DYNAMIC MFFEEENCES IN VALUE SYSTEMS
Thesis for the Degree (35 M. A.

WCH’IGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

JOHN CARL LANCE

1-9572

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ABSTRACT
DYNAMIC DIFFERENCES IN VALUE SYSTEMS
by

JOHN CARL LANGE

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate a qualitative,
dynamic difference in the kinds of value systems (consciousness)
that people have; to give a historical—psychological frame-
work in which this consciousness-dynamic difference may
be understood; and to demonstrate that this difference in
consciousness among persons is a strong predictor of difference
in the importance assigned to those values that are central
to the dynamic.

A test was constructed designed to discriminate

1) between persons who have a greater and lesser cogni-
tion of the conditioned nature of one's primary value system;

2) between persons who have a lesser acceptance of
authority and those persons who have a greater acceptance of
authority;

3) between persons who have a lesser confidence in the
objectivity of their values and those persons who have greater
confidence in the Objectivity of their values.

A significant positive correlation was found to exist

between a greater cognition of the conditioned nature of one's

primary value system and a lesser acceptance of authority.
Persons who scored in this direction on these factors were
said to have a value system which functions more through
reflection. Obversely, a positive correlation was found
between a lesser cognition of the conditioned nature of one's
primary value system and a greater acceptance of authority.
Persons who scored in this direction were said to have a value
system which functions more through superego requiredness. A
curvilinear relationship was found to exist between the'accept-
ance of authority" and "confidence in the objectivity of one's
values" factors. Both high-acceptance and high-rejection of
authority Ss had the high confidence in the objectivity of
their values while moderate "acceptance of authority" persons
ascribed low confidence to their values' objectivity.

One hundred and fourteen 55 were administered both the
Superego-Reflective scale and Rokeach's Terminal Value Survey
(Form E). Superego persons (based on Superego-Reflective

scale scores) valued National Security (p<1.0001), Salvation

 

 

(p<:.0005) and Family Security (p<;.005) more highly than

 

Reflective persons, while Reflective persons valued A World

of Beauty (P<:.01) more highly than Superego persons. The

 

sex of the subjects differentially influenced the relationship
between the Superego-Reflective scale and the Terminal Value
Survey. An ad hoc explanation for these sex differences was

offered.

DYNAMIC DIFFERENCES IN VALUE SYSTEMS

BY

John Carl Lange

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Psychology

1972

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author has particularly to thank Drs. Jeanne Gullahorn,
Jean Jacobson, and Larry Messe for their criticism and sugges-
tions for the revision of earlier drafts of this study, and

for their participation as members of the author's thesis

committee.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS/SYSTEM
Introduction
Consciousness in Prehistory
Mythological Evidence for the Rejection
of Authority as a Basic Dynamic of
Consciousness
The Evolution of System—Consciousness:
Freedom Seen as a Ploy Enabling System
to Claim Objectivity
1. The Failure of the Mythological
System to Solve the Anxiety of
Non-being
2. The Failure of the Religious
System to Solve the Anxiety of
Nonébeing
3. The Failure of the Technological/
Scientific System to Solve the
Anxiety of Non-being
The New Consciousness: Rejection of

System

THE DIFFERENCE IN CONSCIOUSNESS DYNAMIC:
SYSTEM (SUPEREGO) VS. NEW (REFLECTIVE)

METHOD

SUBJECTS

iii

page

11

15

17

21

3O

4O

45

53

58

PREDICTIONS 6O

RESUDTS 67

DISCUSSION 74

Repressed Insecurity of being Fixates

Individual's Evolution 74
Ontogeny of Reflective Morality 76
Sex Differences 84
Composite Superego-Reflective Differences 87
Some Limitations of This Research 88
Suggestions for Future Research 89
CONCLUSION 90
SUMMARY 93
TABLES 94
BIBLIOGRAPHY 105

iv

Table
1.

10.

11°

12.

LIST OF TABLES

Intercorrelation of Superego-Reflective
Scale Factors and Powerlessness (Of
Pretest Data, N = 38)

Intercorrelation of Superego—Reflective
Scale Factors and Powerlessness (Of
Test Data, N = 114)

Comparison of Factor I, Factor II, and
Factor III Average Item Means and Standard
Deviations Between Test and Pretest Data

Terminal Value Means and Rank Order for
Test Ss (N = 114)

Significant Correlations Between Superego-
Reflective Scale Factors and Value-Rankings
for Test Ss (N = 114)

FiSher-Student T-Test Performed on Value-
Rankings Between Top and Bottom Quartiles
of Reflective—Superego Scores (Factors

I & II only)

Significant Correlations Between Superego-
Reflective Scale Factors and Value-Rankings

for Test Males

Significant Correlations Between Superego—

Reflective Scale Factors and Value-Ranklings

for Test Females

Intercorrelation of Superego-Reflective
Scale Factors and Powerlessness, Male
and Female Responses Compared

GRAPH Depicting Curvilinear Relationship
Between "Acceptance of Authority" and
"Confidence in Objectivity of Values"

(N = 114)

Powerlessness Scale

Value Survey (Terminal Values Only)

page

94

94

95

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

104

"Cultivate and make music"--said the dream.

--Socrates

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The purpose of this paper is threefold:
1) to demonstrate a qualitative, dynamic difference
in the kinds of value systems (consciousness) that
people have:
2) to give an historical-psychological framework in
which this consciousness-dynamic difference may be
understood:
3) to demonstrate that this difference in consciousness
among persOns is a strong predictor of differences in
the importance assigned to those values that are

central to the dynamic.

THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS/SYSTEM
Introduction:
The palaeontologist Pere Teilhard de Chardin (1955) has
suggested that
. . .from a purely positivist point of View
man is the most. . .disconcerting of all
objects met with by science. (p. 163)
He points out that man, as science reconstructs him, is an
animal-~and in fact
so little anatomically separable from the
anthropoids that. . .zoologists. . .include

him with them in the same super-family, the
hominidae. (p. 163)

He continues:

Yet, to judge by the biological results

of his advent, is he not in reality some-

thing altogether different?
Morphologically the leap was extremely

slight, Yet it was the concomitant of an

incredible commotion among the spheres

of life--there lies the whole human

paradox; and there, in the same breath,

is the evidence that science, in its

present day reconstructions of the

world, neglects an essential factor,

or rather an entire dimension of the

universe. (p. 163)

This "essential factor," the "central phenomenon of man"
that separatesjman from all other animals is, according to

Teilhard, reflection. He defines reflection as

 

. . .the power acquired by a conscious-

ness to turn in upon itself, to take

possession of itself as an object

endowed with its own particular consis-

tence. (p. 165)
In his opinion, at some time between the end of the Pliocene
and the start of the Pleistocene periods the creature that
became man crossed the "threshold" of reflection in a "single
stride." He believes that the onset of reflection in man
produces a "change of state" in nature akin to the change in
state of inorganic molecules that combined to produce a living
cell. According to Teilhard, "for the first time in a living
creature instinct perceived itself in its own mirror"--and
this consciousness introduced a new order of complexity affec-
ting all of the instincts inherited from his pre-human ancestors.

Rollo May (1961), following Teilhard de Chardin's thought,

also puts himself

...in opposition to the assumption in
conventional science that we explain the
more complex by the more simple. This is
generally taken on the model of evolution:
the organisms and activities higher on
the evolutionary scale are explained

by those lower. But this is only half
the truth. It is just as true that when
a new level of complexity emerges (such

as self-consciousness in man), this

level becomes decisive for our under-
standing of all previous levels. The
principle here is the simpler can be
understood and explained only in terms

of the more complex. (emphasis May's p. 73)

 

Consciousness may now be understood as a continuing muta-
tion of all previous mutations: under this generic we can look
at the previous manifestations of this human mutation which
have taken the form of discovery, invention, religion and
myths, and political and economic institutions, as well as
philosophic systems which more centrally reflect these mutations.

The onset of reflection in man has been described as a
"change of state." The nature of this change is seen here as
critical to the kind of consciousness that has existed, and
to the radical mutation in consciousness that is now occurring.

There has been no perceptable change in the cranial capa-
city of man since the emergence of Homo sapiens about 50,000
years ago, and very little change even from pre—Homo sapiens
living 500,000 years BP (before the present). Perhaps by
examining evidence of consciousness closer to the inception
of this "change of state," by examining the coincidence of
artifacts in the cultures of early man and the mythologies

handed down into early antiquity we may gain a clearer

4
understanding of the basic dynamic of consciousness, of which

the "new" consciousness more wholly encompasses.

Consciousness in Prehistory:
Cave deposits contain clear evidence that Peking man,
Homo erectus, used fire (Day, 1970, p. 110). Fossil remains
of these men, who lived about 500,000 years ago, have been
found in Java, China and Africa, and their cranial capacity
(900-1200cc), compares favorably with that of modern man
(1000-2000cc) and represents a clear advance over the earlier
hominids of Olduvai Gorge in Africa whose smaller cranial
capacity (about 700cc) corresponded with the non-use of fire
and the cruder stone tool culture of these earlier hominids
(Day, p. 77, 98, 109). But the fact that these creatures who
lived about 1-1/2 million years ago used tools at all is cer-
tainly evidence for reflection, however primitive.
DObzhansky (1962) gives evidence that

. . .there is no question that among

living men brain size is not a reliable

measure of the individual's [intellectual]

capacity. (p. 211)
Even though this is so among living men, Dobzhansky feels that

. . .it is a fallacy to conclude that since

brain size alone does not unalterably set

the level of intelligence, the two variables

are not in any way related. (p.211)
He cites Rensch's (1959) studies which measured the relation-

ship between the learning capacity of animals of related species

and the brain size of those animals. Rensch concluded that

. . . memory retention is about propor-
tional to the brain size in the animals

According to DObzhansky, Rensch suggests that "a possible
mechanism" for this relationship between memory retention and
brain size may be that

. . .larger brains contain nerve cells
‘with more numerous branches (dendrites),
which permit more numerous interconnec-
tions between the cells and, thus, a
greater variety of paths of nerve
impulses. (p. 212)

Jane Lawick-Goodall's (1971) field work with chimpanzees
in Tanzania has served to document that animals other than
men are toolmakers:

The point at which tool-using and tool-
making, as such, acquire evolutionary
significance is surely when an animal
can adapt its ability to manipulate
objects to a wide variety of purposes,
and when it can use an object sponta-
neously to solve a brand-new prOblem
that without the use of a tool would
prove insoluble.

. . .They use stems and sticks to
capture and eat insects and, if the
material picked is not suitable, then
it is modified. They use leaves to
sop up water they cannot reach with
their 1ips--and first they chew on the
leaves and thus increase their absor-
bency. One individual used a similar
sponge to clean out the last smears of
brain from the inside of a baboon skull.
‘We have seen them use handfuls of leaves
to wipe dirt from their bodies or to
dab at wounds. They sometimes use
sticks as levers to enlarge underground
bees' nests. (p. 240).

Earlier, Lawick-Goodall had argued that although
. . . the chimpanzee does not fashion
his prObes to a regular and set pattern
. . .prehistoric man, before his develop-
ment of stone tools, undoubtedly poked
around with sticks and straws, at which
stage it seems unlikely that he made
tools to a set pattern either. (p. 239)

Now that Lawick—Goodall has demonstrated evidence of a
primitive tool-making and tool-using "culture" among present-
day chimpanzees, it is evident that if a qualitative differ-
ence in consciousness exists between man and the lower animals,
this difference is not simply one of ability to use and make
tools, and the relatively high order of reflection that this
entails.

Thus, the "critical point" which Teilhard de Chardin es-

pouses, if one exists, must have occurred much later than the

 

late Pliocene-early Pleistocene period that Teilhard has
suggested, and I believe the "boiling point" of man's evolu-
tion occurred when men as individuals, apart from an imme—
diately threatening situation, first became conscious that
their individual dissolution was inevitable.
This distinction between animal and human consciousness

is consonant with that of Rollo May (1961).

The uniquely human form of awareness

is self-consciousness. . . . Conscious-

ness. . .is not simply my awareness of

threat from the world but my capacity

to know myself as the onejbeiqg
threatened. . . . (emphasis Mays, p. 77)

 

 

7
Heidegger's phraseology (trans. in Blackham, 1965, p. 268) of
"running-forward-in-thought".(Being-towards-death) may be
helpful in elucidating the nature of this "critical point."
In this way we may see the ability of the chimpanzee to make
and use tools as indicative of some capacity to ‘run-forward-
in-thought, although the simplicity of the tool culture and
the relatively small cranial capacity indicate that this
capacity is limited.

The Homo habilis of Olduvai Gorge and Homo erectus show

 

 

a progressively greater capacity to run-forward-in-thought
as evidenced by their advancement in toolmaking, but the

advancement does not seem to indicate a different order of

 

existence among these creatures. The number of tools found

 

associated with these cultures is small, and the workmanship
is very crude. The expansion of brain Size, as indicated by
cranial capacity of the fossil remains, was pretty much com-
pleted with the emergence of the early sapients, examples of
which are the Vertesszdllds man (Mindel glaciation, 200,000

years BP) and the Swanscombe skull (Mindel-Riss Interglacial
Period, 150,000 years BP). From these early sapients two

major groupings emerged, Homo sapiens neanderthalensis and

 

Homo sapiens sapiens (Day, p. 118-120).

 

With the emergence of the Neanderthals, there is evidence

of huge cultural advances over Homo erectus.

 

. . .there is evidence from several
Neanderthal sites, . . .burial of the
dead in places of safety from scavengers,

the provision of "grave goods" and the
burial of the dead one's personal
belongings such as necklaces of per-
forated teeth. It has been suggested
that the beginnings of ritualism, mystic
or religious practices can be shown from
Neanderthal sites such as. . .Mount
Circeo. Remains have been found inside
circles of objects placed with ritual-
istic precision. (Day, p. 130)

At about this same time (40,000 years BP) remains of the more

modern Homo sapiens sapiens of the Aurignacian culture show

 

the first bone pins, spear points, and the first art (Day,
p. 145-147).

. . .in this period [the Aurignacian]
as well as the subsequent Solutrean

and Magdalenian periods, men learned

to draw, paint, engrave, sculpt in bas-
relief and in the round. (Day, p. 147)

With the emergence of Homo sapiens, we find the coinci-

 

dence of the first evidence of burials, and the beginnings
and rapid expansion of the first art forms, and an increasingly
rapid increase in the number and complexity of tool-use.

We may now see the increasing ability to run-forward-in-
thought inextricably contingent on the increasing technological
ability to modify the environment as selected by natural
evolutionary pressures, and reaching a "critical point" with

the emergence of the Homo sapiens, whose cortex was suffi-

 

ciently enlarged to enable individual members of the species

 

to run-forward-in-thought to the extent that each recognized
the inevitability of his own death. The anxiety associated

with this cognition is responsible for man's intensity and

his insecurity. Since the coqnition of one's death is an
internal stimulus, the anxiety-arousal elicited by this stimulus
is environment-free, and therefore constant, and is the
arousal associated with the "change of state."
With the primal cognition of death, man first conceived

time which without death is intense-less. Barrett (1962)
recounts Heidegger:

‘We really know time, says Heidegger,

because we know we are going to die.

Without this passionate realization of

our mortality, time would be simply a

movement of the clock that we watch

passively, calculating its advance--

a movement devoid of human meaning. (p. 227)
The inward arousal associated with the cognition of one's
inevitable death is seen as the energizing force responsible
for the rapid expansion of culture continuing through the
present, and the primary solution of this cognition was the
attribution of spirit to the body, which would not die. Freud
(1913) wrote:

Above all, the problem of death must

have become the starting point of the

formation of the theory [of the soul].

(p. 100)
Once man was invested with a soul, animation of the rest of
nature would serve to substantiate his own animation. Freud
agrees that

. . .these soul conceptions are the

original nucleus of the animistic system,

that spirits merely correspond to souls

that have become independent, and that

the souls of animals, plants and things

were formed after the analogy of human
souls. (1913, p. 99, 100)

10

Although Freud does not give the cognition/repression of
non-being the primacy accorded here (in that his interpretation
of the death taboo is that it acts as a defense against repressed
aggression against the "defenseless dead," while here it is
seen as acting in defense of a de-repression of the fear of
one's own death), he does agree that the result of the pro-
jection of "the problem of death" (i.e., animism; mythology)
provided man with his first system of thought.

. . .in the course of time three sys-

tems of thought. . . each of which make

it possible to comprehend the totality of

the world from one point, as a continuity

. . .came into being: the animistic

(mythological), the religious, and the

scientific. Of these, animism, the

first system, is perhaps the most con-

sistent and the most exhaustive, and

the one which explains the nature of the

world in its entirety. . . . (1913, p. 101)
The mythological consciousness is conceived as the primal,
paradigm consequent of man's cognition/repression of the
time-bound nature of his being, and the dynamic of system is
seen as providing the individual with a preception-framework
in which his individuality (ego) is seen as preserved from
death.

Once the fear of non-being was repressed, man resisted a
return of the repressed by projecting that fear onto any out-
group that had selected a different system. Peoples who had
selected a different system were despised precisely because

the selection of a different system by like peoples is

the stimulus most likely to elicit a return of the repressed,

11

since that selection puts in question the objectivity of their

religion/system, and those (foreign) peOple were then seen

(projected) as bad, and later, choosers of bad (i.e., evil).
Lorenz (1966) has shown that

. . .those inhibitions which prevent
animals from injuring or killing fellow
members of the same species have to be
the strongest and most reliable 1) in
those species which, being hunters of
large prey, possess weapons which could
easily kill a conspecific; 2) in those
species which live gregariously. (p. 123)

The anomaly of war within Homo sapiens may be at least

 

partly attributable to man's primal cognition of non—being,
his systematic repression of this idea, and projections of
this repressed fear onto any people whose different system
elicited/elicits a return of the repressed toward conscious-
ness. These projections were/are rationalized such that the
opposing-system people are seen as bad or evil, and thus

needing elimination or conversion.

Mythological Evidence for the Rejection of Authority as a

Basic Dynamic of Consciousness:

 

Maslow (1962) has written

Most religions have had a thread of
anti-intellectualism , some trace of
preference for faith or beliéf or piety
rather than for knowledge, or the feel-
ing that some forms of knowledge were
too dangerous to meddle with and had
best be forbidden or reserved to a few
special people. In most cultures those
revolutionaries who defied the gods by

12

seeking out their secrets were punished
heavily, like Adam and Eve, Prometheus
and Oedipus, and have been remembered
as warnings to all others not to try
to be godlike. (p. 58)
Maslow continues:
. . .it is precisely the godlike in
ourselves that we are ambivalent about,
fascinated by and fearful of, motivated
to and defensive against. (p. 58)
What are the dynamics of this ambivalence? What is it that
we are fascinated by and motivated toward? Of what are we
fearful and defensive?

The two creation stories are similar in that the sin of
Adam and Eve and Prometheus was the sin of knowledge, of reflec-
tion. If, as I have submitted above, the cognition of one's
death, once repressed, produced the "knowledge" of good and e
evil (evil being that which elicits a return of the repressed,
good being that which reinforces the repression),1 it follows
that our fearfulness and defensiveness is of this knowledge
of ourvmortality. This interpretation receives tentative
support in the Lord's command ". . .but of the tree of good
and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of
it you shall die," (Gen. 2:17) and in the Lord's fear that
once ". . .man has become like one of us, knowing good and
evil. . ." that man would ". . .take also from the tree of
life and live forever." (Gen. 3:22.)

When Promotheus gave fire to men, he must also have given
men the ability to use the fire (Prometheus means forethought

l. The concept of "appropriateness," discussed below, is in
some sense "beyond good and evil."

13

(Hamilton, p. 68) and he gave man his own ability, forethought,
to run forward in thought.

Prometheus had not only stolen fire for

men; he had also arranged that they

should get the best part of any animal

sacrificed and the gods the worse. (p. 74)

Because Prometheus had helped mankind, Zeus punished him
by strapping him to a high rock, and had an eagle ". . .feast
. . .on This} blackened liver." (Hamilton, p. 72) But the
early Greeks felt that Prometheus was "wiser even than the
gods" (Hamilton, p. 68); the Greeks felt that his punishment
was unjust, and eventually Hercules, the heroic man, would
free him (Hamilton, p. 78).

Antigone's rejection of the law of the State for the
dictates of her own conscience also demonstrates the relation—
ship between rejection of authority as a viable consciousness--
referent and reflection, as well as the dangers inherent in
rebelling against the System. Antigone had performed burial
rights for her brother Polyneices, which Creon, King of Thebes,
had forbidden. Brought before him and asked if she had dis-
obeyed his law, Antigone replied:

Naturally: Since Zeus never promulgated
such a law. . . . I never thought your
edicts had such force they nullified the
laws of heaven. . . . (Sophocles, Roche
(trans?) p. 179)
For rejecting the State's prescriptions in lieu of her own

conscience, Antigone was sentenced to death.

Yankelovich and Barrett (1970) suggest that

14

. . .perhaps the most fundamental law

of nature expressed in human life is

the tendency to form new wholes or

structures.

This coming into being of new gestalts

is the principle of creativity in nature.

(p. 311)
Possibly this ambivalence suggested by Haslow may represent
on one hand an aversion toward self-knowledge which reveals
itself in the anxiety—producing consciousness of our essential
insecurity, the idea of our non-being; and on the other, a

tendency towards creativity, which offers us the possibility

 

of a better solution to life than the solution system offers
us. A necessary concomitant of this "synergistic quality"
(Tankelovich and Barrett, p. 311), this tendency towards new
gestalts is the rejection of the authority of the system to

structure one's perception. This necessary relationship

 

between reflection/knowledge and rebellion against authority
is mythologically represented in the disobedience of Adam and
Eve, Prometheus, Oedipus and Antigone, who were punished for
their respective crimes of: hunger for knowledge; forethought--
a love of man more than god; a wisdom that caused the death
of monsters; and a belief that one's conscience is a superior
value-referent than the law of the State.
May (1953) has also suggested that these myths

. . .portray the psychological truth that

the child's "opening his eyes," and gain-

ing self-awareness always involves

potential conflict with those in power,
be they gods or parents. (p. 159)

15

He also feels that there is a necessary relationship between
reflection, knowledge and a rebellion against authority:

. . .without. . .[this potential rebellioéj
the child would never acquire potentialities
for freedom, responsibility, and ethical
choice. . . .

and asks ". ; .why. . .this rebellion is condemned?" (p. 159)

As an answer to his own question, he also suggests that indi-

viduals are ambivalent toward actualizing their potentialities
and rejecting the authority/security of the system:

. . .in these myths there is the. . .
conflict between entrenched authority,

as represented by the jealous gods,

and the upsurging of new life and
creativity. The emergence of new
vitality always to some extent breaks

the existing customs and beliefs, and

is thus threatening and anxiety-provoking
to those in power as well as to the
growing person himself. . . . The
anxiety in Adam and the torture exper-
ienced by Prometheus also tell us psycho-
logically that within the creative person
himself there is the fear of moving
ahead. In these myths there speaks not
only the courageous side of man, but

the servile side which would prefer
comfort to freedom, security to one's

own growth. (p. 160.)

The full development of the central "phenomenon of man,"
reflection, self-consciousness, is thus seen here as inextri-

cably tied to the rejection of authority.

 

The evolution of system-consciousness: freedom seen as a ploy

 

 

enabling system to claim objectivity

 

I suggested earlier that the dynamic of system is that

it provides the individual with a perception-framework in

. . . . . . 16
which hlS 1nd1V1duality (ego-soul) can be seen as preserved

from nonebeing. Since individuation is seen as the essence

of system the mutation of system from the mythologic through

the religious and scientific is seen as the selection by system
of a progressively more individual solution to nonébeing, while
retaining the objective, non-finite character of earlier systems.
I will attempt to show below that the disintegration of the old
system-emergence of the new in each instance has coincided with

a progressively greater amount of freedom-to-choose-one's-fate
offered by the emerging system and/Or an internal-systemic
contradiction which effected a reduction of individual freedom-
to-choose-one's fate offered by the dying system. The mutation
of system towards greater freedom enabled the individualdwithin-
system to perceive individuals-outside-system as choosing their
(bad, unhappy) fate, in this way interpreting the less-than-con-
sensus of persons in his system not as an indication of the less-
than-Objective, finite nature of his system, but as indicative of

a more profound evil.

Tillich (1952) has suggested that there are three types of
anxiety that have been predominant in different periods of‘Western

history.

1) NOnAbeing threatens man's ontic self—
affirmation, relatively in terms of
fate, absolutely in terms of death. . . .

2) NOnAbeing threatens man's moral self-
affirmation, relatively in terms of guilt,
absolutely in terms of condemnation. . . .

3) NOnébeing threatens man's spiritual self-
affirmation, relatively in terms of emptiness,
absolutely in terms of meaninglessness. (p. 41,
enumeration mine)

17
The first type of anxiety is seen by Tillich to be predominant at

the end of the ancient period, the second type at the end of the
Middle Ages, and the third at the end of the modern period. If
the dominant system of the ancient period is considered the mytho-
logic, the Middle Ages religious, and the modern period the techno-
logic-scientific, Tillich's formulations may be used: 1) as an
expression of the failure of these successive systems to relieve
the individual of the anxiety of nonebeing; and 2) the predominant
anxiety of each period may thus be seen as having been derived from
the particular solution to individuation inherent in the dominant
system of that period.
1. The Failure of the Mythologic System to Solve the Anxiety
of Non4being.
Tillich is succinct:
The anxiety of fate and death is the
most basic, most universal, and ines—
capable. (p. 42)
and elsewhere:
Fate is the rule of contingency, and the
anxiety about fate is based on the finite
being's awareness of being contingent in
every respect, of having no ultimate
necessity. . . . (p. 44)
The solution of the animistic consciousness to the prOblem of indi-
viduation, of individual fate and death, was the tragic myth.
Nietzsche (1871) felt that there was a "metaphysical solace"

inherent in tragedy which gave the participants in it a ". . .

sense of unity which led back into the heart of nature. "

He wrote:

18

The world of tragedy is. . .a world having

the same reality and credibility as Olympus
possessed for the devout Greek. The satyr,

as the Dionysiac chorist, dwells in reality
sanctioned by myth and ritual. . . . I be-
lieve [that]. . .the cultured Greek felt
himself absorbed into the satyr chorus, and

in the next development of Greek tragedy

state and society, in fact all that separated
man from man, gave way before an overwhelming
sense of unity which led back into the heart
of nature. The metaphysical solace. . .that,
despite every phenomenal change, life is at
bottom indestructibly joyful and powerful, was
expressed most concretely in the chorus of
satyrs, nature beings who dwell behind all
civilization and preserve their identity through
every change of generations and historical
movement. With this chorus the. . .Greek. . .
who had penetrated the destructive agencies of
both nature and history solaced himself. Though
he had been in danger of craving a Buddhistic
denial of the will, he was saved by art, and
through art life reclaimed him. (p. 50, 51)

The solution of the Animistic consciousness to the prOblem of

awareness of one's fate and death is thus seen by Nietzsche as an

artistic one.

Dionysic art. . .makes us realize that everything
that is generated must be prepared to face its
painful dissolution. It forces us to gaze into
the horror of individual existence, yet without
being turned to stone by the vision. . . .For

a brief moment we become ourselves, the primal
Being, and we. . .see the struggle, the pain

. . .as necessary because of the constant pro-
liferation of forms pushing into life. . . .
Pity and terror notwithstanding, we realize

our great good fortune in having life--not as
individuals, but as part of the life force

19

with whose procreative lust we have become one.
(Nietzsche, p. 102—103)

Nietzsche's thesis--that the individual member of the
chorus-community was able to transcend his individuation through
identification with all of the disparate elements of the tragic
myth--appears less far-fetched if it is recognized that the same
Dionysus for Whom all of the Greek tragedies were written (Hamil-
ton, p. 61) was also the god of fertility, wine, and choral song.
This opposition to individuation is seen in each of the older
duties of Dionysus: as god of fertility he represented life
moving through individuals, not in them; as god of wine he
represented life when the ego had been dissolved in alcohol; as
god of choral song he represented life when the ego had been
dissolved in the dithyrambic intoxicatiOn of music. The oppo-
sition of Dionysus to individuation is also represented in the
winter reign of Dionysus at Delphi, complementing the rule of
Apollo, the god of individuation. That Apollo is the god of
individuals is expressed in his function as god of poetry and
the lyre, individual music; of healing, of the lonely shepherd;
and of prOphecy: through him the fate of individuals and states
were divined; and in his twin sister, Artemis, whose virginity
opposed the sexual, procreative nature of the Dionysiac spirit.

Hesiod, in the eighth century B.C. wrote that the Fates
gave to men at birth all the good and evil that they were to

have. But the obverse of accepting one's fate was the denial

20

of personal guilt. Even Oedipus was made to say

Murder, incest, and catastroPhe--...

not through any choice of mine but through

some scheme of heaven, long insensate

against our house. (Sophocles, p. 126-127)
And in The Eumenides of Aeschylus (458 B.C.) Orestes was
released from the vengeance of the Furies by Athena's acceptance
of Apollo's testimony that he ordered the matricide. But only
50 years later the tragic resolution of life forces through
the conflict of gods appeared impossible to Euripides (possibly
because of the failure of Athens in the Peloponnesian war and/or
the inability of the Athenian "spectators" to fully participate
in the Dionysiac rite), and in his Orestes the use of the gods
to explain Orestes' crime was portrayed as an ineffectual, un—
acceptable deux ex machine. Early in the version of Euripides,
Orestes speaks with Menelaus:

Orestes: I am a murderer. I murdered my mother.

Menelaus: So I have heard. Kindly spare me your
horrors.

Orestes: I spare you-—though no god spared me.
Menelaus: What is your sickness?

Orestes: I call it conscience. The certain know-
ledge of wrong, the conviction of crime.

(1. 391—396)
This expropriation of responsibility from the individuating god
(Apollo) to individual man is seen as coincident with the death
of the animistic system. The tragic myth opposed individuation

in that the choice of one's fate was seen as beyond the power

21

of all men, even heroes (e.g., pity "short-lived Achilles").
Since all men were seen as bound by fate, at a higher level

all men were seen to share the same fate, since any individual
destiny was seen as beyond the individual's control. In the
Orestes of Euripides fate was seen as an inadequate explanation
of tragedy. With the breaking of this bond opposing indivi-
duation, the mythologic system dissolved.

2. The Failure of the Religious System to Solve the
Anxiety of Nonébeing

With the increasing individuation coincident with the
dissolution of the mythologic system, the prOblem of nonAbeing
became primarily manifest in terms of guilt and condemnation.
The Furies that pursued Orestes were conceived.by the early
Greeks as pursuing wrong—doers on earth, but by the time of
Virgil, in the first century before Christ, these Furies were
thought of as tormentors of the underworld, where they published
earthly sinners in their after—life. (Hamilton, p. 40) But for
the early Greeks, all of the dead were, according to Homer, "blessed."
In the Eumenides, after Orestes had defended his matricide the
Furies (dieties older than Apollo) replied:

Of this stain, death has set her free
(1. 603)

The idea of an afterlife in which wrong-doers would be eternally
phnished for their deeds is a natural concomitant of the increas—
ing individuation that accompanied the Greeks' skepticism of
fate as an explanation of tragedy.

Nietzsche (1887) attacked the concept of sin as an "inver-

sion of morals" --a tact by an oppressed people (Jews) to gain

22

power through a more subtle repression, guilt, than through

physical domination. Although the concept of the freedom-to-

sin prObably evolved earlier among some Jewish pe0ple than it

did in the Greeks (due to the same skeptic refusal to grant

their god responsibility for tragedy), it is suggested here

that an indigenous evolution of this idea also occurred among

the Athenians.

This skepticism of divine responsibility for tragedy and

the consequent increased individuation is seen as the mutual

source of both the religious and the scientific systems, and it

is suggested here that the evolution of both systems may only

be understood in light of this mutual origin and their contin-

ued interdependence.

Tillich (1952) writes:

[the death of Socrates )became for the

whole ancient world.both a fact and a

symbol. . . . It showed a courage which
could affirm life because it could affirm
death. Soldierly fortitude was transcended
by the courage of wisdom. In this form it
gave 'pholosophical consolation' to many
pe0p1e in all sections of the ancient world
throughout a period of catastrOphes and trans—
formations. (p. 11)

What is the nature of this "courage [that] could affirm death?"

In the Phaedo, Plato describes Socrates' proof of the immortality

of the soul:

Socrates: What is that of which the inherence will

render the body alive?

Cebes: The soul.

S.

And is this always the case?

.
VA ’-

23

C: Yes, Of course.

U)

Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she
comes bearing life?

Yes, certainly.

And is there any opposite to life?
There is.

And what is that?

Death.

m (3 ca 43 m (3

Then the soul, as has been acknowledged, will
never receive the opposite of what she brings.

O

Impossible. . .

(A

And what do we call the principle which does
not admit of death?

The immortal.
And does the soul admit of death?
: No.

Then the soul is immortal?

Yes.

: And may we say that this has been proven?

OUJOMOUJO

Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates.

‘(p. 143, 144)
Nietzsche (1871) analysed the relationship between the use of
reason and the fear of death in Socrates:

. . .we find a deep-seated illusion, first
manifested in Socrates: the illusion

that thought, guided by the thread of
causation, might plumb the farthest abyss
of being and even correct it. This grand
metaphysical illusion Has become integral
to the scientific endeavor and again

and again leads science to those far

24

limits of its inquiry where it becomes art--
which, in this mechanism, is what is really intended.

If we examine Socrates in the light of this idea,
he strikes us as the first who was able not only to
live under the guidance of that instinctive scien—
tific certainty, but to die by it, which is much
more difficult. For this reason the image of the dying
Socrates--mortal man freed by knowledge and argument
from the fear of death--is the emblem which, hanging
above the portal of every science, reminds the adept
that his mission is to make existence appear intelli-
gible and thereby justified. (p. 93)

Nietzsche (1871, p. 83) also tells us that Socrates never attended
tragic plays, except for those of Euripides, whose work as has
been suggested above also portended the death of mythology.

The nature of the "philosophical consolation" of Socrates'
death thus lies in his example of an individual man freed from
the fear of non-being through the power of his own reason. The
individuation process predominatly manifest in Socrates, the
wisest man of Apollo's oracle, is also demonstrated by the
thoughts of Socrates on the composition of the after-life:

When the dead arrive. . .first of all
they have sentence passed on them. . .
[the middle group] go to the river. . .
and there they. . .are purified of their
evil deeds, and having suffered the
penalty of the wrongs. . .they are ab-
solved, and receive the rewards of their
good deeds, each according to his deserts.
(Phaedo, p. 148)

Socrates/Plato continues and describes eternal damnation for

the most wicked, eventual absolution after years in a

25

volcanic-type chasm for those less wicked, when the persons
that they had wronged forgave them. He continues:

. . .those too who have been preeminent

for holiness of life are released from

this earthly prison, and go to their

pure home which is above, and dwell in

the purer earth; and of these, such as

have duly purified themselves with

philoSOphy live henceforth altogether

without the body, in mansions fairer

still. . . .
Though he is

. . .Cnot very confident that the des-

cription. . .of the soul and her mansions

is exactly true. . .inasmuch as the soul

is shown to be immortal, [it is not

improper]. . .to think... .that something

of the kind is true. (p. 148, 149)
The essential theology of Western religion until the Reforma-
tion was already manifest 400 years before Christ, and an
apostle of both the religious and the scientific systems is
seen as present in the persona of Socrates/early Plato. In
that the mythologic system may be seen as a resolution of the
Apollonian and Dionysiac forces, the art of the Ekeptic/
dialectician Socrates-Plate] /death of Socrates, great as it
was, was not on the order of the Dionysiac in providing release
from the fear of non-being. It remained for the symbol of
the resurrection of Christ to provide that release. With the
faith in the one resurrected man/God a synthesis of the new
theology of individuation with a more exclusively individual
Promethean "blind hope" against the fear of non-being was
achieved, the system which was to predominate, in this par-

ticular synthesis, until the Reformation.

26

With the resurrection as the central tenet of the reli-
gious system, the theology of Socrates was modified such that
those who lived in "mansions fairer still" after death were
not those who had "purified themselves with philosophy," but
were those who had faith in Christ as the resurrected Lord.

Then he said to Thomas, "Put your
finger here, and see my hands; and put
out your hand and place it in my side;
do not be faithless, but believing."
Thomas answered.him, "My Lord and my
Godi" Jesus said to him "Have you
believed.because you have seen me?
Blessed are those that have not seen
me and yet believe.“

. . .these [signs1 are written that
you may believe that Jesus is the Christ,
the Son of God, and that believing you
may have life in his name. (John 20:27-31,)

However, with this change in the mechanism of salvation
from purification—through—philosophy of Socrates/Plato to
faith in Christ and his monotheism, the skeptic ethos of
philosophy reemerged as critic of the religious system. The
interrelation of faith and reason is evident in St. Augustine's
justification of evil in God's world. Barrett (1958) describes

this effort:

All evil, he tells us, is a lack of
being, hence a form of non-being; and
since the negative is not real, as
positive being is, we are somehow to
be consoled. (p. 96)

Barrett sees St. Augustine as

. . .[setting] the pattern of Christian thought
for the thousand years of Middle Ages that were
to follow. The formula after Augustine became

'Faith seeking understanding." (p. 97)

 

27
It is suggested here that the conflict between reason and
faith effected the eventual dissolution of the religious system.
Prior to this dissolution the theodicy of St. Augustine and
the later Christian theologians represented an uneasy alliance,
an effort to resolve this conflict.

With reason as the religion of Socrates/Plato, the mortal
body,being finite, could be seen as the allure of evil; but
the theodicy of St. Augustine could not admit of God's crea-
tion as engendering evil. The Socratic solution to the prob-
lem of non-being lay in the "philosophical" opposition of the

essence of mind/soul to the existence of the body, which

 

presaged Descartes' mind/body dichotomy. The evolution of
Philosophy/science/technology system may be seen as interrupted
with the emergence of the religious system. Only when the
religious system had begun to lose its power could the evolu-
tion of the scientific system continue. Plato wrote that
...that idea or essence, which in the dia-
lectical process 2? define as essence or

true existence is . . .not admitting of
o, p. 112)

variation. (Phae
and that these
. . .unchanging thin you ca only per-
ceive with the mind which iSfi . . .invisible
and. . .not seen. (p. 112)
and later:

. . .the soul is more like to the unseen,
and the body to the seen. (p. 113)

Plato/Socrates continued:

. . .the soul, when using the body as
an instrument of perception. . .is then

Augustine's

28

dragged by the body into the region of
the changeable, and wanders and is con-
fused. . .she is like a drunkard when

she touches change. . .but when returning
into herself she reflects, then she passes
into the other world. . .of purity, . . .
eternity, . . .immortality, and with

then she ever lives when she is by her-
self. . .And this state of the soul is
called wisdom. . .the soul is in the

very likeness of the divine, immortal,
intellectual, . . .and unchangeable;

and the body is in the very likeness

of the human,. . .mortal. . .unintellec-
tual. . .and changeable. . .the soul,
which is pure at departing and draws
after her no bodily taint, having never
voluntarily during life had connection
with the body. . .herself gathered into
herself, and making such abstraction

her perpetual study--which means that

she has been a true disciple of philo-
sophy; and therefore has in fact been
always engaged in the practice of dying--
for is not philOSOphy the study of

death?

 

 

. . .the soul. . .accus med to hate
and fear and avoidance of the intel-
lectual principle, which to the bodily
eye is dark and invisible, and can be
attained only by philoSOphy. . .is held
fast by the corporeal,. . .[ind will
not} depart pure and unalloyed.
(Phaedo, p. 113-115, emphasis supplied)

opposition to Plato is apparent:

There is no need, therefore, that in

our sins and vices we accuse the nature
of the flesh to the injury of the Creator,
for in its own kind and degree the

flesh is good;

. . .For he who extols the nature
of the soul as the chief good, and con-
demns the nature of the flesh as if it
were evil, assuredly is fleshly both
in his love of the soul and hatred of
the flesh; for these. . .feelings arise
from human fancy, not divine truth. . . .
(Augustine, p. 446)

29

With the consolidation of the animistic—system gods into one
omnipotent, omniscient deity, Christian theologians faced

the superimposition of the prOblem of cosmic evil on Euripides/
Socrates' solution of tragedy as the choice of evil individuals.
Theodicy was never able to satisfactorily synthesize God's
omniscience and omnipotence with the existence of evil. Augustine
wrote:

. . .God's foreknowledge had anticipated
both. . .how evil the man whom He had
created good should become and.what

good He Himself should even thus derive
from him. . . . God made man upright,
and consequently with a good will. . . .
The good will, then, is the work of

God; for God created him with it. But
the first evil will, Which preceded all
man's evil acts, was rather a kind of
falling away from the work of God to

its own works than any positive work.
And therefore the acts resulting were
evil, not having God, but the will itself
for their end; so that the will or the
man himself, so far as his will is bad,
was as it were the evil tree bringing
forth evil fruit. (p. 457)

Augustine's interpretation of the Biblical passage

And the Lord was sorry that he had made
man on the earth, and it grieved him to
his heart. So the Lord said, "I will
blot out man whom I have created from
the face of the ground. . . for I am
sorry that I have made them." But Noah
found favor in the eyes of the Lord.
(Gen. 6:6-8)

is ". . .not with reference to that which the Almighty had
foreknown that He would do," but it is ". . . with reference

to man's expectation, or the order of natural causes. . ."

(p. 457). The purpose of theodicy was not only to justify

30

the existence of evil in God's world, but also to rationalize
the murder of those who were seen as evil (opposing system).
Saint Augustine wrote:

However, there are some exceptions made
by the divine authority. . .that men

may not be put to death. These excep-
tions are of two kinds, being justified
either by a general law, or by a special
commission granted for a time to some
individual. And in this later case, he
to whom authority is delegated.-. .is
not himself responsible for the death

he deals. And, accordingly, they who
have waged war in obedience to the divine
command, or in conformity with His laws
have represented in their persons the
public justice or the wisdom of govern-
ment, and in this capacity have put to
death wicked men; such persons have by
no means violated the commandment,

'Thou shalt not kill.‘ (p. 27)

With the onset of the Reformation, the attempted synthesis
of reason and faith was either rejected outright (Luther:
"the whore, reason"--Barret. p. 111) or its injust conse-
quences were accepted (Calvin: predestination).

It is suggested here that the failure of theodicy as

manifested in the emergence of Protestantism coincided with

the death of the religious system.

3. The Failure of the Technological/Scientific System
to Solve the Anxiety of Non-being

The loss of freedom-to-choose-one's-fate, represented to
consciousness in the doctrine of predestination, posed essen-
tially the same predicament to system-consciousness emerging

from the dissolution of the universal church as it did to the

31

Greek consciousness emerging from the dissolution of the
mythologic. Whereas before the Reformation reason played a
subordinate role to faith in the "faith—seeking—understending"
theodicy of the Church, the solution to the prOblem of non—

being after the Reformation was the same essential solution

 

of Socrates/Plato to the dissolution of the mythologic system:
the attribution of divine, non-finite qualities to reason.

Descartes' thinking was an early example of the reemergence
of the scientific solution to the fear of nonébeing. Descartes'
resolve to doubt everything (skepticism as the ethos of reason)
led to his conclusion that he could doubt everything but doubt
itself, and that this action of the mind thus proves reality:
Cogito, ergo sum. To Descartes, God was the link between the
mechanical world of the body and the rational world of the mind.
Ryle (1949) has written:

When Galileo showed that his methods of
scientific discovery were competent to
provide a mechanical theory which should
cover every occupant of space, Descartes
found in himself two conflicting motives.
As a man of scientific genius he could
not but endorse the claims of mechanics,
yet as a religious and moral man he
could not accept, as HObbes accepted,
the discouraging rider to those claims,
namely that human nature differs only

in degree of complexity from clockwork.
The mental could not be just a variety
of the mechanical. (p. 18-19)

Ryle expresses Descartes' solution to this conflict--that man
has an autonomous mind Which governs his body, in turn subject
to rigid, mechanical laws—-as the myth of the "ghost in the

machine." The prOblem of fate thus underwent another meta—

32

morphosis and emerged as the problem of determinism to the
individuated technological consciousness.

But in the eXpanding, deterministic universe that existed
after Copernicus and Galileo the power of reason, even combined
with the less objective Christian faith, has not been suffi-
cient to allay the anxiety of non-being, which has manifested
itself in the modern period relatively in terms of emptiness,
absolutely in terms of meaninglessness. Pascal (1623-1622)
expressed what Dobzhansky (1962) calls "the feeling of schism
between man and nature. . ." near the beginning of the rebirth
of the scientific consciousness:

When I consider the short duration of

my life, swallowed up in the eternity
before and after, the little space which
I fill, and even can see, engulfed in
the infinite immensity of spaces of
which I an ignorant, and which know me
not, I am frightened, and am astonished
at being here rather than there, why

now rather than then. . . . The eternal
silence of these infinite Spaces frightens
me. (Dobzhansky, p. 362)

By the early part of the nineteenth century the "schism"
in the thought of Descartes was represented in the opposing
philosophies of Kant and Hegel. Blackham (1965) has sketched
this opposition, suggesting that one of the factors condition-
ing the emergence of Existentialist thought was the situation
in philosophy following these two philosophers.

Kant had shown the limited reach of
reason, competent to organize inter-

subjective experience but not able to
know the object in itself. Hegel had

33

exulted the competence of reason by
restoring the old theme, putting reason
back into nature and history. (p. 2)

The following from Kant's Critigge (second ed., 1787) suggests
that he prepared the way for Kierkegaard's faith that could

. . .hold fast the objective uncertainty,
so as to remain out upon the deep, over
seventy thousand fathoms of water, still
preserving my faith. (Kierkegaard, 1846,
ig_B1ackham, p. 24

. . .even the assumption-—as made on
behalf of the necessary practical employ-
ment of my reason--of God, freedom, and
immortality is not permissible unless

at the same time speculative reason be
deprived of its pretensions to trans—
cendent insight. For in order to arrive
at such insight, it must make use of
principles which, in fact extend only

to Objects of possible experience, and
which, if also applied to what cannot

be an object of experience, always

really change this into an appearance,
thus rendering all practical extension

of pure reason impossible. I have there-
fore found it necessary to deny knowledge,
in order to make room for faith.

(Kant, p. 22)

 

The other precursor of existentialism was also affected
by Kant. Nietzsche (1871) wrote:

Whereas the current Optimism.had treated
the universe as knowable. . .Kant showed
how these supposed laws served only to
raise appearance. . .to the status of
true reality. . . . This perception

has initiated a culture Which I dare
describe as tragic. Its most important
characteristic is that wisdom is put

in the place of science as the highest
goal. (p. 111)

Friedrich (1953) suggests that

34
. . .Kant is the philoSOpher of peace
and international order, whereas Hegel
is the philos0pher of war and of the
national authoritarian state. . . . (p. xxii)

Friedrich also feels that
. . .both Marxism and Fascism are incom-

prehensible without an understanding of
Hegel. (p. xv)

In support of this contention, Friedrich notes Marx's "profound
admiration for Hegel" (p. xvi) and his ". . .contempt for the
small minds that criticized. . .Hegel without understanding him

. . ." in the preface to Das Kapital. (Friedrich, p. 546)

 

Friedrich writes that "Lenin confirmed the judgment of Marx
l
and suggested that Marx "is directly tied to Hegel." Friedrich

traces the change of the Hegelian synthesis to that of Marx through
the philosophy of Feuerbach, whose ". . .substitution of the materia—
list for the idealist position. . ." provided the transfer of Hegel's
dialectic to that of Marx.

. . .[Marx's] argument was based upon

Hegel's radical rationalism and proclaimed
that since the Prussian and all other con-
temporary states were not rational, they

were not truly real and hence were bound to
go. Transforming Feuerbach's speculative
materialism into an economic 'materialism'
Which actually stresses organization (the
pattern of control of the means of produc-
tion), Hegel's dialectic became in the hands
of Marx a proposition to the effect that every
economic system contains the antithesis of another
which will supersede it—-a travesty of Hegel's
sophisticated dialectic, to be sure, but of
enormous political effect. (p. 1xii)

1. Marx "knupft unmittelbar an Hegel an." (Friedrich, p. 546)

35

Friedrich cites Lukacs' work which suggests that Dilthey's

". . .reinterpretation of Hegel" connected Hegel's original
work with modern Fascism, (Friedrich, p. 546) The reemergence
of the "old theme" of reason as religion in Hegel and his
"synthesis" of reason, religion, and the state is clearly

evidenced in his last work, The PhilOSOphy of History (1822):

 

often one has tried to establish a con-
flict between reason and religion and
world; but when sfuaied more cIosely,
this is merely a distinction. Reason,
generally speaking, is the essence of
the spirit, the divine as well as the
human. The difference between religion
and world is merely this, that religion
is reason in mind and heart, that is a
temple of human freedom in the knowledge
of and the will for the actual reality,
the content of which may iself be called
divine. Thus freedom in the state is
confirmed and substantiated by religion,
because ethical law in the state is
merely the execution of what is the
basic princi 1e of religion.

(Friedrich trans] p. 88)

The basis for a "reinterpretation" of Hegel leading to Fascism
lay, in part, in his belief that the German Gei§£_would be
th£_power of the new world (the historical shadow of this
belief was the promise of a millenium to pure-blooded Germans

by das Fuhrer.)

 

The Germanic spirit is the spirit of

the new world. Its end is the realiza-
tion of absolute truth as the unlimited
self-determination of freedom which has
its own absolute form as its content.

The destiny of the Germanic peoples is
to be the bearers of the Christian prin-
ciple. (Hegel, FriedrichEede), p. 88-89)

36

In the modern period major scientific theories have been
used by proponents of disparate sub-systems as substantiafion
of their particular beliefs. The theory of evolution pro-
vided vindication for fascists, capitalists, and Marxists.
DObzhansky (1962) has written:

The radical left welcomed evolution with open
arms. Karl Marx was so delighted that he
*wanted to dedicate the second volume of Q§§_
Kapital to Darwin, an honor Darwin declined.
In Russia, the liberal intelligentsia saw

in evolution a weapon to combat traditional
religion. . . . The conservative Right was

no less pleased, though for different reasons. . . .
Bagehot (1873). . .declared that competition
and conquest between tribes and nations was
nothing less than Darwinian struggle for
existence and evolution by natural selection.
(p. 139)

Dobzhansky suggests that political conservatives did
not want to read Darwin's "struggle for existence" as a
"metaphor . . . not necessarily imply[ing] combat,"’but
as a vindication of their position against social reform.
The social Darwinists felt that

since Nature is "red in tooth and claw,"

it would be a big mistake to let our senti-
ments interfere with Nature's intentions

by helping the poor, the weak, and the
generally unfit to the point where they
will be as comfortable as the rich, the
strong, and the fit. In the long run,
letting Nature reign will bring the greatest
benefits. "Pervading all Nature we may see
at work a stern discipline which is a little
cruel that it may be very kind," wrote
Herbert Spencer (p. 140)

American capitalists were able to use social Darwinism to

justify their favored position. Sumner wrote that

37

...the millionaires are a product of natural
selection, acting on the whole body of men to
pick out those who can meet the requirements
of certain work to be done. . . .(ig_Dob—
ahansky, p. 12)

John D. Rockefeller, Sr., agreed.

The growth of a large business is merely a
survival of the fittest. . . . It is merely
the working out of a law of nature and a law
of God. (ig Dobzhansky, p. 12)

Lysenkoism, in which

the environment is believed to alter heredity
directly, and the sequence of such alterations
is assumed to represent evolution (Dobzhansky,
p. 17)

along with Pavlov's work on the conditioned reflex provided
the Soviet Union (at least under Stalin) with a "scientific"
formula for the molding of the socialist man.

The theory of evolution was also used as an apology for
the idea of biologically inferior and superior races. Herbert
Spencer, Houston, Chamberlain, Wagner (the composer), and (in
what I believe is a misinterpretation of Zarathustra) Nietzsche
were early preponents of the particularly racist strain of Social
Darwinism that produced Fascism. (Dobzhansky, p. 13, 140)

The slogan "survival of the fittest"

was coined by Spencer and accepted by

Darwin not without hesitation. The
superlative in it deftly suggested that

the struggle for life was so inexorable

that eventually all but the one fittest

must fall by the wayside. From there it

was only a step to Nietzsche's superman.
Although Nietzsche had only contempt for
Darwin as a mere "English shOpkeeper,"...
Thus Spake Zarathustra has in it...much

more of Darwin than Zoroaster. And from
Nietzsche (1844-1900), the pedigree of ideas
sends a branch to Hitler, with his one master
leader of one master race. (Dobzhansky, p. 140)

38

The achievement of the scientific consciousness has been
its "conquest" of nature, its "putting nature on the rack"
(Francis Bacon) and using her for its own design. But the
method by which this was achieved was at a minimum psychic
cost to the user: until this century the subject (man) has
been left outside the "laws of nature" that he formulated
about the Objective world. This Cartesian split enabled
western man to develop the physical sciences and at the same
time continue his religion, either through his subjective side
and/Or through the sciences themselves, which, like Plato's
Ig§g§_(Barrett, p. 231-2) were held to be eternal. In
both ways Western man has been able to continue non-recog-
nition of his own finiteness, non-recognition of the in-
evitability of his own death, and repression of the idea
of non-being, but at a cost of severing himself from nature,
from the "gnaund of his Being." (Heidegger, 1962)

Eastern thought, with a conception of all reality as
Sanskara (illusion) also enabled man to avoid (repress) the
fear of death, and at the same time avoided the bifurcation
of man and nature by seeing all reality, including man and
nature, connected in a chain (Karma). According to Teilhard
(p. 211), this Sanskara—Karmic definition of reality was an-
tagonistic to "building the world" since reality regarded
as illusion would not lend itself to knowledge of that reality,

and for that reason the sciences did not develop in the East.

39

Barrett (1958) also feels that

The great historical parting of the ways
between Western and Eastern man came about
because each made a different decision as
to what truth is. (p. 231)

Relating Heidegger's thought, he writes:

Using terms

The fall of Being. . . occurred when the
Greek thinkers detached things as clear
and distinct forms from their encompass-
ing background, in order that they might
reckon clearly with them. (p. 230)

from gestalt psychology, he continues:

By detaching the figure from the ground
the object could be made to emerge into
the daylight of human consciousness: but
the sense of the ground, the environing
background, could also be lost. The
figure comes into sharper focus...but
the ground recedes, becomes invisible,

is forgotten. The Greeks detached beings
from the vast environing ground of Being.
This act of detachment was accompanied
by a momentous shift in the meaning of
truth for the Greeks, a shift which
Heidegger pinpoints as taking place in

a single passage in Plato's Republic

. . .the allegory of the cave. The
quality of un-hiddenness had been con-
sidered the mark of truth; but with
Plato in that passage truth came to be
defined. . .as the correctness of an
intellectual judgment. Truth henceforth
resided in the human intellect insofar
as that intellect judged truly about
things. By adopting this meaning of
truth as the primary and essential one,
the Greeks were able to develop science,
the unique and distinguishing charac-
teristic of Western civilization. (p. 230, 231)

 

In comparing the Western and Oriental civilizations, Barrett

suggests that

In neither India nor China, nor in the
philosophies that these civilizations
produced, was truth located in the intellect.

40

On the contrary, the Indian and Chinese
sages insisted on the very opposite:
namely, that man does not attain to
truth, so long as he remains locked up
in his intellect. . . . If the Greeks
had not detached Objects from their
enveloping ground of Being, what we
know of the Western intellect would not
have come into existence. The lack of
this intellect is the negative, the
shadow, in the historical project of
the Oriental civilizations. (p. 231)

The New Consciousness: Rejection of System

 

But this estrangement of our Being from nature in the West,
because of the very success of technology is physical systems
brought about by this estrangement, has resulted in the gradual

de-humanization, de-subjectivization, objectification of man

 

effected by the application of the tools of technology to
human systems (economic-utilitarian: man as societal-resource,
as cog in industrial machine, man as a mission-function lost
in an acceptable kill—ratio of 3-1: and now psychological:
man as a product of the conflict between instinctual demands
and societal restrictions, or man as solely shapped by the
reinforcement contingencies imposed on man and his ancestors
by the environment).
Again Barrett (1958) is relevant.

It remained for modern science. . .to

effect a sharper division between man

and nature; and the thought of Descartes

is the expression of this cleavage. The

object which has been detached from the

enveloping ground of Being can be measured

and calculated, but the essence of the object--
the thing-in-itself-ébecomes

conscious of himself as cut off from

the object even as his power to manipulate
the Object mounts almost unbelievably. . . .
Man masters beings, but Being--the open
region in which both subject and object
stand out and are thus not divided—-is
forgotten. There is left to man nothing
but his Will to Power over objects; and
Heidegger is right When he says that
Nietzsche is in this respect the culmi—
nation of Western metaphysics, which
metaphysics in turn culminates in the
situation of the world today where

power rides supreme. (p. 231, 232)

We live in a period of history when the technological
consciousness has grown old and technology will become a tool,
if we survive.

The following related, converging forces are seen as the
immediate, dynamic precipitants of a central mutation of
consciousness away from security-authority-future orientation
towards a recognition that insecurity is the real condition of
being, and that freedom and love are bound up in insecurity—
non-authoritarianism. These forces have engendered the realiza-
tion that the "locus of values" for every human being is within
himself (naslow, 1962, p. 10). With acceptance of the idea of
nonebeing/rejection of system the new consciousness lives in
the tense of life: now. These forces are conceived as:

A) Gnawing intuition of the unreality, inconsistency with man

becoming Man, non—actualization of: man as object, the

 

perception of others as useful or not, relationships of need—
object to need-object, relationships in which the central

dynamic is: the will to power/doubleébind control techniques

42

(Haley, l963)/oneaway hypnotism, unnecessary alienated work,

affluence in the middle of hunger, murder for economic benefit.

B) Technology not only has "objectified" man, but also

1.

requires university training for millions of its
workmen, which in turn puts those millions in
greater conflict with their conditioned values
than those persons who do not leave the community
of their parents.

provides the pgtential: to end scarcity (and eco-

 

nomic competition and exploitation): for co-operation
on a world scale; for minimizing and eventual elim-
ination of alienated labor.

improves cross-cultural communication through media
exchange: provides the means for direct contact with
another culture, and the experience that the foreign
is human.

with the application of successful objective-science
technology to the study of man has resulted in a
"scientific" picture of man as an animal completely
determined by the same order of laws of nature

that are operative in animals lower on the phylo-
genetic scale, while ignoring the Obvious effect

of the cognition of those laws in man (e.g., the
cognition of conditioning as such, evolution as

such) as "subjective," unscientific. Thus, there

43
in an inherent paradox in the technological-

consciousness as a total world View, and this
paradox has become manifest as this consciousness

has turned in on itself.
C) Wars

In this century the authoritarian consciousness, with
increasingly destructive technology has defended itself against
its own repressed fear of insecurity/death by projecting its
deficiencies (manifestations of limited, finite humanness) onto
any out-group from which it could discriminate itself: and identify
itself with System, thereby gaining relief from the burden of

finiteness, denying the reality of its inevitable, individual

death.

This consciousness has caused death and suffering to hundreds
of millions of persons in this century. With the advent of ther-
monuclear wars, the cost of this psychic defense against awareness
of one's death, the cost of repression of the idea of nonébeing
(in its necessary potential for*war, the small probability for
which, over time, approaches certainty, in which the realized
potential of this consciousness in time = the death of humanity)
has become greater (for millions of persons now) than the psychic
discomfort of becoming conscious of death, accepting the idea

of nonebeing.

And so the essense of the new consciousness is existence
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 67; Srtre in_Barrett, 1962, p. 248); the
emergence of this radical mutation of consciousness is seen
here as conditioned by the failure of system to solve the

anxiety of non-being, and as selected by Being-itself in

44
an effort to resist extinction. In the service of Being, which
is the de-repression of the primal dread of non-being/rejection
of system, we are restored to ourselves--with system as a

tool, not as a total frame of reference.

45
THE DIFFERENCE IN CONSCIOUSNESS DYNAMIC:
SYSTEM (SUPEREGO) vs. NEW (REFLECTIVE)
The full development of Teilhard's'hentral phenomenon of
man," reflection, is thus seen as dependent on two factors:
1) the rejection of the authority of system to structure one's
perception (values); and 2) the cognition of the illusion of
the "freedom" offered by system. With the cognition of the
illusory nature of freedom-within-system the less-than-consensus
of system is no longer perceived as caused by choices of evil
individuals, but as an indication of the finite, non-objective
character of system. The "new" consciousness, in that it more
wholly encompasses this "central phenomenon," is here desig-

nated the reflective.consciousness. Because systemeconsciousness

 

functions through internalization (conditioning) of the
prescriptions of system-authority; because the non-cognition
of which (internalization-conditioning)_is necessary for the
continued functioning of the religious/technologic system;
because the substructure (ground) of system-consciousness is

repression of non-being and the concomitant estrangement from

 

Being/oneself: for these reasons system-consciousness is seen
as operative through the same dynamics implicit in Freud's
trichotomy of being into id, ego, and superego, and the
consciousness which functions through this dynamic is desig-
nated the superego.

Freud (1930) outlined the function of the superego, and

the inherent alienation of this kind of consciousness-dynamic.

46
. . .What means does civilization employ in
order to inhibit the aggressiveness which
opposes it, to make it harmless...? ...
What happens in. . .[the development of the
individual] to render his desire for aggression
innocuous? . . . His aggressiveness is intro-
jected, internalized; it is. . .sent back to where
it came from--that is, it is directed toward his
own ego. There it is taken over by a portion
of the ego, which sets itself over against the
rest of the ego as super-ego. . . .(p. 70)

. . .The superego is an agency which has been
inferred by us, and conscience is a function
which we ascribe, among other functions, to that
agency. This function consists in keeping a
watch over the actions and intentions of the
ego and judging them, in exercising a censor-
ship. The sense of guilt, the harshness of
the super-ego, is thus the same thing as the
severity of the conscience. It is the per-
ception which the ego has of being watched
over in his way, the assessment of the tension
between its own strivings and the demands of
the super-ego. The fear of this critical agency
(a fear which is at the bottom of the whole
relationship). the need for punishment, is an
instinctual manifestation on the part of the
ego, which has become masochistic under the
influence of a sadistic super-ego; it is a
portion, that is to say, of the instinct
towards internal destruction present in the
ego, employed for forming an erotic attach-
ment to the super-ego. . . . (p. 83)

. . .it is not until. . .the authority is
internalized through the establishment of a
superego. . .that we should speak of conscience
or a sense of guilt. . . . (p. 72)
Brewster Smith (1963) also feels that superego functioning is
not the universal consciousness—dynamic, and contrasts the
superego conscience with a more reflective kind, in which the

values of the person are not solely the internalized edicts

of system authority.

47
Superego requiredness may be said to
characterize those standards (values)
that the person holds in the fashion
portrayed in the classical Freudian
superego. The values. . .are inflexibly
held, irrationally applied, and are
typically implicit, or unconscious,
rather than explicitly formulated by
the person who holds them. . . . In
persons who approach more closely the
commonly formulated ideals of maturity
and good functioning (superego values)
fall into the background as compared
with values characterized by what I am
calling self-requiredness. These as
standards that may be implicit, but,
in any case, are accessible to conscious
formulation. They are actively embraced
by the person and thus become constituents
of the self, part of what the person feels
himself to be and to stand for. Characteris-
tically their application involves more finely
differentiated cognitive discriminations than
is the case with superego values, and they
can therefore be applied with more flexibility,
appropriateness, and rationality.
(emphasis supplied, p. 338-9)

Rokeach (1968) feels that there is a "motivation for con-
sistency" in value-attitude systems:
In common with other balance formulations
the present theory also postulates a need
for consistency, but consistency is defined,
primarily, as consistency with self-esteem
and, secondarily, as consistency with logic
or reality. (p. 164)
Consistent with Rokeash's formulation that personal values
are"secondarily" determined by "consistency with logic or

reality," Smith feels that not all values can be traced to

sources in social experience.

48

A place has to be reserved for the role
of objective appropriateness as a source
of standards having the experienced
quality of requiredness. (p. 339)

In what seems to me to be a particularly elucidating explica-
tion of this "objective" basis for values, Smith continues:

But just as self theory in the Mead-Cooley
tradition ignores the presocial ingredients

of organic sensation and body imagery, so

I fear it would be in error to claim that

the objective requiredness of values can

be traced exhaustively to social origins

. . . . Artists may work within the frame-
work of a cultural style or of a set of
classical rules that is fixed by convention
but the critic's judgment of artistic quality
is not simply a matter of estimating the degree
of fidelity with which the rules have been
applied, the style exemplified. He is almost
sure to be convinced that within the framework
of convention, standards are nonetheless in-
trinsic and objective, hard as they may be

to make fully explicit. What seems common

to these cases is that although convention

or cultural tradition sets the terms of

the problem or defines the materials, modes,
and ends of the activity, standards of evalua-
tion arise that have some necessary_relation
to the structure of the activity and are not
themselves merely conventional. (emphasis
supplied, p. 339-40)

 

 

 

 

Smith suggests that the "ingredient" of objective appro-
priateness
may somehow [be]. . . generated by the
requirements of historically conditioned human
nature, as they mesh or fail to mesh with the
situations that people encounter. . . .(p. 34)

He concludes his discussion of "Objective appropriateness"

by proposing that

49

. . .it is at least conceivable that

perceived relationships of appropriate-

ness are an important source of values

in personality development, together

with the influence of parental demands

and expectations which we are now better

able to formulate. The suggestive

evidence for a core of value universals

points, albeit weakly, to continued pres-

sure from this source that partly shapes

what is socially or personally required.

(p. 342)
It is suggested here that the capability to perceive "relation-
ships of appropriateness" to the "situations that people
encounter" does not lie in superego persons, since their
internalized authority-prescriptions (i.e., values) are
already determined prior to any "situation" that they "encounter."
But rather, this capability to perceive what is objectively
appropriate, the source of "value universals," is progressively
more operative in those individuals who more wholly encompass
reflection, i.e., the "locus of values" lies within the de-
alienated existing person.

But concomitant with the denial of system/authority as

a viable consciousness-referent and the cognition of the illu-
sion of freedom-within-system is the de-repression of the
essential insecurity of being, the perception that the pre-
cepts of system (i.e., superego values) are non-objective.
Brewster Smith believes that self-requiredness, as opposed to
superego requiredness

is vulnerable because the degree of

explicit commitment involved in con-

sciousiy embracing values as part of

the self casts potential doubt upon
the objectivity that distinguishes

50

values from tastes or preferences.

Remember Heider's analysis of "ought,"

as impersonal, relatively invariant

and interpersonally valid. For our

values to carry the full force of "ought"
we need to believe that they have validity
beyond our individual fiat, that they

are as valid for others as for ourselves.
Self-values have this quality of phenomenal
objectivity, but it is endangered by the
very failure of consensus, the prevalent
relativism and pluralistic tolerance,

that makes them salient. In other words,
they appear to be especially susceptible

to change. . .into mere tastes and pref-
erences which since they lack the force

of "ought" can hardly play the same

central role as values in personal and
social integration. (emphasis supplied, p. 341)

 

But it is suggested here that reflective persons are conscious
of the illusion of the consensus/objectivity of system-
prescriptions, and with Kierkegaard (ig_Blackham, p. 22) see
that "truth is subjectivity."

The perception-framework (value system) of any individual
is thus seen as either

1) ordered by superego requiredness, in which case the
locus of the individual's values/perception is in some way
outside of himself, in the authority's prescriptions which
he has internalized; as much as an individual's perception of
reality is structured from without, to that extent the person
is alienated from himself. It is suggested that there is no
"need for consistency," no necessary integration of values
formed through this type of requiredness with the rest of
the individual's cognitive structure, i.e., superego values

are dynamically isolated from the rest of an individual's

51
value-attitude system. Values formed through superego re-

quiredness may exist in a logical, integrated relationship
with each other, since there is a consistency inherent in the
interdependence of superego and system functioning: but any
logic or consistency among the various elements of the super-
ego cognitive structure is seen as contingent on the inter-
consistency of the prescriptions of the socialization agents
effective for the particular superego individual, and not by
any active process within the superego person. That is,
superego values are formed directly by conditioning experiences,
and unlike values formed through reflection (an active process),
there is no personal strain toward consistency of superego
values with the rest of the individual's cognitive structure.
The idea of freedom is seen as a ploy enabling the superego
consciousness to interpret the less-than-consensus of system
as a choice of evil individuals, which allows the prescriptions
of system to be perceived as Objective. It is necessary for
the functioning of religious/technologic system—consciousness
that the internalization by the individual of society's pres-
criptions (via the family, church, school, etc.) be perceived
as a choice.

or 2) the consciousness of an individual may more wholly
function through reflection, in which case the locus of the
individual's perception is within himself. Since reflection

is an active process there is a strain toward consistency of

52
the values of the reflective person with the rest of his
cognitive structure. As Brewster Smith submits, "the
gyroscope of inner directedness, in Riesman's metaphor,
has cash value" (1963, p. 341): that is, the values one
acquires through conscious reflection are more likely
to be personally appropriate than values arbitrarily imposed
on an undiscriminating superego, and the gyroscopic stability
of reflection becomes more and more advantageous (compared
to superego value systems) the more rapid the rate of value
change within the society as a whole.

Just as in music the dominant chord isnecesssarily
resolved to the tonic, so also values are seen as objectively
required by the present historical condition in which one
exists, and the ability to perceive the resolution of life-
conflicts (personal, social dissonance) lies within the indi-
vidual. If one rejects authority as a meaningful value .
source and cognizes the fact that one's primary value system
is conditioned, that person becomes de-alienated from.himself,
and becomes present in himself. As this process (rejection
of authority as a viable value-referent and cognition that
one's primary value system is conditioned) completes,the
person can "see" with progressively less distortion the objec-
tive requiredness of whatever is the object of his perception,

i.e., how that conflict-dissonance is potentially resolved.

53

METHOD
A scale was developed that was designed to differentiate
between superego and reflective persons on the basis of three

factors presented in the preceding section.

Superego-Reflective Scale Factors

 

 

Superego Value System Reflective value System

1. Less cognition of 1. Greater cognition of
the conditioned nature the conditioned nature of
of one's primary value one's primary value system.
system. (Less cognition (Greater cognition of the
of the illusion of freedom illusion of freedom offered
offered by system.) by system.)

2. Greater acceptance of 2. Less acceptance of
authority. authority.

3. Greater confidence in 3. Less confidence in
objectivity of values. objectivity of values.

This scale was pretested in order to check the internal
consistency among the several factors within the scale, and
improve the reliability of the scale by omitting those items
that did not discriminate.

Neal and Seeman's Powerlessness scale (in_RObinson and
Shaver, p. 179) was given to the pretest population to check
the relationship between Factor I (cognition of the condi-
tioned nature of one's primary value system) and powerless-
ness. In the final version of the scale, a separate set of
instructions far the powerlessness items was not used, and

Ss gave Likert—type responses to the powerlessness items

54
(Tablell). Four items from the cognition of the conditioned
nature of one's primary values factor were taken from the
subscale "Strength of Will and Rationality" in Wrightsman's
"Philosophy of Human Nature" scale (13 RObinson and Shaver,
p. 523). One of these items was modified slightly. Two of
these items were used in the final version of the scale.

The basis for five of the six items in the "acceptance
of authority" subscale was drawn from Babs and Couch's Value
Profile. Three of the items were used just as in the original
value Profile, and two of the items were reversed.

Items that are marked with a (+) after the item were
scored so that agreement with that item indicates superego value
functioning, while disagreement indicates self-reflective value
system functioning. The (-) items were reverse-scored. Items
marked with an asterisk (*) were included in the final version
of the scale. Only those items that correlated higher than .3
with their particular scale factor were included in the final
version of the scale. On both the pretest and final versions
of the scale given to the $3 the factor headings were not
included and the items were randomly mixed. Rokeach's Value
Survey (Form E--terminal values only) was included in the
final version of the scale administered to the 83 (Table 12).

88 responses to Rokeach's Value Survey, the powerlessness
scale, and the three value system subscale factors were inter-

correlated. If the correlation between a value-ranking (on

55

the Rokeach survey) and the reflective—superego scale was signi-

ficant,

a t-test was performed on the data. The independent

variable for each t-test was the tOp and bottom quartiles of

the

the

reflective-superego scale, while the dependent variable was
83 ranking of that particular value.

Separate correlation tables were also computed for male

and female subjects.

the

All subjects read the following instructions and completed

items in the manner prescribed.

Below is a series of statements with
which some peOple agree and others dis-
agree. Would you please indicate the
extent of your agreement or disagreement
by marking in front of each item accord-
ing to the following scale:

mark -3 if you disagree strongly
mark -2 if you disagree somewhat
mark -1 if you disagree slightly
mark 0 if you neither agree nor disagree
mark +l if you agree slightly
mark +2 if you agree someWhat
mark +3 if you agree strongly

There are no right or wrong answers.
Please give your opinion on every state-
ment. If none of the numbers adequately
reflect your agreement or disagreement
for a particular statement, please indi—

cate your Opinion by using the number
that is closest to the way you feel.

Factor I—-Cognition of the conditioned
nature of one's primary value system

The average person has an accurate understanding
of the reasons for his own behavior. (+)

*2.

*3.

*10.

11.

*1.

*2.

*3.

*4.

*5.

56

The average person is largely the master of his
own fate. (+)

Most persons have a lot of control over what
happens to them in life. (+)

Persons who have great successes in life, like
great artists and inventors, are usually motivated
by forces outside of themselves. (-)

Some people's lives are tragedies, through no
fault of their own. (-)

Society generally molds the character of the
individual. (-)

Everyone chocses to be what they are in life. (+)

I see myself as the primary cause of any success
or failure that I have had in life up to the
present time. (+)

I see other people and conditions outside of myself
as the primary cause of any success or failure that
I have had in life up to the present time. (-)

I consider myself a self-made person. (+)

Anyone who becomes neurotic or psychotic isn't
to blame for their condition. (-)

Factor II-eAcceptance of Authority

Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but
as they grow up they ought to get over them. (+)

You have to resPect authority and when you stop
respecting authority, your situation isn't worth
much. (+)

Obedience and reSpect for authority are prObably
the most important things for children to learn. (+)

A child ought to be able to talk back to his
parents whenever he feels like it. (-)

I don't think patriotism and loyalty are the
first requirements of a good citizen. (-)

*6.

*1.

*2.

*3.

*4.

*5.

57

You always ought to Obey the law, even those
laws you think are wrong. (+)

Factor III——Confidence in Objectivity of Values

My value system is a good one for anyone to live
by. (+)

My values may be good for me, but I'm not sure
they'd be good for someone else. (-)

If everybody had my values, we'd have a better
'world. (+)

I am quite certain that the values which are the
most important values to me are good values for
other peOple to have. (+)

I am a little unsure that the values which are
the most important values to me are good values
for other peOple to have. (-)

58
SUBJECTS

The 38 pretest 83 were MSU graduate and undergraduate
students in the summer of 1970. 19 of the 53 were male, 19
female. Each subject was approached individually and asked
to fill out a questionnaire in order to help the experimenter

do his master's thesis. The response rate was 100%.

The 114 test 53 were MSU undergraduate students in the
summer of 1970. All test Ss were residents of one "brother-
sister" undergraduate dormitory complex on the MSU campus.
These two dorms had a reputation for being "non—radical" and
though this meant that these particular results could not
prOperly be extrapolated to people in general, or even the
MSU student body, it was felt by this author that the relative
homogeneity of the test 53 would give a conservative cast to
any results that I might Obtain, and make these results less
vulnerable to criticisms of sampling bias. Also, if signifi-
cant results could be demonstrated within this relatively
homogeneous population, it was felt that this demonstration
would be strong evidence of even greater significance (i.e.
that the superego-reflective value scale is a stronger pre-

dictor) in the more heterogeneous general population.

Two hundred "Attitude Surveys" were distributed to the
Ss by placing them in their mailboxes in the dorm. Approximate
randomness was obtained by placing one test in every other
mailbox. Each test was enclosed in an envelOpe pre—addressed

to the experimenter, and subjects were asked to complete the

59
questionnaire and return it via campus mail. Fifty-one males
and sixty-three females responded with usable questionnaires,

or a response rate of 57%.

60
PREDICT IONS

1. A negative correlation between superego—reflective value
system scale scores and the value-rankings of National Defense
was predicted. We can see an individual's (superego) value
system as the internalization of the precepts of the social-
ization agents with which that individual comes into contact.
When those precepts are challenged (e.g., by a friend who
"loses" or changes his religion, by a resPected teacher who
advocates a different kind of economic system) dissonance is
aroused in the individual's cognitive system. One way that

the individual may reduce this dissonance is, of course, to
value his friend or his professor (and their opinions) less
highly. But if the strength of any new socialization agent

is great, and the value—precept(s) of that competing agent is
(are) distant from the internalized precept of the phenomenally
older agent, the path of least dissonance may be a value-movement
in the direction of the new precept. It is suggested here that
one becomes reflective not by some naive free choice, but as
the best way to reduce the dissonance engendered by competing
socialization agents. One of the reasons that superego persons
may not reduce this dissonance by assuming personal responsi—
bility for their own set of values is that the primary agents
of their socialization may have been very effective, and the
cost (guilt) of denying the prescriptions of the superego
which these agencies engendered may be greater than the in-

creased dissonance effected by the conflict of prescriptions

 

61

between phenomenally older and newer agents: if this is the
case, that person would not assume personal responsibility
for his own set of values, and the dissonance caused by that
conflict would.be repressed.

A convenient out-group onto which some of this repressed
dissonance might be projected would be foreign enemies, since
they are far away (therefore it is not necessary to face their
humanity) and they are an Obvious symbolic representation of
one's own consciousness. (What one doesn't know = foreign =
subsconscious) is to be feared and is the enemy.

Thus, it was predicted that superego persons would value
National Defense more highly than reflective persons for
two related reasons: 1) superego persons would project a
greater amount of aggression to the enemy as a means of
exorcising repressed value system dissonance, and would see
a greater need for national defense to defend themselves against
that projected aggression; 2) superego persons are afraid of
facing their own repressed consciousness and symbolically

equate National Defense against foreign enemies with their

 

own psychic defenses against their subconscious, from.which
they feel threatened, and consequently see a greater need for
defense against that threat.

H

No relationship between superego-reflective
0 scale scores and the value—ranking of National
Defense.

62

H : A negative relationship between superego-reflective
alt . .
scale scores and the value—ranking of National Defense.

 

2. A negative correlation between the superego-reflective scale
scores and the value—rankings of Salvation was predicted, indicat—
ing that persons whose value system functions through superego
requiredness would value Salvation more highly than would reflective
persons.

Rokeach (1969) using the same value instrument, and relating
value choice to various indices of social compassion pictured the
religious-minded, or those who ranked Salvation high, as typically:

. . .a person having a self—centered
preoccupation with saving his own soul,
an otheraworldly orientation coupled
with an indifference toward or even a
tacit endorsement of a social system
that would perpetuate social inequality
and injustice. (p. 10)

Rokeach (1968) has also suggested that the relationship
betwen religiosity and social consciousness is not so straight-
forward, and has pointed out Allport's distinction between
two types of religious orientation, the extrinsic and the
intrinsic:

The extrinsic outlook on religion is

utilitarian, self-centered, opportunistic,
and other-directed. The intrinsic, in

 

1. In Rokeach's Value Survey, the higher the value ranking
(from 1 to 18) the less is the importance assigned to
that particular value. A negative relationship between
superego-reflective scale scores and the rankings of a
particular value is equivalent to a positive relationship
between superego-reflective scale scores and the relative
importance assigned to that particular value.

63
contrast, includes basic trust, a com-
passionate understanding of others so.
that'dogma is tempered with humility'
and, with increasing maturity, 'is no
longer limited to single segments of
self interest.‘ (p. 194)

and elsewhere:

in most peOple, the extrinsic orientation
predominated. (1968, p. 195, 196)

And how could it be otherwise? One can be conditioned
long before he is able to see himself reflectively, and yet
some very young children "learn" religious beliefs through
very effective social reinforcement contingencies long before
their beliefs could possibly be the dynamic, integrative
forces of behavior that are those beliefs that have been
arrived at through reflection. Religious values exhibit the
prototypic characteristics of values which function through
superego requiredness: they are the direct internalization
of the precepts of conditioning agencies; denial of the
apprOpriateness of these values results in guilt; there is
no strain towards consistency of these values with the rest
of an individual's cognitive structure; and the concern with

Salvation reflects the importance assigned to the preservation

 

of the ego from nonabeing.

 

H o : No relationship between superego-reflective
scale scores and the ranking of the value
Salvation.

H alt : A negative relationship between superego—

reflective scale scores and the value-
ranking of Salvation.

 

64
3. Salvation is not the only value that has the characteristics

 

of superego requiredness. Freedom also exhibits some of those
same characteristics. Very early in our education we learn that
{American means Freedom, that to value freedom highly is to be
patriotic, not to is to be communistic, or at least anti-
American. It has been suggested that the idea of freedom is

a ploy offered.by the technologic/religious system enabling
superego (system) consciousness a framework in which the
prescriptions of system (i.e., superego values) may continue
to be seen as "Objective" in spite of the less-than-consensus
of system. Since freedom is central to superego functioning
and is seen as less "appropriate" by reflective persons, and
since the value Freedom is typically inculcated before the

age of reflection, it was predicted that the scores on the
superego-reflective scale would correlate negatively with the
ranking of the value Freedom: that is, superego persons would

value Freedom more highly than reflective persons.

H : No relationship between superego-reflective

0 scale scores and the value-ranking of Freedom.
H : A negative relationship between superego-

alt reflective scale scores and the value-ranking

of Freedom.

4. Rokeach has suggested that persons who value Freedom higher
than Eggality are ". . .in general more interested in their

own freedom than they are in freedom for other people." Dob-
zhansky (1962) suggests the nature of the "objective appro-

priateness" of equality.

65

Let us now look at the genetic conse—
quences of equality of opportunity.
Suppose that the opportunity to receive
education and specialized training and

to choose a career of any sort depends
entirely on a youngster's aptitudes. . .
so that his faculties may become manifest.
It is possible that most carriers of
genes favoring outstanding musical abil-
ities will become musicians, possessors
of mathematical abilities mathematicians,
of scientific abilities scientists, etc.
Because of assortive mating. . .these
aggregates of people would to some extent

at least assume the character of Mendelian

populations, in which the genes for certain

special abilities will tend to be concentrated.

(p. 259)
Thus, the benefits that accrue to_all persons in an "equality
of opportunity" society are Obvious, and anything less than
full equality is commensurate with a wastage of the human
resources of that society.

One example of an Objectively inapprOpriate, inconsistent
value relationship would be then the ranking of Freedom higher
than Eggality. Since there is less strain toward consistency
within an individual's value system the more that system functions
through superego requiredness, with a concommitant greater like—
lihood that Objectively inconsistent value relationships would
exist within a superego—functioning value system, it was pre—
dicted that increased superego functioning (as indicated by
superego-reflective scale scores) would yield a corresponding
larger disparity between the values of Freedom and Eggality.

In terms of the Specific analysis performed, it was predicted

that superego-reflective value system scale scores would

66

correlate negatively with the value-rankings of Freedom and

positively with the value-rankings of Equality.

Ho : 1. No relationship between superego-reflective
scale scores and the value-ranking of Freedom,
and ‘
2. No relationship between superego-reflective
scale scores and the value-ranking of Eggality.
H alt : 1. A negative relationship between superego-

reflective scale scores and the value-ranking
of Freedom.

and
2. A positive relationship between superego—
reflective scale scores and the value-ranking

of Eggality.

5. A negative correlation between superego—reflective value
system scale scores and value-rankings of Self-Respect was
predicted. Since persons whose value system functions pri-
marily through superego requiredness are less likely to dis-
cover and live by values that are "persOnally apprOpriate"
for their own actualization, they are more likely than are
self—reflective persons to pursue Self—respect as an end in
itself, rather than see it as a natural concomitant of an
actualized life. Also, it is suggested that the boundary
between the self and others is more sharply defined (being
more alienated from Being) for the superego person since the
superego person is more concerned with preserving his particular
individuality (ego—soul), and thus is more likely to be con-
cerned with gglf—respect than the reflective person.

H o : No relationship between superego—reflective scale
scores and the value-ranking of Self—respect.

 

H alt : A negative relationship between superego—reflective
scale scores and the value-ranking of Self-reSpect.

67
RESUDTS

l. A correlation of —.35 between superego-reflective scale
scores and the value-rankings of National Defense was found,

1
p of R = O<.01; t = 4.53, p‘(.0001 between the top and bottom

 

quartiles of the superego-reflective scale scores and the
2
value-rankings of National Defense.

 

. . H o : No relationship between superego-reflective scale
scores and the value—rankings of National Defense
was rejected,

and
Halt : A negative relationship between superego-

reflective scale scores and the value-rankings
of National Defense was accepted as tenable.

2. A correlation of -.34 between superego—reflective scale
scores and the value-ranking of Salvation was Obtained:

p of R = 04<.Ol; t = 3.71, p = .0005 between the top and bottom
quartiles of the superego-reflective scale scores and the value—

3
rankings of Salvation.

 

. . H o : No relationship between superego—reflective
scale scores and Salvation was rejected,

 

H . A negative relationship between superego-
reflective scale scores and the value-rankings
of Salvation was accepted as tenable.

3. There was no significant correlation.between superego-

reflective scale scores and value-rankings of Freedom.

1. Hereinafter, R will be used to designate/Q, the real
correlation in the pOpulation.

2. From.Tables 5 and 6.

30 Ibid.

68

. . H : No relationship between superego-reflective
scale scores and Freedom was accepted.

However, for men in this sample (n = 53) a correlation r = -.22,
p of R = o-<.1 (two-tailed prObability), was found between
Factor I (less recognition of the conditioned nature of one's
values) and value—rankings of Freedom; for women (n S 61) a
correlation r = .21, p of R = o (.1 (two-tailed prObability)
‘was found between Factor II (greater acceptance of authority)
and value-rankings of Freedom.

Thus, for men, the more they recognize the conditioned
nature of their primary values, the less relative importance
they assign to Freedom: but for women, the less they accept
authority the more relative importance they assign to Freedom.
Also for women, devaluing of Freedom was correlated .21,

p of R = o<f.l with increased feelings of powerlessness.1

4. There was no significant correlation between superego-

reflective scale scores and value—rankings of Freedom and

Eggality.
. . H : 1) No relationship between superego-reflective
o .
scale scores and the value-ranking of Freedom
and
2) No relationship between superego—reflective
scale scores and the value-ranking of Equality,
was accepted.
However, for men in this sample (n = 53) a correlation = —.22,

p of R = o‘(.l was found between Factor I (less recognition

of the conditioned nature of one's primary values) and value

1. From.Tables 7 and 8.

69

rankings of Freedom; and a correlation = .22, p of R = o<(.l
was found between Factor I and Eggality.

For women (n = 61) a correlation = .21, p of R = o<f.l
(two-tailed probability) was found between Factor II (greater
acceptance of authority) and value-rankings of Freedom; and
a correlation = .26, p of R = o‘<.05 (two-tailed prObability)
was found between Factor II and Eggalityf

Thus for men, the more they recognize the conditioned
nature of their values, the more relative importance they
assign to Eggality and the less relative importance they
attach to Freedom. But for women, the less they accept
authority, the more relative importance they assign to
Eggality and the more relative importance they assign to
Freedom. Also, for women, devaluing of Eggaligy was corre—
1ated..35, p of R = o<(.01 with increased feelings of power-
lessness.2
5. There was no significant correlation between superego-
reflective scale scores and value-rankings of Self-ResPect.

H : No relationship between superego-reflective

0 scale scores and the value-rankings of Self-
Respect was accepted.

For women (n = 61), however, there was a correlation
= —.25, p of R = 0 (.05 of Factor I and Self—Respect which
indicates that the more women recognize the conditioned nature
of their primary value system, the less relative importance

1. From Tables 7 and 8.
2. Ibid.

70
they assign to Self—Respect. For men (n = 53) though, there

was a correlation = .22, p of R.= O‘<.l between Factor II and
Self—ResPect, which indicates that the less men accept authority

the more relative importance they give to Self-Respect.

 

OTHER RESUDTS

6. r = -.28, p of R = 0‘<.01 (two-tailed prObability) was
found between Factor II (Greater acceptance of authority) and
value—ranking of Family Security. t = 2.90, p = .005 between
the tOp and bottom quartiles of the superego-reflective scale

scores (Factors I and II) and the value-rankings of Family
1

Security.

. . Superego value-system persons assign a greater relative
importance to Family Security than do self—reflective persons.
7. For males (n = 53) Factor II correlated .36, p of R = 0‘<.Ol
with An Exciting Life.2

For females (n = 62) Factor I correlated .21, p of R = O<(.l
'with An Exciting Life.3

This indicates that the less men accept authority, and
the more women recognize the conditioned nature of their pri—
mary value system, the more relative importance they attach
to An Exciting Life.

A t-test was performed on the value-rankings of An Exciting
1g£g_between the top and bottom quartiles of the reflective-

1. From Tables 5 and 6.
2. From Table 7.

3. From Table 8.

71

superego-scale scores (Factors I and II): t = -2.20, p = .03
l
(two-tailed probability).

8. r = .25, p of R = 0 (.01 (two-tailed.probability was found
between superego-reflective scale scores (Factors I and II)

and value-rankings of.A WOrld of Beauty. t =-2.58,p<<.01
between the t0p and bottom quartiles of the superego-reflective
scale scores and the value-rankings of A World of Beauty.2

... self-reflective value persons assign a greater relative
importance to A World of Beauty than do superego value persons.
9. r = .20, p of R = 04<.05 (two-tailed prObability) between

3
Factor I and value-rankings of Pleasure.

 

There is a slight positive relationship between a greater
recognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary value
system and the assignment of a greater relative importance
to Pleasure.

10. For men (n = 53) r = -.39, p of R = 0 (.01 (two—tailed
4
prObability) between Factor I and'Wisdom.

. . For this pOpulation, reflective value system men assign a
greater relative importance to Wisdom that do superego value

system men. But for women the greater the recognition of the
conditioned nature of one's primary value system, the less the

relative importance that is assigned to the value'Wisdom.

1. From Table 6.

2. From Tables 5 and 6.
3. From Tables 5.

4. From.Tables 7 and 8.

72
110 For men, there is a slight non-significant negative

relationship between Factor I and A Comfortable Life; for
women, r = .24, p of R = 0‘<.05 between Factor I and A Com—

1
fortable Life. If we set up

 

H : R — R = 0, then by .24 - (—.15)
O l 2 Z! = l— l ) 15 = 3.9
50 58 )

Since p of z' (or t) of 3.9<<.001, we can reject the Ho :R1 - Rzzo,

and accept as tenable H alt: ngRz

WOmen who have a greater recognition of the conditioned nature
of one's primary values assign a greater relative importance to

A Comfortable Life than women who have less recognition of the

 

conditioned nature of one's primary values; the extent of

this relationship is significantly less for males, where there
was a tendency (in this pOpulation) for men who have a greater
recognition of the conditioned nature on one's primary value
system to assign less relative importance to A Comfortable

Life than men who have less recognition of the conditioned
nature of one's primary value system.

12. For women, r = —.21, p of R = 0 <.1 (two—tailed prObablity)
between Factor II and Inner Harmony.2

... There was a slight positive relationship for women in this

pOpulation between a greater acceptance of authority and an

increased relative valuation of Inner Harmony.

 

1. From Tables 7 and 8.
2. From Table 8.

73

13. For women (n = 61)r = —.33, p of R = 0< .01 (two—tailed
l
prObability) between Factor II and Social Recognition.

 

. . For women in this pOpulation a positive relationship was
found between a greater acceptance of authority and an increased

relative valuation assigned to Social Recognition.

 

14. A curvilinear relationship was found between Factor II
(Acceptance of Authority) and Factor III (Confidence in the
Objectivity of one's values). This relationship is demonstrated
graphically in Table 10. The correlation ratio for Factor III
on Factor 11 was computed: N xy = .53. This compares to a

linear r = -.03 (N = 114) between these factors.

15. A t—test was computed on the mean standard deviations of
the Factor I and Factor II item means between the pretest and

test reSponses: t = 4.2, p‘(.01 in the direction of a larger
2
average s.d. for the pretest Factor I + II items. This find—

ing in part explains the lower correlation found between
3
Factors I and II in the test data (r = .19) as compared to
4
the pretest data (r = .47). This supports the previous

suggestion made by the author that the test pOpulation is
relatively homogeneous, and any results Obtained would prObably
be more conservative than the real relationship in the larger

society.

1. From.Table 8
2. From Table 3.
3. From Table 2
4. From Table l

74
DISCUSSION

Repressed insecurity of being fixates individual's evolution:

That the most significant differences between superego and
reflective persons were security-oriented seem to bear out the
supposition that superego persons are more afraid than reflective
persons, or rather that fear is more Operative in superego persons.l
Since the fear of non-being (manifested as guilt, fear of dying,
meaninglessness, etc.) is repressed the dynamic of that fear re-
tains its potency, i.e., in a sense the superego person is fixated
at a certain stage of his (potential) develOpment, is less evolved

than the reflective person. Superego persons value Salvation,

Famity Security, and National Defense more highly than reflective

 

persons, and this increased concern with the security of the
ego, family, and nation prObably reflects the increased potency
of the fear of nonebeing Operative through superego/system
persons than through-reflective individuals.
Maslow's (1971) theory of "metamotivation" takes

. . .superior peOple who are also

superior perceivers not only of facts

but of values, and then using their

choices of ultimate values as possibly
the ultimate values of the whole species.

(p. 10)
Since the significance level (p‘<.0001) of the difference
between the reflective and superego persons' relative valuation

of National Defense was so large even in the relatively homo—

 

geneous population of this study, this substantiates the thesis

that one of the strongest historical/psychological pressures

1. See Freud's discussion of the function of the superego
nknarn an AR

75

effecting the mutation in consciousness toward reflection-
encompassing is the real threat to the world Being with a
continuation of superego/technological consciousness. The
value choice of the reflective consciousness in favor of a

radical devaluation of National Defense is thus seen as the

 

kind of "ultimate value choice" that is objectively appropriate
for the whole Species.
Maslow (1971) "reasserts"

. . .that we have come to the point in
biological history where we now are
responsible for our own evolution. We
have become self-evolvers. Evolution
means selecting and therefore choosing
and deciding, and this means valuing.
(p. 10—11)

Tehihard de Chardin (1955) had also felt this.

Man discovers that he is nothing else
than evolution become conscious of
itself, to borrow Julian Huxley's
striking expression. It seems to me
that our modern minds (because and
inasmuch as they are modern) will never
find rest until they settle down to
this view. On this summit and on this
summit alone are repose and illumination
waiting for us. . . . The conscious-
ness of each of us is evolution look-
ing at us and reflecting upon itself.
(p. 221)

 

‘With the rejection-of-system/encompassing—of-reflection being
is de—alienated from itself, restored to Being, and is able
to "see" the apprOpriateness of any particular act, i.e.,
being becomes responsible (is) for its own evolution (Being).
Maslow's (1962) concept of the "real guilt" (p. 114) of

Being—cognition as Opposed to neurotic guilt may be getting

76
at the same phenomena as suggested here, but I would suggest
that the responsibility of reflective persons is entirely of

an active kind, and there is no blame. Blame is a construct

 

attached to the illusion of freedomewithin-system. Since
there is no freedom, there can be no blame and justice will
eventually realize the "crime of punishment." Guilt also
belongs to freedom, to the functioning of the religious/
technologic system. In becoming reflective, reSponsible for
our own evolution we see what is Objectively apprOpriate for
that evolution. Since we are less than fully conscious, know
less than there is to know, we make mistakes. But we are not
to "blame" for these mistakes; with the cognition of the illu-
sion of freedom, we have no guilt. The only choice we can
make is to become more conscious, more responsible for our
own evolution-~and we have no choice but to make that choice,
if the "choice" is offered.

Reflective persons differ from superego persons in that
the essential insecurity of being is not repressed, and that
anxiety/arousal is not fixated at system, but is used to

transcend ego, to begin to become conscious of self/Being.

Ontogeny of reflective morality:

The curvilinear relationship found between "acceptance
of authority" and "confidence in the Objectivity of one's
values" is consistent with Kohlberg's formulations about the

developmental changes in the structure of moral reasoning.

 

77

Kenneth Kenniston (1970) recounts Kohlberg's ideas in a paper
entitled "Student Activism and Moral Development":

...KOhlberg finds that moral reasoning
develOps through three general stages.
The earliest is the pge-conventional
stage, which involves relatively ego-
centric concepts of right and wrong as
that Which one can do without getting
caught, or that which leads to the
greatest personal gratification. The
pre-conventional stage is followed,
usually during later childhood, by a
stage of conventional morality, during
which good and evil are first identified
with the concept of a "good.boy" or
"good girl" and then with the standards
of the community, i.e., with law and
order. The individual in the conven-
tional stage may not act according to
his perceptions of what is right and
wrong; but he does not question the
fact that morality is Objective, immutable,
and derives from external agencies like
parental edicts, community standards,
or divine laws.

 

KOhlberg also identified a third and
final stage of moral development that is
post-conventional--what Erikson has
called the "ethical" stage. This stage
involves reasoning more abstract than
that found in earlier stages, and it may
lead the individual into conflict with
conventional standards. The first of
two subphases within the post-conventional
stage basically involves the concept of
right and wrong as resulting from a
social contract--as the result of an
agreement entered into by the members
of the society for their common good—-
and therefore subject to emendation,
alteration, or revocation. Conventional
moral thinking views moral imperatives
as absolute or given by the nature of
the universe; social contract reasoning
see rules as "merely" convenient and
therefore amendable.

 

 

78

KOhlberg identifies the highest post—
conventional phase as that in Which the
individual becomes devoted to personal
principles that may transcend not only
conventional morality but even the social
contract. In this stage, certain gen—
eral principles are now seen as person-
ally binding though not necessarily
"Objectively" true. Such principles
are apt to be stated in a very high
level of generality: e.g., the concept
of justice, the Golden Rule, the sanctity
of life, the categorical imperative, the
promotion of human development. The
individual at this stage may find himself
in conflict with existing concepts of law
and order, or even with the notion of an
amendable social contract. He may, for
example, consider even democratically—
arrived—at laws unacceptable because
they lead to consequences or enjoin
behaviors that violate his own personal
principles. (p. 579)

 

Again, KOhlberg sees conventional morality viewing "moral
imperatives as absolute or given.by the nature of the universe,"
While social contract reasoning (the first post-conventional
phase), according to KOhlberg, "sees rules as 'merely' con-
venient and therefore amendable."

In the final subphase of the social contract stage (when
reflection is more wholly encompassed) the individual is seen by
Kohlberg to transcend even the social contract stage and live
his life according to certain "general principles," which
are not necessarily felt to be "objectively" true.

However, the Ss responses in this study indicate that
the least accepting of authority subjects were as confident

of the Objectivity of their values as the most authoritarian

79
subjects. It has been suggested earlier in this paper that

the onset of reflection (i.e., the post-conventional phase)
only occurs if the dissonance engendered.by conflicting value
prescriptions among the various competing socialization agents
can best be reduced by'a rejection of the internalized super—
ego and assumption of personal resposibility for one's

values. Concomitant with a rejection of the superego is the
rejection of the validity of one's primary socialization agents
to prescribe one's values. With a denial of the validity of
these authorities to prescribe one's values, he loses
confidence in the Objectivity of his values, since values are
now felt as personal choices rather than as "immutable"

laws. However, as the encompassing of reflection completes,
the person is able to see with progressively less distortion
the Objective requiredness of his vision, and.begins to
realize that his value "choices" are "Objectively appropriate,"
i.e. that they are not choices at all, but reggired.

It has also been suggested earlier that one does not
become reflective by some naive free choice, or rather that
one does not Choose to be gpep, The onset of reflectiveness
is seen as the result of an unconscious dissonance—reduction
process determined in favor of reflection because of the
nature of one's conditioning. If one's primary social-
ization has been very effective in engendering a strong
superego, the concomitant costs of rejecting that superego

(and the validity of those agents to prescribe one's values)

80
may be prohibitive; on the other hand, cultural and social

forces are in operation today that greatly increase the cost
(in terms of increased repressed value system dissonance) of
maintaining a conventional (i.e. superego) value structure.

Kenneth Kenniston (1970) has discussed some social and
historical pressures that he feels are responsible for the
growing prOportion of post-conventional moral reasoning among
the young peOple in America and other advanced nations.
Although I briefly referred to these arguments in "the new
consciousness/rejection of system" subsection in the first
part of this paper, Kenniston's remarks here are more developed.
Concerning the effect of higher education on moral develOpment.
Kenniston states:

The growing affluence of the highly
industrialized nations permits them to
keep millions of the young out of the
labor force: the increasing need for
high-level training in technological
societies requires them to offer a
university education to these millions.

Higher education does not, of course
inevitably entail moral growth. But one
consequence of the prolongation is that
a massive group of young men and women
have been disengaged for an increasingly
protracted period from the institutions
of the adult society, in particular
from occupation and marriage. Freed of
reSponsibilities of work, marriage, and
parenthood, at least some find them-
selves in university atmospheres that
deliverately challenge and undermine
their pre-existing beliefs and conven-
tional assumptions. Thus, the extension
of youth via prolonged education on a
mass scale prObably tends to stimulate
the develOpment of post—conventional
moral thinking. (p. 588)

81
What Kenniston terms "cross—cultural implosion" is also

seen as stimulating moral develOpment:

. . .we live in an age of extraordinary
culture contact and conflict. The elec—
tronic revolution, coupled with the
revolution in transportation, enables

us to confront alien values within our
living room or to immerse ourselves
physically in alien cultures after a
flight of a few hours. The days when

one could live in a parochial isolation,
surrounded only by conventional morality,
are fast disappearing. Conflicts of
ideologies, of world views, of value
systems, of philosoPhical beliefs, of
esthetic orientations, and of political
styles confront every thoughtful man

and woman, wherever he lives. If such
confrontations stimulate moral develOp-
ment, then we live in an era in which
technology and world history themselves
provide new facilitation for moral growth.
We are all today a little like Redfield's
peasants who move to the city, living

in a world where conflicting cultures

and moral viewpoints rub against us at
every turn. The urbanizing and homogen-
izing process has become worldwide: 'we
live in an era of cross-cultural implosion.
My argument here is that this cross—cultural
implosion helps stimulate moral develOpment.
(p. 588-89)

Kenniston's argument that "cross—cultural implosion"
stimulates moral develOpment was especially interesting to
this author, since it corrOborates an idea that I discussed
several years ago in an unpublished paper, "Value Differences
Among the WOrking and Student Classes in Austin, Minnesota."
In that paper I suggested:

. . .societies which are socially complex

have a larger share of inner-directed persons
than do those societies which are less complex.

82

A.society that is more socially complex is

a society which has a greater extent of value
prescriptive disagreement among the various
socialization agents and is one in Which
those socialization agents are more equally
credible. Thus, the more socially complex

a society, the greater is the prObability
that the individual in that society will
admit conflicting value prescriptions to
consciousness, which in turn increases

the pressure on the individual to reduce

the dissonance of these conflicting value
prescriptions by assuming personal responsi—
bility for his own set of values. On a
phenomenal level, the more equally credible
that an individual perceives the various
socialization agents, and the more con-
flicting that he perceives the value
prescriptions of those agents, the greater

is the saliency of inner-directedness (1969. p. 15)

"Cognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary
value system" occurs during or after the rejection of superego—
authority, since one could not cognize the conditioned nature
of his values and continue to see his primary (superego) value
system as viable. No matter how good, enlightened the con-
ditioning of a particular superego person has been, superego
values are intrinsically static——1ife is dynamic. The appro—
priateness of superego "rules" are at best an approximate
"fit" to the situations that the superego individual encounters.
Hence, with the full encompassing of reflection the individual
necessarily rejects his primary value system. If a person
has rejected authority as a meaningful value—source (which is an
unconscious process) but has not cognized the conditioned nature

of his primary value system (which is a conscious process)

 

83
he may regress to what KOhlberg terms the "Raskolnikoff

Syndrome":

The individual moving toward post-
conventional morality regresses to the
earlier pre—conventional (egocentric)

stage in an apparent effort to free himself
from irrational and ego-dystonic guilt.
Interestingly, Kramer finds that such
RaskolnikOffs eventually return to the
develOpmental track at approximately the
point where they drOpped off. (p. 580)

Once one cognizes the conditioned nature Of his primary
value system, the existential void which began with the
unconscious rejection of authority completely replaces the
conventional (superego) value system structure. The trans—
cended post-conventional stage comes out of this void. From
[existential void = absence of authority = absence of defense
mechanisms = absence of distortion] comes a clear perception
of reality, of what is objectively apprOpriate for one's own
actualization,land a concomitant increase in the Objectivity

of one's values.

Although the greater relative valuation of A WOrld of

 

Beauty and the less relative valuation of Family Security of
the more reflective value system persons as compared to the
more superego value system persons was not predicted, these

results are consistent with the results of a study done by

1. Not as though seeing the actual state of man, seeing what
is apprOpriate for one's own actualization, and acting on
that perception are different. One of the characteristics
of transcended post—conventional persons is that they see
that all of these are part of one movement. Maslow's
(1971, p. 269-279) develOpment of "transcendence" implies
that one's own actualization, at a higher level, is in—
clusive of Being—actualization, "apprOpriate" evolution
of the species (i.e. the self as the actualization—referent
is All in full actualization, Being-consciousness).

84
this author several years ago. In this study, students (who

would be expected to be more reflective, on the basis of the
above arguments) differed from non-students in their relative

valuations of A WOrld of Beauty and Family Security in the

 

same direction as reflective persons differed from superego

 

persons. (Lange, 1969, p. 35) Family Security has already
been discussed as part of the constellation of security-
oriented values of the superego person. A greater concern

'with A World of Beauty again supports the contention that

 

reflective persons are "good choosers for the Species," that
they are better able to see (value) what is "Objectively
appropriate" for our evolution, if we grant that ecological
concern for the planet is more far-sighted than a desire for
more efficient nuclear weapons delivery-systems to "protect"
our country.

Sex Differences:

With an increase in reflectiveness there was a differential
response between men and women in the relative importance
assigned several values. A possible reason for the finding
that, with an increase in reflectiveness men have a greater

relative valuation of Self-Respect and women value it rela—

 

tively less, is that men and women may have been socialized
to different meanings of self-respect. A man is (usually)
conditioned to think of self-respect in terms of personal

growth, while a woman is (usually) conditioned to understand

85
self—respect as something "kept" by accepting the "dual standard"
of sexual exploration, accepting that her identity is determined
by the man she married, and otherwise repressing any self-
actualization strivings which are not "properly" channeled.

This interpretation receives tentative support in the correlation
r = .29, p‘(.02, two-tailed significance between Self-Respect

and Inner Harmony for women, While the correlation between these

 

two values for men was not significant (r = -.06). Thus,

for women, an increased relative valuation of self—respect was
directly related to a greater relative concern for "freedom
from inner conflict," while for men no relationship between
these two values was found.

The positive relationship found between a greater accep—
tance of authority and a greater relative valuation of Igpgg
Harmony (freedom from inner conflict) for women but not for
men also suggests that the traditional (superego) woman bears
a heavier load of guilt and repressed actualization strivings
than the superego male.

The greater relative valuation on the part of women of
both Freedom and Equality with a decrease in their acceptance
of authority; and the greater relative valuation of Equality
and the less relative valuation of Freedom on the part of the
men with an increase in their cognition of the conditioned
nature of their primary value system: these differences may

also be understood as stemming from differences in the roles

86

assigned to men and.women in conventional society, in which
(white) men are conditioned to be oppressors and.women are
conditioned to accept their Oppressed state as natural. A
devaluation of freedom is to white men in this society a
devaluation of freedom to exploit others, and an increased
valuation«ofequality is a natural concomitant of a devaluation
of this kind of freedom. But for women in this society,
freedom means freedom from.Oppression, freedom to actualize,
to have an identity apart from any man--and an increased
valuation of this kind of freedom is consonant with an upward
valuation of equality. This interpretation is further sup-
ported by the significant positive correlations fOund.between
less feelings of powerlessness with increased relative
valuations of both Freedom and Eggality for the women students.
It is possible that the differential response of men and
women to value rankings of Wisdom may not be solely a product
of differential conditioning. It may be that while reflective
men are more concerned with "an intellectual understanding of
life" than conventional (superego) men, women who have a
greater cognition of the conditioned nature of their primary
value system may be less concerned with an intellectual under—
standing of life. Although this connotes a difference between
men and women that is more "essence" than conditioned, I would

argue that essence differences between men and women are at

least possible, even though this argument runs counter to most

87
liberation thinking. DObzhansky (1962) suggests one possible

instinctual difference between the sexes, and the probable
mechanism underlying this difference.

It is a rule, which applies not only to
mammals but to diverse other animals,

that males tend to be sexually aggressive
and indiscriminately eager to mate with

any and all receptive females, while

the females are generally more choosy

and demure, or less easily excitable. . . .
Nature is prodigal with male sex cells,
parsimonious with female ones. . . .

Other things being equal, sexually
aggressive males of polygamous species

are favored by natural selection. The

size of the progency of a female is

limited not only by the number of eggs

she produces but, in mammals, by the

length of pregnancy and maternal care.

A female must economize her resources.
Accepting a wrong male (a male of another
species, or a sterile, diseased, or genetically
inferior male) may diminish or eliminate her
progeny. Natural selection favors, then,
discriminate passivity in females. (p. 207-8)

More definitive research may give a clearer idea of what

"yin-yang" differences (if any) exist'but it would seem to

be extremely difficult to escape one's bias (i.e. "male-ness or
1

"female-ness") in researching this prOblem.

Composite superego-reflective differences:

A composite description of the reflective value system

person compared to the superego person is: one who has a

lower relative valuation of National Security, Family Security

 

1. A semantic study of the Rokeach value survey might be a
start in answering the question of whether or not there
are sex differences in the meanings assigned to some
individual values.

88
and Salvation, while valuing A World of Beauty and an Exciting

 

Life relatively more. If the reflective person is female, she

 

will also value Freedom and Equality relatively more, Social

 

Recognition and Inner Harmony relatively less, and feel less
powerless the less her acceptance of authority. With a
greater cognition of the conditioned nature of her primary
value system, she values A Comfortable Life and Pleasure
relatively more, and Self-Respect and Wisdom relatively less
than the woman who has less recognition of the conditioned
nature of her values. If the reflective person is male, he
also assigns a greater relative valuation to Wisdom than the
super-ego male. ‘With less acceptance of authority, he values
Self-Respect more. With a greater cognition of the conditioned
nature of his primary value system, he values Pleasure and
Eggality relatively more, and A Comfortable Life relatively

less than the superego man.

Some limitations of this research:

The small sample size, the unspectacular rate of return,
and the uniqueness of the population all underline the limits
of the generalizability of these findings. However, in that
the particular subject pOpulation was chosen for its homo—
geneity, it would be eXpected that the significance of super—
ego-reflective value differences would be much larger in the
general student population (e.g. the pretest Factor I and II

correlation) and larger still in the general public. Although

89
the factors discriminated satisfactorily, improvement is prOb-
ably possible in the construction of the particular subscale
items, especially in the construction of satisfactory reversal—

items for Factor I.

Suggestions for future research:

1. Alcohol correlation. Hypothesize that superego persons
(based on superego-reflective scale, Factors I + II) would
show greater behaviOr change with ingestion of alcohol than

more integrated reflective persons.

2. Experimentally induced value change and system-functioning.
Point out to the pre-tested superego subjects the relative
"clustering" of their values around security-orientation
compared to reflective persons. Re-test (at different time
intervals) to look for value change Egg superego-functioning

change compared to controls.

90

CONCLUSION

The etymological relationship between “see and "know"
in Greek is the last evidence offered in support of a major
thesis of thisstudy: that the reflective person, who rejects
system as a total perception—framework, is able to "see" the
resolution of dissonance in the conflict—world in much the
same way as one hears the resolution of the dominant chord to
the tonic, that the "locus of values" lies within the de—
alienated existing person. The reflective consciousness
emphasizes being-in-the-present, the "here-now" of Maslow's
(1971) Being-cognition, the dying to the past, the “denial of
time" of Krishnamurti (1967, p. 28, 40) as a necessary con-

dition of being in which this kind of "Seeing" functions.

The Greek word for "I know" oida, is
the perfect of the verb "to see" and
means "I have seen." He who knows is
the man who has seen, who has had a
vision. . . . (Barrett, 1962, p. 81)

For the mythological consciousness, knowing occurs when seeing
is completed, but for knowing to be, it is necessary that the
"I" at sometime in the past "see." With the religious/
scientific consciousness of Socrates there is no time that

seeing is knowing: "all knowledge is recollection." (Phaedo,

 

p. 104). In the rejection of system the reflective conscious-
ness, in its return to the "ground of Being," in the process

of its de—alienation, represents in one sense a regression of

 

consciousness to the state of being prior to the primal

repression of nonebeing, when seeing is knowing, when appro-

91
priateness is directly perceived. The "locus of values" is
only within when being is "here-now."

Erik Erikson is what Watts (1969) calls "ego-oriented,"

and as such is counter to the reflective consciousness (e.g.

. . . reality, the world, the cosmos are. . .identified with
and'become defining characteristics of the self" (Maslow,

1971, p. 332) which tends to transcend, see the illusion of,

ego. Though this may be the case, Erikson's discussion of

man's "regression" to the "pure self" points toward the same
transcendence of system/ego consciousness (remember that the
repression of nonabeing is seen as the primary act of ego—system).

Finally, the glass shows the pure self
itself, the unborn core of creation,
the--as it were, preparental-—center
where God is pure nothing. . . . God

is so designated in many ways in Eastern
mysticism. This pure self is the self
no longer sick with a conflict between
right and wrong, not dependent on guides
to reason and reality. . . . But must
we call it regression if man thus seeks
again the earliest encounters of his
trustful past in his efforts to reach

a h0ped-for and eternal future? . . .

If this is partial regression, it is a
regression which, in retracing firmly
established pathways, returns to the
present amplified and clarified.

And earlier he has said:

From the oldest Zen poem to the most
recent psychological formulation, it
is clear that "the conflict between
right and wrong is the sickness of the
mind." (ig'Watts, p. 168)

92

As the rule "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny" is generally
true for the physiological characteristics of man, so also
the regression to "the earliest encounters of his trustful
past," to the"innocent cognition. . .of the child. . . as an
aspect of Being-cognition" (Maslow, 1971, p 265) is seen as
representing a regression of hgmg.to the psychologically
whole, un-alienated being of man prior to the primal: [repres-
sion of nonebeing]/ego/system. In this "regression" is the
transcendence of ego, being restored to Being, the "child-
like," in-the-present, timeless, "oceanic" (Freud's term,
1930, p. 12) feeling, the perception that "All is in all--
All is actually each" (Huxley, p. 26), the ability to see/
know what is Objectively appropriate, to see "the order of

sensuousness" (Marcuse, p. 169).

93

SUMMARY

A scale was devised in order to discriminate between
superego and reflective persons. This difference was under—
stood as the outcome of an historical—psychological process
that primarily involved the formation and evolution of system
as a mechanism enabling the individual to protect himself
from (repress) the fear of nonébeing. At the present time
the culmination of these historical—psychological forces have
engendered a mutation of consciousness which is not system/
superego-functioning (i.e. is reflective). This difference
between superego and reflective values was shown to be most
centrally manifest in the greater valuation of security-
oriented values (on Rokeach's Terminal Value Survey) by
superego persons than reflective persons. It was suggested
that this greater concern for security represented the failure
to de-repress the fear of non—being and a concomitant fixation
at system/superego functioning, which is seen as alienated,

guilt (fear of non-being) functioning.

94
TABLE 1

Intercorrelation of Superego-Reflective Scale Factors and Power-
lessness (Of pretest data, N = 38)

Less
Factor I I II III Powerlessness
Less Recognition of the

conditioned nature of one's
~primary value system 1,00

Factor II
Greater Acceptance
of Authority .47** 1.00

Factor III
High Confidence in the
Objectivity of one's Values

.18 -007 1000

Less Powerlessness .36** -.03 -.07 1.00

 

TABLE 2

Intercorrelation of Superego-Reflective Scale Factors and
Powerlessness (Of test data, N = 114)
Less
Factor I I II III Powerlessness
Less Recognition of the
conditioned nature of one's
primary value system 1.00

Factor II
Greater Acceptance
of Authority .19* 1.00

Factor III
High Confidence in the
Objectivity of One's Values .16 -.03 1.00

Less Powerlessness .25** .10 -.09 1.00

__ A __4 EH A A—-
‘ AAA—gg A) A ... ,

*Sig. at .05 level (two-tailed probability)
**Sig. at .01 level (two-tailed probability)

9 5
TABLE 3

[Comparison of Factor I, Factor II, and Factor III; Average item* means
and.standard deviations between pretest and test Ss.

ZFactor I Pretest (N = 38) Test (N = 114)
ZLess Recognition of the average m average s.d. average m average s.d.
conditioned nature of one's -
jprimary values (3 items) 3.91 2.27 3.94 2.05
Factor II
Greater Acceptance of
.Authority (4 items) 3.23 2.02 3.62 1.93
Factor III

(Breater Confidence in the
Objectivity of one's values
(4 items) 3.63 2.16 3.46 1.99

*Only those items that remained unchanged in the present and test
conditions were used in this comparison.

 

TABLE 4

'Perminal Value Means and Rank Order for Test 83 (N = 114)

Rank Value Mean
1 Freedom 5.94
2 Wisdom 6.54
3 Happiness 6.78
4 A World of Peace 6.79
5 Self-Respect 6.88
6 Inner Harmony 7.14
7 Mature Love 7.22
8 Sense of Accomplishment 7.87
9 True Friendship 8.33

10 Equality 8.39

11 Family Security 9.77

12 An Exciting Life 10.47

13 A World of Beauty 10.95

14 A Comfortable Life 12.61

15 Social Recognition 13.21

16 Pleasure 13.26

17 National Security 14.04

18 Salvation 14.21

96

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Table 6

97

IPiSher-Student T-Test Performed on Value-Rankings Between T0p
Bottom Quartiles of Reflective-Superego Scale Scores (Factors

‘Value
.An.Exciting Life
.A WOrld of Beauty
1Family Security
National Security
Pleasure
Salvation

“Wisdom

Superego Group (N=28)

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4.61

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TABLE 9

Intercorrelation of Superego-Reflective Scale Factors and
Powerlessness, Male and Female Responses Compared (N = 53
for Males; 61 for Females).

Less Power-

Factor I I II III lessness

Less Recognition of the M/F M/F M/F
Conditioned Nature of one's

Primary Value System 1.00/1.00

Factor II
Greater Acceptance

Of Authority .12/.26 1.00/1.00

Factor III
Greater Confidence in the

Objectivity of One's Values .03/.22 .lO/-.l6 1.00/1.00

Less Powerlessness .22/.27 -.05/ .24 -.08/-.12 1.00/1.00

101

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102

Table 11
POWERLESSNESS SCALE

This is survey to find out what the public thinks about

certain
consits
ment of
believe
believe

events which we face in our society. Each item con-
of a pair of statements. Please select the one state-
each pair (and only one) which you more strongly

to be true. Be sure to check the one you actually

to be more nearly true, rather than the one you think

you should check or the one you would like to be true. This
is a measure of personal belief; obviously, there are no
right or wrong answers. Again, be sure to make a choice

between

1.

* 2.

10.

*11.

12.

each pair of statements (* powerless response)

I think we have adequate means for preventing
run-away inflation.

There's very little we can do to keep prices from
going higher.

Persons like myself have little chance of protecting
our personal interests when they conflict with those
of strong pressure groups.

I feel that we have adequate ways of coping with
pressure groups. ‘

A lasting world peace can be achieved by those of
us who work toward it.

There's very little we can do to bring about a
permanent world peace.

There's very little persons like myself can do
to improve world opinion of the United States.

I think each of us can do a great deal to improve
world opinion of the United States.

This world is run by the few people in power, and
there is not much the little guy can do about it.

The average citizen can have an influence on
government decisions.

It is only wishful thinking to believe that one
can really influence what happens in society at
large.

People like me can change the course of world
events if we make ourselves heard.

*13.

14.

103

More and more, I feel helpless in the face of
what's happening in the world today.

I sometimes feel personally to blame for the
sad state of affairs in our government.

104

Table 12 FORM E
VALUE SURVEY

Below is a list of 18 values arranged in alphabetical order.
Your task is to arrange them in order of their importance to
YOU, as guiding principles in YOUR life.

Study the list carefully. Then place a 1_next to the value
which is most important to ygg, place a 2 next to the value
which is second most important you, etc. The value which

is least important, relative to the others, should be ranked
18.

Work slowly and think carefully. If you cange your mind,
feel free to change your answers. The end result should
truly show how you really feel.

A COMFORTABLE LIFE (a prosperous life)

 

AN EXCITING LIFE (a Stimulating, active life)

 

A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT (lasting contribution)

 

A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)

 

A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)

 

EQUALITY (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)

 

FAMILY SECURITY (taking care of loved ones)

 

FREEDOM (independence, free choice)

 

HAPPINESS (contentedness)

 

INNER HARMONY (freedom from inner conflict)

 

MATURE LOVE (sexual and spiritual intimacy)

 

NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack)

 

PLEASURE (an enjoyable, leisurely life)

 

SALVATION (saved, eternal life)

 

SELF RESPECT (self-esteem)

 

SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, admiration)

 

TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship)

 

WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)

 

(c) 1967 by Milton Rokeach

105
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106

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107

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108

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MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY LIB

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