes, including the durable relocation in interstitial space along the road to Mecca of *Hajj*-bound West African Muslims, others have examined and documented the emergence and the consolidation of West African pilgrimage traditions and the various aspects of *Hajj* traditions from West Africa since the introduction of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa around the eleventh century.²⁵ However, while focusing mainly on the *Hajj* surveillance regulations and apparatus in the context of colonial Senegal and on the responses of colonial Muslims, I bring new insights to issues of Islam in colonial context, and I elucidate the interactions of Muslim women with Islam, as well.

²³C. Bawa Yamba. *Permanent pilgrims: Role of pilgrimage in the lives of West African Muslims in Sudan*. (London, Edinburgh University Press, 1995). J. Works. *Pilgrims in a strange land: Hausa communities in Chad*. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1976).

²⁴M. Adas. "Scientific racism and colonial education in British India and French Senegal." In, T. Meade and M. Walther (Eds.). *Science, Medicine, and Colonialism*. (New York, St-Martin's, 1991), 4-35. F. Cooper and L. A. Stoler (Eds.). *Tensions of empire: Colonial cultures in a bourgeois world*. (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997).

²⁵U. Al-Naqar. *The pilgrimage in West Africa: A historical study*. (Khartoum, Khartoum University Press, 1972).

1. Shedding a new light on a little studied issue

This dissertation is innovative because I intersect the methods of anthropology and history to emphasize the ways in which the *Hajj* shaped colonial public hygiene and current public health policies. Since the 1970s, other scholars have examined the evolution of the *Hajj* from a purely religious duty entirely supervised by Muslim participants, into an endeavor conceptualized and overseen by non-Muslims from beginning to end.²⁶ In addition to considering that unfolding in the case of colonial Senegal, I focus on how surveillance durably impacted public health, Islam, and the *Hajj* in the former colonies of French West Africa generally, and especially in colonial and in today's Senegal, as well.

I do not wish to set Islam and related issues apart as brand-new objects of scholarly inquiry. Such topics have extensively been examined since colonial times. Around 1895, French colonial administrators devoted important efforts to document the Islamic faith and culture in order to structure an efficient *politique Musulmanne* (Muslim policy). In essence, the Muslim policy was aimed at keeping West African Islam under scrutiny, while helping to understand the internal dynamics of a religion which presented at times fierce resistance to colonialism. In fact, the history of French West Africa is marked by Jihadist movements which influenced the course of Islam in the area.²⁷ Pioneer Orientalists such as André le Châtelier coordinated the implementation of the Muslim policy on the ground.²⁸

²⁶J. Baldry. "The Ottoman quarantine station on Kamaran Island, 1882-1914." Studies on the History of Medicine, 2 (1/2), March-June, (1978): 3-138. D. D. Long. *The Hajj today: A survey of the contemporary pilgrimage to Mecca*. (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1979). Peters. *The Hajj: The Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy Places*. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994).

²⁷L. Kaba. *The Wahhabiyya: Islamic reform and politics in French West Africa*. (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1974). D. Robinson. *The Holy War of Umar Tal: The western Sudan in the nineteenth century*. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985).

²⁸A. Le Châtelier. "La politique Musulmane." Revue du Monde Musulman, (Septembre 1910): 1-165. A. Gouilly. *L'Islam dans l'Afrique Occidentale Française*.

In the late twentieth century, anthropologist Leif Manger and others emphasized the difficulty of analyzing Islam outside of the theological mold to which it belongs, and of delineating the complexity inherent to its study.²⁹ There is abundant postcolonial scholarship on Islam in French West Africa, which is mainly concerned with the Muslim policy of France in Africa, or with the interactions of local Sufi brotherhoods with colonial regimes.³⁰ That scholarship permits to understand the major shifts in French West African Islam from militantism to accommodation to/collaboration with the colonial administration, and scholars to assess the major changes in ‘Senegalese’ Islam now characterized by the ability of elites to mediate between the State and social forces, especially in times of political turmoil.

Ramadan reminds us that, “never before [as in this post-9/11 world] have Islam and the Muslims been held up to such relentless scrutiny. [...] And yet never has knowledge of Islam, of Muslims, and of their geographical, political and geostrategic circumstances been so superficial, partial and frequently confused [...] even within academic circles.” He calls “upon intellectuals and journalists to broaden their frames of reference [and] to learn to apprehend the Islamic process in its own terms, through its own terminology, its internal categories, and its intellectual structures.” For him, “the time has come, as [Muslims] enter into another referential universe, to make every effort [to the best of one’s knowledge and ability] to distinguish between that which elucidates and makes possible diversity.”³¹

²⁹L. Manger (Ed.). *Muslim diversity: Local Islam in global contexts*. (Richmond, Curzon Press, 1999).

³⁰S. Gellar. *Senegal: A nation between Islam and the West*. (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995). C. Harrison. *France and Islam in West Africa, 1860-1960*. (London, Cambridge University Press, 1988). D. Robinson. *Paths of accommodation: Muslim societies and French colonial authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920*. (Athens, Ohio University Press, 2000). L. A. Villalón. *Islamic Society and State power in Senegal. Disciples and citizens in Fatick*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998).

³¹T. Ramadan. “Islam today: The need to explore its complexities.” *The Nieman Reports*, Islam: Reporting in context and with complexity, 61(2), (summer 2007) [online].

He suggests going beyond the radical /average Muslims levels of diversity, and taking “into account the multiplicity of cultures that today influence the way Muslims express adherence to Islam.”³² As far as I am concerned, I aimed to examine the *Hajj* surveillance process in French West Africa at-large. However, informed by the works of my predecessors, I realized that assumptions about a near-homogeneity of Islam and the *Hajj* can hardly be sustained.³³ Also, I noticed that the *Originaire*³⁴ Muslim group did not react the same way as other French West African Muslims to non-Muslim involvement in the *Hajj* business.

I have mentioned earlier that several social scientists had already emphasized the necessity to consider Islam in its diversity even in the case of such global and unifying contexts as the *Hajj*.³⁵ Along the same lines, Tariq Ramadan points out the shortcomings of many analyses that fail to interpret adequately the Islamic discourse and practice. In Ramadan’s opinion, “far too often [many] present their findings [...] with the assertion that they have taken pains to distinguish between radicals and conservatives, or average Muslims. But when we examine their offerings more closely, we note a striking lack of clarity and an atmosphere of incomprehension that can only generate suspicion and fear.”³⁶

³²T. Ramadan. “Islam today: The need to explore its complexities.” *The Nieman Reports*, Islam: Reporting in context and with complexity, 61(2), (Summer 2007) [online].

³³B. M. Cooper. “The strength in the song: Muslim personhood, audible capital and Hausa women’s performance of the *Hajj*.” *Social Text* 60, (1999). L. Kaba. *The Wahhabiyya: Islamic reform and politics in French West Africa*. (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1974). S. O’Brien. “Pilgrimage, power and identity: The role of the Hajj in the lives of Nigerian Hausa Bori adepts.” *Africa Today* 46, (1999): 10-40. C. Bawa Yamba. *Permanent pilgrims: The role of the pilgrimage in the lives of West African Muslims in Sudan*. (London, Edinburgh University Press, 1995).

³⁴The term *Originaire* applies to Africans born in the Four Communes (Dakar, Saint-Louis, Gorée, Rufisque) who enjoyed the *Droit du sol* (rights in relation to birth on given soils).

³⁵L. Manger (Ed.). *Muslim diversity: Local Islam in global contexts*. (London, Curzon, 1999). D. F. Eickelman and J. Piscatori. (Eds.) *Muslim travelers: Pilgrimage, migrations, and the religious imagination*. (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990).

³⁶T. Ramadan, op. cit.

This is even truer in this post-9/11 era where Islam has proved to be anything, but static and uniform. As a scholar writing on Islam-related issues in such challenging times, I also realized that the face of Islam in current Senegal is different from that homogenous unit. For instance, in the past, specialized Islamic literature was to be found primarily in private libraries, and in *Madrassas* (Islamic schools). Today, not only the whole Quran, but also interpretations of the Quran,³⁷ and guides to the understanding of the pillars of Islam, including the *Hajj*, are available from *librairies parterre* (sidewalk bookstores), and *bitiki mbaag* (“shoulder stores”) referring to the wooden boxes street vendors fill with various items and carry directly on their shoulders. Furthermore, Senegalese Muslim preachers have given away the Quran’s most intimate secrets once known to learned Muslims only.

In short, nowadays the Quran is accessible to average Senegalese Muslims. Yet, despite the greater access to the Quran and the overall consensus on its main tenets, diversity is the main marker of Senegalese Islam. In Senegal, Islam can be compared to a mosaic of various sensitivities. A broad range of reformist movements advocating orthodoxy (i.e. *Jamaatou Ibaadou Rahman*, *Moustarchidine*), and movements offering mystic alternatives to disciples (e.g. female cleric Ndiaye Mody Guirandou,³⁸ *Thiantacounes*) have emerged alongside the main Sufi *Turuq* (e.g. Muridiyya, Tijaniyya, Qadiriyya, and *Niassène*). Hence, in Senegal a wide variety of Muslim movements, which coexist in rather good harmony.³⁹

³⁷ *Maliki, Hanbali, Hanafi, and Shafi’* are the four schools of thought in Islam. In Senegal, Muslims generally abide by the *Maliki* (Imam Malik B. Anas (b. 179/795)) laws.

³⁸ P. Mbow. “Le phénomène Ndiaye Mody Guirandou: Hérésie ou émergence d’une nouvelle voie soufie dans l’Islam Sénégalais?” *Afrika Zamani*, 5, (1997), and 6, (1998) : 86-104. O. Kane and L. A. Villalòn. “Entre confrérisme, réformisme et Islamisme: Les Moustarchidin du Sénégal. Analyse du discours électoral de Moustapha Sy et Réponse de Abdoul Aziz Sy Junior.” *Islam et Sociétés au Sud du Sahara*, (9), 1995 : 119-201. O. Kane et J-L. Triaud (Eds.). *Islam et Islamismes et Sud du Sahara*. (Paris, IREMAM-Karthala-MSH, 1998).

³⁹ D. Westerlund and E. E. Rosander. (Eds.) *African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists*. (Athens, Ohio University Press, 1997), 12.

2. Connecting the colony of Senegal with the rest of the world

As early as 1982, distancing himself from most of his fellow scholars, Eric Wolf suggested that researchers dealing with culture and culture-related issues adopt more inclusive approaches. To him, cultures must be seen as sets of interconnected processes rather than isolated sequences.⁴⁰ Yet, in the 1990s, the tension embedded within the relationship between colonizers and colonized still framed most analyses of colonial encounters. That pattern is even more obvious in analyses of European medical activity in colonial Africa. While some emphasized the *mimétismes* (literally mimicry)⁴¹ between French and African health systems, others viewed the development of medical activity in colonial Africa a project aimed at securing an African workforce for emerging industries in the Western world.⁴²

However, I wish to adopt a more inclusive approach toward the study of medicine in the colonial context. I mainly draw from Myron Echenberg for whom, “concentrating exclusively on the medical dimension [in the control of epidemics] perpetuates the old cartesian paradigm of clinical medicine, which stressed the individual physiology of the human body while excluding the body politics from its purview. [Whereas,] in Senegal as elsewhere, the decision to declare a medical emergency and to grant wide interventionist powers to health officers, was, [also] a political, not a [mere] medical one.”⁴³

⁴⁰E. R. Wolf. *Europe and the people without history*. (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982).

⁴¹F. Pasnik. “Mimétismes sanitaires: Frein au développement, les pays francophones d’Afrique de l’Ouest.” (Paris, Université de Paris I, Thèse de 3^e Cycle, 1991).

⁴²A. Patton. *Physicians, colonial racism, and Diaspora in West Africa*. (Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 1996). D. Domergue-Cloarec. *Politique coloniale et réalités coloniales : La santé en Côte d’Ivoire*. (Toulouse, Privat, 1986). K. Ngalamulume. “Keeping the city totally clean: Yellow fever and the politics of prevention in colonial Saint-Louis-du-Senegal, 1850-1914.” *Journal of African History*, 45(1), (2004): 183-202.

⁴³M. J. Echenberg. *Black Death, white medicine: Bubonic plague and the politics of public health in colonial Senegal, 1914-1945*. (Portsmouth, Heinemann, 2002), 3.

I have slightly reshuffled the last sentence of the excerpt above in order to highlight the facts that the political dimension is not the only parameter, and the medical dimension cannot be entirely dismissed either. The history of colonial Senegal is spotted by sequences of epidemics (e.g. yellow fever), infectious (e.g. malaria), and contagious diseases (e.g. tuberculosis) which called for urgent medical action, along with concrete administrative legislation.⁴⁴ Furthermore, I agree with Echenberg that in the colonial context bubonic plague epidemics - and other diseases - can best be understood as part of the ideological contest between conquerors and conquered. Yet, I believe we must go beyond that binary opposition. They must situate the sequences of disease outbreaks in broader contexts in order to better grasp the rationale of colonial intervention, and local reactions to epidemics.

Pioneer researchers on issues of the medical history of the colonial world were justified in focusing on the arbitrary and excessive aspects of public health legislation in the colonial world generally and in French West Africa particularly. It is true that the content of the discourse of French authorities with regard to the rules devised to stop the spread of epidemics and contagious disease is quite explicit as regards the announced purposes of the *Assistance Médicale Indigène* (A.M.I.). During the interwar period, the official aim of the administration was to broaden the scale of the A.M.I., and direct it in such a manner as to fulfil the goals of preventive and social medicine while maintaining the primary purpose of medicine, which is to cure the sick. Indeed, French authorities clearly sought to improve the “*Indigène*” (Native) human stock “*en qualité et en quantité*” (in quality and in quantity).⁴⁵

⁴⁴ M. A. Diawara. “Histoire d’une maladie dite « sociale »: La tuberculose à Dakar, 1914-1940.” (Dakar, Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Mémoire de Maîtrise, 1997). M. M. Dieng. “Famines, disettes et épidémies dans la basse et moyenne vallée du Fleuve Sénégal.” (Dakar, Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Thèse de 3^e Cycle, 1992). M. Guéye. “Etudes des épidémies à Dakar (1900-1945): Les mesures sanitaires, la prévention, et leurs conséquences démographiques.” (Dakar: Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Mémoire de Maîtrise, 1995).

⁴⁵ GGAOF. *L’Assistance Médicale Indigène en Afrique Occidentale Française*. (Paris, 1931).

Furthermore, the establishment of the A.M.I. system on January 8, 1905, for instance, coincided with the rise of the *Parti Colonial Français* (created June 15, 1892), which “ambitioned to raise the colonial level of education of the French society.”⁴⁶ The *Parti Colonial* and similar organizations (the *Union Coloniale Française* (1893) and the *Ligue Coloniale* (1907)), served as fora for expression to many supporters of the colonial cause, and French *négociants* working for trading companies established along the West African coast. In the 1890s, France organized its territories in West Africa. Once the Ministry of colonies (March 20, 1894) and *Gouvernement Général de l’Afrique de Occidentale Française* (June 16, 1895) were created, French supporters of the colonial cause launched propaganda among opponents within French public opinion in order to promote the idea of expansion overseas.

The objectives of the *Parti Colonial* found resonance in the *Plan Sarraut*. French minister of colonies Albert Sarraut (1872-1962) insisted on the need to implement the program of *action sanitaire* contained in the *Programme de mise en valeur des colonies* he devised in 1921.⁴⁷ The program stemmed directly from an awareness of the human potential of the colonies, which transpired during the wide pre-war and war recruitment efforts labelled “*Appel à l’Afrique*” by historian Marc Michel. In France, some were quite comfortable with the idea of drawing from the African ‘human reservoir’, because France “had wasted heaps of gold, thousands of soldiers, and streams of blood in Africa.” Yet, if the French people “did not want the gold back, they expected [in return] the men, and the blood back *avec usure*.”⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Hereafter: P.C.F. The *Parti Colonial Français* took control of decision-making services within the French government beginning in 1892. See, M. Lagana. *Le Parti Colonial Français: Eléments d’histoire*. (Québec, Presse de l’Université du Québec, 1990), 4.

⁴⁷ A. Sarraut. *La mise en valeur des colonies Françaises*. (Paris, Payot, 1923).

⁴⁸ Literally: “with [very significant] interest rates” (my emphasis). A. Messiny. *Le Matin*, 3 Septembre 1910, quoted in M. Michel. *Les Africains et la Grande Guerre: L’Appel à l’Afrique, 1914-1918*. (Paris, Karthala, 2003), 15.

Based on such circumstances, researchers and average observers would be justified in reducing the European medical activity in Africa simply to a selfish scheme cloaked in the guise of “humanitarian acts conferring moral legitimacy on the sometimes heavy-handed European paternalist rule over the ‘other’.”⁴⁹ In this dissertation, rather than passing judgements - and drawing on Roy Porter - I attempt to understand and discuss the medical system implemented in AOF, and specifically the medical surveillance apparatus of the *Hajj*.⁵⁰ I think scholars should focus on the two levels of intervention, the administrative and the medical, in order to be more efficient as far as colonial medical activity in French West Africa, generally, is concerned, even if the announced motivation of administrative and medical parties for carrying out medical activity in French West Africa was essentially to curb the alarming morbidity and mortality rates among disease-ridden African populations.

One cannot deny the existence of cultural - if not of racial - prejudice in the implementation of public health policies. Yet, colonial officers were dependent on global and local upheavals (i.e. First World War. Additionally, and while receptive to the same events, colonial physicians also relied on the knowledge of disease emergence and transmission available at the moment (e.g. miasma theory, germ theory) in their fight against the causes of morbidity and mortality within the African milieu. Hence, the many misunderstandings and latent conflict between administration and health agents, which perdured throughout the colonial period.⁵¹ Nevertheless, we should not jump to the conclusion that the enforcement of *Hajj* regulation and surveillance in colonial Senegal was simply the expression of a need to cope with the threats of militant Islam in French West Africa, and global pan-Islam.

⁴⁹ M. J. Echenberg. *Black Death, white medicine: Bubonic plague and the politics of public health in colonial Senegal, 1914-1945*. (Portsmouth, Heinemann, 2002), 4.

⁵⁰ R. Porter. *The greatest benefit to mankind: A medical history of humanity*. (New York, W. W. Norton & company, 1999), 12.

⁵¹ See, ANS: 2G. “Annual Health Reports of *Dakar et Dépendances* (1920-1960).”

Despite early calls for more attention to issues of disease and medicine in African history, that area of investigation is still in infancy as far as the former territories of French West Africa are concerned.⁵² During the colonial era, roughly between 1895 and 1960, those chapters of the history of French West Africa were largely written from the standpoint of the colonial administration, and generally celebrated the triumph of science and civilization over backwardness.⁵³ It was not until the postcolonial era that former health professionals expressed disappointment with the methods used to carry out the “medical crusade” in the colonies, and also their dissatisfaction with the poor results yielded in the fight against the causes of morbidity and mortality in Africa despite their tremendous efforts and dedication.⁵⁴

It is true that, “healthcare played a large role in the implementation of the French ideal of civilization. [Indeed], to partake of the bounty of civilization, the benefits of medical knowledge were often no more than a form of ‘seduction’ through ‘medical diplomacy’.”⁵⁵ Yet, we should not focus on the instrumental role of medicine in the *mise en valeur* of the colonies. Elsewhere, researchers are no longer blaming the selfish motives of the medical initiative in the colonies, because the “colonial experience [has become] a distant past.”⁵⁶ Therefore, I focus on the social, economic and political contexts in which the events occurred.

⁵²G. W. Hartwig and D. K. Patterson (Eds.) *Disease in African History: An introductory survey and case studies*. (Durham, Duke University Press, 1978).

⁵³C. Mathis. *L'oeuvre des Pastoriens en Afrique Noire. Afrique Occidentale Française*. (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1946). G. Péter. *L'Effort Français en Afrique Noire*. (Paris, Larose, 1931).

⁵⁴S. Clapier-Valladon. *Les médecins Français d’Outre-mer : Etude sociologique du retour des migrants*. (Paris, Anthropos, 1982).

⁵⁵A. Marcovic. “French colonial medicine and colonial rule: Algeria and Indochina.” In, R. Macleod and M. Lewis (Eds.). *Disease, medicine and empire: Perspectives on western medicine and the experience of European expansion*. (London, Routledge, 1988), 103.

⁵⁶D. Wylie. *Disease, diet and gender: Late twentieth century perspectives on Empire*. In, R. Winkxs (Ed.). *The Oxford History of the British Empire*. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), 277.

3. Providing policy-makers with appropriate bases of comparison and action

The mid-nineteenth century European industrial revolution did not only bring about a revolution in technology. In fact, the technological progress was combined with a profound revolution in the areas of medical thought and practice. Also, that revolution produced equally important changes in the lives generally - and in the health particularly - of the world population.⁵⁷ Since antiquity, western medical knowledge generally rested on lay beliefs summarized in humoral theory. In the humoral view, “the body [was] seen as a microcosm of the world [and] its inner workings [as] a parallel to those of the universe, or macrocosm. [...] Nature, whose elements were earth, fire, air, and water, corresponded to the bodily humours [e.g. black bile, phlegm, yellow bile and blood]. [...] Associated with these elements and humours in a complex theory were the four qualities, wet, dry, hot and cold.”⁵⁸

In that line of thinking, diseases were understood as humoral imbalances, and “medicine” was the business of lay people within the private sphere (home). Concomitant with that humoral theory regarding disease was the miasma theory, which “identified the cause of disease as pollution of the air by rotting organic matter or stagnant water. [The miasma theory] co-existed with the less influential theory of contagion, derived from the Old Testament which held that tiny seeds acted as infective agents and could be passed from person to person causing specific diseases.”⁵⁹ In France, contagion “figured prominently in ways both real and metaphorical in social thought and policy”⁶⁰ until the nineteenth century.

⁵⁷ A. Cliff, P. Haggett and M. Smallman-Raynor (Eds.). *Deciphering global epidemics: Analytical approaches to the disease records of world cities, 1888-1912*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁵⁸ C. Seale and S. Pattison (Eds.) *Medical knowledge: Doubt and certainty*. (London, Open University Press, 1994), 11.

⁵⁹ Idem, 32.

⁶⁰ A. R. Aisenberg. *Contagion: Disease, government and the “social question” in nineteenth century France*. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999), 3.

The invention of tools for clinical exploration and laboratory analysis led to the understanding of aetiology (how diseases arise and how they operate) and the emergence of epidemiology (the analysis of data collected using mathematical models). In that impetus, the “second half of the nineteenth century saw the heyday of bacteriological theory and practice with Louis Pasteur (1822-1895), Ferdinand Cohn (1828-1898), and Robert Koch (1848-1910) using the new laboratory tools to establish hypotheses of infection and contagion, often against entrenched opposition.”⁶¹ Such groundbreaking discoveries allowed the rise of the *anatomoclinique* approach to medicine in which physicians aimed to cure the ill rather than relying on alternative medicine. In that *anatomoclinique* worldview, physicians were able to touch, explore, and take control of the human body. Indeed, bedside treatment in which patients were confined and treated in their bedrooms was progressively abandoned in favour of confinement in hospitals which have existed in Europe since the middle-Ages.

The fourteenth century Plague pandemics led to the establishment of hospices and *lazarets* throughout Europe. However, the functions of medieval hospices differed from the roles of nineteenth century hospitals. In France, medieval hospices were controlled by the Church, and were meant to provide shelter to needy people and travellers. In the sixteenth century a new function was added to their initial purposes. That was partly the result of inflation and the subsequent growth of the population and mounting poverty. The Lyon *Aumône Générale* (1531-1534), Rouen *Bureau des Pauvres Valides* (1534-1535), and Paris *Grand Bureau des Pauvres* (1544) were even created to tackle poverty-related issues.⁶²

⁶¹A. Cliff, Haggett and M. Smallman-Raynor (Eds.). *Deciphering global epidemics: Analytical approaches to the disease records of world cities, 1888-1912*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 17.

⁶²D. Panzac. “Médecine révolutionnaire et révolution de la Médecine dans l’Egypte de Muhammad Ali: Le Dr. Clot-Bey.” *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée*, (52-53): 95-110. P. L. Laget et F. Salaün. “Hôpital et Europe: Aux origines de l’hôpital moderne, une évolution Européenne.” *Sève*, 3, (2004), (2): 22.

Help was mainly available within big cities. Therefore, European country people moved massively to urban centres. Rural exodus, in turn, led to the growth of the vagrant and outlaw segments of the population. The *Hôpitaux de la Charité* were created in Lyon (1614), in Orléans (1642), in Marseille (1643), in Toulouse (1647), in Angoulême (1650), in Blois (1657), in Riom (1658) and in Limoges (1660) for the internment of vagrants and outlaws. In Paris, the April 1656 *Edit* created three (3) such hospitals: the *Bicêtre* (for the internment of male vagrants and outlaws), *La Salpêtrière* (for women and young girls), and the *Pitié* (for young boys). However, the state differentiated between the “bad poor” (e.g. able-bodied beggar), and the “good poor” (e.g. orphans, old people, people with disability).⁶³ The State maintained the charitable purpose of hospitals - which was to provide assistance to the “good poor” – while transforming hospitals into places of confinement for outlaws.

The transformation of hospitals was not over yet. European hospitals even underwent additional and meaningful transformations in the nineteenth century. Hospitals became centres for the bedside clinical observation of disease patterns, and for the practical training of physicians through the collection of anatomical data directly from human corpses, since - from the 1830s roughly - epidemics (e.g. bubonic plague), and “social”/contagious diseases (e.g. tuberculosis) had become widespread in the West.⁶⁴ That turning point witnessed the emergence and the consolidation of a process of ‘medicalization’ of European and American societies. In that process, states, towns, private citizens, and initiatives all came together to engineer and develop progressively one new site of intervention in the form of public health.

⁶³ P. L. Laget et F. Salaün. “Hôpital et Europe: Aux origines de l’hôpital moderne, une évolution Européenne.” *Sève*, (3), 2004, (2): 22-23.

⁶⁴ See, J. P. Bardet, P. Bourdelais, P. Guillaume, et F. Lebrun. *Peurs et terreurs face à la contagion. Choléra, tuberculose, syphilis. XIXe-XXe siècles*. (Paris, Fayard, 1988.) J. N. Biraben. *Les hommes et la Peste en France et dans les pays Méditerranéens*. (Paris, Mouton, 1975). M. Pelling. *Cholera, fever and English medicine, 1825-1865*. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978). S. M. Rothman. *Living in the shadow of death: Tuberculosis and the social experience of illness in American history*. (Baltimore, Basic Books, 1994).

In the West, despite the persistence of the humoral worldview until the late nineteenth century roughly, state intervention in the management of public health was predominant. In colonial Senegal, humoral worldview and beliefs in miasma theory persisted in the way French authorities and colonial physicians documented and handled medical and sanitary intervention throughout the colonial period. In fact, colonial agents and physicians privileged environmental and cultural habits/behavior-related explanations in their fight against disease in the African milieu.⁶⁵ To them, lapses in hygiene standards jeopardized the health of colonial subjects, and impeded the colonial project.⁶⁶ However, in colonial Senegal - as elsewhere in the French Empire - physicians and civil servants assessed the situation of public health through the lens of hygienist theories, which prevailed in France at that time.⁶⁷

Against a backdrop of concern for the well being of their citizens and subjects, Europeans intended to tackle the sanitary problems posed by the *Hajj*. In the 1830s, the Hedjaz appeared as a “*champ de manoeuvre* [training field] for epidemics.”⁶⁸ Precisely, after the 1890-1895 Hedjaz cholera epidemics, colonial powers feared the potential danger returning Mecca pilgrims may pose to the rest of the colonial population. As a result, those colonial powers sought to devise specific conditions for those among the colonial population willing to make the *Hajj*. Indeed, they imposed restrictions using various provisions of the *Quran* and the ‘*A-hadith*, which prevent *Hajj* accomplishment under certain circumstances.

⁶⁵ All reports on the *Circonscription de Dakar et Dépendances* (1920-1940) include information on the role migrants’ “noxious cultural habits” played in the spread of diseases.

⁶⁶ P. Bertin. *Le problème de la colonisation devant l’hygiène*. (Bordeaux, Thèse de Médecine, n°57, 1920).

⁶⁷ A. Marcovic. “French colonial medicine and colonial rule: Algeria and Indochina.” In, R. Macleod and M. Lewis (Eds.). *Disease, medicine and empire: Perspectives on western medicine and the experience of European expansion*. (London, Routledge, 1988), 107.

⁶⁸ F. Borel. *Choléra et Peste dans le pèlerinage Musulman, 1860-1903*. (Paris, Masson & Cie, 1904), II.

After the Paris 1894 conference, France and Great Britain set aside their differences of opinion over trade to engage in international collaboration in order to minimize – or neutralize – the *Hajj* potential for disease dispersal.⁶⁹ With the October 31, 1938 convention amending the June 21, 1926 International Sanitary Convention, Europeans agreed to hand over supervision of the Sanitary Maritime and Quarantine Board of Egypt to Egyptian sanitary authorities (Part I, Article 1). Officials were asked “to instruct their health administrations to draw up directions enabling ship captains to [...] answer all questions asked to them by the sanitary authority with regard to the health of the ship during the voyage” (Part I, Article 44).

Indeed, pilgrims were to undergo a minimum three days observation at the *Al-Tor* Station for purposes of “sanitization and pest control” if required (Part II, Section I).⁷⁰ Quarantining sick and suspect persons in hospices, or quarantine stations was not an innovation in itself. But, the nineteenth century international interaction, cooperation, and legislation to stop the transnational spread of standard communicable and *Hajj*-related diseases were quite unusual.⁷¹ In our times, “globalisation has altered the traditional distinction between, domestic and international health threats and all of humankind is now immersed in a single microbial sea.”⁷² Such interaction/cooperation was unusual in the nineteenth century marked by the competition between France and Great Britain.

⁶⁹J. Baldry. “The Ottoman quarantine station on Kamaran Island, 1882-1914.” Studies on the History of Medicine, 2 (1/2), March-June, (1978): 3-138.

⁷⁰ADFAT. “Convention amending the International Sanitary Convention of 21 June 1926.” Australian Treaty Series, 4, (1939).

⁷¹O. Aginam. “Salvaging our global neighbourhood: Critical reflections on the G8 Summit and global health governance in an interdependent world.” Law, Social Justice, and Global Development Journal (LGD), (2004) (1). P. L. Laget. “Les lazarets et l’émergence de nouvelles maladies pestilentiennes au XIXe et au début du XXe siècle.” In Situ, 2, (2002): 1-13. Panzac, D. *Quarantaines et lazarets: L’Europe et la peste d’Orient*. (Marseille, Edisud, 1986).

⁷²O. Aginam. Idem.

It is true that much of the action and the legislation aimed at neutralizing the Mecca pilgrimage's potential for disease spread may seem inappropriate to many of us today. That task entailed an infringement on fundamental rights such as the right to attend religious meetings and to worship. Today, many see "health as both intrinsically and instrumentally an end in itself [...], and emphasize the value of health for individual agency."⁷³ Impeding individual rights - even for the good of "our global neighbourhood" – is often perceived as a contradiction in terms. Yet, the "transnational or globalised nature of emerging and re-emerging public health threats in an interdependent world"⁷⁴ along with the scarcity of data on disease emergence and modes of transmission urged for the enforcement of rules for travel.

In the current context of HIV/AIDS prevalence in Africa, epitomized by AIDS/tuberculosis infections, the debate around issues of health and human rights is more passionate than ever.⁷⁵ Some feel "the only solution" to combat AIDS transmission is "mandatory testing, and quarantine," while for others we must "not meddle with the rights of humans to have as much or as little unprotected sex as they choose."⁷⁶ Drawing on the nineteenth century management/surveillance model can help current health policy-makers achieve disease eradication. International cooperation has proved efficient in the past, and the *Hajj* is still handled as a source of disease spread by the World Health Organization.⁷⁷

⁷³ V. Neelakantan. "Tracing human rights in health." (Mumbai, The Centre for Enquiry into Health and Allied Themes (CEHAT)), (2006): 1.

⁷⁴ O. Aginam. "Salvaging our global neighbourhood: Critical reflections on the G8 Summit and global health governance in an interdependent world." Law, Social Justice, and Global Development Journal (LGD), (2004) (1).

⁷⁵ BBC News. *Africa*. "Dual Epidemics" threatens Africa." November 2, 2007 [online].

⁷⁶ BBC News. *Have your say*: "Is enough done to combat AIDS?" November 2, 2007 [online].

⁷⁷ Ministry of Health. "Incidence of Hajj-related Acute Respiratory Infection among Hajjis from Riyadh, 1423 H (2003G)." Saudi Epidemiology Bulletin, 10, (4), October-December 2003.

4. Research significance

This dissertation is concerned with the impact of the medical and administrative surveillance apparatus French colonial authorities established to monitor the *Hajj* beginning in 1895 in colonial Senegal. The implementation of surveillance upon *Hajj* and *Hajjis* was part of the efforts of the colonial administration to structure the *Hajj* business, while preventing the spread of contagious disease such as cholera in the emerging colonial domain. At the end of the nineteenth century, monitoring the movements and the behavior of people in order to contain the spread of disease was standard practice namely in Europe and in the United States with profound implications in the colonies, including in Senegal.⁷⁸ Surveillance of suspect individuals was the main preventive device used by public health professionals to target and neutralize germ-carriers through sanitization of dwellings, of belongings and bodies.

The aforementioned devices and other requirements (i.e. rules for international navigation, passport requirement, and vaccination) devised and applied at the international level, collided directly with individual rights, and affected large-scale movements of people such as the *Hajj*. Helped by the development of science and medicine, European countries set up and enforced regulations meant to organize the interactions of individuals within society and across borders. The goal was clearly to keep away all germs of contagious disease. Territories under European rule, including French West Africa, were not excluded in that fight against germs, and against germ carriers, as well. Germ carriers were perceived as time bombs and relentlessly targeted public health professionals everywhere inside city limits.

⁷⁸J. W. Leavitt. *Typhoid Mary: Captive to the public's health*. (Boston, Beacon Press, 1996). D. Lupton. *The imperatives of health: Public health and the regulated body*. (London, SAGE, 1995). P. Holquist. *Surveillance is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work: Bolshevik Surveillance in its Pan-European Context*. *The Journal of Modern History*, 69, (September 1997): 415-450. D. G. Horn. *Social bodies: Reproduction and Italian modernity*. (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1994).

This dissertation is important for various reasons. First, in this work I address the issue of medical and administrative surveillance of colonial Senegalese Muslim pilgrims going to Mecca for *Hajj* purposes. I argue that, while rooted in the contentious colonial context, the French initiative consisting in the enforcement of international regulations drafted at the health conferences held between 1851 and 1926 was in line with the twentieth century international concern for the global security of goods and people. The aim of French colonial authorities was to bring colonial Senegal Muslims and their counterparts to adopt more responsible ways of making the *Hajj* mainly through compliance with health preservation-oriented rules (e.g. vaccination, routine checkups), and through the reliance on safety-efficient travel options (e.g. colonial government-chartered boats and planes). For instance, incumbent Egypt-based French *médecins sanitaires maritimes* watched helplessly for decades as North Africa and West Africa Muslims wound up on the desert sands and rocks.⁷⁹

Second, average observers of the Senegalese society are often tempted to assume that Islam is the only resource in which Senegalese Muslims draw inspiration in their daily practice, because Senegalese Muslims claim they draw all the guiding principles for their daily life from the *Quran*. Also, most Senegalese Muslims agree that Prophet Muhammad is the prime example toward which all Muslims should strive. In fact, looking closer at the reality of Islam in Senegal, one quickly realizes that there is no doubt as to the wholehearted adherence of the majority of Senegalese Muslims to major concepts of the Muslim faith. Yet, in practice, many aspects of the local culture have been adapted to Islam. In some cases, the association between local culture and Islam is so convenient and convincing that average observers and Muslims, as well, often question the true nature of Islam in Senegal.

⁷⁹ F. Borel. *Choléra et Peste dans le Pèlerinage Musulman, 1860-1903*. (Paris, Masson & Cie, 1904). F. Duguet. *Le Pèlerinage de la Mecque: Au point de vue social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Editions Rieder, 1932). Casualties among pedestrian pilgrims were a source of concern among European officials in the Middle East.

Today, specialists on Islam in the modern world are inclined toward the use of approaches that are less inclusive. In recent years, the idea that Islam is that homogenous and unifying entity has come under attack. For example, Susan O'Brien has demonstrated how Hausa *Bori* adepts have used the *Hajj* to foster "very local conceptions of Islam in both material and symbolic ways."⁸⁰ In a concurring opinion, I provide the example of colonial Senegalese female Muslims to whom the *Hajj* has offered the opportunity to set the foundations economic affluence, social comfort, and *Hajj*-centered culture, through the use of the trade opportunities available to them in Mecca, and on the *Baraka* acquired thanks to the successful accomplishment of a once very unpredictable, if not life-threatening trip, as well.⁸¹ This dissertation provides additional proof that Muslims experience Islam differently even if all Muslims refer to Mecca as the centre from which all Muslims should draw inspiration and view the *Hajj* as the centerpiece of the Muslim faith despite being ranked fifth in Islam.

Last but not least, in this dissertation I distance myself from claims that Muslim women generally play only minor and passive roles in Islam. One common and prevailing idea is that Muslim women are not included in decision-making in Islam.⁸² However, the case of colonial and current Senegalese Muslim women who have managed over the decades to have almost full control over the *Hajj* business, at least in its most practical aspects, proves that such monolithic views deserve to be revised, especially in the context of Islam today. To this day, many Senegalese Muslim women have been able to build 'religious resumes' for themselves, while acquiring significant religious and financial credentials mainly through the completion of *Hajj* rituals at least on one instance, and sometimes on several instances.

⁸⁰ S. O'Brien. "Pilgrimage, Power and Identity: The role of the Hajj in the lives of Hausa *Bori* Adepts." *Africa Today*, 46 (¾), (Summer/Autumn) 1999: 11.

⁸¹ See chapter 4 and chapter 5.

⁸² C. Coulon. "Women, Islam and Baraka." In, D. Cruise O'Brien & C. Coulon (Eds.). *Charisma and brotherhood in African Islam*. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988), 113-133.

5. Research Methodology

I addressed the following four questions in this research. Specifically, how do we make sense of the non-Muslim (European) involvement in the organization of the *Hajj* business in French West Africa? That question is relevant when one considers that non-Muslims are forbidden to enter the sacred area in Mecca. Indeed, many French colonial officers attached great value to the respect of the religious integrity of colonial Muslims. What was the rationale for the non-Muslim involvement in the organization of the *Hajj* business⁸³ generally, and for the French management of the *Hajj* business in colonial Senegal, particularly? Was that French initiative motivated by the fear of the potential ideological and bacteriological infections colonial Muslims might face in the Holy Land? What were the responses of colonial Senegal Muslims toward non-Muslim surveillance of the *Hajj* business?

I situated the process of surveillance of colonial Senegal Mecca pilgrims within the framework of late nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century “public health diplomacy” in order to properly address those issues. I think surveillance of the *Hajj* business in colonial Senegal was part of the concern for the achievement of peace, security and conflict resolution very much present in the world at that time. From the 1830s onward, recurrent cholera outbreaks in the West prompted European powers to convene several international hygiene conferences between 1851 and 1926. Specialists attending hygiene conferences meant to take the problem of cholera, and other communicable diseases seriously. The tone of some delegates was quite vindictive in regard to the seriousness of the situation.⁸⁴

⁸³In this dissertation, “*Hajj* business” does not specifically refer to the commercial dimensions of the *Hajj*. It takes into account the administrative, medical and logistical chain established in order to move pilgrims safely from colonial Senegal to Mecca, and vice-versa.

⁸⁴“You do not compromise with cholera.” Dr. Fauvel (1866), quoted in F. Duguet. *Le Pèlerinage de la Mecque: Au point de vue social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Editions Rieder, 1932), 12.

Second, I did put the process of medical surveillance of colonial Senegalese Muslims in perspective using the context of the fight against all the causes of morbidity and mortality amongst the African population generally in the twentieth century in French West Africa, and more specifically, the implementation of the Assistance Médicale Indigène (A.M.I.) program (1905-1945) devised to promote true access to healthcare benefits for all, and to raise public health and hygiene standards within the African population. I wished to demonstrate that the French initiative consisting in overseeing the organization of the *Hajj* from French West Africa, and elsewhere, as well as in setting firm rules of travel for colonial Muslims going to Mecca, also fit within the initiative of the French government whose ultimate goal in terms of medical activity in French West Africa was summarized in the following words: “Regeneration of the African Race.” That objective was an outcome of the *Plan Sarraut*, which provided guidelines for the development of overseas territories mainly through the achievement of local economic vitality, and the improvement of public health and hygiene.

In summary, I used the data I collected in the repositories of the *Archives Nationales* in Dakar, private archives and witnesses’ oral testimonies in order to document the initiatives of French colonial authorities in matters of management of the *Hajj* business in colonial Senegal, and the *Hajj* experiences of colonial Senegal Muslims as well. In the process of documenting that history, I situated the initiative of medical surveillance of pilgrims from colonial Senegal within the course of colonial history, and within the debate on global contagion and cholera eradication (1851-1926). I also examined the relationships between the African/Islamic values of health and Western concerns about public health and hygiene. I came up with one major conclusion, which is that the progressive decline of pilgrimage to Mecca on foot via overland African passageways to Mecca facilitated the implementation of medical travel requirements for Mecca pilgrims, and saw the increased presence of Muslim women among the AOF Mecca pilgrim population over the years, especially in Senegal.

B. Research experience and main findings

Researching the issues of French management of the *Hajj* from colonial Senegal and the responses of colonial Senegalese Muslims to its implementation was never an easy task, mainly because I was confronted with a significant lack of data. Indeed, I realized from the early stages of field reconnaissance the extent of the vagueness of the topic for the informants I found in Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis. I selected the three cities because of the significance of their Muslim population and culture, and also because of their particular statuses as *communes de plein exercice* where common laws specific to France were applicable. I almost gave up the research topic when I began reconnaissance in Senegal in the summer of 2000. I was familiar with the city of Rufisque, which is only 26 kilometres away from Dakar. I decided to start the investigations in that city for the sake of convenience. I had already heard of several Rufisque Muslims who made *Hajj* on boat and on foot.

However, I soon realized that very few were able to provide me the information I needed. In their own words, many never felt the need to inquire about the *Hajj* experiences of their relatives simply because they did not attach any importance to that “old people’s business.”⁸⁵ I found myself wondering if I would succeed in documenting this topic. I confess that I am confident I was able to piece together some bits of an unknown part of the colonial history of Senegal. In fact, many people are aware that *Mbootay* and *Tuur* are reminiscent of the old ways of social interactions. The majority of current Senegalese Muslims are convinced that the *Hajj*-related tontine system is an innovation of postcolonial Senegal Muslim women. I myself was in that situation until I discovered the rich social life which emerged and prospered around the *Hajj* in postwar Senegal. Colonial Senegalese Muslim women paved the way for the emergence of local *Hajj*-based culture and social life.

⁸⁵ « *Booba dem Màkka mbirum maggàt la* » (old people only were interested in making *Hajj*). *El Hadj Seyni Dramé*. (Rufisque: Dangou Nord, June 20, 2005: 11:20 AM – 13:30 PM).

1. The main aspects of this dissertation research project

This research dealing with the long-term impacts of surveillance of colonial Senegalese Mecca pilgrims from 1895 onward is relevant for various reasons. In today's Senegal, there is a lot to say about the *Hajj* in its relationships with colonial efforts from Britain and France to regulate that fifth - and yet very important - pillar of Islam. West Africa was in the past home to numerous Muslims very vindictive at times toward colonial administrations, especially in the first half of the twentieth century.⁸⁶ Yet, it is likely that the colony of Senegal received special attention in regard to management of the *Hajj* business due to the long history of the relationships of French authorities with the Muslim population of colonial Senegal, mainly within the Four Communes (Dakar, Rufisque, Gorée and Saint-Louis). That is why I chose to conduct oral surveys among the Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis former Mecca pilgrims.

The French views on Islam and Muslim societies in West Africa were shaped by the previous experience of France with Islam in North Africa. In the twentieth century, Paul Marty was the main drafter of the terms of reference for the "*Politique Musulmane*" (Policy on Islam, or Muslim Affairs) of France in French West Africa generally. Paul Marty based his views and defined strategies drawing on ethnological surveys conducted throughout West Africa. Marty came up with what he termed *Islam Noir* (Black Islam) as opposed to North African Islam. However, recent anthropological and historical studies in Sub-Saharan Africa suggest that the ways Islamic dogmas are received and incorporated depends on the local realities of Islam and on the ways Islam is adapted to fit sometimes very local concerns.⁸⁷

⁸⁶D. Robinson et J-L. Triaud (Eds.). *Le temps des Marabouts: Itinéraires et Stratégies Islamiques en Afrique Occidentale Française v. 1880-1960*. (Paris, Karthala, 1997). J. Hanson. "Islam, migration, and the political economy of meaning: Fergo Nioro from the Senegal River Valley, 1862-1890." *Journal of African History*, 35, (1994): 37-60.

⁸⁷B. Callaway and L. Creevey. *The Heritage of Islam: Women, Religion and Politics in West Africa*. (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1994).

Drawing on that literature, I examine the elements of diversity colonial Senegalese Muslims brought throughout the years to the *Hajj* as a religious institution, and as a social and political institution, as well. In fact, in today's Senegal the *Hajj* remains the preferred religious endeavor for Muslims regardless of gender, because the majority wish to attain perfection through *Hajj* accomplishment combined with unconditional acceptance of the Oneness of God, and observance of daily prayers, fasting and alms. In colonial Senegal, as elsewhere, *Hajj* accomplishment provided particular recognition and acceptance in the very exclusive *Pèlerins* club.⁸⁸ Interestingly enough, colonial Senegalese Muslims took advantage of the social and economic opportunities offered by the *Hajj* business. In Saint-Louis for instance, male Muslim *El Hadj* Tidiane Diéne used his connections within the colonial administration and the European community to set up and consolidate profitable businesses as middleman between the administration, the maritime companies and Mecca pilgrims.⁸⁹

As for them, colonial Senegalese female Muslims came under the spotlight of urban life in the Four Communes. As a matter of fact, the *Hajj* gave to many of them a visibility which would have otherwise been denied. *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne and her *Mbootay* friends and partners established a social network epitomized by the *tontine* system, generally labelled money saving system, articulated around the *Hajj*. At first, the network was accessible to affluent women only by nature of circumstances, because significant amounts of money were required in order for Muslims to make the *Hajj*. However, over the years, the patronage of affluent women – such as *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne - allowed less wealthy Senegalese female Muslims to contribute to the large numbers of Senegal women *Pèlerins*.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ See Chapter 4.

⁸⁹ See Chapter 3.

⁹⁰ See Chapter 4.

This research project underlines some unsuspected aspects of Islam as practiced in colonial Senegal, and also in today's Senegal. Furthermore, this work brings to light new understandings and outcomes of Islam in Senegal. The most important aspect of the ways in which Islam is received, incorporated and translated locally is the *Tariqa*, which appears today as the symbol of the Islamic landscape in the eyes of the majority of average observers. *Tariqa* epitomized by revered Sufi leaders represented, and still represent, the major aspect of Islam in Senegal. Yet, this research revealed a no less important and unusual aspect of Islam as it is practiced in Senegal. That is, the remarkable use Senegalese Muslim women made of the *Hajj* to establish their economic and social situations within society. Under their impetus, *tontines*, *ganale*, and *Hajj* sweepstakes came into vogue in Dakar and elsewhere. *Mbootay* women began displaying their highly symbolic status as a distinguishing feature, and *Pèlerin* ways of life and being emerged - literally and figuratively - after the Second World War.

Another important finding of this research is that colonial Senegalese Muslims obviously never demonstrated resistance to the non-Muslim involvement in the French management of the *Hajj*. For instance, West African Wahhabiyya Muslims clearly opposed the involvement of French authorities in the management of the *Hajj* business which they felt was an infringement upon their rights to practice their religion in strict observance of the rules attached to *Hajj* performance.⁹¹ On the contrary, Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis Muslims seem to have had no second thoughts regarding the non-Muslim involvement in the *Hajj* business. However, we must not forget the mindset of Originaires Muslims who knew how to demand and maintain their privileges and identity within the colonial system.⁹²

⁹¹L. Kaba. *The Wahhabiyya: Islamic reform and politics in French West Africa*. (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1974).

⁹²For example, one Saint-Louis contact said to me: “we all knew very well how to be French when the situation required just that while retaining our African identity and values at the same time.” (Adama Séye. Saint-Louis: Cité Niakh, June 26, 2002).

2. Difficulties and shortcomings of the research

I began this research project with a clear idea of what I was looking for. In fact I expected to come up with the conclusion that colonial Senegalese Muslims overwhelmingly blamed the non-Muslim takeover of the *Hajj* business. I knew of the existence in Madina (Saudi Arabia) of a Diaspora linked with the Futa Region (Upper Senegal River Valley). I was confident that my investigations would lead me on the trail West African settlers in Cairo (Egypt), and in Saudi Arabia. Alpha Hashimi Tall, nephew of Al-Hajj Umar Tall and central figure of that Diaspora had stopped by Fort-Lamy (present day Chad) on his way to Madina in 1904. After that year, French authorities noticed an increase in the numbers of *Toucouleurs* Muslims passing through Fort-Lamy under the pretext of making pilgrimage to Mecca.⁹³

I devised my research plan with that benchmark in mind. I was going to collect archival data at the *Archives Nationales du Sénégal*, and seek oral testimonies and traditions where available (e.g. interviews, focus group, stories passed down from one generation to the next one, songs, poems). I was truly convinced that the main stumbling block would be the overabundance of data, rather than the lack of it. The first disappointments were soon to come with my inability to properly document the medical aspect per se (e.g. morbidity and mortality of colonial pilgrims prior to 1947) of *Hajj* business monitoring and surveillance. The medical reports I found in the archives pertained to the 1947-1957 period only. Nevertheless, I persisted in my initial approach because I was convinced of a cause and effect relationship in the involvement of French authorities in the management of the *Hajj*.

⁹³ANS: 19G2. Chef de Bataillon Gaden. "Questions Musulmanes (1906 – 1918): Notes sur les Toucouleurs récemment arrivés à Fort-Lamy." (Fort-Lamy, 10 Août 1906). Robinson D. *The Holy War of Umar Tal: The western Sudan in the nineteenth century*. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985). D. Robinson. *Paths of accommodation: Muslim societies and French colonial authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920*. (Athens, Ohio University Press, 2000).

Also, I heard of the existence of a mainly *Toucouleur* Diaspora, which emerged in the so-called *Dar Al-Islam* (Land of Islam), and probably in other places in the vicinity of Mecca and Madina. I tried correlating epidemic sequences in colonial Senegal around times of return from Mecca of colonial Senegalese pilgrims with epidemic sequences in times of *Hajj* in Mecca to document the medical aspect of the French management of the *Hajj* business in colonial Senegal. I decided to start with the review of correspondence between colonial authorities to gauge their opinion on the issue of the implications of the mid-nineteenth century bacteriological threat which emerged around the *Hajj*. Also, I envisioned assessing the extent of the undertakings in matters of *Hajj* business management in French colonial Africa, and to map out the shifts, if any, in *Hajj* management and regulation. I anticipated that the fight against the causes of disease and epidemic outbreaks was also the rationale for the intervention of French authorities in the management of the *Hajj* business.

In the archives, I researched files in sections 19 (Muslim affairs – 1900-1958) and 21 (Police and security – 1825-1959) of the G series in order to assess the extent of French authorities' actions to make the *Hajj* more hygienic in French West Africa in practice, and the potential responses of colonial Muslims, mainly in colonial Senegal. I was particularly interested in documenting the experiences of colonial Senegalese Mecca pilgrims especially, to hear from the experiences of former women pilgrims, with bodily disinfection and isolation, which were standard practice in quarantine stations established on the route. My aim was to understand how colonial Senegalese women comprehended, and above all how those women experienced the invasion of their privacy by non-Muslims, both individually and as a group. Again, I anticipated that West African Mecca pilgrims, including Mecca pilgrims from colonial Senegal, demonstrated hostility toward sanitation rules which a priori challenged a very important requirement of Islam. In fact, the Muslim religion squarely opposes bringing men and women close together at all times, especially in public settings.

I conducted exploratory surveys between May 2002 and August 2003 in Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis. During those years, I was tempted to build on my personal knowledge of Islam and on my personal experience of Islam as a Muslim woman, and also on the presuppositions I raised above, as well. I soon realized that I was looking in the wrong direction for at least two reasons. First, Muslim responses to the intervention of non-Muslims in the management of the *Hajj* business differed based on the local experiences with colonialism and the local realities of Islam in West Africa. I have already mentioned the way *Originaire* Muslims manipulated their African/Muslim/French identity to secure privileges. Along those lines, French colonial officials - and Muslim physicians, as well – emphasized their shared personal experiences with *Originaire* Muslims always inclined to wave the special status card. Those Muslims relentlessly claimed special advantages they felt were attached to that status. Several colonial agents voiced concern about that expectation.⁹⁴

Second, many Four Communes Muslims made the overland pilgrimage to Mecca. However, the core of the problem was money. Making the pilgrimage was a lifetime dream for all of the former pilgrims who travelled to Mecca “on foot” that I surveyed, but they lacked the necessary financial means to pay for the trip expenses. All were only interested in making their dreams come true. Resisting non-Muslim involvement in the *Hajj* business was not on their agenda. *Originaire* Muslims who stayed behind either paid the price for their recklessness, or they found new opportunities on the way to Mecca. Consequently, I decided to set aside the considerations of resistance to non-Muslim interference with Muslim affairs on religious ground. Rather, I made the choice to focus on the - sometimes indirect – ways *Originaire* male and female Muslims used to take advantage of the newly found business opportunities, and to create a whole new identity and social life around the *Hajj*.

⁹⁴ANS: 1H118(163). *Médecin Principal* Docteur Moustapha Touré. “Rapport Médical du Pèlerinage à la Mecque (1948).”

3. A personal journey in the labyrinth of the history of French West Africa

Conducting research for this dissertation topic on Islam and public health, and the French management of the *Hajj* from colonial Senegal and Muslim responses beginning in 1895, took me back to that day in May 1994 when I took my final oral exam on modern history at the University of Toulouse-le-Mirail (France). At the end of the oral exam, Professor Michel Bertrand (Hispanic World) and I started a discussion on my prospective career as researcher, and on the opportunities ahead of me as a specialist on the Hispanic world. For anecdotal purposes, I came out of the office with the topic of research for a Master project on the differing approaches of race in colonial Spanish America and on their implementation on the ground. I later gave up that project when Professor Danielle Domergue-Cloarec introduced me to medicine and public health in the history of French West Africa, with a topic on tuberculosis in interwar Dakar (1920-1940). Professor Bertrand said to me “now you are going to start the most exciting aspect of intellectual life, research.”

He explained to me that I was going to dig for evidence to write my own personal account of race in history, and he would only interfere to help me stay on track. To him, I was going to have a taste of the unique and exhilarating feeling of independence, because I was going to carry out my own project with little interference by the advisor. I never forgot the kind words of Professor Bertrand. I have not seen Professeur Bertrand since I left his office that day. Yet, I have ever since used those memories as a stimulus, especially during the most difficult years I spent investigating and documenting this doctoral project. It is only now that this project has neared fruition that I understand the message Professor Bertrand tried to deliver. I realize I have brought my own contribution to the study of Islam and public health in colonial Senegal. The task of assessing this work is the responsibility of the committee and whoever will come across this dissertation. Yet, I am glad I was able to enjoy the exhilarating experience of research under the guidance of Professor David Robinson.

This research project is the result of the combination of archival research and oral surveys conducted in Dakar, Rufisque, and Saint-Louis. I was already familiar with the archival material on health and medicine in French West Africa since I started in 1994 researching my Master project on tuberculosis in Dakar during the interwar period. During the process of documenting that topic, I noticed that French colonial authorities clearly established a link between the increase of epidemics outbreak (e.g. yellow fever, plague) in colonial Senegal and the behavioural and cultural habits of the “Oriental” population. In fact, Lebanese and Syrian people had started an emigration movement toward West Africa, including toward Senegal, around the end of the nineteenth century. In Senegal, they were attracted by the development of the cash crop economy epitomized by the flourishing peanut trade. I realized that Syrian and Lebanese migrants were seen as “threats, or dangers, to public health.” Particularly, Syrian and Lebanese peddlers were perceived as disease vectors, and dealt with as such especially in times of epidemics due to their great mobility.

In times of trade, Lebanese and Syrian traders and peddlers acted as brokers between peanut farmers in rural areas and peanut trading centres located in the colonial Senegal peanut basin (e.g. Kaolack). Therefore, colonial authorities felt it necessary to control the movements of that segment of the population. We must remember that, in colonial Senegal segregation was the major large-scale preventive device used by the French administration to contain epidemic outbreaks, especially at the height of yellow fever attacks in the early twentieth century. Between 1900 and 1905 roughly, yellow fever persisted in quite an endemic state in Dakar, Rufisque, and Saint-Louis, prompting colonial authorities to interrupt all communications to and from those cities sometimes for long periods. At some point, colonial authorities established special health passports for Lebanese and Syrian peddlers. This is not to say that colonial authorities considered Lebanese and Syrians as inferior to Africans. However, they feared the health risks involved in the movements of people.

At some point, I wondered if colonial authorities restricted the contacts of Lebanese and Syrians with Africans for the purpose of disease prevention at the apex of epidemic outbreaks, or if disease prophylaxis was only the tip of the iceberg. In the early twentieth century, French colonial authorities were suspicious of “Orientals.” In fact, they felt Moroccans, Lebanese and Syrians were responsible for the introduction in Senegal of seditious literature in Arabic. On November 15, 1911 Gouverneur General William Ponty instructed local governors “to keep an eye [on the Arabic literature and destroy all samples] capable of encouraging *Marabout* action.”⁹⁵ I was familiar with the ancient ties between West African Muslims and North Africans developed along *Hajj* roads and the international debate about the role of returning *Hajjis* on the cross-border spread of cholera into Arabia.

France was central to the international debate about the origins of the 1831 cholera epidemics. Indeed, French policy-makers had experienced the high potential of epidemics for social disruption at home since the 1830s. Consequently, they took the issue of *Hajj*-related cholera and its potential spread to French West Africa to heart. I assumed French colonial authorities made aware of the emergence of new sources of cholera infection in Arabia had taken appropriate measures in order to protect their French West Africa-based colonial domain – also home to a large Muslim population since the eleventh century roughly – not only from cholera, but from all potential communicable diseases altogether. In the nineteenth century already, Algerian colonial authorities adopted official regulations, in order to exert control over the financial resources of prospective North Africa pilgrims.⁹⁶ In so doing, they sought to put some order in the *Hajj*, which claimed many lives among Muslims each year.

⁹⁵ ANS: 19G1. N°105°. W. Ponty. Bureau des Affaires Politiques, Administratives et Economiques. “Surveillance de la Presse Musulmane.” (Dakar, 15 Novembre 1911).

⁹⁶ C. R. Ageron. *Les Algériens Musulmans de France, 1871-1919*. (Paris, Bouchène, 2005). JOAOF : N° 140° – W. Ponty. “Circulaire au sujet du pèlerinage de la Mecque.” (Dakar, 9 Juillet 1909), 334.

Building on the Algerian General Government experience with pilgrimage and dubious about the influence of Arabic literature on West African Muslims despite the non-existence of immediate threats, Governor General William Ponty instructed the French West African local governors to provide firm answers to the four following queries. First, what arrangements were made in each colony to organize the departure of prospective pilgrims for Mecca, and which rules did authorities enforce locally? Second, specify the number of requests to undertake pilgrimage to Mecca filed every year in each colony. Third, provide an idea of the average number of natives from French West Africa “using the overland routes to go to the Holy Sites of Islam, without the government knowing on each *Hajj* season.” Fourth, clarify if West African pilgrims travelled alone, or with their spouses, because many Black women taken along to Mecca had been sold as slaves in the past. Governor Ponty, also asked local governors to assess the significance of the *Hajj* in their respective colonies.⁹⁷

Actually, Governor General William Ponty was trying to respond to queries of the Paris-based Department of Foreign Affairs, which was looking for answers regarding “the administrative procedures adopted vis-à-vis Muslim natives requesting government authorization to undertake the Mecca pilgrimage.” Ponty meant to propose “a special regulation in order to prevent the departure of pilgrims with insufficient funds.”⁹⁸ Until 1909, the common policy aimed at the progressive eradication of overland pilgrimage in order to reduce the repatriation every year of scores of indigent Mecca returnees at the expenses of the General Government was not yet in place. However, French authorities in France and in French West Africa felt that in the colonies the *Hajj* was in need of regulation. I chose to investigate that section of the history of colonial Senegal armed based on the available data.

⁹⁷ JOAOF: N° 140^c. W. Ponty. “Circulaire au sujet du pèlerinage de la Mecque.” (Dakar, 9 Juillet 1909), 334.

⁹⁸ Idem.

4. Outcomes of *Hajj* regulation on the lives of colonial Senegal Muslim women

A lot has been said about the role of Muslim women as “*Agents Religieux*” in the Sokoto Caliphate,⁹⁹ and elsewhere. Conventional wisdom generally assumes that women only play minor roles in Islam. It is true that some West African Muslim women such as Nana Asma’u (1793-1864), teacher and poet, and daughter of Sokoto Caliph Usman Dan Fodio (1754-1817), have left their marks on Islam in West Africa. I will not venture into claiming that learned Muslim women were able to measure up to men in terms of number. Yet, in today’s Senegal learned Muslim women are very visible in the public sphere and in the media landscape where they pit themselves against learned men in terms of interpretation of the *Quran*, and on current issues from the perspective of Islam. However, average observers often picture Muslim women as second-class Muslims with little influence on Islam, except for its most obligatory aspects such as saying one’s prayers five times a day, and fasting.

Still, Muslim women are portrayed as accompanying figures having no opportunities to influence decision-making in Islam. That is not inaccurate, since the clause of separation between men and women, so dear to Islam, keeps Muslim women from occupying leadership positions, at least openly. In Senegal for instance, *Sokhna* Mame Diarra Bousso, *Sokhna* Fawade Wélé, and *Sokhna* Mame Astou Diankha are always mentioned as examples of piety for average Muslim women. However, the three women share one thing of common: they are respectively the biological mothers of the most revered Senegalese Sufi leaders: Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba Mbacké, *El Hadj* Malick Sy, and *El Hadj* Ibrahima “Baye” Niasse. Those *Sokhnas* gained their credentials through extreme self-sacrifice and devotion to their spouses. Their revered sons are seen as God-given rewards for their abnegation and dedication to their spouses. Sufi leaders are still referred to as “*doomu Sokhna*” (children of Sokhna).

⁹⁹J. Boyd and L. Murray. “The role of women as “*Agents Religieux*” in Sokoto.” Canadian Journal of African Studies, 19 (2), (1985): 283-300.

However, wanting to be a Sokhna does not make every willing woman a Sokhna. In the collective imagination, accession to that privileged status requires many sacrifices than average women are usually able to accept in practice. In any case, in Senegal many Muslim women have good command of the Quran and Islamic studies, but many of them seldom go beyond teaching the *Quran* to students within collective Madrassas, or Madrassas which they established.¹⁰⁰ In fact, colonial Senegalese Muslim women used Muslim institutions in the conventional way, and also in a novel way. Specifically in the case of the *Hajj*, while apparently maintaining the pattern of that major Islamic institution with all the rules and rituals attached to it, colonial Senegal women emptied some aspects of the *Hajj* of their original meanings, and changed their purposes. Under the influence of women the *Hajj* status, which normally applies to pilgrims during *Hajj* time only became perennial. Through that device, women were able to create a community they all identified with.¹⁰¹

Under the impetus of colonial women, the *Hajj* gradually became a social artefact in spite of its highly religious content. Colonial Muslim women used already existing socializing structures, such as the *Mbootay* – once used to bring together women of the same generation and their relatives to interact around good meals. The apparatus for the administrative and medical surveillance of the Mecca pilgrimage in French West Africa that Governor General Ponty planned in 1909 was in place by 1945. The months-long trips to Mecca via Fes (Morocco) and Beirut (Lebanon) organized and monitored by colonial authorities mainly attracted colonial Senegalese Muslim women. Around the *Hajj*, colonial women developed entirely new ways of behaving. Therefore, the *Adjaratou* (or *Adja*) became at the same time the symbol of female religiousness and of social success altogether.

¹⁰⁰ In Dakar, the *Seyda* Mariama Niasse Franco-Arabic School owned by the daughter of Tijaniyya cleric *El Hadj* Ibrahima “Baye” Niasse is the perfect example of Madrassas founded and run by Muslim women.

¹⁰¹ See, chapter 4.

5. Memorable encounters

A lot has been said – including in this dissertation - about the ways Senegalese Muslims incorporate Islam in their daily lives. However, despite the significance of *Tariqa* affiliation among Senegalese Muslims, all generally highly value the *Hajj*. In precolonial and colonial Senegal, as elsewhere, the *Hajj* was mainly the business of clerics (e.g. *Al-Hajj* Umar Tall) and learned Muslims. Often accompanied by significant followings, they took the overland routes across West Africa to Suakin (British Sudan) where they embarked on Jeddah-bound boats. The trip to Mecca on foot across far-off and hostile lands was anything but easy. Many were called but few were chosen, which added to the confidence of successful returnees in personal predestination for salvation. Upon return, some former pilgrims capitalized on the expertise in Islam newly acquired in various areas of the Muslim world, while all returnees enjoyed lasting recognition from their peers and average Muslims within the community.

Besides prominent clerics such as *Al-Hajj* Umar Tall, many more anonymous West African Muslims took on the challenge of venturing on dangerous routes across the savannas and the desert to Mecca with scant luck at times. Almost all anonymous pilgrims shared at least three things in common: motivation, temerity, and good physical condition. In fact, the witnesses I surveyed unanimously mention faith and the desire to see the *Kaaba* and the tomb of Prophet Muhammad as the rationale of Mecca pilgrims for undertaking the *Hajj* across the desert routes. However, such a trip required a certain degree of motivation and temerity, because some areas were considered very dangerous.¹⁰² For instance, *El Hadj* Galaye Fall claimed “there is no place in the world where the crime rate is as high as in present Chad.”¹⁰³

¹⁰²Insa Niane (Saint-Louis: Guet-Ndar-Tak. May 29, 2002: 1:20 PM – 1: 45 PM). Abdou Salam Touré (Rufisque: HLM. May 18, 2002: 1:00 PM – 2:30 PM).

¹⁰³*El Hadj* Galaye Fall (Saint-Louis: Léona-Eaux Claires. June 2, 2002: 3:45 PM – 6:00 PM).

I must admit that I was particularly impressed with the stories I heard from former pilgrims who risked their lives on arid and remote desert trails, and also from the descendents of now deceased former pilgrims. Many non-Muslim observers were equally impressed and wondered how those people managed to survive in such hostile environments on very little food.¹⁰⁴ In fact, the former pilgrims who made *Hajj* through overland routes I surveyed, even with disabilities such as *El Hadj* Soucoundou Niane, were mentally and physically resilient. For instance, Saint-Louis Muslim *El Hadj* Dame Sarr always “refrained from taking even one single aspirin tablet during his life, even at the height of malaria crises.” In such circumstances, the only medicine he requested was a popular dish made among other things with crushed millet, sorrel leaves, and smoked herring.¹⁰⁵ That will to resist the attacks of malaria and other diseases provides some clues about the men who ventured out onto the roads to Mecca. In fact, refusal of medicine can be viewed as a mere lack of faith in western medicine, but that also reveals sheer self-will and ability to handle pain and physical efforts.

As I am about to make restitution of the results of my inquiries, I remain convinced I met anonymous and uncommon characters, the personal *Hajj* stories of which may contribute to better understand the issues involved in the colonial management of the *Hajj* business. In today’s Senegal, making *Hajj* has become very common in spite of the rising costs of plane tickets. So much so that Senegal Muslims joke about the fact that, “riding a plane to Mecca is as easy as riding a Dakar-bound commuter bus.”¹⁰⁶ Today Senegalese Muslims believe making *Hajj* during colonial times required the intervention of God. That is probably why the accounts of *Hajj* experiences I used in this work sound so extraordinary in all respects.

¹⁰⁴ F. Duguet. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Du point de religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Rieder, 1932).

¹⁰⁵ Bassirou Sarr (Saint-Louis: Goxu Mbathie. June 2, 2002, 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM).

¹⁰⁶ Anonymous caller on radio talk-show « Kaddug Islam » (Radio Futurs Médias (RFM): September 26, 2008 – 11:00AM to 12:00PM).

I particularly enjoyed talking to *El Hadj* Galaye Fall, as well as to the relatives and friends of late former pilgrims such as Saint-Louis natives *El Hadj* Samba “Corre” Thioune, *El Hadj* Amath Ba, and Dakar female Muslim *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne. For instance, I established special ties with *El Hadj* Baye Galaye Fall during the three months I spent in Saint-Louis looking for witnesses of the events I was trying to document. When I met “Baye” Galaye Fall in the afternoon of June 2, 2002, I had lost hope of ever finding alive one single former pilgrim who successfully made the overland trip. I still wonder if many in Saint-Louis were aware of the past *Hajj* experience of *El Hadj* Galaye Fall. I started the inquiries with the help of Fatima Fall the assistant to Abdul Qadir Aidara (Director of the Saint-Louis-based *Centre de Recherche ET de Documentation du Sénégal* (CRDS)). Fatima Fall made the documents available in the CRDS repository to me, and arranged a meeting for me with her grandfather *El Hadj* Abdoul Magib Diop, Imam of Saint-Louis Greater mosque.

El Hadj Abdoul Magib Diop was knowledgeable about colonial life in Saint-Louis. However, he referred me to Baye Moussé Ba “who knows everyone in Saint-Louis.”¹⁰⁷ Baye Moussé (‘Franky’) Ba is a major political figure in the city. He provided me over forty names of Saint-Louis Muslims who made the *Hajj* “on foot” (*rungu*) and on boat before 1960. I insisted on discussing those two categories of travellers only, since I was seeking to document the experience of pilgrims with colonial surveillance. Also, it seems that overland and sea routes were the preferred options of colonial Senegalese Muslims prior to 1960. However, “Franky” Ba insisted that although many were poor, they were devoted to seeing Mecca.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ *El Hadj* Abdou Magib Diop (Saint-Louis: Ndar-Toute. May 12, 2003: 9:00 AM – 10:00 AM).

¹⁰⁸ Baye Moussé “Franky” Bâ (Saint-Louis: Nord. May 29, 2002: 8:00 PM – 9:00 PM). Baye Moussé Bâ is a central figure of the political life in Saint-Louis. I met him at the headquarters of the ruling Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) located at a walking distance of the Saint-Louis Greater Mosque.

“Franky” Ba named several former pilgrims such as *El Hadj* Pape Guéye Issakha (Chief Clerk at the Saint-Louis Court of Justice) who made *Hajj* over ten times. Among other informants, *El Hadj* Khaly Niasse¹⁰⁹ confirmed much of the information “Franky” provided me. Both “Franky” Ba and Khaly Niasse referred me to the house of *El Hadj* Mafall Seck – son of *El Hadj* Masseck Seck - in Eaux-Clares.¹¹⁰ They both felt the 1928 *Hajj* experience of *El Hadj* Masseck Seck was worth investigating, because *El Hadj* Masseck Seck and his companions *El Hadj* Mawo Sène and *El Hadj* Doudou Thioune had created quite a commotion in those days in Saint-Louis. I met *El Hadj* Mafall Seck at his place in Eaux-Clares. He apologized for being able to provide hearsay evidence only, because he was not born when his father made *Hajj* a first time, in 1928 and again in 1931. Consequently, he proved unable to provide answers to many of my queries. On several occasions, *El Hadj* Mafall Seck heard his father say they sailed to Mecca through Port-Said and Alexandria.

To go back to *El Hadj* Galaye Fall, I ventured to ask *El Hadj* Mafall Seck one perfunctory question: do you know of anyone (relative, or Saint-Louis native or resident) who made the *Hajj* “on foot” before 1960? He stared at me, and as if by magic, he remembered that his own cousin Baye Galaye Fall (a former butcher) and his late friend Badara Seck (a former tailor) made *Hajj* “on foot” in 1958, or in 1959. I still do not believe what happened next, because I heard what I no longer expected to hear. *El Hadj* Mafall Seck said Baye Galaye Fall was still alive, but very sick. He lived about three blocks away from his house. He then asked his granddaughter to take me there. We went to the other side of Eaux-Clares, by the area clinic. I entered the house and found the spouse of *El Hadj* Galaye Fall as she was sitting in the yard. I introduced myself and stated the purpose of my visit to her husband. She took me inside the house, to the lounge where I found a man laying down on a couch.

¹⁰⁹ *El Hadj* Khaly Niasse (Saint-Louis: Nord. May 29, 2002: 11:00AM – 1:00PM).

¹¹⁰ See, chapter 4.

The man on the couch was *El Hadj* Galaye Fall. He looked at me, and started telling me about his three experiences with a vigour and an attention to detail I did not expect from a man in his condition. From the beginning, as I listened to *El Hadj* Galaye Fall's experiences I was trying to appreciate my luck in finding a witness in such a poor condition able to come up with so much very detailed and vibrant - to say the least - information in one single meeting. I did not want to interrupt him, because I did not expect him to hold out for more than fifteen minutes. He seemed to effortlessly remember the most eventful moments of his first trip to Mecca for *Hajj* purpose. He seemed to remember all the places he visited, the dates and times the events occurred, as well as the names of the people he met in French Sudan, in Chad, in Niger and elsewhere. On several occasions, I forced him - without him knowing - to go back to some of the things he had mentioned earlier in his narrative. The purpose was to bring him to confirm his story. The narrative was consistent all along, even when I returned a couple of weeks later in order to try to collect more information from *El Hadj* Galaye Fall.

I became acquainted with *El Hadj* Galaye Fall and his family. So much so, that I used to call him occasionally over the phone when I returned to Dakar and his death came as a shock for me even though I knew that the probability of him passing away sooner or later was high. The last time I called his number in December of 2006 his son picked up and handed the phone to his mother. She greeted me at length and delivered the sad news to me. "It is over, your friend is gone. He passed away in October." As I was trying to make sense of the news, she went on saying: "we sure can keep hope alive, he left quietly the day it rained buckets on Saint-Louis." I remembered indeed hearing of that specific event in the media. Whoever is familiar with the belief system in Senegal might understand the message she was trying to put across. Still today in popular Senegalese culture, people believe that the death of charismatic figures is often materialized by consistent changes in the atmosphere, very often heavy rains, as if the sky itself expresses pain for the loss of Saint-like characters.

Conclusion

As aforementioned, I started investigating this research topic with a clear agenda. Initially, my aim was to establish the missing link between the relocation eastward – especially in former British Sudan and Chad - of West African Muslims from colonial Senegal and the takeover of the management of the *Hajj* business by non-Muslims – specifically of French colonial authorities. I devised that topic with that aim in mind. Between 1999 and 2000, I even tried to set up a network in Cairo through email contacts with scholars at the American University of Cairo, such as Egyptian sociologist Mona Abaza. She gave me indications on the diversity of the West African community in Cairo. However, she acknowledged that she was neither in a position to confirm the presence of colonial Senegalese Muslims among the West African Muslim Diaspora in Cairo, nor was she able to confirm the relationship between their presence - if confirmed - and the non-Muslim involvement in the *Hajj* business through medical and administrative surveillance of pilgrims

I soon realized the near impossibility of documenting that segment of the history of colonial Senegal. However, I must indicate that I was not in a position to carry out that research for at least three reasons. Firstly, even though I have had enough time I never had a chance to go meet the West African Muslim Diaspora in Egypt, Sudan and Chad. Secondly, I was not able to document the existence of *Hajj*-related Muslims from colonial Senegal in Mecca, Madina, or other places eastward through archival research even though I found information pointing to the migration of Muslims from the Senegal River Valley – known as the *Toucouleurs* – under the pretext of making *Hajj*. Thirdly, I found no indication of bitterness toward the involvement of French authorities in the *Hajj* business, at least among the Muslims from the former communes of Dakar, Saint-Louis and Rufisque I surveyed. Rather, it seems that the colonial male and female Muslims from Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis generally welcomed that colonial initiative, especially after World War II.

CHAPTER 2: Public health in its global, regional and local contexts

The process of surveillance of French West African Muslims, including colonial Senegalese Muslims, cannot be understood as a unique event which occurred out of any geopolitical context. This is not to say that there were no calculations involved in the implementation of the medical and administrative monitoring of French West African Mecca pilgrims – including colonial Senegalese Mecca pilgrims. Some of the telegrams, instructions and mail labelled “*SECRET*” or “*CONFIDENTIEL*” I found in the archives, indicate a concern for the preservation of the image of France. Especially, during the First World War and the interwar period, archival records indicate the existence of exchanges between French policy-makers about the need for France to make a good impression on Germany and its Ottoman ally. For instance in 1926, they thought preventing French West African Muslims from making the *Hajj* would send the wrong message, especially to Germans and Ottomans.

In fact, the concern for the risks of spreading various germs of deadly diseases such as cholera was obvious. As proof, the debate about the need to contain pilgrimage-related cholera and other epidemics, as well, was ongoing from the first Paris International Hygiene conference in 1851 until the adoption of a global public hygiene convention regulating the *Hajj* in several respects in 1926. Indeed, research on modernity and public health has demonstrated that the fight against disease causal factors and germ-carriers justified in the mid-nineteenth century infringement upon individual rights to often hardly conceivable extents, especially from our current perspective. Although the causes of many diseases had been identified, the state of global scientific knowledge and research in the contexts of wars and the rise of nationalism was quite favourable to the adoption of restrictive methods of public health management. That is why I am tempted to think that the medical and administrative process of surveillance of the *Hajj* business in French West Africa generally, and in colonial Senegal particularly was also an outcome of the global geopolitical context.

A. Discourse and practice at the world level

In this chapter, I examine the global geopolitical context in which French authorities carried out the process of management of the *Hajj* in colonial Senegal. I focus on how the global understanding of health, medicine and disease affected the ways modern states managed health and public hygiene in French West Africa. In fact, I wish to situate the French West African medical and administrative surveillance apparatuses, and the *Hajj* surveillance apparatus in the worldwide context of emergence of modern medicine. Anti-Islam views may have interfered with the ways in which France addressed health issues in the *Hajj* from colonial Senegal. Yet, despite the prevailing status-based biases often displayed in front of disarming pathologies, French colonial agents in charge of the implementation of the *Hajj* hygienic regulations in effect were also in tune with the views and the state of medical knowledge of their times. The state of medical knowledge and world politics were such that little could be left outside of the surveillance apparatus of the colonial state.

Health and hygiene standards were similar in France and in French West Africa, including in colonial Senegal. As elsewhere, the state exercised considerable power over public health and hygiene in French West Africa by the early twentieth century. Most metropolitan health and hygiene infrastructures, presidential and ministerial instructions, decrees and orders prescribing the observance and the implementation of public health and hygiene standards were passed on to French West Africa. Drawing on contemporary public health and hygiene Acts, on statutory instruments, and on major studies on health and medical-related issues in French West Africa, I underline the French West African health and hygiene system from its inception to the end of the colonial period and the similarities with contemporary systems. I take a look at social programs such as the Plan Sarraut of *Mise en Valeur des Colonies*, the AMI system consisting in providing healthcare at no cost to natives, and the *Faire du Noir* concept (breeding the Black race) carried out from the 1920s onward.

1. Basic understandings of health and disease: Blame, stigma and exclusion

Since the dawn of humanity, disease has always been a source of great distress among human beings regardless of ethnicity, gender, and social status.¹ This was even truer in the case of epidemics such as bubonic plague and cholera, the suddenness, the harshness, and the scope of which had a big impact on individual and collective minds. Prior to the late nineteenth century, and the early twentieth century scientific discoveries which led to the emergence of modern epidemiology, divine wrath seemed to have been the major and more viable explanation of epidemics for all contemporaries of deadly bubonic plague and cholera outbreaks. The modes of transmission of most diseases – including cholera - were unknown, hence the widespread moral outlook of laypersons, theologians, literary men and women, and “health professionals” on the causes and the modes of transmission of disease.²

Laypersons and “health professionals” strongly clung to miasma and contagion theories, especially prior to Louis Pasteur’s discoveries on asepsis and antisepsis in the nineteenth century. “Pre-Pasteurian orthodoxy held that sickness arose from pestilential miasma given off by the environment, by towns, and by their fetid populations”, and stench rhymed with disease. Experts placed the sources of stench among the “great unwashed” (the poor) public hygiene reformers and social engineers joined forces to fight filth in all forms: physical, moral, and verbal.³ In the twentieth century, public hygiene reformers viewed pestilence as a dreadful pathological agent dangerous for all human beings regardless of status.

¹R. Porter. *The greatest benefit to mankind: A medical history of humanity*. (London, W. W. Norton, 1999).

²C. Rosenberg. *Explaining epidemics: And other studies in the history of medicine*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992). B. L. Grigsby. *Pestilence in medieval and early modern English literature*. (New York, Routledge, 2004).

³A. Corbin *The foul and the fragrant: Odour and the social imagination*. (London, Mc Millan Publishers, 1996), vi.

For centuries, people sought solace against diseases in religious-based celebrations, such as penance and processions, and stuffing pockets with scented herbs to cope with stench was standard practice. Later on, apothecaries, barbers and surgeons used bleeding, purging, and various methods paving the way for modern surgery, while physicians recommended homeopathic recipes.⁴ Building on such worldviews, *Docteur* Samuel Hahnemann proclaimed on the front page of his thesis on cholera morbus that, “reliance on God, and a plain and well-balanced diet, while avoiding contact with patients” are the best protection against cholera morbus particularly, and disease generally.⁵ Indeed, whilst praising the effectiveness of camphor on cholera morbus, *Docteur* Hahnemann summarized the very basic state of knowledge of the modes of transmission of disease in the early nineteenth century.

Hahnemann’s thesis was published in the context of the second world pandemic of cholera known as “cholera morbus” (or “Indian cholera”) in 1831.⁶ The second label refers to the Ganges River in India where the pandemic was believed to be endemic. The editor of the *British Medical Journal* and chairman of the *English Health Society* even deemed India “the endemic home of cholera.” In the late nineteenth century, whether the “living contagious matter” was “a bacillus or a spirochæte” was unclear, but the idea that water was the “*causa causans*”⁷ of most cholera outbreaks prevailed thanks to John Snow’s findings (1848-1854).

⁴ I. Loudon (Ed.). *Western medicine: An illustrated history*. (London, Oxford University Press, 2002). P. Brau. *Trois siècles de médecine coloniale*. (Paris, Vigot, 1931). Lapeyssonie. *Médecine coloniale : Mythes et réalités*. (Paris, Seghers, collection Médecine et Histoire, 1988).

⁵ *Docteur* S. Hahnemann. “Dissertation sur le cholera-morbus : A M. le Cte S. des Guidi Docteur-Médecin à Lyon.” (Lyon: De l’Imprimerie de M. P. Rusand aux Halles de la Grenette, 1831). [<http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btp6K654319006.texte.f10.pagination>].

⁶ O Aginam. “The nineteenth century colonial fingerprints on public health diplomacy: A postcolonial view.” *Law, Social Justice and Global Development Journal (LGD)*, (2003 (1)).

⁷ E. F. R. C. S. Hart. “The pilgrim path of cholera.” *The Popular Science Monthly*, XLIII (47), (September 1893): 634-635.

In the late nineteenth century, public health specialists focused on identifying modes of transmission of cholera. In 1849, for instance, referring to seismic and meteorological factors *Monsieur* Agar de Bus d'Issoudun blamed *Asian cholera-morbus* on the “steams or dusts resulting from underground fires keeping in fusion, by accident, various metals with their more or less deleterious gangues. Those dusts, so tenuous they would escape microscopic scrutiny, are likely spread in the air through the medium of the countless volcanoes and cracks of the earth, located on the numerous islands and archipelagos of Oceania.”⁸ Robert Koch (1843-1910) discovered the tuberculosis bacillus (1882) and the cholera vibrio (1883). Yet, stigmatisation and scapegoating of patients still determined human perceptions of illness.

There is no doubt that fear of contagionism is the most common response to disease in nearly every type of society. In the past, flight away from all potential sources of infection “proved to be an effective strategy [even] of the military” - to name but a few - to avoid contagion.⁹ Today, the profound distress resulting from the seriousness, the sudden and often disarming escalation of deadly symptoms, and from the number of casualties in the case of epidemics always prompts the search for culprits and suspects. Interestingly enough, the targets of stigmatisation are always vulnerable individuals living and carrying out their daily duties on the edges of society, or foreigners. As a result, they experience stigmatisation.

⁸ «Selon moi, le choléra-morbus asiatique serait formé de VAPEURS ou POUSSIÈRES produites par des feux souterrains tenant accidentellement en fusion des métaux divers avec leurs gangues plus ou moins délétères. Ces poussières, d'une ténuité telles qu'elles échappent à l'investigation microscopique, seraient répandues dans l'air par les INNOMBRABLES VOLCANS, FISSURES OU CREVASSES de la terre situés dans les nombreuses îles et archipels de l'Océanie ». De Bus Agar d'Issoudun. “Théories des causes physiques qui produisent le choléra-morbus Asiatique, et déterminent sa marche constante des frontières Sud et Sud-est de l'Indostan et de la Chine vers le Pôle Nord-Ouest de l'Europe.” Présentée à l'Académie des Sciences. (Issoudun, Imprimerie H. Cotard, 19 Juin 1849), 7. [<http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btp6k6147790j.image.fr>].

⁹ A. Chapple, S. Ziebland, McPherson. “Stigma, shame, and blame experienced by patients with lung cancer: qualitative study.” *BMJ*, doi:10.1136/bmj.38111.639734.7C (published 11 June 2004). W. Van Damme and W. Van Lerberghe. “Editorial: Epidemics and fear.” *Tropical Medicine and International Health*, 5 (8), (August 2000): 511-514.

Stigmatization is the standard human reaction toward contagious, disfiguring, or lethal diseases. “The response to a plague or threat of a plague is in some ways dependent on the perception of risk held by individuals and decision-makers. The perception can be quite different for the same disease depending on whether it is endemic or epidemic.”¹⁰ Indeed, “stigma ascribed to controllable factors elicits a greater negative reaction than stigma ascribed to uncontrollable factors.”¹¹ Risk acceptance is largely contingent upon individual agency. “People will accept high risks with cigarette smoking [...] if they have control over placing themselves at risk. But they will reject even small or nonexistent risks, such as with food additives, fluoridation, or radiation if they feel they have no control over the exposure.”¹²

Diseases are often referred to by their most striking symptoms. For example, ‘Black Death’ (bubonic plague) - which had economic, political, and social consequences in Europe (1348-1350) - owes its name to the dark spots on the limbs of patients in terminal stage.¹³ Indeed, epidemic outbreaks are often named after other countries. Syphilis was known as ‘*morbus gallicus*’ (‘French disease’) in Renaissance Europe.¹⁴ The 1918 influenza pandemic - which “remains an ominous warning to public health”¹⁵ - is remembered as “Spanish flu”.

¹⁰ W. H. Foege. “Plagues: Perception of risks and social responses.” In, *In times of plague: The history and social consequence of lethal epidemic disease*. Mack, A. (Ed.). (New York, New York University Press, 1991), 12.

¹¹ A. Chapple, S. Ziebland, A. Mc Pherson. “Stigma, shame, and blame experienced by patients with lung cancer: qualitative study.” *British Medical Journal*, doi: 10.1136/bmj.38111.639734.7c (11 June 2004).

¹² W. H. Foege, op. cit., 12.

¹³ D. Herlihy. *The Black Death and the transformation of the West*. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1995). P. Ziegler. *The Black Death*. (London, Collins, 1969).

¹⁴ J. Arizabalaga, J. Henderson and R. French. *The great Pox: The French disease in Renaissance Europe*. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997).

¹⁵ J. K. Taubenberger and D. M. Morens. “1918 Influenza: The mother of all pandemics.” *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, 12, 1, (January 2006): 15-21.

“Blaming “outsiders,” including groups with different national, ethnic, class, or religious backgrounds, occurs frequently during infectious disease outbreaks.”¹⁶ The history of public health abounds with documented cases of suspect “germ carriers.” In that respect, Mary Mallon, Irish immigrant in the United States, appears as a case in point. In 1907, a civil engineer named George Soper identified Mary “typhoid” Mallon as the healthy carrier responsible for cases of typhoid in the houses where she had worked as a cook. Mary Mallon was placed in the custody of the Board of Health once her healthy carrier status was clearly established through blood and stool tests. As such she was confined in a cottage for three years, and released only in exchange for her commitment not to work as a cook anymore. She was caught again working, and sent back to the cottage until her death in 1938.¹⁷

In the case of Mary Mallon, the state did not move to restrain her freedom of action until her role as a typhoid vector was clinically confirmed. Also, the awkwardness of her situation might have had an impact on the minds of her contemporaries, at least at the time of her first arrest. In fact, the concept of healthy carrier was not well understood at that time, and many might have wondered how an apparently healthy individual could pose a threat to the community. Nevertheless, the nineteenth century hygienic approach to public health still pervaded the ways twentieth century public health decision-makers globally handled sources of insalubrity and pathologies in 1907. Public health became one large-scale building project physicians, public hygiene engineers, and civil servants all set out to codify.¹⁸

¹⁶ M. Schoch-Spana, N. Bouri, K. J. Rambhia and A. Norwood. “Stigma, health disparities, and the 2009 H1N1 Influenza pandemic: How to protect Latino farmworkers in future health emergencies.” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense, Practice and Science, 8 (3), (2010): 243-254.

¹⁷ J. W. Leavitt. *Typhoid Mary: Captive to public's health*. (Boston, Beacon Press, 1996).

¹⁸ G. Jorland. *Une société à soigner: Hygiène et salubrité publiques en France au XIX^e siècle*. (Paris, Gallimard, collection « Bibliothèque des Histoires », 2010).

2. The social reform movement in nineteenth and twentieth century France

In the nineteenth century, public health was a global construction site in the making under the impetus of contagionists, hygienists, and later *Pastoriens*. In France, the eradication of causes of morbidity and mortality was high priority on the government's agenda in that "Age of public health."¹⁹ In the twentieth century, the foundations of the current French public health system were established with the law on public health protection (February 15, 1902). The objectives are captured by *Conseiller d'état* Henri Monod and repeated by Governor Roume in 1904. The purpose of public health was "to destroy noxious germs, pathogenic germs, namely germ-borne diseases, as they come along; [and] make the environment we live in, resistant to the reproduction of those [germ-borne] diseases."²⁰

Such were the long-term objectives of governments throughout Europe and the modern world. Pathogenic germ-borne diseases were to be destroyed, in order to turn cities into clean and germ-free living environments. Armed with such instructions, in France especially, state agents, health professionals, and their various allies set out to wage a relentless war against pathogenic germ-borne diseases. From the onset of that process, public health operators clearly identified pathogenic, germ-prone, and disease-prone environments, and the potential vectors of germ-borne diseases, as well. Interestingly enough, the targeted subjects, objects, and places of inquiry soon coincided with the underprivileged and their living environments.

¹⁹W. Coleman. *Death is a social disease: Public health and political economy in early industrial France*. (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1982). A. La Berge. *Mission and method: The early nineteenth century French public health movement*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992).

²⁰« [...] détruire les germes nocifs, les germes pathogènes, c'est à dire générateurs de maladies, au fur et à mesure qu'ils se produisent ; rendre le terrain, c'est-à-dire les milieux où nous vivons, réfractaires à la reproduction de ces germes, tel est le double objet de l'hygiène publique. » Henri Monod quoted in, JOSD. *Gouverneur Général E. Roume*. "Comité Supérieur d'Hygiène et de Salubrité Publiques: Séance du Vendredi 17 Juin 1904." (Dakar, 1904), 345.

In Europe, the nineteenth century was also the age of industrialization and urbanization with all that implies. The impact of industrialization on the health of the working population was a hot topic in scientific and political circles in England and France. “The new economy was accused of using children as slaves and to cause weakness, malformations, severe illnesses, and very often to anticipate their deaths.”²¹ Surveys were carried out amongst working populations to assess their health status and better preserve the manpower. For instance, in 1835 the *Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques* appointed *Docteur* Louis-René Villermé (1782-1863) to “document as exactly as possible,” the physical and moral states of the working class in the textile industry in Northern and Eastern France. Villermé insisted on the urge to regulate child labor extremely detrimental to children’s health.²²

However, French political and social actors soon realized that industrialization and the related poverty of the people could no longer be seen through the lens of moral analysis exclusively. So that, “in ways both real and metaphorical, contagion figured prominently in the late nineteenth century social thought and policy.” In fact, republican politicians used “the regulation of contagious disease [as] a primary “site” where individualism, social order, and government [...] were rearticulated.” They also used the pretext of contagion “to conjure up the social consequences of women’s factory work and to justify the state’s tutelary responsibility for “morally abandoned children.” Most important [and what made the preceding formulations possible], officials made contagion into the basis for objectifying the social ties and moral duties that bound together free individuals in a republic.”²³

²¹P. Bourdelais. “Improving public health in France: The local political mobilization in the nineteenth century.” *Hygiea Internationalis*, 4 (1), (2004): 231.

²²L. R. Villermé. *Tableau de l’état physique et moral des ouvriers employés dans les manufactures de coton, de laine et de soie*. (Paris, EMCC, « Futur Antérieur », 2007).

²³A. R. Aisenberg. *Contagion: Disease, government and the “social question” in nineteenth century France*. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999), 2-3.

As a matter of fact, in nineteenth century France, promoting clean and disinfected living environments in order to eliminate all sources of infection and contagion was a social duty for French state officials and agents and health professionals. Again, the 1830-1840s cholera outbreaks had left vivid memories in the popular imagination, and a debate on the control of contagious diseases took place against a background of social unrest during the epidemic crises of the Restoration and the July Monarchy.²⁴ That debate allowed French policy-makers to redesign all social interactions, in relation to the new economic situation on one hand, and the new perceptions of health and hygiene on the other.²⁵ Pasteur's discoveries on the microbial origins of disease fostered the contagion theory within the French intellectual elite and progressively shaped the administration of public health in the country.²⁶

The history of public health in France is marked by several epidemic outbreaks. For example, cholera took a heavy toll on the population between 1832 and 1885. Also, in the mid-nineteenth century the working class paid a heavy price to tuberculosis. Under the impetus of hygienists, French officials felt compelled to take small incremental steps to minimize lack of hygiene standards in the cities, while improving the living environment. The July 9, 1767 royal order made it compulsory for local residents to clean the streets, and for landlords, tenants, and craftsmen to dispose of the rubbish resulting from their practices.²⁷

²⁴G. D. Sussman. "From Yellow fever to cholera: A study of French Government policy, medical professionalism, and popular movements in the epidemics crises of restoration and the July Monarchy." (New Haven, Yale University, Ph.D. dissertation, 1971).

²⁵C. Salomon-Bayet (Ed.) *Pasteur et la révolution pasteurienne*. (Paris, Payet, 1986). G. Vigarello. *Le sain et le malsain. Santé et mieux-être depuis le Moyen Age*. (Paris, Seuil, 1993).

²⁶L. Murard et P. Zylberman. *L'hygiène dans la république: La santé Publique en France ou l'utopie contrariée: 1870-1918*. (Paris, Fayard, 1996).

²⁷Dédiées au Roi par, P-F. Muyart de Vouglans (*Conseiller au Grand Conseil*). "Les lois criminelles de France, dans leur ordre naturel." (Paris : M. DCC. LXXX (avec approbation et privilège du Roi): 458-459).

In the nineteenth century, the concept of “household crowding” coined by *Docteur* Claude Lachaise in 1822 is echoed in the significant growth of population namely in Paris, where crowding was partly blamed on the process of “haussmannisation” of French cities (1853 and 1870).²⁸ Although the notion of lack of hygiene was quite encompassing until the end of the century, a diagnostic of lack of hygiene standards was established for Paris in 1894. While prohibitive, state injunctions in terms of salubrity were limited in scope. The April 13, 1850 law was very indicative of that situation, even though it paved the way for the twentieth century public health system. The law insisted on “housing hygienization” through at-home health visits and establishment of *Casiers sanitaires* for all houses.²⁹

Regulatory texts, the commitment of professionals from various backgrounds, and day-to-day observations of the daily lives and practice among the working class allowed for further specification of the notion of lack of salubrity.³⁰ The February 15, 1902 law on public health protection was the culmination of nineteenth century hygienist ideas aimed at eradicating cholera and tuberculosis through the cleaning up of the Paris “*îlots insalubres*” based on confirmed tuberculosis-related death rates. By virtue of the 1902 law on public health, French officials were granted the necessary powers to enforce the law, and were asked to ensure that interests of the community come first before individual interests.”³¹

²⁸Y. Fijalkow. “Tuberculose, surpeuplement et îlots insalubres: Paris entre 1850 et 1945.” In, Haumont N. & Lévy J. P. *La ville éclatée : Quartiers et peuplements*. (Paris, L’Harmattan, 1996), 114.

²⁹C. Lévy-Vroelant. “Le diagnostic d’insalubrité et ses conséquences sur la ville: Paris, 1894-1960.” *Population*, 4-5, (1999): 707-744.

³⁰Y. Fijalkow. “La notion d’insalubrité. Un processus de rationalisation, 1850-1902.” *Revue d’Histoire du XIXe Siècle*, 20/21, (2000): 135-156. F. Bourillon. “La loi du 13 Avril 1850, ou lorsque la Second République invente le logement insalubre.” *Revue d’Histoire du XIXe Siècle*, 20/21, (2000) [online].

³¹JOSD. *Gouverneur* General E. Roume. “Comité Supérieur d’Hygiene et de Salubrité Publiques: Séance du Vendredi 17 Juin 1904.” (Dakar, 1904): 345.

3. Casting off contagion: contextualizing the quarantine system

In fifteenth century Europe, European nations established border control in order to tackle bubonic plague. In 1423, the first plague-stricken patient reception center was opened off the coast of Italy, precisely on the Santa Maria di Nazareth Island. Similar institutions known as *sanità* (sanitat), or *lazaretto* (lazaret) were soon to follow. Many such institutions were also created in Germany and in France. In France precisely, the city of Marseille was particularly exposed to foreign disease due to its geographical location on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea and its harbor involved in trade with the Orient. The 1720-1722 Plague epidemics confirmed the vulnerability of Marseille. That outbreak even prompted the inhabitants of the Comtat Vainessin (between the Vaucluse, Rhône and Durance) to erect a 27 kms long brick-wall in order to protect the area. The fear of contagion was global.

The fear of contagion was even more of a hot topic in the 1830s with the spread of cholera worldwide through the medium of the Muslim pilgrimage. In 1895, the idea of an ‘Asiatic’ origin of cholera outbreaks in the world was pervasive. India was referred to as the natural home, and/or “the nurseries of cholera.”³² Also, the idea that cholera was brought to the Muslim Holy land through the medium of Indian Mecca pilgrims was prevailed. Islam had made an impact on Indian society and culture since the eighth century, when Arab armies first invaded the south-eastern province of Sindh, nowadays located in Pakistan. The Hindu people easily adjusted to British rule, while Indian Muslims nostalgic of their past power and privileges, seemed overwhelmingly hostile to the imposition of Western power on India.³³

³²P. L. Laget. “Les lazarets et l’émergence de nouvelles maladies pestilentiennes au XIXe et au début du XXe siècle.” *In Situ*, 2, (2002). D. Panzac. *Quarantaines et lazarets: L’Europe et la peste d’Orient*. (Aix-en-Provence, Edisud, 1986). G. Eggleston. “The nurseries of Cholera. (Peoria, Ill. 09/26).” *The New York Times*, October 1, 1893.

³³F. W. Clothey. *Religion in India: A historical introduction*. (New York, Routledge, 2002). H. Qamar. *Muslims in India: Attitudes, adjustment and reactions*. (New Delhi, Northern Book Centre, 1987).

British rulers in India were very critical of Islam and “*Mohammedan*” worshippers.³⁴ Yet, in the early twentieth century, some officials disagreed with physicians who claimed “that India is responsible for the present, or in fact any of the recent, outbreaks of cholera in the Hedjaz.” Lieutenant-Colonel Monk, “as perhaps, the oldest official of India, connected with the pilgrimage to Hedjaz”, believed it had “been introduced from the Black Sea.” He thought so because, “for many years [he had] inspected every pilgrim ship from India to Jeddah [the port of disembarkation for Mecca], and every one of them [had] been absolutely free from cholera on arrival here, as well as during their six to ten days voyage from India.”³⁵ In any case, the role of Indian Muslims in the spread of cholera was a mainstream idea by 1893. So much so that even anonymous citizens inserted pamphlets in the newspapers.³⁶

The 1893 media campaign took place within a context of high cholera-related morbidity during the *Hajj*. That year, the *Hajj* was deemed year of the “*pèlerinage de l’épouvante*”,³⁷ because 2,455 pilgrims died of cholera in Mecca during one single day. Some observers called for the US to allocate millions of dollars to “put an end to pilgrimages.”³⁸ While others suggested that European powers spent \$100,000,000 in the hygienic supervision of holy places in Arabia and Asia Minor and passageways, and to check pilgrims on site.³⁹

³⁴ H. Qamar. *Muslims in India: Attitudes, adjustment and reactions*. (New Delhi, Northern Book Centre, 1987).

³⁵ Lieutenant-Colonel C. Monk. “Mecca and Europe.” *British Medical Journal*, 1 (2463), (1908): 653.

³⁶ Anonymous. “Pilgrims and cholera.” *The New York Times*, June 7, 1893. Anonymous. “The cholera pilgrimage.” *The New York Times*, January 29, 1894.

³⁷ Literally, “terror pilgrimage.” Justin Godart quoted in the preface of F. Duguet. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Du point de religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Editions Rieder, 1932), x. Anonymous. “The cholera pilgrimage.” *The New York Times*, January 29, 1894.

³⁸ Anonymous. “Pilgrims and cholera.” *The New York Times*, June 7, 1893.

³⁹ W. G. Eggleston. “The Nurseries of Cholera.” (*Peoria, Ill.* 09/26). *The New York Times*, October 1, 1893.

Obviously, that call for concrete and steady Western interventions to “work for the protection of the civilized world” did not go unheard. A widespread belief was that “power to do [that] work [...] could be exercised by the nations of Europe acting in concert, and the most terrible plague of modern times could be confined to the country where it was born, where it is always to be found, and where the most sanguine sanitarian cannot hope that it can be stamped out in the next hundred years.”⁴⁰ Those words encapsulate the whole “view of disease as spread by contagion [which] sought above all to break chains of transmission, interrupting the circulation of carriers by means of cordons, quarantines and sequestration.”⁴¹ In the late nineteenth century, European powers accepted in spite of marked economic and political differences the quarantinist project aimed at stopping cholera through the regulation of cross-border movements and exchanges, and through the neutralization of germ-carriers.

Therefore, as early as the second half of the nineteenth century, Muslim pilgrims going to Mecca and returning to their homeland, along with their means of transportation to Mecca, gradually became the objects of close medical and administrative scrutiny. As a matter of fact, at the various International health conferences held between 1851 and 1926, European and Ottoman delegates slowly but surely designed and shaped an international quarantine system to contain cholera germs in India. That mid-nineteenth - early twentieth century impetus for regulation of sea, land, and later air transportation of Muslim pilgrims directly corresponded to twentieth century state initiatives to prevent the spread of epidemic disease. Although, politically controversial and persecutory in essence, western policy makers and health professionals saw the implementation on the ground of codified quarantine and international travel rules as the only viable options against the crystallization of contagion.

⁴⁰ Anonymous. “Pilgrims and cholera.” The New York Times, June 7, 1893.

⁴¹ P. Baldwin. *Contagion and the State in Europe*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), 4.

4. Post-war global concern: Institution of healthcare and welfare standards

During the nineteenth century the demand for constitutional government became a centrepiece of middle-class struggle for political reform, and that demand increased in the decade prior to the outbreak of World War I, spreading through the empires and infiltrating St. Petersburg, Istanbul and the monarchies of the Balkans.⁴² People witnessed the triumph of liberalism in the wake of industrial revolution-related social and economic mutations. Throughout Europe, people strived for a ‘better world’ embodied, mainly, in constitutional governments and the liberal defence of individual liberties. So much so that, in 1908 constitution was seen as “such a wonderful thing that [people who did] not know what it is [could be considered] donkey[s].”⁴³ World War I boosted the morale of liberalism advocates, by causing the demise of monarchy and the triumph of democracy. However, the expansion of communism dampened the liberalist momentum of the war and early postwar eras.

“By the 1930s the signs were that most Europeans no longer wished to fight for [democracy]; there were dynamic non-democratic alternatives to meet the challenges of modernity. Europe found other, authoritarian, forms of political order no more foreign to its traditions, and no less efficient as organizers of society.”⁴⁴ That state of mind allowed the emergence of authoritarian regimes (Germany, Italy, and Spain) alongside communism. As a result, “the democracies were to be squeezed increasingly tightly between the twin extremes of communism and fascism. These new models were soon to challenge the pre-eminence of the Versailles liberalism.”⁴⁵ Power was no longer in the hands of the royalty as in the past.

Rather, the exercise of power became the exclusive business of the State, which put the promotion of the rights of access to health and welfare at the top of its agenda. The emphasis

⁴² M. Mazower. *Dark Continent: Europe's twentieth century*. (New York, Vintage, 1998), 6.

⁴³ Idem.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, 5-6.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, 13.

was put on collective rights rather than on individual liberties. The context of severe population decline noticed everywhere in Europe justified that approach. Embryonic health systems and social programs welfare emerged throughout Europe, especially in postwar Germany and Italy.⁴⁶ In fact, “the goals of social welfare programs for the poor derive from the goals of the larger society for itself and from the view that society holds of itself and of its various members.” Likewise, “social welfare programs involve a redistribution of resources - from the “haves” to the “have nots.” The United States once “reluctant to do that, holding instead to a faith in laissez-faire and individualism”⁴⁷ chose that option during the New Deal era, since about 25 percent of the US civilian labor was unemployed in 1933.⁴⁸

By the 1920s, the First World War (1914-1918), which took a heavy toll on the world population, and the subsequent Depression (1929 – 1939), which drastically increased the rates of unemployment and the numbers of people in need, gave policy makers little room to manoeuvre. By 1930, many viewed social welfare as the most efficient way to curb the high mortality rates and declining fertility rates, while helping sustain and boost to adequate levels of decency the quality of life of all individuals within society. That roughly ten year period witnessed the emergence of state-sponsored relief and emergency programs throughout Europe and America. For instance, in France, which is of particular concern to us in this dissertation, the State, local authorities and charity, each in their own ways, ensured the smooth functioning of the *programme de protection sociale*, or social welfare system.

However, state assistance to the sick, the poor, and the like, predates the Depression in France. For instance, the July 15, 1893 law ensuring free medical aid for the impoverished

⁴⁶D. Horn. *Social bodies: Reproduction and Italian Modernity*. (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1994).

⁴⁷J. Axinn and H. Levin. *Social welfare: A history of the American response to need*. (New York, Longman, Second Edition, 1982), 1.

⁴⁸Idem, 176.

and the July 14, 1905 law concerning medical aid to the elderly, the disabled and the terminally ill, influenced the current French welfare system. The welfare system focuses on the prevention of difficulties related to *risques sociaux* (social risk factors), such as sickness, occupational hazard, pregnancy, retirement, or unemployment. Thus, a welfare system based on state-sponsored healthcare expenses, and on charity interventions epitomized by the *Secours Populaire Français* (1945) emerged. Since the Middle Ages charity - as defined in the Christian reference system and embodied by the *hospice*, and later hospitals – was the standard assistance system serving the destitute in France.⁴⁹ After the French Revolution, the Church no longer controlled hospices. Rather, state codified assistance prevailed.

However, the sponsorship of healthcare needs and the carrying out of social initiative in the health sector came at a price for the population everywhere, including in France. Particularly, after the First World War, in its efforts to destroy germs and neutralize healthy carriers the state privileged the good of the community to the detriment of individual rights. Good health became the business of all within society. Throughout Europe, including in France, interest for the good of the community implied strict surveillance, at least in theory, of the movements of people as they carried out their daily activities. For example, the objectives were clearly to expunge all debilitating and morbid factors expected to obstruct the achievement of better and purer societies in postwar Italy and Germany.⁵⁰ As a result, health and hygiene workers sought to eliminate debilitating factors in the most private areas of life.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the idea that regulating and restricting the movements of people and goods was the only option to prevent the spread of disease and block the transmission of infection (through the medium of objects, animals, and between

⁴⁹J. Imbert. *Histoire des Hôpitaux de France*. (Toulouse, Privat, 1982).

⁵⁰D. Horn. *Social bodies: Reproduction and Italian modernity*. (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1994). M. Mazower. *Dark Continent: Europe's twentieth century*. (New York, Vintage, 1998).

humans) prevailed within medical and political circles in France. Indeed, the emphasis was put on promoting prevention rather than on curing ills. Simultaneously, various institutions emerged in the areas overseas under French control the aim of which were to minimize, or even better, to prevent the occurrence, or re-occurrence, of outbreaks. In the past, hospitals mainly served as reception centres for the sick, indigents, and at times as confinement centres for individuals incarcerated for various petty thefts. While re-inventing surgery, Louis Pasteur's discovery of antiseptis brought about the far-reaching redefinition of the role of hospitals. In the early twentieth century, hospitals became centres for medical research carried in sterile environments despite the basic knowledge of antisepsis available at the time.

Equal to the revival of medical research and practice within hospital settings, was the commitment of the French state and citizens, which took the eradication of disease factors, the neutralization of germ carriers, and the achievement of good health for all, by the horns. Unequivocally, the goal was to eliminate all potential health hazards, and enforce by all available means – including coercion – the right for all to good health and wellbeing. That is why, we should place the ordeals of “Typhoid” Mary Mallon and Muslim Mecca pilgrims back in the context of their encounter with the institution of public health meant to promote excellent hygiene levels, in order to break the chain of transmission of disease and contagion in the views of twentieth century healthcare professionals, hence the boom of sustainable educational/support social systems and programs such as the *timbre tuberculeux*.⁵¹

5. International control of health and quarantine procedures for the *Hajj*

Before the nineteenth century, the military-guarded *cordon sanitaire* was the basic large-scale preventive apparatus aimed at slowing down the pace of epidemic surges. Memories of medieval bubonic plague outbreaks, and subsequent *Hajj*-related epidemics and

⁵¹ A. Mouret. “L’imagerie de la lutte contre la tuberculose: Le timbre tuberculeux, Instrument d’éducation sanitaire.” Les Cahiers du centre de Recherches Historiques, 12, (1994).

pandemics largely influenced decision-making process for the global regulation of public health and hygiene. Regulation for the purpose of prevention had become the keyword for major nations by the early twentieth century. Also, the magnitude of *Hajj*-related cholera outbreaks raised awareness among Europeans that combined efforts were essential to the eradication of communicable diseases. For years, and despite the “daunting reality of contagion”, French officials had watched while Muslim subjects believing that piety alone would safeguard their physical wellbeing went to meet fellow Muslims in Mecca.⁵²

Stakeholders in the areas of public health and hygiene – including French policy-makers – saw as a time bomb the anarchical and sudden build-up of adamant, careless and bedraggled crowds of devotees armed only with their courage and untainted faith. It is no wonder that those pilgrims, who did not die on the way, usually reached Mecca in poor health due to exhaustion from the risky and lengthy trek across deserts and savannas.⁵³ The extremely poor sanitary conditions during the *Hajj* epitomized by the large-scale slaughtering of thousands of camels, cows, sheep and goats, resulting in “dreadful mass-graves teeming with maggots and flies, and filling the area with stench” captured the minds of observers.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, due to the rules of Islam, French European stakeholders in the areas of public health and hygiene were neither in a position to enforce sanitary regulations, nor to provide medical care within the “Sacred Area”, stretching between *Al-Hodaibieh*, *Ouadi*

⁵²“La meilleure provision [des pèlerins] pour le voyage [aux Lieux Saints de l’Islam], a dit le Prophète, est la piété.” Justin Godart in F. Duguet. *Le Pèlerinage de la Mecque: Au point de vue religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Les Editions Rieder, 1932), ix-x.

⁵³F. Duguet. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Au point de vue religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Editions Rieder, 1932). Dr. F. Borel. *Choléra et Peste dans le pèlerinage Musulman, 1860-1903*. (Paris, Masson et Cie Editeurs, 1904).

⁵⁴Dr. E. Allard. “Le pèlerinage à la Mecque et son rôle dans la propagation des maladies.” *Bulletin du Comité de l’Afrique Occidentale Française*, (Juillet 1895): 229-231.

Nakla, and *Bata Oranah*, forbidden in theory to non-Muslims.⁵⁵ From 1831 onward, it was clear that policy-makers were to bring the *Hajj* under control, and to prevent the recurrence and the further spread of *Hajj*-related cholera epidemics recorded since 1831. However, the ways and means to do that remained the bone of contention between Ottoman and European protagonists until the 1894 Paris International Health Conference.⁵⁶ In fact, the widely differing political and economic interests at stake and the views of *Hajj* regulation remained for a while obstacles to the enforcement of health and quarantine procedures for the *Hajj*.

Arabia was under Ottoman rule since the campaigns of the Ottomans and Muhammad Ali against the Wahhabiyya (1811-1818). In 1839, Sultan Mahmud II created the Constantinople Superior Board of health to oversee the *Hajj*. The Constantinople board of health was administered by foreign consulates, and used to operate “sanitary services in the Red Sea, because of the *Hajj*, as well as the chief ports in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean Sea.” The Sultan offered a large staff with many Levantine medical agents and ample funds. “Nevertheless, the board was constantly harmstrung by the political intrigue of its European members, as well as Ottoman lethargy and obstructionism to what it felt was infringement [on the individual rights of Muslims] by European powers on its sovereignty.”⁵⁷

Indeed, political culture, economic expectations and social layout influenced the modus operandi national states adopted within their own borders to carry out disease control. The same factors had significant impact on the choices of successive boards regarding hygiene standards. The *Intendance Sanitaire Générale d’Egypte* (Egyptian Quarantine Board), later

⁵⁵ The limits of the Sacred Area in Mecca remain the same to this day. Still today, warning signs written “Muslims only” are visible on highways leading to the Sacred Area of Mecca.

⁵⁶ D. E. Long. *The Hajj today: A survey of the contemporary pilgrimage to Makkah*. (New York, CUNY, 1979). P. Baldwin. *Contagion and the State in Europe*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁵⁷ D. E. Long. *The Hajj today: A survey of the contemporary pilgrimage to Makkah*. (New York, CUNY, 1979), 70. W. R. Roff. “Sanitation and security: The imperial powers and the nineteenth century Hajj.” *Arabian Studies*, 6, (1982): 143-156.

known as *Conseil Sanitaire Maritime et Quarantenaire d’Alexandrie*, and again as the *Conseil Sanitaire Maritime et Quarantenaire d’Egypte*, was established in Egypt (1831). Like the Constantinople Board, the Egyptian Quarantine Board was run by foreign consuls. For decades, the Egyptian Quarantine board oversaw hygiene control in the Suez Canal and in the Red Sea until 1938 when the Egyptian government took responsibility of the board.⁵⁸

European powers and their allies in that fight against *Hajj*-related infections gave priority to the quarantinist strategy of prevention aimed at breaking the chains of transmission of contagious disease namely by interrupting the exchange of germs through the identification and the preventive confinement in quarantine stations of all confirmed and potential carriers. However, the enforcement of the quarantinist preventive strategy worked against the best interests of maritime powers, such as Great Britain and the Dutch empire, determined to keep the maritime trade working at all cost.⁵⁹ In addition to that, the Ottoman and European powers seldom intervened in *Hajj* affairs. “For fear of sacrilege, religious authorities gave their opinion with great circumspection only.” However, the *Hajj* had become “a martyrology”⁶⁰ in dire need of regulation due to the succession of *Hajj*-related outbreaks.

B. Public health and Hygiene in French West Africa

At the end of the nineteenth century, the complete eradication of all disease factors and carriers, through the establishment of structured health systems was the highest priority on the agenda of French officials. In fact, morbidity and mortality rates among local populations were so high that metropolitan France could no longer be complacent. Until 1904, local

⁵⁸ D. E. Long. *The Hajj today: A survey of the contemporary pilgrimage to Makkah*. (New York, CUNY, 1979), 70. J. Baldry. “The ottoman quarantine station on Kamaran Island 1882-1914.” In, *Studies in the history of medicine*, March-June 1978, 2 (1/2): 3-148.

⁵⁹ W. R. Roff. “Sanitation and security: The imperial powers and the nineteenth century Hajj.” *Arabian Studies* VI, (1982): 143-156. Duguet F. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Au point de vue religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Les Editions Rieder, 1932).

⁶⁰ « (...) de peur de sacrilège, les autorités religieuses, elles-mêmes, ne se prononçant qu’avec la plus grande circonspection ». F. Duguet., op. cit., 13.

populations relied mainly on their own healing resources for prevention and cure. Yet, the most perceptive among them also turned for primary care to physicians of the *Troupes Coloniales* (colonial troops), responsible for providing healthcare to army men and Europeans living in main colonial cities, and nearby military and trading posts. If the Paris, Bordeaux, Marseille (Pharo), and Lyon-trained physicians offered only basic care to local populations as colonial troops moved further inland, they assessed the needs of the population.

In 1898, *Docteur* Kermorgant argued that the role of the French colonial administration was primarily to provide surgical and medical assistance “with meticulous care and in identical terms and conditions” as in metropolitan France to the colonial civilian and military staff. Also, he added that, “from the triple standpoints of *civilisation*, of *humanity*, of expansion of the colonies,” the French colonial administration had the duty to enable native populations to take advantage of gains from the progress and the victories of science on hygiene. They must also preserve them, “as much as possible”, from outbreaks, and protect them against the diseases which raged in the countries they have been in contact with.⁶¹

1. Health and hygiene standards in pre-colonial Africa

To Steve Feierman and John Janzen, “health, however defined, is not something that “just happens”: it is maintained by a cushion of adequate nutrition, social support, water supply, housing, sanitation, and continued collective defense against contagious and

⁶¹ «...Avec un soin jaloux et dans des conditions identiques. » « Au triple point de vue de la civilisation, de l'humanité, du développement de nos colonies, elle a le devoir non seulement de faire profiter les populations indigènes de tous les avantages résultant des progrès et des conquêtes de la science en matière d'hygiène, «mais encore de les soustraire, autant que possible, aux maladies endémo-épidémiques qui les menacent et de les préserver contre l'importation des maladies qui sévissent dans les pays avec lesquels elles ont été mises en relation. » A. Kermorgant. “Assistance publique aux colonies.” Annales d'Hygiène et de Médecine Coloniales, 01, (1898): 244.

degenerative disease.”⁶² Precisely, only supporting measures such as adequate housing, sanitation and collective defense make the achievement of health possible. However, they do imply that health can only be achieved through coordinated and collective intervention by the state and by the people living within the concerned communities. That conception of health is shared by most contemporaries who witnessed the creation of the 1892 cholera-limited International Sanitary Convention signed in Venice, the emergence of the Washington DC-based Office of International Health in 1902, the *Office International d’Hygiène Publique* (OIHP) in Paris in 1907, and the World Health Organisation (WHO) on April 7, 1948.

This conception of health excludes de facto the healing practices and resources that do not meet those criteria, such as all unsupervised healing systems that thrive independently of the control of structured state institutions. These include the non-western healing practices and systems largely in use in the colonial world before the advent of colonial regimes, including prior to the establishment of the French colonial system in West Africa. Over the past decades, that all-encompassing conception of health has come under attack. Gloria Waite has argued that, in the case of precolonial east-central Africa for instance, the services offered in non-western healing practices are indeed supervised. She insists that, it is simply that the supervision exercised over services such as sorcery and rainmaking is different.⁶³

Although structured and implemented differently, the control over non-western healing systems is the prerogative of local rulers and priests who use the resources of healing systems to consolidate their power. For instance, in Natal and Zululand, local healers gained

⁶²S. Feierman and J. M. Janzen (Eds.). *The social basis of health and healing in Africa*. (Berkeley University of California Press, 1992), xvii.

⁶³G. Waite. “Public health in pre-colonial East-central Africa.” *Social Science and Medicine*, 24 (3), (1987): 197-208.

significant political power before and after the establishment of white rule.⁶⁴ Karen Flint recounts the experience of “Mafavuke Ngcobo, a licensed African *inyanga* or “traditional” herbalist, as opposed to diviners or rainmakers, from the province of Natal who gained the attention of white chemists and authorities when he turned his small herbal practice in decidedly non-conventional directions in the 1930s. Mafavuke Ngcobo used the title “doctor”, until reprimanded by the court of justice. He also marketed himself in pamphlets as “native medical scientist.” Ngcobo also helped establish the “Natal Native Medical Association, a professional organization of African herbalists that tested dues-paying members on their knowledge of “native curatives.”⁶⁵ Mafavuke Ngcobo was ahead of his time in terms of his ability to adapt to the political and economic realities of the colonial environment, and to a certain extent to the realities and the requirements of the modern world.

In any case, colonial Senegalese populations relied mainly on the curative power of specific herbs and sought help from local healers. Throughout the colonial period, and beyond, French officials abundantly criticized the fact that natives routinely resorted to suspect concoctions, or various *gris-gris* and amulets provided by no less suspect *marabouts*, referred to under the generic term “*charlatan*” (quacks).⁶⁶ Consequently, the French administration was never lenient with local healers viewed as barriers to the development of medicine in the colonial world, they also condemned the little regard of natives for hygiene.

Precisely in Dakar, sanitation and hygiene-related issues, especially among Africans, remained a complex problem throughout the colonial period. This caused colonial physicians who authored yearly medical reports for the *Dakar et Dépendances* area to denounce, year

⁶⁴ K. E. Flint. *Healing traditions: African medicine, cultural exchange and competition in South Africa*. (Athens, Ohio University Press, 2008).

⁶⁵ Idem, 1.

⁶⁶ P. Marty. *L'Islam au Sénégal: Les doctrines et les institutions*. (Paris, Maison Ernest Leroux, Tome II, 1917).

after year, the “noxious habits” of natives between 1940 and 1960.⁶⁷ At this point, it is useful to emphasize the fact that the Dakar population was heterogeneous and separated in three main groups: the Europeans, the Africans, and the *Libano-Syriens* (Lebanese and Syrians). The first group included French people and Europeans of various origins. The second group included *Originaires* and *Indigènes* from inland towns and other colonies of the AOF group, and the *population flottante* (vagrant segment). The third group included people from North Africa (e. g. Morocco) and the Middle East (e. g. Lebanon and Syria). Three censuses were conducted for the European population in April 1946, in June 1951 and in December 1956. The census conducted between April and May 1955 concerned the entire population of Dakar.

Table 1. Evolution of the Population of Dakar since 1878

Years	Population
1878	1,560
1891	8,700
1904	18,400
1910	26,000 of which 23,000 Africans
1914	26,800 of which 23,400 Africans
1921	33,400 of which 31,000 Africans
1931	54,000 of which 47,700 Africans
1936	92,000 of which 85,000 Africans
1948	185,400 of which 168,100 Africans
1955*	230,579 of which 200,780 Africans
1960	374,000

(*Numbers include 16,409 vagrants of which 15,766 Africans)

(After Faye C. F. “La Vie Quotidienne à Dakar de 1945 à 1960,” op. cit. 15)

The population grew fast with the development of the Dakar harbor through a 1902 public loan from France under Gouverneur Général Ernest Roume (1858-1941).

At first, the location of the harbor in deep-water far from major undercurrents made French merchants and colonial authorities hopeful, but the lack of salubrity and yellow fever

⁶⁷ See, ANS: 2G. Rapports Périodiques (1941-1960), for further information on the lapses to health and hygiene standards among Africans labeled “*les habitudes nocives des indigènes.*”

curbed their enthusiasm.⁶⁸ The harbor attracted ‘*dojhendem*’ who “sleep anywhere, eat anything, cram into small huts, perform hard work during the day, and end their evenings very late at night with songs and dances which make up their tam-tam.”⁶⁹ During the 1914 plague outbreak, Europeans blamed the “dangerous behaviors of Africans,” while their apparent immunity raised suspicion among Africans who resisted relocation outside the city.⁷⁰

Table 2. Evolution of the population in Colonial Senegal’s main cities

Cities	1910	1921	1931	1945	1955	1961
Dakar and Gorée	24,900	32,400	54,000	132,000	231,000	378,000 (Non-Africans: 36,000)
Rufisque	12,500	11,300	14,600	43,000	37,000	
Thiès	2400	6400	11,000	24,000	43,000	
Saint-Louis	22,100	18,100	29,600		39,000	
Kaolack		1500	14,000	30,000	46,700	

(After Collomb H. & Ayats H. “Les migrations au Sénégal,” op. cit. 569).

The figures provided in table 2 for the population of Dakar are similar to the figures in table 1. Cheikh Faty Faye does not specify if the Gorée population was taken into account in

⁶⁸ L. M. Schrader. “Le port de Dakar.” *Annales de Géographie*, 22 (124), (1913): 367.

⁶⁹ G. Ribot & R. Lafon. *Dakar, ses origines, son avenir*. Quoted in, Mbokolo E. “Peste et société urbaine à Dakar: l’épidémie de 1914.” *Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines*, 22 (85-86), (1982): 15.

⁷⁰ E. Mbokolo, op. cit., 15. B. Salleras. “La peste à Dakar en 1914: Médina ou les enjeux complexes d’une politique sanitaire.” (Paris, EHESS, Mémoire de Maîtrise, 1984).

the census. However, both scenarios indicate that the population of Dakar grew significantly between 1921 and 1961 due in part to the large-scale projects launched in 1903 by Governor General Ernest Roume financed by 65,000,000 Francs public loan. Of that total amount, 10,000,000 Francs were devoted to the extension of the Dakar harbor. Also, 5,450,000 Francs were to be used for the sewer systems in Dakar, Saint-Louis and Rufisque.⁷¹ The implementation of the *politique indigène* defined by Albert Sarraut (1921) played a role in the growth of the colonial population as a whole, and served as a road map for subsequent colonial governments until 1960. The 3,500,000,000 francs *Plan Sarraut* was not approved in 1921, because the Parliament had decided that the financial resources should rather be used to finance the process of postwar reconstruction in Metropolitan France.⁷²

In Dakar, the African group consisting of *Originaires*, Indigenes from inland areas, and natives from other colonies of French West Africa, was the most significant. Until the 1924 bubonic plague outbreak, traditional *Lébou* villages were scattered inside the peninsula at very close range to European dwellings. At the height of the epidemics, French officials came to the conclusion that segregation was the only way to protect Europeans from the deadly disease. Segregation had already been used elsewhere for the purpose of prevention.⁷³ French executives decided to move the traditional *Lébou* villages and all African dwellings to the fringes of the plateau, and behind a buffer-zone designed for that specific purpose.

The *Lébous* received support from the newly elected African representative to the French Parliament, Blaise Diagne (1872-1934), and resisted with riots and harsh criticism toward the colonial administration blamed for taking *Lébou* land and paying little attention to

⁷¹M. Zimmermann. "Les Grands Travaux dans l'Afrique Occidentale." Annales de Géographie, 12 (62), (1903): 186.

⁷²A. Sarraut. *La Mise en valeur des colonies Françaises*. (Paris, Payot, 1923).

⁷³M. W. Swanson. "Sanitation syndrome: Bubonic plague and urban native policy in the Cape colony, 1900-1909." Journal of African History, XVIII (3), (1977): 387-410.

Lébou beliefs and social constraints. For many Africans, born in Dakar or elsewhere, the relocation process and prevention measures - such as destruction of dwellings and contaminated belongings, and immunizations - felt like a conspiracy, so much so that the fatalistic attitude toward disease was soon replaced with suspicion. Partly, because of inequalities in plague-related deaths (weak European subjects versus 20-40 years old Africans), the political context in which the declaration of epidemics took place (perceived as a conspiracy of the merchant elite against Blaise Diagne), and rumours of malicious intent of European rulers on the ground that they were undermining mourning and burial traditions.⁷⁴

Within the African community, responses to disease and health varied according to the group to which the individual belonged.⁷⁵ However, there was a common feature in reactions to official instructions and curative methods. For example, instructions from physicians, nurses or hygiene services agents to avoid contact with sick and contagious persons often fell on deaf ears. In their majority, the members of African communities in Senegal generally catered to the needs of sick relatives to the end, regardless of the threat of contagion. To many, staying away from a sick relative made no sense. As proof, persistent urban legends about the adverse effects of the plague vaccine were spread across the city.⁷⁶

⁷⁴E. Mbokolo. "Peste et société urbaine à Dakar: l'épidémie de 1914." Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, 22 (85-86), (1982): 31-33. B. Salleras. "*La peste à Dakar en 1914: Médina ou les enjeux d'une politique sanitaire*." (Paris, EHESS, Mémoire de Maîtrise, 1984). M. J. Echenberg. *Black Death, white medicine: Bubonic Plague and the politics of public health in colonial Senegal (1914-1945)*. (New York, Heinemann, 2001).

⁷⁵H. Collomb et H. Ayats. "Les migrations au Sénégal: Etude psychopathologique." Cahiers d'Etude Africaine, 2 (8), (1962): 573.

⁷⁶See also, ANS. 2G series. Yearly Medical Reports (1920-1960).

2. The Administration of public health and hygiene in French West Africa

In 1895, France no longer wanted its presence in Africa to simply be a cheap, though dangerous, colonial adventure.⁷⁷ The establishment of the *Gouvernement Général de l'Afrique Occidentale Française* (AOF) resulted from the need to define an administrative organization for the African colonies. In 1895, France found itself in possession of a large area stretching along the coast of the Atlantic Ocean. The law organizing the AOF *Gouvernement Général* was passed on June 16, 1895. The government oversaw eight territories placed under the authority of the *Gouverneur Général*. The AOF *Gouvernement Général* was drawn from the pyramidal structure of the French government. AOF specialists even argue that the *Gouvernement Général* was “heir to the most Jacobin tendencies of the French system, in its structures as much as in the relationships between its institutions.”⁷⁸

It was no surprise that the French government and the AOF *Gouvernement Général* often had the same concerns. In fact, in France social issues were a major concern for French governments since the nineteenth century, especially under the *Front Populaire* government led by Léon Blum (1872-1950) between 1936 and 1937. Health policies were developed in order to set decent life standards for French citizens in accordance with major findings in the area of health and hygiene. As proof, the nineteenth century process of *Haussmanisation* of Paris and major sanitation works aimed at making Paris and major French cities more liveable from a hygiene standpoint, than from a purely aesthetic standpoint.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ C. Coquery-Vidrovitch. “Colonisation ou impérialisme: La politique Africaine de la France entre-deux guerres.” *Le Mouvement Social: Bulletin Bimestriel de l'Institut Français d'Histoire Sociale*, 4 (107), (Avril-Juin 1979): 52.

⁷⁸ C. Becker, S. Mbaye and I. Thioub (Eds.). *AOF: Réalités et héritages. Sociétés Ouest-Africaines et ordre colonial, 1895-196: Introduction*. (Dakar, Direction des Archives du Sénégal, Tome I, 1997), 8.

⁷⁹ D. Reid. *Paris sewers and sewermen: Realities and representations*. (Cambridge, Harvard University, 1991).

The first move to protect the colonies from diseases came with the law on *police sanitaire* in the colonies and *Pays de Protectorat* signed March 31, 1897. Hygiene Committees (*Comités d'hygiène*) placed under the authority of the Director of Health Services (*Chef du Service de Santé*) (art. 130) were established in colonies and *Pays de Protectorat*. The Hygiene Committee was expected to provide assistance on “public health, hygiene to the major cities and groups (AOF and AEF), on hygiene generally, and on the prophylaxis of epidemics.”⁸⁰ The terms of implementation of the March 31, 1897 law were exposed in the November 16, 1900 order signed by Governor Ballay. The Governor requested that *circonscriptions sanitaires* be established in each district within Saint-Louis and Dakar.⁸¹

Conseils sanitaires were also established in the cities of Saint-Louis and Dakar to oversee the *circonscriptions sanitaires*. Article 133 of the March 31, 1897 law required that *conseils sanitaires* meet upon request of their presidents. Board meetings were to be held when the status of public hygiene⁸² in Saint-Louis and Dakar where the *Secrétaire Général du Gouvernement* and the mayor respectively managed the *conseils sanitaires* required urgent action. The aim of the *conseils sanitaires* was to provide advisory services. Governor Ballay also ordered that a *Comité colonial d'hygiène* be established in Saint-Louis.

⁸⁰F. Faure. “Décret du 31 Mars 1897 portant règlement de police sanitaire maritime dans les colonies et Pays de Protectorat.” In, GGAOF. *Colonie du Sénégal. Principaux règlements concernant l'hygiène et la salubrité publiques*. (Saint-Louis, Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1912): 9. N. Ballay. N°444. “Arrêté relatif à l'application du décret sanitaire du 31 Mars 1897. – Conseils sanitaires. – Comité et Commission d'hygiène.” (Saint-Louis, November 16, 1900). In, GGAOF. *Colonie du Sénégal. Principaux règlements concernant l'hygiène et la salubrité publiques*. (Saint-Louis, Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1912)

⁸¹N. Ballay. N°444. “Arrêté relatif à l'application du décret sanitaire du 31 Mars 1897. – Conseils sanitaires. – Comité et Commission d'hygiène.” (Saint-Louis, November 16, 1900). In, GGAOF. *Colonie du Sénégal. Principaux règlements concernant l'hygiène et la salubrité publiques*. (Saint-Louis, Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1912): 3.

⁸²F. Faure. “Décret du 31 Mars 1897 portant règlement de police sanitaire maritime dans les colonies et Pays de Protectorat.” In, GGAOF. *Colonie du Sénégal. Principaux règlements concernant l'hygiène et la salubrité publiques*. (Saint-Louis, Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1912): 9.

The *conseils sanitaires* assisted the *Gouverneur Général* with all issues related to public hygiene and the *police sanitaire* upon requests from the colonies. As such, the *Comité Colonial d'Hygiène* played the same role as the *Comité Consultatif d'hygiène Publique* played in France.⁸³ Among other things, the *Comité Colonial d'Hygiène* examined issues related to:

- 1) Sanitation within dwellings and commune limits
- 2) Issues pertaining to both *arrondissements*.

Also, the *Comité Colonial d'Hygiène* centralized the proceedings of the *Commission Municipale d'Hygiène* and provided reports of the proceedings to the *Gouverneur Général*. The *Gouverneur Général* then passed the report on to the Minister of colonies.

Also, *commissions municipales d'hygiène et de salubrité publiques* were established in the Four Communes.⁸⁴ The consultative role was in the hands of members of the *commissions d'hygiène*. The Saint-Louis and the Dakar *commissions d'hygiène* exercised the powers defined in article 131 of the March 31, 1897 law. Members of *commissions d'hygiène* examined public hygiene-related issues pertaining to the Four Communes, and *arrondissements* reported by the *Gouverneur Général* particularly in the following domains:

- 1) Sanitation of neighbourhoods and dwellings.
- 2) Steps to implement prevention and to fight endemics, epidemics and communicable diseases.
- 3) Epizootics and animal disease
- 4) Vaccines

⁸³N. Ballay. N°444. "Arrêté relatif à l'application du décret sanitaire du 31 Mars 1897. – Conseils sanitaires. – Comité et Commission d'hygiène." (Saint-Louis, November 16, 1900). In, GGAOF. *Colonie du Sénégal. Principaux règlements concernant l'hygiène et la salubrité publiques*. (Saint-Louis, Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1912), 16.

⁸⁴N. Ballay. N°444. "Arrêté relatif à l'application du décret sanitaire du 31 Mars 1897. – Conseils sanitaires. – Comité et Commission d'hygiène." (Saint-Louis, November 16, 1900). In, GGAOF. *Colonie du Sénégal. Principaux règlements concernant l'hygiène et la salubrité publiques*. (Saint-Louis, Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1912), 14.

- 5) Ways and means to improve the sanitary situation of colonial populations
- 6) Health and hygiene within factories, schools, hospitals, charitable organizations, asylums, houses for the insane.
- 7) Control of the quality of food, drink, condiments, and medicine
- 8) Process requests of authorizations to build, destruction of dangerous and unsanitary houses, or non-compliant dwellings
- 9) Oversee issues that pertain to public hygiene and public works: schools, jails, barracks, harbors, reservoirs, shops, markets, sewer systems, cemeteries, etc.⁸⁵

The March 31, 1897 was the roadmap for administering public health in French West Africa.

By 1904, Minister of colonies Gaston Doumergue understood the benefits of some provisions of the February 15, 1902 law. He thought that “implementing the law in *Afrique Occidentale Française*” would help regulate the process of protection of Public health in AOF, while granting local authorities with the necessary powers to safeguard the health of settlers and native populations alike.⁸⁶ Consequently, Doumergue prepared for President Emile Loubet, the April 14, 1904 law concerning protection of public health within the territories of *Afrique Occidentale Française*. Article 1 of the 1904 law on public health ordered that, “the Mayor, the colony administrator or the *Commandant de cercle* be required to implement” the sanitary regulations enacted in the law throughout the AOF group.⁸⁷

⁸⁵N. Ballay. N°444. “*Arrêté relatif à l’application du décret sanitaire du 31 Mars 1897. – Conseils sanitaires. – Comité et Commission d’hygiène.*” (Saint-Louis, November 16, 1900). In, GGAOF. *Colonie du Sénégal. Principaux règlements concernant l’hygiène et la salubrité publiques.* (Saint-Louis, Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1912), 15-16.

⁸⁶G. Doumergue. “Rapport au Président de la République Française.” (Paris, April 14, 1904). In, GGAOF. *Colonie du Sénégal. Principaux règlements concernant l’hygiène et la salubrité publiques.* (Saint-Louis, Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1912), 19.

⁸⁷E. Loubet. “Décret.” (Paris, April 14, 1904). In, GGAOF. *Colonie du Sénégal. Principaux règlements concernant l’hygiène et la salubrité publiques.* (Saint-Louis : Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1912), 20.

As such, the law was timely and took into account most of the concerns of health professionals and civil servants in matters of public health and hygiene. Nevertheless, local administrators were to strictly implement “under the surveillance of health professionals, and through the use of regulatory texts enacted by the *Lieutenants-Gouverneurs* of colonies, reviewed by the *Comité local d’hygiène et de salubrité publiques* and approved by the *Gouverneur général* after review by the *Comité Supérieur d’hygiène et de Salubrité Publiques* of *Afrique Occidentale Française*.”⁸⁸ Local authorities were urged to implement “major in order to prevent communicable diseases [...], and apply confinement rules to patients in specific buildings; disinfection methods; [...] disinfection of patient belongings or soiled objects, and generally any objects that can serve as a medium for contagion.”⁸⁹ Also, in case of epidemics or imminent threats to public health “the *Gouverneur Général* could order the implementation, *tous droits réservés*, of the sanitary regulations in force.”⁹⁰

The 1904 law concerning public health reveals the goal of the colonial state to deal with the most pressing matters in collaboration with all policy makers. As proof, the law insisted on the various ways to eradicate disease, mainly epidemics, and to encourage homeowners to implement hygiene and health regulations at all costs, including through expropriation and sale by auction of properties. The 1904 law was in many ways much more precise than the 1897 law, because the 1904 law cast a wider net. However, the system was unwieldy due to the numerous layers of power involved between the time of the identification of threats to the preservation of public health, reporting to the relevant local and AOF federal authorities, decision-making, and the implementation on the ground of precise sanitation rules.

⁸⁸ E. Loubet. “Décret.” (Paris, April 14, 1904). In, GGAOF. *Colonie du Sénégal. Principaux règlements concernant l’hygiène et la salubrité publiques*. (Saint-Louis, Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1912), 20.

⁸⁹ Idem, 21.

⁹⁰ Idem, 21.

3. The *Assistance Médicale Indigène* system (A. M. I.): concerns and purposes

Complexity remained a constant feature of the AOF health apparatus until 1960. The colonial state was eager to solve all public health issue. At the same time, it struggled to strike a balance in the establishment of public health standards to achieve an environment free of major threats to public health. As a result, various regulatory texts and infrastructures were created between 1904 and 1905. *Gouverneur Général* Ernest Roume required that *Service municipaux d'hygiène* be established in the Four Communes of Senegal, and also within all towns that served as communes.⁹¹ The role of the *Service Municipal d'Hygiène* - under the authority of the Mayor and technical supervision of health officials and the local *Chef du Service de Santé* - was to implement the provisions of the April 14, 1904 law.

Likewise, the *Gouverneur du Sénégal* and mayors, each in their own capacities and under the prior supervision of relevant health and administrative authorities - after review of *comités locaux d'hygiène*, of the *Comité Supérieur d'hygiène et de salubrité publiques de l'AOF*, and the approval of the *Gouverneur Général* - focused on enacting and implementing by means of orders and instructions health-related standards within the limits of the territories under their jurisdiction. For instance, the *Gouverneur du Sénégal* ordered that the “occupants of buildings located on public roads” clean all canals located in the vicinity of their building “at least once a day, and at hours [decided upon] by way of specific municipal orders.”⁹²

⁹¹E. Loubet. “Décret.” (Paris, April 14, 1904). In, GGAOF. *Colonie du Sénégal. Principaux règlements concernant l'hygiène et la salubrité publiques*. (Saint-Louis, Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1912). E. Roume. N°4. “Arrêté instituant un Service Municipal d'hygiène dans les quatre communes de plein exercice du Sénégal, et éventuellement dans les centres ou agglomérations érigés en communes.” (Gorée, January 5, 1905). In, GGAOF. *Colonie du Sénégal. Principaux règlements concernant l'hygiène et la salubrité publiques*. (Saint-Louis, Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1912), 27-30.

⁹²C. Guy. N°29. “Arrêté relatif aux eaux stagnantes dans l'intérieur des villes.” (Saint-Louis, January 12, 1905). In, GGAOF. *Colonie du Sénégal. Principaux règlements concernant l'hygiène et la salubrité publiques*. (Saint-Louis, Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1912), 31-33.

Incumbent mayors were involved in that 1904-1905 initiative. On February 3, 1905, Georges Patterson, Dakar's deputy mayor, extended the order on stagnant water in inner cities to Dakar January 12, 1905.⁹³ Mayor Escarpit made the same decision as Georges Patterson for the Rufisque commune a month later.⁹⁴ However, more important regulations were to come with the May 28, 1905, order of *Gouverneur du Sénégal* Camille Guy on the steps to prevent the spread of epidemics. Guy ordered that the individuals diagnosed with fourteen diseases such as Typhoid, cholera-like diseases and plague be traced. He also asked health specialists to provide assistance to individuals who voluntarily reported any the eight diseases (including tuberculosis and conjunctivitis) the reporting of which was simply advised.⁹⁵

Nothing was said in the order about financial support. On the contrary, penalties were applied for non-compliance with the order. Violators of any of the clauses of the order were to pay a fine of up to two hundred Francs. The fine was also applied in times of epidemic outbreaks to all patients and their contacts (e.g. relatives, neighbors), who had failed to comply with the standards of isolation, antisepsis and disinfection of dwelling and objects (titles II and III). Non-compliant patients or suspects could face up to two years in prison.⁹⁶

⁹³G. Patterson. N°156. "Arrêté municipal au sujet de l'application de l'arrêté général relatif aux eaux stagnantes dans l'intérieur des villes." (Dakar, February 3, 1905). In, Gouvernement Général de l'AOF. *Colonie du Sénégal. Principaux règlements concernant l'hygiène et la salubrité publiques*. (Saint-Louis, Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1912), 34.

⁹⁴Escarpit. N°158. "Arrêté relatif aux eaux stagnantes dans l'intérieur de la ville de Rufisque." (Rufisque, March 22, 1905). In, GGAOF. *Colonie du Sénégal. Principaux règlements concernant l'hygiène et la salubrité publiques*. (Saint-Louis, Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1912), 35.

⁹⁵C. Guy. N°215. Arrêté concernant les mesures à prendre pour prévenir ou faire cesser les maladies épidémiques." (Saint-Louis, May 28, 1905). In, GGAOF. *Colonie du Sénégal. Principaux règlements concernant l'hygiène et la salubrité publiques*. (Saint-Louis, Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1912), 38.

⁹⁶C. Guy. N°215. "Arrêté concernant les mesures à prendre pour prévenir ou faire cesser les maladies épidémiques." (Saint-Louis, May 28, 1905).

4. “*Faire du Noir*”: The interwar years shift of the A. M. I. system (1920-1940)

In 1875, *Professeur* Mahé told prospective colonial physicians they were going to meet “the dreadful sphinx of malaria [...and] the [scary] mask of vomito Negro” on the plague-ridden shores of the Atlantic Ocean “from the land and the waters [of which] wafts poisoning air.”⁹⁷ *Professeur* Mahé’s words summarize the reputation of unhealthiness of the environment in the area. From the beginning of the colonial conquest onward, Europeans paid a heavy toll to *fièvre hémoglobinurique*, yellow fever, and malaria. Of all three diseases, yellow fever was the most dreadful and difficult to tackle for colonial authorities. In fact, the advent of yellow fever outbreaks was always a source of significant distress among the European population and colonial authorities alike. So much so that, concealing the colony’s yellow fever status remained a convenient panacea for the colonial state at least for a while.⁹⁸

In any case, until the First World War, French colonial officials were more interested in legislating on matters of disease eradication to improve the living conditions in the colonies. Local populations were the main targets in that fight. The tone used in the legislation on public health before 1920 was maintained in later regulatory texts. Colonial policy makers maintained their resolve from the time they realized something needed to be done to transform the colonies generally - and colonial Senegal particularly - into hospitable spaces where members of the military and European settlers would be able to live healthy lives in “sanitized” environments. Nevertheless, the First World War further moved the goalposts, especially in terms of the social and medical bearings of intervention in the colonies.

⁹⁷ « *Là-bas, sur les rives infestées de l’Atlantique, vous rencontrerez le redoutable sphinx de la malaria..., le masque du Vomito Negro. (...) De la terre et des eaux s’exhale un souffle empoisonné.* » Docteur Mahé quoted in D. Domergue-Cloarec. “Epidémies de fièvre jaune en Afrique Française (1900-1940).” *Maladie, Médecine et Sociétés*, 6^e Colloque de l’Association Histoire au Présent (Paris, 15-19 Mai 1990): 278-246.

⁹⁸ A. A. Pam. “Fièvre jaune et ordre colonial (1850-1960).” (Paris, Ecole Nationale des Chartes, Thèse, 2000).

In colonial Senegal, numerous yellow fever outbreaks had been recorded since the nineteenth century. Authorities feared that the status of the colony in relation to disease would jeopardize the economic development. The 1914 plague outbreak further confirmed the centrality of public health issues in the colonial development plans.⁹⁹ Yet, all the initiatives undertaken in French West Africa were aimed at safeguarding the military and settlers against the effects of the debilitating environment. As a reminder, there was a heavy toll on Europeans during the colonial conquest and settlement operations, to the extent that, like Sierra Leone, much of West Africa appeared as a “land of pestilence and death” and the “white man’s grave” in the eyes of European travelers and average people.”¹⁰⁰ However, a more encompassing approach of public health was adopted after the First World War.

It was *Gouverneur Général* Martial Merlin (1919-1923) who recognized the need to widen the scope of the April 1904 law on public health. We must keep in mind the context of ‘Association’ that surrounded the renewal of the A.M.I system in the 1920s. Precisely, French colonial executives of the interwar period operated on the basis of two main premises. “The first was that some form of power-sharing with the old and new elite in West Africa was necessary to preserve French authority intact. The second was that this power-sharing in the proper doses and surrounded by the proper safeguards, was also in the best interests of their subjects and thus consistent with the Third Republic’s civilizing mission in West Africa.”¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ E. Mbokolo. “Peste et société urbaine à Dakar: l’épidémie de 1914.” *Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines*, 22 (85-86), (1982), 31-33. A. A. Pam. “Fièvre jaune et ordre colonial (1850-1960).” (Paris, Ecole Nationale des Chartes, Thèse, 2000).

¹⁰⁰ P. D. Curtin. *Disease and empire: The health of European troops in the conquest of Africa*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998). J. P. Dozon. “D’un tombeau, l’autre.” *Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines*, 121-122 (XXXI-1), 135-157. F. R. Harrison. *The white man’s grave: A visit to Sierra Leone in 1834*. (London, Richard Bentley, 1836), 1.

¹⁰¹ A. L. Conklin. “Democracy” rediscovered: Civilization through association in French West Africa (1914-1930).” *Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines*, 37 (145), (1997), 66.

In his April 12, 1921, memo governor Martial Merlin suggested that the A.M.I. system focus on hygiene and preventive medicine, while maintaining assistance to the sick as primary purpose of the A.M.I. In 1926, returning from a tour in the various colonies of AOF, his successor governor Jules Carde concluded that the entire A.M.I. system had made significant progress. However, much more needed to be done in order to achieve the goals the administration set for taking the necessary steps to achieve “the numerical increase and the physiological improvement of native races.”¹⁰² In fact, the goal of the Merlin memo was to direct the A.M.I. system toward hygiene and preventive medicine. By all appearances, high mortality and infant mortality rates among Africans were sources of great concern for French colonial physicians and civil servants since the beginning of the colonial enterprise.¹⁰³ Carde also insisted on the central role of native medical auxiliaries (nurses, and midwives).

French colonial authorities gave a new impetus to the A.M.I. system once the major morbidity and mortality factors among natives were identified mainly as lack of hygiene among children, lack of appropriate care among childbearing women, and susceptibility to epidemics among all adults. The goal of the new A.M.I. system was to “increase the native races in quality and in quantity” as well. Furthermore, medical assistance provided to patients individually, especially in a hospital environment, was meant to be secondary to preventive and social medicine. The aims of “preventive and social medicine” were “to prevent disease, and to teach how to avoid diseases that are avoidable” through education, dissemination of childcare concepts, screening, and immediate implementation of preventive rules.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² GGAOF. J. Carde. “Instructions du Gouverneur Général Carde sur le développement de l’Assistance Médicale indigène sociale et sur la protection sanitaire des travailleurs en AOF.” (Paris, Agence Economique de l’Afrique Occidentale Française, 1931), 1.

¹⁰³ See ANS: 2G. Rapports périodiques Dakar et Dépendances (1941-1960).

¹⁰⁴ GGAOF. J. Carde, op. cit., 2-3.

5. The political basis of the surveillance of AOF Mecca pilgrims (1895-1960)

It is true that French colonial authorities made less reference to pure medical concerns than to the socio-political requirements of colonial intervention in their epistolary exchanges, and confidential and official memos regarding *Hajj* regulation in French West Africa.¹⁰⁵ Yet, concerns for the health and well-being of colonial pilgrims were still ongoing at the end of the timeframe of this dissertation mainly because of the lack of coordination of regulation efforts at the international level until 1926 roughly. For instance, British Indian pilgrims boarded Mecca-bound boats at Mumbai, Karachi and Calcutta, only after an observation period in “harbors placed under the surveillance of “Guardians” and of pilgrimage committees.”¹⁰⁶ Likewise, the government oversaw ground and sea transportation of Egyptians pilgrims. Also, Lebanese and Syrian Mecca pilgrims travelled on government chartered-boat.

On the other hand, Persian and Afghan pilgrims subject to no regulation were deemed “the vagrants of the pilgrimage.”¹⁰⁷ In short, Persian and Afghan pilgrims used various transportation means with no control or order of their respective authorities. Turks managed with what was at hand, since the policy of the Ottoman government was to avoid interfering in religious issues. Similarly, around pilgrimage time, West African pilgrims, the majority of which came from Nigeria, boarded basic sailing boats known as *sambouks*. For many, the journey from home to Mecca had started on foot months before. However, from 1926 on West African pilgrims were required to cross the Red Sea exclusively on steamboats.

¹⁰⁵ It is true that, the epidemiological situation of the Hedjaz had been a significant source of concern for European and US health professionals, especially since the 1830s. Yet, the political situations of the areas and countries located on the path of Mecca pilgrims and the global political situation of the world level seemed to have mattered significantly to European countries responsible for important Muslim communities, namely in the colonial context.

¹⁰⁶ F. Duguet. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Du point de religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Editions Rieder, 1932), 22.

¹⁰⁷ Idem, 23-24.

Generally, French officials seemed relatively confident about the loyalty of Muslims from French West Africa toward the colonial administration. In a 1931 report an anonymous author summarized Islam as practiced in A.O.F. as “tolerant, conciliatory, and marked by genuine loyalty toward the French authority.” The same author mentioned the “*Mouridisme Sénégalais*” as the most striking example of that loyalty toward France. He even suggested helping the “young Muslim segment aspiring to perfect its Islamic culture.” To him, the most expedient device to reach that goal was the establishment in Dakar of “an institution conceived and adapted specially to grant the native elite a sacred culture, while providing complementarily to concerned people a general and traditional teaching ultimately aimed at linking the French culture to the Islamic culture.” Among other things, the appropriate assistance granted to natives for attendance to the Mecca pilgrimage was also part of the collaboration plan between French the government and West African Muslims.

However, that consideration for the aspirations of West African Muslims was also part of a strategy to forestall any potential crisis with Muslims. In fact, the colonial government was aware that fighting Islam “in the present circumstances (i.e. the failure of the Moroccan nationalist movement which resulted in a massive arrival of Moroccan immigrants in AOF) would be a political mistake, if not nonsense.” Indeed, the colonial government chose to “maintain a kindly neutrality toward Islam,” and even better “to provide (Islam), under thoughtful conditions, active support” as a strategic measure.¹⁰⁸ In short, French colonial authorities understood the need to negotiate with native Muslims in order to hold back potential sympathy, or rallying signs, to the Moroccan cause. In any case, the apparent confidence of French authorities in the loyalty A.O.F. Muslims did not rule out the control of the interactions of A.O.F. Muslims with their fellow Muslims under the pretext of pilgrimage.

¹⁰⁸ ANS: 9G 71-72 (107). Anonymous. “Questions intéressant à la fois le Maroc et le Département.” (Notices, 1931), 1.

Colonial authorities also viewed the *Hajj* as an opportunity for militant Muslims to spread seditious ideas in A.O.F. A secret report from the *Direction des Affaires Politiques et Administratives* indicates that the “pilgrimage of Merebbi Rebbo had a political tone, and a religious one as well.” Mauritanian native Rebbo was instructed “to sing the praises of Germans, Italians, and [the Caudillo Francisco] Franco [1872-1975]” who funded the journey to Mecca for him and his followers. Mauritanian natives were particularly targeted because, many among them helped spread rumors that Germany “was the strongest nation”, and Italians had built “a big Mosque and Madrassas in *Tripolitania* (North of present Lybia) for the Muslims of all countries.” In response, Governor de Coppet (1881-1968) instructed the Lieutenant-Gouverneur “to establish a mosque and Madrassas in Dakar”, in order to “provide Muslims with tangible proof” of the good intentions of the colonial government.¹⁰⁹

In fact, French officials seemed more suspicious of clerics heading to Mecca along with their followers, than they were of anonymous pilgrims individually venturing in the dangerous and “too highly organized countries” of the *Ouaddaï* (in current Chad) and the *Dar For* (in current Sudan). *Chef de Bataillon* Gaden summarized that prevailing view in his note about a group of *Toucouleurs* en route to Mecca, which had recently arrived in Fort-Lamy (current Chad). The main members of the group in question were Aliou Tierno (brother of cleric *El Hadj Omar*), Ma Bassirou (son of *El Hadj Omar*), Ahmadou Oumarou Eliman, Ahmadou Eliman Bousso (the *Alkali* of Nioro), Aliou Ousman (brother of Tidiani and former Sultan of Bandiagara), and Alpha Abdou (Diawando and right-hand man of Ahmadou).¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ ANS: 9G71-72 (107). N°561 A/P. Direction des Affaires Politiques et Administratives. “Rapport Secret. Renseignements source indigène bonne, non recoupée.” (Dakar, February 21, 1938).

¹¹⁰ ANS: 19G2. Chef de Bataillon Gaden. “Questions Musulmanes (1906 – 1918): Notes sur les Toucouleurs récemment arrivés à Fort-Lamy.” (Fort-Lamy, August 10, 1906). Gaden denied Ma Bassirou authorization to cross Chad, on the ground that – “as a resident” - he had no power to grant such authorizations.

In fact, the group was seeking to repeat the performance of Alpha Hashimi Tall, also called “Alpha Hashmi”, “Assmilor”, or “Assémamou.” Alpha Hashimi Tall, nephew of *El Hadj* Omar Tall and brother of Tidiani was a very influential *Marabout*. He had stopped in Zinder alone at the end of 1904 on his way “supposedly to Mecca.”¹¹¹ Alpha Hashimi had left French Sudan, immediately after colonel Archinard seized Ségou on April 6, 1890.¹¹² The colonial State feared Hashimi had set an example for the *Toucouleur* people. They believed that the “*Toucouleurs* of Ahmadou” of Sokoto, and the “discontented Muslims of northern Nigeria” had started relocation eastward with no immediate plans of return.¹¹³

The colonial State received information suggesting that Hashimi was living in Mecca, and serving as Imam of the Mecca Greater Mosque. Of course, Governor Clozel and his peers had serious doubts about this, because the *Chorfas* had been providing Imams to the Great Mosque for centuries. To them, the probability that the *Chorfas* would accept sharing the privileges attached to such a prestigious position as Imam of the Great Mosque with a “negro, as Tall as he may be” was extremely low. Therefore, as such Alpha Hashimi was no threat to their rule in French West Africa. Nevertheless, colonial authorities feared Alpha Hashimi would inspire his fellow Muslims, and might become the instigator of an emigration movement eastward. That is why Alpha Hashimi Tall was placed under close watch.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ ANS: 19G2. Chef de Bataillon Gaden. “Questions Musulmanes (1906 – 1918): Notes sur les Toucouleurs récemment arrivés à Fort-Lamy.” (Fort-Lamy, August 10, 1906).

¹¹² ANS: 19G2. N° 183. Affaires Politique et Administratives. Clozel. “Le Gouverneur des Colonies, Lieutenant Gouverneur du Haut-Sénégal-Niger à Monsieur le Gouverneur de l’AOF à Dakar.” (Bamako, Marc 20, 1911).

¹¹³ J. Hanson. “Islam, migration, and the political economy of meaning: Fergo Nioro from the Senegal River Valley, 1862-1890.” *Journal of African History* 35, (1994): 37-60. D. Robinson et J. L. Triaud (Eds.). *Le temps des Marabouts: Itinéraires et Stratégies Islamiques en Afrique Occidentale Française v. 1880-1960*. (Paris, Karthala, 1997).

¹¹⁴ ANS: 19G2. Anonymous. Sous-Direction de l’Afrique à Paris. “Courrier adressé à la Direction des Affaires Politiques et Administratives.” (Not dated).

In fact, colonial officials feared Alpha Hashimi “would fast become dangerous if he was to reappear in the *Soudan*.”¹¹⁵ In the early twentieth century, it seems that French West African *Marabouts* were globally perceived as a nuisance to the French administration and local populations. *Marabouts* used to undertake periodical tours in various areas to meet their followers. According to Governor Clozel, they used that pretext to spread subversive ideas and “distract from [French authorities] the primitive minds of the natives, while receiving gifts in cash and in kind from the Muslims they visited”.¹¹⁶ In fact, the visits were costly for local people because they were “required by tradition to provide lodging, food, and gifts to visitors, and above all to visiting clerics.”¹¹⁷ Therefore, French authorities sought to regulate Islam-related celebrations - including clerical tours - with meticulous care.”¹¹⁸

Clozel was not specifically referring to the *Hajj*. However, the *Hajj* fell naturally in the category of the Islamic celebrations that were in dire need of regulation. French authorities were aware of the movements eastward of French West African Muslims opposed to their presence in West Africa since the end of the nineteenth century. They also knew of the risks West African pilgrims took each year to comply with the requirements of their faith. As a matter of fact, West African pilgrims, also known as *Takruri*, accounted for a significant part of the “*déchets du pèlerinage*” (pilgrimage waste) at the end of each *Hajj* season. That is why surveillance of *Hajj* was on the top of the colonial agenda in the early twentieth century.

Conclusion

¹¹⁵ ANS: 19G2. N° 183. Affaires Politique et Administratives. Clozel. *Le Gouverneur des Colonies, Lieutenant Gouverneur du Haut-Sénégal-Niger à Monsieur le Gouverneur de l'AOF à Dakar*. (Bamako, March 20, 1911).

¹¹⁶ ANS: 19G3. N°21 C. *Circulaire aux Lieutenant- Gouverneurs des territoires - au sujet de la nécessité de réglementer les quêtes religieuses*. (Dakar, September 27, 1906).

¹¹⁷ ANS: 19G3. N° D674. C. Guy. *Surveillance de l'Islam – Réglementation des quêtes (1905-1915). – Lieutenant - Gouverneur du Sénégal au Gouverneur Général – au sujet des quêtes religieuses de Cheikh Saad ou au Sénégal*. (Saint-Louis, October 16, 1906).

¹¹⁸ ANS: 19G3. N°21 C. *Circulaire aux Lieutenant- Gouverneurs des territoires - au sujet de la nécessité de réglementer les quêtes religieuses*. (Dakar, September 27, 1906).

As aforementioned, European colonial powers generally, and French colonial authorities particularly, were concerned with the risks of introduction of cholera germs and other communicable disease back in the colony through the medium of returning West African Mecca pilgrims. This was even truer in the case of colonial Senegal because of the early nineteenth century yellow fever epidemics. Until the 1920s, such yellow fever outbreaks threatened the lives of French colonial authorities, colonists and the local population established within the colony of Senegal. For almost two decades, the well-being of the colony was related to the severity of yellow fever outbreaks. As described in chapter three of this dissertation, Syrian and Lebanese peddlers – for instance - were perceived as major germ-carriers because of the very nature of their activities, which involved frequent movements between urban areas and the hinterland. Due to that situation, colonial authorities felt the need to regulate their movements through the requirement of travel documents.

More research is necessary to further confirm the relationships between the process of management of the *Hajj* business through medical and administrative monitoring of colonial Senegalese Muslims and the implementation of public health standards applied in other areas of the world. Yet, we should keep in mind that such issues have been discussed the international level for almost one century. Indeed, discussions over the need to prevent risks of spread of *Hajj*-related cholera out of its boundaries permitted the adoption and the implementation of global public health and travel standards still noticeable in the World Health Organization standards. Modern public health owes as much, if not more, to the colonial past than to modern epidemiology. In today's world, global public health concerns may have shifted, but the focus of international public health policy remains the eradication of communicable diseases, and the large-scale fight against diseases such as HIV/AIDS, avian flu, swine flu and resistant strains of re-emerging diseases such as TB.

CHAPTER 3: “*Sanitizing the Hajj*”: in the name of global security and better health

From 1851 onward, colonial European powers led by France continued their efforts to contain and eradicate *Hajj*-related cholera which threatened the rest of the world, including colonial Senegal. For centuries, colonial Senegal Muslims had travelled to Mecca along with fellow West Africa Muslims through desert routes, and were not required to abide by any rules, or control. In colonial Senegal, the challenge for French colonial authorities was to ensure that colonial Senegalese Muslims, along with their fellow French West Africa Muslims, abide by international hygiene regulations so that they would undertake the *Hajj* under excellent hygiene conditions and reach Mecca safely. At least in the case of *Originaire* Muslims, the project did not meet resistance. It seems that they adopted the system without question. Obviously, those Muslims were used to French laws and management methods. Obeying French medical directives was taking steps toward enjoying French living standards.

In colonial Senegal, as elsewhere, France created a surveillance apparatus epitomized by a series of medical and administrative requirements made mandatory for all prospective pilgrims months prior to their departure for the Holy Land. For instance, prospective colonial Mecca pilgrims were required to undergo medical exams and receive various vaccinations prior to their departure for Mecca. Furthermore, colonial Mecca pilgrims were required to provide a statement signed by two witnesses in the presence of the mayor. The role of witnesses was to testify that the applicant was in a position to meet all the financial obligations of the *Hajj*. Colonial Muslims managed to circumvent such requirements. For instance, in 1928 Saint-Louis Muslim *El Hadj* Amath Bâ provided a duly signed affidavit. Yet, to make ends meet, he worked as a cook on the boat taking him to Mecca along with Mpal (near Saint-Louis) Cleric *El Hadj* Rawane Ngom, Saint-Louis Cleric *El Hadj* Salif Mbengue and *El Hadj* Ablaye Sow “Dagana” from Dagana (north of Saint-Louis).

A. Administrative apparatus of *Hajj* surveillance in French West Africa

In the twentieth century, Europeans strived to implement hygiene rules capable of “insulating [the continent and its vicinities] from the transnational spread of infectious diseases, and of certain non-communicable diseases.”¹ In the eyes of Governor Roume, the improvement of health conditions, along with the creation and the development of a transportation network, were the essential to any progress, material and moral. He explained that the improvement of sanitary conditions was to be a high priority for the colonial administration and medical staff in AOF. He was also convinced that the establishment and the development of the transportation network, “[even] alone”, would “make possible all the other progresses.”² To him, the colonial government was to focus on achieving the twin objectives: global improvement of public health and development of a transportation network.

In the late nineteenth century, Governor General Chaudié proclaimed that, “at last, [the colony of Senegal] could come out of the collecting and economy period which had followed the mediocre years between 1893 and 1895.” He also proposed to “squarely address the ways and means to equip [the colony of Senegal] with the economic apparatus essential to its development.” Of course, the program of *mise en valeur* was in its first stages in 1898. In the 1920s, Minister of Colonies Albert Sarraut put that initiative back in the spotlight. Yet, it appeared in the speech of *Gouverneur Général* Chaudié that the economic development of the colony of Senegal was intimately linked with the enactment of hygienic policies and to the effective enforcement of public health regulations in the colonies, as well.³

¹ O. Aginam. “The nineteenth century colonial fingerprints on public health diplomacy: A postcolonial view.” *Law, Social Justice and Global Development Journal*, 2003 (1).

² JOAOF. E. Roume. N°49. “Ouverture la session du Conseil du Gouvernement de l’Afrique Occidentale Française.” Session de 1905. (Dakar, December 9, 1905), 587.

³ JOAOF. N°164. “Ouverture de la Session ordinaire de Conseil Général.” (Dakar, December 8, 1898), 449.

1. The extension of the *Police Sanitaire* regime to French West Africa

In the early twentieth century, “Senegal, only, [...] seemed to have available in its reserve fund the minimal amount of money set at 1,300,000 Francs in 1898.” Other French West Africa colonies were never able to come up with that minimum amount of 1,300,000 Francs in their own reserve funds. That is why, Governor General Chaudié was willing for the first time since 1895 - and in his own words - “to distance himself with a tradition rigorously observed until that day.”⁴ A tradition which consisted of making the colonies and *pays de protectorat* in French West Africa liable for all economic development-related expenses made in their territory. Governor Chaudié requested assistance from the colonial budgets and *pays de protectorat* in the form of a *fonds de concours* in order to finance such expenses, in exchange for an annual payment of 392,330 francs from recipient colonies and *pays de protectorat*. The State equipped the AOF colonies with facilities like harbors and railways.

Also, Chaudié believed agriculture was central to the economic development of the colony. Therefore, he announced several measures aimed at improving agricultural yields in the colony of Senegal, such as the implementation of “seriously organized” specimen-farms in the Thiès and Tivavouane *cercles*. As an eager advocate of development through agriculture, Chaudié felt that “colonists” were turning away “from trade to carry out exploitation of agricultural projects.” To the governor, “they needed to achieve the following two conditions in order for them to strive in the context of the emerging and promising colonial economy. Firstly, they needed both good land and soil use regime. Secondly, colonists needed the insurance to have access to a native workforce, as serious and as stable as possible.”⁵

⁴JOAOF. E. Chaudié. N°164. “Ouverture de la Session ordinaire de Conseil Général.” (Saint-Louis, December 8, 1898), 449-450.

⁵Idem.

Governor Chaudié referred to the moral qualities of the native workforce, and also to their alleged physical strength. His successors provided the colonial administration with the legal means and infrastructures to protect the population from diseases. In fact, the population of Senegal, including colonists, was under serious threat of various epidemics and endemic pathologies, such as bubonic plague and malaria. To counter those threats, Minister of Colonies Albert Decrais signed an order on July 13, 1903 making public the list of outbreak occurrences that were to be notified to AOF authorities.⁶ They only considered diseases “which did not require confidentiality” from health professionals, including typhoid fever, smallpox, cholera and cholera-related diseases, plague and yellow fever.⁷ AOF authorities meant to capitalize on the experience of the French government with such matters.

Of all diseases malaria and yellow fever were most in the limelight since the early stages of the colonial initiative in French West Africa in general, and in Senegal in particular. Malaria, which “affected Europeans and native populations alike, had impeded development in the tropics.” However, by 1899 quinine proved effective against malaria in 25 centigram doses taken daily during the rainy season.⁸ In the early twentieth century, yellow fever was the number one public health issue. Between 1900 and 1901, administrative records generally indicate that yellow fever was responsible for numerous cases of outpatient and hospital consultations, and of mortality among Europeans and Syrians. That situation led to the establishment of *cordons sanitaires* between Dakar and the other cities of colony’s hinterland.

⁶ JOAOF. M. Merlin. N°132. 490. “Arrêté promulguant dans les diverses colonies et territoires de l’Afrique Occidentale Française l’arrêté du Ministre des colonies du 7 Janvier 1902 fixant la liste des maladies dont la déclaration sera obligatoire aux colonies.” (Saint-Louis, July 7, 1903), 397.

⁷ JOAOF. A. Decrais. N°132. “Arrêté du Ministre des Colonies fixant la liste des maladies dont la déclaration sera obligatoire aux colonies.” (Paris, January 7, 1902), 398.

⁸ JOAOF. E. Marchoux. “Rapport présenté au Gouverneur Général sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de microbiologie de Saint-Louis par M. le Dr. Marchoux, médecin principal des colonies, directeur de ce laboratoire.” (Saint-Louis, April 25, 1899), 182.

In the early twentieth century, Dakar was “expected to achieve a fast development, due to its very favourable location.” The development “was [already] taking place every day under [the] eyes of colonial civil servants and colonists.”⁹ In that socio-economic context, the persistence of yellow fever epidemics was viewed as a threat to the efforts of development in French West Africa. Consequently, the colonial government spared no effort to protect the colonies from outbreaks of epidemic and communicable diseases. The *police sanitaire maritime* governed by the March 8, 1822 law and enforced overseas through orders specific to each colony was seen as the best tool for controlling disease. Many France-based *maisons de commerce* (e. g. Devès & Chaumet, Buhan & Teisseire) had established trading outposts in Dakar, Saint-Louis and Rufisque, hence, the need to protect French traders from pestilence. Minister of Colonies André Lebon submitted an order proposal to President Félix Faure on March 29, 1897 in order “to coordinate the various regulations [in effect in French colonies].”

Minister André Lebon meant to “harmonize [the aforementioned regulations] through the enforcement of clauses in the Dresden [Germany] April 5, 1893 Health Convention adopted by European countries, and promulgated in France through the May 22, 1894 order.” The Minister of Colonies concluded the report by saying that the new regulation was “made necessary by the proximity of several primary sites for epidemic transmission.” He advised the replication of the January 4, 1896 order concerning regulation of maritime sanitary police in France and in Algeria.”¹⁰ The first article of the March 29, 1897 order on maritime sanitary police attached to the report of the Minister considered “cholera, yellow fever and Plague the only pestilential exotic diseases which called for the [effective] enforcement of significant and permanent sanitary measures in the colonies, and in the *pays de protectorat*.”

⁹ JOAOF. N°25. “Comité Supérieur d’Hygiène et de Salubrité Publiques: Compte rendu de la Session du 20 Juin 1905.” (Dakar, June 24, 1905), 323.

¹⁰ JOAOF. A. Lebon. N°89. “Gouvernement Général de l’Afrique Occidentale Française: Rapport au Président de la République Française Félix Faure.” (Paris, March 29, 1897), 241.

The first article also insisted that, “other serious, communicable and importable diseases can be subjected to special precautions, specific to some regions [of the world].” Additionally, Article Two stated that “precautions could be required for boats the hygienic conditions of which are deemed dangerous by health authorities.”¹¹ Under that new order, bills of health meant to provide indications on the state of health in the countries visited by these boats in question, and especially if the diseases mentioned in the first article had occurred in these boats’ ports of call. Bills of health were valid, only if issued forty-eight hours prior to departures from harbors. Under the March 31, 1897 regulation, each boat was entitled to a single bill of health. Also, bills of health could be of two kinds: ‘clean’ when the countries where the boats had left from were declared free of any pestilential disease; or ‘gross’ when the health status of harbors of departure was uncertain. The *Directeur de la Santé* (Health Services Officer) was to inform the Governor General of any disease-related threats. The Governor General required that all incidents be reported on bills of health.

Epidemics outbreaks were considered over only when no new cases had been recorded for seven straight days during cholera outbreaks, and for nine straight days in case of plague and yellow fever outbreaks. The ending of epidemics was to be mentioned on the bills of health after the disinfection of ships and their passengers had been completed. Outside the colonies and *pays de protectorat*, French consuls, or local authorities, were to issue bills of health to boat captains. Violators carrying improper bills of health, or failing to provide any bill of health, were subject to fines stipulated in the March 3, 1822 law. According to the March 31, 1897 order, French boats assigned to mail service, or the transportation of at least hundred Europeans and set for a maritime trip exceeding forty-eight hours - including transits - was required to have at least one *médecin sanitaire* (public health specialist) on board.

¹¹ JOAOF. F. Faure. N°210. “Décret du 31 Mars 1897 relatif à la police sanitaire maritime aux colonies.” (Paris, March 31, 1897), 241.

The public health specialist appointed by the central government was to use all the means made available to him by science and by his own experience, to:

- preserve boats from ‘exotic’ pestilential diseases such as cholera, yellow fever, plague, and other contagious diseases;
- prevent the spread of such diseases, once they emerged on board, among crew members and populations of harbors where the boat had dropped anchor, as well;
- ensure with the assistance of boat captains the strict observance of hygiene standards on board and the concrete implementation of the aforementioned measures;
- record on a daily basis all occurrences likely to affect the health of passengers. Boat physicians were also to report upon arrival in any harbor of AOF colonies.¹²

The March 31, 1897 order on maritime sanitary police was amended by the 20 July, 1899 decree in order to “abide by the sanitary regulation adopted at the March 19, 1897 Venice International Sanitary Convention.”¹³ In substance, the July 20, 1899 decree is not any different from the March 31, 1897 decree, except for the explicit and extensive reference to natives and naturalized persons, whereas the 1897 decree considered cholera, plague and yellow fever, and focused on European populations only. Also, passengers on boats that dropped anchor in cholera-ridden harbors were to show health passports specifying the date the boat left that harbor, and the final destination of the owners as well. Indeed, crew members, European and naturalized native staff were subject to “the same surveillance.”¹⁴

¹²JOAOF. F. Faure. N°210. “Décret du 31 Mars 1897 relatif à la police sanitaire maritime aux colonies.” (Paris, March 31, 1897), 242.

¹³JOAOF. A. Decrais. N°211. “Rapport au Président de la République Française, suivi d’un décret portant modification au décret du 31 Mars 1897 sur la police sanitaire maritime dans les colonies et Pays de protectorat.” (Paris, July 20, 1899), 464.

¹⁴JOAOF. E. Loubet. N°210. “Décret portant modification au décret du 31 Mars 1897 sur la police sanitaire maritime dans les colonies et Pays de protectorat.” (Paris, July 20, 1899), 461.

2. The “Oriental syndrome” in French West Africa

The July 20, 1899 decree amending the March 31, 1897 decree on maritime hygiene police was meant to tackle the global *Hajj*-related cholera issue. In fact, the March 19, 1897 Venice Health Convention reflected the concerns of European powers faced with recurring attacks of cholera brought introduced by returning pilgrims. As a reminder, Convention came one year prior to the 1898 “terror pilgrimage” which claimed the lives of thousands of pilgrims, and exposed the risks involved in the *Hajj*. Also, the maritime hygiene police act was enacted in French West Africa one year after the major cholera epidemic crisis suggesting a direct correlation with the epidemiological situation in the Hedjaz. We can imagine that, the same situation further intensified the already grim image of ‘Orientals’ living in West Africa in regard to hygiene standards fostered by European ‘Orientalism.’

In their exchanges and in official reports, colonial officers routinely referred to Lebanese and Syrians as *les Levantins*, or *les Libano-Syriens*. The first term generally used in political reports, directly referred to the geographical position of Lebanon, to the east of Europe and West Africa. The second term was the expression of the tendency, so dear to the colonial administration of arranging members of the colonial population in specific and distinct categories for the sake of convenience and accountability. Lebanese migrants, and to a certain extent Syrian migrants, started a mass-emigration movement toward French West Africa in the late nineteenth century at the invitation of the AOF Governor “through the intermediary of the French Consulate in Beirut.” Cheikh Faty Faye argues that, colonial authorities “called upon [the *Levantins* in order] to block the mounting [aspirations of the] local bourgeoisie”, and use them to counterbalance the claims of that same bourgeoisie.¹⁵

¹⁵C. F. Faye. “La vie quotidienne à Dakar de 1945 à 1960: Approche d’une opinion publique.” (Dakar, Thèse de Doctorat d’Etat, 1990), 20.

According to Cheikh Faty Faye, Christian Maronite Lebanese made up a good number of the *Libano-Syrien* (or *Levantins*) segment of colonial Senegal's population. In Dakar, Lebanese and Syrians settled down at the junction of the European area of the *Plateau* and the native neighborhood known as the *Médina*. From the very beginning of their settlement Lebanese and Syrian migrants chose to live as a separate community. Over the years they were joined by other members of their families, or other members of the communities they belonged to back in Lebanon and in Syria. The Levantine community in Dakar grew fast. In 1960, the population of the Levantine community had grown to 15,000 people. Cheikh Faty Faye insists that, "the Lebanese neighborhood functioned as a buffer-zone [figuratively, and in reality as well] between the European and the African neighborhoods."¹⁶

Table 3. The Levantine Population of Dakar between 1941 and 1960

Years	Population
1941	1600
1945	1900
1948	2,000
1955	3,591
1960	10,000

(After Faye C. F. "La vie Quotidienne à Dakar," op. cit. 21.)

Lebanese and Syrians were tolerated at the early stages of their settlement in French West Africa, but French authorities soon perceived their presence as a source of problems.

¹⁶C. F. Faye. "La vie quotidienne à Dakar de 1945 à 1960: Approche d'une opinion publique." (Dakar, Thèse de Doctorat d'Etat, 1990), 21

It is true that French high officials and civil servants were more suspicious of Moroccans, than they were of Lebanese settlers. Lebanese migrants essentially carried out commercial activities. In Dakar and Rufisque, they were involved in retail sales. Also, many Lebanese and Syrian settlers acted as brokers between the French administration and Senegalese farmers in the flourishing peanut trade. As middlemen in the peanut trade, they used to purchase from farmers and channel the cash crop to the main collection points established in various places within the colony. For that very reason, French authorities felt that the movements of middlemen were to be put under the scrutiny of health professionals. As for Moroccan migrants, French authorities feared they were carrying out illegal activities aimed at spreading subversive anti-colonial ideas among French West Africa natives, mainly around the First World War. Governor General William Ponty addressed a circular to *Lieutenant-Gouverneurs* and the Mauritania *Commissaire Général en Territoire Civil*.

Governor Ponty claimed that “Moroccans and Syrians had been introducing, in the colony, unusual quantities of publications of all kind in Arabic,” mainly in the guise of gravures depicting Muslim religious life, newspapers, brochures, and various books developed for *marabouts* and Muslim scholars. Marabouts and scholars were responsible for the sale of that literature among their students, while Syrian and Moroccan middlemen reaped the maximum benefit of that trade. William Ponty advised the rulers of the various French territories to take all the necessary steps to “stop the genuine political propaganda trying to give itself free rein, in the guise of religion, thanks to the diffusion among ignorant populations - and as such all the more easily deceivable - of a press which was voluntarily distorting the work of civilization [France was] conducting in [its] colonies of Africa.”¹⁷

¹⁷ANS: 19G1. W. Ponty. N°105^c. “Situation de l’Islam 1906-1916: Surveillance de la Presse Musulmanne.” (Dakar, November 15, 1911).

Governor Ponty recognized that “the global political situation in the [French] West African possessions presented no alarming symptom from the point of view of Islam.” Yet, he instructed the heads of colonies to exert “a strict surveillance” on all publications in Arabic. Also, he recommended that “all [publications] hostile to [France] or simply able to encourage the actions of the Marabouts be destroyed.”¹⁸ William Ponty encouraged the administration agents to monitor the movements of people and implement special rules (e.g. issuance of special IDs, deportations) for Syrians and Moroccans the colony of Senegal between 1911 and 1950.¹⁹ By 1955, the columnists of the newspaper the “*Echos d’Afrique*” felt that the *Levantine* community “formed the number one issue in French West Africa.” Indeed, the newspaper referred to the issue of the *Levantine* community in French West Africa as “the irritating issue”, or the sensitive issue of the “foreign invasion.”²⁰

In putting blame on the *Levantine* community, its detractors did not explicitly differentiate between Lebanese, Syrians, and Moroccans. Yet, Syrians and Moroccans were seen as more inclined toward proselytism, because the majority among them was practicing Muslims. As aforementioned, many Lebanese settlers were of Maronite Christian faith and more interested in making their living in the peanut trade and retail sales. However, the Middle Eastern community as a whole, including the Lebanese group, was blamed for the non-observance of public health standards with all that implies. In fact, between 1920 and 1940, colonial authorities involved in the process of reviewing the AMI system, program viewed the members of the *Levantine* community as the enemies of public health.

¹⁸ ANS: 19G1. W. Ponty. N°105^c. “Situation de l’Islam 1906-1916: Surveillance de la Presse Musulmane.” (Dakar, November 15, 1911).

¹⁹ ANS: 21G33. “Mesures spéciales prises contre les Syriens (1918-1920).” 21G34. “Circulation des Syriens (1918-1920).” 21G35. “Syriens: expulsion et condamnations (1918-1920).”

²⁰ C. F. Faye. “La vie quotidienne à Dakar de 1945 à 1960: Approche d’une opinion publique.” (Dakar: Thèse de Doctorat d’Etat, 1990), 20 (my emphasis).

Lebanese and Syrian migrants, and assimilated people resident within the limits of the city of Dakar were singled out as more dangerous to public health than *Originaires*. The members of that community were portrayed as “filthy”, and “reckless”, and as such, the colonial administration enforced a special surveillance on the members of the community, especially during epidemics. In the early twentieth century, when yellow fever threatened to undermine the great potential of the colony of Senegal, the *Levantins* were specifically targeted by the colonial administration in their efforts to keep the yellow fever epidemics under control. On May 20, 1900, Governor General Chaudié ordered the institution of Identity Cards for Syrian peddlers. In fact, colonial authorities had received information from the Dakar *Service Sanitaire* (Health Services) that “seven cases of suspected yellow fever ending in death [of yellow fever suspects] had been recorded in the city of Dakar in less than three weeks.”²¹ Before, Syrian peddlers travelled freely within the colony of Senegal.

Yellow fever provided the colonial administration an opportunity to regulate the movements of Syrians and assimilated people inside the colony. Admittedly, the *Levantine* community was not the only target of the colonial administration in the yellow fever-ridden Senegal of the 1900’s. On June 10, 1900, Governor General Chaudié ordered that “all boats and travelers from Dakar be the object of quarantine everywhere in the colony”; in compliance with the March 31, 1897 decree.” Also, that “all travelers, white or *Créole*, going from one part of the colony to another carried a health passport.” The bad reputation of the *Levantin* community in terms of hygiene may have influenced the decision of colonial authorities to apply specific travel rules to itinerant Middle Eastern peanut traders.²²

²¹ JOAOF. E. Chaudié. N°210. “Décision instituant la délivrance de cartes d’identité aux colporteurs Syriens.” (Saint-Louis, May 20, 1900), 211.

²² JOAOF. N. Ballay. N°261. “Arrêté portant création à Dakar d’un service de désinfection publique.” (Saint-Louis, Octobre 14, 1900), 410. JOAOF. Mayor Marsat. N°241. “Arrêté prescrivant certaines mesures sanitaires.” (Dakar, 25 Mai 1900), 222. JOAOF. N°257.

3. International Sanitary Conferences: Solving the *Hajj*-related sanitary enigma

“In the course of the nineteenth century, the pilgrimage to Mecca, and more specifically the maritime pilgrimage, came to be of interest and concern to non-Muslim, European powers.” The main reason for that situation was “the opening of the Suez Canal [which] was accompanied by a rise in sea-borne pilgrim traffic from India and the East. And the pilgrim traffic in turn brought to Arabia from the 1820s - increasingly for further transmission to Europe” - Asiatic cholera. Cholera was not foreign to India where it seems to have persisted in an endemic state, especially around the Ganges River area. Cholera “was first recorded in Arabia, in Nejd, in 1821, and again in 1828-1829, having arrived from India by way of the Gulf [though this was not clearly understood at the time]. In 1831, it appeared in the Hedjaz for the first time and caused up to 20,000 deaths [...] The Hedjaz suffered further outbreaks in association with the *Hajj* 1841, 1847, 1851, 1856-57, and 1859.”²³

Not until 1865, however, was the Mecca pilgrimage officially blamed for the spread - by way of Egypt - of ‘Asiatic’ cholera to Europe, and the rest of the world, as well. The severity of the 1865 cholera epidemic sequence raised awareness that Europe could no longer remain at the mercy of the Mecca pilgrimage every *Hajj* season. In short from 1865 on, the recurring *Hajj*-related cholera outbreaks led European powers to convene a series of international health conferences - and adopted various conventions - in order “to erect a ‘defence wall’ to insulate Europe from exotic diseases,”²⁴ especially against cholera. At the same time, the standardisation of quarantine rules, and the establishment of common health structures was perceived as the best possible protection against this global threat.

²³W. R. Roff. “Sanitation and Security: The Imperial powers and the nineteenth century *Hajj*.” *Arabian Studies* VI, (1982): 143.

²⁴O. Aginam. “The nineteenth century colonial fingerprints on public health diplomacy: A postcolonial view.” *Law, Social Justice and Global Development Journal (LGD)*, 2003 (1).

“The desire to protect Europe from the diseases of the new world, although mentioned by some medical historians is severely marginalized in the hierarchy of motivating factors.”²⁵ Yet, at least in the case of the attempts of France to regulate the *Hajj* in French West Africa, the arguments set forth to justify the need to regulate the management of the *Hajj* reveals a desire to maintain in Jeddah trustworthy colonial Muslim allies to help French consuls keep an eye on Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia pilgrims.²⁶ The desire to prevent the introduction of communicable diseases in French territories and ‘sanitize’ the *Hajj* was also a high priority for France, especially after World War II. Towards this end, a meeting between professionals in charge of public health controls on the Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco borders was held in Marseille in November 1948. French territories, “likely to send people on the Muslim pilgrimage”, were invited to attend a similar upcoming meeting to be held in Paris in 1955.²⁷

The first International Health Conference on cholera was held in Paris on July 23, 1851. Many such international meetings were to follow the 1851 cholera conference: for example, in 1859 in Paris (France), in 1866 in Constantinople (Ottoman Empire), in 1874 in Vienna (Austria), in 1881 in Washington (United States), in 1885 in Rome and in 1892 in Venice (Italy), in 1893 in Dresden (Germany), again in Venice in 1891, and in 1894 again in Paris. Major agreements were signed before Europeans at those cholera-related reference international public health and hygiene meetings before the 1926 consensus.

²⁵O. Aginam. “The nineteenth century colonial fingerprints on public health diplomacy: A postcolonial view.” Law, Social Justice and Global Development Journal (LGD), 2003 (1).

²⁶ANS. 19G9. “Courrier du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à Mr. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France, Secrétaire Général des Affaires Etrangères, à Mr. Lutaud, Gouverneur Général de l’Algérie, à Mr. Alapetite, Résident Général de la République Française à Tunis, à Mr. Le Général Lyautey, Commissaire Résident Général de la République Française au sujet de la reprise du pèlerinage de la Mecque.” (Not dated).

²⁷ANS. 1H118(163). “Le Directeur du contrôle sanitaire aux frontières de l’Algérie, à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Algérie. Conférence annuelle des Chefs de service et de contrôle sanitaire aux frontières.” (Algiers, October 22, 1954).

Until the end of the nineteenth century, health conferences focused on protecting Europe from cholera. “The four International treaties concluded between 1892 and 1897 followed the trend of protecting the populations from the diseases of the non-Western world. While the 1892 Sanitary Convention focused on the spread of cholera through the Suez Canal by Mecca Muslim pilgrims, the 1893 conference focused broadly on policing European boundaries against cholera. Whereas, the 1894 International Sanitary Convention focused on Mecca pilgrimages and on the maritime traffic in the Persian Gulf, the 1897 International Sanitary Convention focused on keeping Europe safe.”²⁸ The objectives were always to find practical ways to contain cholera epidemics in the place where the outbreaks had first started. For example, at the Constantinople 1866 International Sanitary Conference European delegates suggested “to cut off all communications with the Arabian coast” to no avail, because of opposition from the Ottoman Empire, Britain, Persia and Russia.²⁹

At the 1866 conference, delegates suggested that the number of pilgrims attending Mecca pilgrimages “be restricted and their “quality” improved by the enforcement of a “certificate of means.” Also, “boats were to be halted or “regulated” in the event of cholera outbreaks in India.”³⁰ At the end, no agreement was signed. At the 1892 Venice conference, delegates required that a quarantine station be established at Al-Tur for all ships bound northward. *Hajjis* were also required to abide by the fifteen days quarantine in the event the bill of health of their boat was unclean, and to at least three days quarantine if the bill of health was clean. Also, the conference granted administrative powers to the new *Conseil Sanitaire Maritime et Quarantenaire* by the Egyptian January, 1881 khedival decree.

²⁸ O. Aginam. “The nineteenth century colonial fingerprints on public health diplomacy: A postcolonial view.” *Law, Social Justice and Global Development Journal (LGD)*, 2003 (1).

²⁹ D. E. Long. *The Hajj today: A survey of the contemporary pilgrimage to Mecca*. (New York, SUNY, 1979).

³⁰ Idem, 72.

The 1894 Paris Conference was as a “milestone” in conferences, since *Hajjis* were required “to undergo medical examination at home and comply with five days observation before embarking for Jeddah.” In addition, two quarantine stations were established “on Kamaran Island [South of Jeddah], and on the Shatt Al-Arab at the northern end of the Persian Gulf.” Delegates suggested that “financial means certificates” be required from Muslim pilgrims wishing to attend *Hajj* in the future, but the proposal met strong opposition from Ottomans on the ground that such requirements challenged religious agency.³¹ By 1900, “European imperial powers had established a firm foothold on the Arabian Peninsula, except for the Holy Places. Despite protests from Ottomans, they were in a position to enforce significant surveillance and regulation standards for the foreseeable future.”³²

An additional “milestone” in *Hajj* sanitary regulation was reached at the 1926 International Health Conference. The resolutions of the 1926 health convention sought to raise public health standards to a level where they could prevent the spread of communicable diseases. The 1926 sanitary convention assigned the task of enforcing the rules of regulation of the Mecca pilgrimage to the Saudi government. Later on, the European powers and their allies went further in their efforts to standardize the *Hajj* regulation standards, mainly after 1945. The World Health Organization (WHO) created in 1948 was in charge of overseeing the pilgrimage regulation efforts everywhere. In 1949, the second WHO general assembly even appointed an expert committee to “draw a draft of the international sanitary [public health] rules of movement of people.”³³ The final draft of the proposal was adopted in 1951.

³¹D. E. Long. *The Hajj today: A survey of the contemporary pilgrimage to Mecca*. (New York, SUNY, 1979), 71.

³²W. R. Roff. “Sanitation and Security: The Imperial powers and the nineteenth century Hajj.” *Arabian Studies* VI, (1982), 156.

³³D. E. Long, op. cit., 76-77.

4. *Hajj* and politics: Underside of the Mecca Pilgrimage regulations in the colonies

In French West Africa, the enforcement of *Hajj* regulation standards was never easy, at least until the WHO reached a consensus about the enactment of the International Health Regulations of the pilgrimage. In fact, the achievement of the regulation of the Mecca pilgrimage coincided with global political turmoil, especially during the World War I and World War II. Also, in their internal negotiations on how to handle the participation of French colonial Muslim subjects in the Mecca pilgrimage, French policy-makers voiced concerns about the right decision to make. In the official and non-official correspondence, French officials in Paris and their representatives AOF and in colonial Senegal, openly expressed their concerns about having to interfere directly in the organization of pilgrimage convoys from West Africa, and for having to devise the administrative and medical rules required for all pilgrims prior to their departure for the Holy Land of Mecca.

French officials in France kept reminding colonial civil servants in AOF that they were to be non-obstructionist to prevail in how they handled Islam in the area. Officials felt that Islam in French West Africa was different from Islam elsewhere, especially in North Africa. To them, the “extreme division along race lines gives Islam infinite aspects.” They thought that “there were as many different Islam as there were Islamic tribes.”³⁴ That is why Minister of Foreign Affairs Théophile Delcassé (1852-1923) advised that France preserve a convenient status-quo by building on the differences in the ways in which Islam is received locally. Also, Delcassé warned that colonial officials would have been misguided “in granting a certificate of Mahometan orthodoxy to any of the elements claiming spiritual supremacy upon Islam.”³⁵

³⁴ ANS: 19G1. “Situation Générale de l’Islam en AOF.”

³⁵ ANS: 19G1. T. Delcassé. “Mr. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à Mr. Le Ministre des Colonies. Au sujet du loyalisme de la population Musulmane de l’AOF.” (Bordeaux, November 29, 1914).

The ideal option for France would have been to maintain that status quo for everything that relates to Islam in French West Africa, including the *Hajj*. However, neither policy-makers in France, nor civil servants operating in the colonies were in a position to respect the order from the Minister of Foreign Affairs Delcassé. The way French authorities handled Muslim affairs reflected local political, social and religious exigencies, and was influenced by the global geopolitical situation of the world. Especially during the First World War, Paris-based policy-makers forbid the Mecca pilgrimage in territories under their jurisdiction. In 1914, for example, the Governor General in Algeria, and French residents in Tunisia and Morocco informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of their decision to prevent Muslims from making *Hajj* in order to curb the pan-Islamic activities of North African agents. In fact, they feared the impact of the pan-Islamist message on Muslims in the context of global warfare.

In 1914, backing the Minister of Foreign Affairs Delcassé, Minister of Colonies Gaston Doumergue (1863-1937) suggested that the decision to prevent Muslims from making *Hajj* be extended to all the AOF colonies. He advised the men on the spot to avoid “damaging the religious feelings of Muslims.” He also suggested discouraging prospective pilgrims under the pretext that warring factions had requisitioned the boats usually used to transport pilgrims, thus putting pilgrims at risk of being stranded in foreign harbors.³⁶ In spite of the pervasive suspicion of Islam in other parts of the world, French authorities seemed to find the presence of Islam in AOF beneficial for them. For instance, in 1907, Governor General François-Joseph Clozel (1860-1918) viewed the presence of Muslim small business owners among the “fetishist populations” in Afrique Occidentale Française as advantageous for the French.³⁷

³⁶ ANS: 19G9. G. Doumergue. N°427. “Pèlerinage à la Mecque (1914-1917): Le Ministre des Colonies à Mr. Le Gouverneur Général de l’AOF.” (Bordeaux, October 21, 1914).”

³⁷ ANS: 19G3. F.-J. Clozel. N° 131. “Gouverneur des Colonies, Lieutenant Gouverneur de la Côte d’Ivoire au Gouverneur Général.” (Bingerville, March 9, 1907).

Like François-Joseph Clozel, many French civil servants feared the influence of external Muslim influences brought by the *Tirailleurs* who once served in Morocco, and itinerant *marabouts*, as well. In short, French colonial officials generally shared the view that West African Islam was not subversive. Nevertheless, the central administration advised civil servants to carry out strict vigilance of West African Muslims.³⁸ The colonial administration was attentive to external factors that came into play in the *Hajj*. Nevertheless, they did not prevent Muslims from making the *Hajj*. During World War I, many colonial officials and agents felt that the public prohibition of the pilgrimage would damage the image of France in the eyes of enemies, especially Germany and the Ottoman Empire.³⁹ In fact, French authorities feared that failing to make arrangements for the *Hajj* would have been perceived as an admission France's inability to face Germany's military striking power in the Red Sea.

French Resident in Morocco General Hubert Lyautey (1854-1934) even felt that French authorities should not authorize "their Muslim protégés to go to the Orient." French authorities prohibited the *Hajj* in 1914 and 1915. Lyautey insisted that Morocco should be the exception, "because all prohibitive decisions could be used by the enemies [of France in war context]." Obviously, the image of France mattered more than anything else in the face of adversity. Therefore, gave instructions to French consuls to deny *Hajj* passports to West African Muslims on the ground that the *Gouvernement de Protectorat* could not be held responsible for exposing Muslims to the various dangers involved in the trip to Mecca.⁴⁰

³⁸ ANS: 9G71/72(107). "*Questions intéressant à la fois le Maroc et le Département. Notes sur l'Islam. 1931.*"

³⁹ ANS: 19G9. N°295. "*Lettre Officielle. Le Ministre des Colonies au Gouverneur Général de l'AOF: Au sujet du pèlerinage de la Mecque.*" (Paris, 23 Octobre 1915).

⁴⁰ ANS: 19G9. N°7444. "Dépêche du Général Lyautey, commissaire résident Général de la République Française à Rabat à Monsieur Delcassé, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères." (Rabat, 25 Septembre 1915).

5. Overview of current *Hajj* Affairs in Senegal

The *Hajj* was the trip Muslims from French West Africa strived to go even prior to the management of the *Hajj* by the colonial administration. Before the involvement of French authorities in the *Hajj* business, through their implementation of medical and administrative standards which determined the eligibility of candidates for the Holy trip, pilgrims went to Mecca on their own free will and at their own pace. Time and costs did not deter poor Muslims. History has recorded famous pilgrimage trips such as the fourteenth century trip to Mecca of Malian King Kankan Musa. The *Hajj* of Kankan Musa is remembered as an event that led to the fall of the exchange rate of gold and precious metals in Cairo due to the king's free-spending ways in Egypt. However, less wealthy Muslims also made *Hajj* each year.⁴¹

By the early twentieth century, French observers were already aware of the propensity of West African Muslims to undertake the Mecca pilgrimage. French physicians assigned to the *Service Quarantenaire d'Egypte* and employees of pilgrim's quarantine stations were in an opportune position to observe the movements of pilgrims on their way to the Muslim Holy Land. Like Firmin Duguët, many observers captured the memories of ragged and hungry Muslim pilgrims arriving on the shores of the Red Sea months prior to the beginning of the *Hajj* season on flimsy boats known as *sambouks*.⁴² To this day, the number of pilgrims armed with their faith as their only weapon who disappeared in the Sahara is unknown.⁴³

Yet, colonial authorities were never able to completely discourage French West African Muslims from going to Mecca "on foot" despite their tremendous efforts to bring all Muslim

⁴¹J. S. Birks. *Across the savannas to Mecca: The overland pilgrimage routes from West Africa*. (London, Hurst, 1978).

⁴²Dr. F. Borel. *Choléra et Peste dans le Pèlerinage Musulman, 1860-1903*. (Paris, Masson et Cie Editeurs, 1904). F. Duguët. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Du point de religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Rieder, 1932). W. R. Roff. "Sanitation and security: The imperial powers and the nineteenth century *Hajj*." *Arabian Studies*, 6, (1982), 143-156.

⁴³M. Wolfe. *One thousand roads to Mecca: Ten centuries of travelers writing about the Muslim pilgrimage*. (New York, Grove Press, 1998).

pilgrims to adopt the modern public health and travel standards devised specifically for the pilgrimage to Mecca. In fact, West African Muslims were still going to Mecca “on foot” after 1960. Two French researchers documented the cases of two Malian families who had travelled from their village for the purpose of making the *Hajj* when they visited in the 1970s.⁴⁴ In colonial Senegal, however, it seems that only the most devout Muslims unable to purchase *Hajj* boat or plane tickets kept going to Mecca ‘on foot’ after 1945. We have for instance, the case of Saint-Louis pilgrim *El Hadj* Galaye Fall and Rufisque pilgrim *El Hadj* Samba Diakhaté for whom denial of *Hajj* passports was not enough a reason to cancel *Hajj* plans.⁴⁵ Seemingly, many Muslims from colonial Senegal were comfortable with the standards imposed by the administration and the restrictions to their freedom of movement.

That is all the more true for Muslims from the Three Communes of Dakar, Saint-Louis and Rufisque for whom the *Hajj* opened whole new social vistas. Once out reach for average Muslims because it required a strong will and great physical resources, the regulation of transportation to the Hedjaz in the first half of the twentieth century made the *Hajj* accessible to colonial Muslims as long as they were fit and complied with the requirements of the colonial administration. Given the patriarchal orientation of most Senegalese communities, women essentially played the roles of travel mates for their male spouses or parents on the *Hajj*. We must keep in mind the fact that, in the Islamic law, Muslim women are required to make *Hajj* accompanied with their spouse or with male relatives (e.g. father, blood brother) with whom they are not supposed to interact intimately due to their blood ties.

It is also likely that in the days predating the enforcement of administrative and medical regulation of the *Hajj*, Muslim women, including Muslim women from colonial Senegal,

⁴⁴ C. Pairault et A. Prost. “Actualité du pèlerinage à pied à la Mecque.” *Notes Africaines*, Dakar, (1978), 46-47.

⁴⁵ *El Hadj* Galaye Fall (Léona – Eaux Claires, June 2, 2002: 3:45 PM – 6:00 PM) and *El Hadj* Samba Diakhaté (Rufisque: Dangou Nord. May 18, 2002: 11:20 AM – 12:30 PM).

made *Hajj* out of deep religious faith or out of dedication to male spouses, or parents. One can hardly imagine a woman, no matter her origin, risking her life on the Sahara desert roads where she was likely to be attacked by animals and outlaws. In the thesis he defended in 1991, Khadim Mbacké presents Rokhaya Guéye as the first “Senegalese” woman who successfully ‘walked’ to Mecca in 1939. However, Khadim Mbacké does not provide much background on that female pilgrim. Except for the fact that she left from the Baol province, we neither have information on her upbringing, nor on her ties with Islam. Likewise, we do not have information on the circumstances which surrounded her *Hajj* experience, her motivations for undertaking the journey ‘on foot’ to Mecca, and details about her ordeal. We have only one certainty: the trip to Mecca ‘on foot’ was very difficult in 1939.⁴⁶

The introduction of modern public health regulation and the “official” ban of journeys to Mecca ‘on foot’ by French colonial authorities drastically changed the face of *Hajj* experience for the majority of colonial Senegalese Muslims. As has already been mentioned, the *Hajj* was essentially limited to males in precolonial Senegal and elsewhere due mainly to the length of the trip across the desert and remote areas. The regulation of the *Hajj* business in colonial Senegal also opened up new vistas for colonial Senegalese Muslims. In Islam, the *Hajj* is normally considered the fifth pillar of the Muslim faith, and as such it is not mandatory. Muslims willing to undertake the trip to Mecca in order to comply with the fifth pillar of Islam must have the financial means and be in good physical condition. Prior to the French involvement in the management of the *Hajj* business from colonial Senegal, it was physical strength more than wealth which determined who was able to make the *Hajj*.

The introduction of *Hajj* medical and administrative standards, and the establishment of air and sea transport to Saudi Arabia operated by accredited agents and companies (e. g.

⁴⁶K. Mbacké. “Le pèlerinage à la Mecque: Le cas du Sénégal, 1886-1986.” (Dakar, UCAD, 1991).

Monsieur Nassar, the *Compagnie Fabre et Freyssinet*), and reserved exclusively for Mecca pilgrims transportation made a huge difference in who could undertake the *Hajj*.⁴⁷ Modern standards significantly reduced the time it took to reach Mecca. In the past, Muslim pilgrims left home one year prior to the *Hajj* season and would not return immediately after the *Hajj*. Voluntarily - or involuntarily - stranded *Hajjis* often accounted for what *Docteur* Duguet has termed “*les déchets du pèlerinage*” (“pilgrimage wastes”) who made up a significant part of the global pilgrim population. For instance, Doctors Vaume and Borel “who took care of pilgrimage wastes, estimated that [...] in 1891, out of 46,000 Mecca pilgrims [including AOF pilgrims essentially referred to as *Sénégalais*], 21,000 did not return [from the Holy Land].” That is, almost half of the total pilgrim population recorded that year.⁴⁸

This improvement in transportation and hygiene and administrative standards made going on the *Hajj* a viable option for colonial Senegalese women, because the trip to Mecca lasted between two to three months, and pilgrims enjoyed medical assistance provided by trained physicians during the journey and in Mecca. That explains the keen interest of colonial Senegal women for the *Hajj* after World War II. Many among them, for example, *Adja* Marième Diop Makhtar and *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne, made the Mecca pilgrimage on several occasions. The *Hajj* even became the preferred shortcut of colonial Senegalese Muslim women wishing to penetrate the very exclusive circles of upper class Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis. The colonial Senegalese Muslim women from Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis used the Mecca pilgrimage as their main mutual reference point after 1945.

⁴⁷ See ANS: 1H118(163). “Reports on the pilgrimage to Mecca (1947-1957).”

⁴⁸ F. Duguet. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Du point de religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Rieder, 1932), 32.



Figure 1. Reunion of Dakar *Mbootay* women prior to the beginning of the *Hajj* vogue.



Figure 2. Reunion of Dakar *Mbootay* women prior to *Hajj* vogue. Note the presence of young girls among *Mbootay* women.



Figure 3. Female *Hajjis* progressively taking over the Dakar Plateau *Mbootay*.



Figure 4. Transition from traditional *Mbootay* to *Adjaratou Mbootay*. Children are still visible among *Mbootay* women and traditional outfits are still predominant.



Figure 5. Transition from traditional *Mbootay* to Adjaratou *Mbootay*. The pilgrim outfit symbolized by the *égale* (headgear) is progressively making its way.



Figure 6. The Plateau *Mbootay* at the height of the *Hajj* vogue. Pilgrim outfit (headscarf and *égale*) is the standard apparel for the *Plateau Mbootay* women after 1945.

After World War one, the *Hajj* became a preoccupation of many colonial Muslim women. In Dakar-*Plateau*, colonial women transformed the ancient *Mbootay* into a select organization. Prior to the *Hajj* vogue, the *Mbootay* operated as a female organization opened to female teenagers and young girls. Periodically women met for lunch and socialized with one another. The only purpose of the *tours*, or periodical meetings organized at the places of *Mbootay* women, was to allow women to spend time together and share food.⁴⁹ However, according to *Adja Mame Jacques Mbaye*, as time passed, and as *Adja Mame Yacine Diagne* introduced the Plateau Muslim women to the *Hajj*, they changed their value systems and the way they lived their lives. Progressively, they devoted much more of their lives to the *Hajj*. Plateau *Mbootay* women established *Hajj*-related codes (e. g. medal award ceremonies, money saving societies (*tontine*), *ganale* (pilgrim homecoming ceremonies)).

In short, the Muslim women of colonial Senegal successfully turned a formerly closed religious requirement to their advantage. Colonial Senegal Muslim women succeeded in shaping a very particular *Hajj* tradition which persists to this day in present Senegal. It seems that colonial Senegalese Muslim women played no major role in the administrative and medical regulation of the *Hajj*. Also, they did not function as mediators between the colonial administration and the colonial Senegalese Muslim population either.⁵⁰ On the contrary, male colonial Senegalese Muslims such as *El Hadj* Alieu Diéne (Dakar) and *El Hadj* Tidiane Diéne (Saint-Louis) served as Middlemen for the French maritime companies in charge of Mecca pilgrims' transportation. However, colonial Muslim women established a long standing tradition that has led to the female domination of the *Hajj* business up until today.

⁴⁹ *Adja Mame Jacques Mbaye* (113, Avenue Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).

⁵⁰ I personally found no evidence of colonial Senegal women mediating between the colonial administration and the Muslim population, nor have I found colonial Muslim women playing roles of middlepersons between accredited travel agents and prospective Mecca pilgrims.

B. *Hajj* medical and administrative surveillance in the context of colonial Senegal

In spite of legitimate concerns about interfering in the performance of a valuable pillar of the Muslim faith, France made the choice of regulating the *Hajj* in French West Africa. After the 1865 *Hajj*-related epidemic in Europe and America, “the peoples of the Midi [of France] were terrified. Europe realized that it could not remain like this, every year, at the mercy of the pilgrimage to Mecca.”⁵¹ Britain and the Ottoman Empire expressed interest in interfering with the *Hajj* even though *Hajj*-related cholera hardly hit populations beyond the epicentre of outbreak. In fact, both advocated for the enforcement of hygiene standards on the basis of their economic and moral interests. At that time, Britain was the perfect example of what a maritime power should be, and, as such, the crown feared the enforcement of strict quarantine rules, for instance, would impede maritime trade. The Ottoman Empire, felt that interfering in the performance of the *Hajj* would challenge Muslims’ right to worship.

For France, the moral issues involved in the regulation of the *Hajj* were not connected with the risks incurred by their Muslim subjects. In the following chapters, I deal extensively with the state of mind in which colonial Senegal Muslim pilgrims, and pilgrims from contemporary Senegal too, prepare to perform the *Hajj*. Many among them simply have not been equipped to comprehend the pathological dangers that have awaited them in the Hedjaz. Today, many believe that Senegalese pilgrims to Mecca, especially Senegalese female pilgrims who largely outnumber male pilgrims, are more interested in the *Hajji* status and the conspicuous consumption attached to it than they are in achieving spiritual perfection. However, many colonial Senegalese pilgrims to Mecca still shared an idealistic vision of the *Hajj* even in contemporary Senegal. In chapter four, I will deal with the case of a retired *maison de commerce* agent from Saint-Louis who expressed the desire to die in Mecca.

⁵¹Dr. A. Proust quoted in, W. R. Roff. “Sanitation and security: The imperial powers and the nineteenth century *Hajj*.” *Arabian Studies*, 6 (1982): 146.

1. Peace and security issues in the enforcement of *Hajj* surveillance

In spite of the ambivalence of Britain and the Ottoman Empire, France made the choice to apply the *Hajj* regulations to AOF Mecca pilgrims, because of the risks involved in making *Hajj*. Colonial officials feared for the security of the colony and pilgrims themselves, even though they were only able to trace the movement of Mecca pilgrims along the major passageways to Mecca. For years, officials such as the Inspector of the *Conseil Sanitaire, Maritime et Quarantenaire d’Egypte* Firmin Duguet had wondered how Mecca pilgrims managed to survive all the way to Mecca in hostile environments. *Docteur* Duguet provides the example of two Moroccans, Ali Messaoud and Abdel Rahman Ben Omar who had arrived in Alexandria on March 25, 1930 from the Targuist region located in Spanish Morocco. The two had started the journey eastward on November 14, 1929. They had travelled 14,000 kilometres between the Targuist region and the town of Alexandria (Egypt).⁵²

The visas on the passports of Messaoud and Ben Omar indicated they had passed through Zaza (Spanish Morocco) on November 26, 1929; Borkane (Algeria) on November 28, 1929; Tunis (Tunisia) on January 3, 1930, and the Egyptian border at Solloum on March 14. Duguet is positive that the two had absolutely no funds. They lived exclusively on the abundant alms they received from local populations as they went their way. That is why, *Docteur* Duguet wondered “how [the two] lived in the Libya desert, where [Duguet himself] personally had seen rocks only, without the slightest trace of animal or vegetable life.” To *Docteur* Duguet, the experience of Messaoud and Ben Omar “was a [complete] mystery.”⁵³ The case of the two Moroccan pilgrims was not unique. All Muslim travellers to Mecca followed the same path in their attempt to secure a place in paradise through going on *Hajj*.

⁵²F. Duguet. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Du point de religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Rieder, 1932), 30

⁵³Idem.

Pilgrims travelling to Mecca “on foot” were exposed to danger over the whole period of their journey to Mecca. Most pilgrims – including colonial Senegal pilgrims – took only the essentials needed to survive until the next village, town or harbor. Reserves for the trip consisted essentially in money for transportation and various expenses, and millet-based dry food such as *couscous*. Like Saint-Louis-based pilgrim *El Hadj* Dame Sarr, “they were happy when they managed to find water. That water added to the *couscous* was the basic meal for pedestrian pilgrims. Mecca pilgrims travelling “on foot” were not like us [today Senegalese Muslims]. They had made the choice to turn away from earthly things and devote their souls to Islam. That is why, that very basic food was for them the most divine meal.”⁵⁴ Colonial Senegal pilgrims took little money with them, because they were aware of the dangers waiting for them on the road to Mecca across the desert (wild animals and outlaws).⁵⁵

Not all pilgrims returned from the *Hajj*. *Docteur* Duguët claims that, in 1929 out of “3,866 black [pilgrims]”, one thousand had not returned in August, three months after the *Hajj* season, to the Suakin Harbor (British Sudan) from where they embarked for Jeddah before the *Hajj*. *Docteur* Duguët provided the following statistics:

1324 Sudanese with:

Men.....	933
Women.....	363
Children.....	28

And 2,552 from West Africa with:

Men.....	1,226
Women.....	1,021
Children.....	305

⁵⁴ Bassirou Sarr (Saint-Louis: Goxu Mbathie. June 2, 2002, 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM).

⁵⁵ See the experience of *El Hadj* Insa Niane in chapter 4.

Docteur Duguet concluded that the missing pilgrims had remained in the Hedjaz, or in various places along the road to Mecca. In the Holy Land, they were often seen wandering in the streets, begging for bread. He indicated that out there, “most of them live in extreme poverty, sometimes with no garments [...] and no pockets, ready for all kinds of miseries, and unfortunately also, to all kinds of submissiveness.”⁵⁶ The concerns of *Docteur* Duguet were probably justified. All the former pilgrims I surveyed have testified about the significant number of beggars of African descent they met outside the mosques and on the streets in Mecca and Madina. According to the former pilgrims from Senegal, those people have been living in the Hedjaz for generations, and have kept no memories of the motherland except for information regarding their origins passed on to them by the members of the first generations which had come from West Africa. Beggars were probably part of “pilgrimage wastes.”

Yet, for French authorities the major security issue was the potential risk of introduction of communicable diseases back in the colonies by returning *Hajjis*. That is also probably why public health specialists campaigned so actively for the international recognition of the Hedjaz as the epicentre of cholera pandemics, and, likely, other epidemics as well at the first Paris International Health Conference in 1851. As cholera outbreaks began occurring with greater frequency in the world, legislation became urgent. “The first of the international sanitary conferences to address itself solely and directly to cholera was held [...] in 1866, in Constantinople, setting in train a thirty year process during which, as a later French writer put it, the European powers with a direct interest in the pilgrimage from territories controlled by them, exercised ‘their right to meddle a little in the question of the purification of Jidda.’”⁵⁷

⁵⁶F. Duguet. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Du point de religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Rieder, 1932), 31.

⁵⁷W. R. Roff. “Sanitation and security: The imperial powers and the nineteenth century Hajj.” *Arabian Studies*, 6, (1982): 152-153.

European delegates at the ‘Cholera Conference’ decided on the opening of a quarantine station at Kamaran (off the coast of Turkish Yemen) during the *Hajj* season of 1882. Jeddah-bound boats were required to pass through the Kamaran station “for 10 to 15 days observational or strict quarantine, depending on the reported state of health of passengers on board and on the duration of the last trip.”⁵⁸ At the example of *Docteur* Oslchanietzki, Director of the *Office Quarantenaire de Beyrouth*, European physicians had firsthand experiences of the ravages of cholera among pilgrims. Nothing happened until the arrival of 5,000 camels carrying 15,000 pilgrims from Mecca where 1,000 deaths were recorded daily. He saw “corpses and dying people all over the place, men, women and children screaming [...], in short, a frightening picture,” inscribed in his memory for the rest of his life.⁵⁹

Descriptions of cholera outbreaks were frightening. By all accounts, cholera attacks were sudden and deadly. However, there seemed to be common patterns to the cholera epidemics recorded in Jeddah which originated in Mecca. The outbreaks stopped as suddenly as they had started, with the last convoy of pilgrims returning from the Mecca pilgrimage.⁶⁰ That is why public health decision-makers and professionals hoped that the intensity of cholera outbreaks would diminish significantly, if not completely, by the time Mecca returnees reached their home countries. In the case of Mecca pilgrims returning home through overland routes, public health professionals expected the desert to function as a quarantine zone, allowing pilgrim convoys to be cleansed naturally of all cholera cases.⁶¹

⁵⁸W. R. Roff. “Sanitation and security: The imperial powers and the nineteenth century Hajj” *Arabian Studies* VI, (1982), 153.

⁵⁹Dr. Oslchanietzki. “Souvenirs de l’épidémie de cholera au Hedjaz en 1893.” Quoted in, F. Duguet. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Du point de vue religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Rieder, 1932), 297.

⁶⁰Idem, 299.

⁶¹M. Wolfe. *One thousand roads to Mecca: Ten centuries of travelers writing about the Muslim pilgrimage*. (New York, Grove Press, 1998).

2. *Hajj* regulation in practice in French West Africa

After the 1893 *Hajj* season, public health professionals rallied around the idea that cholera was to be contained in the cities of Mecca and Madina where non-Muslims were not allowed. The choice to leave the two Muslim Holy cities out of their sphere of intervention was because any non-Muslims visiting either place would be executed on the spot. I have already mentioned the fact that Europeans counted on the sterilizing properties of the desert to remove cholera from the desert caravans. However, like *Docteur* Firmin Duguet, other Europeans were aware that the “sterilizing role of desert caravans was not absolute.”⁶² That theory proved wrong in 1830 and 1837, when the Afghan and Persian pilgrim caravans allowed cholera to spread beyond its Indian source, and into Europe. In spite of these diverging views on the origins of recurrent cholera outbreaks France and its allies came up with a blueprint for the international regulation of health issues and population movements.

The road to the adoption of one unified international public health regulation was long and quite difficult for all participants due in part to diverging views on health and ethics, and clashing socio-economic interests. I will not go back to the details of the negotiations carried out at the international sanitary conventions held between 1851 and 1926, the aim of which was to draw up one common sanitary convention to address the global threat to public health embodied by recurrent *Hajj*-related cholera world outbreaks. Until 1892, the negotiations stalled for the aforementioned reasons. For instance, the Ottoman Empire kept bringing up the argument of challenge to the religious agency of believers. Also, the British and Dutch Empires very protective of their privileges over international maritime trade reluctantly fell in with their European counterparts. Indeed, general agreement on the modes of transmission of diseases was reached with the major scientific discoveries of late nineteenth century.

⁶²F. Duguet. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Du point de vue religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Rieder, 1932) 274.

A global agreement was reached with the 1926 International Sanitary Convention, which worked as the centrepiece of a highly needed international regulation of international travels generally, and of the *Hajj* in particular. The convention came as a breath of fresh air, at least for French public health professionals and colonial civil servants who had been struggling to find a consensus with their counterparts elsewhere in matters of regulation of people's movement. The 1926 convention ignored the reluctance of European nations such as Great-Britain. Basically, the convention provided European nations and their American allies with all the necessary tools to prevent the spread worldwide of communicable diseases, and epidemics through international travel particularly. Article 13 provided the general outline of its major measures. These measures designed to prevent the introduction of vectors of foreign diseases in Europe, the Americas and countries within the convention's jurisdiction.

Article 13, stated that the authorities in charge the regulation of international population movements were expected to provide the appropriate guidance in order to:

1. Prevent people showing signs of plague, cholera, yellow fever, typhus exanthématique, or smallpox from access to embarkation points. In case of:
2. Plague: to prevent the introduction of rats on board the vessels;
3. Cholera: to ensure that water food and stocks are healthy or otherwise disinfected in an appropriate manner;
4. Yellow fever: to prevent the introduction of mosquitoes on board the vessels;
5. Typhus exanthématique: to carry out delousing operations on suspects;
6. Smallpox: to carry out the disinfection rules of used clothes prior to their introduction in a compactor.⁶³

⁶³“*Convention Sanitaire Internationale de 1926*”. Quoted in, F. Duguet. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Du point de vue religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Editions Rieder, 1932), 313.

Article 93 of the 1926 International Sanitary Convention stipulated that all pilgrims must have purchased round trip tickets prior to embarking on pilgrims boats (*sambouks*). In case, they have not yet purchased their tickets, they must provide the equivalent cash amount (to the relevant authorities) to cover the cost of the round trip ticket. It was also desirable that pilgrims in the second situation provide proofs they have the necessary means to make the *Hajj*. More than the first and second provision the third one was certainly the innovation that may have caused more worries to impoverished Muslim pilgrims, because the only way to raise money for their trip was to work petty jobs on the way to Mecca. Article 98 advises that pilgrims be brought together into small groups inside pilgrim camps set up for screening purposes once ashore. Article 99 suggests that all the food brought along by pilgrims be discarded if judged improper to consumption, or harmful to the health of pilgrims.⁶⁴

The 1926 International Sanitary Convention also provided details on how pilgrim boats should conform to meet international sanitary standards. Each boat was to have enough adequate toilets. Indeed, the toilets were to be reserved for women use at a rate of 2% (out of 100%), or in a proportion of one toilet for the exclusive use of women for 100 pilgrims (Article 102). Pilgrim boats were also to be equipped with clean and security-proof primary care centres reserved for the isolation of sick pilgrims taking into account communicable diseases (Article 104). Indeed, each pilgrim boat was to have sufficient stocks of medicine, disinfection tools and products, and the necessary material for the treatment of sick passengers. Last but not least, boats were to carry on board a sufficient stock of necessary immunization products, namely anti-cholera and anti-smallpox vaccines (Article 105).⁶⁵

⁶⁴The “*Convention Sanitaire Internationale de 1926*”. Quoted in, F. Duguet. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Du point de vue religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Editions Rieder, 1932), 314.

⁶⁵Idem, 316.

3. Collateral effects of *Hajj* administrative and medical regulation

The effects of the international regulation of population movements generally, and of *Hajj*-related movements in particular, proved very beneficial in terms of preservation of public health at the world level. However, it seems that the control of trans-border spread of epidemics and communicable disease through the standardization of international health regulation came at a price for West African Muslim populations. Some scholars have documented the particular mindsets of West African pilgrims, especially Hausa-speaking Mecca pilgrims, going to North Africa and to the Holy Land for the purpose of making *Hajj*, or simply to acquire better knowledge of Islam prior to the enactment of the 1926 Convention.⁶⁶ Most West African Muslims travelling Mecca knew about the dangers of travels across deserts and remote areas. However, they kept making the same arrangements each *Hajj* season despite their knowledge of the dangers involved in that endeavor.

European powers ruled over large areas where Islam was predominant. Yet they left Muslims decide of whether to make *Hajj*. That was the case until the Paris 1851 International Conference when the risk of the spread of communicable diseases, including cholera, through the medium of pilgrim caravans and ships became widely recognized in the West. From the 1851 Paris Conference on, making the *Hajj* was an ordeal for West African Muslims. By the end of the nineteenth century, Mecca pilgrims were required to show proof of enough funds for transportation, and living and lodging expenses in Mecca and Madina. Also they were required to meet other specific requirements such as the proof that they were in good health, and up to date in terms of immunizations against yellow fever, smallpox and cholera.

⁶⁶C. Bawa Yamba. *Permanent pilgrims: Role of pilgrimage in the lives of West African Muslims in Sudan*. (London, Edinburgh University Press, 1995). F. Harrak. *West African Muslims in nineteenth century Morocco: Representations of Moroccan religious institutions*. (Rabat, The Institute of African Studies, 1994). J. Works. *Pilgrims in a strange land: Hausa communities in Chad*. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1976).

We also know that West African pilgrims devised their itineraries and carried the minimum necessary for daily living all the way to Mecca. Except for first timer travellers to Mecca, they knew beforehand where to stop on their way to the Holy Land. A significant number of pilgrims travelling to Mecca “on foot” were skilled workers back home, and used their various skills to make a living on the way to Mecca. They often worked as bricklayers, carpenters, house painters and the like, in Niger, Sudan and Chad, some of the places known as step-off points for West African Muslims heading to Mecca via Suakin (British Sudan). The fact that pilgrims going to Mecca “on foot” were known as skilled workers (i.e. bricklayers, butchers, carpenters) suggests the existence of a deeply rooted and highly structured *Hajj* tradition in these professions. That is probably why the Director of the Saint-Louis-based *Centre de Recherche et de Documentation du Sénégal* suggests the existence of a well-established overland pilgrimage organization among skilled workers.⁶⁷

Most pilgrims from colonial Senegal who took the overland routes to Mecca that I have been able to personally document came from these groups. Even though many colonial Senegalese pilgrims went to Mecca “on foot”, I am unable to confirm the existence of a structured *Hajj* organization of skilled manual workers either in Saint-Louis, Rufisque, or Dakar. However, I know that they relied on the experience of their predecessors on the road to Mecca. It seems that the decision to make *Hajj* was generally the choice of physically fit Muslims. However, this does not mean that all pilgrims going to Mecca from colonial Senegal “on foot” were impoverished. They knew that carrying money and precious items was suicidal, because of the high probability of encountering armed robbers on the way. The example of pedestrian Mecca pilgrim *El Hadj* Soucoundou Niane was not unique.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Abdul Qadir Aïdara (Saint-Louis: CRDS, June 2, 2002: 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM).

⁶⁸ See chapter 4. Abdou Salam Touré (Rufisque: HLM. May 18, 2002: 1:00 PM – 2:30 PM). Insa Niane (Saint-Louis: Guet-Ndar-Tak. May 29, 2002: 1:20 PM – 1: 45 PM).

It seems that scores of Mecca pilgrims did not return in the places from where they set out for Mecca. Baye Moussé “Franky” Bâ provided the names of several Saint-Louis Muslims who informed their families that they were undertaking the Mecca pilgrimage and were never to be heard from again. To this day, “their families in Saint-Louis have no information on their whereabouts. It is even unclear if they ever made it to Mecca safe and sound.”⁶⁹ Indeed, many overland Mecca pilgrims never reached Mecca. However, scores of West African Muslims, including Muslims from Senegal, experienced firsthand the effects of the adoption of international public health standards. Hausa Muslim communities in Sudan and Chad in Sudan, which emerged because of the *Hajj* have been documented extensively. For example, Christian Bawa Yamba has examined the case of Hausa settlers in Chad who re-organized their whole lives around the *Hajj* hope to reach Mecca sooner or later.⁷⁰

Many of these Muslims did not relocate in Sudan and Chad willingly. As they were progressing toward Mecca, they lacked the resources to meet the international public health and travel regulation they encountered at various crossings. Many were unable to go further than Sudan, because they did not possess the pilgrim passport made mandatory for all Muslim pilgrims by 1920, at least for Mecca pilgrims from French West Africa. In order to obtain passage on European-chartered boats to Jeddah via the Red Sea, all were required to carry duly stamped documents by the authorities in charge of the regulation of International movements and public health. In fact, these pilgrim passports soon served as means to discourage Muslims from making the *Hajj*, especially in times of crisis, such as the struggle between the Wahhabiyya and the royal Al-Saud family, which started in the nineteenth century and came to an end with the reunification of the Hedjaz and the Nejd in 1932.

⁶⁹ Baye Moussé “Franky” Bâ (Saint-Louis: Nord, May 29, 2002: 8:00 PM – 9:00 PM).

⁷⁰ C. Bawa Yamba. *Permanent pilgrims: Role of pilgrimage in the lives of West African Muslims in Sudan*. (London, Edinburgh University Press, 1995).

In 1925, France used the pretext of the persisting “troubled situation in Saudi Arabia to deny *Hajj* authorization to its Muslim subjects to make pilgrimage.” That same year also witnessed the fight between the Al-Saud and the Wahhabiyya for the control of Jeddah. The siege ended with the victory of the former on December 23, 1925, that is a few months after the Mecca pilgrimage. The Minister of Colonies enjoined local governors of colonies “not to issue any (pilgrim) passport for the Hedjaz” that year.⁷¹ In response to the instructions of the Minister of Colonies, the Chad *Lieutenant-Gouverneur* inquired to know if colonial authorities were to turn back to their native colonies the Mecca pilgrims from French West Africa with pilgrim passport duly issued in French West Africa, and equally duly stamped at the various entry ports they had passed through.”⁷² Governor General Jules Carde responded to that specific query from the local governor. He advised to “collect pilgrim passports and to explain pilgrims all the dangers attached to attempts to travel in the Hedjaz.”⁷³

It is likely that many Muslim pilgrims stayed in Chad in such a situation where the colonial powers decided to keep pilgrim passports until further notice. They already were thousands of miles away from home by the time the decision came. Many chose to wait for the first opportunity to go to Mecca. They worked to raise money in order to survive and acquire the financial means to make *Hajj*. As in 1914 and 1915, French authorities often denied *Hajj* authorizations to Muslim subjects. Therefore, many AOF Muslims, including from colonial Senegal, started new professional lives and new families abroad. In fact, it is not uncommon to find in present Chad and Sudan people of Hausa or Senegalese descent whose origins can be tied to the enforcement of *Hajj* regulation standards.

⁷¹ ANS: 19G9. Hesse. “Circulaire 9 bis. Copie de Radio/Télégramme Officiel.” (Paris, May 23, 1925).

⁷² ANS: 19G9. Alfassa. N°277. “Copie de Télégramme Officiel.” (Brazzaville, June 25, 1925).

⁷³ ANS: 19G9. Carde. N°233. “Copie Télégramme Officiel.” (Brazzaville, June 7, 1925).

If many colonial Senegalese pilgrims relocated in foreign lands, others tried to go back home. At the end of each *Hajj* season, French consuls in Jeddah requested authorizations from the General Government in Dakar to send stranded AOF pilgrims back to the colony at the expense of the French West African colonial regime. Unfortunately, the demand surpassed by far the financial capacity of the colonial government, and French consuls watched helplessly the despair of the stranded pilgrims until the next *Hajj* season. In 1939 in another example, the Governor General in Algeria requested authorization from the Governor General to repatriate, “at the expense of the Budget of French West Africa”, six pilgrims who had arrived in Algiers from the Hedjaz. Five of them - Demba Ali, his wife Fatoumata Samba and son Amadou from Aéré (Senegal River Valley), Momar Yayle N’Diaye from Dakar, Yoro Silla from the Jolof area, and Marane Mourat - came from the colony of Senegal.⁷⁴

Overland colonial Senegal pilgrims stranded in interstitial spaces between the homeland and Mecca experienced different situations. Like Saint-Louis Muslim *El Hadj* Galaye Fall, some reached Mecca, made the *Hajj*, and returned home.⁷⁵ Others, tried very hard to find a way to reach Mecca, but were forced to return to the colony and wait for the right moment to make new attempts.⁷⁶ Unfortunately, the great majority of stranded West African pilgrims remain unaccounted for to this day. They are either to be traced among the numerous people of African descent living in bondage in Saudi Arabia, or living on the streets on the fringes of the opulent Saudi society, especially around the yearly *Hajj* season.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ ANS: 19G2(1), N° 142. “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Algérie à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’AOF.” (Algiers, February 25, 1939).

⁷⁵ *El Hadj* Galaye Fall (Saint-Louis: Léona-Eaux Claires. June 2, 2002: 3:45 PM – 06 :00 PM).

⁷⁶ *El Hadj* Samba Diakhaté (Rufisque: Dangou Nord. May 18, 2002: 11:20 AM – 12:30 PM).

⁷⁷ Senegalese Muslims are often puzzled by the significant numbers of “black beggars” they meet on the streets, especially around the main mosques of Mecca and Madina.

4. Experiencing *Hajj* quarantine and sanitation regulation standards

Once European powers came up with clearly defined standards, Mecca pilgrims from all around the world experienced non-Muslim scrutiny with various degrees of understanding and acceptance. For instance, the Hausa Muslims documented in the Sudan and Chad seemed to have been opposed to the non-Muslim involvement in *Hajj* affairs. Hausa pilgrims travellers to Mecca “on foot”, especially members of Chad and Sudan Hausa communities living to this day with the hope to make *Hajj* one way or another, still view the non-Muslim management of the *Hajj* business as interference in their religious life. This is even truer, that many among them are convinced that the divine rewards waiting for them at the end of the ordeal are tantamount to the hardships they overcome in the process of making *Hajj* “on foot”.⁷⁸ As *El Hadj Galaye Fall*, many think the trip to Mecca “on foot” is more meritorious.⁷⁹

By 1926, eligibility for the *Hajj* became dependent upon strict compliance with medical and administrative requirements and quarantine rules. From that time on, the colonial government would not tolerate any lapses among the pilgrims. In AOF, it seems that the efforts of France to bring Mecca pilgrims up to these medical standards, especially Mecca pilgrims from colonial Senegal, really came to fruition after the Second World War. It seems that colonial Senegal pilgrims did not have overtly objected to the non-Muslim management of the *Hajj*. At least, Mecca pilgrims from the cities of Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis seemed to have found certain advantages in the system. Many used their French *Originnaire* card to claim special favours from escort members and *Commissaires au Pèlerinage*.⁸⁰

⁷⁸C. Bawa Yamba. *Permanent pilgrims: Role of pilgrimage in the lives of West African Muslims in Sudan*. (London, Edinburgh University Press, 1995).

⁷⁹*El Hadj Galaye Fall* (Saint-Louis: Léona – Eaux Claires: June 2, 2002: 3:45 PM – 06:00PM).

⁸⁰See ANS: 19G1 through 19G11, and 1H118(163).

Agents in charge of *Hajj* affairs in the colonies were not foreign to the situation leading Originaire Muslims to claim special favours. In their various exchanges, colonial agents tended to differentiate between pilgrims from North Africa and West African pilgrims. In a 1952 confidential report, the *Commissaire au Pèlerinage* Cardaire emphasized in barely veiled terms the good “models of discipline” offered by French West African pilgrims compared to the Moroccan pilgrims with whom they shared the same experience during the trip between Casablanca and Jeddah on the “Athos II”.⁸¹ Cardaire indicates that all “Athos II” passengers went through quarantine at the Tor station. But the boat captain managed to save pilgrims the additional fatigue of having to disembark to undergo medical examination on firm land, in exchange for that favor he offered to cover in advance all the costs of food expenses for the “Athos II” passengers held in observation in the El-Tor lazaret.

However, Captain Cardaire, the crew, and passengers were all outraged by the way the El-Tor Egyptian physicians handled the boat inspection. He complained that, they “made the 1,700 pilgrim parade in front of them pants down.” Then, they took samples from them in a general hilarity and at the dismay of the crew, which further aggravated the persecutory nature of the circumstances in which they carried out the exams in the first place. Docteur Corcuf - a World Health Office (WHO) representative sent to Jeddah to observe the *Hajj* - witnessed the degrading treatment. He was deeply moved by what he saw, and was deeply convinced stool sample collecting was useless and unnecessary in that case. Docteur Corcuf felt that Egyptian physicians could not have had enough time to carry out microscopic exams between the time the samples were taken from pilgrims, and the results of the microscopic were released.⁸²

⁸¹ANS: 19G11(17). Cardaire. “Rapport du Capitaine Cardaire, Commissaire du Gouvernement de l’AOF au Pèlerinage de la Mecque, 1952 (Confidentiel).”

⁸²Idem. Docteur Corcuf promised to prepare a report for the health services attached to the office of the *Haut Commissaire au Pèlerinage*. The report was to be made available to the *Haut Commissaire* through the Public Health Services in Morocco.

The humiliating conditions involved in these medical examinations were certainly the reason why West African Muslims generally, and colonial Senegal Muslims particularly, hated the quarantines connected with the *Hajj*. In their majority, Muslim Mecca pilgrims fought quarantine mainly through protests. In 1948, twenty-six years old *Médecin Africain Principal, Docteur* Moustapha Touré, appointed to escort AOF pilgrims to Mecca, experienced opposition from pilgrims when he decided to place the boat in quarantine. Docteur Touré suspected a case of cholera after one AOF pilgrim fell sick during the trip back from Mecca. He placed the boat under quarantine off the coast of Bizerte or Casablanca. The tests conducted on samples taken from the patient proved positive. Nevertheless, Docteur Touré experienced the ire of pilgrims, “who - in turn - placed him in complete quarantine for the rest of the journey. Passengers and crew were really angry at him.”⁸³

However, most former ‘colonial’ pilgrims I surveyed have no recollection of quarantine measures, except for *El Hadj* Galaye Fall who rebelled against the British Sudan border agents when they tried to take him back to a quarantine station located 16 kilometres away from Khartum. *El Hadj* Galaye Fall felt “one experience with quarantine was enough.” With fellow pilgrims, both had already gone through quarantine in Jenina (British Sudan) where they received several shots “of unknown products”; they were also sprayed with “unknown” powders and showered for eight straight days. That is why they refused to comply with quarantine rules again and only one week after the first experience with quarantine in Jenina.⁸⁴ In any case, many ‘colonial’ pilgrims testified to having no recollection of medical surveillance during the *Hajj*, except for the mandatory immunizations required by the colonial administration from all Mecca pilgrims prior to departure from the colony and during the trip.

⁸³ *Adja* Rougui Diallo, widow of Docteur Moustapha Touré. (Dakar: Bopp. August 12, 2003: 05:15 PM - 06:15 PM).

⁸⁴ *El Hadj* Galaye Fall (Saint-Louis: Léona – Eaux Claires. June 2, 2002: 3:45 PM – 06:00 PM).

5. Morbidity among French West Africa Mecca pilgrims (1947-1957)

Until the end of World War II, data on morbidity and mortality among Mecca pilgrims from French Africa on site during the pilgrimage is very scarce, if not totally unavailable. The rare statistics on the “Sénégalais” segment of the pilgrim population are found in broad monographs such as the works of Docteurs Borel and Duguet.⁸⁵ Statistics on AOF pilgrim casualties are included in the general statistics for Mecca pilgrims. Indeed, the statistics mainly concern movements recorded at the Jeddah entry port. Complete statistics were not available for colonial Senegal until 1947 in the yearly reports of Muslim physicians appointed to escort AOF pilgrims during the *Hajj*. In 1948, the Hedjaz government required that all pilgrims be vaccinated against smallpox, yellow fever, typhoid with the TAB vaccine, typhus *exhantématique*, cholera and bubonic plague.

The vaccines were to be applied in the following order:

- Dual vaccine: smallpox and yellow fever;
- TAB vaccine: at the rate of three shots within seven days;
- Seven days after the third TAB shot: anti-typho-exhantématique vaccine: at the rate of three shots of 1 cc. within seven days.
- Seven days after the third anti-typho-exhantématique shot: anti-plague vaccine at a rate of one first shot (at 1 cc.) followed by one shot (at 2 cc.) seven days after the first shot.
- Two shots of anti-cholera vaccine (at 1 cc. and 2 cc.) within one week.⁸⁶

⁸⁵Dr. F. Borel. *Choléra et Peste dans le Pèlerinage Musulman, 1860-1903*. (Paris. Masson et Cie Editeurs, 1904). F. Duguet. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Du point de vue religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Rieder, 1932), 274.

⁸⁶ANS: 1H118(163). *Inspecteur Peltier*. N° 118 I. “Le Haut-Commissaire de la République de l’AOF aux Gouverneurs locaux. Objet : Vaccination des candidats au pèlerinage de la Mecque de 1948.” (Dakar, April 4, 1948).

Inspecteur Peltier specified that appointed physicians were to perform mandatory immunizations on all Mecca pilgrims. Physicians were also required to record data pertaining to Mecca pilgrim immunization operations in a special “pilgrim immunization notebook.” Last but not least, they were to issue vaccination certificate “strictly similar to the international samples provided to all local managers of public health services.” However, Peltier insisted that “immunizations did not imply enrollment *ipso facto* in pilgrimage departure roles.” Rather, that was only the most effective, “but also orderly and quiet way”, of ensuring that pilgrims travelled with the appropriate paperwork.⁸⁷ It seems that the rules for AOF pilgrims became more effective after 1948, when African Muslim physicians began overseeing the health of AOF pilgrims during *Hajj* season. The first of such physicians was Docteur Moustapha Touré who passed away in 2003. He has published his 1948 report.⁸⁸

In 1949, a *Médecin-Africain Principal*, Gaspard Kamara, was appointed to play same role Docteur Moustapha Touré played in 1948. In the report he provided at the end of the *Hajj* season, Docteur Gaspard Kamara listed the types of infections usually detected among Mecca pilgrims. He identified three types of infections: infections contracted before, during, and after the trip to Mecca. In the second category, he placed infections contracted during the journey to Mecca, he mentioned mainly communicable diseases (flu and pneumococcal infections), infections resulting from the effects of the unhealthy maritime climates and the diet on the boat. Infections resulting from the climate can be summarized as follows: chills, benign diarrhoea, recurrences of dysentery attacks and pulmonary congestion. No pestilential infections were detected among AOF Mecca pilgrims during the 1948 *Hajj* season.

⁸⁷ ANS: 1H118(163). *Inspecteur* Peltier. N° 118 I. “Le Haut-Commissaire de la République de l’AOF aux Gouverneurs locaux. Objet: Vaccination des candidats au pèlerinage de la Mecque de 1948.” (Dakar, April 4, 1948).

⁸⁸ I was unable to obtain a copy of the book entitled “*Pèlerin en Blouse Blanche*.”

He mentioned a benign attack of smallpox among already immunized Egyptian pilgrims, in the form of small pustules with no fever. The attack was stamped out within five days. During the *Hajj*, the infections recorded were primarily related to the effects of exhaustion, sun and dust. Docteur Kamara mentioned cases of sunstroke, distress, and certain types of respiratory infections. In addition, dormant diseases re-emerged among the exhausted pilgrims. Docteur Kamara provided the following morbidity and mortality statistics for “Senegalese”, Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisian pilgrims at the end of his 1949 report:⁸⁹

Table 4. Infections reported during the 1949 *Hajj* season

Venereal	Eye	Lung	digestive	Skin	Surgical	Vaccines	Various	Total
85	350	688	792	310	850	604	810	4,946

(After, ANS: 1H118(163) - G. Kamara. “Rapport Médical sur le pèlerinage, op. cit.)

That table indicates a significance of pulmonary and digestive infections, as well as diseases resulting from accidents (e.g. wounds), or from benign or chronic infections (e.g. kidney stones) which require surgical procedures. The pattern of disease prevalence among pilgrims remained identical until the end of colonial era. For instance, the 1954 report indicates 150 pulmonary infections, 91 digestive infections, and 169 various types of wounds. Such infections made up 410 out of 654 infections treated during the 1954 *Hajj* season, or almost two-thirds of the total infections treated.⁹⁰ Fatou Ba Ndiaye, who served as a nurse on three pilgrimage commissions thinks pilgrims get sick because they do not eat properly in order to save money to buy gifts for relatives and merchandises for their businesses.

⁸⁹ ANS: 1H118(163). K. Gaspard. “Rapport médical sur le pèlerinage à la Mecque: année 1949.” (Dakar, not dated).

⁹⁰ ANS: 1H118(163). *Médecin-Capitaine* E. Noel. “Rapport de la mission médicale accompagnant les pèlerins en 1954: Archives.” (Dakar not dated).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that French West Africa generally, and Dakar in particular, was the site of intense negotiations in order to curb the risks of introduction of deadly diseases in French West Africa. Yellow fever and the proximity of other epidemics provided colonial authorities with the incentives to implement preventive methods in French West Africa and the clauses of orders already enforced in Metropolitan France such as, the January 4, 1896 order on regulation of maritime sanitary police in France and in Algeria. Also, the colonial administration progressively established pieces of legislation and guidelines which were implemented on the ground by colonial civil servants and entrusted health and hygiene professionals. Indeed, within a worldwide suspicion of germ-carriers, colonial authorities in French West Africa started taking a closer look at individuals and groups thought to be disease-prone and dangerous in regard to the preservation of public health.

In that respect, Lebanese and Syrians, especially and peddlers within that group, were perceived as threats to public health owing to their close interactions with indigenous populations, mainly through trade. In fact, until the end of the colonial era, and in spite of the bitter experience with 'segregation' during the 1914 Plague epidemic in Dakar, French colonial authorities never completely broke with the view that isolation, and more specifically 'segregation', were the most adequate preventive devices to contain the spread of epidemics in the places where these disease belonged. Therefore, they saw the necessity to apply all Muslim pilgrims from French West Africa, including those from colonial Senegal the preventive precautions in order to ensure that they remained safe from all the numerous causes of morbidity and mortality they could face in the course of the performance of the *Hajj* rituals in Mecca and Madina. After the Second World War, French colonial authorities appointed Muslim African doctors in order to extend the scope of the preventive system devised for the *Hajj* to the heart of the Sacred Area of Mecca and Madina, and beyond.

CHAPTER 4: *Hajj* management in practice: Colonial Senegal Muslims and the *Hajj*

The French West Africa Mecca pilgrimage management system was not created in a vacuum. Of course, there never had been any concrete framework, and prospective pilgrims were not obliged to comply with any rules other than the ones they had set for themselves. Pilgrims travelled ‘on foot’ to the Holy Land, and on their way they interacted with different people, profited from their skills, and sometimes established new lines of descent. Devout Muslim travellers made the trip at their own risk. They took only little food and belongings, and their faith with them. In their own accounts, many former colonial Mecca pilgrims did not know what surprises awaited them. Also, many had little idea on how to reach Mecca. They relied mainly on word of mouth to find their way. They were also aware that they might never see their families again. Yet, prospective Mecca pilgrims were motivated by the desire to comply with one of the most important requirements of the Muslim faith.

As non-Muslims, French colonial authorities knew that the Mecca pilgrimage was primarily a matter of religious faith. French policy-makers and French public opinion as well, overwhelmingly accepted the fact that France had no other choice than to help colonial Muslims from French West Africa, who contributed to France’s war effort in many ways during World War II, to freely practice their religion. For them, permitting French West African Muslims to make the *Hajj* was a fair reward for their participation in the success of France and its allies against Germany in both world wars. Yet, it was obvious to French colonial authorities that something needed to be done to protect North Africa and AOF pilgrims from their own recklessness. At least in theory, they struggled to find the happy medium in making the *Hajj* easy for prospective pilgrims in terms of diminishing the time-span of the trip, alleviating the lack of comfort, and preventing Mecca pilgrim returnees from potentially introducing communicable diseases (e. g. cholera, yellow fever, bubonic plague) back into the colonies of French West Africa, including in the colony of Senegal.

A. Dilemmas on both sides

In colonial Senegal, accounts of management of the *Hajj* business should not be reduced to stories of coercion leading to resistance on one hand, or fatalism leading to acceptance on the other. The first scenario implies that the French tried to downgrade the fifth pillar of Islam. It is more historically accurate to recognize that France stood at the forefront of the nineteenth century international drive to come up with quarantine rules applicable to Mecca-bound vessels. Committed to the neutralization of *Hajj*-related pandemics, France positioned itself as the enforcer of hygiene rules greeted lukewarmly at the 1851 Paris Health Conference, and many at similar meetings.¹ Yet, on the ground they soon realized the need to take into account the ideological and practical hurdles to implementing such rules.

Despite the importance of *Tariqa*² affiliation, colonial Senegal Muslims revered the tenets of Islam, including the *Hajj*. Many among them consider the *Hajj* a personal experience, which “allows Muslim believers to get closer to God.”³ Learned Muslims insist that a main *sàrtu aj*⁴ is that pilgrims must as a priority interact with their fellow Muslims in the Holy Land. Indeed, pilgrims must engage in dialogue with fellow Muslims about the issues pertaining to the lives and fates of Muslims from around the world.⁵ Since, the soils of Mecca and Madina are strictly forbidden to non-Muslims some may jump to the conclusion that the *Hajj* is exclusively a Muslim affair. In any case, Senegalese Muslims find a wealth of explanations to justify and accept the involvement of French authorities in the *Hajj*.

¹J. Baldry. “The ottoman quarantine station on Kamaran Island 1882-1914.” *Studies in the history of medicine*, 2 (1/2), March-June (1978), 3-148. D. E. Long. *The Hajj today: A survey of the contemporary pilgrimage to Makkah*. (New York, SUNY, 1979).

²*Tariqa* (sing.), *Turuq* (plur.): School of Sufism or Sufi orders.

³*Ustaz* Alioune Sall. (Dakar: Dieuppeul. May 15, 2002: 11:00 – 12:00 PM).

⁴*Sàrt*: “the Condition, the essence or the *raison d’être* of the *Hajj*.”

⁵*Al-Imam* Ahmet Dame Ndiaye (Sud FM radio show “*Al-Bidaya*.” February 1, 2008: 9:00 – 11:00 AM).

1. *Hajj* surveillance in theory: Concession rather than prohibition

In the 1830s, about five centuries after the fourteenth century Bubonic Plague that claimed a large percentage of the world population, a new epidemic emerged in the form of cholera. Between 1831 and 1912, forty cholera epidemics in the Hedjaz coincided with the *Hajj* season,⁶ and several cholera outbreaks were reported throughout the world in the aftermath of cholera outbreaks in the Hedjaz.⁷ The identification of returning Mecca pilgrims as potential cholera carriers prompted international action to prevent collateral damage.⁸

By the end of the nineteenth century, the role of *Hajji* in disease dispersal was generally accepted. In 1895, *Docteur* Edouard Allard urged the government to take concrete actions in order to protect colonial Muslims from the health risks they faced during the *Hajj*.⁹ In 1904, *Docteur* Borel even compared the Hedjaz to “a field of operation for [terrifying and deadly] epidemics [such as cholera].” Likewise, Justin Godart compared the *Hajj* to “a double-sided panel [which displayed] attractive mysticism and bewildering mystery [on one side, and] the scary reality of contagion” on the opposite side of the panel.¹⁰

⁶ J. Godart quoted in, F. Duguët. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Au point de vue religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Rieder, 1932), x.

⁷ See, R. J. Evans. “Epidemics and revolutions: Cholera in nineteenth century Europe.” In, *Epidemics and ideas: Essays on the historical perceptions of pestilence*. T. Ranger & P. Slack (Eds.). (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992). C. Rosenberg. *Cholera years: The United States in 1832, 1849 and 1866*. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987). G. D. Sussman. “From yellow fever to cholera: A study of French government policy, medical professionalism and popular movements in the epidemics crises of the Restoration and the July Monarchy.” (New Haven, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1971). P. Vinten-Johansson, H. Brody, N. Paneth & S. Rachman. *Cholera, chloroform and the science of medicine*. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁸ O. Aginam. “The nineteenth century colonial fingerprints on public health diplomacy: A postcolonial view.” *Law, Social Justice and Global Development Journal*, 2003(1).

⁹ E. Allard. “Le pèlerinage à la Mecque et son rôle dans la propagation des maladies.” *Bulletin du Comité de l’Afrique Occidentale Française*, (Juillet 1895), 229-231.

¹⁰ A “*champ de manoeuvre des épidémies*” (my emphasis). Dr. F. Borel. *Choléra et Peste dans le Pèlerinage Musulman, 1860-1903*. (Paris, Masson & Cie, 1904), ii.

Médecin-Africain Gaspard Kamara provided a firsthand account - as a physician appointed to escort AOF pilgrims - in his 1949 report. To him, “pilgrimage mess and religion-related worries”¹¹ made health conditions on the *Hajj* and medical follow-up of pilgrims very difficult. During the *Hajj*, sick pilgrims would not interrupt their prayers to seek medical assistance for medical conditions. In fact, “they seem to forget completely the presence of physicians appointed to look after their safety and well-being.”¹² Doctor Kamara thought the Mina,¹³ Arafat,¹⁴ and Muzdalifa¹⁵ stages are the most difficult, since health professionals can only provide very basic first aid treatment to pilgrims on the *Hajj*.

French officials and practitioners alike were long aware of the realities of the Holy Land, and of the *Hajj* as well. From the beginning of their involvement in the management of the *Hajj*, they took such realities into account. For centuries, the Ottoman Empire and Islam had spurred the interest of French bureaucrats and thinkers. Around 1535, King François 1^{er} (1494-1547) secured the monopoly of trade navigation to the Middle East. That way, he established the basis of French action in Lebanon, and in the Middle East. The maintenance of French consulates in places such as Jeddah, and the creation of the *Ecole des Langues Orientales* in Paris in 1795 were part of this extension of French influence.¹⁶

¹¹“*Les désordres du pèlerinage et les préoccupations religieuses.*” See, ANS: 1H118(163). G. Kamara. “Rapport médical sur le pèlerinage à la Mecque, année 1949.” (Dakar, not dated), 5.

¹²Idem. “*Ils donnent l’impression de n’avoir plus la notion de l’existence d’un médecin chargé de veiller à la sauvegarde de leur vie.*”

¹³On day four of the pilgrimage, Muslim pilgrims perform the stoning ritual at the *Jamaraat*. They also immolate animals (sheeps), and clip or shave their hair.

¹⁴On day two, which is the “day of standing” pilgrims gather to pray, and to carry out meditation and contemplation on Mount Arafat.

¹⁵After completing the “standing ritual” in Arafat, pilgrims stay to Muzdalifa overnight to pray and collect the 21 pebbles required for the upcoming “stoning ritual” in Mina.

¹⁶W. Arbid. *Méditerranée, Moyen-Orient : Deux siècles de relations internationales*. (Paris, l’Harmattan, 2003). M. Bozdemir. *La marche Turquie vers l’Europe*. (Paris, Karthala, 2005). E. W. Said. *Orientalism*. (New York, Vintage, 1979).

Orientalist icons such as writer Alphonse de Lamartine (1790-1869) and painter Etienne Dinet (1861-1929) shaped French public's knowledge of the Middle East.¹⁷ Yet, the familiarity with Orient had little impact on France's relations with Islam in AOF. That situation was due to the experience with Islam in North Africa. Alfred le Châtelier (1855-1929) – former head of the Ouargla *bureaux Arabes* - summarized concisely the complexity of the Islamic policy of France in Africa. To him, the France's policy toward “*Islam soudanien [...] devrait [...] être une extrême réserve, une action déterminée par l'indifférence apparente, par un sentiment inné de tolérance, ni agressive, ni tyrannique, mais attentive et énergique sans hésitation, préventivement plutôt que par réaction.*”¹⁸

Colonial agents soon realized they had very limited latitude to carry out *Hajj* management, because non-Muslims are banned from the Holy sites.¹⁹ They were unable to cancel pilgrimages on the ground that such events jeopardized public health.” However, they felt the alternative was to encourage Muslim pilgrims to abandon their “dangerous habits through the use of [dissuasive] means ideally combining the respect of Muslim customs and public health standards.”²⁰ That argument carried even more weight after World War I.

¹⁷ D. Brahimi & B. Koudir. *Les Orientalistes: Etienne Dinet*. (Paris, ACR Editions, 1984). M. De Lamartine. *Pensées et paysages pendant un voyage en Orient, 1832-1833 ou notes d'un voyageur*. (Paris: Furne & Cie, 1856).

¹⁸ To Alfred le Châtelier, “the Islamic policy of France in sub-Saharan Africa should be marked by extreme reserve and concrete actions cloaked in the guise of indifference.” He suggested combining an “innate feeling of tolerance, neither aggressive, nor tyrannical,” with “attentive and energetic” action, “without hesitation and preventively, rather than in reaction [to a threat]” when dealing with Islam in AOF (my emphasis). A. Le Châtelier, quoted in A. Gouilly. *L'Islam dans l'Afrique Occidentale Française*. (Paris, Larose, 1952), 250.

¹⁹ Sura *At-Tawba*, (n°9), verse n° 28: “O ye who believe! Truly the Pagans are unclean; so let them not approach the sacred Mosque after their year” (my emphasis). See also, C. Snouck-Hurgronje. *Mekka in the latter part of the nineteenth century: Daily life, customs and learning the Moslems of the East Indian Archipelago*. (London, Luzac & Co., 1931), 185 and 208.

²⁰ E. Allard. “Le pèlerinage à la Mecque et son rôle dans la propagation des maladies.” *Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Occidentale Française*, (Juillet 1895), 229 (my emphasis).

Gabriel Séailles (1852-1921) - French philosopher, founding member of the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme* and opponent to the war - felt that France “owed French Muslims what they deserved [that is] liberty in their personal [and religious] status,” [because they defended France] “and the cause of liberty with heartfelt loyalty.” Therefore, it was “critical for French Muslims to maintain the elements that epitomized their virtue.”²¹ Yet, keeping the right balance between the preservation of public health and religious agency was difficult in practice until 1957 when the World Health Organization (WHO) surrendered its obligations in the management of the *Hajj* business to the Saudi government.²² Also, French officials wished to preserve the image of France in the eyes of the global Islamic community.

French authorities still questioned the whereabouts of West African Muslim pilgrims going eastward. In 1906, the *Chef de Bataillon* Gaden reported that Alpha Hashimi Tall - nephew of cleric *El Hadj* Oumar Tall who later relocated in Madina - had stopped by Fort-Lamy in late 1904 alone allegedly “to distract French authorities.” *Marabout* Ciré Ali followed him in late 1905 when he passed through Fort-Lamy on his way to Mecca. For Gaden, both cases proved that the intentions of Muslim pilgrims passing through Fort-Lamy since 1904 were to relocate in the Hedjaz ultimately.²³ The *Gouverneur des Colonies* François-Joseph Clozel was probably thinking along the same lines when he withheld *Hajj* authorizations in 1911 under the pretext of plague and cholera outbreaks in Arabia.²⁴

²¹ G. Séailles, quoted by J. Godart. In, F. Duguet. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Au point de vue religieux, social et sanitaire*. vii–viii.

²² D. E. Long. *The Hajj today: A survey of the contemporary pilgrimage to Makkah*. (New York, SUNY, 1979).

²³ ANS: 19G2. Chef de Bataillon Gaden. *Notes sur le Toucouleurs récemment arrivés à Fort-Lamy*. (Fort-Lamy, August 10, 1906).

²⁴ ANS: 19G2. N. 183. Gouverneur Général Clozel. Le Gouverneur des colonies, Lieutenant-Gouverneur du Haut-Sénégal-Niger à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’AOF à Dakar. (Bamako, March 20, 1911).

In sub-Saharan Africa, France made it difficult for Muslims to meet the required conditions for travel to Mecca. Colonial authorities used various pretexts, such as war-related issues to discourage potential *Hajj* candidates. In the report, Clozel admitted that outbreaks of cholera and plague had been reported in the newspapers “very briefly, in reality.”²⁵ That specific comment suggests that the cholera record of the Hedjaz was not alarming in 1911. Nevertheless, there probably was no need to go as far as cancelling, until further notice, the authorizations which would have enabled French West African Muslims to make *Hajj* in 1911. Clozel does not provide detailed information on the scale and scope of the cholera outbreak in the Hedjaz in 1911. Nevertheless, the 1911 cholera epidemic provided French authorities the most convenient pretext to prevent Muslims from making the *Hajj*.²⁶

In 1914 Minister of Colonies Gaston Doumergue insisted on enacting throughout the territories of French West Africa “toute mesure qui serait de nature à empêcher nos sujets musulmans de se rendre cette année à la Mecque, sans avoir pour inconvénient de susciter des commentaires qui nous seraient défavorables ou de froisser les sentiments religieux des Musulmans. Il serait impolitique d’interdire par voie d’arrêté le pèlerinage, à un moment où cette mesure paraîtrait dictée par la crainte de mettre nos sujets en contact avec ceux de l’Empire Turc. Mais, l’administration locale pourrait déconseiller le départ, en invoquant la raison que les bateaux qui font d’ordinaire le service ont été réquisitionnés par les puissances belligérantes et que les pèlerins risqueraient d’attendre indéfiniment dans les ports.”²⁷

²⁵“*Très sommairement à vrai dire*” (my emphasis). In, ANS: 19G2. N. 183. Gouverneur Général Clozel. Le Gouverneur des colonies, Lieutenant-Gouverneur du Haut-Sénégal-Niger à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’AOF à Dakar. (Bamako, March 20, 1911).

²⁶See, ANS: 1H118(163).

²⁷ANS: 19G9. N. 247. “Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de L’AOF.” (Bordeaux, October 21, 1914). The Minister of Colonies suggested taking all necessary actions to prevent Muslim subjects from going to Mecca this year, without raising negative comments toward France and hurting Muslims’ religious feelings (my emphasis).

2. *Hajj* health surveillance in practice: Overcoming ideological and practical obstacles

The very first words of Doctor Frederic Borel in his monograph on cholera and plague in the Muslim pilgrimage are, “*les épidémies de choléra et de peste du Hedjaz – c’est à dire du pèlerinage*”...²⁸ The words “*c’est-à-dire*” (that is) do not constitute a semantic mistake. In fact, Borel linked the *Hajj* with the spread of cholera and plague epidemics in the Hedjaz. Borel was not the only physician holding Muslim pilgrims and the *Hajj* responsible for the spread of epidemics out of the Hedjaz. At the Paris 1894 International Sanitary Conference all delegates agreed on that idea. In 1866 already, the French delegate at the Constantinople International Sanitary conference had cried out, “*on ne transige pas avec le choléra.*”²⁹ Yet, as most European rulers dealing with Muslim communities at that time, French officials felt uncomfortable interfering directly in how Muslim believers made the pilgrimage.

In 1895, French consuls and physicians appointed by the government generally complied with rules that ban non-Muslims from the *Hajj*.³⁰ The offices of European consulates and embassies - including the French consulate - were even based in Jeddah. Administrative and medical personnel escorted their Muslim subjects up to Jeddah where they waited for Mecca pilgrims to return after the completion of *Hajj* rituals. However, as pilgrimage-related cholera and plague outbreaks increased in number and in scope Europeans used undercover Muslim agents to unravel the mystery surrounding *Hajj* celebrations in the Holy Land.³¹ They largely relied on the various accounts of returnees to document the *Hajj*.

²⁸Dr. F. Borel. *Choléra et Peste dans le Pèlerinage Musulman, 1860-1903*. (Paris, Masson & Cie, 1904), i.

²⁹“We must stay firm in front of cholera.” F. Duguët. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Au point de vue religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Rieder, 1932), xii.

³⁰In some instances, French and British adventurers (e.g. René Caillé, or Sir Francis Burton) were able to get close to the epicentre of Muslim celebrations in Mecca and Madina.

³¹See, W. Roff. “Sanitation and security: Imperial powers and the nineteenth century *Hajj*.” *Arabian Studies*, 6 (1982), 143-160.

For a long time, French officials felt they owed protection to returning Muslim pilgrims living within the limits of areas under their rule. After 1895, strict surveillance of the *Hajj* was not on the agenda of French officials. Rather, the dilemma consisted in finding ways to manage the *Hajj* with due respect for the Muslim faith. They used verses of the '*Quran*, and the '*A-Hadith* to justify their preventive action. In that respect, French officials displayed a wealth of knowledge of Islamic laws relating to the issue of *Hajj*. They understood very well the fact that the Mecca pilgrimage is a fundamental pillar of the Muslim faith. Doctor Borel quoted verse 192 of *The Cow* Sura, "[You Muslims must] perform pilgrimage to Mecca and to the Holy Sites." He emphasized that aspect with verse 91 of the '*Imran* chapter, which reads "making pilgrimage is a duty for whoever is equipped to do so."³²

At the 1894 Paris conference, the issue of interfering in Ottoman and Muslim affairs resurfaced. Doctor Pagliani (Italy) set aside the recriminations of the Ottoman delegate, because "the rights of the people come [first] before any other rights. [...] In that cholera era the Hajj had entered the realm of the public good."³³ French policy-makers played around with the nuances involved in the word able quoted from the '*Imran* chapter. To them, being 'able' meant being physically fit to make the *Hajj*, or having the financial means to pay for the trip.³⁴ For Doctor Borel the sentence "for whoever is able to do so" excluded from the *Hajj* the "poor Muslims" he viewed as "the wound of the Muslim pilgrimage." He referred to pilgrims "unable to pay for sanitary taxes, and mainly for the minimal disembarkation tax."³⁵

³²'*Accomplissez*' ((You) perform!) indicates a command. While, '*en état de le faire*' (equipped to do so) suggest specific requirements. Dr. F. Borel. *Choléra et Peste dans le Pèlerinage Musulman, 1860-1903*. (Paris, Masson & Cie, 1904), 13, (my emphasis).

³³Duguet F. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Au point de vue religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Rieder, 1932), 173.

³⁴*Al-Ustaz* Alioune Sall (Dieuppeul: May 15, 2002: 11:00 – 11:20 PM), *Al-Ustaz* Malick Sow (Institut Islamique de Dakar: May 16, 2002: 12:15 – 1:15 PM).

³⁵"La plaie du pèlerinage Musulman." In, F. Borel, op. cit., 27.

Yet, in spite of the relative consensus of Europeans on matters of *Hajj* regulation, French civil servants judged that preventing Muslim from attending the *Hajj* was politically incorrect.³⁶ Until 1914 roughly, French authorities did not include AOF in the program of regulation of the *Hajj*. They essentially made arrangements for Muslims from Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. Even then, French authorities seemed to have preferred the enactment of *circulaires* (circulars) rather than *arrêtés* (orders) in their attempts to oversee the *Hajj*. Certainly, this was because orders embody a sense of authoritative command, which is not appropriate in the context of religious affairs such as the *Hajj*. The purposes of circulars are very often to describe given situations, and to suggest specific lines of action. Also, even though circular addressees are very often expected to comply with the recommendations in the circular, the latter emphasize the realities of the context in which addressees operate.

On April 9, 1902, Minister of Colonies Albert Decrais published a ministerial circular labelled, “*Interdiction du pèlerinage à la Mecque.*” In his circular to the Governor General of French West Africa, he mentioned the Mecca cholera epidemic, which had reached the Jeddah harbor and claimed the lives of numerous Muslim pilgrims. He argued in favor of the “intérêt qui s’attache en présence de cette dangereuse épidémie, à ce que la prohibition du pèlerinage, imposée depuis quelques années pour des motifs analogues, aux populations musulmanes de la Colonie que vous administrez, soit maintenue en 1902 avec la même rigueur.”³⁷ Actually, Decrais also prophesized cholera would soon threaten the Empire of French West Africa as it spread beyond the boundaries of the Jeddah harbor. Yet, he did not go beyond drawing the attention of the Governor General on the benefits of thoroughly maintaining the prohibition of Mecca pilgrimage already in effect prior to 1902.

³⁶ ANS. 19G9. N. 247. “Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de L’AOF.” (Bordeaux, October 21, 1914).

³⁷ JOSD. A. Decrais. N. 72. “Circulaire ministérielle - Interdiction du pèlerinage à la Mecque.” (Paris, April 9, 1902, 264).

However, as in North Africa, French officials realized the need to codify the *Hajj* business in AOF. In 1909, at the request of the Foreign Affairs Department, Governor Ponty addressed a circular to all *Lieutenant-Gouverneurs*. He asked if, “*la question du pèlerinage, dans la colonie que vous administrez, vous semble avoir assez d’ampleur pour qu’il y ait utilité de mettre à l’étude une réglementation spéciale tendant à empêcher le départ des pèlerins sans ressources.*” He insisted on the need to document the *Hajj* in AOF in order to avoid past situations, in which pilgrims had used the pretext of indigence to request repatriation at the expenses of the AOF Government. That situation came to an end when the Government of Algeria decided “to check the financial resources of prospect Algerian pilgrims.” Governor Ponty recognized the relevance of that innovation. Yet, the necessity to implement such initiatives in AOF depended on the magnitude of the *Hajj* issue locally.³⁸

In any case, French authorities in Paris and in the AOF territories had no doubt about the need and urgency of scrutinizing the *Hajj* business in French West Africa. On January 12, 1910 Governor General Ponty himself enacted an order, which promulgated in French West Africa the December 15, 1909 decree regulating the *police sanitaire* in the colonies. In the attached preliminary report to the President of the French Republic, Minister of Colonies Georges Trouillot pointed out the fact that European and American “delegates to the 1903 Paris [health] conference had added flexibility to the legislation pertaining to the protection of national borders against all “*provenances suspectes et infectées*” [from suspect and infected areas of the world] drawing on new data pertaining to the prophylaxis of diseases.”³⁹

³⁸ JOAOF. W. Ponty. N. 237. “Circulaire au sujet du pèlerinage de la Mecque.” (Dakar, July 9, 1909), 334. Governor Ponty asked local governors to check if the situation of Mecca pilgrims with limited financial means required special regulations (my emphasis).

³⁹ French officials took advantage of previous international requirements regarding the surveillance and handling of “ships coming from areas where transmissible diseases may still exist, or (where disease outbreaks) have prevailed (my emphasis).”

Minister of Colonies Georges Trouillot stated that “the present order sought to make French colonies enjoy the 1903 less strict legislation.” Nevertheless, in that same report Trouillot recapped the purposes of the *police sanitaire* as described in the March 3, 1822 Law. The aim of the *police sanitaire* was to “prevent permanently, under the conditions defined in the attached decree, the introduction foreign plague-like tropical diseases, mainly bubonic plague, cholera, and Yellow fever.”⁴⁰ He announced that the 1903 Paris Conference measures could not be fully implemented in the colonial world, due to the inadequate and basic sanitary services and apparatuses, and the lack of the required prophylaxis services. That is why the December 15, 1909 decree reinstated much of the arrangements of the pre-1903 legislation regarding the standards meant to prevent the introduction of foreign plague-like tropical diseases in all the colonial territories of France in Africa and elsewhere.

However, the August 26, 1907 decree implementing the December 23, 1903 Paris International Health Convention was promulgated in French West Africa on February 26, 1910.⁴¹ The purpose of the 1903 Paris International Sanitary Convention was clearly, to “define specific measures in order to safeguard public health against the invasion and expansion of plague and cholera epidemics.”⁴² Much of the convention not only dealt with maritime navigation in the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf, but also Title III of that convention contained special provisions for all pilgrimages. However, it is clear that Muslim pilgrim boats and the Mecca pilgrimage were the primary targets of that 1903 Convention. From February 26, 1910 on, AOF Muslims became the targets of *Hajj* regulation rules.

⁴⁰“*L’importation de maladies pestilentiennes exotiques.*” JOAOF. G. Trouillot. “Rapport au Président de la République Française.” (Paris, December 15, 1909).

⁴¹JOAOF. N°. 238. W. Ponty. “Arrêté promulguant en Afrique Occidentale Française le décret du 26 Août 1907, portant promulgation de la Convention sanitaire internationale signée à Paris, le 23 Décembre 1903.” (Dakar, February 26, 1910), 133.

⁴²JOAOF. N°. 272. A. Fallières. “Décret.” (Rambouillet, August 26, 1907), 134 -155.

3. *Originaire* Muslim responses to the colonial management of the *Hajj*

The *Hajj* and the Holy Cities of Mecca and Madina are still very dear to all Muslim believers. Since precolonial times, Muslims living within the boundaries of the present-day Senegal have complied with the requirements of Islam. Like North African Muslims, they have followed overland roads to Mecca. Even to this day, African settlers of Senegalese descent still in Chad, Sudan, or elsewhere in the Middle East. Such settlers often relate their personal stories with the *Hajj* when asked about their origins. On the way to Mecca, they established brotherhood ties with other Muslims on the basis of shared knowledge and beliefs. On the way, many taught the ‘Quran to pay for the trip and married local women.’⁴³

Originaire Muslims from Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis⁴⁴ played significant roles in that respect. Most West African Muslims who undertook trip to Mecca ‘on foot’, including *Originaire* Muslims worked as bricklayers, carpenters, or tailors to raise enough money for the *Hajj*. For instance, the Saint-Louis Muslim *El Hadj* Galaye Fall worked for months as a butcher at the Niamey market (Niger). His friend *El Hadj* Badara Seck, who later caught up with him in Niamey, also used his tailor skills in Niamey and in Jeddah to fund his *Hajj* trip.⁴⁵ Abdul Qadir Aïdara drew my attention to a Saint-Louis “*corporation d’ouvriers*” (guild of workers) the members of which undertook the *Hajj* ‘on foot’ by small groups each year.⁴⁶ However, I was unable to document such guild of workers as described by Aïdara.

⁴³ Seydou Ndiath used to live in Sudan. To him, when you ask Sudan-born - or Chad-born - Senegalese people about their origins they often respond “my father married my mother on his way to Mecca. They started a new family. That is how I was conceived.” He also mentioned the area - near Khartoum – known as *Ghayyu Seneghaali* (Senegalese neighborhood) where people tie their personal stories with the *Hajj*. Seydou Ndiath (Rufisque: Keury Kao, May 22, 2002: 3:00 PM – 4:15 PM).

⁴⁴ I did not include Gorée Island, because Islam played little role in Gorée until recently.

⁴⁵ *El Hadj* Galaye Fall (Saint-Louis: Léona-Eaux Claires, June 2, 2002: 3:45 PM – 6:00 PM).

⁴⁶ Abdul Qadir Aïdara (Saint-Louis: CRDS, June 2, 2002: 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM).

Yet, I heard of scores of ‘average’ Saint-Louis, Dakar and Rufisque Muslims who travelled eastward through their own means and with their own agendas. *El Hadj* Dame Sarr, a famous Ndar-Toute ‘*Quran* teacher/*Marabout* took the *voie terrestre* several times, including one time with *El Hadj* Siby who used to work at the Saint-Louis city Hall.⁴⁷ When *El Hadj* Galaye Fall returned to Saint-Louis from Saudi Arabia in October 1958, *El Hadj* Dame Sarr approached him to inquire about the most convenient overland itinerary. He later heard the *marabout* had left Saint-Louis for Mecca ‘on foot’.⁴⁸ Bassirou Sarr, ‘*Quran* teacher and son of *El Hadj* Dame Sarr, maintains that his father went to Mecca seven times through the *voie terrestre*. On separate instances, he took his first wife with him once and his second wife twice. Bassirou Sarr said his father - a fervent Jolof-born Tijan disciple - used to be a tailor in Saint-Louis. He became a ‘*Quran* teacher after he visited Mecca.’⁴⁹

Bassirou Sarr revealed *El Hadj* Dame Sarr’s first visits to Mecca lasted longer, for the simple fact that he was not familiar with the itinerary. However, he progressively made acquaintances, especially in Mali, Nigeria, Sierra-Leone, and Ivory Coast. He raised money for the trip through teaching of the ‘*Quran* to local children. Bassirou Sarr said his father then “suppressed all useless stops on the way to Mecca.” He would go directly to specific places (e.g. Bamako) raise money, and move to the next village, or city. Leaving Saint-Louis, he would only carry the amount of money necessary to survive until the next stop on the road to Mecca, probably for security reasons.⁵⁰ At each station, he would request a visa for the next destination. Bassirou Sarr claims he has lost his father’s pilgrim passport. Yet, Bassirou Sarr remembers seeing visas on the passport for each of the locations his father visited.

⁴⁷ *El Hadj* Khaly Niasse (Saint-Louis: Rue Potin, May 29, 2002: 11:00 AM – 1:00 PM).

⁴⁸ *El Hadj* Galaye Fall (Saint-Louis: Léona – Eaux Claires, June 2, 2002: 3:45 PM – 6:00 PM).

⁴⁹ Bassirou Sarr (Saint-Louis: Goxu Mbathie, June 2, 2002: 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM).

⁵⁰ ‘Overland’ travelers often met outlaws on the “*voie terrestre*” (overland) leading to Mecca.

I also heard about the experience of Guet Ndar Muslim *El Hadj* Soucoundou Niane a blind beggar according to *El Hadj* Galaye Fall,⁵¹ and a shopkeeper in the testimony of his son Insa Niane. Insa Niane said his father became unable to keep his business running when he became blind. Insa Niane himself is now blind. During our conversation, I felt his reluctance to deal with certain issues. He said, his father was “bad-tempered,”⁵² and never told his children about the details of his ordeal. Insa Niane said his only certainty is that his father took the *voie terrestre* to Mecca. Nevertheless, he heard from others in Saint-Louis that *El Hadj* Soucoundou Niane and his travel companions were attacked at some point on the road. All were killed except for *El Hadj* Soucoundou Niane. Relatives later provided money to Saint-Louis Mecca pilgrims to pay for his passage on a French government-chartered boat.⁵³

With the help of Ouakam health district nurse Sokhna Astou Diarra, I met ten Ouakam-Taglou residents, including *El Hadj* Malick Kane at their *gran’ place*.⁵⁴ A place where the group study the ‘*Quran*, and hold neighborhood meetings periodically. Those long-time Ouakam-Taglou residents remember that Ouakam-Rip carpenter Mbaye (or Saliou) Niakh, Ouakam-Taglou ‘*Quran* teacher Momar Ndiaye, farmer Mbaye Seyni Ndiaye, mechanics *El Hadj* Assane Diagne, and Ouakam-Sinthie tailor *El Hadj* Mamadou Seck “walked” to Mecca together through the *voie terrestre* around the 1950s. They also remember *El Hadj* Momar Ndiaye who “walked” to Mecca in 1946. He came back two years later in 1948, thanks to the financial support of late Ouakam-Taglou figure *Diaraf El Hadj* Moussa Guéye.

⁵¹ *El Hadj* Galaye Fall (Saint-Louis: Léona – Eaux Claires. June 2, 2002: 3:45 PM – 6:00 PM). He said that, like all beggars *El Hadj* Soucoundou Niane walked down the streets of Saint-Louis singing “*néew di doole ngi ñaan ndimmal*.” Literally, “the poor [beggar] is seeking assistance [in cash and in kind].”

⁵² “*Naqari deret*.”

⁵³ Insa Niane (Saint-Louis: Guet-Ndar-Tak. May 29, 2002: 1:20 PM – 1:45 PM).

⁵⁴ *Délégué de quartier* (neighborhood representative) *El Hadj* Malick Kane. (Dakar: Ouakam-Taglou). May 15, 2002: 11:00 PM – 12:15 PM).

Interestingly enough, in Rufisque very few witnesses remember cases of *Rufisquois* who “walked” to Mecca. I concluded that, either Rufisque Muslims were had no interests in *Hajj* accounts, or the collective memory has failed to record such accounts. I was told that, in 1963 many Rufisque Muslims travelled to Mecca on the last administration-chartered boats named known as “the *Sidi-Bel-Abbès*.”⁵⁵ Nevertheless, I was referred to Abdou Salam Touré, son of former pilgrim Ibrahima “Haoussa” Touré who – a *Marabout* of Hausa origins, who made *Hajj* on three occasions through the *voie terrestre* - and settled in Rufisque in the early twentieth century. According to the son, his father went to Mecca “on foot” at least twice before he was born. He remembers his father visiting his mother upon return from Mecca in Thiès where he lived as a child. Pointing a finger at the man his mother asked him, “do you know this man?” That event occurred after his father’s third *Hajj* experience ‘on foot’.⁵⁶

The cases I mention in this section are some of the most significant *Originaire* Muslims’ experiences with overland trip I documented during the reconnaissance phase. Before the European management of *Hajj* Affairs, the *voie terrestre* was the only alternative. To no avail, Europeans encouraged West African Muslims to use colonial administration-chartered boats and planes.⁵⁷ In 1957, the international apparatus regulating the *Hajj* was in place. Yet, in the 1970s two French researchers discovered that the *voie terrestre* to Mecca was still very popular among West African Muslims, including in colonial Senegal.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Adjaratou Pine Guéye (Rufisque: Dangou-Nord. June 21, 2002: 12:20 PM – 1:15 PM).

⁵⁶ Abdou Salam Touré (Rufisque: HLM. May 18, 2002: 1:00 PM – 2:30 PM).

⁵⁷ See, C. Bawa Yamba. *Permanent pilgrims: The role of the pilgrimage in the lives of West African Muslims in Sudan*. (London, Edinburgh University Press, 1995). F. E. Peters. *The Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca and the holy places*. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994). J. Works. *Pilgrims in a strange land: Hausa communities in Chad*. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1976).

⁵⁸ C. Pairault and A. Prost. “Actualité du pèlerinage à la Mecque.” *Notes Africaines*, (1978), 46-47.

However, the degree of involvement of West African Muslims in overland journeys to Mecca differed. This became more obvious with the establishment of air transportation for Muslims going to Mecca. Obviously, the “regulated” *Hajj* rapidly gained popularity among colonial West African Muslims for security reasons and convenience (e.g. adequate transportation means, food, and lodging).⁵⁹ Yet, pockets of resistance persisted beyond the colonial era, especially in Northern Nigeria, the Senegal River Valley, French Sudan and French Guinea. Hausa Muslims generally perceived the *voie terrestre* as more meritorious. Indeed, drawing on Umari militants such as Alpha-Hachimi Tall militant *Toucouleur* Muslims maintained the *Fergo Nioro*⁶⁰ movement. While, French Sudan and French Guinean Wahhabiyya affiliates viewed the *Hajj* – among other things - as the exclusive business of Muslims despite several failed attempts to set up all-Muslim run *Hajj* convoys.⁶¹

Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis *Originaire* Muslims travelled through the *voie terrestre*. However, it seems that their reasons for doing so had little to do with militant action toward non-Muslim involvement in Muslim Affairs. Many *Originaire* Muslims tried the *voie terrestre* between 1895 and 1960. Yet, their motivations were very different from that of militant West African Muslims. Assessing the oral data I collected in the course of oral investigation, I have identified some major reasons. First, when I asked them why they chose to “walk” to Mecca the response was that they did not have the means to travel on boat.

⁵⁹ D. E. Long. *The Hajj today: A survey of the contemporary pilgrimage to Makkah*. (New York, SUNY, 1979).

⁶⁰ The *Fergo Nioro* is the movement of relocation of Toucouleur people eastward (see below, J. Hanson).

⁶¹ C. Bawa Yamba. *Permanent pilgrims: The role of the pilgrimage in the lives of West African Muslims in Sudan*. (London, Edinburgh University Press, 1995). J. Hanson. “Islam, migration, and the political economy of meaning: Fergo Nioro from the Senegal River Valley, 1862-1890.” *Journal of African History*, 35, (1994), 37-60. L. Kaba. *The Wahhabiyya: Islamic reform and politics in French West Africa*. (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1974). D. Robinson. *Paths of accommodation: Muslim societies and french colonial authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920*. (Athens, Ohio University Press, 2000).

In 1945, the Department of Political Affairs required 150 *Souverains* as pilgrim *pécule*.⁶² The General Government provided 80 *Souverains*, and pilgrims provided the additional amount of 70 *Souverains*. In 1945, since the exchange rate for a *Souverain* was 950 Francs,⁶³ each AOF pilgrim was expected to provide 66,500 Francs to travel on government-chartered boats. *Originaire* Muslims who worked as carpenter, bricklayer, or else, could not afford that cost of the trip. In 1957, the *pécule* amount was raised to 70.000 Francs and to 90.000 Francs in 1958.⁶⁴ *El Hadj* Abdou Magib Diop - *Imam Ratib* of the Saint-Louis Greater Mosque – said many “*de ñu bëggon dem Makka, waaye de ño amoul woon moyens*”, simply because they were labourers or small-business owners only.⁶⁵

Second, it seems that the non-Muslim management of the *Hajj* did not disturb *Originaire* Muslims. In fact, *Originaire* Muslims generally felt that management of *Hajj* Affairs by French authorities had little or no impact on the validity of the *Hajj*. Yet, some of them contend the *Hajj* management was the business of Muslims only, and deny the involvement of non-Muslims in the *Hajj* business. For instance, 88 years old Ouakam leader *El Hadj* Médoune Guéye claims “there is no such thing as medical surveillance or administrative surveillance of the *Hajj* by French authorities.” To him, “Europeans had nothing to do with the *Hajj*, and were not involved at all in the regulation of *Hajj* affairs.”⁶⁶

⁶²The ‘*pécule*’ is the fixed minimum amount of money required by the State from each prospective pilgrim. That is in fact the pocket money of Muslim pilgrims.

⁶³ANS: 19G2(1). Y. Digo. “Pour Monsieur le Directeur Général des Affaires Politiques: Référence à votre télégramme adressée à tous les gouverneurs au sujet du pèlerinage officiel de la Mecque.” (Dakar, 28 Juillet 1945).

⁶⁴*El Hadj* Galaye Fall (Saint-Louis: Léona–Eaux Claires, June 2, 2002: 3:45 PM – 6:00 PM).

⁶⁵Literally, *Originaire* Muslims “were willing to go to Mecca, but did not have the material means” to pay for the trip expenses. *El Hadj* Abdou Magib Diop (Saint-Louis: Ndar-Toute, May 12, 2003: 9:00 AM – 10:00 AM).

⁶⁶*El Hadj* Médoune Guéye (Dakar: Ouakam-Taglou. May 15, 2002: 10:15 AM – 10:55 AM).

Yet, even learned Senegalese Muslims generally admit that non-Muslim involvement in *Hajj* Affairs has “no impact on the *Hajj*.”⁶⁷ Some justify that involvement on religious ground. Others insist on “the flexibility and the ability to anticipate on events of Islam”. To them, the purpose of non-Muslim involvement in the *Hajj* business was to protect Muslims from various threats. According to Al-Ustaz Bâ, the concept “*Ad-daruratu tubikhu makhzurat*” makes the à priori illicit (*Haram*) non-Muslim involvement in *Hajj* Affairs permissible (*Halal*).⁶⁸ Like Doctor Borel, they call upon the *Hadith* on disease prevention, which advises Muslims “not to enter a place should Plague [or any other epidemic] occur, and to stay within the premises of the plague-infected area if they happen to be there already.”⁶⁹

For *Originaire* Muslims, European control over *Hajj* Affairs was never really an issue. Rather, the lack of financial resources to pay for the trip expenses, the eagerness to visit (*zîkr*) the tomb of Prophet Muhammad and touch the Kaaba, and to complete the *farata* (compliance with the five pillars) appear as the motives of most overland Senegalese Muslims. For many, the means do not matter as long as believers comply with *Hajj* essentials. For instance, for *Cheikh* Ibrahima Sall Muqqadam of *Cheikh* Al-Islam “Baye” Niasse, refusing modern transportation means to make *Hajj* “makes no sense.” “No one would refuse to wear an outfit because the material is made in Europe, or to eat bread because wheat is grown in Europe.”⁷⁰

⁶⁷ *El Hadj* Malick Sow (Dakar: Institut Islamique de Dakar. May 16, 2002: 12:15 PM – 1:15 PM).

⁶⁸ *Al-Ustaz* Cheikh Tidiane Bâ (Dakar: Amitié III, June 25, 2000: 3:15 PM – 4:00 PM), *El Hadj* Idrissa Mbengue (Saint-Louis: Goxu Mbathie, June 25, 2002: 11:00 AM – 12:30 PM), and *Al-Ustaz* Alioune Sall (Dieuppeul: May 15, 2002: 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM) translate “*ad-daruratu tubikhu makhzurat*” as, “*le mal nécessaire*.” Under specific circumstances (e.g. case of severe food shortage) things that are otherwise *Haram* (prohibited) in Islam, such as the consumption of pork or meat from cadavers, are permitted if no other options are available.

⁶⁹ F. Duguet. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Au point de vue religieux, social*. (Paris, Rieder, 1932), 20. See also, K. M. Mukhsin. *Summarized Sahîh Al-Bukhari*. (Riyadh, 1994), 686.

⁷⁰ *El Hadj* Ibrahima Sall (Dakar: Guédiawaye-Corniche. July 18, 2002: 5:30 PM – 6:00 PM).

4. A profitable parallel market: Colonial Senegal middlemen and the *Hajj*

Many may assume AOF Muslims generally, and colonial Senegal Muslims in particular, played no role in the organization and implementation of official *Hajj* programs.⁷¹ However, the management of *Hajj* affairs was not the exclusive business of the colonial government. Colonial authorities relied on their Muslim allies for implementation of the programs for two reasons. First, non-Muslims were not allowed in the Holy Cities, and colonial Muslims - such as Bou-El-Moghdad Seck and his sons Souleymane Seck and Ainina Seck - proved helpful in documenting the *Hajj*.⁷² Second, non-Muslim health professionals were not in a position to enforce the rules of public health and hygiene without the assistance of Muslims.

As a result, especially after World War II, African physicians and nurses were selected to enforce hygiene standards and fight diseases on the ground.⁷³ However, the colonial Senegal Muslims went beyond mere involvement in the management of *Hajj* affairs from a medical standpoint. *Originaire* Muslims particularly benefitted directly from the financial aspects of the *Hajj* business. Many acted as brokers between colonial pilgrims and the maritime companies operating pilgrim ships bound for the Jeddah harbor. Through their interactions with the maritime companies, Muslim middlemen or brokers such as *El Hadj* Tidiane Diéne (a Saint-Louis *Originaire*), or Dakar prominent Muslim contractor Cheikhou Diop ('Sékou' for the administration) acquired prestige and significant financial gains.

⁷¹ANS: 19G15(17). "Revue trimestrielle des questions Musulmanes." (2e trimestre, Haut Commissariat des Affaires Politiques en AOF, Service des Affaires Politiques, 1952), 1. French colonial officials labelled "*pèlerinage officiel*" the regulated *Hajj* organized and supervised by them, as opposed to the unsupervised *Hajj* through the *voie terrestre*.

⁷²D. Robinson. *The Holy War of Umar Tal: The western Sudan in the nineteenth century*. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985), 151.

⁷³Except for the 1952 report, I found the reports of physicians appointed to escort AOF Muslims in Mecca between 1948 (*Médecin Africain* Moustapha Touré) and 1957 (*Médecin-Principal* Babacar Diop) in the file ANS: 1H118(163). Prior to 1948, medical reports deal mainly with North Africa, with references to AOF pilgrims often for the sake of comparison.

I first heard of the parallel activities of *El Hadj* Tidiane Diène through Baye Moussé “Franky” Bâ. Baye Moussé mentioned the existence of Saint-Louis Muslim middlemen in charge of “recruiting” pilgrims for private companies. His “brother” *El Hadj* Tidiane Diène, employee at the Saint-Louis city hall, was of them for the Saint-Louis area. According to “Franky Bâ”, *El Hadj* Tidiane Diène located prospective *Hajj* candidates in Saint-Louis and in other cities throughout the colony of Senegal. He worked closely with maritime companies, which operated pilgrim ships such as the “Général Leclerc”, or the “Foucoul.” On several occasions, “Franky Ba” took the candidates *El Hadj* Tidiane Diène recruited in Saint-Louis to Dakar in order to help them complete the required *Hajj* formalities. According to him, *El Hadj* Tidiane Diène obtained a commission for bringing customers to the companies. In exchange, and for each group of ten pilgrims he “recruited” for maritime companies, *El Hadj* Tidiane Diène received two free tickets for maritime passage to Mecca.⁷⁴

El Hadj Khaly Niasse substantiated the account of Franky Bâ.⁷⁵ According to Doudou Diène - son of the middleman who attended my meeting with *El Hadj* Khaly Niasse - the latter was a close friend of his father in spite of their age difference. *El Hadj* Tidiane Diène was born in 1916. He passed away in 1985 in Saint-Louis. He worked with the companies between 1952 and 1965. In his capacity as representative of the *borom bateau*⁷⁶ he enrolled colonial pilgrims on the maritime companies boarding lists a month prior to each *Hajj* season. *El Hadj* Tidiane Diène collected travel fees from *Hajj* candidates, he helped them open pilgrim accounts and obtain travel tickets. As a correspondent of the Saudi the *Mutawwaf* Burkhan, he arranged pilgrim food and lodging accommodations in Mecca and Madina. He also escorted “his” pilgrims to Mecca from the beginning to the end of their *Hajj* trips.

⁷⁴ Baye Moussé “Franky” Bâ (Saint-Louis: Nord. May 29, 2002: 8:00 PM – 9:00 PM).

⁷⁵ *El Hadj* Khaly Niasse (Saint-Louis: Nord. May 29, 2002: 11:00 – 1:00 PM).

⁷⁶ Literally, the “ship owner.” “*Borom bateau*” refers also to the maritime company.

Colonial authorities viewed quite negatively the rise of African Muslim middlemen who mediated between the maritime companies and pilgrims. For instance, returning pilgrims had allegedly complained about poor travel conditions in the 1939 semi-official Algeria and French West Africa government joint convoy. Thirty-four returning pilgrims, including twenty-four members of the ‘*Association Fraternelle des Pèlerins Sénégalais*’ shared their 1939 *Hajj* experience at a March 3, 1939 reception. According to the *Directeur de la Sûreté*, all denied the rumors of bad treatments they were said to have experienced during the *Hajj*. “*Aucun des pèlerins de Dakar ayant participé au dernier pèlerinage ne [fit] de réserves sur les conditions, vivement appréciées dans lesquelles le voyage s’est effectué tant à Alger qu’au Hedjaz.*”⁷⁷ He accused *El Hadj* Ali Diène⁷⁸ of spreading rumors in order to discourage colonial Senegal pilgrims from making the *Hajj* trip on government-chartered convoys.

El Hadj Ali Diène asked pilgrims to purchase tickets directly from maritime companies. “*Ce désir [n’était] pas étranger à une question d’intérêt, la compagnie des transports maritimes était indiquée comme lui ayant offert une commission pour tout pèlerin amené par lui pour se rendre au pèlerinage sur les navires de cette compagnie.*”⁷⁹ *El Hadj* Moustapha Diop, president of the ‘*Association Fraternelle des Pèlerins Sénégalais*,’ also received such commissions. With three relatives, he enjoyed significant discounts on boat tickets. The *Directeur de la Sûreté* concluded that, both meant to undermine the administration’s efforts in order to increase the profits they made from the parallel trade with maritime companies.

⁷⁷ ANS: 19G2(1). N. 782 D. S. “Le Directeur de la Sûreté Générale de l’AOF à Monsieur le Directeur de Cabinet: A.s. Pèlerinage de 1939.” (Dakar, April 18, 1939).

⁷⁸ *El Hadj* Ibra Guéye Paye (Dakar-Plateau: Mbott. June 25, 2003: 9:30 AM – 10:00 AM). *El Hadj* Ameth Diéne, son of *El Hadj* Ali Diéne, (Dakar – Médina. Rue 17 x 18. June 25, 2003: 11:15 AM – 1:00 PM). The house of Dakar Lébou community leader *El Hadj* Ali Diène (also known as ‘Alia’, or ‘Alieu’ Diéne) at the corner of 17 and 18 streets in the Médina used to be the headquarter of the ‘*Association Fraternelle des Pèlerins Sénégalais*’.

⁷⁹ ANS: 19G2(1). N. 782 D. S., op. cit. “A company promised Ali Diéne retribution for each, pilgrim he would bring to the company.”

5. Case study: The experience of Sékou Diop

Some *Originaire* middlemen looked beyond the simple - yet lucrative - business of pilgrim recruitment for French maritime companies. For instance, in 1956 transit contractor *El Hadj* Sékou Diop took advantage of the lapses in the *Hajj* organization to try to control the *Hajj* ‘business.’ In 1956, a Muslim *Commissaire du Gouvernement* had been appointed as usual to follow and assist about 2000 Mecca pilgrims from French West Africa in and around Mecca. However, colonial authorities had cancelled the Dakar-Jeddah maritime service and maintained the Air France (443 passengers), and UAT (603 passengers) air services only. Until 1954, the “Fabre et Freyssinet” maritime company had enjoyed the monopoly of the pilgrim transportation business in AOF. In 1955, some African businessmen complained to the administration. As Muslims, they felt they were entitled to manage *Hajj* Affairs.⁸⁰

Like Sékou Diop, prominent Dakar *Lébou* figures “Baye Bouya and [Amadou] Assane [N]Doye” founded ‘*L’Islam Africain Transports*’ found interests in the *Hajj* business. The chief purpose of ‘*L’Islam Africain Transports*’ was to make available “adequate transportation means” for the *Hajj*.⁸¹ The *Originaire* challengers of “Fabre et Freyssinet” maritime company claimed the company was “purely Christian owned and operated.” They also felt uneasy with the fact that *Monsieur* Nassar, the immigration agent of Fabre and Freyssinet, was of “Hebrew [origin], on top of [all] that.”⁸² Those *Originaire* Muslim businessmen clearly implied that the *Hajj* should be the exclusive ‘business’ of Muslims only.

⁸⁰ANS: 19G16(17). D. T. Diallo. “Rapport au Commissaire du Gouvernement pour le pèlerinage de la Mecque (1956).” (SECRET). (Dakar, December 15, 1956), 1-68.

⁸¹Idem, 13. “*La mise sur pied de moyens de transports adéquats pour le pèlerinage à la Mecque.*”

⁸²Idem, 8. “*Israélite, de sucroît*” (my emphasis). The relatives of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne said colonial Muslims were very pleased with the way *Monsieur* Nassar catered to their needs. Mbootay women used to invite him to attend their *pèlerins* (pilgrim) banquets.

Originaire Muslims did not seem to oppose the French involvement in *Hajj* affairs, at least openly. I suggest that one should look elsewhere for the real motivations behind the request of *Originaire* businessmen to charter pilgrim boats in lieu of “Fabre and Freyssinet.” The religious obedience of Nassar had never been an issue for complaints before. For over twenty years, the colonial administration had overseen *Hajj* Affairs to the full satisfaction of the Muslim population of colonial Senegal. Cases of *Originaire* Muslims who chose the *voie terrestre* because they rejected the non-Muslim supervised *Hajj* may have existed. However, the ones I met denied any militant opposition from pilgrims making *Hajj* ‘on foot’ to the French interference in the *Hajj*. For instance, Bassirou Sarr - son of Saint-Louis pilgrim Dame Sarr - responded that the lack of financial means was “the [only] motivation” behind the decision of overland pilgrims. According to him, never did overland pilgrims think the non-Muslim interference could tarnish their faith, because “*sen xalaat weesu na foofu*.”⁸³

El Hadj Samba Diakhaté is a fervent Tijan affiliate and now retired rail worker, born in 1914. Like other Muslims from French West Africa, he was denied the passport when he decided to undertake the *Hajj* in 1939. Colonial officers informed him that “many use the *Hajj* as a pretext to connive with enemies of France.” I asked him if the suspicion of colonial authorities was legitimate. He responded, “I do not know. I only know about myself and my own experience. In 1939, my spirit was just the same as it is today. I was only interested in being a good Muslim and completing my [religious] duties as well. I was not interested in militant action whatsoever. I had no choice. Unfortunately, I was unable to go further than Niamey due to [the war] circumstances. I guess many were in my situation.”⁸⁴

⁸³ Literally, “their line of thinking went beyond that” (my emphasis). Bassirou Sarr (Saint-Louis: Goxu Mbathie. June 2, 2002, 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM).

⁸⁴ *El Hadj* Samba Diakhaté kept saying “*sama bopp daal la xam*” (my emphasis). *El Hadj* Samba Diakhaté (Rufisque: Dangou Nord. May 18, 2002: 11:20 AM – 12:30 PM).

The account of *Commissaire du Gouvernement* Diallo Telli Boubacar about the failed attempts of *Originaire* Muslims to charter pilgrim boats to Jeddah in 1956 suggests that the search for financial profit also was significant in shaping Senegalese attitudes. The owners of ‘*L’Islam Africain Transports*’ first negotiated with an Italian ship operator through Tunisian notables, and cut a deal with that Italian ship operator to rent the ‘Valfiorita’ boat. Unfortunately, the *Marine Marchande* department denied the ‘Valfiorita’ the authorization to transport pilgrims, because “the boat did not meet the required minimal security standards to carry out such activities.” Then, ‘*L’Islam Africain*’ businessmen rented the Liberian-flagged ‘Atlantic’ boat. The “boat was not available.”⁸⁵ Finally, the African businessman received the 12.000.000 francs deposit from the Tunisian middlemen, and reimbursed angered prospect pilgrims who had besieged the *Délégation* offices in Dakar in order to break even.

Lébou businessman Sékou Diop was responsible for a memorable mishap during the 1956 *Hajj* season. With his sons, Sékou Diop had taken the initiative to transport colonial Senegal Muslim pilgrims to Mecca. In spite of “a shared animosity”, Sékou Diop and ‘*L’Islam Africain*’ businessmen shared a unique goal, which was to end the ‘Fabre and Freyssinet’ monopoly. Sékou Diop reached out to the “Messina and Cie” Italian boat operator to rent the “Pace.” However, the cost was too expensive at 40.000 Francs. Sékou Diop also feared Egyptian authorities would deny the “Pace” the authorization to enter the Suez Canal on the grounds it transported Israeli immigrants in 1948. Sékou Diop sent his emissary Ousmane Ndiaye on a mission to Marseille. The latter succeeded in boarding 163 colonial pilgrims on the “Bretagne” back to Dakar. Ousmane Ndiaye cut the deal “*presque à la sauvette et dans des conditions d’irrégularités et de précipitations extraordinaires.*”⁸⁶

⁸⁵ ANS: 19G16(17). “Rapport au Commissaire du Gouvernement pour le pèlerinage de la Mecque (1956).” (SECRET), (Dakar, December 15, 1956), 13 -14.

⁸⁶ My emphasis. Idem, 11.

The “Bretagne” left Dakar on June 26, 1956. In Marseille, Sékou Diop claimed the ship operator had raised the price. He charged pilgrims additional fees of 9.100 FCFA and 4.100 FCFA, and transferred them on the “Iskanderun” Beyrouth-bound Turkish boat. In Beyrouth, Sékou Diop announced his money was frozen at the Indochina Bank in Jeddah, and the money in his possession only enabled him to fly to Jeddah 120 pilgrims out of the 163 pilgrims under his responsibility. To pay for passages with “Saudi Air” company, he borrowed the *pécules* of 43 more stranded pilgrims. In the presence of the French consul, he signed an affidavit in which he agreed to reimburse the money once in Jeddah. He had promised to cover all the expenses for Beyrouth – Jeddah roundtrips, to reimburse each pilgrim the amount of 234 Saudi Rials, and to cover all the food and transportation expenses in Saudi Arabia. Yet, in Jeddah, he claimed again he was expecting a money transfer from Dakar. French consular authorities intervened to end the sufferings of stranded pilgrims.

At the end, the *Mutawaff* Burkhan agreed to assist stranded pilgrims. In a second affidavit, Sékou Diop pledged to reimburse Burkhan the amount of 10.920 Rials. The *Commissaire du Gouvernement* requested 9.600 Rials from the General Government to pay back the *pécules*. Each pilgrim received an amount of 300 Rials. Sékou Diop signed a third affidavit in which, he took full responsibility for the mishaps. He promised to reimburse creditors with money from the sale of a building he owned in Dakar. On the way back, pilgrims were stranded again in Marseille. The General Government paid for the ticket of Ousmane Ndiaye, the assistant of Sékou Diop, who dispatched 172 pilgrims on the “Général Mangin” on September 1, 1956. The case of Sékou Diop was not unique, especially once private contractors came to be responsible for the management of the *Hajj* ‘business.’⁸⁷

⁸⁷ANS: 19G16(17). “Rapport au Commissaire du Gouvernement pour le pèlerinage de la Mecque (1956).” (SECRET), (Dakar, December 15, 1956), 18 – 20.

B. Case studies: Selected *Hajj* experiences of colonial Senegal Muslim pilgrims

The Muslims of French West Africa generally, and colonial Senegal in particular, did not discover the *Hajj* in 1895. However, *Hajj* candidates were asked to meet medical and administrative requirements prior to departure for Mecca. Beginning in 1895, prospective pilgrims also faced the establishment of borders and the imposition of pilgrim passports that restrained their movements. In the past, sub-Saharan Africa Muslims undertaking *Hajj* had their own agendas, and progressed at their own pace. They used to devise their itineraries, on the basis of their knowledge of the places they visited, and the people they encountered. *Turuq* affiliation of Muslim pilgrims and local social and political contexts (e.g. conflicts, religious interests) played major roles in the choice of pilgrimage itineraries as well.⁸⁸

For a while, the overland *Hajj* was seen mainly as the business of the devout and the nobility.⁸⁹ Yet, even though pilgrims needed quite substantial means to cover *Hajj* expenses, money was not the issue. Accounts of the pilgrimages of wealthy Malian kings, or of revered Muslim figures dominated the literature the *Hajj* in West Africa.⁹⁰ Yet, recent research on the *Hajj* suggests that poor and devout anonymous West African Muslims including colonial formed a significant percentage of the West African Muslim pilgrim population undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca each year through the overland desert roads to Mecca.⁹¹

⁸⁸F. Harrak. *West African Muslims in nineteenth century Morocco: Representations of Moroccan religious institutions*. (Rabat, the Institute of African Studies, 1994). Kane O. "Les relations entre la communauté Tijane du Sénégal et la Zawiya de Fès." *Fès et l'Afrique: Relations économiques, culturelles et spirituelles* (Rabat, the Institute of African Studies, (1993), 13-24.

⁸⁹J. S. Birks. *Across the savannas to Mecca: The overland pilgrimage routes from West Africa*. (London, Hurst, 1978).

⁹⁰A. Gouilly. *L'Islam dans l'Afrique Occidentale Française*. (Paris, Larose, 1952).

⁹¹C. Bawa Yamba. *Permanent pilgrims: The role of the pilgrimage in the lives of West African Muslims in Sudan*. (London, Edinburgh University Press, 1995). J. Works. *Pilgrims in a strange land: Hausa communities in Chad*. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1976).

1. Overview: *Originnaire* Muslims and the *Hajj*

It is not wrong to say that the post-1895 international and local regulations of the *Hajj* business enhanced the visibility of overland pilgrims. Since that time, Europeans were helpless in the face of a phenomenon they could only observe from a distance. In addition, the post-1895 regulation standards increased drastically number of pilgrims undertaking *Hajj* each year. In the past, pilgrims from West Africa used to spend months, if not years, on the roads and endure all kinds of hardships to complete *Hajj* rituals and return home. Also, the *Hajj* was such a harsh ordeal that prospective pilgrims often made their wills in case something happens to them. Some male pilgrims would often solemnly give their wives the choice to get out of wedlock since they were uncertain about the outcome of the trip.⁹²

Colonial pilgrims used all means within their disposal to go to Mecca for *Hajj* purposes. They generally travelled in groups to increase their chances to make it safe.⁹³ Yet, using the *voie terrestre* did not mean going all the way to Mecca ‘on foot’. ‘Overland’ pilgrims rode horses, donkeys or camels whenever possible; hence, the long stays in various places along the way to Mecca. Transportation means shortened the length of the trip. The new travel conditions made the *Hajj* even more appealing, especially to women. Women once felt reluctant to partake in travel for religious purpose such as *Hijra* (emigration), and eventually *Hajj*. In the past, such travels for religious purposes often meant going away from home for very long periods of time, and sometimes such travels led to permanent relocation.⁹⁴

⁹²“*Bala ma dem Makka, defar na sama gannaaw*” (I took care of my private businesses). “The day before departure, I called my pregnant wife and I offered her divorce. She chose to wait for me.” *El Hadj* Galaye Fall (Léona – Eaux Claires, June 2, 2002: 3:45 PM – 6:00 PM).

⁹³ Abdou Salam Touré (Rufisque: HLM, May 18, 2002: 09:30 AM – 12:15 PM).

⁹⁴ C. Bawa Yamba. *Permanent pilgrims: The role of the pilgrimage in the lives of West African Muslims in Sudan*. (London, Edinburgh University Press, 1995). J. Hanson. “Islam, migration, and the political economy of meaning: Fergo Nioro from the Senegal River Valley, 1862-1890.” *Journal of African History*, 35, (1994), 37-60.

Between 1895 and 1957, many Saint-Louis Muslims made *Hajj*. For example, *traitant* Hamet Gora Diop (1846 – 1910) made *Hajj* four times, and *interprète* Bou El Moghdad Seck (1867 - 1943) at least on two occasions. Also, butcher-contractors *El Hadj* Masseck Seck and *El Hadj* Doudou Thioune, and fisherman-contractor *El Hadj* Mawo Sène (1875 – 1965) sailed to Mecca on a sailboat around 1921.⁹⁵ As for the *Originaire* Muslims from Rufisque and Dakar, especially the *Originaire* Muslims of Lébou origins, they were also familiar with the *Hajj*. Yet, it seems that the improvements in transportation means and the regulation of the *Hajj* spurred the interests of *Originaires* in the *Hajj*. In any case, after 1895, *Originaire* Muslims overwhelmingly chose to perform the *Hajj* rituals at least once in their lifetime.

This was even truer after World War II, once international decision-makers reached the agreement that, “all previous regulations should be brought under the newly organized World Health Organization.”⁹⁶ After the war, the numbers of pilgrims grew drastically in colonial Senegal, especially among the *Originaire* Muslims. Like Saint-Louis ‘*Quran* teacher and Muslim leader Serigne Mouhsine Diop (1894 – 1952), many *Originaire* Muslims probably knew each Muslim is required to perform *Hajj* only once in a lifetime.⁹⁷ Serigne Mouhsine was very close to prominent politician Lamine Guéye who offered him the opportunity to make the *Hajj* in 1945. Afterwards, he received several *Hajj* tickets from his followers, friends, and *taalibe* (students). In each such instance, he gave away the tickets because; he sincerely felt that “making the *Hajj* one time is enough” for each believer. In fact, Serigne Mouhsine Diop believed that “going to Mecca several times is a waste of time and money.”⁹⁸

⁹⁵ *El Hadj* Mafall Seck (Saint-Louis: Léona-Eaux-Clares. June 2, 2002: 2:00 PM – 3:00 PM).

⁹⁶ D. D. Long. *The Hajj today: A survey of the contemporary pilgrimage to Mecca*. (New York, SUNY, 1979), 76.

⁹⁷ Even today, many Senegalese Muslims chose to disregard that recommendation.

⁹⁸ Zeine Abidine Diop (Saint-Louis: Nord. May 28, 2002: 3:30 PM – 5:00PM).

In Dakar and Saint-Louis particularly, I recorded several cases of Muslims who made *Hajj* several times. “Franky” Bâ provided me a list of such ‘regular’ *Hajjis*. For instance, *Greffier-en-chef* at the Saint-Louis Hall of Justice *El Hadj* Papa Guéye Issakha performed *Hajj* between seventeen to twenty times. On twelve different occasions, he travelled with his sisters *Adja* Lalla Guéye, *Adja* Khoudia Lô Guéye, and *Adja* Fama Cissé Guéye. Customs officer *El Hadj* Madiagne Diagne also went to Mecca twelve times. On several occasions, *El Hadj* Madiagne Diagne took his mother *Adja* Gnagna Fall with him. *El Hadj* Badara Ngoné Ndiaye, a wealthy merchant, also accomplished the fifth obligation of the Muslim faith at least eighteen times. As for Saint-Louis Muslim women *Adja* Charlotte Dieng and her daughter *Adja* Tabara Dieng both went to Mecca for *Hajj* purposes at least eighteen times.⁹⁹

After 1945, making *Hajj* was also *à la mode* especially among the Dakar Lébou community. Dakar was a small city until 1960 stretching “eastward between the Cap Manuel and the Repos Mandel, and westward between the Cap Manuel and the Bel-Air Christian cemetery.” Therefore, inhabitants all knew each other and shared the same views and ways of life within city limits.¹⁰⁰ A new way of life emerged from the *Hajj* experiences of the members of the Lébou community. Lébou male and female pilgrim held annual banquets and “*concours de sape*” (fashion shows). They all belonged to the “*Association des Pèlerins Lébous*.” Such associations existed in other cities, including in Rufisque. *El Hadj* Samba Diakhaté led the Rufisque section of the “*Association des Pèlerins Sénégalais*.” Each year, members of the Rufisque section would join in Dakar to welcome Mecca returnees.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ *El Hadj* Ibra Guéye Paye (Dakar: Mbott. June 25, 2003: 9:30 AM – 10:00 AM). *El Hadj* Ameth Diéne (Dakar: Médina. Rue 17 x 18, June 25, 2003: 11:15 AM – 1:00 PM).

¹⁰⁰ *El Hadj* Ibra Guéye Paye (Dakar: Mbott. June 25, 2003: 9:30 AM – 10:00 AM). .

¹⁰¹ *El Hadj* Samba Diakhaté (Rufisque: Dangou Nord. May 18, 2002: 11:20 AM – 12:30 PM). Pilgrims from other cities also appear on the pictures I obtained from the relatives of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne.

Between 1945 and 1960, many wealthy colonial Senegalese Muslims helped less wealthy Muslims make the *Hajj*. To this day, *traitant El Hadj* Ameth Gora Diop is still remembered as a philanthropist, because he made the *Hajj* dreams of many come true. In addition to providing discrete financial assistance for food and lodging to the needy, *El Hadj* Ameth Gora paid *Hajj* tickets and provided *pécule* for *El Hadj* Soulye Ndiaye Thiam and *El Hadj* Birahim Balla Diop. Former *Greffier-en-Chef* (Clerk) at the Saint-Louis hall of justice *El Hadj* Amadou Moctar Bâ used to distribute money in the form of alms to the needy after tax season. ‘Franky’ Bâ thinks he may also have provided financial assistance to Muslim pilgrims. However, ‘Franky’ Bâ is not positive about that, because *El Hadj* Amadou Moctar Bâ did not like his identity as a benefactor disclosed. *Notaire* (Legal Adviser) *El Hadj* Cissé Soubaila also helped many Saint-Louis Muslims achieve their dreams to make the coveted journey to Mecca, and thus enjoy the benefits attached to *Hajj* performance.¹⁰²

The *Hajj* also provided pilgrims the opportunity to make a name for themselves in Mecca. According to *El Hadj* Idrissa Mbengue, colonial Senegal pilgrims did not content themselves with making *Hajj* and returning home. They were “very respectful of the recommendations of the Prophet of Islam.” Yet they spent money in charitable actions. For example, “*El Hadj* Ameth Gora Diop dug wells in Mecca and Madina” to facilitate access to drinking water, and established long-term relationships with local Saudi families.¹⁰³ For example, the *Mutawwaf* Burkhan visited *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne and friends in Senegal with his mother and sisters (see below). Many colonial Senegal Muslims even “met him when, as a young child, he performed *Tawaff* on the shoulders of his father.”¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Baye Moussé “Franky” Bâ (Saint-Louis: Nord, May 29, 2002: 8:00 PM – 9:00 PM).

¹⁰³ Idrissa Mbengue (Saint-Louis: Goxu Mbathie. June 25, 2002 : 6:00 PM – 7:30 PM).

¹⁰⁴ ANS: 19G16(17). Chef de Bataillon A. Fall. Commissaire du pèlerinage de 1954. (SECRET), not dated, 12.



Figure 7. Front, right to left: *Adja* Fakha Thiam, Burkhan's mother, *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne. Back, right to left: Burkhan's sister and *Adja* Gogo Keita.



Figure 8. Front, right to left: Burkhan's mother, *Adja* Gogo Keita, Burkan's sister. Back, right to left: *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne, *Adja* Fakha Thiam.

2. *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune (Nord, Saint-Louis)

When I explained to ‘Franky’ Bâ the purpose of my oral research, which was mainly to document the *Hajj* experiences of prominent and anonymous colonial Muslims, the first names that came to his mind was *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune who made *Hajj* on eleven occasions. He referred me to *El Hadj* Abdourahmane Thioune the son of *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune and Muezzin of the Saint-Louis Greater Mosque. He had made the *Hajj* with his father in 1962. *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune (1895 – 1979) was a contractor and *surveillant des travaux publics* (Site Supervisor). He “made the nickname ‘Cor’, because of his relationship with Henri Cor, *Lieutenant-Gouverneur* of Senegal” (1911-1914), who gratified *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune with various rewards. “He was so pleased with the work of *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune; he offered him two houses in *Tendjiguène*.”¹⁰⁵

El Hadj Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune was an extremely devout Muslim very close to the Tivavouane Sy family. *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune was also dedicated to his work. Among other things, Governor Henri Cor liked his honesty. He would take back a single nail if he happened to forget one in his pocket. He enjoyed several honorific awards and salary increases, made a living for himself, and gained the respect of all in Saint-Louis. Yet, he would tell everyone “*li ma liggéey yéep doye u ma ko dara lu dul tagge yonent bi*.”¹⁰⁶ *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune was actually of *griot* origin. As such, he was expected to chant the praises of the members of the nobility. Yet, he focused on securing a decent life. Indeed, rather than chanting the praises of the nobility he chose to chant the praises of the Prophet, exclusively. In so doing, he set himself apart from his other *griot* counterparts.

¹⁰⁵ Henri Cor is the Governor of Senegal Jean d’Aramy d’Oxoby - founder of “*La démocratie du Sénégal*” (1913) - ridiculed in his columns. See, G. Wesley Johnson. *Naissance du Sénégal Contemporain: Aux origines de la vie politique moderne*. (Paris, Karthala, 1991), 189.

¹⁰⁶ Idem. “The money I make serves only one purpose: to sing the praises of Prophet [Muhammad] only.”

The story of Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune is interesting for at least two reasons. First, the accounts of the *Hajj* experience of *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune I collected in Saint-Louis described him as “an exceptional *griot*.” For instance, *El Hadj* Chérif Diop who organized the meeting with *El Hadj* Abdourahmane Thioune in his own compound provided one such account. He gave the following testimony about *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune and his progeny, “*ñii ay géwél la ñu waaye ñépp a len naw ndax sen diine.*”¹⁰⁷ *El Hadj* Abdourahmane Thioune himself said someone told his father, “*xamna ci dara dé, géwél nga waaye su ma amon doom ju jigéen ju séyul ma may la ko.*”¹⁰⁸ For who is familiar with the ways in which the caste system operates in Senegal, such words speak for themselves. I wonder if the pilgrim status of *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune can explain such progressive views for that time, because such views are groundbreaking even among Saint-Louis *Originaire* Muslims long exposed to the French ideals of “*Liberté, Egalité, [and] Fraternité.*”

Second, the *Hajj* experiences of *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune provide an excellent picture of the tendency of Senegalese Muslims to romanticize the *Hajj* and everything that relates to it. In the course of oral inquiries, I found that the content of the *Hajj* experiences of the colonial Senegal Muslims varied greatly. However, there is a common ground to all *Hajj* experiences as far as its meaning is concerned. It seems that the feelings of affection for *Hajj* and the *Hajjis*, and the respect for the personal achievements of pilgrims often tarnished *Hajj* accounts. I first felt that way listening to the story of the *Hajj* experiences of *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune. He is still remembered as an extremely devout Muslim who worshipped exclusively *Allah*, and lived exclusively by the rules of Islam and the Prophet.

¹⁰⁷ Literally, “these people are of griot descent, but they have gained the respect of all due to their faith.” *El Hadj* Chérif Diop (Saint-Louis: Nord. June 24, 2002: 12:15 PM – 1:30 PM).

¹⁰⁸ “You are a *griot*, but if I still had a daughter to marry, I would have let you marry her.” *El Hadj* Abdourahmane Thioune (Saint-Louis: Nord. June 24, 2002: 12:15 PM – 1:30 PM).

El Hadj Abdourahmane Thioune does not know when his father went to Mecca for the first time, because he was too young at that time. However, one day in the year 1962 *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune submitted to his son a riddle-like inquiry. He started, “I know of an old man who is planning to go far away. He is looking for a strong and young man to assist him in that endeavor.” Abdourahmane Thioune responded straightforwardly, “I want to go to Mecca,” because he knew the purpose of that journey. The father promised he would take him if he kept their trip a secret to prevent bad luck. Then, he sent *El Hadj* Abdourahmane Thioune to nurse Baye Fara Camara in Sindone (Sud) for the required immunizations. *El Hadj* Abdourahmane Thioune was the youngest son. At first, his brother Pape Touty Thioune did not understand why their father had chosen to take his young brother to Mecca. Pape Touty Thioune finally came to the conclusion that the latter was “God-chosen.”

Abdourahmane Thioune remembers he went to Mecca with his father in 1962. Yet, he does not have a recollection of the details of the itinerary. He only remembers they reached Casablanca fourteen days after departure from Dakar, and days later they were in Jeddah. They travelled along with *Cheikh* Ibrahima “Baye” Niasse. The cleric said “you are so young. Did you pay for the *Hajj* ticket of that old man?” *El Hadj* Abdourahmane Thioune responded “on the contrary, he is the one taking me with him to Mecca.” Later on in Mecca, father and son performed the *Tawaff* around the Kaaba and visited the tombs of the Prophet and his companions in Madina. On the “Day of Standing” in Arafat, *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune disappeared, which caused distress to his son and fellow pilgrims. In Saint-Louis, Pape Touty Thioune had warned *El Hadj* Abdourahmane Thioune. He asked him to keep an eye on their father, because “*da fay dem*.”¹⁰⁹ That had happened for three days on a previous *Hajj* trip.

¹⁰⁹ Literally, “he will go.” Pape Touty Thioune meant that their father would disappear. He told his brother such an incident had already happened during the *Hajj* in the past, because *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune would often go out alone to pray and meditate.

The first time, the *Mutawaff* Burkhan, a very good friend of *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune, located him on the third day after his disappearance. On Arafat Day of *Hajj* season 1962, *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune was also nowhere to be found. Crying out “I cannot find my father,” Abdourahmane Thioune went out to look for him along with Saint-Louis Muslims *Adja* Nalla Mbaye, *Adja* Aïda Thioune, and Pèdre Alassane. He snubbed them when they found him hours later. “What is wrong with you? Why are you crying like *góorjigéen*? Nobody should cry in such a Holy place.”¹¹⁰ He said he had climbed on top of the Arafat Hill to pray and meditate away from the crowd. *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune is also remembered as a man who always looked for perfection in the practice of Islam. Every day, before *Timis* (sunset) people would “barely catch sight of his shadow as he ran to the mosque.” At that point of the story, Abdourahmane Thioune burst into tears. “I am crying for myself. I know my father and his peers are saved, but I have doubts about my own fate.”

El Hadj Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune travelled to Mecca ten times on boat. In 1979, he took the plane to Mecca with his friend Bathie Mbaye. He was never to return to Mecca. He died a week later. The story of the death of *El Hadj* Abdourahmane Thioune encapsulates the way he lived his whole life. According to his son, *El Hadj* Samba ‘Cor’ Thioune came home from the airport, and fell asleep for eight straight days. Doctor Masse Ndiaye was called in to try to wake him up, to no avail. He woke up on a Thursday night leading to Friday. “*Da fa nekkat nit rek daadi naax.*”¹¹¹ One of his grandsons saw many *Naar* (Arabs) dressed in white in the the pilgrim’s bedroom that night. They had come to take him away. He passed away around 10:00 AM on Friday. His death is the dream of many Tijan *taalibe* (disciples) who generally view death on Friday is not only a good sign, but also the promise of access to heaven.

¹¹⁰ Literally: “why are you crying like gay people.” Senegalese people will understand that was a way for him to say that “men should not cry.”

¹¹¹ Literally: “he woke up. He regained consciousness, and lost his memory right away.”

3. *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne (Plateau, Dakar)

The *Hajj* experience of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne is interesting in many respects.¹¹² *Adja* Mame Yacine was not the first woman from colonial Senegal who made the *Hajj*.¹¹³ Yet, she can be considered as one of the women who played a role in the establishment of a long-standing *Hajj* culture in Senegal generally, and in Dakar particularly. The *Hajj* experiences of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne provides a revealing picture of the colonial/urban/African/Islamic cultures of representative of the Four Communes generally, and especially of the Lébou community. Her experience is not unique, because several *Originaire* women went to Mecca over twenty times.¹¹⁴ However, *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne helped less wealthy women accomplish the *Hajj* through direct sponsorship and the creation of *Hajj* money saving systems (*tontines*) and *Hajj* sweepstakes (*loteries*).¹¹⁵

Adja Mame Yacine Diagne spurred emulation among her *Originaire* Muslim friends and acquaintances through the organization of banquets, and medal award ceremonies for “successful” returnees. I first heard of her *Hajj* experiences through Mbaye Mbengue, who used to be the friend of Moustapha Sène ‘Mbeuss’, the late son of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne.¹¹⁶ Mbaye Mbengue introduced me to her relatives. They made available to me over a hundred pictures of the *Adja* and her friends. *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne was born to prominent Saint-Louis *traitant* Mathurin Diagne and a Dakar Lébou woman.

¹¹² *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne made the *Hajj* on eleven instances from 1946 onward.

¹¹³ Khadim Mbacké considers *Adja* Rokhaya Guéye from Pire (Thiès region) as the first Senegalese female pilgrim. She made *Hajj* through the *voie terrestre* in 1939.

¹¹⁴ For instance, *Adja* Marème Diop Mactar made *Hajj* twenty-eight times. The first time, she was about fifty years (1947). She was about ninety-one years old when she passed in the 1990s. Mbaye Mbengue (Dakar: Champ de Courses. May 11, 2002: 9:30 AM – 10:15 AM).

¹¹⁵ She helped several women of her entourage to make *Hajj* through direct sponsorship.

¹¹⁶ *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne and her husband Momar Sène “Mbass” had eleven children together. However, only Moustapha Sène “Mbeuss” survived out of the eleven children.



Figure 9: *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne awarding a medal to one deserving female pilgrim. *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye has no recollection of the name of the recipient and the year this medal award ceremony took place.




Figure 10. *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne awarding a medal to one deserving female pilgrim (according to the standards of the Plateau Mbootay). Her relatives proved unable to provide much information on the context of this picture.

I first met the relatives of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne in the Plateau family compound located 113, Avenue Lamine Guèye (formerly 15, Boulevard Maginot). It is now an established tradition for the family, the friends and acquaintances of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne to meet for lunch at the compound on twice a week. At first, I intended to speak individually to people who knew *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne, and were willing to talk about her experience.¹¹⁷ However, we ended up having a casual conversation in which men and women walking in and out of the house would parise the *Adja*. However, noticed consistency in each individual input, because all insisted on the generosity of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne.

Adja Mame Yacine Diagne is remembered as a strong woman who could withstand comparison with men.¹¹⁸ She was born in Dakar in 1896, and passed away in 1981.¹¹⁹ She was married to Momar Sène “Mbass,” a man from a wealthy Dakar Lébou family. *Adja* Mame Yacine was - as for her - born to Mathurin Diagne, a rich Saint-Louis merchant. As for him, Momar Sène “Mbass” was the son of Alassane Sène, the prominent Lébou landowner who granted *El Hadj* Malick Sy the piece of land on which the Tijan *Zawiya* (Mosque) is built. Tijan followers still gather at the *Zawiya* to perform the Friday weekly prayers.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ I realized early on that many were reluctant to talk about the *Hajj* experiences of colonial men and women at first. Everywhere, I was inevitably referred to “*voix autorisées*” that is, broadly speaking to Muslim clerics, imams, or elders knowledgeable the events I was investigating. In best case scenario, I was referred to witnesses of the events I was surveying.

¹¹⁸ All claimed that, “*góor yabu ko won te jigéen yabu ko won.*” (She enjoyed the respect of men and women alike.) *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye said “*su daan ne noppil, ñépp noppi.*” (Everyone would comply when she urged for silence). “*Jigéen ju mën góor la won.*” (She was stronger and more capable than men). As proof, her posture in most pictures seems to indicate she played a central role in the social and political activities of the African community in Dakar. (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).

¹¹⁹ Oumy Diagne is the granddaughter of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne on her mother’s side, and her “daughter” on her father’s side (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 – 11:00 PM). She was raised by *Adja* Mame Yacine, as such she proved helpful in providing details on the *Hajj*-related activities the *Adja*, and other *Originaire* women in Dakar-Plateau.

¹²⁰ To this day, the *Zawiya* is situated right next door to the Sène family compound in Dakar-Plateau. (113, Avenue Lamine Guèye, formerly 15, Avenue Maginot).

French colonial authorities chose to discourage colonial pilgrims from making the *Hajj* during World War II (1939-1945). That is probably why *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne did not make the *Hajj* until she turned 50, in 1946. According to relatives, she was the only woman from colonial Senegal on the 1946 maritime convoy chartered by the AOF *Gouvernement Général*. For security reasons, *Commissaire au Pèlerinage* Abdou Salam Kane came over to the house of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne to collect her *pécule*.¹²¹ In 1946, she made the wish to perform *Hajj* at least ten times in front of the *Kaaba* in Mecca and on the tomb of the Prophet in Madina. Her family and her friends all prayed for her dream to come true. That is why they all celebrated when she returned in Dakar after her tenth trip to Mecca.¹²²

Before I met her relatives, I heard she used to sell Orient products (e.g. incense, jewels).¹²³ Her relatives claimed she “never sold a single handkerchief.” Rather, she took presents for the Burkhans and Saudi friends who showered her with gifts she gave away back in Dakar.¹²⁴ Indeed, “she did not need to do business since she was rich and generous.” For example, she made her nephew “Jules” distribute *Fistines* (Franc coins) and *Libidors* (Louis d’Or) to *Miskines* (indigents) on her behalf every day on her 1961 *Hajj* trip.”¹²⁵

¹²¹ ANS: 19G9. In 1916, Muslim subject *El Hadj* Abdou Kane was selected to be the “special” envoy of the colonial government in Mecca. He was the only pilgrim from French West Africa in the pilgrimage convoy that year. However, I doubt the ‘Abdou Kane’ from 1916, and the Abdou Salam Kane who collected *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne’s *pécule* in 1946 is the same person. Abdou Kane was reportedly so old in 1916 that French authorities proposed to send a substitute for him at a meeting in Mecca where French authorities meant to address *Hajj* issues. The Abdou Salam Kane from 1946 is Oumy Diagne’s father-in-law.

¹²² Oumy Diagne (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guéye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 – 1:00 PM).

¹²³ ANS: 1H118(163). GGAOF. Nouradian. “Commissariat du Gouvernement pour l’AOF. Rapport sur le Pèlerinage aux Lieux Saints de l’Islam en 1947.” (Dakar, 15 Mars 1948).

¹²⁴ *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guéye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).

¹²⁵ *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye, Oumy Diagne, and Souleymane “Jules” Guéye nephew (son of her late brother) (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guéye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).



Figure 11: *Adja* Mame Yacine standing in front of the Kaaba during the 1946 *Hajj* season.

I also heard from Adja Mame Jacques Mbaye and Oumy Diagne that *Adja Mame Yacine Diagne* founded the Plateau women *Mbootaay*,¹²⁶ which later merged with the “*Association des Pèlerins de Dakar*”, or the “*Association des Pèlerins de l’AOF*.”¹²⁷ At the beginning, the Plateau women *Mbootaay* ran a *tontine* in which each member contributed 500 francs once a year.¹²⁸ The money was initially used to organize parties in which women indulged on food, danced, and displayed their latest *sañse* (toilette), and new acquisitions in terms of jewellery and garments. After she returned from her 1946 *Hajj* trip, she suggested that “the money be used to *siyaare* prophet Muhammad rather than on useless parties.”¹²⁹

Thus, she started along with the women of the Plateau *Mbootaay* a process which has endured, and allowed scores of *Originaire* and non-*Originaire* women, who would otherwise have been unable to do so, to make the *Hajj*. Around *Hajj* season, the total contribution was divided in shares corresponding each with the amount of the total *Hajj*-related expenses for one pilgrim. Prior to *Hajj* season, *tontine* participants gathered in the city hall main lounge for the official ball-drawing ceremony. That ceremony was held in the presence of Muslims and government officials. Members were assigned numbers written on small plastic balls placed in a box. *Mbootay* women with the winning numbers received tickets for the *Hajj* trip.

¹²⁶ *Mbootaay*: n. association, society, club, circle.

¹²⁷ I am sure neither of the real name of the association, nor of the date of its establishment. I heard different names for that predominantly *Lébou* pilgrim association witnesses.

¹²⁸ *Tontines* are still very representative female socializing. *Tontines* have various purposes. Members usually spend the money on useful items (e.g. kitchenware, food supplies). All *tontines* follow the same rules. Generally, *Mbootaay* members contribute for specific amounts of money on a monthly basis. Contributions are generally collected at the beginning of the month. The members’ names are written on small pieces of paper and placed in a box. Winners are generally selected by people who are foreign to the *tontine*. Winners receive the total amount of monthly contributions. Nowadays, the major purpose of *tontines* is to help women acquire financial autonomy through the establishment of small businesses.

¹²⁹ In this context, *siyaare* (*Ziyara*) means, to pay tribute to and visit the tomb of the Prophet Muhammad. See also, D. Eickelman and J. Piscatori (Eds). *Muslim travelers: Pilgrimage, migration and the religious imagination*. (London, Routledge, 1990).



Figure 12: Mbootay women standing outside the City Hall prior to the ball-drawing ceremony.



Figure 13: Children drawing winning numbers from a hat inside the City Hall conference room.




Figure 14: Children drawing the winning numbers from a hat inside the City Hall conference room.




Figure 15: *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne, notables, and Baillif Me Alssim Fall (looking at the camera) announcing the names of the winners of *Hajj* tickets.



Figure 16: Mbootay women waiting for the publication of the names of *Hajj* sweepstake winners inside the City Hall conference room.



Figure 17. Children giving the winning tickets to the men in charge.



Figure 18. Children giving the winning tickets to the men in charge.



Figure 19. Mbootay women attending *Hajj* tickets ball-drawing ceremony inside the City Hall conference room.

The Plateau *Mbootaay* was an all-female organization, except for the “*góoru Mbootaay*”¹³⁰ *El Hadj* Souleymane Paye who belonged to a prominent Lébou family.¹³¹ As a devout Muslim, he “dedicated his life to Islam.” He used to fast always except on *Korité* and *Tabaski* days (celebrations for the end of Ramadan and the rehearsal of Abraham’s sacrifice).¹³² On the boat, he called for the five prayers and sing “*Labeyka, labeyka, Allahouma labeyka ...*”¹³³ Pilgrim *mbotaay* were all part of the larger “*Association des Pèlerins de l’AOF*.”¹³⁴ Members gathered at the Sène compound to make plans for the *Hajj*.

Adja Mame Yacine Diagne was also a wealthy landowner. “She owned a huge house in the Point E residential area.” She later sold it because, “she could not live in a mosque-free environment. She also made a bagful of money from the sale of the plot where the *Pompriers* transportation center is located today.” Her wealth enabled *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne to pay every year from her own pocket to allow three to four more women to go to Mecca.¹³⁵ She paid for their boat or plane tickets, their *pécule*, and the *armal*¹³⁶ she personally washed the six times with plain water, and one time with *Zem-Zem* water.

¹³⁰ However, men were involved in the sweepstake. *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).

¹³¹ *El Hadj* Ibra Guèye Paye - cousin of *El Hadj* Souleymane Paye – proved unable to say much, because he was too young at that time, and the only living son of *El Hadj* Souleymane was not available. (Dakar: Mbott-Plateau. June 25, 2003: 9:45 AM – 10:00 AM).

¹³² “*Bou lekke Korité, Tabaski ley lekkat.*” *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).

¹³³ The *Talbiya* (“Here I come Allah...”) is a invocation pilgrim sing once in state of ‘*Ithram*.

¹³⁴ *El Hadj* Ameth Diéne is the son of *El Hadj* Alieu Diéne long-time President of the “*Association des Pèlerins de l’Afrique Occidentale Française*.” (*El Hadj* Ameth Diéne. Dakar: Médina rue 17x18. June 25, 2003: 11:15 AM – 1:00 PM).

¹³⁵ The total cost of the trip per pilgrim was 100.000 francs at that time. *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).

¹³⁶ The piece of percale cloth, which symbolizes purity male and female pilgrims wrap around their bodies when they enter the state of ‘*Ithram*. Pilgrims keep that piece on until completion of the full set of *Hajj* rituals.

Adja Mame Yacine Diagne often travelled with *Adja* Marème Ndir, daughter of prominent Lébou figure Alassane Ndir; *Adja* Gogo Keita, wife of cleric Seydou Nourou Tall; *Adja* Fakha Thiam, her best friend of *tëgg* (jeweller) status; and *Adja* Oumy Ngom, a woman a *griot* friend of her.¹³⁷ Despite their different social statuses, *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne and her *ñeeño* friends closely interacted, and shared the same conditions of life during the *Hajj*.¹³⁸ *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne, *Adja* Marème Diop Makhtar, *Adja* Safiétou Ndiaye from Rufisque, and *Adja* Marième Ndiaye Sidy from Saint-Louis pioneered a long-standing fashion, and new *Pèlerin* mentality and way of life through the establishment of codes and symbols meant to mark belonging to an the exclusive *Originaires*' *pèlerin* circle.

The case of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne and her *Mbootaay* friends is interesting, because various of innovations which allowed them to make *Hajj* ten, twenty or more times in spite of the humble origins of many *Mbootaay* members. *Adja* Mame Yacine always returned sick after the months-long *Hajj* trips. Yet, she pursued her goal of making *Hajj* ten times until 1969 when she made *Hajj* for the last time. In that process, she set up a network in Morocco and in Saudi Arabia. As a devout Tijan disciple, she often travelled to Morocco to the tomb of Tijaniyya founder Sheikh Ahmad Tijani in Fès, or to honor private invitations from her Moroccan friends. She made many “Arab friends” due to her dedication to Islam.” Her “Arab friends” even offered her the black cloth that covers the Kaaba as a present after trip number ten. The black cloth used to wrap her body when she passed away in 1981.¹³⁹

¹³⁷ According to *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye and Oumy Diagne, *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne knew most women in Dakar, Rufisque, Gorée and Saint-Louis. However, *Adja* Fakha Thiam, *Adja* Marème Ndir, and *Adja* Gogo Keita were her best friends. (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).

¹³⁸ *Ñeeño*: generally used for the members of all Wolof artisan castes.

¹³⁹ Her husband chose to make *Hajj* one time only. Every time, he would ask *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne: “are you trying to kill yourself?” *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).



Figure 20: *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne with some of the women she personally sponsored. The year this picture was taken is unclear.



Figure 21: Front, right to left: *Adja* Aminata Sène ‘Mbass’ (*Adja* Mame Yacine’s sister-in-law), *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne, and *Adja* Fakha Thiam. Back, right to left: *Adja* Oumy Ngom and a friend of them in Mecca.



Figure 22: Front, right to left: *Adja* Aminata Sène ‘Mbass’, *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne, and *Adja* Fakha Thiam. Back, right to left: *Adja* Oumy Ngom and a friend of them in Mecca.



Figure 23: *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne with other Dakar-Plateau Mbootay women in their *Armal* (pilgrim outfit) in Mecca.

4. *El Hadj* Galaye Fall (Léona - Eaux-Clares, Saint-Louis)

I heard of the experience of *El Hadj* Galaye Fall through his own cousin *El Hadj* Mafall Seck, the son of butcher-contractor *El Hadj* Masseck Seck. I first intended to document the experience of *El Hadj* Masseck Seck, one of “Saint-Louis’ first millionaires.” A Qadir *taalibe* and disciple of *Cheikh* Abdoul Khadre Jeylani and *Cheikh* Sidiyya, he was born in 1889 or 1890, and passed away in Saint-Louis in 1981. He used to sail along the Senegal River, and carry dried fish, dried meat, salt, millet, and various goods up to *Penku* [broadly the East, and specifically present Mali] along with *Guet-Ndar* fisherman-contractor *El Hadj* Mawo Sène and butcher-contractor *El Hadj* Doudou Thioune. He made the *Hajj* on three occasions, including “with *Serigne* Falillou Mbacké [the second Murid caliph] in 1928.”¹⁴⁰

I asked *El Hadj* Mafall Seck if he knew of living Saint-Louis Muslims who made *Hajj* on boat, or ‘on foot’. He mentioned his first cousin *El Hadj* Galaye Fall who went to Mecca ‘on foot’ in the late 50’s. *El Hadj* Galaye Fall used to work as a butcher in Saint-Louis where he was born on March 15, 1930. *El Hadj* Galaye Fall was already sick and bed-ridden when I met him at his place in the area of Saint-Louis Léona-Eaux Claires. Yet, he was delighted to see me because of the unexpected opportunity I was giving him to “leave something meaningful for posterity.”¹⁴¹ *El Hadj* Galaye Fall said he went to Mecca in 1957, and again, in 1966 and in 1967. In 1957, he went to Mecca ‘on foot’ with his friend *El Hadj* Badara Seck, a tailor established at the *Tendjiguène* market in the area of the city known as Sor.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ *El Hadj* Mafall Seck was born in 1931. (Saint-Louis: Léona – Eaux Claires. June 2, 2002: 2:00 PM – 3:00 PM). He confessed he does not have of his father’s *Hajj* experiences, because he was not born when that happened. However, the pilgrim told his son he went to Mecca first in the early 20s, then in 1928, and in 1931.

¹⁴¹ *El Hadj* Galaye Fall (Saint-Louis: Léona – Eaux Claires. June 2, 2002: 3:45 PM – 6:00 PM). *El Hadj* Galaye Fall passed away in Saint-Louis on September 14, 2006.

¹⁴² The word “*rungu*” refers to the action of ‘walking’ to Mecca through the *voie terrestre*. The word refers to the wolof verb *rung*, which means to move toward a specific place on foot.

El Hadj Galaye Fall provided a detailed account of his ordeal to the best of his recollection. A fervent Murid affiliate, he believes “*Tariqa* membership carries no weight.” To him, “the most important thing is the relationship of believers with God and fellow Muslims.” To him, we should seek salvation through hard work, respect, and compliance with the rules of Islam. I thought he was literate in Arabic because of his frequent references the ‘*Quran* and ‘*A-hadith* during the conversation. He said he learned only the basics of the ‘*Quran* at the *Daara* of *Serigne* Mouhsine Diop in Saint-Louis as a young boy.¹⁴³ He “owes his fancy Arabic accent to the teachers of the *Daara* who made sure the *taalibe*¹⁴⁴ mastered perfectly the *Al-Fatiha* before they could proceed to the next *Sura*.”

French citizen Baye Galaye Fall left Saint-Louis alone on January 8, 1957. He was 27 years old at that time. He returned to Saint-Louis twenty-two months after he left Saint-Louis in 1957. He said he made *Hajj* through the *voie terrestre* simply because he did not have 70.000 Francs to pay for a boat ticket. Additional motives were also “*bëgg yonent bi rek, ta di xaleel*.”¹⁴⁵ His pregnant wife gave birth to a baby girl not long after he left Saint-Louis. He walked all the way to Guinguinéo (in the present Fatick region) and boarded the Dakar-Bamako express train. From Bamako (in present Mali) he went to Abidjan (Ivory Coast). In Abidjan, Galaye filed for a French passport. He was denied the passport. I asked him why he had not filed for it in Saint-Louis. He responded: “as a first time traveller I did not know that passports were required for *Hajj* trips. I thought you can just get up, and leave as you wish.”

¹⁴³The *Daara* (Quranic/Arabic school) of *Serigne* Mohsine Diop - located in the Sud area of Saint-Louis - is one of the most famous *Daara* in Saint-Louis. To this day, the *Taalibe* of *Serigne* Mohsine Diop are said to be very knowledgeable of the ‘*Quran*, and of everything that relates to Islamic sciences.

¹⁴⁴*Taalibe*: n. (ar.) disciple, student of Quranic School.

¹⁴⁵I decided to try the *voie terrestre* “due to my love for Prophet Muhammad and my young age.” He insisted, “I used to be very healthy and strong as a young man. That is why, I felt fit for the overland adventure.”

He responded to the administration agent that, “as a French citizen I have the right to file for a passport.” The former made it clear to him that other people in his situation were also French citizens, and yet they too had been denied passports. They told him that “many use the pretext of going to Mecca to file for a passport when in fact they go to Congo to dig for gold and diamonds.” He persisted, and finally obtained the travel documents. He went back to Bamako, and boarded a train to Ouagadougou in Haute-Volta (now Burkina Faso). Then, he rode a car to Koupéla and Kantiari (120 kilometres away from the Haute-Volta-Niger border). He worked as a butcher in Torodi and Niamey during Ramadan. He confessed having “no clues about distances, expenses, or time.” He made 30.000 Francs in Niamey, and thought he “would never be able to spend all that money.” He had left Saint-Louis with a map of the AOF group of territories on which an arrow drawn near the Niger area indicated “toward Mecca.” After a quick guess, he decided “if I reach Niamey, I am in Mecca.”

After Ramadan, he went to Dosso, Birnin Koni, Madawa, Maradi and Zinder (Niger). Then, he stopped by Kano and Maiduguri (present Nigeria). With fellow travellers, he experienced some problems when they were arrested at the Cameroon-Nigeria border. After their release, they entered the Chadian territory through Kousséri (the northern limit of Cameroon). They reached Fort-Lamy (now Ndjamena, Chad). *El Hadj* Galaye Fall continued, in Fort-Lamy “*aj ba dab ma.*”¹⁴⁶ He realized that if he stayed in Fort-Lamy he would never be able to raise enough money to attend the next *Hajj* season in Mecca. He went back to Niamey and wrote to his relatives and friends in Saint-Louis to tell them he had missed the 1957 *Hajj* season. He decided to work in Niamey to prepare the 1958 *Hajj* season. Months later, “*Sama xarit Badara Seck daadi takk ay bagaasem fekk ma Niamey.*”¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶“I missed the *Hajj*.” In fact, the 1957 *Hajj* started when they reached Fort-Lamy.

¹⁴⁷Later on, “my friend Badara Seck came (Saint-Louis) to meet me in Niamey.” *El Hadj* Badara Seck died some years ago.

In Niamey, he went back to work as a butcher, and made a significant amount of money. He believed “*loxo Yalla ngi ci woon.*”¹⁴⁸ He told Badara “we are going to Mecca. I have enough money to take at least ten more people with me.” In Chad, they entered a “*domaine bo xammne xammuma ko.*”¹⁴⁹ “*Comme da ñu doon dabënte,*” they were arrested with other pilgrims near the river¹⁵⁰ and taken to a police station in Fort-Lamy.¹⁵¹ Northern Nigerian pilgrims were separated from the three “Senegalese” pilgrims, the two of them and Ibrahima Dieng, a *Naaru-Kajoor*¹⁵² the Jolof province. They were asked why they did not choose government-chartered convoys. They responded they could not afford the 70.000 Francs worth ticket. Authorities telegraphed back to AOF to check the accuracy of the information.

Four days later the superintendant told detainees, “you are right: the price of the ticket is even 90.000 Francs this year.” He released them and asked them to leave the country immediately. Baye Galaye Fall thinks “there is no country where the criminality rate is as high as in Chad.” “*Foofu reyënte rek leñu xam, waaye boobu Yalla dafa def nak góor yu dëgër la ñu.*”¹⁵³ Around 7:00 PM, they boarded an Attiya-bound truck (400 kilometres away from Ndjamena), “exactly halfway between Dakar and Mecca.” Then, they passed through Abéché, and Adré “Adré the Chad-Anglo-Egyptian Sudan border.” To him, that was the most difficult episode of the journey, because, “*foofu le ñuy xeex ba tey.*”¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁸ Literally, “the hand of God was involved.”

¹⁴⁹ Literally, “we entered an unknown domain.”

¹⁵⁰ He either meant the Chari, or the Logone, because Ndjamena is located at their confluence.

¹⁵¹ On the way to Mecca, pedestrian pilgrims used to catch up with others at main stations, such as Fort-Lamy.

¹⁵² Moors who permanently relocated in the western province of Kayor, and later elsewhere.

¹⁵³ Literally, “the only thing they know how to do [well] in that area is, to kill each other. However, at that time my friend Badara and I were very strong and healthy men.”

¹⁵⁴ Literally, “fights are still going on in Adré to this day.” He was referring to the Chadian – Sudanese conflict, which has claimed many lives.

Baye Galaye Fall and fellow pilgrims spent 15 days in the desert where they found mountains “*yo xàmmne kenn xàmmul na ñu tollu.*”¹⁵⁵ He insisted, “*lépp luy dem rekk yóbbu ñu.*”¹⁵⁶ The companions reached the railway at Loubiyid in the south of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan at 8:00 AM on the morning of the fifteenth day. “In 1958, there was no armed conflict in the area, but there were very dangerous outlaws.” In Jenina they underwent isolation and disinfection for eight days. They received shots, were forced to shower, and were forcibly sprayed with “unknown powders.”¹⁵⁷ After their release, they joined a convoy of eight Lorries heading to Khartum. They resisted to no avail when the authorities of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan took them to a quarantine station 16 kilometres away from Khartum. At the end of the quarantine, they boarded a train and reached Port-Sudan forty-eight hours later.

In Port-Sudan, “overland pilgrims had the possibility to catch a twenty-five minutes flight to Jeddah for only sixteen Guinéés.” That price included the cost of the ticket and the *devises*. Another way to enter Arabia was to sail through Suakin. Galaye and Badara opted for the plane, because “that was cheaper and faster.” In Jeddah, Baye Galaye Fall and Badara Seck refused to undergo quarantine again at the “*quarantaine bu sore ba.*”¹⁵⁸ In case there was any, they asked a taxi-driver to take them to a Senegalese neighborhood. “The driver dropped them somewhere.” They stayed with *El hadj* Gorgui Diop, a former carpenter in Rufisque who had been living in Jeddah for eight years. The next morning - coinciding with day one of Ramadan 1958 - they went to the *Bab-Al-Sharif* market to purchase their *armal*.

¹⁵⁵ Literally: “no one can tell the height of those mountains.”

¹⁵⁶ Literally: “we rode everything that was in motion,” cars, buses, lorries, even donkeys.

¹⁵⁷ He has no recollection of the number and nature of the shots they received in Jenina.

¹⁵⁸ Literally: “at the [very] remote quarantine station.” He was probably alluding to the new Jeddah quarantine station inaugurated April 3, 1956 in place of the ancient Kamaran quarantine station which closed after 1951, and the other smaller quarantine facilities on two islands in the Jeddah outer bay. See, D. E. Long. *The Hajj today: A survey of the contemporary pilgrimage to Makkah*. (New York, SUNY, 1979), 78.

That night, they called a taxicab and headed to Mecca, where they arrived around 1:00 AM to perform ‘*Umra*’ the next morning. Within the *Masjid Al-Haram*, Baye Galaye Fall kept staring at the sky while the *Mutawwaf* urged them to recite prayers.¹⁵⁹ He believed what he was taught as a boy: “*bu sa aj nangu wul kaaba gi dey aju, bu nango nak da fey wàcc nga laal.*”¹⁶⁰ They returned to Mecca the next Friday, made *Tawaff* around the Kaaba, prayed, and went to the *Bab-Ibrahima* where executions were held each Friday. Severed limbs were displayed until late in the evening. “They stared at a hand tied to a rope, and at the head of one black man convicted of beating one child to death.” The view of the severed hand and head turned his life around. They were so moved, they fell sick once in Jeddah.

A week later, on Friday *El Hadj* Gorgui Diop took them again to the *Masjid-Al-Haram*. In fact, their host knew executions were to be carried out nearby that day. “They watched the stoning to death of two ‘Arabs’ convicted of adultery. At the end of the execution spectators rushed to the scene where the corpses laid in state. Their *njaatige* (host) managed to smother both of them with blood from the corpses, “because whoever comes into contact with the blood of executed prisoners shall be saved from the inferno of Hell.” The next day, they went to *Medinatoul Rassoul* (Madina) to “*siyaare Seydina Mohamed, Omar Ben Khattab, ak saabam yep*”¹⁶¹ and wait for *Korité* (Ramadan festival).” *El Hadj* Galaye Fall claimed “two *Korités* were celebrated in Madina in that year 1958.” The day before, he heard *zitr* (litanies) coming from a mosque after sunset. He was told “Ramadan Festival was to be celebrated the next day. He went to meet Badara on another side of Madina, and heard that the moon crescent had not been seen. The next day some celebrated *Eid*, while others kept fasting .

¹⁵⁹The Mecca Sacred Mosque, with the Kaaba as focal point. The Sacred Mosque or Masjid *Al-Haram* is the world’s biggest mosque and the major Muslim Holy Place.

¹⁶⁰Literally: “if God does not approve your *Hajj* the Kaaba remains suspended above your head. On the contrary, if God approves your *Hajj*, it stays where it is and you can touch it.”

¹⁶¹Saaba: n. companions of the Prophet Muhammad. A. Fal, R. Santos & J. L. Doneux. *Dictionnaire wolof-français*. (Paris, Karthala, 1990), 191.

They returned to Jeddah two months later to get ready for the *Hajj*. At the Jeddah airport, he saw the name of his own brother on the list of AOF pilgrims. He went to look for him and found him along with Saint-Louis Muslims *El Hadj* Kader Guéye, and *Adjaratou* Mame Diarra Thioune. Badara Seck and him, slept at *Saafa-wal-Marwa* during the whole time of the *Hajj*, “because, they could not afford to rent a place in Mecca.” However, the proximity of the Kaaba to *Saafa-wal-Marwa* provided Baye Galaye Fall the opportunity he considers the most precious of his three *Hajj* experiences altogether. He followed pilgrims rushing toward the opened Kaaba door on three occasions. The first time, he prayed inside the Kaaba, and went outside. On Sunday, he went back and did the same thing.

The next day, a watchman asked him if he “wants to know what is inside the Kaaba.” The man asked a boy take him inside the Kaaba. “What followed was like *léeboon ak lipoon*.”¹⁶² He gave the boy a few Rials. The boy refused asking for ten Guineas¹⁶³ instead. He paid and the boy took him inside the room within the Kaaba. “*Ma déshydraté ba desetu ma ndox, foofu du bérébu desukaay*.”¹⁶⁴ The boy opened the “*frontière*” (revolving door inside the *Kaaba*), and pushed his head inside. “*Ma janoo ak li ci biir. Yàlla rek mo xam lan la. Mënu ma ko misaal. Mo ko gis ak sama ay bët. Mënu ma ko liyaar. Mënu ma ko lëkële ak dara. Xool na ko ci sama ay bët, ba tey ji mu ngi ci sama bopp*.”¹⁶⁵ After the *Hajj*, *El Hadj* Galaye Fall returned to Niamey and telegraphed his wife to tell her he was coming back.

¹⁶²Literally: “that was like an extraordinary tale.” (opening statement for tales in Wolof).

¹⁶³Normally, the exchange rate was 5.000 Francs for five Guineas. However, in 1958 the exchange rate was raised twofold. Meccans traded five Guineas for 10.000 Francs.

¹⁶⁴Literally: “I sweat so much there was no liquid left in my system. This was not a place where humans stay.”

¹⁶⁵“I faced the thing inside the Kaaba. Only God knows what that thing was. I cannot put words on what I saw. I saw it with my own eyes. I cannot explain it with gestures. I cannot compare it with anything. However, I saw it and looked at it with my own eyes, and to this day [the image of] is engraved in my brain.” *El Hadj* Galaye Fall moaned and opened his eyes as if he was having a vision.

5. *El Hadj* Amath Ba (*Sor*, Saint-Louis)

El Hadj Mohamadou Lamine Ba (1890-1977) - his real name on the copy of the ID card I saw - was born in Saint-Louis to a man named Amadou Ba and his wife Bigué Yacine Ba. His children Mohamadou Abdoulaye ‘Johnny’ Ba, Souleymane ‘Jules’ Ba, Fatou Ba Niang, and his nephew Dialor Lô recounted his various *Hajj* experiences to me. As per his ID card issued on December 22, 1953, he was registered as “Senegalese” in the files of the Haut-Commissariat de l’AOF. According to his children, *El Hadj* Amath Ba was a skilled handyman (e.g. bricklayer, mechanic, carpenter, and tailor).¹⁶⁶ He was also fluent in French, English, Arabic, Wolof and Fulani. He studied the ‘*Quran* at the *Daara* of *El Hadj* Mamoune Ndiaye. According to Fatou Ba Niang, her father “lived Islam completely with his heart.”

When *El Hadj* Amath Ba graduated from the *Daara*, he left Saint-Louis, officially to acquire knowledge of the ‘*Quran* in the British colony of Gambia. His relatives lost hope of ever seeing him again. Years later, they learned he had in fact been living in Sierra-Leone. He had married a local woman in that country. At some point, he expressed the desire to return in Senegal. The wife disagreed. ‘Jules’ Ba claims she resorted to charms to keep him there. Fortunately, the latter managed to catch a boat, and to leave Sierra Leone. Long after that “narrow escape,”¹⁶⁷ someone came to Saint-Louis with the news he had met a tailor who looked a lot like Amath Ba in a Dakar market. The sisters of Amath Ba went to Dakar to verify the information. They found their young brother, and took him back to Saint-Louis.

¹⁶⁶His business card reads “*Maître Maçon, Maître Menuisier, Maître Tailleur [...] ex-Commis Principal du Service Administratif, Ex-Interprète Judiciaire [...] Assesseur des Tribunaux du Sénégal, Imam de la Mosquée de Léona.*”

¹⁶⁷Souleymane ‘Jules’ Ba provided detail on the charm the woman used. “Jules” Ba is a character who blames his “Parisian-like” on his artist side. He does “not mind saying things others would conceal (siblings?).” He then gave a vivid description of the charm. I have chosen not to provide the details of that part of his testimony, since the other family members did not say anything about that specific episode of the life of *El Hadj* Amath Ba. Souleymane ‘Jules’ Ba (Saint-Louis: Léona. June 3, 2002: 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM).

In Saint-Louis, while working with the colonial administration *El Hadj* Amath Ba also managed a tailor shop at the Sor market. In addition, he spent much of his time spreading the words of the '*Quran*. He eventually became an erudite in matters of Islam.¹⁶⁸ After his office hours, he used to walk down the streets preaching tirelessly redemption to Saint-Louis Muslims. Fatou Ba Niang said her father took advantage of funerals to carry out his preaching mission. According to her, many in Saint-Louis disliked his sermons. He made scores of enemies in spreading the message of the '*Quran*. Fatou Ba Niang remembers he would stop by all the houses on his way back from the mosque to slaughter sheep on Tabaski days. She also noticed he quit that habit around her tenth birthday. To her, he started making *Hajj* on a yearly basis around the time she turned ten, in 1948. She was born in 1938.

Based on the Ba family private archives, *El Hadj* Amath Ba made *Hajj* for the first time in 1928. Then, he took a break for about twenty years, and likely returned to Mecca almost on a yearly basis between 1949 and 1975. *El Hadj* Amath Ba made *Hajj* twenty-eight times. He kept a personal record of his *Hajj* trips. He even wrote: "Arafat. February 5, 1971. 24th visit in Mecca" on one picture. His children claim he paid for all the expenses of his 1928 *Hajj* trip from his own pocket. The notarized affidavit dated March 19, 1928 and signed by Matar Dia (merchant in Saint-Louis) and Gallo Sow Ousmane (retired post office agent) he provided to file for authorization to make *Hajj* sustains that argument. Dia and Sow testified that *El Hadj* Amath Ba "who is undertaking an authorized pilgrimage is taking with him a quite sufficient amount of money to pay for all the trip expenses."¹⁶⁹ Yet, *El Hadj* Amath Ba worked as a *graisseur* (oiler) in the boat's machine room in exchange for food.

¹⁶⁸The business card also mentions, "*24e pèlerinage à la Mecque. Tafsiroul Khourane, Afissoul Khourane, Moukhadame Tidiane*". Fatou Ba Niang (Saint-Louis: Léona. June 5, 2002: 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM).

¹⁶⁹She showed allowed me to use that information. However, she did not feel comfortable lending me the documents because she "is does not want to lose her father's memorabilia."

El Hadj Amath Ba shared the same cabin with three famous *Muqqadam* (representatives) of *El Hadj* Malick Sy: *El Hadj* Rawane Ngom (founder of the Mpal caliphate south of Saint-Louis), *El Hadj* Ablaye Sow ‘Dagana’, and *El Hadj* Salif Mbengue. According to his relatives, *El Hadj* Amath Ba worked as an oiler only because he “was young and healthy.”¹⁷⁰ Based on his ID he was thirty-eight years old in 1928. The clerics remained in the cabin praying, reading the ‘*Quran*, and making plans for the *Hajj* while he worked. *El Hadj* Amath Ba shared the *gamelles* (food bowls) with the clerics, and catered to their needs with heartfelt dedication. When he learned he helped three more people, the boat captain granted him eight food bowls instead of four. *El Hadj* Rawane Ngom asked him his age. He responded “I am twenty-eight years old.” The cleric said to him, “*fī ñu jublu, Makka gi ñu jëm, di nga fa tegg sa tànk ñaar fukk ak juróom ñetti yoon doora génn àddina.*”¹⁷¹

The wish of *El Hadj* Rawane Ngom obviously came true, because after 1949 *El Hadj* Amath Ba made *Hajj* twenty-seven more times. Upon return, every time people greeted him with the words “*siyaare na la*, [he responded] *tàggu na la, déwén da may dellu dé.*” Mecca meant so much to him that he did everything in his power to obtain authorization to make *Hajj* in spite of poor health during the last two decades of his life. He suffered severe high blood pressure episodes and massive limb swellings, which made him physically unfit for the *Hajj*.” Yet, especially after 1960, he always negotiated to obtain the necessary clearances from relevant administrative and medical authorities. On two occasions, he took his wives Fatou Ndiaye ‘Alain’ and Fatou Ndiaye ‘Rama’ to Mecca to assist him during the *Hajj*.”¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ Dialor Lô (Saint-Louis: HLM. June 4, 2002: 10:00 PM – 11:00 AM).

¹⁷¹ Literally, “You will set foot in the place [Mecca] where we are going twenty-eight times before you pass away.” Dialor Lô (Saint-Louis: HLM. June 4, 2002: 10:00 PM – 11:00 AM).

¹⁷² Literally, “I am paying you my respect on your return from Mecca,” “I am greeting you good-bye. I am going back [to Mecca] next year.” Fatou Ba Niang (Saint-Louis: Léona. June 5, 2002: 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM).

One time, *El Hadj* Amath Ba fell sick and underwent surgery. His condition was alarming. He sent his nephew Dialor Lô to fetch *Saafara* ('*Quran*-based remedy) from *El Hadj* Rawane Ngom in Mpal. The hiccup that had made him sick for days disappeared soon after he took the remedy. "The physicians and Governor Wiltord (1947-1950) who visited him that day inquired about the remedy." *El Hadj* Amath Ba later told Dialor, "I am not dying anytime soon." He reminded him the *Marabout's* prophecy. He is also remembered for bravery. "During World War I, he fought at Verdun under the command of General Leclerc whose son had fallen on the battlefield under German gunfire. Leclerc wanted the corpse back. "*El Hadj* Amath Ba volunteered. He took the body on his shoulders and brought it back to Leclerc under gunshots. Leclerc promised to award him the *Légion d'Honneur* at the end of the war. That is how *El Hadj* Amath Ba earned the award."¹⁷³

The story of the end of life of *El Hadj* Amath Ba is as interesting as the story of his life and his *Hajj*-related experiences. When he returned from trip number twenty-eight, *El Hadj* Amath Ba called Dialor Lô from the airport, and asked him to let everyone know he was coming back. In Saint-Louis, visitors paid him respect. He kept responding "*tàggu na len.*" They asked "*foo jëm, da ngay dellu Makka?*" He responded, "*sama demuum Makka jeex na.*" He passed away peacefully three months later, on February 28, 1977 (or March 30, 1977).¹⁷⁴ He was buried on *Gamou* day. As a reminder, the *Gamou* still is a very important festival for Tijan disciples, and *El Hadj* Amath Ba was fundamentally a dedicated Tijan disciple."¹⁷⁵

Conclusion

¹⁷³ In the testimony of Dialor Lô, the *tul* (charms) conferred him protection against bullets and similar weapons. Dialor Lô (Saint-Louis: HLM. June 4, 2002: 10:00 PM – 11:00 AM).

¹⁷⁴ Literally, "I am greeting you good-bye." "Where are you going? Are you going back to Mecca?" "No, I have completed my set of trips to Mecca." Fatou Ba Niang (Saint-Louis: Léona. June 5, 2002: 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM).

¹⁷⁵ Mohamadou Abdoulaye Ba, AKA "Johnny" Ba said his father "*était foncièrement Tidiane*" (my emphasis). (Saint-Louis: Balacosse. June 3, 2002: 16:10 – 17:00).

It seems that the surveillance system French colonial authorities set up in order to monitor Mecca pilgrims from French West Africa did not meet great resistance, at least among colonial Muslims from Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis. Most former pilgrims I interviewed were satisfied with the way colonial authorities managed the *Hajj* until 1960. They spoke endlessly about the treatment they received from administrators and health professionals on the boat and in the Holy Land, as well. Mecca pilgrims from colonial Senegal – more specifically from Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis - who clashed with the colonial administration when they were not allowed to proceed toward Mecca were overland travellers. Often, they lacked the necessary pilgrim passports and were unable to provide proof of compliance with the medical standards imposed upon all Muslims willing to undertake the pilgrimage. Also, it seems that colonial Senegal pilgrims were often stopped on the way to Mecca and had to negotiate with colonial authorities to continue their way.

In any case, the involvement of colonial authorities in the *Hajj* offered many advantages for colonial Senegalese Muslims. First, they were in a position to complete the pilgrimage trip and rituals in very acceptable transportation conditions, whereas in the old days danger was waiting around every corner. Indeed, overland pilgrims knew they were a good chance they would never see their relatives again. Second, the medical assistance made them feel safe and comfortable with the management of the *Hajj* by colonial authorities. Doctors extensively complained that colonial Mecca pilgrim never sought medical assistance in a timely manner. Yet, some former pilgrims felt relieved knowing that someone was there for them just in case. Third, the management of the *Hajj* by colonial authorities made colonial Muslim women happy, because they were able to accomplish the dream of every Muslim, which is to make *Hajj*, whereas they had had to pay a high price in the past. Colonial Muslim women even managed to find new forms of expression and socializing in the *Hajj*.

CHAPTER 5: Changes and continuity in Islam: The *Hajj* in Contemporary Senegal

As has been shown previously, European powers joined forces to control the cross border spread of disease generally, and *Hajj*-related cholera in particular, between 1851 and 1926. Between 1831 and 1857, the Western world, including North America, was believed to be at the mercy of cholera. In countries such as France, cholera outbreaks had caused disturbances in the social order in the past with major popular uprisings in the major cities, and in the rural areas as well. As in the case of all dangerous pathologies, cholera was perceived as a scourge, and also as a plot by the well-off against the lower classes. Several international sanitary conferences were held in various cities in Europe for the purpose of stamping out the deadly and fast-moving disease. The first International Sanitary Conference was held in Paris in 1851, and several such meetings were to follow. The series of *Hajj*-related health conferences progressively led to the creation of the World Health Organization in 1948, and to the adoption of the International Health Regulations (IHR) in 1951.

The purpose of the IHR was to set in motion an international collaboration in order to implement hygiene rules aimed at achieving global public health security. Clearly, with the implementation of IHR rules, international decision-makers were hoping to contain and neutralize at the source all the germs of communicable diseases in order to protect the areas not yet infected. The *Hajj* and Saudi Arabia were targeted, because the link with the Muslim event and the spread of cholera to the rest of the world had been established since the nineteenth century. Clear hygiene regulations and medical standards were systematically applied in the areas of the world, including in colonial Senegal, which were home to large Muslim populations in order to make the *Hajj* safer for pilgrims and for the rest of world. The global coordination to better organize the *Hajj* and make it adhere to global health standards entailed unexpected outcomes in colonial Senegal. The impact of that global coordination aimed at regulating the *Hajj* is still present in contemporary Senegal *Hajj* system.

A. The emergence and consolidation of *Pèlerin* elites in colonial Senegal

The *Hajj* is a very complex issue. Very often, Muslims and non-Muslims rely on conventional wisdom and seldom go beneath the surface of *Hajj* performance and the symbolic meaning of *Hajj* rituals. The *Hajj* is often viewed as a set of global celebrations in which Muslims from various countries interact in and around major Muslim Holy Sites. Yet, Susan O'Brien makes the case that "the globalizing impact of the modern *Hajj* can hardly be reduced to a simple story of increasing cultural, religious, and economic homogeneization, in which the sacred centre of Mecca slowly subsumes the Islamic periphery."¹ For Barbara Cooper, "globalization does not annihilate locality." According to her, "cultural forms at more approximate scales are given heightened, not reduced, salience with globalization."

She adds that, "rather than producing deterritorialization, the modern *Hajj*, [...] produces a resacralization of familiar terrain [while inducing] a powerful recentering around Mecca."² My own study of the colonial management of the *Hajj* in the contexts of colonial and contemporary Senegal supports such arguments. In this dissertation, I demonstrate that Senegalese Muslims display a feeling of sympathy for fellow Muslims in their overall perception of the *Hajj*. In theory, they rely on exclusive interaction with fellow '*Umma* members in Mecca.³ Yet, in practice, and as the Hausa Bori adepts in Susan O'Brien article - they tend to incorporate in the *Hajj*, and emphasize various elements drawn directly from their local beliefs and social experiences. However, they generally maintain the '*Quran* and Mecca as main reference points, while claiming unconditional belonging to the '*Umma* as well.

¹ S. O'Brien. "Pilgrimage, power, and identity: The role of the Hajj in the lives of Nigerian Hausa Bori adepts." *Africa Today*, 46 (¾), (Summer/Autumn 1999), 12.

² B. M. Cooper. "The strength in the song: Muslim personhood, audible capital, and Hausa women's performance of the Hajj." *Social Text*, 17.3, (1999), 101.

³ See, references to the *sàrtu aj* according to *Al-Imam* Ahmet Dame Ndiaye (Sud FM radio, "*Al-Bidaya*" talk-show, February 1, 2008: 9:00 – 11:00 AM).

1. “You do not get sick in Mecca”: Fantasizing the *Hajj* and Muslim Holy Places

Senegalese Muslims share in common with other fellow Muslims a set of inalienable beliefs. That was true in the past, and that still applies in Senegal today. As do their Muslim counterparts elsewhere, most Senegalese Muslims subscribe to the creed that “*Allah* is One [or is Unique], and Muhammad is His Prophet.” That creed is the cornerstone of the Muslim faith. In accepting that creed they assert that they belong to a wide, and yet selective faith community. They should call his blessings only upon them. In a similar manner, Senegalese Muslims believe Prophet Muhammad should be the only intercessor between God and them in their quest for earthly happiness and post-mortem salvation. Senegalese Muslims hold dear the values of the five pillars of Islam: the ‘*Shahadah* (the Uniqueness and Oneness of God), *Salat* (prayers), ‘*Az-Zakat* (alms), *Sawm* (fasting), and the *Hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca).

That is why they generally agree that failing to comply with any of the five pillars, and the ‘*A-hadith* is synonymous with automatic self-exclusion from the Muslim community of faith (‘*Umma*).⁴ Yet, the practice of Islam in Senegal suggests a great flexibility of belief, if not an outright lack of orthodoxy. Observers of Senegalese Muslim society sometimes wonder about the non-conventional, if not contradictory, elements deeply embedded within the practice of Islam, especially in contemporary Senegal. Often, it is Senegalese Muslims themselves who question their own widespread and deep-seated habits consisting in constantly referring to charismatic brotherhood leaders for intercession with the *Allah* (the Almighty). Likewise, many Senegalese Muslims criticize their fellow Muslims for swearing on the names of Sufi leaders (e.g. “*barke Serigne bi*”) often as proof of good faith.

⁴ In today’s Senegal, there is an increase talk-shows aimed at helping Muslims acquire the fundamentals of Islam. Islamic talk-show remind Muslims of the necessity to strictly observe the five pillars as, The Condition of the Muslim faith. During my years listening such shows, I have often heard talk-show hosts elaborate arguments around the Wolof words *Julli* (to pray) and *Jullit* (broadly the devout, and specifically Muslim(s)). They argue that the word *Jullit* (Muslim) constructed with the root *Julli* is self-explanatory. Consequently, whoever does not pray regularly should not be considered as a member of the ‘*Umma*.

Swearing on the names of Sufi leaders is a habit in Senegal. Senegalese Muslims have been warned, and are still being warned about the dangers of *Shirk*, or *Associationisme*.⁵ The Islamic tradition is clear about the fact that Muslims should address their heavenly and earthly requests to God Only. Indeed, they should expect post-mortem salvation from him Only. Today, learned Muslims take the opportunity to use Islamic conferences and radio shows to remind average Muslims that proclaiming, in concrete actions or in words, personal reliance on intercessors for redemption and happiness is *Haram*.⁶ Yet, reference to Sufi leaders for daily needs seems to be gaining momentum among Senegalese Muslims concomitantly with the rise of *Turuq* power and representativeness. Learned Muslims firmly condemn such conduct. Yet, they take into account the particular relationship of Senegalese Muslims with Islam, and the particular cultural background in which Islam operates in Senegal.

For example, the former *Haut Commissaire au Pèlerinage El Hadj* Moustapha Guéye always responds, “*laata ñu doon ay Jullit ay tuubeen la ñu.*”⁷ It is certainly not his intention to excuse the lapses in the ways Senegalese Muslims understand and practice Islam. Rather, *El Hadj* Moustapha Guéye wishes to acknowledge the unconscious and firm entrenchment of Senegalese believers in their pre-Islamic cultural milieu. In fact, devout *Turuq* affiliates often proclaim unconditional dedication to *Turuq* charismatic leaders in words and in deeds as much as they acknowledge complete agreement with the rules of Islam. Most Senegalese Muslims have been warned that whoever swears on Sufi Saints and expects salvation through their mediation risks undermining *Tawhid* and ‘*Iman*’⁸, and engaging in *Shirk* altogether.

⁵ *Shirk* (n.): conferring ‘associates’ to God, and divine attributes to humans or objects. Islamic talk-show hosts insist that the risk of makin *Shirk* is significant in the Senegalese context.

⁶ *Haram* (adj.): used for things strictly forbidden in Islam (i.e. adultery, *Shirk*).

⁷ Literally, “our status as converts comes before our status as Muslims.”

⁸ *Tawhid* (n.): opposite of *Shirk*, the exclusive belief and proclamation that, Allah is Unique. ‘*Iman*’: faith.

As Barbara Cooper, Susan O'Brien and others,⁹ Christian Bawa Yamba has insisted on the complexity of the *Hajj*, which lies in its contradictory characteristics. On one hand, are the "sacred spots" of pilgrimage generally, and of the *Hajj* particularly. The *Hajj* attracts "people from various horizons seemingly sharing cosmological features that transcend particular cultural and religious traditions." On the other hand, "each manifestation of pilgrimage derives its significance from its regional, historical, or geographical specificity."¹⁰ In line with this argument, I emphasize the quite contradictory patterns noticeable in the ways Senegalese Muslims view and live the *Hajj*. Senegalese Muslims are firmly entrenched in purely Senegalese realities. In spite of the particularity of their interactions with the *Hajj*, all claim attachment to the recommendations of the Prophet regarding the centrality of the *Hajj* in Islam. Likewise, Senegalese Muslims seem to value the *Sart* (key principles) of *Hajj*.¹¹

However, they have devised a wide array of benefits they credit to the *Hajj*. Senegalese Muslims generally claim profound attachment to Islam and the *Hajj*, and the power of images is very acute within Senegalese culture. Most learned Muslims repeat to Senegalese believers that objects (e.g. pictures, carvings) representing humans and animals are not recommended in the Islamic tradition. Furthermore, to explain that position they claim that on Judgement Day people who own pictures or carvings will be asked to bring the objects, and the persons and animals represented on the pictures they own back to life. Yet, many Senegalese Muslims generally keep copies of pictures showing famous Senegalese - or foreign - *Turuq* leaders (e.g. Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba, *El Hadj* Malick Sy, Serigne Babacar Sy) and their offspring.

⁹ M. J. Sallnow. "Andean and European pilgrimage: Some comparisons and contrasts. A paper presented at the Interdisciplinary Conference on Pilgrimage." (London, July 1-3 1988), 1.

¹⁰ C. Bawa Yamba. *Permanent pilgrims: The role of the pilgrimage in the lives of West African Muslims in Sudan*. (London, Edinburgh University Press, 1995), 6.

¹¹ The importance of the *Hajj* and its principles are extensively explained in the 'A-hadith. Indeed, specific chapters of the Muslim the '*Quran* also specifically refer to the *Hajj*.

Also, visitors might find pictures showing believers around the *Kaaba* during the *Hajj* in the house of self-proclaimed Senegalese Muslims. The presence of such pictures in the most private spaces is the sign of belonging to the Muslim community of faith, and attachment to Mecca generally, and to the *Hajj* particularly. Third, while expressing what the *Hajj* means to Senegalese Muslims, such pictures embody the hopes of their owners to perform the *Hajj* at least once in a lifetime. It is the dream of all Senegalese Muslims to live long enough, be healthy enough, and acquire sufficient financial means to set foot in Mecca and Medina. Most of them cling to their hopes of touching the *Kaaba*, and drinking *Zem-Zem* water on the site. That is why Senegalese Muslims sometimes go to extremes to make their dreams of travelling to Mecca and Medina, and attending the *Hajj* with fellow Muslims come true. In his study of the West African Wahhabiyya, Lansiné Kaba has argued that “informants who had been to Mecca frequently spoke of the magnitude of this feeling [the sense of unity and solidarity with the Muslim community], and of their inability to describe clearly the satisfaction and the emotions they felt upon their arrival there [Mecca].”

Over the years, Senegalese members of the official *Hajj mission d’accompagnement* of Senegalese Muslims such as sociologist *Docteur* Maréma Touré Thiam have brought to the attention of Senegalese policy-makers the necessity to take into account the numerous cases of psychological distress observed among Senegalese male and female pilgrims during the *Hajj*, especially in front of the Prophet’s tomb. Doctor Maréma Touré Thiam blames that state of affair on the inability of Senegalese pilgrims to cope with the overwhelming feelings of satisfaction and gratefulness they experience, mainly in front of the tomb of the Prophet. According to Doctor Thiam, in Mecca and in Madina many Senegalese pilgrims also have been unable to handle encounters with Muslims from all around the world.¹²

¹² Doctor Maréma Touré Thiam. (Walfadjri FM radio, “*Diine ak Jamono*” talk-show, January 4, 2008: 3:00 – 5:00 PM).

Indeed, the accounts of returnees emphasize the desire of Senegalese Muslims to be among the blessed Muslims, the ones chosen by God to undertake the *Hajj*. Yet, while Senegalese Muslims generally strive for Mecca not all achieve that goal. That is why they believe you have to be a God-chosen Muslim to see Mecca.¹³ Furthermore, Senegalese Muslims think God-chosen Muslims undertake the *Hajj* under the auspices of special divine benediction and protection. For many of them, “you [simply] do not get sick in Mecca.” Senegalese Muslims are convinced death in Mecca is the guarantee of a place in heaven. Once back home, Mecca returnees keep repeating that pilgrims are invested with supernatural strength and outstanding spirit as soon as they set feet on the soil of Mecca. They argue that this strength and spirit protect pilgrims from ailments during the *Hajj*. Keeping this in mind, I asked my witnesses if they had been sick in Mecca or in Madina.

I received the same answer from the majority of them in Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis. Despite the hardships inherent in the accomplishment of *Hajj* rituals they claim they experienced no pain at all. They felt strong up to the end of the *Hajj*. Like 1963 pilgrim *Adjaratou* Fatou Ngom¹⁴ many believe that, during the *Hajj* “*yàala day wàcce yërmandeem sa kow sàng la sutura ba nga ñibbi*.”¹⁵ They also contend that pilgrims do not even think about sleeping during the *Hajj*. According to them, believers pray round the clock in Mosques such as the *Masjid Al-Haram*,¹⁶ visit sanctuaries, and devote significant amounts of time to meditation. For such reasons, Senegalese Muslims revere all that relates to the *Hajj*.

¹³ See chapter 4. How Abdourahmane Thioune’s relatives understood their father’s decision the youngest of his children to Mecca. They came to the conclusion that Abdourahmane Thioune was God-chosen. The idea that one needs to be chosen to be part of something (e.g. *Tariqa*) applies to various domains in Islam in Senegal (e.g. *Turuq* membership).

¹⁴ *Adja* Fatou “Ndoura” Ngom (Dakar: 43 Rue Kléber. July 8, 2003: 3:30 PM – 4:15 PM).

¹⁵ Literally, “God extends his compassion and discreet consideration over the believer until he returns home [safe and sound].”

¹⁶ See chapter 4, for the account of the *Hajj* experiences of *El Hadj* Galaye Fall.

2. Revered *Hajj* incentives: Coveted *El Hadj* and *Adjaratou* titles

Michael Wolfe has summarized the *Hajj* as “both a collective celebration and an intensely personal celebration.”¹⁷ It is true that the most salient aspects of Muslim travels such as *Hijra*, and *Hajj* are that Muslims worship and communicate along with fellow Muslims around the holiest shrines of Islam in Mecca and Medina. Yet, like other Muslims, Senegalese Muslims experience religious travels, the *Hajj* particularly, in very personal ways.¹⁸ Furthermore, for Senegalese Muslims things do not end with the actual *Hajj*, which normally lasts ten days altogether. During the *Hajj*, they replicate a set of rituals codified according to predefined rules. Upon return, Mecca returnees share an enduring pride nurtured by the sheer feeling of accomplishment they all seem to experience afterwards.

Like Christiaan Snouck-Hurgronje, European witnesses and Muslim pilgrims all have reported the commercial mindedness of Meccans and Medinans, especially in times of *Hajj*.¹⁹ Doctor Duguet also characterized the *Hajj* as the Saudi “national industry,”²⁰ and the only source of revenues for the populations of the Hedjaz. Bedouins claimed: “we sow neither wheat nor millet. Pilgrims are our crop.”²¹ Yet, the inconvenience stemming from that situation is often concealed by Muslims, and does not tarnish the desire of most Senegalese Muslims to make *Hajj* and gain the titles of *El Hadj* (male), or *Adjaratou* (female).

¹⁷ M. Wolfe. *One thousand roads to Mecca: Ten centuries of travellers writing about the Muslim pilgrimage*. (New York, Publishers Group West, 1999), xii.

¹⁸ D. Eickelman and J. Piscatori (Eds.) *Muslim travellers: Pilgrimage, migration, and the religious imagination*. (New York, Routledge, 1990).

¹⁹ C. Snouck-Hurgronje. *Mecca in the latter part of the nineteenth century*. (London, Luzac & Co., 1931). See also, ANS: 1H118 (163). *El Hadj* Chérif Diop reported that Meccans and Medinans “are very mean and greedy who may ask you to pay for using “the shade of their houses, or the shade of their buildings if you ever sit on their door porches to protect yourself from the heat of the sun.” (Saint-Louis: Nord. June 24, 2002: 12:15 PM – 1:30 PM).

²⁰ F. Duguet. *Le pèlerinage de la Mecque: Du point de religieux, social et sanitaire*. (Paris, Editions Rieder, 1932), 3.

²¹ Idem, 48. “*Nous ne semons ni blé, ni mil, le pèlerin est notre [seule] récolte*”.

Ustaz Alioune Sall and other learned Muslims argue that the titles of *El Hadj*, and *Adja* or *Adjaratou*, are applicable to pilgrims during the ten to twelve days of the *Hajj* rituals only.²² Normally, the *Hajj* ends with the farewell *Tawaff*.²³ However, for many Senegalese Muslims, the pilgrim status becomes effective mainly once pilgrims are ready to return home. It is usually from that point on that *El Hadj* and *Adjaratou* titles become part of the identity of Senegalese Muslim returnees. In precolonial Senegal already, returning Mecca pilgrims enjoyed long-term prestige attached to the accomplishment of *Hajj* rituals. This was even truer for overland pilgrims who braved hostile lands and dangerous outlaws, and returned home safe and sound after months or years away from home. Nowadays, former pilgrims often keep such titles permanently, perhaps to emphasize their difference with other Muslims.

It is true that, Senegalese people are generally respectful of former pilgrims with *Hajj* titles placed before their first names. Yet, *Hajj* titles (i.e. *El Hadj* and *Adjaratou*) are sometimes used as firstnames in Senegal. In such cases there is no relationship with *Hajj* rituals accomplishment, because *Hajj* titles in relation relating to the *Hajj* do not appear on birth certificates. *Hajj*-related titles usually appear on birth certificates when it is part of a newborn's namesake firstname, and the parents have chosen to honor the namesake to the fullest extent.²⁴ In any case, pilgrim titles have nowadays become part of the identity of Senegalese Muslims. However, *Hajj* titles bear various meanings. For instance, women refer to their partners as *Aladji* (*El Hadj*). In referring to their partners as *Aladji*, some of the intentions of Senegalese are to stress the maturity, prosperity, and respectability of their partners. Somehow, they wish to emphasize the seriousness of their relationship.

²² *Al-Ustaz* Alioune Sall (Dakar: Dieuppeul. May 15, 2002: 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM).

²³ The *Tawaff* is the ritual consisting in walking or running seven times around the Kaaba.

²⁴ In a casual conversation, a Saint-Louis woman suggested that I look on the army's veterans list for men named *El Hadj* to locate former *Hajjees* among colonial soldiers. She forgot the lack of relationship between *El Hadj* as first name and the effective *Hajj* title.

Likewise, the *Adja* title is nowadays granted to Senegalese women to acknowledge similar qualities. Unlike single women, married women are often referred to as *Adja*, or *Adjaratou*. Corpulent women are also often nicknamed *Adja*, as opposed to slim women. That probably has to do with the fact that in the past - and to a lesser extent today – people used to consider obesity as a sign of wealth and even of internal good health. Still today, for numerous Senegalese men and women thinness is associated with poverty and poor health. Looking at their pictures, it seems that respectable women such as *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne and her *Mbootay* partners shared that way of thinking. Despite the local tropical weather, colonial Senegalese women, especially wealthy former female pilgrims, enhanced their corpulence using artificial devices on purpose. In fact, the dresscode of colonial Senegalese women was part of that particular mindset. For instance, *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne would wear at least seven wrappers underneath her *camisole*, and *boubou* on all occasions.²⁵

In colonial Senegal, many male Muslims acquired great prestige among their peers through the performance of the *Hajj* (e.g. *Al-Hajj* Umar Tall). Undertaking *Hajj* used to be a real ordeal for Muslim pilgrims. Therefore, many returnees re-orientated their lives to be more in line with their new status, and put forward the *Hajji* profile. For instance, Mecca returnees such as Saint-Louis Muslim *El Hadj* Dame Sarr turned their lives around. After a seventh trip to Mecca, he completely abandoned his profession of tailor, and focused on teaching the '*Quran* to Saint-Louis Muslims.²⁶ In fact - consciously or not - Senegalese Muslims generally reserve special respects for *Hajjis* at least for a little while, and generally until the beginning of the following *Hajj* season when new pilgrims are ready to return home.

²⁵ According to daughter-in-law *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye, “clothes would pile up in the living room whenever *Adja* Mame Yacine returned home from walks in the neighborhood, or from visits to relatives and friends.” *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne and fellow colonial Senegalese women obviously enhanced their figures on purpose.

²⁶ Bassirou Sarr (Saint-Louis: Goxu Mbathie. June 2, 2002: 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM).

Sometimes, the newly acquired prestige of West African *Hajjees* spread even beyond the limits of their own community. That was even truer for former pilgrim with a large reputation prior to going to Mecca for *Hajj* purposes. Historian David Robinson has provided an in-depth account of the case of cleric *Al-Hajj* Umar Tal who used “pilgrimage and affiliation to the Tijaniyya Sufi order [to build] a following in the mid-nineteenth century.” The famous Futanke cleric and former pilgrim later “channelled that following into a Jihad against “paganism” incarnated in the Bamana states of Segu and Karta.” *Al-Hajj* Umar Tall remained away from the Senegal River Valley for several years interacting with learned Muslims in Egypt and Arabia, and deciphering the secrets of the Tijaniyya order under the guidance of Muhammad Al-Ghali, the representative of Ahmad Al-Tijani in the Hijaz. He took that opportunity to perform the *Hajj* in 1828, 1829 and again in 1830.²⁷

Likewise, Soninke cleric *Al-Hājj* Muhammad Al-Amīn (or Mamadou Lamine), was often referred to as “*Al-hājj*.” That title was “used in fact as the battle cry of his troops,”²⁸ which indicates the importance of *Hajj* titles for militant Muslims. *Al-Hajj* Umar and Mamadu Lamine shared similar *Hajj* experiences. On the way to Mecca, *Al-Hajj* Umar waged Jihad in Segu and Bornu, while the Mamadou Lamine raided Gamon and Segu. Oral tradition in Diawara (on the Senegal River) suggests a meeting between the two in Mecca, which is unlikely since Mamadou Lamine left Segu in 1864, “well after al-Hājj ‘Umar’s return” from the *Hajj*.²⁹ In any case, both cases emphasize the importance of pilgrim credentials.

²⁷ D. Robinson. *The Holy War of Umar Tal: The western Sudan in the nineteenth century*. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985), 21-22. J. Hanson. “Islam, migration, and the political economy of meaning: Fergo Nioro from the Senegal River Valley, 1862-1890.” *Journal of African History*, 35, (1994), 37-60.

²⁸ H. Fisher. *The early life and pilgrimage of Al-Hājj Muhammad Al-Amīn the Soninke (d. 1887)*. *Journal of African History*, XI (I), (1970): 53.

²⁹ Idem, 56. See also, M. Diouf. *Histoire du Sénégal*. (Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 2001), 116-117.

The situation is still the same in present Senegal. Most, if not all, Senegalese Muslims strive to accomplish the *Hajj* at least once in a lifetime. Many seek to enhance their visibility among Senegalese Muslims. At least for a while, the actual *El Hadj* and *Adjaratou* enjoy the respect of their peers. Learned Senegalese Muslims insist on the fact that Muslims should observe *sellal* and *jubal* at all times roughly from the age of seven onward.³⁰ Yet, many average Senegalese Muslims consider returning pilgrims as particularly *sell*. For many, it is as if new *Hajjees* received divine grace because they touched the Kaaba and visited the tomb of the prophet. Nowadays, pilgrims return home in about eight different flights. Prior to their arrival, relatives make plans for fancy post-*Hajj* season parties known as *ganale*.³¹

Post-*Hajj* season banquets are the most impressive aspects of the Senegalese *Hajj* culture. I heard former colonial pilgrims and their relatives narrate with nostalgia the welcome ceremonies pilgrims received upon their arrival in their hometowns. In Dakar, the Governor General in person attended welcome ceremonies at the harbor accompanied by local brass bands. Colonial pilgrims then proceeded to their homes on decorated horse-drawn carriages.³² In Saint-Louis, such official ceremonies took place at the entrance of the railway station. For *El Hadj* Galaye Fall, “the welcoming home is the memory [he] cherishes the most.”³³ Because for days, visitors paid him respect, and talked to him with deference. They treated him “as if [he] had accomplished something beyond comprehension.”³⁴ To this day, average Senegalese Muslims run from one *Ganale* to another seeking to be among the first visitors to rub the hands of new *Hajjees*, and pay them respect for their achievement.

³⁰ Literally: “observe chastity and attain a state of purity,” and “put one’s life in order.”

³¹ Literally: “to welcome.”

³² *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guéye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM).

³³ *El Hadj* Galaye Fall (Saint-Louis: Léona – Eaux Claires. June 2, 2002 3:45 PM – 6:00 PM).

³⁴ Idem. “*mu mel ni da ma def lu yéeme.*”

At such colonial and present day post-*Hajj* season banquets, guests indulge in food and drink available in abundance. Also, they drink at least one cup of the water from Holy *Zem-Zem* well in Mecca diluted with tap water offered to visitors and brought specially from Mecca. Most importantly, they seek to receive some of the *barke*³⁵ acquired in Mecca. At *ganale* parties, colonial pilgrims were recognizable due to the *égales* sitting on the piece of white cloth covering their heads (see pictures). *Égales* are now outdated, especially among Senegalese female *Hajjees*. Henna-tattooed hands and feet are still en vogue among Senegalese *Adjaratous*. Both male and female pilgrims let visitors rub, smell, and kiss their hands, and endlessly recite prayers and blessing formulas for people who have come to greet them. Visitors often rub their hands blessed by the new *Hajjees* on their faces and chests. Today, *ganale* parties also provide Senegalese *Hajjees* the opportunity to display their wealth.

Until recently, *El Hadj* and *Adjaratou* were essentially aged Muslim men and women in their 50s or more. However, in Senegal today, young men and women are very much represented within the annual Senegalese pilgrim population. This is due in part, to the fact that the trip to Mecca has become much easier. In contemporary Senegal a widespread idea is that the younger one makes the *Hajj*, the better. Also, housing conditions in Mecca and in Madina have dramatically improved, and the duration of the trip has shortened.³⁶ Yet, the performance of the *Hajj* still requires good mental and physical health. However, the desire to enjoy the status and the related benefits that accrue to a successful pilgrim during at least the forty days following the end of the *Hajj* still leads to certain extremes.

³⁵ Literally, “blessings, riches, consideration, prestige, profit.” A. Fal, R. Santos, J. L. Doneux. *Dictionnaire wolof-français : suivi d’un index français-wolof*. (Paris, Karthala, 1990), 39.

³⁶ In the past pilgrims used to stay away for months. It is only about two decades ago that the State of Senegal started making arrangements for lodging for pilgrims in Saudi hotels. Thierno Birahim Ndao said “he did not know where he was going to stay” when he was appointed Former *Haut Commissaire au Pèlerinage* for the 1972 *Hajj* season. He decided to stay with “his pilgrims and sleep outdoor on bare mattresses, or on the floor if necessary.” Phone conversation with Thierno Birahim Ndao (June 17, 2003: 9:15 AM – 9: 40 AM).

3. Pilgrim *Mbootay*: Fostering the *pèlerin* mentality and ways of life

Beginning in the colonial period, Senegalese Muslims used all the means available to them to make their *Hajj* dreams come true. Influential colonial Senegal Muslims such as Dakar-Plateau Muslim woman *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne and Saint-Louis Muslim *Greffier-en-chef El Hadj* Papa Guéye Issakha used much of their financial assets to fund several trips to Mecca for *Hajj* purposes for their friends, and for themselves.³⁷ While, less wealthy Muslims from Saint-Louis such as *El Hadj* Soucoundou Niane and *El Hadj* Galaye Fall risked their lives on the overland roads. The relatives of Saint-Louis Muslims Baye Mody Faye and *El Hadj* Soucoundou Niane even thought they had died on the way to Mecca.³⁸

In the 1920s, going to Mecca was “*dans l’Air du temps*” or, “*à la mode*” the Lébous. For *El Hadj* Ibra Guéye Paye, that is because Dakar was a small town stretching westward between the Cap Manuel and the Repos Mandel, and eastward between the Cap Manuel and the Bel-Air cemetery.³⁹ As a reminder, in 1785 the Governor of Gorée Island had purchased the Madeleines Islands and the village of Dakar from the Kayor *Damel*. However, an opposition of the *Damel* successors and the Lébou rulers to the sale cancelled the treaty. In 1845, French officials began considering relocation on the peninsula across Gorée Island in response to the complaints of Gorée merchants regarding the behavior of local chiefs.⁴⁰

³⁷ Baye Moussé “Franky” Bâ (Saint-Louis: Nord. May 29, 2002: 8:00 PM – 9:00 PM). *El Hadj* Galaye Fall (Saint-Louis: Léona–Eaux Claires. June 2, 2002 3:45 PM – 6:00 PM). *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye (Dakar: 113, Avenue L. Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).

³⁸ The relatives of Baye Mody Faye held a symbolic burial ceremony in his honor. Likewise, the relatives of *El Hadj* Soucoundou Niane thought he had passed until Saint-Louis pilgrims returned from Mecca two years later with the news they had seen the blind man in Mecca. The following year, they provided money to Saint-Louis pilgrims to have them bring him back home. Insa Niane (Saint-Louis: Guet-Ndar Tak. May 29, 2002: 1:20 PM – 1:45 PM).

³⁹ *El Hadj* Ibra Guéye Paye (Dakar: Mbott. June 25, 2003: 9:30 AM – 10:00 AM), and *El Hadj* Ameth Diéne (Dakar: Rue 17 angle 18. June 25, 2003: 11:15 AM – 1:00 PM).

⁴⁰ A. Sinou *Comptoirs et villes du Sénégal : Saint-Louis, Gorée, Dakar*. (Paris, Karthala-ORSTOM, 1993), 225-226.

In 1851, the Kayor *Damel* raised *coutumes* (taxes) on the caravans, and decided that the Rufisque *comptoir* would remain the only harbor reserved for peanut trade on the Cap-Vert peninsula. With the mounting significance of the peanut trade, Gorée merchants wished for a military occupation of Dakar from 1852 onward. In 1855, Gorée Governor Pinet-Laprade suggested the military occupation of Dakar and the “establishment of a big warehouse on the African west coast.” In 1857, the first French military outpost was built.⁴¹ Only two roads existed until 1954, the *Route de Ouakam* (present-day Avenue Blaise Diagne) and *Route de Rufisque*. The Ecole Manguiers - near Dakar’s University –marked the limit of the inhabited section of Dakar, beyond which *El Hadj* Ameth Diéne “used to cultivate his father fields.”⁴²

All Lébou Muslims knew each other in the 1920s, and certainly after World War II. They marked their contribution to war efforts through *Hajj* rituals accomplishment.⁴³ They also wished to celebrate the end of the “*coonoy rafle bi ak xiif bi*” era characteristic of wartimes.⁴⁴ During war food was scarce, and colonial women displayed a ingenuity to feed their families. For example, they soaked macaronis in water “*ba mu seey ñu defar ci beñe*”⁴⁵ and used semolina in place of rice. In extreme cases, they boiled pumpkin, or cassava for children, and avoided scraping pots while serving food, because “*da fa daan indi gan*.”⁴⁶

⁴¹ A. Sinou *Comptoirs et villes du Sénégal : Saint-Louis, Gorée, Dakar*. (Paris, Karthala-ORSTOM, 1993), 227.

⁴² *El Hadj* Ibra Guéye Paye (Dakar: Mbott, June 25, 2003: 9:30 AM – 10:00 AM).

⁴³ See, M. Michel. *Les Africains et la Grande Guerre: L'appel à l'Afrique, 1914-1918*. (Paris, Karthala, 2003).

⁴⁴ Literally: “the hardships of clothes shortage and hunger.” *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM). *El Hadj* Ameth Diéne (Dakar: Rue 17 angle 18. June 25, 2003: 11:15 AM – 1:00 PM).

⁴⁵ Idem. “Macaroni-based paste obtained from soaked macaroni and used to make fritters.”

⁴⁶ Senegalese people generally hold dear the values of *Téranga* (hospitality), *Sutura* (discretion), and *Jom* (sense of dignity). Yet, during the wartime era women would not scrape pots while serving food “to keep guests away.”

People experienced severe food and clothing shortage.⁴⁷ During wartime, many families owned one single outfit “*ku sol ba pare abal moroomam*.”⁴⁸ I inquired about the huge hems at the bottom of the *boubous Mbootaay* women wore on the pictures taken at various parties. Ordinarily, hems consist of small bands meant to prevent the fabric from unravelling. The hems on the outfits of *Mbootaay* women stood at least at knee-level. *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye took that opportunity to criticize French rulers. She claims percale was the only fabric until the arrival of American soldiers who “brought along with them a large variety of food (e.g. sweetened bananas, egg powder) and fabrics.” Women had to choose among a wide array of fancy fabrics to dress properly. The only thing to do was “*dagg baat rek sol*.”⁴⁹

After 1946 colonial men and women took advantage of the large choice of fabrics. Mecca pilgrims differed from the rest of the colonial population, partly because of the fancy outfits they wear on all occasions. “*Aladji ak Adjaratou yi da ñu daan sañse fo len fekk, booba góor bu solul baraya bokkoo*.”⁵⁰ Indeed, *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne and her *Mbootaay* female friends literally ran fashion shows at each periodical *pèlerin* banquet, and at all casual gatherings as well. *Adja* Mame Fakha Thiam created styles and made outfits for many of the women who belonged to the inner circle of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne.

⁴⁷ In wartime Dakar men and women had nothing to wear at times. Some would visit cemeteries at night, “*lóqati néew, jël malaan ya, cuub ko sol*.” Literally: “exhume corpses, remove, dye, and wear the pieces of fabric around corpses.” *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).

⁴⁸ Members of a same family would take turns wearing the outfit they owned in common.

⁴⁹ Literally: “to cut out a piece from the material with scissors and insert the head through that opening.” See also, Echenberg, M. J. *Black Death, white medicine: Bubonic Plague and the politics of public health in colonial Senegal, 1914-1945*. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002, for the achievements of American soldiers in matters of hygiene and the social impact of the American presence in Dakar during the Second World War.

⁵⁰ “Colonial Senegal *El Hadj* and *Adjaratou* used to dress well. Fashionable colonial men dressed in *Baraya* to fit in.” *El Hadj* Ameth Diéne (Dakar: Rue 17 angle 18. June 25, 2003: 11:15 AM – 1:00 PM).



Figure 24: Three Dakar-Plateau Mbootay women attending one of the famous postwar parties at the house of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne. Make note of the length of their hems.



Figure 25: *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne and her friend *Adja* Marème Ndir wearing similar outfits. That picture was taken within the house of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne.

As a result, *Mbootay* women attending *pèlerin* banquets in colonial Senegal were often dressed with similar outfits in terms of style and color. They not only wore rich garments, but many among them also wore gloves, and carried nice purses. Indeed, the apparels of *Mbootaay* women included fancy gold jewels, because *Adja* Gogo Keita (wife of Tijan cleric *El Hadj* Seydou Nourou Tall) and Marème Ndir (daughter of prominent Dakar Lébou landowner Alassane Ndir) – to name a few – were very wealthy. They wore gold necklaces, bracelets, rings, and pinned *libidors* (Louis d’Or) in their headdresses. Some even wore golden belts around their waists. A kilogram of gold was worth 150.000 Francs at that time.⁵¹ As a matter of fact, Plateau Muslim men and women and their counterparts from Saint-Louis and Rufisque, essentially, came to identify themselves as *Pèlerins* (pilgrims) even though once back in colonial Senegal they obviously were no longer on pilgrimage.

In his best-seller “*Maïmouna*,” Abdoulaye Sadjì provides a good picture of the very private “*Jeunes Hadj*” (Young *Hajjees*) Society. One night, members gathered at the place of Maïmouna’s brother-in-law to celebrate the birth of the Prophet Muhammad (*Gamou*). All were rich high-ranking civil servants and private contractors who used much of their earnings to make *Hajj*. “*Jeunes Hadj*” dressed up in similar Moroccan pants and jackets, and wore the same “Haroun-Al-Rashid like” headdresses. “*Jeunes Hadj*” were popular among women.⁵² That is why young civil servants and executives all strived to make *Hajj*, and belong to the “*Jeunes Hadj*” Society. The *Hajjees* Sadjì described are similar to the male *Pèlerins* immortalized on the pictures I obtained from the relatives of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne. Like the “*Jeunes Hadj*”, most Dakar-Plateau *Pèlerins* dressed up in fancy Moroccan or Saudi-like outfits (e.g. *Jellabas*). They also shared the same views on the importance of the *Hajj*.

⁵¹ *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye (Dakar: 113, Ave. Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).

⁵² Sadjì A. *Maïmouna*. (Dakar, Présence Africaine, 1958), 104-110.



Figure 26: *Adja* Mame Yacine and her friends at a *Pèlerin* banquet held at her house.



Figure 27: The *Pèlerin* female elite in front of the presidential palace with *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne standing in pole position near the picture of former President of Senegal Leopold Sédar Senghor (see little arrow).

In similar vein, Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis Muslims devised a whole set of codes and activities which set them apart from average colonial Muslims. Some pictures show *Mbootaay* women attending a 1968 parade in honor of the president Léopold Sédar Senghor. They displayed signs clearly identifying them as *Pèlerins* (see picture above). In the postwar era, many women undertook *Hajj* several times in order to gain recognition as *Pèlerins*. Wealthy female *Pèlerins* run *tontines* to allow average Muslim women to make *Hajj*.⁵³ After each *Hajj* season, Plateau *Mbootaay* women would invite fellow female *Pèlerins* from other communes to *Pèlerins* banquets, which consisted of refined lunches, afternoon snacks, or dinners entirely made often served by French caterers established in the Plateau area.⁵⁴

At this point, I must highlight the particular post-war social, religious and political contexts, especially in the Four Communes of colonial Senegal. Historian Cheikh Faty Faye has demonstrated the public opinion emerged and consolidated in Dakar immediately following the wartime “*Vichysme triomphant*”, and the ban of militant political and unionist actions. Africans used to participate in European-run political and social associations. After World War II, though, members of the Dakar African elite claimed political and social autonomy through the creation of all-African associations. That is why, the author of a 1944 political report emphasized the emerging “racist, and quite anti-French feeling” within the colonial population.” He insisted that, “natives [were] now willing to run their own associations [...] the times when Europeans acted as political leaders [were] now over.”⁵⁵

⁵³ See chapter 4, for details on the *tontines* organized by the Plateau women.

⁵⁴ Neither *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye, nor Oumy Diagne could provide the names of the French caterer who prepared *Pèlerin* banquets. However, on the pictures the way things arranged on tables suggest catering specialist’s touch. *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye and Oumy Diagne (Dakar: 113, Ave. Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).

⁵⁵ C. F. Faye. “La vie quotidienne à Dakar de 1945 à 1960: Approche d’une opinion publique.” (Paris, Thèse de Doctorat d’Université, 1990), 39 – 40.

Adja Mame Yacine Diagne used to be ‘*Laministe*’, a supporter of *Maître* Lamine Guèye former mayor of Dakar (1946-1961), founder of the *Parti Socialiste Sénégalais* in 1935, and leader of the AOF section of SFIO in 1938. Like most *Lébous*, she was grateful to Lamine Guèye for assisting the *Lébou* community when the colonial state took their land to build the Yoff Airport. She would prevent *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye “from going to the market and from cooking meals every time Lamine Guèye lost elections.”⁵⁶ Yet, one day she returned home from an errand and told the daughter-in-law “from this day forward you will be *Senghorienne*.”⁵⁷ To this day, no one knows her reasons for abandoning Lamine Guèye. Cheikh Faty Faye argues that colonial women “chose a man rather than a program” when they claim “I am *Laministe*, or *Senghorienne*.” That is why Senegalese male politicians are often left with only one choice: “to show off [*paraître*], rather than just be [*être*] themselves.”⁵⁸

After each successful *Hajj* season, *Adja* Mame Yacine held annual medal award ceremonies to congratulate her fellow *Mbootaay* friends. Decorations consisted in colorful knots made by ‘Rouda’ (Lebanese tailor).⁵⁹ *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne wished to reward female pilgrims for overcoming the hardships of the trip and completing *Hajj* rituals. Also, the ribbons pinned on the chest of female recipients were the expression of the acceptance of beneficiaries within the very elitist *Pèlerin* Society. In present-day Senegal, pilgrim statuses are still coveted, and most Senegalese Muslims strive to make the *Hajj* at least one time.

⁵⁶ *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).

⁵⁷ After the breakup of the *Fédération du Mali* in 1958, *Maître* Lamine Guèye and Léopold Sédar Senghor founded the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise* (UPS). They later engaged in a fierce to run the independent Republic of Senegal. That race brought up divisions within *Turuq* and families, and with the victory of Léopold Sédar Senghor.

⁵⁸ C. F. Faye. “La vie quotidienne à Dakar de 1945 à 1960: Approche d’une opinion publique.” (Paris, Thèse de Doctorat d’Université, 1990), 43.

⁵⁹ Oumy Diagne (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guèye, May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).

4. “Yàlla na nga dem Makka”: Longing for Mecca and the Muslim Holy Places

Today, the *Hajj* is no longer the business of learned men only.⁶⁰ I have described the rituals, which take place during post-*Hajj* season *Ganale*.⁶¹ In fact, all average Senegalese Muslims believe *Hajjees* enjoy divine grace for at least forty days after the end of the *Hajj*. The underlying reason is the conviction that Muslims believers come closer to God during the *Hajj*. Senegalese Muslims also believe worshippers get rid of their sins in Mecca, and return home with “clean records”, which remains that way unless they commit sins that can nullify the advantages acquired in Mecca and Madina. In general, Senegalese Muslims also believe, *Hajjees* can consolidate the aforementioned benefits through *Sellal* and *Jubal* after return.

For such reasons, even the *Hajjees* with only a basic knowledge of the ‘*Quran* and the rules of Islam generally enjoy respect from their Senegalese Muslim peers upon return within their own community. Ordinarily, except for their own parents or spouses, Senegalese Muslims mainly seek blessings from religious leaders and their offspring, and from individuals made famous by their erudition in Islam and their righteousness. However, Senegalese Muslims generally seem to neglect such distinctions around the post-*Hajj* season. Precisely, it is true that many condemn the Senegalese Muslims for being ignorant of the most basic tenets of Islam, and for whom going to Mecca “is like going to the market.”⁶² Yet, despite such reducing comments returning *Hajjees* generally enjoy the respect of their peers at least until the next *Hajj* season, and take full advantage of their new *Hajj*-related status.

⁶⁰ Devout Muslims must be respectful of all five Pillars of Islam. In addition to the daily observance of the Pillars they must abide by the rules defined in the corpus of laws handed down by the Prophet (‘*A-hadith*.’)

⁶¹ See subhead number 2 of this section.

⁶² See chapter I of this dissertation for the words of an anonymous caller very critical of Senegalese Muslims who have now turned Mecca flights into commuter flights. Many feel that trend is undermining the very essence of the *Hajj* (Al-‘*Ustaz* Mor Thiam on *Radio Futurs Médias* (R.F.M.). February 1, 2008: 11: 46 AM).

As a result, the Senegalese pilgrim population today is constantly on the rise, generating all sorts of problems Senegalese authorities struggle to solve.⁶³ According to Paul Marty, in 1917 French West Africa, “making *Hajj* was not a priority, even among die-hard *marabouts*.” Indeed, the annual number of Senegalese Mecca pilgrims amounted only to “about half a dozen [six] people, mainly of Wolof and *Toucouleur* origins.” Furthermore, “the total number of Muslim converts still alive in 1917 who made the round trip to Mecca did not exceed , hundred largely speaking.”⁶⁴ Marty was aware that West African Muslims largely resorted to pilgrimage through the *voie terrestre*. Yet, he claimed that “Senegalese pilgrims opted preferably for the [regulated] French authorities overseen sea routes,”⁶⁵ which makes sense in the event *Sénégalais* refers to *Originaire* Muslims, and the latter were in the same states of mind before World War I (1914-1918) and after World War II (1939-1940). To forget wartime hardships Originaires fostered a whole new social life eraound the *Hajj*.

Seafaring and air faring pilgrims mainly relied on the “general pilgrimage authorization granted annually by the Governor General upon special request of local governors [i.e. Lieutenant Governor of Senegal].” Prospective seafaring and air faring pilgrims were duly identified and coached for the upcoming trip. However, official statistics did not take into account anonymous overland Muslim pilgrims. Marty was likely wrong in thinking overland pilgrim routes were outdated and abandoned from 1900 onward.⁶⁶ For inland Senegalese Muslims, it is likely that completing formalities (e.g. pilgrim passports), and travelling on official convoys might have been too time and money consuming.

⁶³ I will address those problems in the second section of this chapter.

⁶⁴ Marty P. *L'Islam au Sénégal: Les doctrines et les institutions*. (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1917), 20.

⁶⁵ Idem, p. 21

⁶⁶ See, C. Pairault et A. Prost. “Actualité du pèlerinage à pied à la Mecque.” *Notes Africaines*, Dakar, (1978), 46-47.

In contemporary Senegal, we are far from the six pilgrims Paul Marty recorded for the entire colony of Senegal in 1917. Since the month of March 1988, Saudi Arabia has imposed quotas of 1 visa per 1000 inhabitants on all the countries involved in the *Hajj*, except for Europe, China, the United States, and Israel.⁶⁷ According to Demba Teuw, in 2006 the total Senegalese pilgrim population was set at 9.800 pilgrims based on the quota policy.⁶⁸ However, as it is often the case, the *Hajj* commission received over 9.800 *Hajj* visa requests. Therefore, the commission was left with no choice but to negotiate additional visas with Saudi Arabia.⁶⁹ One may wonder why the commission did not ignore late requests. My guess is that - as Turkish and European officials before them – the members of pilgrimage commission in Senegal were frequently confronted with the religious agency-related ethical issue.

In matters of *Hajj*, officials are often confronted dilemmas, because many older Muslims undertake the *Hajj* with the hope to die in Mecca. For example, in 1952, Elie Justin Barbé - director of the Buhan et Teisseire *maison de commerce* - offered *Hajj* ticket to a retired 75 years old deserving agent. Khar Fall told everyone about his hope to die in Mecca.⁷⁰ His prayers were answered because he passed away on that *Hajj* trip. Every year, Senegalese *Hajj* officials deal with *Hajj* candidates literally begging to talk physicians into overturning *Hajj* authorization denials to them granted on the ground they are unfit.⁷¹

⁶⁷ S. Zeghidour. *La Mecque, le voyage le plus long*. Le Monde Diplomatique, (Février 2003).

⁶⁸ Today, Demba Teuw is the chief librarian of the *Institut Islamique de Dakar*. He also has twenty years experience in the administration of the *Hajj* business (Dakar: Institut Islamique. May 16, 2002: 12: 50 PM).

⁶⁹ High commissioner *El Hadj* Moustapha Guéye announced the commission would stay under the maximum of 1 visa per 1000 inhabitants allowed by the quota rule. Under the Saudi legislation, any country exceeding its quota risks automatic exclusion from the *Hajj*. (Sud FM radio: “Assessing the 2007 *Hajj* season.” May 15, 2008: 10:00 PM – 12:00 AM.)

⁷⁰ *El Hadj* Khaly Niasse (Saint-Louis: Nord. May 29, 2002: 11:00 – 1:00 PM). Fatou Ba Niang (Saint-Louis: Léona. June 5, 2002: 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM).

For Senegalese Muslims, the desire to go to Mecca for the *Hajj* surpasses all wishes. That fact is noticeable in all the aspects of most Senegalese Muslims daily lives. Women, especially, are now increasingly using the *tontine* system to go to Mecca at least one time. That has led to the emergence of “Arafat-like” women *Mbootaay*. The goals of such *mbotaay* are generally to promote Islam while empowering women. The “Arafat” organization was created in 1992 by *Adja* Dior Diop and other famous women entrepreneurs. Today, the “Arafat” organization has spread throughout the world. “Arafat” has six sections in the United States only.⁷² “Arafat” members meet once a year, on the first or second weekend of the Ramadan month. The meetings are held in Dakar. That day, “Arafat” women usually dressed in similar outfits join for a day of prayers. Then, they formally select the winners of the *Hajj* tickets purchased with the amount of their total annual contributions.

As it is often the case, “Arafat” women are mainly private business owners operating in the informal sphere of economic activity. They are usually involved in the trade of commodity goods ranging from food (i.e. vegetables, fish, local goods), to luxury items (e.g. incense, fabrics, jewels). Unlike civil servants and private sector workers claiming salaries on a monthly basis, such women do not enjoy the benefits of regular incomes. It is likely that a large proportion of the Senegalese female population falls into this category. Many women view the *tontine* system as the only way to acquire the necessary means to make the *Hajj*. The *tontine* system is useful in many respects. The *tontine* system is a way for *tontine* subscribers to increase their business capital. It is a convenient saving system for women wishing to ‘invest’ their money, and already “has helped 4000 women make the *Hajj*.”⁷³

⁷²In, “Le Soleil” (October 11, 2007: online).

⁷³Idem. *Adja* Oulimata Dioum’s *Association des Femmes pour la Promotion de L’entrepreneuriat Féminin* (AFEPEF) is one of many “Arafat-like” organizations in Senegal. He claims that, “it is only through membership in such associations that many women were able to make *Hajj*.” Demba Teuw (Dakar: Institut Islamique. May 16, 2002: 12: 50 PM).

The proliferation of “Arafat-like” organizations is another indication of the significance of the *Hajj* for Senegalese Muslims. It is certainly the dream of most Senegalese Muslims to make *Hajj*, and eventually ‘*Umra* at least once in a lifetime. That desire explains probably why in Senegal the Wolof formula “May God give you the means to go to Mecca” (*Yàlla na nga dem Makka*) is now a commonplace blessing among Senegalese Muslims. That formula is not foreign to Senegalese Muslims for whom *Az-zakat* is a humdrum routine. *Az-zakat* is twofold. First, *Az-zakat-al-Mâl* is imposed on Muslims who saved an amount equivalent to 85 grams of gold within a year. They are required to give 2.5% of that amount to the needy. That taxation is mandatory only if the savings were unused for a whole year. *Az-zakat-al-Mâl* applies to money, cattle, minerals, vegetables and staples. Second, *Az-Zakat-al-Fitr* is an almsgiving required from Muslims towards the last week of Ramadan. They should give the poor the equivalent of four handfuls of the staple most commonly used in the area where they live. For all Muslims, including Senegalese Muslims, *Az-zakat* is fundamental.

In similar vein, observers of Senegalese society are aware of the importance of regular almsgiving for all individuals born and raised in Senegal regardless of their religion. Senegalese people generally believe in the power of almsgiving in helping alleviate various sufferings, as well as in easing the hardships men and women encounter in their daily lives. Alms are generally given to beggars and *taalibe* in the form of money (few coins), or in the form of food (e.g. sugar, milk, rice, poultry). That is why foreigners are often struck by the number of beggars and *taalibe* looking for that manna every day at the street corners of all major Senegalese cities. Grateful beggars and *taalibe* often accept the alms with the formula “*Yàlla na nga dem Makka.*” Children who beg especially endow that blessing. It is a common assumption in Senegal is that God never turns down the wishes of children, because of the purity of their hearts and souls. Therefore, such blessings coming from children are meaningful to the majority of Senegalese Muslims, wether they are devout or not.

5. Commonalities in pilgrim trajectories: The omnipresent hand of God

The inquiries I made in Dakar and Rufisque during the summer of 2002 yielded one consistent fact in all the narratives relating to *Hajj* experiences. I found that in their narratives most witnesses intentionally emphasized what they perceive as clear signs of divine grace, or sainthood in the *Hajj* experiences of colonial pilgrims. I was already aware of the twofold widespread belief among Senegalese Muslims. First, it is something impressive to be willing to go to Mecca. Second, it is still another thing to be actually among the God-chosen Muslims to make the *Hajj*. Senegalese Muslims know that making *Hajj* prior to the advent of boat and air transportation was an ordeal. That is why many firmly believe pioneer overland pilgrims enjoyed God's protection and special powers. According to Abdou Salam Touré, learned Muslims were very knowledgeable about the secrets and mysteries of the '*Quran*.

He contends Muslim travellers used various strategies as means of protection against the wild animals, outlaws, and evil spirits "they almost inevitably met on the way to Mecca."⁷⁴ Going to Mecca 'on foot' was hard indeed, and was a real challenge until the late 1980s. Today Senegalese Muslims, compare the *Hajj* to "a walk to the park" nowadays due to the tremendous improvements brought about by its organization by the Saudi government.⁷⁵ In the past, except for pilgrims staying with the Saudi *Mutawwaf* Burkhan, Senegalese Muslims generally made arrangements directly with landlords in Jeddah, Mecca and Madina. That is why, many pilgrims chose to sleep outdoor because they could not afford high rents.

⁷⁴ Abdou Salam Touré said overland pilgrims never travelled alone. At night, they would gather their mats at the center of carefully selected camping spots in such a way that they could look after each other. Then, overland pilgrims would plant a sword-like knife nearby the camping spot to keep unwanted visitors, and wild animals away. There is no need to say the knife was, in fact, a charm. He claimed *Takobi* is the name of that charm. In his words, he inherited one such charm from his father. However, he was unable to locate the *Takobi* for me to see. Abdou Salam Touré is even convinced the word *Takruri* is an alteration of the word *Takobi*. Abdou Salam Touré (Rufisque: HLM. May 18, 2002: 1:00 PM – 2:30 PM).

⁷⁵ See, D. D. Long, op. cit.

The living conditions in Mecca and Madina were very hard. On some pictures, *Adja Mame* Yacine Diagne, her sister-in-law Marème Sène “Mbass”, her friends *Adja* Fakha Thiam and *Adja* Oumy Ngom are seen sitting outdoors on a mat. It is as if the women either just finished eating, or they had cooked their own meals outdoor. Kitchenware is visible around them. However, *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne and her travel companions were among the well-off pilgrims. During the *Hajj*, they used to stay at the house of the *Mutawwaf* Burkhan who provided food and lodging to his pilgrims. However, in 1916 the living conditions of foreign pilgrims in the Holy Land were so appalling French authorities sent a Muslim emissary M. Ben Ghabrit to Mecca with the mission to acquire a house to accommodate indigent North African and AOF Muslims during the *Hajj* season. That *hôtellerie* was to be set up as a *bien habous* (owned in common) by Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and AOF Muslims.⁷⁶

Many Senegalese Muslims I spoke to say their ancestors overcame various supernatural ordeals. I was left with the feeling that all were trying to tell me that the hand of God was involved in the trajectories of their pilgrim relatives. Furthermore, to them God accompanied the Holy Travellers from the beginning to the end of their *Hajj* experiences. They seemingly implied that colonial pilgrims benefitted from special divine assistance and protection from the very minute they expressed the desire to undertake *Hajj*. In narrating pilgrim experiences, many clearly or implicitly suggested supernatural intervention. It even seems that many were trying to convey the idea that their colonial pilgrim relatives were different from average colonial Muslims. The narratives of the *Hajj* experiences of Saint-Louis Muslim *El Hadj* Amath Ba indicate Senegalese Muslims generally conform to that worldview.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ ANS: 19G9. N°528. J. Cambon. *Hôtellerie de la Mecque, Mission de Mr. Ben Ghabrit. L'Ambassadeur de France, Secrétaire Général des Affaires Etrangères Jules Cambon, à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies.* (Paris, December 27, 1916).

⁷⁷ See chapter 4, for a summary of the *Hajj* experiences of *El Hadj* Amath Ba. See also, Abdou Salam Touré (Rufisque: HLM. May 18, 2002: 1:00 PM – 2:30 PM).

B. Worldviews underlying the *Hajj* business in today Senegal

I have insisted on the fact that the *Hajj* has always meant a lot to the Muslims of the current republic of Senegal. No one knows how many colonial Senegal Muslims “*ño jaar kow*.”⁷⁸ In the Four Communes – especially in Dakar - making *Hajj* somehow became the Criterion to be part of the elite. For example, at the previously mentioned *Maouloud* celebration held at the residence of Bounama and Rihanna - Maïmouna’s brother-in-law and sister - a “*jeune Hadj*” named M’Bodj talked about becoming Maïmouna’s husband. A *griot* praised the ties of M’Bodj to major royal families in Senegal. He sang, “M’Bodj, grandson of *Bracks*, *Brack* in Walo, *Damel* in Kajor, *Teigne* in Bawol, and *Bour* in Siin.” The *griot* insisted, M’Bodj “has made *Hajj*, and owns several *villas* [houses] in Dakar.” Yet, Bounama promised to consider M’Bodj’s proposal only if he makes *Hajj* three times.⁷⁹

One can legitimately say that the interest of Senegalese Muslims in the *Hajj* has never faded since precolonial times. It even seems that Senegalese male and female Muslims are more than ever interested in touching the Kaaba and adding the *Hajj* titles (*El Hadj* and *Adjaratou*) to their given names. Today, especially among female Senegalese Muslims, going to Mecca on a yearly basis, officially for *Hajj* or ‘*Umra* purposes, has become standard practice. That is why authorities need to regulate the *Hajj* institution, which means so much to Senegalese Muslims. During colonial times, French authorities had understood beforehand the difficulties involved in the monitoring of an endeavor so dear to the hearts of Muslims from all around the world. Their successors in an independent Senegal are also aware of the significance of the *Hajj*. Yet, the *Hajj* is still in need of regulation in today’s Senegal.

⁷⁸ Literally, “went north.” That is, via present Mali and northern Nigeria all the way to Suakin (in present Sudan). Saint-Louis Muslims also use the word “*rungu*” (from the verb *rung*, to move from one place to a different location on foot) to describe the process consisting in making the *Hajj* ‘on foot’ across the desert. *El Hadj* Abdou Magib Diop, *Imam* of the Great Mosque of Saint-Louis (Saint-Louis: Nord. May 12, 2003: 9:00 AM – 10:15 AM).

⁷⁹ A. Sadji. *Maïmouna*. (Dakar, Présence Africaine, 1958), 108.

1. “We are not like the others”: *Turuq*-based attachment to the values of Islam

The *Hajj* is a basic yet critical institution of the Muslim faith. It is basic in the sense that, along with the four already named institutions (i.e. *Salat*) the *Hajj* forms a cornerstone of the Muslim religion. That is true despite the fact that unlike the mandatory other four pillars of Islam the *Hajj* requires, among other things, physical fitness and possession of sufficient financial means righteously acquired. The *Hajj* is the pillar many Muslims value the most despite the fact that making *Hajj* is not mandatory. In Senegal, most Senegalese Muslims praise the sanctity of the *Hajj* as their fellow Muslims elsewhere. Yet, one may be justified in thinking they have devised their own particular perspective on the institution. All Muslims have locally developed specific *Hajj* cultures more in line with the social and political realities of their communities. Nevertheless, the vitality and the ambiguity of the Senegalese *Hajj* culture are probably more culturally specific than *Hajj* cultures elsewhere.⁸⁰

Like Christians - and other believers - Senegalese Muslims very much value the pilgrimage. However, pilgrimages bear meanings which differ in time and in space. European Middle Age pilgrimages were the expression of religious practices which allowed believers to meet the “transcending element” in burial places of Saints, or in sites made Holy by Virgin-like apparitions.⁸¹ Drawing on Eickelman and Piscatori and on various scholars as well, I subscribe to the “assumption that Muslim religious doctrine prescribes certain kind of travel [such as *Hijra*, *Hajj*, or *Ziyara*] and that the ritual movement of Muslims [for religious purposes] leads to a heightened sense of identification with fellow Muslims.”⁸²

⁸⁰ See chapters 2 and 5, for the most meaningful aspects of the Senegalese *Hajj* culture which emerged and consolidated from the colonial period onward.

⁸¹ A. Graboïs. *Le pèlerin occidental en Terre Sainte au Moyen Âge*. (Paris, De Boeck Université, 1998). D. Blackbourn. *Marpingen: Apparition of the Virgin Mary in a nineteenth century German village*. (New York, Vintage Books, 1995).

⁸² D. Eickelman and J. Piscatori. *Muslim travellers: Pilgrimage, migration, and the religious imagination*. (New York, Routledge, 1990).

While making *Hajj* or *Ziyara* Muslim believers recognize themselves in the essential (e.g. the Uniqueness of God, and the centrality of Mecca). At the same time, they experience travel for religious purposes in very personal ways, because it is “principally a journey of the mind [and] an act of imagination”, which goes beyond the mere “physical movement from one place to another.”⁸³ That argument is true in the case of major pilgrimages (e.g. the *Hajj*, the Rome and Jerusalem pilgrimages), which bring together people from various backgrounds. It is also valid in the case of local pilgrimages particular to specific communities. Emma Aubin-Boltanski provides a good picture of the meanings of pilgrimage with the Palestinian case. She argues that Palestinian authorities have “revived” two pilgrimage sites dedicated to Prophet Muhammad (Nabî Sâlih) and to Prophet Moses (Nabî Mûsâ) in order to foster strong feelings of national identity among Palestinians.⁸⁴

Another issue is, the widespread habit among Muslim believers to question - or quantify - the way their fellow Muslims comply with the pillars of Islam, including the *Hajj*. Christian Bawa Yamba has surveyed Hausa Muslims in Sudan many have re-arranged their lives around the *Hajj*, which has become a “paradigm” of life for them. Despite border regulations and ongoing conflicts in the area which further impede their progression toward Mecca, Hausa settlers act and live “as if they are on their way” to Mecca. The *Fellata* or *Takari* (their local names) are convinced the amount of hardships they are enduring in the process of “moving toward Mecca” makes their experiences meritorious compared to other *Hajjees*.⁸⁵

⁸³ D. Eickelman and J. Piscatori. *Muslim travellers: Pilgrimage, migration, and the religious imagination*. (New York, Routledge, 1990), xii.

⁸⁴ E. Aubin-Boltanski. *Pèlerinages et nationalisme en Palestine : Prophètes, héros et ancêtres*. (Paris, Editions de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 2007). M. Perez-Gomez. *L'Islam politique au Sud du Sahara: Identités, discours et enjeux*. (Paris, Karthala, 2005), 534.

⁸⁵ C. Bawa Yamba. *Permanent pilgrims: Role of pilgrimage in the lives of West African Muslims in Sudan*. (London, Edinburgh University Press, 1995).

Senegalese Muslims go even further in their comparisons. They tend to quantify their respective levels of attachment to Islamic institutions. Even observers tend to focus on the attachment of Senegalese Muslims to *Turuq*. Some may conclude *Tariqa* comes before membership to the ‘*Umma* in Senegal. However, Senegalese *Turuq* affiliates disagree with that viewpoint. Yet, there are enough grounds to justify that outsider viewpoint. In Senegal the line between affiliation to *Tariqa* and membership to the ‘*Umma* is very thin, if not blurred. While proclaiming identification with ‘*Umma* members, Senegalese Muslims adhere thinking of their spiritual guides. With no exception, drawings and statements referring to main *Turuq* guides are displayed on taxicabs, commuter buses, and walls throughout Senegalese urban and rural towns. Indeed it is commonplace among *Turuq* affiliates to carry pictures of *Turuq* guides in place of necklaces, or in their wallets. Nevertheless, even among those Muslims, most view themselves as The Champions of orthodoxy and Islamic practice.

Tijaniyya, Qadiriyya, and Muridiyya affiliates are particularly outspoken on such matters, partly, because all enjoy worldwide influence or claim special ties with Prophet Muhammad himself. The roots of the main branches of the Tijaniyya (e.g. Sy family in Tivavouane, Tall family in Dakar, and Niasse family in Kaolack) go back to the Moroccan Tijaniyya founded by Ahmad-al-Tijani. Qadiriyya families (e.g. Aïdara and Kunta) assert direct blood ties with Prophet Muhammad. Similarly, the label *Khadimou Rassoul* (servant of the Prophet) emphasizes the closeness of Muridiyya founder *Cheikh* Amadou Bamba to Prophet Muhammad.⁸⁶ With the pedigrees of their *Tariqa* founder carefully preserved orally and in writing as well, affiliates are confident they are “on the *Sirat al-Mustaqim*” (the Straight Path), as opposed to “the *Sirat al-Jahim*” (path of the ones who have gone astray).

⁸⁶ See, O. Kane. *Les relations entre la communauté Tijane du Sénégal et la Zawiya de Fez. Annales de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Dakar* 24, (1995), 59-68. M. Ly-Tall. *Un Islam militant en Afrique de l’Ouest au XIXe siècle: La Tijaniyya de Saïku Umar Futiyyu contre les pouvoirs traditionnels et la puissance coloniale*. (Paris, Harmattan, 1991).

Turuq affiliates overwhelmingly believe they secure after-life Salvation through the observance of rituals particular to each *Tariqa*. For example, in addition to the required daily prayers, fasting, and alms Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya, and Muridiyya affiliates practice *Al-zikr*. That word refers to the fact of reciting periodically selected verses of the ‘*Quran*, or the ninety-nine names of God a. In addition, Muridiyya affiliates recommend daily reading of *Khassides* (poems of *Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba*). Tijaniyya disciples of the Sy branch advise recitation of *Tayssir* (poems of *El Hadj Malick Sy*). All *Turuq* affiliates cling to the sanctity of the texts written by their leaders. In addition, their confidence in after-life salvation is also nurtured by the conviction the Holy Places of their respective *Tariqa* are, literally, the depositories where *Allah* has put the key of Salvation for safekeeping. For instance, one affiliate of the Muridiyya grants curative powers to *Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba’s Khassida*.⁸⁷

Also, *Turuq* disciples generally revere pilgrimage to cities brought out of anonymity, or entirely created, by *Turuq* founders and spiritual leaders (i.e. Tivavouane, Touba, Nimzatt, Médina Baye, or Ndiassane). Senegalese Holy Cities correspond with the burial places of *Turuq* founders and their offspring.⁸⁸ Once in a while, die-hard *Turuq* affiliates try delineating bases of comparisons between the *Hajj*, and local pilgrimages meant to commemorate Senegalese *Turuq* founders and their teachings. Average Senegalese Muslims, and even moderate *Turuq* affiliates, consider such die-hard *Turuq* disciples heretics. Sometimes, the most convinced among those hardliners try comparing local Holy Cities to Mecca, and Medina. Hardliners sometimes even contend that *Turuq* disciples gain the same benefits from attending *Magal* or *Gamou* (or the like) as those Muslims who made *Hajj*.

⁸⁷ During preliminary fieldwork, I met a Muridiyya disciple who claims to have “dissolved himself in the Ocean of Bamba.” He explained to me the different virtues of each of the writings of *Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba*. For instance, he deems the writing entitled *Matlabouch Chifai*: “the doctor.” He contends that piece has the power to cure all ills. Modou Seck. (Dakar: Médina, rue 6 Angle 25. July 22, 2000: 4:30 PM – 6:15 PM).

⁸⁸ See chapter 3 for the importance of local *Turuq* in the practice of Islam in Senegal.

However, like *Cheikh* Ibrahima Sall and *El Hadj* Galaye Fall the majority of Senegalese Muslims feel that, “there is nothing like the *Hajj*.”⁸⁹ Most of them value the *Hajj* even when they have not yet had the chance to make it. Several colonial clerics never made the *Hajj*. Generally, their reasons had little to do with lack of financial means, or physical ability. In fact, going to Mecca depended on several factors which involved the colonial administration. Several clerics probably found themselves in that situation during the colonial era, especially once French colonial officials defined several rules which made travel to Mecca for *Hajj* purposes more difficult for their Muslim subjects. Nevertheless, Paul Marty jeered at colonial clerics for never making *Hajj*. In fact, “except for a few of them”, most clerics did not make *Hajj*. Further ridiculing them, Marty claimed they only “mention the *Hajj*” in their conversations to formulate “conventional excuses” as to why they did not make *Hajj*.⁹⁰

Marty, though, says nothing about the fact that in 1912 and in 1915, the *métropole* often turned down requests from AOF Governors to organize *Hajj* convoys (*autorisation générale du pèlerinage*).⁹¹ Also, even when general *Hajj* authorizations were approved, colonial agents often looked for local criteria that would have enabled them to turn down individual requests. For example, *El Hadj* Samba Diakhaté and *El Hadj* Galaye Fall were both denied individual authorizations in 1939 and in 1957. Also, Paul Marty obscures the fact that the relationships of some clerics with the administration might have not been an impediment.

⁸⁹ “*Ku réer rek ay lëkkële Aj Makka ak Gamu wa illa lu ni mel. Makka yemmul ak dara.*” Literally, “only confused people would dare compare *Hajj* with *Gamou*, or the like. There is nothing like the *Hajj*.” *Cheikh* Ibrahima Sall (Dakar: Guédiawaye. July 18, 2002: 5:30 PM – 6:00 PM). “*Murid sadikh laa, waaye nak dara yemmu ma fi ma Aj Makka yem.*” Literally, “I am a die-hard Murid disciple, but to me the *Hajj* does not compare to anything.” *El Hadj* Baye Galaye Fall (Saint-Louis: Léona – Eaux Claires. June 2, 2002: 3:45 PM – 6:00 PM).

⁹⁰ P. Marty. *L’Islam au Sénégal: Les doctrines et les institutions*. (Paris, E. Leroux, Tome II, 1917), 20.

⁹¹ Idem.

Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba was placed in the custody of the state from the moment France decided to consolidate the AOF group in 1895. *Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba* was sent to Gabon between 1895 and 1902. Between 1903 and 1907 he was forced to remain in Mauritania in the care of Qadiriyya figure *Cheikh Sidiyya*. Again, between 1907 and 1912 he was placed under house arrest at Thiéryène, in the circle of Louga. Then, from 1912 until his death in 1927 he remained again under house arrest in Diourbel. French colonial authorities were seemingly never able to clearly confirm the aspirations of Bamba and his followers to resist French rule. Yet, the cleric remained in confinement for thirty-two years. Muridiyya followers still view him as a resistant to French occupation, even if recent research suggests he engaged in collaboration with the colonial administration between 1880 and 1920.⁹²

Bamba was not able to make *Hajj*. That was not the case for his siblings and offspring. Mbaye Mbengue remembers the reception in the honor of *Cheikh Anta Mbacké* (*Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba's* younger brother) at the house of his uncle Cheikhou Diop in 1928.⁹³ *Cheikh Anta Mbacké* and his following were on their way to Mecca for *Hajj* purposes. Mbaye Mbengue who was born in 1919, was nine years old. His uncle slaughtered countless sheep and chicken for days. The narrator even “tried macaronis for the first time.”⁹⁴ He does not remember how long they were away but “the party resumed when they returned.”

⁹²For more details on the experience of *Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba* with colonial rule, see C. A. Babou. *Autour de la g n se du Mouridisme. Islam et Soci t  au Sud du Sahara*, n  11, November 1997: 5-36. C. A. Babou. *Fighting the Greater Jihad: Amadu Bamba and the fighting of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853-1913*. (Athens, Ohio University Press, 2007). D. Robinson. *Paths of accommodation: Muslim societies and French colonial authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920*. (Athens, Ohio University Press, 2000).

⁹³Mbaye Mbengue (Dakar: Champ de Courses. May 11, 2002: 9:30 AM – 10:15 AM). Also, see chapter 3 for details on the experience of businessman Cheikhou Diop with the *Hajj*.

⁹⁴Mbaye Mbengue first refused to eat macaronis and beef, because the *Macaronis* looked like “*vers de terre* [worms] to him.”

I also learned from couple witnesses that *Serigne* Fallilou Mbacké (1888-1968), son and second *Khalife* of Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba Mbacké (1945-1968), made *Hajj* in 1928. For instance, *El Hadj* Mafall Seck claims in 1928 his father *El Hadj* Masseck Seck made *Hajj* on the same boat as *Serigne* Fallou. A self-proclaimed Murid *taalibe*, *El Hadj* Mafall Seck claimed *Serigne* Fallilou further deserved the motto “*na am mu am, [or] du am du am*” on that trip⁹⁵ by taking the boat out of a violent storm on the way back to Dakar. Except for *El Hadj* Masseck Seck, all were sick in his cabin. They asked him to “seek *Serigne* Fallou’s prayers for safety.” The Qadiriyya *taalibe* waited while the *Serigne* prayed. When he was done praying the cleric told him to go back to sleep. *El Hadj* Masseck Seck and his peers fell fast asleep and woke up hours or days later when they heard, “*héé, faaru Ngor ga ngee*.”⁹⁶

El Hadj Malick Sy, founder of the Tivavouane branch of the Tijaniyya, did not experience the same difficulties. In the early twentieth century, French officials viewed Tijaniyya affiliates as fanatics.⁹⁷ However, the relationships of *El Hadj* Malick Sy with the French colonial administration were good. It is unclear if *El Hadj* Malick Sy obtained authorization from the administration to make *Hajj*. Yet, the colonial state did not oppose the *Hajj* plans of *El Hadj* Malick Sy, since he sailed to Mecca on a French government-chartered boat via the Marseille harbor in France’s Southern France between 1888 and 1889.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ The Muridiyya oral tradition maintains that *Serigne* Fallilou Mbacké was born on the night of the twenty-seventh day of Ramadan, which many Senegalese Muslims (including the followers of *Serigne* Fallou) believe coincides with the “Night of Power”, or the “Night of Destiny” (*Laylat-ul-Qadr*). To Muslims throughout the world, the *Quran* was revealed to Prophet that night. Murids believe *Serigne* Fallilou’s prayers never were always answered by God. Today, the memory of the miracles he accomplished survives through his nickname: “let that be: [and] that happens, let that not be: [and] that does not happen.”

⁹⁶ Literally: “over there, the Ngor lighthouse,” meaning they woke up off the coast of Dakar.

⁹⁷ D. Robinson. *France as a Muslim Power in West Africa*. *Africa Today*, 46 (¾), (Summer/Autumn 1999), 105-127

⁹⁸ D. Robinson. *The Holy War of Umar Tal: The western Sudan in the nineteenth century*. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985).

I asked *Niassène* cleric *Cheikh* Ibrahima Niasse how Baye Niasse managed to set up such a wide network of followers between Senegal and Saudi Arabia. *Cheikh* Ibrahima Niasse responded, “*alxuraan dafa ne Ikhra: jàng len. Loola tax, fu mu xalaat ne mën na fa jële xam-xam, Baay dem na fa.*”⁹⁹ He insisted that Baye Niasse went indeed to Nigeria, “*Misra*” (Egypt), and Saudi Arabia in order to improve his knowledge of Islam and related sciences. When Muslims in the places he visited realized “*ni Baay Niass xereñe ci xam-xamum lislām ñu topp ko. Baay da fa len daan nemmeeku saa su ne. Ci noonu la baay aje Makka ay yooni yoon.*”¹⁰⁰ I asked him if the motive of the *Niassène* leader were to make *Hajj*, or to improve his knowledge of Islam. He answered “*du ma ne jàngul dara ci tukki yi bari yi. Waaye yaakaar naa ne bayi na fa lu tollu na la mu fa jële, wa illa lu ko raw.*”¹⁰¹

Baye was interested in everything that relates to the *Hajj*, because it is a duty for all able-bodied Muslims with the means. To him, true disciples feel the same way about the *Hajj*. In that same vein he added, “I am not talking about disciples for whom the *Niassène* label is simply a camouflage. I am talking about true *Niassène* disciples.” Following through with his idea on such matters *Cheikh* Ibrahima Sall concluded “*bare na ci ay këru diine yo xamne ci aj Makka bakkul ci sen ay mbiir. Ñun nak ñaseen melu ñu na yooyu këru diine. Baay ñass da fa farataloon aj Makka. Te ba tey jii noonu la ko ay taalibem farataale.*”¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Literally: “the ‘*Quran* says *Ikhra*: [you should] acquire knowledge [and look for it everywhere]. That is why Baye [Niasse] visited all the places where he thought he could acquire that knowledge [of Islam-related issues].”

¹⁰⁰ Literally: “they [converts] realized how Baye Niasse was knowledgeable of the issues of Islam, and paid allegiance to him. Baye visited them regularly. He [also] took that opportunity make *Hajj* several times.”

¹⁰¹ Literally: “I will not say he learned nothing more than what he knew on Islam during those trips. However, he taught them as much as they taught him, if not more than they taught him.”

¹⁰² Literally: “the *Hajj* is not part of the concerns of many leading local [Senegalese] Muslim families [*Turuq*]. However, we [the *Niassène* family] are not like those families. Baye Niasse considered the *Hajj* an obligation. [And] to this day, the disciples of Baye Niasse feel that way [about the *Hajj*].”

2. A Self-reliant tool of governance and powerful instrument of socialization

Senegalese Muslims look for differences in the ways they perceive the *Hajj*. However, a constant feature in that debate is that most Senegalese Muslims still look for their bearings in a context where telling the *Fardh* (obligation) from the *Sunnah* (ways and teachings of the Prophet), or the *Bida* (innovation) in *Hajj* issues is difficult. Senegalese Muslims generally think Muslims make *Hajj* without the minimal knowledge of what the *Hajj* is about. Hence, the numerous lapses in the behavior of Senegalese pilgrims noticed and described extensively every year in their reports and conversations by members of the *Commission du Pèlerinage*, and by Senegalese pilgrims themselves. Médecin-Colonel Ousseynou Noba, the 2002-2009 head of the medical team of the *Hajj* Commission, claims that prospective Senegalese Muslim pilgrims need to go through minimal training in order to understand what the *Hajj* is about. “That is the only way to prevent the recurrence of careless behaviours.”¹⁰³

One of the most outspoken learned Senegalese Muslims on such matters is certainly *Al-Imam* Ahmet Dame Ndiaye. The latter argues it is mandatory that Muslims comply with canonical obligations prior to making the Muslim pilgrimage. Otherwise, the *Hajj* of Senegalese Muslims who failed to comply with canonical rules will turn out to be not valid. According to the *Imam*, Senegalese Muslims must imperatively accomplish *As-Zakat* prior to departure for ‘*Umra*, or *Hajj*. In his own words, Senegalese Muslims who pride themselves on having totalled ten or more *Hajj* or ‘*Umra* trips can consider their *Hajj* and ‘*Umra* trips null and void if they have failed to give away *As-Zakat* on each instance. In his opinion, such Muslims would be better off giving away that money in the form of alms to the needy.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Médecin-Colonel Ousseynou Noba (Dakar: Ministry of Health. August 20, 2003: 9:00 AM – 11: 00 AM).

¹⁰⁴ Sermon of *Al-Imam* Ahmet Dame Ndiaye, quoted from the radio-show *Al-Bidaya* hosted by *Ustaz* Alioune sall (Sud FM radio: February 1, 2008: 9:15 AM – 11:00 AM).

To catch listeners' attention, *Al-Imam* Ahmet Dame Ndiaye read the story of two next-door neighbors (rich and poor) whose children used to play together in spite of differences in social status. One day, the rich child went to poor neighbors' house. He found the family having grilled meat for dinner. His friend's father told him "you cannot have dinner with us tonight." He went home in tears and complained to his father. The father was very angry. He shouted "*tey ma won ko ne file yapp fekke baax.*"¹⁰⁵ He added for his crying son, "I will let nobody disrespect you for some meat. Do not cry! I will buy a whole ox just for you." Nevertheless, he decided to confront the next-door neighbor about the incident that had left his son distraught. The man went to the house of the neighbor, and found parents and children still having dinner. The narrator, *Al-Imam* Ahmet Dame Ndiaye started crying.

The neighbor responded "your son is also my son. It is always a great pleasure for us to share our food with him. Nonetheless, today I prevented him from having dinner with us, because the grilled meat we have had actually comes from the remains of an animal I found on the streets yesterday. I thought my children can have that meat, because that is the only option for them to have food tonight. Whereas, your son does not have to eat from a cadaver, because he can have all the meat he wants at his own house."¹⁰⁶ In tears, the rich man went home and took all the money he intended to use to make pilgrimage that year. He gave it all to the poor neighbor. That year all pilgrims from the area who returned from Mecca reported seeing the rich man in Mecca and in Medina during the *Hajj* season. *Al-Imam* Ahmet Dame Ndiaye concluded, "in fact, an Angel had taken the [bodily] appearance of the rich man and made the *Hajj* for him." With that story he wished to make the point that it is useless to make *Hajj* several times. "Muslims gain more from using that extra money to feed the needy."

¹⁰⁵Literally, "I will prove him that my house is the place where meat came into being."

¹⁰⁶Eating meat from cadavers is strictly forbidden (*Haram*). To be considered fit for consumption by Muslims (*Halal*), animals must be slaughtered according to Muslim laws.

The call of *Al-Imam* Ahmet Dame Ndiaye will go largely unheard, because Senegalese Muslims are more than ever attracted to the *Hajj*. Muslims know that *Hajj* performance is required once in a lifetime if candidates meet the requirements. Yet, many make *Hajj* over and over again, and find a wealth of explanation to justify their *Hajj* habits. For instance, a man who had fathered children with four wives went to Mecca seven times. In the testimony of his own daughter, he used to give the following answer to people who said making *Hajj* several times is useless. “That is your opinion! I make *Hajj* to pray for my children. I want them all to get along. I will go back this year if I have the means.”¹⁰⁷ She concluded that the trips served their purpose, because no one can tell which wife gave birth to which child.”¹⁰⁸

More than ever, Senegalese policy-makers and politicians of all persuasion feel that helping their political clients, and useful *administrés* fulfil their *Hajj* dreams is a powerful tool for maintaining their followings. Colonial authorities understood early that one effective way to strengthen alliances with colonial Muslims was to sponsor *Hajj* trips. They sent to Mecca Saint-Louis Muslim Hamat Ndiaye Anne (1813-1879) “who collaborated closely with Faidherbe, especially during the expedition in the River Valley,” and for the services he rendered through his “public appeals for calm during the 1865-1866 famine, and the 1868-1869 cholera epidemics”. Likewise, Dudu Seck Bu-El-Moqdad (1826-1880) enjoyed that preferential treatment as a major ally of the administration. He “assisted Faidherbe with the development of propaganda against “militant Islam” and Al-Hajj Umar in particular.” Consequently, he made the *Hajj* twice at the expenses of the colonial administration.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ In Senegal, conventional wisdom assumes that *doomu baay* (children from a same father) seldom get along with each other. In fact, it is widely believed children born from different mothers tend to feud all the time.

¹⁰⁸ “*Confidences*” talk-show (Dunya FM radio: April 21, 2007: 9:00 AM – 12:00 AM).

¹⁰⁹ D. Robinson. *The Holy War of Umar Tal: The western Sudan in the nineteenth century*. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985), 81-82

Similarly, wealthy colonial Muslims helped other Muslims face *Hajj* expenses. For example, *Maître* Lamine Guéye offered boat ticket and *pécule* to *El Hadj* Mohsine Diop in 1945. According to Baye Moussé “Franky” Ba, scores of colonial Muslims would never have been able to make *Hajj* if it was not for “famous local politicians, and rich merchants.” Nevertheless, he insists that “such patrons would take every possible precaution to ensure that their identities remain undisclosed. Unlike today’s patrons, colonial patrons believed in the central values of *Sutura* [discretion] and *Kersa* [respectability].” In the past, “*nit da fa la daan may ak [loxo] ndeyjooram ta càmmooñam du yëg.*”¹¹⁰ Muslims “did not starve to death thanks to *traitant* Hamet Gora Diop, in Saint-Louis.” Also, “he made the *Hajj* dreams of many Muslims come true. Yet, it is long after he passed away that many *Saint-Louisiens* identified him as a patron.” “Nowadays, Senegalese people publicize their good deeds.”¹¹¹

Several witnesses in Saint-Louis, Dakar, and Rufisque argue that colonial Muslims were not looking for fame, or anything similar.¹¹² However, in today Senegal *Hajj* ticket award ceremonies are quite often very well-publicized, and seldom kept secret. That has to do in part with the extensive media coverage. In the last two decades, Senegalese people have become largely familiar with local newspapers. Furthermore, they generally have an inclination for the type of local gatherings known as *xawaare*, which is a regular form of entertainment in Senegal. During *xawaare* parties, *griots* acting as “Masters of Ceremony” are generally vested with the task of distributing the *Hajj* packages (i.e. ticket and *devises*) to the lucky awardees on behalf of their *géer* (the nobility and the non-artisan castes).

¹¹⁰ Literally, “someone would give you something with the right [hand] without the left [hand] knowing.”

¹¹¹ Baye Moussé “Franky” Bâ (Saint-Louis: Nord. May 29, 2002: 8:00 PM – 9:00 PM).

¹¹² Rich *Saint-Louisiens* “meant to help *néew-ji-doole* (indigent) *mattal sen farata* (complete their (religious) duties). They sought after-life salvation. The deal was between God and them.” Baye Moussé “Franky” Bâ (Saint-Louis: Nord. May 29, 2002: 8:00 PM – 9:00 PM).

3. State and town-run *Hajj* sponsoring ceremonies: The *collectivités locales*

Footages and pictures of *xawaare*-style *Hajj* ticket award shows are often displayed in local newspapers and people magazines, and to a lesser extent on local TVs. *Xawaare*-style *Hajj* ticket award ceremonies usually take place in formal settings. Besides the formal, well-recognized and popular *Hajj* ticket award ceremonies are the less-publicized and yet institutionalized *Hajj* packages allocation ceremonies. The State of Senegal, *collectivités locales* (local authorities), and the private and public sectors oversee and arrange institutionalized *Hajj* package allocation processes upstream and downstream. Every year, the State gives scores of high-ranking and average civil servants the opportunity to make *Hajj*. That is possible because of the special regulations of the *Hajj* organization under which the government must appoint the *Haut Commissaire* and members of the *Hajj* commission.

Yet, in reality the government appoints only “about 10 to 15 members out of the approximately 100 members of the commission. The bulk of commission members come from the various departments and agencies which make up the government of Senegal.”¹¹³ According to *El Hadj* Malick Sow, the State effort to reach out to all departments in setting up the *Hajj* commission is laudable. Yet, that initiative paves the way for all kind of excesses every year. The State seeks to bring more expert advices to the commission in including all departments in the forming of *Hajj* commissions. Many former commission members, including Colonel Ousseynou Noba have complained because “members are appointed on the basis of their level of acquaintance with the men and women on the spot.”¹¹⁴ The latter thinks “many members are more interested in going to Mecca than in assisting pilgrims.”¹¹⁵

¹¹³ *El Hadj* Malick Sow. (Dakar: Institut Islamique. May 16, 2002: 12:15 – 12:30 PM).

¹¹⁴ *Idem.*

¹¹⁵ Médecin-Colonel Ousseynou Noba (Dakar: Ministry of Health. August 20, 2003: 9:00 AM – 11: 00 AM).

It is true that connections within policy-making circles of the Senegalese society helped. Fatou Ba Niang confessed she was selected as member of the medical team on the *Hajj Commission* in 1982, 1987, and in 1990. When she was first selected in 1982, she was very involved in politics in Saint-Louis. She remembers being sick with malaria and bed-ridden when the emissary of an unnamed Saint-Louis politician socialite came to her bedside. The man handed her a blank piece of paper. He “simply asked me to place my signature at the bottom of the piece of paper. Next thing I know, I was on my way to Mecca.” She had missed previous opportunities to go to Mecca, because her father *El Hadj* Amath Ba meant to take her with him on at least three occasions. Nevertheless, her husband turned down all the offers on the ground that “no one else but him is supposed to pay for her Mecca ticket.” Fatou Ba Niang concluded “politics did, indeed, play a role in my being selected. But make no mistakes. I was highly qualified for the job in my capacity as a state-trained midwife.”¹¹⁶

Many Senegalese Muslims have been able to make *Hajj* thanks to their selection as *Hajj* commission members, and through corporate and community-sponsored *Hajj* ticket lotteries. Sweepstakes have become standard practice. Ed Van Hoven mentions one such event held in Tambacounda in April 1992 in which Abdou Diouf, then president of Senegal, handed a *Hajj* package at Sodefitex expenses to the “King of Cotton.” According to Ed Van Hoven, the Sodefitex celebration “points out to new themes and elements pertinent to the transformation of political realities in contemporary Senegalese society.” Such “themes, [...] are characteristics of a new phase of nationalism in Senegal. [A new phase] in which Islam has a greater effect on the politics of national identity applied by the national state.”¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ Fatou Ba Niang (Saint-Louis: Léona. June 5, 2002: 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM). The case of Fatou Ba Niang is certainly not unique in its kind.

¹¹⁷ E. Van Hoven. *The nation turbaned? The construction of nationalist Muslim identities in Senegal*. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 30 (2), (2000), 225. Sodefitex is the *Société de Développement des Fibres Textiles* (a state-run company involved in the cotton industry).

The Senegalese *collectivités locales*, made up of regions, *communes* (towns or cities), and *communautés rurales* (groups of villages), are governed by law number 96-06 on the “Code des Collectivités Locales” signed March 22, 1996. *Collectivités locales* are the outcome of the decentralisation policy set in motion after 1960. I focus on towns only, especially on town-run *Hajj* sponsorship in Rufisque. The *plein exercice* status, once granted to Saint-Louis, Rufisque, Dakar and Gorée only, was applied in 1960 to towns nationwide. Law number 66-64 signed June 30, 1966, brought under one text the various laws governing Senegalese regions, towns, and *communautés rurales*. 48 towns and 320 *communautés rurales* emerged after the enactment of the 1996 “Code des Collectivités locales.” In order to promote local development through power decentralisation, all units of the *collectivités locales* are granted financial autonomy. It is that financial autonomy which allowed Rufisque Mayor Ndiawar Touré to set up a “one of a kind *Hajj* program” between 2003 and 2008.¹¹⁸

Ndiawar Touré (2002-2009) is Rufisque second mayor of the *Alternance* regime (2000 and beyond). He relied on sixty-eight municipal council members to carry out his executive tasks. “All political parties are represented within the municipal council, which is a model of democracy.”¹¹⁹ In 2002, Ndiawar Touré set up twenty-two committees to oversee the social and economic issues municipal agents deal with on a daily basis. The Mayor was the president of all 22 commissions. The “*Commission des Affaires Religieuses et Coutumières*” (Religious and Customary Affairs Committee) took into account Christianity and Islam mainly, and local African cults as well. First of all, the mayor requested from the *Commission* a full inventory of religious buildings within the city. The Religious Affairs Commission identified 120 mosques, the Sainte-Agnès catholic church, and the Protestant church.”

¹¹⁸ *El Hadj Seyni Dramé* (Rufisque: Dangou Nord. June 10, 2005: 11:20 AM – 13:30 PM).

¹¹⁹ A retired labor Inspector (1948-1996), *El Hadj Seyni Dramé* was the *Doyen* (most senior person) of the *Conseil des Sages* (the Board of Wise Men) of the Rufisque municipal council at the time we met.

The *Commission des Affaires Religieuses et Sociales* was initially meant to provide “assistance and support in cash and in kind, without distinction, to all religious communities within Rufisque.” For instance, each Imam was given a 25.000 francs allowance for Tabaski (*Eid-El-Kebir*). For Ramadan, they each received 30 kilogrammes of sugar. According to *El Hadj Seyni Dramé*, “the commission was planning to extend the benefits of Tabaski and Ramadan allowances to the deputies of Rufisque Imams.” In addition, the *Commission allocated* financial contributions to support the religious-based celebrations (e.g. *Gamou*, Islamic conferences) of neighborhood mosques and Islamic associations. “Such financial support was never recorded, simply because such type of financial support does not need be publicized.” In 2003, the *Commission* added pilgrimage sponsorship to its matters of concern. *El Hadj Seyni Dramé* claimed the Commission sponsored the *Hajj*, and the Rome pilgrimage

Since the 2003 *Hajj* season, the *Commission des Affaires Religieuses et Coutumières* has been providing full coverage for *Hajj* expenses to Rufisque Muslims selected from among the various social strata of Rufisque population. “The rationale for the decision of the *Commission* to implement *Hajj* sponsorship is that provision is made for *Assistance aux Lieux de Culte*¹²⁰ in the budgets of *Collectivités locales* nationwide. Ndiawar Touré simply did what the city should have been doing a long time ago.”¹²¹ The *Hajj* sponsoring program was carried out in an effective manner between 2003 and 2005.¹²² In the words of *El Hadj Seyni Dramé*, “the *Hajj* sponsoring program was innovative. Indeed, it helped many average retired, and unemployed yet deserving, citizens fulfill the dream of all Muslims.”

¹²⁰ Literally: “places of worship.”

¹²¹ *El Hadj Seyni Dramé* kindly made available to me the archives of the *Commission des Affaires Religieuses*.

¹²² In 2005 *El Hadj Seyni Dramé* was confident the *Commission* would last even if Ndiawar Touré is not maintained in office, because of the popularity of the *Hajj* sponsorship program among *Rufisquois*. The mayor Ndiawar Touré lost his seat in 2009.

Beginning in 2003, the *Commission des Affaires Religieuses et Coutumières* has awarded *Hajj* packages to the Imams, municipal employees, neighborhood representatives, members of the civil society, elderly people, members of all political parties sitting on the *Commission*, and to customary affairs leaders and associates. About forty Rufisque inhabitants have received *Hajj* packages. Each year, the *Commission* selected:

- 1) Three Imams: one for each of the three *arrondissements* of Rufisque.
- 2) Two retirees: one from the private sector (*Fonds National de Retraite* (FNR)), and one from Civil Service (IPRES).
- 3) Three senior citizens selected by Imams within the three *arrondissements*.
- 4) Three municipal agents.
- 5) Two members of Civil Society.¹²³
- 6) One representative of each political party sitting on the *Commission*.

The distribution of the *Hajj* packages takes place in the *Salle des Fêtes* of the Rufisque City Hall in the presence of city officials, members of the *Commission*, and the contestants themselves. As is the case for the *tontine* system, the names of the winners selected among municipal employees and neighborhood representatives are written on small pieces of papers drawn from a box in front of a huge crowd. According to *El Hadj Seyni Dramé*, all 500 to 600 municipal agents are eligible. Senior winners are also rewarded. “The *Commission* takes full responsibility and follows principles of utmost transparency. The only thing prospect pilgrims have to do is provide a *Certificat d’Aptitude Médicale* (clean health certificate) as a proof of their eligibility to perform *Hajj*.” The Rufisque *Paierie* (Treasury), not the *Commission*, transfers the funds to the *Banque Islamique du Sénégal* (BIS). In return, the bank issues anonymous bonds later redeemed to cover all *Hajj*-related expenses.

¹²³*El Hadj Seyni Dramé* did not specify the categories included in the “Civil Society” as understood by members of the *Commission des Affaires Religieuses et Coutumières* of the Rufisque Municipal Council.

El Hadj Seyni Dramé proudly ended our conversation by saying that “the national commission for *Hajj* affairs, the BIS, the *Air Sénégal International* airline company, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are all agree that the *Hajj* sponsoring program implemented in Rufisque is unique of its kind.” For two years, he has attended the departures and arrivals of pilgrims sponsored by the Rufisque municipal council to Mecca. That is why he is “entitled to say that the *Hajj* sponsoring program works, even though Rufisque pilgrims are integrated into the dysfunctional government-run convoy also deemed *Commission Nationale*. No casualties have been recorded among our pilgrims to this day.” Furthermore, “returnees will tell you that they received a very good treatment during their stay in Mecca, and completed the rituals in the best possible ways. The *Commission* has spared no efforts to ensure that the pilgrims of the Rufisque municipal council make *Hajj* in the best possible conditions.”

Despite the firm conviction of *El Hadj* Seyni Dramé, the case of the Rufisque municipality is not unique. In postcolonial Senegal, perhaps to a lesser extent in colonial Senegal, *Hajj* sponsorship has always been the best device for decision-makers and politicians to secure a political clientele. I have already mentioned the case of a Saint-Louis prominent Muslim figure Serigne who received a *Hajj*-package from Maître Lamine Guèye. However, he gave the package away, because he believed there was no need for Muslims to make *Hajj* more than one time.¹²⁴ In Senegal today, it is standard practice among incumbent rulers, and opposition figures as well, and their sympathizers to distribute *Hajj* packages, especially around election times. That is an additional indication of how Senegalese Muslims generally value the *Hajj*. As for the case of the Rufisque municipal board, the innovation lies in the fact that a new institution was set up within the municipal board for that purpose.¹²⁵

¹²⁴Zeine Abidine Diop (Saint-Louis: Nord. May 28, 2002: 3:30 PM – 5:00PM).

¹²⁵*El Hadj* Seyni Dramé (Rufisque: Dangou Nord. June 10, 2005: 11:20 AM – 13:30 PM). The *Commission des Affaires Religieuses et Coutumières* belonged to the Municipal Board.

4. Observations on the postcolonial *Hajj* organization system (1960-2008)

It is true that French rulers drew on their experience with Islam in North Africa in dealing with Islam in AOF. However, they combined apparent neutrality and quite effective conciliatory methods in an effort to contain potential Muslim militancy. They felt uneasy with Islam in the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth century, when militant Muslim movements such as the Umarian Jihad and *Hamallisme* emerged and spread. By the 1930s, they believed in AOF they “faced a tolerant and compliant Islam, marked with heartfelt loyalty toward French actions in spite of *Hamallisme*.”¹²⁶ That is why - except for their harsh positions against militant Muslim movements and periodical ban on Arabic literature and suspect organizations - French rulers maintained a wide network of Muslim allies.¹²⁷

Notwithstanding the confidence of French civil servants in West African Islam, French physicians insisted on the urgent need to monitor the *Hajj* in order to preserve the collective well-being of the AOF population. *Docteur* Edouard Allard sounded the alarm as early as 1895, with his very vivid description of the lapses in public hygiene which posed a potential threat for AOF pilgrims.¹²⁸ *Docteur* Allard’s early calls for action did not go unheard, since the colonial state took steps to tackle the threat. The monitoring system devised early in the twentieth century to structure and monitor the *Hajj* in French West Africa was effectively at work by 1917. The *Gouverneur Général* himself oversaw the whole *Hajj* system.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ ANS: 9G71/72 (107). Anonymous. “Questions intéressant à la fois le Maroc et le Département.” (1931), 3.

¹²⁷ ANS: 21G41. “Associations et comités suspects.” 19G24. “Presse Arabe (contrôle de la propagande Musulmane (1920-1922)).” 19G25. “Contrôle des Livres en Arabe.”

¹²⁸ E. Allard. “Le pèlerinage à la Mecque et son rôle dans la propagation des maladies.” *Bulletin du Comité de l’Afrique Occidentale Française*, (Juillet 1895), 229-231.

¹²⁹ P. Marty. *L’Islam au Sénégal: Les doctrines et les institutions*. (Paris, Maison Ernest Leroux, Tome II, 1917). Each year, the AOF Governor was responsible gave orders to Lieutenant-Gouverneurs to start organizing pilgrims for the upcoming *Hajj* season, after ensuring that the context was favorable prior to granting any authorization.

Months prior to the *Hajj* season, local officials would submit *Hajj* authorization requests to the *Gouverneur Général* to make *Hajj* arrangements for Muslim. *Gouverneurs Généraux* seldom turned down such authorizations. In 1944 “the land and water transport routes [to Mecca] were impassable due to the circumstances [with World War II].” Yet, rather than denying local executive officers the authorization to carry out *Hajj* preparations for their constituents, members of the *Comité National de Libération* while suppressing the seaborne links to Mecca, still maintained airborne links.¹³⁰ They insisted on two aspects in devising the *Hajj* organization system. First, they required from AOF Muslims compliance with medical and administrative rules (e.g. registration, immunizations, and contributions). Second, they appointed Muslim escort to provide assistance to Muslim pilgrims during the journey, and throughout the duration of their stay in the Holy Land for *Hajj* purposes.

No doubt the concept of *mimétismes* (mimicry), which applies to the impact of the French colonial system on current West African institutions, is as relevant in the context of studies of the *Hajj* organization system in Senegal, as it is in that of the study of current healthcare systems in French speaking Africa.¹³¹ The Senegalese *Hajj* organization system is a carbon copy of the colonial blueprint. The framework of the current Senegalese Mecca pilgrimage organization system consists of the same bipolar structure. On one hand is the *Commission Administrative* (administrative committee) to the Mecca pilgrimage headed by Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the *Hajj Haut-Commissaire*, or *Commissaire Général*.¹³²

¹³⁰ ANS: 19G2(1) – N. 782 D. S. “Le directeur de la sûreté générale de l’Afrique Occidentale Française à Monsieur le directeur de cabinet : A.s. Pèlerinage de 1939.” (Dakar, April 18, 1939). ANS: 19G2(1) – N° 142. “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Algérie à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’AOF.” (Alger, February 25, 1939).

¹³¹ F. Pasnik. *Mimétisme sanitaire: Frein au développement (les pays Francophones de l’Afrique de l’Ouest)*. (Paris, Thèse de 3^e Cycle, 1991).

¹³² Except for a phone conversation with 1972 *Haut-Commissaire au Pèlerinage* Thierno Birahim Ndao, all my attempts to reach former high-ranking *commission* members failed.

On the other hand, we have the *Commission Médicale* (medical committee) headed by physicians. To this day the medical organization is the cornerstone on which rests the success of the organization, and also the weak link of the *Hajj* organization system. For years, health specialists appointed in *Hajj* medical committees have expressed helplessness in the face of recurring chaotic situations they have experienced firsthand while escorting pilgrims in and out of the *Holy Land* during *Hajj* times. Many blame significant administrative failings for the disastrous state of affairs in regard to the management of *Hajj* affairs; whereas, most Senegalese citizens see the pilgrims' lack of discipline and inadequate knowledge of the *Hajj* key principles as major shortcomings. For instance, Colonel Ousseynou Noba argues that, "it is virtually impossible to solve the health puzzle [*"casse-tête"*] as long as the government sticks with the quota policy." He explains that people "with no medical skills whatsoever" are sometimes appointed in the medical committee. "Under the circumstances, you cannot expect such members to be of any help to the *Hajj Commission*. Pilgrims often complain about *Commission* members nowhere to be seen once they are in the Holy Land."¹³³

Fatou Ba Niang, who was appointed as a nurse on the medical committee on three occasions concedes that the "system is not perfect." Madame Niang insists "her teammates and herself did exactly what the state expected from [them] on all three occasions." They would go out morning, noon and nights looking for Senegalese pilgrims in distress." In her words, "pilgrims made the task difficult for them." Most of the sick persons they encountered were affected with chronic illnesses such as, high blood pressure and diabetes. However, the great majority suffered from the lack of an adequate diet. "They refrained from buying food and eating properly, in order to save enough money for gifts and merchandise."¹³⁴

¹³³ *Médecin-Colonel Ousseynou Noba* (Dakar: Ministry of Health. August 20, 2003: 9:00 AM – 11: 00 AM).

¹³⁴ Fatou Ba Niang (Saint-Louis: Léona. June 5, 2002: 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM).

Since the 1990s, the state of Senegal rents buildings and hotels for Senegalese pilgrims in Saudi Arabia. Yet, “many pilgrims still tried to save on lodging costs.” Carrying on the conversation, Fatou Ba Niang said “commission members found many Senegalese pilgrims living in the attics of old buildings of Mecca and Madina among the pigeons, with all that implies for their health and well-being.” According to her, many sick pilgrims were “simply very hungry, thirsty and exhausted. Even with enough food and appropriate lodging accommodations, with temperatures often exceeding 104° Fahrenheit in the shade, the *Hajj* is still an ordeal.” She herself was “first diagnosed with high blood pressure during her 1982 *Hajj* trip.” Moreover, convenience bills of health granted to unfit pilgrims are also “to blame for many casualties among Senegalese pilgrims.” For example, father, “suffering from severe arthritis and high blood pressure, often used bribery to obtain clearance from the State.”¹³⁵

The State is aware of such pilgrim tactics. In 2007, the *Hajj* file was computerized to identify ‘cheaters’. In addition, the State enforced *Cartes d’Identité Sanitaire* (Health IDs) in the hope that pilgrims denied *Certificat Médicaux d’Aptitude* (Clean Bills of Health) will not find a way around the *Carte d’Identité Sanitaire*.¹³⁶ Yet, the first casualty among Senegalese pilgrims recorded during the 2009 *Hajj* season (opened November 4) was an eighty year old female pilgrim. Ndickou Diagne “died suddenly in Madina on November 18, while making her ablutions.”¹³⁷ Therefore, the topical issue today still remains: do Senegalese pilgrims abide by all the canonic and legal criteria of the *Hajj* as prescribed in the ‘*Quran*?’¹³⁸

¹³⁵ Fatou Ba Niang (Saint-Louis: Léona. June 5, 2002. 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM). When I met her she was recovering from a major surgery she underwent couple weeks ago.

¹³⁶ Ibrahima Diakhaté (Assistant to the *Commissaire Général* in 2007, named *Commissaire Général* in 2008), www.diplomatie.gouv.sn/mecque/pel16.htm

¹³⁷ Agence de Presse Sénégalaise (APS). Colonel Samba Ndiaye. “*Dépêche*.” (November 18, 2009).

¹³⁸ <http://www.nettali.net/L-age-avance-des-pelerins-en-html>. “L’âge avancé des pèlerins en question” (December 2, 2009).

5. “Feminizing” Muslim affairs: Contemporary Senegal women in the *Hajj* business

In 1989, Christian Coulon emphasized the fact that Muslim women do not belong in the “twilight zone” of Islam where they are routinely relegated.¹³⁹ In the last decade of the twentieth century scholars have dealt with Islamic reform and the growth of Sufi brotherhoods in West Africa.¹⁴⁰ They are increasingly paying attention to the multidimensional roles Muslim women play in Islam. They are now viewed as “Agents religieux” who have devised coping strategies in order to circumvent the ideological, cultural and social hurdles which confined them in minor roles. Muslim women shape Islam to make it fit their agenda.¹⁴¹

Particularly in Senegal, Muslim women are becoming visible and invading traditional male strongholds, such as leadership of Sufi brotherhoods, or teaching.¹⁴² However, their more significant achievement is they gradually transformed the *Hajj* into their field of expertise. Recently, Hajj commission members have noticed that Senegalese Muslim women outnumber Senegalese Muslim men within the annual Senegalese pilgrim population.

¹³⁹C. Coulon. “Women, Islam and Baraka.” In, D. Cruise O’Brien and C. Coulon (Eds.) *Charisma and brotherhood in African Islam*. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988), 113-133.

¹⁴⁰See for instance, R. Loimeier. “L’Islam ne se vend plus: The Islamic reform movement and the State in Senegal.” *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 30 (2), (2000), 168-190. R. Loimeier. “Patterns and peculiarities of Islamic reform in Africa.” *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 33 (3), (2003), 237-262. M. Miran. “Le Wahhabisme à Abidjan : dynamisme urbain d’un Islam réformiste en Côte d’Ivoire contemporaine (1960-1996).” *Islam et Sociétés au Sud du Sahara*, (12), (1998), 5-74. D. Robinson et J. L. Triaud (Eds.) *Le temps des Marabouts: Itinéraires et stratégies Islamiques en Afrique Occidentale Française, 1880-1960*. (Paris, Karthala, 1997). J. L. Triaud et D. Robinson (Eds.) *La Tijaniyya en Afrique Subsaharienne : Une confrérie Musulmane à la conquête de l’Afrique*. (Paris, Karthala, 2000).

¹⁴¹C. Bop. “Roles and the positions of women in Sufi Brotherhoods in Senegal.” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 2005, 73 (4): 1099-1119. M. Last. “The role of women as “Agents religieux” in Sokoto.” *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 9 (2), (1985), 283-300.

¹⁴²A. Gemmeke. “Marabout women in Dakar: Creating authority in Islamic knowledge.” *Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute*, 79 (1), (2009), 128-147. P. Mbow. “Le phénomène Ndiaye Mody Guirandu : Hérésie ou émergence d’une nouvelle voie soufie dans l’Islam Sénégalais?” *Afrika Zamani*, (1997), and 6, (1998), 86-104.

For example, the first Saudi Arabia-bound plane for *Hajj* season 2009 arrived in Madina on November 4, 2009 with 227 pilgrims on board, 174 of which were women.¹⁴³ In fact, Senegalese women “have appropriated (the pilgrimage to Mecca) through re-invention of “tontines” or saving societies combined with the powerful discourse of Islamic charity in order to organize and finance their religious journey.”¹⁴⁴ They are also using the *Hajj* as a tool to position themselves in the political, social and economic upper circles of the Senegalese society. The trade of goods from Asia has become important in the Senegalese economy in part as a result of *Adjaratous*’ action. Many Senegalese Muslim women over the years have gained significant financial autonomy through their involvement in that *Hajj*-related trade, instead of swelling the ranks of the non-working segment of the population.

According to *El Hadj* Ameth Diéne, “*Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne and Ya Codou Mbaye were the most famous and the richest among Plateau women. They organized the *tontine* of the Plateau *Mbootay*, and managed the social life of women, as well.” Most importantly, “they pioneered the trade of commodities and luxury goods between Asia and Senegal by means of the *Hajj*.”¹⁴⁵ *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye and Oumy Diagne agree that *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne was among the icons of postwar Dakar social and political life. Yet, both deny that *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne was involved in the “Orient-bound trade”. *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne gave away everything she brought from Mecca to friends, neighbors and acquaintances free of charge, but she never sold anything, not even “one handkerchief.”¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ See, *Le Soleil*. (November 6, 2009. Online).

¹⁴⁴ See, F. Hardy & J. Semin. *Fissabililah! Islam au Sénégal et initiatives féminines*. *Afrique Contemporaine*, 231, (2009/3), 139-153. (« Economie Morale et mutations de l’Islam en Afrique sub-saharienne »).

¹⁴⁵ *El Hadj* Ameth Diéne (Dakar: Médina, Rue 17x18. June 25, 2003. 11:00 AM – 01:00 PM).

¹⁴⁶ *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye and Oumy Diagne (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).

In any case, if *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne was not personally involved in that very lucrative “Orient-bound trade”, other members of the Plateau women *Mbootay* probably were. Indeed, countless Senegalese women have today secured a decent living for their relatives and themselves through involvement in the “Orient-bound trade”. In all likelihood, colonial women started the trade of 21, 22, and 24 carat gold jewels, rich garments, and heady incense very much popular in present Senegal. They obviously had an inclination for fancy gold jewels and equally fancy garments.¹⁴⁷ Indeed, the amount and the variety of jewels they displayed as ostentatious luxury signs at *ganale* and *drianké* gatherings suggests a proximity to an abundant source of supply. The reunions provided colonial Senegalese *Mbootay* women involved in the trade an opportunity to sell gold and luxury items to their counterparts.

After each *Hajj* season, *Mbootay* women traders brought back the latest jewel creations available in Saudi to their *Mbootay* friends/customers.¹⁴⁸ That is why they looked quite identical in the pictures from one year to another. “*Bu ñu daan noos, ña daan ànd da ñu daan nuroole. At bu nekk ak la ca daan xew.*”¹⁴⁹ *Adja* Fakha Thiam and *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne used to dress alike on all occasions. *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne brought the material from Mecca, and *Adja* Fakha Thiam made similar outfits for both of them. *Adja* Fakha Thiam was a quite successful woman trader who was involved in the Orient-products business.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ The numerous pictures taken at the various *ganale* and seasonal banquet gatherings are very indicative of how *Mbootay* women valued fancy apparels and jewelry. It even seems that they decided on a dresscode for each party, because they usually wore the same styles and colors.

¹⁴⁸ *El Hadj* Ameth Diéne (Dakar: Médina, Rue 17x18. June 25, 2002. 11:00 AM – 01:00 PM).

¹⁴⁹ *Mbootay* friends generally dressed alike at each and every *noos* (party). The meaning of that last sentence is, “to each year its novelties.” *Mbootay* women set high standards for themselves. *Mbootay* women were supposed to dress with taste in order to fit in.

¹⁵⁰ According to *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye, *Adja* Fakha Thiam was the best friend of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne, and her seamstress as well. She was also among the very first Dakar women who pioneered the informal trade between Senegal and Saudi Arabia.

Many colonial *Mbootay* women made names for them and secured a decent living for their families and themselves through their involvement in the predominantly women-run “Orient-bound trade”. That informal trade has become one of the preferred economic activities for Senegalese women regardless of their age and social status. That may explain why “Senegalese female pilgrims are so young nowadays. On average the age of Senegalese female pilgrims is somewhere between 30 and 40 years.” Demba Teuw was unable “to provide the ratio of female pilgrims who make *Hajj* only for the sake of complying with Islam.” He knows that “the number of “*Adjaratou commerçantes*”¹⁵¹ is on the rise.” Indeed, “there is a growing interest among female pilgrims in purchasing gold jewels and various items for their businesses.” Demba Teuw concludes that, “many Senegalese female pilgrims, especially those making their ‘umpteenth’ *Hajj*, do not even get close to the Holy Kaaba.”¹⁵²

It is true that trade has become an integral part of the *Hajj* for most Senegalese female pilgrims in today Senegal. Indeed, a significant number of Senegalese women traders take advantage of the flexibility of Saudi travel regulations around *Hajj* time, and of the inclination of Senegalese people for ‘Orient’ products. Furthermore, it seems that the development of that women-run industry is leading toward corporatism. Senegalese women, including non-Muslim women, involved in that informal trade are increasingly shaping specific corporate identities for themselves through the development of all-women societies running multidimensional and nationwide *tontine* systems. These days, many women, who would have otherwise been labelled “housewives, or unemployed women” have become wealthy economic entrepreneurs who routinely make several trips to Mecca, Dubai, and Dakar each year and sometimes outside the *Hajj* season (around Ramadan time) to fetch goods.

¹⁵¹That time-honored formula literally means “female pilgrim traders.” Demba Teuw emphasized the quite obvious link between Senegalese female Mecca pilgrims and trade.

¹⁵²Demba Teuw (Dakar: Institut Islamique. May 16, 2002: 12: 50 PM).

One such leading all-women society is AFEPEs (Association des Femmes pour le Promotion de l'Entreprise au Sénégal) created October 19, 2000. AFEPEs - as peer all-women societies such as 'Arafat'¹⁵³ - contributes toward the reinforcement of the now well-established corporative dynamic. Members of such societies "combine [among other things] the powerful discourse of Islamic charity" with the "principle of *retour à l'envoyeur* [return to sender]" in order to conduct their religious/economic activities.¹⁵⁴ AFEPEs has two major goals. The first goal is to bring women around a common ideal of development and fulfilment within a framework for exchange, sharing and discussion, and mutual consultation. Second, AFEPEs – a bipolar structure with a committee for social engagement, and a religious committee - seeks to foster a spirit of entrepreneurship among women.

The goal of AFEPEs is to set up a sisterhood network system to encourage women to undertake business trips around *Hajj* times. AFEPEs women contribute a sum of 10.000 FCFA each year. Once a year, society members hold an "Islamic conference". On that occasion, AFEPEs members are selected through lottery and offered plane tickets to attend the *Hajj*. The aim of that lottery is probably to provide novices an opportunity to make *Hajj*, and most certainly to arouse interest in doing business in Saudi Arabia. To this day, over 400 women have made pilgrimage by means of the AFEPEs lottery. Yet, AFEPEs is also opened to non-Muslim Senegalese women. For example, Catholic AFEPEs members can either choose to make the Rome pilgrimage, or to redeem their lottery tickets in cash. The fact remains that many Senegalese women have gained financial autonomy thanks to the *Hajj*.¹⁵⁵

Conclusion

¹⁵³ See, chapter 4 for information on the 'Arafat' all-women society run by *Adjaratou* Dior Diop.

¹⁵⁴ F. Hardy & J. Semin. *Fissabililah! Islam au Sénégal et initiatives féminines*. *Afrique Contemporaine*, 231, (2009/3), 139-153. (« Economie Morale et mutations de l'Islam en Afrique sub-saharienne »).

¹⁵⁵ See, www.afepes.com for more information of AFEPEs.

At the end of the colonial era in Senegal, the colonial *Hajj* organization system had matured, and the system was running smoothly. The first government of Independent Senegal led by Léopold Sédar Senghor inherited this system and maintained its overall configuration. André Guillabert (1918-2010), Christian and member of the prominent Guillabert and Descemet Métis families of Saint-Louis - was appointed as the first *Commissaire au Pèlerinage* of the independent Republic of Senegal in 1962. Trained as a lawyer in Toulouse, André Guillabert was briefly appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Senegal at the end of 1962. In that capacity, he served as incumbent *Commissaire au Pèlerinage* (Pilgrimage Administrator), he was succeeded by *El Hadj* Mass Diokhané in 1963. *El Hadj* Mass Diokhané opened the era of Senegalese Muslim *Commissaires au Pèlerinage*. As the Muslim physicians in charge of watching over the health of pilgrims, Muslim *Hajj* administrators were given full mandate to assist pilgrims during the *Hajj* in Saudi Arabia.

In 1960, the *Hajj* organization system was full-fledged and largely accepted among the Muslim population of Senegal. Yet, the complete restructuration of the *Hajj* organization system was not complete. Until the appointment of *El Hadj* Rawane Mbaye as the head of the department from 1982 to 2001, Mecca pilgrims from Senegal were free to stay at their convenience in Jeddah, Mecca, and Madina. From that time on, the State of Senegal signed agreements with hotels and private individuals around Mecca to rent their premises. The aim was to gather all Senegalese pilgrims in specific places in order to know where to easily find the pilgrims in need of medical assistance. Even though the system is far from perfect to this day, that move was important in that it made the *Hajj* easier for Senegalese pilgrims. Senegalese women particularly took advantage of all the major adjustments in the *Hajj* organisation system which was started during the colonial period. Over the years, they progressively took possession of the *Hajj*, sometimes in very unexpected ways.

CONCLUSION

I came up with two main conclusions after several years of studying the issues of Islam and public health, the French management of the *Hajj* from colonial Africa, and Muslim responses to that foreign involvement in a significant Islamic institution. First, at least in the case of colonial Senegal, on which I have focused in this work, the non-Muslim regulation of the *Hajj* cannot be addressed as a simple issue of concerted coercive actions on the part of the colonial administration opposed with organized, or individual, resistance from people attacked in what is dearest to any human being: freedom of faith and religious practice. Second, to address the various issues in this topic we must also go beyond the plain fatalism and acceptance normally expected from people with limited agency due to their status of colonial subjects. The first conclusion may be disconcerting, because the target of the administrative and hygienic regulation and monitoring of the *Hajj* business was the *Hajj*. The *Hajj* is ranked fifth behind acceptance that “there is only one God and Prophet Muhammad is his prophet”, the five daily prayers, observance of Ramadan and charity.

Yet, it seems that the decision to bring the *Hajj* under control in French West Africa generally, and in colonial Senegal particularly, permanently affected the *à priori* male-dominated endeavor in unexpected ways. France stood at the forefront of the nineteenth century’s international drive to come up with regulatory codes applicable to Mecca-bound ships and pilgrims alike. Driven by its commitment to prevent and neutralize *Hajj*-related pandemics, France established itself as the main supporter and enforcer of the public health rules discussed at the 1851 Paris International Hygiene Conference, and at later international hygiene meetings. Yet, on the ground, French colonial rulers realized early on the need to take into account the various ideological and practical hurdles the enforcement of such radical rules entailed. Obviously, the men in charge faced serious dilemmas in their attempts to enforce the administrative and public health regulations on the ground in AOF.

Central and local colonial authorities used various pretexts to justify their decisions in the face of public opinion when the prohibition of *Hajj* seemed to be the only option. In fact, they were well aware of the sensitivity of the issue especially in the contentious colonial environment, and the no less contentious situation in the Muslim world. On various occasions, especially in wartime contexts - World War I and World War II - French officials felt reluctant to prohibit the *Hajj*. They feared *Hajj* prohibition would have been equal to an admission of failure, or of fear, all the more that the Ottoman Empire, then guardian of the Muslim Holy Land, was on the side of the *Triple Alliance* (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy). It is only after World War II, precisely after 1948, well after the drafting and the implementation of the 1926 International Sanitary Convention, that French colonial authorities felt comfortable with the growing participation of AOF Muslims in the Mecca pilgrimage. In fact, French officials viewed AOF Mecca pilgrims, mainly colonial Senegalese pilgrims, as role models that could be brought to the attention of North African pilgrims.

In spite of the great significance of *Turuq* affiliation both then and now, the overwhelming majority of Senegalese Muslims claim unconditional allegiance to the tenets of Islam, including the *Hajj*. Like *Al-Ustaz* Alioune Sall, many among them consider the *Hajj* as a personal experience, meant to “allow Muslim believers to get closer to God.” Since, the soils of Mecca and Madina are strictly forbidden to non-Muslims some may jump to the conclusion that the *Hajj* is exclusively a Muslim affair. Nevertheless, Senegalese Muslims find a wealth of explanations to justify and implicitly accept the involvement of French authorities in the management of the *Hajj*. That is probably why, between 1945 and 1960, scores of colonial Senegalese Muslims from Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis accepted French colonial administrative and hygienic guidance of the *Hajj*. Many colonial Senegalese Muslims felt even so comfortable with the conditions that they returned to Mecca time and time again (i.e. *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne and *Adja* Marième Diop Makhtar).

In colonial Senegal there was prestige attached to the *Hajji* status. At least for a while, Mecca returnees enjoyed unrivalled respect from their Muslim peers, because the simple fact of partaking in *Hajj* celebrations in Mecca and in Madina was viewed as sign of divine benediction. So much so that, once *Hajj* became safe due to thorough medical and administrative supervision, making the *Hajj* became the dream of almost every Senegalese Muslim, particularly women. Furthermore, female colonial Senegalese Muslims used the *Hajj* as a tool to foster and promote a well-crafted and long-lasting *pèlerin* mentality and way of life. It is widely believed that in Senegal, as elsewhere, Muslim women are voiceless and marginalized, even within the quite autonomous spaces of local Sufism. This study of the *Hajj* in colonial context, and also in the postcolonial context, tells an entirely different story. The account of the *Hajj* experience of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne and her *Mbootay* friends reveals that colonial Muslim women from Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis set new goals for themselves. They also made a durable and successful breakthrough in the religious arena.

Still today, the *Hajj* provides Senegalese female Muslims a convenient springboard to achieve social and financial promotion. In that process many position themselves as breadwinners. The Senegalese state has long understood the social and economic importance of the *Hajj*. That is why the State took charge of the *Hajj* through administrative management, but also through private *Hajj* sponsorship in spite of the proclaimed religious neutrality of the State. As their French predecessors, Senegalese authorities operating in all sectors of the government (central and territorial bodies) now routinely use the *Hajj* to reward deserving civil servants and citizens, and also to build up and secure a trustworthy political clientele. However, the State of Senegal struggles every year with the management of the *Hajj*, because the Hajj business has become complex. In recent years, Senegalese women have dominated *Hajj* in terms of representation within the pilgrim population each year, and in the social and financial gains they make from the *Hajj* these days, as well.

Currently in Senegal, the *Hajj* has become a female-dominated activity, which reflects local cultural practice. In fact, many observers of Senegalese society and Senegalese Muslims themselves are increasingly questioning the Islamic legitimacy of contemporary *Hajj*-related behaviours. For example, the fact that contributions through *tontine*, or money saving system, are still the preferred means by which most Senegalese Muslims, especially women, raise the amounts required to make pilgrimage to Mecca. The *tontine* system makes the *Hajj* accessible to people from various backgrounds and social status. As proof, in present-day Senegal, the *convois de Pèlerin* (convoys of pilgrims) to Mecca resemble a large mosaics where Senegalese Muslims from major urban centres come together and closely interact with fellow Senegalese Muslims from the most remote areas of the nation. However, many would argue that *Hajj*-related *tontines*, which involve a lottery - and therefore betting, contravene the Islamic prohibition of gambling and earning interests on investments.

In its essence the *tontine* system rests on the same principles as games of chance, that is, the drawing of numbered balls from a hat, or from a container. Children or people who are foreign to the *tontine* are generally called upon to perform the drawing of the winning ticket. The Sura Al-Maidah, also the fifth surat of the Holy Quran, is clear about the opposition of Islam to games of chance, namely in its third verse. Verse number 3 of the Al-Maidah Sura rejects outright the consumption of pork or, meat from animals the throats of which have not been cut, and also of everything that relates to random drawings using “arrows” for instance, on the grounds that such activities result from “depravity.”¹⁵⁶ I have no evidence concerning the levels of understanding of Islam and of the Quran among *Originaire* Muslim women involved in the Dakar-Plateau *Mbootay*. Likewise, I am not in a position to say if the women set up the *Hajj tontine* system knowing about the prohibitive nature of such activities, in which case they voluntarily chose to veer away from the conventional path.

¹⁵⁶ See, ‘Quran (n°5): Al-Maidah (verse n°3).

The fact remains that, *Originnaire* women are at the root of the emergence and the consolidation of one important pattern of Islam in current Senegal. However, finding the appropriate information to document that part of the history of the encounter between the French colonial administration in French West Africa and a major institution in Senegal proved difficult; mainly because of the lack of written data in the major repositories of the National Archives in Dakar and in Saint-Louis, and the fragmented nature of the oral testimonies I was able to collect between 2002 and 2006. During that period, I spoke to dozens of people related to former colonial Senegalese pilgrims by ancestry, or through ties of friendship and acquaintance. Yet, I was continuously confronted with the difficulty of finding contact persons able to provide me with informative answers to my queries. At first, I decided to approach elderly people, because I thought they would be more knowledgeable about the issues I was trying to investigate. I thought mosques and “grand places” (places where retired man usually meet) would be the appropriate places to look for informants.

However, I realized early on that many such persons I met were caught off-guard by my queries, and some of them were even a little suspicious about my real intentions. Then I came to the conclusion that I needed the assistance of people familiar with the milieu I was trying to penetrate. From that point on, each time I would first look for someone either of a certain age or someone related one way or another to the former male or female colonial pilgrims the whose experiences I was trying to research. That is why I approached a prominent member of the Lébou community and the Republic of Senegal *Commission Electorale Nationale Autonome* (CENA). He introduced me to the relatives of Adja Mame Yacine Diagne at a time when I was seriously questioning my ability to shed light on the responses of colonial Senegalese Mecca pilgrims to the management of the *Hajj* by French authorities beginning in 1895. The experience of Adja Mame Yacine Diagne and her Mbootay friends lifted the veil on the relationships of colonial women with Islam generally, and with the *Hajj* particularly.

I obtained dozens of interesting period pictures and useful testimonies from *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye who is also the daughter-in-law of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne. As such, the pictures are not out of the ordinary because many such pictures exist of colonial subjects in ceremonial regalia. *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye fully understood the purpose of my research, and as we were exchanging on the *ganale* held in the honor of returning pilgrims, she went inside and came out with a bundle full of pictures. When I saw the pictures, I realized I had under my eyes the most important pieces of evidence for my research. I told her I was going to use the pictures to document my dissertation topic. She felt that the “world need to know about such a good person as Mame Yacine Diagne,” and insisted she “abandoned school at an early age, but she knows the importance of researching our history.”¹⁵⁷ As for the pictures the innovation lies in the efforts of *Originaire* women to establish - and to document - the meaningful culture and the long-standing traditions articulated around the *Hajj* as well.

Nevertheless, the pictures proved of little assistance in helping me determine the chronological sequence of the aforementioned processes. The pictures were not taken at random, because each was taken on very special occasions, for instance, at the *ganale* held upon each return of the women from Mecca from 1946 onward. However, there is no clear indication of the precise dates when the pictures of Mbootay women I used in this work were taken. Mame Yacine Diagne passed away in 1981, and her relatives have little recollection of the context which surrounds the pictures. *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye married her husband, and joined the Sène family at a very young age, but she was uncertain about the dates.¹⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the pictures helped me in several ways fill the gap of one important chapter of the history of colonial Muslim women, and the role they played in Islam after 1945.

¹⁵⁷ *Adja* Mame Jacques Mbaye (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).

¹⁵⁸ *Idem*. There were no indications as to when and where the pictures were taken, except for the fact that most pictures were taken inside the house of *Adja* Mame Yacine Diagne.

APPENDICES

Oral Documentation

Abdul Qadir Aïdara (Saint-Louis: CRDS, June 2, 2002: 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM).

Abdou Salam Touré (Rufisque: HLM. May 18, 2002: 1:00 PM – 2:30 PM).

Adama Séye. (Saint-Louis: Cité Niakh, June 26, 2002: 11:00 AM – 11:30 AM).

Adja Fatou Ngom, A.K.A “Ndoura” Ngom (Dakar: 43 Rue Kléber. July 8, 2003: 3:30 PM – 4:15 PM).

Adja Mame Jacques Mbaye (Dakar : 113, Avenue Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 AM – 1:00 PM).

Adja Pine Guéye (Rufisque: Dangou-Nord. June 21, 2002: 12:20 PM – 1:15 PM).

Adja Rougui Diallo (Dakar: Bopp. August 12, 2003 05H15 PM - 06:15 PM).

Al-Ustaz Alioune Sall (Dieuppeul: May 15, 2002: 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM).

Al-Ustaz Cheikh Tidiane Bâ (Dakar: Amitié III, June 25, 2000: 3:15 PM – 4:00 PM).

Al-Ustaz Momar Seck (Rufisque: Bargny. June 3, 2002: 4:00 – 5:00 PM).

Bassirou Sarr (Saint-Louis: Goxu Mbathie. April 29, 2002, 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM).

Baye Moussé “Franky” Bâ (Saint-Louis: Nord, May 29, 2002: 8:00 PM – 9:00 PM).

Demba Teuw (Dakar: Institut Islamique. May 16, 2002: 12: 50 PM).

Dialor Lô (Saint-Louis: HLM. June 4, 2002: 10:00 PM – 11:00 AM).

Docteur Tidiane Touré (Dakar: Bopp. August 12, 2003: 05:15 PM - 06:15 PM.)

El Hadj Abdou Magib Diop (Saint-Louis: Nord. May 12, 2003: 9:00 AM – 10:15 AM).

El Hadj Ameth Diéne (Dakar–Médina: Rue 17 x 18. June 25, 2003: 11:15 AM – 1:00 PM).

El Hadj Abdourahmane Thioune (Saint-Louis: Nord. June 24, 2002: 12:15 PM – 1:30 PM).

El Hadj Chérif Diop (Saint-Louis: Nord. June 24, 2002: 12:15 PM – 1:30 PM).

El Hadj Galaye Fall (Léona – Eaux Claires, June 2, 2002: 3:45 PM – 6:00 PM).

El Hadj Idrissa Mbengue (Saint-Louis: Goxu Mbathie, June 25, 2002: 11:00 AM – 12:30 PM).

El Hadj Ibra Guéye Paye (Dakar-Plateau: Mbott. June 25, 2003: 9:30 AM – 10:00 AM).

El Hadj Ibrahima Sall (Dakar: Guédiawaye - Corniche. July 18, 2002: 5:30 PM – 6:00 PM).

El Hadj Malick Kane (Dakar: Ouakam – Taglou. May 15, 2002: 11:00 PM – 12:15 PM).

El Hadj Malick Sow (Dakar: Institut Islamique. May 16, 2002: 12:15 PM – 1:15 PM).

El Hadj Mafall Seck (Saint-Louis: Léona – Eaux-Clares. June 2, 2002: 2:00 PM – 3:00 PM).

El Hadj Médoune Guéye (Dakar: Ouakam-Taglou. May 15, 2002: 10:15 AM – 10:55 AM).

El Hadj Samba Diakhaté (Rufisque: Dangou Nord. May 18, 2002: 11:20 AM – 12:30 PM).

El Hadj Seyni Dramé (Rufisque: Dangou Nord. June 20, 2005: 11:20 AM – 13:30 PM).

Fatou Ba Niang (Saint-Louis: Léona. June 5, 2002: 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM).

Insa Niane (Saint-Louis: Guet-Ndar Tak. May 29, 2002: 1:20 PM – 1: 45 PM).

Mbaye Mbengue (Dakar: Champ de Courses. May 11, 2002: 9:30 AM – 10:15 AM).

Médecin-Colonel Ousseynou Noba (Dakar: Ministry of Health. August 20, 2003: 9:00 AM – 11: 00 AM).

Modou Seck. (Dakar: Médina, rue 6 Angle 25. July 22, 2000: 4:30 PM – 6:15 PM).

Mohamadou Abdoulaye “Johnny” Ba (Saint-Louis: Balacosse. June 3, 2002: 16:10 – 17:00).

Oumy Diagne (Dakar: 113, Avenue Lamine Guèye. May 12, 2002: 9:30 – 11:00 PM).

Seydou Ndiath (Rufisque: Keury Kao, May 22, 2002: 3:00 PM – 4:15 PM).

Souleymane “Jules” Ba (Saint-Louis: Léona. June 3, 2002: 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM).

Thierno Birahim Ndao (June 17, 2003: 9:15 AM – 9: 40 AM).

Zeine Abidine Diop (Saint-Louis: Nord. May 28, 2002: 3:30 PM – 5:00PM).

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