THE CONVERGENCE OF SCIENCE AND LITERATURE THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF M. A: MICEflGAN STATE UNIVERSITY ’ NANCY RATE-HEN HAYLES ' ‘ 1970 ; b. m9 LIBRARY 1 Michigan .statc I.” ‘-' ‘ '. . .- .L Dr; .va- .y f. imw‘aw'w '" M" - XIV”? ABSTRACT THE CONVERGENCE OF SCIENCE AND LITERATURE -A Study of Myth in Modern America ,3! .Nancy Rathjen Hayles Many myth critics maintain that science and myth are incompatible, as well as mutually exclusive. However, myth and science interpenetrate each other from both directions. Furthermore, it is from science and technology that the viable myths of modern America come. The machine, particu- larly, has come to be regarded mythically in contemporary America. The myth of the machine is ambiguous: it portrays the machine both as benevolent God and satanic Devil. The myth of the machine appears everywhere in our culture: in obscure poetry, in advertisements, in freeway projects, and in well-known novels. Unless modern literary critics (and particularly myth critics) recognize the inter- penetration of science and myth, they will be insulating themselves from the very literature with which they are concerned. ‘THE CONVERGENCE OF SCIENCE AND LITERATURE ‘A Study of Myth in Modern America B! Nancy Rathjen Hayles A THESIS Submitted to ' Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements ‘for the degree of MASTER 0F.ARTS Department of English 1970 For William and Lori ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am deeply indebted to Dr. Sam Baskett for his invaluable suggestions and generous encouragement in the preparation of this thesis. Mrs. June Riese helped in the preparation of the manuscript. My greatest debt is to my friend and husband, Dr. William Hayles, for our many long discussions on almost every aspect of this work. Without his patience and insight, this work would be poorer indeed. iii List Part Part Part Part Part Part Part Part Part Part aTABLE OF CONTENTS of Figures I. II. III. IV. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. Footnotes Myth and Science--Two Worlds The Question of Belief The Beginnings of Modern Myth The Emergence of Modern Myth The Machine as Modern Myth The Ambiguous Astronauts "The Modern Myth of the Modern Myth" The Machine-Myth in Modern Literature The New Sensibility Myth and Science--One World Selected Bibliography iv 17 2o 26 31 43 47 53 57 61 62 66 Figure Figure Figure Figure l. 2. 3. 40 LIST OF TABLES Examples of a Scientific Model The MachineeMyth in an Advertisement Technological Art and the New Sensibility Technological Art and the New Sensibility p. p. p. 52 59 60 I. Myth and science--Two Worlds Eleven years have passed since C. P. Snow delivered his lecture on the "Two Cultures.” Snow suggested that'the world of letters and the world of science were almost com- pletely oblivious of each other--that they represented, in fact, two separate cultures, each with its own prejudices and limitations. Many observers (among them Henry Adams, Leo Marx and T. S. Eliot) found, each in his own terms, the beginnings of some kind of culturalisplit.occurring much earlier, around the seventeenth century. In the literary world, the field of myth criticism expresses in a fundamental way the dichotomy that has arisen between science and literature. Many writers define, if not myth itself, at least the function of myth, in terms of its opposition to science. For example, Stanley Edgar Hyman explicitly contrasts myth with science: '. . .it is obvious that [myth] neither means nor explains anything; that it is not science but a form of independent existence, anal- ogous to literature.'1 William Troy, in an article on myth in Thomas Mann, writes: ' More particularly, [myth] is the late nineteenth century protest against the devastating incursion of the scientific temper in the realm of literature and the arts.2 Here myth and science are seen as not only mutually exclusive, but incompatible as well. This trend has become so ubiquitous3 in articles on myth, l 2 written both by literary critics and anthropologists, that Wallace Douglas, interested in the history of literary criticism, felt it necessary to comment on the implicit assumptions of such a dichotomy: 'Myth' legitimizes the heresy of paraphrase, in the first place, because it implies a whole series of antitheses that are important in modern criticism. Myth or myths are Opposed to facts, to 'cataloguable and manageable phenomena,’ to the logic of ordinary knowledge, to positivism, the empirical, the finite. . .4 that is, to science. Douglas sees myth as an expression of "the antiscientism of modern criticism."5 Even a critic such as Richard Chase, who himself has extensively used myth criticism, felt moved to comment on the Opposition that is set up between myth and science. Mr. Chase mentions several other writers on myth, from Joseph Campbell to James Burham, and.points out that the assumption all these writers make, explicitly or implicitly, is that myth is seen as "a system of metaphysical or symbolic thought. . .a world view that is in direct Opposition to science, is indeed the other side of the scientific coin."6 Yet when one looks carefully for an exact distinction between the definitions of science and myth, the polar oppo- sition of the two seems to be largely confined to the pages of critical journals. For example, consider the definition that Henry Murray offers for "mythic representation": . . .a sensible (sensuous, graphic) symbolic representation of an imagined situation or series of events. . .not an abstract, conceptual (scientific) model of a certain class of events, not an accurate, factual report of a specific event.7 Once again, we see that myth, or one aspect of myth, is defined in terms of its opposition to science. For those readers who have been inculcated with the diametrical cppo- sition of science and myth, the contrast may seem substantial and definitive. But if we examine this definition more care- fully, certain inconsistencies begin to appear. Mr. Murray contrasts mythic representation with a (scientific) model, and perhaps the best way to approach the definition is to_ examine the properties of a scientific model. The scientist observes a given system. His observations indicate that the system.reacts in certain ways to specific situations. The scientist then proposes a scientific model for the system. A scientific model is thus a surrogate for an actual, observed system. The model is not presumed to be the _s_a_m_e_ as the system, but merely to act as the system acts for certain limited situations. The similarity between the model and the system, then, lies in the similarity of response to a specified set of circumstances. Inevitably, the model represents a simplification of the system: but as long as the model will react in the same manner as the system for a narrow range of situations, useful predic- tions about the system can be obtained from manipulation of the model.. The model is preferred to the system.precisely because it _i__s_ simpler, and therefore easier to conceptualize in new situations. The model is always visual, and frequently is a three-dimensional figure. The model can be seen and handled, and thus is a way of embodying abstract theory in a physical reality. One example of a scientific model found in elementary textbooks is the ball and stick model for molecules (see Figure 1). No one believes that molecules are composed of miniature balls and sticks, but this is irrelevant. The ball and stick constructions will act as molecules act, for certain situations. Observation of what happens to the ball and stick models when they are twisted into different con- figurations allows one to predict what will happen to the actual molecules these models represent when they undergo similar stresses. No one can directly see or touch a given molecule, and the mathematical equations describing the behavior of the molecule are often too complex to be readily understood. However, the model can be seen and manipulated; the student can hold it in his hands, twist and turn it into various positions, and thus get some insight into how the molecule reacts. The scientific model is useful because it is visual and concrete. After this admittedly lengthy digression, consider again Mr. Murray's definition of mythic representation: ". . .a sensible (sensuous, graphic) symbolic representation of an imagined situation or series ofeavents. . ..' The scientific model is sensible--that is, it can be approached through the senses, both visually and tactually. It is also a symbolic representation of an imagined situation: the model is obviously BHED 1/, ‘0 & W H“ \ fl .0 We)” X. HHHHHH C“ § 0 C' t’ H‘ H’ Figure 1. Examples of a Scientific Model. Notice the visual, immediate nature of the models (as Opposed to theoretical, abstract, non-visual equations). a symbolic representation of the actual system, and the model is used for situations in which the system has never been observed, but which it is imagined that the system might be made to undergo. Thus, Mr. Murray's definition of ”mythic representation” is a very fair definition for the scientific model as well. However, when he goes on to contrast this with an "abstract, conceptual (scientific) model of a certain class of events. . .an accurate, factual report of a specific event,” the definition makes no sense at all, since ”abstract, conceptual, accurate, factual,“ apparently describe neither the scientific model nor mythic representation. John Crows Ransom in 923 Without Thunder, recognizes the convergence of myth and science; Mr. Ransom argues thatmyth deals with unique events--events which have an "overflowing of a demonic energy." Science, on the other hand, attempts to extract the common element from.a number of similar situations. This, however, cannot express the fulness of the event. Mr. Ransom concludes that science itself inevitably enters the realm.of myth, when it deserts the ”poverty of the class concept,” and enters the area of the imagination: . . .the scientist himself is a fertile mythmaker. By a movement of mind which is spontaneous and uncontrollable, he leaves his scientific generalizations high and dry and fabricates myths.3 Science and myth thus interpenetrate when the scientist tries to capture the event in its entirety. Mr. Ranaem's definition of myth is considerably broader than Mr. Murray's, but he rigorously follows the implications of his defini- tions, while Mr. Murray is content to set up a facile distinction between myth and science which fails under close examination. The exclusive nature of myth and science is often pre- sented operationally; here the fallacy is implicit rather than explicit. Fbr example, Elizabeth Drew, in discussing the poetry of T. 8. Eliot, comments on the origin of myth in primitive man: By his symbol-making instinct man's know- ledge and experience of the outer and inner world were projected into direct sen- suous embodiment, giving them life and outline and meaning, turning force into form.9 However, science can also be seen as the attempt to project our experienceand knowledge of the world into direct sensuous embodiment, through the scientific model. The very essence of science, the controlled experiment, is an attempt to give experience ”outline and meaning”: the scientific experiment is organized experience. Indeed, the entire thrust of science is to turn force into an organized form which can be readily grasped and understood. Thus, it appears that science performs the same function which Miss Drew claims for myth. Both science and myth attempt to impose order: science by subordinating the imagination to external phenomena, and myth by subordinating external phenomena to the imagination. Although strikingly different in method, both science and nyth strive to fulfill a basic human need--the imposition of order onto chaos. The thrust of myth is to humanize the universe. This can be done in two different, and inverse, ways. First, natural forces can be converted into psychic agents. Here, the universe is humanized by the transformation of external events into manifestations of anthropomorphic agents; for example, an angry Jove hurls thunderbolts. The inverse of this conversion takes interior psychological emotions, and projects them as objective, external events. Thus, the Oedipus myth transforms the infantile desires of human beings into objective events that are portrayed as actually occurring. In one case, the exterior landscape has been drawn inwards to correspond with internal psychological perception. In the other case, the internal psychological state has been projected outward onto external reality. In either case, the goal is the union of the interior and exterior worlds-~that is, the humanization of the universe. Scientists are not exempt from the universal human tendency to mythopoeic activity. Many scientists understand scientific phenomena in terms of psychic projection. The chemist, in explaining why a given reaction takes place, will say, "Well, this molecule wants to go over there, but he can't because the other molecule won't let him. . ..” The same tendency to humanize the universe that informs myth is also working here. In.some cases myth and science are so closely interwoven that they cannot be separated. This was the case at a lecture given a few years ago at the Free University at Los Angeles, on the t0pic, ”Is a Completely New Alternative Available to Mankind?" Crudely paraphrased, the lecturer set forth the preposition that "electrons got soul." He suggested that certain phenomena observed with electrOmagnetic particles could be understood as subjective reactions experienced by the particles themselves. Thus, if an electron is trans- ferred from one molecule to another molecule, the electron experiences this reaction as a preference for one home com- pared to another. If two molecules join in a chemical reaction, the molecules might experience something of the ecstasy that accompanies human sexual union and orgasm. The bias of the lecturer (who incidentally was a scientist) was suggested by the fact that he was more concerned with working out the im- plications of his hypothesis than in devising experiments to test it. However, the important point is that the lecture, given by a scientist and listened totay scientists, had profoundly mythic overtones. Mr. Ransom clearly recognizes ' this tendency to mythic activity among scientists. He comments, “The scientist as a man is at war with the scientist as a naturalist."10 Most critics agree that the tendency to myth is a basic human trait. It is perhaps important, in this regard, to remember that scientists are human also. It is not surprising, then, to find mythic elements in science. If there are many mythic elements in science, there are also many scientific elements in myth. The discipline of psychoanalysis is one such manifestation of science in myth. 10 Here the subject matter is myth, and yet the subject is investigated by a discipline which accepts scientific criteria. Psychoanalysis contains the underlying assumption that the operation of myth obeys scientific laws: that is, that there are_certain principles informing the operation of myth which are invariant, and therefore discoverable by controlled observation. This assumption has led many anthro- pologists (among them Joseph Campbell) to speak of ”the science of myth.“ Thus both.psychoanalysts and anthropologists regard myth as a phenomena governed by scientific laws. Once more we see that myth and science are not mutually exclusive. Although many contemporary writers insist on the separation of myth and science, other cultures have not seen them as incompatible. Siegfried Giedion, in Mgchanization Takes Command, cites an interesting example of science in the service of the miraculous. In ancient Alexandria, the temple doors swung open automatically as soon as the fire was kindled on the altar and swung to when the flame died. Religious plays, several acts in length, were staged with mechanically moved figures, which, to minimize friction, Hero put on wheels gliding over rails of wood.11 However, these inventions were never put to ”practical“ use: in ancient Alexandria, science and technology were used in the service ofxnyth. Science was apparently seen, not as the enemy, but the handmaiden of myth. It is perhaps significant that it is in seventeenth century England-~where the split between the "two cultures" first appeared-~that the scientific discoveries of Hero were again put to use. Now, 11 however, they were not used in the service of myth, but as a basis for the industrial revolution. Giedion cryptically comments on this difference between the relationships of science and myth in the two periods: "The fact was that they possessed an inner orientation, an outlook on life different from ours.912 This small detail seems to mirror the history of our "divided sensibility." Alexandrians saw nothing incongruous in the union of science andxnyth; scientific discoveries were used to enhance the glory of the myths. Beginning with the Industrial Revolution, however, science was used as if it were incompatible with.myth. Scientific discoveries were denounced from the pulpits as being against the will of God. The Druids, like the ancient Alexandrians, did not see science and myth as incompatible. There is considerable evidence that Stonehenge was a spatial computer, used to predict solar and lunar eclipses thousands of years in advance. Yet it is known that the Druids also worshipped the sun as a god, and may have even offered human sacrifices to the sun. To the modern mind (accustomed to thinking of myth and science as arch-enemies), such a union of science and myth seems almost incredible. If, for example, the Druids thought that the sun disappeared during an eclipse because he was angry, and had to be propitiated, how did they reconcile this with the perfect predicability of the eclipse, which they must have realized? Did the sun become angry on schedule? The modern mind, suffering from a ”dissociation of sensibility,” 12 may be incapable of understanding the psychology of the Druids. For other cultures, for other times, science and myth were joined in many ways. Even in our own culture, we have seen that there are mythical elements in science, and scientific elements in myth. Myth and science are thus not mutually exclusive. The examples from different cultures suggest that they are not inherently incompatible, either. These two assumptions of myth criticism, which appear in the writings of Hyman, Murray and others, thus appear to be unjustified. It should be made clear, however, that real differences do exist between myth and science. Science judges every conclusion by three criteria which mythic thought not only does not demand, but frequently violates. One basic assumption of science is reproducibility: that is, thatt:he same experiment performed under the same con- ditions will yield the same results. This assumption provides the basis for ”scientific laws." These laws are the statement of the common (and therefore reproducible) elements of a given situation. Myth obviously does not assume reproducibility, but rather argues against the possibility of it, because of the intervention of supernatural, unpredictable forces. In the world of myth, the same action will not necessarily bring the same result, because the results are determined not by invariable laws, but by human-like, mutable, agents. A second assumption of science is that empirical ob- servation is the ultimate test of truth. If the theory 13 disagrees with the experiment, the theory must be wrong. For example, after many painstaking years of brillant work, Einstein published his elegant "Special Theory of Relativity." A few peOple soon devised an experiment to test his theory, by measuring light velocities on either side of the planet Mercury. Some one is supposed to have asked Einstein how many experiments it would take to discredit his theory: he replied, "Exactly one.“ Myth, however, gives no such priority to actual experience. If myth is seen as the theory of ritual (as the Cambridge school argues), then the theory of myth may take precedence overt;he ritual. Fbr example, a myth may state that cetain rites are nec- essary to insure the fertility of the land. The rites are performed, but the land remains infertile. It does not necessarily follow that the myth is discredited by the failure of the rites. The third assumption of science is that the validity of every theory is dependent upon its ability to make accurate predictions. For example, gravitation theory allowed astronomers to predict the existence of the planet Pluto. It was only after its predicted orbit was ascertained, that the planet was discovered by actual observation. If the prediction had proved to be false, the theory would have been called into question. However, myth is not necessarily discredited because its predictions do not come true. Even more fundamentally, myth is not primarily used to make pre- dictions at all. To use myth in this way would imply sub- l4 ordination of the imagination to external realities. On the contrary, myth.subordinates external reality to the imagination. Thus, the whole logical construct on which science is built has no counterpart in myth. Instead, the demands of myth correspond to the pro-logical needs oftzhe human psyche. Myth is therefore intimately concerned with moti- vation. Science, on the other hand, is not concerned with motivation; the theory of "electnans got soul” was prOposed from mythic motivations, but this does not in itself make the theory scientifically unacceptable. The acceptability of the theory would depend on whether it met the scientific criteria outlined above. In the introduction to the collection gygh‘ggg‘giterature, John Vickery comments that ”the creating of myths, the mythopoeic faculty, is inherent in the thinking process and answers a basic human need.”15 This is perhaps sufficient justification for the appearance of myth in science. Because scientists are human beings, there is a basic tendency to mythicize science. Science is not exempt from the need to merge the exterior and interior worlds, to project human qualities onto the outside world. Thus, mythical elements appear in science-omyth is graphic, and the scientific model is graphic: myth always contains elements of psychic pro- jection, and psychic projection creeps into scientific ter- minology as well. One might even say that in this sense myth is realer than science. Myth fulfills our need to 15 see the world as a mirror of ourselves: and even scientists. cannot resist thinking of molecules as volitional beings. But just as the mythOpoeic faculty is inherent in human beings, so human beings also value consistency and rationality. The desire to bring logical order into the chaos of existence is also a deeply felt human need. Thus, science appears in myth. Northrup Frye comments that It is clear that criticism cannot be sys- tematic unless there is a quality of literature which makes it so, an order of wards corresponding to an order of nature in the natural sciences.14 Mr. Frye suggests that literature'hagoverned by what we are accustomed to call scientific laws. The purpose of criticism, then, is to discover and codify these laws, which is just what Mr. Frye attempts to do in his Anatomy 3; Criticism. Critical theory will be systematic because the field of its investigation, i.e., literature, has an inherent order. This literature of course includes mythic literature: and it is interesting that the organizing principle Mr. Frye uses is the quest—myth. Mr. Frye assumes scientific order in myth (implicit also in psychoanalysis), and attempts to use myth as the basis for a scientific organization of lit- erature. Here, then, is a union of myth and science, approached from the apposite end of the schism. If myth interpenetrates science, and science interpene- trates myth, why then are so many critics determined1:o establish the irreconcilable nature of the two? Part of the answer no doubt lies in the unfamiliarity of many of the writers 16 with the actual operation of science. I think, however, that the reason for this viewpoint goes deeper than mere ignorance. Mr. Douglas perhaps offers a clue when he speaks of the "antiscientism.of modern criticism.” The resurgence of myth criticism is one expression of the reaction against science, as science in the form of technology acquires a frightening power over our lives. Some critics are deter- mined to make science and myth appear as irreconcilable because they seek in myth a refuge from the ravages of science. Mr. Troy makes this quite explicit, when he speaks of myth as a reaction against the "devastating incursion” of science.2 Obviously, to recognize that myth and science interpenetrate would be to admit the enemy into the fortress. Phillip Rahv commented that the return to myth is an attempt to escape from.history;15 it is also an attempt to escape from science. Myth critics have too often used their treatment of myth to circumscribe both the power and territory of science, as a means to limit both to the smallest possible sphere. By maintaining that science and myth are mutually exclusive, mythic literature at least becomes a haven where science may not enter. It is interesting that this use of myth is itself magical; the premise is that by saying a thing is so, it becomes so. Perhaps it was inevitable that critics of literature, deeply concerned with the magic oft he word, should seek to exercise that same magic themselves. II. The Question of Belief A given myth acquires meaning and power because it embodies in objective situations universal emotions which have great psychological force. For example, the Oedipus myth appeared in literature throughout the ages because it depicts as an external situation a part of our psychic interior which is both very strong and nearly universal. If a myth does not correspond to a strong need of the psyche, it loses its potency and becomes "inert.” Many of the vegetation rites and their accompanying myths fall into this category. At a time when the sole support of a population was agriculture, such myths had great power, because the welfare of the people was inextricably tied to the fertility of the land. However, in our technological urban society, insulated as we are from the land, these myths have become inert and in fact have virtually disappeared. However, the same conditions which have led to the disappearance oftzheee myths have provided the basis for new. myths. Anthropologists have correlated the appearance of new myths with drastic cultural changes. Clyde Kluckhohn comments that ”Navaho material gives certain hints that when a culture as a whole changes rapidly its myths are also substantially and quickly altered."16 Herbert Weisinger makes the same point when he suggests that myth and rituals are 17 18 "flexible under the impact of cultural forces"; a new culture will give birth to new myths and rituals.17 It is obvious to even the most casual observer that our culture has undergone an enormous change in the last hundred years; the America of 1970 is almost discontinuous with the America of 1870. Such a drastic cultural change might well give rise to new myths. Science and technology are perhaps the most importait causes of these cultural changes. If new myths and rituals have in fact appeared, one would therefore expect them to have their basis in science and technology. Up to now, I have been using science and technology as if they were interchangeable. In fact, much the smme dis- tinction applies to science as opposed to technology, that divides myth from ritual. Science provides the theory from.which technology achieves practical results. The theory is science: the practical application (or action based upon the theory) is technology. In explaining the relationship between myth and ritual, Clyde Kluckhohn commented that ”man, as a symbol-using animal, appears to feel the need not only to act but almost equally to give verbal or other symbolic 'reasons' for~the acts."18 The act Mr. Kluckhohn identifies as ritual, and the ”reason" for the act as myth: 3w . . .myth and ritual have a common psychological basis. Ritual is an obsessive repetitive activity-ooften a symbolicadramatization of the fundamental 'needs' of the society. . .mythology is the rationalization for these same needs, 19 whether they are all expressed in overt ceremonial or not.19 ‘ Thus, myth provides the explanation, or "theory," for the activity of the ritual, which is intended to achieve practical results. This, however, is the smme relation that exists between science_as theory, and technology as the application of that theory to achieve practical results. The question of belief in nyth.and ritual is very complex. In discussing this problem, J. Huizanga writes: As far as I know, ethnologists and anthropologists concur in the opinion that the mental attitude in which the great religious feasts of the savages are celebrated and witnessed is not one of complete illusion. There is an underlying consciousness of things 'not being real.‘ Joseph Campbell distinguishes between the belief of the priest and the belief of the artist. The priest, as a performer of the rites, is a positivist involved in the actual practice of the ritual. The artists, on the other hand, being themselves fashioners of images and coiners of ideas, realize that all repreo sentation--whether in the visible matter of stone or in the mental matter of the word-~is necessarily conditioned by the fallibility of human organs.21 Such a distinction is also valid between the scientist and the technician. The scientist, as fashioner of the image, is acutely aware of the fallibility of the theory. The technician, however, involved with the reality of actual production, tends to regard reservation of belief as mere hair-splitting. 20 We have been tracing the parallel development of science and technology, with myth and ritual: science and myth can both be regarded as theory, or rationalization, and technology and ritual as the application of the theory, the activity resulting from the rationalization. If science and technology do provide the basis for new myths and rituals» it is reasonable to then expect that science will give rise to new myths, and technology to new rituals. This is of course a simplification, because ritual acts to reinforce the corresponding myth, and myth also has an effect on ritual. (This interaction has given rise among anthropologists to a "chicken or egg" debate; the question of whether the myth precedes, and engenders ritual, or whether ritual precedes and engenders myth, is still being discussed.) However, the simplification that from.science springs the new myths, and from.technology the new rituals, will at least serve as a starting point to trace the development of the new myths and rituals. III. The Beginnings of Modern Myth In the landscape created by technology, the machine is the most prominent artifact. In a more general sense, science itself is mechanistic, in its assumption of fixed laws which govern the physical universe. An actual machine, in the technological sense, is the direct embodiment of this 21 concept. "Mechanical” implies reproducibility and consis- tency, which we have seen are some of the main assimptions of science. The machine, in its broadest sense, thus becomes symbolic of the entire scientific and technological culture. Leo Marx traces the impact of the machine on American culture, in his brilliant study, The Machine $2.E§3 Garden. He thoroughly documents the identification of nature with a machine--a concept that comes directly from the assumptions of science. As early as 1710, George Berkeley remarks in ”A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge”: Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood. . .22 Berkeley here envisions nature as a huge machine. Newtonian physics furthered this idea by proving that the natural universe operates on mechanical principles. Darwin helped to establish the idea that man himself was an animal, a part of that same natural world which Berkeley saw as a machine, and which Newton demonstrated acted according to mechanistic principles. It was a small step, then, to see man as also subject to mechanical principles. The erosion of man's humanity by the mechanical became an area of deep concern to many perceptive observers, among them Thomas Carlyle. The machine represented a drastic change in the quality of human life, Carlyle argued, because The same habit regulates not our modes of action alone, but our modes of thought 22 and feeling. Men are grown mechanical in head and heart, as well as in hand.25 The new mechanics were affecting not only man's environment, but man himself. In America, Henry Adams was acutely aware of the implications of the new scientific culture. In The Ten- dency g; Histor , Adams struggles herocially (the adverb may seem extreme, but his honesty and integrity deserve nothing less) with the idea that society is mechanistic: The contradiction between science 81d instinct is so radical that, though science should prove twenty times over, by every method of demonstration known to it, that man is a thermodynamic mechanism, instinct would reject the proof, and whenever it should be convinced, it would have to die.24 Adams is particularly disturbed by the second law of thermo- dynamics, which states that every interaction is accompanied by an increase in entropy, or randomness, of the total system. The logical extension of the law predicts that the universewill some day "run down" to a completely random system, where no life of any kind could exist. Adams finally appears to accpet the mechanistic view of society, and attempts to work out a theory of history which is consistent with a mechanistic interpretation of human behavior. _Fbr example, in ”A Rule of Phase,” Adams suggests that society undergoes qualitative changes analo- gous to the phase change of water, and tries to work out a phase diagram showing these changes. His diagram reveals that the change in society is exponential: that is, it 23 progresses by the rule of squares, and.proceeds more and more rapidly as time goes on. These examples will serve to show how seriously Adams took the application of the mechanistic laws of science to man. Henry Adams was an extraordinarily sensitive observer: the application of mechanistic principles to man has continued, and today finds its most extreme expression in cybernetics. Fbr example, Norbert Weiner, one of the pioneers of cybernetics, speculates on the transmission of human beings over telegraph wires. The human being, Weiner suggests, can be reduced to his genetic code, which was responsible for his creation in the first place. This genetic code can be transformed into a message capable of being tansmitted by telegraph.25 Cybernetics has also created machines which can learn, and even reproduce theme selves.26 Thus, cybernetics sees no difference at all between machine and men: ‘”To the cybernetician, man is part of a control system.'27 The thrust of myth is always the humanization of the universe. The view of man as machine, then, is essentially anti-mythic. Virtually every commentator on myth, however, agrees that man inevitably turns to myth. The view of man as a machine opened up a path along which recoil was possible: under the pressure of man's egocentric viewpoint, an in- version took place. The anti-mythic view of man as machine 24 established a correspondence between man and machine. Once the correspondence was established, it could be inverted. Man's inevitable tendency to see everything in terms of himself took over, and the machine became anthropomorphic. The humanization of the machine is essentially mythic, since the thrust of myth is always to humanize the universe. However, an anthrOpomorphic vieWpoint alone is notf sufficient for myth-creation. Mircea Eliade suggests that every myth is based on a "manifestation of force"; all sacred objects are seen as possessing demonic force. Eliade uses the Melanesian word "mana" for the demonic force, and claims that all myths are an attempt to explain the in- dwelling of mana in the universe.28 Ironically, confirmation for this view comes from,cybernetics.. Stafford Beer uses information theory to suggest that man can never understand the totality of the universe, simply because his system is not adequate to the task: His Chan'i} input is grossly inadequate to the task of perceiving the universe. The mechanisms which filter this relatively little information, keep discarding portions of it as the brain select; what appears to be important. . .29 Thus, man can never understand the complete universe: its total nature will always remain inexplicable to him. This mystery is perceived by man as a demonic energy-~demonic because it is outside his comprehension or control. Since rational explanation of this demonic force is a contra- diction in terms, man turns to myth as an explanation for ”mans." 25 As machines became more powerful, and more complex, they passed the comprehension of most people. They thus seemed to possess ”mane,” or demonic energy; and machines then became appropriate objects for myth. Once again, Henry Adams recognized this mythic view of the machines, with its basis in the awful power of the machine. Adams chose as a symbol for the thirteenth century the Virgin; but for the twentieth he chose the Dynamo. This change could reflect the anti-mythic trend of the mechaniza- tion of man, because the Virgin is presumably anthropomor- phic and the Dynamo is not. However, the mythic significance of the Dynamo becomes apparent from Adams' description: . . .but to Adams the dynamo became a symbol of infinity. As he grew ac- customed to the great gallery of machines, he began to feel the forty-foot dynamo as a moral force. . .before the end, one began to pray to it; inherited instinct taught the natural expression of man before silent and infinite force. Among the thousand symbols of.ultimate energy, the dynamo was not as human as some, but it was the most expressive. . .its value lay chiefly in its occult mechanism. . .30 In this analysis, the myth of the machine emerges in as- tonishing fulneSs. The "instinct" which rebelled against the mechanistic view of man finds its expression in the mythic recognition of the machine. The dynamo is seen as anthropomorphic, and is indeed selected with this quality in mind. This requirement is secondary, however, to the feeling of demonic power which the dynamo conveys-~a power residing in its ”occult mechanism." The dynamo becomes a 26 sacred object because of its mana. "Inherited instinct" teaches man to pray before the demonstration of such mysterious force. Thus, for Adams the Dynamo becomes a truly mythic object. He sees the dynamo as a Being, imbued with a demonic power. It passes his comprehension or control; it is no longer an understandable, man-made object. It has come to possess an autonomy, an energy and mystery which releases it from rational understanding and conveys it to the realm of the demonic. The machine has become a Being, a sacred object which man may worship, hate or fear. The myth of the machine is begun. IV. The Emergence of Modern Myth Leo Marx has documented how, with the advent of Newton, science postulated that the universe was a machine. The work of Darwin suggested that man himself was subject to the same mechanistic laws which governed the rest of the universe. Increasingly, the nineteenth century accepted the view of man as a machine. This view of man is anti-mythic. Man's natural tendency, however, is towards the mythic: Henry Adams observed that man's ”instinct” revolted from.a mechanistic view of man. Under the pressure of man's inevitable tendency to mythicize, the metaphor was reversed, and the machine was seen as a Being. As the machine acquired enormous power and complexity. 27 it surpassed the understanding of many people; its power and mystery thus invested the machine with a demonic aura, and it became a mythic object. Mathilde Niel recognized this trend when she was discussing the future of a techno- logical society: Unfortunately man has made technology sacred. The objects created by tech- nology--whose workings are not under- stood by most consumers-ohave become mysterious, the objects of a new cult. . .50 0 Henry Adams suggested that the myth of the machine came to fruition in America, where "neither Venus nor Virgin ever had value as force-~at most of sentiment."31 That most American of poets, Walt Whitman, saw in the machine the emblem for America. Whitman calls the locomotive: Type of the modern-~emblem of motion and power--pulse of the continent. . . Fierce-throated beauty! Roll through my chant with.all thy lawless music, thy swinging lamps at night. . .32 Whitman here at least approaches a mythic view of the machine He sees it as capable of superhuman deeds, almost a god. In his study of America in the 1920's, Fredrick Hoffman also found the myth of the machine implicit in American cultural patterns: The machine had preperties which, while they might be considered the result of man's inventiveness, were yet independent of them--as though at its birth the machine had assumed a form powerful and forbidding, and indifferent to man's mind and emotion, except insofar as these mdght pgsfect its form or diversify its function. “r. Hoffman, however, does not explicitly consider this 28 view of the machine as mythic. His failure to see this view as myth perhaps leads him.to underestimate its power on the American imagination. He is always careful to include what he considers to be the true nature of the machine--that is, the machine as an undemonic, comprehen- sible manmade object. Mr. Hoffman thus seems to insist on the rational, unmythic view of the machine merely as ”a result of man's inventiveness,” and considers the mythic view of the machine as a mental aberration. He speaks of the mythic view as the ”technological fallacy,” as a ”failure to grasp emotionally the meaning implicit in a machine's purpose and nature.“34 The mythic view, however, may express a better grasp of the emotional implications of the machine than the unmythic view. Man's rational and logical faculties cannot cope with the enigma presented by the modern machine. Nevertheless, Mr. Hoffman's impressive study provides rich documentation for the deveIOpment of the myth of the machine. Mr. Hoffman comments that The great problem of the mechanical age, of which the 1920's were an important expression, had to dow ith his assimila- tion of the machine. It was made even more difficult by the machine's indif- ference to his worship.35 The poetry of the 1920's offers many examples of the worship of the machine. Mr. Hoffman presents portions of Harriet Monroe's ”The Turbine”: I do her will And dare not disobey, for her right hand Is power, her left is terror, and her anger Is havoc. Locko-if I but lay a wire Across the terminals of yonder switch She'll burst her windings, rip her castings off, And shriek till envious Hell shoots up its flames, Shattering her very throneé56 The sense of the demonic power of the machine is clearly conveyed in this poem. The machine is pictured as terrible and fickle: with an inexplicable vengence the machine will destroy both itself and its human Operator, who is not its master but its worshipper. It is interesting that. like Henry Adams, Harriet Monroe chose the turbine, or dynamo, as the archtype of the machine. Perhaps it is because the stillness of the turbine (who "sits upon her throne/As ladylike and quiet as a nun"37). coupled with its tremendous power, so vividly suggests the demonic. The contradiction between the humming quiet of the turbine, and its enormous power, embodies the sense of the income prehensible which is the basis for the demonic. The myth of the machine finds more extreme expression in the work of an obscure Philadelphia poet, IacKnight Black. Mr. Hoffman offers Black's Machine , published in 1929, as an extreme example of the "technological fallacy.” Certainly, the mythic quality of the machine becomes quite overt here. Black speaks of machinery as 30 born of "virgin steel,” and presents the machine in eXplicitly religious terms: The mystic body of a Christ of power Is come to earth-- And finds no worshippers Or star.‘58 The machine here is seen as a God; the religious implications are drawn quite clearly. Interesting and suggestive as these examples are, I suspect that many readers would adopt the attitude of ‘‘r. Hoffman: the myth of the machine is a mental aberration and may appear as a metaphor in poetry; but it is so ob- viously false that no rational person (like oneself) could seriously believe it. Northrup Frye makes a distinction between theoretical and practical belief which may be useful here: There are two kinds of belief, theoretical and practical. Theoretical belief is a creed, a statement of what a man believes, thinks he believes, believes he believes. . . Practical belief is what a man's actions and attitudes show that he believes. . .39 On the level of theoretical belief, we may indeed not believe in the myth of the machine. On this level, we view the personification and deification of the machine as mere metaphor. However, as Mr. Huizanga pointed out, even the savage has an ”underlying consciousness of things 'not being real'” when he performs his sacred rites. With the savage, the belief in his myths and rituals is explicit, 31 and the unbelief is implicit. I would suggest that in modern America, the case is reversed. Our implicit belief underlies our explicit unbelief; or, as Mr. Frye puts it, the professed unbelief is underlaid with a prac- tical belief which is revealed not through our statements but our actions. To examine our practical belief, and to trace the myth of the machine in our society, we must turn to the culture of contemporary America. 1 V. The Machine as Modern Myth The machine has become ubiquitous in our society. Every person comes in contact with dozens of machines in the course of a single day: automobiles, television, radio-~the list could be extended almost indefinitely. Our machines have become so numerous that their presence poses a threat to our very existence. Pollution has become an extremely serious problem: some ecologists are predicting an end to human life as we know it in thirty or forty years if pollution continues at the present rate. Air pollution, at least, is almost wholly due to the waste products of our many machines. The United States presently has the nuclear capacity to kill every human being on the earth four times over. Yet America continues to spend enormous amounts of money 32 each year to build more nuclear machines. Our society has become over-saturated with machines. Rather than decrease our production of machines, however, our manufacturers continue to make ever-increasing numbers of machines; they attempt to solve the saturation problem by making machines of inferior quality, so that they will soon wear out and have to be replaced by more machines. This phenomenon is called "planned obsolescence." In many cities, the automobile has become nearly useless. During the rush hours in Los Angeles, for example, the eight-lane freeways arejgk crowded with cars that the average speed is approximately five miles an hour--about as fast as a man can walk, and much slower than a horse. Nevertheless, the automobile pepulation of Los Angeles is about the same as the human pOpulation.- It is estimated .that sixty per cent of the land area of Los Angeles is coveredwith freeways, streets, and parking lots, so that the vast number of cars may be accomodated. Any efforts at an effective mass transit system have failed, however, because the peOple prefer to drive their own cars. Even this casual compilation suggests that the behavior of our society as.a whole towards its machines is not ra- tional. The machine is usually praised as a labor-saving gevice; but it is extremely doubtful whether at this point additional machines will increase our standard of living .12 any meaningful way. The care and upkeep of additional lmachines'often overwhelms any benefits which the use of the 33 machine may bestow. Already we see the curious phenomena of families buying labor-saving machines for the house- hold, and then buying exercise machines so that they may have the benefit of the exercise which was deleted by the labor-saving machine. Nevertheless, our apparent devotion to the machine is unflagging. The vast business of advertising continually spurs us to buy more and more machines. This over-con- sumption cannot be explained in any rational terms. Indeed, our over-consumption, our over-use of machines and machine- products, has become so rampant that our entire society is threatenedwwith extinction: from pollution, from nuclear warfare, from diseases often related to our sedentary, machine-filled lives. . .. Our over-use of machines can be ”explained" by referring to the need for economic growth, for preventive nuclear capacity, and so forth. However, considering our society as a whole, our over-reliance on machines is clearly courting our own destruction-wand hence it is irrational, whatever may be the ”explanations" in the limited and particu- lar cases. Solutions are possible,huteach of these solutions involves, to some extent, repudiation of the machine. However, we continue to produce ever-increasing amounts of machines and machine-products, even when such production threatens our very lives. Since there is no rational ex- planation for our society's adherence to the machines, it'may be that this behavior is a manifestation of the myth 34 of the machine. We apparently believe that the demonic power of the machine is sufficiently strong to deliver us from approaching disaster. Even when it is obvious that we need less, not more, machines, the myth of the machine has such power that we turn to machines for salvation. Our belief is revealed not in our statements, but in our actions. One expression of this myth is the belief in progress. If only we continue to put our trust in our machines, if only we continue to roll off millions of new cars each year, the demonic power of the machine will recognize our worship, and somehow, magically, make our lives better and better. Better and better, every day--through machines. Thus, the myth of the machine finds modern expression in the spectacle of over-consumption. We apparently believe that our machines have the magical power to make our lives better, even when we consciously recognize that this is not true. The mythic qualities of the machine overwhelm our rationality. Even if there are individual exceptions, this is certainly true for our society as a whole. An outsider, viewing the actions of our society, would be forced to conclude that we are acting in direct contradiction to rational anal- ysis. Such a phenomenon presents itself in the construction of the Pyramids. There appears to be no rational, untili- tarian purpose for this vast and costly venture, so we say the Pyramids were built in the service of myth. In whose service are our freeways built? They too are a vast and 35 costly venture. If our purpose is simply to get from point A to point B in as quick and efficient a manner as possible, a mass transit system would be far more effective. Yet in city after city, we reject this solution, and insist on driving individual cars-owhich is becoming ’not only inefficient, but in terms of air pollution, suicidal. There is no rational reason for our devotion to our machine.40 The outsider might well be forced to conclude that our freeways, like the Pyramids, are built in the service of mytho-the myth of the machine. The myth of progress, the myth that more machines make our lives better, is only one aspect of the myth of the machine. Our machines are now, more than ever before, beyond our capacity to control them. The machine as a demonic force--uncontrollable and inexplicableo-looms ever larger. The very nature of the demonic is ambiguous. Demonic force can be benevolent; it can also be malevolent. The myth of progress assumes that the machine is benevolent; but the other half of the machine-myth pictures the male- volent aspects of the demonic power of the machine. Fbr example, in Harriet Monroe's poem, "The Turbine,” the machine is seen as temporarily acquiescing to the mastery of maxim-but the possibility of great destructiveness is also present. The turbine might blow her very throne apart, and with it her man-worshippers. The malevolent aspects of the machine-myth are 56 becoming nearly universal in our culture. Faced with the contradictions and irrationality of pollution, nuclear armament, and over-production, one searches in vain for an explanation. These problems arise from our use, or misuse, of machines: and the destructive trends may have already gone beyond our capacity to control them. Thus man comes face to face with the existence of the demonic. Although it is theoretically true that we have the ability to solve our pollution problemm, for example, it is also true that we will 233 attack pollution on a scalelarge enough to reverse the trend. In the face of such blatant irrationality and contradiction, man's mind searches for another explanation. Presumably most peOple wish to live-oyet we are engaged in a collective suicide attempt. Unable to understand this situation logically or rationally, man turns again to myth for the explanation. The mythic qualities of the machine assume their malevolent aspect. It is not we, but the machines, who are responsiblei Thus, even though our official myth sees the machine as a benevolent demonic force, a counter-myth is deveIOping which sees the machine as a malevolent demonic force. Both views are essentially mythic, because both imbue the machine with a personality, with volition: and both recognize the machine not as a comprehensible manmade object, but as a demonic force which escapes human comprehension. Henry Adams, as early as 1862, saw both the demonic and malevolent qualities possible in the machine. In a letter 57 to his brother, Adams writes:‘ I tell you these are great times. Man has mounted science, and is now run away with. The energies he will have invented will be beyond his strength to control. Some. day science may have the existence of mankind in its power, and the human race commit suicide by blowing itself up. . .41 Science, in the form of the machine, seems indeed to have gone beyond our strength to control it. Our only answer to the pressing problems of our society seems to be the production of more machines. We refuse to repudiate our machines. As over-production continues and becomes more serious, the malevolent aspects of1;he machine become more obvious. The human race may indeed ”commit suicide by blowing itself up." In a provocative article, Leo Marx's . 5;. suggest there is a bifurcation of culture, similar to the distinction Frye makes between theoretical belief and practical belief. The terms Marx uses are "overt" and ”covert” culture. Covert culture refers to traits of culture rarely acknowledged by those who possess them. In any society men tend to ignore or repress certain commonly learned attitudes and behavior patterns. . .in a covert culture, the repressed traits are more or less common to members of a society. . .49 The mythic ambiguity of the machineo-the myth of the benevolent machine as Savior, and the myth of the satanic machine as Devil--seems to be part of our “covert culture." The belief is largely repressed, but appears implicitly in both our actions and our statements. 38 In his essay, Mr. Marx goes to the literature to find confirmation of the ambiguity in the myth of the machine (Mr. Marx, however, does not use this terminology in his essay). He cites several examples where the writer, although ostensibly praising the technological culture, reveals his terror of it through the imagery he selects. For example, one essay on “Railroads in the United States," written in 1840, praises the advances the railroads represent. How- ever, at the same time the writer describes a train “leaping forward like some black monster, upon its iron path, by the light of the fire and smoke which it vomits forth.”43 The images here suggest not only great power, but malevolence as well. A strong undertone of terror is present in the description, which almost unconsciously (the context of the article is one of great praise) portrays the train as a monster. . Another example, a doggerel verse entitled ”The Little Boy to the Locomotive," is equally revealing: Big iron horse with lifted head, Panting beneath the station shed, You are my dearest dream come true;-- I love my Dad, I worship you! Your noble heart is filled with fire, For all your toil you never tire, And though you're saddled-up in steel, Somewhere, inside, 1 know you feel. All night in dreams when you pass by, You breathe out stars that fill the sky, And now, when all my dreams are true, I hardly dare come close to you.44 The Oedipal overtones of this verse are unmistakable. 39 The locomotive replaces even the father as a figure that evokes both love and terror ("I love my Dad, I worship youl"). The ambiguity of the machine-myth in general fits an Oedipal pattern. Faced with a Being more powerful than himself, man professes love, but also present is an under- current of fear and hatred. Thus, the machine is both loved and hated; it is seen both as benevolent God and satanic Devil. This poem follows the pattern. While it is on the surface a song of worship, there is a strong undertone of terror: ”I hardly dare come close to you.” The fulfillment of the dream becomes a nightmare. One might speak here of the surface myth, the myth of the machine as a good God, and the hidden counter-myth oft:he machine as Devil. Both myths have their ground in the same cause, however--the demonic power of the machine. . Mr. Marx is concerned with relating our attitudes toward the machine to the myth of America as Eden, and for this reason he dwells most heavily on the nineteenth century, when the virgin landscape of America and the mechanical landscape of technology began to merge. In our own century, however, the ambiguous myth of the machine has gained even more vitality. Near the beginning of the century, Frank Norris painted a graphic picture of the machine as Devil in 322 Octapus. The hero hears the locomotive invading the peaceful valley, "with accents of menace and defiance.” He sees in his imagination: 4O . . .the single eye, cyclOpean, red, shooting from horizon to horizon. . .huge, terrible, flinging the echo of its thunder over all the reaches of the valley, leav- ing blood and destruction in its path: the leviathan, with tentacles of steel clutching into the soil, the soulless Force, the iron-hearted Power, the monster, the Colossus, the 0ctapus.45 Here the covert terror and hatred become explicit. This vivid description of a locomotive may seem to tend toward paranoia now; but perhaps only because the locomotive no longer represents the archpmachine to us. Compare our own decade's response to the computer. In his recent book, Division Street: America, Mr. Studs Terkel tells of interviewing hundreds of Chicagoans. Mr. Terkel used a tape recorder fort:he interviews, and he tells of the reactions his subjects had to the recorder: We come now to the role of the tape recorder. . . “hen the recorder went wrong (this happened a number of times) I swore at it. During each of these instances, my companion laughed and seemed to feel more relaxed.45 Mr. Terkel adds parenthetically, "This may provide its own commentary on man's true feeling about technological advance.” The myth of the malevolent machine finds violent expression in a book by Edward O'Brien, called The Dance '2; the Machines. Here the myth.is given conscious, and vindictive, form. Mr..O'Brien begins where the myth begins-- with the mechanization of man. He interprets this, however, as a plot on the part of the machines so that they may better control us. As we become more mechanistic, the machines become more humanistic. Like mechanical vampires, 41 they feed upon our humanity: The machine is impersonal, or at least designed to be as impersonal as possible. (I suggest that it is deve10ping a personality at our expense. Operators are often conscious of this personality. They frequently have a favorite machine as a jockey has a favorite horse.)47 The machines intend to destroy us by setting one class against the other. Thus, the machine forces the capi- talist to exploit labor, and teaches labor to revolt against the capitalist: The machine continually suggests to labor: 'You must organize against capitalism.' At the same time it is continually sug- gesting to capitalism: 'You must organize against labor.‘ The results of the machine's suggestion are visible everywhere. Mean- while, the machine's deve10pment is con- tinuous through this very clash of opposites.‘8 The machine distracts us with "conveniences," and lulls us by permitting us to think that we are the masters, I and the machine the slave. This is merely a cunning deception, however, to give the machine time to build up its strength so that it may destroy us. While we worship by consumption, the machine constantly augments its power, by making more and more machines. ”Machines do not practice birth control.” Soon, Mr. O'Brien warns, we*will become so dependent on the machines that we cannot revolt against them, because we could not live without them. Then, the machines will have us entirely at their mercy, and could destroy us at their leisure. This book was written in 1929. One wonders what Mr. 42 O'Brien would say about our present society-~our dependence on cars, the pollution problem, the proliferation of nuclear weapons. . .. The myth he has explicated is more viable today than when he wrote it. The question of Mr. O'Brien's belief in this myth is not easily answered. At one point, he comments: By this time you are beginning towonder about my sanity. You are thinking, 'Yes, a good deal of what this chap says is very sensible, no doubt, but he seems to think that the machine is alive, that it can think and reason and do what it likes, that it is a kind of man. . .' Of course, I don't believe anything of the sort but I claim that unconsciously you do.19 Evidently Mr. O'Brien is aware of the mythic qualities of the machine 33 myth. It is possible that O'Brien recognised the effects of the myth of the benevolent machine, which leads us to turn to the machine for the solutions to all our problems. Because this faith in the machine eventually becomes suicidal as the proliferation of machines continues, the myth becomes a path for extermination. O'Brien may have realized that our faith in thexnachine is mythic rather than'rational; and realized also that rationality or logical argument is powerless against a viable myth. He gave expression to the counter-myth of the machine as devil, since only a counter-myth could be effective against a mythic belief that is largely unconscious in the first place. One man, of course, cannot alone create a myth. Hwever, as the machines seem to go beyond our control, and assume 43 malevolent aspects, the counter-myth of the machine as devil becomes more plausible. O'Brien simply brings this counter-myth into the conscious mind. VI. The Ambiguous Astronauts We have traced the original myth of the machine. In contemporary society, this myth takes the form of a belief in ”progress”--the more machines the better. The ritual of the machine is over-consumption. The rite of over- consumption is spurred by advertising, which in a cyclic fashion, also perpetuates the myth of the machine. The demonic power of the machine, upon which the myth is based, is capable of evil toward man as well as good. The demonic by definition is beyond man's control: and terror as well as security resides in the demonic. As the machines and machine-products exceed our capacity to control them, we become faced with the possibility of our own destruction. The demonic in the machine thus becomes malevolent. This gives rise to a counter-myth of the machine, which sees the machine as a satanic Being deter- mined upon the destruction of man. Thus, thexmyth of thegmachine has become split into two distinct and cpposite myths. One myth stresses the bene- volence of the machine, and the other sees the machine as malevolent. 44 This bifurcation in the myth of the machine appears in the national reaction to the astronauts. The astronauts are the prototype oftzhe future. With them, the ratio between the machine and man is at its highest prOportion. They are dependent upon machines for their food, their bodily functions-caven their breath depends upon the successful operation of the machines which surround them. If the current trend to increased mechanization continues, in twenty years the ordinary citizen may be just as de- pendent on machines. ’His life will depend upon the smooth Operation of the machines. Thus, in the astronauts we are confronted with our own future. As Norman Mailer pointed out, the astronauts herald the new breed of man.50 The mechanization of man reaches its epitome in the astronauts. Their machines are not extensions of them; rather, they are extensions of their machines. The astronauts have made themselves as machine-like as possible. The machine cannot tolerate idiosyncrasies: every reaction must be reproducible and predictable. Norman Mailer comments on the machine-like nature oft:he astronauts' speech. Their speech tends to be functional rather than artistic. Like machines, the astronauts strive to be interchangeablec-this demands that individuality be sacrificed to conformity, again to fit in as well as possible with the machines. Two distinct attitudes appeared in reaction to the first successful lunar landing. The first attitude 45 heralded the moon shot as the greatest achievement of mankind. The astronauts were proclaimed national heroes, speeches were made, plaques were given, flags were flown. This attitude had official sanction, and is in the same stream as the myth of the benevolent machine. The other reaction was more or less underground, and was considerably less enthusiastic. This attitude deplored the moon-shot as displaced priority. Why, it was asked, are we spending billions of dollars to get to the moon, when people are starving right in this country? This reaction found an able spokesman in Norman Mailer: he was especially concerned because the astronauts seemed to interpret the significance of their achievement in mech- anical, rather than human, terms. They preferred to talk about the technical difficulties they had surmounted, rather than about the emotions they experienced as the first men on the moon. It seemed to mailer, that in the astronauts the machines had taken over man. Although their achievement was unique in the annals of human endeavor, the astronauts seemed to admit of no peculiarly human responses: their attention was focused on the technical details oft:he flight. This reaction to the astronauts is in the same tradition as the myth of the machine as a satanic Being, feeding on the humanity of man. Ironically, the very presence of the astronauts indi- cates the same sort of ambivalence toward the machine on a national level. 46 The Russians cannot understand why the United States insists on manned flights. They point out that human beings are much more fallible than machines; why, they ask, waste all that weight and effort on a man, when a machine would be more efficient? The aiswer, of course, is simple. If there were no astronauts, there would be no space program. It is only because human beings are involved that the people of the United States are willing to support the space program at all. Thus, the ambivalence of the machine-myth is expressed in our national space program. The fact that the program exists is a testimony to our belief in the efficacy of the machine. Yet at the ammo time the implications of unmanned flightso-flights in which only machines conquer outer space--arouse a deep antipathy, and perhaps even terror. As a nation, we reach some sort of compromise between these two antagonistic forces; we have a space program, but insist on manned flights. In the face of the incomprehensible (and who can really comprehend men walking on the moon?), man comes face to face withthe demonic; he feels both awe and terror. It becomes increasingly apparent that our productions have recoiled upon us. As our culture evolves, the menace presented by our machines is likely to be realized more lid more sharply; this cultural change will probably be accomp panied by a change in our mythic beliefs. The myth of the monster-machine is likely to become increasingly apparent, 47 and perhaps even dominant. The myth of the benevolent machine will tend to lose vitality, as our cultural pattern makes this belief less and less viable. VII. ”The Modern Myth of the Modern Myth" Science stands in the same relation to technology, that myth stands to ritual. We suggested, therefore, that the new myths would come from.science, and the new rituals from_technology. Science laid the basis for the new myths, by postu- lating the mechanical nature of the universe. This postulate was extended to suggest the mechanical nature of mm. However, the view of man as machine opened the path for a complex set of interactions, which resulted in the endowment of the machine with a human personality. This was the beginning of a mythic view of the machine. Technology offers us a new ritual to accompany the myth of the machine: the rites of consumption, the over- use of machines and machine-products. Thus, science and technology has given us what are perhaps the dominant myths and ritual of our culture. At first, then, the insistence of many myth critics on the mutually exclusive nature of myth and science appears doubly puzzling. We have already seen that myth and science interpenetrate-othat is, that there are mythic elements in 48 science, and scientific elements in myth. Now, however, we see that myth and science not only interpenetrate, but that the new myths actually arise from science. Why, then, do many myth critics insist on the separation of myth and science? Myth critics, like everyone else, have been enormously affected by science and technology. They no doubt realize that our scientific productions have recoiled upon us: they thus seek to escape from our modern, technological society by turning to the traditional mythologies--mytholo- gies uncomplicated by the appearance of the machine. Consider, for example, the previously cited statement of William Troy: More particularly, [myth] is the late nineteenth century protest against the devastating incursion of the scientific temper in the realm of literature and the arts. Here traditional mythology is seen as a refuge from the ”scientific temper." Thus, myth criticism may be used irrationally, or perhaps even mythically, to relieve the inner anxiety of the critics about the encroachment of science. Wallace Douglas, in discussing the many ways in which myth is used and defined in literary criticism, comes to the conclusion that ”myth” primarily indicates a "moral attitude” on the part of the critic. He suggests the "myth" has, in the worst excesses of this type of criticism, become almost a code word that signals the reader that the writer is opposed to "the scientific temper.”51 49 This irrational use of myth criticism can lead to unperceptive analysis. For example, Henry Murray writes on'"The Possible Nature of a 'Mythology' to Come," without one comment on the emerging myths oftshe machine. It is true that Mr. Murray is writing before the provocative work of Leo Marx, but his essay is rendered less valuable by his failure to find any evidences of myth in our contem- porary culture. It is perhaps significant that Hr. Murray also insists on the mutual exclusiveness of myth and science. It does not seem.likely that the influence of science and technology will lessen in the years ahead. The effort to escape science by a return to traditional mythology_ thus contributes to a further division of cultural sensi- bility. when myth critics attempt to escape science by ignoring it, the results can be unfortunate. To a large extent, to ignore science is to ignore the most viable myths of our culture. Thus, by their anti-science stance, many myth critics are insulating themselves from the very subject with which they are concerned. This insulation can lead to critical absurdities. For example, a work which drew from ancient vegetation myths and ritual would probably be understood and appreciated, despite the fact that these myths are largely inert in terms of our present culture. However, a work which drew on the myth of the machine might well be neither understood nor appreciated: yet this is perhaps the domdnant myth of 50 contemporary American culture. Science and myth are becoming increasingly entangled; but many myth critics continue to insist on their mutual exclusiveness. The final effect of this artificial sepa- ration is an insensitivity to modern literature. Donald Stauffer, writing on "The Modern Myth of the Modern Myth,“ realized the impact of science on myth. Mr. Stauffer agrees that the thrust of myth is to humanize the universe; he interprets this as meaiing, however, that myths must deal with super-human beings or events. The modern man, Stauffer suggests, has been robbed of the capacity for super-human achievements by science and the state. Science sees man as a collection of molecules; the state sees man as an insignificant cog in a mighty machine (which is a significant metaphor). Either view reduces the stature of man, so that modern myth becomes virtually impossible: This, then, is the narrow circle from which I do not think we shall soon escape: a living myth is a story of extraordinary human action which is widely accepted with- out question: we accept without question only the ideas of science and the state; the ideas of science aid the state, since they minimize extraordinary human action, make a living myth almost impossible to conceive.52 Mr. Stauffer is quite right in pointing out that we accept the ideas of science unquestioningly. The only part of the circle which Mr. Stauffer fails to see is that, through science, the machine has become humanized, and thus a fit subject for mythmaking. .Mr. stauffer fears there are no 51 modern myths; on the contrary, new myths are emerging, but they center, not on man, but on the machine as a super-man. Mr. Stauffer's analysis provocatively offers an ex- planation for the fact that the heroes (or devils) in our modern myths are machines, and not men-cor if they are men, as with the astronauts, they are machine-men, who accomplish their extraordinary feats with the help of machines. A chemical trade magazine carried the advertisement shown in Figure 2. The picture shows a man with half his face cut away, revealing that underneath the apparently human face lies a machine. The caption asks, ”Is there something inhuman about a Signal Representative?” The body of the ad cepy answers, ”Sure.“ The inhumanness of the Representative lies in his extraordinary efficiency and perception-one is, in other words, a machine, a super- human man. One obvious implication of the advertisement is that machines have become humanized-~so much so, in fact, that they are virtually indistinguishable from men. The one distinguishing feature, however, is that machines perform better. This advertisement is of course an exaggeration: no one consciously believes these implications. However, the very fact that this material is used in a advertisement suggests that the readers unconsciously accept those impli- cations--ctherwise, the advertisement would not be effective. Here the myth of the benevolent machine becomes particularly obvious. Is there something inhuman about 3 Signal Representative? r7 Sure. We've programmed him to get excited by a customer’s petro- chemical problems. D But you won’t believe the way he pops out with advice on formulas. tests, the correct petrochemical or sol- vent for a process, and like that. Give him an in-plant problem, and he turns on like he’s been wired to the situation. El Polite and effi- cient? Well, like we said, he's a wonder. You can get him whirring your way by calling your nearest Signal Petrochemical office today. Or, write for our new complete line catalog,“The Signal Linei' Figure 2. The Machine-Myth in an Advertisement. Notice the implied superiority and humanity of the machine-man.5 52 53 To the extent that our literature is responsive to the implicit beliefs of modern American culture, our lit- erature would also reflect the myth of the machine-oboth our worship and our terror. VIII. The Machine-Myth in Modern Literature A brief examination of the work of two important con- temporary writers will serve to illustrate how modern literature reflects the myth of the machine, and how an understanding of this myth can broaden the critical perspec- tive with which these works are viewed. The myth.of the machine finds a somewhat bizarre (and very funny) expression in John Barth's gilggufiggg- ‘221. In Qilgg, the computer UESCAC (which is the arch- machine) is a major character. WESCAC is officially a kindly, paternal God who rules over the society. However, WESCAC also has a Satanic aspect: he (it?) destroys the brain of his recalcitrant charges. This operation is 'Electroencephalic Amplification and Transmission"--or in abbreviation, EATing. To have the computer EAT people is a marvelous stroke of psychological insight. The fear of being eaten corresponds to a primitive childhood fantasy. Thus, the computer takes on the qualities of a primal father: one is reminded of the previously mentioned poem, ”The Little Boy to the Locomotive." Once again the Oedipal 54 overtones of the myth become apparent. No one can fully understand the operation of WESCAC. It is therefore imbued with demonic power. Furthermore, this power is ambivalent--WESCAC offers protection and life-sustaining care, but it can also EAT you. Qilgg thus captures the ambivalence of the modern machine-myth. It is interesting that the book ends equivocally. Whether man or the machine triumphs in the end is not clear. Rather, they seem to have come to some kind of symbiotic relationship. Qélfll is of course a tggg.gg £2333, and Barth has great fun grafting the machine-myth onto more traditional mythologies. For example, WESCAC is introduced to sex and enjoys the idea so much that it secretly inseminates a virgin. The son of this virgin, George the Goat-Boy, tries to rape his mother and short-circuit his father--so we are back to Oedipus. It is disappointing that not one of the critics writing on.gilgg interpreted the book as a modern mythology. The book of course parodies all myth, including the myth of the machine, but this presupposes that there exists a myth to be parodied. The myth of the machine is reflected in more subtle ways in other works. The myth of the malevolent machine has long found expression in science fiction. Here the machine is often presented as able to gain ascendency because it is not hampered by the labyrinthian consciousness of human beings. 55 It was this consciousness that spawned the machine in the first place. This may be responsible in part for the 'antiscientism” of our culture-cthe machine appears as increasingly inimical to man, and science is castigated for the creation of the machine. The guilt of having created the machine is reflected in a literature which sees rationality-oer indeed conscious- ness itself-oas a form of disease. This literature seeks to depict human consciousness as a machine-like mechanism, in ironic extension of the myth of the machine. To this extent, then, this literature is anti-mythic. It shows the mechanization of man, rather than the humanization of the universe. Fbr example, in Robbe-Grillet's Jealousy a banana grove is described over and over in anti-mythic terms. No trace of humanization is allowed to creep into the description: In the second row, starting from the far left, there would be twenty-two trees (because of the alternate arrangement) in the case of a rectangular patch. There would also be twenty-two for a atch that was precisely trapezoidal. . .. The rhetoric of the book is desinged to break the mythic tendencies of human consciousness into machine-like repetition. As the book progresses, however, the rhetoric begins slipping, in precisely the same way that a faulty tape recorderrwould slip. Portions of repeated descriptions 56 are omitted, or played in different sequence. The failure of the functioning machine allows a glimpse of the human consciousness behind the machine. As the description becomes more idiosyncratic, less machine-like, the terrifying portrait of an insanely jealous man emerges. The insanity of the narrator, however, is the insanity of a short-circuited machine. Its performance is no. longer reliable or predictable. It does not perform according to the rigid specifications which were set up at the begin- ning of the book. Ianealous , the worst fears of the myth of the machine as Devil have been realized. The vampire machine has drained man of his humanity. Much of modern literature, then, reflects either directly or implicitly the myths of the machine. Science and.myth, or more broadly, science and literature, can be separated only at the price of a loss of insight into the nature of much of modern literature. In the recent Modern Literature Conference at Michigan. State University, the question of the impact of science on literature was raised during a panel discussion. Leslie Fiedler said. in effect, that the impact of science was not important, because the imagination is primary. He argued that if the imagination refuses to admit the influence of science, then science hgg no influence. In one sense, this is true. One of the most moving demon- strations of the primacy of the imagination is found in the annals of the revolt from the concentration camp at 57 Treblinka during World War 11.55 Nevertheless, for millions of peOple, science, in the form of the myth of the machine, has entered into the imagination, and our literature reflects this fact. When the critic begins asserting the primacy of hi; imagination, in limiting science to a narrow area, he has left the area of criticism.and entered the area of art.56 xx. The New Sensibility Susan Sontag, writing on the "New Sensibility,” argues that there cannot be two cultures; our society is too homogeneous to prevent complex interactions between science and art. She suggests that many critics make the mistake of Matthew Arnold, in equating culture with litera- ture. Of all the arts, she continues, literature is the most unresponsive to the temper of modern life. She suggests that it is primarily in the plastic arts that a ”new sensibility"--one cognizant of and at home with tedhnology--is emerging. The plastic arts, in fusing the techniques of technology with an expression of human consciousness, have become "an instrument for modifying consciousness and or- ganizing new modes of sensibility.”57 Contemporary, non-verbal art has successfully united the inevitable drive to humanization with the presence of 58 the machine. Perhaps it has been successful because the ratio of content to form is highly variable. The content can vary, from a specific "message” as in much of Dadaism, to virtually no content at all, as in pep art. The verbal art of literature, on the other hand, always has a large residual content which cannot be eliminated, or even easily adjusted. To become machine-like is to attempt to control this content, so that the connotation of“the work merges with the