

DYNAMIC DIFFERENCES IN VALUE SYSTEMS

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

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1972

THESIS



ABSTRACT

DYNAMIC DIFFERENCES IN VALUE SYSTEMS

by

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The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate a qualitative, dynamic difference in the kinds of value systems (consciousness) that people have; to give a historical-psychological framework in which this consciousness-dynamic difference may be understood; and to demonstrate that this difference in consciousness among persons is a strong predictor of difference in the importance assigned to those values that are central to the dynamic.

A test was constructed designed to discriminate

1) between persons who have a greater and lesser cognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary value system;

2) between persons who have a lesser acceptance of authority and those persons who have a greater acceptance of authority;

3) between persons who have a lesser confidence in the objectivity of their values and those persons who have greater confidence in the objectivity of their values.

A significant positive correlation was found to exist between a greater cognition of the conditioned nature of one's

primary value system and a lesser acceptance of authority. Persons who scored in this direction on these factors were said to have a value system which functions more through reflection. Obversely, a positive correlation was found between a lesser cognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary value system and a greater acceptance of authority. Persons who scored in this direction were said to have a value system which functions more through superego requiredness. A curvilinear relationship was found to exist between the "acceptance of authority" and "confidence in the objectivity of one's values" factors. Both high-acceptance and high-rejection of authority Ss had the high confidence in the objectivity of their values while moderate "acceptance of authority" persons ascribed low confidence to their values' objectivity.

One hundred and fourteen Ss were administered both the Superego-Reflective scale and Rokeach's Terminal Value Survey (Form E). Superego persons (based on Superego-Reflective scale scores) valued National Security ($p < .0001$), Salvation ($p < .0005$) and Family Security ($p < .005$) more highly than Reflective persons, while Reflective persons valued A World of Beauty ($p < .01$) more highly than Superego persons. The sex of the subjects differentially influenced the relationship between the Superego-Reflective scale and the Terminal Value Survey. An ad hoc explanation for these sex differences was offered.

DYNAMIC DIFFERENCES IN VALUE SYSTEMS

By

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A THESIS

Submitted to

Michigan State University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Psychology

1972

157120

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author has particularly to thank Drs. Jeanne Gullahorn, Jean Jacobson, and Larry Messe for their criticism and suggestions for the revision of earlier drafts of this study, and for their participation as members of the author's thesis committee.

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"Cultivate and make music"--said the dream.

--Socrates

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is threefold:

- 1) to demonstrate a qualitative, dynamic difference in the kinds of value systems (consciousness) that people have;
- 2) to give an historical-psychological framework in which this consciousness-dynamic difference may be understood;
- 3) to demonstrate that this difference in consciousness among persons is a strong predictor of differences in the importance assigned to those values that are central to the dynamic.

THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS/SYSTEM

Introduction:

The palaeontologist Pere Teilhard de Chardin (1955) has suggested that

. . .from a purely positivist point of view man is the most. . .disconcerting of all objects met with by science. (p. 163)

He points out that man, as science reconstructs him, is an animal--and in fact

so little anatomically separable from the anthropoids that. . .zoologists. . .include him with them in the same super-family, the hominidae. (p. 163)

He continues:

Yet, to judge by the biological results of his advent, is he not in reality something altogether different?

Morphologically the leap was extremely slight, yet it was the concomitant of an incredible commotion among the spheres of life--there lies the whole human paradox; and there, in the same breath, is the evidence that science, in its present day reconstructions of the world, neglects an essential factor, or rather an entire dimension of the universe. (p. 163)

This "essential factor," the "central phenomenon of man" that separates man from all other animals is, according to Teilhard, reflection. He defines reflection as

. . .the power acquired by a consciousness to turn in upon itself, to take possession of itself as an object endowed with its own particular consistence. (p. 165)

In his opinion, at some time between the end of the Pliocene and the start of the Pleistocene periods the creature that became man crossed the "threshold" of reflection in a "single stride." He believes that the onset of reflection in man produces a "change of state" in nature akin to the change in state of inorganic molecules that combined to produce a living cell. According to Teilhard, "for the first time in a living creature instinct perceived itself in its own mirror"--and this consciousness introduced a new order of complexity affecting all of the instincts inherited from his pre-human ancestors.

Rollo May (1961), following Teilhard de Chardin's thought, also puts himself

...in opposition to the assumption in conventional science that we explain the more complex by the more simple. This is generally taken on the model of evolution: the organisms and activities higher on the evolutionary scale are explained by those lower. But this is only half the truth. It is just as true that when a new level of complexity emerges (such as self-consciousness in man), this level becomes decisive for our understanding of all previous levels. The principle here is the simpler can be understood and explained only in terms of the more complex. (emphasis May's p. 73)

Consciousness may now be understood as a continuing mutation of all previous mutations: under this generic we can look at the previous manifestations of this human mutation which have taken the form of discovery, invention, religion and myths, and political and economic institutions, as well as philosophic systems which more centrally reflect these mutations.

The onset of reflection in man has been described as a "change of state." The nature of this change is seen here as critical to the kind of consciousness that has existed, and to the radical mutation in consciousness that is now occurring.

There has been no perceptable change in the cranial capacity of man since the emergence of Homo sapiens about 50,000 years ago, and very little change even from pre-Homo sapiens living 500,000 years BP (before the present). Perhaps by examining evidence of consciousness closer to the inception of this "change of state," by examining the coincidence of artifacts in the cultures of early man and the mythologies handed down into early antiquity we may gain a clearer

understanding of the basic dynamic of consciousness, of which the "new" consciousness more wholly encompasses.

Consciousness in Prehistory:

Cave deposits contain clear evidence that Peking man, Homo erectus, used fire (Day, 1970, p. 110). Fossil remains of these men, who lived about 500,000 years ago, have been found in Java, China and Africa, and their cranial capacity (900-1200cc), compares favorably with that of modern man (1000-2000cc) and represents a clear advance over the earlier hominids of Olduvai Gorge in Africa whose smaller cranial capacity (about 700cc) corresponded with the non-use of fire and the cruder stone tool culture of these earlier hominids (Day, p. 77, 98, 109). But the fact that these creatures who lived about 1-1/2 million years ago used tools at all is certainly evidence for reflection, however primitive.

Dobzhansky (1962) gives evidence that

. . .there is no question that among living men brain size is not a reliable measure of the individual's [intellectual] capacity. (p. 211)

Even though this is so among living men, Dobzhansky feels that

. . .it is a fallacy to conclude that since brain size alone does not unalterably set the level of intelligence, the two variables are not in any way related. (p.211)

He cites Rensch's (1959) studies which measured the relationship between the learning capacity of animals of related species and the brain size of those animals. Rensch concluded that

. . . memory retention is about proportional to the brain size in the animals [tested] . . . (p. 211-212)

According to Dobzhansky, Rensch suggests that "a possible mechanism" for this relationship between memory retention and brain size may be that

. . . larger brains contain nerve cells with more numerous branches (dendrites), which permit more numerous interconnections between the cells and, thus, a greater variety of paths of nerve impulses. (p. 212)

Jane Lawick-Goodall's (1971) field work with chimpanzees in Tanzania has served to document that animals other than man are toolmakers:

The point at which tool-using and tool-making, as such, acquire evolutionary significance is surely when an animal can adapt its ability to manipulate objects to a wide variety of purposes, and when it can use an object spontaneously to solve a brand-new problem that without the use of a tool would prove insoluble.

. . . They use stems and sticks to capture and eat insects and, if the material picked is not suitable, then it is modified. They use leaves to sop up water they cannot reach with their lips--and first they chew on the leaves and thus increase their absorbency. One individual used a similar sponge to clean out the last smears of brain from the inside of a baboon skull. We have seen them use handfuls of leaves to wipe dirt from their bodies or to dab at wounds. They sometimes use sticks as levers to enlarge underground bees' nests. (p. 240).

Earlier, Lawick-Goodall had argued that although

. . . the chimpanzee does not fashion his probes to a regular and set pattern . . . prehistoric man, before his development of stone tools, undoubtedly poked around with sticks and straws, at which stage it seems unlikely that he made tools to a set pattern either. (p. 239)

Now that Lawick-Goodall has demonstrated evidence of a primitive tool-making and tool-using "culture" among present-day chimpanzees, it is evident that if a qualitative difference in consciousness exists between man and the lower animals, this difference is not simply one of ability to use and make tools, and the relatively high order of reflection that this entails.

Thus, the "critical point" which Teilhard de Chardin espouses, if one exists, must have occurred much later than the late Pliocene-early Pleistocene period that Teilhard has suggested, and I believe the "boiling point" of man's evolution occurred when men as individuals, apart from an immediately threatening situation, first became conscious that their individual dissolution was inevitable.

This distinction between animal and human consciousness is consonant with that of Rollo May (1961).

The uniquely human form of awareness is self-consciousness. . . . Consciousness. . . is not simply my awareness of threat from the world but my capacity to know myself as the one being threatened. . . . (emphasis Mays, p. 77)

Heidegger's phraseology (trans. in Blackham, 1965, p. 268) of "running-forward-in-thought" (Being-towards-death) may be helpful in elucidating the nature of this "critical point." In this way we may see the ability of the chimpanzee to make and use tools as indicative of some capacity to run-forward-in-thought, although the simplicity of the tool culture and the relatively small cranial capacity indicate that this capacity is limited.

The Homo habilis of Olduvai Gorge and Homo erectus show a progressively greater capacity to run-forward-in-thought as evidenced by their advancement in toolmaking, but the advancement does not seem to indicate a different order of existence among these creatures. The number of tools found associated with these cultures is small, and the workmanship is very crude. The expansion of brain size, as indicated by cranial capacity of the fossil remains, was pretty much completed with the emergence of the early sapients, examples of which are the Vertesszöllös man (Mindel glaciation, 200,000 years BP) and the Swanscombe skull (Mindel-Riss Interglacial Period, 150,000 years BP). From these early sapients two major groupings emerged, Homo sapiens neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens sapiens (Day, p. 118-120).

With the emergence of the Neanderthals, there is evidence of huge cultural advances over Homo erectus.

. . .there is evidence from several
Neanderthal sites, . . .burial of the
dead in places of safety from scavengers,

the provision of "grave goods" and the burial of the dead one's personal belongings such as necklaces of perforated teeth. It has been suggested that the beginnings of ritualism, mystic or religious practices can be shown from Neanderthal sites such as . . . Mount Circeo. Remains have been found inside circles of objects placed with ritualistic precision. (Day, p. 130)

At about this same time (40,000 years BP) remains of the more modern Homo sapiens sapiens of the Aurignacian culture show the first bone pins, spear points, and the first art (Day, p. 145-147).

. . . in this period [the Aurignacian] as well as the subsequent Solutrean and Magdalenian periods, men learned to draw, paint, engrave, sculpt in bas-relief and in the round. (Day, p. 147)

With the emergence of Homo sapiens, we find the coincidence of the first evidence of burials, and the beginnings and rapid expansion of the first art forms, and an increasingly rapid increase in the number and complexity of tool-use.

We may now see the increasing ability to run-forward-in-thought inextricably contingent on the increasing technological ability to modify the environment as selected by natural evolutionary pressures, and reaching a "critical point" with the emergence of the Homo sapiens, whose cortex was sufficiently enlarged to enable individual members of the species to run-forward-in-thought to the extent that each recognized the inevitability of his own death. The anxiety associated with this cognition is responsible for man's intensity and

his insecurity. Since the cognition of one's death is an internal stimulus, the anxiety-arousal elicited by this stimulus is environment-free, and therefore constant, and is the arousal associated with the "change of state."

With the primal cognition of death, man first conceived time which without death is intense-less. Barrett (1962) recounts Heidegger:

We really know time, says Heidegger, because we know we are going to die. Without this passionate realization of our mortality, time would be simply a movement of the clock that we watch passively, calculating its advance-- a movement devoid of human meaning. (p. 227)

The inward arousal associated with the cognition of one's inevitable death is seen as the energizing force responsible for the rapid expansion of culture continuing through the present, and the primary solution of this cognition was the attribution of spirit to the body, which would not die. Freud (1913) wrote:

Above all, the problem of death must have become the starting point of the formation of the theory [of the soul]. (p. 100)

Once man was invested with a soul, animation of the rest of nature would serve to substantiate his own animation. Freud agrees that

. . .these soul conceptions are the original nucleus of the animistic system, that spirits merely correspond to souls that have become independent, and that the souls of animals, plants and things were formed after the analogy of human souls. (1913, p. 99, 100)

Although Freud does not give the cognition/repression of non-being the primacy accorded here (in that his interpretation of the death taboo is that it acts as a defense against repressed aggression against the "defenseless dead," while here it is seen as acting in defense of a de-repression of the fear of one's own death), he does agree that the result of the projection of "the problem of death" (i.e., animism; mythology) provided man with his first system of thought.

. . .in the course of time three systems of thought. . . each of which make it possible to comprehend the totality of the world from one point, as a continuity . . .came into being: the animistic (mythological), the religious, and the scientific. Of these, animism, the first system, is perhaps the most consistent and the most exhaustive, and the one which explains the nature of the world in its entirety. . . . (1913, p. 101)

The mythological consciousness is conceived as the primal, paradigm consequent of man's cognition/repression of the time-bound nature of his being, and the dynamic of system is seen as providing the individual with a preception-framework in which his individuality (ego) is seen as preserved from death.

Once the fear of non-being was repressed, man resisted a return of the repressed by projecting that fear onto any out-group that had selected a different system. Peoples who had selected a different system were despised precisely because

the selection of a different system by like peoples is the stimulus most likely to elicit a return of the repressed,

since that selection puts in question the objectivity of their religion/system, and those (foreign) people were then seen (projected) as bad, and later, choosers of bad (i.e., evil).

Lorenz (1966) has shown that

. . .those inhibitions which prevent animals from injuring or killing fellow members of the same species have to be the strongest and most reliable 1) in those species which, being hunters of large prey, possess weapons which could easily kill a conspecific; 2) in those species which live gregariously. (p. 123)

The anomaly of war within Homo sapiens may be at least partly attributable to man's primal cognition of non-being, his systematic repression of this idea, and projections of this repressed fear onto any people whose different system elicited/elicits a return of the repressed toward consciousness. These projections were/are rationalized such that the opposing-system people are seen as bad or evil, and thus needing elimination or conversion.

Mythological Evidence for the Rejection of Authority as a

Basic Dynamic of Consciousness:

Maslow (1962) has written

Most religions have had a thread of anti-intellectualism, some trace of preference for faith or belief or piety rather than for knowledge, or the feeling that some forms of knowledge were too dangerous to meddle with and had best be forbidden or reserved to a few special people. In most cultures those revolutionaries who defied the gods by

seeking out their secrets were punished heavily, like Adam and Eve, Prometheus and Oedipus, and have been remembered as warnings to all others not to try to be godlike. (p. 58)

Maslow continues:

. . .it is precisely the godlike in ourselves that we are ambivalent about, fascinated by and fearful of, motivated to and defensive against. (p. 58)

What are the dynamics of this ambivalence? What is it that we are fascinated by and motivated toward? Of what are we fearful and defensive?

The two creation stories are similar in that the sin of Adam and Eve and Prometheus was the sin of knowledge, of reflection. If, as I have submitted above, the cognition of one's death, once repressed, produced the "knowledge" of good and evil (evil being that which elicits a return of the repressed, good being that which reinforces the repression),¹ it follows that our fearfulness and defensiveness is of this knowledge of our mortality. This interpretation receives tentative support in the Lord's command ". . .but of the tree of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die," (Gen. 2:17) and in the Lord's fear that once ". . .man has become like one of us, knowing good and evil. . ." that man would ". . .take also from the tree of life and live forever." (Gen. 3:22.)

When Prometheus gave fire to men, he must also have given men the ability to use the fire (Prometheus means forethought

1. The concept of "appropriateness," discussed below, is in some sense "beyond good and evil."

(Hamilton, p. 68) and he gave man his own ability, forethought, to run forward in thought.

Prometheus had not only stolen fire for men; he had also arranged that they should get the best part of any animal sacrificed and the gods the worse. (p. 74)

Because Prometheus had helped mankind, Zeus punished him by strapping him to a high rock, and had an eagle ". . . feast . . . on [his] blackened liver." (Hamilton, p. 72) But the early Greeks felt that Prometheus was "wiser even than the gods" (Hamilton, p. 68); the Greeks felt that his punishment was unjust, and eventually Hercules, the heroic man, would free him (Hamilton, p. 78).

Antigone's rejection of the law of the State for the dictates of her own conscience also demonstrates the relationship between rejection of authority as a viable consciousness--referent and reflection, as well as the dangers inherent in rebelling against the System. Antigone had performed burial rights for her brother Polyneices, which Creon, King of Thebes, had forbidden. Brought before him and asked if she had disobeyed his law, Antigone replied:

Naturally! Since Zeus never promulgated such a law. . . . I never thought your edicts had such force they nullified the laws of heaven. . . . (Sophocles, Roche [trans.] p. 179)

For rejecting the State's prescriptions in lieu of her own conscience, Antigone was sentenced to death.

Yankelovich and Barrett (1970) suggest that

. . .perhaps the most fundamental law of nature expressed in human life is the tendency to form new wholes or structures.

This coming into being of new gestalts is the principle of creativity in nature. (p. 311)

Possibly this ambivalence suggested by Maslow may represent on one hand an aversion toward self-knowledge which reveals itself in the anxiety-producing consciousness of our essential insecurity, the idea of our non-being; and on the other, a tendency towards creativity, which offers us the possibility of a better solution to life than the solution system offers us. A necessary concomitant of this "synergistic quality" (Tankelovich and Barrett, p. 311), this tendency towards new gestalts is the rejection of the authority of the system to structure one's perception. This necessary relationship between reflection/knowledge and rebellion against authority is mythologically represented in the disobedience of Adam and Eve, Prometheus, Oedipus and Antigone, who were punished for their respective crimes of: hunger for knowledge; forethought-- a love of man more than god; a wisdom that caused the death of monsters; and a belief that one's conscience is a superior value--referent than the law of the State.

May (1953) has also suggested that these myths

. . .portray the psychological truth that the child's "opening his eyes," and gaining self-awareness always involves potential conflict with those in power, be they gods or parents. (p. 159)

He also feels that there is a necessary relationship between reflection, knowledge and a rebellion against authority:

. . .without. . . [this potential rebellion]
the child would never acquire potentialities
for freedom, responsibility, and ethical
choice. . . .

and asks ". . .why. . .this rebellion is condemned?" (p. 159)

As an answer to his own question, he also suggests that individuals are ambivalent toward actualizing their potentialities and rejecting the authority/security of the system:

. . .in these myths there is the. . .
conflict between entrenched authority,
as represented by the jealous gods,
and the upsurging of new life and
creativity. The emergence of new
vitality always to some extent breaks
the existing customs and beliefs, and
is thus threatening and anxiety-provoking
to those in power as well as to the
growing person himself. . . . The
anxiety in Adam and the torture experienced by Prometheus also tell us psychologically that within the creative person himself there is the fear of moving ahead. In these myths there speaks not only the courageous side of man, but the servile side which would prefer comfort to freedom, security to one's own growth. (p. 160)

The full development of the central "phenomenon of man," reflection, self-consciousness, is thus seen here as inextricably tied to the rejection of authority.

The evolution of system-consciousness: freedom seen as a ploy enabling system to claim objectivity

I suggested earlier that the dynamic of system is that it provides the individual with a perception-framework in

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which his individuality (ego-soul) can be seen as preserved from non-being. Since individuation is seen as the essence of system the mutation of system from the mythologic through the religious and scientific is seen as the selection by system of a progressively more individual solution to non-being, while retaining the objective, non-finite character of earlier systems. I will attempt to show below that the disintegration of the old system-emergence of the new in each instance has coincided with a progressively greater amount of freedom-to-choose-one's-fate offered by the emerging system and/or an internal-systemic contradiction which effected a reduction of individual freedom-to-choose-one's fate offered by the dying system. The mutation of system towards greater freedom enabled the individual-within-system to perceive individuals-outside-system as choosing their (bad, unhappy) fate, in this way interpreting the less-than-consensus of persons in his system not as an indication of the less-than-objective, finite nature of his system, but as indicative of a more profound evil.

Tillich (1952) has suggested that there are three types of anxiety that have been predominant in different periods of Western history.

- 1) Non-being threatens man's ontic self-affirmation, relatively in terms of fate, absolutely in terms of death. . . .
- 2) Non-being threatens man's moral self-affirmation, relatively in terms of guilt, absolutely in terms of condemnation. . . .
- 3) Non-being threatens man's spiritual self-affirmation, relatively in terms of emptiness, absolutely in terms of meaninglessness. (p. 41, enumeration mine)

The first type of anxiety is seen by Tillich to be predominant at the end of the ancient period, the second type at the end of the Middle Ages, and the third at the end of the modern period. If the dominant system of the ancient period is considered the mythologic, the Middle Ages religious, and the modern period the technologic-scientific, Tillich's formulations may be used: 1) as an expression of the failure of these successive systems to relieve the individual of the anxiety of non-being; and 2) the predominant anxiety of each period may thus be seen as having been derived from the particular solution to individuation inherent in the dominant system of that period.

1. The Failure of the Mythologic System to Solve the Anxiety of Non-being.

Tillich is succinct:

The anxiety of fate and death is the most basic, most universal, and incapable. (p. 42)

and elsewhere:

Fate is the rule of contingency, and the anxiety about fate is based on the finite being's awareness of being contingent in every respect, of having no ultimate necessity. . . . (p. 44)

The solution of the animistic consciousness to the problem of individuation, of individual fate and death, was the tragic myth.

Nietzsche (1871) felt that there was a "metaphysical solace" inherent in tragedy which gave the participants in it a ". . . sense of unity which led back into the heart of nature. "

He wrote:

The world of tragedy is. . .a world having the same reality and credibility as Olympus possessed for the devout Greek. The satyr, as the Dionysiac chorist, dwells in reality sanctioned by myth and ritual. . . . I believe [that]. . .the cultured Greek felt himself absorbed into the satyr chorus, and in the next development of Greek tragedy state and society, in fact all that separated man from man, gave way before an overwhelming sense of unity which led back into the heart of nature. The metaphysical solace. . .that, despite every phenomenal change, life is at bottom indestructibly joyful and powerful, was expressed most concretely in the chorus of satyrs, nature beings who dwell behind all civilization and preserve their identity through every change of generations and historical movement. With this chorus the. . .Greek. . . who had penetrated the destructive agencies of both nature and history solaced himself. Though he had been in danger of craving a Buddhistic denial of the will, he was saved by art, and through art life reclaimed him. (p. 50, 51)

The solution of the Animistic consciousness to the problem of awareness of one's fate and death is thus seen by Nietzsche as an artistic one.

Dionysic art. . .makes us realize that everything that is generated must be prepared to face its painful dissolution. It forces us to gaze into the horror of individual existence, yet without being turned to stone by the vision. . . .For a brief moment we become ourselves, the primal Being, and we. . .see the struggle, the pain . . .as necessary because of the constant proliferation of forms pushing into life. . . . Pity and terror notwithstanding, we realize our great good fortune in having life--not as individuals, but as part of the life force

with whose procreative lust we have become one.
(Nietzsche, p. 102-103)

Nietzsche's thesis--that the individual member of the chorus-community was able to transcend his individuation through identification with all of the disparate elements of the tragic myth--appears less far-fetched if it is recognized that the same Dionysus for whom all of the Greek tragedies were written (Hamilton, p. 61) was also the god of fertility, wine, and choral song. This opposition to individuation is seen in each of the older duties of Dionysus: as god of fertility he represented life moving through individuals, not in them; as god of wine he represented life when the ego had been dissolved in alcohol; as god of choral song he represented life when the ego had been dissolved in the dithyrambic intoxication of music. The opposition of Dionysus to individuation is also represented in the winter reign of Dionysus at Delphi, complementing the rule of Apollo, the god of individuation. That Apollo is the god of individuals is expressed in his function as god of poetry and the lyre, individual music; of healing, of the lonely shepherd; and of prophecy: through him the fate of individuals and states were divined; and in his twin sister, Artemis, whose virginity opposed the sexual, procreative nature of the Dionysiac spirit.

Hesiod, in the eighth century B.C. wrote that the Fates gave to men at birth all the good and evil that they were to have. But the obverse of accepting one's fate was the denial

of personal guilt. Even Oedipus was made to say

Murder, incest, and catastrophe--...
not through any choice of mine but through
some scheme of heaven, long insensate
against our house. (Sophocles, p. 126-127)

And in The Eumenides of Aeschylus (458 B.C.) Orestes was released from the vengeance of the Furies by Athena's acceptance of Apollo's testimony that he ordered the matricide. But only 50 years later the tragic resolution of life forces through the conflict of gods appeared impossible to Euripides (possibly because of the failure of Athens in the Peloponnesian war and/or the inability of the Athenian "spectators" to fully participate in the Dionysiac rite), and in his Orestes the use of the gods to explain Orestes' crime was portrayed as an ineffectual, unacceptable deux ex machina. Early in the version of Euripides, Orestes speaks with Menelaus:

Orestes: I am a murderer. I murdered my mother.

Menelaus: So I have heard. Kindly spare me your horrors.

Orestes: I spare you--though no god spared me.

Menelaus: What is your sickness?

Orestes: I call it conscience. The certain knowledge of wrong, the conviction of crime.

(1. 391-396)

This expropriation of responsibility from the individuating god (Apollo) to individual man is seen as coincident with the death of the animistic system. The tragic myth opposed individuation in that the choice of one's fate was seen as beyond the power

of all men, even heroes (e.g., pity "short-lived Achilles"). Since all men were seen as bound by fate, at a higher level all men were seen to share the same fate, since any individual destiny was seen as beyond the individual's control. In the Orestes of Euripides fate was seen as an inadequate explanation of tragedy. With the breaking of this bond opposing individuation, the mythologic system dissolved.

2. The Failure of the Religious System to Solve the Anxiety of Non-being

With the increasing individuation coincident with the dissolution of the mythologic system, the problem of non-being became primarily manifest in terms of guilt and condemnation. The Furies that pursued Orestes were conceived by the early Greeks as pursuing wrong-doers on earth, but by the time of Virgil, in the first century before Christ, these Furies were thought of as tormentors of the underworld, where they punished earthly sinners in their after-life. (Hamilton, p. 40) But for the early Greeks, all of the dead were, according to Homer, "blessed." In the Eumenides, after Orestes had defended his matricide the Furies (dieties older than Apollo) replied:

Of this stain, death has set her free
(l. 603)

The idea of an afterlife in which wrong-doers would be eternally punished for their deeds is a natural concomitant of the increasing individuation that accompanied the Greeks' skepticism of fate as an explanation of tragedy.

Nietzsche (1887) attacked the concept of sin as an "inversion of morals" --a tact by an oppressed people (Jews) to gain

power through a more subtle repression, guilt, than through physical domination. Although the concept of the freedom-to-sin probably evolved earlier among some Jewish people than it did in the Greeks (due to the same skeptic refusal to grant their god responsibility for tragedy), it is suggested here that an indigenous evolution of this idea also occurred among the Athenians.

This skepticism of divine responsibility for tragedy and the consequent increased individuation is seen as the mutual source of both the religious and the scientific systems, and it is suggested here that the evolution of both systems may only be understood in light of this mutual origin and their continued interdependence.

Tillich (1952) writes:

[the death of Socrates] became for the whole ancient world both a fact and a symbol. . . . It showed a courage which could affirm life because it could affirm death. Soldierly fortitude was transcended by the courage of wisdom. In this form it gave 'philosophical consolation' to many people in all sections of the ancient world throughout a period of catastrophes and transformations. (p. 11)

What is the nature of this "courage [that] could affirm death?"

In the Phaedo, Plato describes Socrates' proof of the immortality of the soul:

Socrates: What is that of which the inherence will render the body alive?

Cebes: The soul.

S. And is this always the case?

- C: Yes, Of course.
- S: Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life?
- C: Yes, certainly.
- S: And is there any opposite to life?
- C: There is.
- S: And what is that?
- C: Death.
- S: Then the soul, as has been acknowledged, will never receive the opposite of what she brings.
- C: Impossible. . .
- S: And what do we call the principle which does not admit of death?
- C: The immortal.
- S: And does the soul admit of death?
- C: No.
- S: Then the soul is immortal?
- C: Yes.
- S: And may we say that this has been proven?
- C: Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates.

(p. 143, 144)

Nietzsche (1871) analysed the relationship between the use of reason and the fear of death in Socrates:

. . .we find a deep-seated illusion, first manifested in Socrates: the illusion that thought, guided by the thread of causation, might plumb the farthest abyss of being and even correct it. This grand metaphysical illusion has become integral to the scientific endeavor and again and again leads science to those far

limits of its inquiry where it becomes art--
which, in this mechanism, is what is really intended.

If we examine Socrates in the light of this idea, he strikes us as the first who was able not only to live under the guidance of that instinctive scientific certainty, but to die by it, which is much more difficult. For this reason the image of the dying Socrates--mortal man freed by knowledge and argument from the fear of death--is the emblem which, hanging above the portal of every science, reminds the adept that his mission is to make existence appear intelligible and thereby justified. (p. 93)

Nietzsche (1871, p. 83) also tells us that Socrates never attended tragic plays, except for those of Euripides, whose work as has been suggested above also portended the death of mythology.

The nature of the "philosophical consolation" of Socrates' death thus lies in his example of an individual man freed from the fear of non-being through the power of his own reason. The individuation process predominately manifest in Socrates, the wisest man of Apollo's oracle, is also demonstrated by the thoughts of Socrates on the composition of the after-life:

When the dead arrive. . .first of all
 they have sentence passed on them. . .
 [the middle group] go to the river. . .
 and there they. . .are purified of their
 evil deeds, and having suffered the
 penalty of the wrongs. . .they are ab-
 solved, and receive the rewards of their
 good deeds, each according to his deserts.
 (Phaedo, p. 148)

Socrates/Plato continues and describes eternal damnation for the most wicked, eventual absolution after years in a

volcanic-type chasm for those less wicked, when the persons that they had wronged forgave them. He continues:

. . .those too who have been preeminent for holiness of life are released from this earthly prison, and go to their pure home which is above, and dwell in the purer earth; and of these, such as have duly purified themselves with philosophy live henceforth altogether without the body, in mansions fairer still. . . .

Though he is

. . .[not] very confident that the description. . .of the soul and her mansions is exactly true. . .inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal, [it is not improper]. . .to think. . .that something of the kind is true. (p. 148, 149)

The essential theology of Western religion until the Reformation was already manifest 400 years before Christ, and an apostle of both the religious and the scientific systems is seen as present in the persona of Socrates/early Plato. In that the mythologic system may be seen as a resolution of the Apollonian and Dionysiac forces, the art of the [skeptic/dialectician Socrates-Plato] /death of Socrates, great as it was, was not on the order of the Dionysiac in providing release from the fear of non-being. It remained for the symbol of the resurrection of Christ to provide that release. With the faith in the one resurrected man/God a synthesis of the new theology of individuation with a more exclusively individual Promethean "blind hope" against the fear of non-being was achieved, the system which was to predominate, in this particular synthesis, until the Reformation.

With the resurrection as the central tenet of the religious system, the theology of Socrates was modified such that those who lived in "mansions fairer still" after death were not those who had "purified themselves with philosophy," but were those who had faith in Christ as the resurrected Lord.

Then he said to Thomas, "Put your finger here, and see my hands; and put out your hand and place it in my side; do not be faithless, but believing." Thomas answered him, "My Lord and my God!" Jesus said to him "Have you believed because you have seen me? Blessed are those that have not seen me and yet believe."

. . .these [signs] are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in his name. (John 20:27-31,)

However, with this change in the mechanism of salvation from purification-through-philosophy of Socrates/Plato to faith in Christ and his monotheism, the skeptic ethos of philosophy reemerged as critic of the religious system. The interrelation of faith and reason is evident in St. Augustine's justification of evil in God's world. Barrett (1958) describes this effort:

All evil, he tells us, is a lack of being, hence a form of non-being; and since the negative is not real, as positive being is, we are somehow to be consoled. (p. 96)

Barrett sees St. Augustine as

. . .[setting] the pattern of Christian thought for the thousand years of Middle Ages that were to follow. The formula after Augustine became 'Faith seeking understanding.' (p. 97)

It is suggested here that the conflict between reason and faith effected the eventual dissolution of the religious system. Prior to this dissolution the theodicy of St. Augustine and the later Christian theologians represented an uneasy alliance, an effort to resolve this conflict.

With reason as the religion of Socrates/Plato, the mortal body, being finite, could be seen as the allure of evil; but the theodicy of St. Augustine could not admit of God's creation as engendering evil. The Socratic solution to the problem of non-being lay in the "philosophical" opposition of the essence of mind/soul to the existence of the body, which presaged Descartes' mind/body dichotomy. The evolution of Philosophy/science/technology system may be seen as interrupted with the emergence of the religious system. Only when the religious system had begun to lose its power could the evolution of the scientific system continue. Plato wrote that

. . .that idea or essence, which in the dialectical process we define as essence or true existence [is] . . .not admitting of variation. (Phaedo, p. 112)

and that these

. . .unchanging things you can only perceive with the mind [which is] . . .invisible and. . .not seen. (p. 112)

and later:

. . .the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to the seen. (p. 113)

Plato/Socrates continued:

. . .the soul, when using the body as an instrument of perception. . .is then

dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, and wanders and is confused. . . she is like a drunkard when she touches change. . . but when returning into herself she reflects, then she passes into the other world. . . of purity, . . . eternity, . . . immortality, and with then she ever lives when she is by herself. . . And this state of the soul is called wisdom. . . the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, immortal, intellectual, . . . and unchangeable; and the body is in the very likeness of the human, . . . mortal. . . unintellectual. . . and changeable. . . the soul, which is pure at departing and draws after her no bodily taint, having never voluntarily during life had connection with the body. . . herself gathered into herself, and making such abstraction her perpetual study--which means that she has been a true disciple of philosophy; and therefore has in fact been always engaged in the practice of dying--for is not philosophy the study of death?

. . . the soul. . . accustomed to hate and fear and [avoidance of] the intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark and invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy. . . is held fast by the corporeal, . . . [and will not] depart pure and unalloyed.
(Phaedo, p. 113-115, emphasis supplied)

Augustine's opposition to Plato is apparent:

There is no need, therefore, that in our sins and vices we accuse the nature of the flesh to the injury of the Creator, for in its own kind and degree the flesh is good;

. . . For he who extols the nature of the soul as the chief good, and condemns the nature of the flesh as if it were evil, assuredly is fleshly both in his love of the soul and hatred of the flesh; for these. . . feelings arise from human fancy, not divine truth. . . .
(Augustine, p. 446)

With the consolidation of the animistic-system gods into one omnipotent, omniscient deity, Christian theologians faced the superimposition of the problem of cosmic evil on Euripides/Socrates' solution of tragedy as the choice of evil individuals. Theodicy was never able to satisfactorily synthesize God's omniscience and omnipotence with the existence of evil. Augustine wrote:

. . .God's foreknowledge had anticipated both. . .how evil the man whom He had created good should become and what good He Himself should even thus derive from him. . . . God made man upright, and consequently with a good will. . . . The good will, then, is the work of God; for God created him with it. But the first evil will, which preceded all man's evil acts, was rather a kind of falling away from the work of God to its own works than any positive work. And therefore the acts resulting were evil, not having God, but the will itself for their end; so that the will or the man himself, so far as his will is bad, was as it were the evil tree bringing forth evil fruit. (p. 457)

Augustine's interpretation of the Biblical passage

And the Lord was sorry that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him to his heart. So the Lord said, "I will blot out man whom I have created from the face of the ground. . . for I am sorry that I have made them." But Noah found favor in the eyes of the Lord. (Gen. 6:6-8)

is ". . .not with reference to that which the Almighty had foreknown that He would do," but it is ". . . with reference to man's expectation, or the order of natural causes. . . ." (p. 457). The purpose of theodicy was not only to justify

the existence of evil in God's world, but also to rationalize the murder of those who were seen as evil (opposing system).

Saint Augustine wrote:

However, there are some exceptions made by the divine authority. . .that men may not be put to death. These exceptions are of two kinds, being justified either by a general law, or by a special commission granted for a time to some individual. And in this later case, he to whom authority is delegated. . .is not himself responsible for the death he deals. And, accordingly, they who have waged war in obedience to the divine command, or in conformity with His laws have represented in their persons the public justice or the wisdom of government, and in this capacity have put to death wicked men; such persons have by no means violated the commandment, 'Thou shalt not kill.' (p. 27)

With the onset of the Reformation, the attempted synthesis of reason and faith was either rejected outright (Luther: "the whore, reason"--Barret. p. 111) or its injust consequences were accepted (Calvin: predestination).

It is suggested here that the failure of theodicy as manifested in the emergence of Protestantism coincided with the death of the religious system.

3. The Failure of the Technological/Scientific System to Solve the Anxiety of Non-being

The loss of freedom-to-choose-one's-fate, represented to consciousness in the doctrine of predestination, posed essentially the same predicament to system-consciousness emerging from the dissolution of the universal church as it did to the

Greek consciousness emerging from the dissolution of the mythologic. Whereas before the Reformation reason played a subordinate role to faith in the "faith-seeking-understanding" theodicy of the Church, the solution to the problem of non-being after the Reformation was the same essential solution of Socrates/Plato to the dissolution of the mythologic system: the attribution of divine, non-finite qualities to reason.

Descartes' thinking was an early example of the reemergence of the scientific solution to the fear of non-being. Descartes' resolve to doubt everything (skepticism as the ethos of reason) led to his conclusion that he could doubt everything but doubt itself, and that this action of the mind thus proves reality: Cogito, ergo sum. To Descartes, God was the link between the mechanical world of the body and the rational world of the mind. Ryle (1949) has written:

When Galileo showed that his methods of scientific discovery were competent to provide a mechanical theory which should cover every occupant of space, Descartes found in himself two conflicting motives. As a man of scientific genius he could not but endorse the claims of mechanics, yet as a religious and moral man he could not accept, as Hobbes accepted, the discouraging rider to those claims, namely that human nature differs only in degree of complexity from clockwork. The mental could not be just a variety of the mechanical. (p. 18-19)

Ryle expresses Descartes' solution to this conflict--that man has an autonomous mind which governs his body, in turn subject to rigid, mechanical laws--as the myth of the "ghost in the machine." The problem of fate thus underwent another meta-

morphosis and emerged as the problem of determinism to the individuated technological consciousness.

But in the expanding, deterministic universe that existed after Copernicus and Galileo the power of reason, even combined with the less objective Christian faith, has not been sufficient to allay the anxiety of non-being, which has manifested itself in the modern period relatively in terms of emptiness, absolutely in terms of meaninglessness. Pascal (1623-1622) expressed what Dobzhansky (1962) calls "the feeling of schism between man and nature. . ." near the beginning of the rebirth of the scientific consciousness:

When I consider the short duration of my life, swallowed up in the eternity before and after, the little space which I fill, and even can see, engulfed in the infinite immensity of spaces of which I am ignorant, and which know me not, I am frightened, and am astonished at being here rather than there, why now rather than then. . . . The eternal silence of these infinite spaces frightens me. (Dobzhansky, p. 362)

By the early part of the nineteenth century the "schism" in the thought of Descartes was represented in the opposing philosophies of Kant and Hegel. Blackham (1965) has sketched this opposition, suggesting that one of the factors conditioning the emergence of Existentialist thought was the situation in philosophy following these two philosophers.

Kant had shown the limited reach of reason, competent to organize intersubjective experience but not able to know the object in itself. Hegel had



exulted the competence of reason by restoring the old theme, putting reason back into nature and history. (p. 2)

The following from Kant's Critique (second ed., 1787) suggests that he prepared the way for Kierkegaard's faith that could

. . .hold fast the objective uncertainty, so as to remain out upon the deep, over seventy thousand fathoms of water, still preserving my faith. (Kierkegaard, 1846, in Blackham, p. 24

. . .even the assumption--as made on behalf of the necessary practical employment of my reason--of God, freedom, and immortality is not permissible unless at the same time speculative reason be deprived of its pretensions to transcendent insight. For in order to arrive at such insight, it must make use of principles which, in fact extend only to objects of possible experience, and which, if also applied to what cannot be an object of experience, always really change this into an appearance, thus rendering all practical extension of pure reason impossible. I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith. (Kant, p. 22)

The other precursor of existentialism was also affected by Kant. Nietzsche (1871) wrote:

Whereas the current optimism had treated the universe as knowable. . .Kant showed how these supposed laws served only to raise appearance. . .to the status of true reality. . . . This perception has initiated a culture which I dare describe as tragic. Its most important characteristic is that wisdom is put in the place of science as the highest goal. (p. 111)

Friedrich (1953) suggests that

. . .Kant is the philosopher of peace and international order, whereas Hegel is the philosopher of war and of the national authoritarian state. . . . (p. xxii)

Friedrich also feels that

. . .both Marxism and Fascism are incomprehensible without an understanding of Hegel. (p. xv)

In support of this contention, Friedrich notes Marx's "profound admiration for Hegel" (p. xvi) and his ". . .contempt for the small minds that criticized. . .Hegel without understanding him . . ." in the preface to Das Kapital. (Friedrich, p. 546)

Friedrich writes that "Lenin confirmed the judgment of Marx¹ and suggested that Marx "is directly tied to Hegel." Friedrich traces the change of the Hegelian synthesis to that of Marx through the philosophy of Feuerbach, whose ". . .substitution of the materialist for the idealist position. . ." provided the transfer of Hegel's dialectic to that of Marx.

. . .[Marx's] argument was based upon Hegel's radical rationalism and proclaimed that since the Prussian and all other contemporary states were not rational, they were not truly real and hence were bound to go. Transforming Feuerbach's speculative materialism into an economic 'materialism' which actually stresses organization (the pattern of control of the means of production), Hegel's dialectic became in the hands of Marx a proposition to the effect that every economic system contains the antithesis of another which will supersede it--a travesty of Hegel's sophisticated dialectic, to be sure, but of enormous political effect. (p. lxii)

1. Marx "knüpft unmittelbar an Hegel an." (Friedrich, p. 546)

Friedrich cites Lukacs' work which suggests that Dilthey's ". . .reinterpretation of Hegel" connected Hegel's original work with modern Fascism, (Friedrich, p. 546) The reemergence of the "old theme" of reason as religion in Hegel and his "synthesis" of reason, religion, and the state is clearly evidenced in his last work, The Philosophy of History (1822):

often one has tried to establish a conflict between reason and religion and world; but when studied more closely, this is merely a distinction. Reason, generally speaking, is the essence of the spirit, the divine as well as the human. The difference between religion and world is merely this, that religion is reason in mind and heart, that is a temple of human freedom in the knowledge of and the will for the actual reality, the content of which may itself be called divine. Thus freedom in the state is confirmed and substantiated by religion, because ethical law in the state is merely the execution of what is the basic principle of religion.
(Friedrich [trans.] p. 88)

The basis for a "reinterpretation" of Hegel leading to Fascism lay, in part, in his belief that the German Geist would be the power of the new world (the historical shadow of this belief was the promise of a millenium to pure-blooded Germans by das F hrer.)

The Germanic spirit is the spirit of the new world. Its end is the realization of absolute truth as the unlimited self-determination of freedom which has its own absolute form as its content. The destiny of the Germanic peoples is to be the bearers of the Christian principle. (Hegel, Friedrich[ed.], p. 88-89)

In the modern period major scientific theories have been used by proponents of disparate sub-systems as substantiation of their particular beliefs. The theory of evolution provided vindication for fascists, capitalists, and Marxists. Dobzhansky (1962) has written:

The radical left welcomed evolution with open arms. Karl Marx was so delighted that he wanted to dedicate the second volume of Das Kapital to Darwin, an honor Darwin declined. In Russia, the liberal intelligentsia saw in evolution a weapon to combat traditional religion. . . . The conservative Right was no less pleased, though for different reasons. . . . Bagehot (1873). . . declared that competition and conquest between tribes and nations was nothing less than Darwinian struggle for existence and evolution by natural selection. (p. 139)

Dobzhansky suggests that political conservatives did not want to read Darwin's "struggle for existence" as a "metaphor . . . not necessarily imply[ing] combat," but as a vindication of their position against social reform. The social Darwinists felt that

since Nature is "red in tooth and claw," it would be a big mistake to let our sentiments interfere with Nature's intentions by helping the poor, the weak, and the generally unfit to the point where they will be as comfortable as the rich, the strong, and the fit. In the long run, letting Nature reign will bring the greatest benefits. "Pervading all Nature we may see at work a stern discipline which is a little cruel that it may be very kind," wrote Herbert Spencer (p. 140)

American capitalists were able to use social Darwinism to justify their favored position. Sumner wrote that

...the millionaires are a product of natural selection, acting on the whole body of men to pick out those who can meet the requirements of certain work to be done. . . . (in Dobzhansky, p. 12)

John D. Rockefeller, Sr., agreed.

The growth of a large business is merely a survival of the fittest. . . . It is merely the working out of a law of nature and a law of God. (in Dobzhansky, p. 12)

Lysenkoism, in which

the environment is believed to alter heredity directly, and the sequence of such alterations is assumed to represent evolution (Dobzhansky, p. 17)

along with Pavlov's work on the conditioned reflex provided the Soviet Union (at least under Stalin) with a "scientific" formula for the molding of the socialist man.

The theory of evolution was also used as an apology for the idea of biologically inferior and superior races. Herbert Spencer, Houston, Chamberlain, Wagner (the composer), and (in what I believe is a misinterpretation of Zarathustra) Nietzsche were early proponents of the particularly racist strain of Social Darwinism that produced Fascism. (Dobzhansky, p. 13, 140)

The slogan "survival of the fittest" was coined by Spencer and accepted by Darwin not without hesitation. The superlative in it deftly suggested that the struggle for life was so inexorable that eventually all but the one fittest must fall by the wayside. From there it was only a step to Nietzsche's superman. Although Nietzsche had only contempt for Darwin as a mere "English shopkeeper,"... Thus Spake Zarathustra has in it...much more of Darwin than Zoroaster. And from Nietzsche (1844-1900), the pedigree of ideas sends a branch to Hitler, with his one master leader of one master race. (Dobzhansky, p. 140)

The achievement of the scientific consciousness has been its "conquest" of nature, its "putting nature on the rack" (Francis Bacon) and using her for its own design. But the method by which this was achieved was at a minimum psychic cost to the user: until this century the subject (man) has been left outside the "laws of nature" that he formulated about the objective world. This Cartesian split enabled Western man to develop the physical sciences and at the same time continue his religion, either through his subjective side and/or through the sciences themselves, which, like Plato's Ideas (Barrett, p. 231-2) were held to be eternal. In both ways Western man has been able to continue non-recognition of his own finiteness, non-recognition of the inevitability of his own death, and repression of the idea of non-being, but at a cost of severing himself from nature, from the "ground of his Being." (Heidegger, 1962)

Eastern thought, with a conception of all reality as Sanskara (illusion) also enabled man to avoid (repress) the fear of death, and at the same time avoided the bifurcation of man and nature by seeing all reality, including man and nature, connected in a chain (Karma). According to Teilhard (p. 211), this Sanskara-Karmic definition of reality was antagonistic to "building the world" since reality regarded as illusion would not lend itself to knowledge of that reality, and for that reason the sciences did not develop in the East.

Barrett (1958) also feels that

The great historical parting of the ways between Western and Eastern man came about because each made a different decision as to what truth is. (p. 231)

Relating Heidegger's thought, he writes:

The fall of Being. . . occurred when the Greek thinkers detached things as clear and distinct forms from their encompassing background, in order that they might reckon clearly with them. (p. 230)

Using terms from gestalt psychology, he continues:

By detaching the figure from the ground the object could be made to emerge into the daylight of human consciousness; but the sense of the ground, the environing background, could also be lost. The figure comes into sharper focus...but the ground recedes, becomes invisible, is forgotten. The Greeks detached beings from the vast environing ground of Being. This act of detachment was accompanied by a momentous shift in the meaning of truth for the Greeks, a shift which Heidegger pinpoints as taking place in a single passage in Plato's Republic . . . the allegory of the cave. The quality of un-hiddenness had been considered the mark of truth; but with Plato in that passage truth came to be defined. . . as the correctness of an intellectual judgment. Truth henceforth resided in the human intellect insofar as that intellect judged truly about things. By adopting this meaning of truth as the primary and essential one, the Greeks were able to develop science, the unique and distinguishing characteristic of Western civilization. (p. 230, 231)

In comparing the Western and Oriental civilizations, Barrett suggests that

In neither India nor China, nor in the philosophies that these civilizations produced, was truth located in the intellect.

On the contrary, the Indian and Chinese sages insisted on the very opposite: namely, that man does not attain to truth, so long as he remains locked up in his intellect. . . . If the Greeks had not detached objects from their enveloping ground of Being, what we know of the Western intellect would not have come into existence. The lack of this intellect is the negative, the shadow, in the historical project of the Oriental civilizations. (p. 231)

The New Consciousness: Rejection of System

But this estrangement of our Being from nature in the West, because of the very success of technology is physical systems brought about by this estrangement, has resulted in the gradual de-humanization, de-subjectivization, objectification of man effected by the application of the tools of technology to human systems (economic-utilitarian: man as societal-resource, as cog in industrial machine, man as a mission-function lost in an acceptable kill-ratio of 3-1; and now psychological: man as a product of the conflict between instinctual demands and societal restrictions, or man as solely shaped by the reinforcement contingencies imposed on man and his ancestors by the environment).

Again Barrett (1958) is relevant.

It remained for modern science. . .to effect a sharper division between man and nature; and the thought of Descartes is the expression of this cleavage. The object which has been detached from the enveloping ground of Being can be measured and calculated, but the essence of the object--the thing-in-itself--becomes

the first of these is the fact that the
the second is the fact that the
the third is the fact that the
the fourth is the fact that the
the fifth is the fact that the
the sixth is the fact that the
the seventh is the fact that the
the eighth is the fact that the
the ninth is the fact that the
the tenth is the fact that the

the eleventh is the fact that the
the twelfth is the fact that the
the thirteenth is the fact that the
the fourteenth is the fact that the

the fifteenth is the fact that the
the sixteenth is the fact that the
the seventeenth is the fact that the
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the twenty-ninth is the fact that the
the thirtieth is the fact that the

the thirty-first is the fact that the
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the thirty-fifth is the fact that the
the thirty-sixth is the fact that the
the thirty-seventh is the fact that the
the thirty-eighth is the fact that the

the thirty-ninth is the fact that the
the fortieth is the fact that the
the forty-first is the fact that the
the forty-second is the fact that the

the forty-third is the fact that the
the forty-fourth is the fact that the
the forty-fifth is the fact that the
the forty-sixth is the fact that the

the forty-seventh is the fact that the
the forty-eighth is the fact that the
the forty-ninth is the fact that the
the fiftieth is the fact that the

conscious of himself as cut off from the object even as his power to manipulate the object mounts almost unbelievably. . . . Man masters beings, but Being--the open region in which both subject and object stand out and are thus not divided--is forgotten. There is left to man nothing but his Will to Power over objects; and Heidegger is right when he says that Nietzsche is in this respect the culmination of Western metaphysics, which metaphysics in turn culminates in the situation of the world today where power rides supreme. (p. 231, 232)

We live in a period of history when the technological consciousness has grown old and technology will become a tool, if we survive.

The following related, converging forces are seen as the immediate, dynamic precipitants of a central mutation of consciousness away from security-authority-future orientation towards a recognition that insecurity is the real condition of being, and that freedom and love are bound up in insecurity-non-authoritarianism. These forces have engendered the realization that the "locus of values" for every human being is within himself (Maslow, 1962, p. 10). With acceptance of the idea of non-being/rejection of system the new consciousness lives in the tense of life: now. These forces are conceived as:

A) Gnawing intuition of the unreality, inconsistency with man becoming Man, non-actualization of: man as object, the perception of others as useful or not, relationships of need-object to need-object, relationships in which the central dynamic is: the will to power/double-bind control techniques

(Haley, 1963)/one-way hypnotism, unnecessary alienated work, affluence in the middle of hunger, murder for economic benefit.

B) Technology not only has "objectified" man, but also

1. requires university training for millions of its workmen, which in turn puts those millions in greater conflict with their conditioned values than those persons who do not leave the community of their parents.
2. provides the potential: to end scarcity (and economic competition and exploitation); for co-operation on a world scale; for minimizing and eventual elimination of alienated labor.
3. improves cross-cultural communication through media exchange; provides the means for direct contact with another culture, and the experience that the foreign is human.
4. with the application of successful objective-science technology to the study of man has resulted in a "scientific" picture of man as an animal completely determined by the same order of laws of nature that are operative in animals lower on the phylogenetic scale, while ignoring the obvious effect of the cognition of those laws in man (e.g., the cognition of conditioning as such, evolution as such) as "subjective," unscientific. Thus, there

in an inherent paradox in the technological-consciousness as a total world view, and this paradox has become manifest as this consciousness has turned in on itself.

C) Wars

In this century the authoritarian consciousness, with increasingly destructive technology has defended itself against its own repressed fear of insecurity/death by projecting its deficiencies (manifestations of limited, finite humanness) onto any out-group from which it could discriminate itself; and identify itself with System, thereby gaining relief from the burden of finiteness, denying the reality of its inevitable, individual death.

This consciousness has caused death and suffering to hundreds of millions of persons in this century. With the advent of thermonuclear wars, the cost of this psychic defense against awareness of one's death, the cost of repression of the idea of non-being (in its necessary potential for war, the small probability for which, over time, approaches certainty, in which the realized potential of this consciousness in time = the death of humanity) has become greater (for millions of persons now) than the psychic discomfort of becoming conscious of death, accepting the idea of non-being.

And so the essence of the new consciousness is existence (Heidegger, 1962, p. 67; Sartre in Barrett, 1962, p. 248); the emergence of this radical mutation of consciousness is seen here as conditioned by the failure of system to solve the anxiety of non-being, and as selected by Being-itself in

an effort to resist extinction. In the service of Being, which is the de-repression of the primal dread of non-being/rejection of system, we are restored to ourselves--with system as a tool, not as a total frame of reference.

THE DIFFERENCE IN CONSCIOUSNESS DYNAMIC:
 SYSTEM (SUPEREGO) VS. NEW (REFLECTIVE)

The full development of Teilhard's "central phenomenon of man," reflection, is thus seen as dependent on two factors: 1) the rejection of the authority of system to structure one's perception (values); and 2) the cognition of the illusion of the "freedom" offered by system. With the cognition of the illusory nature of freedom-within-system the less-than-consensus of system is no longer perceived as caused by choices of evil individuals, but as an indication of the finite, non-objective character of system. The "new" consciousness, in that it more wholly encompasses this "central phenomenon," is here designated the reflective consciousness. Because system-consciousness functions through internalization (conditioning) of the prescriptions of system-authority; because the non-cognition of which (internalization-conditioning) is necessary for the continued functioning of the religious/technologic system; because the substructure (ground) of system-consciousness is repression of non-being and the concomitant estrangement from Being/oneself: for these reasons system-consciousness is seen as operative through the same dynamics implicit in Freud's trichotomy of being into id, ego, and superego, and the consciousness which functions through this dynamic is designated the superego.

Freud (1930) outlined the function of the superego, and the inherent alienation of this kind of consciousness-dynamic.

. . .What means does civilization employ in order to inhibit the aggressiveness which opposes it, to make it harmless...? ... What happens in. . .[the development of the individual] to render his desire for aggression innocuous? . . . His aggressiveness is introjected, internalized; it is. . .sent back to where it came from--that is, it is directed toward his own ego. There it is taken over by a portion of the ego, which sets itself over against the rest of the ego as super-ego. . . .(p. 70)

. . .The superego is an agency which has been inferred by us, and conscience is a function which we ascribe, among other functions, to that agency. This function consists in keeping a watch over the actions and intentions of the ego and judging them, in exercising a censorship. The sense of guilt, the harshness of the super-ego, is thus the same thing as the severity of the conscience. It is the perception which the ego has of being watched over in his way, the assessment of the tension between its own strivings and the demands of the super-ego. The fear of this critical agency (a fear which is at the bottom of the whole relationship), the need for punishment, is an instinctual manifestation on the part of the ego, which has become masochistic under the influence of a sadistic super-ego; it is a portion, that is to say, of the instinct towards internal destruction present in the ego, employed for forming an erotic attachment to the super-ego. . . . (p. 83)

. . .it is not until. . .the authority is internalized through the establishment of a superego. . .that we should speak of conscience or a sense of guilt. . . . (p. 72)

Brewster Smith (1963) also feels that superego functioning is not the universal consciousness-dynamic, and contrasts the superego conscience with a more reflective kind, in which the values of the person are not solely the internalized edicts of system authority.

Superego requiredness may be said to characterize those standards (values) that the person holds in the fashion portrayed in the classical Freudian superego. The values. . .are inflexibly held, irrationally applied, and are typically implicit, or unconscious, rather than explicitly formulated by the person who holds them. . . . In persons who approach more closely the commonly formulated ideals of maturity and good functioning (superego values) fall into the background as compared with values characterized by what I am calling self-requiredness. These as standards that may be implicit, but, in any case, are accessible to conscious formulation. They are actively embraced by the person and thus become constituents of the self, part of what the person feels himself to be and to stand for. Characteristically their application involves more finely differentiated cognitive discriminations than is the case with superego values, and they can therefore be applied with more flexibility, appropriateness, and rationality. (emphasis supplied, p. 338-9)

Rokeach (1968) feels that there is a "motivation for consistency" in value-attitude systems:

In common with other balance formulations the present theory also postulates a need for consistency, but consistency is defined, primarily, as consistency with self-esteem and, secondarily, as consistency with logic or reality. (p. 164)

Consistent with Rokeach's formulation that personal values are "secondarily" determined by "consistency with logic or reality," Smith feels that not all values can be traced to sources in social experience.

A place has to be reserved for the role of objective appropriateness as a source of standards having the experienced quality of requiredness. (p. 339)

In what seems to me to be a particularly elucidating explication of this "objective" basis for values, Smith continues:

But just as self theory in the Mead-Cooley tradition ignores the presocial ingredients of organic sensation and body imagery, so I fear it would be in error to claim that the objective requiredness of values can be traced exhaustively to social origins Artists may work within the framework of a cultural style or of a set of classical rules that is fixed by convention but the critic's judgment of artistic quality is not simply a matter of estimating the degree of fidelity with which the rules have been applied, the style exemplified. He is almost sure to be convinced that within the framework of convention, standards are nonetheless intrinsic and objective, hard as they may be to make fully explicit. What seems common to these cases is that although convention or cultural tradition sets the terms of the problem or defines the materials, modes, and ends of the activity, standards of evaluation arise that have some necessary relation to the structure of the activity and are not themselves merely conventional. (emphasis supplied, p. 339-40)

Smith suggests that the "ingredient" of objective appropriateness

may somehow [be]. . . generated by the requirements of historically conditioned human nature, as they mesh or fail to mesh with the situations that people encounter. . . .(p. 34)

He concludes his discussion of "objective appropriateness" by proposing that

. . .it is at least conceivable that perceived relationships of appropriateness are an important source of values in personality development, together with the influence of parental demands and expectations which we are now better able to formulate. The suggestive evidence for a core of value universals points, albeit weakly, to continued pressure from this source that partly shapes what is socially or personally required. (p. 342)

It is suggested here that the capability to perceive "relationships of appropriateness" to the "situations that people encounter" does not lie in superego persons, since their internalized authority-prescriptions (i.e., values) are already determined prior to any "situation" that they "encounter." But rather, this capability to perceive what is objectively appropriate, the source of "value universals," is progressively more operative in those individuals who more wholly encompass reflection, i.e., the "locus of values" lies within the de-alienated existing person.

But concomitant with the denial of system/authority as a viable consciousness-referent and the cognition of the illusion of freedom-within-system is the de-repression of the essential insecurity of being, the perception that the precepts of system (i.e., superego values) are non-objective. Brewster Smith believes that self-requiredness, as opposed to superego requiredness

is vulnerable because the degree of explicit commitment involved in consciously embracing values as part of the self casts potential doubt upon the objectivity that distinguishes

values from tastes or preferences. Remember Heider's analysis of "ought," as impersonal, relatively invariant and interpersonally valid. For our values to carry the full force of "ought" we need to believe that they have validity beyond our individual fiat, that they are as valid for others as for ourselves. Self-values have this quality of phenomenal objectivity, but it is endangered by the very failure of consensus, the prevalent relativism and pluralistic tolerance, that makes them salient. In other words, they appear to be especially susceptible to change. . . into mere tastes and preferences which since they lack the force of "ought" can hardly play the same central role as values in personal and social integration. (emphasis supplied, p. 341)

But it is suggested here that reflective persons are conscious of the illusion of the consensus/objectivity of system-prescriptions, and with Kierkegaard (in Blackham, p. 22) see that "truth is subjectivity."

The perception-framework (value system) of any individual is thus seen as either

1) ordered by superego requiredness, in which case the locus of the individual's values/perception is in some way outside of himself, in the authority's prescriptions which he has internalized; as much as an individual's perception of reality is structured from without, to that extent the person is alienated from himself. It is suggested that there is no "need for consistency," no necessary integration of values formed through this type of requiredness with the rest of the individual's cognitive structure, i.e., superego values are dynamically isolated from the rest of an individual's

value-attitude system. Values formed through superego requiredness may exist in a logical, integrated relationship with each other, since there is a consistency inherent in the interdependence of superego and system functioning; but any logic or consistency among the various elements of the superego cognitive structure is seen as contingent on the interconsistency of the prescriptions of the socialization agents effective for the particular superego individual, and not by any active process within the superego person. That is, superego values are formed directly by conditioning experiences, and unlike values formed through reflection (an active process), there is no personal strain toward consistency of superego values with the rest of the individual's cognitive structure. The idea of freedom is seen as a ploy enabling the superego consciousness to interpret the less-than-consensus of system as a choice of evil individuals, which allows the prescriptions of system to be perceived as objective. It is necessary for the functioning of religious/technologic system-consciousness that the internalization by the individual of society's prescriptions (via the family, church, school, etc.) be perceived as a choice.

or 2) the consciousness of an individual may more wholly function through reflection, in which case the locus of the individual's perception is within himself. Since reflection is an active process there is a strain toward consistency of

the values of the reflective person with the rest of his cognitive structure. As Brewster Smith submits, "the gyroscope of inner directedness, in Riesman's metaphor, has cash value" (1963, p. 341); that is, the values one acquires through conscious reflection are more likely to be personally appropriate than values arbitrarily imposed on an indiscriminating superego, and the gyroscopic stability of reflection becomes more and more advantageous (compared to superego value systems) the more rapid the rate of value change within the society as a whole.

Just as in music the dominant chord is necessarily resolved to the tonic, so also values are seen as objectively required by the present historical condition in which one exists, and the ability to perceive the resolution of life-conflicts (personal, social dissonance) lies within the individual. If one rejects authority as a meaningful value source and cognizes the fact that one's primary value system is conditioned, that person becomes de-alienated from himself, and becomes present in himself. As this process (rejection of authority as a viable value-referent and cognition that one's primary value system is conditioned) completes, the person can "see" with progressively less distortion the objective requiredness of whatever is the object of his perception, i.e., how that conflict-dissonance is potentially resolved.

METHOD

A scale was developed that was designed to differentiate between superego and reflective persons on the basis of three factors presented in the preceding section.

Superego-Reflective Scale Factors

Superego Value System

1. Less cognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary value system. (Less cognition of the illusion of freedom offered by system.)
2. Greater acceptance of authority.
3. Greater confidence in objectivity of values.

Reflective Value System

1. Greater cognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary value system. (Greater cognition of the illusion of freedom offered by system.)
2. Less acceptance of authority.
3. Less confidence in objectivity of values.

This scale was pretested in order to check the internal consistency among the several factors within the scale, and improve the reliability of the scale by omitting those items that did not discriminate.

Neal and Seeman's Powerlessness scale (in Robinson and Shaver, p. 179) was given to the pretest population to check the relationship between Factor I (cognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary value system) and powerlessness. In the final version of the scale, a separate set of instructions for the powerlessness items was not used, and Ss gave Likert-type responses to the powerlessness items

(Table 11). Four items from the cognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary values factor were taken from the subscale "Strength of Will and Rationality" in Wrightsman's "Philosophy of Human Nature" scale (in Robinson and Shaver, p. 523). One of these items was modified slightly. Two of these items were used in the final version of the scale.

The basis for five of the six items in the "acceptance of authority" subscale was drawn from Babs and Couch's Value Profile. Three of the items were used just as in the original Value Profile, and two of the items were reversed.

Items that are marked with a (+) after the item were scored so that agreement with that item indicates superego value functioning, while disagreement indicates self-reflective value system functioning. The (-) items were reverse-scored. Items marked with an asterisk (*) were included in the final version of the scale. Only those items that correlated higher than .3 with their particular scale factor were included in the final version of the scale. On both the pretest and final versions of the scale given to the Ss the factor headings were not included and the items were randomly mixed. Rokeach's Value Survey (Form E--terminal values only) was included in the final version of the scale administered to the Ss (Table 12).

Ss responses to Rokeach's Value Survey, the powerlessness scale, and the three value system subscale factors were inter-correlated. If the correlation between a value-ranking (on

the Rokeach survey) and the reflective-superego scale was significant, a t-test was performed on the data. The independent variable for each t-test was the top and bottom quartiles of the reflective-superego scale, while the dependent variable was the Ss ranking of that particular value.

Separate correlation tables were also computed for male and female subjects.

All subjects read the following instructions and completed the items in the manner prescribed.

Below is a series of statements with which some people agree and others disagree. Would you please indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement by marking in front of each item according to the following scale:

mark -3 if you disagree strongly

mark -2 if you disagree somewhat

mark -1 if you disagree slightly

mark 0 if you neither agree nor disagree

mark +1 if you agree slightly

mark +2 if you agree somewhat

mark +3 if you agree strongly

There are no right or wrong answers. Please give your opinion on every statement. If none of the numbers adequately reflect your agreement or disagreement for a particular statement, please indicate your opinion by using the number that is closest to the way you feel.

Factor I--Cognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary value system

1. The average person has an accurate understanding of the reasons for his own behavior. (+)

- *2. The average person is largely the master of his own fate. (+)
- *3. Most persons have a lot of control over what happens to them in life. (+)
- 4. Persons who have great successes in life, like great artists and inventors, are usually motivated by forces outside of themselves. (-)
- 5. Some people's lives are tragedies, through no fault of their own. (-)
- 6. Society generally molds the character of the individual. (-)
- *7. Everyone chooses to be what they are in life. (+)
- 8. I see myself as the primary cause of any success or failure that I have had in life up to the present time. (+)
- 9. I see other people and conditions outside of myself as the primary cause of any success or failure that I have had in life up to the present time. (-)
- *10. I consider myself a self-made person. (+)
- 11. Anyone who becomes neurotic or psychotic isn't to blame for their condition. (-)

Factor II--Acceptance of Authority

- *1. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them. (+)
- *2. You have to respect authority and when you stop respecting authority, your situation isn't worth much. (+)
- *3. Obedience and respect for authority are probably the most important things for children to learn. (+)
- *4. A child ought to be able to talk back to his parents whenever he feels like it. (-)
- *5. I don't think patriotism and loyalty are the first requirements of a good citizen. (-)

- *6. You always ought to obey the law, even those laws you think are wrong. (+)

Factor III--Confidence in Objectivity of Values

- *1. My value system is a good one for anyone to live by. (+)
- *2. My values may be good for me, but I'm not sure they'd be good for someone else. (-)
- *3. If everybody had my values, we'd have a better world. (+)
- *4. I am quite certain that the values which are the most important values to me are good values for other people to have. (+)
- *5. I am a little unsure that the values which are the most important values to me are good values for other people to have. (-)

SUBJECTS

The 38 pretest Ss were MSU graduate and undergraduate students in the summer of 1970. 19 of the Ss were male, 19 female. Each subject was approached individually and asked to fill out a questionnaire in order to help the experimenter do his master's thesis. The response rate was 100%.

The 114 test Ss were MSU undergraduate students in the summer of 1970. All test Ss were residents of one "brother-sister" undergraduate dormitory complex on the MSU campus. These two dorms had a reputation for being "non-radical" and though this meant that these particular results could not properly be extrapolated to people in general, or even the MSU student body, it was felt by this author that the relative homogeneity of the test Ss would give a conservative cast to any results that I might obtain, and make these results less vulnerable to criticisms of sampling bias. Also, if significant results could be demonstrated within this relatively homogeneous population, it was felt that this demonstration would be strong evidence of even greater significance (i.e. that the superego-reflective value scale is a stronger predictor) in the more heterogeneous general population.

Two hundred "Attitude Surveys" were distributed to the Ss by placing them in their mailboxes in the dorm. Approximate randomness was obtained by placing one test in every other mailbox. Each test was enclosed in an envelope pre-addressed to the experimenter, and subjects were asked to complete the

questionnaire and return it via campus mail. Fifty-one males and sixty-three females responded with usable questionnaires, or a response rate of 57%.

PREDICTIONS

1. A negative correlation between superego-reflective value system scale scores and the value-rankings of National Defense was predicted. We can see an individual's (superego) value system as the internalization of the precepts of the socialization agents with which that individual comes into contact. When those precepts are challenged (e.g., by a friend who "loses" or changes his religion, by a respected teacher who advocates a different kind of economic system) dissonance is aroused in the individual's cognitive system. One way that the individual may reduce this dissonance is, of course, to value his friend or his professor (and their opinions) less highly. But if the strength of any new socialization agent is great, and the value-precept(s) of that competing agent is (are) distant from the internalized precept of the phenomenally older agent, the path of least dissonance may be a value-movement in the direction of the new precept. It is suggested here that one becomes reflective not by some naive free choice, but as the best way to reduce the dissonance engendered by competing socialization agents. One of the reasons that superego persons may not reduce this dissonance by assuming personal responsibility for their own set of values is that the primary agents of their socialization may have been very effective, and the cost (guilt) of denying the prescriptions of the superego which these agencies engendered may be greater than the increased dissonance effected by the conflict of prescriptions

between phenomenally older and newer agents: if this is the case, that person would not assume personal responsibility for his own set of values, and the dissonance caused by that conflict would be repressed.

A convenient out-group onto which some of this repressed dissonance might be projected would be foreign enemies, since they are far away (therefore it is not necessary to face their humanity) and they are an obvious symbolic representation of one's own consciousness. (What one doesn't know = foreign = subconscious) is to be feared and is the enemy.

Thus, it was predicted that superego persons would value National Defense more highly than reflective persons for two related reasons: 1) superego persons would project a greater amount of aggression to the enemy as a means of exorcising repressed value system dissonance, and would see a greater need for national defense to defend themselves against that projected aggression; 2) superego persons are afraid of facing their own repressed consciousness and symbolically equate National Defense against foreign enemies with their own psychic defenses against their subconscious, from which they feel threatened, and consequently see a greater need for defense against that threat.

H : No relationship between superego-reflective
 O scale scores and the value-ranking of National Defense.

H_{alt}: A negative relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and the value-ranking of National Defense.¹

2. A negative correlation between the superego-reflective scale scores and the value-rankings of Salvation was predicted, indicating that persons whose value system functions through superego requiredness would value Salvation more highly than would reflective persons.

Rokeach (1969) using the same value instrument, and relating value choice to various indices of social compassion pictured the religious-minded, or those who ranked Salvation high, as typically:

. . .a person having a self-centered preoccupation with saving his own soul, an other-worldly orientation coupled with an indifference toward or even a tacit endorsement of a social system that would perpetuate social inequality and injustice. (p. 10)

Rokeach (1968) has also suggested that the relationship between religiosity and social consciousness is not so straightforward, and has pointed out Allport's distinction between two types of religious orientation, the extrinsic and the intrinsic:

The extrinsic outlook on religion is utilitarian, self-centered, opportunistic, and other-directed. The intrinsic, in

1. In Rokeach's Value Survey, the higher the value ranking (from 1 to 18) the less is the importance assigned to that particular value. A negative relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and the rankings of a particular value is equivalent to a positive relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and the relative importance assigned to that particular value.

contrast, includes basic trust, a compassionate understanding of others so that 'dogma is tempered with humility' and, with increasing maturity, 'is no longer limited to single segments of self interest.' (p. 194)

and elsewhere:

in most people, the extrinsic orientation predominated. (1968, p. 195, 196)

And how could it be otherwise? One can be conditioned long before he is able to see himself reflectively, and yet some very young children "learn" religious beliefs through very effective social reinforcement contingencies long before their beliefs could possibly be the dynamic, integrative forces of behavior that are those beliefs that have been arrived at through reflection. Religious values exhibit the prototypic characteristics of values which function through superego requiredness: they are the direct internalization of the precepts of conditioning agencies; denial of the appropriateness of these values results in guilt; there is no strain towards consistency of these values with the rest of an individual's cognitive structure; and the concern with Salvation reflects the importance assigned to the preservation of the ego from non-being.

- H_o : No relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and the ranking of the value Salvation.
- H_{alt} : A negative relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and the value-ranking of Salvation.

3. Salvation is not the only value that has the characteristics of superego requiredness. Freedom also exhibits some of those same characteristics. Very early in our education we learn that American means Freedom, that to value freedom highly is to be patriotic, not to is to be communistic, or at least anti-American. It has been suggested that the idea of freedom is a ploy offered by the technologic/religious system enabling superego (system) consciousness a framework in which the prescriptions of system (i.e., superego values) may continue to be seen as "objective" in spite of the less-than-consensus of system. Since freedom is central to superego functioning and is seen as less "appropriate" by reflective persons, and since the value Freedom is typically inculcated before the age of reflection, it was predicted that the scores on the superego-reflective scale would correlate negatively with the ranking of the value Freedom: that is, superego persons would value Freedom more highly than reflective persons.

H : No relationship between superego-reflective
o scale scores and the value-ranking of Freedom.

H : A negative relationship between superego-
alt reflective scale scores and the value-ranking
of Freedom.

4. Rokeach has suggested that persons who value Freedom higher than Equality are ". . .in general more interested in their own freedom than they are in freedom for other people." Dobzhansky (1962) suggests the nature of the "objective appropriateness" of equality.

Let us now look at the genetic consequences of equality of opportunity. Suppose that the opportunity to receive education and specialized training and to choose a career of any sort depends entirely on a youngster's aptitudes. . . so that his faculties may become manifest. It is possible that most carriers of genes favoring outstanding musical abilities will become musicians, possessors of mathematical abilities mathematicians, of scientific abilities scientists, etc. Because of assortive mating. . . these aggregates of people would to some extent at least assume the character of Mendelian populations, in which the genes for certain special abilities will tend to be concentrated. (p. 259)

Thus, the benefits that accrue to all persons in an "equality of opportunity" society are obvious, and anything less than full equality is commensurate with a wastage of the human resources of that society.

One example of an objectively inappropriate, inconsistent value relationship would be then the ranking of Freedom higher than Equality. Since there is less strain toward consistency within an individual's value system the more that system functions through superego requiredness, with a concomitant greater likelihood that objectively inconsistent value relationships would exist within a superego-functioning value system, it was predicted that increased superego functioning (as indicated by superego-reflective scale scores) would yield a corresponding larger disparity between the values of Freedom and Equality. In terms of the specific analysis performed, it was predicted that superego-reflective value system scale scores would

correlate negatively with the value-rankings of Freedom and positively with the value-rankings of Equality.

H_o : 1. No relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and the value-ranking of Freedom,
and
2. No relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and the value-ranking of Equality.

H_{alt} : 1. A negative relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and the value-ranking of Freedom.
and
2. A positive relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and the value-ranking of Equality.

5. A negative correlation between superego-reflective value system scale scores and value-rankings of Self-Respect was predicted. Since persons whose value system functions primarily through superego requiredness are less likely to discover and live by values that are "personally appropriate" for their own actualization, they are more likely than are self-reflective persons to pursue Self-respect as an end in itself, rather than see it as a natural concomitant of an actualized life. Also, it is suggested that the boundary between the self and others is more sharply defined (being more alienated from Being) for the superego person since the superego person is more concerned with preserving his particular individuality (ego-soul), and thus is more likely to be concerned with self-respect than the reflective person.

H_o : No relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and the value-ranking of Self-respect.

H_{alt} : A negative relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and the value-ranking of Self-respect.

RESULTS

1. A correlation of $-.35$ between superego-reflective scale scores and the value-rankings of National Defense was found,
¹
 p of $R = 0 < .01$; $t = 4.53$, $p < .0001$ between the top and bottom quartiles of the superego-reflective scale scores and the
²
 value-rankings of National Defense.

.
 . . H_0 : No relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and the value-rankings of National Defense was rejected,

and

H_{alt} : A negative relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and the value-rankings of National Defense was accepted as tenable.

2. A correlation of $-.34$ between superego-reflective scale scores and the value-ranking of Salvation was obtained:

p of $R = 0 < .01$; $t = 3.71$, $p = .0005$ between the top and bottom quartiles of the superego-reflective scale scores and the value-
³
 rankings of Salvation.

.
 . . H_0 : No relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and Salvation was rejected,

and

H_{alt} : A negative relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and the value-rankings of Salvation was accepted as tenable.

3. There was no significant correlation between superego-reflective scale scores and value-rankings of Freedom.

1. Hereinafter, R will be used to designate ρ , the real correlation in the population.
2. From Tables 5 and 6.
3. Ibid.

- . . . H₀ : No relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and Freedom was accepted.

However, for men in this sample (n = 53) a correlation $r = -.22$, $p \text{ of } R = 0 < .1$ (two-tailed probability), was found between Factor I (less recognition of the conditioned nature of one's values) and value-rankings of Freedom; for women (n = 61) a correlation $r = .21$, $p \text{ of } R = 0 < .1$ (two-tailed probability) was found between Factor II (greater acceptance of authority) and value-rankings of Freedom.

Thus, for men, the more they recognize the conditioned nature of their primary values, the less relative importance they assign to Freedom; but for women, the less they accept authority the more relative importance they assign to Freedom. Also for women, devaluing of Freedom was correlated .21, $p \text{ of } R = 0 < .1$ with increased feelings of powerlessness.

4. There was no significant correlation between superego-reflective scale scores and value-rankings of Freedom and Equality.

- . . . H₀ : 1) No relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and the value-ranking of Freedom and
2) No relationship between superego-reflective scale scores and the value-ranking of Equality, was accepted.

However, for men in this sample (n = 53) a correlation = $-.22$, $p \text{ of } R = 0 < .1$ was found between Factor I (less recognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary values) and value

1. From Tables 7 and 8.

rankings of Freedom; and a correlation = .22, p of $R = 0 < .1$ was found between Factor I and Equality.

For women ($n = 61$) a correlation = .21, p of $R = 0 < .1$ (two-tailed probability) was found between Factor II (greater acceptance of authority) and value-rankings of Freedom; and a correlation = .26, p of $R = 0 < .05$ (two-tailed probability)¹ was found between Factor II and Equality.

Thus for men, the more they recognize the conditioned nature of their values, the more relative importance they assign to Equality and the less relative importance they attach to Freedom. But for women, the less they accept authority, the more relative importance they assign to Equality and the more relative importance they assign to Freedom. Also, for women, devaluing of Equality was correlated .35, p of $R = 0 < .01$ with increased feelings of powerlessness.²

5. There was no significant correlation between superego-reflective scale scores and value-rankings of Self-Respect.

H : No relationship between superego-reflective
o scale scores and the value-rankings of Self-Respect was accepted.

For women ($n = 61$), however, there was a correlation = -.25, p of $R = 0 < .05$ of Factor I and Self-Respect which indicates that the more women recognize the conditioned nature of their primary value system, the less relative importance

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1. From Tables 7 and 8.
 2. Ibid.

they assign to Self-Respect. For men ($n = 53$) though, there was a correlation = .22, p of $R = 0 < .1$ between Factor II and Self-Respect, which indicates that the less men accept authority the more relative importance they give to Self-Respect.

OTHER RESULTS

6. $r = -.28$, p of $R = 0 < .01$ (two-tailed probability) was found between Factor II (Greater acceptance of authority) and value-ranking of Family Security. $t = 2.90$, $p = .005$ between the top and bottom quartiles of the superego-reflective scale scores (Factors I and II) and the value-rankings of Family Security.¹

. . . Superego value-system persons assign a greater relative importance to Family Security than do self-reflective persons.

7. For males ($n = 53$) Factor II correlated .36, p of $R = 0 < .01$ with An Exciting Life.²

For females ($n = 62$) Factor I correlated .21, p of $R = 0 < .1$ with An Exciting Life.³

This indicates that the less men accept authority, and the more women recognize the conditioned nature of their primary value system, the more relative importance they attach to An Exciting Life.

A t-test was performed on the value-rankings of An Exciting Life between the top and bottom quartiles of the reflective-

1. From Tables 5 and 6.
2. From Table 7.
3. From Table 8.

superego-scale scores (Factors I and II): $t = -2.20$, $p = .03$
¹
 (two-tailed probability).

8. $r = .25$, p of $R = 0 < .01$ (two-tailed probability was found
 between superego-reflective scale scores (Factors I and II)
 and value-rankings of A World of Beauty. $t = -2.58$, $p < .01$
 between the top and bottom quartiles of the superego-reflective
 scale scores and the value-rankings of A World of Beauty.²

. . self-reflective value persons assign a greater relative
 importance to A World of Beauty than do superego value persons.

9. $r = .20$, p of $R = 0 < .05$ (two-tailed probability) between
³
 Factor I and value-rankings of Pleasure.

There is a slight positive relationship between a greater
 recognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary value
 system and the assignment of a greater relative importance
 to Pleasure.

10. For men ($n = 53$) $r = -.39$, p of $R = 0 < .01$ (two-tailed
⁴
 probability) between Factor I and Wisdom.

. . For this population, reflective value system men assign a
 greater relative importance to Wisdom than do superego value
 system men. But for women the greater the recognition of the
 conditioned nature of one's primary value system, the less the
 relative importance that is assigned to the value Wisdom.

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1. From Table 6.
 2. From Tables 5 and 6.
 3. From Tables 5.
 4. From Tables 7 and 8.

11. For men, there is a slight non-significant negative relationship between Factor I and A Comfortable Life; for women, $r = .24$, p of $R = 0 < .05$ between Factor I and A Comfortable Life. If we set up

$$H_0 : R_1 - R_2 = 0, \text{ then by } z' = \frac{.24 - (-.15)}{\sqrt{\frac{1}{50} + \frac{1}{58}}} = 3.9$$

Since p of z' (or t) of $3.9 < .001$, we can reject the $H_0 : R_1 - R_2 = 0$, and accept as tenable $H_{alt} : R_1 > R_2$

Women who have a greater recognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary values assign a greater relative importance to A Comfortable Life than women who have less recognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary values; the extent of this relationship is significantly less for males, where there was a tendency (in this population) for men who have a greater recognition of the conditioned nature on one's primary value system to assign less relative importance to A Comfortable Life than men who have less recognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary value system.

12. For women, $r = -.21$, p of $R = 0 < .1$ (two-tailed probability) between Factor II and Inner Harmony.

. . There was a slight positive relationship for women in this population between a greater acceptance of authority and an increased relative valuation of Inner Harmony.

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1. From Tables 7 and 8.
 2. From Table 8.

13. For women ($n = 61$) $r = -.33$, p of $R = 0 < .01$ (two-tailed¹ probability) between Factor II and Social Recognition.

. . For women in this population a positive relationship was found between a greater acceptance of authority and an increased relative valuation assigned to Social Recognition.

14. A curvilinear relationship was found between Factor II (Acceptance of Authority) and Factor III (Confidence in the objectivity of one's values). This relationship is demonstrated graphically in Table 10. The correlation ratio for Factor III on Factor II was computed: $N_{xy} = .53$. This compares to a linear $r = -.03$ ($N = 114$) between these factors.

15. A t-test was computed on the mean standard deviations of the Factor I and Factor II item means between the pretest and test responses: $t = 4.2$, $p < .01$ in the direction of a larger² average s.d. for the pretest Factor I + II items. This finding in part explains the lower correlation found between³ Factors I and II in the test data ($r = .19$) as compared to⁴ the pretest data ($r = .47$). This supports the previous suggestion made by the author that the test population is relatively homogeneous, and any results obtained would probably be more conservative than the real relationship in the larger society.

1. From Table 8.
2. From Table 3.
3. From Table 2.
4. From Table 1.

DISCUSSION

Repressed insecurity of being fixates individual's evolution:

That the most significant differences between superego and reflective persons were security-oriented seem to bear out the supposition that superego persons are more afraid than reflective persons, or rather that fear is more operative in superego persons.¹ Since the fear of non-being (manifested as guilt, fear of dying, meaninglessness, etc.) is repressed the dynamic of that fear retains its potency, i.e., in a sense the superego person is fixated at a certain stage of his (potential) development, is less evolved than the reflective person. Superego persons value Salvation, Family Security, and National Defense more highly than reflective persons, and this increased concern with the security of the ego, family, and nation probably reflects the increased potency of the fear of non-being operative through superego/system persons than through-reflective individuals.

Maslow's (1971) theory of "metamotivation" takes

. . .superior people who are also
superior perceivers not only of facts
but of values, and then using their
choices of ultimate values as possibly
the ultimate values of the whole species.
(p. 10)

Since the significance level ($p < .0001$) of the difference between the reflective and superego persons' relative valuation of National Defense was so large even in the relatively homogeneous population of this study, this substantiates the thesis that one of the strongest historical/psychological pressures

1. See Freud's discussion of the function of the superego
above, p. 46

effecting the mutation in consciousness toward reflection-encompassing is the real threat to the world Being with a continuation of superego/technological consciousness. The value choice of the reflective consciousness in favor of a radical devaluation of National Defense is thus seen as the kind of "ultimate value choice" that is objectively appropriate for the whole species.

Maslow (1971) "reasserts"

. . .that we have come to the point in biological history where we now are responsible for our own evolution. We have become self-evolvers. Evolution means selecting and therefore choosing and deciding, and this means valuing.
(p. 10-11)

Tehihard de Chardin (1955) had also felt this.

Man discovers that he is nothing else than evolution become conscious of itself, to borrow Julian Huxley's striking expression. It seems to me that our modern minds (because and inasmuch as they are modern) will never find rest until they settle down to this view. On this summit and on this summit alone are repose and illumination waiting for us. . . . The consciousness of each of us is evolution looking at us and reflecting upon itself.
(p. 221)

With the rejection-of-system/encompassing-of-reflection being is de-alienated from itself, restored to Being, and is able to "see" the appropriateness of any particular act, i.e., being becomes responsible (is) for its own evolution (Being).

Maslow's (1962) concept of the "real guilt" (p. 114) of Being-cognition as opposed to neurotic guilt may be getting

at the same phenomena as suggested here, but I would suggest that the responsibility of reflective persons is entirely of an active kind, and there is no blame. Blame is a construct attached to the illusion of freedom-within-system. Since there is no freedom, there can be no blame and justice will eventually realize the "crime of punishment." Guilt also belongs to freedom, to the functioning of the religious/technologic system. In becoming reflective, responsible for our own evolution we see what is objectively appropriate for that evolution. Since we are less than fully conscious, know less than there is to know, we make mistakes. But we are not to "blame" for these mistakes; with the cognition of the illusion of freedom, we have no guilt. The only choice we can make is to become more conscious, more responsible for our own evolution--and we have no choice but to make that choice, if the "choice" is offered.

Reflective persons differ from superego persons in that the essential insecurity of being is not repressed, and that anxiety/arousal is not fixated at system, but is used to transcend ego, to begin to become conscious of self/Being.

Ontogeny of reflective morality:

The curvilinear relationship found between "acceptance of authority" and "confidence in the objectivity of one's values" is consistent with Kohlberg's formulations about the developmental changes in the structure of moral reasoning.

Kenneth Kenniston (1970) recounts Kohlberg's ideas in a paper entitled "Student Activism and Moral Development":

...Kohlberg finds that moral reasoning develops through three general stages. The earliest is the pre-conventional stage, which involves relatively ego-centric concepts of right and wrong as that which one can do without getting caught, or that which leads to the greatest personal gratification. The pre-conventional stage is followed, usually during later childhood, by a stage of conventional morality, during which good and evil are first identified with the concept of a "good boy" or "good girl" and then with the standards of the community, i.e., with law and order. The individual in the conventional stage may not act according to his perceptions of what is right and wrong; but he does not question the fact that morality is objective, immutable, and derives from external agencies like parental edicts, community standards, or divine laws.

Kohlberg also identified a third and final stage of moral development that is post-conventional--what Erikson has called the "ethical" stage. This stage involves reasoning more abstract than that found in earlier stages, and it may lead the individual into conflict with conventional standards. The first of two subphases within the post-conventional stage basically involves the concept of right and wrong as resulting from a social contract--as the result of an agreement entered into by the members of the society for their common good--and therefore subject to emendation, alteration, or revocation. Conventional moral thinking views moral imperatives as absolute or given by the nature of the universe; social contract reasoning sees rules as "merely" convenient and therefore amendable.

Kohlberg identifies the highest post-conventional phase as that in which the individual becomes devoted to personal principles that may transcend not only conventional morality but even the social contract. In this stage, certain general principles are now seen as personally binding though not necessarily "objectively" true. Such principles are apt to be stated in a very high level of generality: e.g., the concept of justice, the Golden Rule, the sanctity of life, the categorical imperative, the promotion of human development. The individual at this stage may find himself in conflict with existing concepts of law and order, or even with the notion of an amendable social contract. He may, for example, consider even democratically-arrived-at laws unacceptable because they lead to consequences or enjoin behaviors that violate his own personal principles. (p. 579)

Again, Kohlberg sees conventional morality viewing "moral imperatives as absolute or given by the nature of the universe," while social contract reasoning (the first post-conventional phase), according to Kohlberg, "sees rules as 'merely' convenient and therefore amendable."

In the final subphase of the social contract stage (when reflection is more wholly encompassed) the individual is seen by Kohlberg to transcend even the social contract stage and live his life according to certain "general principles," which are not necessarily felt to be "objectively" true.

However, the Ss responses in this study indicate that the least accepting of authority subjects were as confident of the objectivity of their values as the most authoritarian

subjects. It has been suggested earlier in this paper that the onset of reflection (i.e., the post-conventional phase) only occurs if the dissonance engendered by conflicting value prescriptions among the various competing socialization agents can best be reduced by a rejection of the internalized superego and assumption of personal responsibility for one's values. Concomitant with a rejection of the superego is the rejection of the validity of one's primary socialization agents to prescribe one's values. With a denial of the validity of these authorities to prescribe one's values, he loses confidence in the objectivity of his values, since values are now felt as personal choices rather than as "immutable" laws. However, as the encompassing of reflection completes, the person is able to see with progressively less distortion the objective requiredness of his vision, and begins to realize that his value "choices" are "objectively appropriate," i.e. that they are not choices at all, but required.

It has also been suggested earlier that one does not become reflective by some naive free choice, or rather that one does not choose to be open. The onset of reflectiveness is seen as the result of an unconscious dissonance-reduction process determined in favor of reflection because of the nature of one's conditioning. If one's primary socialization has been very effective in engendering a strong superego, the concomitant costs of rejecting that superego (and the validity of those agents to prescribe one's values)

may be prohibitive; on the other hand, cultural and social forces are in operation today that greatly increase the cost (in terms of increased repressed value system dissonance) of maintaining a conventional (i.e. superego) value structure.

Kenneth Kenniston (1970) has discussed some social and historical pressures that he feels are responsible for the growing proportion of post-conventional moral reasoning among the young people in America and other advanced nations. Although I briefly referred to these arguments in "the new consciousness/rejection of system" subsection in the first part of this paper, Kenniston's remarks here are more developed. Concerning the effect of higher education on moral development. Kenniston states:

The growing affluence of the highly industrialized nations permits them to keep millions of the young out of the labor force; the increasing need for high-level training in technological societies requires them to offer a university education to these millions.

Higher education does not, of course inevitably entail moral growth. But one consequence of the prolongation is that a massive group of young men and women have been disengaged for an increasingly protracted period from the institutions of the adult society, in particular from occupation and marriage. Freed of responsibilities of work, marriage, and parenthood, at least some find themselves in university atmospheres that deliberately challenge and undermine their pre-existing beliefs and conventional assumptions. Thus, the extension of youth via prolonged education on a mass scale probably tends to stimulate the development of post-conventional moral thinking. (p. 588)

What Kenniston terms "cross-cultural implosion" is also seen as stimulating moral development:

. . .we live in an age of extraordinary culture contact and conflict. The electronic revolution, coupled with the revolution in transportation, enables us to confront alien values within our living room or to immerse ourselves physically in alien cultures after a flight of a few hours. The days when one could live in a parochial isolation, surrounded only by conventional morality, are fast disappearing. Conflicts of ideologies, of world views, of value systems, of philosophical beliefs, of esthetic orientations, and of political styles confront every thoughtful man and woman, wherever he lives. If such confrontations stimulate moral development, then we live in an era in which technology and world history themselves provide new facilitation for moral growth. We are all today a little like Redfield's peasants who move to the city, living in a world where conflicting cultures and moral viewpoints rub against us at every turn. The urbanizing and homogenizing process has become worldwide: we live in an era of cross-cultural implosion. My argument here is that this cross-cultural implosion helps stimulate moral development. (p. 588-89)

Kenniston's argument that "cross-cultural implosion" stimulates moral development was especially interesting to this author, since it corroborates an idea that I discussed several years ago in an unpublished paper, "Value Differences Among the Working and Student Classes in Austin, Minnesota." In that paper I suggested:

. . .societies which are socially complex have a larger share of inner-directed persons than do those societies which are less complex.

A society that is more socially complex is a society which has a greater extent of value prescriptive disagreement among the various socialization agents and is one in which those socialization agents are more equally credible. Thus, the more socially complex a society, the greater is the probability that the individual in that society will admit conflicting value prescriptions to consciousness, which in turn increases the pressure on the individual to reduce the dissonance of these conflicting value prescriptions by assuming personal responsibility for his own set of values. On a phenomenal level, the more equally credible that an individual perceives the various socialization agents, and the more conflicting that he perceives the value prescriptions of those agents, the greater is the saliency of inner-directedness (1969. p. 15)

"Cognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary value system" occurs during or after the rejection of superego-authority, since one could not cognize the conditioned nature of his values and continue to see his primary (superego) value system as viable. No matter how good, enlightened the conditioning of a particular superego person has been, superego values are intrinsically static--life is dynamic. The appropriateness of superego "rules" are at best an approximate "fit" to the situations that the superego individual encounters. Hence, with the full encompassing of reflection the individual necessarily rejects his primary value system. If a person has rejected authority as a meaningful value-source (which is an unconscious process) but has not cognized the conditioned nature of his primary value system (which is a conscious process)

he may regress to what Kohlberg terms the "Raskolnikoff

Syndrome":

The individual moving toward post-conventional morality regresses to the earlier pre-conventional (egocentric) stage in an apparent effort to free himself from irrational and ego-dystonic guilt. Interestingly, Kramer finds that such Raskolnikoffs eventually return to the developmental track at approximately the point where they dropped off. (p. 580)

Once one cognizes the conditioned nature of his primary value system, the existential void which began with the unconscious rejection of authority completely replaces the conventional (superego) value system structure. The transcended post-conventional stage comes out of this void. From [existential void = absence of authority = absence of defense mechanisms = absence of distortion] comes a clear perception of reality, of what is objectively appropriate for one's own actualization,¹ and a concomitant increase in the objectivity of one's values.

Although the greater relative valuation of A World of Beauty and the less relative valuation of Family Security of the more reflective value system persons as compared to the more superego value system persons was not predicted, these results are consistent with the results of a study done by

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1. Not as though seeing the actual state of man, seeing what is appropriate for one's own actualization, and acting on that perception are different. One of the characteristics of transcended post-conventional persons is that they see that all of these are part of one movement. Maslow's (1971, p. 269-279) development of "transcendence" implies that one's own actualization, at a higher level, is inclusive of Being-actualization, "appropriate" evolution of the species (i.e. the self as the actualization-referent is All in full actualization, Being-consciousness).

this author several years ago. In this study, students (who would be expected to be more reflective, on the basis of the above arguments) differed from non-students in their relative valuations of A World of Beauty and Family Security in the same direction as reflective persons differed from superego persons. (Lange, 1969, p. 35) Family Security has already been discussed as part of the constellation of security-oriented values of the superego person. A greater concern with A World of Beauty again supports the contention that reflective persons are "good choosers for the species," that they are better able to see (value) what is "objectively appropriate" for our evolution, if we grant that ecological concern for the planet is more far-sighted than a desire for more efficient nuclear weapons delivery-systems to "protect" our country.

Sex Differences:

With an increase in reflectiveness there was a differential response between men and women in the relative importance assigned several values. A possible reason for the finding that, with an increase in reflectiveness men have a greater relative valuation of Self-Respect and women value it relatively less, is that men and women may have been socialized to different meanings of self-respect. A man is (usually) conditioned to think of self-respect in terms of personal growth, while a woman is (usually) conditioned to understand

self-respect as something "kept" by accepting the "dual standard" of sexual exploration, accepting that her identity is determined by the man she married, and otherwise repressing any self-actualization strivings which are not "properly" channeled. This interpretation receives tentative support in the correlation $r = .29$, $p < .02$, two-tailed significance between Self-Respect and Inner Harmony for women, while the correlation between these two values for men was not significant ($r = -.06$). Thus, for women, an increased relative valuation of self-respect was directly related to a greater relative concern for "freedom from inner conflict," while for men no relationship between these two values was found.

The positive relationship found between a greater acceptance of authority and a greater relative valuation of Inner Harmony (freedom from inner conflict) for women but not for men also suggests that the traditional (superego) woman bears a heavier load of guilt and repressed actualization strivings than the superego male.

The greater relative valuation on the part of women of both Freedom and Equality with a decrease in their acceptance of authority; and the greater relative valuation of Equality and the less relative valuation of Freedom on the part of the men with an increase in their cognition of the conditioned nature of their primary value system: these differences may also be understood as stemming from differences in the roles

assigned to men and women in conventional society, in which (white) men are conditioned to be oppressors and women are conditioned to accept their oppressed state as natural. A devaluation of freedom is to white men in this society a devaluation of freedom to exploit others, and an increased valuation of equality is a natural concomitant of a devaluation of this kind of freedom. But for women in this society, freedom means freedom from oppression, freedom to actualize, to have an identity apart from any man--and an increased valuation of this kind of freedom is consonant with an upward valuation of equality. This interpretation is further supported by the significant positive correlations found between less feelings of powerlessness with increased relative valuations of both Freedom and Equality for the women students.

It is possible that the differential response of men and women to value rankings of Wisdom may not be solely a product of differential conditioning. It may be that while reflective men are more concerned with "an intellectual understanding of life" than conventional (superego) men, women who have a greater cognition of the conditioned nature of their primary value system may be less concerned with an intellectual understanding of life. Although this connotes a difference between men and women that is more "essence" than conditioned, I would argue that essence differences between men and women are at least possible, even though this argument runs counter to most

liberation thinking. Dobzhansky (1962) suggests one possible instinctual difference between the sexes, and the probable mechanism underlying this difference.

It is a rule, which applies not only to mammals but to diverse other animals, that males tend to be sexually aggressive and indiscriminately eager to mate with any and all receptive females, while the females are generally more choosy and demure, or less easily excitable. . . . Nature is prodigal with male sex cells, parsimonious with female ones. . . . Other things being equal, sexually aggressive males of polygamous species are favored by natural selection. The size of the progeny of a female is limited not only by the number of eggs she produces but, in mammals, by the length of pregnancy and maternal care. A female must economize her resources. Accepting a wrong male (a male of another species, or a sterile, diseased, or genetically inferior male) may diminish or eliminate her progeny. Natural selection favors, then, discriminate passivity in females. (p. 207-8)

More definitive research may give a clearer idea of what "yin-yang" differences (if any) exist but it would seem to be extremely difficult to escape one's bias (i.e. "male-ness or
1
"female-ness") in researching this problem.

Composite superego-reflective differences:

A composite description of the reflective value system person compared to the superego person is: one who has a lower relative valuation of National Security, Family Security

1. A semantic study of the Rokeach value survey might be a start in answering the question of whether or not there are sex differences in the meanings assigned to some individual values.

and Salvation, while valuing A World of Beauty and an Exciting Life relatively more. If the reflective person is female, she will also value Freedom and Equality relatively more, Social Recognition and Inner Harmony relatively less, and feel less powerless the less her acceptance of authority. With a greater cognition of the conditioned nature of her primary value system, she values A Comfortable Life and Pleasure relatively more, and Self-Respect and Wisdom relatively less than the woman who has less recognition of the conditioned nature of her values. If the reflective person is male, he also assigns a greater relative valuation to Wisdom than the super-ego male. With less acceptance of authority, he values Self-Respect more. With a greater cognition of the conditioned nature of his primary value system, he values Pleasure and Equality relatively more, and A Comfortable Life relatively less than the superego man.

Some limitations of this research:

The small sample size, the unspectacular rate of return, and the uniqueness of the population all underline the limits of the generalizability of these findings. However, in that the particular subject population was chosen for its homogeneity, it would be expected that the significance of super-ego-reflective value differences would be much larger in the general student population (e.g. the pretest Factor I and II correlation) and larger still in the general public. Although

the factors discriminated satisfactorily, improvement is probably possible in the construction of the particular subscale items, especially in the construction of satisfactory reversal-items for Factor I.

Suggestions for future research:

1. Alcohol correlation. Hypothesize that superego persons (based on superego-reflective scale, Factors I + II) would show greater behavior change with ingestion of alcohol than more integrated reflective persons.
2. Experimentally induced value change and system-functioning. Point out to the pre-tested superego subjects the relative "clustering" of their values around security-orientation compared to reflective persons. Re-test (at different time intervals) to look for value change and superego-functioning change compared to controls.

CONCLUSION

The etymological relationship between "see and "know" in Greek is the last evidence offered in support of a major thesis of this study: that the reflective person, who rejects system as a total perception-framework, is able to "see" the resolution of dissonance in the conflict-world in much the same way as one hears the resolution of the dominant chord to the tonic, that the "locus of values" lies within the de-alienated existing person. The reflective consciousness emphasizes being-in-the-present, the "here-now" of Maslow's (1971) Being-cognition, the dying to the past, the "denial of time" of Krishnamurti (1967, p. 28, 40) as a necessary condition of being in which this kind of "seeing" functions.

The Greek word for "I know" oida, is the perfect of the verb "to see" and means "I have seen." He who knows is the man who has seen, who has had a vision. . . . (Barrett, 1962, p. 81)

For the mythological consciousness, knowing occurs when seeing is completed, but for knowing to be, it is necessary that the "I" at sometime in the past "see." With the religious/scientific consciousness of Socrates there is no time that seeing is knowing: "all knowledge is recollection." (Phaedo, p. 104). In the rejection of system the reflective consciousness, in its return to the "ground of Being," in the process of its de-alienation, represents in one sense a regression of consciousness to the state of being prior to the primal repression of non-being, when seeing is knowing, when appro-

priateness is directly perceived. The "locus of values" is only within when being is "here-now."

Erik Erikson is what Watts (1969) calls "ego-oriented," and as such is counter to the reflective consciousness (e.g. ". . . reality, the world, the cosmos are. . . identified with and become defining characteristics of the self" (Maslow, 1971, p. 332) which tends to transcend, see the illusion of, ego. Though this may be the case, Erikson's discussion of man's "regression" to the "pure self" points toward the same transcendence of system/ego consciousness (remember that the repression of non-being is seen as the primary act of ego-system).

Finally, the glass shows the pure self itself, the unborn core of creation, the--as it were, preparental--center where God is pure nothing. . . . God is so designated in many ways in Eastern mysticism. This pure self is the self no longer sick with a conflict between right and wrong, not dependent on guides to reason and reality. . . . But must we call it regression if man thus seeks again the earliest encounters of his trustful past in his efforts to reach a hoped-for and eternal future? . . . If this is partial regression, it is a regression which, in retracing firmly established pathways, returns to the present amplified and clarified.

And earlier he has said:

From the oldest Zen poem to the most recent psychological formulation, it is clear that "the conflict between right and wrong is the sickness of the mind." (in Watts, p. 168)

As the rule "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny" is generally true for the physiological characteristics of man, so also the regression to "the earliest encounters of his trustful past," to the "innocent cognition. . . of the child. . . as an aspect of Being-cognition" (Maslow, 1971, p 265) is seen as representing a regression of homo to the psychologically whole, un-alienated being of man prior to the primal: [repression of non-being]/ego/system. In this "regression" is the transcendence of ego, being restored to Being, the "child-like," in-the-present, timeless, "oceanic" (Freud's term, 1930, p. 12) feeling, the perception that "All is in all-- All is actually each" (Huxley, p. 26), the ability to see/ know what is objectively appropriate, to see "the order of sensuousness" (Marcuse, p. 169).

SUMMARY

A scale was devised in order to discriminate between superego and reflective persons. This difference was understood as the outcome of an historical-psychological process that primarily involved the formation and evolution of system as a mechanism enabling the individual to protect himself from (repress) the fear of non-being. At the present time the culmination of these historical-psychological forces have engendered a mutation of consciousness which is not system/superego-functioning (i.e. is reflective). This difference between superego and reflective values was shown to be most centrally manifest in the greater valuation of security-oriented values (on Rokeach's Terminal Value Survey) by superego persons than reflective persons. It was suggested that this greater concern for security represented the failure to de-repress the fear of non-being and a concomitant fixation at system/superego functioning, which is seen as alienated, guilt (fear of non-being) functioning.

TABLE 1

Intercorrelation of Superego-Reflective Scale Factors and Powerlessness (Of pretest data, N = 38)

	I	II	III	Less Powerlessness
Factor I Less Recognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary value system	1.00			
Factor II Greater Acceptance of Authority	.47**	1.00		
Factor III High Confidence in the Objectivity of one's Values	-.18	-.07	1.00	
Less Powerlessness	.36**	-.03	-.07	1.00

TABLE 2

Intercorrelation of Superego-Reflective Scale Factors and Powerlessness (Of test data, N = 114)

	I	II	III	Less Powerlessness
Factor I Less Recognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary value system	1.00			
Factor II Greater Acceptance of Authority	.19*	1.00		
Factor III High Confidence in the Objectivity of One's Values	.16	-.03	1.00	
Less Powerlessness	.25**	.10	-.09	1.00

*Sig. at .05 level (two-tailed probability)

**Sig. at .01 level (two-tailed probability)

TABLE 3

Comparison of Factor I, Factor II, and Factor III; Average item* means and standard deviations between pretest and test Ss.

Factor I	Pretest (N = 38)		Test (N = 114)	
	average m	average s.d.	average m	average s.d.
Less Recognition of the conditioned nature of one's primary values (3 items)	3.91	2.27	3.94	2.05
Factor II				
Greater Acceptance of Authority (4 items)	3.23	2.02	3.62	1.93
Factor III				
Greater Confidence in the Objectivity of one's values (4 items)	3.63	2.16	3.46	1.99

*Only those items that remained unchanged in the present and test conditions were used in this comparison.

TABLE 4

Terminal Value Means and Rank Order for Test Ss (N = 114)

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Mean</u>
1	Freedom	5.94
2	Wisdom	6.54
3	Happiness	6.78
4	A World of Peace	6.79
5	Self-Respect	6.88
6	Inner Harmony	7.14
7	Mature Love	7.22
8	Sense of Accomplishment	7.87
9	True Friendship	8.33
10	Equality	8.39
11	Family Security	9.77
12	An Exciting Life	10.47
13	A World of Beauty	10.95
14	A Comfortable Life	12.61
15	Social Recognition	13.21
16	Pleasure	13.26
17	National Security	14.04
18	Salvation	14.21

TABLE 5

Significant Correlations Between Superego-Reflective Factors and Value-Rankings
for Test Ss (N = 114)

Value	Factor I Less Recognition of The Conditioned Nature of One's Primary Value System	Factor II Greater Acceptance of Authority	Factor III More Confidence In The Objectivity of One's Values	Factors I + II
An Exciting Life	.12	.22	.09	.23
A World of Beauty	.17	.25	-.13	.25
Family Security	-.08	-.28	.13	-.25
National Security	-.17	-.34	-.04	-.35
Pleasure	.20	.10	-.22	.11
Salvation	-.22	-.31	-.09	-.34
Wisdom	-.01	.23	-.14	.17

r = .15 sig. at .1 level (two-tailed) and .05 level (one tailed probability)
r = .18 sig. at .05 level (two-tailed) and .025 level (one-tailed probability)
r = .22 sig. at .02 level (two-tailed) and .01 level (one-tailed probability)
r = .24 sig. at .01 level (two-tailed) and .005 level (one-tailed probability)

Table 6

Fisher-Student T-Test Performed on Value-Rankings Between Top and Bottom Quartiles of Reflective-Superego Scale Scores (Factors I + II only)

	Superego Group (N=28)		Reflective (N=29)		T	Prob.T
<u>Value</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Std.Dev.</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Std.Dev.</u>	—	—
An Exciting Life	11.97	4.45	9.46	4.15	-2.20	.03
A World of Beauty	11.86	4.24	9.04	4.01	-2.58	.01
Family Security	7.83	4.04	11.04	4.30	2.90	.005
National Security	12.03	3.94	15.89	2.32	4.53	.0001
Pleasure	14.03	3.23	12.86	3.26	-1.37	.18
Salvation	11.66	5.96	16.32	3.16	3.71	.0005
Wisdom	7.52	4.61	5.79	4.48	-1.44	.16

TABLE 7

Significant Correlations Between Superego-Reflective Scale Factors and Value-Rankings for Test Males (N = 53)

<u>Value</u>	<u>Factor I</u> Less Recognition of The Conditioned Nature of One's Primary Value System	<u>Factor II</u> Greater Acceptance Of Authority	<u>Factor III</u> More Confidence In The Objectivity of One's Values	<u>Factors I + II</u>
A Comfortable Life	-.15	-.09	.13	-.13
An Exciting Life	-.01	.36	.11	.32
A World of Beauty	.21	.24	-.07	.27
Equality	.22	-.12	.18	-.02
Family Security	-.08	-.32	-.11	-.32
Freedom	-.22	.06	.01	-.04
National Security	-.19	-.37	-.03	-.41
Pleasure	.25	.15	.06	.24
Salvation	-.27	-.31	-.06	-.38
Self-Respect	.01	.22	-.09	.20
Wisdom	.23	.34	.11	.39

TABLE 8

Significant Correlations Between Superego-Reflective Scale Factors and Value-Rankings for Test Females (N = 61)

Value	Factor I Less Recognition of The Conditioned Nature of One's Primary Value System	Factor II Greater Acceptance Of Authority	Factor III More Confidence In The Objectivity of One's Values	Factors I + II
A Comfortable Life	.24	.08	.09	.16
An Exciting Life	.21	.07	.14	.14
A World of Beauty	.15	.26	-.20	.24
Equality*	.01	.26	-.07	.20
Family Security	-.08	-.25	.33	-.19
Freedom**	.10	.21	-.10	.19
Inner Harmony	.13	-.21	.01	.09
National Security	-.15	-.31	-.04	-.30
Pleasure	.16	.05	-.09	.08
Salvation	.18	-.31	-.11	-.31
Self-Respect	-.25	-.04	.07	-.13
Social Recognition	.04	-.33	.05	-.21
Wisdom	-.21	.11	-.33	-.02
				99

* -.35 Corr. with Less Powerlessness

** -.21 Corr. with Less Powerlessness

TABLE 9

Intercorrelation of Superego-Reflective Scale Factors and Powerlessness, Male and Female Responses Compared (N = 53 for Males; 61 for Females).

	I	II	III	Less Power- lessness
Factor I	M/F	M/F	M/F	
Less Recognition of the Conditioned Nature of one's Primary Value System	1.00/1.00			
Factor II				
Greater Acceptance Of Authority	.12/.26	1.00/1.00		
Factor III				
Greater Confidence in the Objectivity of One's Values	.03/.22	.10/-.16	1.00/1.00	
Less Powerlessness	.22/.27	-.05/ .24	-.08/-.12	1.00/1.00

TABLE 10

GRAPH Demonstrating Curvilinear Relationship Between "Acceptance of Authority" and "Confidence In Objectivity of Values" (N = 114)

Acceptance of Authority	Y							X						
	HIGH	+30..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	LOW
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
+20..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
+10..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
-10..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
-20..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
-30..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
LOW	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

Confidence in Objectivity of Values

THE CORRELATION RATIO OF Y/X = .53

Table 11
POWERLESSNESS SCALE

This is survey to find out what the public thinks about certain events which we face in our society. Each item consists of a pair of statements. Please select the one statement of each pair (and only one) which you more strongly believe to be true. Be sure to check the one you actually believe to be more nearly true, rather than the one you think you should check or the one you would like to be true. This is a measure of personal belief; obviously, there are no right or wrong answers. Again, be sure to make a choice between each pair of statements (* powerless response)

1. I think we have adequate means for preventing run-away inflation.
- * 2. There's very little we can do to keep prices from going higher.
- * 3. Persons like myself have little chance of protecting our personal interests when they conflict with those of strong pressure groups.
4. I feel that we have adequate ways of coping with pressure groups.
5. A lasting world peace can be achieved by those of us who work toward it.
- * 6. There's very little we can do to bring about a permanent world peace.
- * 7. There's very little persons like myself can do to improve world opinion of the United States.
8. I think each of us can do a great deal to improve world opinion of the United States.
- * 9. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do about it.
10. The average citizen can have an influence on government decisions.
- *11. It is only wishful thinking to believe that one can really influence what happens in society at large.
12. People like me can change the course of world events if we make ourselves heard.

- *13. More and more, I feel helpless in the face of what's happening in the world today.
- 14. I sometimes feel personally to blame for the sad state of affairs in our government.

Table 12
VALUE SURVEY

FORM E

Below is a list of 18 values arranged in alphabetical order. Your task is to arrange them in order of their importance to YOU, as guiding principles in YOUR life.

Study the list carefully. Then place a 1 next to the value which is most important to you, place a 2 next to the value which is second most important you, etc. The value which is least important, relative to the others, should be ranked 18.

Work slowly and think carefully. If you change your mind, feel free to change your answers. The end result should truly show how you really feel.

- _____ A COMFORTABLE LIFE (a prosperous life)
- _____ AN EXCITING LIFE (a stimulating, active life)
- _____ A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT (lasting contribution)
- _____ A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)
- _____ A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)
- _____ EQUALITY (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)
- _____ FAMILY SECURITY (taking care of loved ones)
- _____ FREEDOM (independence, free choice)
- _____ HAPPINESS (contentedness)
- _____ INNER HARMONY (freedom from inner conflict)
- _____ MATURE LOVE (sexual and spiritual intimacy)
- _____ NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack)
- _____ PLEASURE (an enjoyable, leisurely life)
- _____ SALVATION (saved, eternal life)
- _____ SELF RESPECT (self-esteem)
- _____ SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, admiration)
- _____ TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship)
- _____ WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)

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