MIDWEST SENTIMENT IN THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS OF 1931-32

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This is to certify that the

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MIDWEST SENTIMENT IN THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS OF 1931-32

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John N. Jozsa

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FORWARD

The United States owed much of the material progress and well being of its first hundred and twenty-five years to a traditional policy of isolation which allowed the country to grow in stature, wisdom and wealth. The coming of the twentieth century with its new facilities for communication and transportation plus the rapid industrialization with its need for raw materials and markets inextricably tied all nations together. The world, now at our doorstep, created a major problem in American foreign relations; the American people, long isolationist, were now faced from time to time with the problem of deciding what should be done when little wars begin in remote parts of the world. The American people tried hard to remain out of the conflict started at Sarajevo in 1914 but 1918 saw our forces fighting on European soil. The Manchurian Crisis of 1931 can be said to have been America's first point of decision since the defeat of the League of Nations in the early 1920's. Many people including, Henry L. Stimson, our Secretary of State at the time, believed that if the United States had acted differently in the early 30's toward Japan's aggressive action in Asia, Pearl Harbor and World War II could have been averted. These same people also claimed that the failure of the United States to act in restraining the Japanese was due to the strong isolationist sentiment present in the country.

The midwestern part of our nation, and particularly the Great Lakes region, has been labeled the "heart of isolationism," and I believed that research, on a critical international situation along the lines of public opinion, would not only show to what

degree isolationist sentiment was present in the Great Lakes area but also as to what influence it had on our foreign policy. The Great Lakes area is a decisive part of the Midwest because it represents the thickly populated section of the area and also has within it heterogeneous economic groups, such as industrial, dairying, agricultural, commercial, mining and oil.

I carried on my study in the area newspapers not only because of the scarcity of personal correspondence and documents and the availability of newspapers, but because they are the most useful barometer of public opinion in the period. The press, despite the growth of the radio, was still the major organ for the dissemination of news in 1931 and consequently an important agent in the formulation of public opinion. The man on the street relied on the newspapers for much of the information which he used to arrive at an opinion. Furthermore, newspapers do represent the views of some of the people in the area. The owner who makes the policy and the editor who writes it come into contact with business men, social groups, the farmer and the man on the street. The paper feels the pulse of the region and expresses the ideas of many through the pens of a few.

The newspapers are also important in a study of public opinion because they do influence many other writers, such as the people who write to the editor, well known personages who express themselves on the stand taken by the paper and editors of smaller and lesser known papers who obtain many of their ideas from the larger newspapers. I ran across many instances of the latter in my study where certain arguments and even identical phrases appeared in many small town newspapers after the original editorial had appeared in a much larger paper.

The administration in Washington likewise recognized the power of the press not only to reflect public opinion but also to mould it. The published works of Henry L. Stimson, and the State Papers of Herbert Hoover give evidence of this. The Manchurian Crisis contained quite a few instances where the administration in Washington was forced to revise or modify foreign policy because of danger signs from the press.

The following questions provided a guide for my research:

1. Was the press opinion of the Midwest such as to encourage vigorous action against Japan for her actions in Manchuria?

2. Were the makers of our foreign policy conscious of public opinion on the Manchurian Crisis and did it influence our foreign policy?

3. How did the response of the Great Lakes press compare with other sections of the United States?

My research was carried on at the Michigan State Library at Lansing; the Indiana State Library at Indianapolis; the University of Michigan Library at Ann Arbor; the Detroit Public Library; the Alma College Library at Alma, Michigan and the Michigan State College Library at East Lansing. The twenty or more newspapers used represent a rather adequate sampling of how the Great Lakes newspapers felt concerning the Crisis. My research showed that the area newspapers, except for minor exceptions, did respond actively and for the most part did maintain an isolationist stand during the Crisis, and also that public opinion did influence our foreign policy in the Manchurian Crisis. I did find a response in other parts of the country but it appears that the Great Lakes press took a more active interest because of their stand for isolation.

The response of the press was rather meager in the initial stages but it increased as Japan proceeded with her actions in Manchuria despite the censures of the League, the United States and world public opinion, and reached its heights during the Shanghai "incident". My thesis will trace this response and point out the arguments utilized for or against isolation.

John N. Jozsa

CHAPTER I

Background

> "Storm center of Far Eastern diplomacy, politics and finance...Manchuria has become to the watchers on the fire towers of the Far East what Constantinople was to Europe for half a century, and for much the same reason. It is a great opportunity, geographically placed, where three nations meet and such an oyster has seldom been opened without war." (1)
>
> New York Times Editorial

The time was 10:30 p.m., September 18, 1931. The place was a section of railroad track at the small village of Luitaiokou just outside Mukden, Manchuria. The action consisted of a muffled explosion that chewed up a few feet of track belonging to the South Manchurian Railway. The result was an undeclared war between Japan and China but what has been referred to by the western world as the Manchurian Crisis. It was a crisis in that the action taken by Japan as a result of the explosion eventually created a diplomatic crisis that had world wide implications and repercussions.

The civilized world would not have become unduly concerned over Japan's operations in Manchuria if Japan had confined herself to mere police action in the area, but the continued conduct of the Japanese military in Manchuria, their defiance of world opinion and the ultimate conquest of the region in violation of recent treaties shocked the peace-loving nations of the world.

Japanese military action in September of 1931, by which she aggressively occupied Manchuria, was apparently a military coup carried out without the sanction of the Government. The action was but the culmination of a set of historical events and circumstances which determined the one course open to the military group of Japan,

[1] New York Times, July 7, 1929, Part III, p. 6

that of taking over political, military and economic control of Manchuria. Thus, if Japan could take over Manchuria she could dispense with China's claim to sovereignty, solidify the Japanese position as a bulwark against possible Russian expansion and at the same time guarantee her power in Korea and furnish adequate protection to her interests in Manchuria.

Japan had varied reasons for considering that she had the right to act in the region. Her immediate interests in the area consisted of investments valued at more than a billion dollars. In addition to her economic investments, Japan also believed it was her duty to look out for the well being of Korean immigrants that she had encouraged to settle in the area after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894. The Japanese claimed legal rights obtained in 1895 as a result of the Sino-Jap war of 1894. These rights were short-lived as a European political consortium persuaded Japan to give up her gains in Manchuria. Japan eventually regained these concessions in the Treaty of Portsmouth after her war with Russia. The Japanese action in 1931 was also aimed at forestalling the Chinese Nationalists with their strong determination to end if possible foreign domination of portions of Chinese territory. The Chinese desired to end economic control as well as political control and had built railroad lines that would compete with the Japanese owned South Manchurian Railway, and in addition had begun the construction of a railway terminal and an improved deep water dock at Hulutao to compete with the Japanese ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. Though Japan had acted primarily because of Chinese influence in Manchuria, the threat of Russia was also a contributing factor in the course that

Japan followed in Manchuria. China had attempted unsuccessfully in 1929 to force Russia out of her position in the Chinese Eastern Railway. This presence of a powerful European nation so precariously close to her own interests in Asia was a great influencing factor on Japan's decisions following the railroad explosion at Mukden. Japan believed that she must act to forestall any move that the Russian "bear" might make in the future.

The military group, always a powerful factor in the government of Japan, had always advocated a strong, "positive" policy toward Manchuria while the opposing conservative group had always been content to carry on a moderate program. The military had been stirred up in 1931 by the Nakamura affair, in which a Captain Nakamura and three companions had disappeared in western Manchuria. The Japanese claimed that Nakamura and his companions had been arrested, shot and cremated by Chinese soldiers. The militarists in Japan seized upon this incident and clamored for reprisals and even inferred that the military would be forced to take things into its own hands if the government failed to take appropriate action. While the foreign office sought a diplomatic solution, the military sought a military settlement.

It is very obvious that the explosion of a section of track near Mukden was not the cause but only the event seized by the military of Japan in 1931 to conquer Manchuria and to bring about what has been labeled by the world as the "Manchurian Crisis".

CHAPTER II

Conciliation

> "The difficulties between China and Japan have given us great concern, not alone for the maintenance of the spirit of the Kellogg Briand Pact, but for the maintenance of the spirit of the treaties to which we are a party assuring the territorial integrity of China. It is our purpose to assist in finding solutions sustaining the full spirit of those treaties." [2]
>
> Herbert Hoover

The United States Department of State and the Great Lakes press both viewed the actions of Japan in Manchuria with alarm. Both tended to maintain a conciliatory attitude. Secretary Stimson called Japan's attention to its sacred obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact but refrained from more vigorous action because he believed that the conquest of Manchuria had been carried out by the military groups in the government of Japan, contrary to the known and expressed wishes of the liberals led by Baron Shidehara. Our Secretary of State held that:

> The evidence in our hands pointed to the wisdom of giving Shidehara and the Foreign Office an opportunity, free from anything approaching a threat or even public criticism, to get control of the situation. This must be done without any surrender of American treaty rights or any approval of the use of force. My problem is to let the Japanese know that we are watching them and at the same time to do it in a way which will help Shidehara who is on the right side and not play into the hands of any nationalist agitators. [3]

Whereas Stimson's conciliatory policy was based on giving the Japanese liberals an opportunity to bring the situation under control the Midwest press approved conciliation but their reasoning was

[2] William Starr Myers, The State Papers and Other Writings of Herbert Hoover (Garden City, New York, Doubleday Doran and Co., Inc., 1934), p. 43

[3] Henry L. Stimson, On Active Service In Peace And War (New York, Harper & Bros., 1947), p. 225

isolationist in its approach. For example, the Grand Rapids Press presented a rather timid front when it went so far as to take the Chinese to task for their dependence on our traditional concern, in seeking help from the United States and that in this instance the Chinese were assuming wrongly if they thought we would play "big brother again; they must negotiate or accept dismemberment. They shouldn't count on foreign intervention this time." [4] The Detroit Free Press, after the first series of notes, did not believe that it was our duty to concern ourselves with what was transpiring in remote corners of the world and that Americans "are under no obligation to pull China's chestnuts out of the fire. The State Department," it continued, "seems to have well nigh exhausted it's friendly offices. There it should stop, otherwise it will risk putting this country in the position of having its bluff called." [5] The Lansing State Journal, in a similar view, took objection to the conciliatory actions of our country. It held: that, "if the world powers would mind their own business, the end intended by fate for Manchuria will doubtless be better served...neighbors should keep their advice to themselves." [6] Other newspapers argued that Manchuria was a long way off and whatever occurred there should not concern us or our government: the South Bend News-Times stated that "the ordinary American (as a result of the distance, strange names, hard to pronounce and still harder to remember) is beginning to get tired of hearing about it all, and is wondering why he or his

[4] Sept. 24, 1931, p. 6

[5] Oct. 13, 1931, p. 6

[6] Oct. 14, 1931, p. 6

government should worry about it."[7] The Chicago Tribune was a little more down to earth in its comments than the previously mentioned dailies. It held, for instance, that the Manchurian trouble would be worked out by the usual diplomatic relations but that this should be a stern warning to the United States not to place her safety in treaties but in military and financial strength.[8]

The moderation of editorial opinion may be partially explained by the Stimson-inspired moderation in Washington correspondence. Stimson, following a policy of conciliation in order to encourage the Japanese liberal element, asked Washington correspondents to exercise patience and self-control in their publication of the war news from the Orient. Thereby, Stimson hoped to carry on his dealings with the moderate Japanese Government group led by Baron Shidehara without interference from an emotionally upset public. The Secretary writing in retrospect, said the correspondents "had as a whole kept the press from becoming inflamed and had endeavored to protect me from having my elbow joggled during the ticklish times through which we were passing."[9]

Some of the newspapers possibly contributed to the growth of isolationist sentiment in their attempt to acquaint their readers with the background of the Manchurian Crisis with educative and informative editorials. These informational pieces, like one in the Detroit Free Press for instance entitled "The Manchurian Melee," gave the background of the trouble but, after reading about the complicated and involved issues behind the Crisis, the average reader was very apt to throw up his hands and cry out that, "east is east and west is

[7] Oct. 22, 1931, p. 6

[8] Sept. 23, 1931, p. 12

[9] Henry L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis, p. 72

west and never the twain shall meet," or easier still, reaffirm his pledge for America's traditional isolation.[10]

The papers in the area curiously failed to criticize Stimson's conciliatory policy as such, which leads one to believe that in general they approved it, but in not criticizing it the press let the administration know that more vigorous action would have lost the support of the Midwest.

[10] The "Manchurian Melee" editorial of Sept. 21, 1931, p. 6 told how Japan had been squeezed out of Manchuria in 1895 and her actions in the area since that time.

CHAPTER III

Cooperation With The League

> "You are authorized to participate in the discussions of the Council when they relate to the possible application of the Kellogg Briand Pact, to which the United States is a party. You are expected to report the result of such discussions to the Department for its determination as to possible action. If you are present at the discussion of any other aspect of the Chinese-Japanese dispute, it must be only as an observer and auditor." [11]
>
> Sec. of State Stimson's
> Instructions to Prentiss Gilbert

The first phase of the Crisis was a period of conciliation by both the League of Nations and the United States, both parties working individually and independently of each other. The second phase from October 13 to October 24 was similar in that both these agents were attempting conciliation, but now they were working together. The Japanese Government had been defiantly ignoring the Western powers, and Secretary Stimson, worried over Japan's stiffening attitude felt that the time was ripe for reminding the two powers of their obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact. He let the League Secretary-General, Mr. Eric Drummond, know that if the Council sought to discuss the invoking of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the United States consul at Geneva, Prentiss Gilbert would join, if invited, in the discussion of anything relative to the aforementioned pact. The League accepted Stimson's suggestion and opened discussions on the possibility of invoking the Peace Pact, with a representation of the United States in attendance.

The decision of Secretary Stimson to work with the League was generally applauded by the papers of the area who saw in the State

[11] Russell M. Cooper, American Consultation in World Affairs (New York, MacMillan Co., 1934) p. 211

Departments action a wise move. The Gary Post Tribune lashed out at the newspapers that were preaching isolation using the anti-League argument and in retaliation brought up the argument that the United States had acted before to settle such disputes and that co-operation was not a new thing. The Gary paper, which opposed war but with interventionist leanings, didn't believe that our country favored war in spite of all the noise of the anti-Leaguers, that they were putting more of their strength into kicking the League than stopping the war. The paper then went on to defend its views:

> Yet it has always been the practice of our government to use its influence to prevent war and to settle war... We have always interfered just as all other governments have interfered but heretofore we have interfered alone. We have done what we could but it was not much because the moral force of one nation against war between China and Japan is very great. Indeed, it is so great that Japan has done everything it could to prevent that joint action. [12]

Other papers in the area believed that world peace would be best served by the continued presence at the League of our consul from Geneva. The Cleveland Plain Dealer, a Democratic paper, held that the presence of our representative at those discussions would "be accepted as a symbol of this country's growing inclination to take its place among the powers pledged to peace. The old pretense of aloofness is worn threadbare by its contact with the realities of a world distraught." [13] The Fort Wayne Journal also took the stand that Stimson's action was for peace only. It also took issue with the "irreconcialables" and "bitter enders" who held that we should remain aloof from the business of settling the trouble between Japan and China. The Fort Wayne paper believed that the prevention of

[12] Oct. 17, 1931, p. 6

[13] Oct. 17, 1931, p. 12

war ought not be shocking to anybody's spirit of isolationism and that our presence at Geneva was all right that "we take no hazard, incur no risk, stake nothing to lose by lending our unofficial but sympathetic and helpful endeavors to the efforts of the League in averting a conflict that will be shocking to every humane sense of all mankind." [14] A Detroit weekly was glad that "instead of pursuing a course of independent intervention as it had done frequently, the United States is co-operating with the League." [15] The Indianapolis News was in agreement with the administration's stand of having a representative at the League during the period and that there was no reason as far as it could see why our government "as a non-member of the organization should not cooperate with the League of Nations when they are traveling toward the same objective." [16] The Minneapolis Journal also was in complete accord with League co-operation believing that it was fair notice that "the peace of the Orient is a world concern and not a matter to be settled by Japan and China alone." [17] It was obvious that the newspapers which applauded the presence of our representative at the League Council table appeared to base their stand on a desire for peace, while the papers that did not approve of cooperation with the League saw only trouble in our dealings with the international organization. The Chicago Herald and Examiner, a Hearst paper, attacked the co-operation with the following parody on

[14] Oct. 19, 1931, p. 4

[15] Detroit Saturday Nite, Oct. 17, 1931, p. 2

[16] Oct. 13, 1931, p. 6

[17] Oct. 16, 1931, p. 18

one of our well known children rhymes:

There was an old lady who never stayed home,
A kindly old soul who delighted to roam
Advising the neighbors in all their affairs
And lecturing them on their troubles and cares
At home there were children who clamored for bread
And cried for a mother to tuck them in bed
But she was so busy she left them alone
And never had time to take care of her own.
Moral
When statesmen assume foreign troubles and cares
They haven't much time for domestic affairs. [18]

Many newspapers had argued against the United States joining the League of Nations ever since Wilson's "brain child" had come into being. These same papers now used as their argument the fact that the American people had already expressed their opposition to our participation in the League and therefore, "Stimson's Folly", the name they had tabbed on Secretary Stimson's new action, is "unfair to American citizens and entirely uncalled for, that it is directly contrary to the wishes of the American voters, overwhelmingly expressed at the polls repeatedly...Without any mandate from the American people, in fact against their registered wishes he has notified the League." [19] The Chicago Tribune also utilized the anti-League argument in a sarcastically worded editorial "Mr. Stimson Joins the League" in which the paper stated that "Uncle Sam at last has decided without any authority from home to take a seat in the Council when it is more than ordinarily discrediting all its pretentions." [20] The Chicago Herald and Examiner considered the presence of our country in League deliberations "an affront to the American electorate which has no precedent...The American people cry halt on this betrayal." [21] This same paper, on the day

[18] Oct. 22, 1931, p. 8

[19] Chicago Herald & Examiner Oct. 14, 1931, p. 8

[20] Oct. 13, 1931, p. 12

[21] Oct. 16, 1931, p. 8

following the previous quotation, compared our participation to a person being most cordially welcomed and given a ringside seat at a boxing match not to be a spectator but in reality to act in the squared circle as referee. The article went on to advise that:

> If they (the silk hatted gentlemen in Geneva) can get him into a front seat, he may have to take a hand to save his own skin. The innocent spectator enters at his own risk. Can nobody persuade Uncle Sam that he can see the fight well enough from where he is standing? [22]

The Lansing State Journal also took issue with our presence at Geneva and spoke of it as "Sam's voice on a watch chain" because "out of the League we are a powerful and respected. In the League we would be merely a member of a society. Can Uncle Sam afford to trade his voice for a new charm on his watch chain?" [23]

About this time, while the papers were arguing the merits of our cooperation with the League, disorders occurred in parts of the United States between American representatives of Japan and China. The Detroit Free Press seized this opportunity to give a bit of advice to the Japanese and Chinese in our country and also to express its views regarding our lack of interest on the explosive happenings in the Far East; "Chinese and Japanese are free to display their dislike for each other as long as they do not disturb the peace or make this country a base for hostile activities...The row in Manchuria is not our row and we do not want it brought to our shores." [24]

The shift of a paper in its views during the League co-operation phase is interestingly portrayed by the Detroit Free Press, though

[22] Oct. 17, 1931, p. 8

[23] Oct. 15, 1931, p. 4

[24] Oct. 17, 1931, p. 6

the Detroit paper was by no means the only paper to do so. The Free Press on October 15 believed that by recognizing the jurisdiction of the League, which we did by joining in the discussion, we would not or were less liable to elbow our way into the situation alone.[25] The paper was all too willing to have our representative at Geneva if it meant only discussion. However, by November the League was considering sanctions and possibly even intervention. The last possibility shocked the Free Press into a drastic change of policy. It then came out against co-operation and believed that we could do more for the cause of world peace "as an independent laborer in the vineyard of peace in Asia, the United States can plow a lone furrow undaunted by the recollection of past aggressions and undiverted by present political ambitions that it doesn't share."[26] This same paper in November viciously attacked the presence of our observer at Geneva while discussions were being carried on regarding Manchuria. The Detroit paper unequivocally stated that United States troops were in China solely for protecting American lives and property and "they cannot be commandeered by the League of Nations. Others can send troops, the United States is under no obligation to do so."[27]

The co-operation of the United States with the League while it did secure support from some papers resulted in such vehement attacks from others using the anti-League argument that Prentiss Gilbert, our representative at the League, had to be recalled.

[25] Oct. 15, 1931, p. 6

[26] Nov. 23, 1931, p. 6

[27] Nov. 11, 1931, p. 6

Mr. Stimson expressed his fears in a trans-atlantic telephone call with Lord Reading, British representative on the League Council, that if Gilbert did not withdraw, the anti-League press in America would inflame public opinion further, inciting alarm on the thought that we were going further than was warranted by our treaties.[28] Thus the midwest press with its anti-League arguments could be said to have aided in part in the formulation of foreign policy.

[28] Based on material presented by Paul H. Clyde in "The Diplomacy of Playing No Favorites: Secretary Stimson and Manchuria", Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. XXV, Sept. 1948, p. 197.

CHAPTER IV

The Interim Period - Nov. 1, 1931 - Jan. 1, 1932

> "With the repeated acts of defiance of world opinion on the part of the Japanese army and the failure of the Japanese Government to make good its assurances, popular criticism throughout the country had been rising. Through the press the growth of this American feeling became very manifest here at the Department. It was clear that the American people were following the proceedings both here and at Geneva with great interest. It was also clear that they were growing puzzled and angry at the silence of their own government in the face of the defiant attitude of the Japanese Army." [29]
>
> Secretary Stimson

The November and December period of the Manchurian Crisis in 1931 was relatively quiet, but nevertheless an important one when viewed in the light of future events. The time between our withdrawal from the League discussions and the promulgation of the doctrine of non-recognition in January saw Japan proceed unabated with her program of conquest in Manchuria while popular criticism in the United States grew over the Crisis. These two months were important in that the Great Lakes press was forced by rising public opinion to express itself on such issues as; rearmament, the boycott, and the perennial question of isolation. This sixty day period also saw the mid-west press accept the failure of the League, justify the action of Japan in the light of our own history and even rationalize that China was as much to blame as Japan for the trouble in the Orient. The last two months of 1931, therefore, saw the Great Lakes press lay the groundwork for issues which reach maturity later in the Crisis.

The question of a boycott, though not a major issue in the United States until the Shanghai incident, had its beginnings in

[29] Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, p. 92-3

this period. The League of Nations found itself faced with the ticklish problem of considering economic sanctions against Japan. The Great Lakes press generally opposed the use of a boycott, especially if the United States were involved. Some papers believed that President Hoover should invoke a boycott against the aggressor nation, Japan. The Detroit News was one of the papers to favor an American boycott and viewed it as "the one effective weapon." [30] The papers in opposition to the use of the boycott opposed it on the ground that it would lead us into war, and injure us commercially and industrially. The Chicago Herald and Examiner took the stand that our cooperation with the League was bad enough "but the fatuity of our diplomacy cannot carry us to the extreme folly of participating in the League boycott of Japan's commerce." [31] The Minneapolis Journal believed that the big drawback was that "the boycotter stands to suffer like the boycotted." [32]

Isolationist sentiment was obviously strong in the Great Lakes area during this period. The Chicago Herald and Examiner asked all peace-loving people to write to Congress if war should come to the United States over the Far Eastern trouble because "anybody that tried to start Americans marching to war will have his hands full and fail." [33] This same paper reminded its readers that the Hearst papers had repeatedly warned the country that all that the impoverished nations overseas want of us is our money, the United States

[30] Quoted in the Literary Digest, Dec. 5, 1931, p. 5

[31] Nov. 11, 1931, p. 8

[32] Nov. 20, 1931

[33] Nov. 1, 1931, Part III, p. 1

to pull their chestnuts out of the fire; and "Manchuria is aflame, the whole Far East smolders, Sam will be wise if he minds his own business and stays out." [34] The Detroit Free Press also maintained that our country desired isolation. It did not consider that our State Department was expressing the wishes of the people in its notes and "whatever officialdom and a few specially interested persons may say, the people of the United States as a whole do not care three straws what Japan does or doesn't do in Asia as long as it doesn't drag us into the mess." [35] The Minneapolis Journal made a study of the Armistice Day addresses delivered by speakers in various parts of the country and the paper told its readers that the speeches showed unanimity for peace, "for peace at almost any price short of abject surrender to some foeman bent on America's destruction or degradation." [36] The same paper also took the occasion now to indulge in a little anti-League argument, that "pulling League chestnuts out of the fire-- saving face for the League instead of for the Orientals who put most faith in face-saving-- is no job for Uncle Sam." [37]

The Great Lakes press, however, was not unanimously isolationist at this time. The Cleveland Plain Dealer seemed to be in doubt as to where it stood but asked a very pertinent question nevertheless; "Generally speaking a policy which keeps the United States out of trouble is acceptable to the American citizenry. But what are we going to do if trouble becomes inescapable? It is time to know." [38]

[34] Nov. 18, 1931, p. 8

[35] Dec. 21, 1931, p. 6

[36] Nov. 12, 1931, p. 20

[37] Nov. 24, 1931, p. 18

[38] Nov. 10, 1931, p. 8

This same paper had arrived at an evaluation of Japan by November 23, 1931. It spoke of the Japanese as being so grimly determined that "They have even risked war with Russia by invading the Russian zone and taking Tsitsihar. Men who are thus desperately reckless and who have defied with equal arrogance their own government, the opinion of the world, and the power of Soviet Russia are manifestly beyond the reach of reason." [39] This Ohio paper, a Democratic paper, was consistently more internationalist than most papers.

While some papers expressed a touch of indecision on the question of isolation the South Bend News-Times did not. It believed that "nations cannot wholly isolate themselves. Civilization with its resultant inventions and improvements has made that impossible. Only through understanding can this world be made safe for itself." [40] This Indiana paper also criticized a speech by former ambassador to Germany, Gerard, who advocated that the United States maintain an army of 500,000 men, an adequate navy plus a resolution to sit tight and mind our own business. The News-Times agreed that this formula was easy to understand but the trouble came when one tried to define what was our business. The paper held that "it has become more and more evident in recent years that the nation cannot shut its eyes to events in Europe and Asia. Whether it likes it or not, the United States has a very direct concern in international affairs. Banker and exporter to half the world -- how is the old gentleman going to ignore the doings of his neighbors?" [41]

[39] Nov. 23, 1931, p. 10

[40] Nov. 20, 1931, p. 6

[41] Nov. 19, 1931, p. 6

Though most of the papers were pro-Chinese at this stage of the Crisis, there were some, who, though they might not have been pro-Japanese, did rationalize and place some of the blame for the trouble on the Chinese nation.[42] The Minneapolis Journal attacked China because it had sought to renounce treaty obligations such as extra-territoriality. The Minneapolis paper held that "in this particular (the renunciation of extra-territoriality) the issue between Japan and China is an issue of other governments as well. We may not like Japan's militarism but neither can we countenance China's sabotage of treaties."[43] The Lansing State Journal took the stand that China's incompetency to manage Manchuria properly warranted Japanese occupation and seizure and that Japan's actions in Manchuria were justified because "international relations abhor a vacuum as much as nature. If China cannot serve as promised in Manchuria, then Japan must."[44] The Detroit Free Press had on December 4, 1931 also gone along with the argument that order in Manchuria was the most important thing and Japan would be in a much better position to bring this order about. The paper rationalized that Japan did have valuable interests in Manchuria and that the Chinese were unable to suppress the hordes of bandits in the area and as long as Japan already had the right by treaty to police the South Manchurian Railway it was much better for her to maintain order in the region. The editorial even brought in a touch of humanitarianism when it remarked that "Japan has taken up the yellow man's burden, whatever we may think of Japan's procedure, abstractly we must admit that

[42] Nov. 28, 1931, p. 8

[43] Nov. 27, 1931, p. 12

[44] Nov. 13, 1931, p. 6

concretely, if the United States were forced into a similar situation we should do much the same thing in our hemisphere." [45]

Another curious thing occurred during this period. Certain papers even went so far as to justify the action of Japan in the light of our own country's history and compared the actions of our early settlers with the Indians to the actions of Japan in Manchuria. The Lansing State Journal contended that Japan was actuated in Manchuria;

> In about the same way the people of the United States have been actuated in putting down Indian uprisings. That is to say, we have so desired peace that we were willing to fight for it. The Japanese desire and must have stability in Manchuria...When the American people came into America and drove the Indians before them, the whites were invaders. Invaders also are aggressors. In these days, the aggressor in any conflict, comes in for seemingly bad standing. [46]

The Detroit News raised the question of what would happen if Manchuria revolted from China at a future date, and embarked on a course similar to that of Texas in 1836:

> For suppose a few months or years hence, Manchuria revolts from China, sets up a government which Japan chooses to recognize, insists on self-determination -- and then annexes itself to Japan. It is merely a repetition of the story of Texas. What would any other nation or combination of nations have to say about that? [47]

Even though the protests and attempts by the League of Nations to end the trouble had apparently failed, newspapers in the Midwest area were, nevertheless, divided in their estimation of the worth and work of the League. The Evansville Courier referred to the "miserable failure of the League of Nations to act in the

[45] p. 6

[46] Dec. 17, 1931, p. 6

[47] Nov. 30, 1931, p. 16

Manchurian Crisis."[48] The Detroit Free Press told its readers in December of 1931 that the League had been rebuffed again and proceeded to sarcastically speak of the body as having "no power or cohesiveness, or economic sanctions or boycott...All the League's horses and all the League's men cannot put China together again."[49]

While some papers were ridiculing the League because of its actions on the Crisis there were papers which gave credit to the League. The Detroit Saturday Nite, a weekly, for instance, held that the situation in the Far East was not really a fair test for the League and the paper proceeded to justify its stand by using the words of Great Britain's great wartime minister, Lord Grey, who had pointed out that the League could function "only among nations each of which is master in its own house. China is obviously not that."[50] The St. Paul Pioneer Press similarly applauded the Geneva body for its work in the Manchurian Crisis and believed that the "outcome can only be regarded as an impressive victory for the League of Nations."[51]

Secretary Stimson in writing of this stage of the Crisis points out that President Herbert Hoover was a profoundly peaceable man who, while outraged by Japanese aggression was opposed in every fiber of his being, to any action which might lead to American participation in the struggle of the Far East. In this view,

[48] Dec. 11, 1931, p. 10

[49] Dec. 31, 1931, p. 6

[50] Dec. 5, 1931, p. 1

[51] Quoted in Literary Digest Dec. 26, 1931, p. 6

writes Stimson, "he had the support of the American people." [52] An analysis of the Great Lakes press indicates that many papers thought Stimson was too vigorous and few or none demanded he take a determined stand at this time. Thus, it appears that Stimson was taking the most vigorous action permitted by press opinion.

[52] Stimson, On Active Service, p. 234-5

CHAPTER V

The Chamberlain Incident

"Americanism: Making abject apology when an officer's speech offends Mussolini; asking no compensation when Jap soldiers scar an American consul for life." [53]

Detroit Free Press

The next phase of the Manchurian Crisis, was the "Chamberlain incident." Early in January of 1932, three Japanese soldiers beat up an American consul in Mukden, Manchuria. Culver B. Chamberlain, our consul involved, suffered abrasions on his forehead, and his nose plus a badly bruised face from the fists of three Japanese soldiers. The car, a Mukden consulate auto that Chamberlain had been riding in, had displayed an American flag in addition to a coat of arms. In many other periods of our national history, such brazen treatment of an American official would have meant drastic action by the government and vicious condemnation by the press. Our government in this case did send diplomatic notes of protest but the press of the Great Lakes region did not consider it important enough to get excited about. Papers referred to it as a "grave affair", and a "regrettable incident" but explained it would not become a threatening matter between this country and Japan. The papers reasoned that the Far East was a reckless part of the world and that these amenities were commonplace east of Suez, especially as soldiers had to live the type of life they do in the barracks of the Far East. For instance, the Detroit Free Press called the

[53] Detroit Free Press, Jan. 27, 1932, The columnist is referring to an incident where a high ranking officer of our military supposedly made derogatory remarks about Mussolini's driving. The Italian Government protested strongly and the United States diplomatically apologized for the actions of the general.

Chamberlain incident "regrettable" but that "Japan undoubtedly will do the proper diplomatic thing, which is to disown and apologize for the irresponsible act of men wearing its uniform...Soldiers in uniform do not speak for their countries; if they did, all nations would be in hot water all the time." [54] The Fort Wayne Journal Gazette likewise made little of the incident and excused Japan on the basis that the soldiers were probably acting on their own and the three would probably be dealt with in a fashion that the United States would consider satisfactory. The papers stated that:

> An incident of this sort might occur anywhere under like circumstances, for not all soldier men are diplomats or acquainted with procedures in delicate matters...The two nations are not going to war over a piece of blundering stupidity, though there was a time when wars were kindled from fainter sparks than that. [55]

The Grand Rapids Press, at this time, held that the people's apathy over the mauling of an American consul in Mukden was because the American people had progressed far in their search for peace and that "if the consul had been a subject of some other nation, his abuse, very likely would have stirred up intense feeling. The fact it actually caused so little concern in America is evidence that the United States has progressed far in education toward pacific intent." [56]

Thus it appeared that the Great Lakes press played down the Chamberlain incident. The area newspapers did not consider the beating up of an American consular official reason enough to become entangled in a conflict thousands of miles from our shores. The papers, with very few exceptions, held that the trouble in the Orient was not and should

[54] Jan. 5, 1932, p. 6

[55] Jan. 5, 1932, p. 4

[56] Jan. 6, 1932, p. 6

not become our concern. It almost seemed as if the papers were afraid that such an incident would arouse public opinion and subsequently lead to vigorous action.

CHAPTER VI

Hoover Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition

"The American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Government of the Chinese Republic and the Imperial Japanese Government that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between these governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenants and obligations of the pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan as well as the United States are parties." [57]

Secretary Stimson

Japan's continued defiance of world opinion led President Hoover and Secretary Stimson to announce in the transmission of identic notes to China and Japan on January 7, 1932 their doctrine of non-recognition: that the United States would not recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris, also known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Harry Paxton Howard, in his book America's Role In Asia, insists that "press criticism at this time finally forced the Department of State to make a gesture of opposition to Japan." [58] Secretary Stimson in his book On Active Service verified this statement. Stimson explained that the new move was the result of public opinion and that the doctrine of "non-recognition was designed to give expression to the deep and genuine feeling of the American people, and their

[57] Stimson, On Active Service, p. 235

[58] Harry Paxton Howard, America's Role In Asia (New York, Howell Soskin, Inc., 1943) p. 247

Government, that what the Japanese were doing in Manchuria was terribly wrong." [59]

Very few middle western newspapers expressed themselves at length on the Government's new approach to the Crisis. A non-commital attitude was noticeably prevalent throughout the entire area. Some papers apparent lack of concern and interest was probably due to the fact that they considered it another diplomatic maneuver and thus far beyond the understanding of a typical American. The Fort Wayne Journal Gazette explained at this time that "diplomacy and its ingenious trickeries do not much interest the common run of us." [60]

There were elements of the Midwest press that believed it was not only a masterful move but a wise ending to our letter writing. The Cleveland Plain Dealer, for instance, congratulated the government for definitely committing itself and assured the United States government that it was assured of popular approval, because it was a "statement of fact definitely worded, shorn of all fringe and feathers and superfluous verbiage." [61] The Indianapolis News praised the "comprehensiveness" of the American Statement, observing that the basis on which it rested made "it a noteworthy document." [62]

The Stimson Doctrine was not criticized too strongly by the Great Lakes press because the doctrine held within it sentiment favorable to both the isolationist and internationalist camps. Some members of the area press, of course, criticized it on the grounds that it was still a part of the obnoxious "note system" that tended to irritate the sensitive Japanese. A Chicago Tribune editorial entitled,

[59] Stimson, On Active Service, p. 235

[60] Jan. 10, 1932, p. 4

[61] Jan. 9, 1932,p. 6

[62] Jan. 9, 1932, p. 6

"Mr. Stimson Astonishes Everybody", complained:

> The Secretary has made the Japanese mad, irritated the French and drawn the fire of the British...Mr. Stimson has said his piece...If the State Department will let it rest with that (the principle of non-recognition) and cease sticking pins into Japan the United States may recover some of the advantages it lost when it was beguiled into the sham maneuvers of the League. [63]

The Chicago Daily News likewise opposed the "note system" of bringing about peace in Manchuria and suggested that the ultimate interests of China would be better served by a policy of overlooking Japan's inconsistencies and allowing it to restore order to Manchuria in the manner she saw fit rather than by sending pinprick notes that "irritate the sensitive and proud Japanese and stiffen the attitude of the dominant military clique." [64]

Bailey's The Man On The Street gives an excellent interpretation of the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine, and after one reads Bailey's evaluation one can see why it was nationally acclaimed and accepted by the isolationists, the unconcerned, and the internationalists as well.

> It was cheap, because it cost us nothing more than note paper; it was moral, because it put us on record as disapproving things which we did not have the power to stop; it was safe because it presumably would not provoke a war; it was theoritically effective because nations which wanted loans and other favors from us would do well not to flout our desires. But the record does not reveal that the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine stopped the Japanese for as much as five minutes in Manchuria. [65]

The Midwest area did not wax too enthusiastic over the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine, sentiment was such in the area that even so mild a thing as a note won little real support.

[63] Jan. 10, 1932, p. 10

[64] Quoted in the Literary Digest Jan. 23, 1932, p. 6

[65] Thomas A. Bailey, The Man In The Street (New York, MacMillan Co., 1948) p. 281

CHAPTER VII

The Shanghai Incident

> "The dominant desire of the President was to protect the lives of the American citizens in China. He regarded such protection as a primary and fundamental obligation of a government towards its own nationals. It was an obligation which struck home to him, for, as a young man, he had gone through an uprising in China. The military operations he had ordered were devoted solely, absolutely and singly to that end. Another action he forwarded, and entirely separate from the military operations was to use the good offices of this country to bring about a settlement if possible, of the questions at issue between Japan and China. He did this, I may say, in response to definite requests by both Japan and China." [66]
>
> Theodore Goldsmith Joslin

The Japanese attack on Shanghai was the high point of popular interest in the Manchurian Crisis, for Japan's action against that Chinese port changed the entire complexion of the Sino-Japanese affair because it now threatened American lives and property as well as the sacred documents of Hay and Kellogg. As a result of Japan's immigration policy in Manchuria, riots had occurred between Koreans and Chinese in Korea in June of 1931. The supposed failure of Japan to make proper redress over these anti-Chinese riots in July, led to the formation, by the Chinese, of an anti-Japanese Council which set up an economic boycott against the Japanese. This boycott was greatly strengthened and enlarged after Japan's aggression in Manchuria and it proved very effective. One Chinese newspaper claimed that up to the end of 1931, the boycott had cost Japan $143,000,000. [67] This show of passive resistance by the Chinese Nation seriously affected

[66] Hoover Off The Record (New York, Doubleday Doran and Co., 1934) p. 177

[67] Quoted in the Literary Digest, Jan. 30, 1932, p. 16

Japanese industry, whose spokesmen clamored for their government to take some kind of punitive action. In addition, the presence of large numbers of Japanese nationals in Shanghai, most of them engaged in some aspect of commerce likewise contributed to the tense situation. The Japanese in Shanghai seized upon the beating of five Japanese Buddhist monks in January 18, 1932 as justification for military intervention in Shanghai.

The Japanese nationals in Shanghai on January 20, 1932, burned a Chinese factory and held mass meetings to protest the attacks on the priests plus the uncomplimentary attacks on the Emperor by the Chinese press. A resolution was adopted, as a result of these mass meetings, which asked their home government to send vessels and military units to help suppress the anti-Japanese movement. The Japanese Consul-General on the same day, January 20, presented to the Mayor of Shanghai an ultimatum, which included in it the suppression of the anti-Japanese organizations and all anti-Japanese activities, especially the boycott. The city officials of Shanghai had no alternative but to meet these demands as a threatening Japanese force of 4,000 marines and 23 warships stood by. The bombardment of Shanghai began in spite of the Mayor's acceptance of all the demands. Japanese marines landed while their artillery bombarded the unfortified and densely populated metropolitan district of Chapei. The Chinese army gave valiant opposition to the invaders and in the following weeks thousands of Chinese, soldiers and non-combatants, men, women and children were killed by the artillery and aerial missiles of the Nipponese. The Chinese were finally driven out and on May 5, 1932, the Japanese and Chinese signed an armistice, and on May 31, the Japanese officially withdrew.

The Shanghai incident was the culmination or high point of the Manchurian Crisis as far as the papers of the Great Lakes area were concerned; the response of the press reached its crescendo in this period. The action of Japan in the city constituted a delicate international situation because of the presence there of the International Settlement, where the representatives of various foreign powers were in residence. There was no doubt that the American people were now sufficiently interested in what was happening at Shanghai; glaring headlines and atrocity stories made it difficult for them to ignore the new "hot spot" in the Far East. The papers in the Great Lakes area gave the latest Japanese aggression good coverage. The news from China took first place in the public interest and even displaced the tiresome talk of the depression. The Detroit News remarked that as a result of the new aggression "talk of the depression and of the painful task of recovery has sunk to an all but inaudible whisper." [68] Some papers now were fearful that this heightened interest might lead people to draw hasty conclusions or cause the public to rely on information which had been colored for propaganda purposes, and therefore, cautioned the public concerning possible danger. The Grand Rapids Press exhorted its readers to keep a clear head and not to pass on any exaggerated tales or wild rumors because "war is born of hysteria not calm judgment." [69] The Grand Rapids Herald's editorial, "A Conflagration Threatens," probably best summarizes the attitude of a large element of the Great Lakes press in the early days of the trouble at Shanghai; "it is a spark flying toward a tinder box, ignition of which conceivably may produce a conflagration comparable only

[68] Feb. 2, 1932, p. 18

[69] Feb. 1, 1932, p. 4

with that which followed the murder of an Austrian Archduke in Serajevo in 1914." [70]

While many of the Great Lakes papers were advising caution they did recognize the threat to American lives and property in Shanghai. The Detroit Free Press on January 30, for instance, advised cautious forbearance on the part of the United States and that "as far as the United States is concerned the moment is one for careful watchful waiting and the exercise of shrewd judgement in an endeavor to keep as clear of the mess as may be possible." It went on to say that although it was a delicate situation,"American lives in the troubled area of China should be safeguarded and that a sufficient American force should be sent to Shanghai and other threatened ports to handle any contingency that may arise in which American lives and rights are involved." [71] The Indianapolis News likewise advised its readers not to jump at conclusions but at the same time stated that the "United States cannot afford to see its prestige flaunted, its citizens endangered, its trade interrupted and its diplomatic representations ignored as merely academic." [72]

Many papers put forth the argument, in the early days of Japan's aggression in Shanghai, that our country did not want war. The Gary Post Tribune explained: "President Hoover knows, as well as any man alive what a frightful thing war is. He can be depended on to chart a course to lead the nation away from it." [73] The Detroit Free Press also preached for peace and remarked that "although no nation can

[70] Jan. 29, 1932, p. 4

[71] Jan. 30, 1932, p. 6

[72] Feb. 2, 1932, p. 6

[73] Feb. 3, 1932, p. 14

tread with impunity on American rights, we do not want war with Japan and every honorable means should be taken to avoid it...There will be no world conflagration unless Japan lights it." [74] The Evening News at Sault Ste. Marie, likewise held that "America does not want and should long hesitate to countenance military warfare against Japan."[75] The Fort Wayne Journal Gazette recognized that even though we had become known as the chief guardian of the "Open Door" in China, our government had no purpose "to exceed the peaceful offices of a neutral or do more than assert the true and just status of our own national interest in China." [76] Without a doubt the area papers were cognizant of the fact that Shanghai had within it the seed for world conflict and that our government had cause to be cautious. The Chicago Herald and Examiner explained to its readers that the Shanghai incident could rouse the sleeping monster world conflict from its slumbers and that:

> Tact, extreme tact is required to handle the situation with the necessary firmness and still avoid embarrassing international complications. Coolness and caution should govern the action of the commanders of the forces dispatched to the International Settlement by the various powers. It is no place, nor time for hotheads. [77]

The Shanghai incident saw many of the newspapers utilize the "Keep America Strong" theme in their arguments for isolation. They desired an increase in our military but only for the purposes of defense. For example, the Chicago Herald and Examiner "blossomed" out

[74] Feb. 1, 1932, p. 6

[75] Jan. 29, 1932, p. 4

[76] Feb. 1, 1932, p. 4

[77] Feb. 5, 1932, p. 10

with a reprint of a Saturday Evening Post editorial which emphatically argued that:

> We must lose no time in looking to our own defensive position by increasing the strength of the navy by building submarines and last but by no means least important, by launching a fleet of airplanes that will have no superior in the world. [78]

The Chicago Tribune used one of its reader's letters on the editorial page to express its views. The letter had the heading that "Might is Right:"

> Recent developments in China are further conclusive proof that might is right and the absurdity of relying on treaties for protection. Treaties like Jap promises are made to be broken. The bully fares the best and the meek inherit the earth to the tune of a funeral march. Napoleons remark is still the classic of the ages. "The Lord is on the side of the heaviest artillery". [79]

The Detroit Times and the Chicago Herald and Examiner bemoaned our weak defense set-up and claimed that it was the result of the administration in Washington. The Chicago paper for instance believed that "the nations defense should not be suffered to remain in the palsied group of the Hoover Administration with its murky thinking, inert will and dull perception." [80] The Detroit Times stated:

> We have a dangerous man in the White House. He insists upon getting into complications with foreign nations, and at the same time, reducing our army and navy to a point of impotence. His interference in affairs foreign to our interests may involve us in war, in which case the impotence of our defense may expose the United States to very damaging if not disastrous attack. Fools rush in where angels fear to tread and apparently there are no angels in the administration. [81]

The Detroit Free Press also maintained that we should keep ourselves

[78] Feb. 8, 1932, p. 8

[79] Feb. 14, 1932, p. 14

[80] Feb. 8, 1932, p. 8

[81] Feb. 3, 1932, p. 24

defensively strong and "to keep the 'Big Stick' so obviously in working order that soft speech will be listened to as though it were thunder from Thor." [82] The Chicago Tribune joined in with the "keep America strong" theme and stated that the Shanghai incident was a "votive offering" to the disarmament conference that was in session at Geneva. It continued:

> We are to trust our peace to a diminishing navy, to the decisions of Dr. Mary Woolly and the woman pacifists who flocked with the American delegate to Geneva, and to the notes of Mr. Stimson. We are to make enemies, obstruct military people, and rely on the olive branch. We'll need to be experts at taking punishment. [83]

The crisis at Shanghai gave many papers the opportunity to campaign for traditional isolation. An Indiana paper, the Decatur Daily Democrat believed that it would take more than the sinking of one or more of our battleships to get the American people into a frame of mind to fight another war as, "most of us don't like them while they are on and we are sure few enjoy the aftermath." [84] The isolation argument also appealed to the Grand Rapids Press. On January 30, it ran an editorial entitled, "A War We Don't Want", in which it stated that there had never before been a war situation in which the American people were less interested and partial and that "fighting for the rights of the Chinese nation, whatever that may be, in bandit-ridden Manchuria or to protect Chinese associations in boycotting Japanese goods is about as inspiring an idea to the average American as fighting for somebody on a canal in Mars." [85] "Will there be war?" This was the question posed by the Cleveland Plain Dealer. The daily then

[82] Feb. 1, 1932, p. 6

[83] Jan. 30, 1932, p. 8

[84] Jan. 30, 1932, p. 4

[85] Jan. 30, 1932, p. 4

went on to say that wherever this question was asked, it was answered in "a profound and earnest negative; for the moment any serious talk of war can be inspired only by rancorous jingoism or by selfishly interested individuals in the United States." [86]

The argument of "disillusion over the last war" was seen in the newspapers of the area at this time. For instance, the Detroit News, utilizing this argument, stated that "as participants, we no more belong in that cauldron of boiling blood than we belonged in Europe's suicidal abandonment to four years of throat cutting." [87] The Ohio State Journal similarly believed we should let the World War and its consequence be a lesson to America, that "until Japan deliberately and maliciously encroaches upon our rights, our place is at home where President Hoover and Secretary Stimson and Congress have kept us so faithfully." [88]

Even while the Japanese warships were belching shells into Chinese forts, while our 31st Infantry stood entrenched behind its barricades in the International Settlement, while American investments were threatened and our citizens were being subjected to unbelievable insults in the Shanghai sector, papers expressed their ideas that the American people had no desire for war. The Detroit Free Press admitted that the makings of a war were present in Shanghai but that if we really wanted war we would have to "roll our own", that apart from a few sensational newspapers working to boost street sales, and the usual quota of addlepated jingoes we have always with us, there is no one in this country that wants anything of the sort." [89] A

[86] Jan. 29, 1932, p. 8

[87] Feb. 5, 1932, p. 20

[88] Quoted in the Literary Digest Feb. 13, 1932, p. 7

[89] Feb. 5, 1932, p. 6

conservative weekly in Detroit answered the critics as to whether the United States would get into this undeclared war in China:

> Public opinion is determined that the United States shall not get into it. The sons of America vow that they would not cross the Pacific to fight for either China or Japan or any other Oriental race, and the fathers have obviously made up their minds that they shall not be asked to go. The 'open door' in China is a traditional American policy, which the American government is trying to back up with moral suasion in the form of notes, but the 'Open Door' in China is not worth a single drop of American blood. [90]

Some members of the press even criticized our government's policy of keeping troops and warships on the scene to protect American lives and property. These papers believed that the proximity of our military representatives and our citizens to the battle zone might lead to an incident and, therefore, the only solution appeared to be to get our troops and nationals away from the danger zone, quickly. The Sault Ste. Marie Evening News admitted that our ships and troops were there ostensibly to protect American citizens and property but that "there is considerable reason to believe that American citizens and property, as a whole would be better off if every American fighting unit were withdrawn." [91] This idea that we should withdraw and leave China to her fate was expressed also by the Cleveland Plain Dealer which posed the question; "Should we step in it at Shanghai and set things right?" It answered in a unanimous and vociferous negative. "China left to herself must work out some kind of a solution." [92] Many papers at this time harped continually on the idea that we should mind our own business. A reader's letter, printed in the Chicago Tribune, believed, for instance, that we should practice a little of

[90] Detroit Saturday Night, Feb. 6, 1932, p. 1

[91] Feb. 29, 1932, p. 4

[92] Feb. 9, 1932, p. 8

Washington's advice:

> It is the rule of the plains never to draw a gun unless you are prepared to take all the consequences of its instant use...Let us keep our fleets and troops at home... Let us calm ourselves by the library lamp with the letters and messages of George Washington wherein are set forth the advantages of minding our own business and of not trying on the "Civis Romanus Sum" stuff until we have cash in the bank to pay for it. [93]

Following the lead of the Chicago Tribune, the Houghton Mining Gazette agreed that our warships were in Chinese waters to protect our citizens and our $200,000,000 investment but insisted that we did not desire war and that the best way to avoid war would be to get away from the scene of war. "If we really want to protect our own countrymen -- shove out the old gangplank -- get them aboard even if they have to be driven aboard -- bring them home -- where they are safe and then mind our own business -- which will keep us pretty well occupied." [94]

There were some newspapers, however, who used a more analytical approach; they agreed that we should mind our own business but could not decide what constituted our own business. The Fort Wayne Journal, for instance, told its readers:

> Our trade is with the world and upon that world trade our prosperity depends in large portion...As a great commercial nation our own business clearly seems to be anywhere on this wheeling ball to which our trade points, provided we respect the sovereign rights there established. We have no quarrel with Japan as to her proper trade relations with China, but we have very deep concern for our own proper rights in the same place. Our own business does seem to take us into the Orient to mind it. [95]

The diplomatic maneuverings that evolved out of the Shanghai incident also received quite a bit of attention from the Midwest press.

[93] Feb. 26, 1932, p. 12

[94] The Sault Ste. Marie Evening News reprinted this editorial of the Houghton Mining Gazette on Feb. 29, 1932, p. 4

[95] Feb. 6, 1932, p. 4

The United States and the European powers, because of their economic interests in China, sent vigorous notes of protests as soon as the troops of Japan moved into the Shanghai area. The Chicago Tribune acclaimed the move and was glad to see the United States join in this transmittal and thus revert to the old fashioned type of diplomacy, that of basing your stand not only on the ground of common interest but of joining in with Great Britain, France and Italy to make the protest to Japan. The Chicago paper reasoned along these lines:

> Behind this united front there is as much security as can be expected. The United States has allies to secure all that it is called upon to obtain. Can it be hoped that all the world shall be arrayed against it before it seeks the largest measure of trouble. [96]

Although the United States did protest vigorously to Japan over the action of that nation in China, it also attempted to bring about a peaceful solution of the undeclared war by offering its "good offices" to the parties in conflict. The Detroit Free Press, acclaimed this move by our State Department and went on to explain that we had acted in the past in such a capacity and that as a result "China has come to lean heavily on the 'good offices' of the United States and Americans have become accustomed to their government exercising that recognized diplomatic function." [97]

Isolationists apparently will overlook a lot to preach their doctrine. An example of this appeared in the Detroit Free Press on May 12, 1932. It seemed that while Japanese marines and Yankee doughboys had glowered at each other over Soochow Creek in Shanghai, a delegation of Japanese Boy Scouts had planted three cherry and two cedar trees on the grounds of the American Embassy in Tokyo as

[96] Feb. 3, 1932, p. 12

[97] Feb. 4, 1932, p. 12

"living symbols of the fundamental friendship between the two countries." The Free Press comment on the gesture was that it was "one of those things in the contacts of nations which show where the heart of a people really is." [98]

The Shanghai phase of the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-32 received more press response of an isolationist nature from the Great Lakes newspapers and the objectives were generally the same; keep America strong, away and apart from the troubles of Europe and Asia.

[98] May 12, 1932, p. 6

CHAPTER VIII

The Questions Of An Economic Boycott

> "We do not propose always to pull foreign chestnuts out of the fire for every nation. We have no mandate to preserve the peace of the world. We have been Santa Claus long enough for all the foreign nations and we have no mandate to preserve the lives of missionaries who do not come out of the battle zone. We have no mandate to preserve the peace of the world by sending American soldiers to Manchuria. The surest way to become involved in a war anywhere in the world is to ship munitions of war. That is the first step toward war because it causes the hatred of the country that does not get the munitions." [99]
>
> Hamilton Fish

The events in Manchuria and later in Shanghai proved that the protests of the various governments and the public opinion of the world was not sufficient to restrain Japan. China insisted that it was the covenanted duty of the League of Nations to take action against Japan with the use of economic sanctions, and thus prevent all economic intercourse with that country. Members of the League were bound as members to sever commercial relations with Japan if sanctions were agreed on. However, the body at Geneva realized that the United States, not being a member, was not bound or committed to follow the actions of the League. The discussions at Geneva over the possibility of sanctions caused a great deal of concern in the United States even though there was already present a strong sentiment for such action. The American public had been brought slowly up to the boiling point by Japan's action in Manchuria and they continued to boil furiously in the initial stages

[99] Speech by Mr. Hamilton Fish before the Senate in reply to the Lowell Round-Robin Boycott Petition. Congressional Record, Vol. 74, Part 4, p. 4654

of the Shanghai incident. The ruthlessness and unmerciful attitude of the Japanese troops in the Shanghai fighting and, moreso the indiscriminate bombings of Chapei with the resultant loss of civilian lives, was the stage at which the Americans were worked up sufficiently to want to do something about it. Traditional isolation did not countenance the use of actual force but there was a method open to us and to the world, the use of economic sanctions or boycotting of one, or both of the warring nations.

A few midwestern papers urged boycott, arguing, as did the Detroit News, that it was very obvious that Japan was intent on a program of war and therefore, "it is quite clear that only some drastic measures will stop this and only a boycott or war seems drastic enough to do it. Of these, the boycott is eminently to be preferred." [100] The Milwaukee Journal urged that peace was "more desirable than silk stockings." [101]

President Lowell of Harvard agitated for an economic boycott and even went so far as to present to the United States Senate a round robin letter calling for a boycott. Many prominent Americans and educators had affixed their signatures and the petition received a great deal of publicity. The Cleveland Plain Dealer praised the action [102] but the overwhelming majority of the newspapers in the States of the Great Lakes area opposed the United States using a boycott lest it lead to war. The Chicago Herald Examiner caustically rebuked the petitioners:

[100] Nov. 23, 1931, p. 18

[101] Quoted in Literary Digest March 5, 1932, p. 7

[102] Ibid

> When such a blundering policy is invoked by men of age and public experience such as Newton D. Baker and a group of college presidents headed by Dr. Lowell of Harvard, it deserves rebuke. They should know better than to advocate a line of action by this country, which history has shown is often the precursor of war to which it invariably tends.[103]

Senator Borah of Idaho, always a champion of isolation, took up the fight against a boycott. He warned the American people that boycotts and embargoes were warlike measures and if any country employed them she must expect retaliation. He predicted that boycotts might lead to incidents, then rising anger, an exchange of increasingly heated notes and finally war. The Chicago Tribune agreed wholeheartedly with Sen. Borah:

> It is not and never was the business of the United States to police the world and to take sides in every quarrel between nations, no matter how great may be the wrong which one nation has suffered at the hands of another. It would be ironic indeed if in the year in which all America is paying homage to the memory of its greatest citizen, the advice of Washington on the conduct of our foreign relations should be flouted.[104]

The Chicago Herald and Examiner likewise believed that careful steering would keep us out of trouble in the Far East but that it was necessary to rule out the use of the boycott because "we cannot boycott either Japan or China in their conflict, first because we do not actually know which is right and second because such a hostile act would amount to taking sides in the war and would be virtually an act of war."[105] The Evansville Courier held that we should confine our activities in China to the protection of American lives and property only;

[103] Feb. 27, 1932, p. 8

[104] Feb. 2, 1932, p. 12

[105] Nov. 12, 1931, p. 8

> There is enough dynamite in the situation. Those who are clamoring for an economic boycott would bring down war upon us immediately if their wishes were followed...In this commercially inter-dependent world, declaration of an economic boycott can mean only one thing -- war.[106]

"Next to an act of war itself, the boycott is the most serious affront to a nation," was the comment of the Indianapolis News.[107] The Detroit Free Press cautioned that our country could think as it pleased about who was right or wrong in the "China puzzle" but that as a neutral it did not have the "right to translate its private feelings and judgement into terms of action. By doing that it would immediately become a participant in the struggle and place itself open to retaliation from the injured party."[108]

The argument against economic coercion, that the boycotter stands to suffer like the boycotted, was also taken up and used by the papers in the Great Lakes section. They pointed out what a harmful effect a boycott would have on certain industries in the United States especially those industries that are dependent on their imports from Japan. The Minneapolis Tribune, as early as December, had emphasized the boomerang effect of a boycott which it spoke of as "a two edged instrument which cuts in more than one direction."[109] The Minneapolis Journal, explained that American cotton growers would suffer because they were dependent on Japan to purchase millions of dollars of cotton every year. Americans would lose Japan as a market for their timber, and even Hollywood would be affected and in addition we would lose our ability to buy silk, tea, soy sauces, crockery, chinaware and

[106] Feb. 2, 1932, p. 6

[107] Feb. 23, 1932, p. 6

[108] March 1, 1932, p. 6

[109] Quoted in Literary Digest Dec. 5, 1931, p. 6

pottery. The Minneapolis Journal also pointed out that a boycott would not only affect our home industry but our profitable commercial dealings with Japan. For instance, it pointed out that we took nearly half of her silk output. Thus a curtailment of the trade would deprive our American silk textile workers of jobs. Japan also took each year a million to a million and a half bales of cotton and large quantities of iron and steel and railway supplies. The editorial concluded by saying that the "boycott is a powerful weapon but it would have consequences at home;" then it asked the signers of the Lowell Petition, "Are the petitioners prepared to offer a way to stabilize the American industries that depend in no small degree on business with the Japanese?" [110] One paper, the Chicago Herald and Examiner, reported that our imports from Japan amounted to $375,000,000 yearly while she took exports from us, for the same period, of $300,000,000." [111]

The argument that it was not our job to do Europe's work was also used by some papers in regards to the boycott. For example, the Detroit Free Press believed that Great Britain was the most logical nation to take the lead in placing an embargo or boycott on commerce to the Far Eastern war theater "because it is the foremost power of the League of Nations, because it is the chief naval state of the world and because it has greater interests at stake in the Orient than any other nation has." [112] The same paper commented on a speech made by an Englishman concerning the boycott. The speaker had made the statement that the United States was not going to pull England's chestnuts

[110] Feb. 24, 1932, p. 14

[111] Nov. 11, 1931, p. 8

[112] March 1, 1932, p. 6

out of the fire and the Free Press agreed affirmingly; "America will not pull other peoples' chestnuts out of the fire if it keeps its head squarely on its shoulders as Great Britain, France, Italy and other European countries are keeping their's." [113]

We can therefore see that nearly all of the Great Lakes papers decried and opposed the possible use of an economic boycott by the United States against the parties in the Far Eastern conflict. The opponents to the boycott, an overwhelming majority in this section, based their arguments on the risk of war, and injury to the American economy, while the advocates for the boycott, very few in number, justified the boycott as a preferable alternative to war.

[113] Feb. 29, 1932, p. 6

CHAPTER IX

Stimson's Letter To Borah

"The Borah letter had many causes. The first was the state of American opinion. In February and March Stimson was backed by a public sentiment against Japan stronger than anything he had behind him before or after. American admiration of China was strongly reinforced by the exploits of the Nineteenth Route Army...As he considered the feeling of his countrymen, Stimson became more convinced of his duty to give official expression to the historic policy and present opinion of his nation...A second reason for clear public protest was the importance of remaining loyal to traditional American policy in China. During early February there were intimations from Tokyo that the Japanese no longer considered the Nine-Power Treaty applicable and that China should now be permanently dismembered and her major commercial areas controlled by foreigners. Both Japan and China must be shown how far this or any similar suggestion was from American policy. Third, and perhaps most important, it seemed time for a new move in the continuing campaign to mobilize world opinion." 114

Henry Stimson

In an examination of the diplomatic correspondence relating to the Shanghai Crisis one can see how unsuccessful our government had been in its note writing and how inconsiderate and delaying Japan was in the answering of the correspondence. After months of protest through the diplomatic channels, our Secretary of State sought a way in which he could express the real interest of the American people who had, in the meantime, become exasperated by Japan's actions and stirred up by the unmerciful bombings at Chapei. Stimson also believed it was an opportune spot for stating our true policy in regards to the conflict in the Orient. He decided to express himself in a letter to Senator Borah. By this letter to Borah, he took a

114 Stimson, On Active Service, p. 246-7

page from Theodore Roosevelt, who, whenever he desired to put out an announcement of major policy which he didn't wish to be contradicted or discussed, wrote a letter to a friend by the name of William Dudley Foulke. Stimson later wrote that the letter "was intended for the perusal of at least five unnamed addresses. It was designed to encourage China, enlighten the American public, exhort the League, stir up the British and warn Japan." [115] The letter explained that by the Nine-Power Treaty signatory nations were to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China and to allow China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government. Stimson went on to state that the United States in spite of Japanese action was not considering the abandonment of the principles present in the Nine-Power and the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact. The letter, in summary then, let the world know that we believed in a strong and independent China and that strict adherence by the signatories of the Nine-Power and Kellogg-Briand Pacts could bring this about.

The newspapers in the area bordering the Great Lakes, with but a few exceptions, applauded the action of our Secretary of State. They were all glad to see the end of our policy of uncertainty and note writing. The Evansville Courier was pleased that there would be "no more note writing to Japan." [116] The Detroit Saturday Night, said, "it was just as well he (Stimson) stopped writing notes when he did. They were at least provocative to a nation that thinks rightly or wrongly that it has stood provocation enough from a

[115] Stimson, On Active Service, p. 249

[116] March 2, 1932, p. 8

close neighbor." [117] The Indianapolis News applauded the letter as being of "penetrating analysis, done in a temperate mood despite its incisiveness, and is salutary and inspiring." [118] The Minneapolis Journal merely chorused what the majority of other papers had said and spoke of Mr. Stimson's notice as "being served opportunely." [119] This same paper also replied to Japan's answer which based its rebuff to the "letter" on some insignificant point as to which treaty superceded the other. The Journal still maintained that "Secretary Stimson's case was well made." [120]

Although Stimson's letter to Senator Borah achieved great popularity with the area press, there were some voices of opposition to it. The opposition attacked the letter chiefly because it called attention to, and mentioned the possibility of, the United States invoking the Nine Power Treaty. The Detroit Free Press, for example, believed that the United States did not owe it to humanity or our own interests in China to take to uphold the Nine Power Treaty; that Great Britain, France and Italy also signed the treaty but none of them were expressing themselves so boldly over the loss of their trade;

> They are only too glad to stand back and let Uncle Sam put his shoulder under the whole "white man's burden". The spectacle of the State Department drawing this country into the position of wet nurse to 400,000,000 people in Asia who are old enough to take care of themselves, will not set well with posterity, which may have to foot the bill for the folly of 1932. [121]

The Chicago Tribune, always opposed to treaties, applauded this letter to Senator Borah on the ground that it might bring about the

[117] March 5, 1932, p. 1

[118] Feb. 25, 1932, p. 6

[119] Feb. 25, 1932, p. 10

[120] Feb. 26, 1932, p. 22

[121] Feb. 26, 1932, p. 6

demise of our treaties that had to deal with the Far East. The daily remarked that the "inference from the letter is that if the Nine Power Pact fails, the United States will abrogate the naval treaty;" at which the Tribune remarked; "Let it be hoped." [122] The St. Paul Daily News approved Stimson's move but believed that stronger action could have been taken as the letter was "only a slap on the wrist." [123]

[122] Feb. 26, 1932, p. 12

[123] Quoted in Literary Digest, March 12, 1933, p. 12

CHAPTER X

Manchukuoan Recognition

> "Signed with the listless ceremony at a plain oak desk in a room floored with yellow linoleum, a new scrap of paper gives the world a chill of apprehension... The state of Manchukuo, youngest of the worlds commonwealths and born of the successful military campaigns of the Jap army in Manchuria last fall, is recognized officially by Japan." [124]
>
> Literary Digest

The Shanghai incident was the climax of the Far Eastern Crisis as far as the press response of the Midwest was concerned. Everything, relating to the crisis, that followed Shanghai received little attention when viewed in contrast to the response to the Shanghai incident. Public interest in the oriental war theater largely subsided after the hectic days of February. This tapering off of public opinion became obvious in the newspaper treatment given the question of Manchukuoan recognition. The Midwest press was content to merely comment on the recognition issue but did not feel sufficiently compelled to approve or criticize the policy of the administration in Washington regarding Manchukuoan recognition.

While hostilities had been going on at Shanghai, a new republic had been born in Asia. The Japanese action in Manchuria during the waning months of 1931 had brought about a complete cessation of governmental administration in the area. This political vacuum was soon filled, however, by the appearance on the scene of qualified administrative personnel who proceeded to form self-governmental committees. These qualified persons "just" happened to be Japanese businessmen, consular officials and resident officials of the South Manchurian

[124] Oct. 1, 1932, p. 12

Railway. Representatives of these self-governmental committees met on February 18, 1932 and established the republic of Manchukuo with Mr. Pu-Yi, the heir apparent to the throne of the Manchus, formally installed as regent of the new state.

Some members of the Midwest press were inclined to accept Manchukuo as a "fait accompli". They saw the "Made in Japan" trademark on the new republic, but the excitement brought on by the Shanghai crisis had died down and there was not public opinion to warrant the papers support of the State Department's policy of strong and vehement protest.

Some papers did, however, express their concern over the threat to the "Open Door" in the new republic. The papers were cognizant of the fact that the new Manchukuon Government contained an excessive number of Japanese advisers and undersecretaries. The Indianapolis News commented on the "puppet show in Manchuria...The actors wear Chinese costumes and have Chinese voices but they are automatons moving and speaking only as directed from backstage. The strings are pulled by Japanese and the author of the sketch is the home government at Tokyo." [125] While some papers wrote editorials on the "puppet-like quality" of the new state, others, the Evansville Courier, merely commented that Manchuria had gone republican and that "there is to be a constitution with five fundamental principles in it. They are popular sovereignty, state autonomy, racial equality, racial co-operation and the maintenance of the 'Open Door'". [126] Perhaps articles such as the above were written for the express purpose of squashing fears

[125] Feb. 19, 1932, p. 6

[126] Feb. 20, 1932, p. 6

that were already evident over the continuance of the "Open Door" in Manchukuo. For instance, the Detroit News, even as far back as January, 1932, wrote about Japan's possible method of closing the "Open Door"; "She merely seizes everything anybody might want and stands at the door armed to the teeth while Japanese scramble through in hordes. There are so many Japanese in the doorway that others have little chance of crowding through." [127] In September, after Japan had officially accepted its own handiwork by extending diplomatic recognition to Manchukuo many papers seized upon this action to talk about isolation. The Detroit Saturday Night believed that without a doubt our government would refuse to recognize Manchukuo and that as a result nothing drastic would happen. The Detroit paper then went on to say:

> We shall wait to see whether the Japanese kick the door shut on our fingers. As for war, you couldn't get ten percent of the American people to vote for it now, even if the Japanese should openly say she would not permit us to trade in Manchuria. At any rate you won't see the American people raising up as one man on this asiatic issue unless the Japanese in their mad folly do something comparable to the sinking of the Maine. [128]

The Detroit Free Press, which had already defended Japan's case in Manchuria in an editorial on April 20, 1932, in September now insisted that we must be realistic about Manchukuon recognition. The Free Press thought that the United States should adopt a more realistic policy toward Manchukuo because of our interests in Japan:

> A realist today would remember that the United States has invested in Japan nearly three times as much money as in the whole of China and that American trade with

[127] Jan. 3, 1932, p. 6

[128] Sept. 31, 1932, p. 1

> China while American interests in the new state of Manchukuo are almost negligible. Japan on the other hand believes the resources of Manchukuo necessary to her national existence, and to keep control of them is willing to discard her membership in the League and risk her popularity with the United States.[129]

One can conclude from the treatment given Manchukuon Recognition by Midwestern papers that people in the Midwest could become excited over actual threats to American lives and property in Shanghai but not over theoretic ones in Manchuria.

[129] Sept. 19, 1932, p. 6

Conclusion

> "There are in addition certain general conclusions looking towards the future, lessons we must learn if the present tragedy is not to be repeated. We must recognize that the only time to stop a war is before it begins, before a nation or a group of nations becomes so involved that it cannot draw back without humiliating loss of face. Japan might have been stopped in September when the blame and the disgrace could still have been laid on a few hot headed junior officers of the Manchurian army, but not after the prestige of the entire army, to say nothing of the nation itself, was at stake. We must recognize also that there is no chance of success in a major crisis involving one or more of the great powers so long as any great power remains outside the international organization." [130]

Sarah Smith

The League of Nations in 1931 had appointed a Manchurian investigating body, known as the Lytton Commission, to make an "on the spot" inquiry of the Manchurian Crisis. The Lytton Commission reported to the League in February, 1933, that the Japanese nation was guilty of aggression in Manchuria, that the new Manchukuo Government was not supported by the Manchukuo people and recommended that all Japanese forces should be withdrawn and the area should be autonomous under Chinese sovereignty but with Japanese interests recognized in the area. The League of Nations approved on February 24, the report of the Committee of Nineteen which had considered and agreed with the recommendations of the Lytton Commission. The approval of the Lytton Report obligated League members not to extend recognition to the new puppet state of Manchukuo. The acceptance of the Lytton Report was the straw that broke the camel's back as far as Japan was concerned. She had notified the League on a previous occasion that she was

[130] Smith, Manchurian Crisis, p. 261

seriously considering leaving the League, and on February 28, 1933, the Japanese Government advised its delegation to attend no more Council meetings. Thus, as a direct result of the Manchurian Crisis, Japan ceased to be a member of the League of Nations. Moreover, it can be considered the opening phase of the second world war, for the Manchurian Crisis showed the whole world that the League of Nations was an impotent body whose members would do little to preserve order in another part of the world. Hitler and Mussolini saw in world apathy and League impotence a go ahead signal for their grandiose plans. Because the Manchurian Crisis ended as it did, the world saw the Ethiopian turmoil, the Spanish Civil War, the phenomenal rise of the European dictators, their hell-bent rearmament race and the war with the atomic climax; World War II. A Chinese writer has said that the "Manchurian Crisis, the European turmoil, the African tangle and the Armament race are all as intricably related to each other as are different branches of the same tree." [131]
If that is so, does the United Nations action going on now in Korea presage a new era? Does it mean that when world opinion acts against troubles in remote corners of the globe, future peace and security is better served? We have in 1951, through a study of the past and a costly war, decided that the things that occur in the distant parts of the world are important and do have a bearing on our future. Events of the 30's and the 40's proved that the majority of the Midwest press were wrong during the Manchurian Crisis in their preaching of isolation. Isolation in our modern world is not only impracticable but impossible.

[131] Park, Retreat Of The West, p. 28

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of facts and interestingly documented with much primary source material. She also holds that the trouble in Manchuria was the first step toward the world conflagration, World War II. To better understand Japan's position in the Orient and her economic interest in Manchuria, see Edith Ware's Business And Politics In The Far East (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1932). Chapter III is excellent on the influence of Manchuria on the determination of Japanese international policy. Chapters VI and VII good on the Crisis and the evaluation of it. T. A. Bisson has in his American Policy In The Far East (Mac Millan Co., New York, 1940) a very good summary on the Crisis in Chapter II. Harry Paxton Howard's America's Role In Asia (Howell Soskin Publishers, New York, 1943), in Chapters XII, XIII and XIV, has a pleasant narrative type discussion on the Crisis. An aid to understanding Japan's place in the Far East is George H. Blakerslee's Conflicts Of Policy In The Far East, which shows how the national policies of China, Japan and Soviet Russia have been in conflict in the Far East. Chapter III and IV are good summaries on Japan's role in Manchuria and the Crisis of 1931. The position and stake of the United States in the Manchurian area is covered very well in Whitney Griswold's The Far Eastern Policy Of The United States. (Harcourt Brace and Co., New York, 1938). Two works which cover the Crisis from the viewpoint of the Chinese are No Yong Park's Retreat Of The West (Hale, Cushman and Flint, Inc., Boston & New York, 1937) and the Chinese Information Committees Work, Japanese Actions In Contravention Of The Nine Power Pact Since The Mukden Incident (Hankow, China). On the Japanese side of the League we

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Two good articles on Midwest isolation are William G. Carlton's "Isolation and the Midwest", Mississippi Valley Historical Review (Vol. 33, 1946-7) pp. 377-390, and Ray A. Billington's "Origins of Midwest Isolation", Political Science Quarterly (Vol. 60, 1945) pp. 41-64.

NEWSPAPERS

The Chicago Tribune maintained an isolationist stand during the Crisis and was especially expressive during the period of our co-operation with the League and the "Shanghai gesture". The paper during these times played up the "Keep America Strong" idea and utilized the anti-League argument. The Chicago Herald and Examiner and the Detroit Times, members of the Hearst chain, likewise were isolationist regarding the trouble in Manchuria. The Grand Rapids Press and the Grand Rapids Herald, were similarly in the isolationist camp. These Michigan papers were not lonely as they had plenty of company in the Detroit Free Press, the Sault Ste. Marie Evening News, the Houghton Mining Gazette and the Lansing State Journal. The Detroit Saturday Night, a weekly, listed as a "Conservative paper for discriminating readers", maintained a rather cautious stand and deviated only after a long consideration of public opinion. The Detroit News was one of the few papers in Michigan which did not campaign too seriously for any stand. The Cleveland Plain Dealer, a Democratic paper, was one of the notable opponents of isolation. It's approaches to the Crisis were cautious, realistic, and the

events of the late 1930's proved the wisdom of the Cleveland paper's stand in 1931. The Indianapolis News and the Indianapolis Times were lukewarm in their comments about the Manchurian Crisis. None of these papers took a forceful stand one way or the other but leaned precariously at times toward isolation. While the above Hoosier state papers were straddling the fence, the Evansville Courier, the South Bend News-Times and the Gary Post Tribune were acting more outspoken on the Crisis. One would expect the Minneapolis papers, because of their geographic location to be rather unconcerned over international happenings but contrary to expectation, they did not believe that isolation was the best move. They argued on the economic basis for internationalism. Too few copies of such papers as the Milwaukee Journal, the Muskegon Chronicle and the Toledo Blade were available to make any generalizations regarding the Manchurian Crisis.

CALENDAR OF EVENTS 1931-33

1931	September 18	Explosion on South Manchurian Railway near Mukden leads to seizure of city by Japanese troops.
	September 18	Japanese troops occupy leading towns and cities in southeastern Manchuria.
	September 21	Chinese delegate to the League requests body to take action under Article XI of the Covenant.
	September 24	Secretary of State Stimson directs an appeal to China and Japan to put an end to hostilities.
	October 5	Nanking Government accepts Japanese pledge to League that she would withdraw troops by October 14. Stimson notifies League that United States would act independently through its diplomatic representatives and endeavor to reinforce what the League does.
	October 11	United States agrees to attend League Conferences but will act independently of League.
	October 14	League Council meets and Japan attempts to block the presence of the United States at the meeting.
	October 18	League Council in private session votes 13-1 to invite United States to participate in the discussion of the Council.
	October 19	Japan denounces the admission of United States to Council and demands that a date be set for the legal decision of the Manchurian question.
	October 23	League Council adopts resolution asking evacuation of Manchuria by November 16.
	November 12	Ambassador Dawes ordered to Paris to be available for consultative purposes by the League Council.
	November 23	League Council members draw up draft of resolution which provides for a commission of inquiry.

1931	December 10	League Council unanimously passes resolution which provides for the immediate appointment of an inquiry commission of five to study the Manchurian controversy.
	December 12	Japanese Conservative Cabinet falls. Fall considered to strengthen the status of the military in Manchuria.
	December 18	Senate, on a move by Senator Johnson, asks Stimson for correspondence relative to the Manchurian Crisis.
1932	January 7	Stimson transmits identic notes to China and Japan; known as the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine of non-recognition.
	January 18	Japan replies to Stimson note and pledges "Open door" policy.
	January 20	Japanese mass meeting to protest the attacks on their citizens. Meeting adopts resolution asking home government for suppression of the anti-Japanese movement. Ultimatum presented to officials of Shanghai, which demands end of boycott.
	January 21	Major-General McCloy of the United States accepts the appointment to the League Investigating Commission for Manchuria.
	January 24	Japanese marines land at Shanghai.
	January 28	Hoover submits to Senate the diplomatic correspondence relative to the trouble in China.
	January 29	Four American destroyers sent from Phillipine Islands. Great Britain states it will help the United States safeguard international rights in the International Settlement.
	January 30	W. W. Yen of China asks League Council to invoke Article X and XVI of the League Covenant. Japan threatens to withdraw from the League.
	February 17	League Council sends note to Japan reminding her of her obligations under the League Covenant.

1933	January 17	League Committee of Nineteen decides to give Japan 48 hours for submission of new proposals for settlement of dispute or stronger action will be taken by the League.
	February 20	Japanese Cabinet decides to secede from the League if the Assembly adopts the Report of the Committee of Nineteen.
	February 24	Assembly of the League adopts the Report of the Committee of Nineteen.
	February 25	United States officially gives approval and support to the Report of the Committee of Nineteen.
	February 28	Japanese Government notifies League delegation to attend no more Council meetings.