FROM  DIFFERENCE  TO  INTERFERENCE:  THE  TRANSCULTURAL  APPROACH  AS  AN   ALTERNATIVE  TO  FEMINIST  MULTICULTURALISM     By   Yuanfang  Dai                                     A  DISSERTATION   Submitted  to   Michigan  State  University   in  partial  fulfillment  of  the  requirements   for  the  degree  of     DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY   Philosophy     2012     ABSTRACT   FROM  DIFFERENCE  TO  INTERFERENCE:  THE  TRANSCULTURAL  APPROACH  AS  AN   ALTERNATIVE  TO  FEMINIST  MULTICULTURALISM     By   Yuanfang  Dai     Questions  about  essentialism  and  “difference”  are  at  the  heart  of  many   debates  within  U.S.  feminism  in  the  past  three  decades.    Worries  about  making   cross-­‐cultural  generalizations,  or  about  establishing  a  universal  concept  of  “woman,”   have  led  feminists  into  a  variety  of  difficulties.    Focusing  in  particular  on  identity   and  cultural  differences,  I  suggest  that  these  problems  are  in  part  due  to  a   problematic  understanding  of  multiculturalism.    In  my  research,  I  conduct  parallel   discussions  of  women’s  identity  within  difference  and  of  cultural  differences.    I   critically  assess  two  approaches  to  women’s  identity—the  “particularity  argument”   and  gender  skepticism—and  propose  a  concept  of  women’s  identity  that  embraces   differences  among  women.    I  then  evaluate  two  aspects  of  cultural  differences—the   liberal  feminist  critique  and  the  postcolonial  feminist  critique—and  propose  a   concept  of  culture  that  respects  differences  among  cultures  and  the  dynamics  of   cultures  as  well  as  a  compatible  transcultural  approach.    The  discussions  of  identity   and  culture  point  to  a  practical  issue:  the  necessity  of  discussing  transcultural   feminist  solidarity.     I  propose  a  transcultural  approach  as  an  alternative  to  multiculturalism.     Unlike  the  multicultural  approach,  which  asserts  a  completeness  of  each  culture,  the       ii   transcultural  approach  suggests  that  if  a  specific  group  loosens  the  hold  of  the   oppression  of  a  specific  cultural  identity  by  virtue  of  transcultural  experiences,  then   they  will  have  a  starting  point  to  emancipate  themselves  from  the  subordination   that  is  imposed  by  the  culture  of  origin,  which  consists  of  social  factors  such  as  race   and  class.    Transcultural  themes  have  been  explored  in  the  feminist  scholarship,   such  as  work  by  María  Lugones  (2003),  who  demonstrates  that  transcultural   themes,  such  as  “world”-­‐traveling,  have  been  in  the  background  of  feminist   scholarship  and  that  they  hold  the  promise  for  achieving  women’s  solidarity  if  more   fully  exploited.    I  propose  transculturalism  as  an  alternative  to  feminist   multiculturalism  because  it  offers  a  promising  way  of  mediating  the  assumed   tension  between  differences  among  women  and  the  common  cause  of  feminist   solidarity.    Through  bringing  the  discussions  of  women’s  identity  and  cultural   differences  into  a  normative  discussion  of  feminist  transcultural  solidarity,  I  show   that  a  category  of  women  embraces  the  variability  and  the  dynamics  of  women,  that   a  concept  of  culture  embraces  the  variability  and  the  dynamics  of  cultures,  and  that   a  transcultural  approach  is  promising  for  overcoming  the  flaws  of  multiculturalism.     These  three  arguments  point  to  the  direction  that  we  should  learn  to  understand   differences,  confront  conflicts,  and  intentionally  build  bridges,  while  we   acknowledge  differences  among  women  and  among  cultures.             iii         ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS     This  dissertation  would  not  have  been  possible  without  the  guidance,   encouragement,  and  patience  of  my  advisor,  Professor  Richard  Peterson,  who   literally  changed  the  path  of  my  life.    I  would  like  to  express  my  gratitude  to  my   committee  members,  Professor  Marilyn  Frye,  Professor  Lisa  Schwartzman,  and   Professor  Fred  Gifford,  for  their  good  advice,  support  and  friendship.    Most   importantly,  I  would  like  to  thank  my  family  for  their  love,  and  sacrifice.                   iv   TABLE  OF  CONTENTS       INTRODUCTION    ........................................................................................................................................  1   1.  Motive………………………………………………………………………………………………...…1   2.  Themes,  Thesis,  and  Trajectory……………………………………………………………....3   3.  Background…………………………………………………………………………………………...7   4.  Mapping  the  Dissertation……………………………………………………………………..17       PART  ONE   WOMEN’S  OPPRESSION  IN  DIFFERENT  FORMS  AND  WOMEN’S  IDENTITY  WITHIN   DIFFERENCE…………………………………………………………………………………...26   Introduction  to  Part  One………………………………………………………………………….26       CHAPTER  1     WOMEN’S  OPPRESSION  IN  DIFFERENT  FORMS:  CRITICIZING  THE  “PARTICULARITY   ARGUMENT”………………………………………………………………………………………29   1.  The  Rise  of  the  “Difference  Critique”……………………………………………………..30   1.1  Friedan’s  Critical  Analysis……………………………………………………………..31   1.2  The  Normative  Implications  of  Friedan’s  Analysis………………………….32   1.3  Spelman’s  Critique  of  Friedan’s  Critical  Analysis……………………………33   1.4  Spelman’s  Critique  of  the  Normative  Implications  of  Friedan’s   Analysis……………………………………………………………………………………………  .35   2.  Women’s  Oppression  versus  Women’s  Identity……………………………………..39   3.  Crenshaw’s  Theory  of  Intersectionality…………………………………………………46   3.1  Crenshaw’s  Critical  Analysis………………………………………………………….46   3.2  Crenshaw’s  Normative  Position…………………………………………………….48   3.3  Criticizing  Crenshaw’s  Critical  Analysis…………………………………………50   3.4  Criticizing  Crenshaw’s  Normative  Position…………………………………….52   4.  The  Differences  and  Similarities  between  Spelman  and  Crenshaw…………56   Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………60       CHAPTER  2     WOMEN’S  IDENTITY  WITHIN  DIFFERENCE:  CRITITICIZING  CATEGORY   SKEPTICISM  ……………………………………………………………………………………...65   1.  Brown’s  Postmodernist  Category  of  Skepticism…………………………………….67   1.1  Brown’s  Critical  Analysis………………………………………………………………67   1.2  Brown’s  Normative  Position………………………………………………………….72   1.3  Critique  of  Brown’s  Critical  Analysis……………………………………………...74   1.4  Critique  of  Brown’s  Normative  Position………………………………………...77   2.  Frye’s  Positive  Category  of  Women……………………………………………………….83   2.1  Frye’s  Critical  Analysis………………………………………………………………….83   2.2  Frye’s  Normative  Position…………………………………………………………….87     v   2.3  Assessing  Frye’s  Critical  Analysis…………………………………………………..89   2.4  Assessing  Frye’s  Normative  Position……………………………………………..93   Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………99   Part  One  Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………101       PART  TWO     FROM  MULTICULTURALISM  TO  TRANSCULTURALISM……………………………………..103   Introduction  to  Part  Two……………………………………………………………………….103       CHAPTER  3     RECONCEPTUALIZING  “CULTURE”:  ASSESSING  THE  DEBATE  ABOUT   MULTICULTURALISM  AND  FEMINISM………………………………………………106   1.  The  Notion  of  Culture…………………………………………………………………………107   2.  Kymlicka’s  Definitions  of  Culture  and  Multiculturalism………………………..110   3.  Kymlicka’s  Defense  of  Liberal  Multiculturalism…………………………………...113   4.  Okin’s  Definition  of  Cultural  and  Multiculturalism  (Okin’s  Analytical   Claims)…………………………………………………………………………………………….116   5.  Okin’s  Challenge  to  Liberal  Multiculturalism  (Okin’s  Normative   Claims)…………………………………………………………………………………………….119   6.  The  Problematic  Account  of  Culture  (Assessing  Okin’s  Analytical   Claims)………………………………………………………………………………………….…122   7.  Reconceptualizing  “Culture”……………………………………………………………….125   8.  Criticizing  Okin’s  Normative   Position…………………………………………………..........................................................127   9.  Challenging  Multiculturalism……………………………………………………………...130   Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………….135       CHAPTER  4     DISPLACING  MULTICULTURALISM  WITH  AN  ALTERNATIVE:  A  WAY  TO  ADVANCE   THE  POSTCOLONIAL  FEMINISM  CRITIQUE  OF  MULTICULTURALISM...137   1.  Narayan’s  Critique  of  Multiculturalism………………………………………………..138   1.1  Exposition  of  Narayan’s  Critique  Analysis……………………………………139   1.2  Exposition  of  Narayan’s  Normative  Position………………………………...141   1.3  Assessing  Narayan’s  Critical  Analysis…………………………………………..143   1.4  Assessing  Narayan’s  Normative  Position……………………………………..145   2.  Mohanty’s  Critique  of  Multiculturalism……………………………………………….149   2.1  Exposition  of  Mohanty’s  Critical  Analysis  of  the  Concept  of   Culture…………………………………………………………………………………………….150   2.2  Exposition  of  Mohanty’s  Normative  Position………………………………..152   2.3  Assessing  Mohanty’s  Critical  Analysis……………………………………….....153   2.4  Assessing  Mohanty’s  Normative  Position……………………………………..155   3.  Beyond  Multiculturalism…………………………………………………………………….157   Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………….164     vi       CHAPTER  5     THE  TRANSCULTURAL  PERSPECTIVE  AS  THE  ALTERNATIVE  TO  THE   MULTICULTURAL  APPROACH  ………………………………………………………….166   1.  The  Transcultural  Perspective……………………………………………………………167   1.1  Epstein’s  Critique  Analysis………………………………………………………….167   1.2  Epstein’s  Normative  Position………………………………………………………172   1.3  Assessing  Epstein’s  Critical  Analysis……………………………………………176   1.4  Assessing  Epstein’s  Normative  Position……………………………………….179   2.  The  Transcultural  Trend  in  Feminism…………………………………………………183   2.1  Lugones’s  Critical  Analysis…………………………………………………………..183   2.2  Lugones’s  Normative  Position……………………………………………………..186   2.3  Assessing  Lugones’s  Critical  Analysis…………………………………………..189   2.4  Assessing  Lugones’s  Normative  Position……………………………………...192   3.  The  Advantages  and  Limitations  of  the  Transcultural  Perspective………..194   Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………….202   Part  Two  Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...204       CONCLUSION     BRIDGING  THE  DIVIDE  IN  FEMINISM  WITH  TRANSCULTURAL  FEMINIST   SOLIDARITY:  A  FEMINIST  CRITIQUE  OF  FEMINIST  COALITION  POLITICS   AND  GLOBAL  FEMINISM…………………………………………………………………..206   1.  What  is  Solidarity  and  Why  is  it  an  Important  Concept  of  Feminism?.......207   2.  Feminist  Solidarity  after  Identity  Politics:  Allen’s  Concept  of   Solidarity………………………………………………………………………………………....211   2.1  Allen’s  Concept  of  Women’s  Solidarity………………………………………....211   2.2  Critique  of  Allen’s  Concept  of  Solidarity……………………………………….215   3.  Global  Feminism  and  its  Critique………………………………………………………...220   3.1  Bunch’s  Notion  of  Global  Feminism……………………………………………..221   3.2  Chowdhury’s  Critique  of  Global  Feminism……………………………………222   4.  Imagining  Transcultural  Feminist  Solidarity………………………………………..226   5.  Applying  the  Notion  of  Transcultural  Feminist  Solidarity  in  the   Formulation  of  Solidarity  between  Chinese  Women  and  U.S.   Women…………………………………………………………………………………………....231   6.  Obstacles  to  Transcultural  Feminist  Solidarity…………………………………….236   Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………….238       BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………………………………..241               vii   INTRODUCTION     1.  Motive       I  attended  a  feminist  gathering  that  was  organized  to  provide  junior  feminists  an   opportunity  to  share  their  stories.    Several  of  the  fellow  feminists  at  my  table  talked   about  their  research  projects  in  various  parts  of  the  world.    It  was  fascinating  to   learn  how  they  managed  to  study  languages  and  do  research  on  local  women,  for   instance,  women  in  a  remote  Asian  village  or  in  an  African  community.    They  did  not   pay  much  attention  to  me  until  I  happened  to  mention  that  I  am  completing  my   second  Ph.D.    All  of  sudden  I  became  the  focus  of  attention,  not  so  much  because  of   my  Chinese  background,  but  because  of  my  academic  accomplishments.    It  seemed   the  Ph.D.(s)  earned  me  a  pass  into  this  club  of  researchers:  I  was  no  longer  a   potential  object  of  research,  but  rather  semi-­‐qualified  as  “one  of  them”   (researchers).       However,  I  feel  that  I  am  someone  in  between  object  and  subject  because  I   am  not  “exotic”  enough  to  be  studied,  but  at  the  same  time  I  am  not  “qualified”   enough  to  do  research  on  “other”  women  because  I  do  not  adopt  the  perspective  of   viewing  “other”  women  as  research  objects.    There  are  two  issues  involved  in  this   dilemma.    On  the  one  hand,  I  view  my  uncertain  status  in  feminism  as  a  result  of  my   limited  understanding  of  relevant  women’s  experiences  in  the  U.S.,  since  I  do  not   come  from  one  of  the  social  contexts,  where  the  various  debates  that  characterize   recent  feminism  arise.    At  the  same  time,  there  is  a  virtue  in  my  standpoint  as  a   Chinese  woman  studying  in  the  U.S.,  since  I  do  not  fit  the  usual  ways  of  speaking  of   “women  of  color”  or  “Third  World  women.”    For  instance,  I  had  never  been     1   consciously  aware  of  my  skin  color  and  its  social  implications  before  I  arrived  in  the   United  States.    I  did  not  automatically  identify  myself  with  either  “women  of  color”   or  “Third  World  women”  in  the  sense  that  U.S.  feminism  utilizes  these  terms.    On  the   other  hand,  I  view  my  uncertain  status  in  feminism  as  an  issue  of  the  method  and   role  of  philosophy.    My  philosophical  methods  and  approaches  do  not  seem  to  fit  the   feminist  discourse  in  the  U.S.,  even  if  my  having  a  degree  is  regarded  as  something   to  admire.    In  this  sense,  just  as  I  bring  my  specific  experience,  background,  and   standpoint  to  the  feminist  discourse,  I  have  something  distinctive  to  say  by  virtue  of   working  as  a  philosopher.    In  so  doing,  I  am  making  a  case  for  the  importance  of  a   philosophical  approach  to  feminist  issues  and  the  value  of  philosophical  reflection  in   dealing  with  them.    This  experience  from  the  feminist  gathering  and  other   interesting  experiences  that  I  have  encountered  in  the  United  States  make  me   wonder  why  there  is  such  a  divide  between  “us/women  in  the  U.S.  (women  who  are   eager  to  learn  about  ‘other  women’  to  enrich  their  knowledge)”  and  “them/Other   women  (women  who  are  ‘out  there’  to  be  studied),”  how  we  can  understand  women   across  cultural  differences,  and  how  best  to  address  transcultural  experiences.       My  dissertation  topic  emerged  from  studying  the  feminist  discourse  in  the   United  States.    Questions  about  essentialism  and  “difference”  have  been  at  the  heart   of  many  debates  within  U.S.  feminism  in  the  past  three  decades.    Worries  about   making  cross-­‐cultural  generalization,  or  about  establishing  a  universal  concept  of   “woman,”  have  led  feminists  into  a  variety  of  difficulties.    These  difficulties  have   directed  attention  to  metaphysical  issues  rather  than  to  a  focus  on  collaborations   among  women  within  and  across  the  U.S.  borders.    Feminist  “difference  critiques”     2   are  inadequate  because  they  have  neither  provided  ways  to  make  valid   generalizations  about  differences  among  women  nor  offered  opportunities  for  open   discussions  of  divisions  among  feminists.    My  perspective  on  these  feminist  theories   offers  a  different  and  perhaps  broader  viewpoint  because  I  approach  these  theories   as  a  scholar  who  is  from  another  part  of  the  world  and  who  seeks  to  develop  an   argument  that  is  global  and  cosmopolitan.     2.  Themes,  Thesis,  and  Trajectory     In  this  dissertation,  I  discuss  a  number  of  feminist  theories  that  argue  against  the   generalizations  made  by  many  (white  middle-­‐class)  feminists,  who  are  criticized  for   their  essentialism.    The  accused  essentialist  feminists  seem  to  suggest  that  we   develop  an  idea  of  women  that  responds  to  the  whole  range  of  women’s   experiences.    Accordingly,  there  are  issues  of  appropriate  generalization,  of  what   factors  need  to  be  brought  in  the  discussion,  and  of  how  they  are  to  be  included.    At   the  same  time,  these  antiessentialist  feminist  theories  have  not  yet  themselves   provided  a  vista  from  which  we  can  postulate  a  solution  to  these  issues.    When  we   think  about  women’s  oppression,  it  is  important  to  draw  important  distinctions,  but   we  do  not  have  all  the  concepts  required  to  differentiate  among  women  and  their   experiences  properly.    We  require  concepts  to  talk  about  women’s  oppression,   particularly  those  emerging  directly  within  gender  relations.    Yet,  women  are   oppressed  in  other  ways  as  well,  for  instance  through  economic  exploitation  and   racial  discrimination.    Thus  a  problem  that  these  discussions  raise  is  how   determining  we  can  take  into  account  of  differences  among  women’s  lived     3   conditions,  including  different  ways  women  are  oppressed  as  women,  different  ways   they  suffer  other  kinds  of  oppressions,  and  different  ways  in  which  these   oppressions  intermesh  with  gender  oppression.    My  critical  discussion  begins  with   most  general  concepts  of  women  and  the  distinctions  among  them,  and  with  the   problem  of  evaluating  these  theories  and  of  locating  their  contributions  and   limitations.   One  of  my  tasks  is  to  look  into  what  antiessentialist  feminists  mean  when   they  use  such  term  as  “essentialism”  and  “ethnocentrism”  and  to  evaluate  the   adequacy  of  these  concepts,  particularly  if  we  are  not  going  to  think  metaphysically.     I  approach  the  feminist  philosophical  literature  partly  with  an  eye  on  the  problems   that  arise  due  to  the  language  in  which  the  debates  are  stated.    I  am  developing  my   own  perspective  as  a  result  of  my  discussion  and  evaluation  of  these  theories  and  I   write  from  the  standpoint  of  someone  who  does  not  fit  in  any  of  the  categories  that   these  feminists  have  typically  employed.    My  goal  is  to  analyze  the  authors’  theories   that  I  discuss  to  determine  their  argumentative  integrity  as  well  as  how  their   concepts  fit  into  the  perspective  that  I  hope  to  develop.    Women  who  are  like  me  are   not  well  represented  in  the  feminist  literature,  but  I  am  not  concerned  about   representing  a  group  because  I  think  mutual  understanding  and  communication   matters  more  than  representation.    Writing  from  a  standpoint  of  a  cosmopolitan   feminist,  I  seek  theoretical  understandings  on  which  everyone  should  agree.       There  are  three  themes  in  my  dissertation:  The  theme  of  a  general  concept  of   women  as  such,  the  theme  of  culture  and  transcultural  experiences,  and  the  theme   of  feminist  solidarity.    The  theme  of  a  general  concept  of  women  as  such  matters     4   because  I  think  that  generalization  about  women  is  possible  and  that  we  should  be   concerned  with  what  kinds  of  generalization  are  valid.    A  valid  generalization   implies  that  we  can  construct  a  category  of  women  that  captures  (1)  differences   among  women  and  (2)  the  possibility  and  the  dynamics  of  what  women  can  be  in   the  future.    A  valid  generalization  needs  not  only  to  capture  differences  among   women,  but  also  to  keep  the  category  of  women  open  for  the  possibility  of   emancipation,  and  this  suggests  a  normative  dimension  to  the  category  of  women.     Reference  to  the  future  justifies  some  hesitation  since  such  concept  or  category  of   women  cannot  simply  be  based  on  generalizations,  if  that  means  generalizations   based  on  descriptive  claims  about  existing  and  past  women.    The  theme  of  culture   and  transcultural  experiences  is  important  because  it  connects  the  discussion  of  U.S.   women  of  color  and  that  of  international  women  (“international”  from  the   standpoint  of  the  U.S.  feminism)  with  the  intention  to  blur  boundaries  between  “us”   and  “other  women  in  other  countries”  and  boundaries  between  the  U.S.  feminism   with  “other”  feminisms.    The  theme  of  a  category  of  women  as  such  and  the  theme  of   cultural  and  transcultural  experiences  are  in  interplay  with  the  theme  of  women’s   solidarity,  which  can  be  demonstrated  that  some  aspect  of  the  normative  ideal  of   solidarity  is  incorporated  into  an  adequate  category  of  women  and  is  realized  in   transcultural  experiences.       Feminist  discourse  in  the  United  States  has  focused  on  the  “problem  of   difference,”  which  has  in  fact  led  to  limited  discussions  of  women’s  collaboration   across  cultures  and  societies.    While  it  is  important  to  recognize  that  women  are   different  and  subject  to  different  forms  of  oppression,  it  is  also  crucial  to  look  for     5   effective  methods  for  resisting  these  various  forms  of  oppression.    A  discussion  of  a   category  of  women  as  such  can  lead  to  feminist  resistance  because  it  provides  an   intellectual  basis  for  claiming  that  women  are  oppressed  as  women  and  women   should  resist  gender  oppression  as  women.    Transcultural  experiences  reveal  that   the  resistance  is  not  only  White  women’s  resistance,  or  U.S.  women  of  color’s   resistance,  but  also  a  resistance  in  the  transcultural  sense.    My  research  focuses  on   multiculturalism  and  transculturalism  as  contrasting  approaches  to  fostering   women’s  solidarity  across  cultural  differences.    Despite  its  merits,  multiculturalism   emphasizes  the  separation  and  non-­‐intervention  of  cultures  to  the  exclusion  of   investigating  communicative  needs  of  cultures,  and  this  fails  to  offer  an  effective   way  for  women  from  different  backgrounds  to  recognize  and  interact  with  each   other.    I  argue  that  a  transcultural  approach  is  a  promising  alternative  to  feminist   multiculturalism  for  discussing  the  relationship  between  solidarity  and  differences   among  women.    Transcultural  experiences  do  not  view  cultural  differences  as  a   challenge  to  women’s  solidarity;  rather,  the  transcultural  approach  offers  an   alternative  social  and  practical  framework  to  think  about  differences  in  a  more   constructive  way  and  to  construct  women’s  solidarity  without  dismissing   differences  among  them.       I  examine  the  issue  of  diversity  and  the  complexity  within  feminism  and   suggest  a  move  toward  transculturalism,  which  is  a  practical  stand  that  is  supported   by  intellectual  arguments  involved  in  the  dissertation  as  I  reject  perspectives  of   affirmation  or  simple  negation  of  the  “essentialist”  conceptualization.    I  have  two   commitments  in  this  dissertation:  (1)  One  is  an  intellectual  commitment:  it  makes     6   sense  to  talk  about  women  are  oppressed  as  women,  which  means  that  even  though   there  is  an  error  associated  with  certain  kinds  of  generalization,  we  can  make  some   generalizations  that  are  valid;  and  (2)  the  other  is  a  political  commitment:  it  makes   sense  to  think  about  solidarity  among  women  and  to  some  extent  a  much  broader   form  of  solidarity  is  possible.    Feminist  solidarity  does  not  mean  that  all  women   would  act  in  solidarity,  but  that  it  is  possible  for  women  in  very  different   circumstances  to  find  balance  among  their  differences  and  work  with  each  other  to   eliminate  gender  oppression.         3.  Background     The  main  issues  about  feminist  “difference  critique”  arise  with  debates  over   essentialism  and  related  discussions  of  ethnocentrism.    Because  I  evaluate  the   different  approaches  of  the  “difference  critique”  and  consider  what  is  at  issue  in  the   debates  over  essentialism,  it  is  necessary  to  look  into  how  feminists  use  terms  such   as  “essentialism”  and  “ethnocentrism.”    Here  I  explore  where  the  theme  of   essentialism  fits  into  the  dissertation  and  what  issues  arise  when  I  criticize   particular  positions.    With  regard  to  my  distinctive  experience  and  philosophical   approaches,  the  themes  of  essentialism  and  ethnocentrism  become  good  examples   for  illustrating  what  I  take  to  be  the  key  points  when  I  say  that  I  do  not  “fit.”    By   developing  the  philosophical  reflection  on  the  possible  meanings  and  implications  of   ideas  such  as  essentialism  and  ethnocentrism,  I  show  how  philosophy  plays  a  role,   both  regarding  the  analysis  of  women’s  oppression  and  approaching  practical   challenges  to  it,  which  are  theoretical  issues  and  practical  issues.       7     Defining  Essentialism   What  exactly  is  essentialism  and  what  is  wrong  with  it?    Oddly,  the  term   “essentialism”  is  rarely  defined  or  explained  explicitly  in  the  debates  over   essentialism.    When  it  is  defined,  it  is  often  done  by  its  “antiessentialist”  critics   rather  than  its  alleged  defenders.    For  instance,  Toril  Moi  provides  a  typical  anti-­‐ essentialist  claim  when  she  says  that  “any  attempt  to  formulate  a  general  theory  of   femininity  will  be  metaphysical.  …as  we  have  seen,  to  define  ‘woman’  is  necessarily   to  essentialize  her”  (1985,  139).       One  can  easily  have  the  impression  that  all  forms  of  essentialism  are   pernicious  and  politically  regressive  while  anti-­‐essentialism  represents  the  new   promising  direction  with  little  political  limitation.    Any  definition  of  woman  and  any   attempt  to  generalize  about  women  from  the  particular  historical,  cultural,  ethnic,   and  class  positions  of  particular  women  runs  the  risk  of  reducing  the  particularity  of   social  construction  to  essentialism.    “Essentialism”  is  rashly  condemned  as  a   theoretical  pitfall  in  feminist  theories  and  the  “essentialist”  accusation  is  posited   without  careful  reflection  and  assessment.    As  Cressida  Heyes  points  out,  the  anti-­‐ essentialists  tend  to  use  “  ‘essentialist’  as  a  pejorative  adjective  rather  than  a   substantive  term  of  critical  assessment”  (2000,  20).    According  to  her,  there  are   several  controversial  themes  in  the  debates  over  essentialism  ranging  from   problematic  or  illegitimate  generalizations  to  ahistorical  thinking,  and  from  the   importance  of  identity  politics  to  the  problem  of  implicit  metaphysics.    The  result  is   that  the  term  “essentialism”  suffers  from  being  overly  comprehensive  and  vague  at     8   the  same  time.    Some  feminists,  such  as  Elizabeth  Grosz,  Natalie  Stoljar,  and  Heyes,   endeavor  to  find  out  what  “essentialism”  could  mean.    In  what  follows,  I  will  briefly   present  their  explanations  of  possible  meanings  of  the  term  “essentialism.”       Grosz  offers  a  conception  of  essentialism  and  three  forms  that  it  can  assume.     She  defines  essentialism  as  the  tendency  to  attribute  a  fixed  essence  to  women  and   claims  that  “the  existence  of  fixed  characteristics,  given  attributes,  and  ahistorical   functions….limit  the  possibilities  of  change  and  thus  of  social  reorganization”  (1994,   84).    The  three  forms  that  essentialism  takes  are:  (1)  Biologism,  in  which  women’s   essence  is  defined  in  terms  of  women’s  biological  capacities,  such  as  the  functions  of   reproduction  and  nurturance;  (2)  naturalism,  in  which  a  fixed  nature,  such  as  being   emotional  or  irrational,  is  claimed  for  women;  and  (3)  universalism,  in  which   invariant  social  categories  and  activities  are  assigned  to  all  women  in  all  cultures   (See  Grosz  1994,  83-­‐86).    Stoljar  combines  the  biological  and  natural  characteristics   that  Grosz  addresses  into  the  essential  properties  and  maps  out  two  forms  of   essentialism:  (1)  One  is  the  position  that  attributes  a  fixed  and  unchanging  nature  to   women,  which  is  a  claim  about  the  essential  properties  of  an  individual  woman;  and   (2)  the  other  is  the  position  that  suggests  an  implicit  universalism,  which  is  a  claim   about  a  universal  “womanness.”    Stoljar  also  maps  out  the  anti-­‐essentialist   arguments  that  respond  to  these  two  forms  of  essentialism:  (1)  The  social   constructionism  argument  against  the  first  form  of  essentialism  proposes  a  socially   constructed  account  of  gender  rather  than  a  natural  and  fixed  nature  of  women;  and   (2)  the  diversity  argument  against  the  second  form  of  essentialism  rejects  the   implicit  universalism.  (See  Stoljar  1995,  261-­‐67).         9   Heyes  distinguishes  three  varieties  of  essentialism:  (1)  Biological   essentialism,  which  is  the  tendency  of  feminists  to  distinguish  the  sexed  body  as  a   pre-­‐social  site  upon  which  constructions  of  gender  are  imposed;  (2)  metaphysical   essentialism,  which  consists  in  the  claim  that  certain  species  or  types  of  things  have   an  essence,  that  is,  a  certain  innate  structure,  for  instance  the  Lockean  nominal   essence;  and  (3)  linguistic  essentialism,  which  consists  in  the  claim  that  any   definition  of  “women”  must  assume  certain  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions— they  can  be  biological  attributes  but  do  not  need  to  be—of  membership  in  that   definition  (See  Heyes  2000,  20-­‐22).    Heyes  points  out  that  the  debates  over   essentialism  in  recent  feminist  thought  are  rarely  concerned  with  biological   essentialism  and  metaphysical  essentialism,  so  they  are  not  the  targets  of  feminist   criticism  of  essentialism.    Because  concerns  with  bodies  are  located  within  social   constructionist  discourses  and  because  essentialism  of  the  metaphysical  and   biological  varieties  is  prior  to  social  constructionism,  they  are  not  what  are  at  stake   in  contemporary  feminist  debates  over  essentialism.    Rather,  according  to  Heyes,   linguistic  essentialism,  which  concerns  the  assumption  that  the  definition  of   “women”  consists  in  a  set  of  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions,  is  the  focus  of   feminist  attention  regarding  antiessentialist  efforts.       Issues  Raised  by  the  Idea  of  “Essentialism”     At  least  two  issues  are  raised  by  the  idea  of  “essentialism”:  One  issue  is  about   whether  there  is  a  reason  to  think  that  there  is  an  essence;  the  other  issue  is  about   difficulties  that  follow  from  thinking  that  there  is  an  essence.    Certain  ways  of     10   thinking  that  are  labeled  “essentialist”  are  undeniable,  e.g.,  certain  kinds  of   metaphysical  thinking  or  biological  reductionism,  but  we  need  to  focus  on  the   question  whether  there  is  a  point  of  speaking  about  women  in  general.    I  am  not   assuming  that  there  are  no  biological  generalizations  that  can  be  made,  but  rather  I   think  that  no  biological  generalization  can  adequately  grasp  women’s  oppression.    It   seems  that  the  issue  being  raised  by  the  critics  of  essentialism  is  in  respect  to   generalization  concerning  women’s  oppression.    When  critics  deny  any   generalizations  about  women,  they  may  be  missing  something  important,  which   could  be  about  actual  conditions  of  women  or  about  normative,  ethical,  or  political   perspectives  in  conditions  and  possibilities  of  women.   Although  a  term  with  enormous  complexity,  essentialism  in  feminist   discussions  implies  that  (1)  women  share  some  properties,  or  (2)  women  are   oppressed  in  the  same  way.    The  problem  with  essentialism  is  that  it  does  not  help   us  understand  women’s  experiences  across  cultural  differences.    When   antiessentialist  feminists  use  “essentialism”  as  a  criticism,  they  are  not  saying  that   there  are  no  essences  (at  least  most  of  them  are  vague  about  whether  there  are   essences  or  not),  but  rather  they  are  just  saying  that  those  “essentialists”  are   positing  an  essence  when  there  is  not  one.    So  the  issue  about  essentialism  is  not  just   about  whether  there  is  an  essence  of  women,  but  rather  it  is  about  the  way  that   feminists  reason  when  they  criticize  that  one  asserts  that  there  is  an  essence.    My   general  view  on  essence  is  that  whether  there  is  an  essence  of  women  or  not  is  not   the  key  issue  when  we  are  discussing  women’s  oppression,  because  essentializing   oppression  prejudges  what  is  possible.    Without  adequate  evidence,  essentializing     11   cuts  short  the  exploration  of  alternatives  to  what  exists  as  well  as  the  explanation  of   the  social  causes  of  oppression—causes  that  could  be  challenged  politically.    It  is   possible  to  generalize  about  women  whether  or  not  feminists  talk  about  essences,   but  there  are  limitations  of  what  kind  of  generalization  one  can  make.    When  we  say   that  women  are  oppressed  as  women,  it  means  that  all  women  are  subject  to   oppression  by  virtue  of  their  gender  position  in  the  society  regardless  of  what  forms   of  oppression  they  are  subject  to.    So  we  can  say  that  women  are  subject  to  gender   oppression,  which  is  different  from  saying  that  they  are  all  oppressed  in  the  same   way.    The  way  that  some  feminists  think  about  essences  and  essentialism  point  to   the  fact  that  it  is  a  confusing  conceptual  problem,  but  it  is  often  joined  with  a   historical  problem.    Maybe  the  generalization  about  women  is  a  historical   generalization  instead  of  a  metaphysical  generalization,  because  we  are  making  a   historical  generalization  when  we  say  that  women  happen  to  be  oppressed  as   women  in  the  society  in  which  they  live  and  the  gender  distinction  corresponds  to   some  kind  of  oppression.    So  one  of  the  themes  that  I  am  concerned  with,  which  may   be  get  confused  under  the  heading  of  essentialism,  is  what  kinds  of  generalizations   are  valid  and  what  kinds  of  generalizations  are  helpful.   If  we  focus  on  the  issue  of  the  generalization  of  women’s  oppression  rather   than  essence,  we  can  point  to  problems  with  biological  and  metaphysical  thinking  in   that  regard  and  we  can  defend  using  general  conceptions  (based  on  generalizations,   not  metaphysics)  as  useful  for  reflecting  on  oppression  and  as  relevant  to  a  nuanced   approach  to  challenging  gender  oppression.    For  instance,  when  it  comes  to  the   historical  generalization  of  women’s  experiences,  neither  White  nor  Black  women     12   are  able  to  generalize  all  women’s  experiences  on  the  basis  of  their  own  experiences   because  they  are  not  considering  experiences  of  non-­‐White  and  non-­‐Black  women   and  therefore  they  only  tell  part  of  the  story.    As  a  result,  generalization  seems  to  be   a  historical  question,  so  we  need  to  find  out  in  what  ways  gender  oppression  is   similar  and  in  what  ways  it  is  different.    Antiessentialists  seem  to  suggest  that  this  is   a  historical  and  empirical  question,  but  if  they  are  not  going  to  argue  about  the   generalization  of  women  metaphysically,  then  how  are  they  going  to  argue?     Presumably,  it  can  be  argued  anthropologically,  historically,  culturally,  etc.    In  other   words,  if  one  cannot  argue  about  generalization  on  a  priori  basis,  then  the  role  of   theory  is  to  organize  the  available  information  about  the  historical  records.    The   question  then  becomes  how  adequate  these  conceptions  for  organizing  the   materials  for  our  knowledge  are,  that  is,  how  valid  our  generalization  is.     Since  the  issue  is  one  about  generalization,  I  think  both  the  accused   “essentialists”  and  antiessentialists  have  their  merits  and  limitations:  On  the  one   hand,  antiessentialists  are  right  in  the  sense  that  women  in  different  situations   suffer  different  forms  of  oppression;  on  the  other  hand,  feminists  who  are  accused   of  essentialism  might  be  right  at  least  in  the  sense  that  generalizing  about  conditions   of  women  is  appropriate  because  one  could  generalize  about  women  by  saying  that   they  have  all  been  subject  to  gender  oppression—at  least  in  historical  societies.    It  is   important  to  understand  this  generalization,  even  if  forms  of  gender  oppression   have  been  (or  are)  different.    In  this  sense,  both  antiessentialists  and  those  accused   “essentialists”  have  a  point.         13   Defining  ethnocentrism:   Criticism  of  ethnocentrism  is  an  attempt  to  challenge  the  forces  regarding  the  views   that  have  been  charged  as  essentialist,  so  it  is  necessary  to  talk  about  what   ethnocentrism  is.    The  use  of  the  term  “ethnocentrism”  goes  with  the  kind  of   criticism  where  one  assumes  one’s  standard  as  the  point  of  reference  or  the   paradigm  case.    Ethnocentrism  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  one  is  hostile  to   others,  but  it  means  that  one  is  overgeneralizing  on  the  basis  of  her  own   experiences.    One  way  to  think  about  ethnocentrism  is  to  examine  whether   ethnocentrism  is  an  intellectual  error  or  a  moral  criticism.    For  instance,  it  could  be   that  both  White  women  and  Black  women  make  an  intellectual  error  if  they  only   generalize  on  the  basis  of  their  own  experiences.    In  particular,  it  could  be  the  case   that  in  the  United  States,  Black  women  and  a  subset  of  White  women  think  on  the   basis  of  the  historically  poor  treatment  of  Blacks,  so  it  does  not  make  sense  to   emphasize  the  issue  of  White  women  in  this  society,  because  by  focusing  on  Black   women’s  experiences,  feminists  can  develop  an  intellectual  insight  about  gender   oppression  in  general.    It  seems  that  feminists  view  ethnocentrism  as  a  moral  failure   rather  than  an  intellectual  failure;  that  is,  ethnocentrism  is  not  a  false  generalization,   but  rather  a  narrow-­‐mindedness  that  is  morally  defective.    So  one  of  the  problems   with  the  concept  of  ethnocentrism  is  that  it  is  a  moral  criticism.    When  feminists   accuse  someone  as  “ethnocentrist,”  they  are  criticizing  her  in  the  moral  sense.    This   is  where  the  value  of  the  otherwise  very  abstract  usage  of  ethnocentrism  reveals   itself  because  one  could  say  that  some  women  are  ethnocentrists  since  they     14   generalize  only  from  their  own  experiences  but  not  from  experiences  of  other   women.       However,  often  ethnocentrism  is  more  complicated  than  a  moral  criticism   because  it  could  be  that  a  White  middle-­‐class  woman  is  not  just  being  ethnocentric   in  the  sense  that  she  only  generalizes  from  her  situation,  but  also  that  she  is   complacent  about  the  exploitation  of  women  whose  labor  she  is  benefiting  from.    In   principle,  women  can  identify  with  all  other  women  but  at  the  same  time  it  is  a  fact   that  there  are  profound  differences  among  women  in  most  circumstances.    Some   differences  conceal  actual  conflicts,  such  as  competing  race  and  class  issues,  so  the   problem  of  the  differentiation  of  women  is  not  just  the  problem  that  the  complexity   of  women  face  in  terms  of  different  forms  of  oppression  they  experience,  but  also   that  they  are  in  different  relations  to  other  women  because  oppression  can  be  in  the   form  of  being  oppressed  by  other  women.    I  am  committed  to  the  idea  that  women   are  oppressed  as  women,  which  means  that  all  women  are  subject  to  gender   oppression  in  some  forms  even  though  there  might  be  differences  at  different  times   and  places.    Yet,  the  idea  that  all  women  are  oppressed  as  women  encounters   problems  when  it  comes  to  encouraging  solidarity  among  women,  in  part  because   gender  oppression  that  women  experience  are  sometimes  very  different  in  their   expressions  in  each  individual  woman’s  life.    It  could  be  the  case  that  women  are   simply  being  different  and  it  is  difficult  for  them  to  compare  experiences.    For   instance,  White  middle-­‐class  homemakers  experience  one  kind  of  oppression  and   women  as  domestic  workers  experience  another.    However,  it  is  another  thing  when   differences  become  an  issue  of  conflicts,  for  example,  the  issue  of  low-­‐income     15   women  of  color  has  the  moral  primacy  not  just  because  they  are  oppressed  worse,   but  also  because  Whites  benefit  from  the  system  that  is  partly  supported  by  racial   discrimination.    These  women  deserve  the  priority  of  our  focus  because  White   women  are  actually  oppressing  them.    In  this  sense,  ethnocentrism  is  also  connected   with  racism  although  no  feminist  really  uses  the  term  “racism”  in  her  criticism.    So   the  charge  of  ethnocentrism  is  almost  saying  that  an  ethnocentrist  is  someone  who   is  a  racist,  but  this  charge  operates  through  the  conceptual  fallacy  of  ethnocentrism   and  essentialism.    There  is  a  virtue  of  worrying  about  ethnocentrism  and   essentialism,  but  if  one  wants  to  accuse  another  as  a  racist,  one  should  just  say  it   rather  than  using  ethnocentrism  or  essentialism  as  the  code  language.    However,  it   should  be  noted  that  antiessentialists  are  not  accusing  essentialists  personally  as   racists,  but  that  ethnocentrists  and  essentialists  think  in  the  way  that  enables  the   propagation  of  racism.       If  there  were  solidarity  of  women,  it  would  have  to  include  women  who  are   different  from  each  other  as  well  as  those  women  who  are  oppressed  by  other   women.    Women  who  benefit  from  oppressing  other  women  have  to  undergo  some   radical  self-­‐critique,  which  is  dominant  in  the  current  U.S.  feminist  discourse,  and   then  we  should  think  about  how  to  engage  in  correcting  those  forms  of  oppression   together.    This  means  that  we  should  not  only  acknowledge  differences  but  also   recognize  conflicts  that  are  locked  in  the  knowledge  of  the  historical  oppression.     The  idea  that  there  are  potential  conflicts  among  women  might  be  one  of  the  ways   to  think  about  the  ambiguity  of  the  notion  of  ethnocentrism  that  some  feminists  are   concerned  with.    The  issue  of  differences  and  the  reality  and  possibility  that  some     16   differences  would  lead  to  conflicts  make  it  necessary  to  talk  about  women’s   category  as  such  and  feminist  solidarity  despite  the  difficulty  inherent  in  the   construction  of  a  woman’s  category  as  such  and  feminist  solidarity  that  embodies   differences  among  women.    If  we  recognize  issues  of  conflict,  we  are  appealing  to  a   much  broader  conception  of  emancipation,  which  is  an  assertion  that  is  consistent   with  my  guiding  belief  that  oppression  is  not  inherent  in  women’s  identity.    One  of   the  problems  with  antiessentialist  literature  is  that  very  little  of  it  discusses  human   emancipation  and  social  transformation  in  general  terms.    This  is  a  vacuum   conceptually  as  well  as  politically,  which  is  a  problem  that  I  want  to  point  out,   though  I  cannot  solve  in  this  dissertation.     4.  Mapping  the  Dissertation   The  dissertation  is  composed  of  two  parts  and  a  concluding  chapter.    Part  One   (Chapter  1-­‐2)  critically  assesses  two  approaches  to  women’s  identity—the   “particularity  argument”  and  gender  skepticism—and  proposes  a  women’s  identity   that  embodies  differences  among  women  and  the  dynamics  of  women.    Part  Two   (Chapter  3-­‐5)  critically  assesses  two  aspects  of  cultural  differences—the  liberal   feminist  critique  and  the  postcolonial  feminist  critique—and  proposes  a  concept  of   culture  that  embodies  differences  among  culture  and  the  dynamics  of  cultures  and  a   transcultural  framework  that  is  compatible  with  this  concept  of  culture.    The   discussion  of  identity  in  Part  One  and  the  discussion  of  culture  in  Part  Two  point  to   a  practical  issue:  the  necessity  and  importance  of  the  discussion  of  solidarity,  which   will  be  discussed  in  the  concluding  chapter.         17     Part  One  is  divided  into  two  chapters.    In  Chapter  1,  I  trace  the  rise  of  the   “problem  of  difference,”  which  is  centered  on  differences  among  women;  in   particular,  lower-­‐class  women,  whose  experiences  are  not  represented  in  the   feminist  discourse,  are  different  from  White  middle-­‐class  women.    I  begin  this   chapter  by  presenting  the  case  of  Betty  Friedan,  whose  work  became  a  target  of  the   “difference  critique.”    Friedan  presents  a  White  middle-­‐class  feminism  and  is   accused  of  presenting  essentialist  argumentation.    I  explore  the  limitations  of  the   “particularity  argument,”  which  is  an  approach  of  criticizing  generalizations  such  as   Friedan  makes,  by  Elizabeth  Spelman  and  Kimberlé  Crenshaw.    I  label  Spelman’s   and  Crenshaw’s  arguments  the  “particularity  argument”  because  both  of  them  argue   that  the  particulars  of  an  individual  woman  should  be  considered  to  avoid  the   danger  of  glossing  over  differences  among  women.    The  “particularity  argument”   addresses  the  interlaced  oppression  of  underprivileged  women  but  fails  to  elaborate   on  how  women  can  be  connected  among  their  particularities.    Intellectually,  it   seems  that  feminism  now  is  divided  into  separate  feminisms,  such  as  Black   feminism,  Latino  feminism,  Asian  feminism.    Politically,  feminist  struggles  are   dissolved  into  localized,  regional,  and  specific  struggles  representing  the  interests  of   particular  women  or  particular  groups  of  women.       In  Chapter  2,  I  explain  what  is  built  into  the  uses  of  the  term  “category”  and   consider  how  to  construct  a  category  in  a  way  that  is  consistent  with  recognizing   differences  among  women.    The  general  metaphysical  perspective  of  gender  is   under  attack  because  it  fails  to  take  into  account  racial,  cultural,  and  class   differences  among  women  and  because  gender  is  considered  a  detrimental  concept.       18   Feminists  who  fall  under  the  banner  of  postmodernism  generally  assert  that   categories  are  unreal.    I  focus  on  the  shortcomings  of  Wendy  Brown’s  version  of   postmodernist  category  skepticism.    Brown  suggests  that  the  idea  of  a  unified  and   coherent  subject  should  be  abandoned  because  by  attaching  an  injured  identity  to   women,  feminist  theory  perpetuates  a  sense  of  victimhood  as  primary  to  women’s   identity,  and  by  implication  that  victimhood  is  detrimental  for  achieving   empowerment.    To  criticize  Brown’s  argument,  I  present  Marilyn  Frye’s  approach  of   addressing  the  dynamic  relationship  between  differences  among  women  and  the   category  of  women.    Frye  points  out  that  plural  identity  should  be  categorized  as  a   practice  of  pluralism  in  a  logically  positive  category  construction,  in  which  genuine   subjectivities  A:  B  displace  the  A/not-­‐A  pseudo-­‐dualism.    Frye’s  construction  of  a   positive  category  demonstrates  that  experiences  of  women  can  be  generalized  and   that  the  concept  of  women  can  be  generalized  in  a  way  that  grasps  both  the   variability  and  the  dynamics  of  women.    This  chapter  is  centered  on  the  category   and  the  necessity  of  the  category  of  women.  The  link  between  Brown  and  Frye  is   that  the  former  argues  against  identity  and  the  latter  argues  for  identity.       In  Part  Two,  I  conduct  an  argument  about  culture  that  is  parallel  to  the   argument  of  women’s  identity  that  I  conduct  in  Part  One.    In  Part  Two,  I  address  the   divide  of  feminism  along  the  line  of  cultural  difference  and  critically  examine   multiculturalism.    Part  Two  is  divided  into  three  chapters.    In  Chapter  3,  I  present  a   debate  about  multiculturalism  between  Will  Kymlicka  and  Susan  Okin  and  in   particular  Okin’s  liberal  feminist  critique  of  multiculturalism.    Discussions  of   cultural  diversity  have  largely  taken  place  in  a  dominantly  liberal  context,  so  I     19   narrow  my  discussion  to  the  liberal  multiculturalism  of  Kymlicka  and  his  liberal   critic  Okin.    They  both  rely  on  a  problematic  understanding  of  cultures  as  self-­‐ contained  entities.    Okin  argues  that  the  protection  of  minority  cultures—the  main   claim  of  Kymlicka’s  version  of  multiculturalism—is  in  fact  harmful  for  women  and   girls  in  those  minority  cultures.    Okin’s  critique  of  multiculturalism  is  based  on  a   problematic  account  of  culture,  which  regards  cultures  as  static,  self-­‐contained,  and   well-­‐integrated  entities.    Okin  has  a  questionable  assumption  that  the  minority   culture  is  often  more  patriarchal  than  the  majority  culture  and  she  is  insensitive  to   the  political  context  in  which  the  minority  cultural  claims  are  made.    I  propose  that   the  concept  of  culture,  as  a  self-­‐contained  entity,  should  be  reconceptualized  into  a   fluid  concept  of  culture  as  internally  contested  and  diversified,  with  the   consideration  of  cultural  interdependence  and  communication.     Chapter  4  assesses  the  postcolonial  critique  of  multiculturalism  by  pointing   out  both  its  failure  to  break  free  from  the  multiculturalist  framework  and  its  fruitful   proposal  for  fostering  dialogue  among  women.    Postcolonial  feminists  such  as  Uma   Narayan  and  Chandra  Mohanty  argue  that  there  is  a  major  problem—the   problematic  understanding  of  “Other”  culture—with  multicultural  studies.    They   criticize  the  problematic  concept  of  culture  used  by  multiculturalists  within  the   framework  of  multiculturalism  with  the  hope  that  people  in  multicultural  studies   become  more  sensitive  to  the  context  and  the  history  of  cultural  differences.    The   postcolonial  critiques  of  multiculturalism  launched  by  Narayan  and  Mohanty  are   useful  for  challenging  various  multicultural  assumptions  and  practices;  however,   they  fail  to  provide  an  alternative  framework  to  replace  multiculturalism.    That  is,     20   with  the  acknowledgement  that  the  postcolonial  critique  of  the  problematic  concept   of  culture  is  fruitful,  the  critique  is  inadequate  because  although  it  suggests  the   necessity  of  finding  an  alternative  to  the  multiculturalist  framework,  it  fails  to   provide  such  an  alternative.    Narayan  and  Mohanty’s  critiques  call  attention  to  the   fact  that  feminism  needs  a  concept  of  culture  that  can  capture  the  variability  and  the   dynamics  of  cultures,  but  they  unwittingly  adopt  aspects  of  the  positions  that  they   otherwise  reject.    Without  a  transition  of  the  framework,  their  suggestions  for  the   reconstruction  of  the  concept  of  culture  and  for  women’s  solidarity  are  impractical.     I  propose  that  feminism  not  only  needs  to  have  a  reconstructed  concept  of  culture,   but  also  needs  a  new  framework  because  the  reconstruction  of  the  concept  of   culture  challenges  the  foundation  of  multiculturalism.     With  their  merits,  both  the  liberal  feminist  critique  and  the  postcolonial   feminist  critique  are  unfruitful  strategies  for  addressing  differences  among  women   because  they  both  fail  to  avoid  thinking  about  cultural  differences  in  a  way  that  is   multicultural.    They    (1)  fail  to  grasp  the  complexity  and  variability  of  the  culture,   thus  failing  to  grasp  the  potential  interconnection  between  cultures;  or  (2)  fail  to   explicitly  suggest  going  beyond  multiculturalism.    I  propose  a  shift  from   multiculturalism  to  a  more  favorable  alternative  because:  (1)  the  alternative   accommodates  the  reconstructed  notion  of  culture;  and  (2)  the  alternative  enhances   women’s  cross-­‐cultural  solidarity.     In  Chapter  5,  I  specify  the  transcultural  approach  as  the  alternative  to  the   multicultural  approach.    The  transcultural  approach  was  developed  by  the  Russian-­‐ American  cultural  theorist  Mikhail  Epstein,  who  offers  a  very  useful  metaphysical     21   framework  for  feminists  to  adopt  for  exploring  the  possibility  of  women’s  collective   struggles.    Unlike  the  multicultural  approach,  which  asserts  a  completeness  of  each   culture,  the  transcultural  approach  suggests  that  if  a  specific  group  loosens  the  hold   of  the  oppression  of  a  specific  cultural  identity  by  virtue  of  transcultural   experiences,  then  they  will  have  a  starting  point  to  emancipate  themselves  from  the   subordination  that  is  imposed  by  the  culture  of  origin,  which  consists  of  social   factors  such  as  race  and  class.    I  introduce  the  transcultural  approach  through  a   critical  exposition  of  Epstein’s  conceptions  such  as  “transculture”  and  “interference.”   In  a  word,  transculture  means  the  freedom  of  every  person  to  live  on  the  border  of   one’s  “inborn”  culture  or  beyond  it.    Interference  refers  to  a  necessary,  mutual,  and   multidirectional  process  that  transposes  the  borders  of  interacting  cultures,   mentalities,  and  disciplines  in  multiple  directions.    Through  interference,  the   differences  complement  each  other  and  create  a  new  interpersonal  transcultural   community  to  which  we  belong,  not  because  we  are  similar  but  because  we  are   different.    In  this  sense,  different  cultures  should  not  be  satisfied  with  merely   tolerating  one  another,  but  rather  they  should  be  creatively  involved  with  one   another.    The  transcultural  themes  have  been  present  in  the  background  of  feminist   scholarship,  such  as  work  by  María  Lugones.    Lugones’s  work  demonstrates  that   elements  of  transculturalism  are  present  in  feminist  philosophy  and  transcultural   themes,  such  as  “world”-­‐traveling,  have  been  in  the  background  of  feminist   scholarship  and  they  hold  the  promise  for  achieving  women’s  solidarity  if  more  fully   exploited.       22   If  we  think  transculturally,  then  the  possession  of  a  vague  cultural  identity   would  not  be  anymore  confusing  than  having  a  single  cultural  identity.    The  purpose   that  I  propose  transculturalism  as  the  alternative  to  multiculturalism  is  that  it  is   urgent  for  feminism  to  find  the  balance  at  the  intersection  between  the  debate  about   women’s  oppression  in  various  cultures  and  the  debate  about  the  possibility  for   women  to  resist  gender  oppression.    The  notion  of  solidarity  suggests  that  there   should  be  strong  connections  among  women,  but  this  idea  is  not  adequately   illuminated  in  the  multicultural  approach.    Transculturalism,  however,  is  an   approach  that  cultivates  an  idea  that  involves  both  the  variability  and  the  dynamics   of  women  and  those  of  cultures.     The  concluding  chapter  focuses  on  the  theme  of  solidarity.    The  theme  of   solidarity  is  important  from  at  least  two  perspectives:  (1)  From  the  epistemological   perspective,  women  have  different  experiences  of  gender  oppression  and  women  do   not  automatically  form  a  group,  so  solidarity  is  a  strategy  for  them  to  recognize   gender  oppression  on  a  macroscopic  scale;  and  (2)  from  the  political  perspective,   solidarity  is  crucial  for  women  to  resist  structural  gender  oppression  collectively.    I   talk  about  women’s  solidarity  from  two  aspects  in  this  chapter:  One  aspect  is  from   the  theme  of  identity  politics  and  the  other  aspect  is  from  the  theme  of  cultural   differences.    I  focus  on  the  aspect  of  identity  politics  by  discussing  Amy  Allen’s  work,   in  which  she  employs  a  strategic  usage  of  “a  mediated  concept  of  group  identity”   and  proposes  a  concept  of  political  coalition  as  feminist  solidarity.    I  argue  that  a   discussion  of  feminist  solidarity  needs  to  emphasize  women’s  group  identity   because  women  are  oppressed  as  a  group.    I  focus  on  the  aspect  of  cultural     23   differences  by  addressing  the  idea  of  global  feminism  by  Charlotte  Bunch,  who  is  an   advocate  of  the  campaign  that  women’s  rights  are  human  rights.    However,  Elora   Chowdhury  criticizes  the  problematic  construction  of  global  feminism  in  the  U.S.   academy,  arguing  that  the  politics  of  global  feminism  is  based  on  a  justification  of   Western  liberal  notion  of  democracy.    Chowdhury  proposes  braiding  U.S.  anti-­‐ racist/women  of  color  feminism  and  Third  World/transnational  feminism  to  resist   both  hegemonic  White  feminism  and  Western  feminism,  which  is  similar  to  Chandra   Mohanty’s  proposal  of  transnational  feminist  solidarity.    I  argue  that  both  Mohanty   and  Chowdhury  seem  to  foreshow  an  alternative  idea  of  feminist  solidarity.    The   alternative  perspective,  which  I  name  transcultural  feminist  solidarity,  endorses   women’s  group  identity  and  addresses  structural  inequality,  global  injustice,  and   cultural  differences.    Practices  or  initiatives  that  draw  from  a  transcultural  approach   (or  at  least  act  in  a  way  that  is  consistent  with  such  an  approach)  can  foster   solidarity.    By  showing  challenges  to  transcultural  feminist  solidarity,  I  argue  that   the  transcultural  approach  intends  to  promote  the  interaction  of  women,  even  of   those  women  who  are  from  different  cultural  backgrounds  and  class  locations.     These  interactions,  such  as  a  genuine  dialogue  between  Chinese  and  American   women,  would  benefit  from  following  the  transcultural  approach  and  as  a  result   they  would  contribute  to  women’s  solidarity  in  general.      The  concluding  chapter  manages  to  bring  the  discussions  in  the  previous   chapters  into  a  normative  discussion  of  feminist  transcultural  solidarity.    I   demonstrate  that  the  conclusions  from  previous  chapters,  such  as  a  category  of   women  with  the  variability  and  the  dynamics  of  women,  a  concept  of  culture  with     24   the  variability  and  the  dynamics  of  cultures,  and  a  transcultural  approach  that  is   promising  to  overcome  the  flaws  of  multiculturalism,  contribute  to  the  conclusion   that  I  made  in  this  chapter.    That  is,  while  we  acknowledge  differences  among   women  and  among  cultures,  we  should  learn  to  understand  differences,  confront   conflicts,  and  intentionally  build  bridges.                   25     PART  ONE:  WOMEN’S  OPPRESSION  IN  DIFFERENT  FORMS  AND  WOMEN’S   IDENTITY  WITHIN  DIFFERENCE       Introduction  to  Part  One   Critics  of  feminist  literature  of  the  sixties  and  seventies  argued  that  some  writers   were  overgeneralizing  about  the  problems  women  suffer  as  a  result  of  male   domination  and  therefore  also  about  the  goals  of  feminist  politics.    For  instance,   White  middle-­‐class  feminists’  theories  are  criticized  as  overgeneralizing  from  the   situation  of  specific  women  because  underprivileged  women  are  overlooked  in  their   generalizations.    This  problem  was  identified  as  being  one  of  essentialism.    In   feminist  discussions,  essentialism  implies  that  women  share  some  properties,  or   that  women  are  oppressed  in  the  same  way.    We  can  identify  two  kinds  of  argument   that  were  developed  to  pursue  this  criticism.    One  argument  examines  the  claims   about  the  particularity  of  women’s  contexts,  and  the  other  focuses  on  issues  about   the  nature  of  thought  itself  (category  skepticism).    Despite  pointing  to  relevant   considerations,  neither  is  adequate  because  the  focus  on  essentialism  was  in  some   ways  misleading  or  inadequate  to  the  problem.    Neither  of  these  approaches   adequately  balances  the  need  to  respect  multiple  forms  of  women’s  oppression  or   their  diverse  goals  while  retaining  some  understanding  of  the  importance  of  the   idea  of  feminist  solidarity.     In  what  follows,  I  will  analyze  the  claims  made  by  each  of  these  two  lines  of   criticism,  state  fundamental  analytical  and  normative  issues  about  each  position,   and  criticize  the  main  claims  they  make  about  the  analysis  of  women’s  oppression   and  about  feminist  politics.    By  critically  examining  these  two  approaches  to     26   differences  among  women,  I  argue  that  difference  as  such  is  not  a  problem,  but  that   it  becomes  a  problem  if  we  assume  that  difference  is  a  barrier  to  women’s  theory   and  practice.    They  both  seem  to  conflate  the  theme  of  generality  of  women’s   oppression  with  the  theme  of  a  women’s  essence,  but  the  theme  of  difference  and   the  theme  of  essentialism  are  two  distinctive  themes.    That  is  to  say,  overlooking   differences  among  women  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  a  feminist  theory   employs  essentialism.    I  also  argue  that  the  two  “difference  critiques”  do  not  lead  to   women’s  solidarity.         Part  One  is  divided  into  two  chapters.    In  Chapter  1,  I  trace  the  rise  of  the   “problem  of  difference”  and  explore  the  limitations  of  the  “particularity  argument”   by  Elizabeth  Spelman  and  Kimberlé  Crenshaw.    In  Chapter  2,  I  focus  on  the   shortcomings  of  gender  skepticism  presented  by  Wendy  Brown.    I  draw  on  Marilyn   Frye’s  construction  of  a  positive  category  to  demonstrate  that  experiences  of   women  can  be  generalized  and  that  the  concept  of  women  can  be  generalized  in  a   way  that  grasps  both  the  variability  and  the  dynamics  of  women.    I  argue  that  the   debates  over  essentialism  are  not  about  feminists  making  essentialist  claims  but   rather  about  them  making  problematic  generalizations  about  women;  thus  valid   generalizations  are  necessary  for  feminist  projects.    I  argue  that  the  type  of   generalization  of  women  that  Frye  proposes  contributes  to  women’s  solidarity.       There  are  two  general  themes  in  this  part:  One  theme  is  women’s  oppression   and  the  other  is  women’s  identity.    Both  themes  are  closely  related  and  are  feminist   reflections  of  the  “problem  of  difference,”  but  the  former  is  more  from  an  empirical   perspective  and  the  latter  is  more  from  a  metaphysical  perspective,  although  one     27   cannot  draw  a  distinct  line  between  these  two  perspectives.    With  these  two  themes   in  mind,  we  see  how  the  “problem  of  difference”  arises  for  understanding  and  for   practice  (solidarity  and  politics).    The  two  issues  that  are  raised  by  the  feminists   that  I  will  discuss  in  this  part  correspond  to  these  two  themes.    The  kind  of  issue   raised  by  Spelman  and  Crenshaw  is  an  issue  of  the  difference  among  women’s   oppression,  which  can  be  shown  from  the  conceptual  solution  that  is  offered.    The   kind  of  issue  raised  by  Brown  and  Frye  is  less  about  women’s  oppression  but  more   about  women’s  identity  although  women’s  oppression  is  the  backdrop  of  their   discussions  of  women’s  identity.    What  needs  to  be  noted  is  that  without  the   consideration  of  women’s  oppression  in  different  forms,  women’s  identity  within   difference  is  not  possible.    This  is  the  link  that  connects  the  theme  of  women’s   oppression  and  the  theme  of  women’s  identity.    We  want  to  find  out  how  differences   in  oppression  take  place  and  how  to  react  to  the  differences  that  are  considered   obstacles  to  solidarity.    There  are  intellectual  and  practical  problems,  for  instance,   does  each  woman  suffer  a  different  kind  of  sexism?  Or  is  the  way  they  experience   gender  so  influenced  by  racial  issues  that  the  gender  issue  and  the  race  issue  cannot   be  separated?    Can  these  issues  be  settled  philosophically?         28   CHAPTER  1       WOMEN’S  OPPRESSION  IN  DIFFERENT  FORMS:  CRITICIZING  THE   “PARTICULARITY  ARGUMENT”     Feminists  who  launched  the  “difference  critique”  claim  that  it  is  wrong  for  White   feminists  to  make  general  claims  for  all  women  because  by  doing  so  they  ignore   important  differences  among  women.    These  critics  argue  that  it  is  essentialist  for   feminists  to  make  general  claims  about  women  without  taking  into  account  the   important  differences  among  women.    For  instance,  Elizabeth  Spelman  (1988)   emphasizes  differences  tied  to  race  and  class  among  women  and  emphasizes  the   importance  of  studying  women  within  their  specific  social  contexts.    “Difference   critiques”  as  such  and  the  closely  related  issue  of  women’s  identity  have  occupied   feminist  theory  since  then.    A  category  of  women  refers  to  something  with  which  we   can  identify  general  patterns  of  gender  oppression  and  therefore  we  can  develop   political  responses  to  sexism.    If  a  feminist  claims  that  there  is  a  category  of  women   or  makes  general  claims  about  women,  she  is  highly  suspicious  of  accounts  that  fail   to  address  the  “problem  of  difference.”    In  other  words,  it  is  problematic  that  the   important  differences  among  women  are  ignored  in  some  feminist  works  as  if  such   differences  did  not  exist.1    Feminists  who  do  not  explicitly  address  the  “problem  of   difference”  are  criticized  for  relying  on  an  indefensible  essentialism  and  of  being   ethnocentric.   I  begin  this  chapter  by  presenting  the  case  of  Betty  Friedan,  whose  work   became  a  target  of  the  “difference  critique,”  as  a  way  to  explain  why  I  initiate  and   approach  my  discussion  from  the  perspective  of  culture.    I  then  critically  examine     29   the  “difference  critique,”  which  can  be  developed  in  different  ways,  launched  by   Spelman  and  Kimberlé  Crenshaw.2    They  assert  that  feminist  resistance  should  be   demonstrated  in  localized,  regional,  specific  struggles,  which  represent  interests  of   particular  women  or  groups  of  women.    I’ve  labeled  their  arguments  the   “particularity  argument”  although  they  make  other  claims  as  well.    First,  I  critically   examine  Spelman’s  criticism  of  feminists  such  as  Betty  Friedan,  who  is  criticized  as   assuming  an  “essential  ‘womanness’.”    Spelman  argues  that  claiming  an  “essential   ‘womanness’”  treats  women  or  their  particular  living  situations  as  irrelevant.    Then  I   critically  examine  the  theory  of  intersectionality  developed  by  Crenshaw,  who   argues  that  women  should  be  theorized  as  existing  at  the  intersection  of  gender  and   race.    I  argue  that  the  “particularity  argument”  addresses  the  interlaced  oppression   of  underprivileged  women  but  fails  to  elaborate  on  how  women  can  be  connected   among  their  particularities.    I  conclude  that  the  “particularity  argument,”  despite  its   virtues,  dissolves  feminist  struggles  into  fragmented  struggles.         1.  The  Rise  of  the  “Difference  Critique”   Some  feminists’  analysis  of,  and  solution  to,  women’s  oppression,  such  as  Friedan’s,   are  criticized  by  feminists  who  launched  “difference  critiques”  as  being  exclusive  to   White  educated  middle-­‐class  women  because  feminists  like  Friedan  ignore   differences  among  women.    Differences  among  women  are  overlooked  by  privileged   women,  who  are  accused  of  taking  their  experiences  as  the  experience  of  all  women   and  of  implying  that  what  they  understand  as  women  is  the  essence  of  women.    In   this  section,  I  present  Friedan’s  critical  analysis  of  women’s  problems  and  her     30   normative  standing  on  this  issue  as  well  as  Spelman’s  critique  of  Friedan’s   arguments.       1.1  Friedan’s  Critical  Analysis   In  her  book  The  Feminine  Mystique,  Friedan  describes  a  “feminine  mystique”  that   she  argues  is  prevalent  in  the  Post-­‐World  War  II  American  culture.    The  feminine   mystique  applies  to  women  who  find  true  feminine  fulfillment  and  satisfaction  as  a   wife  and  mother.    These  women  are  materially  well-­‐off,  educated,  respected  as   equals  to  their  husbands,  and  have  the  freedom  to  choose  what  is  good  for  their   home  and  children,  for  instance,  which  cars  to  purchase  and  which  markets  to  shop   at.    Although  they  are  educated,  few  of  them  have  the  intention  to  enter  professional   workplace.    Even  for  women  who  go  to  college,  the  biggest  desire  in  life  is  finding  a   husband  and  bearing  children.    As  Friedan  states,  “In  the  fifteen  years  after  World   War  II,  this  mystique  of  feminine  fulfillment  became  the  cherished  and  self-­‐ perpetuating  core  of  contemporary  American  culture.”  (2001[1963],  61)   The  feminine  mystique  is  buttressed  by  a  “problem  that  has  no  name.”   Friedan  states  that  “the  problem  that  has  no  name”  is  shared  by  “countless  women   in  America”  (63),  who  feel  tired,  empty,  incomplete,  dissatisfied,  desperate,  and   hopeless.    She  asserts  that  “the  problem  that  has  no  name”  is  a  crisis  in  women’s   identity  because  the  “feminine  mystique”  does  not  allow  women  to  think  about  their   identity  as  something  other  than  being  someone’s  mother  or  wife.    American   housewives  who  are  entrapped  in  the  “feminine  mystique”  cannot  find  their  own   worth.    Yet,  “the  problem  that  has  no  name”  has  little  to  do  with  physical  or  material   difficulties  such  as  poverty,  illness,  or  hunger.    In  fact,  material  responses  to  “the     31   problem  that  has  no  name,”  such  as  fancier  cars  and  bigger  houses,  often  make  the   problem  worse.    It  has  little  to  do  with  the  tedious  housework  routine  either.     Rather,  “the  problem  that  has  no  name”  is  something  about  these  women’s  mind  and   an  inner  voice  that  screams,  “I  want  something  more  than  my  husband,  children,   and  home.”    As  Friedan  states,     It  is  easy  to  see  the  concrete  details  that  trap  the  suburban  housewife,  the   continual  demands  on  her  time.    But  the  chains  that  bind  her  in  her  trap  are   chains  in  her  own  mind  and  spirit.    They  are  chains  made  up  of  mistaken   ideas  and  misinterpreted  facts,  of  incomplete  truths  and  unreal  choices.     They  are  not  easily  seen  and  not  easily  shaken  off.  (77)     That  is,  the  “feminine  mystique”  keeps  these  housewives  entrapped  in  “the  problem   that  has  no  name”  as  if  being  a  good  mother  and  wife  was  the  best  choice  for  their   lives.    A  culture  that  cherishes  the  “feminine  mystique”  does  not  encourage  or  allow   women  to  find  their  own  identity  and  fulfill  their  potentials  as  human  beings.     1.2  The  Normative  Implications  of  Friedan’s  Analysis   Friedan’s  solution  to  “the  problem  that  has  no  name”  is  that  women  should  manifest   their  potential  in  employment  that  allows  them  to  exercise  their  true  abilities,  and   establish  their  distinctive  identities.    She  points  out  that  the  “feminine  mystique”  is   full  of  delusions,  which  try  to  persuade  women  that  it  is  their  husbands,  children,   and  homes  that  give  meaning  to  their  lives.    But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  housework  is   not  a  career  in  which  a  wife  can  find  meaning,  and  marriage  does  not  contain   everything  that  a  woman  needs.    No  matter  how  perfect  a  woman  can  make  her   house  appear,  and  how  perfect  her  marriage  is,  she  does  not  live  a  life  that  can  “give   her  a  self”  (464).    Instead,  Friedan  suggests  that  women  should  have  “a  new  life     32   plan—in  terms  of  one’s  whole  life  as  a  woman”  (469).    Both  marriage  and  career  are   part  of  the  “new  life  plan,”  and  are  not  mutually  exclusive  choices.       According  to  Friedan,  women  should  “get  out  of  the  house  and  into  the   workplace”(8).    The  job  that  Friedan  has  in  mind  is  something  that  a  woman  can   “take  seriously  as  part  of  a  life  plan;”  that  a  woman  can  “work  in  which  she  can  grow   as  part  of  society”  (472);  the  vocation  she  thinks  of  can  “provide  a  basis  for  identity”   (553,  n2);  “that  is  of  real  value  to  society—work  for  which,  usually,  our  society  pays”   (474);  that  “permits  an  able  woman  to  realize  her  abilities  fully,  to  achieve  identity   in  society  in  a  life  plan  that  can  encompass  marriage  and  motherhood”  (476),  and   work  through  which  women  can  “have  a  sense  of  achievement”  (486).    As  Friedan   states,       The  only  way  for  a  woman,  as  for  a  man,  to  find  herself,  to  know  herself  as  a   person,  is  by  creative  work  of  her  own.    There  is  no  other  way.    But  a  job,  any   job,  is  not  the  answer—in  fact,  it  can  be  part  of  the  trap.    Women  who  do  not   look  for  a  job  equal  to  their  actual  capacity,  who  do  not  let  themselves   develop  the  lifetime  interests  and  goals  which  require  serious  education  and   training,  who  take  a  job  at  twenty  or  forty  to  “help  out  at  home”  or  just  to  kill   extra  time,  are  almost  as  surely  as  the  ones  who  stay  inside  the  housewife   trap,  to  a  nonexistence  future.  (472)     That  is,  the  job  should  not  be  simply  a  way  to  make  a  living,  but  also  should  be   creative,  fulfilling,  and  meaningful.    To  achieve  this  goal,  women  need  to  receive  a   serious  education  for  serious  purposes,  which  means  education  should  cultivate  a   woman’s  capacities  and  prepare  her  for  participating  in  the  society  as  someone   more  than  a  mother  or  a  wife.     1.3  Spelman’s  Critique  of  Friedan’s  Critical  Analysis   “The  problem  that  has  no  name”  is  criticized  by  some  feminists  as  White,  middle-­‐ class,  and  privileged  because  it  ignores  differences  among  women.    For  instance,     33   Spelman  argues  that  it  is  problematic  for  some  feminists  such  as  Friedan  to  talk   about  women,  the  problems  of  women,  and  especially  the  problems  of  women  as  if   there  was  a  “womanness”  that  all  women  share.    Spelman  argues  that  claiming  an   “essential  ‘womanness’”  ironically  makes  women  “inessential,”  by  which  term  she   means  to  “point  to  an  essential  ‘womanness’  that  all  women  have  and  share  in   common  despite  the  racial,  class,  religious,  ethnic,  and  cultural  differences  among   us”  (1988,  ix).    Spelman  argues  that  until  the  particulars  of  an  individual  woman  are   considered,  it  is  doubtful  that  we  can  talk  about  “women.”  As  she  states,     Positing  an  essential  “womanness”  has  the  effect  of  making  woman   inessential  in  a  variety  of  ways.    First  of  all,  if  there  is  an  essential   womanness  that  all  women  have  and  have  always  had,  then  we  needn’t  know   anything  about  any  woman  in  particular.    For  the  details  of  her  situation  and   her  experience  are  irrelevant  to  her  being  a  woman.    Thus  if  we  want  to   understand  what  “being  a  woman”  means,  we  needn’t  investigate  her   individual  life  or  any  other  woman’s  individual  life.    All  those  particulars   become  inessential  to  her  being  and  our  understanding  of  her  being  a   woman.  (158)     Spelman  seems  to  suggest  that  this  criticism  can  apply  to  Friedan,  who  dogmatically   presupposes  an  ideal  (that  of  fulfilling  work)  that  she  misleadingly  attributes  to  all   women  by  only  discussing  the  particulars  of  White  middle-­‐class  women.    By  doing   so,  Friedan  seems  to  assume  that  the  particulars  of  non-­‐White  non-­‐middle-­‐class   women  are  irrelevant.     Spelman  raises  the  issue  of  essentialism  as  she  argues  that  that  feminist   theory  must  take  differences  among  women  more  seriously.    She  characterizes   essentialism  as  something  that  “invites  me  to  take  what  I  understand  to  be  true  of   me  ‘as  a  woman’  for  some  golden  nugget  of  womanness  all  women  have  in   common,”  which  “makes  the  participation  of  other  women  [women  other  than     34   White  middle-­‐class  women]  inessential  to  the  production  of  the  story”  (159).     Moreover,  because  women  are  not  understood  in  their  particular  situations  and   experiences,  positing  an  essential  “womanness”  makes  certain  women  appear  less   like  a  “woman”  (because  these  “other  women”  do  not  share  the  “womanness”   derived  from  the  experiences  of  White  middle-­‐class  women)  and  thus  removes  the   need  for  communication  among  women.    It  seems  that  there  are  two  issues  at  stake   here:  One  issue  is  ignoring  women  with  different  experiences  by  treating  them  as   invisible,  and  the  other  issue  is  the  resulting  lack  of  need  for  communication  with   other  women  since  their  differences  are  not  relevant.     Spelman  has  reservations  about  such  phrases  as  “as  a  woman”  or  “oppressed   as  a  woman.”    To  her,  these  phrases  in  effect  isolate  gender  from  race  and  class  and   obscure  the  race  and  class  identity  of  White  middle-­‐class  women.    They  can  function   to  imply  that  all  other  women  have  the  same  version  of  womanness  as  that  of  White   middle-­‐class  women.    As  she  states,     …  the  solution  has  not  been  to  talk  about  what  women  have  in  common  as   women;  it  has  been  to  conflate  the  condition  of  one  group  of  women  with  the   condition  of  all  and  to  treat  the  differences  of  white  middle-­‐class  women   from  all  other  women  as  if  they  were  not  differences.  (4)     On  this  view,  the  problem  with  feminist  theories  such  as  Friedan’s  is  that  they   confuse  the  condition  of  one  group  of  women  with  the  condition  of  all  women.     1.4  Spelman’s  Critique  of  the  Normative  Implications  of  Friedan’s  Analysis   Friedan’s  view  about  women’s  liberation  is  an  example  of  the  White  middle-­‐class   perspective  that  Spelman  argues  fails  to  recognize  race  and  class  differences  among   women.    It  is  a  perspective  that  emerges  in  a  White  middle-­‐class  American  culture,   which  differs  significantly  from  the  conditions  and  needs  of  women  of  color  and  of     35   different  social  classes.    Friedan’s  solution  to  “the  problem  that  has  no  name,”  that  is,   “getting  out  of  the  house  and  into  the  workplace,”  is  widely  criticized  by  feminists,   who  argue  that  women  from  less  privileged  backgrounds  already  worked  outside   the  home  to  support  their  families  and  that  Friedan’s  analysis  assumes  the   experiences  of  White  middle-­‐class  women  as  common  to  all  women.    Many  feminists   of  color  make  the  point  that  Black  and  Hispanic  women  in  America  experience   oppression  differently  from  that  of  White  middle-­‐class  women.    For  instance,  bell   hooks  argues  that  Friedan’s  presentation  of  “American  women”  in  fact  describes  the   oppression  only  of  White  middle-­‐class  women.    Moreover,  if  Friedan’s  feminist   prescriptions  for  these  women  to  go  into  the  workplace  can  be  implemented  under   existing  social  structures,  Black  women  are  going  to  endure  continuing   subordination  because  more  Black  women  will  be  forced  into  domestic  housework   to  help  White  women  (See  hooks  2004  [1981]).     Similar  to  hooks,  Spelman  argues  that  Friedan’s  solution  to  “the  problem  that   has  no  name”  may  have  been  relevant  for  White  middle-­‐class  American  women  in   the  1950s,  but  it  has  never  been  apt  for  poor  women  or  women  from  ethnic   minorities,  who  have  always  worked  outside  the  home  as  well  as  in  it  (see  Spelman   8).    It  is  important  to  note  that  Spelman  speaks  of  jobs  in  a  different  sense  than   Friedan:  While  Spelman  thinks  every  job  counts  as  work,  Friedan  thinks  that  work   should  give  a  woman’s  life  meaning  and  identity.    However,  it  does  not  seem  that   Spelman  would  disagree  that  all  women  need  to  have  meaningful  and  rewarding   work,  so  it  is  unlikely  for  Spelman  to  suggest  that  Friedan  is  wrong  to  think  that   way.      It  seems  that  Spelman  is  suggesting  that  Friedan  is  problematically     36   generalizing  about  women  when  she  identifies  the  problem  and  when  she  identifies   the  solution.    White  middle-­‐  and  upper-­‐class  feminists  such  as  Friedan  have  been   insensitive  to  the  problems  of  women  of  other  races,  cultures,  religions,  and  classes.     For  example,  it  seems  that  Friedan  is  saying  that  all  women  have  “the  problem  that   has  no  name.”    Spelman  argues  that  thinking  in  terms  of  commonality  among   women  does  not  lead  to  a  solution  to  gender  oppression,  because  it  is  unhelpful  to   speak  of  the  condition  of  all  women  on  the  basis  of  an  analysis  of  the  condition  of  a   specific  group  of  women.    Assuming  that  there  is  a  single  problem  of  all  women  is  to   ignore  the  differences  between  White  middle-­‐class  women  and  other  women.     Spelman  urges  feminist  theorists  to  resist  the  impulse  to  make  general  claims  on   behalf  of  all  women,  as  if  there  exists  an  immutable  core  of  “womanness”  into  which   all  of  women’s  differences  dissolve.    Instead,  she  claims  that  what  it  means  to  be  a   woman  is  contingent  on  the  social  context.       However,  Spelman  acknowledges  that  generalization  about  women  is   possible  because  she  does  not  mean,  “we  ought  never  to  think  about  or  refer  to   women  ‘as  women’  or  to  men  ‘as  men’”  (186).    That  is,  she  thinks  that  generalization   of  women  is  possible,  but  undesirable.    She  emphasizes  that  it  is  impossible  to  think   of  a  woman’s  “womanness”  in  abstraction  from  the  fact  that  she  is  a  particular   woman.    She  suggests  that  feminists  should  stop  presupposing  an  “essential   ‘womanness’”  that  all  women  share;  instead,  they  should  start  to  conceptualize   gender  as  always  inflected  by  other  differences  among  women.    Spelman  argues  that   the  phrase  “as  woman”  is  “the  Trojan  horse  of  ethnocentrism”(13,  167,  185)  and  it   carries  a  heavy  political  load.    She  claims  that  assuming  an  “essential  ‘womanness’”     37   is  a  disguised  ethnocentrism.    That  is,  thinking  of  women  as  a  group  characterized   by  certain  essential  features—economic,  sexual,  reproductive,  political—has   reflected  the  social  positions  of  the  theorizer,  in  this  case  White  middle-­‐class   women.    The  theorizer  emphasizes  what  is  in  common  among  women  at  the   expense  of  ignoring  differences  and  even  conflicts  among  them.    Spelman  warns  that   feminists  need  to  be  cautious  about  such  commonalities.         At  issue  is  not  so  much  whether  there  are  or  are  not  similarities  or   differences,  but  about  how  white  middle-­‐class  feminists  try  to  use  claims   about  similarity  and  differences  among  women  in  different  directions,   depending  on  what  they  believe  such  similarity  or  dissimilarity  implies.   (139)     Spelman  gives  an  example  to  illustrate  that  claims  about  commonality  can  be   arrogant  depending  on  who  is  claiming  it.    For  instance,  if  a  Black  women  in  the   United  States  claims  that  she  shares  some  similarities  with  a  White  woman,  she  is   not  making  an  arrogant  claim  about  commonality.    However,  it  is  arrogant  for  a   White  woman  to  make  the  claim  that  a  Black  woman  is  like  her.    According  to   Spelman,  what  makes  the  difference  is  that  the  White  woman  presumes  the  power   and  the  authority  to  authorize  her  identity  while  the  Black  woman  does  not  assert   such  rights.     In  addition,  Spelman  criticizes  what  she  calls  the  “additive  analysis  of  sexism   and  racism”  (125)  as  ethnocentrism.    An  “additive  analysis  of  sexism  and  racism”   considers  that  “all  women  are  oppressed  by  sexism;  some  women  are  further   oppressed  by  racism”  (125).    This  “adding  on”  analysis  focuses  on  the  fact  that  the   racial  and  class  identity  of  Black  women  or  of  working-­‐class  women  is  made  salient,   but  ironically,  White  women’s  racial  and  class  identity  are  left  unmentioned.    This     38   irony  reveals  that  White  middle-­‐class  women  take  their  experiences  as  what  women   have  in  common  and  to  introduce  “difference”  simply  means  to  bring  in  women  who   are  not  White  and  middle-­‐class.    In  so  doing,  Spelman  claims,  White  middle-­‐class   Western  feminists  regard  their  particular  view  of  gender  as  “a  metaphysical  truth”   (186),  thereby  unintentionally  privileging  some  women  while  marginalizing  others.     What  is  implied  in  this  claim  is  that  (some)  White  women  may  not  simply  be  the   victims  of  class  or  racial  oppression,  but  are  also  sometimes  oppressors  (of  other   women).     2.    Women’s  Oppression  versus  Women’s  Identity     There  are  strengths  in  Spelman’s  arguments  about  the  interlaced  oppression  of   underprivileged  women.    She  rightly  emphasizes  the  importance  of  thinking  of   women  in  terms  of  differences  rather  than  of  an  abstract  commonality.    She   highlights  the  importance  of  recognizing  the  differential  nature  of  women’s  gender   oppression.    She  brings  people’s  attention  to  women  who  are  normally  overlooked   in  the  problematic  conceptualization  of  women.    She  raises  the  question  of  the   connection  between  gender  categorization  and  power  relations.    She  rightly  argues   that  categorization  itself  is  a  political  act  because  it  reflects  the  interests  and  social   positions  of  the  categorizer,  even  in  the  situation  that  a  powerless  person  uses  the   concept  of  the  powerful.     However,  I  suspect  that  it  is  theoretically  incorrect  to  label  the  neglect  of   differences  among  women  as  being  the  same  as  claiming  an  “essential   ‘womanness’.”    I  wonder  whether  talking  about  women  in  their  particular  contexts     39   would  by  itself  cure  “essentialism”  or  “disguised  ethnocentrism”  (in  Spelman’s   sense).    I  also  suspect  whether  it  is  helpful  for  the  feminist  movement  to  emphasize   the  rivalry  between  White  middle-­‐class  women  and  non-­‐White  non-­‐middle-­‐class   women  without  exploring  the  possibility  of  them  working  together.    In  what  follows,   I  will  criticize  Spelman’s  arguments  from  these  three  perspectives.       First  of  all,  the  theme  of  difference  is  different  from  the  theme  of  essentialism   and  it  seems  that  Spelman  assumes  these  are  the  same  argument.    Although   Spelman  acknowledges  that  generalization  is  possible,  she  mainly  emphasizes  that   generalization  can  be  seriously  misleading.    As  Spelman  states,  evidence  of   committing  “essentialism”  is  to  “take  what  I  understand  to  be  true  of  me  ‘as  a   woman’  for  some  golden  nugget  of  womanness  all  women  have  in  common”(159).     That  is,  a  feminist  becomes  open  to  the  charge  of  essentialism  if  she  claims  that   gender  oppression  that  she  experiences  is  the  same  as  the  oppression  of  women  in   general.    For  instance,  even  if  Friedan  takes  White  middle-­‐class  women’s   experiences  as  if  they  were  universal  to  all  women,  this  issue  may  or  may  not  be   associated  with  the  claim  that  women’s  oppression  can  only  be  grasped  in  its   particularity.    That  is,  claiming  women  are  oppressed  in  different  forms  is  not   necessarily  in  conflict  with  making  claims  on  behalf  of  women.    In  other  words,  the   claim  that  women  all  endure  gender  oppression  although  women  are  oppressed  in   different  forms  is  different  from  the  claim  that  all  women  enduring  gender   oppression  is  the  essence  of  women.    It  seems  to  me  that  there  are  two  issues   involved  in  Spelman’s  criticisms:  One  issue  is  whether  all  women  are  oppressed  in   the  same  way  or  whether  all  share  certain  kinds  of  oppression,  and  the  other  issue  is     40   that  whether  there  is  an  essence  of  women  or  whether  to  be  oppressed  is  part  of   that  essence.    A  women’s  essence  is  a  separate  issue  from  the  issue  that  whether   oppression  is  in  relation  with  that  essence,  but  Spelman  seems  to  say  that  if  one   generalizes  oppression,  one  is  claiming  an  essence.    So  she  is  mixing  up  these  two   issues.    The  question  of  generality  of  (certain  kinds  of)  women’s  oppression  can  be   posed  as  an  empirical  or  historical  question  and  is  independent  of  positing  a   women’s  essence.    In  other  words,  the  issue  of  a  women’s  essence  may  or  may  not   involve  a  claim  about  the  relation  of  oppression  to  that  essence  or  the  relation  of  the   generality  of  oppression  to  that  essence.    It  is  important  that  we  sort  out  this   conceptual  distinction.       Secondly,  focusing  on  the  particulars  might  not  be  able  to  cure  essentialism.     It  is  true  that  we  should  not  reject  the  idea  that  particularity  must  be  preserved  in   the  criticism  of  oppression;  that  is,  we  must  be  attentive  to  the  different  kinds  of   oppression  women  suffer  in  different  contexts.    It  is  also  true  that  we  can  imagine   strategies  that  unify  different  groups  of  women;  that  is,  different  kinds  of   oppression  may  call  for  different  practical  responses.    Yet,  it  is  a  different  point  to   argue  that  whoever  overgeneralizes  is  not  just  making  an  intellectual  or  political   error,  but  is  also  engaging  in  essentialism.    It  seems  that  Spelman  is  saying  that   essentialism  is  a  way  of  thinking  that  allows  for  or  even  encourages  empirical   overgeneralization.    So  focusing  on  essentialism  as  the  problem  leads  Spelman  to   avoid  facing  the  empirical  question  of  the  extent  to  which  generalization  might  be   justified  as  well  as  the  extent  to  which  it  is  not.    The  danger  of  ethnocentrism  exists   regardless  of  whether  we  can  generalize  or  not,  though  readiness  to  make     41   generalizations  may  reflect  ethnocentric  attitudes.    Ethnocentrism  reflects  the   narrowness  of  one’s  generalization.    It  can  be  interpreted  as  either  a  weaker   accusation  or  a  stronger  accusation.    The  weaker  accusation  of  ethnocentrism  is  that   one  is  making  intellectual  errors  by  overlooking  experiences  and  situations  of   people  other  than  their  own  ethnicity.    The  stronger  accusation  of  ethnocentrism  is   that  one  is  imposing  her  group’s  outlook  on  others,  therefore  her  analysis  might  be   racist.    The  weaker  accusation  is  an  intellectual  criticism  while  the  stronger  one  is  a   political  criticism.    Although  the  intellectual  cannot  be  separated  from  the  political,   it  might  be  more  constructive  to  focus  on  the  intellectual  criticism  when  there  is  no   evidence  of  vicious  political  intentions.    For  instance,  it  is  legitimate  for  Spelman  to   argue  that  the  form  of  the  relegation  of  housework  to  women  might  vary  in  different   contexts  and  that  “doing  housework”  is  not  the  essence  of  women,  but  it  is   theoretically  incorrect  to  charge  those  who  generalize  that  women  are  oppressed  by   taking  the  role  of  house  worker  are  claiming  an  essence  of  women  (which  Friedan   obviously  does  not  claim).    Although  Friedan  does  not  explicitly  claim  that  women   who  do  not  receive  serious  education  cannot  work  equal  to  their  top  capacities  and   cannot  obtain  a  meaningful  job,  she  seems  to  imply  that  every  woman  has  the   opportunity  to  receive  education  and  work  creative  jobs.    As  a  matter  of  fact,  many   underprivileged  women  have  to  deal  with  poverty,  hunger,  and  illness,  do  not  have   the  opportunity  to  receive  education,  and  therefore  obtain  employment  that   provides  a  living  and  is  below  their  potential.    The  problem  with  Friedan  is  not  that   she  thinks  all  women  should  receive  a  good  education  and  be  able  to  explore  their   full  potentials,  but  rather  that  she  ignores  the  obstacles  to  such  a  vision  for  most     42   women.    Friedan’s  ideal  is  less  relevant  to  poor  women  of  color,  but  it  cannot  be   denied  that  poor  women  of  color  want  to  do  meaningful  work  as  well.     Last,  claiming  social  categories  constructed  solely  in  their  particularity  can   lead  to  fragmentation  and  Spelman’s  emphasis  of  the  rivalry  of  Black  women  and   White  women  and  distrust  of  White  women’s  intention  could  make  barriers  to   feminist  solidarity  appear  to  be  greater  than  they  actually  are.    Spelman’s  argument   about  “inessential  woman”  seems  to  recommend,  unintentionally,  a  kind  of  cultural   relativism  or  contextualism.    She  makes  the  statement  that  “generalizations  about   women  are  possible”  (183),  but  they  are  culturally  contingent  and  socially   constructed.    That  is,  cultural  contexts  and  social  conditions  must  make  a  difference   to  how  gender  is  generalized.    Moreover,  Spelman  does  not  specify  how  she  would   categorize  gender  culturally,  so  she  leaves  open  the  possibility  that  gender   constructed  as  such  can  be  fragmented.    For  instance,  there  can  be  African  American   women,  Latino  women,  etc.    In  addition,  it  remains  questionable  that  Black  women   are  more  justified  to  make  claims  about  commonality  among  women  than  White   women.    I  understand  that  Spelman  is  making  a  point  that  making  claims  about   commonality  is  a  political  act,  but  it  does  not  do  White  women  justice  by   automatically  suspecting  that  they  abuse  their  social  privilege.    A  more  constructive   approach  is  to  diminish  the  opposition  between  Black  women  and  White  women   instead  of  boosting  the  rivalry.    After  all,  when  women  are  on  the  same  page  that   they  endure  gender  oppression  in  different  forms,  they  still  need  to  work  together   to  figure  out  ways  to  resist  sexism.       43   Now  it  looks  that  there  are  two  issues  entangled  in  Spelman’s  argument:  One   is  the  definition  of  women  and  the  other  is  the  condition  of  women’s  oppression.    It   seems  to  me  Spelman’s  critique  of  Friedan  conflates  these  two  issues:  She  rightly   argues  that  Friedan  makes  the  mistake  of  assuming  the  condition  of  White  middle-­‐ class  women  as  the  condition  of  all  women  and  that  Friedan  overlooks  the  fact  that   women  are  oppressed  in  different  forms.    However,  it  is  questionable  that  Spelman   is  correct  when  she  argues  that  feminists  such  as  Friedan  assume  a  womanness   (derived  from  the  condition  of  White  middle-­‐class  women)  as  a  universal  concept.     That  is,  the  issue  of  women’s  identity  and  the  issue  of  women’s  oppression  are   separate  issues,  although  they  are  closely  related.    It  remains  a  question  whether   Friedan  actually  claims  that  “the  problem  that  has  no  name”  is  essential  for  all   women.    Spelman  does  not  provide  evidence  that  Friedan  explicitly  or  implicitly   makes  claims  about  what  is  good  for  all  women.       Friedan’s  finding  is  culturally  bound:  Her  depiction  of  women’s  experiences   results  from  her  White,  middle-­‐class,  and  heterosexual  location  in  the  postwar   American  culture.    However,  criticizing  Friedan’s  arguments  as  claiming  an   “essential  ‘womanness’”  ignores  the  real  problem  that  is  attached  to  women’s   identity  and  does  not  give  Friedan  the  credit  she  deserves.    It  seems  that  Spelman  is   imputing  a  philosophical  or  intellectual  commitment  to  Friedan  for  which  there  is   no  evidence.    It  seems  that  overgeneralization  is  not  even  the  problem,  since  it  could   be  the  case  that  Friedan  is  just  focusing  on  one  group  of  women  without  saying  that   her  argument  applies  to  all  women.    She  could  still  be  criticized  for  allowing  for  the   impression  that  she  is  addressing  the  issue  for  all  women  and  she  could  still  in  fact     44   be  ethnocentric,  but  we  have  not  seen  evidence  for  that  charge.    It  is  undeniable  that   Friedan  does  generalize  from  her  own  case  and  the  similar  cases  of  her  Smith   College  alumna,  but  it  is  also  undeniable  that  Friedan’s  specific  arguments  have  to   do  with  real  gender  oppression  even  if  of  only  for  a  specific  group,  therefore   deserving  a  more  radical  understanding  than  she  was  given  credit  for.    Friedan’s   observations  and  arguments  are  confined  by  her  social  location,  but  it  does  not  do   her  arguments  justice  to  call  her  arguments  claiming  an  “essential  ‘womanness’.”     That  is,  even  if  Friedan  implicitly  overgeneralizes,  it  is  still  overkill  to  say  that  she   employs  essentialism.     In  any  case,  Friedan  raised  a  challenge  to  women’s  oppression  that  in  turn   ran  into  criticism  for  inadequacy  of  its  intellectual  assumptions.    She  raised  a   genuine  if  not  a  universal  issue  for  women.    Reading  Friedan’s  specific  arguments,  it   is  clear  that  she  cares  about  women’s  oppression  and  strives  to  find  a  way  to  end  the   oppression.    She  does  not  assume  that  simply  having  a  job  is  sufficient;  rather,  her   solution  is  that  women’s  identity  should  include  a  focus  on  reaching  their  vocational   potential.    For  instance,  she  suggests  that  one  of  the  sources  of  women’s  oppression   is  the  relegation  of  housework  to  women.    Although  it  is  clear  that  the  relegation  of   housework  to  women  is  not  the  only  source  of  women’s  oppression  and  for  some   women  it  is  not  the  source  of  oppression  at  all,  it  remains  true  that  the  relegation  of   housework  to  women  is  a  good  example  that  women  in  general  endure  massive,   structural,  systemic,  and  invisible  subordination  collectively  and  it  is  also  an   example  of  a  more  general  pattern  of  a  sexual  division  of  labor.    In  the  rest  of  this     45   dissertation,  I  will  utilize  the  example  of  the  relegation  of  housework  to  women  to   demonstrate  how  different  feminist  philosophers  discuss  the  same  issue.       3.  Crenshaw’s  Theory  of  Intersectionality       In  the  previous  sections,  I  presented  the  origination  of  the  “difference  critique”  by   critically  examining  Spelman’s  critique  of  Friedan.    I  argued  that  Spelman  is  right  to   assert  that  women  should  be  looked  at  in  their  particular  situations,  but  her   argument  that  feminist  theories  such  as  Friedan’s  argue  for  an  “essential   ‘womanness’”  is  unfruitful  because  it  confuses  the  overgeneralization  of  women’s   oppression  with  the  assertion  of  an  essence  of  women.    Spelman  is  not  the  only   feminist  who  seems  to  recommend  that  women  should  be  looked  at  within   particular  environments.    Crenshaw  develops  a  theory  of  intersectionality  that   argues  for  the  particularity  of  a  certain  group  of  women.    Crenshaw  challenges  the   conceptual  limitations  of  the  single-­‐axis  framework  that  treats  race  and  gender  as   separable.    She  uses  the  concept  of  intersectionality  to  denote  the  various  ways  in   which  race  and  gender  interact,  for  the  purpose  of  highlighting  the  distinct  social   experience  and  existence  of  Black  women.     3.1  Crenshaw’s  Critical  Analysis   Crenshaw  tries  to  find  a  way  to  best  conceptualize  the  important  differences  among   women’s  conditions  and  oppression.    She  argues  that  (White)  feminism  displays  a   tendency  to  treat  race  and  gender  as  mutually  exclusive  categories.    An  example  of   this  tendency  is  the  usage  of  the  term  “Blacks  and  women.”    Crenshaw  argues  that   “although  it  may  be  true  that  some  people  mean  to  include  Black  women  in  either     46   ‘Blacks’  or  ‘women,’  the  context  in  which  the  term  is  used  actually  suggests  that   often  Black  women  are  not  considered”  (1989,  139  n3).    She  argues  that  this   tendency  is  perpetuated  by  a  single-­‐axis  framework  that  is  reflected  in  feminist   theories  and  antiracist  politics.    By  a  “single-­‐axis  framework,”  Crenshaw  means  that   race  and  gender  are  treated  separately,  on  mutually  exclusive  axes.    As  a  result,   typical  uses  of  both  the  category  of  women  and  the  category  of  Blacks  exclude  Black   women  because  these  categories  are  developed  on  the  basis  of  the  experiences  of   otherwise-­‐privileged  members  of  the  group,  in  this  case  White  women  in  the  gender   category  and  Black  men  in  the  race  category.    So  Black  women  are  invisible  in  terms   such  as  “Black  and  women”  and  are  theoretically  erased  in  feminist  theory  and   antiracist  politics.    Black  women  are  marginalized  in  feminist  theory  and  antiracist   politics  because  neither  examines  the  experience  of  Black  women,  whose   oppression  is  located  at  the  intersection  of  race  and  gender.    Crenshaw  argues  that   the  single  categorical  axis  analysis  distorts  the  multidimensionality  of  Black   women’s  experiences.       These  problems  of  exclusion  cannot  be  solved  simply  by  including  Black   women  within  an  already  established  analytical  structure.    Because  the   intersectional  experience  is  greater  than  the  sum  of  racism  and  sexism,  any   analysis  that  does  not  take  intersectionality  into  account  cannot  sufficiently   address  the  particular  manner  in  which  Black  women  are  subordinated.   (1989,  140)       That  is  to  say,  Black  women  are  subordinated  and  marginalized  in  a  categorically   different  manner  from  other  women.    Crenshaw  utilizes  the  analogy  of  traffic  to   describe  Black  women’s  experiences.       Consider  an  analogy  to  traffic  in  an  intersection,  coming  and  going  in  all  four   directions.    Discrimination,  like  traffic  through  an  intersection,  may  flow  in   one  direction,  and  it  may  flow  in  another.    If  an  accident  happens  in  an     47   intersection,  it  can  be  caused  by  cars  traveling  from  any  number  of  directions   and,  sometimes,  from  all  of  them.    Similarly,  if  a  Black  woman  is  harmed   because  she  is  in  the  intersection,  her  injury  could  result  from  sex   discrimination  or  race  discrimination.  (1989,  149)         According  to  her,  the  oppressions  that  Black  women  experience  are  not  from  just   one  aspect  of  their  identity,  but  rather  they  are  multiplicative  and  intersectional.    In   other  words,  Black  women  are  not  simply  oppressed  as  women,  nor  are  they   oppressed  simply  as  Blacks;  rather,  they  are  oppressed  as  Black  women,  who  are  at   the  intersection  of  the  racial  oppression  and  the  gender  oppression.    Crenshaw   argues  that  both  feminist  theory  and  antiracist  politics  require  acknowledgement  of   the  complexity  of  the  oppression  of  Black  women.       3.2  Crenshaw’s  Normative  Position   Crenshaw  applies  her  concept  of  intersectionality  within  the  broader  scope  of   contemporary  identity  politics  and  claims  that  intersectionality  “might  be  more   broadly  useful  as  a  way  of  mediating  the  tension  between  assertions  of  multiple   identity  and  the  ongoing  necessity  of  group  politics”  (1991,  1296).    According  to  her,   the  theory  of  intersectionality  encourages  the  recognition  of  multiple  dimensions  of   identity  in  feminist  theory  and  antiracist  politics.3    As  she  states,     In  mapping  the  intersections  of  race  and  gender,  the  concept   [intersectionality]  does  engage  dominant  assumptions  that  race  and  gender   are  essentially  separate  categories.    By  tracing  the  categories  to  their   intersections,  I  hope  to  suggest  a  methodology  that  will  ultimately  disrupt   the  tendencies  to  see  race  and  gender  as  exclusive  or  separable.    While  the   primary  intersections  that  I  explore  here  are  between  race  and  gender,  the   concept  can  and  should  be  expanded  by  factoring  in  issues  such  as  class,   sexual  orientation,  age,  and  color.  (1991,  1244-­‐45  n9)     That  is  to  say,  the  theory  of  intersectionality  is  one  way  to  address  differences,   including  gender,  race,  and  class  differences.    It  is  developed  as  a  method  to     48   challenge  the  conceptual  limitations  of  the  tendency  to  regard  race  and  gender  as   exclusive  or  separable,  such  as  the  “additive  analysis,”  which  results  in  the  exclusion   of  Black  women.    Like  Spelman,  Crenshaw  argues  that  women  need  to  be   understood  within  the  complex  social  context  they  inhabit.    In  particular,  Crenshaw   emphasizes  the  importance  to  think  with  categories  such  as  “Black  women.”     Crenshaw  suggests  that  to  be  consistent  with  the  idea  of  intersectionality,  a   “bottom-­‐up  approach”  rather  than  a  “top-­‐down  approach”  should  be  adopted  to   alleviate  discrimination  (1989,  167).    A  bottom-­‐up  approach  begins  with  addressing   the  needs  and  problems  of  those  who  are  most  disadvantaged,  in  this  case  Black   women.    In  doing  so,  “others  who  are  singularly  disadvantaged  would  also  benefit”   (1989,  167).    She  suggests  that  in  order  to  include  Black  women  and  embrace  the   complexities  of  the  social  marginalization  of  Black  women,  both  feminist  theory  and   Black  liberationist  politics  should  distance  themselves  from  the  single-­‐axis   approach,  which  views  struggles  as  singular  issues  (either  as  a  race  issue  or  a   gender  issue).       If  their  efforts  instead  began  with  addressing  the  needs  and  problems  of   those  who  are  most  disadvantaged  and  with  restructuring  and  remaking  the   world  where  necessary,  then  others  who  are  singularly  disadvantaged  would   also  benefit.    In  addition,  it  seems  that  placing  those  who  currently  are   marginalized  in  the  center  is  the  most  effective  way  to  resist  efforts  to   compartmentalize  experiences  and  undermine  potential  collective  action.   (1989,  167)           It  seems  that  Crenshaw  is  comparing  different  ways  of  thinking  about  women’s   oppression:  She  prefers  her  “bottom-­‐up”  approach  to  the  “top-­‐down”  approach,  as   well  as  different  ways  of  thinking  about  “potential  collective  action”  that  would   respond  to  oppression.    She  claims  that  identities  constructed  at  the  intersection  of     49   multiple  dimensions  forge  “organized  identity  groups  in  which  we  find  ourselves  in   are  in  fact  coalitions,  or  at  least  potential  coalitions  waiting  to  be  formed”  (1991,   1299).    By  coalition,  she  means  attempts  to  organize  as  communities  of  color  in  the   context  of  antiracism.    According  to  her,  race  can  be  reconceptualized  on  the  basis  of   intersectionality  as  “a  coalition  between  men  and  women  of  color”  and  “a  coalition   of  straight  and  gay  people  of  color”  (1991,  1299).    In  a  sense,  “potential  collective   action”  and  “coalitions”  can  be  considered  as  forms  of  solidarity  within  the  Black   community.     3.3  Criticizing  Crenshaw’s  Critical  Analysis   Crenshaw  is  right  that  feminism  needs  a  sharper  statement  of  the  inseparability  of   race  and  gender  (and  class)  as  they  function  in  contemporary  oppression.    It  is  true   that  the  gender  experience  is  also  a  racial  one  and  that  race  is  always  experienced   within  a  gender  setting  (in  particular,  the  power  relations  associated  with  it).    The   theory  of  intersectionality  has  many  virtues:  It  reflects  more  accurately  women’s   diverse  social  experiences;  it  theoretically  situates  individuals  within  networks  of   relations  that  complicate  their  social  locations;  it  illustrates  the  virtues  and   necessity  of  approaching  situations  through  an  intersectional-­‐axis  rather  than   through  a  single-­‐axis;  and  it  reframes  the  ways  feminists  think  about  political  issues.     However,  the  theory  of  intersectionality  has  its  weaknesses  as  well,  two  of  which  I   will  address  now.     One  weakness  with  the  theory  of  intersectionality  is  that  it  regards  race  and   gender  as  self-­‐contained  concepts.    By  adding  race  and  gender  together,  the  theory   of  intersectionality  does  not  avoid  an  “additive  analysis.”    Crenshaw  works  with  the     50   image  of  two  separate  directions  coming  together  in  an  intersection,  but  the   metaphor  of  intersection  posits  disconnectedness  as  well  as  separateness  and   mutual  exclusiveness.    The  complexity  of  the  multidimensional  oppression  that   Black  women  endure  should  be  elaborated  in  a  more  sophisticated  way  than  the   additive  picture  of  intersectionality.    In  a  paper  presented  at  the  World  Conference   Against  Racism  in  2001,  Crenshaw  again  depicted  intersectionality  with  the  imagery   of  a  crossroads.4    The  crossroad  image  has  an  additive  nature:  It  sounds  as  if  we  can   account  for  complexity  by  simply  running  more  roads  through  a  designated   intersection.    Another  troubling  consequence  of  the  additive  nature  is  that  it  does   not  ensure  that  we  avoid  making  the  mistake  of  valuing  one  group’s  experiences   more  highly  than  other  groups’  experiences.    For  instance,  the  sexual  violence   against  Black  women  is  more  visible  than  that  of  Native  women  or  other  women  of   color  in  the  academic  literature  and  media.    The  additive  nature  of  the   intersectionality  image  would  re-­‐inscribe  the  fragmented  model  of  oppression  and   reify  specific  social  identities.    For  example,  the  idea  of  intersectionality  is  supposed   to  capture  the  complexity  of  intracategorical  differences,  for  instance,  the  difference   among  Black  women,  but  in  Crenshaw’s  application  of  this  idea,  she  seems  to  drop   the  emphasis  on  the  class  difference  among  Black  women.    The  alternative  model  to   intersectionality  should  understand  the  different  ways  in  which  different  social   divisions  are  concretely  enmeshed  and  constructed  by  each  other  and  how  they  are   related  to  political  and  subjective  constructions  of  identities.     The  other  weakness  with  the  theory  of  intersectionality  is  that  it  might  lead   to  fragmented  feminism  because  Crenshaw  does  not  explain  what  intersectionality     51   means  to  the  feminist  movement  as  a  whole.    Most  of  the  writings  about   intersectionality  derive  from  the  work  of  women  of  color  in  the  United  States  and  it   is  worth  exploring  whether  gender,  race,  and  class  are  similarly  entwined  in  other   national  contexts.    For  instance,  S.  Laurel  Weldon  points  out  that  capitalism   sometimes  reinforces  and  sometimes  undermines  gender  or  race  hierarchies;  race  is   a  more  salient  division  than  class  in  the  United  States  while  the  reverse  is  true  in   Europe;  gender  is  more  important  than  class  in  explaining  some  features  of   women’s  work  (see  Weldon  2006).    It  is  true  that  ideas  such  as  “global  sisterhood”   are  built  on  an  insensitive  assumption  that  all  women  are  similarly  situated  in   patriarchy,  but  it  is  equally  inaccurate  to  assume  a  fragmented  feminism.       3.4  Criticizing  Crenshaw’s  Normative  Position   Crenshaw  rightly  points  out  the  genesis  of  the  single-­‐axis  framework,  what  sustains   it  and  what  its  consequences  are.    The  political  implication  of  intersectionality  is   that  women  of  color  frequently  pursue  conflicting  political  agendas  while  White   women  normally  do  not  have  to.    Crenshaw  seems  to  suggest  that  if  Black  women’s   issues  are  solved  (since  they  are  the  most  disadvantaged  and  their  situations  are  the   most  complicated),  then  the  gender  issue  for  non-­‐Black  women  and  the  race  issue   for  non-­‐White  men  would  be  solved  more  easily.    However,  statements  like  this  have   unexpected  social  implications.   First,  the  fissure  of  women  into  at  least  two  groups—Black  women  and  non-­‐ Black  women—is  not  only  conceptual,  but  also  social  and  political.    The  theory  of   intersectionality  conceptually  splits  women  into  fragmented  social  categories,  thus   it  risks  the  unexpected  political  consequence  of  undermining  the  common  ground     52   for  feminist  practices.    As  a  result  of  applying  the  theory  of  intersectionality,  women   as  members  of  specific  intersections  of  race  and  class  might  create  their  own   feminism,  and  as  an  unintended  result,  exclude  the  solidarity  of  women.     Intersectionality  is  believed  to  be  democratic  because  it  posits  authority  for  women   of  color,  which  is  sanctioned  by  White  feminists,  to  create  their  own  feminisms.     While  I  agree  with  Crenshaw’s  critique  of  the  separability  of  social  factors,  I  worry   that,  at  least  as  she  has  articulated  it,  the  idea  of  intersectionality  may  contribute  to   a  practical  fragmentation  of  women.    There  is  the  danger  of  inhibiting  women’s   collaboration  across  racial  differences.    Although  it  is  not  clear  how  Crenshaw  would   categorize  White  women  and  other  non-­‐Black  and  non-­‐White  women,  she  seems  to   set  agendas  only  for  Black  women  and  does  not  address  the  problem  of  an  agenda   for  all  women  with  which  to  resist  gender  oppression  together.    She  suggests  that   Black  women  should  forge  a  coalition  with  Black  men  and  homosexual  Blacks,  but   she  does  not  suggest  a  coalition  of  Black  women  with  White  women  or  with  other   women  of  color.    Although  it  is  understandable  that  the  Blacks  see  racism  as  their   primary  oppression,  recommending  solidarity  only  in  the  Black  community  also   unintentionally  diminishes  the  feminist  goal  of  eliminating  gender  injustice.     Second,  it  is  understandable  that  Crenshaw  aims  to  emphasize  the   marginalization  specific  to  Black  women,  but  her  picture  of  crossroads   corresponding  to  the  theory  of  intersectionality  results  in  the  isolation  of  Black   women  from  other  women.    At  one  point,  she  claims  that  “Black  women  are   sometimes  excluded  from  feminist  theory  and  antiracist  policy  discourse  because   both  are  predicated  on  a  discrete  set  of  experiences  that  often  does  not  accurately     53   reflect  the  intersection  of  race  and  gender”  (1989,  140),  but  her  argument  has  the   same  flaw  as  the  single-­‐axis  framework  that  she  criticizes.    That  is,  Black  women  are   “predicated  on  a  discrete  set  of  experiences”  in  the  intersection  of  race  and  gender,   just  as  race  or  gender  is  “predicated  on  a  discrete  set  of  experiences”  in  a  single-­‐axis   framework.    Crenshaw  argues  that  the  single-­‐axis  framework  takes  gender  and  race   as  “essentially  separate  categories”  (1991,  1244  n9),  but  expanding  the  concept  of   intersections  by  factoring  in  issues  such  as  class,  sexual  orientation,  age,  and  color  is   not  going  to  make  these  social  factors  less  separate  and  exclusive.    That  is,  because   the  notion  of  intersectionality  does  not  provide  a  common  ground  on  which  the   privileged  and  the  underprivileged  can  communicate  and  work  together,  it  therefore   is  not  inclusive  enough.    Maybe  the  image  of  the  intersection  is  too  limited:  On  the   one  hand,  with  the  equation  of  sexism  with  a  road,  it  does  not  really  differentiate   among  kinds  of  gender  oppression;  on  the  other  hand,  with  the  image  of  the   intersection,  it  only  includes  what  overlaps  with  another  road,  e.g.,  race.    In  this   sense,  it  is  too  narrow  regarding  the  gender  dimension.     Last,  it  is  not  clear  what  Crenshaw  refers  to  when  she  talks  about  “culture.”     Since  she  thinks  that  cultures  define  identities,  it  is  strange  that  she  only  expounds   upon  the  intersectionality  of  gender  and  race  without  mentioning  culture.     Crenshaw  acknowledges  that  she  capitalizes  “Black”  as  a  proper  noun  because   “Blacks,  like  Asians,  Latinos,  and  other  ‘minorities,’  constitutes  a  specific  cultural   group”  (1991,  1244  n7)  but  Whites  or  “women  of  color”  do  not  constitute  a  specific   cultural  group.    She  emphasizes  the  role  that  cultural  images  play  in  the  social   devaluation  of  women  of  color.    As  she  says,  “The  stories  our  culture  tells  about  the     54   experience  of  women  of  color  present  another  challenge—and  a  further   opportunity—to  apply  and  evaluate  the  usefulness  of  the  intersectional   critique”(1991,  1282).    The  fact  that  it  is  unclear  what  culture  she  refers  to  explains   why  Crenshaw  suggests  the  necessity  of  the  coalition  of  the  Black  communities   without  talking  about  Black  women’s  coalition  with  other  women.     It  seems  that  Crenshaw  risks  presupposing  too  great  a  difference  among   women,  at  least  if  she  implies  that  Black  women  exist  in  an  entirely  different  culture.     Related  to  this  point,  Crenshaw’s  argument  about  the  “bottom-­‐up”  approach  is  more   doubtful  than  it  appears  to  be.    Her  argument  about  the  “bottom-­‐up”  approach   resonates  with  the  feminist  standpoint  theory.    With  all  its  merits,  for  instance   centering  experiences  of  the  most  disadvantaged,  the  “bottom-­‐up”  approach  does   not  provide  us  enough  evidence  how  the  resolution  to  the  problems  of  Black  women   applies  to  other  women.    Supposedly,  women  are  oppressed  in  different  forms,  so  it   is  difficult  to  make  the  judgment  that  some  women  are  more  disadvantaged  than   others.    Furthermore,  the  solution  to  some  women  might  not  be  suitable  for  other   women.    For  instance,  the  solution  to  Black  women’s  problems  might  not  work  for   Chinese  women  in  the  United  States  since  they  might  face  different  sets  of   challenges.    Crenshaw  seems  to  argue  for  two  contradictory  points  at  the  same  time.     On  the  one  hand,  it  seems  that  Crenshaw  is  saying  that  putting  Black  women  in  the   center  would  actually  also  illuminate  the  condition  of  White  women  and  other   women  in  certain  respects.    On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  that  Crenshaw  is  arguing   that  the  theme  of  solidarity  to  be  conceived  more  in  race  than  in  gender  terms;  that   is,  it  seems  that  Crenshaw  is  saying  Black  women  should  unite  with  Black  men     55   instead  of  White  women.    Given  the  fact  that  Black  women  are  also  possibly  victims   of  Black  men,  it  is  not  clear  how  Crenshaw’s  argument  of  solidarity  in  the  Black   community  contributes  to  the  feminist  collaboration.       4.  The  Differences  and  Similarities  between  Spelman  and  Crenshaw   Spelman  and  Crenshaw  have  their  distinctive  positions,  but  their  views  are  similar   in  certain  respects  as  well.    Both  argue  that  we  need  to  pay  attention  to  women’s   particularity,  that  is,  talking  about  women  cannot  be  separated  from  the  particular   social  locations  they  occupy.    In  particular,  their  race  and  class  background  should   also  be  considered.    Both  of  them  argue  against  the  “additive  analysis,”  which   assumes  that  the  race  or  class  issue  is  simply  something  in  addition  to  the  gender   issue  though  my  criticism  of  Crenshaw  suggests  that  she  is  not  consistent  in  this   regard.       Although  both  argue  that  feminists  should  talk  about  women  with  the   particularity  of  their  experience  in  mind,  Spelman  and  Crenshaw  seem  to  adopt   different  views.    While  Spelman  emphasizes  the  differences  among  women  as  well   as  the  ethnocentric  attitudes  and  mistakes  that  go  into  ignoring  these  differences,   Crenshaw  adds  the  argument  that  ignoring  differences  between  the  oppression  of   White  women  and  Black  women  is  a  matter  of  ignoring  racism  as  well  as  ignoring   the  fact  that  the  combination  of  sexism  and  racism  produces  a  distinctive   oppression  for  Black  women.    Spelman  discusses  the  more  general  danger  of   ignoring  any  number  of  possible  distinctive  oppressions,  while  Crenshaw  focuses   more  on  the  specific  issue  of  the  mixture  of  sexism  and  racism.    Spelman  talks  about     56   the  particularity  of  women  in  general.    In  particular,  she  criticizes  the  idea  that   women  are  defined  by  the  particularity  of  White  middle  class  women,  which  is   assumed  to  be  condition  of  all  women.    So  the  particularity  of  White  middle-­‐class   women  becomes  sort  of  an  essence  of  women,  which  implies  that  White  middle-­‐ class  women  are  “essential”  women.    In  so  doing,  the  particularities  of  non-­‐White   non  middle-­‐class  women  are  ignored;  therefore,  these  women  become  “inessential.”     The  point  that  Spelman  makes  in  her  critique  of  the  “additive  analysis”  is  that  one’s   gender  identity  cannot  be  separable  from  her  racial  and  class  identity.    However,  the   claim  that  Whites  in  the  United  States  are  not  oppressed  on  account  of  their  racial   identity  hardly  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  sexist  oppression  of  White  women   cannot  be  understood  without  reference  to  their  racial  identity.     Crenshaw  deepens  Spelman’s  argument  about  talking  about  women  with   their  particulars  in  mind  by  discussing  the  oppressions  of  Black  women  in   particular.    Crenshaw  launches  her  critique  of  a  single-­‐axis  framework  from  her   particular  social  location  as  a  Black  woman.    When  Crenshaw  uses  the  term  “women   of  color,”  she  seems  in  practice  actually  to  mean  “Black  women.”    This  is  exactly  the   way  that  Friedan  uses  “women”  to  refer  to  “women  like  me.”    It  seems  that   Crenshaw  uses  the  term  “Black  women”  and  “women  of  color”  interchangeably.    As   she  states,  “The  value  of  feminist  theory  to  Black  women  is  diminished  because  it   evolves  from  a  White  racial  context  that  is  seldom  acknowledged.    Not  only  are   women  of  color  in  fact  overlooked,  but  their  exclusion  is  reinforced  when  White   women  speak  for  and  as  women”(1989,  154).    Note  that  in  this  quote  Crenshaw’s   argument  moves  from  “Black  women”  to  “women  of  color”  as  if  they  are  the  same     57   category.    It  seems  that  Crenshaw  identifies  the  category  of  “Black  women”  with  the   category  of  “women  of  color.”    This  reasoning  is  similar  to  Friedan’s  identification  of   “White  middle-­‐class  women”  with  “women.”     Crenshaw’s  argument  appears  to  suggest  that  Black  women  are  women  of   color  or  at  least  representative  of  women  of  color:  She  makes  the  same  mistake  of   exclusion  that  she  criticizes  feminist  theory  and  antiracist  politics  of—her  category   of  women  of  color  is  not  inclusive  enough  to  include  women  of  other  colors  that  are   non-­‐White  and  non-­‐Black.    If  we  follow  her  reasoning,  we  could  come  up  with   categories  such  as  Latino  women,  Native  women,  Asian  women,  etc.  and  we  could   assume  that  each  of  these  categories  could  exclusively  represent  “women  of  color.”     We  know  right  away  that  this  reasoning  does  not  follow.    What  makes  Crenshaw’s   argument  a  fallacy  is  exactly  what  she  criticizes:  She  assumes  that  Black  women  are   the  sole  representative  of  women  of  color,  just  as  White  feminists  assume  their   experiences  represent  the  experiences  of  “all  women.”    It  is  unfair  to  say  that  they   (or  Crenshaw)  actually  think  in  this  way,  but  it  seems  this  assumption  is  hiding   beneath  their  arguments.    Perhaps  they  do  not  intend  to  assert  themselves  as  the   paradigm  case,  but  the  paradigm  is  inherent  in  their  generalizations.    So,  there  must   be  something  wrong  with  their  generalizations  or  the  context  in  which  they  make   their  assumptions.    Crenshaw  argues  from  her  experience  as  a  Black  woman  in  the   United  States,  where  the  term  “women  of  color”  is  assumed  to  refer  to  Black  or   Latino  women.    Her  failure  to  differentiate  among  women  of  color  may  reflect  a   problem  with  the  idea  of  intersectionality.    It  is  fair  to  say  that  Crenshaw   overgeneralizes  her  own  argument.    If  that  is  the  case,  then  it  may  be  fair  to  say  that     58   Crenshaw  resembles  Friedan  in  a  kind  of  overgeneralization  that  does  not,  however,   prevent  them  from  capturing  a  part  of  the  truth.    Both  Friedan  and  Crenshaw  make   claims  from  the  particular  social  location  that  they  occupy,  White  middle-­‐class   women  and  Black  women  respectively.    Whether  the  suggestive  idea  of   intersectionality  can  function  as  a  universally  applicable  theoretical  idea  is  doubtful.     Perhaps  Crenshaw  would  not  claim  it  could  be  universally  applied,  just  as  whether   Friedan  claims  that  “the  problem  that  has  no  name”  is  universally  applicable  is  open   to  debate.       One  can  argue  that  the  idea  of  intersectionality  offers  a  useful   characterization  of  the  interrelatedness  of  oppressions  arising  in  a  complex  society.     One  can  also  argue  that  it  does  not  hold  true  in  all  cultures.    For  instance,  the  race   issue  is  in  particular  salient  in  the  United  States  while  it  is  almost  invisible  in  China.     Although  there  are  56  ethnicities  in  China,  a  particular  Chinese  woman  does  not   normally  think  she  is  at  the  intersection  of  gender  and  a  particular  race.    What   makes  the  intersection  of  race  and  gender  salient  is  a  particular  social  structure,  for   instance,  the  American  society.    The  point  I  try  to  make  here  is  that  we  all  make   claims  from  our  social  locations  and  are  limited  by  our  social  experiences  and   visions.    Even  when  well-­‐intentioned,  well-­‐educated,  and  privileged  feminist   scholars  make  numerous  efforts  trying  to  think  from  the  perspective  of   underprivileged  women,  it  is  undeniable  that  we  are  all  confined  by  our  visions  no   matter  how  open-­‐minded  we  are.       However,  this  frustration  reveals  a  fact  that  women  are  oppressed  in   different  forms.    Since  women  are  oppressed  differently,  how  can  they  find  a     59   common  ground  on  which  to  work  together  to  resist  gender  oppression?     Crenshaw’s  theory  of  intersectionality  reveals  the  potentially  antagonist  rivalry   between  White  women  and  Black  women,  women  who  practice  (intentionally  or   unintentionally)  racism  and  women  who  suffer  racism,  but  she  does  not  provide  a   conception  of  how  women  at  various  intersections  can  collaborate.    For  instance,  it   is  more  likely  that  housework  is  delegated  to  women  who  are  at  the  intersection  of   race  and  gender  due  to  their  underprivileged  social  locations.    It  is  not  uncommon  to   see  women  of  color  or  female  immigrants  work  as  domestic  workers  so  that  their   employers  can  work  and  live  more  freely.    Crenshaw  does  not  explain  how  the   “bottom  up”  approach  solves  this  kind  of  social  tensions  or  conflicts.    In  this  sense,   the  theory  of  intersectionality  does  not  shed  much  light  on  the  collaboration  of   women  at  different  “intersections.”     Conclusion   In  this  chapter,  I  criticized  adherents  of  the  “particularity  argument”  for  conceiving   particularity  as  the  solution  to  the  differences  among  women.    I’ve  labeled   Spelman’s  and  Crenshaw’s  arguments  the  “particularity  argument”  because  both  of   them  argue  that  the  particulars  of  an  individual  woman  should  be  considered  to   avoid  the  danger  of  glossing  over  differences  among  women.    The  “difference”  refers   to  the  fact  that  the  race,  class,  sexual  orientation,  age,  etc.,  have  an  impact  on  how   women  experience  gender  oppression.    Spelman  argues  that  feminists  such  as   Friedan  posits  an  “essential  ‘womanness’”  by  making  claims  on  the  basis  of  the   experiences  of  middle-­‐class  women  and  that  Friedan’s  solution  to  “the  problem  that     60   has  no  name”  is  not  suitable  for  all  women  because  women  endure  gender   oppression  differently.    I  argued  that  Spelman  fails  to  distinguish  the  theme  of   difference  (whether  all  women  are  oppressed  in  the  same  way  or  whether  all  share   certain  kinds  of  oppression)  from  the  theme  of  essentialism  (whether  there  is  an   essence  of  women  or  whether  to  be  oppressed  is  part  of  that  essence).    The   intellectual  result  of  this  lack  of  distinction  is  that  focusing  on  essentialism  as  the   problem  leads  Spelman  to  avoid  facing  the  empirical  question  of  the  extent  to  which   generalization  might  be  justified  as  well  as  the  extent  to  which  it  is  not.    The   unintentional  political  result  of  this  lack  of  distinction  is  that  it  contributes  to  the   rivalry  of  women  in  terms  of  race.    Along  the  line  of  differences  between  Black   women  and  White  women,  Crenshaw  argues  that  we  need  to  adopt  the  theory  of   intersectionality  as  the  alternative  to  the  “additive  analysis  of  sexism  and  racism.”     While  the  theory  of  intersectionality  greatly  advances  feminist  discussions  about   differences  among  women  by  paying  attention  to  socially  disadvantaged  women,  it   has  unintentional  intellectual  and  political  results.    Intellectually,  it  seems  that   feminism  now  is  divided  into  separate  feminisms,  such  as  Black  feminism,  Latino   feminism,  Asian  feminism.    Politically,  feminist  struggles  are  dissolved  into  localized,   regional,  and  specific  struggles  representing  the  interests  of  particular  women  or   particular  groups  of  women.       The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  suggest  that  feminists  should  focus  their   attention  on  their  intellectual  and  normative  assumptions  for  the  purpose  of   facilitating  women’s  collaborative  work.    Feminists  like  Friedan  do  not  claim  an   “essential  ‘womanness’”;  rather,  she  fails  to  consider  the  situation  of  most  women     61   when  she  frames  her  problem  in  terms  of  White  middle-­‐class  circumstances.    Or  at   the  most  she  overgeneralizes,  although  we  have  not  established  this  criticism  on  the   basis  of  textual  quotations.    In  other  words,  the  target  of  the  “difference  critique”   should  not  be  an  “essence”  of  women  but  rather  problematic  generalizations  of   women’s  oppression  in  different  forms.    Differences  in  the  form  women’s   oppression  takes  per  se  are  not  problems;  rather,  the  problem  is  how  to  perceive   and  generalize  these  differences  properly.    For  example,  we  would  have  to  ask  why   or  how  the  intermeshedness  of  racism  with  sexism  might  make  an  alliance  among   women  to  transform  that  status  quo.    In  other  words,  we  need  to  explore  whether  it   is  possible  for  groups  of  women,  for  instance,  Black  women  and  White  women,  to   address  their  respective  racial  make-­‐up  and  cultures  sufficiently  for  them  to   cooperate  against  sexism.       This  chapter  has  a  historical  and  a  conceptual  point:  By  presenting  the   conception  and  criticism  of  the  alleged  claiming  an  “essential  ‘womanness’,”  I   depicted  a  revival  of  feminism  in  which  the  challenge  to  women’s  oppression  in  the   United  States,  such  as  Friedan’s  arguments,  came  to  be  challenged  as  being  too   narrow.    We  can  see  how  one  might  think  that  a  specific  approach  is  good  for   women,  such  as  Friedan’s,  but  that  in  practice  it  is  too  limited.    We  can  also  see  that   some  of  the  errors  associated  with  an  “essential  ‘womanness’”  impede  mutual   understanding  and  cooperative  action  in  cultural  and  political  contexts.       I  have  argued  that  women  are  oppressed  in  different  forms,  but  in  the   arguments  that  I  utilized  in  the  chapter,  there  is  one  related  issue  lingering:  the   issue  of  women’s  identity.    Both  Spelman  and  Crenshaw  talk  about  the  differences  in     62   the  gender  oppression  that  women  endure  as  well  as  how  to  understand  women’s   identity  given  differences  in  their  oppression.    However,  the  emphasis  on   particularity  grasps  differences  among  women  but  fails  to  construct  a  useful   category  of  women  for  helping  with  women’s  collective  resistance  to  structural   oppression.    The  claim  that  women  endure  gender  oppression  does  not  necessarily   lead  to  the  conclusion  that  they  endure  gender  oppression  in  the  same  way.    It   seems  to  me  that  the  “difference  critique”  shifts  between  the  discussion  of   “differences  of  women’s  gender  oppression”  (an  empirical  question)  and  the   discussion  of  “whether  a  social  category  of  women  is  necessary  and  possible  given   differences  among  their  oppression”  (a  metaphysical  question).    For  instance,   Spelman’s  critique  of  an  “essential  ‘womanness’”  is  a  metaphysical  argument  while   what  she  criticizes  is  an  empirical  observation.    Although  “women”  and  “women’s   oppression”  are  closely  related,  it  is  helpful  for  us  to  make  a  distinction  between  the   two  concepts  so  that  we  can  see  what  is  at  stake  in  the  “difference  critique.”    It   seems  that  we  cannot  avoid  using  the  term  “woman”  and  when  we  use  it  we  offer  it   certain  connotations.    For  instance,  what  exactly  do  I  mean  when  I  say  “women  are   oppressed  in  different  forms”?    What  “women”  am  I  talking  about?    Is  it  a  universal   “womanness”  that  is  subject  to  overgeneralization?    Or  is  it  just  a  term  used  for   convenience  because  we  otherwise  cannot  even  talk  about  “women’s”  oppression?     So  the  question  is:  Is  it  possible  to  define  women  with  all  differences  among  them?     In  addition,  is  the  attempt  to  define  women  necessary  at  all?    I  argue  that  we  need  to   construct  the  category  of  women  in  such  a  way  that  we  can  address  differences     63   among  women  as  well  as  achieving  our  collective,  structural,  and  political  goals,   which  I  will  address  in  the  next  chapter.     64   CHAPTER  2     WOMEN’S  IDENTITY  WITHIN  DIFFERENCE:  CRITICIZING  CATEGORY   SKEPTICISM       Feminists  have  scrutinized  the  issue  of  categorization,  that  is,  whether  the  category   of  women  is  a  legitimate,  necessary,  or  possible  social  category,  for  several  decades.     According  to  some  feminists,  using  the  category  of  women  or  the  concept  of  women   can  be  problematic  in  certain  contexts  for  certain  purposes.    The  general   metaphysical  perspective  of  gender  is  under  attack  because  it  fails  to  take  into   account  racial,  cultural,  and  class  differences  among  women  and  because  gender  is   considered  a  detrimental  concept.    Feminists  who  fall  under  the  banner  of   postmodernism  generally  make  this  claim  on  the  latter  ground,  asserting  that   gender  is  unreal.    In  this  chapter,  I  will  focus  on  gender  skepticism  in  this  regard.       This  chapter  explores  how  the  category  of  women  raises  questions  for   feminist  criticism  and  politics.    Feminist  criticism  and  politics  are  interested  in   understanding  and  resisting  gender  oppression,  yet  speaking  of  the  oppression  of  all   women  may  be  misleading.    Speaking  of  women  in  general  is  problematic  because   doing  so  may  miss  or  even  obscure  the  ways  in  which  other  social  conditions  (other   forms  of  social  oppression)  overlap  with  or  even  modify  gender  oppression  to  a   certain  extent.    Indeed,  it  may  even  be  that,  even  if  all  women  suffer  from  some   aspects  of  gender  oppression,  these  oppressions  along  with  other  differences  in   historical  circumstances,  may  result  in  their  oppressions  being  quite  different  from   those  of  other  women.    In  this  chapter,  I  explain  what  is  built  into  the  uses  of  the   term  “category,”  which  seems  loaded  from  both  the  critics  and  advocates.    I  consider     65   how  to  construct  a  category  in  a  way  that  is  consistent  with  recognizing  differences   among  women.    I  argue  that  the  category  of  women  should  be  constructed  in  a  way   that  reflects  women’s  differences,  accommodates  the  relationship  between  power   and  categorization,  and  contributes  to  women’s  collaboration.       I  begin  by  critically  examining  Wendy  Brown’s  version  of  postmodernist   category  skepticism.    Brown  suggests  that  the  idea  of  a  unified  and  coherent  subject   should  be  abandoned.    She  sees  the  implicit  use  of  this  philosophical  idea  as   contributing  to  a  normative  criticism;  that  is,  by  attaching  an  injured  identity  to   women,  feminist  theory  perpetuates  a  sense  of  victimhood  as  primary  to  women’s   identity.    Therefore,  feminists  need  an  alternative  that  is  political  (rather  than   moral).  I  argue  that  a  past  of  injury  is  not  inherent  in  women’s  identity  and  a   feminist  politics  is  not  at  odds  with  identity  politics.    Without  ontological  or   epistemological  support,  feminist  politics  cannot  go  as  far  as  Brown  hopes.    I  then   summarize  Marilyn  Frye’s  position  on  category  construction.    Frye  points  out  that   plural  identity  should  be  categorized  as  a  practice  of  pluralism  in  a  logically  positive   category  construction,  in  which  genuine  subjectivities  A:B  displace  the  A/not-­‐A   pseudo-­‐dualism.    She  argues  that  plural  identities  are  loci  of  political  solidarity  and   coalition  and  that  the  category  of  women  does  not  have  to  be  defined  by  a  set  of   necessary  and  sufficient  conditions.    Frye’s  solution  that  the  category  of  women   should  be  constructed  through  multilayered  correlations  sets  an  example  of  how  the   concept  of  women  can  be  generalized  within  women’s  differences.    I  argue  that  a   category  of  women  is  necessary  for  feminist  projects  and  that  it  is  not  essentialist  to   make  use  of  one  through  a  discussion  of  the  relationship  between  essentialism  and     66   ethnocentrism.    The  debates  over  essentialism  often  conflate  essentialism  with   ethnocentrism  because  of  the  misunderstanding  of  these  two  terms.    Then  I   elaborate  on  the  connection  between  the  construction  of  the  category  of  women  and   the  advancement  of  women’s  solidarity.    I  conclude  that  women’s  identity   constructed  in  the  way  that  Frye  proposes  would  be  helpful  for  diverting  feminism   from  the  debates  over  essentialism  and  would  refocus  it  on  feminist  gender  justice.       1.  Brown’s  Postmodernist  Category  Skepticism   In  this  section,  I  focus  on  the  limitations  of  Brown’s  critical  analysis  about  women’s   identity  and  of  her  normative  standing  on  the  issue  of  identity.       1.1  Brown’s  Critical  Analysis   Brown  is  one  of  the  feminists  that  claim  postmodern  theories5  are  effective  in   illustrating  how  feminist  scholars  have  supplanted  the  notion  of  universal  “woman”   with  the  incorporation  of  “difference”  into  feminism.    The  postmodern  feminist  anti-­‐ essentialist  critique  is  occasionally  carried  to  the  extreme  of  asserting  that  no   generalizations  at  all  can  or  should  be  made  about  women.    Going  along  with  Judith   Butler’s  argument  of  “gender  trouble”(1990),  Brown  suggests  that  the  idea  of  a   unified  and  coherent  subject,  i.e.,  women  as  subject,  be  abandoned  because  it   contributes  to  equating  gender  oppression  with  an  injured  identity  for  women.    In   so  doing,  feminist  theory  perpetuates  a  sense  of  victimhood  as  having  to  do  with  an   injury  to  women’s  identity.    She  argues  that  by  claiming  a  women’s  identity,   feminists  are  making  at  least  two  mistakes:  One  is  that  feminists  defend  an   unjustified  “epistemological  foundation”  (1995,  45)  and  the  other  is  that  they  attach     67   “a  past  of  injury”  to  women  (74).    She  states  that  a  feminist  politics  should  not  rely   on  epistemology  and  ontology,  nor  should  it  rely  on  unjustified  moral  claims.     Brown  argues  that  clinging  to  a  women’s  identity  means  that  you  do  not  let   go  of  the  past  because  producing  identity  is  “both  bound  to  the  history  that   produced  it  and  as  a  reproach  to  the  present  which  embodies  that  history”  (73).     This  past  cannot  be  redeemed  unless  the  identity  ceases  to  be  invested  in  it,   and  it  cannot  cease  to  be  invested  in  it  without  giving  up  its  identity  as  such,   thus  giving  up  its  economy  of  avenging  and  at  the  same  time  perpetuating  its   hurt—“When  he  then  stills  the  pain  of  the  wound  he  at  the  same  time  infects   the  wound.”  (73,  emphasis  in  original)     That  is,  by  investing  in  the  unredeemable  injury,  feminist  identity  politics   perpetuates  the  hurt  of  the  injury,  so  we  need  to  avoid  the  notion  of  identity  in  order   to  cure  the  injury  on  identity  and  we  should  not  linger  upon  the  identity  that  has  a   wounded  past.    Brown  seems  to  suggest  that  the  suffering  associated  with  women’s   oppression  cannot  be  relieved  by  a  politics  that  focuses  on  identity.    According  to   her,  the  premise  of  identity  is  exclusion  (those  who  do  not  share  the  identity  are   excluded)  and  the  formation  of  identity  is  a  site  of  exclusion.    Moreover,  claiming  an   identity  implies  an  unjustified  moral  claim.     In  locating  a  site  of  blame  for  its  powerlessness  over  its  past—a  past  of  injury,   a  past  as  a  hurt  will—and  locating  a  “reason”  for  the  “unendurable  pain”  of   social  powerlessness  in  the  present,  it  [identity]  converts  this  reasoning  into   an  ethicizing  politics,  a  politics  of  recrimination  that  seeks  to  avenge  the  hurt   even  while  affirms  it,  discursively  codifies  it.  (74)     In  other  words,  by  reminding  women  of  the  injured  past  and  the  powerlessness,   identity  does  not  devoid  of  the  injury  but  rather  reinforces  it.    Moreover,  a  moral   approach  of  power  replaces  a  more  promising  way  of  constructing  a  political   culture.       68   Brown  argues  that  feminist  movements  such  as  “consciousness-­‐raising”  tend   to  regard  women’s  experiences  as  “Truth”  and  thus  claims  an  “epistemological   foundation.”    She  criticizes  that  women’s  experiences  are  “anointed  as  Truth,  and   constitute  the  foundations  of  feminist  knowledge”  (42).    In  this  way,  women’s   experiences  “acquire  a  status  that  is  politically  if  not  ontologically  essentialist— beyond  hermeneutics”  (42).    According  to  Brown,  the  “epistemological  foundation”   and  “Truth”  are  the  ground  of  moral  claims:  Anointed  as  Truth,  women’s   experiences  are  always  related  to  powerlessness  while  the  power  always  distorts   because  people  who  hold  it  are  in  the  position  of  dominating  others.    That  is,  Truth   is  always  on  the  side  of  the  disadvantaged,  who  are  always  without  power  and  in  the   position  of  reproaching  power  because  power  is  possessed  and  abused  by  who  hold   it.    In  doing  so,  feminists  claim  their  truth  is  less  partial  and  more  moral  than  the   truth  of  those  who  misuse  power.    According  to  Brown,  in  this  way,  by  claiming  an   “epistemological  foundation,”  feminists  hold  the  ground  of  moral  critique  on  power,   which  Brown  depicts  as  “ressentiment”  (46,  emphasis  in  original)  and  “a  political   practice  of  revenge”  (73).    She  argues  that  feminists  cannot  move  forward  in   feminist  politics  if  we  cannot  get  out  of  the  mode  of  moral  reproach.     Brown  thus  denies  the  moral  basis  for  the  feminist  standpoint  theory.    She   challenges  the  logic  of  standpoint  theory—the  subject  harbors  a  truth  and  that  truth   opposes  power—and  points  out  that  this  logic  is  problematic  because  standpoint   theory  has  a  false  belief  that  a  situated  knowledge  is  capable  of  achieving  universal   norms.    She  argues  that  feminist  standpoint  theory  is  politically  essentialist  because   it  does  not  offer  an  explanation  of  the  legitimacy  of  how  women’s  experiences  are  to     69   be  granted  as  epistemologically  grounded.    Without  this  explanation,  “This  strand  of   feminist  foundationalism  transports  the  domain  of  Truth  from  reason  to  subjectivity”   (42).    Granting  the  subjectivity  of  the  subject  as  the  source  of  truth  is  problematic   because  the  subject  adheres  to  its  own  truth-­‐value,  which  is  questionable  in  itself.     In  fact,  according  to  Brown,  this  is  a  manifestation  of  partiality  and  self-­‐interest  for   standpoint  of  women’s  experiences  “cannot  admit  to  partiality  or  contestability,  and   above  all  cannot  be  subjected  to  hermeneutics  without  giving  up  its  truth  value”   (42-­‐3).    Therefore,  Brown  argues  that  standpoint  theory’s  need  for  grounded   knowledge  of  its  own  is  equally  unjustified  as  the  knowledge  derived  from  male   supremacy.    This  groundless  justification  reveals  the  tension  and  inconsistency  in   standpoint  theory:  On  the  one  hand,  it  claims  that  it  is  a  theory  of  social  construction;   on  the  other  hand,  it  claims  that  women’s  experiences  and  situations  are   epistemologically  more  privileged.    Standpoint  theory  thus  creates  a  dilemma:   women’s  experiences,  as  well  as  other  social  experiences,  are  all  socially   constructed  and  culturally  varied,  but  women’s  experiences  count  more  as  an   epistemological  ground.    Thus,  she  suggests  giving  up  epistemological  foundations;   that  is,  we  should  surrender  the  moral  claim  that  people  of  certain  groups  are  more   epistemologically  privileged  than  other  groups.     Brown  argues  that  identity  politics  and  postmodernity  are  rivalries  in  the   sense  that  postmodernity  dismantles  the  collective  identity  that  is  characteristic  of   modern  communities  while  identity  politics  is  a  reaction  to  the  dismantlement  of   identity.    According  to  her,  the  subject,  which  is  “rational,  willing,  autonomous,  and   self-­‐determining,”  is  a  production  of  modernity  (40).    The  affirmation  of  the  subject     70   makes  it  possible  to  reify  women’s  experiences  as  sources  of  an  unquestionable   Truth,  which  is  characteristic  of  modernity  and  liberalism.    One  of  the  tasks  of   postmodernity  is  to  deconstruct  the  subject  by  “postmodern  decentering,   disunifying  and  denaturalizing  of  the  subject”  (40).   When  the  notion  of  a  unified  and  coherent  subject  is  abandoned,  we  not  only   cease  to  be  able  to  speak  of  woman  or  of  women  in  an  unproblematic  way,   we  forsake  the  willing,  deliberate,  and  consenting  “I”  that  liberalism’s   rational-­‐actor  model  of  the  human  being  proffers,  and  we  surrender  the   autonomous,  rights-­‐bearing  fictional  unity  that  liberalism  promises  to  secure.     (40)     While  Brown  admits  that  gender  is  “a  marker  of  subjects”  and  “an  axis  of   subordination,”  she  questions  the  tactic  advanced  by  feminist  theories  to  convert   gender  to  a  center  of  foundational  self.    According  to  her,  it  is  problematic  to  fix  or   circumscribe  what  “woman”  is  because  if  feminist  theory  does  so,  then  it  cannot   distinguish  its  notion  of  women  from  “autonomous,  rights-­‐bearing  fictional  unity   that  liberalism  promises  to  secure.”    In  other  words,  if  the  subject  is  a  creation  of   modernity  and  liberalism,  then  feminist  theory  in  fact  falls  into  the  same  camp  with   liberalism  when  it  fails  to  challenge  the  historical  constitution  of  the  subject.    It   seems  that  Brown  connects  modernity  and  liberalism  with  “the  unified  subject,”   which  is  in  contrast  to  the  fact  that  pluralities  are  “unwieldy  and  shifting”  (37)  to   such  an  extent  that  they  cannot  be  pinned  down.    A  derivation  from  these  “unwieldy   and  shifting”  pluralities  is  also  illegitimate  for  individuals  who  are  already  justifiably   settled  in  “their  own  habits  and  arguments”  (37);  thus  any  generalization  that  goes   beyond  those  habits  and  arguments  transgresses  the  boundary  of  “their  own  habits   and  arguments.”    Brown  seems  to  use  the  term  “plurality”  in  the  same  sense  of   “difference.”    For  instance,  she  states  that  “politics  refers  always  to  a  condition  of     71   plurality  and  difference”  (38),  but  sometimes  she  uses  the  term  “plurality”  as  a   feature  of  postmodernity  to  contrast  the  “individuality”  of  modernity,  which  insists   on  a  coherent  subject.   Dispensing  with  the  unified  subject  does  not  mean  ceasing  to  be  able  to   speak  about  our  experiences  as  women,  only  that  our  words  cannot  be   legitimately  deployed  or  constructed  as  larger  or  longer  than  the  moments  of   the  lives  they  speak  from;  they  cannot  be  anointed  as  “authentic”  or  “true”   since  the  experience  they  announce  is  linguistically  contained,  socially   constructed,  discursively  mediated,  and  never  just  individually  “had.”  (40)     It  is  clear  that  Brown  insists  that  only  specific  experiences  count  and  therefore   generalizations  from  the  particulars  are  illegitimate  and  impossible.    Generalization   from  specific  experiences  run  the  risk  of  reifying  the  diversified  and  lived   experiences.         1.2  Brown’s  Normative  Position   The  common  political  vision  that  Brown  wants  to  popularize  is  the  desire  to  struggle   for  “what  we  want”  or  what  “I  want  for  us,”  hence  this  not  an  identity  politics  (49,   75).    She  asserts  that  the  moral  ground  for  identity,  truth,  and  norms  is  more   problematic  than  useful  because  the  identity  and  experiences  of  women  are  a   thoroughly  contingent  construction.    She  suggests  detaching  the  political  from  the   moral  goal  and  contesting  for  a  “sheerly  political”  struggle  (45).     Surrendering  epistemological  foundations  mean  giving  up  the  ground  of   specifically  moral  claims  against  domination—especially  the  avenging  of   strength  through  moral  critique  of  it—and  moving  instead  into  the  domain  of   the  sheerly  political:  “wars  of  position”  and  amoral  contests  about  the  just   and  the  good  in  which  truth  is  always  grasped  as  coterminous  with  power,  as   always  already  power,  as  the  voice  of  power.  (45,  emphasis  in  original)     That  is,  observations  such  as  women’s  experiences  or  confessions  do  not  have   higher  moral  values  than  others  and  women’s  experiences  are  not  devoid  of  power.       72   So  Brown  seems  to  reject  both  a  women’s  identity  and  the  idea  of  an  ethical   standard  that  might  be  associated  with  it.     Then  what  should  women  do  with  their  “past  of  injury”?    Brown  suggests   women  learn  “the  virtues  of  ‘forgetting’”  because  “identity  structured  in  part  by   ressentiment  resubjugates  itself  through  its  investment  in  its  own  pain”  (74).    That   is,  if  feminists  continue  to  construct  identity  politics,  they  are  going  to  continue   investing  in  the  pain  that  is  associated  with  women’s  identity.           What  would  be  required  for  us  to  live  and  work  politically  without  such   myths  [that  women’s  experiences  are  more  moral  and  less  partial],  without   claiming  that  our  knowledge  is  uncorrupted  by  a  will  of  power,  without   insisting  that  our  truths  are  less  partial  and  more  moral  than  “theirs”?    Could   we  learn  to  contest  domination  with  the  strength  of  an  alternative  vision  of   collective  life,  rather  than  through  moral  reproach?    In  a  word,  could  we   develop  a  feminist  politics  without  ressentiment?  (46)     We  can  see  that  the  alternative  that  Brown  presents  is  a  plan  that  is  purely   political  rather  than  being  based  on  ontology,  epistemology,  or  moral  claims:  We   should  cultivate  “feminist  postmodern  political  spaces”  and  practice  “postmodern   judgment”  (50).    According  to  Brown,  these  political  spaces  are  not  sharply  bounded   or  fixed  but  rather  open  to  contestation  and  public  arguments.    Different  from   judgments  that  rely  on  ontology  or  epistemology,  postmodern  judgments  are   constructed  in  the  public  realm:   Such  judgments  require  learning  how  to  have  public  conversations  with  each   other,  arguing  from  a  vision  about  the  common  (“what  I  want  for  us”)  rather   than  from  identity  (“who  I  am”),  and  from  explicitly  postulated  norms  and   potential  common  values  rather  than  from  false  essentialism  or   unreconstructed  private  interests.  (51)     That  is,  a  political  struggle  in  these  postmodern  spaces  is  the  best  approach  for   eliminating  oppression  because  of  its  detachment  from  subjectivity,  identity,     73   morality,  and  normativity.    In  a  sense,  such  a  politics  is  a  matter  of  power  against   power.    Brown  focuses  on  the  shift  from  ontological  claims  (“am”  or  “being”)  to   political  ones  (“wanting”).    She  believes  that  this  is  a  “slight  shift”  from  ontological   claims  to  a  political  one,  from  fixed  interests  or  experiences  to  desires  in  motion,   and  from  “who  I  am”  to  “what  I  want  for  us.”    By  requiring  “what  I  want  for  us,”  we   go  beyond  private  interests  of  certain  people,  which  are  associated  with  self-­‐ interests  in  the  liberal  sense,  to  the  potential  common  values  of  the  public,  because   “what  I  want  for  us”  is  a  desire  for  “a  political  or  collective  good”  (75),  which  is   different  from  the  liberal  expression  of  self-­‐interest.       1.3  Critique  of  Brown’s  Critical  Analysis   Brown  seems  to  associate  reliance  on  the  metaphysical  idea  of  the  subject  with  an   essentialist  idea  of  women  and  of  an  identity  specific  to  women.    Her  criticism  of   identity  politics  is  questionable  from  three  perspectives:  (1)  identity  politics  relies   on  truth  claims;  (2)  the  subject  is  individual  in  the  liberal  sense;  and  (3)   constructing  identity  reinforces  the  injury  of  women.    I  will  launch  my  critique  from   these  perspectives.       First  of  all,  Brown’s  criticism  is  groundless  when  she  posits  that  feminist   standpoint  theory  makes  truth  claims.    It  might  be  useful  to  look  into  specific   feminist  standpoint  theorists  who  suggest  we  start  our  epistemological  process   from  women’s  experiences.    For  instance,  Sandra  Harding  argues  that  some  social   situations,  namely  the  situations  of  the  oppressed,  are  scientifically  superior  to   others  with  respect  to  epistemic  privilege.    Harding  asserts  that  the  discursive   accounts  of  women’s  lives  “provide  richer  resources  than  others  for  understanding     74   natural  and  social  worlds—that  they  are  epistemically  privileged  in  this  sense”   (2004b,  260).    Harding  states  that  the  goal  of  her  project  is  to  “study-­‐up”;  that  is,  to   “understand  the  conceptual  practices  of  dominant  institutions  through  which  their   exploitation  was  designed,  maintained,  and  made  to  seem  natural  and  desirable  to   everyone”  (2004a,  29).    That  is,  she  means  not  only  to  start  with  but  also  go  beyond   specific  experiences  of  the  marginalized  to  disclose  structures  of  marginalization.     She  proposes  that  new  subjects  of  knowledge  should  be  valued  over  subjects  of   conventional  knowledge.    A  characteristic  of  new  subjects  is  the  idea  of  “strong   reflexivity”  (1993,  69).    That  is,  the  subject  of  knowledge  is  considered  as  part  of  the   object  of  knowledge.    This  leads  to  her  discussion  about  objectivity,  because  strong   reflexivity  is  a  resource  for  objectivity.    However,  Harding  is  not  referring  to  truth   when  she  talks  about  maximizing  objectivity;  rather,  she  suggests  the  use  of  “less   false  beliefs”  instead  of  “truth”  (2004b,  256).    According  to  her,  the  benefits  of  using   “less  false  beliefs”  is  that  it  does  not  invoke  the  notions  of  Truth  in  the  conventional   sense  of  the  term,  and  it  avoids  the  unassailable  exclusiveness  of  being  “the  Truth”,   or  “the  one  true  story.”    In  fact,  what  strong  objectivity  addresses  is  not  an   epistemological  issue;  rather,  as  Harding  argues,  it  is  a  moral  and  political  issue.     When  we  start  off  our  thinking  from  the  lives  and  experiences  of  the  oppressed,  we   implicitly  acknowledge  that  we  are  beginning  with  an  unrecognized  and   unacknowledged  reality.    I  do  not  think  such  moral  claims  should  be  interpreted  as   truth  claims  as  Brown  argues.     Second,  Brown  fails  to  distinguish  the  subject  of  feminist  theory  from  the   unified  subject  of  liberalism.    The  subject  in  feminist  theory  is  not  “a  fictional  unity,”     75   but  rather  a  subject  located  and  situated  in  the  social  context  of  power  relations.     There  is  a  fallacy  in  Brown’s  refusal  of  “the  subject”:  If  a  theory  advocates  “the   subject,”  then  it  is  no  different  from  liberalism.    Apparently,  advocating  the  idea  of   the  subject  is  not  necessarily  a  manifestation  of  liberalism  for  the  point  is  about   whether  the  notion  of  the  subject  is  reformulated  to  include  experiences  of   underrepresented  subjects  to  such  an  extent  that  the  subject  is  more  inclusive  and   representative,  and  not  about  whether  we  should  not  have  a  notion  of  the  subject.     Liberalism  advocates  an  individualistic  subject  while  feminist  theorists  such  as   Spelman  and  Crenshaw  suggest  that  the  notion  of  the  subject  be  generalized  from   the  concrete  context  where  individuals  are  situated.    As  Lisa  Schwartzman  argues,   liberalism  focuses  “primarily  on  each  and  every  individual  as  an  individual,  rather   than  also  calling  attention  to  the  social  context  and  to  the  relations  of  power  in   which  individuals  live”  (2006,  7).    In  other  words,  by  focusing  on  individuals’  self-­‐ interests  and  by  ignoring  the  social  context  of  power  relations,  the  subject  in   liberalism  is  an  individual  as  individual  rather  than  an  individual  of  a  social  group.     On  the  contrary,  the  subject  in  feminism  is  a  member  of  a  social  group,  in  this  case,   the  social  group  of  “women,”  which  helps  to  reveal  the  fact  that  women  are   oppressed  not  as  individual  but  as  members  of  the  social  group  “women.”     Last,  Brown  mistakes  the  “injured”  identity  for  women’s  nature.    The  identity   is  a  site  of  inclusion  rather  than  exclusion  as  Brown  criticizes.    She  seems  to  say  that   speaking  in  terms  of  women  only  risks  lapsing  into  a  fixation  on  identity.    However,   women’s  identity  is  a  much  more  diverse  and  dynamic  concept  than  Brown   speculates  and  constructing  women’s  identity  does  not  reinforce  women’s  wounded     76   past.    The  question  is  determining  what  the  best  language  for  characterizing   women’s  oppression  is  and  the  demands  that  challenge  it.    According  to  Brown,  in   order  to  cure  the  injury  on  identity,  we  need  to  avoid  the  notion  of  identity,  but  her   argument  is  not  convincing:  It  is  not  because  identity  perpetuates  the  injury  but   because  concrete  content—for  instance,  the  past  of  injury—  is  not  brought  into  the   discussion  of  identity.    Brown  makes  use  of  Freud’s  theory  to  explain  how  the  past   of  injury  is  reinforced:  A  compulsion  to  repeat  traumatic  events  from  the  past  is   motivated  by  our  desire  to  gain  control  over  the  event,  but  this  compulsive   repetition  maintains  the  power  of  the  event  over  us  by  making  it  the  organizing   focus  of  our  actions  and  choices.    Brown  also  makes  use  of  Nietzsche’s  nihilism:   “Man”  would  rather  will  nothingness  than  will  nothing  at  all,  therefore  those  who   embrace  their  identity  categories  in  fact  prefer  oppression  to  an  annihilation.    She   accepts  Nietzsche  and  is  questioning  speaking  “in  the  name  of  women,”  but  neither   Freud’s  theory  nor  Nietzsche’s  is  useful  to  capture  the  nature  of  feminist  theories   and  practices:  Feminists  theorize  and  act  in  the  name  of  women  in  order  to  break   through  the  repetitive  patriarchal  power  and  to  eliminate  the  oppression  of  women.     1.4  Critique  of  Brown’s  Normative  Position   Brown  is  correct  when  she  points  out  that  ressentiment  should  not  be  the  drive  for   feminist  practices  and  movements.    It  is  true  that  there  is  rivalry  even  within  the   feminist  practices,  for  instance,  the  separation  of  Black  feminism  and  White   feminism.    Although  this  sort  of  rivalry  is  not  really  the  same  as  the  ressentiment   that  Brown  talks  about,  she  nevertheless  gives  us  a  warning  that  ressentiment  is  not     77   a  constructive  force  of  feminist  movements.    However,  Brown’s  normative   arguments  are  not  without  flaws.    I  will  address  three  of  them  here.     First  of  all,  Brown’s  proposal  is  that  by  detaching  from  an  “injured”  identity   and  creating  “feminist  postmodern  political  spaces,”  a  feminist  politics  that  does  not   rely  on  ontology,  epistemology,  and  moral  claims  is  the  most  promising  approach   for  feminism.    It  seems  that  Brown  assumes  that  oppression  is  linked  with  women’s   identity  and  if  women  throw  off  such  an  identity  (“sites  of  injury”)  and  cultivate   “postmodern  political  judgments,”  then  they  would  gain  emancipation.    Or  at  least   she  is  saying  that  emphasizing  identity  is  not  the  most  effective  way  of  challenging   oppression.    Yet,  her  normative  standing  on  the  issue  of  oppression  is  built  on  a   misunderstanding  of  identity.    For  instance,  she  argues  that  we  should  not  and   cannot  go  beyond  specific  experiences  because  “our  words  cannot  be  legitimately   deployed  or  constructed  as  larger  or  longer  than  the  moments  of  the  lives  they   speak  from”  (40).    This  argument  is  rather  unfruitful  because  by  rejecting  such  an   approach  of  generalization  as  metaphysical,  it  is  hard  to  find  out  what  and  how  I   want  such  and  such  for  us.    In  other  words,  if  one  wants  to  find  out  “what  I  want  for   us,”  then  one  needs  to  figure  out  “who  are  us”  and  “why  I  want  this  for  us.”    In   addition,  it  is  not  clear  why  Brown  says  “what  I  want  for  us”  rather  than  “what  we   want  for  us,”  which  seems  inconsistent  with  her  statement  of  “developing  political   conversation  among  a  complex  and  diverse  ‘we’”  (51).    A  “sheerly  political”  goal   needs  to  be  backed  up  by  purposes  for  certain  groups  of  people,  whose  experiences   cannot  just  stay  at  the  level  of  empirical  experiences.    Without  the  ontological  and   epistemological  support,  too  empirical  an  approach  leads  to  illusions  or  mistakes.       78   By  only  focusing  on  the  “not  larger  or  longer  than  the  moments”  present,  it  is   difficult  to  reveal  that  gender  oppression  still  persists.    For  instance,  individual   women’s  emancipation  does  not  reflect  that  women  as  a  social  group  are   emancipated.     Secondly,  forgetting  the  past  does  not  really  contribute  to  the  emancipation   in  the  present  and  future.    Brown  misunderstands  emancipation  as  the  ability  to  be   free  from  social  identities  and  argues  that  we  can  never  get  away  from  our  own   victimization  if  we  attach  ourselves  to  social  identities.    But  problems  do  not  get   solved  by  avoiding  acknowledgement,  examination,  and  analysis.    The  construction   of  women’s  identity  does  not  have  to  be  caught  in  a  cycle  of  power  that  is   maintained  by  a  repetitive  compulsion,  which  focuses  on  oppression  rather  than   empowerment.    It  is  politically  wrong  for  Brown  to  assume  that  if  women  are   oppressed,  then  their  identities  cannot  even  be  imagined  to  be  useful  for   progressive  feminist  politics.    As  a  matter  of  fact,  rather  than  sources  of  oppression,   social  identities  are  sources  of  empowerment.    That  is,  having  a  coherent  concept  of   woman  in  order  to  advance  feminist  demands  is  not  a  dangerous  error.    Women   might  be  able  to  be  more  aware  that  some  obstacles  that  they  encounter  have   something  to  do  with  the  fact  that  they  are  women.    The  feminist  movement  in   1950s  and  1960s  is  a  good  example  that  a  reflection  on  the  wounded  past  can   generate  enormous  drives  and  power  toward  women’s  emancipation.    If  feminists   only  focus  on  the  “now”  and  the  “present,”  as  Brown  suggests,  then  they  might  miss   the  connection  between  similar  oppressive  phenomena  in  which  women  are  victims.     That  is,  they  might  not  be  able  to  look  at  gender  oppression  in  a  macroscopic  way.       79   Lastly,  the  postmodernist  denial  of  the  ontological  possibility  or  its  political   justification  on  a  priori  grounds  is  unfruitful  to  feminist  projects.    Thinkers  who   characterize  themselves  as  postmodernists  often  argue  that  social  categories  are   fictional  and  it  is  impossible  to  construct  a  category  of  women  because  a  set  of   necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  the  category  of  women  cannot  be  provided.   The  academic  feminists’  “postmodern  turn,”  by  engaging  in  rhetoric  of  anti-­‐ essentialism,  is  in  part  a  flight  from  direct,  interactive,  and  responsible  engagement   with  ethical  politics.    Postmodern  feminists’  distance  from  the  meaningful  work  of   gender  construction  misleads  feminist  practices.    As  I  read  Brown,  her  attempt  to   detach  “a  wounded  identity”  from  women’s  theories  and  practices  might  provide   her  a  more  comfortable  intellectual  terrain  politically  because  she  dissolves  issues   such  as  racial  identity  in  the  “sheerly  political”  struggle.    Yet,  postmodern  feminists   like  Brown  fail  to  turn  feminist  theories  into  sites  for  engaging  interactions  between   women  of  dominating  groups  and  women  of  subaltern  groups.    Indeed,  the  “sheerly   political”  struggle  that  Brown  proposes  seems  to  suggest  avoiding  active   engagement  with  sound  reality  by  avoiding  identity  politics,  which  are  crucial  for   feminist  projects.    A  postmodernist  approach,  say  the  focus  on  demands  rather  than   identity  as  Brown  argues,  is  unable  to  address  the  problems  that  came  up  in  Chapter   1;  that  is,  the  gap  between  different  groups  of  women,  for  instance,  middle-­‐class  and   poor,  elite  and  subaltern.    Some  kind  of  binding  identification  is  needed  to  link   women  from  different  social  positions  together.    In  this  case,  identity  draws  from   shared,  though  not  the  same,  experiences  of  oppression.    Brown  seems  to  claim  that   her  view  is  based  on  experience  rather  than  ontological  and  moral  claims  that  can     80   become  ideological.      However,  experiences  are  not  necessarily  at  odds  with   ontological  and  moral  norms  in  the  way  Brown  suggests.    For  instance,  a  women’s   identity  does  not  solidify  women’s  experiences  or  imply  that  women’s  experiences   have  more  moral  values  than  those  of  others,  but  rather  utilize  women’s   experiences  to  reveal  gender  oppression  as  a  general  social  phenomenon.     Moreover,  Brown’s  argument  is  not  as  postmetaphysical  as  she  claims.    It   seems  that  the  “difference”  or  “plurality”  that  Brown  talks  about  is  more  abstract   than  the  “difference”  that  Spelman  and  Crenshaw  talk  about  in  the  previous  chapter.     While  Spelman  and  Crenshaw  talk  about  differences  among  women’s  oppression,   which  is  an  empirical  observation,  Brown  seems  to  talk  about  a  general  and  abstract   “difference,”  which  is  a  metaphysical  generalization  of  differences  among  women’s   oppression.    For  instance,  Brown  states,  “postidentity  political  positions  and   conversations  potentially  replace  a  politics  of  difference  with  a  politics  of   diversity—difference  grasped  from  a  perspective  larger  than  simply  one  point  in  an   ensemble”(51).    Brown  does  not  explicitly  connect  the  term  of  “injury”  to  the  theme   of  women’s  oppression.    Yet,  it  is  clear  that  if  women  are  “victims”  of  “injuries,”   these  “injuries”  must  have  something  to  do  with  gender  oppression.    In  this  sense,   Brown  is  concerned  with  the  same  issue  as  Spelman  and  Crenshaw  are,  but   obviously  from  a  more  metaphysical  perspective  though  she  is  claiming  to  be   resolutely  anti-­‐metaphysical  or  postmetaphysical.    However,  by  arguing  that   diversity  is  larger  than  difference,  Brown  shows  that  she  is  in  fact  covertly   metaphysical  by  virtue  of  her  mode  of  argumentation.    It  is  not  clear  whether  this   sort  of  aversion  of  identity  has  something  to  do  with  the  assumed  connection     81   between  identity  and  overgeneralization.    As  I  argued  in  Chapter  1,  it  seems  that   Spelman  conflates  the  issue  of  women’s  identity  with  the  issue  of   overgeneralization/essentialism.    The  relation  between  the  issue  of  identity  and  the   issue  of  overgeneralization  is  that  it  is  the  metaphysical  and  the  empirical   expressions  of  the  same  effort,  that  is,  the  effort  to  have  a  sweeping  grasp  of  women   as  a  whole.    The  idea  of  category  and  its  relation  to  identity  can  be  demonstrated  as   claiming  a  social  category  of  women  is  equal  to  confirming  that  women  have  a   collective  identity.     So  far,  we  have  touched  on  various  but  connected  themes,  for  instance,  the   issue  of  conceptualization,  the  problem  of  overgeneralization,  the  reliance  on   metaphysical  assumptions,  the  need  to  test  concepts  by  experience  but  not  descend   into  empiricism.    These  themes  are  both  intellectual  points  of  reference  and  connect   up  with  practical  or  political  issues.    In  this  regards,  we  are  implicitly  touching  on   how  the  project  of  solidarity  both  requires  conceptual  resources  and  needs  some   sense  of  interests,  needs,  values  or  identities  that  allow  for  a  sense  of  the  emergence   of  solidarity  in  the  midst  of  its  absence,  and  the  relation  between  this  emergence   and  our  conceptualization  of  the  oppressions  linked  to  gender  and  other  social   relations.    The  idea  of  women  as  a  group  needs  to  be  considered  in  a  more  flexible   and  non-­‐metaphysical  way.    That  is,  if  we  think  of  women  as  a  group,  it  does  not   necessarily  mean  the  category  of  “women”  is  an  abstract  concept  that  ignores   experiential  differences  among  women.    Marilyn  Frye  offers  a  fruitful  way  to   construct  a  social  category  of  women  within  differences  among  women,  which  I  will   explore  in  the  next  section.     82     2.  Frye’s  Positive  Category  of  Women       In  the  previous  section,  I  presented  Brown’s  denial  of  the  necessity  of  the  notion  of   “women,”  and  I  argued  that  Brown’s  alternative  to  women’s  identity  is  unfruitful   because  a  sheerly  political  “us”  is  too  indefinite  to  capture  the  collective  gender   oppression  that  women  endure.    In  this  section,  I  present  Frye’s  critical  analysis  and   normative  views  on  the  issue  of  gender  categorization  and  I  draw  on  her  proposal  of   constructing  a  useful  category  of  women  by  working  differences  into  a  structure.   2.1  Frye’s  Critical  Analysis   It  is  proper  to  start  the  exposition  of  Frye’s  critical  analysis  with  what  Frye  is  trying   to  accomplish  with  the  idea  of  a  category  of  women.     [I  am]  working  to  re-­‐conceptualize  social  categories  (or  at  least  some  kinds   of  social  categories,  identity  categories)  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  some  kind   of  “identity  politics”  both  cognitively  and  politically  intelligible.    I  have   thought  of  the  task  as  “re-­‐metaphoring”  or  “re-­‐imaging”  what  social   categories  are,  in  order  to  dissolve  the  category  skepticism  that  has  been   expressed  in  feminist,  queer  and  race  theory,  and  to  promote  a  pluralist   ontological  imaginations  that  can  accommodate  the  multiplicity  of  identity.   (2005b,  1)     As  we  can  see,  Frye’s  project  directly  addresses  the  skepticism  of  identity  politics   that  I  talked  about  in  the  previous  section.     Frye  argues  that  thinking  of  “women”  as  an  Aristotelian  species  or  defining   “woman”  as  members  of  a  set  are  unacceptable  ways  of  conceptualizing  women.     According  to  her,  Aristotle’s  idea  of  species  has  long  been  a  paradigm  case  of   category:  Species  are  defined  in  an  Aristotelian  fashion  “as  a  natural  category   delimited  by  a  distinctive  combination  of  innate  traits  that  constitute  the  essence  of   each  individual  in  the  category”  (1996,  997  n9).    That  is,  if  we  follow  the  distinction     83   of  species,  all  individuals  will  be  sorted  into  discrete  kinds.    For  instance,  men  and   women  would  be  two  species  each  with  a  distinctive  combination  of  natural   features  that  are  biologically  determined.    To  define  women  as  members  in  a  set,  on   the  other  hand,  means  that  individual  women  share  a  set  of  properties  or  attributes,   which  are  the  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  of  being  members  of  the  set.    Frye   argues  that  the  twin  approaches  of  species  and  sets  are  two  different  examples—the   material  and  the  abstract  mode—of  the  same  container  image,  in  which  social   categories  are  imagined  as  in  a  space  with  boundaries  fixed  by  necessary  and   sufficient  conditions  and  as  containing  homogenous  content  within  these   boundaries.    Frye  argues  that  the  container  logic  encourages  one  to  sort  individuals   as  members  and  nonmembers  by  going  through  the  list  of  necessary  and  sufficient   conditions  for  membership.       A  metaphor  that  embodies  the  worst  of  both  images,  sets  and  species  (even   on  a  nonessentialist  construal  of  species).    Like  the  image  of  a  species,  it   blocks  thinking  of  one  individual  as  a  member  of  more  than  one  category;   like  the  image  of  a  set,  it  locks  in  the  picture  of  a  fixed  and  fixing  boundary.     (2005a,  49-­‐50)     Frye  advocates  a  practice  of  pluralism  in  a  logically  positive  category   construction,  in  which  genuine  pluralist  subjectivities  A:B  displace  the  A/not-­‐A   pseudo-­‐dualism.    In  the  dichotomy  of  categorization  A/not-­‐A,  “what  A  is”  is  defined   by  its  negation  “what  A  is  not.”    This  kind  of  duality  is  inappropriate  because  it   presumes  that  individuals  who  have  a  set  of  “A”  properties  are  members  of  the   category  A  and  casts  the  remainder  into  the  not-­‐A  category.    The  A/not-­‐A  is  pseudo-­‐ dualism  because  they  do  not  divide  the  world  into  two  equal  parts.     When  woman  is  defined  as  not-­‐man,  she  is  cast  into  the  infinite   undifferentiated  plenum.    The  man/not-­‐man  dichotomy  makes  no     84   distinctions  on  the  not-­‐man  side.    This  helps  make  it  so  “natural”  to  lump   women  indiscriminately  with  children  in  “women  and  children”  and  to  cast   “nature”  (which  is  another  name  of  not-­‐man)  as  a  woman  and  woman  as   nature.  (1996,  1000)     Frye  argues  the  A/not-­‐A  dualism  is  objectionable  because  it  distorts  the  condition  or   make-­‐up  of  women  and  it  prevents  women  from  being  a  category  by  lumping  them   with  other  not-­‐man.    She  claims  that  plurality  identity  can  be  and  should  be   conceptualized,  but  it  should  be  categorized  neither  as  species  nor  as  set   membership.    Rather,  it  is  a  genuine  pluralist  categorization,  in  which  the  category  is   constructed  positively  in  a  logical  sense  because  each  subjectivity  “A”  or  “B”  is  self-­‐ supporting  and  self-­‐defining  rather  than  being  constructed  by  contrast  with  its   negation  as  what  happens  in  A/not-­‐A.    Because  a  category  is  constructed  not  against   its  negation  but  rather  in  a  self-­‐supporting  way,  Frye  labels  it  “a  positive  category,”   in  which  “positive”  is  defined  in  a  logical  sense  instead  of  an  ethical  sense.    In  the   positive  categorization,  what  makes  a  category  discrete  in  the  otherwise   undifferentiated  space  and  what  makes  A  as  A  is  not  essential  sameness  or   attributes,  but  rather  a  principle  of  coherence  or  a  structure.    According  to  Frye,   structure  is  a  set  of  relations  that  stand  between  individuals,  who  are  different  from   each  other  in  a  substantial  way.       It  is  the  presence  of  internal  structure  that  establishes  the  setting  off  of  a   thing  or  a  sort  of  thing  (a  category)  from  its  environment.    Structure  is  a  set   of  relations,  and  relations  stand  between  differentiated  individuals.     Structure  requires  that  the  things  structured  are  not  all  alike;  it  also  gives   salience  to  some  features  and  aspects  of  the  things  it  structures.    It  gives   differential  significance  to  different  properties  and  relations  of  the  things  it   structures.  (1996,  1001  emphasis  in  original)     That  is  to  say,  a  category  is  constructed  by  working  differences  into  structure,  rather   than  sorting  things  according  to  a  list  of  properties  and  attributes.    The  structure     85   requires  that  the  elements  that  it  arranges  be  in  a  significant  variety  of  relations   with  each  other  and  that  they  have  internal  complexity,  thus  difference  of  any   specific  kind  is  preserved  and  organized.     Frye  argues  that  her  idea  of  structure  offers  a  way  of  conceptualizing  women   that  neither  relies  on  the  idea  of  an  essence  nor  ignores  significant  differences   among  women.    She  argues  that  having  an  internal  structure  as  necessary  for  a   category  does  not  imply  that  the  category  is  an  essence.    According  to  her,  both   essentialism  and  anti-­‐essentialism  work  within  the  same  logic—the  logic  of  the   container.    The  reasoning  of  anti-­‐essentialism  runs  like  this:  A  category  is  equal  to  a   set  of  attributes;  therefore  it  is  equal  to  an  essence.    If  a  category  of  women  is   constructed  by  a  set  of  attributes  shared  by  all  and  only  the  members  of  the   category,  that  is,  an  essence,  then  it  makes  sense  to  take  the  stance  of  anti-­‐ essentialism.    Frye  also  claims  that  a  category  of  women  does  not  ignore  differences   among  women.    In  other  words,  commonalities,  likeness,  and  sameness  among   women  are  not  what  construct  women’s  identity.    According  to  her,  the  logic  of   difference  works  like  this:  If  there  were  no  difference,  then  there  would  be  no   structure  for  differences;  if  there  were  no  structure,  then  there  would  be  no   category.    That  is,  differences  and  structures  are  central  to  category  construction.    In   Frye’s  words,  the  construction  of  a  positive  category  of  women  is  one  of  the   varieties  of  “the  practice  of  differences”  (1996,  1007).    The  A/not-­‐A  pseudo-­‐ dichotomy  makes  it  difficult  to  understand  how  an  individual  can  be  a  member  of   more  than  one  category  simultaneously.    For  instance,  category  construction   involving  both  gender  and  race  turns  out  to  be  difficult,  but  Frye’s  solution  is  that     86   the  category  of  women  should  be  demonstrated  by  images  such  as  individual   women  located  in  “a  correlational  density  in  a  multidimensional  quality  space”   (2005a,  46).    That  is,  the  category  of  women  is  constructed  through  multilayered   correlations.    In  a  sense,  this  is  a  matter  of  overlapping  clusters  of  similarities  and   differences  among  women.    The  positive  category  of  women  does  not  have  built-­‐in   exclusivity  or  closure  against  other  identity  categories,  so  it  does  not  preclude  self-­‐ constructive  involvement  in  others.    For  instance,  gender  can  be  conceived  around   social  dimensions  such  as  race,  class,  and  culture.   2.2  Frye’s  Normative  Position   Frye  argues  that  feminist  responses  to  the  “problem  of  difference,”  such  as   postmodernist  gender  skepticism,  produces  numerous  theoretical  constructs  based   on  a  misleading  set-­‐rhetoric,  which  assumes  that  individuals  who  have  a  set  of   properties  are  members  of  a  category,  thus  distracting  feminists  from  generating   and  operating  women-­‐focused  practices  and  projects.    She  argues  that  the   immediate  attention  and  research  energy  of  feminism  should  be  spent  on  liberating   our  conceptions  of  categories  from  the  confines  of  the  container  metaphor  rather   than  on  anti-­‐essentialism.       Frye  argues  that  gender  itself  is  an  extremely  important  category  of  analysis   and  that  plural  and  curdled  identities  are  effective  locations  for  formulating  feminist   political  solidarity  and  coalitions.    According  to  her,  defining  “woman”  does  not   necessarily  commit  one  to  essentialism.    Frye  defines  essences  as  such:   The  world  is  ultimately  constituted  of  entities  each  of  which  exists   independently  of  all  others:  for  instance,  Plato’s  Forms,  Aristotle’s  individual   substances.  …Each  such  entity  has  a  distinctive  identity:….it  is  what  it  is  in     87   virtue  of  one  of  more  intrinsic,  innate,  structured-­‐in  or  inborn  properties   (like  rationality  and  animality),  which  are  its  Essence.  (2005a,  48)     According  to  this  definition,  essences  are  what  make  things  what  they  are.    But  Frye   states  that  there  are  no  essences  and  essentialism  is  false  rather  than  problematic.     She  argues  that  feminist  theoretical  and  political  efforts,  such  as  constructing  falsely   unitary  pictures  of  identities,  creating  social  categories  that  operate  as  the   normative  construct,  or  constructing  categories  to  give  some  politically  dominant   group  paradigmatic  status,  produce  problematic  generalization  rather  than  make  a   commitment  to  an  essence.     A  good  deal  of  discussion  about  sexist,  racist,  or  ethnocentric  constructions   of  human  and  of  woman  uses  the  vocabulary  of  “center”  and  “margin.”    I  am   suggesting  here  that  it  is  useful  at  least  for  some  purposes  to  think  of  this   “centering”  and  “marginalizing”  as  someone  constructing  the  category  of   humans  or  persons  as  a  paradigm-­‐case  category,  with  him-­‐  or  herself  and  a   small  number  of  folk  s/he  identifies  with  located  as  the  paradigm  case   governing  the  category.  (2005a,  58  n10)     Frye  argues  that  critics  of  essentialism  often  conflate  essentialism  with   ethnocentrism.    What  she  means  is  that  feminists  who  argue  in  ways  that  others   criticize  as  essentialist,  such  as  Spelman  criticizing  Friedan  as  essentialist,  are  really   criticizing  them  for  being  ethnocentric;  that  is,  Friedan  is  ethnocentric  rather  than   essentialist.    Frye  defines  “ethnocentrism”:     [W]hat  is  wrong  in  some  of  the  cases  of  problematic  generalization  to  be   found  in  some  feminist  theorizing  is  that  the  theorist  has  situated  herself,  or   her  family,  or  her  culture  as  a  paradigm  case  that  structures  a  paradigm-­‐case   type  of  category.    I  am  inclined  to  think  that  this  kind  of  construction  is   central  to  much  of  the  thought  and  perception  that  we  call   “ethnocentric.”...But  it  is  not  essentialism.  (2005a,  51  emphasis  in  original)     According  to  Frye,  “essentialism”  (whose  meaning  varies  depending  on  who  is  using   it)  is  not  the  problem,  but  ethnocentrism  is.    For  instance,  when  Friedan  argues  that     88   the  solution  to  women’s  oppression  is  to  seek  an  identity  through  professional   work,  she  is  actually  making  an  ethnocentric  argument,  taking  the  situation  of   women  like  hers  as  the  paradigm  case  of  all  women.    In  other  words,  Friedan  is  not   claiming  that  staying  at  home  or  working  outside  the  house  is  the  essence  of   women,  but  rather  she  is  taking  her  experiences  as  the  paradigm  case  of  all  women.     However,  it  is  legitimate  for  disadvantaged  women,  African  American  women  for   instance,  to  claim  the  center  stage.    Yet,  Frye  does  not  specify  whether  African   American  women  make  their  experiences  the  paradigm  case  in  this  case.   2.3  Assessing  Frye’s  Critical  Analysis   I  argue  that  Frye’s  proposal  addresses  concerns  of  feminists  who  engage  in  the   “difference  critique,”  and  in  particular,  their  concerns  about  essentialism.    Brown   worries  that  feminist  identity  politics  is  derived  from  a  politically,  if  not   ontologically,  essentialist  foundation,  but  I  argue  that  the  charge  of  essentialism  is   misleading  and  thus  unfruitful  for  feminist  projects.    A  feminist  category  of  women   can  be  free  from  the  essentialist  charge  and  capture  both  the  variability  and  the   dynamics  of  women.     Frye  is  right  to  argue  for  a  positive  category  construction.    Her  proposal  of   constructing  pluralist  subjectivities  in  “the  practice  of  differences”  addresses   concerns  with  which  feminists  are  engaged  when  they  launch  the  “difference   critique.”    The  feminist  philosophers  that  I  have  discussed  to  this  point  in  Part  One   are  all  concerned  with  how  feminists  should  find  a  way  to  talk  about  differences   among  women.    Frye’s  proposal  emphasizes  the  particularity  of  different  contexts   that  women  inhabit,  which  is  a  point  that  Spelman  and  Crenshaw  bring  to  our     89   attention.    We  can  generalize  about  women  without  claiming  an  essence  for  them.    It   is  theoretically  misleading  and  unnecessary  to  dismiss  all  generalization  and   categorization  as  essentializing.    Frye’s  construction  of  a  positive  category  of  women   offers  an  example  of  how  the  concept  of  women  depicts  the  variability  of  women’s   oppressions  and  allows  for  the  fluidity  of  women’s  identity  and  therefore  helps  to   make  change  in  the  conditions  of  women  imaginable.    That  is,  it  is  possible  to   generate  a  notion  of  gender  that  would  be  a  general  concept,  yet  not  susceptible  to   what  people  find  problematic  when  they  label  positions  as  “essentialist.”    Rather   than  thinking  about  essences  of  women,  we  might  think  of  gender  as  a  structure  of   oppression  that  has  general  features  that  take  very  different  forms  in  different   cultures  and  societies.    Some  may  wonder  what  is  built  into  the  “structure”  of   gender  relations  and  argue  that  there  is  a  latent  essentialism  there.    However,   according  to  Frye,  what  is  built  into  structure  are  differences  and  essence  simply   does  not  exist.    That  is,  essentialism  is  a  false  accusation.     Frye  argues  that  plurality  identity  should  not  be  categorized  as  set   membership.    Some  may  ask  whether  there  are  no  respects  on  which  we  can  speak   of  all  women  sharing  certain  distinctive  characteristics.    For  instance,  women  who   endure  specific  kinds  of  patriarchal  oppression,  such  as  relegation  of  women  to   housework,  economic  dependency,  exclusion  from  politics,  etc.,  seem  to  share  some   characteristics.    Frye  might  argue  that  women  do  not  endure  these  kinds  of   oppression  in  substantially  different  ways,  so  these  kinds  of  oppression  do  not   count  as  distinctive  characteristics  of  women;  that  is,  they  are  not  a  set  of   characteristics  that  women  are  required  to  have  in  order  to  be  identified  as  women.       90   Frye’s  proposal  also  shows  that  it  is  intellectually  misleading  to  insist  that  feminists   should  give  up  the  category  of  gender,  the  intellectual  grounding  for  feminist   theories  and  practices  (as  Brown  argues).    That  is,  it  is  theoretically  unhelpful  to   automatically  dismiss  any  generalization  and  categorization  as  essentializing.    Frye’s   construction  of  a  positive  category  of  women  is  an  example  of  how  the  fallacy   associated  with  essentialism  is  corrected  and  offers  a  way  to  generalize  women.     That  is,  a  concept  of  women  should  not  be  based  on  the  traditional  concept  of   essence  because  the  oppression  of  women  manifests  itself  in  such  varied  forms  that   no  single  concept  grasps  the  various  oppressions  that  all  women  experience.    So  this   indicates  what  is  problematic  about  generalization  is  that  it  is  difficult  to  consider   all  possible  situations  in  the  generalization.         While  Frye  states,  “women  are  oppressed,  as  women”(1983,  16,  emphasis  in   original),  Spelman  thinks  phrases  such  as  “as  women”  ignore  or  obscure  differences   among  women.    However,  it  is  theoretically  incorrect  to  suspect  any  systematic   marking  of  difference  or  any  generalization  being  “exclusive”  and  “essentialist.”    It  is   incorrect  to  assume  that  categorizing,  per  se,  is  essentializing.    The  “problem  of   difference,”  which  is  depicted  as  a  battle  against  essentialism,  seems  to  have  a  two-­‐ sided  aspect:  On  the  one  hand,  oppression  cannot  be  discussed  without  the   normative  discussion  of  its  background;  on  the  other  hand,  thinking  of  category  as   an  Aristotelian  essence  or  a  set  membership  constrains  some  feminists  from   category  construction.    Yet,  one  can  be  against  category  in  general  or  against  the   specific  claim  that  there  is  some  categorization  improper  to  women.    In  the  debates   over  essentialism,  these  two  distinctive  views  are  criticized  without  a  clear     91   distinction,  thus  some  useful  feminist  theories  are  criticized  rashly.    It  is  unhelpful   that  some  claims  confine  feminist  discussions  to  issues  that  are  perceived  as   common  to  all  women  independent  of  culture  and  class.    Essentialism  seeks  a   universalism,  where  standards  of  justification,  moral  principles  or  truth  are  said  to   be  universal  regardless  of  culture  and  class,  without  awareness  of  its  limitations.     However,  it  is  also  unhelpful  that  feminists  relinquish  the  category  of  gender,  which   is  the  intellectual  grounding  for  feminist  theories  and  practices,  or  simply  use  it   strategically.    The  claim  that  “women  are  oppressed  in  different  forms”  is  not  in   conflict  with  the  claim  that  “there  is  a  category  of  women.”    In  other  words,  a   category  of  women  is  necessary  for  feminist  projects  and  it  is  not  essentialist  to  use   such  a  category.       The  oppressions  suffered  by  different  women  should  be  described  as   intermeshed  or  enmeshed  to  capture  the  inseparability  of  one  oppressive  factor   from  another.    This  inseparable  structure  of  oppression  makes  it  necessary  for   feminists  to  build  a  structural  resistance  to  oppression.    A  structural  resistance  to   gender  oppression  requires  theoretical  tools  and  practical  goals.    On  the  one  hand,   the  category  of  women  is  crucial  for  creating  such  a  structural  resistance  because   (1)  women  are  oppressed  as  women  and  it  is  important  to  be  able  to  theorize  what   “as  women”  means  even  when  they  are  oppressed  in  different  ways;  (2)  women’s   oppression  is  endured  collectively  rather  than  individually  even  if  it  takes   distinctive  forms.    On  the  other  hand,  the  category  of  women  is  crucial  for  creating   such  a  structural  resistance  because  women  need  to  be  aware  that  only  when  they   unify  as  women  can  they  resist  women’s  oppression  as  women  despite  their  race,     92   class,  and  cultural  differences.    Here,  the  “structure”  in  terms  of  oppression  and   resistance  refers  to  the  gender  relation.    In  this  sense,  the  feminist  movement  needs   solidarity,  which  points  out  how  change  in  women’s  situations  is  possible  with  the   consideration  of  the  social  structures  of  power  relations.     2.4  Assessing  Frye’s  Normative  Positions       According  to  Frye,  problematic  generalization  is  due  to  ethnocentrism  instead  of   essentialism.    However,  the  issue  here  is  not  the  motivating  force  of  the  error— ethnocentrism—  but  rather  it  is  an  issue  either  why  it  is  inaccurate  to  characterize   all  generalizations  as  essentialism  or  why  it  is  problematic  to  reject  generalizations   about  women.    One  might  wonder  why  the  real  problem  in  the  instances  that  are  the   focus  of  the  “difference  critique”  is  ethnocentrism  (as  Frye  argues)  rather  than   essentialism  or  some  other  strictly  intellectual  error.    I  will  examine  the  relationship   between  essentialism  and  ethnocentrism  by  further  exploring  why  the  issue  of   essentialism  is  so  pervasive  in  the  feminist  “difference  critique.”    In  addition,  I  will   argue  that  Frye’s  proposal  for  constructing  a  positive  category  of  women  within   differences  among  women  would  provide  theoretical  support  to  prove  why  the   collaboration  of  women  from  different  backgrounds  is  both  necessary  and  possible.       There  are  two  problems  with  ethnocentric  perspectives:  (1)  One  is  that  it  is   narrow-­‐minded  in  regards  to  the  concept  of  women  and  it  displays  an  inability  or   lack  of  incentive  to  relate  beyond  one’s  ethnicity;  and  (2)  the  other  assumes  the   generalization  of  situations  of  a  similar  ethnicity  would  apply  to  all  women.    Why  do   critics  of  essentialism  conflate  essentialism  with  ethnocentrism?    Namely,  why  does   the  antiessentialist  critique  take  the  form  of  accusing  some  feminists  of  believing  in     93   essence  while  what  these  feminists  actually  do  privileges  the  experience  of  some   women  over  that  of  other  women?    Why  is  it  damaging  for  feminists  to  focus  on   essentialism  rather  than  ethnocentrism?      Here  we  may  face  more  of  a  practical   issue  rather  than  one  of  metaphysics,  though,  at  the  same  time,  there  seems  to  be   the  claim  that  the  mistaken  views  condemned  as  essentialist  still  need  not  only  to  be   dropped  but  to  be  replaced  by  different  theoretical  approaches  at  a  comparable   level  of  generality.    Maybe  the  anti-­‐essentialist  argument  does  not  “conflate”   essentialism  and  ethnocentrism,  but  instead  it  is  affected  by  ethnocentric   assumptions;  that  is,  the  anti-­‐essentialist  argument  is  in  fact  anti-­‐ethnocentric.    In   other  words,  charging  an  argument  as  essentialist  does  not  make  it  less   ethnocentric.    So  “essentialism”  and  “ethnocentrism”  are  not  two  different  positions   that  are  being  confused  in  the  mind  of  those  who  challenge  them,  but  it  is  the  source   of  political  validity  to  make  an  ethnocentric  statement  posing  as  essentialist  that  is   being  conflated.    That  is  to  say,  ethnocentrism  may  be  expressed  in  a  view  that  is   (mistakenly)  criticized  as  essentialist  and  the  recourse  to  the  position  that  is  labeled   “essentialist”  is  adopted  (or  motivated)  by  an  ethnocentric  bias,  which  the  person   may  not  be  aware  of,  or  would  even  deny  having.    It  is  true  that  imputing  an  essence   of  women  may  serve  a  view  whose  most  significant  flaw  is  ethnocentrism,  but   saying  one’s  view  is  ethnocentric  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  essence  is  or  is  not   acceptable.        Antiessentialist  feminist  critics  do  not  specify  what  they  mean  by  “essence,”   so  I  take  them  to  mean  that  they  assume  having  cultural  biases  has  something  to  do   with  feminist  “essentialism.”    For  instance,  Friedan  can  be  accused  of  looking  at     94   women  through  the  lens  of  a  White  middle-­‐class  suburban  culture  in  the  U.S.  in  the   1950s.    Namely,  along  the  line  of  the  “essentialist”  accusation,  ethnocentrism  can  be   suspected  as  the  essence  of  the  Western  culture.    There  are  two  possible   interpretations  for  this  assumption:  (1)  What  anti-­‐essentialism  argues  against  is   ethnocentrism  or  essentialism,  which  implies  that  essentialism  and  ethnocentrism  is   the  same  thing;  or  (2)  they  simply  mistake  cultural  bias  for  essence.    When  Frye   argues  that  a  person  who  thinks  in  terms  of  Aristotelian  category  or  sets  is  making   an  intellectual  error  and  that  there  is  a  better  way  of  generalizing  about  women,  she   is  not  arguing  that  one  is  ethnocentric  because  one  is  applying  the  notion  of  essence;   rather,  she  is  arguing  that  those  who  are  accused  of  being  essentialists  are  actually   committing  ethnocentrism.    So  the  debates  over  essentialism  are  centered  upon  a   misunderstanding,  which  mistakes  “what  essence  is”  for  the  real  problem  with  the   charged  “essentialist”  position.    As  a  result,  the  cultural  bias  of  a  subset  of  feminists,   i.e.,  White  middle-­‐class  feminists,  is  mistaken  as  claiming  an  essence  for  women.     The  point  of  claiming  that  essentialist  thinking  is  really  the  expression  of   ethnocentric  bias,  such  as  Frye  argues,  is  to  say  that  those  who  speak  of   “essentialism”  are  not  really  putting  their  finger  on  the  key  problem.    It  might  be   true  that  the  feminist  philosophers  who  are  accused  of  essentialism  use  some   implicit  idea  of  an  essence  of  women  when  stating  their  narrow  views,  but  the  real   problem  is  not  intellectual  so  much  as  motivational/ideological—the  real  problem  is   that  they  are  not  opening  up  to  the  complexity,  diversity,  and  dynamics  of  women.     Doing  so  requires  that  a  different  kind  of  conceptualization  take  place,  but  the     95   precondition  for  that  is  not  so  much  strictly  intellectual  as  it  is  a  matter  of  critical   self-­‐awareness  and  openness.   However,  we  should  not  overlook  the  role  that  essence  plays  in   ethnocentrism,  which  remains  unaddressed  in  most  anti-­‐essentialist  critiques.    That   is,  they  do  not  explain  why  it  is  a  fallacy  to  think  that  women  have  an  essence.    It  is   intellectually  inadequate  for  these  critics  to  use  concepts  without  properly   explaining  them  due  to  the  confusion  that  these  concepts  cause.    As  a  matter  of  fact,   the  reason  that  the  traditional  concept  of  essence  commits  a  fallacy  when  it  is   applied  to  the  concept  of  women  is  that  an  essence  cannot  grasp  the  fact  that  (1)   women  have  variability  (they  have  different  experiences  and  problems)  and  their   oppressions  take  different  forms;  and  (2)  that  women  are  dynamic  (their  situations   are  fluid  and  changing)  and  have  the  potential  to  change.    Arguments  such  as  Frye’s   attempt  to  agree  that  the  anti-­‐essentialists  have  a  point,  but  also  insist  that  some   generalizing  concepts  about  women  are  feasible  and  desirable.       Frye’s  proposal  for  constructing  a  positive  category  of  women  reveals  the   connection  between  category  and  power  in  a  way  of  exercising  of  power-­‐with,   rather  than  a  way  of  exercising  of  power-­‐over  in  the  universal  dichotomous   category  construction.    It  is  important  to  recognize  that  it  is  the  exclusive  dichotomy   rather  than  differences  that  splits  the  category  of  women  into  fragments.    Brown   suggests  a  shift  from  ontological  arguments  to  political  claims  as  if  once  claimed  as   political,  a  project  automatically  accommodates  differences  and  is  thus  collective.     As  a  matter  of  fact,  ontological  arguments  and  political  claims  can  coexist:  Making   ontological  arguments  does  not  mean  these  arguments  are  anti-­‐political.    Similarly,     96   claiming  something  to  be  political  does  not  guarantee  that  it  is  collective.    Yet,  when   feminists  theorize,  they  should  keep  political  goals  in  mind.    The  construction  of  a   logically  positive  category  of  women  as  a  way  to  think  outside  of  the  container  logic   has  a  politically  constructive  impact  on  feminist  practices  because  if  differences  and   differentiation  are  logically  necessary  for  the  category  construction,  then  they  must   be  necessary  for  women’s  collective  activities.    In  other  words,  women  are  in   collaboration  with  each  other  not  because  they  are  the  same,  but  rather  because   they  are  different  with  respect  to  their  experiences  of  gender  oppression.       Antiessentialist  arguments  such  as  gender  skepticism  that  Brown  makes  do   not  help  us  understand  how  such  solidarity  is  possible.    That  is,  these  arguments  do   not  grasp  the  sense  of  a  common  locus  of  oppression  when  it  takes  different  forms.     It  is  frustrating  that  feminism  focuses  on  the  discourse  of  difference  but  lacks  a   substantial  discussion  of  women’s  solidarity.    The  fact  that  the  idea  of  “global   sisterhood”  does  not  actually  contribute  to  women’s  solidarity  does  not  mean  that   women’s  solidarity  is  not  needed  or  politically  vacuous.    A  more  fruitful  idea  of   women’s  solidarity  should  be  developed  using  proper  ways  of  gender  identity   construction  although  one  needs  to  acknowledge  practical  as  well  as  theoretical   obstacles.    That  is,  the  normative  discussion  of  women  should  utilize  generalization   to  address  and  challenge  the  structural  power  relations  of  women’s  oppression   rather  than  denying  the  category  of  women.    In  other  words,  criticism  of  sexism   requires  generalization  that  is  otherwise  blocked  by  the  “anti-­‐essentialist”  thought.     The  “difference  critique”  distracts  feminists  from  collective  consideration  of   women’s  solidarity;  in  particular,  anti-­‐essentialism  contributes  to  political     97   fragmentation.    Both  women’s  oppression  and  resistance  are  structural  and   collective,  so  it  is  important  to  recognize  the  collective  political  goals  among  specific   political  aspirations.       Having  a  properly  constructed  category  of  women  would  greatly  help  the   definition  of  women’s  collective  political  goals.    Yet,  such  a  category  is  not  possible   without  including  women’s  oppression  as  part  of  it.    This  connection  is  the  link  of   the  two  themes—the  theme  of  women’s  identity,  which  I  address  in  this  chapter  and   the  theme  of  women’s  oppression  in  different  forms,  which  I  addressed  in  the   previous  chapter.    When  the  category  of  women  is  explicitly  constructed  in  feminist   theory  and  consciously  used  in  feminist  movements,  the  race  issue  is  raised  because   the  category  of  women  threatens  White  women’s  racial  bond  with  White  men.    The   tension  between  White  feminists  and  feminists  of  color  would  be  eased  when  they   have  collective  political  goals.    White  feminists  should  stop  unhealthy  self-­‐criticism,   which  repeats  familiar  faultfinding  arguments  without  creating  space  for  the   recognition  of  common  interests  and  the  development  of  respectful  alliances.      A   practical  question  that  needs  to  be  noted  is  that  certain  kinds  of  privilege  do  not  rule   out  oppression,  though  they  may  inhibit  solidarity.    When  White  feminists   persistently  point  out  that  they  have  placed  themselves  at  the  center  of  feminist   theories,  they  paradoxically  reinforce  that  position.    When  Black  feminists  claim  that   Black  women  should  take  the  center  stage,  they  replicate  the  same  phenomenon   they  want  to  decry.    Instead,  both  groups  should  focus  on  collective  theorization  and   political  projects,  rather  than  criticizing  essentialism.       98   Conclusion   In  this  chapter,  I  have  critically  examined  a  style  of  feminist  anti-­‐essentialist   responses  to  the  “problem  of  difference”—postmodernist  gender  skepticism—  and  I   have  argued  against  it  because  it  denies  the  possibility  of  gender  categorization.     Gender  skepticism  arose  as  a  response  to  the  “problem  of  difference”  among  the   debates  over  essentialism.    It  questioned  the  normative  standpoint  that  early  second   wave  feminists  developed  for  criticizing  and  challenging  the  existing  oppression  of   women.    As  a  “difference  critique,”  gender  skepticism  has  a  theoretical  and  a   political  legacy  for  feminism,  but  it  also  has  its  flaws.    By  presenting  Frye’s  approach   to  address  the  dynamic  relationship  between  differences  among  women  and  the   category  of  women,  I  argued  that  Frye  offers  a  fruitful  approach  to  demonstrate  that   the  dichotomy  between  generality  and  particularity  is  false.    In  other  words,  through   criticizing  Brown’s  version  of  gender  skepticism,  this  chapter  aims  to  accomplish   the  following  three  tasks:  (1)  Gender  skepticism  is  groundless  because  its   skepticism  of  the  “essentialist  foundation”  of  feminist  identity  politics  does  not   threaten  the  possibility  of  the  category  of  women;  (2)  whether  there  is  an  essence  or   not  is  irrelevant  to  the  fact  that  we  can  and  should  construct  the  category  of  women,   which  embodies  differences  within  women  and  the  possibility  and  the  dynamics  of   what  women  can  be  in  the  future;  and  (3)  the  category  of  women  is  helpful  for   feminists  to  think  about  all  forms  of  women’s  collaboration.     I  concluded  that  non-­‐ethnocentric  category  construction  is  crucial  for   women’s  solidarity  across  cultural  differences  because  the  category  of  women   discloses  the  power  structure  of  both  gender  oppression  and  resistance  that  is     99   prevalent  in  various  cultures.    One  may  ask  what  is  universal  about  gender  across   cultures.    Though  specific  oppressions  differ  in  different  societies,  we  can   nonetheless  speak  of  a  universal  structure  of  oppression,  for  instance,  the  general   tendency  towards  male  dominance,  unequal  distribution  of  resources  and   capacities,  divisions  of  labor,  etc.    It  is  not  that  women  or  men  have  an  essence  that   determines  this  universal  structure  of  oppression,  but  that  there  is  a  persisting   structure  of  relations  between  the  genders.    That  is,  societies  are  always  structured   in  part  through  gender  divisions  that  involve  disparities  and  conflicts  of  these  kinds.             100   Part  One  Conclusion   In  this  part,  I  presented  the  rise  of  the  “problem  of  difference”  and  critically   examined  two  approaches  addressing  differences  among  women  and  the  category  of   women:  The  “particularity  argument”  and  gender  skepticism.    These  two   approaches  are  among  the  feminist  efforts  to  cure  the  “essentialism”  in  feminism.    I   argued  that  essentialism  is  the  wrong  target  for  feminist  critiques;  rather,  false   generalizations  (and  the  ethnocentric  attitudes  involved  in  false  generalizations)  are   what  make  some  feminists  assume  that  constructing  the  category  of  women  is  an   essentialist  act.    I  concluded  that  if  the  problem  of  essentialism  is  the  danger  of   working  with  fixed  ideas  of  what  women  are  or  can  be,  and  then  we  can  avoid  this   without  surrendering  general  ideas  about  the  oppression  of  women.    To  speak  of  a   general  structure  of  relations  inherent  in  the  gender  division  of  societies  is  not  to   say  that  all  societies  embody  these  relations  in  the  same  way.    In  this  sense,  Frye’s   approach  to  constructing  a  category  of  women  without  surrendering  differences   among  women  is  a  good  example  of  how  gender  can  be  categorized.     The  antiessentialist  arguments  bring  into  play  a  number  of  ways  of  thinking   about  differences.    With  its  inherent  complexity,  it  is  important  to  recognize  that   gender  categorization  could  be  culturally  bounded.    That  is,  when  the  category  of   women  is  constructed,  differences  among  women  could  be  considered  as  a  product   of  a  specific  culture.    For  instance,  Friedan’s  categorization  is  closely  related  to  the   American  culture  in  the  1950s,  even  though  gender  oppression  is  not  specific  to  that   culture  and  takes  different  forms  in  various  cultures.    Thinking  of  differences  in   terms  of  culture  would  better  capture  the  intermeshedness  of  categories  because     101   culture  itself  is  an  intermeshed  reality.    However,  by  saying  that  categorization  is   culturally  bounded,  I  do  not  mean  that  categorization  is  culturally  relative  because   gender  is  not  a  culturally  contingent  conception.    Neither  does  gender  run   independently  of  cultural  practices  because  the  gender  dimension  is  complicated  by   culture.    The  concept  of  gender  is  not  stable  or  fixed,  but  neither  is  it  fluid  in  a   postmodernist  way.    In  this  dissertation,  I  deal  with  cultural  difference  while   realizing  there  is  complicated  ambiguity  of  the  interplay  of  gender,  class,  race,  and   culture.    One  of  the  key  things  to  acknowledge  is  that  although  I  am  aware  of  all  the   issues,  culture  defined  as  socially  shared  values  and  historically  formed  identities   include  racial,  national,  ethnical  differences.    Racial  differences,  which  are   pronounced  in  the  United  States,  are  theoretically  included  in  the  definition  of   cultural  differences.   After  battling  with  the  misunderstandings  and  confusions  about  essentialism   and  anti-­‐essentialism  and  gaining  a  clear  idea  that  a  category  of  women  is  necessary   and  possible,  we  need  to  know  how  to  contribute  to  the  collaboration  of  women  in  a   non-­‐oppressive  pursuit  among  cultural  differences.    Multiculturalism  offers  a   conceptual  framework  in  an  effort  to  make  cultural  differences  salient,  protect  the   right  of  minority  cultural  groups,  and  preserve  cultural  diversity  or  culturally   embedded  differences,  however,  I  will  criticize  multiculturalism  and  provide  an   alternative  to  the  multicultural  approach  in  Part  Two.             102   PART  TWO:  FROM  MULTICULTURALISM  TO  TRANSCULTURALISM     Introduction  to  Part  Two   In  Part  One,  I  argued  that  the  concept  of  women  can  be  generalized  and  that  it   should  grasp  both  the  variability  inherent  to  women’s  varied  life  and  the  dynamics   and  theoretical  possibilities  for  women.    That  is,  a  concept  of  gender  as  a  structure   of  analyzing  oppression  is  consistent  with  the  cultural  and  class  variability.    In  this   part,  I  will  conduct  a  parallel  argument  about  culture.    I  will  address  the  divide  of   feminism  along  the  line  of  cultural  differences  and  critically  examine   multiculturalism.    There  are  two  aspects  from  which  I  critique  multiculturalism  in   this  part:  One  aspect  criticizes  the  misunderstanding  of  culture  as  a  self-­‐contained   entity,  such  as  the  view  held  by  the  liberal  defenders  and  the  critics  of   multiculturalism;  the  other  aspect  criticizes  the  misunderstanding  of  culture   through  the  utilization  of  an  ethnocentric  lens,  which  was  initiated  by  postcolonial   feminist  adherents.    Both  critiques  point  to  the  fact  that  multiculturalism  fails  to   provide  an  effective  way  to  contribute  to  a  constructionist  concept  of  culture  and   genuine  cultural  communication.    I  argue  that  multiculturalism  is  an  unsuccessful   “difference  critique”  because:  (1)  It  relies  on  a  problematic  account  of  culture;  and   (2)  it  fails  to  assist  the  communication  among  cultures  and  therefore  it  does  not   contribute  to  solidarity.    I  argue  that  something  beyond  the  multiculturalist  notion  is   needed  and  that  transculturalism  is  a  promising  alternative  to  multiculturalism.    I   propose  that  feminism  needs  a  framework  transition  from  multiculturalism  to   transculturalism  for  two  reasons:  (1)  Feminism  needs  the  transition  of  framework   to  accommodate  a  reconstructed  concept  of  culture  because  multiculturalism  as  a     103   framework  would  fall  apart  if  the  problematic  concept  of  culture,  which  is  the  key   concept  of  multiculturalism,  is  reconstructed;  and  (2)  feminism  needs  a  new   framework  to  foster  women’s  cross-­‐cultural  solidarity.       Part  Two  is  divided  into  three  chapters.    Chapter  3  starts  with  a  strategy  for   avoiding  an  ethnocentric  narrowness,  namely  the  idea  of  multiculturalism   developed  by  important  liberal  thinkers.    I  then  present  and  challenge  a  liberal   feminist  criticism  of  such  multiculturalism  by  pointing  out  the  problematic   treatment  of  culture  as  a  self-­‐contained  entity,  a  view  held  by  both  the  liberal   defenders  and  the  critics  of  multiculturalism.    Chapter  4  assesses  the  postcolonial   critique  of  multiculturalism  by  pointing  out  both  its  failure  to  break  free  from  the   multiculturalism  framework  and  its  fruitful  proposal  for  fostering  dialogue  among   women.    I  argue  that  although  they  have  merits,  both  the  liberal  feminist  critique   and  the  postcolonial  feminist  critique  are  unfruitful  strategies  for  addressing   differences  among  women  because  they  both  fail  to  avoid  thinking  about  cultural   differences  in  a  way  that  is  multicultural.    They    (1)  fail  to  grasp  the  complexity  and   variability  of  cultures,  thus  failing  to  grasp  the  potential  interconnection  between   cultures;  or  (2)  fail  to  explicitly  suggest  going  beyond  multiculturalism.    I  conclude   this  chapter  by  proposing  a  shift  from  multiculturalism  to  an  alternative.    In  Chapter   5,  I  specify  that  the  alternative  to  multiculturalism  is  transculturalism.    After   presenting  what  transculturalism  is,  I  argue  that  transculturalism  is  more  favorable   than  multiculturalism.    I  then  explain  to  what  extent  feminists  have  adopted  the   transcultural  perspective,  by  which  I  demonstrate  that  the  transcultural  theme  is   visible  in  feminist  theories.    I  argue  that  the  concept  of  transculturalism  needs  to  be     104   transformed  to  adopt  a  category  of  women  to  suit  a  feminist  agenda.    Finally,  I   specify  the  advantages  and  limitations  of  feminist  transcultural  perspective  and   conclude  that  despite  its  limitations,  a  feminist  transcultural  perspective  is   beneficial  for  forging  women’s  solidarity  in  overcoming  gender  oppression  among   other  forms  of  oppression.           105   CHAPTER  3       RECONCEPTUALIZING  “CULTURE”:  ASSESSING  THE  DEBATE  ABOUT   MULTICULTURALISM  AND  FEMINISM   Multiculturalism  is  a  vague  term,  which  can  refer  to  various  approaches  discussing   cultural  diversity,  or  very  literally,  multiple  numbers  of  cultures.    While   multiculturalism  has  been  used  as  an  umbrella  term  to  characterize  the  moral  and   political  claims  of  a  wide  range  of  disadvantaged  groups  in  political  theory,  some   liberal  theorists  focus  their  arguments  on  “group  differential  rights”  (for  instance,   see  Kymlicka  1995,1989  and  Okin  2005,  1999,  1998).    That  is,  multiculturalism   often  refers  to  minority  groups  who  demand  recognition  of  their  identity  and   accommodation  of  their  cultural  differences.    Discussions  of  cultural  diversity  have   largely  taken  place  in  a  dominantly  liberal  context,  so  I  narrow  my  discussion  to  the   liberal  multiculturalism  of  Will  Kymlicka  and  his  liberal  critic  Susan  Okin.    In  this   chapter,  I  will  present  a  debate  about  multiculturalism  between  Kymlicka  and  Okin.     I  argue  that  they  both  rely  on  a  problematic  understanding  of  cultures  as  self-­‐ contained  entities.    As  an  alternative,  I  propose  reconceptualizing  “culture”  using  a   fluid  concept  of  culture  as  internally  contested  and  diversified  to  point  out  that   feminists  should  avoid  the  multicultural  approach.    I  also  argue  that  this   constructionist  concept  of  culture  is  consistent  with  the  conceptualization  of  women   that  I  attribute  to  Marilyn  Frye  in  Part  One.     I  start  the  discussion  by  first  presenting  what  I  mean  by  “culture.”    I  then  lay   out  Kymlicka’s  definitions  of  culture  and  multiculturalism  before  I  state  Kymlicka’s   account  of  liberal  multiculturalism,  and  lastly  I  turn  to  Okin’s  definitions  of  culture     106   and  multiculturalism  and  her  account  of  tensions  between  feminism  and   multiculturalism.    I  criticize  the  problematic  account  of  culture  in  Okin,  who  regards   cultures  as  static,  self-­‐contained,  and  well-­‐integrated  entities.    I  propose  that  the   concept  of  culture,  as  a  self-­‐contained  entity,  should  be  reconceptualized  with   cultural  interdependence  and  communication  in  mind.    The  transformed  concept  of   culture  leads  to  an  examination  of  the  limitations  of  the  multicultural  approach.    I   conclude  that  multiculturalism  should  be  discarded  because:  (1)  It  relies  on  a   problematic  account  of  culture;  and  (2)  it  can  lead  to  separateness  and  divisiveness   among  feminists—the  opposite  of  feminist  solidarity.       1.  The  Notion  of  Culture   The  term  “culture”  is  an  extremely  complex  notion  partly  because  it  went  through   complicated  historical  development  and  is  used  differently  in  various  disciplines   and  thought  systems.    We  often  talk  about  cultures  such  as  the  American  culture,  the   Chinese  culture,  or  multiculturalism  without  scrutinizing  what  we  mean  by  “culture”   partly  because  “culture”  seems  a  self-­‐evident  notion.    Since  culture  is  a  key  term  in   this  chapter,  in  this  section,  I  present  briefly  what  “culture’  means  to  me  and  what  I   take  to  be  at  issue  when  scholars  are  talking  about  cultures.    By  setting  up  my   explanation  of  culture  early  on  in  this  chapter,  I  intend  to  compare  my   understanding  of  culture  with  scholars  who  address  cultures  in  Part  Two.   There  are  at  least  three  interrelated  senses  of  the  notion  “culture”:  Culture  as   background,  as  resources,  and  as  shaping  capacities.    I  will  specify  the  three   functions  of  culture  respectively:  (1)  Culture  as  a  general  background  to  social     107   experiences  and  as  embodied  in  the  practices  of  specific  institutions:  Culture   articulates  and  sustains  the  values,  identities,  sensibilities,  motivations,  practices  of   child  rearing  and  education,  etc.  that  are  distinctive  of  a  given  society  or   subsocieties;  (2)  Culture  as  a  process  by  which  people  emerge  within  specific   societies  as  agents  oriented  to  values,  meaning,  possessing  identities,  internalizing   rules  and  capacities.    That  is,  culture  provides  resources  for  corporate  development   of  people  as  an  agent;  and  (3)  Culture  as  shaping  capacities  that  provide  resources   for  individual  development,  i.e.  for  the  individual,  culture  as  resource  that  is   internalized  through  personality  formation  and  ongoing  social  life.    Sociological   ideas  of  social  integration  into  lifeworlds  (all  the  immediate  experiences,  activities,   and  contacts  that  make  up  the  world  of  an  individual  or  corporate  life)  are   contrasted  with  system  integration  and  participation  in  formal  institutional   structures.       Culture,  politics,  and  economics  are  interdependent.    When  we  compare   different  types  of  societies,  issues  of  institutional  differentiation  are  important   because  cultures  are  in  relation  to  meaning,  value  structure,  etc.  as  well  as  in   relation  to  the  corresponding  articulation  of  women’s  accepted  social  roles,  etc.    For   instance,  in  various  types  of  societies,  women’s  social  roles  might  be  different.     Culture  consists  of  social  factors  such  as  gender,  race,  and  class:  These  social  factors   are  mediated  through  culture,  so  it  is  more  effective  to  talk  about  differences  among   women  in  terms  of  cultural  differences  than  addressing  various  social  differences   separately  or  intersectionally.6    What  is  at  issue  here  is  that  culture  can  be  defined     108   as  a  comprehensive  concept,  in  which  gender  differences,  racial  differences,  and   class  differences  are  all  addressed.     According  to  William  Sewell  (1999),  the  term  “culture”  has  two  meanings:   one  is  culture  as  an  abstract  category  of  social  life  and  the  other  is  culture  as  a   concrete  and  bounded  body  of  beliefs  and  practices.    Culture  in  the  first  sense  is   singular,  which  is  normally  contrasted  to  other  abstract  categories  of  social  life,  such   as  economy  and  politics.    Culture  in  the  second  sense  is  pluralizable,  which   represents  distinctive  worlds  of  meaning  and  is  normally  in  contrast  with  another   culture,  for  instance,  “American  culture”  and  “Chinese  culture.”    The  distinction   between  an  abstract  and  singular  sense  of  culture  and  a  concrete  and  pluralizable   sense  of  culture  is  meaningful  because  when  we  say  that  cultures  are  connected   with  politics  and  economies,  we  use  the  term  “culture”  in  the  first  sense  (although   we  tend  to  use  “culture”  in  this  sense  in  a  pluralizable  form),  while  when  we  say  that   American  culture  is  a  melting  pot  culture,  we  use  the  term  “culture”  in  the  second   sense.     There  are  two  models  of  culture:  the  classic  model  and  the  transformed   model.7    The  classic  model  sees  the  concept  of  cultures  as  coherent  and  distinct   entities  while  the  transformed  model  sees  the  concept  of  cultures  as  fluid.     The  classic  model  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  cultures  are  logically  consistent,   highly  integrated,  consensual,  resistant  to  change,  and  clearly  bounded.    On  the   contrary,  the  transformed  model  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  cultures  are   contradictory,  loosely  integrated,  contested,  subject  to  constant  change,  and  weakly     109   bounded.    Tony  Bennett  (2005)  explains  the  shift  from  the  classic  model  to  the   transformed  one:     [A]  move  away  from  the  view  that  cultures  can  be  described  as  fixed  and   separate  entities.    The  terms  cultural  hybridity,  cultural  flows,   transculturation,  cross-­‐cultural  dialogue,  and  cultural  in-­‐betweenness  thus   all  draw  attention  to  the  fluidity  and  impermanence  of  cultural  distinctions   and  relationships.    The  change  of  emphasis  that  is  involved  here  is  best   captured  by  the  shift  from  speaking  of  different  cultures  to  a  stress  on   cultures  in  difference,  with  the  implication  that  cultural  activities  are  caught   up  in  processes  of  differing  rather  than  being  simply  different  from  the   outset.    The  emphasis  on  processes  of  racializing  or  ethnicizing  culture  points   in  the  same  direction.  (2005,  68)     That  is,  the  transformed  concept  of  culture  is  in  close  relation  with  the  term   “difference”  and  the  dynamic  and  fluidity  of  the  concept  of  culture  is  crucial  to  grasp   ideas  such  as  “transculturation”  and  “cross-­‐cultural  dialogue.”       2.  Kymlicka’s  Definitions  of  Culture  and  Multiculturalism   In  this  section,  I  will  present  the  analytical  claims  offered  by  Kymlicka  regarding   culture  and  multicultural  conditions.    Kymlicka  uses  “a  culture”  in  a  sense  that  is   neither  overly  restrictive  nor  too  broad.    To  him,  culture  does  not  refer  to  the   narrow  sense  of  culture—the  distinct  customs,  perspectives,  or  ethos  of  a  group  or   association—for  instance,  a  “gay  culture.”    Neither  does  “culture”  refer  to  the  broad   sense  of  culture—the  “customs”  or  “civilization”  of  a  group  or  people—for  instance,   the  “Western  modern  culture.”    Kymlicka’s  definition  of  “culture”  is  as  follows:   I  am  using  culture  (and  “multicultural”)  in  a  different  sense.    My  focus  will  be   on  the  sort  of  “multiculturalism”  which  arises  from  national  and  ethnic   differences.    As  I  said  earlier,  I  am  using  “a  culture”  as  synonymous  with  “a   nation”  or  “a  people”—that  is,  as  an  intergenerational  community,  more  or   less  institutionally  complete,  occupying  a  given  territory  or  homeland,   sharing  a  distinct  language  and  history.    And  a  state  is  multicultural  if  its   members  either  belong  to  different  nations  (a  multination  state),  or  have     110   emigrated  from  different  nations  (a  polyethnic  state),  and  if  this  fact  is  an   important  aspect  of  personal  identity  and  political  life.  (1995,  18)     The  kind  of  culture  that  Kymlicka  focuses  on  is  “a  societal  culture,”  which  involves   not  just  shared  memories  or  values,  but  also  common  institutions  and  practices.     Kymlicka  states  that  the  world  contains  various  societal  cultures.    A  societal  culture   is  “a  culture  which  provides  its  members  with  meaningful  ways  of  life  across  the  full   range  of  human  activities,  including  social,  educational,  religious,  recreational,  and   economic  life,  encompassing  both  public  and  private  spheres.    These  cultures  tend   to  be  territorially  concentrated,  and  based  on  a  shared  language”  (1995,  76).    That   is,  societal  cultures  refer  to  all  practices  and  institutions  that  exist  in  public  and   private  human  activities.    In  particular,  a  shared  language  and  history  is  crucial  to  a   societal  culture.    Societal  culture  is  centered  on  a  shared  language,  but  a  shared   language  is  necessary  rather  than  a  sufficient  condition  for  a  societal  culture.    That  is   to  say,  members  of  a  societal  culture  shared  the  same  language,  but  it  does  not  lead   to  the  conclusion  that  people  who  share  the  same  language  belong  to  the  same   societal  culture.8    A  societal  culture  typically  aligns  with  a  national  territory.    For   instance,  there  is  not  a  single  culture  in  the  United  States,  but  there  is  a  dominant   common  societal  culture  based  on  the  English  language  that  incorporates  the   majority  of  Americans,  with  the  rest  belonging  to  a  small  number  of  minority   cultures  of  immigrants  and  national  minorities.     Going  along  with  his  definition  of  culture,  Kymlicka  distinguishes  two  main   forms  of  cultural  pluralism:  “multinational”  and  “polyethnic”  (1995).    He  uses  the   terms  “national”  and  “ethnic”  to  refer  to  a  group’s  mode  of  incorporation  into  a     111   larger  society,  not  its  level  of  political  mobilization.    In  “national  minorities,”  the  first   form  of  cultural  diversity,  previously  self-­‐governing,  territorially  concentrated   cultures  are  incorporated  into  a  larger  state.    For  instance,  the  Canadian   government’s  “multiculturalism”  policy  is  to  support  polyethnicity  within  the   national  institutions  of  the  English  and  French  culture.    In  “ethnic  groups,”  the   second  form  of  cultural  diversity,  individual  and  familial  immigrants  wish  to   integrate  into  the  larger  society  and  to  be  accepted  as  full  members  of  it.    Here,   “ethnic  group”  does  not  refer  to  national  minorities  who  do  not  have  political   privileges  but  rather  refers  to  immigrant  groups.    According  to  Kymlicka,  a  state  that   is  multicultural  depends  on  two  conditions:  The  first  condition  is  that  its  members   either  belong  to  different  nations  (a  multinational  state)  or  have  immigrated  from   different  nations  (a  polyethnic  state);  the  second  condition  is  that  such  belonging   and  immigration  is  an  important  aspect  of  personal  identity  and  political  life.       Kymlicka  points  out  that  “multiculturalism”  refers  to  different  things  in   different  countries.    Whereas  in  the  United  States,  the  term  “multiculturalism”  is   often  used  to  include  the  demands  of  marginalized  social  groups  who  are  excluded   or  marginalized  from  the  mainstream  of  society,  in  Canada  it  normally  refers  to  the   right  of  immigrants.    Although  he  acknowledges  the  importance  of  social   movements  such  as  feminism,  Kymlicka  excludes  these  social  movements  from  his   discussion  of  multiculturalism.    He  explains  that  the  disadvantaged  such  as  women,   gays  and  lesbians,  and  the  disabled  do  not  form  distinct  “cultures”  or  “subcultures,”   so  their  demands  against  their  marginalization  are  not  struggles  for   multiculturalism.    Instead,  the  oppression  of  these  social  groups  is  pervasive  despite     112   of  ethnic  and  national  differences.    He  argues  that  the  claims  of  the  disadvantaged   are  compatible  with  the  claims  of  cultural  minorities.    That  is  to  say,  two  distinctions   need  to  be  made  in  the  understanding  of  the  term  “multiculturalism”:  One  is  the   distinction  between  national  minorities,  which  have  distinct  and  potentially  self-­‐ governing  societies  that  are  incorporated  into  a  larger  state,  and  ethnic  groups,   which  constitute  immigrants  who  have  left  their  national  community  to  enter   another  society;  the  other  distinction  is  between  these  cultural  differences  and   social  movements  initiated  by  the  marginalized  such  as  gays,  women,  the  poor,  and   the  disabled.         3.  Kymlicka’s  Defense  of  Liberal  Multiculturalism     In  the  previous  section,  I  presented  definitions  offered  by  Kymlicka  regarding   culture  and  multicultural  conditions.    In  this  section,  I  will  turn  to  the  normative   side  of  his  discussion  of  multiculturalism.       Kymlicka  develops  a  theory  of  multiculturalism  that  emphasizes  the  liberal   values  of  autonomy  and  equality  (2007,  1995,  1989).    He  makes  the  egalitarian   claim  that  members  of  minority  groups  are  entitled  to  special  protections  because   they  are  disadvantaged  in  terms  of  access  to  their  own  cultures  compared  to   members  of  the  majority  culture.    According  to  him,  in  a  liberal  multicultural  society,   there  are  certain  non-­‐subsistence  resources  that  should  be  available  to  everyone   and  cultural  membership  is  one  such  resource  that  everyone  is  entitled  to;   therefore,  there  is  a  need  to  defend  minority  cultures.    Kymlicka  makes  four  points   in  his  defense  of  liberal  multiculturalism:  (1)  Cultural  membership  is  a  primary     113   good  that  everyone  is  entitled  to  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  self-­‐esteem  and  self-­‐ respect;  (2)  autonomy  and  freedom  are  the  basic  principles  of  liberalism;  (3)   individual  freedom  is  tied  up  with  cultural  membership;  and  (4)  group-­‐ differentiated  rights  are  consistent  with  the  liberal  principles  of  freedom.    I  will   examine  these  four  points  respectively  below.     First,  Kymlicka  regards  cultural  membership  as  a  primary  good.    According   to  him,  access  to  culture  or  cultural  membership  is  one  of  the  primary  goods  to   which  all  are  entitled.    Individuals  should  be  viewed  as  “members  of  a  particular   cultural  community,  for  whom  cultural  membership  is  an  important  good”   (1989,162).    “Cultural  membership  is  (still)  a  primary  good”  (1989,  166)  so  that   cultural  membership  is  part  of  the  consideration  that  individuals  are  being  equally   treated.    In  Kymlicka’s  words,  “we  should  treat  access  to  one’s  culture  as  something   that  people  can  be  expected  to  want,  whatever  their  more  particular  conception  of   the  good”  (1995,  86).    Cultural  membership  is  a  primary  good  for  two  reasons:  First,   it  provides  individuals  with  dignity  and  self-­‐respect;  second,  it  not  only  provides   various  meaningful  options  for  one’s  life  choice  but  also  assists  individuals  in   making  life  plans.   Second,  Kymlicka  argues  that  the  principles  of  freedom  are  the  basic   principles  of  liberalism.    He  recognizes  that  there  are  many  visions  of  liberalism,  so   he  states  that  the  vision  of  liberalism  he  defends  is  grounded  in  a  commitment  to   freedom  of  choice.    In  his  words,  “the  basic  principles  of  liberalism,  of  course,  are   principles  of  individual  freedom”  (1995,  75,  also  see  34,  80,186).    He  argues  that   liberalism  attributes  fundamental  freedoms  to  individuals  by  providing  them  two     114   freedoms  of  choice:  One  is  a  freedom  of  choice  regarding  how  they  choose  to  live   their  lives  and  the  other  is  a  freedom  of  choice  regarding  the  direction  in  life  they   choose.    That  is,  in  the  liberal  tradition,  not  only  individuals  should  have  resources   and  freedom  to  lead  lives  according  to  their  inner  values  and  beliefs,  but  also  they   have  the  liberty  to  question  their  beliefs  and  alter  their  life  plans  accordingly.   Third,  Kymlicka  argues  that  individual  freedom  is  tied  up  with  cultural   membership.    To  him,  there  is  a  close  connection  between  freedom  and  culture.    He   argues  that  culture  plays  an  important  role  in  the  liberal-­‐democratic  theory  due  to   the  fact  that  cultural  membership  provides  individuals  with  cultural  preconditions   for  living  a  good  life—freedom  of  choice  and  freedom  of  changing.     Respecting  minority  rights  can  enlarge  the  freedom  of  individuals,  because   freedom  is  intimately  linked  with  and  dependent  on  culture.  …I  will  argue   that  individual  choice  is  dependent  on  the  presence  of  a  societal  culture,   defined  by  language  and  history,  and  that  most  people  have  a  very  strong   bond  to  their  own  culture.  (1995,  75)     That  is  to  say,  cultures  are  important  to  individuals’  freedom,  so  cultural   membership  should  be  taken  into  account  within  the  liberal  principles.     Last,  Kymlicka  argues  that  group-­‐differentiated  rights  are  consistent  with  the   liberal  principles  of  freedom.    Group-­‐differentiated  rights  are  consistent  with   individual  freedom  because  liberals  only  endorse  minority  rights  that  respect   individual  freedom.9    Kymlicka  recognizes  that  his  defense  of  group-­‐differentiated   rights  might  raise  issues  in  contexts  that  the  minority  has  illiberal  restrictions  on  its   members,  so  he  distinguishes  his  liberal  account  of  multiculturalism  from  the   “conservative”  or  “traditionalist”  approach  to  multiculturalism.    According  to  him,   the  “conservative”  approach  mistakenly  assumes  multiculturalism  as  a  right  to     115   preserve  “authentic”  cultural  traditions  while  the  liberal  multiculturalism  is  a   matter  of  intentional  transformation  of  people’s  cultural  traditions.    The  liberal   multiculturalism  demands  “both  dominant  and  historically  subordinated  groups  to   engage  in  new  practices,  to  enter  new  relationships,  and  to  embrace  new  concepts   and  discourses,  all  of  which  profoundly  transform  people’s  identities  and  practices”   (2007,99).    In  other  words,  it  is  the  liberal  account  of  multiculturalism,  which   concerns  both  the  dominant  and  the  subordinated,  that  provides  the  framework  for   contemporary  multiculturalist  policies.         4.  Okin’s  Definitions  of  Culture  and  Multiculturalism  (Okin’s  Analytical   Claims)   In  the  previous  sections,  I  presented  Kymlicka’s  definitions  of  culture  and  of   multiculturalism  and  his  defense  of  multiculturalism.    In  this  section,  I  will  present   Okin’s  definitions  of  culture  and  of  multiculturalism.    In  the  next  section,  I  will   present  Okin’s  normative  claims  about  multiculturalism.     Although  Okin  never  explicitly  says  she  means  the  same  thing  using  the  two   terms,  in  her  critique  of  multiculturalism,  Okin  seems  to  hold  a  similar  definition  of   culture  and  multiculturalism  to  Kymlicka’s  since  she  does  not  criticize  Kymlicka’s   definitions  and  implications  of  these  two  terms.    She  seems  to  suggest  an  account  of   cultures  as  monolithically  patriarchal  with  minority  cultures  being  generally  more   patriarchal  than  the  surrounding  Western  culture.    As  she  says,  “sex   discrimination—whether  severe  or  more  mild—often  has  very  powerful  cultural   roots”  (1998,  679  emphasis  in  original).    Sometimes,  it  seems  that  she  identifies     116   “culture”  with  “tradition”  in  terms  of  patriarchy.    For  instance,  she  says,  “Sometimes,   moreover,  ‘culture’  or  ‘traditions’  are  so  closely  linked  with  the  control  of  women   that  they  are  virtually  equated”  (1999,  16).    Other  times,  it  seems  that  she  identifies   “culture”  with  “ethnicity.”    For  instance,  she  says,     In  the  context  of  (this)  multiculturalism  language,  history,  or  religion—any   combination  of  which  are  sometimes  referred  to  as  “ethnicity”—are  frequent   markers  of  distinct  cultures.  (1998,  662)       Okin  argues  that  there  is  a  difference  between  “some  poor  women  in  poor   countries”  (1994,  15)  and  women  in  Western  industrialized  countries.    That  is,  the   former  live  in  a  generally  more  patriarchal  culture  than  the  latter.    She  argues  that   the  justification  of  group  rights  from  a  liberal  standpoint  fail  to  have  two  things  in   mind:  One  is  an  accounting  of  the  degree  that  a  culture  is  patriarchal  and  the  other  is   the  measure  of  its  willingness  to  change.    She  brings  the  attention  to  the  institutional   structure  of  a  culture,  that  is,  one’s  social  location  in  a  particular  culture  is  equally  as   important  as  the  development  of  self-­‐respect  and  self-­‐esteem  in  that  culture.    Given   that  minority  cultures  are  more  patriarchal  than  the  majority  culture,  minority   rights  may  worsen  women’s  oppression.    In  her  words,  “the  situation  of  some  poor   women  in  poor  countries  is  different  from—as  well  as  distinctively  worse  than— that  of  most  Western  women  today”  (1994,  15).    She  argues  that  the  focus  on   differences  among  women  and  the  respect  for  cultural  diversity  does  great   disservice  to  many  women  around  the  world.    Okin  acknowledges  that  gender   inequality  has  similarities  in  their  causes  and  effects,  but  not  in  their  extent  or   severity.    She  points  out  that  gender  inequality  exists  in  all  cultures,  but  it  exists  to  a   greater  extent  in  cultures  that  are  strictly  religious  or  traditional.    For  instance,  the     117   Western  women  do  not  face  the  cruel  branding  of  women  in  other  cultures,  such  as   foot  binding,  clitoridectomy,  and  purdah.    These  are  demonstration  of  “the  case  of  a   more  patriarchal  minority  culture  in  the  context  of  a  less  patriarchal  majority   culture”  (1998,  680).   Okin  argues  that  group  rights  should  not  be  granted  to  cultural  groups  living   within  liberal  societies  if  the  minority  culture  is  more  patriarchal  than  the  majority   culture.    In  her  own  words,     While  a  number  of  factors  would  have  to  be  taken  into  account  in  assessing   the  situation,  they  [women  in  minority  cultures]  may  be  much  better  off,   from  a  liberal  point  of  view,  if  the  culture  into  which  they  were  born  were   either  gradually  to  become  extinct  (as  its  members  became  integrated  into   the  surrounding  culture),  or,  preferably,  to  be  encouraged  and  supported  to   substantially  alter  itself  so  as  to  reinforce  the  equality,  rather  than  the   inequality,  of  women—at  least  to  the  degree  to  which  this  is  upheld  in  the   majority  culture.  (1998,  680,  emphasis  in  original)         That  is  to  say,  in  a  liberal  society,  minority  cultures  are  normally  more  patriarchal   than  the  majority  culture,  so  the  elimination  of  gender  inequality  in  minority   cultures  would  imply  those  cultures  assimilation  into  the  majority  culture  or  their   extinction,  preferably  the  former.    A  particular  culture  does  not  generate  self-­‐ respect  and  self-­‐esteem  in  its  members  if  (1)  it  fails  to  provide  individuals,   especially  women,  their  places  within  the  culture;  and  (2)  it  forces  certain  (normally   subordinate)  social  roles  upon  its  members.    Since  most  cultures,  especially   minority  cultures,  are  patriarchal,  granting  rights  to  the  minority  is  not  the  solution   to  protect  women  and  girls.    Worse,  “they  [minority  rights]  may  exacerbate  the   problem”(1998,  680).    Therefore,  for  the  sake  of  the  healthy  development  of  women,   those  patriarchal  cultures  are  better  off  being  incorporated  into  and  accommodated   to  the  majority  (liberal)  culture  or  they  should  cease  existence  all  at  once.       118   Okin  states  that  there  are  two  concepts  of  multiculturalism:  One  is  the   politics  of  recognition  or  identity  politics  in  the  narrow  context  of  education,  which   demands  the  recognition  of  marginalized  groups  such  as  women,  people  of  races,   the  poor,  the  homosexuals,  and  indigenous  people;  the  other  is  the  protection  of   cultural  group  rights  in  the  wider  social,  economic,  and  political  nation-­‐state   context,  which  demands  the  protection  of  the  distinctive  cultures  of  minority  groups   within  the  nation  state.    Okin  clarifies  that  she  focuses  on  the  second  concept  of   multiculturalism,  that  is,  arguments  for  group  rights  are  built  upon  liberal  premises.     That  is,  she  holds  the  same  definition  of  multiculturalism  as  Kymlicka  does.10     5.  Okin’s  Challenge  to  Liberal  Multiculturalism  (Okin’s  Normative  Claims)   Having  presented  Okin’s  definitions  of  culture  and  of  multiculturalism  in  the   previous  section,  I  will  present  her  normative  claims  about  multiculturalism  in  this   section.       Okin  points  out  that  there  are  tensions  between  feminism  and   multiculturalism  because  asking  for  special  protections  for  and  accommodations  to   patriarchal  communities  may  reinforce  gender  inequality  within  these  communities.     She  argues  that  tensions  between  feminism  and  multiculturalism  might  be  best   addressed  by  focusing  on  how  to  alleviate  the  multiculturalism/feminist  dilemma.   Okin  challenges  Kymlicka’s  liberal  multiculturalism  by  arguing  that  there  are  some   conflicts  between  feminism  and  the  liberal  claims  for  group  rights.11    She  argues   that  Kymlicka  has  not  adequately  or  directly  addressed  the  relationship  between   gender  and  culture.12    She  states,       119   I  shall  argue  that  there  are  tensions  between  feminism  and  multiculturalism   which  have,  so  far,  been  insufficiently  attended  to  by  either  feminists  or   defenders  of  group  rights.  …I  want  to  argue  that  there  is  considerable   likelihood  of  conflict  between  feminism  and  group  rights  for  minority   cultures,  and  that  this  conflict  persists  even  when  the  latter  are  claimed  on   liberal  grounds,  and  are  limited  to  some  extent  by  being  so  grounded.  (1998,   664)         In  what  follows,  I  will  explain  this  criticism.     Okin  argues  that  those  who  defend  the  liberal  claims  for  group  rights  for   minority  cultures,  Kymlicka  for  instance,  overlook  two  factors:  One  is  that  he  fails  to   recognize  that  minority  cultural  groups,  as  well  as  the  majority  society,  are   gendered;  the  other  is  that  he  pays  insufficient  attention  to  the  private  sphere.    For   the  first  factor,  Okin  explains  that  although  all  cultures  practice  sex  discrimination   and  patriarchy,  women  in  Western  liberal  cultures  have  more  freedom  and   opportunities  than  women  in  many  of  the  world’s  other  cultures.    In  other  words,   granting  minority  group  rights  to  patriarchal  groups  may  worsen  the  situation  of   women  in  those  cultures.    For  the  second  factor,  Okin  explains  that  patriarchy  is   subtler  and  less  formal  than  public  injustice,  so  it  remains  a  question  whether   Kymlicka’s  test  of  a  liberal  culture  is  justified.    That  is,  because  Kymlicka  overlooks   the  private  sphere,  fewer  cultures  than  he  assumes  are  actually  liberal  therefore   there  is  less  protection  of  women’s  rights  than  he  assumes.    Establishing  group   rights  to  enable  some  minority  cultures  to  preserve  themselves  may  not  necessarily   be  in  the  best  interest  of  girls  and  women  of  these  cultures  since  these  cultures   might  be  illiberal.     Okin  argues  that  conflicts  between  feminism  and  multiculturalism  persist   even  when  multiculturalism  is  grounded  in  liberalism.    According  to  her,  Kymlicka's     120   arguments  for  group  rights  are  based  on  the  rights  of  individuals  and  confine  such   privileges  and  protection  to  cultural  groups  that  are  internally  liberal.    Okin  shows   that  the  defense  of  group  rights  on  liberal  grounds  would  encounter  problems  when   women  and  gender  are  taken  into  account.    She  suggests  that  the  liberal  model  of   multiculturalism  should  ensure  the  participation  and  adequate  representation  of  the   less  powerful  members,  in  particular  women,  of  more  patriarchal  groups.       Okin’s  normative  position  lies  in  her  endorsement  of  liberalism.    She  suggests   that  “some  poor  women  in  poor  countries”  should  accommodate  the  Western  liberal   culture.    According  to  her,  evidence  that  Western  women  are  less  oppressed  is  that   they  are  allowed  to  engage  in  paid  labor  while  “some  poor  women  in  poor   countries”  are  prohibited  by  their  regions  or  cultures  to  work  for  pay.    Poverty,  a   lack  of  paid  employment  opportunities  for  women,  and  highly  patriarchal  cultural   norms  are  likely  to  enhance  women’s  oppression  in  those  cultures.    Furthermore,   Okin  points  out  that  “oppressed  people  have  often  internalized  their  oppression  so   well  that  they  have  no  sense  of  what  they  are  justly  entitled  to  as  human  beings”   (1994,  19).    That  is,  the  oppressed  might  accept  their  oppression  and  even  be   cheerful  about  it  for  the  sake  of  survival.    In  this  case,  Okin  argues,  outsiders  can   often  be  better  analysts  and  constructive  critics  of  social  injustice  than  those  who   live  within  the  relevant  culture  because  outsiders  have  a  critical  distance  from  the   culture  in  question.   Okin  argues  that  the  majority  culture  has  a  special  responsibility  to  members   of  minority  groups  whose  oppression  it  may  exacerbate  by  granting  them  group   rights  without  careful  consideration  of  intragroup  inequalities.    That  is,  granting     121   group  rights  to  a  nondemocratic  community  amounts  to  taking  the  same  side  with   those  in  power  in  the  more  patriarchal  culture.    Okin  argues  that  tensions  between   feminism  and  multiculturalism  might  be  best  addressed  by  focusing  on  how  to   resolve  the  multiculturalism/feminism  dilemma.    For  women  who  are  members  of   relatively  more  patriarchal  minority  groups  (than  the  liberal  Western  groups),  it  is   not  a  simple  choice  between  the  culture  and  rights.    Okin  proposes  that  “discussion   about  group  rights  should  be  premised  on  a  good-­‐faith  effort  to  ensure  that  liberal-­‐ multicultural  aims  do  not  contribute  to  unequal  intra-­‐group  social  power  that  is   perpetuated  by  undemocratic  means”  (2005,  73).    That  is,  she  believes  that   liberalism  is  the  best  social  theory  to  promote  gender  equality  and  that  liberalism   usually  respects  women’s  equality  more  than  most  minority  cultures  that  currently   seek  group  rights  within  liberal  societies  do.       6.  The  Problematic  Account  of  Culture  (Assessing  Okin’s  Analytical  Claims)   In  the  previous  sections,  I  identified  what  Kymlicka  and  Okin  mean  by  culture  and   multiculturalism.    I  showed  that  Kymlicka  and  Okin  seem  to  share  similar   definitions  of  culture  and  of  multiculturalism  since  there  was  no  dispute  about  the   definition  and  implication  of  these  two  terms  in  the  debate  over  multiculturalism.     That  is,  to  them  culture  is  the  sum  total  of  all  human  practices  and  institutions  in   both  the  private  and  the  public  spheres,  i.e.,  “a  culture”  is  similar  to  “a  nation”  or  “a   people.”    By  multiculturalism,  they  mean  that  minority  cultures  need  to  be  granted   group-­‐differentiated  rights  on  liberal  principles.    In  this  section,  I  will  argue  that  the   tensions  presumed  by  Okin  between  feminism  and  multiculturalism  stem  partly     122   from  a  problematic  account  of  culture  that  Okin  adopts,  which  regards  cultures  as   static,  self-­‐contained,  and  well-­‐integrated  entities  to  such  an  extent  that  cultures  are   sharply  distinct.       Okin’s  critical  analysis  of  culture  has  its  strength.    She  does  not  refrain  from   the  critique  of  cultural  practices  that  oppress  women  in  cultures  other  than  her   own.    She  rightly  acknowledges  potential  tensions  between  respecting  cultural   identities  and  protecting  women’s  rights.    Okin’s  concerns  that  granting  group-­‐ differentiated  rights  might  exacerbate  gender  inequality  are  legitimate,  but  I  will   argue  that  Okin’s  concerns  should  be  posed  differently  and  that  to  pose  Okin’s   legitimate  concerns  in  a  different  way  has  some  relevance  in  a  different   conceptualization  of  culture.    Before  I  propose  a  different  way  of  conceptualizing   “culture,”  I  will  assess  the  weakness  of  Okin  critical  analysis  of  culture  from  two   perspectives.       With  regard  t  the  first  perspective,  Okin  holds  an  over-­‐simplified  concept  of   culture,  which  overlooks  internal  contestations  of  cultures.    We  can  infer  that  her   view  of  culture  is  monolithic  from  her  statements  that  minority  cultures  are  more   patriarchal  than  the  majority  culture.    As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  majority  culture  is  not   always  less  patriarchal  than  minority  cultures,  but  rather,  the  patriarchy  of  the   majority  culture  and  minority  cultures  are  manifested  differently.    Okin  fails  to  note   the  internal  diversity  of  cultures  and  turns  a  blind  eye  to  the  deep  sexism  of  Western   cultures,  which  is  a  demonstration  of  her  ethnocentrism.    Okin  allows  herself  to  be   distracted  from  the  oppression  that  Western  women  endure  as  if  they  had  already   achieved  gender  equality.    In  a  positive  sense,  the  diversion  of  attention  from  the     123   oppression  of  Western  women  to  the  oppression  of  women  in  other  cultures  draws   our  attention  to  the  oppression  of  women  in  other  cultures,  but  in  a  negative  sense   it  makes  feminists  blind  to  the  oppression  of  Western  women.    Although  Okin  insists   that  her  arguments  are  more  nuanced  than  they  are  often  understood  to  be,  in   general  she  has  a  binary  view  of  culture.    For  instance,  in  her  statement  that   Western  liberal  cultures  are  less  patriarchal  than  other  cultures,  she  unconsciously   dichotomizes  the  world  into  “our  culture”  versus  “their  cultures,”  “our  liberal  state”   versus  “their  non-­‐liberal  traditions,”  and  “our  less  patriarchal  society”  versus  “their   more  patriarchal  norms.”     The  second  perspective  is  related  to  the  first.    Okin  focuses  exclusively  on   sexual  violence  in  other  cultures,  thus  she  does  not  do  justice  to  the  historical   progress  of  those  cultures  and  she  pays  inadequate  attention  to  the  possible   changes  and  trends  in  those  cultures.    Okin  is  insensitive  to  the  political  context  in   which  minority  cultural  claims  are  made  and  mistakes  religions  or  traditions  of  a   particular  culture  as  the  culture.    She  views  these  religions  and  traditions  as   internally  static  or  irredeemably  patriarchal.    Without  a  thorough  study  of  the  full   dynamics  of  the  power  relations  within  a  particular  culture,  it  is  doubtful  that  the   judgment  about  that  culture  would  be  faithful  and  accurate.    For  instance,  Okin   rightly  criticizes  that  the  Chinese  culture  cruelly  brands  women  through  foot   binding  (see  1999),  but  she  fails  to  acknowledge  that  the  resistance  to  foot  binding   was  initiated  by  women  and  she  also  fails  to  mention  that  foot  binding  is  no  longer   practiced.    She  presents  foot  binding  as  a  static,  persistent,  and  isolated   phenomenon  that  has  survived  historical  changes  and  developments.    Simplistic     124   definitions  of  culture,  which  assume  that  minority  cultures  are  unified,  traditional,   uncontested,  and  unaffected  by  their  social  contexts,  are  definitely  problematic.           7.  Reconceptualizing  “Culture”       In  the  previous  section,  I  argued  that  Okin’s  concept  of  culture  is  problematic   because  it  does  not  take  into  consideration  internal  contestations,  historical   processes,  and  social  contexts  of  a  particular  culture  to  demonstrate  the  variability   of  a  culture  and  it  depicts  culture  as  static  because  it  overlooks  the  degree  to  which   the  development  of  a  culture  can  occur.    In  this  section,  I  will  propose  that  feminists   need  to  reconceptualize  “culture”  to  better  serve  feminist  projects  and  that  the   liberal  concept  of  culture  should  be  reconceptualized  with  cultural  interdependence   and  communication  in  mind.    An  alternative  concept  of  culture  is  one  that  is   internally  contested,  interactive,  and  fluidly  defined.    This  new  conceptualization  of   culture  is  consistent  with  the  views  attributed  to  Frye  about  the  concept  of  women   that  I  discussed  in  Part  One.     The  alternative  concept  of  culture  is  a  more  adequate  notion  of  culture  than   the  one  used  by  multiculturalists  because  it  grasps  that  (1)  cultures  overlap  with   each  other  so  they  are  without  sharp  boundaries  from  which  they  could  be  isolated   from  each  other;  (2)  cultures  are  internally  diversified  and  contested;  (3)  cultures   are  sensitive  to  contexts,  attentive  to  the  politics  of  cultural  construction,  and  are   the  product  of  specific  and  complex  historical  processes;  and  (4)  cultures  are   interactive  and  interdependent  among  each  other.    The  alternative  concept  of   culture  helps  us  to  understand  cultural  conflicts  from  a  perspective  of  cultural     125   interconnections  rather  than  from  a  dichotomized  liberal  majority  culture  versus   illiberal  minority  cultures  perspective.    It  is  clear  that  not  only  the  majority  culture   has  influence  on  gender  norms  of  minority  cultures,  minority  cultures  also  have   influence  on  gender  norms  of  the  majority  culture.     According  to  the  alternative  concept  of  culture,  culture  can  be  metaphorically   viewed  as  a  sphere  or  space  that  an  individual  is  located  in,  but  this  space  does  not   have  a  clear-­‐cut  boundary.    Cultural  features  are  seen  within  any  given  economic  or   political  activity,  so  culture  is  also  a  sphere  of  social  reality.    Culture  seems  to  be   something  that  we  can  acquire,  so  culture  can  be  viewed  as  something  that  shapes   the  way  we  experience  a  world.    For  example,  an  immigrant  living  in  the  United   States  can  manage  to  learn  English  or  acquire  practices  and  habits  associated  with   the  American  culture.    Literally,  some  people  might  say  that  White  women  and   women  of  color  do  not  share  the  same  culture  because  they  belong  to  different   races,  but  we  can  also  say  they  share  the  same  culture  if  they  live  in  the  same   country.    The  key  issue  here  is  whether  we  regard  culture  as  an  issue  that  is   separated  from  race  and  class.    When  we  speak  of  cultural  differences,  we  do  not   speak  of  a  set  of  variables  that  operate  separately  from  class  or  race;  instead,  they   are  intertwined.    However,  speaking  of  cultural  differences  does  not  necessarily   justify  speaking  of  different  cultures  because  different  groups  do  not  really  have   entirely  different  values  or  interpret  the  universe  in  completely  different  ways.    In   other  words,  cultures  are  not  self-­‐enclosed  entities,  which  are  neatly  bounded  and   precisely  delineated.    We  could  say  that  the  structure  of  cultures  organizes   differences  with  a  certain  degree  of  coherence  so  that  cultures  are  not  too  fluidity  to     126   grasp  and  define.    Structure  helps  to  understand  an  otherwise  undifferentiated  idea   of  culture.    It  is  “reification”  to  speak  of  cultures  as  though  they  were  entirely   different  from  one  another.     The  alternative  concept  of  culture  is  consistent  with  the  concept  of  women  I   attributed  to  Frye  in  Part  One.    That  is,  the  alternative  concept  of  culture  is   consistent  with  the  theory  of  women’s  oppression  as  a  general  structure.    As  I   argued  in  Part  One,  the  concept  of  women  should  (1)  involve  the  variability  of   women’s  experience;  and  (2)  can  grasp  the  dynamics  of  possible  changes  for   women.    The  alternative  concept  of  culture  and  Frye’s  concept  of  women  address   both  the  variability  and  the  dynamics  of  women  and  cultures.    The  alternative   concept  of  culture  would  help  feminists  understand  different  women  in  different   cultures  in  a  more  fruitful  way  than  a  multicultural  concept  of  culture  does.         8.  Criticizing  Okin’s  Normative  Position   In  the  previous  sections,  I  first  criticized  Okin’s  problematic  notion  of  culture,  then  I   proposed  an  alternative  concept  of  culture.    In  this  section,  I  will  focus  on  Okin’s   normative  position  about  how  to  deal  with  gender  inequality  within  the  context  of   cultural  conflicts.    I  tend  to  equate  multiculturalism  with  a  concept  of  culture  that  is   flawed,  so  I  argue  that  Okin’s  critique  of  multiculturalism  is  inadequate  in  terms  of   her  adoption  of  a  problematic  account  of  culture  from  multiculturalism  and  her   endorsement  of  liberalism.    That  is,  Okin’s  criticism  of  multiculturalism  is  misplaced   because  she  is  not  using  an  adequate  notion  of  culture.    Yet,  I  still  agree  with  her  that   the  multicultural  view  is  inadequate.         127   I  sympathize  with  Okin’s  concerns  that  granting  the  minority  group-­‐ differentiated  rights  might  worsen  gender  inequality  within  a  particular  group.     Indeed,  as  Okin  argues,  gender  inequality  is  worse  in  some  places  of  the  world  than   others,  although  I  would  not  necessarily  agree  with  her  overgeneralizing  statement   that  women  in  Western  liberal  societies  are  much  better  off  than  “some  poor   women  in  poor  countries”  in  term  of  gender  equality.    Okin  rightly  points  out  that   any  legitimate  liberal  model  of  multiculturalism  must  take  into  account  voices  of  the   disadvantaged  such  as  women.    She  also  rightly  points  out  that  “some  poor  women   in  poor  countries”  are  in  the  best  position  to  explore  what  the  best  options  for   themselves.     However,  Okin’s  suggestion  that  the  reformed  (with  gender  equality  in  mind)   Western  liberalism  is  the  best  approach  for  feminism  is  problematic  for  the   following  three  reasons.    First  of  all,  Okin  needs  to  specify  which  groups  of  women,   in  which  countries,  and  in  what  circumstances  internalize  their  oppressions.    She   undercuts  their  capacities  with  her  assertion  that  the  oppressed  tend  to  internalize   their  oppressions,  and  as  a  result,  committed  outsiders  are  better  analysts  of  the   oppressive  situations  because  of  the  critical  distance  they  possess.    It  is  unjustifiable   for  Okin  to  make  the  judgment  that  Western  women  are  less  oppressed  because   they  have  the  opportunity  to  work  outside  their  house.    It  is  notable  that  some   “Other”  cultures  do  not  prohibit  women  from  working  for  pay  outside  of  the  home.     In  fact,  to  better  diagnose  gender  oppression  in  “Other”  cultures  (and  in  the  Western   culture),  efforts  from  both  directions  are  needed:  On  the  one  hand,  the  agency  of  the   oppressed  is  crucial  to  the  awareness  of  the  oppression  because  they  have  the  local     128   knowledge  of  their  situations;  on  the  other  hand,  outsiders  can  provide  a  helpful   complementary  perspective  to  fully  assess  the  situations.    More  credence  needs  to   be  granted  to  minority  women’s  agency  and  more  work  needs  to  be  done  in   navigating  the  complex  interdependence  of  gender  and  culture  in  individuals’   experiences  in  that  particular  culture.   Second,  Okin  overlooks  the  more  systemic  aspects  of  patriarchy  and  thus  she   is  limited  to  a  controversial  understanding  of  minority  patriarchy.    She  assumes  that   a  minority’s  distinctive  set  of  norms  would  give  rise  to  patriarchal  forms  of   regulation  to  which  women  submit  and  that  these  norms  also  define  these  women’s   cultural  identity.    Yet,  the  specific  patriarchy  in  minority  groups  should  not  be   excluded  from  a  broader  sense  of  patriarchy.    As  a  matter  of  fact,  far  from  being   neutral,  majority  norms—in  some  cases,  patriarchal  majority  norms—have  shaped   both  practices  at  the  heart  of  cultural  conflicts  and  normative  frameworks  within   which  claims  for  cultural  accommodations  are  evaluated.     Last,  Okin’s  suggestion  that  liberalism  is  a  “one  size  fits  all”  solution  to   alleviate  women’s  oppression  is  doubtful.    By  liberalism,  Okin  means  the  values  of   equality  and  individual  freedom  and  from  her  statement  of  liberalism,  it  seems  that   she  is  certain  that  liberalism  guarantees  gender  equality.    Although  there  are   internal  contestations  in  liberalism  and  it  has  the  potential  to  change,  as  tested  out,   liberalism  as  an  ideal  social  theory  does  not  function  as  effectively  as  it  is  projected.     Although  the  United  States  publicly  supports  gender  equality  in  many  respects,   struggles  to  transform  social  norms  and  practices  to  make  such  equality  a  reality  are   incomplete  and  ongoing.    Liberalism  is  an  idea  to  promote  individual  freedom,  but  it     129   is  unknowable  whether  every  culture  will  accommodate  because:  (1)  Liberalism  as   a  working  theory  is  criticized  by  feminists  within  the  United  States;  (2)  liberalism   might  not  be  the  solution  to  gender  inequality  in  every  culture  because  it  can  be   rejected  as  a  Western  (and  possibly  imperialistic)  ideology;  and  (3)  something  more   suitable  than  liberalism  to  alleviate  gender  inequality  in  various  cultures  might   grow  from  intercultural  communications  and  competitions.       9.  Challenging  Multiculturalism     In  the  previous  section,  I  argued  that  Okin’s  criticism  of  multiculturalism  is   inadequate.    In  this  section,  I  will  argue  that  multiculturalism  is  not  beneficial  for   feminism,  but  my  critique  of  liberal  multiculturalism  is  based  on  a  different   rationale  than  Okin’s.       The  alternative  concept  of  culture  points  to  possibilities  of  expanding  the   narrow  view  that  is  associated  with  multiculturalism.    However,  I  am  not  asserting   that  there  would  not  be  tension  between  feminism  and  multiculturalism  if  a   different  account  of  culture  is  in  use.    What  I  will  argue  is  that  multiculturalism  is   not  a  suitable  framework  for  feminism.    The  interactive  understanding  of  culture   has  important  implications  for  normative  debates  over  multiculturalism:  (1)  It  shifts   the  focus  from  defining  a  culture  to  how  cultural  affiliations  impact  people;  and  (2)   it  emphasizes  the  need  to  develop  context-­‐sensitive  approaches  to  evaluating  claims   of  minority  cultures.    Culture  cannot  be  conceptualized  in  the  transformed  sense   within  the  framework  of  multiculturalism  in  Kymlicka’s  and  Okin’s  sense.    In  other   words,  the  alternative  concept  of  culture  is  not  compatible  with  the  multicultural     130   framework.    The  liberal  sense  of  multiculturalism  that  both  Kymlicka  and  Okin   adopt  is  that  the  protection  of  minority  “group  differential  rights”  is  based  on  the   liberal  values  of  autonomy  and  equality.    According  to  Kymlicka,  culture  not  only   enables  individual  autonomy  but  also  cultivates  individual  self-­‐respect.    I  use  the   term  “multiculturalism”  in  Kymlicka’s  sense.    I  argue  that  multiculturalism  should  be   discarded  not  because  there  is  an  either/or  choice  between  minority  group  rights   and  feminism,  but  rather,  because  multiculturalists’  emphasis,  such  as  Kymlicka’s,   on  “group  differential  rights”  can  lead  to  separateness  and  divisiveness  among   feminism—the  opposite  of  feminist  solidarity.         Multiculturalism  has  theoretical  and  practical  advantages  regarding   feminism.    Theoretically,  multiculturalism  is  a  better  way  than  ethnocentrism  to   understand  cultural  differences  among  women.    It  undermines  the  tendency  of  a   certain  group  of  women  (White,  First  World,  middle-­‐class,  educated,  heterosexual)   to  presume  to  speak  on  behalf  of  all  women,  thus  it  can  increase  the  recognition  of   social  and  cultural  diversity.    Practically,  it  aims  to  avoid  social  chaos  by  reconciling   the  relationship  between  minority  and  majority  cultural  groups.   However,  the  multicultural  approach  also  has  theoretical  and  practical   limitations.    The  theoretical  challenge  that  multiculturalism  faces  is  that  it  relies  on  a   conception  of  cultures  as  well-­‐integrated,  clearly  bounded,  and  self-­‐generated   entities,  defined  by  a  set  of  key  attributes,  including  a  shared  language  or  history.     This  problematic  account  of  culture  is  inherent  in  the  idea  of  multiculturalism  and  is   also  the  prevailing  concept  of  culture  among  those  who  advocate  multiculturalism.     With  a  conception  of  culture  as  a  coherent,  self-­‐contained,  and  distinct  entity  at  the     131   heart  of  multiculturalism,  multiculturalists  assume  culture  is  the  exclusive  source  of   freedom.    For  example,  Kymlicka  regards  cultural  membership  as  a  key  component   to  individual  freedom.    He  defines  culture  as  a  “primary  good,”  which  means  that   cultures  provide  their  members  with  meaningful  ways  of  life,  so  every  individual   should  have  the  freedom  to  possess  this  “good.”    On  the  flip  side,  the  liberal   understanding  of  “good”  might  trigger  non-­‐Western  resistance  to  cultural   imperialism.    It  seems  that  Kymlicka  assumes  that  people  have  the  same   understanding  of  what  “good”  is.    In  fact,  what  “good”  means  might  vary  in  different   cultures.    Accommodating  group  rights  in  liberal  multiculturalism  might  not  be  the   best  solution  for  solving  problems  related  to  issues  of  cultural  diversity.    Like  what   Okin  points  out,  the  connections  between  culture  and  individual’s  freedom  and  self-­‐ respect  are  not  as  straightforward  as  Kymlicka  suggests.    Not  every  minority  culture   would  associate  the  majority  cultural  membership  with  freedom  and  self-­‐respect.     At  one  point,  Kymlicka  points  out  that  “cultures  do  not  have  fixed  centers  or  precise   boundaries”(1995,  83),  but  then  he  understands  the  history  and  language  of  that   culture  as  the  culture  as  if  a  culture  does  indeed  have  a  center  and  boundary  lines.     The  practical  challenge  that  multiculturalism  faces  is  that  it  is  not  able  to   contribute  to  solidarity.    The  account  of  culture  that  Kymlicka  and  Okin  utilize  does   not  help  with  feminist  solidarity  because  it  overlooks  the  multidimensional  nature   of  cultures  and  the  ways  in  which  gender  practices  in  First  World  cultures  and  Third   World  cultures  have  evolved  through  cross-­‐cultural  interactions.    Since  the  social   structure  of  politics  and  the  historical  processes  are  all  intertwined  with  culture,  it   is  not  an  overstatement  to  say  that  culture  is  the  source  of  values  and  norms.    The     132   misconception  that  cultures  are  self-­‐contained  underestimates  the  possibility  of   interactions  of  women  in  various  cultures.    The  presumption  that  “Other”  cultures   are  more  patriarchal  than  the  Western  culture  without  examining  how  patriarchy   plays  out  in  particular  political  and  historical  contexts  can  lead  to  separation   between  Western  feminism  and  Third  World  feminism,  resulting  in  a  threat  to   feminist  solidarity.    Not  all  feminists  would  agree  that  solidarity  is  the  goal  of   feminist  projects.    For  instance,  postmodernist  feminism  may  not  agree  that   solidarity  is  the  solution  to  women’s  oppression.    Yet,  as  I  argued  in  Part  One,   women  are  oppressed  as  members  of  the  category  “women,”  so  the  alleviation  and   elimination  of  women’s  oppression  should  be  collective  and  structural.    Solidarity  is   a  plausible  goal  for  women  to  resist  gender  inequality  collectively,  however,   multiculturalism  as  a  framework  does  not  help  feminists  attain  this  goal.   At  this  point,  we  need  to  consider  the  following  objection:  Some  may  argue   that  there  are  a  lot  of  cultural  exchanges  going  on  under  multiculturalism  and  this   eventually  would  contribute  to  gender  equality  in  cultures  that  are  less  patriarchal.     For  example,  Andrew  Mason  argues  that  some  multicultural  assumptions  can  be   reconstructed  in  order  to  avoid  relying  on  “an  essentialist  conception  of  culture”   (2007,  221).    Although  he  does  not  specify  how  this  reconstruction  can  happen  and   what  would  be  the  result,  he  suggests  that  “the  truth,  no  doubt,  lies  somewhere   between  the  extreme  view  that  adapting  to  cultural  change  is  either  impossible  or   unfairly  burdensome,  and  the  view  that  the  burdens  associated  with  such  change   are  never  any  greater  than  those  borne  by,  say,  a  middle-­‐aged  worker  who  needs  to   retrain  because  the  industry  in  which  he  has  been  employed  no  longer  economically     133   viable”  (243).    I  would  argue  that  this  objection  overlooks  two  factors:  First,  the   current  cultural  exchange  is  based  on  a  model  of  tolerance  and  protection  of   “minority”  cultures.    Some  feminists  claim  that  we  should  tolerate  minority  group   rights  so  that  we  would  not  make  judgments  of  other  cultures,  but  the  consequence   of  this  tolerance  and  non-­‐intervention  is  that  there  is  division  among  feminists  due   to  its  polite  indifference  or  coldness.    There  is  a  demand  for  recognition  from  two   competing  claims:  On  the  one  hand,  we  want  to  protect  women  on  the  basis  of  their   common  oppression  as  women;  on  the  other  hand,  we  often  base  the  protection  on   the  specifics  of  their  cultural  groups.    As  a  result,  these  cultural  exchanges  often  do   not  result  in  genuine  dialogues.    Second,  this  statement  seems  to  suggest  that  we   should  be  applying  a  liberal  ideology  to  presumed  illiberal  “minority”  cultures,  but   that  makes  it  sound  like  cultural  chauvinism  rather  than  cultural  interaction.     Cultural  interactions  should  be  initiated  and  negotiated  among  cultures  rather  than   one  assuming  one’s  ideology  is  superior  than  others  and  taking  it  for  granted  that  its   own  ideology  would  be  helpful  for  “them”  as  well.    This  strategy  is  based  on  the   assumption  of  a  dichotomized  picture  of  egalitarian  majority  cultures  and   oppressive  minority  cultures,  resulting  in  cultural  intervention  than  cultural   interaction.    This  strategy  also  lacks  self-­‐reflection  of  one’s  own  ideology,  which   might  lead  to  resistance  and  hostility  of  another  culture.    Cultural  interaction  should   be  interculture  and  transculture,  rather  than  have  a  monopoly  on  other  cultures.    In   this  sense,  multiculturalism  simply  does  not  explore  the  relevant  process  of  cultural   interaction  and  change.         134   Conclusion   Multiculturalism  is  one  of  the  key  responses  to  the  issue  of  difference  raised  in  Part   One.    In  this  chapter,  I  presented  Okin’s  concern  that  multiculturalism  might  be   detrimental  to  feminism.    Okin  argues  that  the  protection  of  minority  cultures—the   main  claim  of  Kymlicka’s  version  of  multiculturalism—is  in  fact  harmful  for  women   and  girls  in  those  minority  cultures.    I  argued  that  Okin’s  critique  of  multiculturalism   is  based  on  a  problematic  account  of  culture.    Okin  has  a  questionable  assumption   that  the  minority  culture  is  often  more  patriarchal  than  the  majority  culture  and  she   is  insensitive  to  the  political  context  in  which  minority  cultural  claims  are  made  and   the  religions  and  traditions  of  a  particular  culture  are  internally  static  or   irredeemably  patriarchal.    I  argued  that  Okin’s  inaccurate  understanding  of  Other   cultures  prevents  her  from  finding  a  productive  solution  to  women’s  oppression.    I   explained  the  weakness  of  multiculturalism  while  tracing  the  difficulty  that   multiculturalism  encounters  both  intellectually  and  normatively.    I  argued  that   multiculturalism  misunderstands  cultures  as  separate,  closed,  and  internally   uniform  and  that  cultures  are  more  dynamic  and  loosely  defined  than   multiculturalists  suggest.       The  problematic  account  of  culture  is  inherent  in  the  multicultural  approach,   so  reconceptualizing  culture  means  that  we  should  abandon  the  multicultural   framework.    I  have  argued  that  the  multicultural  approach  should  be  replaced  by  a   new  framework  because  (1)  multiculturalism  relies  on  a  problematic  account  of   culture;  (2)  critiques  of  multiculturalism  within  the  framework  of  multiculturalism   would  not  solve  the  problem;  and  (3)  multiculturalism  fails  to  contribute  to  feminist     135   solidarity.    Ideally,  the  women’s  movement  is  a  collective  movement,  which  includes   resistance  of  various  forms  of  oppression  in  different  geographic  domains.    We  need   to  further  assess  multiculturalism  and  disclose  the  shortcomings  of  “taking  a   multicultural  approach”  that  result  in  a  static  apolitical  vision  of  culture  and  instead,   choose  a  framework  that  endorses  a  political  use  of  culture.                 136   CHAPTER  4     DISPLACING  MULTICULTURALISM  WITH  AN  ALTERNATIVE:  A  WAY  TO   ADVANCE  THE  POSTCOLONIAL  FEMINIST  CRITIQUE  OF  MULTICULTURALISM     In  Chapter  3,  I  criticized  the  problematic  concept  of  culture  used  by  liberal   multiculturalism.    Postcolonial  feminists  such  as  Uma  Narayan  and  Chandra   Mohanty  argue  that  there  is  a  major  problem—the  problematic  understanding  of   “Other”  culture—with  multicultural  studies.    They  manage  to  criticize  the   problematic  concept  of  culture  used  by  multiculturalists  within  the  framework  of   multiculturalism  with  the  hope  that  people  in  multicultural  studies  become  more   sensible  to  the  context  and  the  history  of  cultural  differences.    With  the   acknowledgement  that  the  postcolonial  critique  of  the  problematic  concept  of   culture  is  fruitful,  in  this  chapter  I  will  argue  that  this  critique  is  inadequate  because   although  it  suggests  the  necessity  of  finding  an  alternative  to  the  multiculturalist   framework,  it  fails  to  provide  such  an  alternative.    Framework  in  this  context  refers   to  the  social  structure  of  power  relations  and  its  theoretical  underpinning,  under   which  policies  regarding  ideologies,  politics,  and  economies  are  made,  tested,  and   sustained  or  challenged.         I  begin  by  critically  assessing  Narayan’s  critique  of  cultural  essentialism  and   her  proposal  to  foster  international  women’s  solidarity.    Narayan  argues  that   cultural  essentialism  results  in  sharp  boundaries  between  the  Western  culture  and   particular  “Other”  cultures  as  if  these  cultures  were  neatly  packed  entities.     Although  Narayan  rightly  suggests  that  women’s  solidarity  is  important  for  creating   women’s  cross-­‐cultural  interactions,  her  charge  of  the  problematic  concept  of     137   culture  as  cultural  essentialism  is  problematic  in  itself  because  assuming  cultures  as   distinctive  entities  is  not  cultural  essentialism.    I  then  examine  Mohanty’s  critique  of   problematic  multiculturalism  in  the  U.S.  academy  and  her  proposal  of  cross-­‐border   feminist  solidarity.    Mohanty  criticizes  a  harmonious  and  empty  pluralism  in  the  U.S.   academy  and  proposes  to  create  cultures  of  dissent  for  building  solidarities  across   divisive  boundaries.    Although  Mohanty  rightly  challenges  the  institutionalization  of   multiculturalism,  she  nevertheless  does  not  specify  how  cultures  of  dissent  can  be   built  within  institutionalized  multiculturalism.    The  postcolonial  critiques  launched   by  Narayan  and  Mohanty  are  useful  for  challenging  various  multicultural   assumptions  and  practices;  however,  they  fail  to  provide  an  alternative  framework   to  replace  multiculturalism.    Without  a  transition  of  the  framework,  their   suggestions  for  the  reconstruction  of  the  concept  of  culture  and  for  women’s   solidarity  are  impractical.    In  the  final  section,  I  propose  that  feminists  need  an   alternative  framework  to  multiculturalism,  and  I  explain  why  shifting  to  this   alternative  is  necessary  and  urgent  for  feminist  agendas.       1.  Narayan’s  Critique  of  Multiculturalism   In  this  section,  I  will  critically  examine  Narayan’s  critique  of  cultural  essentialism   and  her  proposal  of  international  women’s  solidarity.    Narayan  endorses   multiculturalism  although  she  criticizes  the  problematic  notion  of  culture  used  by   multiculturalism.    She  suggests  that  international  women’s  solidarity  is  possible   within  the  framework  of  multiculturalism.    I  argue  that  Narayan’s  endorsement  of   multiculturalism  is  incompatible  with  her  critique  of  the  notion  of  culture  and  that     138   multiculturalism  does  not  support  international  women’s  solidarity.    In  the  next   section,  I  will  make  a  parallel  argument  about  Mohanty’s  critique  of  the  notion  of   culture  and  her  view  on  cross-­‐border  women’s  solidarity.   1.1  Exposition  of  Narayan’s  Critical  Analysis     Narayan  criticizes  “cultural  essentialism,”  which  is  the  view  that  “assumes  and   constructs  sharp  boundaries  between  ‘Western  culture’  and  ‘Non-­‐western  cultures’   or  between  ‘Western  culture’  and  particular  ‘Other’  cultures”  (2000a,  82).     According  to  her,  well-­‐intentioned  feminists  attempt  to  avoid  gender  essentialism   but  end  up  practicing  cultural  essentialism.    These  feminists  distinguish  entities   such  as  “Western  culture”  or  “non-­‐Western  cultures”  as  distinct  from  each  other.     Accordingly,  women  who  live  in  those  cultures  are  distinguished  as  “Western   women,”  “African  women,”  etc.    In  particular,  “Western  culture  (women)”  and  “Non-­‐ Western  cultures  (women)”  are  set  in  a  contrasting  relationship  as  if  they  were   sharply  distinctive  spheres.       Narayan  argues  that  cultural  essentialism  relies  on  the  problematic   “Packaged  Picture  of  Cultures,”  a  view  that  “understands  cultures  on  the  model  of   neatly  wrapped  packages,  sealed  off  from  each  other,  possessing  sharply  defined   edges  or  contours,  and  having  distinctive  contents  that  differ  from  those  of  other   ‘cultural  packages’”  (2000b,  1084).    That  is,  the  essentialist  notion  views  cultures  as   distinct  and  separate  entities.    According  to  her,  this  notion  of  culture  is  essentialist   due  to  the  fact  that  it  shares  some  problematic  features:  (1)  It  asserts  that  cultures   are  distinctive  entities  with  arbitrary  boundaries;  (2)  it  assumes  that  cultures  are   static,  rigid,  fixed,  or  homogeneous  with  no  internal  plurality  and  ongoing  changes;     139   (3)  it  assumes  that  cultures  are  ahistorical  and  apolitical;  and  (4)  it  assumes  that   certain  aspects  are  the  defining  element  of  culture,  such  as  dominant  cultural  norms   that  normally  jeopardize  women  (See  2000b,  1084-­‐85).    Narayan  argues  that   cultural  boundaries  are  not  naturally  given,  but  are  human  constructs  that  involve   political  agendas,  history,  and  changes.    For  instance,  how  an  individual  is  assigned   to  a  certain  culture  involves  complicated  political  and  historical  processes.       Narayan  agues  that  to  understand  cultural  issues  in  national  contexts  other   than  their  own,  one  needs  to  be  sensitive  to  the  national  contexts  on  both  sides  of   the  border.    For  instance,  dowry  murder,  in  which  Indian  women  are  burned  by   their  families  for  dowry,  is  understood  by  the  Western  academy  as  the  typical   outcome  of  domestic  violence  over  women  in  India.    Other  aspects  of  domestic   violence  in  India  do  not  receive  as  much  public  attention  as  dowry-­‐murder.     Whereas  in  the  United  States,  domestic  violence-­‐related  homicides  are  less  visible   than  general  issues  of  domestic  violence.    Narayan’s  study  shows  that  the   proportion  of  women  in  the  U.S.  population  who  are  fatal  victims  of  domestic   violence  is  similar  to  the  proportion  of  women  in  the  Indian  population  who  suffer   dowry-­‐murder  (see  1997,  96-­‐100).    One  of  the  reasons  that  there  is  such   “asymmetry  in  focus”  (90)  on  fatal  domestic  violence  in  India  is  that  there  is  a  lack  of   explanation  of  the  development  of  feminist  issues  in  different  national  contexts.    In   this  case,  feminists  fail  to  look  into  dowry-­‐murder  with  both  the  consideration  of  the   U.S.  context  and  the  Indian  context.    On  the  American  side  of  the  border,  dowry-­‐ murder  is  selected  as  the  represented  feature  of  “Indian  culture”  in  the  American   academic  discourse.    The  selection  not  only  singles  out  certain  oppressive  practices     140   against  women  as  the  social  norms  of  Indian  culture  but  also  fails  to  reflect  social   changes  over  it  and  Indian  women’s  challenges  to  such  norms.    On  the  Indian  side  of   the  border,  it  is  more  feasible  for  Indian  women  to  organize  against  dowry-­‐murder   than  against  general  issues  of  domestic  violence  due  to  the  absence  of  an  effective   legal  system,  social  welfare,  education,  etc.    So  dowry-­‐murder  stands  out  among   domestic  violence,  which  is  misunderstood  by  Westerners  as  the  issue  of  Indian   women.       1.  2  Exposition  of  Narayan’s  Normative  Position   Narayan  shows  the  political  implication  of  her  critique  of  the  notion  of  culture  by   arguing  that  the  essentialist  notion  of  culture  is  detrimental  to  feminist  projects.     She  suggests  that  notions  such  as  “Western  culture”  or  any  particular  culture  be   reconstructed  in  antiessentialist  ways  and  that  feminists  think  of  cultural   differences  in  antiessentialist  ways.    Some  antiessentialist  strategies  that  she   suggests  include:  (1)  Being  sensitive  to  the  historical  and  political  processes  by   which  a  particular  culture  is  regarded  as  a  distinctive  culture;  (2)  emphasizing   internal  diversity,  plurality,  multiplicity,  changes,  and  conflicts  of  a  particular   culture  because  culture  is  not  internally  consistent  and  monolithic;  (3)  being  aware   of  the  fact  there  is  no  single  perspective  of  culture  that  can  be  the  sole  and   authoritative  representative  of  a  particular  culture  because  problematic   generalization  glosses  over  internal  diversity;  and  (4)  being  actively  engaged  in   women’s  issues  in  cultural  contexts  other  than  one’s  own  and  creating  women’s   cross  cultural  interaction  (See  2000a,  81-­‐90).     141   Narayan  points  out  that  women’s  solidarity  is  important  for  feminist  agendas   and  that  feminists  should  encourage  exchanges  between  feminist  communities.    In   particular,  she  makes  note  that  progressive  Third  World  feminists  are  not  immune   from  cultural  essentialism.    Some  Third  World  feminists  assert  that  notions  such  as   “equality”  and  “human  rights”  are  Western  values  and  therefore  there  are  no   common  interests  between  Western  women  and  Third  World  women.    Narayan   argues  that  this  sharply  contrasting  picture  of  Western  culture  and  Third  World   cultures  not  only  skims  over  the  genuine  conflicts  within  each  culture,  but  also   makes  it  hard  to  think  of  possible  collaboration  between  Western  women  and  Non-­‐ Western  women.    In  so  doing,  progressive  Third  World  feminists  reject  possible   social  changes  for  women.    Narayan  argues  that  Third  World  women  should  not   reject  “equality”  and  “human  rights”  as  Western  values  because  they  would  be   performing  cultural  essentialism  if  they  perceive  these  ideas  as  Western.    That  is,   Third  World  women  should  not  regard  ideas  such  as  “equality”  or  “human  rights”  as   the  essence  of  Western  culture.    They  would  not  be  able  to  team  up  with  Western   feminists  to  fight  against  gender  inequality  if  they  cannot  avoid  such  an  essentialist   conception  of  culture.    In  Narayan’s  words,  “rejection  of  feminism  as  a  Western   construct  makes  it  problematic  for  international  women’s  solidarity”  (2000a,  92).      Although  she  criticizes  the  notion  of  culture  used  by  multiculturalism,   Narayan  endorses  multiculturalism  and  proposes  to  “develop  and  sustain  robust,   credible,  and  genuinely  enriching  forms  of  multiculturalism”  (1997,  157).    She   suggests  that  Third-­‐World  individuals  play  an  active  role  in  shaping  the  agendas  and   understandings  of  multiculturalism.       142   I  believe  Third-­‐World  individuals  are  crucial  partners  for  many  mainstream   Western  voices  engaged  in  criticism  of  the  agendas  and  understandings  of   those  who  are  virulently  opposed  to  all  forms  of  “multiculturalism”  even  as   we  serve  as  critical  interlocutors  of  some  of  the  understandings  and   strategies  at  work  in  versions  of  academic  multiculturalism  espoused  by   mainstream  Westerners.    Not  all  visions  or  versions  of  multiculturalism  are   moral  or  political  equals,  and  both  mainstream  Western  and  Third-­‐World   subjects  need  to  engage  with  the  question  of  what  sort  of  multicultural   perspectives  we  wish  to  support  or  endorse.  (1997,  156)     That  is,  Narayan  suggests  that  there  are  different  versions  of  multiculturalism,  but  it   is  not  clear  in  this  statement  which  version  or  versions  of  multiculturalism  she   supports  or  endorses  and  what  claims  the  version(s)  of  multiculturalism  make.    Yet,   it  seems  that  she  mainly  talks  about  “multiculturalism  within  U.S.  academia”  (see   1997,  154-­‐57),  in  which  Westerners  refuse  to  judge  “Third-­‐World  issues”  thus   failing  to  critically  engage  with  Third-­‐World  individuals.    The  flip  side  of  this   multicultural  attitude  is  that  Third-­‐World  individuals  are  assigned  (by  Westerners   within  U.S.  academia)  roles  of  Emissary,  Mirror,  and  Authentic  Insider  to  be  the   representative  of  their  own  cultures,  which  suggests  that  these  are  the  only  roles   that  Third-­‐World  individuals  can  play  and  the  only  space  that  they  can  inhabit.     Narayan  describes  the  assignment  of  these  roles  to  Third-­‐World  individuals  as   sending  kids  to  their  rooms,  which  prevents  them  from  dealing  with  “important   political  questions  that  have  to  do  with  the  complexities  of  national  and  global   cohabitation”  (1997,  155).    It  seems  that  Narayan  uses  the  term  as  if  “Third-­‐World”   is  in  contrast  to  “Western”  although  she  argues  against  the  sharp  contrast  between   “Western  women  and  Third-­‐World  women”  (1997,  50).     1.3  Assessing  Narayan’s  Critical  Analysis     143   Narayan  does  not  define  what  “culture”  is  in  her  critique  of  the  “Packaged  Pictures   of  Culture.”    It  appears  that  she  might  regard  culture  as  a  form  of  social  reality,   which  converges  with  nationality  and  social  identity.    For  instance,  she  talks  about   “Indian  culture,”  “African  culture,”  and  “Western  culture,”  which  should  be   considered  more  dynamic  than  they  are  normally  perceived.    I  agree  with  Narayan’s   critique  of  the  problematic  concept  of  culture  being  ahistorical,  apolitical,   decontextualized,  and  lacking  internal  diversity.    Her  critical  analysis  of  culture   reveals  that  the  concept  of  culture  is  more  sophisticated  than  treating  culture  as   static  and  fixed.    However,  I  do  not  agree  with  her  criticism  of  Western  feminism   that  charges  them  with  committing  “cultural  essentialism.”    My  disagreement  can  be   supported  by  two  reasons.       One  reason  is  that  it  is  problematic  for  Narayan  to  define  “Packaged  Picture   of  Culture”  as  “cultural  essentialism.”    Cultural  essentialism  should  not  be  the  target   of  critique  because  the  problematic  account  of  a  neatly  packaged  culture  does  not   commit  essentialism.    Assuming  cultures  as  distinctive  entities  is  not  essentialism   because  lack  of  history  and  politics  is  not  the  essence  of  western  culture  or  other   cultures.    Reduction  of  the  complexity  of  culture  is  not  the  essence  of  culture.    It   seems  to  me  that  Narayan  misuses  the  term  “essentialism”  because  multiculturalists   who  use  the  problematic  notion  of  culture    (ahistorical,  apolitical,  or   decontextualized)  are  not  taking  these  features  as  the  essence  of  culture.    For   instance,  saying  that  Western  feminists  believe  that  Indian  women  (in  general)   suffer  from  the  dowry-­‐murder  of  Indian  culture  is  not  the  same  as  saying  that  these   Western  feminists  believe  dowry-­‐murder  is  the  essence  of  Indian  culture.    In  other     144   words,  Western  feminists  do  not  commit  cultural  essentialism  when  they  make  such   problematic  statements  about  certain  cultures.    Similarly,  when  Third  World   feminists  assume  that  “equality”  and  “human  rights”  are  Western  values,  they  do  not   actually  take  these  features  as  the  essence  of  Western  culture.    Therefore,  it  is   problematic  for  Narayan  to  charge  the  problematic  “Packaged  Pictures  of  Cultures”   as  essentialist.       The  other  reason  that  cultural  essentialism  is  a  problematic  charge  is  that   Narayan  does  not  explain  why  it  is  a  fallacy  to  consider  that  culture  has  an  essence.     Narayan  adopts  the  essentialism  language,  and  in  doing  so,  she  does  not  get  to  the   real  problem  that  makes  the  concept  of  culture  troubling.    The  criticized  notion  of   culture  is  problematic  is  not  because  it  is  essentialist;  but  rather  because  it  fails  to   comprehend  the  fact  that  (1)  cultures  have  variability  (internal  plurality,  real   differences);  and  (2)  cultures  have  dynamics  (the  historical  and  the  political   contexts,  and  the  ongoing  changes).    It  is  intellectually  inadequate  and  confusing  for   Narayan  to  use  concepts  such  as  essentialist  or  essentialism  without  properly   explaining  them.   1.4  Assessing  Narayan’s  Normative  Position   Narayan  does  not  specify  what  she  means  by  “multiculturalism,”  so  it  might  be   justifiable  to  assume  that  she  adopts  this  term  in  the  same  sense  as  Will  Kymlicka   and  Susan  Okin  uses  it.    That  is,  multiculturalism  means  that  cultural  groups,   especially  minority  cultural  groups,  deserve  differential  group  rights.    Yet,  Kymlicka   distinguishes  a  narrow  sense  of  multiculturalism,  which  is  the  preservation  and     145   protection  of  minority  group  rights,  from  a  broader  sense  of  multiculturalism,  which   is  commonly  used  in  the  U.S.    In  Kymlicka’s  words,   Some  people  use  “multicultural”  in  an  even  broader  way,  to  encompass  a   wide  range  of  non-­‐ethnic  social  groups  which  have,  for  various  reasons,  been   excluded  or  marginalized  from  the  mainstream  of  society.    This  usage  is   particularly  common  in  the  United  States,  where  advocates  of  a   “multicultural”  curriculum  are  often  referring  to  efforts  to  reverse  the   historical  exclusion  of  groups  such  as  the  disabled,  gays  and  lesbians,  women,   the  working  class,  atheists,  and  Communists.  (1995,17-­‐8)     Kymlicka  claims  that  these  two  senses  of  multiculturalism  express  themselves  in   different  countries:  Multiculturalism  refers  to  the  right  to  preserve  ethnic  identity  of   immigrants  in  Canada,  while  it  refers  to  the  inclusion  of  marginalized  social  groups   in  the  United  States.13    It  is  not  clear  in  what  sense  Narayan  uses  the  term   “multiculturalism,”  but  in  any  case  she  endorses  multiculturalism.     Narayan’s  normative  position  rightly  points  to  the  strategies  for  resisting  the   problematic  notion  of  culture  and  encourages  feminists  to  restore  history  and   politics  to  the  notion  of  culture.    She  also  rightly  points  out  the  direction  of   possibilities  for  feminist  agendas,  that  is,  women’s  international  solidarity.    I  agree   with  her  that  women’s  solidarity  is  important  for  feminist  projects  because   feminists  can  use  solidarity  as  a  political  goal  to  resist  gender  oppression  in  various   cultures.    Although  not  all  feminists  would  agree  that  solidarity  is  the  goal  of   feminist  agendas,  it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  fostering  women’s  solidarity  is   an  effective  way  for  making  more  people  aware  of  the  social  structures  of  gender   oppression  and  a  crucial  step  for  disrupting  oppressive  social  structures.    However,   Narayan’s  account  is  unable  to  foster  women’s  solidarity  by  failing  to  provide  a   philosophical  alternative  to  multiculturalism.    It  seems  that  there  is  disconnect     146   between  her  endorsement  of  multiculturalism  and  her  proposal  of  international   women’s  solidarity.    The  disconnection  can  be  demonstrated  in  three  aspects.     First,  Narayan  fails  to  detect  that  the  notion  of  culture  is  problematic  might   be  due  to  that  multiculturalism  as  framework  is  problematic.    It  is  not  clear  why   Narayan  does  not  draw  the  conclusion  that  multiculturalism  fosters  “cultural   essentialism”  when  she  criticizes  “cultural  essentialism.”    It  seems  to  me  that  there   is  a  clear  link  between  multiculturalism  and  Narayan’s  sense  of  “essentialist”  picture   of  cultures.    In  other  words,  multiculturalism  can  be  suspected  problematic  in  the   same  sense  that  the  concept  of  culture  is  questioned.    Narayan  fails  to  discern  the   incompatibility  between  her  notion  of  culture  and  the  multicultural  framework.    As  I   stated  earlier,  it  is  not  clear  in  what  sense  Narayan  uses  the  term  “multiculturalism,”   but  she  endorses  multiculturalism  as  the  framework  for  her  postcolonial  critique  of   the  problematic  concept  of  culture  that  is  utilized  by  multiculturalists.    It  remains  a   question  how  a  multiculturalist  framework  can  host  a  “non-­‐essentialist”  (in   Narayan’s  sense)  notion  of  culture  given  the  fact  multiculturalism  by  default   considers  some  values  as  the  essential  components  of  a  particular  culture.     Narayan’s  postcolonial  feminist  critique  indicates  that  there  is  a  severe  limitation  in   the  framework  that  multiculturalists  employ.    It  would  help  her  argument  if   Narayan  would  identify  the  shortcomings  of  the  notion  of  culture  as  the  result  of  a   bad  framework.   Second,  Narayan  does  not  fully  address  how  exactly  “cultural  essentialism”   makes  the  formation  of  cross-­‐cultural  knowledge  problematic.    At  one  point,  she   explicitly  specifies  that  cultural  essentialism  is  different  from  ethnocentrism     147   because  there  are  “multiple  mediations”  (1997,  104)  going  on  when  cultural   essentialism  comes  into  being.    According  to  her,  “multiple  mediations”  not  only   make  the  perception  of  a  certain  trans-­‐border  culture  filtered  and  distorted  by   essentialist  and/or  ethnocentric  Western  lenses  but  also  make  it  filtered  and   distorted  by  essentialist  and/or  ethnocentric  Third  World  lenses.    She  clarifies  that   cultural  essentialism  cannot  be  reduced  to  ethnocentrism  or  racism  because   ethnocentrism  only  contributes  partly  to  the  perpetuation  of  such  distortions.    Other   factors  beside  ethnocentrism  play  a  part  in  the  perpetuation  of  cultural  distortions.     “Multiple  mediations”  filter  the  information  that  crosses  national  borders  and   reshapes,  edits,  and  reframes  it  in  a  Western  national  context.    However,  performing   “multiple  mediations”  is  not  cultural  essentialism  because  the  misperception  of  a   particular  culture  through  distortion  and  filtration  is  not  the  same  as  assuming  a   certain  essence  to  that  culture.    Narayan  needs  a  clearer  explanation  of  the   relationship  between  cultural  essentialism  and  “multiple  distortions.”   Last,  Narayan  fails  to  recognize  that  women’s  international  solidarity  cannot   happen  within  the  multicultural  framework.    That  is,  multiculturalism  as  a   framework  does  not  foster  women’s  solidarity.    It  seems  that  a  fruitful   reconstruction  of  the  notion  of  culture  and  a  framework  that  relies  on  a  problematic   notion  of  culture  are  an  odd  combination  to  utilize  as  a  strategy  to  achieve  women’s   international  solidarity.    Narayan  suggests  resisting  various  forms  of  anti-­‐ multiculturalism  by  both  being  critics  of  anti-­‐multiculturalism  (to  defend   multiculturalism  as  a  working  framework)  and  being  critics  of  multiculturalism  (to     148   revise  certain  aspects  of  multiculturalism  such  as  the  notion  of  culture).    Yet,  she   does  not  explain  how  feminists  can  complete  these  two  tasks  at  the  same  time.     To  sum  it  up,  Narayan’s  reconstructed  notion  of  culture  provides  a  more   contemplative  understanding  of  cultures  because  her  consideration  of  political   agendas  and  historical  processes.    The  possibility  of  women’s  international   solidarity  points  out  that  it  is  crucial  not  to  defuse  conflicts  and  contestations  in   order  to  establish  a  dialogical  relationship  among  feminists  and  work  toward  the   direction  of  women’s  resistance  and  struggle.    However,  Narayan’s  criticism  of  the   notion  of  culture  is  unfruitful  because  she  does  not  complete  the  criticism  by   suggesting  a  change  of  framework.    Although  her  criticism  has  some  elements  of   truth  in  it,  it  is  hard  to  imagine  how  multiculturalism  can  accommodate  the   reconstructed  notion  of  culture  and  international  women’s  solidarity.     Multiculturalism  as  a  framework  seems  to  foster  neither  the  reconstructed  notion  of   culture  nor  women’s  international  solidarity.    My  criticism  of  Narayan  is  more  from   the  perspective  that  her  critique  of  Western  feminism  does  not  provide  a   philosophical  alternative  to  multiculturalism,  even  though  her  critical  analysis  has   elements  of  the  alternative.       2.  Mohanty’s  Critique  of  Multiculturalism     In  the  previous  section,  I  attempted  to  critically  examine  Narayan’s  critique  of  the   problematic  notion  of  culture.    I  have  argued  that  Narayan  fails  to  provide  a   philosophical  alternative  to  multiculturalism  although  her  critique  has  some   elements  of  an  alternative.    In  this  section,  I  shall  focus  on  Mohanty’s  criticism  of  the     149   concept  of  culture.    In  doing  so,  I  argue  that  Mohanty’s  criticisms  are  sound  but   inadequate  because  she  does  not  point  out  the  possibility  of  a  new  framework   either.     2.1  Exposition  of  Mohanty’s  Critical  Analysis  of  the  Concept  of  Culture     Similar  to  Narayan,  Mohanty  criticizes  the  idea  that  cultures  can  be  examined  as  if   they  were  separated  from  power  relations.    It  seems  that  she  regards  “culture”  as   counterpart  of  ideology  and  economy.     Western  feminist  scholarship  on  the  Third  World  must  be  seen  and  examined   precisely  in  terms  of  its  inscription  in  these  particular  relations  of  power  and   struggle.    There  is,  it  should  be  evident,  no  universal  patriarchal  framework   that  this  scholarship  attempts  to  counter  and  resist—unless  one  posits  an   international  male  conspiracy  or  a  monolithic,  ahistorical  power  structure.     There  is,  however,  a  particular  world  balance  of  power  within  which  any   analysis  of  culture,  ideology,  and  socioeconomic  conditions  necessarily  has  to   be  situated.  (2003,  20)     That  is,  a  static  and  distinct  concept  of  culture  is  problematic  because  it  does  not   reflect  internal  contradictions  and  ongoing  changes  and  it  risks  becoming   dehistoricalized  and  depoliticized.    According  to  her,  certain  concepts  of  culture  lack   an  account  of  power  relations,  thus  relations  of  domination  and  resistance  are  not   reflected  in  the  problematic  concept  of  culture.    The  dehistoricalized  and   depoliticized  concept  of  culture  is  depicted  as  such  distinctive  spheres  that  there  is   no  way  to  compare  and  evaluate  cultural  differences  due  to  the  neglect  of  larger   political  processes.    Mohanty  claims  that  women’s  studies  classroom  in  the  United   States  adopts  “a  discourse  of  cultural  pluralism,”  which  is  problematic.     [It  is]  a  pedagogy  in  which  we  all  occupy  separate,  different,  and  equally   valuable  places  and  where  experiences  is  defined  not  in  terms  of  individual   qua  individual,  but  in  terms  of  an  individual  as  representative  of  a  cultural   group.    This  results  in  a  depoliticization  and  dehistoricization  of  the  idea  of     150   culture  and  makes  possible  the  implicit  management  of  race  in  the  name  of   cooperation  and  harmony.  (204)     That  is,  Mohanty  challenges  “a  harmonious,  empty  pluralism”  in  higher  education   (193)  and  “the  proliferation  of  ideologies  of  pluralism”  (196).    According  to  her,   pluralism  as  ideology  was  heavily  promoted  on  campus  in  the  past  few  decades.     “Harmonious,  empty  pluralism,”  in  which  harmony  replaces  conflicts,  becomes  the   symbol  of  the  achievement  of  cultural  pluralism.    In  “harmonious,  empty  pluralism,”   White  faculty  and  students  play  the  role  of  listener  and  Third  World  individuals  are   considered  as  authoritative  representatives  of  particular  cultures.    According  to   Mohanty,  there  are  two  dangers  associated  with  the  idea  of  “harmonious,  empty   pluralism”:  One  is  tokenism,  which  mistakes  personal  or  individuated  discourse  of   culture  as  the  authentic  picture  of  a  particular  culture;  the  other  is  that  the  personal   narrative  of  culture  glosses  over  larger  issues  stemming  from  structural  political   and  power  relations.    As  a  result,  the  promotion  of  cultural  pluralism  not  only  avoids   genuine  conversations  on  cultural  differences,  but  also  contributes  to  making   cultural  pluralism  manageable.    Cultural  pluralism  becomes  manageable  because   the  institution  of  pluralism,  such  as  Affirmative  Action  laws  and  programs,   determines  the  voices  a  minority  person  can  have  and  to  what  extent  they  can  be   heard.    Because  power  relations  and  political  agendas  are  crucial  to  cultural   differences  and  because  “harmonious,  empty  pluralism”  does  not  touch  the  deep   political  and  power  issue  of  cultural  conflicts  and  contestations,  the  current  cultural   pluralism  is  an  inadequate  response  to  cultural  differences.       To  redefine  the  concept  of  culture,  Mohanty  suggests  that  feminists  need  to   create  “cultures  of  dissent”  because  such  cultures  are  not  in  existence  yet  (215).       151   Cultures  of  dissent  make  the  structure  of  power  relations  and  politics  visible  in  the   concept  of  culture,  so  that  oppositional  and  collective  voices  are  heard  rather  than   the  empty  harmonious  and  individual  voices.    According  to  her,  cultures  of  dissent   are  sites  of  resistance  and  struggle,  which  reflect  conflicts,  privileges,  and   dominations,  rather  than  the  collection  of  various  discrete  cultural  entities.         2.2  Exposition  of  Mohanty’s  Normative  Position   Mohanty  endorses  multiculturalism  although  she  criticizes  the  concept  of  culture   used  by  multiculturalism  and  of  cultural  differences  in  the  multicultural  discussion.     She  states,  “While  multiculturalism  itself  is  not  necessarily  problematic,  its   definition  in  terms  of  an  apolitical,  ahistorical  cultural  pluralism  needs  to  be   challenged”  (208).    She  argues  against  “the  institutionalization  of  multiculturalism   in  the  academy”  (208).     In  the  last  few  decades  there  has  been  an  increase  in  this  kind  of  activity,   often  as  a  response  to  antiracist  students  organizing  and  demands  or  in   relation  to  the  demand  for  and  institutionalization  of  “non-­‐Western”   requirements  at  prestigious  institutions  in  a  number  of  academic  institutions   nationally.    More  precisely,  however,  these  issues  of  multiculturalism  arise  in   response  to  the  recognition  of  changing  demographics  in  the  United  States.   (208)     That  is,  multiculturalism  is  not  problematic  as  long  as  it  is  defined  in  terms  of  a   political  and  historical  cultural  pluralism:  What  is  problematic  is  not   multiculturalism  itself,  but  rather  the  institutionalization  of  multiculturalism.   Mohanty  suggests  building  “solidarities  across  divisive  boundaries”  (191).     She  argues  that  if  we  are  able  to  understand  our  collective  cultural  difference  within   a  political  and  historical  context,  then  we  will  be  able  to  build  solidarity  across   borders.    She  proposes  a  feminist  solidarity  model  to  contribute  to  cross-­‐border     152   solidarity.    The  feminist  solidarity  model  allows  two  things  to  happen:  One  is  that   rather  than  focusing  on  differences,  it  focuses  on  “mutuality  and  common  interests”   (243);  the  other  is  that  it  can  bridge  local  feminist  movements  with  international   feminist  movements  given  that  the  redefined  concept  of  culture  is  not  a  sharply   defined  and  separated  one.    Mohanty  argues  that  cross-­‐border  solidarity  should  be   built  on  the  basis  of  “common  differences.”    She  uses  the  phrase  “common   differences”  to  show  that  differences  are  not  simply  “differences,”  but  are   specifically  located  in  a  dynamic  relationship  between  particularities  and   commonalities.     In  knowing  differences  and  particularities,  we  can  better  see  the  connections   and  commonalities  because  no  border  or  boundary  is  ever  complete  or   rigidly  determining.    The  challenge  is  to  see  how  differences  allow  us  to   explain  the  connections  and  border  crossings  better  and  more  accurately.    It   is  this  intellectual  move  that  allows  for  my  concern  for  women  of  different   communities  and  identities  to  build  coalitions  and  solidarities  across   borders.  (226)     That  is,  through  the  feminist  solidarity  model,  feminists  can  put  into  practice  the   idea  of  “common  differences”  as  the  basis  for  coalitions  and  solidarity  across   differences  and  borders.       2.3  Assessing  Mohanty’s  Critical  Analysis   Mohanty  does  not  specify  what  she  means  by  “culture,”  but  her  concept  of  “culture”   is  more  closely  related  to  the  power  relations  between  nations,  or  groups  of  nations.     For  instance,  Mohanty  suggests  using  languages  such  as  “One-­‐Third/Two-­‐Thirds   Worlds,”  which  refers  to  the  division  of  social  power,  in  conjunction  with  “First   World/Third  World”  and  “North/South”  to  overcome  the  limitation  of  the  false   dichotomy  of  First/Third  World  (See  226-­‐27).     153   Mohanty’s  critique  of  the  “harmonious,  empty  pluralism”  powerfully   challenges  the  problematic  way  of  dealing  with  cultural  differences.    Her  proposal  of   creating  cultures  of  dissent  is  helpful  for  associating  power  relations  and  political   agendas  with  the  understanding  of  culture.    However,  I  am  not  confident  about  how   cultures  of  dissent  are  manifested  in  multiculturalism.     I  suspect  that  the  “harmonious,  empty  pluralism”  might  overpower  cultures   of  dissent.    The  diversity  talk  on  the  university  campus  mostly  promotes  tolerance   of  cultural  differences  rather  than  confronting  cultural  conflicts.    Well-­‐intentioned   people,  especially  White  faculty  and  students  who  are  aware  of  their  White   privileges,  learn  to  be  sensitive  to  cultural  differences  to  a  degree  that  their   sensibility  evolves  into  avoidance  of  negative  judgments  on  “Other”  cultures.    This   kind  of  avoidance  has  a  positive  consequence  that  people  are  more  sensitive  to   cultural  differences,  but  it  also  has  a  negative  consequence  that  an  institutional   avoidance  of  conflicts  is  proliferated.    Individuals  from  the  “mainstream”  culture   and  those  from  “Other”  cultures  are  all  left  voiceless  because:  (1)  Individuals  from   “Other”  cultures  do  not  ask  for  more  interaction  since  their  cultural  differences  have   already  been  acknowledged;  (2)  “mainstream”  individuals  might  risk  being  “not   sensitive  to  diversity,”  or  “racist”  when  they  initiate  cultural  contestations  and   conflicts.    As  a  result,  neither  of  the  parties  assumes  they  are  in  the  position  to  be   dissenters  of  the  “harmonious,  empty  pluralism.”    To  prove  her  proposal—cultures   of  dissent  could  be  formulated  in  Western  academia—is  plausible,  Mohanty  needs  to   show  whether  the  academy  could  provide  incentives  for  dissent  and  provide   strategies  to  discourage  the  proliferation  of  the  “harmonious,  empty  pluralism.”     154   2.4  Assessing  Mohanty’s  Normative  Position   Mohanty  rightly  proposes  cross-­‐border  feminist  solidarity  as  the  avenue  for   women’s  connection  and  communication.    As  I  argued  above,  feminist  solidarity  is   crucial  for  women’s  resistance  to  structural  gender  oppression.    However,  it  seems   that  Mohanty  does  not  acknowledge  there  are  problems  regarding  her  endorsement   of  multiculturalism  and  her  proposal  of  feminist  solidarity.    I  will  specify  my   concerns  from  three  perspectives.     First,  I  find  Mohanty’s  statement  that  multiculturalism  is  not  problematic  is   disputable.    Mohanty  insists  that  multiculturalism  itself  is  not  problematic  while   suggesting  the  definition  of  multiculturalism  needs  to  be  challenged  to  transform   “an  apolitical  and  ahistorical  cultural  pluralism”  into  a  political  and  historical   cultural  pluralism  (208).    This  statement  is  saying  that  if  we  redefine  culture  and   cultural  differences  with  the  consideration  of  politics  and  history,  then   multiculturalism  would  remain  unproblematic.    It  is  not  immediately  clear  what   Mohanty  would  make  of  the  relationship  between  “multiculturalism”  and  “cultural   pluralism.”    It  seems  that  she  does  not  use  these  two  terms  interchangeably,   otherwise  the  challenge  of  “an  apolitical,  ahistorical  cultural  pluralism”  would  be   equal  to  the  challenge  of  “an  apolitical,  ahistorical”  multiculturalism.    Since  Mohanty   views  multiculturalism  as  unproblematic  and  that  cultural  pluralism  is  problematic,   we  can  draw  the  conclusion  that  “multiculturalism”  and  “cultural  pluralism”  are   defined  differently.    This  conclusion  is  rather  puzzling  because  normally   multiculturalism  and  cultural  pluralism  can  be  used  interchangeably.    Maybe   Mohanty  means  that  multiculturalism  built  on  cultures  of  dissent  would  be  different     155   from  the  “harmonious,  empty  pluralism,”  but  even  if  this  was  the  case,  it  remains   unclear  how  multiculturalism  can  be  unproblematic  while  cultural  pluralism  is   under  severe  attack.     Second,  it  remains  a  question  whether  multiculturalism  would  nurture   “common  differences,”  which  Mohanty  considers  as  the  basis  of  feminist  solidarity.   Mohanty  proposes  the  creation  of  cultures  of  dissent  and  feminist  solidarity  at  the   same  time,  which  is  why  she  comes  up  with  the  idea  “common  differences.”    She   states,  “In  knowing  differences  and  particularities,  we  can  better  see  the   connections  and  commonalities  because  no  border  or  boundary  is  ever  complete  or   rigidly  determining”  (226).    Maybe  she  means  that  we  need  to  consider   commonality  with  difference  and  conflicts.    By  “common  differences,”  she  means   that  what  we  have  in  common  is  that  we  all  have  experiences  of  differences,  but  the   experiences  of  differences  can  be  different.    It  seems  that  the  idea  of  “common   differences”  is  the  consideration  of  commonality  among  differences  and  conflicts,   which  is  a  dialectical  relation  that  can  be  found  in  the  following  statement:  “The   challenge  is  to  see  how  differences  allow  us  to  explain  the  connections  and  border   crossings  better  and  more  accurately,  how  specifying  difference  allows  us  to   theorize  universal  concerns  more  fully”  (226).    That  is,  the  basis  of  feminist   solidarity  is  both  commonalities  and  differences.    This  statement  is  powerful   because  it  helps  us  recognize  that  having  commonality  does  not  naturally  generate   solidarity.    That  is,  solidarity  is  in  fact  not  so  much  challenged  by  the  existence  of   differences  among  people,  as  it  is  by  the  assumption,  in  advance,  that  solidarity  only   comes  naturally  when  we  can  recognize  commonality.    However,  it  is  not  clear     156   whether  multiculturalism  would  be  able  to  acknowledge  the  powerful  concept  of   “common  differences.”     Last,  Mohanty  intends  to  reconfigure  the  conception  of  cultural  differences   and  to  foster  cross-­‐cultural  feminist  solidarity,  but  adopting  the  multicultural   approach  does  not  help  her  complete  this  mission.    The  multicultural  approach  does   address  cultural  differences,  but  it  leaves  inherent  conflicts  unresolved  and  weakens   a  potential  for  achieving  solidarity.    It  is  not  merely  about  the  acknowledgement  of   differences,  but  also  about  which  specific  differences  are  acknowledged  and  what   feminists  should  do  with  differences.    Both  the  theoretical  difficulties  that  Mohanty’s   critique  reveals  and  the  factual  split  of  feminism  indicate  the  urgent  need  to   examine  limitations  of  the  multicultural  framework  and  to  look  for  an  alternative.     Mohanty’s  critique  points  to  the  fact  that  there  is  something  wrong  with  the   multicultural  approach,  but  she  does  not  suggest  that  the  multicultural  approach   needs  to  be  replaced.     To  sum  up,  I  agree  with  Mohanty  that  the  concept  of  culture  needs  to  be   redefined  to  include  genuine  diversity  with  consideration  of  power  relations  and   political  agendas  and  that  feminist  solidarity  is  crucial  for  feminist  projects.     However,  with  the  redefinition  of  the  concept  of  culture,  multiculturalism  as  a   framework  would  fall  apart.    I  doubt  that  multiculturalism  should  and  can  continue   to  work  as  a  framework  and  that  the  feminist  solidarity  model  that  Mohanty   envisions  would  be  possible  within  the  framework  of  multiculturalism.       3.  Beyond  Multiculturalism     157   In  the  previous  two  sections,  I  have  called  attention  to  both  Narayan’s  and   Mohanty’s  reconfigurations  of  the  notion  of  culture  and  their  proposals  of  cross-­‐ cultural  feminist  solidarity.    I  argued  that  they  rightly  criticize  the  concept  of  culture   that  multiculturalism  utilizes,  but  both  Narayan  and  Mohanty  fail  to  point  out  that   multiculturalism  as  framework  is  not  compatible  with  the  reconstructed  concept  of   culture  and  that  multiculturalism  does  not  support  cross-­‐cultural  feminist   solidarity.    In  this  section,  I  shall  first  show  what  limitations  and  shortcomings   multiculturalism  has  and  why  we  need  an  alternative  framework  to   multiculturalism.    I  then  propose  that  feminism  needs  a  transition  of  framework   from  multiculturalism  to  an  alternative.    I  argue  that  rather  than  remedying   multiculturalism,  we  need  a  shift  of  the  framework  from  multiculturalism  to  an   alternative.    I  also  argue  that  the  alternative  must  be  compatible  with  the   reconstructed  notion  of  culture  and  that  it  must  support  cross-­‐cultural  women’s   solidarity.    At  the  end  of  this  section,  I  consider  one  of  the  possible  objections  to  my   proposal  and  respond  to  the  objection.     I  begin  by  specifying  both  theoretical  and  the  practical  limitations  and   shortcomings  of  multiculturalism.    Theoretically,  multiculturalism  relies  on  a   problematic  notion  of  culture,  in  which  culture  is  viewed  as  a  set  of  shared   characteristics  and  attributes  and  as  a  separate,  closed,  and  internally  uniform   entity.    If  one  adopts  multiculturalists’  definition  of  culture,  it  would  be  self-­‐ defeating  for  her  to  believe  the  establishment  of  substantial  rather  than  superficial   interaction:  On  the  one  hand,  the  self-­‐containment  of  the  cultural  definition   presumes  some  barrier  and  boundaries  among  cultures;  on  the  other  hand,  the     158   multicultural  definition  of  culture  demarcates  cultures  and  makes  differences   tangible  to  such  an  extent  that  it  leads  to  the  perception  that  the  perceived  barriers   are  insurmountable.    I  am  not  positive  that  multiculturalism  will  be  able  to   accommodate  the  reconstructed  notion  of  culture  as  Narayan  and  Mohanty  hope  for   because  if  cultures  are  more  dynamic  than  multiculturalists  suggest,  then   multiculturalism  as  a  framework  needs  to  go  through  a  substantial  transformation   to  accommodate  a  redefinition  of  culture.    It  remains  a  question  whether   multiculturalism  is  still  multiculturalism  if  it  is  transformed  substantially.    The   postcolonial  feminist  critique  indicates  the  necessity  of  a  shift  from  multiculturalism   to  a  new  framework  but  it  fails  to  specify  what  it  would  be.       Multiculturalism  also  is  limited  in  its  capacity  for  increasing  cross-­‐cultural   exchanges  due  to  its  lack  of  significant  engagement.    The  purpose  of  the  “difference   critique”  is  to  draw  attention  to  the  fact  that  feminism  does  not  do  sufficient  work  to   be  inclusive.    The  intention  of  the  “difference  critique”  is  that  women  should  be   collaborative  instead  of  being  unintentionally  influenced  by  ethnocentrism.    The   direction  of  feminism  took  an  unfortunate  detour  by  going  from  Friedan  to   multiculturalism  rather  than  to  a  different  framework.    Certain  aspects  of  cultural   differences  focus  on  the  ethnic  portion  of  cultures  without  situating  differences   within  histories  and  contexts  or  reflecting  on  why  and  how  certain  cultural   phenomena  are  picked  as  different  (from  Western  culture).    The  divide  of  feminism   is  not  healed  by  the  “difference  critique;”  but  rather,  against  the  good  intentions  of   the  “difference  critique,”  the  divide  is  made  broader.    Thus,  the  multicultural   assumption  that  cultures  are  simply  separated  entities  becomes  an  intellectual     159   obstacle  that  impedes  feminist  solidarity  instead  of  contributing  to  genuine   collaboration  and  interaction.     To  correct  the  limitations  of  multiculturalism,  feminism  needs  an  alternative   framework  to  replace  multiculturalism.    I  suggest  that  we  need  to  go  beyond  the   current  multicultural  framework  and  make  a  transformative  shift  to  an  alternative   framework  and  theoretical  model.    This  alternative  should  emphasize  the  aspects  of   communication  and  dialogue  that  can  create  not  only  the  sensitivity  to  cultural   differences  but  also  an  active  engagement  between  cultures.    This  alternative  should   be  executed  with  full  awareness,  courage,  and  devotion  to  problems  affecting   “Other”  women.    To  complete  this  task,  we  need  a  good  understanding  of  the   alternative  to  multiculturalism  and  how  it  is  different  from  the  multicultural   approach.    Next,  I  will  explain  what  an  alternative  to  multiculturalism  has  to  do  with   the  problem  of  multiculturalism  and  how  the  alternative  succeeds  where   multiculturalism  fails.    I  specify  the  advantage  of  having  the  alternative  as  the   framework  from  both  the  theoretical  perspective  and  the  practical  perspective.   From  the  theoretical  perspective,  the  alternative  to  multiculturalism  must   hold  a  dynamic  concept  of  culture,  which  allows  us  to  see  that  cultures  are  not  only   internally  contested  but  also  interactive  and  mutually  constitutive.    This  view  of   culture  also  acknowledges  the  contingency  and  variability  of  individuals’   experiences  of  cultural  experiences.    Thus,  the  alternative  to  multiculturalism  must   have  an  intellectual  concept  and  practice  of  culture  that  is  different  from  that  of   multiculturalism.    In  this  new  framework,  the  negative  and  the  positive  aspects  of  a   culture  would  be  faithfully  recorded.    Rather  than  the  Western  avoidance  of  a     160   critique  of  Third  World  cultures,  we  need  a  framework  in  which  a  true  story  of   Third  World  culture  is  revealed.    For  instance,  the  oppression  of  Indian  women  and   the  liberation  of  them  would  be  both  discussed.     In  addition,  the  alternative  to  multiculturalism  must  recognize  that  cultures   are  not  rigidly  defined,  but  are  open-­‐ended,  overlapping,  and  in  need  of   intercommunication.    An  alternative  is  crucial  in  analyzing  gender  and  cultural   diversity  in  the  cross-­‐cultural  context:  Not  only  should  Westerners  recognize  Third   World  cultures  are  different  from  their  own,  but  they  should  also  recognize  that   their  culture  is  different  from  Third  World  cultures.    That  is,  the  Western  culture   should  quit  being  the  referent  norm  and  both  the  Western  culture  and  Third  World   cultures  should  attend  to  their  own  limitations  as  well  as  to  their  internal  diversity   and  conflicts.    For  instance,  even  in  North  America,  Canada  and  the  United  States   share  some  commonality  but  also  exhibit  important  distinctions.    For  another   example,  there  are  numerous  evidences  that  gender  inequality  persists  in  the   Western  culture.    The  humble  recognition  of  limitations  may  help  cure  the  Western   culture  of  ethnocentrism,  thus  enhancing  the  dialogue  between  cultures.    The   alternative  must  be  able  to  promote  genuine  cultural  dialogues  since  it  is  going  to   confront  cultural  contestations  and  conflicts.     From  the  practical  perspective,  the  alternative  must  be  helpful  in  facilitating   solidarity  across  cultural  differences.    A  key  normative  implication  that  follows  from   adopting  a  dynamic  view  of  culture  is  that  there  should  be  a  shift  for  evaluating   cultural  claims  from  one  that  is  based  upon  inherent  features  of  cultural  groups  to   one  that  is  based  upon  the  social  and  political  effects  of  cultural  differences.    The     161   alternative  must  adopt  a  view  of  culture  that  is  more  attentive  to  the  politics  of   cultural  construction  and  contestation:  Cultural  communities  have  long  interacted   and  shaped  one  another  in  their  interactions,  and  they  have  been  internally   heterogeneous  from  the  start  (so  the  cultural  difference  is  not  a  concern).    This   dynamic  concept  of  culture  is  the  product  of  not  only  internal  contestations  within  a   specific  culture,  but  also  of  complex  historical  processes  of  interaction  with  other   cultures.    Hence,  the  social  condition  of  women’s  solidarity  should  be  characterized   as  transcultural  rather  than  multicultural.    Given  the  right  conditions,  feminism   under  the  alternative  framework  is  more  promising  than  multicultural  feminism.     That  is  to  say,  the  alternative  must  be  compatible  with  women’s  solidarity,  while   multiculturalism  is  inherently  not.     I  have  argued  that  it  is  inadequate  to  simply  criticize  the  problematic  concept   of  culture  and  that  feminism  needs  a  framework  transition  from  multiculturalism  to   an  alternative.    Some  postcolonial  multicultural  feminists  might  object  that  it  is   sufficient  to  have  a  reconstructed  notion  of  culture  and  that  the  transition  from   multiculturalism  to  an  alternative  could  be  a  nominal  transition,  which  would  not   bring  any  substantial  changes  to  feminist  projects.    In  other  words,  they  might  claim   that  if  feminists  amend  the  problematic  concept  of  culture,  multiculturalism  would   function  as  the  framework,  to  which  I  have  three  objectives.       First  of  all,  multiculturalism  as  a  framework  relies  on  the  problematic   concept  of  culture,  so  the  framework  would  fall  apart  if  we  reconstruct  the  concept   of  culture.    The  reconstruction  of  the  concept  of  culture  would  be  substantial  enough   to  distinguish  itself  from  the  problematic  concept  of  culture,  thus  the  reconstructed     162   concept  of  culture  cannot  function  as  the  foundation  of  multiculturalism.    For   instance,  we  observe  that  in  the  United  States  nowadays,  minority  cultures  are  not   distinctive  cultures  that  are  sharply  separated  from  the  “American  culture”  or  from   each  other.    In  other  words,  minority  cultures  such  as  the  Chinese  culture  and  the   Latin  cultures  have  vague  and  obscure  contours.    Especially  in  California,  where   members  of  both  cultures  might  have  more  in  common  with  each  other  than  they   would  with  their  own  cultural  members  in  their  countries  of  origin.    Given  this   acknowledgement  of  culture  being  vaguely  defined,  the  replacement  of   multiculturalism  with  an  alternative  is  what  the  reconstructed  concept  of  culture   requires.    The  replacement  of  multiculturalism  with  transculturalism  is  a  substantial   theoretical  change  rather  than  a  semantic  exercise.     Second,  multiculturalism  is  problematic  because  it  works  with  an  inadequate   idea  of  culture.    That  is,  if  we  want  to  start  to  reconstruct  the  concept  of  culture,  we   need  to  stop  referring  to  the  problematic  framework  because  it  is  exactly  the   framework  where  multiculturalists  generate  their  problematic  concept  of  culture.    If   feminists  continue  to  work  within  the  framework  multiculturalism,  then  it  remains   a  question  of  how  the  reconstruction  of  the  concept  of  culture  is  possible.    We  need   to  consider  the  relationship  between  the  problematic  concept  of  culture  and   multiculturalism.     Last,  I  am  skeptical  that  a  reconstructed  concept  of  culture—political,   historical,  closely  connected  to  power  relations,  and  contested  in  terms  of  cultural   majorities  and  minorities—proposed  by  postcolonial  feminists  would  sustain   multiculturalism  because  it  does  not  adequately  address  the  underlying  deficiencies     163   associated  with  the  multicultural  framework.    For  the  moment,  let  us  suppose  that   multiculturalism  as  a  framework  is  not  as  problematic  as  I  have  argued  and  that  we   are  going  to  live  with  the  reconstructed  concept  of  culture  within  the  multicultural   framework.    Then  we  would  have  to  reconcile  the  idea  of  multiple  cultures  being   distinctive  from  each  other  (by  the  definition  of  multiculturalism)  and  the  idea  of   cultures  not  being  distinctive  from  each  other  (by  the  reconstructed  concept  of   culture).    In  other  words,  cultures  are  semi-­‐distinctive  from  each  other.    For   instance,  a  Chinese  individual  living  in  America  would  identify  with  being  both   Chinese  and  American,  and  neither  Chinese  nor  American  at  the  same  time.     Although  this  would  fit  into  many  cross-­‐cultural  advocates’  reconfiguration  of   identity,  the  confusion  of  cultural  belongs  could  be  troubling  because  of  the   problematic  assumption  that  someone  should  belong  to  a  particular  culture.     According  to  the  assumption,  one  should  be  troubled  if  she  is  not  certain  which   culture  she  belongs  to  because  the  norm  is  that  a  person  should  be  certain  about  her   cultural  identity.         Conclusion     In  this  chapter,  I  have  presented  both  Narayan’s  and  Mohanty’s  critique  of  the   notion  of  culture  used  by  multiculturalism.    I  have  called  attention  to  their  proposal   that  feminism  needs  a  concept  of  culture  that  can  capture  the  variability  and  the   dynamics  of  cultures.    I  have  argued  that  these  two  postcolonial  feminists  fail  to   provide  a  philosophical  alternative  to  multiculturalism  even  though  they  suggest   that  certain  aspects  of  multiculturalism  are  problematic.    They  unwittingly  adopt     164   aspects  of  the  positions  that  they  otherwise  reject.    That  is,  they  assume  that  there  is   no  problem  with  multiculturalism  itself.    I  have  proposed  that  feminism  not  only   needs  to  have  a  reconstructed  concept  of  culture,  but  also  needs  a  new  framework.    I   have  argued  that  the  reconstruction  of  the  concept  of  culture  challenges  the   foundation  of  multiculturalism.    I  have  also  argued  that  an  alternative  is  more   favorable  than  multiculturalism  because:  (1)  the  alternative  accommodates  the   reconstructed  notion  of  culture;  and  (2)  the  alternative  enhances  women’s  cross-­‐ cultural  solidarity.     By  proposing  a  framework  transition  from  multiculturalism  to  a  new   alternative,  I  sense  that  feminists  would  have  a  better  framework  to  understand   cultural  differences  and  actively  engage  in  cultural  dialogues.    I  also  think  that   feminists  would  have  a  better  framework  to  initiate  and  foster  solidarity  across   borders,  whether  it  be  national  borders  or  assumed  cultural  borders.    I  will   introduce  the  alternative  to  multiculturalism  and  specify  how  it  would  manifest  it  in   feminism  in  the  next  chapter.         165   CHAPTER  5     THE  TRANSCULTURAL  PERSPECTIVE  AS  THE  ALTERNATIVE  TO  THE   MULTICULTURAL  APPROACH       In  the  previous  chapters,  I  argued  that  feminist  debates  over  the  difference  among   women  and  the  related  problematic  generalization  are  in  part  due  to  ethnocentrism.     Although  ethnocentrism  is  not  the  only  criticism  of  multiculturalism,  I  argued  that   the  current  multicultural  framework  does  not  suppress  ethnocentrism  but   unintentionally  encourages  it.    In  this  chapter,  I  will  suggest  that  a  transcultural   perspective  might  provide  an  alternative  to  the  multicultural  approach  for   discussing  cultural  differences  among  women.    I  will  specify  what  the  transcultural   perspective  is  and  what  it  promises  for  feminism.    I  argue  that  if  feminism  employs   the  transcultural  perspective,  it  will  be  able  to  make  generalizations  without  falling   into  ethnocentrism.    The  transcultural  approach  was  developed  by  the  Russian-­‐ American  cultural  theorist  Mikhail  Epstein,  who  offers  a  very  useful  metaphysical   framework  for  feminists  to  adopt  for  exploring  the  possibility  of  women’s  collective   struggles.    Unlike  the  multicultural  approach,  which  asserts  a  completeness  of  each   culture,  the  transcultural  perspective  suggests  that  if  a  specific  group  loosens  the   hold  of  the  oppression  of  a  specific  cultural  identity  by  virtue  of  transcultural   experiences,  then  they  will  have  a  starting  point  to  emancipate  themselves  from  the   subordination  that  is  imposed  by  the  culture  of  origin,  which  consists  of  social   factors  such  as  race  and  class.     I  begin  by  introducing  the  transcultural  perspective  through  a  critical   exposition  of  Epstein’s  conceptions  such  as  “transculture”  and  “interference.”    I     166   explain  why  interference  is  crucial  for  transcultural  experiences  and  I  examine  the   difference  between  multiculturalism  and  transculturalism  and  I  argue  that   transculturalism  is  preferable  to  multiculturalism.    I  then  specify  that  the   transcultural  themes  have  been  present  in  the  background  of  feminist  scholarship,   such  as  the  work  by  María  Lugones.    I  utilize  Lugones’s  work  to  demonstrate  that   elements  of  transculturalism  are  present  in  feminist  philosophy  as  well  as  to  point   to  her  oscillation  between  the  multicultural  approach  and  the  transcultural   perspective.    I  conclude  by  bringing  together  the  advantages  and  limitations  of  the   transcultural  perspective.    I  argue  that  the  transcultural  perspective  is  promising  for   forging  women’s  solidarity  because  of  the  ways  it  helps  feminists  to  challenge   gender  oppression  and  to  transform  the  oppressive  social  structures.       1.  The  Transcultural  Perspective     In  this  section,  I  first  present  Epstein’s  conception  of  transculturalism  and  his  view   of  identity.    I  then  examine  the  normative  implication  of  his  account  of  transculture   by  further  exploring  his  conception  of  interference  and  his  view  on  the  difference   between  transculturalism  and  multiculturalism.    I  argue  that  the  conception  of   transculture  is  useful  to  feminism,  but  I  also  criticize  Epstein’s  related  conception— the  denial  of  identity.       1.1  Epstein’s  Critical  Analysis   Epstein  introduces  the  concept  of  transculture  as  a  type  of  consciousness  of   envisioning  the  yet  unrealized  potentials  and  possibilities  of  existing  cultures.    To   him,  culture  is  a  complex  of  tightly  interconnected  levels  or  types  of  activity,  each  of     167   which  is  separable  from  another  in  theory,  but  woven  together  in  practice.    The   transcultural  world,  which  is  like  a  multidimensional  space,  does  not  lie  apart  from,   but  lies  within  all  existing  cultures.    This  multi-­‐dimensional  space  is  the  site  of   interaction  among  all  existing  and  potential  cultures,  thus  transculture  is  richer  than   the  totality  of  all  known  cultural  traditions  and  practices.    Transculture  is  not  a   specific  culture  or  cultural  identity,  or  the  sum  of  them;  rather  it  is  “beyond”  the   entire  cultural  realm,  and  yet  not  fully  outside  any  specific  culture.    To  Epstein,  just   as  culture  helps  individuals  to  break  the  dependence  on  nature,  transculture  will   help  individuals  to  break  dependence  on  specific  cultures.    It  does  so  because  a   culture  is  capable  of  exceeding  its  own  boundaries  and  contains  possibilities  for   transculture.    “Transculture”  is  not  a  property  or  feature  shared  by  all  individual   cultures,  although  all  cultures  are  already  in  relation  with,  or  overlap  with,  other   cultures.    Rather,  “transculture”  has  to  do  with  a  potential  inherent  in  all  cultures  for   moving  beyond  what  is  specific  to  any  given  culture.    The  purpose  of  breaking  free   from  any  given  culture  is  that  individuals  can  be  rid  of  isolated  symbolic  systems   and  value  determinations  of  their  culture  and  gain  creativity  at  the  cultural   boundary  crossing,  rather  than  escaping  from  their  given  culture.    As  Epstein  states,     Transculture  lies  both  inside  and  outside  of  all  existing  cultures  as  a   Continuum,  encompassing  all  of  them  and  even  the  gaps  and  blank  spaces   between  them.    The  transcultural  world  is  a  unity  of  all  cultures  and   noncultures,  that  is,  of  those  possibilities  that  have  not  yet  been  realized.   (2009,  333)     That  is  to  say,  being  “beyond”  means  that  transculture  is  both  inside  and  outside  of   specific  cultures  and  the  “unity”  is  not  necessarily  the  sum  of  all  cultures.    In   transcultural  experiences,  individuals  transcend  their  cultural  identities  and  are     168   outside  of  any  specific  culture  and  they  stop  clinging  to  their  national,  racial,  sexual,   ideological,  or  other  identities.    Transculture,  as  it  is  defined,  seeks  to  move  beyond   the  hegemony  of  any  single  dominant  culture  by  recognizing  the  existence  of  a   multiplicity  of  distinct  cultures,  which  presupposes  an  existing  interaction  between   cultures.    That  is,  transcultural  thinking  aims  to  broaden  one’s  framework  of   identification  so  that  one  may  imaginatively  inhabit  a  range  of  cultural  identities   that  are  themselves  shifting  and  mutable.    Transculture  means  the  freedom  of  every   person  to  live  on  the  border  of  one’s  “inborn”  culture  or  beyond  it.    According  to   Epstein,  transculture  enables  individuals  to  be  free  from  their  own  cultures,  just  as   cultures  liberate  individuals  from  their  dependence  on  nature.    Transculture  is  both   deconstructive  and  constructive:  It  deconstructs  determinism  and  constructs  new   possibilities  with  new  creativity.    Epstein  uses  the  word  “deconstruct”  in  a  similar   sense  to  Jacques  Derrida,  who  does  not  refer  to  it  in  a  negative  operation  that   destroys  structures  of  meanings;  but  rather,  deconstruction  has  the  potential  of   reconstruction.    As  Epstein  states,     I  suggest  that  the  term  “potentiation”  would  better  accommodate  positive   aspects  of  deconstruction  of  alternative  readings  and  interpretations,  future   projections  that  might  never  be  actualized  as  “the  present.”    Such  a  “positive   deconstruction”  celebrates  the  proliferation  of  interpretive  possibilities  and   unrestricted  semantic  play  set  free  from  any  one  signified,  not  by  negating   the  “signified”  as  such,  but  by  the  potentiation  of  new  signifiables.  (1999,   160-­‐61  emphasis  in  original)     That  is,  transcultural  experiences  bring  out  the  actualization  of  potentials.     According  to  Epstein,  any  specific  cultural  identity  is  too  narrow  for  the  full   range  of  human  creative  potentials.    Multiculturalism  prevents  infinite  self-­‐ differentiation  by  affirming  certain  cultural  identities  on  individuals,  but  an     169   individual  should  not  be  determined  in  terms  of  race,  nation,  gender,  or  class.     Identities  are  self-­‐enclosed  and  highly  oppositional,  for  instance,  female  is  set  as  the   opposition  of  male  and  white  is  set  as  the  opposition  of  black.14    In  transculture,   gender,  national,  and  racial  identities  are  replaced  by  an  endless  process  of  multiple   identifications.     The  global  society  can  be  viewed  as  the  space  of  ultimate  diversity:  diversity   of  free  individuals  rather  than  that  of  fixed  groups  and  cultures.    Once  again,   a  rule  of  thumb  for  transcultural  diversity:  oppose  yourself  to  nobody,   identify  yourself  with  nothing.    No  identities  and  no  oppositions—only   concrete  and  multiple  differences.    The  deeper  is  differentiation,  the  better  is   the  prospect  for  universal  peace.  (2009,  349)     However,  Epstein  also  claims  that  cultural  identities  are  necessary  because  one   needs  cultural  identities  to  think  and  work  transculturally  to  surpass  them.    It  is   important  to  understand  Epstein’s  view  on  the  relationship  between  “culture”  and   “transculture”  in  order  to  understand  his  idea  of  cultural  identities.    To  Epstein,   transculture  is  a  higher  level  of  human  liberation  than  culture.    Cultural  activities,   such  as  literature  and  cinema,  liberate  human  beings  from  natural  factors  like   physical  conditions,  but  these  cultural  activities  also  create  a  system  of  symbolic   meanings  that  transculture—a  higher  level  of  human  liberation—liberates  human   beings  from.    For  instance,  the  symbolic  meanings  of  being  female  or  male,  black  or   white,  are  dissolved  in  transculture.    In  this  sense,  transculture  is  the  self-­‐ transformation  of  culture  and  “the  transcultural  model  is  not  just  a  field  of   knowledge  but  also  a  mode  of  being,  located  at  the  crossroads  of  cultures”  (1999,   25).         170   Epstein  uses  the  term  “culture”  as  a  descriptive  rather  than  a  normative   concept  both  in  the  singular  and  plural  forms.    To  him,  “Culture  as  an  integrity  of   disciplinary  spheres  presupposes  the  diversity  of  cultures  as  multiple  national  and   historical  types,  each  having  its  own  formative  principle,  irreducible  to  others”   (1999,  17  emphasis  in  original).    According  to  Epstein,  transcultural  individuals  do   not  escape  cultures  or  abolish  cultures,  but  rather  they  abolish  human  slavery  to   cultures.    Transcultural  practice  is  a  way  of  expanding  the  limits  of  our  ethnic,   professional,  linguistic,  and  other  identities  to  new  levels  of  indeterminacy  without   diminishing  our  primary  symbolic  identities,  for  instance  our  symbolic  identities   such  as  being  a  woman,  or  being  an  American.    He  argues  that  we  need  to  question   the  very  category  of  identity  as  a  cultural  and  ethical  value  because  “violence  occurs   between  groups  with  firmly  established  identities”  (1999,  347).    As  a  result,  he   urges  to  move  from  the  diversity  of  cultures  to  the  even  greater  diversity  of   individuals,  transcending  their  rigid  cultural  identities.       Culture  relativizes  natural  identities,  whereas  transculture  demystifies   cultural  identities.    This  process  has  no  limit.    From  a  transcultural   perspective,  multiculturalism  is  right  in  asserting  the  natural  origins  and   physical  essences  of  existing  cultures,  whereas  deconstruction  is  equally   right  in  demystifying  these  origins  and  essences.    It  is  not  merely  a   contradiction  within  the  postmodern  paradigm  but  the  very  engine  of  its   further  transformation.    Origins  need  to  be  acknowledged  in  order  to  be   exceeded  in  the  transnational  movement  of  culture  that  at  a  certain  stage   passes  into  transcultural  movement.  (1999,85)     In  this  way,  the  global  society  can  be  viewed  as  a  diversity  of  free  individuals  rather   than  that  of  fixed  groups  and  cultures.    Cultures  are  enriched  by  transcultural   experiences,  in  which  the  cultural  ground  of  their  origin  is  recognized  but  not  clung   to.    Transculture  dissolves  rigid,  naturalized  features  of  culture,  such  as  being     171   American  or  Chinese,  male  or  female,  and  gives  new  flexibility  and  compatibility  to   elements  of  different  cultures.     1.2  Epstein’s  Normative  Position   Epstein  emphasizes  the  importance  of  interference,  which  refers  to  “not  only  a   necessary,  mutual,  and  multidirectional  process,  but  also  a  wavy  and  fuzzy  one  (as   the  original  scientific  use  of  this  term  suggests)  that  transposes  the  borders  of   interacting  culture,  mentalities,  and  disciplines  in  multiple  direction”  (1999,  11).   Interference  lies  at  the  foundation  of  the  transcultural  project  and  is  originated  from   but  not  limited  to  principles  such  as  opposition,  identity,  and  difference.    Through   interference,  differences  complement  each  other  and  create  a  new  interpersonal   transcultural  community  to  which  we  belong,  not  because  we  are  similar  but   because  we  are  different.    Different  cultures  should  not  be  satisfied  with  merely   tolerating  one  another,  but  rather  they  should  be  creatively  involved  with  one   another.    Transcultural  transcendence  happens  through  the  interference  of  one   culture  with  another  while  self-­‐deconstructing  and  self-­‐transforming  one’s  cultural   identity.    For  instance,  a  white  male  should  interfere  with  individuals  with  other   identities,  such  as  a  woman,  a  black,  a  disabled  person.     Every  culture  is  intrinsically  insufficient  and  needs  interaction  with  other   cultures  to  compensate  for  its  deficiencies:  rational  culture  needs  sensual   elements,  male  culture  needs  female  elements,  and  vice  versa.    The  principle   that  applies  here  is  not  that  of  difference,  but  that  of  “interference,”  of   “dispersion”  of  symbolic  values  of  each  culture  in  the  field  of  all  others.   (2009,  334)     That  is,  the  interference  of  cultures  is  a  normative  state  of  “sufficiency”  and   “completeness.”    In  this  sense,  cultures  are  not  sufficient  or  complete  if  they  do  not   interfere  with  each  other.    A  culture  is  insufficient  or  incomplete  when  it  is  not  open     172   to  mutual  involvement.    For  instance,  multiculturalism  assumes  cultures  are   sufficient  in  the  sense  that  there  are  clear  boundaries  between  cultures,   presupposing  cultures  are  finished  entities  that  are  not  open  for  mutual   involvement.    The  process  of  interference  among  various  cultures  or  various  kinds   of  cultural  activity  would  increasingly  complement  their  progressive  differentiation,   which  means  differentiation  works  at  the  goal  of  transculture  and  interference  that   is  more  progressive  than  multiculturalism  and  difference.    For  instance,  it  is  crucial   for  one’s  development  to  explore  positions  that  differ  from  one’s  own  and  try  to   think  in  ways  that  other  people  might  think  as  a  way  to  support  each  other’s   differing  positions.    In  this  process  of  interference-­‐through-­‐difference,  one  can  start   self-­‐differentiation  without  losing  one’s  own  identity.       Epstein  claims  that  interference  is  quite  different  from  difference.    According   to  him,  difference  is  “a  self-­‐justified  and  self-­‐contained  principle  of  contemporary   cultural  reformation”  (1999,  8).    However,  difference  should  not  be  viewed  as  a   multiplicity  of  self-­‐contained  and  disconnected  cultural  worlds  each  assuming   tolerantly  indifferent  positions  towards  the  other.       “Interference”  has  the  same  Greek  and  Latin  root  as  the  word  “difference”  but   while  “differ”  means  to  carry  apart,  “interfere”  means  to  bear  or  bring   between.    Within  a  transcultural  model,  spaces  between  diverging  cultures   are  filled  by  the  effects  of  their  interference.    Interference  produces  not   unification  but  rather  more  diversification  within  existing  diversity;   differences  no  longer  isolate  cultures  from  each  other  but  rather  open   between  them  perspectives  of  both  self-­‐differentiation  and  mutual   involvement.  (1999,9)     Interference  produces  more  diversification  within  existing  diversity  in  such  a  way   that  differences  make  it  possible  for  both  self-­‐differentiation  and  mutual   involvement  to  co-­‐exist.    As  Epstein  states,       173   As  difference  has  the  potential  of  maturation,  it  grows  into  interference,  the   “wavy”  and  “fuzzy”  intersections  and  overlappings  of  two  or  more  cultural   entities,  mentalities,  principles,  intuitions.    It  is  a  kind  of  wholeness  that   acknowledges  difference  but  can  be  reduced  neither  to  external  differences   between  entities,  nor  to  their  predifferential  unity.    “Interference”  leads  to   the  construction  of  a  “non-­‐totalitarian  totality”  that  is  produced  by  the   second  order  of  difference—its  differentiation  from  itself.  (1999,99)     That  is,  within  the  multicultural  framework,  differences  are  accepted  and  valued,   but  they  are  often  promoted  for  their  own  sakes  and  kept  distinct.    This  can  result  in   a  kind  of  cultural  leveling  in  which  differences  may  in  fact  be  transformed  into  their   exact  opposites,  thus  leading  to  a  relativistic  and  cynical  “indifference”  among   cultures.    As  a  result,  multiculturalism  erects  new  walls  among  cultures,  contrary  to   its  original  benign  intentions,  rather  than  making  ruins  of  the  old  ones.    Epstein  uses   the  term  “multiculturalism”  in  the  sense  that  “the  U.S.  multicultural  model  that   posits  aggregates  of  discrete  subcultures  (based  on  racial,  ethnic,  sexual,  or  other   differences),  each  of  which  seeks  to  constitute  and  maintain  its  cultural  specificity  in   the  face  of  a  homogenizing  dominant  culture”  (1999,  2-­‐3).    According  to  him,   transculturalism  is  different  from  multiculturalism.     From  the  multicultural  perspective,  each  culture  is  perfect  in  its  own  way,  as   a  self-­‐enclosed  and  self-­‐sufficient  entity;  from  the  transcultural  perspective,   each  culture  has  some  basis  incompleteness  that  opens  it  for  encounters  with   other  cultures.  (1999,  97)     That  is  to  say,  the  potential  richness  of  cultural  experiences  will  be  lost  if  all  existing   cultures  are  treated  as  self-­‐sufficient  and  perfect  in  their  own  ways,  because  a   culture  cannot  embrace  difference  effectively  unless  it  recognizes  its  own   incompleteness.    Epstein  does  not  specify  who  are  the  subjects  of  cultures,  so  it   appears  that  cultures  are  the  subjects  rather  than  individuals  or  groups  located  in   cultures.    Cultures  are  incomplete  in  the  sense  that  Western  cultures  need  Asian     174   cultures,  male  cultures  need  female  cultures,  and  white  cultures  need  black  cultures   to  reach  completeness  in  “transculture.”    Transculture  is  both  a  norm  and  a  state  of   being:  The  realization  of  incompleteness  opens  a  culture  for  encounters  with  other   cultures,  thus  transitioning  from  difference  to  interference.       Epstein  argues  that  the  deconstruction  of  identity  helps  to  make  peace.    He   follows  Derrida’s  usage  of  the  term  “deconstruction;”  that  is,  deconstruction  has  a   positive  aspect  of  reconstruction.    If  people  interact  with  difference,  rather  than   clinging  to  group  identity,  cultural,  social,  or  ideological  differences,  then  differences   will  not  be  hardened  into  oppositions.    In  Epstein’s  opinion,  categories  such  as   “identity,”  “opposition,”  and  “difference”  are  in  a  dialectical  relationship  that  is   similar  to  the  relation  between  thesis  and  antithesis.    Differences  complement  each   other  and  create  a  new  interpersonal  transcultural  community  in  which  differences   are  cherished  while  categories  such  as  cultural  identity  might  give  rise  to  opposition   or  even  violence.    On  the  contrary,  emphasizing  differences  has  a  moral  value   because  being  different  from  one  another  does  not  cause  an  opposition  to  one   another.    If  the  oppositional  components  of  self-­‐definition  are  eliminated,  the   component  of  identification  will  be  abandoned.     Epstein  goes  on  to  develop  the  contrast  between  transculturalism  and   multiculturalism.    He  argues  that  although  fundamental  differences  remain  between   the  two  ideas,  transculturalism  and  multiculturalism  have  a  common  desire  to   dislodge  a  vision  of  cultures  as  unitary  and  monolithic  even  though  they  share  an   attempt  to  unite  different  cultures  while  recognizing  their  multiplicity.     Multiculturalism  praises  “pride”  in  any  single  culture  (and  especially  of  cultural     175   minorities),  while  transculturalism  “embraces  the  moral  value  of  humility  that   makes  one  culture  open  to  other  cultures”  (2009,  334).    Multiculturalism  is  a   pluralism  that  is  based  on  the  ethical  impulses  of  pride—in  relation  to  one’s   identity,  and  tolerance—in  relation  to  other  cultures  and  emphasizes  the  virtue  of   “faithfulness”  to  one’s  own  native  soil  and  natural  roots.    Multiculturalism  also   thinks  in  terms  of  racial  or  gender  identities  and  “presentation”;  for  instance,   individuals  express  themselves  as  representatives  of  male,  white,  black,  etc.    In   contrast  to  the  multicultural  framework,  the  transcultural  approach  asserts  the   fundamental  incompleteness  of  any  culture  and  thus  its  need  for  radical  openness  to   and  dialogue  with  others,  because  “what  is  at  stake  now  is  not  whether  different   cultures  can  tolerate  one  another  but  whether  they  can  be  creatively  involved  with   one  another”  (1999,  97).     1.3  Assessing  Epstein’s  Critical  Analysis   Epstein’s  conception  of  transculturalism  is  inspiring  for  feminism.    The  transcultural   perspective  has  the  potential  to  transform  the  social  structure  of  power  relations   into  a  less  oppressive  form  if  we  understand  the  relationship  between  interference   and  power,  and  use  that  understanding  as  a  motivation  to  challenge  the  oppressive   power  relations.    For  instance,  second  wave  feminists  and  third  wave  feminists,   Western  feminists  and  Third  World  feminists  should  all  go  beyond  their  racial,  class,   cultural,  sexual  orientation  differences,  and  engage  with  each  other  in  order  to  grow   and  be  liberated  collectively.     An  example  of  the  transcultural  practice  can  be  demonstrated  by  Chinese   immigrants  in  the  United  States.    The  first  wave  of  Chinese  immigrants  to  the  United     176   States  were  drawn  by  the  economic  boom  associated  with  the  1849  California  “Gold   Rush”  and  they  worked  as  labor  of  services  such  as  laundry  and  restaurants.    Unlike   the  older  generations  of  immigrants,  current  Chinese  immigrants  are  more  likely  to   be  professionals  with  advanced  degrees  or  persons  with  exceptional  skills  in  certain   fields  that  can  benefit  the  national  economy,  cultural  or  educational  interests  or   welfare  of  the  United  States.    According  to  a  recent  study  on  the  status  of  Chinese   immigrants  in  the  United  States,  Chinese-­‐born  adults  were  more  likely  than  the   native  born  to  have  a  bachelor’s  degree  or  higher  level  of  education.    Almost  one-­‐ quarter  of  employed  Chinese-­‐born  men  worked  in  information  technology  and  other   sciences  and  engineering  occupations  in  2010.    Chinese-­‐born  women  were  more   likely  than  Chinese-­‐born  men  and  immigrant  men  and  women  overall  to  work  in   management,  business,  and  finance  professions  in  2010.    In  2010,  roughly  1  percent   of  all  unauthorized  immigrants  in  the  United  States  were  from  China.15   Compared  to  Chinese  immigrants  a  century  and  a  half  ago,  new  Chinese   immigrants  have  more  bargaining  power  due  to:  (1)  self-­‐esteem  stemming  from  an   increasingly  powerful  home  country,  (2)  self-­‐confidence  that  they  have  something   unique  to  contribute  to  the  host  country,  and  (3)  flexibility  of  going  back  and  forth   between  the  United  States  and  China.    In  this  sense,  transcultural  experiences   expand  immigrants’  vision  and  grant  them  more  freedom  for  individual   development,  which  is  true  to  comparable  experiences  of  immigrants  from  various   countries  in  the  previous  generations.    Although  only  a  small  percentage  of  new   immigrants  would  intentionally  forgo  their  cultural  identity  and  become  entirely   international  cosmopolitans,  descendants  of  immigrants  in  the  United  States     177   transform  their  cultural  identities  in  transcultural  experiences.    For  instance,  a   Chinese  American  may  identify  herself  as  a  Chinese,  an  American,  both  Chinese  and   American,  or  neither  Chinese  nor  American.       Relatedly,  Epstein’s  denial  of  identity  is  problematic.    Epstein  has  a   reservation  about  the  multiculturalist  “politics  of  identity”  because  he  does  not   endorse  “solidified”  identities  (2009,  337).    Yet,  Epstein  is  inconsistent  with  his  view   on  identity.    Sometimes  he  claims  that  our  slavery  to  cultural  identity  is  the  barrier   to  freedom,  other  times  it  seems  that  he  admits  that  human  beings  cannot  escape   their  cultural  identity.    For  instance,  saying  “I  am  a  Chinese”  is  a  way  of  partial   identification.    If  one  claims  that  “being  Chinese”  is  her  identity,  she  appears  to  claim   that  “being  Chinese”  is  an  exhaustive  quality  of  hers.    As  a  matter  of  fact,  she  might   have  other  qualities  to  identify  with  other  than  “being  Chinese.”    So  the  best   strategy,  according  to  Epstein,  is  to  identify  oneself  with  nothing  because  “the   question  is  not  who  I  am  but  who  I  might  become  and  how  I  am  different  from   myself”  (1999,  94).    At  one  point,  he  argues  that  there  should  be  no  identities  and   “only  concrete  and  multiple  differences  ”  (2009,  349).    It  seems  that  he  is  saying  that   what  exists  is  anarchic  difference  and  nothing  else,  but  it  remains  a  question  how  it   is  possible  that  one  can  transcend  (stop  being  a  slave  to)  her  cultural  identity  and   still  attach  oneself  to  a  cultural  identity  at  the  same  time.    At  times,  he  talks  about   identity  in  its  positive  sense;  for  instance,  he  claims  that  interference  is  “an  attempt   at  self-­‐differentiation  without  losing  one’s  own  identity”(1999,11).     Due  to  Epstein’s  reservation  about  identity,  it  is  unlikely  that  he  would   endorse  women’s  identity,  but  he  does  advocate  a  society  of  androgynism,  in  which     178   people  are  not  judged  or  discriminated  by  their  gender.    So,  it  seems  that  his  view  of   transculture  has  the  potential  of  being  transformed  into  a  view  for  aiding  a  feminist   transculturalism.    In  the  feminist  adaption  of  the  transcultural  perspective,  some   flaws  of  Epstein’s  version  of  transculture  can  hopefully  be  amended;  for  instance,   feminists  can  generate  a  transcultural  view  without  denial  of  identity.    As  Epstein   argues,  clinging  to  certain  identities  does  lead  to  opposition  and  violence.    Some  of   the  racial  or  national  conflicts  are,  as  Epstein  argues,  due  to  the  self-­‐righteousness  of   their  values  and  identities.    However,  women’s  identity  is  not  meant  to  impose  self-­‐ sufficiency  of  being  women,  but  rather  engagement  with  both  feminist  men  and   women  in  this  world.    In  this  sense,  Epstein’s  idea  of  transculture  offers  feminism  a   useful  ethical  and  moral  framework  to  work  with.    I  will  discuss  this  point  in  detail   in  the  next  section  to  show  what  is  at  stake  with  the  idea  of  identity  and  the  concept   of  transculture.   1.4  Assessing  Epstein’s  Normative  Position     Epstein  rightly  argues  that  transculturalism  is  more  favorable  than   multiculturalism.    As  I  argued  in  Chapter  4,  feminism  needs  an  alternative  to   multiculturalism.    Here  I  propose  that  transculturalism  is  a  proper  alternative,   although  we  need  to  adapt  Epstein’s  idea  of  transculturalism  to  a  feminist  usage.     Epstein’s  statement  that  each  culture  is  insufficient  or  incomplete  could  easily  be   misunderstood  in  a  society  that  promotes  multiculturalism  as  claiming  that  some   cultures  are  insufficient  or  incomplete  rather  than  all  cultures  are  insufficient  and   incomplete.    It  seems  that  there  is  an  unspeakable  satisfaction  of  having  a   multicultural  and  diversified  environment  and  there  is  also  the  fear  that  by  pointing     179   out  cultures  are  insufficient  or  incomplete  one  is  judgmental  about  other  cultures.     However,  if  we  strive  to  be  self-­‐reflective  and  critical,  we  will  not  be  afraid  to  say   that  our  culture  or  other  cultures  are  in  the  need  of  constructive  critiques.    If  we  are   eager  to  engage  in  diversity,  we  should  not  be  afraid  of  giving  constructive   suggestions.    Epstein’s  critique  of  multiculturalism  rightly  hits  the  stagnant   contentment  of  Americans  who  are  satisfied  with  “I  tolerate  cultural  differences,  and   I  am  for  diversity.”    This  superficial  diversity  needs  to  be  challenged  in  a   constructive  way.    For  instance,  as  a  critical  theory,  feminism  can  initiate  the   challenge  by  adopting  a  framework  other  than  multiculturalism  because  (1)  with   more  interaction  among  nations,  we  need  a  framework  to  examine  border  issues;   (2)  even  within  the  border,  we  need  transculturalism  because  cultural  interactions   are  increased  to  such  an  extent  that  there  is  more  internal  dynamism  than  ever   before;  and  (3)  multiculturalism  is  a  fact  in  the  United  States  and  women  identify   with  multiple  identifications,  so  transculturalism  would  not  start  with  a  blank  slate   but  at  a  thoroughly  multicultural  mindset.    We  need  a  richer  conception  than   “interaction”  provides  in  order  to  address  transcultural  communications  such  as   what  was  mentioned  above.    In  this  aspect,  transculturalism  has  a  specific  advantage   to  multiculturalism.     Epstein’s  conception  of  interference  is  extremely  useful  for  feminism.     Interference  as  a  kind  of  activity  or  practice  is  central  to  transcultural  experiences.     The  root  of  the  word  “interference”  is  the  combination  of  Latin  elements  inter-­‐ “between”+  ferire-­‐  “to  strike.”    Interference  is  defined  as    “the  mutual  effect  on   meeting  of  two  wave  trains  (as  of  light  or  sound)  that  constitutes  alternating  areas     180   of  increased  and  decreased  amplitude  (as  light  and  dark  lines  or  louder  and  softer   sound)”  (Merriam-­‐Webster’s  Collegiate  Dictionary  eleventh  edition  2003,  652).    The   effect  of  interference  in  natural  science  can  be  manifested  by  natural  patterns  such   as  the  butterfly’s  markings,  the  rainbow  colors  of  a  film  of  oil  on  water,  or   iridescence  on  the  surface  of  soap  bubbles.    In  constructive  interference,  two  or   more  light  or  sound  waves  interact  in  such  a  way  that  the  amplitudes  of  their   frequency  reinforce  each  other  and  form  a  wave  that  has  an  amplitude  equal  to  the   sum  of  the  individual  amplitudes  of  the  original  waves.    In  the  deconstructive   interference,  two  intersecting  waves  neutralize  each  other  and  cancel  each  other   out.    What  we  focus  here  is  constructive  interference  in  transcultural  experiences.       The  metaphoric  meaning  of  interference  implies  the  ethical  aspect  of  cross-­‐ cultural  interference  and  collaboration.    Interference  can  mean  the  disturbing  effect   of  new  pressure  on  the  performance  of  previously  learned  behavior  with  which  it  is   inconsistent.    Difference,  friction  and  conflict  are  aspects  of  interference,  which  is  a   faithful  reflection  of  the  reality  of  cultural  exchanges.    That  is  to  say,  transculture   does  not  simply  mean  the  co-­‐existence  of  different  cultures,  but  rather  the   interference  of  all  the  differences.    We  can  take  Chinese  young  professionals   participating  in  the  cultural  exchange  between  the  United  States  and  China  as  an   example  of  interfering  with  each  other  in  a  positive  way  to  demonstrate  what   interference  means,  what  a  transcultural  experience  is,  and  in  what  circumstances   one  might  have  it.    At  a  token  level,  this  kind  of  cultural  interaction  encourages  a   deeper  understanding  of  cultural  differences  compared  with  the  mutual  ignorance   and  misunderstanding  that  previously  existed  between  the  two  nations.    The     181   American  culture  is  transformed  into  a  transculture  through  the  interference  of  the   American  and  Chinese  cultures.    The  transculture  is  more  complete  in  Epstein’s   sense  than  the  sum  of  the  American  culture  and  the  Chinese  culture  because  the   transcultural  experiences  bring  more  richness  to  the  original  American  culture.     Transcultural  experiences  as  such  have  been  practiced  in  the  American  culture  by   immigrants  and  visitors  over  generations,  which  makes  the  American  culture  a   richer  culture  than  the  sum  of  all  the  immigrant  cultures  and  the  indigenous   cultures.    The  interference  is  an  ongoing  process,  which  the  transcultural   experiences  of  the  Chinese  young  professionals  are  part  of.      This  kind  of   interference  and  transcultural  experiences  not  only  make  the  American  culture  a   richer  culture,  but  also  makes  the  Chinese  culture  richer  because  these  people  travel   back  and  forth  between  cultures.    People  who  travel,  do  business,  live  temporarily   or  permanently  in  different  cultures  all  experience  and  contribute  to  transculture,   so  they  make  the  world  culture  more  complete  through  the  growth  and  evolvement   in  the  development  of  culture.    On  the  contrary,  if  we  think  and  practice  from  a   multicultural  perspective,  according  to  which  the  majority  culture  protects  the   minority  differential  group  rights,  there  would  be  less  interference  in  the   preservation  of  cultures  and  less  engagement  in  cultures.    In  other  words,  cultural   development  is  in  a  more  engaging  and  active  mode  from  a  transcultural   perspective  than  it  is  from  a  multicultural  perspective.             182   2.  The  Transcultural  Trend  in  Feminism     In  the  previous  section,  I  presented  Epstein’s  notion  of  transculturalism,  in   particular  his  view  on  group  identity  and  his  concept  of  interference.    I  argued  that   Epstein’s  concept  of  interference  is  useful  for  feminism  and  his  postmodern  denial   of  group  identity  should  be  corrected.    In  this  section,  I  will  draw  on  Lugones’s  work   to  demonstrate  how  to  approach  women’s  solidarity  by  defending  identity  politics   while  going  along  with  the  transcultural  perspective.    I  show  that  the  transcultural   perspective  and  the  feminist  goal  are  compatible,  thus  demonstrating  that  the   transcultural  perspective  is  a  promising  alternative  to  the  multicultural  approach;  In   fact,  the  transcultural  perspective  is  already  present  in  feminist  theories  and  offers  a   great  promise  to  end  this  divide  within  feminism.    I  also  show  that  feminists  such  as   Lugones  have  not  fully  distinguished  the  transcultural  perspective  from  the   multicultural  approach.    The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  show  that  my  suggestion   that  transculturalism  is  good  for  feminism  can  be  confirmed  by  the  presence  of   elements  of  it  in  some  important  feminist  theorists.    At  the  same  time,  we  see  the   value  of  being  more  explicit  about  issues  such  as  transculture,  transcultural   experiences,  and  interference  when  we  see  that  someone  like  Lugones  does  not  go   far  enough  in  the  transcultural  direction.     2.1  Lugones’s  Critical  Analysis   The  strategy  of  transculture  has  been  implicit  in  the  rhetoric  of  feminists  at  times   (for  instance,  see  Anzaldúa  1999  and  Lugones  2003).    Transcultural  themes   occasionally  lurk  in  the  background  of  feminist  scholarship,  which  can  be     183   demonstrated  by  Lugones’s  notion  of  interaction  and  collaboration.    This  is  an   example  and  indication  of  the  values  of  the  transcultural  perspective  in  feminism.     Lugones  argues  that  oppressions  are  intermeshed  rather  than  interlocked,   because  “interlocking”  implies  that  the  oppressed  are  categorically  separated  from   each  other  and  categorically  lumped  together  while  intermeshed  indicates  the   inseparability  of  various  oppressions.    Accordingly,  resistance  to  oppressions  should   be  a  struggle  to  connect  with  each  other.     The  interlocking  of  oppressions  is  a  central  feature  of  the  process  of  social   fragmentation,  since  fragmentation  requires  not  just  shards  or  fragments  of   the  social,  but  that  each  fragment  be  unified,  fixed,  atomistic,  hard-­‐edged,   internally  homogeneous,  bounded,  repellent  of  other  equally  bounded  and   homogeneous  shards.  (2003,  231n1)         The  conception  of  interlocking  follows  the  logic  of  the  presentation—the  logic  of   purity  and  the  logic  of  fragmentation  as  an  instrument  of  social  control.    Lugones   asserts  that  feminists  should  reject  the  logic  of  fragmentation  and  embrace  “a   nonfragmented  multiplicity  that  requires  an  understanding  of  oppressions  as   interlocked”  (141).16    Fragmentation  occurs  when  oppressions  are  looked  at  as   interlocked  rather  than  intermeshed  because  social  subjects  are  divided  into  groups   or  communities  of  the  same  interests.    Fragmentation  occurs  when  every  group   member  identifies  with  the  group  value,  so  there  is  no  difference,  contestation,  or   conflict  among  group  members  but  only  between  groups.    Therefore,  the   intermeshing  of  oppressions  of  some  group  members  is  not  revealed  in  this   fragmented  group  picture.     According  to  Lugones,  to  overcome  social  fragmentation,  we  need  to  identify   with  each  other  as  oppressed  as  well  as  being  capable  of  overcoming  and  resisting     184   oppression.    The  identification  does  not  require  sameness  and  independence,  but   rather,  difference  and  interdependence,  “seeing  ourselves  and  each  other   interrelating  ‘worlds’  of  resistant  meaning”  (85).    Social  subjects  should  be   multiplicitous  as  well  as  non-­‐fragmented.    That  is  to  say,  we  should  not  erase  our   complexity  simply  for  the  sake  of  the  group  when  we  move  from  one  group  to   another  because  the  self  is  multifaceted,  but  not  fragmented.       Lugones  distinguishes  between  the  logic  of  impurity  and  the  logic  of  purity.     The  logic  of  impurity  is  a  logic  of  curdling,  which  results  in  multiplicity,  while  the   logic  of  purity  is  a  logic  of  splitting,  which  results  in  fragmentation.    According  to   her,  the  fundamental  assumption  of  purity  is  that  there  is  unity  underlying   multiplicity,  which  is  split-­‐separation.    Different  from  split-­‐separation,  curdle-­‐ separation  is  a  form  of  solidarity  that  does  not  stem  from  communities  consisting  of   the  same  qualities.    Lugones  specifies  the  difference  between  the  logic  of  impurity   and  the  logic  of  purity:   According  to  the  logic  of  curdling,  the  social  world  is  complex  and   heterogeneous  and  each  person  is  multiple,  nonfragmented,  embodied.   …According  to  the  logic  of  purity,  social  world  is  both  unified  and  fragmented,   homogeneous,  hierarchically  ordered.    Each  person  is  either  fragmented,   composite,  or  abstract  and  unified—not  exclusive  alternatives.  (127,  emphasis   in  original)       That  is,  the  logic  of  impurity  is  the  logic  of  curdle-­‐separation  and  of  heterogeneity.     The  world  should  not  be  perceived  as  consisting  of  separated  fragments,  but  rather   of  curdled  elements.    In  other  words,  heterogeneity  does  not  simply  mean  the  co-­‐ existence  of  various  elements  that  are  clearly  separated  from  each  other,  but  rather   it  means  the  intermeshing  and  interfering  of  elements.    She  uncovers  the  connection   between  impurity  and  resistance  and  takes  mastizaje  as  an  example  for  this     185   connection.    Lugones  uses  a  metaphor  of  mayonnaise  as  an  oil-­‐in-­‐water  emulsion  to   describe  something  or  someone  in  the  middle  of  either/or,  impure  and  mestizo.17     According  to  her,  curdling  is  an  art  of  resistance,  in  which  one  is  both  separate,   curdled,  and  resisting  by  “looking  at  oneself  in  someone  else’s  mirror  and  back  in   one’s  own,  of  self-­‐aware  experimentation”  (145).       Lugones  argues  that  the  group  identity  is  based  on  differences  among  group   members  in  terms  of  race,  gender,  culture,  class,  and  other  differences  that  affect   and  constitute  the  identity  of  the  group’s  members.    According  to  her,  her  emphasis   on  differences  is  entirely  different  from  the  postmodern  agenda  of  promoting   difference.    Postmodern  endorsement  of  difference  “goes  against  a  politics  of   identity  and  toward  minimizing  the  political  significance  of  groups”  (142),  while  her   discussion  of  difference  emphasizes  the  importance  of  the  impact  that  multiple   oppressions  have  on  the  identity  of  the  group’s  members.   2.2  Lugones’s  Normative  Position   Lugones  emphasizes  the  importance  of  interaction.    She  criticizes  ethnocentrism,   which  she  defines  as  the  belief  that  one’s  culture  and  cultural  ways  are  superior  to   others.    She  also  sees  ethnocentrism  as  an  arrogant  indifference  to  other  cultures   that  devalues  them  either  through  under-­‐appreciating  and  stereotyping  or  through   accepting  such  stereotypes.    Lugones  claims  that  what  is  missing  in  the  feminist   work  that  deals  with  the  “problem  of  difference”  is  the  interactive  step.    Normally  it   is  not  women  of  color  who  tell  White  women  that  “we”  are  all  alike,  rather,  it  is   White  women  who  tell  women  of  color  so.    Lugones  states  that  when  women  of   color  challenge  White  women  on  what  they  mean  by  “we,”  they  actually  call  out  “an     186   interactive  demand,  a  demand  for  an  answer”  (70).    Unfortunately,  White  women   hear  that  demand  as  an  attack  on  the  activity  of  their  theorizing  rather  than  on   White  racism.    It  is  this  misinterpretation  that  generates  the  “problem  of  difference.”     That  is,  the  challenge  for  interaction  from  women  of  color  to  White  women  is  one   that  White  women  unintentionally  dismiss  by  labeling  the  challenge  as  “difference.”     Why  is  there  a  lack  of  deeper  interaction  between  White  feminists  and   women  of  color  and  why  do  some  White  feminists  merely  emphasize  their   theorization  rather  than  interacting  with  actual  women  of  color?    Lugones  explains   that  it  is  because  racism  plays  two  tricks  on  White  women  theorists.    The  first  trick   is  that  White  women  do  not  notice  women  of  color,  so  they  do  not  think  that  the   difference  between  them  is  important,  which  leads  to  their  generalization  that  all   women  are  the  same.    The  second  trick  is  that  White  women  conceive  this  lack  of   noticing  women  of  color  as  a  theoretical  problem—the  “problem  of  difference.”     Lugones  argues  that  what  lies  at  the  root  of  ethnocentrism  is  racism.    According  to   her,  racism  is  partly  due  to  one’s  lack  of  recognition  of  “the  structure  and   mechanism  of  the  racial  state”  (44).    She  asserts  that  by  noticing  the  race  issue,  we   see  “the  possibility  and  complexity  of  a  pluralistic  feminism”  (77).    Lugones  argues   that  theorizing  is  not  the  solution  to  the  “problem  of  difference”;  rather,  the  solution   lies  with  White  women  interacting  with  women  of  color,  because  by  doing  so,   women  of  color  act  as  mirrors  in  which  White  women  see  themselves  in  a  way  that   no  other  mirrors  can  reveal.     Lugones  presents  a  consciousness  called  “world”-­‐traveling  as  a  way  of   identifying  with  others  and  resisting  oppression.    “World”-­‐traveling  is  an  active     187   subjectivity,  which  presupposes  collective  intentionality.    Lugones  does  not  identify   “world”  with  culture  because  she  regards  “world”  as  less  determined  than  culture.     As  she  explains,     My  use  of  the  word  “world”  understands  meaning  and  communication  to  be   both  less  coded  and  less  determined  by  cultural  codes.    And  it  understands   the  existing  codes  as  less  ossified  and,  as  the  result  of  ongoing   transculturalism,  interworld  influencing  and  interworld  relations  of  control   and  resistance  to  control.  (25-­‐26)       “World,”  for  Lugones,  does  not  identify  with  the  physical  world  in  the  sense  that   “world”  is  not  as  solidified  as  the  physical  world.    Through  traveling  to  the  “world”   of  the  other,  one  can  identify  with  her  and  discover  the  need  of  interdependence  of   each  other.    By  traveling  to  others’  “worlds,”  we  gain  knowledge  of  their  “worlds,”   thus  getting  to  know  the  people  that  inhabit  other  “worlds.”       Lugones  recommends  that  traveling  across  “worlds”  be  partly  constitutive  of   cross-­‐cultural  and  cross-­‐racial  loving  as  a  new  meaning  of  coalition.    As  mentioned   earlier,  she  proposes  a  “playful”  thought  experiment  called  “world”-­‐traveling  as  a   way  of  identifying  with  others.    “World”-­‐traveling  generates  deep  understanding   and  makes  one  feel  at  ease.    Playfulness  is  the  loving  attitude  towards  others  and  an   openness  to  uncertainty  while  traveling,  because  when  we  are  playful,  we  are  not   self-­‐important,  nor  stabilized  in  any  particular  “world,”  but  rather  being  creative   and  open  to  further  self-­‐construction  and  new  possibilities.    According  to  Lugones,   by  traveling  to  others’  “worlds,”  we  can  understand  what  it  is  to  be  like  others  and   see  ourselves  through  the  eyes  of  others.    The  flexibility  of  “world”-­‐traveling  is   necessary  for  outsiders  because  it  is  partly  constitutive  of  cross-­‐cultural  and  cross-­‐ racial  loving.    As  Lugones  states,  “I  recommend  to  women  of  color  in  the  United     188   States  that  we  learn  to  love  each  other  by  learning  to  travel  to  each  other’s  ‘worlds’”   (78).    This  identification  means  that  we  are  disloyal  to  being  arrogant  perceivers.    If   we  perceive  someone  arrogantly,  we  fail  to  identify  with  them,  and  thus  fail  to  love   them.    This  identification  also  means  that  we  should  quit  being  servants  because   love  is  not  the  same  as  unconditional  servitude.    Lugones  thus  proposes  an  Iàwe   model,  which  indicates  that  women  inhabit  multiple  liberatory  trajectories.    Women   engage  in  interactive  multiple  sense-­‐making  by  encountering  “at  the  intersections  of   local  and  translocal  histories  of  meaning  fashioned  in  the  resistingßàoppressing   relation”  (228).    That  is  to  say,  the  emancipatory  sense-­‐making  occurs  in  a  complex   intersubjective  context  with  a  transitional  intentionality.     Lugones  advocates  a  polycentric  multiculturalism,  which  is  to  break   boundaries  and  produce  heterogeneity.    She  mainly  endorses  multiculturalism:   A  polycentric  multiculturalist  perception  that  emphasizes  the  production  of   space  perceives  against  the  grain  of  social  fragmentation  and  reduction  of   heterogeneous  subjects  and  communities  into  bounded,  isolated,  simple,   because  homogeneous,  units.  (200)     This  is  to  say,  the  critique  of  social  fragmentation  and  the  purpose  of  “world”-­‐ traveling  is  to  sustain  this  polycentric  multiculturalism.    Lugones’s  sense  of   polycentric  multiculturalism  is  somewhat  different  than  the  one  that  Epstein  and  I   attack,  but  it  is  clear  that  Lugones  still  thinks  and  argues  within  the  multicultural   framework.     2.3  Assessing  Lugones’s  Critical  Analysis     There  are  similarities  in  Lugones’s  account  of  intermeshed,  the  logic  of   fragmentation;  and  curdle-­‐separation  and  Epstein’s  account  of  transcultural   experiences.    In  particular,  Lugones  uses  the  term  “intermeshing,”  which  is  similar     189   to  Epstein’s    “interference”  although  Lugones  never  uses  the  term  “interference.”     The  distinctive  difference  between  Lugones  and  Epstein  is  that  Lugones  emphasizes   the  importance  of  group  identity  while  Epstein  rejects  identity.       There  are  at  least  three  similarities  between  Lugones  and  Epstein.    First  of   all,  Epstein  argues  that  transculture  seeks  to  move  beyond  the  hegemony  of  any   single  culture  by  recognizing  the  existence  of  a  multiplicity  of  distinct  cultures.    This   is  similar  to  Lugones’s  account  of  mastizaje,  which  is  non-­‐fragmented  multiplicity.     Lugones  quite  rightly  points  out  that  oppressions  are  intermeshed.    The  conception   of  “intermeshed”  reveals  the  fact  that  social  categories  are  not  unified,  self-­‐ contained,  and  internally  homogeneous  entities;  rather,  they  are  as  inseparable  as   an  oil-­‐water  emulsion.    Because  oppressions  are  intermeshed,  people  need  to   connect  with  each  other  to  resist  oppressions.     Secondly,  it  seems  that  both  Lugones  and  Epstein  argue  against  the  self-­‐ representation  of  certain  cultures  or  certain  groups.    Lugones  criticizes  that   privileged  White  women  take  themselves  as  the  representative  of  women.    Epstein   criticizes  that  Western  cultures  assume  themselves  as  the  representative  of  culture.     Lugones  argues  that  fragmentation  happens  when  social  subjects  are  divided  into   groups  or  communities  of  the  same  interests  while  Epstein  points  out  that  it  could   be  detrimental  if  one  clings  to  the  pride  of  being  the  representative  of  one’s  culture.     Lugones’s  critique  of  the  logic  of  fragmentation  is  similar  to  Epstein’s  critique  of  the   multicultural  view  of  cultures  being  separate  entities.       Lastly,  Lugones’s  conception  of  curdle-­‐separation  is  similar  to  Epstein’s   conception  of  interference.    Lugones’s  idea  of  curdle-­‐separation  implies  that  there  is     190   something  new  being  generated  in  the  process  of  curdling  just  like  there  is   something  new  being  generated  in  the  process  of  interference.    In  Epstein,   difference  can  be  self-­‐differentiated  into  interference  in  transculture,  which  is  an   endless  process.    In  Lugones,  people’s  identities  can  be  multiplied  into   heterogeneous  identities  just  like  oil  and  egg  yolk  can  be  emulsified  into   mayonnaise.    Individuals  in  transculture  are  either/or  and  both/and  just  like   mastizaje  in  its  curdled  state,  both  separated,  curdled,  and  resisting  at  the  same   time.    Both  Lugones  and  Epstein  depict  the  necessity  and  urge  for  interaction  and   interconnection,  no  matter  the  purpose  of  doing  so  is  to  rid  society  of  cultural   rigidness  or  gender  oppression.       However,  Lugones  has  a  quite  different  view  on  identity  from  Epstein’s.       Epstein  views  identity  as  the  barrier  to  the  full  human  potential  because  one  can  be   anything  if  one  does  not  identify  her  with  something.    According  to  him,  denial  of   identity  can  also  avoid  the  danger  of  opposition,  which  leads  to  conflicts  and   violence.    For  instance,  transcultural  Chinese  individuals  may  or  may  not  identify   themselves  with  either  Chinese  or  American,  but  they  carry  identities,  which  could   be  transcultural  beings,  cosmopolitan  beings,  or  Chinese  aliens  living  in  the  United   States.    That  is  to  say,  identity  is  not  incompatible  with  transculture.    In  this  sense,   Lugones’s  emphasis  of  identity  is  very  important  for  reminding  feminists  of  the   purpose  of  being  mastizaje:  Women  want  to  be  mastizaje  not  simply  for  the  sake  of   being  mastizaje,  but  rather  they  want  to  be  connected  with  other  feminists  and  to   eliminate  intermeshed  oppressions  including  gender  oppression.         191   2.4  Assessing  Lugones’s  Normative  Position   It  seems  that  differences  among  women  mean  class  and  racism  to  Lugones,  but  she   does  not  talk  about  them  separately  from  culture.    By  defining  ethnocentrism  as  the   belief  that  some  cultures  are  superior  to  others,  she  mainly  regards  racial  and  class   differences  as  cultural  differences.    Thus,  Lugones  talks  about  culture  in  the  sense   that  culture  is  characterized  as  the  stratification  of  race  and  class  in  the  United   States.    She  discusses  race  and  class  as  other  forms  of  difference  and  conflict,  in   which  the  “problem  of  difference”  is  situated.    In  a  sense,  Epstein  and  Lugones  share   similar  views  about  the  transcultural  perspective.    For  instance,  Epstein’s  notion  of   transculture  is  similar  to  Lugones’s  idea  of  “world”-­‐traveling.    Epstein’s  concept  of   interference  is  embodied  in  Lugones’s  argument  about  interaction  and   interdependence.    We  can  find  Epstein’s  idea  of  the  potential  of  self-­‐transformation   in  Lugones:  Lugones  notices  the  resistance  imbedded  in  “world”-­‐traveling.    The   desire  and  importance  for  interaction  among  women  addressed  by  Lugones  echoes   a  realization  of  incompleteness  that  Epstein  points  out.       Lugones’s  account  of  the  need  for  interaction  and  “world”-­‐traveling  offers   feminists  a  way  to  explain  the  intermeshedness  of  oppressions,  which  can  direct   feminism  back  to  solidarity.    According  to  her,  knowing  other  women  is  a  way  of   loving  them,  which  is  intelligible  in  the  sense  that  women  should  stop  perceiving   other  women  with  arrogant  eyes  because  arrogance  is  a  destructive  attitude.     Lugones  rightly  believes  that  the  change  we  need  to  make  to  improve  women’s   situations  cannot  be  made  without  there  being  solidarity  among  women  of  different   cultures  or  ethnicities  or  class.    She  implies  that  women  can  learn  how  to  generalize     192   the  consciousness  of  playful  “world”-­‐traveling  into  a  more  political  solidarity  once   they  figure  out  personal  friendship,  but  it  remains  unclear  how  women  can  transit   from  this  personal  friendship  to  a  political  solidarity.    In  this  sense,  it  appears  that   Lugones  is  rather  individualist  in  orientation  just  as  Epstein  is.    However,  although   there  are  certain  issues  left  unaddressed  in  Lugones’s  account,  it  is  important  to   note  that  we  cannot  lose  sight  of  the  impact  of  women’s  friendship  on  women’s   solidarity  and  women’s  personal  friendship  as  a  useful  component  of  women’s   solidarity.18   This  ambiguity  is  a  possible  explanation  of  why  we  can  find  both  the   multicultural  approach  and  the  transcultural  perspective  in  Lugones.    We  can  see   that  Lugones  oscillates  between  multiculturalism  and  transculturalism  from  time  to   time.    Sometimes  her  arguments  lean  toward  multiculturalism,  which  shows  that   how  prevalent  multiculturalism  is  and  how  necessary  transculturalism  is.    When   Lugones  confirms  the  existence  of  “world”  and  thus  encourages  women  to  travel  to   each  other’s  “world,”  she  in  fact  implies  that  the  “world”  is  to  some  extent  self-­‐ contained  although  she  claims  that  “worlds”  are  open  to  surprises.    Yet,  she  leans   toward  transculturalism  when  she  defines  “world”  as  the  result  of  ongoing   transculturation  although  she  does  not  use  terms  such  as  “transculture”  or   “interference.”    The  oscillation  indicates  that  difference  and  interference  are   inherently  connected  because  only  when  one  acknowledges  differences,  can  one   start  to  interfere  with  others.    The  oscillation  also  indicates  that  feminism  is  in  need   of  transculture,  but  has  not  explicitly  specified  it  as  the  appropriate  direction  for   feminism.    This  lack  of  recognition  not  only  explains  why  the  problem  of  the  division     193   of  feminism  has  not  been  fully  solved  in  feminism,  but  also  demonstrates  the   necessity  and  significance  of  an  explicit  endorsement  of  the  transcultural   perspective.       3.  The  Advantages  and  Limitations  of  the  Transcultural  Perspective   In  the  previous  sections,  I  presented  Epstein’s  account  of  transculture  and   interference  and  Lugones’s  account  of  interaction  and  “world”-­‐traveling.    I  argued   that  there  are  similarities  between  Epstein’s  transculture  and  Lugones’s    “world”-­‐ traveling,  but  Lugones’s  emphasis  on  group  identity  can  helpfully  amend  Epstein’s   version  of  transculturalism.    In  this  section,  I  will  further  explore  how  feminists  can   transform  the  transcultural  perspective  by  summarizing  and  weighing  the   advantages  of  the  feminist  transcultural  perspective  with  its  limitations.       To  better  serve  feminism,  we  need  to  apply  the  transcultural  perspective  to  a   feminist  cause.    For  instance,  Epstein’s  term  “transcendence”  should  be  interpreted   in  the  political  sense.    In  the  context  of  feminism,  transcending  cultures  or  borders   does  not  mean  we  transcend  into  nothingness,  but  rather  it  means  we  set  a   reflective  distance  between  women  and  oppressive  cultures.    A  reflective  distance  is   generated  when  one  observes  and  reflects  on  the  culture  she  is  originally  from  and   when  one  has  a  better  ability  to  analyze  the  structure  of  power  relations  in  that   culture.    The  reflective  distance  helps  women  to  understand  gender  oppression   more  thoroughly  and  have  a  starting  point  to  generate  resistance  to  the  oppression.   As  we  discussed  in  Chapter  4,  Western  feminists  and  Third  World  feminists  desire   interaction  among  women,  which  is  exactly  what  the  transcultural  project  brings     194   about.    The  feminist  transcultural  perspective  has  at  least  four  advantages   compared  to  Epstein’s  version  of  transculturalism  since  his  version  denies  women’s   identity.       First  of  all,  the  feminist  transcultural  perspective  aims  to  understand,   challenge,  and  transform  the  oppressive  social  structures  by  setting  a  distance   between  the  oppressed  groups  from  the  culture  they  are  located  in.    By  setting  a   reflective  distance,  I  do  not  mean  uprooting  the  oppressed  group,  but  rather   examining  the  bigger  picture  of  their  situations.    The  distance  provides  the   macroscopic  perspective  that  is  crucial  in  understanding  the  structure  of   oppression,  so  the  marginalized  are  reflectively  distant  from  their  respective   cultures  via  their  transcultural  experiences.    Those  experiences  in  different  ways   suggest  the  evolution  of  a  critical  consciousness  that  deflects  the  claims  of  a  singular   culture.    Since  the  oppression  is  systemic  and  structural,  the  emancipation  should  be   systemic  and  structural  as  well.    Feminism  should  explore  the  relationship  between   agency  and  structures  of  oppression  and  find  out  how  agents  can  challenge  or   subvert  gender  norms.    This  reflective  distance  is  quite  different  from  the  distance   proposed  by  Okin,  who  claims  that  Western  women  have  an  epistemic  advantage  of   understanding  the  oppression  of  Third  World  women  due  to  Western  women’s   distance  from  the  Third  World  Women’s  oppression.    Rather  than  a  global   expansion  and  reconfiguration  of  a  dominant  race,  gender,  or  culture,  a   transcultural  perspective  provides  women  with  power  to  resist  oppression.    Women   gain  distinctive  agency  due  to  both  their  social  locations  and  the  distance  from  the     195   locations,  and  thus  express  unique  voices  to  critically  observe  and  explain  the  social   structures  of  power  relations.     Secondly,  from  a  feminist  transcultural  perspective,  transcendence  from  the   specific  culture  does  not  conflict  with  the  situatedness  of  women  and   intermeshedness  of  women’s  oppressions.    Being  conscious  of,  or  sensitive  to   cultural  differences  does  not  only  mean  the  recognition  of  differences,  but  also   means  transcendence  of  differences  by  distantly  reflecting  on  communicative  needs   of  each  culture.    However,  it  is  not  completely  distant,  but  rather  transcendent  with   reciprocal  recognition  of  and  identification  with  others.    When  a  person  reflects  on   the  culture  that  she  is  situated  in,  the  reflection  is  aided  by  the  experience  of   different  cultural  perspectives  or  practices.    This  reflection  is  an  attitude  of   resistance;  transcendence  from  a  culture  is  different  from  avoidance  of  that  culture.     A  transcultural  perspective  encourages  a  de-­‐centered  cultural  and  political   relationship  to  cultures,  which  can  foster  an  interreferencing  sensibility  that  is   crucial  for  initiation  and  generation  of  resistance.    Transcultural  experiences  deepen   self-­‐reflection  and  mutual  recognition  and  are  able  to  promote  new  imaginations   about  power  and  about  the  self.    Therefore,  the  transcultural  perspective  helps  ease   the  tension  between  the  dominant  culture  and  the  marginalized  culture  created  by   globalization  because  one  culture  needs  the  other  to  engage  in  cultural  dialogues.   Thirdly,  the  feminist  transcultural  perspective  suggests  that  feminism  must   reconcile  the  competing  interests  of  having  a  multiplicity  of  identities  and  construct   also  a  unity  based  on  certain  principles  of  collaboration.    That  is,  each  identity  might   imply  distinctive  and  competing  interests.    For  example,  Chinese  women  who  have     196   transcultural  experiences  would  be  more  likely  to  understand,  sympathize,  and   incorporate  the  interests  of  American  women,  and  vice  versa.    Over  time,  those   interests  would  become  part  of  their  identities  and  as  a  result,  their  decisions  and   actions  might  be  an  expression  of  these  competing  interests.    On  a  similar  note,  the   transformation  of  systematic  structures  of  social  power  should  be  in  a  collective   form  as  well.    Feminism  is  a  collective  movement  rather  than  the  emancipation  of   individuals,  so  an  account  of  collaboration  should  include  various  resistant   practices,  a  conception  of  power,  and  connectedness.    The  tension  and  conflict  that   results  from  differences  among  women  can  be  resolved  through  transcultural   processes  and  practices,  which  can  in  turn  inform  a  new  politics  of  difference  in   feminism.    That  is,  recognition  of  and  reflection  on  the  shortcoming  of  each  version   of  feminism  or  each  culture  highlights  differences  among  women  and  encourages   the  interaction  between  them.    A  transcultural  perspective  offers  an  ethical   perspective  within  which  one  might  work  with  different  identities  but  also  sustain   collaboration  across  these  identities.    What  needs  to  be  noted  is  that  although  the   feminist  struggle  is  considered  a  collective  one,  the  idea  of  collaboration  among  all   women  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  a  movement  should  always  consist  of  every   woman.    Instead,  there  may  be  different  kinds  and  aspects  of  collaboration,  in  which   subsets  of  women  can  be  brought  together  by  a  universal  category.     Lastly,  the  transcultural  perspective  is  necessary  for  the  feminist  political   movement  for  practical  reasons:  Transculture,  by  providing  a  model  of  engagement   and  interaction  that  builds  on  differences,  holds  great  promise  for  feminism  to  find  a   way  to  deal  more  productively  with  differences  among  women  other  than  treating     197   feminism  as  the  sum  of  various  kinds  of  feminism,  such  as  African  American   feminism,  Asian  feminism,  or  Lesbian  feminism.    Differences  among  women  are   concrete  and  contextual  rather  than  an  abstract  summary  of  being  simply  different   in  reference  to  the  dominant  group,  so  feminism  should  treat  oppression  as   multiplicative  and  concrete  rather  than  abstract  because  oppressions  are   intermeshed.    The  transcultural  perspective  does  not  simply  emphasize  that   cultures  are  different,  but  rather  stresses  the  significance  of  interaction  and   interdependency  of  cultures.    For  example,  the  transcultural  practice  in  which   women  engage  in  the  interference  of  different  cultures  can  cure  the  myopia  of   viewing  women’s  experiences  only  through  the  lens  of  the  Western  culture.    The   transcultural  perspective  would  encourage  women,  especially  those  in  the  dominant   cultures  or  those  who  have  privileges,  to  stop  taking  undue  pride  of  their  cultures  or   social  positions.    At  the  same  time,  it  encourages  women  in  the  less  dominant   cultures  to  be  humble  with  other  cultures  and  reflect  on  their  own  cultures.    The   category  of  women,  which  embraces  similarities  and  differences  among  women,   reminds  women  in  various  cultures  that  they  share  a  collective  mission.    Employing   the  transcultural  perspective  thus  makes  it  possible  for  women  to  understand  each   other  and  share  a  political  solidarity  in  order  to  eliminate  gender  oppression.     However,  the  transcultural  perspective  has  its  own  limitations  that  might  be   detrimental  to  feminism.    I  will  point  out  three  limitations  here.    First  of  all,  various   forms  of  deconstructive  interference  such  as  colonialism,  cultural  imperialism,  and   international  exploitation  can  take  place  in  the  name  of  transculturalism.    Epstein   only  focuses  on  the  constructive  interference  without  talking  much  about     198   deconstructive  interference.    Transculturalism  faces  challenges  with  the  rapid   development  of  global  economic  capitalism,  which  appears  to  be  widening  the  gap   between  the  developed  countries  and  the  less-­‐developed  countries  and  thus  further   marginalizing  women,  ethnic  or  indigenous  minorities,  and  the  working-­‐class  in  the   Third  World  nations.    With  the  increased  mobility  through  global  economic   expansion  and  immigration,  neo-­‐colonization  emerges.    While  globalization   increases  the  connection  between  nations  to  a  degree,  we  are  caught  in  a  larger   struggle  where  transnational  exploitation  and  cultural  imperialism  operate  in  less   explicit  ways  but  on  a  larger  scale.    The  transcultural  perspective  calls  for  support   from  the  local  and  global  economy  and  politics,  but  transcultural  feminists  should  be   aware  of  and  more  cautious  about  political  agendas  that  can  occur  as  a  result  of   cross-­‐border  information  filtering  and  reframing.    For  instance,  more  and  more   Latino  and  Filipino  women  come  to  the  United  States  to  provide  domestic  work  and   “liberate”  some  women  from  domestic  work.    This  kind  of  transcultural  experience   (in  Epstein’s  sense)  improves  housework  providers’  economic  ability  but  also  harms   their  own  well-­‐being  and  their  families  and  creates  a  social  vulnerability  based  on  a   new  internationally  gendered  system.     Second,  feminists  should  be  aware  of  the  increasing  tokenism  in  feminism   that  is  formulated  in  transcultural  experiences.    Tokenism  is  the  practice  of  making   a  symbolic  effort  to  recruit  a  small  number  of  people  from  underrepresented  groups   in  order  to  give  the  appearance  of  sexual  or  racial  equality  in  circumstances  such  as   workplaces  and  committees.    Tokenism  might  happen  in  the  transcultural  process  in   Epstein’s  sense  because  “interference”  could  possibly  only  engaged  by     199   representatives  from  underrepresented  groups.    For  example,  on  a  U.S.  campus,  the   fact  that  a  women  of  color  faculty  member  can  sit  on  an  academic  diversity   committee  to  show  that  the  university  is  a  diversified  campus  does  not  necessarily   mean  all  women  of  color  are  represented  on  campus.    Having  that  women  of  color   faculty  as  a  token  representative  sends  a  misleading  message  that  women  of  color   are  recognized  without  fully  engaging  with  the  whole  body  of  women  of  color  on   campus.    The  division  of  feminism  and  the  lack  of  engaged  interaction  among   women  are  partly  due  to  the  self-­‐representation  of  certain  Third  World  feminist   figures,  who  provide  knowledge  about  Third  World  cultures  without  examining   whether  they  offer  authentic  depictions  of  their  cultures.    This  tokenism  exempts   both  Western  feminists  and  Third  World  feminists  from  active  engagement  in  cross-­‐ cultural  activities  and  creates  problems  for  both  sides.    On  the  one  hand,  Western   feminists  assume  that  acknowledgement  and  inclusion  of  these  token  Third  World   feminists  resolves  the  issue  of  Third  World  women,  therefore,  further  engagement  is   unnecessary.    On  the  other  hand,  Third  Word  feminists  assume  that  Third  World   issues  are  “our  issues”  and  that  White  women  are  not  in  the  position  to  talk  about   “our  issues.”    This  tokenism  and  self-­‐representation  also  increases  the  distance   between  Western  feminism  and  Third  World  feminism.   Lastly,  there  is  a  dangerous  tendency  by  people  located  in  the  Western   culture  to  reassure  themselves  that  their  values  are,  and  should  be,  the  norm  of  the   world.    The  Western  world  tends  to  take  the  credit  for  the  advancement  and   development  of  other  countries  in  transcultural  exchanges.    For  instance,  in  a  recent   TIME  magazine  article  on  Kim  Jung  Un,  the  new  leader  of  North  Korea,  the  author     200   poses  the  question  whether  Kim  would  liberalize  the  economy  of  North  Korea  as   China’s  leader  did  more  than  30  years  ago.    The  author’s  speculation  is  based  on  the   fact  that  Kim  went  to  school  in  Switzerland  for  several  years  when  he  was  a  boy,   which  shares  similarity  with  Deng  Xiaoping,  who  was  the  leader  of  China  and  was   once  an  international  student  in  France.    The  author  asks:   The  time  that  young  Kim  Jong  Un  spent  in  Switzerland,  dressing  in  Dennis   Rodman  Jerseys,  playing  video  games  and  befriending  Westerners,  prompts   some  to  think  the  young  man  must  know  these  decisions  [such  as  liberalizing   the  economy  and  giving  up  its  pariah  status  as  a  rogue  nuclear  state]  are  no-­‐ brainers.    He  experienced  the  outside  world  and  then  witnessed  the  abject,   criminal  poverty  of  his  own  country.    After  all,  didn’t  Deng  Xiaoping,  the   mastermind  of  China’s  opening,  spend  time  in  France  with  Zhou  Enlai  when   he  was  young?19     It  is  interestingly  strange  that  the  rhetoric  of  this  article  seems  to  suggest  that   China’s  economic  development  was  due  to  its  leader’s  transcultural  experiences  (in   Epstein’s  sense)—mostly  learning  from  the  Westerners.    Such  mass  media  rhetoric   unfortunately  reinforces  the  problematic  assumption  that  the  values  of  the  Western   culture  are  superior  to  those  of  other  cultures.     One  may  object  that  women’s  oppression  in  Third  World  cultures  would  not   be  solved  by  transculturalism.    For  instance,  issues  such  as  the  protection  of   minority  cultures  that  concerns  Kymlicka  cannot  be  improved  through   transculturalism.    This  objection  leads  us  to  ask  two  questions  about   transculturalism:  Is  it  possible  that  transculturalism  can  ease  the  tension  between  a   majority  culture  and  minority  cultures?    And  if  we  become  transculturalists,  what   will  change  and  what  could  be  changed?    I  would  argue  that  the  transcultural   perspective  does  not  defend  the  value  of  a  particular  culture  simply  because  the     201   culture  is  in  the  minority  or  majority.      In  other  words,  being  minority  or  majority   does  not  assign  a  moral  value  to  a  culture.    Yet,  this  does  not  mean  the  value  of  a   particular  culture  is  not  worthy  of  respect  and  given  serious  consideration.    Rather,   values  of  the  whole  cultural  world  are  adapted  and  revised  because  of  the   transcultural  communication,  through  which  each  culture  recognizes  advantages   and  disadvantages  of  their  value  systems  and  is  more  open  to  further   communication.    This  is  not  an  easy  mission  to  undertake,  especially  when  we  are   caught  up  with  the  satisfaction  of  being  multicultural,  diversified,  and  tolerant.    The   advocate  of  the  transcultural  perspective  would  provoke  uncomfortable   engagement  and  communication  patterns,  but  this  kind  of  uneasy  confrontation  is   exactly  the  starting  point  of  genuine  dialogues.       Conclusion     In  this  chapter,  I  have  argued  that  the  transcultural  perspective  is  superior  to  the   multicultural  approach  regarding  the  discussion  of  gender  differences  and  culture   differences  for  the  following  reasons:  (1)  The  transcultural  perspective  creates  a   useful  space  with  which  women  can  distantly  reflect  on  the  various  living   experiences  of  women;  therefore,  the  transcultural  perspective  holds  the  promise  of   opening  dialogues  among  women  who  are  from  different  backgrounds;  (2)  the   transcultural  perspective  helps  ease  the  tension  between  the  dominant  culture  and   the  marginalized  culture  by  emphasizing  the  need  of  one  culture  of  another  to   engage  in  cultural  dialogues;  (3)  the  transcultural  perspective  offers  an  ethical   perspective  within  which  women  might  work  with  intermeshed  identities  but  also     202   sustain  collaboration  across  their  identities;  and  (4)  employing  the  transcultural   perspective  makes  it  possible  for  women  to  understand  each  other  and  share  a   political  solidarity  in  order  to  eliminate  gender  oppression.   This  chapter  provides  the  basis  for  a  concept  about  accommodating  cultural   differences.    The  critique  of  essentialism  argues  that  the  concept  of  women  excludes   other  women,  but  we  can  show  that  in  transculturalism  the  category  of  women  does   not  exclude  other  women.    If  we  pursue  transculturalism,  then  we  can  have  women   connecting  with  women  while  having  a  concept  of  women.    We  should  note  that  a   transcultural  perspective  is  encountered  and  sustained  by  keeping  inequality  and   class  in  mind.    That  is,  the  two  kinds  of  differences  run  through  the  discussion  of   cultural  differences.    There  may  be  certain  conditions  required  for  the  transcultural   process  to  have  the  desired  effects,  for  example,  some  degree  of  economic  equality   or  shared  participation  in  a  social  movement.    In  any  case,  we  need  to  acknowledge   the  question  of  the  needed  preconditions  for  applying  or  embodying  the   transcultural  process.    Transcultural  themes,  such  as  “world”-­‐traveling,  have  been   implied  background  of  feminist  scholarship  and  they  hold  the  promise  for  achieving   women’s  solidarity  if  more  fully  exploited.         203   Part  Two  Conclusion     In  this  part,  I  criticized  the  problematic  concept  of  culture  used  by  liberal   multiculturalists.    I  argued  that  their  concept  of  culture  does  not  adequately  account   for  the  variability  of  cultures  and  the  possible  dynamic  within  and  among  cultures.     By  critically  assessing  postcolonial  multiculturalist  feminists’  critique  of  the  concept   of  culture,  I  proposed  that  feminism  not  only  needs  a  reconstructed  concept  of   culture,  but  also  needs  a  transition  of  framework  from  multiculturalism  to   transculturalism  because  multiculturalism  does  not  identify  where  cultural   dialogues  are  needed  and  how  they  are  possible.    I  argued  that  transculturalism  as   an  alternative  framework  would  not  only  help  feminists  better  understand  cultural   differences  but  also  help  them  foster  cross-­‐border  solidarity.    If  we  think   transculturally,  then  the  possession  of  a  vague  cultural  identity  would  not  be   anymore  confusing  than  having  a  single  cultural  identity.    Moreover,  having  a  single   cultural  identity  in  the  transcultural  model  would  be  less  and  less  possible  due  to   the  increase  of  cultural  exchanges.    Individuals  in  the  transcultural  setting  would  be   more  amenable  to  identifying  transculturally  owing  to  the  physical  mobility  of   others  even  if  they  remain  located  in  her  country  of  origin.   The  reason  that  I  propose  transculturalism  as  the  alternative  to   multiculturalism  is  that  it  is  urgent  for  feminism  to  find  the  balance  at  the   intersection  between  the  debate  about  women’s  oppression  in  various  cultures  and   the  debate  about  the  possibility  for  women  to  reach  gender  equality.    The  notion  of   solidarity  suggests  that  there  should  be  strong  connections  among  women,  but  this   idea  is  not  adequately  illuminated  in  the  multicultural  approach.    Transculturalism,     204   however,  is  a  framework  that  cultivates  an  idea  that  involves  both  the  variability   and  the  dynamics  of  women  and  of  cultures.    Now  we  are  ready  to  return  to  the   topic  of  solidarity,  which  runs  through  the  discussions  in  both  Part  One  and  Part   Two  and  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  the  concluding  chapter.         205   CONCLUSION:  BRIDGING  THE  DIVIDE  IN  FEMINISM  WITH  TRANSCULTURAL   FEMINIST  SOLIDARITY:  A  FEMINIST  CRITIQUE  OF  FEMINIST  COALITION   POLITICS  AND  GLOBAL  FEMINISM     This  chapter  focuses  on  the  theme  of  solidarity.    The  theme  of  solidarity  is  important   from  at  least  two  perspectives:  (1)  from  the  epistemological  perspective,  women   have  different  experiences  of  gender  oppression  and  do  not  automatically  come   together  collectively  to  strengthen  each  other,  so  solidarity  is  a  political  strategy  for   them  to  recognize  gender  oppression  on  a  macroscopic  scale;  and  (2)  from  the   political  perspective,  solidarity  is  crucial  for  women  to  resist  structural  gender   oppression.    The  discussion  of  solidarity  roughly  runs  parallel  to  the  discussion  of   women’s  identity:  A  concept  of  solidarity  denies  women’s  group  identity,  affirms   women’s  group  identity,  or  uses  it  strategically.    The  discussion  of  solidarity  also   roughly  runs  parallel  to  the  discussion  of  cultural  differences  among  women,  in   particular,  the  divide  between  U.S.  women  of  color  feminism  and  Third   World/transnational  feminism.    That  is  to  say,  I  will  talk  about  women’s  solidarity   from  two  aspects  in  this  chapter:  One  aspect  is  the  theme  of  identity  politics  and  the   other  aspect  is  the  theme  of  cultural  differences.       I  begin  with  the  concept  of  solidarity  itself  and  why  it  is  important  to   feminism.    In  Section  2,  I  turn  to  the  related  theme  of  identity  politics  by  discussing   Amy  Allen’s  work,  in  which  she  employs  a  strategic  usage  of  “a  mediated  concept  of   group  identity”  and  proposes  a  concept  of  political  coalition  as  feminist  solidarity.    I   argue  that  a  discussion  of  feminist  solidarity  needs  to  emphasize  women’s  group   identity  because  women  are  oppressed  as  women.    In  Section  3,  I  focus  on  the   relevance  of  cultural  differences  by  addressing  Charlotte  Bunch’s  idea  of  global     206   feminism,  a  main  claim  of  which  asserts  that  women’s  rights  are  human  rights.     However,  Elora  Chowdhury  criticizes  the  problematic  construction  of  global   feminism  in  the  U.S.  academy,  arguing  that  the  politics  of  global  feminism  is  based   on  a  justification  of  Western  liberal  notion  of  democracy.    Chowdhury  proposes   braiding  U.S.  anti-­‐racist/women  of  color  feminism  and  Third  World/transnational   feminism  to  resist  both  hegemonic  White  feminism  and  Western  feminism.    This   approach  resembles  Chandra  Mohanty’s  conception  of  transnational  feminist   solidarity.    In  Section  4,  I  argue  that  both  Mohanty  and  Chowdhury  foreshow  an  idea   of  transcultural  feminist  solidarity  although  they  do  not  articulate  their  concepts  in   this  way.    In  Section  5,  I  show  that  the  transcultural  approach  is  needed  to   conceptualize  collaboration  among  women  in  different  cultures;  for  instance,  it  will   help  us  understand  the  relationship  between  U.S.  feminism  and  Chinese  feminism.     In  the  final  section,  by  pointing  out  obstacles  and  limitations  to  solidarity,  I   demonstrate  how  a  new  solidarity  can  emerge  from  the  idea  of  transculture.       1.  What  is  Solidarity  and  Why  is  it  an  Important  Concept  for  Feminism?   Solidarity  is  individuals  acting  together  with  one  another  with  a  bond  or  goal  that   differs  from  the  pursuit  of  self-­‐interest  in  relation  to  shared  or  similar  life   conditions,  i.e.,  certain  patterns  of  oppression.    Identity  and  a  feeling  of   interdependence  constitute  the  basis  for  solidarity  with  others.    The  goal  of   solidarity  is  to  realize  certain  personal  or  collective  interests  that  are  not  possible   without  establishing  a  relationship  to  others.    Solidarity  increases  strength  and   influences  in  confrontation  with  an  adversary.    It  can  be  expressed  in  various  terms,     207   such  as  cooperation,  shared  identification,  and  shared  interests.    I  define  solidarity   as  collective  resistance  and  empowerment  and  I  define  feminist  solidarity  as   creating  a  self-­‐consciously  constructed  space  where  the  resistance  to  gender   oppression  is  established  by  forming  a  coalition  around  women’s  group  identity  and   around  resistance  itself  while  recognizing  the  different  forms  that  gender   oppression  takes.    In  this  sense,  the  issue  of  women’s  group  identity  and  the   resistance  to  gender  oppression  are  connected.     Not  all  feminists  regard  solidarity  as  a  necessary  component  of  the  feminist   movement.    For  instance,  postmodernist  feminists  do  not  advocate  solidarity  or   solidarity  of  all  women  (though  some  of  them  advocate  solidarity  among  certain   groups  of  women).    However,  the  issue  of  women’s  solidarity  is  important  for   feminism  for  the  following  two  reasons.    The  first  reason  is  that  solidarity  helps   women  be  aware  that  women  endure  oppression  as  women  and  the  issue  of   women’s  solidarity  is  in  fact  an  issue  of  women’s  collective  consciousness  raising   and  empowerment.    Feminist  solidarity  is  not  a  goal  or  end,  but  rather  a  way   through  which  women  can  act  collectively  to  achieve  the  goal  of  ending  gender   oppression.    Women’s  oppression  cannot  be  eliminated  by  women  individually;   rather,  the  elimination  of  women’s  oppression  requires  collective  and  political   action.    For  instance,  postmodernist  feminists  criticize  feminist  multiculturalism,  but   they  do  so  primarily  in  a  way  that  stresses  limitations  of  identity  politics.    They   assume  that  identity  politics  is  built  upon  a  fixed  identity,  and  propose  a  form  of   political  practice  that  is  built  upon  overlapping  alliances,  which  are  formed  over   common  interests  instead  of  identity  politics.    In  other  words,  they  propose  coalition     208   politics  in  which  individuals  work  together  upon  shared  agreements  to  reach  a   common  goal.    As  Cressida  Heyes  observes,  these  feminists  reach  “the  conclusion   that  ‘coalitional  politics’  is  a  more  appropriate  form  of  organizing  than  conventional   ‘identity  politics’”  (2000,  60).       The  second  reason  that  solidarity  is  important  is  that  women’s  solidarity   suggests  that  there  should  be  strong  connections  among  women,  but  this  idea  is  not   illuminated  in  the  positions  that  address  differences  among  women.    Women’s   solidarity  suggests  a  point  where  social  changes  regarding  gender  inequality  can   lead.    The  “difference  critique”  points  feminist  scholarship  in  the  direction  of   multiculturalism.    In  the  context  of  the  “difference  critique”  and  multiculturalism,   feminism  seems  to  be  drifting  away  from  its  initial  goal  as  a  collective  activity  for  the   elimination  of  gender  oppression  by  focusing  on  the  discussion  of  differences   (although  the  discussion  of  differences  might  be  for  the  purpose  of  eliminating   gender  oppression).    Women’s  solidarity  is  particularly  important  for  the  issues  in   question  of  this  dissertation—the  increasing  divide  and  fissures  of  feminism  in  the   past  three  decades  partly  due  to  debates  over  differences  among  women—but  the   divide  has  less  to  do  with  differences  than  the  way  some  feminists  theorize   differences  among  women.    Acknowledging  differences  is  a  necessary  step  for   eliminating  women’s  oppression,  but  feminists  should  gain  collective  power  to   achieve  the  goal  of  the  feminist  movement  while  acknowledging  differences  among   women.    As  Marilyn  Frye  rightly  points  out,  “the  idea  that  articulating  and   elaborating  differences  among  women  was  a  route  to  viable  female  identity  and   solidarity  was  not  an  easy  idea  to  grasp;  Indeed,  it  has  had  to  be  invented”  (1996,     209   1006).    Gaining  collective  power  is  the  key  to  overcoming  women’s  oppression   because  resisting  women’s  oppression  is  impossible  to  achieve  through  individual   efforts  and  struggles.    Feminists  have  not  reached  the  consensus  that  differences   among  women  can  lead  to  feminist  solidarity  in  part  because  of  the  pervasive   misconception  that  solidarity  must  be  built  upon  commonality  and  sameness.       Some  feminists  have  attempted  to  discuss  women’s  collaboration  despite   their  differences,  but  not  many  of  them  have  translated  their  discussions  into  a   useful  account  of  solidarity;  thus,  solidarity  remains  a  problematic  concept  in   feminism.    A  number  of  feminists,  such  as  Robin  Morgan  (1984),  Jodi  Dean  (1996),   Amy  Allen  (1999),  Charlotte  Bunch  (2001),  Sandra  Bartky  (2002),  María  Lugones   (2003),  Chandra  Mohanty  (2003),  and  Elora  Chowdhury  (2009)  developed  a  variety   of  approaches  to  women’s  solidarity.    These  attempts  are  related  to,  but  are  not  the   same  as,  actual  political  solidarity.    For  instance,  Robin  Morgan’s  concept  of  “global   sisterhood”  is  frequently  seen  as  a  founding  element  of  global  feminism  (though   later  global  feminism  diverges  from  Morgan’s  notion  of  “global  sisterhood”).       Assuming  a  universal  patriarchy  and  a  common  experience  of  oppression  of   women  around  the  globe,  as  a  representative  of  early  second  wave  feminism,   Morgan  believed  that  women  could  build  a  unified  front  against  patriarchy  by   disregarding  divisions  of  class,  race,  sexuality  and  national  origin  between  women.     In  the  introduction  to  Sisterhood  is  Global,  an  anthology  she  edits,  Morgan  argues   that  what  characterizes  women  across  cultures  and  histories  is  a  common  condition   and  worldview,  which  is  what  women  share  and  thus  is  referred  to  as  the  suffering   inflicted  by  a  universal  “patriarchal  mentality”  (1984,1).    In  Morgan’s  opinion,     210   women  are  not  different  from  each  other  and  have  an  essential  bond  because  they   are  victims  of  male  supremacy,  which  is  a  common  condition  that  is  “experienced  by   all  human  beings  who  are  born  female”  (4).    Morgan’s  intent  is  to  further  dialogues   between  women  from  different  social  locations.    To  her,  solidarity  “as  a  real  political   force  requires  that  women  transcend  the  patriarchal  barriers  of  class  and  race,  and   furthermore  transcend  even  the  solutions  the  Big  Brothers  propose  to  problems   they  themselves  created”  (18,  emphasis  in  original).       Morgan’s  idea  of  “global  sisterhood”  presents  a  widely  recognized  but  heavily   criticized  notion  of  solidarity.    In  the  next  two  sections,  I  will  present  two  feminist   critiques  of  Morgan’s  idea  of  “global  sisterhood,”  which  focus  on  the  critique  of   identity  politics  and  the  activist  work  of  building  global  networks  across  cultures   respectively.       2.  Feminist  Solidarity  after  Identity  Politics:    Allen’s  Concept  of  Solidarity     In  the  previous  section,  I  explained  that  the  concept  of  solidarity  is  crucial  to  the   feminist  movement  because  the  concept  of  solidarity  is  necessary  to  think  through   how  women  may  overcome  patriarchy  collectively.    It  seems  that  the  problem  is   how  we  can  contextualize  potential  solidarity  and  locate  processes  by  which  it  can   be  achieved.    In  this  section,  I  will  examine  Amy  Allen’s  alternative  to  a  universal   concept  of  women’s  solidarity  to  construct  a  concept  of  feminist  solidarity.   2.1  Allen’s  Concept  of  Women’s  Solidarity   Allen  discusses  a  strategic  use  of  women’s  group  identity  and  tries  to  find  a  middle   way  between  two  positions:  Having  a  women’s  group  identity  and  not  having  a     211   women’s  group  identity.    If  we  embrace  an  identity  for  women,  we  will  then  have  a   basis  for  theorizing  the  common  experience  of  women’s  oppression  and  make   collective  efforts  to  resist  such  oppression.    However,  by  doing  so  we  exclude  some   women  from  the  feminist  discourse.    If  we  totally  avoid  asserting  a  women’s  group   identity,  then  we  can  avoid  the  problem  of  exclusion,  but  we  would  lose  the  basis  for   theorizing  oppression  and  collective  resistance.    The  middle  way  that  Allen  finds   helpful  involves  women  acting  in  concert  without  committing  to  a  sisterhood  that   relies  on  a  fixed  identity  of  women.    She  assumes  that  such  an  identity  suppresses   differences  within  women.    Allen  argues  that  the  sisterhood  model  of  solidarity  that   Morgan  advocates  relies  on  problematic  essentialist  notions  of  women  or  women’s   common  experience,  which  reflects  “an  exclusionary  and  repressive  conception  of   women’s  shared  essence  or  experience  of  oppression”  (1999a,  109).    According  to   Allen,  these  problematic  notions  restrict  women’s  experiences  of  oppression  to  such   an  extent  that  they  appear  to  marginalize  or  even  exclude  groups  such  as  Black   women,  queer  women,  and  working-­‐class  women.      Accordingly,  this  shortcoming  of   the  sisterhood  model  of  solidarity  might  lead  one  to  think  that  in  criticizing  identity   politics  one  must  also  criticize  the  idea  of  solidarity,  at  least  of  the  idea  of  solidarity   relying  on  “an  exclusionary  and  repressive”  identity.     Allen  adopts  “a  mediated  conception  of  group  identity”  that  stands  in  a   dialectical  relationship  between  identity  and  non-­‐identity  (1999a,  99).    She  argues   that  the  opposition  between  identity  and  non-­‐identity  is  false  because  neither   option  is  defensible.    On  the  one  hand,  she  asserts  that  an  identity  politics  that  relies   on  the  category  of  women  has  the  merit  of  talking  about  common  experiences  and     212   shared  goals  that  contribute  to  the  feminist  movement,  but  the  category  of  women   that  is  posited  by  some  feminists  is    “fixed,  pregiven,  and  perhaps  even  ‘natural’”   (1999a,  100).    On  the  other  hand,  she  acknowledges  that  a  fragmented  non-­‐identity   makes  it  impossible  to  talk  about  solidarity  among  women  because  it  abandons  all   notions  of  solidarity  among  political  actors.    Allen  observes  that  the  feminist   movement  is  increasingly  fragmented  in  the  debates  over  identity  politics,  so  she   claims  that  the  feminist  movement  cannot  rely  on  fragmented  non-­‐identity  because:   [W]e  cannot  be  powerful  if  we  are  dispersed  and  fragmented,  if  we  reject  any   and  all  forms  of  group  identity  in  favor  of  an  absolute  non-­‐identity  or   difference.    For  once  we  do  this,  it  is  impossible  to  understand  how  we  can   talk  to  one  another,  dispute  our  priorities,  come  to  pragmatic  agreements,   and  formulate  provisional  but  nonetheless  shared  goals.    In  other  words,  we   make  it  impossible  to  have  a  movement.  (1999a,  114)     That  is,  Allen  does  not  entirely  reject  the  concept  of  women’s  group  identity  since  it   is  crucial  for  the  feminist  movement.    She  draws  on  Hanna  Arendt’s  term  “plurality”   to  explain  this  dialectical  relationship  between  identity  and  non-­‐identity,  and   between  sameness  or  commonality  and  difference.    According  to  Arendt,  “plurality   means  that  ‘we  are  all  the  same,  that  is,  human,  in  such  a  way  that  nobody  is  ever   the  same  as  anyone  else  who  ever  lived,  lives,  or  will  live’”  (Arendt  1958,  8;  Allen   1999a,  105).    In  other  words,  plurality  is  an  unchangeable  aspect  of  the  human   condition,  which  means  that  humans  are  both  set  apart  and  bound  together  through   action.    Allen  claims  that  it  is  antipolitical  to  reject  all  identity  categories,  “especially   when  those  identities  are  under  attack”  because  by  doing  so  “it  renders  all   resistance  to  persecution  and  domination  impossible”  (108).    However,  Allen’s   approach  to  group  identity  is  strategic  in  the  sense  that  involves  being  compelled  to   defend  oneself  in  terms  of  identity  only  when  her  identity  is  under  attack.       213   The  category  of  women  is  neither  incontrovertible  fact  nor  pure  fiction;  it  is  a   political  fact;  as  fact  it  is  undeniable,  and  to  attempt  to  deny  it  is  to  blind   oneself  to  political  realities,  but  as  political  it  is  changeable.    One  changes  it   by  resisting,  but  one  can  resist  only  in  terms  of  the  political  fact  of  an  identity   under  attack.  (1999a,  112)     A  political  fact  is  that  a  group  of  people  can  be  attacked  on  the  basis  of  their  sharing   the  same  group  identity;  for  instance  Jews  are  attacked  simply  because  they  are   Jews.       Despite  her  recognition  of  the  usefulness  of  shared  group  identity  when  it  is   under  attack,  Allen  claims  that  identity  politics  is  passé  for  the  discussion  of  feminist   solidarity,  which  “must  move  beyond  the  terms  of  the  identity  politics  debate  and   formulate  non-­‐repressive,  non-­‐exclusionary  conceptions  of  group  identity.   …reformulate  solidarity  as  the  result  of  concerted  action,  rather  than  as  a  pre-­‐given,   fixed  and,  hence,  repressive  identity”  (1999a,  106).    In  this  way,  according  to  her,   feminists  can  bind  the  feminist  movement  together  and  link  it  to  related  social   struggles  against  racism  and  heterosexism  without  the  exclusion  and   marginalization  of  those  who  do  not  fit  into  fixed  identity  categories.    Allen  thus   proposes  a  concept  of  solidarity  after  identity  politics  (without  rejecting  identity   altogether).    That  is,  the  feminist  concept  of  solidarity  grows  out  of  the  dialectical   interplay  between  identity  and  non-­‐identity  and  rests  on  “a  mediated  conception  of   group  identity.”    She  believes  this  concept  of  solidarity  should  replace  the  sisterhood   model  of  solidarity  that  rests  on  “an  exclusionary  and  repressive  conception  of   women’s  shared  essence.”     The  conception  that  goes  along  with  such  a  politics  views  solidarity  as   something  that  is  achieved  through  a  shared  commitment,  a  promise,  to  act   in  concert,  not  an  exclusionary  unity  that  is  presumed  in  advance.  (1999a,   113)     214     In  other  words,  solidarity  is  the  power  that  arises  out  of  reciprocal  commitments  to   act  in  concert.    Feminist  men  and  women  are  bound  together  as  political  actors  to   fight  against  the  system  of  domination  by  promises  and  shared  commitments,  which   are  open  to  contestation,  reinterpretation,  and  revision.       2.2  Critique  of  Allen’s  Concept  of  Solidarity   Allen  rightly  points  out  that  feminists  need  some  basis  to  bind  together  to  make  a   common  cause,  but  her  account  of  using  “a  mediated  conception  of  group  identity”   only  when  the  group  identity  is  under  attack  (for  instance,  when  Jews  are   persecuted  because  they  are  Jews)  is  confusing.    Allen  is  vague  about  why  a  group   identity  can  only  be  used  when  that  particular  identity  is  under  attack.    It  seems  that   she  suggests  that  if  an  identity  is  not  under  attack,  then  it  is  not  contestable  and  is   not  changeable;  that  is,  it  cannot  embrace  differences.    It  is  theoretically  wrong  for   Allen  to  assume  that  if  we  construct  the  category  of  women,  it  must  be  built  on  a   notion  of  shared  experiences  in  which  women  endure  gender  oppression  in  the   same  form.    It  is  problematic  to  assume  that  if  one  embraces  the  category  of  women   (when  it  is  not  under  attack),  then  the  category  excludes  other  women,  because   embracing  the  category  of  women  does  not  necessarily  marginalize  or  exclude   certain  groups  of  women  from  the  feminist  discourse.    It  seems  to  me  that  Allen  is   saying  that  identities  are  changeable  but  existing  identities  are  limited  and  limiting   in  some  ways,  but  her  explanation  of  “the  dialectical  interplay  of  identity  and   nonidentity”  need  further  clarification.    It  would  be  helpful  to  consider  historical   constructions  of  group  identities,  which  Allen  clearly  does  not  do  in  her  discussions,   to  understand  that  one  does  not  necessarily  need  “the  dialectical  interplay  of     215   identity  and  nonidentity”  to  be  able  to  sort  out  limitations  of  “an  exclusionary  and   repressive  identity.”    An  identity  does  not  have  to  be  exclusive  and  repressive:  A   useful  way  of  categorizing  women  without  suppressing  differences  among  women  is   to  regard  the  categorization  as  the  practice  of  differences.    In  this  way,  a  women’s   identity  can  avoid  Allen’s  concerns  by  showing  its  ability  of  grasping  both  the   variability  and  the  dynamics  of  women.     It  seems  to  me  that  Allen  tries  to  draw  a  distinction  between  a  philosophical   conception  of  women  (such  as  her  idea  of  “a  mediated  conception  of  group   identity”)  and  a  women’s  identity.    I  agree  with  Allen  that  there  is  a  distinction   between  a  philosophical  conception  of  women  and  women’s  identity,  but  in  contrast   to  Allen,  I  argue  that  a  women’s  identity,  rather  than  a  philosophical  conception  of   women  (such  as  Allen’s  account  of  “a  mediated  conception  of  group  identity”),  is   necessary  for  feminist  solidarity.    A  philosophical  conception  of  women  is  not   necessarily  a  women’s  identity  although  one  can  link  the  former  to  the  latter.    It  is   theoretically  possible  that  a  philosophical  conception  of  women  can  tell  us  why   there  is  no  such  a  thing  as  a  women’s  identity,  but  this  does  not  necessarily  mean   that  a  women’s  identity  is  not  needed  for  feminist  solidarity.    Identification  plays  a   role  in  solidarity,  but  it  is  not  clear  what  kind  of  identification  is  necessary  for   solidarity.    Allen  seems  to  say  that  one  does  not  need  to  have  a  unified  conception  of   women,  or  even  necessarily  a  unified  identity  of  women  to  have  solidarity  among   women.    That  is,  there  could  be  solidarity  among  women  without  a  philosophical   conception  of  women.    One  of  the  reasons  that  we  separate  the  idea  of  women’s   shared  group  identity  (such  as  what  I  claim)  from  a  philosophical  concept  of  women     216   (such  as  what  Allen  claims)  is  that  the  identity  that  women  share  and  the  respect  in   which  women  identify  with  each  other  do  not  in  any  way  homogenize  them.    Having   a  shared  women’s  identity  means  that  their  lives  are  in  some  general  sense  shaped   by  their  gender  reality;  the  way  that  they  live  their  gender  reality  is  that  they  are   oppressed  as  women.    In  other  words,  it  is  because  they  are  women  that  they  are   oppressed.    Yet,  they  do  not  have  to  be  oppressed  in  the  same  way  to  be  oppressed   as  women  because  there  can  be  differences  within  the  shared  gender  oppression.     This  dialectic  relationship  between  differences  of  women’s  oppression  and  a  shared   women’s  identity  fits  with  the  idea  that  there  can  be  solidarity  among  women  who   are  located  in  very  different  social  and  political  circumstances.    A  particular  woman   may  feel  solidarity  with  women  who  are  oppressed  very  differently  than  she  is,   because  although  gender  oppression  has  different  local  meanings  for  her  and  other   women,  the  solidarity  is  rooted  in  the  fact  that  they  are  both  oppressed  as  women.     Maybe  for  some  feminists  (Allen  for  instance)  differences  undermine  the  possibility   of  there  being  a  women’s  group  identity,  so  having  a  philosophical  conception  of   women  is  sufficient  for  feminist  solidarity.    However,  in  the  discussion  of  women’s   solidarity,  a  women’s  group  identity  is  a  more  useful  concept  than  a  philosophical   conception  of  women.    We  can  generalize  about  women  no  matter  how  different   they  are  because  they  all  are  susceptible  to  oppression  as  women.    In  practice   women  all  experience  being  treated  as  women  in  societies  across  borders,  whether   it  is  in  the  form  of  inequality  or  some  other  oppressive  forms.     The  idea  of  “women’s  group  identity”  can  be  ambiguous  because  the  notion   of  “group”  often  suggests  that  members  of  the  group  act  together  or  are  capable  of     217   acting  together.    In  the  context  of  forging  women’s  solidarity,  “women’s  group   identity”  obviously  does  not  have  this  implication  because  what  is  built  into  the  idea   of  “women’s  group  identity”  is  not  beyond  there  being  an  identity  that  all  women   share.    That  is,  it  is  possible  to  have  an  identity  to  share  with  other  people  without   existing  as  group  in  any  practical  sense.    Allen  asserts  that  identity  politics  is   inadequate  and  that  solidarity  does  not  require  identity  politics,  but  it  remains  a   question  whether  the  concept  of  solidarity  that  Allen  visions  would  actually  advance   the  feminist  movement  due  to  her  ambiguity  of  women’s  group  identity.    So  it  is   necessary  to  further  examine  the  issue  of  women’s  group  identity  by  pointing  to  the   inadequacy  of  Allen’s  concept  of  solidarity  from  two  aspects.     One  aspect  is  that  it  states  that  the  mainstream  feminist  movement   marginalizes  or  excludes  certain  groups  of  women  (although  the  feminist  movement   started  to  focus  on  differences  among  women  in  the  late  1960s  and  the  1970s).    It  is   undeniable  that  the  concept  of  women  being  used  in  the  feminist  literature  is  in  fact   sometimes  too  narrow.    However,  Allen’s  argument  attacks  the  wrong  target   because  what  caused  the  marginalization  and  exclusion  is  not  the  category  of   women  that  assumingly  excludes  certain  groups  of  women,  but  rather  the   assumption  that  the  category  of  women  cannot  embrace  differences  among  women.     An  alternative  method  that  she  suggests  for  feminist  theories  is  one  that  she  claims   will  minimize  the  emphasis  on  the  membership  in  a  social  group  and  will  instead   stress  the  possibilities  for  alliances  founded  on  non-­‐identical  connections  such  as   “acting  in  concert.”    The  alternative  indicates  an  identity  crisis  and  generates  a   situation  where  feminists  aim  to  speak  and  make  political  demands  in  the  name  of     218   women,  and  at  the  same  time  reject  the  idea  that  there  is  a  unified  category  of   women.    This  alternative  fails  to  explain  what  role  that  social  groups  play  in  the   structure  of  male  domination,  neither  does  it  explain  what  role  women  as  a  social   group  play  in  the  elimination  of  gender  oppression.    Since  she  regards  group   identity  only  as  a  political  fact,  Allen  is  unable  to  recognize  that  women’s  group   membership  is  the  basis  on  which  gender  oppression  occurs.    As  a  matter  of  fact,   identity  politics  helps  women  understand  the  structure  of  male  domination  and   female  oppression,  because  it  provides  a  viewpoint  for  looking  at  women  in  terms  of   their  membership  in  the  social  group  women.    A  number  of  feminists  who  claim  that   male  domination  is  a  power  also  embrace  the  idea  of  women’s  group  identity  and   believe  that  women  are  oppressed  as  a  group  (for  instance,  see  Schwartzman  2006).       The  other  aspect  of  the  inadequacy  of  Allen’s  concept  of  solidarity  is  that  her   concept  of  solidarity  as  “acting  in  concert  or  shared  agreement”  can  lead  to   unexpected  results.    Feminist  solidarity  cannot  simply  be  understood  through   reconstructing  the  communicative  underpinnings  of  feminist  coalitional  practices  or   a  politically  constructed  mutual  recognition.    If  this  kind  of  “coalition  politics”  is   considered  as  a  more  appropriate  form  of  organizing  than  identity  politics,  it  would   lead  to  further  marginalization  and  exclusion  within  the  feminist  movement.    For   example,  more  and  more  Third  World  immigrant  women  are  employed  as  domestic   laborers  in  the  global  North,  freeing  their  female  employers  to  work  outside  of  their   home.    If  we  adopt  Allen’s  concept  of  solidarity,  then  this  redistribution  of  domestic   labor  would  be  considered  as  emerging  from  a  shared  agreement  since  women  in   the  global  North  do  not  force  women  in  the  global  South  into  the  international     219   domestic  work  market.    We  can  even  regard  this  arrangement  as  some  sort  of   solidarity  in  the  sense  of  “acting  in  concert  or  shared  agreement”  because  women  in   the  global  South  would  be  empowered  at  least  financially  through  seeking   employment  in  the  global  North.    Women  in  the  global  South  and  North  have  some   common  interests  and  common  goals,  such  as  focusing  on  bettering  themselves,  but   these  interests  and  goals  are  rather  immediate,  which  mask  the  hidden  conflicts  of   self-­‐interest.    This  kind  of  coalition  should  be  scrutinized  because  there  is  also   exploitation  along  with  the  economic  empowerment  in  the  above  scenario.     Although  alliance  between  such  groups  of  women  are  possible,  Allen’s  concept  of   solidarity  does  not  help  us  fully  see  through  the  complex  interplay  of  social  power.       Some  may  object  that  Allen’s  concept  of  solidarity  is  useful  for  strategic   coalitions  and  alliances  because  it  is  attentive  to  differences  and  generates  some   sort  of  sympathy  feeling  with  fellow  allies.    I  would  respond  that  as  far  as  sympathy,   love,  and  feeling-­‐with  are  important  components  of  feminist  solidarity,  strategic   coalitions  and  alliances  built  upon  shared  agreements  are  not  sufficient  for  the   elimination  of  gender  oppression  because  they  fail  to  challenge  the  deeply  rooted   patriarchal  social  structure.    Gender  oppression  is  experienced  by  members  of  the   social  group  women,  which  makes  it  crucial  to  construct  a  category  of  women  as  a   significant  part  of  feminist  solidarity       3.  Global  Feminism  and  its  Critique       220   In  the  previous  section,  I  focused  on  the  aspect  of  women’s  group  identity  in  the   discussion  of  feminist  solidarity.    In  this  section,  I  will  focus  on  the  aspect  of  cultural   differences  by  addressing  a  notion  of  global  feminism  and  a  critique  of  it.     3.1  Bunch’s  Notion  of  Global  Feminism   Like  Allen,  Charlotte  Bunch  also  concerns  the  relationship  between  diversity  and   commonality  and  tries  to  find  a  common  basis  for  women  to  be  organized.    Bunch   proposes  a  global  perspective  on  feminist  diversity  through  which  women  can  learn   from  each  other.    She  argues  that  a  global  perspective  on  feminist  ethics  requires  a   global  vision  of  feminism—a  feminism  that  is  inclusive  and  seeks  to  reflect  a  wide   diversity  of  women’s  experiences  and  views.    She  suggests  feminists  not  only   acknowledge  and  respect  differences,  but  also  struggle  against  social  power  that   divides  women  along  differences.   When  diversity  is  understood  as  richness  of  possibility,  it  is  possible  to  move   beyond  tolerance  toward  genuine  engagement  around  difference.  …Feminist   appreciation  of  diversity  must  move  beyond  tolerance  to  valuing  diversity   not  by  condescendingly  allowing  others  to  live  but  by  learning  from  them.   (1992,  181)     That  is,  a  global  perspective  is  one  that  regards  the  domestic  life  and  the   international  sphere  as  interconnected.    Accordingly,  feminists  need  to  go  beyond   nation-­‐state  boundaries  to  strengthen  solidarity.    Although  Bunch  acknowledges  the   importance  of  solidarity,  she  nevertheless  argues  that  the  global  networking  should   go  beyond  solidarity  to  “a  more  integrated  understanding  of  the  connection   between  what’s  happening  in  one  country  or  another”  (2001,  134).    Bunch  thus   advocates  women’s  global  networking,  by  which  she  means  that  women  need  to   understand  the  connection  between  local  issues  as  well  as  the  connection  between     221   local  issues  and  international  issues.    She  argues  that  although  there  are  differences   among  women’s  oppression,  feminists  need  to  find  a  common  basis  for  women’s   global  networking.    What  she  finds  compelling  is  “a  commonality  in  the  stories  that   they  told  about  the  discrimination  and  violence  that  they  faced  as  women  that   brought  them  together  in  spite  of  their  differences”(2001,  130),  which  justifies  her   belief  that  one  of  the  universalities  of  the  feminist  struggle  is  the  commonality  of   women’s  oppression.    Bunch  explains  that  the  commonality  of  women’s  oppression   can  be  shown  in  various  forms  of  gender-­‐based  violence,  such  as  battery,  rape,   female  genital  mutilation,  female  infanticide,  and  trafficking,  which  are  human  rights   violations.       Bunch  is  actively  involved  in  network  building  effects  such  as  the  Global   Campaign  for  Women’s  Human  Rights,  a  loose  worldwide  coalition  of  groups  and   individuals  formed  in  1993.    The  driving  force  of  this  campaign  is  a  commitment  to   building  linkages  among  women  across  multiple  boundaries  locally  and  globally.     Bunch  asserts  that  women’s  networking  develops  a  model  that  affirms  the   universality  of  human  rights,  which  includes  specifically  women’s  rights,  while   respecting  the  diversity  of  particular  experiences.    She  claims  that  feminist  struggles   are  based  on  the  commonality  of  women’s  oppression  and  that  human  rights  are   universal.    As  she  states,         The  universality  of  human  rights  means  that  human  rights  should  apply  to   every  single  person  equally,  for  everyone  is  equal  in  simply  being  human.  …It   is  important  to  note  that  the  concept  of  universality  in  human  rights  does  not   mean  that  everyone  is  or  should  be  the  same,  but  rather  than  all  are  equal  in   their  rights  by  virtue  of  their  humanities.  (2001,  140,  emphasis  in  original)       3.2  Chowdhury’s  Critique  of  Global  Feminism     222   Some  feminists  not  only  dispute  the  commonality  of  women’s  oppression,  but  also   criticize  the  political  agenda  of  global  feminism.    For  instance,  Elora  Chowdhury   launches  a  critique  of  global  feminism,  which  she  believes  to  be  critical  of  the  notion   of  global  sisterhood  but  nevertheless  attaches  itself  to  earlier  western  liberal   feminist  notions  of  democracy.    She  questions  the  role  that  global  feminism  plays   when  it  addresses  “women’s  issues  elsewhere”  in  the  U.S.  academy  and  in  global   feminist  politics  and  argues  that  global  feminism  (unintentionally)  aids  hegemonic   maneuvers  of  the  U.S.  administration.    There  are  two  focuses  in  Chowdhury’s   criticism  of  global  feminism:  One  is  her  critique  of  U.S.  White  feminists  assumptions,   such  as  “women  elsewhere”  are  victimized  by  their  cultures  or  countries,  which   flattens  the  oppression  of  women  in  other  cultures;  the  other  is  her  critique  of  the   unreflected  consequences  of  global  feminist  actions  such  as  the  advocacy  of  (a   Western  notion  of)  human  rights  in  other  countries.    Both  critiques  point  to  the   necessity  of  bridging  U.S  women  of  color  anti-­‐racist  feminism  and  Third  World   transnational  feminism  to  resist  the  hegemony  of  Western  White  feminism.     First  of  all,  Chowdhury  argues  that  the  utilization  of  discrete  categories  such   as  “women  of  color”  and  “Third  World  women”  hinder  feminist  alliances  because   the  former  is  normally  used  to  refer  to  women  of  national  minorities  within  the   United  States  while  the  latter  refers  to  “women  elsewhere.”    Accordingly,  global   feminism  focuses  on  addressing  “women’s  issues  elsewhere.”    Chowdhury  argues   that  although  the  theory  of  intersectionality  is  applied  to  analyze  women’s   experiences  in  the  United  States,  the  intersectional  analysis  has  not  yet  been  utilized   to  analyze  women  beyond  borders,  which  leads  to  the  result  that  “women  in  the  USA     223   become  a  singular  individual  with  freedom  to  choose  in  opposition  to  her  victimized   singular  third  world  counterpart”  (2009,  60).    Although  she  recognizes  the   importance  of  alliances  between  U.S.  women  of  color  and  Third  World  women,   Chowdhury  does  not  intend  to  integrate  these  two  categories  into  one  category   because  doing  so  “smudges  over  the  necessity  of  analyses  around  nation  as  well  as   race”  (57).    She  claims  that  struggles  experienced  by  women  of  color  and  Third   World  women  are  ignored  (by  White  women)  because  they  are  divisive.  She  thus   suggests  connecting  “the  struggles  of  US  anti-­‐racist  and  third  world  feminists—at   times  viewed  as  divisive—in  order  to  envision  a  collective  response  to  the   hegemony  of  white  feminism”  (58).    In  this  sense,  she  acknowledges  both  the   intersections  and  the  divergences  of  U.S.  women  of  color  anti-­‐racist  feminism  and   Third  World  transnational  feminism.         Secondly,  Chowdhury  asserts  that  global  feminism  posits  itself  as  a   benevolent  savior  of  women  in  other  cultures,  which  relies  on  an  assumption  that   the  United  States  is  a  free  country  where  human  rights  are  respected  while  women   in  Other  cultures  are  abused  by  their  cultures.    This  opposition  between  “free  us”   and  “oppressed  them”  has  the  consequence  of  justifying  Western  liberal  notion  of   democracy  and  leaving  its  role  unexamined  in  the  hegemonic  reconstruction  of  a   U.S.  empire  through  governmental  military  intrusion  of  other  countries.           [G]lobal  feminism  aids  the  US  government’s  political  strategy  of  positioning   America  as  the  site  of  authoritative  enunciations  of  freedom  and  rights   whose  representatives  can  judge  the  immoral  practice  of  other  nation  states.     Using  the  logic  of  global  feminism,  female  US  government  representatives   support  US  foreign  policy  strategies  and  interventions  in  the  name  of   women’s  rights  activism.  (61)   224   By  doing  so,  Chowdhury  claims,  global  feminism  reproduces  “the  West  as  its   predetermined  default  frame  of  reference”  (51).    For  instance,  global  feminism  uses   a  universal  human  rights  paradigm  to  posit  itself  as  the  savior  of  women  in  non-­‐ Western  societies.    She  argues  that  the  advocacy  of  women’s  human  rights  by  global   feminism  perpetuates  a  framework  of  commonality  of  women’s  oppression  because   it  flattens  experiences  of  Third  World  women  into  “wounded  experiences”  by   ignoring  historical  contexts  of  these  experiences;  meanwhile,  the  agenda  of  global   feminism  and  its  political  implications  remain  unexamined.     Chowdhury’s  alternative  to  the  problematic  notion  of  global  feminism  is   braiding  U.S.  women  of  color  and  transnational  feminisms.    She  claims  that  bridging   U.S.  women  of  color  anti-­‐racist  feminism  and  Third  World  transnational  feminism   helps  to  deepen  our  understanding  of  globalization  and  global  feminism.       According  to  her,  this  alternative  is  similar  to  Chandra  Mohanty’s  mission.    Mohanty   claims  that  the  common  context  of  struggles  against  exploitation  can  potentially   create  “transnational  feminist  solidarity”  among  Third  World  women  or  women  of   color  (2003,144).    That  is,  Mohanty  promotes  an  anticapitalist  transnational   feminist  solidarity  to  struggle  against  capitalism  and  globalization.    She  argues  that   globalization  is  a  site  for  recolonization  of  peoples  in  the  Two-­‐Thirds  World,  but   their  exploitation  in  globalization  in  turn  give  them  epistemic  privilege  and  the   potentials  to  form  a  particular  form  of  solidarity  that  is  anticapitalist  and   antiglobalist.    Mohanty  uses  both  Third  World/South  and  Two-­‐Thirds  World  to  refer   to  women  who  are  the  social  minority  of  the  globe.    One-­‐Third  World  and  Two-­‐ Thirds  World  are  categories  that  incorporate  social  power  relations  and  are  based     225   on  a  quality  of  life  gradation.      According  to  her,  underprivileged  and  marginalized   women  have  epistemic  privilege  and  therefore  the  discourse  and  practices  of  social   justice  is  going  to  be  able  to  reveal  how  the  social  power  works  and  be  the  most   inclusive  if  it  includes  these  women’s  marginalized  social  locations  and  experiences.     Furthermore,  because  these  women  are  marginalized  and  exploited  by  capitalism’s   effects,  they  have  the  potential  ability  to  analyze  and  act  against  capitalism.    As   Chowdhury  comments  on  Mohanty’s  account  of  feminist  solidarity,   Drawing  connections  between  the  critique  of  white  feminism  by  women  of   color  and  of  “western  feminism”  by  third  world  feminists  working  within   paradigms  of  decolonization,  Mohanty  called  for  the  building  of  a   noncolonizing  feminist  solidarity  across  borders.  (2009,  73  n1)     That  is,  it  seems  that  both  Chowdhury  and  Mohanty  argue  that  the  purpose  of   formulation  of  transnational  feminism  is  to  resist  (hegemonic)  white  and  western   feminism.  20       4.  Imagining  Transcultural  Feminist  Solidarity     From  the  previous  discussions  about  the  various  feminist  approaches  to  solidarity,   it  seems  that  the  issues  centered  around  women’s  solidarity  are:  (1)  the  question  of   the  relation  of  a  philosophical  conception  of  women  to  feminist  solidarity,  which  is   different  from  the  question  of  the  relation  of  a  women’s  identity  to  feminist   solidarity;  and  (2)  how  should  a  concept  of  feminist  solidarity  confront  the  cultural   differences  in  an  increasingly  transnational  condition.    If  we  have  an  adequate  idea   of  women’s  identity  and  an  adequate  idea  of  culture,  then  what  would  be  the   conditions  for  solidarity?    How  would  we  forge  solidarity,  and  how  would  it  be     226   expressed  or  recognized  if  the  transcultural  approach  is  materialized?    In  what   follows,  I  will  offer  a  description  of  the  normative  ideal  of  solidarity  in  order  to   argue  that  a  transcultural  feminist  solidarity  is  related  to  an  adequate  idea  of   women’s  identity  in  the  context  of  cultural  differences.    I  speculate  that  as  the   normative  ideal  of  feminist  solidarity,  transcultural  feminist  solidarity  would  at   least  include  the  following  two  aspects.   From  the  aspect  of  identity  politics,  transcultural  feminist  solidarity   emphasizes  women’s  group  identity,  which  includes  identification  as  women   because  women  are  subject  to  oppression  as  women,  so  it  helps  ease  the  tension   between  the  commonality  of  conditions  and  differences  among  the  members  from  a   gender  standpoint.    It  seems  that  the  relationship  between  commonality  and   difference  plays  an  important  role  in  the  discussion  of  women’s  solidarity,  which  is  a   practical  as  well  as  a  theoretical  idea.    The  normative  ideal  of  feminist  solidarity   recognizes  the  diversity  of  individual  women  but  also  focuses  on  building  the   common  cause  for  solidarity.    As  we  saw  in  Part  One,  a  category  of  women  can   accommodate  differences  among  women  rather  than  reduce  differences  to   attributes  or  an  essence  that  women  share.    Transcultural  feminism  understands   these  differences  as  necessary  transcultural  conditions  for  women’s  solidarity,   which  is  different  from  the  universalist  understanding  that  views  differences  as  the   primary  threat  to  solidarity.    The  “difference  critique”  has  launched  debates  about   how  relations  between  White  women  and  women  of  color  have  often  been   constructed  to  reinforce  differences  in  social  and  institutional  status  that  are   founded  on  race,  class,  and  culture.    In  this  context,  transcultural  feminist  solidarity     227   should  also  address  class  and  structural  inequality  because  there  is  a  tension   between  the  commonality  of  conditions  and  differences  among  members  from  the   standpoint  of  class.    Feminist  solidarity  in  the  feminist  movement  does  not  isolate   itself  from  other  social  movements  because  woman  is  a  category  concerning  racial,   sexual  orientation,  religious,  and  class  differences.    That  is,  feminist  solidarity  is   aligned  with  other  kinds  of  solidarity.    We  do  not  need  to  reach  the  commonality   among  women  to  attain  women’s  solidarity.    There  is  no  need  for  commonality  at   any  level  to  have  solidarity  because  in  the  space  of  interference,  commonality  and   differences  do  not  have  much  value  and  significance.   From  the  aspect  of  cultural  differences,  transcultural  feminist  solidarity  is  an   account  for  creating  a  self-­‐consciously  constructed  space  of  transcultural   interference  where  women’s  resistance  to  male  domination  is  established  by   consciously  forming  a  coalition  in  the  name  of  women.    Solidarity  connects  U.S.   women  of  color  feminism  with  Third  World  transnational  feminism.    In  fact,  the   divide  between  these  two  feminisms  is  one  of  motives  for  transcultural  feminist   solidarity.    The  normative  ideal  of  feminist  solidarity  should  provide  the  flexibility   that  enables  individuals  to  loosen  themselves  from  certain  cultural  backgrounds  and   sample  other  cultures  without  pretending  to  be  deeply  enmeshed  with  any   particular  cultural  background.    Transculturalism  could  provide  such  flexibility   because  a  preliminary  summary  of  transcultural  feminism  is  that  it  represents  a   serious  attempt  to  overcome  shortcomings  of  various  feminist  approaches  to   solidarity  such  as  “global  sisterhood,”  political  coalition,  and  global  feminism.     Transcultural  feminist  theorizations  center  around  differences  between  women  of     228   different  cultures  and  largely  appropriate  contemporary  analysis  of  transnational   capitalism  to  formulate  theories  and  practices,  and  to  understand  themselves  as   generated  by  a  novel  transnational  condition.   We  can  see  that  the  concept  of  transcultural  feminist  solidarity  is  already   present  in  the  feminist  discussion  of  solidarity  when  we  look  at  Chowdhury’s  and   Mohanty’s  accounts  of  feminist  solidarity.    Chowdhury  points  out  the  limitation  of   feminist  understanding  of  Other  cultures,  which  is  a  similar  argument  to  the   problematic  notion  of  culture  in  my  discussion  of  feminist  multiculturalism.    She   also  points  out  the  limitation  of  the  theory  of  intersectionality  when  it  comes  to   transnational  issues.    For  instance,  there  is  a  stark  distinction  between  a  discussion   of  the  complexity  of  “our  issues”  such  as  the  intersection  of  race  and  gender  and  a   simplified  “their  issues”  such  as  the  lack  of  human  rights.    This  shows  that  some   approaches  of  “difference  critique”  in  feminist  multiculturalism  are  unable  to   capture  the  complexity  of  transnational  issues.    Feminists  such  as  Chowdhury  and   Mohanty  demonstrate  that  feminists  can  develop  a  women’s  collaboration  that  is   grounded  in  differences,  rather  than  working  towards  solidarity  that  is  founded  on   sameness.    The  plausibility  of  Chowdhury’s  and  Mohanty’s  accounts  of  women’s   solidarity  is  partly  due  to,  I  argue,  their  employment  of  something  like  what  I  am   calling  the  transcultural  approach.    For  instance,  although  Mohanty’s  concept  of   solidarity  is  articulated  within  the  context  of  multiculturalism,  it  nevertheless  has   elements  of  transcultural  feminist  solidarity.    Mohanty  rightly  points  out  that   capitalism  and  globalization  are  the  sources  of  some  Third  World  women’s   oppression.    For  example,  some  Third  World  women  go  abroad  as  domestic     229   laborers.    From  the  perspective  of  globalization,  this  kind  of  immigrant  work  is  a   free  exchange  of  labor;  but  from  the  perspective  of  antigloblization,  the  nature  of   exploitation  is  also  displayed  in  laborers’  struggles.    This  understanding  of  solidarity   fits  the  agenda  of  the  transcultural  approach.    In  fact,  Mohanty  addresses  women’s   solidarity  by  employing  a  transcultural  approach,  although  she  has  not  explicitly   expressed  it  or  distinguished  it  from  multiculturalism.   However,  according  to  Chowdhury’s  and  Mohanty’s  discussions,  it  seems  that   solidarity  between  the  U.S.  women  of  color  anti-­‐racist  and  Third  World   transnational  feminism  is  possible  only  if  the  target  of  their  resistance  is  White   feminism  and  Western  feminism.    I  argue  that  we  should  resist  this  kind  of   dichotomy  between  White  Western  women  and  women  of  color  or  Third  World   women.    After  all,  there  is  no  such  a  stark  distinction  between  White  Western   women,  women  of  color,  and  Third  World  women  when  it  comes  to  gender   oppression.    With  a  transcultural  consciousness  and  the  principle  of  interference,   women  can  interact  with  other  women  in  a  larger  scale  across   culture/ethnicity/class  lines.    Emergent  feminist  transcultural  solidarity  involves  a   practice  or  learning  that  is  specific  to  a  transcultural  commitment  to  interference.     Employing  the  conception  of  interference  breaks  the  momentum  of  simply  focusing   on  differences.    Transcultural  experiences  help  women  to  understand  the   importance  of  interference  and  to  think  about  the  basis  for  women  acting   collectively.       230   5.  Applying  the  Notion  of  Transcultural  Feminist  Solidarity  in  the  Formulation   of  Solidarity  between  Chinese  Women  and  U.S.  Women   Previously,  I  argued  that  Mohanty’s  account  of  transnational  feminist  solidarity  and   Chowdhury’s  proposal  of  braiding  U.S.  women  of  color  feminism  with  Third  World   transnational  feminism  foreshadow  a  form  of  transcultural  consciousness.    To   further  elaborate  on  this  issue,  I  will  explore  the  relationship  between  Chinese   women  and  U.S.  women  as  a  way  to  test  out  whether  transcultural  feminist   solidarity  is  helpful  for  forging  mutual  understanding  and  to  examine  implications   of  the  previous  discussions  of  feminist  solidarity  in  Chinese  women’s  situations.    I   look  at  the  relationship  between  Chinese  and  U.S.  women  because  the  two  countries   are  increasingly  involved  with  each  other.    I  will  argue  that  the  transcultural   approach  can  help  feminists:  (1)  Recognize  the  need  to  enhance  communication   among  women  in  China  and  in  the  United  States;  (2)  understand  the  uniqueness  and   complexity  of  Chinese  women’s  situations;  and  (3)  examine  the  hidden  exploitation   of  Chinese  women  in  the  context  of  globalization.       First  of  all,  the  transcultural  approach  illuminates  a  lack  of  communication   between  Chinese  women  and  U.S.  women  that  multiculturalism  fails  to  reveal.    In   the  U.S.  academia,  some  feminists  are  challenged  by  Third  World  women,  which  has   resulted  in  segregated  feminisms  such  as  Third  World  women  feminism  and  various   area  studies  of  women.    The  feminist  “difference  critique”  in  the  United  States   occurred  concurrently  with  the  Chinese  policy  of  opening  its  door  to  the  world.    Yet,   there  is  a  lack  of  discussions  of  Chinese  women’s  experiences  in  (Western)  feminist   literature.    This  is  not  only  due  to  the  fact  that  Western  feminism  “ignores”  the     231   situations  of  Chinese  women,  but  also  due  to  the  fact  that  Chinese  women  do  not   take  the  initiative  to  participate  in  dialogues  with  U.S.  women.    The  model  of   multiculturalism  does  not  contribute  to  the  consciousness-­‐raising  in  China  because   feminism  is  regarded  by  Chinese  women  as  a  Western  concept  that  has  little  to  do   with  their  Chinese  situations.    Examining  how  Western  feminist  theories  of   oppression,  identity,  and  solidarity  apply  to  Chinese  women  is  an  underexplored   area  of  feminist  scholarship.    It  is  worth  exploring  why  Chinese  women  are  seldom   mentioned  in  the  multicultural  feminist  rhetoric  or  are  only  placed  in  stereotypical   positions  when  they  are  discussed,  and  why  the  study  of  Chinese  women  is   neglected  academically,  and  how  the  transcultural  approach  would  improve  this   situation.    For  instance,  it  is  disturbing  to  see  the  Western  feminist  literature  uses   foot  binding—a  phenomenon  that  becomes  more  and  more  distant  to  contemporary   Chinese  women—as  a  symbol  of  Chinese  women’s  oppression.    The  neglected  and   outdated  stereotype  of  Chinese  women  in  the  (Western)  feminist  literature  (1)   presents  a  distinctive  challenge  to  a  Western  paradigm  case  (“free  us”  versus   “oppressed  them”);  (2)  shows  us  that  the  complexity  and  changes  of  Chinese   cultures  (and  women)  are  unexamined  by  feminist  multiculturalism,  which  in  turn   provides  evidence  of  limitations  of  multicultural  approaches;  and  (3)  demonstrates   the  promise  of  the  transcultural  approach,  which  not  only  addresses  why  there  is  a   lack  of  Chinese  women’s  voice  in  the  feminist  scholarship,  but  also  offers  an   approach  to  forge  women’s  solidarity  globally.     Secondly,  the  transcultural  approach  can  help  us  explore  the  uniqueness  and   complexity  of  Chinese  women’s  situations.    Chinese  women  have  their  own     232   understandings  of  issues  that  concern  both  them  and  Western  feminists;  for   example,  in  the  context  of  poverty  elimination,  Chinese  women  view  reproductive   rights  differently  from  U.S.  feminists.    It  is  broadly  accepted  in  the  United  States  that   women’s  reproductive  rights  are  women’s  right  and  thus  human  rights,  so  the   Chinese  state  regulation  on  women’s  reproductive  right  is  viewed  as  oppressive  and   inhuman.    However,  the  assumption  that  there  is  a  positive  correlation  between   economic  growth,  the  population  control,  and  the  advance  of  women  is  generally   accepted  without  critical  examination  in  China.    An  immediate  but  complicated  case   is  the  Chinese  government’s  one-­‐child  policy,  which  Western  feminists  criticize  as   detrimental  to  women,  but  the  policy  has  broad  support  in  China,  especially  among   urban  Chinese  women.    To  understand  Chinese  women’s  “insensibility”  to,   acceptance  of,  and  support  of  policies  that  are  claimed  to  be  anti-­‐human  rights,  we   need  to  locate  these  issues  within  the  historical  and  contemporary  context  of  China   rather  than  speculating  and  scrutinizing  them  from  a  universalist  (and  Western)   point  of  view.    The  issue  of  reproductive  rights  does  not  seem  to  be  the  most   pressing  issue  from  the  perspective  of  ordinary  Chinese  people.    Although  the  issue   of  reproductive  rights  is  a  legitimate  human  rights  issue,  focusing  on  it  ignores  the   most  immediate  issues  to  Chinese  women.    There  are  other  issues  of  concern  to   Chinese  women  that  are  ignored  in  the  rhetoric  of  women’s  human  rights.    To  most   Chinese,  government  corruption,  social  and  economic  disparity,  poverty,   unemployment,  housing,  medical  care,  education,  inner  migration,  etc.  are  more   pressing  than  other  social  issues.    Women  in  post-­‐1949  China  believe  that  the   degree  of  their  liberation  is  rather  high,  certainly  in  comparison  to  the  previous     233   generations  and  probably  also  higher  than  women  in  most  other  contemporary   countries.    There  is  a  huge  contrast  in  life  quality  in  terms  of  materials  and   education  within  the  three  decades  since  the  one-­‐child  policy  took  effect,  though  one   may  argue  that  this  concurred  with  the  rapid  growth  of  Chinese  economy  and  it   came  with  a  very  high  price.    But  to  the  Chinese,  the  achievements  are  visible  and   immediate,  so  the  price  is  often  overlooked.21    Maybe  having  a  better  quality  of  life   is  one  of  the  reasons  that  Chinese  women  support  the  one-­‐child  policy.    One  may   argue  that  educated  Chinese  women  are  “brainwashed”  by  the  government   reproduction  propaganda  while  less  educated  Chinese  women  remain  intact  (since   the  one-­‐child  policy  encounters  more  obstacles  in  rural  areas  than  in  urban  areas),   but  it  is  questionable  whether  choosing  between  endorsing  an  unrestricted   reproductive  choice  and  promoting  a  higher  life  quality  is  a  hard  choice  for  most   Chinese  women.       Lastly,  the  transcultural  approach  can  help  feminists  understand  and  address   the  exploitation  of  Chinese  women  in  the  global  market.    Similar  to  women  in  other   developing  Third  World  countries,  Chinese  women  face  the  dilemma  of  economic   development  versus  capitalist  exploitation.    China  has  been  going  through  new  class   stratification  under  the  influence  of  capitalization  and  globalization.    More  and  more   urban  professional  Chinese  women  hire  women  who  migrate  from  rural  areas  as   caregivers.    More  Chinese  women  work  in  industries  that  are  part  of  the  global   economy,  either  within  or  outside  China.    Domestically,  one  sees  female  inner   migrants  provide  service  and  domestic  labor  to  urban  people  as  nannies,  cleaning   ladies,  senior  caregivers,  street  food  vendors,  massagers,  etc.    Internationally,  one     234   sees  Chinese  women  work  in  nail  salons,  small  restaurants,  shopping  mall  massage   kiosks,  someone’s  house,  etc.    There  are  also  Chinese  women  who  work  in   manufacturing  plants,  make  clothes,  clean  and  package  food,  most  of  which  is   exported  overseas.    For  instance,  cities  and  towns  on  the  East  coast  of  China  prosper   on  exporting  packaged  seafood  and  fresh  produce  to  other  countries,  which  relies   on  female  laborers  who  work  10  hours  a  shift.    The  wall  between  being  employed  in   the  assembly  line  filleting  fish  and  sitting  at  the  dinner  table  eating  the  fish  someone   else  fillets,  for  the  majority  of  Chinese,  is  education,  which  they  believe  is  the  most   effective  way  to  shake  off  poverty  and  improve  social  status.    There  is  a  strong  belief   in  China  that  education  is  the  most  effective  means  for  a  country  and  its  people  to   resist  exploitation.    With  limited  education  resources  and  a  large  population,   population  control  together  with  the  dramatic  expansion  of  higher  education  is  an   effective  strategy  to  guarantee  that  more  Chinese  receive  higher  education.    It  is  not   surprising  that  an  increasing  number  of  Chinese  students  and  young  professionals   study  and  work  in  the  United  States.    A  recent  article  in  The  Chronicle  of  Higher   Education  reports  that  47%  of  all  foreign  applications  for  fall-­‐2012  graduate  spots   are  from  China.22    Hopefully,  the  younger  generation  would  be  able  to  better  solve   the  dilemma  of  population  control  and  development  and  simultaneously  build  a   cultural  bridge  between  China  and  the  United  States.    In  this  sense,  transcultural   experiences  can  greatly  change  the  demography  and  understanding  of  cultures  and   the  interaction  between  the  U.S.  and  Chinese  cultures  would  demonstrate  that   cultural  boundaries  are  porous  and  that  individual  cultures  are  dynamic.         235   6.  Obstacles  to  Transcultural  Feminist  Solidarity     In  this  section,  I  will  address  obstacles  to  transcultural  feminist  solidarity  and   propose  some  intermediate  ways  toward  transcultural  feminist  solidarity.    By   pointing  out  obstacles  and  limitations  to  solidarity,  I  show  that  new  solidarity  can   emerge  from  the  idea  of  transculture  and  that  the  transcultural  approach  fosters  a   high  potential  for  solidarity.   Transcultural  feminist  solidarity  may  encounter  obstacles.    For  instance,  the   individual  lives  of  women,  such  as  family  ties,  individual  interests,  and  religious   commitments,  are  so  different  that  it  is  difficult  for  women  to  act  together.     Discussions  of  differences  and  other  factors  lead  to  the  divide  of  U.S.  women  of  color   feminism  and  Third  World  feminism.    It  is  even  more  challenging  for  women  across   class,  racial,  ethnic,  and  national  lines  to  forge  solidarity.    In  particular,  the  class   difference  remains  a  potential  obstacle  to  achieving  transcultural  solidarity.    The   class  issue  is  not  a  conceptual  issue;  rather,  it  is  a  practical  issue.    The  class  issue   raises  the  need  for  adequate  understanding  of  social  conditions  that  block  solidarity.     However,  it  is  exactly  these  obstacles  that  make  it  important  for  women  to  forge   solidarity  to  resist  male  oppression,  because  women  need  mutual  understanding,   common  activities,  and  political  initiatives  to  transform  the  patriarchal  framework.     So,  transculturalism  must  be  combined  with  social  movements,  i.e.,  the  combination   of  theoretical  transculturalism  and  activist  work  to  lead  to  solidarity.    There  are  also   limitations  that  can  be  speculated  about  transcultural  feminist  solidarity.    One   limitation  has  to  do  with  the  power  of  terms  such  as  transculturalism,  which  can  be   suspected  to  lose  its  power  in  politics.    For  instance,  it  remains  questionable  how  it     236   would  be  received  by  people  or  communities  who  are  more  concerned  with  race  or   class  issues.    What  needs  to  be  acknowledged  is  that  as  a  valuable  term,   transculturalism  works  better  in  some  contexts  but  not  in  others.    I  use  terms  such   as  transculturalism  mainly  in  a  context  of  transnational  interactions  and   globalization  and  I  fully  acknowledge  that  it  might  lose  its  power  in  certain  power   relations.    The  reason  that  I  promote  this  term  is  that  it  is  appropriate  to  use  for   describing  and  analyzing  transcultural  experiences  that  more  and  more  people  are   experiencing.   In  addition,  the  stability  of  solidarity  fostered  by  the  conception  of   transculture  requires  support  from  the  society,  so  the  society  has  to  be  transformed   in  reference  with  the  transcultural  approach  as  well.    People  who  benefit  from  the   patriarchy  are  unlikely  to  share  the  same  goal  with  feminists,  thus  transcultural   feminist  solidarity  still  faces  severe  challenges.    Because  of  the  mobility  brought  by   immigration,  connections  among  women  across  national  borders  are  strengthened,   but  they  also  confront  new  barriers.    For  instance,  in  the  case  of  international   immigration,  it  is  more  likely  for  new  female  immigrants  to  seek  alliance  with  ethnic   groups  than  with  native  women,  because  there  are  cultural  and  language  barriers  to   the  communication  between  immigrant  women  and  local  women.    In  this  case,   feminism  aims  to  transform  oppressive  social  structures  of  gender  inequalities.    The   transformation  process  is  more  like  an  evolution,  which  requires  feminists  to  seek   alliance  with  feminist  men.    If  women  want  to  establish  an  international  female   solidarity,  then  they  need  to  formulate  collective  power  to  transform  the  current   patriarchal  framework.    In  this  sense,  political  solidarity  may  not  be  the  only  point     237   of  reference.    For  instance,  we  should  place  a  political  notion  of  solidarity  in  the   context  of  other  concepts  of  solidarity  that  are  relevant  to  challenging  gender   oppression.    We  can  consider  other  kinds  of  group  bonds  that  involve  a  kind  of   social  mutuality  and  cooperation  that  defies  the  individualist  model.    It  is  plausible   to  think  of  a  notion  of  “intermediate  solidarity”  as  a  transitional  stage  in  between   women’s  personal  friendship  and  international  women’s  solidarity.    For  instance,   unions  such  as  clubs,  communities,  cultural  organizations,  neighborhood   associations,  and  support  groups  are  all  necessary  to  forge  certain  scales  of   women’s  solidarity  locally.    However,  these  groups  should  be  formulated  under  the   guidance  of  female  political  solidarity  to  a  national  level.    Eventually,  women  need   another  movement  like  the  consciousness-­‐raising  movement  to  forge  solidarity   across  borders  while  emphasizing  the  importance  of  cultural,  racial,  and  class   differences.       Conclusion     In  this  chapter,  I  have  argued  that  the  concept  of  solidarity  is  crucial  for  the  feminist   movement  from  two  aspects:  (1)  Solidarity  reminds  us  that  the  feminist  movement   is  a  collective  movement  and  participants  should  be  empowered  collectively,  which   has  to  do  with  the  necessity  of  a  women’s  group  identity;  and  (2)  solidarity  is   particularly  necessary  when  the  feminist  discourse  focuses  on  differences  among   women  to  such  an  extent  that  there  is  a  divide  in  feminism.         I  have  made  my  argument  from  the  first  aspect  by  criticizing  Allen’s  concept   of  solidarity  since  she  is  not  fully  committed  to  women’s  group  identity.    Women  are     238   not  oppressed  as  individuals,  but  rather  as  members  of  the  social  group  women;  and   men  benefit  from  the  group-­‐based  male  supremacy.    Women’s  oppression  cannot  be   reduced  to  economic  inequalities,  class  exploitations,  racial  discriminations,  cultural   imperialism,  or  other  social  injustices  because  these  social  forces  are   interdependent  and  intertwined,  thus  resulting  in  the  complexity  of  gender   oppression.    Only  by  acting  collectively  and  by  forging  transcultural  solidarity  will   women  solve  these  structural  and  systemic  problems.    I  have  made  my  argument   from  the  second  aspect  by  criticizing  Bunch’s  notion  of  global  feminism.    The  divide   of  feminism  is  partly  due  to  the  pervasiveness  of  multiculturalism  in  feminism.     According  to  multiculturalism,  culture  is  a  self-­‐enclosed  and  self-­‐sufficient  entity,   thus  there  are  differences  between  “our  culture”  and  “their  cultures”  and  we   (Western  feminists)  should  “help  them.”    This  salvation  attitude  lacks  meaningful   engagement  and  does  not  foster  solidarity  because  of  its  superficial   acknowledgment  of  differences  without  addressing  the  interaction  of  differences.       The  feminist  approaches  to  solidarity  has  its  advantages  as  well  as   shortcomings,  which  shows  that  we  need  an  alternative  concept  of  solidarity  to   guide  the  feminist  movement  to  realize  the  goal  of  eliminating  women’s   subordination.    It  seems  that  Allen,  Bunch,  Chowdhury,  and  Mohanty  all  agree  that   feminists  should  bridge  the  divide  in  feminism,  no  matter  what  their  opinions  about   identity  politics  and  cultural  differences  are.    So  we  need  a  specific  account  of   women’s  political  solidarity  across  cultures  to  address  concerns  that  feminists  have   about  differences  among  women.    The  alternative  perspective,  which  I  name   transcultural  feminist  solidarity,  endorses  women’s  group  identity  and  addresses     239   structural  inequality,  global  injustice,  and  cultural  differences.    Practices  or   initiatives  that  draw  from  the  transcultural  approach  (or  at  least  act  in  a  way  that  is   consistent  with  such  an  approach)  can  foster  solidarity.    By  showing  challenges  to   transcultural  feminist  solidarity,  I  argued  that  the  transcultural  approach  intends  to   promote  the  interaction  of  feminism,  even  of  those  women  who  are  from  different   cultural  backgrounds  and  class  locations.    These  interactions,  such  as  genuine   dialogues  between  Chinese  and  American  feminists,  would  benefit  from  following   the  transcultural  approach  and  as  a  result  they  would  contribute  to  women’s   solidarity  in  general.      This  chapter  managed  to  bring  the  discussions  in  the  previous  chapters  into   a  normative  discussion  of  feminist  transcultural  solidarity.    I  demonstrated  that  the   conclusions  from  previous  chapters,  such  as  a  category  of  women  with  the   variability  and  the  dynamics  of  women,  a  concept  of  culture  with  the  variability  and   the  dynamics  of  cultures,  and  a  transcultural  approach  that  is  promising  to   overcome  the  flaws  of  multiculturalism,  contribute  to  the  conclusion  that  I  made  in   this  chapter.    That  is,  while  we  acknowledge  differences  among  women  and  among   cultures,  we  should  learn  to  understand  differences,  confront  conflicts,  and   intentionally  build  bridges  to  decrease  the  divide  in  feminism.    This  dissertation  is  a   small  step  toward  the  bridge  building  from  an  individual  who  benefits  from   transcultural  experiences,  through  which,  one  does  not  only  understand  others   better  but  also  understands  oneself  better.           240                                             BIBLIOGRAPHY         241       BIBLIOGRAPHY     Allen,  Amy.1999a.  Solidarity  after  identity  politics:  Hannah  Arendt  and  the  power  of   feminist  theory.  Philosophy  &  social  criticism  25  (1):  97-­‐118.   _______.  1999b.  The  power  of 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 culture,  edited  by  Victoria  Bonnell  and   Lynn  Hunt,  35-­‐61.  Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press.       Weldon,  S.  Laurel.  2006.  The  structure  of  intersectionality:  A  comparative  politics  of   gender.  Politics  and  gender  2(2):  235-­‐48.         245     Yural-­‐Davis,  Nira.  2006.  Intersectionality  and  feminist  politics.    European  Journal  of   Women’s  Studies  13(3):  193-­‐209.                                                                                                                     1  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  “problem  of  difference”  was  not  a  phenomenon  that   was  new  in  the  1980s.    As  a  matter  of  fact,  differences  among  women,  such  as  class,   race  and  sexuality,  were  already  salient  concerns  for  feminist  solidarity  in  women’s   movements  in  the  late  1960s  and  the  1970s.    For  instance,  Marilyn  Frye  mentions   that  the  National  Organization  for  Women  in  the  1970s  raised  issues  such  as  race   and  sexuality  (see  Frye  1996,  1006  n17).    However,  feminism  in  the  1960s  and   1970s  was  more  concerned  with  women’s  common  interests  while  the  feminist   theory  has  turned  its  focus  on  women’s  differences  since  the  1980s.   2  Spelman  does  not  use  the  term  “particularity  argument”  herself,  but  her  argument   about  “inessential  woman”  is  arguing  for  the  particularity  of  women.    I  use  the  term   “particularity  argument”  to  refer  to  this  emphasis  of  hers.     3  Contemporary  feminist  uses  of  intersectionality  became  popular  in  the  early   1980s  when  U.S.  academic  feminism  underwent  a  dramatic  paradigm  shift.    At  the   time,  groundbreaking  books  challenged  the  essentialist  underpinnings  of  White   academic  feminism  and  its  accompanying  account  of  gender.    These  books  include   Angela  Davis’s  Women,  race  and  class  (1983),  bell  hooks,  Ain’t  I  a  woman?  Black   women  and  feminism  (1981),  Cherríe  Moraga  and  Gloria  Anzaldúa’s  The  bridge   called  my  Back:  Radical  writings  by  women  of  color  (2002  [1981]),  Gloria  Hull,   Patricia  Scott  and  Barbara  Smith’s  But  some  of  us  are  brave  (1993  [1983]),  Audre   Lorde’s  Sister  outsider  (2007[1984]),  Elizabeth  V.  Spelman’s  Inessential  women:   Problem  of  exclusion  in  feminist  thought  (1988),  and  Patricia  Hill  Collins’s  Black   feminist  thought:  Knowledge,  consciousness,  and  the  politics  of  empowerment  (2008   [1990]).    Using  this  basic  insight,  feminist  critical  race  theorists  coined  the  term   “intersectionality”  to  name  approaches  to  discrimination  that  treated  oppressions  as   multiplicative  rather  than  additive.    Amongst  the  discourses  on  intersectionality,   Crenshaw’s  crossroads  and  traffic  metaphor  is  a  popular  tool.   4  Crenshaw  states,  “Intersectionality  is  what  occurs  when  a  woman  from  a  minority   group…tries  to  navigate  the  main  crossing  in  the  city….The  main  highway  is  ‘racism   road.’    One  cross  street  can  be  Colonialism,  then  Patriarchy  Street….She  has  to  deal   not  only  with  one  form  of  oppression  but  with  all  forms,  those  named  as  road  signs,   which  link  together  to  make  a  double,  a  triple,  multiple,  a  many  layered  blanket  of   oppression.”    See  Crenshaw,  2001,  “The  intersection  of  gender  and  race   discrimination,”  paper  presented  at  the  World  Conference  Against.    The  paper  is   cited  in  Yuval-­‐Davis  2006,196.   5  Brown  states  that  postmodernity  to  her  signifies  “a  pervasive  condition  and   experience  of  ‘being  after’”  (31).    For  instance,  it  means  after  Platonic  forms,   Hegelian  totality,  and  Kantian  reason  and  will,  etc.   6  For  more  discussions  about  the  theory  of  intersectionality,  see  the  section  about   Crenshaw  in  Part  One.     246                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             7  William  Sewell  (1999,  52-­‐55),  Bennett  (2005,  68),  and  Song  (2007)  discuss  this   transformed  sense  of  culture.     8  See  Kymlicka  1995,  103,  218  n29  for  his  discussions  of  a  shared  language.       9  Kymlicka  argues  that  group-­‐differentiated  rights  should  be  granted  for  ethnic   groups  and  national  minorities  can  be  justified  via  three  arguments:  (1)  equality-­‐ based  arguments,  which  claim  that  disadvantages  that  the  minority  face  can  be   corrected  by  group-­‐differentiated  rights;(2)  history-­‐based  arguments,  which  claim   that  the  minority  should  be  granted  group-­‐differentiated  rights  because  of  historical   reasons;  and  (3)  arguments  that  cultural  diversity  has  intrinsic  values.    (See  1995,   Chapter  6)   10  Neither  Kymlicka  nor  Okin  defines  multiculturalism  in  terms  of  disadvantaged   groups  such  as  women,  people  of  races  other  than  Caucasian,  gays  and  lesbians,   formerly  colonized  people,  and  indigenous  people  (see  Kymlicka  1995,  198  n10  and   Okin  1989,  661).     11  Okin  published  two  overlapping  articles  on  multiculturalism  and  feminism  in  the   late  1990s.    One  is  “Is  Multiculturalism  Bad  for  Feminism?”  (1999),  and  the  other  is   “Feminism  and  Multiculturalism:  Some  Tensions”  (1998).    In  the  article   “Multiculturalism  and  Feminism:  No  Simple  Question,  No  Simple  Answers”  (2005),   Okin  states  that  the  “Some  Tensions”(1998)  article,  which  has  a  more  neutral  title,   contains  a  longer  and  more  philosophical  version  of  the  same  argument  she  makes   in  the  1999  article.    She  argues  that  readers  misinterpret  her  when  they  consider   her  holding  an  affirmative  answer  to  the  question  “Is  multiculturalism  bad  for   feminism?”  or  consider  her  suggesting  societies  have  to  choose  between  feminism   and  multiculturalism.  (See  2005,  71-­‐2)  To  do  justice  to  Okin’s  argument,  I  mainly   discuss  and  cite  her  “Some  Tension”  (1998)  piece  in  this  part.     12  To  avoid  the  feminism/multiculturalism  dilemma,  Kymlicka  distinguishes  two   kinds  of  “group  rights”:  One  is  “internal  restrictions”  and  the  other  is  “external   protection”  (1989).    “Internal  restrictions”  claim  rights  to  restrict  the  choice  of  its   own  members  in  the  name  of  preserving  the  culture,  while  “external  protections”   claim  rights  against  the  power  of  the  larger  society.    From  a  liberal  standpoint,   “internal  restrictions”  are  impermissible  because  they  create  or  exacerbate   inequality  and  injustice  within  the  group,  while  “external  protections”  are   acceptable  because  they  help  promote  justice  and  autonomy  of  individuals.     Kymlicka  argues  that  both  feminism  and  multiculturalism  challenge  the  inadequacy   of  the  traditional  liberal  concept  of  individual  rights.    That  is,  feminism  and   multiculturalism  have  a  common  interest  in  fighting  the  liberal  complacencies:  (1)   Both  pay  attention  to  the  structure  of  societal  institutions,  including  the  workplace   and  family;  (2)  both  provide  the  same  explanation  for  why  traditional  liberal   theories  are  not  satisfactory—the  distinctive  needs  and  interests  of  women  and   ethnocultural  minorities  are  never  addressed  in  the  traditional  liberal  theory;  and   (3)  both  look  to  similar  remedies  for  the  inadequacy  of  the  traditional  liberal   theory—rights  for  women  that  are  not  available  to  men  are  required  to  replace  the     247                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             traditional  identical  treatment  of  the  liberal  theory  that  fails  to  recognize  the   interests  of  women  and  cultural  minorities.   13  Kymlicka  states  the  different  senses  of  multiculturalism:  “These  various  senses  of   culture  are  reflected  in  the  different  meaning  attached  to  the  term  ‘multiculturalism’   in  different  countries.    In  Canada,  it  typically  refers  to  the  right  of  immigrants  to   express  their  ethnic  identity  without  fear  of  prejudice  or  discrimination;  in  Europe,   it  often  refers  to  the  sharing  of  powers  between  national  communities;  in  the  USA,  it   is  often  used  to  include  the  demands  of  marginalized  social  groups.”  (1995,  198  n9)   14  Epstein  does  not  capitalize  “black”  or  “white”  when  he  refers  to  races.     15  Kristen  MaCabe.  “Chinese  Immigrants  in  the  United  States,”  accessed  January  2,   2012.  http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?ID=876       16  Although  Lugones  was  aware  that  “interwoven  or  intermeshed  or  enmeshed  may   provide  better  images,”  she  was  not  “ready  to  give  up  the  term  [interlocking]   because  it  is  used  by  other  women  of  color  theorists  who  write  in  a  liberatory  vein   about  enmeshed  oppression.  …At  the  time  of  this  writing,  I  had  not  drawn  the   distinction  between  intermeshed  oppressions  and  the  interlocking  of  oppressions”   (Lugones  2003,  146  n1,  emphasis  in  original).   17  “I  am  making  mayonnaise.    I  place  the  yolk  in  a  bowl,  add  a  few  drops  of  water,   stir,  and  the  add  oil  drop  by  drop,  very  slowly,  as  I  continue  stirring.    If  I  add  too   much  oil  at  once,  the  mixture  separates.    …In  English,  one  might  say  that  the   mayonnaise  curdled.    Mayonnaise  is  an  oil-­‐in-­‐water  emulsion.    As  all  emulsions,  it  is   unstable.    When  an  emulsion  curdles,  the  ingredients  become  separate  from  each   other.    But  that  is  not  altogether  an  accurate  description:  rather,  they  coalesce   toward  oil  or  toward  water,  most  of  the  water  becomes  separate  from  most  of  the   oil—it  is  instead,  a  matter  of  different  degrees  of  coalescence.    The  same  with   mayonnaise;  when  it  separates,  you  are  left  with  yolky  oil  and  oily  yolk.”  (Lugones   2003,  122)   18  For  instance,  Sandra  Bartky  (2002)  emphasizes  the  function  of  sympathy  in   forging  women’s  solidarity  from  the  perspective  of  phenomenology.    According  to   her,  genuine  collective  fellow-­‐feeling  is  crucial  for  the  development  of  feminist   political  solidarity  because  fellow-­‐feeling  experience  can  promote  the  kind  of   solidarity  that  encourages  attentiveness  to  difference.    However,  an  endorsement  of   political  fellow-­‐feeling  to  form  a  common  goal  is  different  from  deconstructing   gender  in  the  feminist  discourse.    In  other  words,  solidarity  is  a  political  practice   rather  than  a  strategic  practice  of  fellow-­‐feeling.     19  Bill  Powell.  “Meeting  Kim  Jong  Un.”  TIME.    February  27,  2012,  p.  34.   20  Although  Mohanty  criticizes  both  “essentialist”  identity  politics  and   postmodernist  skepticism  about  identity,  she  is  ambiguous  about  women’s  identity:   On  the  one  hand,  she  disassociates  herself  from  postmodernism  and  claims  that  the   hegemonic  postmodernist  discourse  “emphasizes  only  the  mutability  and   constructedness  of  identities  and  social  structures”  (2003,  225);  on  the  other  hand,     248                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             she  draws  on  Jodi  Dean’s  notion  of  “reflective  solidarity,”  which  is  crafted  on  the   basis  of  an  interactive,  communicative,  and  in-­‐process  understanding  of  the  “we.”     21  Looking  at  some  of  the  data  would  help  us  understand  better  why  Chinese   women  in  general  support  this  “inhuman”  one-­‐child  policy.    The  population  of  China   was  563  million  in  1950,  after  which  China  went  through  a  baby  boom,  when  the   majority  of  Chinese  went  through  poverty.    With  a  similarly  sized  land,  the  United   States  had  a  population  of  311  million  while  China’s  population  was  estimated  to  be   1.3  billion  in  2011.    In  2010  China’s  GDP  per  capita—a  proxy  for  standards  of   living—was  16%  of  the  United  States  (up  from  just  2%  in  1980  and  7%  in  2000).    In   1980,  a  year  after  one-­‐child  policy  took  effect,  China’s  GDP  per  capita  was  $193,   while  U.S.’s  was  $12,186.    In  2010,  thirty  years  after  the  one-­‐child  policy  took  effect,   China’s  GDP  per  capita  was  $4,428,  while  U.S.’s  was  $47,199.    World  Bank  website.   Accessed  April  5,  2012.  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.    In   terms  of  education,  in  1979,  Chinese  college  admission  rate  was  6.1%  (280,000   freshmen  out  of  4,680,000  national  college  entrance  exam  takers)  while  in  2011  it   was  72%  (6,750,000  out  of  9,330,000).    In  2000,  twenty  years  after  the  one-­‐child   policy  took  effect,  the  college  admission  rate  was  59%  (3,200,000  out  of  3,750,000).     The  data  shows  that  in  China,  it  is  common  knowledge  that  the  life  quality,  which  is   indicated  by  the  income  and  the  educational  level,  is  closely  related  to  population.     Zhongguo  Boke  Wang  (Chinese  Blog  Site).    Accessed  April  4,  2012.   http://www.cnblogs.com/tohen/archive/2011/06/07/2074518.html.   22  Fischer,  Karin.  “Chinese  students  account  for  about  half  of  all  international   applicants  to  U.S.  graduate  programs.”  The  Chronicle  of  Higher  Education,  April  3,   2012.    Accessed  April  4,  2012.    http://chronicle.com/article/Chinese-­‐Students-­‐ Account-­‐for/131416/.     249