THE DECLINE OF THE NOBiUTY EN FRANCE DURlNG
THE FOURTEENTH AND HFTEENTH CENTURIES

Thai: for tho Doom of M. A.
MICHlGAN STATE UNW'ERSITY
Richard M‘ Judd, Jr.
1961

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LIBRARY

Michigan State
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THE DECLINE OF THE NOBILITY IN FRANCE DURING
THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH CENTURIES

By

RiChard Mo JUdd, Jr.

AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
fer the degree of

.MASTER OF ARTS
Department of History

1961

ABSTRACT

The main purpose of this study is to demonstrate
the decline of the nobility in France during the feurteenth
and fifteenth centuries. In order to discern any change
one must first have a standard against which new findings
can be compared. The standards used in this study involve
first an analysis of the ramifications of the feudal obliga-
tions prior to 1300. The ideals of the code of chivalry
which so thoroughly captured the nobility are of even greater
importance.

’With these standards in mind, the next step involved
the consultation of sources to demonstrate in what way the
nobility deviated from the established norm. The chronicles
of Froissart give a great deal of valuable infermation con-
cerning the nobility's decline from about 1326 until 1400.
Beginning at the point where Jean Froissart leaves off,
Enguerrand de.Monstrelet presents excellent infbrmation for
the period spanning the first half of the fifteenth century.
Though these two chroniclers were eulogists of chivalry,
they nevertheless offer an enormous amount of information
which reveals the multitudinous transgressions committed by
the men of rank. Philip de Commines completes the trilogy
with his invaluable portrayal of the reign of Louis XI of
France and his poignant but realistic political commentaries.

The above mentioned writers, in addition to other
less comprehensive tracts, give evidence concerning the
nobility in several important areas. The sources substanti-
_ate a protracted dispute between the nobility and monarchy.
The relationship between the fellow nobles themselves changed
perceptably during the later Middle Ages. In endeavoring
to demonstrate the glories of knighthood the eulogists of
chivalry tended instead only to portray it as an outmoded
ideal. The major sources involved also present extensive
information concerning the nobility's relationships with the
Church, the urban classes, and the peasantry.

After analyzing information from the major sources
pertaining to the areas mentioned above one finds an over-
whelming amount of information indicating that the nobility
degenerated in almost every aspect. They shamefully violated
their duties to the monarchy. Their irresponsibility eventu-
ally enabled the king to gain the upper hand. In respect
to fellow individuals of‘noble rank, the virtues and defer-
ence previously so prevalent were plainly lacking during
the last two centuries of the Middle Ages. Even chivalry
itself appeared utterly inept to cope with the changing con-
ditions. The nobility miserably failed to uphold their obli-
gations to the Church, acting as a class without any purpose
or valid reason for existence. In their relations with the
urban classes and peasantry the men of’rank, with few’exe

captions, degenerated into wretches who either participated

in themselves, or condoned the murderous plundering forays

of their men. Indeed in every aspect, the nobility, en masse,
declined perceptably during the course of the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries.

THE DECLINE OF THE NOBILITY IN FRANCE DURING
THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH CENTURIES

By

Richard M. Judd, Jr.

A THESIS

Submitted to
IMichi an State University
in partial illment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
Department of History

1961

/"j 7
/ 1,. "'3 ./ ‘ .‘
[CZKL’U/fi/ -' / 2/41. é/V'l/ 2- VLK (Arrive

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to
Dr. Richard E. Sullivan for his inspiration, encouragement,

and helpful criticism in the writing of this thesis. I wish

also to express gratitude to my wife, Karen, for her patience
and understanding throughout this study.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACMOWLEDGEMENT O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0

INTRODUCTION

Chapter

I.

II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.

ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF THE FEUDAL NOBILITY

AND KNIGHTHOOD
THE NOBILITY REACTS TO MONARCHY . .
INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NOBLES
CHIVALRY OUTMODED . . . . . . . . .
THE NOBILITY AND THE CHURCH . . . .
THE NOBILITY AND THE URBAN CLASSES .
THE NOBILITY AND THE PEASANTS . . .

CONCLUDING COMMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . .
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . .

iii

Page
ii

39

72
112
11.3
163
183
201
205

INTRODUCTION

This thesis was suggested by Cervantes' immortal
tale of Don Quixote, the idealistic knight-errant who roamed
the Spanish countryside with his humorous partner, Sancho
Panca. This brilliant novel put an end to chivalry as a
workable ideal by literally laughing it out of existence.
Cervantes clearly demonstrated the ridiculous state into
which chivalry had fallen. Knights not only failed to fill
any useful purpose in society but they actually caused ex-
tensive destruction and injury to the property and people
of all classes in the milieu of which they were a part.
Realizing that chivalry was the major ideal after which the
nobility of the Middle Ages patterned their lives, Cervantes'
satire suggested a study of the decline of nobility which
would endeavor to demonstrate just how they happened to fall
into such a state of decadence.

The decline of the nobility was a universal phenom-
enon in Western Europe in the era of the later Middle Ages
(1300-1500). To survey so vast a range of materials proved
too extensive fer this study. It was therefore decided to
deal only with the nobility of France, which indeed was the
true home of chivalry during the Middle Ages. Since the
boundaries of France were constantly fluctuating during

-1-

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the course of the Middle Ages, it is most difficult to speak
_of this country with any degree of precision. This is es-
pecially true during the period 1300-1500 because of the
constant interchange of the various duchies and counties
between France and England. For reasons of expediency and
clarity the term "France" shall be understood to include

not only the boundaries of France as they exist in 1961 but
also the geographic areas of Belgium and the Netherlands.

In addition to confining the study to the nobility
in France, the author found it desirable to focus his atten-
tion on a selected group of sources. This seemed justifi-
able since certain major primary sources of the are under
consideration supply more than enough reliable infermation
needed to substantiate the hypothesis purported in this
study. IMaterial gathered from the major sources specifically
demonstrates in what respects the nobility failed to meet
the obligations which it had set up for itself.

Fortunately, there were three writers whose works
collectively spanned the later Middle Ages, and who, though
differing in ability, treated the condition of the nobility
in their respective periods with great thoroughness. The
chronicles of Froissart undoubtedly contain the most valuable
information concerning the nobility and its actions during
the fourteenth century. Froissart was a eulogist of chivalry;
however, one is able to find innumerable examples of un-

Chivalrous and irresponsible behavior exhibited by the

 

-3-
nobility in the exciting pages of this writer. In the very
year that Froissart terminated his chronicle (1400) Enguerrand
de Monstrelet began his narrative, which encompassed the

first half of the fifteenth century. His description, though
less colorful and more tedious to read, is more accurate than
is Froissart's, especially concerning dates, names, and
events. Philip de Commines completes the detailed coverage

of the era in a brilliant work which deals mainly with the
reign of Louis XI (lh61-1A83). ’Commines can be classified

as a true historian and one of the very few writers during

the Middle Ages able to perceive the qualities necessary

to classify a king or noble as a successful intelligent

ruler. Many of his criticisms concerning fifteenth century
statesmen are as true today as they were #50 years ago.

Upon analysis of the three fundamental sources
mentioned above, in addition to other lesser known but valu-
able tracts, one concludes that the nobility did indeed
violate its obligations in every respect. During the four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries the nobility in France re-
peatedly displayed a lack of responsibility toward the so-
ciety to which they belonged. These two centuries encompassed
the devastating Hundred Years' war which sent France into
turmoil and brought death and destruction to people from all
walks of life. Over the space of these two centuries the
nobility repeatedly had opportunities to strengthen their
position; however, they failed to accept any responsibility

 

-g-
toward socity and consequently steadily declined in power.

At the end of the thirteenth century France was the
most prosperous and best governed country in Europe. The
farms were producing rich crops and her peasants were healthy
and happy. The towns were strong and safe and trade grew
steadily. The roads had become much safer for the traveler
and merchant. Justice prevailed in the courts of the king-
dom, especially under Louis IX, and the whole country seemed
to be functioning in an orderly fashion. The Church became
somewhat disrupted when the papacy moved to Avignon in 1305;
however, loyalty to the French popes was not seriously chal-
lenged by people of other countries during the first years
of the Babylonian Captivity. Up until the beginning of the
Hundred Years' war in 1337 one can honestly state that con-
ditions in France were excellent.

This rich country quickly deteriorated into a strife
torn battlefield during the Hundred Years' War. The battles
were spasmodic and certain areas felt the hand of destruc-
tion more heavily than others, but befOre order was restored
completely, practically every town and village was subjected
to innumerable depredations against both life and property.
Persons from all walks of life, from the lowliest peasant
to the most noble duke, were left with deep scars of warfare
and chaos that required many years to heal. Not until the
reign of Louis XI and the death of Charles the Bold in 1477

can one perceive any real order and unity returning in France.

 

-5...

One might legitimately ask at this point, was it
not the duty of the monarch to control the destiny of the
state? In our modern age of the Nation State one gives
praise or assigns blame for the running of the affairs of
any state upon the central government. It would thus appear
that in the late Middle Ages it was the duty of the French
monarchy to control the destiny of that nation; but upon
further examination one will readily perceive that prior
to the last half of the reign of Charles VII, the Valois
kings were unable to keep order in France. Consequently,
only the powerful nobility were in a position to bring about
some sort of stability out of this period of disorder. The
story of their abysmal failure to rise to this challenge
will be of’major importance in this study.

The most logical method to treat the downfall of
the nobility must begin by examining exactly what position
they held in society at the beginning of the period. ,This
analysis is facilitated by the valuable material dealing
with the feudal structure and explicit statements’of a
stringent code of chivalry. The nobles over a period of
several centuries had laid down a strict set of rules to
regulate themselves. Our purpose is not to criticize every
infraction of the rules, for even Saint Louis, king of
France, failed in some respects to fulfill his classification
as a perfect knight. There did, however, appear such a

marked increase in the number of violations of their self

-6-

imposed code during the course of the fourteenth and fif-
teenth centuries that the nobles no longer even attempted
to meet their obligations. Not only did they violate their
feudal bonds and code of honor but they swung to the utmost
extremes of viciousness, victimizing society at every'turn,
and committed acts of perversity that the peasant equalled
only in the wildest moments of the Jacquerie.

Once the obligations of the nobility have been _'
clearly shown, the easiest way to discern their downfall A
is to examine their conduct with respect to the various other
segments of society. Honorable relations between the nobles
and the king and even between fellow nobles deteriorated
during the course of the Hundred Years' war. Although, with
the exception of Charles V, the first feur Valois monarchs
were generally incompetent, the nobility made no attempt to
unify and present a strong common front to counter the weak-
ness of the monarchy. The powerful dukes and counts lacked
any feeling that they had an obligation to work for France
as a unified nation; instead they constantly undermined not
only the strength of the monarchy but also brought about
the downfall of fellow nobles. Their whole purpose deteri-
orated from one of seeking honor to one of seeking pillage
and booty from the helpless lesser segments of society. Harm-
less tournaments replaced the rough but chivalrous melee of
the previous centuries. The religious zeal shown during

the crusades wasted away and in its place sprang an emphasis

-7-
upon courtly love. In all respects the nobility failed to
show any purpose or valid reason for their existence.

The noble class became degenerate in respect to
their obligations to the Church. The ideal knight of the
earlier medieval period took upon himself the oath to defend
the Church even at the risk of injury or death to himself.

In the later Middle Ages, one finds instead numerous examples
during the Hundred Years' war of the failure of knights even
to pay lip-service to their oath and of their swinging to

the other extreme whereby they physically attacked the clergy
and the various churches and monasteries, burning and destroy-
ing them almost at will.

During the course of the war the French towns suf-
fered prostration and many were demolished by the armies of
France and England, plus the smaller roving bands of Free
Companies and similar groups. In almost every case, the
various depredations to which the towns were subjected can
be traced to irresponsible leadership by knights whose duty
it was to protect society. While nothing in the oath of a
knight stated specifically that he must aid the towns, he
was obligated to act with courage, justice, and honor and
by no stretch of the imagination can one present the destruc-
tion of the towns by bands of knights in armor as anything
but an outright disavowal of every virtue they were supposed
to hold. mercy was rarely shown fer the lives or property

of the townsmen, and trade was risky if not impossible for

-8-

the merchants. The French towns did not begin to recover
until Louis XI ascended to the throne and protected and en-
couraged the merchants, thereby farming a loose alliance
based on mutual support between the monarchy and bourgeoisie.

The common peasant was probably hit hardest by the
predatory nobility. When the nobles moved their armies of
knights and squires they literally lived off of the land
that they passed through. Whether they were an organized
army or just a band of roving knights they settled upon
the poor peasant like a flock of locust, carrying off his
crops and livestock and burning what they could not take.
with them. In some cases, such as the Black Prince's expe-
dition in 1370 in Southern France, the land was devastated
so badly they could not even sustain themselves and were
forced to retreat.

In many instances over the course of the Hundred
Years' war the English nobility in France were just as guilty
of depredatory actions as were the French. Consequently,
no attempt will be made to treat the actions of the latter
in isolation. In many cases, such as the actions of the Free
Companies and routiers, it is practically impossible to
separate the nationalities due to the lack of definite na-
tional lines until near the end of the fifteenth century.
Consequently the following discourse will occasionally refer
to the English as well as the French nobility in order to
demonstrate the decline of the nobility.

CHAPTER I

ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF THE FEUDAL NOBILITY AND KNIGHTHOOD

By the year 1300, feudalism had lost its vitality
as a workable basis of government, yet its structure lingered
on for almost two hundred years. To understand the nobility
in France during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries it
is first necessary to discuss briefly the nature of the feudal
relationship and the obligations which this relationship
placed on the nobility.

Feudalism essentially rested upon a personal con-
tract or agreement between two individuals. "It consisted
of private contracts whereby one man willingly accepted the
status of being an honorable dependent of another."1 When
an owner of property found it impossible to live securely
and comertably due to the warfare of neighboring nobles
or outside invaders, he selected a powerful man who possessed
adequate resources to protect him. His property was given
to his new lord and immediately returned as a benefice to
be used by the vessel. The lesser noble or vessel received

the protection of his lands and his person; in return he

 

—_ ‘—

1John B. Harrison and Richard E. Sullivan, A Short
History of Western Civilization (New York, 1960), p. ZIl.

-9-

-10-

pledged military service to his lord for "the benefice of
a vessel was held on condition of military service. . . ."2

Feudalism originated as a combination of Roman and
early Germanic institutions. The precggium principally
obligated any powerful Roman who accepted the land (volun-
tarily given) of a small landowner to protect him in exchange
for title to the land. For those people without land the

Roman institution of patronage, known as trocinium, arose,
whereby the wealthy and influential man, as patron, sur-
rounded himself with a group of dependent followers, called
clients, who sought his aid and support. The patrocinium
became amalgamated with the German comit tus, described as,
early as the second century A. D. by Tacitus in the Gegmania.
The comitatus stripped to its barest elements consisted
essentially of a band of armed men, seeking adventure, booty,
and glory. These warriors devoted themselves to a powerful
leader, whereby they were bound to defend and obey him with
the most diligent loyalty and courage. Both of these in-
stitutions had two features in common: "The personal de-
pendence of the weaker man on the stronger and the rendering
of service, often military, in return fer protection and

support."3

A.—

2Carl Stephenson, Me aev l Feud lism (New York, 1960),
p. 11. (Hereafter cited as tep enson, eu glism).

3James westfall Thompson and Edgar Nathaniel Johnson,
An Introduction to Medieval Europe 300-1500 (New York, 1937),
pp. 2 3-4. Hereafter c te as ompson and Johnson, Medie-

W)-

-11-

To form a feudal system it was now necessary to
combine the precarium with the patrocinium and comitatus.
"It was Charles Martel who fused these two into one system,
chiefly as a result of the Arabian attack on Gaul.“i The
Carolingians utilized proto-feudal practices to such an
extent that these practices became a recognized part of the
structure of society. The Carolingian rulers sanctioned
the feudal practices in an effort to preserve and strengthen
their own authority. "These rulers depended less on their
theoretical sovereignty than on the fidelity of their per-
sonal retainers, now styled vassals."5 In order to establish
his power more securely, Charlemagne established himself as
supreme lord over all his vassals. Such Carolingian rulers
as Charles Martel, Pepin, and Charlemagne were powerful
enough to control their vassals and keep the nascent feudal
system in check. However, their sanction of the feudal
system set a legal precedent for centuries to come.6 After
these powerful Carolingian monarchs passed on, their suc-

cessors were not able to cope with the nascent feudal system

 

hRaymond Lincoln Kilgour, The Decline of Chiv 1r 5
Shown in the French Literature of the Late MiddIe I es (Cam-
bridge, Nassachusetts, I§37), Introduction, p. xi. (Here-
after cited as Kilgour, Decline of Chivalry).

 

SStephenson, Feudalism, p. 11.

6Francois Louis Ganshof, Feud lism, trans. Philip
_ Grierson (London, 1952), supplies the Best description of
the evolution of feudalism during the Carolingian period.

-12-
so successfully. Feudalism hereafter began to root itself
firmly as a workable replacement to the void left following
the collapse of the Carolingian system. For approximately
the next five centuries, feudalism remained the primary
system of government in Europe.

Feudalism was more than a system of government for
it implied a method of land tenure whereby one man held or
used the land of another by a contract made between the two
giving the holder of the land almost a perpetual lease. In
return, the landholder owed his lord certain services and
the lord was obliged to aid in the protection of the land.
The word fief is used to designate the land which
the vassal held, but it was more than a piece of land fer
it included the laborers, buildings, and equipment needed
for the cultivation of that land. The fief might even be
in the form of a sum of money given to the vassal for his
support or in order to buy a piece of land. In other words,
a fief might be anything that yielded an income. Control
of a fief implied vassalage fer the fief legally existed only
when held by a vassal. The reverse of this was not neces-
sarily true, for it was possible for a man to become a vassal
'without receiving a fief. However, this latter arrangement
became increasingly more rare as the Middle Ages wore on
and the fief and vassalage tended to become fused.
While the fief best exemplifies the tangible bond

between the parties involved, the term vassalage best

 

-13-
describes the personal element. The vassal commended him-
self to his lord and was "his man;" by virtue of this arrange—
ment he obligated himself to perform certain services for
his lord, the most important of which was military. Though
the vassal owed certain services to his lord, there was no
loss of social prestige for this was a reciprocal bond. The
fact that one was a vassal was degrading in no way, for even
the greatest noble was almost invariably the vassal of the
king. Though a hierarchy of nobility did arise, a man's
worth as a noble was based on other criterion than the amount
of land that he controlled. Ultimately, however, the feudal
ties were based on force and the "disloyal refusal of a
vassal to perform his owed service"7 was a felony and
usually meant confiscation of his fief. 0n the other hand,
a powerful vassal occasionally overthrew his lord if he
possessed the military might. "As in all free competition
the fit survived and the unfit lost their preperty and dis-
appeared, usually into a monastery."8
From.the description so far one might get the im-
pression that the feudal system was completely chaotic due
to its decentralized nature and the fact that it was formed

on a basis of military force. However, there were several

7Stephenson, Feudalism, p. 3h.

8Sidney Painter, French Chivalr : Chiv lric Ide s
and Practices in.MediaevaI France, (Ithaca, New York, I537),

Herea er c to

p. 7. . as Painter, Chivalry.

 

-14-

important factors which stabilized the feudal system.and
gave it a quality of permanence and respectability. The
heritability of the fief and vassalage was one such stabil-
izing factor. The lord-vassal relationship specifically
entailed a personal bond and technically the feudal contract
ended upon the death of either party; however, by the tenth
century this relationship had become hereditary.9 It was
necessary for the heir to seal again the contract by swear-
ing a new oath to his lord, and by paying an inheritance
tax, called a relief, but the land and official position be-
came inseparable, continuing for generations in the same
family.

Of paramount value to the stabilization of the feudal
ferm of government was the mutual oath sworn between the
lord and vassal. The personal bond between these two parties
lent an air of honor to the institution which became more
and more idealized. The act of homage and oath of fealty
represent the outward and inward actions binding the two
parties together. By the ceremony of homage the vassal
publicly declared his intention to aid and serve his lord

 

9There is some disagreement among medieval historians
upon this point. In Harrison and Sullivan, A Short Histor
of western Civiliz tion, p. 212, Sullivan claims HeritaEIIity
Became common in the tenth century. Ganshof, Feudalism, p.
119, claims the fief became hereditary in the eIeventH cen-

tury. For our purposes, this technical difference will have
no effect on the results of this study.

-15-
and demonstrated this by a corporeal act, usually placing
his hands between those of the lord who accepted him. Having
made an act of homage to his lord, the vassal next took an
oath of fealty or fidelity which was sworn upon the Holy
Scriptures or some holy' relic. The Church played a major
role in this latter ceremony by giving the oath a sacred
nature, thereby placing the mutual obligations of both parties
under the auspices of the deity. The principle virtue of
the lord was one of responsibility. By right, the lord owed
his vassal military support to help protect the property and
person of the latter. The vassal also expected aid from
his lord in righting all wrongs, both on the field of battle
and in the court. In return, the vassal was expected to
render his lord military service, which in the twelfth
century was restricted to forty days a year. In addition,
the vassal was expected to attend his lord's court and assist
in the administration of justice. Among the monetary aids,
the vassal was expected to contribute a specified sum of money
upon the knighting of the lord's eldest son and the marriage
of his eldest daughter, or if the occasion required, he was ob-
ligated to contribute for the ransom of his lord. The lord was
also entitled to entertainment, which consisted of feed and
lodging when he was traveling through the lands of his vassals.
This too became restricted to a specified number of visits
per year, "and lords--the king included-~when traveling were
expected to live as far as possible from their own manors,

that is, manors not given out as fiefs."10 However, in the

 

10Thompson, and Johnson, Medieval Euro e, p. 306.

-16-

1ast analysis the chief virtue of the vassal was loyalty,
for loyalty was the major force that kept feudal society
from anarchy. As Ramdh Lull so aptly put it in the_thirteenth
century it was a "wycked knyght that aydeth not his erthely
lord and natural countrey ageynst another prynce. . . . A
knyght withoute offyce. . . ."11

A clearly defined nobility arose as part of the
structure of the feudal system. This aristocracy increasing-
ly set itself above and apart from the rest of society, more
especially the common people, becoming an exclusive class
unto itself. Economically and politically the nobility's
position was based upon control of the only Source of wealth,
land, and upon its monopoly on the chief functions of govern-
ment. Equally important to the position of this class was
the development of a code of conduct whose rules applied
especially to the feudal nobles. This code of conduct is
called chivalry. As it developed the code of chivalry postu-
lated a group of qualities considered proper to the behavior '
of the noble. The nobility enthusiastically accepted this
ideal code of conduct and sought to enact its demands in

daily life. "The profession of arms came to be governed by

llRamon Lull, The Book of the 0rdre of Oh , trans,
William Caxton, ed. Alfred T. P. Eers (fondon, I52 2), pp. .
32-3. (Hereafter cited as Lull, 0rdre of Chyvalry). I have
taken the liberty to add punctuation and occasionally moder-
nize the spelling in Caxton's translations, but only in the
cases where obsolete symbols and obscure spelling has nec-

essitated this be done.

 

-17-
an aristocratic code of chivalry-~a set of rules that had
meaning only for the highborn. Thus in the later Middle
Ages knight and noble were virtually synonymous terms."12
Though every knight was a man of nobility the reverse of
this did not necessarily follow. A man might be born of
the nobility and yet remain a mere fief holder the remainder
of his life. To become accepted in the order of knighthood
a noble was required to undergo a period of rigorous train-
ing and an elaborate ceremony. However, during the later
Middle Ages every noble of any significance whatsoever was
a knight and for the purposes of this study the terms shall
hereafter be used interchangeably.

During the early Middle Ages cavalry came to be the
most effective method of warfare and chivalry emerged out
of the requirements which this type of warfare imposed. 0r-
iginating basically as a combination of the comitatus and
atrocinium, chivalry "conferred privileges" but also "im-

13 upon its members, the primary duty being

posed duties"
' military service. The first knights were crude and rough
but fulfilled the function of protecting the fief of their

lord and all of the peeple on that fief. Always fighting

 

12Carl Stephenson, "The Origin and Si ificance of
Feudalism," American Historical Review, XLVI II9AI), p. 807.

13GustaveMasson, The Stor of’Mediaeval France:
From the Rei of Hu es Ca st to the He innin of the Six-
teenth Century (New York, I533), p. 33. _

 

 

-13-
astride a horsa,the knight was obligated to serve both his
lord and the state, for the lower classes were not considered
capable of governing and protecting themselves. With their
monopoly upon warfare, the feudal knights were the only ones
the commoner could look towards for protection.

The training to become a knight was long and arduous.
A boy born of aristocracy began learning horsemanship and
the use of arms as soon as he could walk. Usually at the
age of seven he was sent to the court of his father's lord
to begin a period of formal training. At this stage he was
known as a page or valet. Though such tasks as running
errands for ladies or assisting knights with horse and har-
ness seemed menial, the purpose of this early training was
to develop the page's skill in the martial exercises and
to familiarize him with the aristocratic way of life. At
the age of fourteen he became an écuyer or squire and began
his military training in earnest. "Henceforth he was regu-
larly attached to an individual knight, whom it was his duty
to accompany and assist. In the event of battle, the squire
carried the knight's reserve of arms, led his extra herse
if he had one, laced on his defensive armor, rescued him
when dismounted or wounded, and took charge of any prisoners
he might capture. Through such activity the squire learned

1h

the brutal business of war at first hand." About the age

 

11"Stephenson, Feud lism, p. A6.

-19-
of’twenty-one after proving himself a warrior, he was "dubbed"
a knight. The regular ceremony was elaborate and expensive
and usually was performed by his father or some distinguished
warrior. Under extreme circumstances, normally prior to an
important battle, a squire could be "dubbed" a knight in the
field but this was the exception rather than the rule. The
formal ceremony was highly symbolic including a ritualistic
bath, a twenty-four hour fast, and a night-long vigil in a
chapel. Upon taking his vows the knight donned his armor,
mounted his steed, and was off to prove himself a man of
courage and honor. A truly perfect and gentle knight was
bound

. . . to fear God and maintain the Christian re-
ligion; to serve the King faithfully and valorously;
to protect the weak and defenceless; to refrain from .
the wanton giving of offence; to live for honour and
glory, despising pecuniary reward; to fight for the
general welfare of all; to obey those placed in au-
thority; to guard the honour of the knightly order;
to shun unfairness, meanness and deceit; to keep
faith and speak the truth; to persevere to the end
in all enterprises begun; to respect the honour of
women; to refuse no challenge from an equal and never
to turn the back upon a fee. 5
Chivalry did in fact set up a code of honor for all men to
look up to and did instill a sense of duty and trustworthi-

ness in men.

 

15F. J. C. Hearnshaw, "Chivalry and its Place in

History," in Edgar Prestage, ed., Chivalr : A Series of
Studies to Illustrate its Historic I Si iTIc ce 3 Civili-
zing Ianuence (London, I923), p. 24. ‘

-20-
Probably one of the major reasons why the nobility
lend themselves so easily to criticism lies in the fact
that they set up an almost monastic code to pattern their
lives by, while the commoners for example had no such strict
"doctrines.'
Among the laity the gap between the ideal and the
actual may best be observed in the warrior class whose
ideals accorded with the feudal situation and tended
to express themselves in chivalry. Not that knights
and ladies were better or worse than other mediaeval
men and women. But literature contains clearer state-
ments of their ideals. The knightly virtues range
before us as distinctly as the monastic; and harsh is
the contrast between the character they outline and
the feudal actuality of cruelty and greed and lust.
Feudalism itself presents everywhere a state of cone
trast between its principles of mutual fidelity and
protection, and 123 actuality of oppression, revolt,
and private war.1
It is not our purpose to chastise the nobility for
their failure to follow every facet of their code of chivalry
for not even Saint Louis of France achieved perfection. One
can find sufficient examples of knights breaking their code
of chivalry prior to 1300. However the fact remains they
were serious in their efforts to live up to their ideals,
and both the knights themselves and the code of chivalry
served a useful function in society.
Let us now discuss in slightly greater detail some

of the virtues which formed the basis of chivalry. After

16Henry Osborn Taylor, The Mediaeval Mind: A Histor
of the Develo ment of Thou ht and Emotion in the MiddIe A es,
4th ed. (London, I93S), I, 533. (Hereafter cited as Taonr,

Mediaeval Mind).

-21-m
trying to categorize these virtues one finds a striking re-
semblance between the five major virtues in classical Greece
and those advocated by the medieval knights. Courage as
known by the Greek would be termed prowess by a knight.
Knighthood embodied a martial spirit, probably derived from
the Germanic tribes with their emphasis on bravery and skill
with arms. Courage was often carried to the point of reck-
lessness, so dramatically demonstrated in the Song of Roland
by Roland's bravery and loyalty to Charlemagne. Saint Louis
on occasion displayed an excessive bravery, often carried
to the point of foolishness. As in ancient Greece, the
knight was admonished to be courageous but always to temper
his courage with discretion.

Piety played a small role in the lives of the early
knights. These crude warriors had little time or interest
to devote to the affairs of the Church. Religious chivalry
reached its zenith during the centuries of the crusades when
the goals of chivalry and of the Church became intermixed.
The knights of the crusading era became true warriors of the
Church. For almost two centuries, knighthood was inspired
with a religious fervor whereby the knights admirably upheld
the religious ideals of chivalry and set a noble example for
the members of the lower classes.

The Greeks felt that justice was giving every man
his due but one can find no such specific statement of the

justice expected of a knight. Ramdh Lull probably comes

-22-
closest to any clear definition of justice.

The knyghtes ought to be mayntened and kept justyce,

for in lyke wyse as the juges haue thoffyce to juge,

in lyke wyse haue the knyghtes thoffyce for to kepe

them fro vyolence in exercysyng the fayt of iustyce.

Yf it myght be that chyualry and clergy assebled them

to gyder in such maner that knyghtes shold be learned

so that by scyece they were sufficient to be juges,

none office sholde be so proper to be a juge as

chyualry, for he that by justyce may best bi holden

is more proper to be a juge than any other. 7
Justice is one of those disputable terms which has always
intrigued mankind. The writers on chivalry tended to banter
the term about rather loosely, but probably its closest
synonym for the medieval knight would be fairness in his
interactions with his fellow men. The account of the eleventh
century Spanish hero, known as the Cid, offers an excellent
example of the exhibition of a lack of justice. The Cid
represented the ideal Castilian noble, faithfully serving
his lord, hlfonso VI, upon the ascension of the latter to
the throne of Castile. However in 1081, upon returning from
a campaign in the service of his king, the Cid was unjustly
accused by Alfonso of keeping part of the tribute taken on
the expedition. As punishment he was exiled from Castile.
Though his exile released him from all dependence upon the
king, he never lost his love and desire to serve both king
and country. Several years later he was happily restored

to royal favor. His stay in court was brief, for at the

 

l7Lull, 0rdre of Chyvalgy, pp. 30-31.

-23-
behest of the Cid's enemies, the king again subjected him
to unjust accusations, this time not only exiling the Cid
but confiscating his property and imprisoning his wife and
children. The Cid offered to submit himself to the ordinary
judicial procedure of the time to clear himself on oath but
Alfonso would not consent. Hereafter the Cid set out on
his own, winning fame and fortune by his military prowess.
Though he eventually gained greater military and political
prestige than his king, he sincerely regretted the injustice
shown him and always retained a desire to serve his native
country and monarch.

The virtue of temperance as known by the Creek was
certainly a goal for and a restraint upon medieval chivalry.
However, in actual practice the medieval knight had a most
difficult time in achieving this virtue. It was a rare per-
son such as Saint Louis who tempered his drinking (watered
his wine) and eating. Yet within their chivalrous hierarchy
knightly behavior was considered moderate prior to 1300,
not reaching the extremes of the waning Middle Ages so vividly
described by Huizinga.l8

Of the five Greek virtues which were crucial to

knighthood, wisdom was the least realized in actual practice.

 

l8See J(ohan) Huizinga, The Wanin of the Middle A es:
A Stud of the Forms of Life,gThougHt and Art in France and
the Netherlands in the XIVth and XVth Centuries (Garden City,
New York, 1955), Chapter I. (Hereafter cited as Huizinga,

waning Middle Ages).

-24-
A knight might have good common sense but few had more knowl-
edge than the art of warfare, and many could neither read

or write. Ramdn Lull recommended there be books and schools
whereby a squire could receive the proper training to become
a knight.19 Probably one of the best arguments foria wise
and intelligent nobility was put forth in the thirteenth
century poem, Rgmgnce of the Rggg.

Much fairer chance the learned have

To prove them noble, wise, and suave.
Briefly, a man from books may learn
Virtue to love and vice to spurn.

When comes the dreadful dooming day,
Find sterner judge than people lay,

Who ne'er in books were trained to read
How vice to shun and virtue speed.

If men fain would learn

How they for high noblesse may earn
Distinction, with this golden lore
Their minds and memories let them store:
Whoso would practise true noblesse

Must cast off pride and idleness,
Himself to arms or study give,

And pure of soul and spirit live.20

Among the other virtues of significance, courtesy
received increasing emphasis as chivalry matured. ‘In its
feudal environment, courtesy meant being polite to another
knight and not attacking an unarmed man. Fighting must take

place under equal conditions for both concerned. Due mainly

 

19Lu11, 0rdre of Ch alr , p. 22.

20
W(Guillaume de) Lorris and J(ohn) Clopinel (Jean de
‘¥388;H The Romance of the Rose, trans. F. S. Ellis (London,
3 -5-

-25-
to the influence of the romance literature, courtesy was
eventually expanded to include an elaborate set of manners
specifying the proper interrelationship between a knight and
a lady, having as an ultimate effect the upraising of the
status of womanhood. In the late thirteenth century, Lull
gave a good definition of courtesy; however, he explained
it from a moral point of view.
To a knyght apperteyneth to speke nobly and curtoisly,
and to haue fayr harnoys and to be wel cladde, and to
holde a good houshold and an honest hows. For alle
these thynges ben to honours Chyualrye necessarye.
Curtosye and chyualry concorden to gyder. For vylaynous
and foule wordes ben.ageynst thordre of chyualry.
Pryualte and acqueyntaunce of good folke, loyalte and
trouthe, hardynesse, largesse honeste, humylyte, pyte
and the otheS thynges semblable to these apperteyne
to chyualry. 1
Courtesy reached fruition in the court life of
France with elaborate rules being prescribed which specified
the behavior of the nobility, more especially concerning
the art of love. Courtly love developed in the twelfth cen-
tury, emerginngainly as a fusion of Latin and Moslem ele-
ments. The troubadours of southern France first popularized
it; henceforth it spread throughout France-and Europe. In
the late twelfth century Andreas Capellanus wrote a classic
tract showing not only the traits necessary to be a perfect
lover but more important those actions that would tend to

undermine love. "Things which weaken love are blasphemy

 

21Lull, 0rdre of Chyvalry, p. 113.

-26-
against God or His saints, mockery of the ceremonies of the
Church, and a deliberate withholding of charity from the
poor. we find that love decreases very sharply if one is
unfaithful to his friend, or if he brazenly says one thing
while he deceitfully conceals a different idea in his heart.
Love decreases, too, if the lover piles up more wealth than
is pr0per, or if he is too ready to go to law over t‘rifles."22
The rules set down here are most stringent and never per-
fectly followed, but at least the institution of courtly
love as presented by Capellanus contained none of the arti-
ficiality and false delusions of perfection that came to
characterize so many of the writings on this topic. ‘

Just as the crusades brought an end to a strictly
feudal chivalry and gave it a more noble and honorable pur-
pose, so too, courtly love began to replace the ardent re-
ligious zeal so prevalent among the crusaders.. As early as
the twelfth century courtesy and courtly love tended to be
emphasized in differing ways. .Such writers as Capellanus
and Lull stressed courtesy and courtly love from a moral
point of view, emphasizing their refinements and demonstrating
the beneficial effect this new aspect of chivalry could have
upon the individual knight and society in general. However,
also beginning in the twelfth century courtesy and courtly

 

22Andreas Capellanus, The Art of Courtl Love, trans.
John Jay Parry (New York, 1959),"p"p“T§-‘6"“‘L——. 5- .

-27-
love tended to emerge in a different direction which had

the effect of undermining the true virtues of chivalry.
Though this aspect will be dealt with to a greater extent

in a later chapter, it is sufficient to state at this point
that the type of courtly love generally presented in such
works as the Romance of the Rose was basically opposed to
the virtues of both Christianity and chivalry.

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries largesse
struck its way into the code of chivalry. Largesse might
be defined as lavish generosity sometimes expressed in an
almost reckless extravagance. Tournaments and jousts in
particular gave expression to elaborate displays of food
and drink by the cordial host. It is inconceivable to pic-
ture a knight being thrifty or miserly.

Honesty and humility were also of great importance
as part of the repertoire of the knightly virtues. Honesty
and loyalty showed many patterns of similarity in their re-
quirements of fulfillment. Humility was not only a knightly
but also a Christian virtue being directly opposed to the
deadly sin of pride. The strict adherence to all of these
virtues was the prerequisite to perfect fulfillment of one's
role as a knight.

It will now be most beneficial to consider some of
the religious obligations and aspects of feudalism and
chivalry. The feudal ceremony which began as a secular bond

very early received the sanction of the Church. The oath

-23-
of fealty was sworn on the Holy Scriptures or some holy
relic and the "king and count . . . agreed to permit their
lands to fall under the interdict of the Church in case
either failed in his duty."23 It was difficult to instill
a sense of charity and "love thy neighbor" in these early
feudal nobles and the Church first maintained that a vicious
knight was not a good Christian. Later as chivalry became
more prevalent as an ideal this was reinterpreted to mean
an unchristian knight was not a true knight. As early as
the tenth century the Peace of God was put forth to restrain
the unbridled feudal warfare and protect the clergy, the
peasants, and eventually the merchants from violence and
oppression. Some lords accepted this peace, going so far
as to take oaths voluntarily to this effect. However, the
unruly segments of the nobility were not effectively re-
strained until the Truce of God was promulgated early in
the eleventh century. By this arrangement the Church re-
stricted feudal warfare to certain specific times of the
year, thereby giving relief to the oppressed peasantry dur-
ing the seaSon of cultivation and harvesting of crops. Those
who ignored this decree received the penalty of excommuni-
cation. The ultimate solution to unbridled warfare came
in channeling the energy of the knights against the infidel

via the crusade.

 

23Thompson and Johnson, Medieval Euro e, p. 301.

-29-
In a very real sense chivalry was the spiritual

force that gave value to feudalism. The ceremony of becom-
ing a knight was filled with religious significance begin-
ning with the twenty-four hour fast, the ceremonial bath,
the all night vigil before the altar, the blessing of the
sword, and ending with the final vow to aid the Church and
the poor and oppressed. Lull claimed that the office of A
2“ "The offyce of a
knyght is to mayntene and deffende the holy feyth catholyque

knight was second only to the clergy.

. . . and for to honours and multyplye the feythe suffryd

in this world. For . . . god of glory hath chosen knyghtes
be cause by force of armes they vaynquysshe the mescreautes
whiche daily labours fOr to destroy [the] holy chirche,

and such knyghtes god holdeth them for his frendes honoured
in this world, and in that other when they kepe and mayntene
the feith by the whiche we entende to be saved."25 It was.
the knight's duty to combine with the clergy in enforcing
God's will for he owed his first responsibility to the Church,
secondly to his lord, and then to his native land. Up until
the eleventh century knights did not usually respond in this
manner; however, in the year 1095 chivalry took on a whole

new'aspect.

 

2hLull, 0rdre of Ch al , p. 115.

2
sLull, 0rdre of Ch a1 ,~p. 24.

-30-

Beginning in the late eleventh century and continu-
ing through the twelfth and thirteenth the crusades raised
the religious fervor of the knights to a fever pitch. Here
was an opportunity for an exciting life of adventure and
glory with paradise as the ultimate reward. The knight be-
came a type of policeman for the Church. One might argue
the worth of the crusades to society but no one can dispute
the religious enthusiasm they created. One gains a feeling
of the enthusiasm after reading the summons which Urban II
made at Clermont in 1095 and the response he received from
these first crusaders. Urban appealed to the vanity of
the Frenchmen by beginning his speech "0 ye men of the
Franks, who live beyond the mountains! God hath favored
you in many ways, in your happy land as in your steadfast
faith and valor. To you our words are spoken, and by you
our message will be passed on." Urban continued his appeal
by stating the urgent need to recover the holy land from
the infidel Turks and Arabs. In order to build up the fervor
he related numerous examples of inhuman atrocities committed
by the Turks against the Christians. He appealed to those
who were robbers and pillagers to turn their energies against
the infidel. "You are girdled knights, but you are arrogant
with pride. . . . Come forward to the defense of Christ.

0 ye who have carried on feuds, come to the war against
the infidels. 0 ye who have been thieves, become soldiers.

Fight a just war. . . . Let no obstacle turn you aside

-31-
. . . God [is] guiding you--." With great emotion, the

knights present answered in a tumultuous "Dian lo vult,

God wills it!" And upon this zealous note the first crusade

was initiated.26

On a later crusade one catches some of the religious
fervor from the pages of Villehardouin as he described how
the knights fell prostrate before the Dogs and people of
Venice. After the Venetians agreed to finance the trip
there arose great shouts of consent.27 Villehardouin em-
phasizes that due to God's will the crusaders were able to
gain victories over superior numbers.28

Saint Louis of France represents the perfect embodi-
ment and in a sense the culmination of the ideal knight.

His religious zeal was indisputable as he lead two crusades,
but he also strove to achieve the other virtues of chivalry.
This holy man loved God with all his heart, and fol-
lowed Him in His acts; and this appeared in that, as
God died fer the love He bore His people, so did the
king put his body in peril, and that several times,
for the love he bore to his people. . . . The holy
king so loved truth, that . . . he would never con-
sent to lie to the Saracens as to any covenant that

he had made with them. Of his mouth he was so sober,
that on no day of my life did I ever hear him order

 

—w——

26The quotations are from Harold Lamb The Crus des:
Iron Men and Saints (Garden City, NeW'YOrk,1§3 , pp. -a1.

27Villehardouin, Memoirs of the Crusade, trans. Sir
Frank T. Marzials (New York, 19587, p.03:

28Ibid., p. 126.

-32-

special meats. . . . In his words he was temperate;
for on no day of my ligg did I ever hear him speak
evil of any one. . . .

Joinville, the famous biographer of Saint Louis, relates that
his king also showed great temperance in his drink. "He

put water into his wine by measure, according as he saw

that the strength of the wine would suffer it." Louis
warned Joinville "that it was too foul a thing for a brave
man to get drunk."30 Perhaps the most famous and also most
illustrative example of Saint Louis' deep piety and humility
comes to us today in the form of a conversation that took
place between this chivalrous king and his beloved vassal,
Joinville. In this discussion Saint Louis demonstrates his
love of the poor and abhorrence of all mortal sins and he
endeavors to persuade Joinville to follow his example.

"Now I ask you," said he "which you would the
better like, either to be a leper or to have committed
a mortal sin?" And I, who never lied to him, made an-
swer that I would rather have committed thirty mortal
sins than be a leper. And when the monks had departed,
he called me to him alone, and made me sit at his feet,
and said, "How came you to say that to me yesterday?"
And I told him that I said it again. And he answered,.
"YOu spoke hastily and as a fool. For you should know
'that there is no leprosy so hideous as the being in
Amortal sin, inasmuch as the soul that is in mortal sin
is like unto the Devil; wherefore no leprosy can be so
hideous. And sooth it is that, when a man dies, he is
healed of the leprosy in his body; but when a man who
has committed mortal sin dies, he cannot know of a cer-
tainty that he has, during his lifetime, repented in

 

29Joinville, Memoirs of the Crusades, trans. Sir
Frank T. Marzials (New York, l§5§), p. 139.

3oIbid., p. 110.

 

-33-
such sort that God has forgiven him; wherefore he must
stand in great fear lest that leprosy of sin should last
as long as God is in paradise. So I pray you,” said he,
"as strongly as I can, for the love of God, and for the
love of me, so to set your heart that you prefer any
evil that can happen to the body, whether it be leprosy
or any other sickness, rather than that mortal sin should
enter into your soul."

He asked me if I washed the feet of the poor on
Holy Thursday. "Sire " said I, "it would make me sick!
The feet of these villains will I not wash." "In truth,"
said he, "that was ill said; for you should never disdain
what God did for our teaching. So I pray you, for the
love of God first, and then for the love of me, that 1
you accustom yourself to wash the feet of the poor."3
Louis truly practiced almost every virtue that was
advocated in the code of chivalry. However, on numerous
occasions Louis carried his piety and bravery entirely too
far, needlessly endangering his own life, as well as the
lives of his family and also of his companions. On one
occasion his ship struck a rock and was greatly damaged. In-
stead of directing the men in abandoning ship and seeing

to it his family was saved, Louis placed himself prostrate

in the form of the sign of the cross on the ship's deck,

swearing not to leave the ship even though it was damaged.

Luckily the ship did not sink but it could have been a most

unfortunate incident.

One is impressed by what appeared to be sincere re-
livious zeal shown by many of the knights who took part in
the crusades. However, as is the case with all movements

of this nature the interest dropped as each succeeding crusade

 

3 bid., p. 111.

 

"Le!

 

 

 

 

-34-
was initiated. Joinville would not even join Saint Louis
in his second crusade in 1270 for he wisely foresaw the
disaster which was forthcoming. This fiasco culminated in
the death of Louis and was the last crusade of any signifi-
cance. From this point forth chivalry changed direction.
In fact, even before the crusading era had ended a more
fermalized, less purposeful type of chivalry had sprung up
and begun to undermine the virtues of prowess and piety
which had been of such great importance to the knights of
the feudal and religious era of chivalry.

Let us now delve into some of the interactions which
took place between the men of chivalry and those people
known as commoners. During the early feudal period the
lower classes often received harsh treatment due to the al-
most constant warfare of the nobility. However, the Church
endeavored to soften the burdens of the peasantry, townsmen
and merchants by proclaiming the Peace and Truce of God,
and achieved some degree of success. While the knight him-
self in no way swore to assist the lower classes, he did
realize that it was through their labor and support that he
was able to lead his life free from manual labor. Lull
summarized it when he stated that "to a knyght apperteyneth
that he be louer of the comyn wele, fer by the comynalte of
the peOple was chyualry founden and establysshed. And the

comyn wele is gretter and more necessary than propre good

-35-
and specyall."32

The code of chivalry did prescribe that knights es-
pecially aid women (particularly widows), children, the help-
less and poor and oppressed of society. In other words, a
knight must show charity toward society for

a knyght withoute charyte maye not be without cruelte, ““
and euyll wylle. And cruelte and euyll wylle accords

not to the offyce 'of chyualrye by cause that charyte

behoueth to be in a knyght. For yf a knyght haue not

charyte in god and in his neyghbour, how or in what A
wyse shold he loue god. And yf he had not pyte on . 1
pours men, not myghty and dyseased, how shold he haue 1
mercy on the men taken and vaynquysshed that demaunde 1_
mercy, as not of power to escape and maye not fynde ii
the fynaunce that is of them demaunded for theyr
delyueraunce. And yf in a knyght were not charyte,
how myght he be in thordre of chyualry. Charite is a
vertu above other vertues for she departeth euery
vyce. Charite is a loue of the which euery knyght
ought t3 have as moche as nede is to mayntene his
offyce. 3

Now that the obligations of the nobility have been
discerned let us look at the actual practices and conditions
jprior to the Hundred Years' war. Private warfare was ram-
jpant during the early Middle Ages; however, this warfare
‘was restricted mainly to small bands of knights fighting
each other. Consequently wars remained localized, upsetting
only small scattered areas at any one time. The nobility ‘
did in fact fulfill their functions as armed knights by
protecting their fiefs and the people on them from outside

 

32Lull. W. p. 113.

33Lu11, 0rdre of Ch 1r , pp. 93-3.

-36-

invaders and other greedy nobles. Conditions improved
greatly during the twelfth and especially the thirteenth
century in France as private warfare decreased considerably
in the wake of a more centralized monarchy. France has al-
ways placed her strength in her superior rural economy and
this prospered greatly prior to the Hundred Years' War due
to the increasingly longer periods of peace resulting from
decreased private warfare. "At the end of the thirteenth
century France was the most prosperous and best governed
nation in Europe."3h Relative peace and justice reigned
in the kingdom. One can picture Saint Louis sitting under
an oak tree hearing the cases of those whose rights had been
impinged upon.

The towns also flourished prior to the Hundred Years'
War, more especially due to the aid and protection of Philip
IV. "Commerce and industry had a great extension and his-
torians agree in recognizing that the years which preceeded
the Hundred Years' War may be counted among the most for-
tunate which France has known in its long history. . . .
The majority of the towns did not exceed 10,000 inhabitants;
the villages were more populous than now [1931]; and in

particular there were many isolated villages which disappeared

 

3l"Jamss Westfall Thompson, Economic and Social Histor
- in the Later Middle A;es

   
   

-37-
during the Hundred Years' war. . . . New towns or bastides
were created everywhere, and fixed to the soil that wander-
ing population always numerous in the Middle Ages and often
dangerous."35

Under the leadership of Louis IX and Philip IV the
French monarchy gained increasing strength. The former
supressed private warfare which disconcerted the nobility,
fer this was not only their function but their pastime. His
efforts to channel the knights' energy into a dynamic crusade
completely failed. Philip IV allied with the bourgeoisie
which became a great source of wealth and power to draw
upon. These two monarchs had gained much strength at the
expense of the nobility. The feudal institutions were prac-
tically dead, for by "the end of the thirteenth century they
ceased in western Europe to be the most fundamental element
in the structure of society, lying behind and influencing
every aspect of its life and thought."36 In the thirteenth
century the kings were truly above feudalism.

Although chivalry had separated itself from the
legalistic and economic aspects of the feudal structure, it
still had strong roots in the feudal system, and a blow to
one had an effect on the other. Within the code of chivalry
itself there was a conflict between the obligations of

 

35Thompson, Economic Histor , p. 46.

36Ganshof, Feudalism, p. 152.

~38-
tvELIflfare, religion, and courtesy. It was difficult if not
impossible for any knight to satisfy them all and still
maintain a balance between the three. It was only during
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that these three vital
functions of a knight were reconciled most effectively due
13:: ‘the religious zeal of the crusades, the suppression of
lpzrigvate warfare, and rising emphasis on courtesy with the
great influx of romance literature. 0
The chief purpose of this study is not to show

isliert feudalism was an empty institution by 1300 and that
absolute monarchy was in the ascendancy, for this is a

conclusion agreed upon by most all medieval historians.

finer-'will we further dwell on the technical structure and
achievements of chivalry prior to the Hundred Years' War.
Chxr- purpose is to analyze the behavior of the nobility
during these two long centuries of warfare and chaos. After
the reign of Philip IV the French monarchy floundered in an '
age of warfare for almost a century and a half. This lapse
~-ix1 nuanarshical power offered the nobility a chance to recoup
the losses they had suffered at the hands of the strong
kings of the thirteenth century and to regain a position of
Power in the society to which they belonged. The fact
that they failed to grasp this golden Opportunity to retain

their mastery over society shall concern us hereafter.

CHAPTER II
THE NOBILITY REACTS TO MONARCHY

Out of the rubble of the Hundred Years' War emerged
the great nations of modern Europe. In the case of France
the monarchy emerged absolutistic almost in spite of itself.
With the exception of Charles V, the first four Valois
kings were incompetent, tending to undo the work of the
earlier powerful Capetian monarchs such as Louis IX and
Philip IV. Realizing the void left by lack of strong mon-
archical direction and the chaos brought on by a long war
the responsibility fell to the powerful nobles of France
to rise above their petty differences and give direction
and support to the established government. Not only did they
fail to control the lesser nobility by force if necessary
or even by example, but they played a negative role concern-
ing any sense of loyalty toward France as a whole and unified
society. While it is true some of the literature of this
period (more especially during the fifteenth century) reflects
an increasing awareness of a national consciousness, the
nobility on few occasions demonstrated any loyalty further
than would enhance their own greedy ends. The war offered
the nobility a chance to regain some of their diminishing
prestige and power, but they failed to grasp this Opportunity

-39-

."h‘ s

-40-

either because they could not rise above their own avaricious
tendencies or because they had become too set in their out-
worn chivalric practices.

The chief source concerning the actions of the no-
bility during the fourteenth century is Jean Froissart, whose
chronicles cover a period ranging from 1326 to lAOO. Since
his first patron, Robert of Namur, fought on the side of the
English, Froissart is accused of favoring England in his
writings. Perroy, whose classic book on the Hundred Years'
war is the best to date, claims "Froissart, [was] always
predjudiced in favour of the Plantagenets. . . ."1 Others
have contended he was pro-French after the Peace of Bretigny
in 1360. One could find evidence to support both of these
contentions but it appears more likely that neither gives
an accurate portrayal of this man, for he was first and
foremost a chronicler and historian of chivalry. Froissart
is representative of his age in the sense that he lacked
any true patriotism, for there was no French nation in the
fourteenth century but only a kingdom of France which tottered
on the brink of disintegration.

Froissart's greatest glee comes when describing the

"feates of armes" and the glitter and excitement of a battle

——

1Edouard Perroy, The Hundred Years war, trans. W. B.
wells (New York, 1951), p. 125.

-A1-
with little thought of its significance other than a great
display of chivalry. He describes a battle between the
English and French at Rayvombergues as follows: "It was
great beautie to beholde shynynge ageynst the sonne, to
baners, penons, and clere bassenettss, and so great nombre
of people, that the eye of man coude nat nombre them: their
speares semed a great thicke wode."2 His enthusiasm for 1
chivalry comes bubbling forth at its finest in his descrip- ,
tion of the battle of Poitiers in 1356. The burning of the
towns, pillaging of the countryside and finally the capture
of King John the Good at Poitiers do not strike him as in-
jurious to France but as part of the trappings and the ex-
citement which seemed so natural for this chivalrous vis-
ionary.
Often tymss the adventures of amours and of war are
more fortunate and marvelous than any man canne thynke
or wysshe; truly this batayle, the which was nere to
Poycters . . . was right great and peryllous, and many
dedes of armes there was done. . . . The fyghters on
bothe parties endured moche payne; kyng John with his
owns handes dyd that day marvels in armes; he had an
an axe in his handes wherwith he defended hymsslfe and
:fought in the brekynge of the prease. . . . The chase
endured to the gates of Poiters: Ther were many slayne
and beaten downs, horse and man, for they of Poyters
closed their gates and wolde suffre none to entre; wher-

fore in the strete before she gate was horrible murdre,
men hurt and beaten downs.

 

2Sir John Froissart, The Chronicles of Froissart,
trans. Sir John Bourchier Lord Berners annis 23-25
(London, 1901), III, A48. (Hereafter cited as Froissart).

3Froissart, I, 378.

-42-
This incident is not only typical of Froissart's
love of chivalry to the exclusion of any patriotism but also
represents the futility of fighting in small, disorganized
armies. Insubordination was a common occurrence and the
French king's control over his army of knights was loose
indeed. While by mid-fourteenth century the English forces
contained a great number of commoners mostly wielding the
longbow, the armed knights continued to monopolize the war-
fare in France. Their lack of discipline and disobedience
to the king was clearly demonstrated at Crécy in 1346. King
Philip sent out four scouts to gain information about the
enemy. Upon returning they reported that the enemy was well
rested and it would be best to rest the French army over-
'night, for by the time they could organize the men and
prepare them for battle it would be late in the day and the
‘troops would be exhausted. Early in the morning the French
‘would be fresh and have the leisure to prepare for battle.
Philip agreed with this sensible advice and "than the kynge
commaunded . . . Tary and abyde here in the name of God
and.saynt Denys. They that were formast taryed, but they
'that were behynde wolde nat tary, but rode forthe and
sayd hows they wolde in no wyse abyde tyll they were as
.ferr forward as the formast: And whan they before saws
‘them come on behynde, than they rode forward agayne, so that
the kyng nor his marshals coude nat rule them. So they rode
‘without order or good aray, tyll they came in sight of their

-43-
ennemyes; and assone as the formast sawe them, they reculed
them abacke without good aray; whereof they behynde had
marvell and were abasshed. . . ."4 Clearly these nobles
broke their feudal oath of loyalty to King Philip. Since
they were still acting according to the modes of the feudal
system and rules of chivalry, they may be legitimately casti-
gated for this most flagrant violation of duties and sworn
loyalty to their lord the king. Their insubordination and
disunity cost France one of her worst defeats in her long
history.

Perhaps at this point we might clarify some of the
obligations which were required of the nobility in their
relationship with the king. Technically every vassal of
the king, that vessel's vassal, and so forth down the line
owed service to the king for he was considered the supreme
lord within the feudal hierarchy of his kingdom. In this
sense according to feudal theory the kings were the ultimate
source of all political rights and land tenure. The power-
ful princes of the land who were vassals of the king owed
him the same military, monetary, and court services as they
expected from their vassals. Ultimately, however, it was
only through force and military conquest that the king truly
controlled his lands. During the twelfth century the French

monarchs began to consolidate and strengthen their feudal

 

hFroissart, I, 296.

-44-
holdings. The Capetian monarchs gained greater control over
the officials of the household and also asserted greater
authority over local governmental officials. They also ex-
panded their legal power and taxation rights beyond those
ordinarily exercised by feudal lords. Consequently with

the Opening of the fourteenth century the kingship entailed
extensive power above and beyond that held by the average
lord.

The responsibility of the nobility to back the king
as their supreme lord deteriorated greatly during the course
Of the fourteenth century for the French nobles continuously
broke their feudal obligations to their monarch; in many
cases for the most dishonorable reasons. At the very be-
ginning of the war King Edward endeavored to persuade the
Flemish nobility to join his service and they replied "we
‘wolde gladly do this; but, syr, we be bounds by faith and
othe, and on the somme Of two myllyons of floreyns in the
popes chaumbre, that we may make nor move no warre ageynst
the kynge of Fraunce, whosoever it be, on payne to lose
the sayd somme, and besyde that, to ryn in the sentence of
cursyng; but, syr, if ye wyll take on you the armes of
Fraunce, . . . and call your selfe kyng of Fraunce, . . .

than we woll take you for rightful kyng of Fraunce. . . ."5

 

5Froissart, I, 122.

-45-
This Edward willingly agreed to; hence technically
the nobles had not broken their allegiance to the French
monarch. However, one readily perceives their loyalty was
extremely shallow to agree to such a Machiavellian maneuver
as made by Edward even though he did have a claim to the

French throne (his mother was the daughter of Philip IV).
This same type of situation occurred in reverse concerning
John of Hainault and King Philip. The latter endeavored tO'
persuade John to switch his loyalty from England to France
by offering him greater revenues. Sir John finally succumbed
when informed that England would no longer pay him his pen-
sion, even though since early youth he had been in the ser-
vices of the English. King Philip must bear some of the
blame for his flagrant dishonesty; however, John of Hainault
‘took his loyalty rather lightly, if, for purely monetary
reasons, he was willing to switch his allegiance. It is
Inyt so much our concern to deal exclusively with the no-
‘bility‘s allegiance to either France or England but to gain
a general understanding of the apparent superficiality of
'theiur.loya1ty in respect to the state and the willingness
with which they snapped their bonds.

“ Charles the Bad, king of Navarre, in spite of his
marriage to the daughter of King John, was one of the most
notorious hypocrites and traitors the. fourteenth century
produced. He continuously intrigued with Edward III, but

due tn) his powerful holdings in Normandy, so vulnerable to

-46-
invasion by England, John was perpetually forced to capitu-
late to his wishes. Following the capture of John at
Poitiers France was in great turmoil and the people knew
not where to turn for leadership. The royal authority was
reduced to a shadow, as rival factions split the country.
The Estates General was impotent, gaining the support of
Only one of the conflicting factions. Simplifying this
struggle to_its barest essentials, Charles of Navarre
joined Etienne Marcel (the richest man in France who con-
trolled the Third Estate in Paris) in an effort to gain
control Of the French government. Their motives were con-
trary, however, for Marcel wished to reform the government
through the Estates General while Charles sought to be king
and have supreme power in France. The young nineteen year
Old dauphin representing the royal authority Opposed Charles
the Bad and the Estates and eventually in 1359 got the upper
hand in supressing the disorder. Marcel was killed and
Charles was discredited due to his treacherous behavior. In
the meantime King John had signed a humiliating peace which
the dauphin, now supported by the Estates General, refused
to accept. Peace finally ensued in 1360 upon the signing
Of the Peace of Bretigny. These four complicated years
following Poitiers represent one of the most sordid periods
Of France's long history. Royal authority was stultified
with the disunified, irresponsible nobility only making

matters worse. It would take a strong king such as Charles

-h']-
V to revive France.

The young Charles V made great strides in bringing
unity and order to France, but he was still confronted with
the treasonous Charles the Bad. "The king learnt through
the capture of some agents of the King of Navarre that
Charles the Bad had not ceased to play the traitor, and
that in 1370, 1372, and again in 1378, he had negotiated with
the English for the dismemberment of the French kingdom.

All sorts Of crimes-were imputed to him, the last being a
cunningly-laid plot to poison Charles V."6 Finally Bertrand
du Guesclin was sent by the king to subdue Charles the Bad.
Although he received the aid of the English, Charles was
despoiled of most of his domains in France including
.Montpellier. All his principle castles were seized and he
endured the remainder of his days in hOpeless destitution.

On occasion there arose a spark of sincere allegi-
ance to the king, as in the case of the nobles of Gascony
in 1360. Since according to the agreements signed at
Bretigny and Calais Edward III gained control of the duchies
of Guienne and Gascony, it was necessary for King John to
release the nobles from their allegiance to France. This
‘was accomplished but many nobles showed great reluctance

‘oo do so. They appeared to be faithful French subjects.

 

6A. Coville, in The Cambrid e Medieval Histor (New
York and Cambridge, England, I932),'VII, 355.

-48-
Eight years later, after returning to the French fold, these
same knights of Gascony defied Charles V by stating that
if he did not aid them against the Black Prince they would
find some other lord. Since they wielded such great power,
Charles was forced to aid them, paying their expenses and
giving them gifts.

The Companions or Free Companies which formed shortly
after the battle of Poitiers represent knighthood at its
worst. At this point let us limit ourselves only to their
interactions with the kingship. These bands of roving
pillagers were commanded by and formed from knights from
England, Gascony and Germany, left unemployed after the
formal fighting ceased. They roamed at will paying heed
to no one "for all that the kyng of Englandes duputies had
commaunded them to avoyde and to deparfix howbeit, they

."7 For several decades these

wolde hat all obey. .
unmanageable fighters remained in France, causing a general
turmoil and following the orders of neither the king Of
England nor of France. In 1369 a great band of Companions
led by Sir Perducas Dalbreth split away and became French,
while the rest of the band led mainly by Sir Robert Briquet

remained loyal to England.8 Though "loyalty" here is used

 

7

Froissart, II, 86.

8Froissart, II, 262.

-49-
in the most superficial sense, the example is typical of
the unpredictability of these bands of rowdies. Their
"loyalties" were easily channeled from one king to another
in direct relationship to the amount Of pillage and plunder
they expected to receive.

Charles V spent his whole reign undoing the damage
of the previous two Valois kings, making the monarchy a A
more powerful Office than it had ever been before. Upon
his death in 1380 there began a period of fifty years of
factional disputes that rocked the French kingdom almost to
the breaking point. The background Of the ensuing conflict
dates from 1363 when King John made his son, Philip the
Bold, the duke Of Burgundy. Thinking to strengthen France
by making Burgundy a hereditary possession of his son, he
discovered instead that this duchy, under the direction of
Philip, rose to challenge the kingship. Philip allied with
‘the rich province of Flanders through his marriage to
Margaret of Flanders and soon perceived that his interests
differed greatly from those of France.
The new king, twelve year Old Charles VI, was crowned
immediately after his father's death. However, because of
his age and week will the affairs of the kingdom were placed
in a Council Of Twelve, presided over by his extravagant
uncle, the duke Of Anjou. He pilfered the royal treasury
and set out on an adventurous mission to conquer Naples,

where he met his death in 1384. The other three uncles of

-50-
the king (the dukes of Burgundy and Berry were brothers Of
his father and the duke of Bourbon was his mother's brother)
stood ready to assume control of the government. Philip
of Burgundy held the upper hand and it was he who led the
young king against the rebellious Flemings in 1382 in which
the French gained the victory of Roosebeke and Philip van m
Artevelde met his death. The uncles of the king rules in
a manner that would enhance their own private holdings by

manipulating the kingship to serve their own personal

m .1 JH...._‘-. .
1

needs, illustrated best by their extractions from the royal
treasury. "The dukes of Berreyand Burgoyne kepte styll the
governaunce of the realms Of Fraunce, for they had great
profyte therby: they had apoynted suche persones as them

pleased to be about the kyng."9

The duke of Burgundy remained the real head Of the
royal government, pursuing a selfish policy to be regularly
followed by the house of Burgundy. In 1388 probably under
the influence of his brother, Louis, Charles VI announced
to his uncles his intention to rule by himself. His primary
guidance came from the "Marmousets," who were old counsellors
of Charles V; these men were backed by the Constable Clisson
and Louis, duke of Touraine (the king's younger brother).
Things looked bright during the brief period of their rule

as many excellent ordinances were passed, peace was concluded

 

9Froissart, VI, 102.

-51-
with the English, and order and justice returned to the
realm. Charles VI personally set out to reform the abuses
and extortions of the duke of Berry's administration. The
duks's treasurer, Bétizac, was put to death by the constable,
Oliver de Clisson, an act which brought upon him the enmity
of both the dukes of Berry and of Burgundy. In the spring
Of 1392, an old quarrel between the duke of Brittany and
COnstable Clisson flared up once again and led the duke to
engineer a plot designed to assassinate his foe. The king,
who was devoted to his constable, set out to avenge him
even though he had been warned by his physicians not to
travel until he was fully recovered from the sickness that
had struck him in the spring. On a boiling day in August
while riding through the forest of Le Mans, Charles was
startled by the clash Of a page's spear against a steel hel-
met. This capped a series of incidents which sent the
king into a fit of madness.10 While the madness was inter-
mittent, the periods of sanity diminished each year. Once
again the reins of government fell to the powerful princes
'who immediately dismissed all Of the prominent royal coun-
sellors including Clisson.

The power of the dukes of Berry and Burgundy was

hencefbrth challenged by a new force who claimed the leadership

 

10For an excellent account of the immediate sequence
Of events leading up to and following this pitiful scene
read Froissart's (VI, 68-9) colorful description.

-52-
of the Council. This was none other than Louis, the younger
brother of the king, who had just been made duke Of Orleans.
"When the king recovered his sanity, or when the Duke of
Burgundy was in his own domains, the Duke of Orleans, with the
king's partiality and affection to support him, appeared
as master, and the finances and the disposal of favours
were at his command. So there was constant vicissitude in
the government Of the kingdom."11 The lavish spending and
irresponsible actions of the powerful princes only tended
to increase as time went on while the kingship declined just
as fast in the opposite direction. "Indeed, can one still
call it a monarchy, when the kingdom was dominated by a
group of magnates, territorial princes already too powerful,
but insatiably ambitious and eager to acquire the utmost of
the wealth, still great, in the hands of the royal govern-
ment?"12

The rivalry between the Orieanist and Burgundian
factions increased but did not break into violence and civil
'war until John the Fearless replaced his father, upon the
death of the latter in 1404, as head of the house of Burgundy.
The spark which set Off the conflagration occurred in the

form of the cruel murder of Louis of Orleans in 1407 by the

 

11A.Coville, in The C brid e Mediev 1 Hi tor , VII,
373.

12Perroy, The Hundred Ye rs War, p. 219.

--. u—-..-—‘ .a .c'

11 “l .

-53-
Burgundians. Both sides claimed they were on the side of
justice and that it was the other party who was disloyal
and treasonous against the king, but there is much evidence
to show the latter half of this statement was true of both
parties. The common people, more especially the people of
Paris, felt little remorse at the loss of this extravagant
spendthrift but it is interesting to note John's justifica-
tion for having Louis of Orleans done away with. His main
argument as put forth by Jean Petit, a scholar and theologian,
stated that it was lawful for a subject to kill such a dis-
loyal traitor as Louis according to the mandates of divine,
moral, and natural law. In fact Petit argued that it was
honorable and even laudable to kill a tyrant, giving as a

13 Were this argu-

parallel case the death of Julius Caesar.
ment carried to its logical conclusion anarchy would reign
and justice and order would be crushed which in fact was
the case during the years the dispute raged between the
.Burgundians and house Of Orleans (or Armagnacs as they came
‘to be known). Clearly no prince, no matter how powerful,
has the right to arbitrarily exterminate another prince for
'treason, for only the monarch has the prerogative to act in
cases Of‘this sort. One would be naive to believe that the

m of the duke of Orleans was anything more than the

 

13En errand de Monstrelet, The Chronicles Of En-
err' d De ionstrelet, trans. Thomas Johfies (Landon, 1859),
I, 71. (Hereafier cited as Monstrelet).

 

-54-
by-product Of a factional struggle for power, but the justi-
fication is indicative of the self-confidence and feeling
of security which motivated the powerful princes, little
realizing that in continuing their petty struggles they
were only digging their future grave into which would fall
their power and positive role in society.

The royal treasury was being quickly depleted and
dishonesty and scandal were bywords in the French court.
The poor insane king was pitifully neglected while his
princes pilfered the treasury. In 1409 the dukes of Berry,
Burgundy, and Bourbon asked the king for permission to re-
form the finances and dismiss the dishonest officials. One
of the richest, Jean de MOntague, was executed and the
king's gold and silver was confiscated; however, all the
spoils fell back into the hands of the princes.

The Armagnacs and Burgundians embarked upon open
civil war in 1411, paying no attention to the king's efforts
to mediate and secure peace for his realm. The Burgundians

kept large bodies Of‘men-at-arms south of Paris in direct

Opposition to the king's orders to return to their own lands.

In one of his ever diminishing moments of sanity, Charles
'VI proclaimed to the Estates General in February, 1413, that
"having learnt that after this our said cousin of Burgundy
‘was assembling a large body of men-at-arms, we sent one of
the sergeants-at-arms of the parliament with sealed letters

to him, to forbid him to raise any forces whatever.

'c
l:‘—'—‘-"’

-55-
Notwithstanding this, in defiance of the treaty of peace
and of our positive orders, our cousin of Burgundy continued
to assemble men-at-arms and . . . gained possession of our
towns of Compiegne and Soissons . . . also attempted to
gain by force our town Of Senlis. . . ."lh Later that
month the Burgundians marched on Paris itself, ironically
all the time claiming that they were aiding the king.

Not only did the Burgundians disregard the king's
[authority, but prior to Agincourt they defected to the
English. John the Fearless had negotiated with both kings
before the battle and finally ordered his troops to remain
aloof. While he did not directly aid the English, this
‘was a traitorous act against his rightful lord, King Charles
VI. For the next seventy years Burgundy retained a some-
‘what independent status, always playing one side Off against
‘the other until she finally was absorbed by France under
Louis XI.

With his army almost completely destroyed, Charles
\flI was weaker than ever. He continued to admonish the duke
caf Burgundy to cease his acts of agression but his words
went unheeded as John marched on Paris once again in 1418.
hflrile John managed to establish himself in the city, he

seldom made any effort to restore order and subdue the unruly

elements .

 

ll’Monstrelet, I, 289.

-56-

The situation looked more promising in 1419 after
John met with the young dauphin Charles (virtual head Of
the Armagnacs) several times in an effort to make peace.
All hOpe was shattered, however, after the fateful slaying
of John the Fearless on the bridge at MOntereau by some
followers of the dauphin. Immediately the Burgundian suc-
cessor, Philip the Good, turned his support to the English.
After short negotiations the Treaty of Troyes was signed
in May. 1420, between the kings of France and England. The
most significant results lay in the marriage of Henry V to
Catherine of France (daughter of Charles VI), whereby
Henry became the adopted son of Charles VI and heir to the
French throne, superseding the rights of the dauphin, son
of the king and queen of France. Ironically Henry V pre-
ceded Charles VI to the grave, and consequently his one
year old son became Henry VI, king Of England and de jure
king of France though not de facto.

At the funeral of the pitiful Charles VI the only
person of high nobility to attend was John, duke of Bedford,
brother of Henry V and regent fOr Henry VI. An air of com-
plete indifference seemed to reign among the princes and
nobles. However, the continuous intrigue and warfare carried
on between the Armagnacs and Burgundians was for naught.
Not only had the power, prestige, and dignity of the French
crown reached an all-time low, but the crown itself had

been.transferred to foreign soil. France was not meant to

-57-
meet such an end even though fruitless change and disorder
had plagued the government.

In 1423, the duke of Burgundy formed a triple
alliance with the dukes of Bedford and Brittany, throwing
his full support against the dauphin. Monstrelet attacked
Philip for his alliance with the English for Henry VI only
became "king of France through the aid Of the duke of
Burgundy . . . [and] they had sworn to keep peace and friend-
ship between them On the holy sacrament, and had divided
the wafer between them as a pledge of their amity,--which
was a most disgraceful act, and never can be enough con-
demned."l5 The duke of Bedford faced an impossible task
in his efforts to bring the French under the suzerainty of
Henry VI. Upon the defection of the Burgundians and the
death Of the duke of Bedford in 1435, any English hope of
retaining France disintegrated. Philip the Good signed
the Peace Of Arras with Charles VII in which he outwardly
forgave Charles fOr any part he played in the murder of his
.father. .Monstrelet states that the "duke Philip of Burgundy,
from loyalty to the crown of France, and a dislike to see
'the English in possession Of that country, which they were
destroying, at the earnest request and solicitations of

king Charles agreed to a peace, which was signed at

 

l
SMonstrelet, II, 275:

-53-
Arras. . . ."16 Probably a better explanation Of Philip's
action was that he now controlled the Low Countries and
England was no longer such an indispensible ally. Philip
set his own terms in the treaty, exempting himself from
homage to Charles and restoring to himself'much of his
territory and revenue. The duke Of Burgundy had not made
peace fOr any patriotic reasons, for he was intent upon
carving out a kingdom in his own right and this seemed like
the best method to achieve his goal.

It has been claimed that the dessrtion Of the duke
of Burgundy broke England's hold on France, and there is
much truth in this statement. However, the advent of Joan
of Arc six years earlier had a great deal to do with the
'weakening of the English hold and subsequently the strength-
ening of French monarchy. For our purposes her significance
lies in the fact that the nobles shunned and distrusted her,
indicating their fear that she might be the catalyst that
'would unite France and thereby strengthen the monarchy at
their expense. After Charles VII was crowned at Rheims, La
'Tremoille counseled the king not to proceed too rapidly.
UnfOrtunately, the immature monarch listened to this jealous
prince and delayed the maid's attack on Paris thereby com-
promising the campaign. TO a loyal Frenchman this was
:nothing more than treason but to a fearful nobility it was
‘better to have a disunified country than one led by an

 

161Monstrelet, II, 275.

 

-59-
aggressive monarch. Joan of Arc was finally captured by
the Burgundians who traitorously turned her over to the
English. After a year of imprisonment and trials she was
convicted of heresy and burned at the stake in 1431, while
the ungrateful French rulers made no attempt to intercede
in her behalf.

One is amazed to find the lack of attention given
to this famous maiden in such an important chronicle as
Monstrelet's, and there seems little indication that she
inspired the masses or that her fame spread much beyond her
immediate contacts. Her immediate value seemed to lie in
ner military victories while her fame and importance as a
:artyr came much later. The appearance of Joan Of Arc
ruly marks a turning point for thencefOrth the nobility
)st any chance to become a positive force in. either
as French government or French society.

The French kingship had yet to receive some serious
allenges not withstanding Joan of Arc and the Peace of
res. The challenge came from the army captains, every
3 of which was a representative member of the nobility.

captains of King Charles' army, if one can call it such,
ned their energy toward driving the English from France.
ir overpowering motivation was not a strong loyalty to
me as might be expected but a hatred of the English and
size to Obtain plunder and booty from the land. Luckily
people blamed the English for their misfortunes. Sometimes

 

 

-60-
the desire for plunder overpowered the noble captains'

enmity toward the English. The king found it practically

impossible to subject these unruly nobles to his authority,
as Monstrelet so lucidly explained in 1437. "King Charles

of France, in the course of this year learned that many of

his captains were grievously harassing divers parts of his

kingdom, and that they kept large bodies of armed men under

their command to overrun the provinces. The principal

among them was Roderigo de Villandros, who had upwards of

six hundred horse under his orders. The king sent him his

commands to quit his territories immediately, and to make
war on those of the English, but he refused obedience to
:hem."17

When King Charles did endeavor to pass ordinances
.gainst these disobedient nobles and finally to subdue them
y force he naturally met with violent Opposition. The
ebellious captains lacked any real unity or purpose for
1s only thing that even nominally held them together was
Leir mutual fear Of a strong monarchy. This "decimated
d impoverished nobility proved their impotence in the
alitions they attempted between 1437 and 1442, of which
3 most important, the Praguerie, fell to pieces almost
‘ectly, despite the support of the dauphin himself."18

17Monstrelet, II, 74.

18The Enc clo aedia Britannica, 11th ed. (Cambridge,
Land, 1915), X, 82);.

 

 

 

 

 

 

-61-

The Praguerie took place in 1440 and was led by Charles I,

the duke of Bourbon. He and his bastard brothers, Alexander

and Georges ds la Tremoille, the dukes of Brittany and

Alencon, several mercenary captains, plus the dauphin (the

future Louis XI) all rebelled against the king. Due to the

energy of the king's officers and the loyalty Of the Con-

stable de Richemont and Xantrailles the uprising was quickly

crushed and civil war averted. The king won the loyalty

of the duke of Bourbon by giving him a pension; the remainder

of the rebellious gentry were forgiven and his son installed

in Dauphine. Hereafter the French nobility was more pliable

in the hands of King Charles and the only real threat to a
unified France lay with the duke of Burgundy.
The duke of Burgundy continued to remain aloof and

independent of France throughout the reign of Charles VII.

.‘he Burgundian policies had worked to the detriment of
’rance since the days of Philip the Bold's intrigues against

harles VI. Their treasonous action at Agincourt and their

id to the English under Bedford's regency exemplify the

leoyal nobility at their very worst. As Charles VII be-

in to grow wiser and gain strength many of his disloyal

»bles were brought under control. However, the duke of

rgundy with strong leadership could have brought the French
bility into a position of responsibility and power had

been wise enough to see that unity of purpose was the

Ly path to survival. Early in the reign of King Louis XI ,

‘flflowuafiwn ~.‘

 

-62-
.the dukes of Berry and Brittany and the count of Charolois

(Charles the Bold, next duke of Burgundy) formed a weak

alliance called the League of the Public Weal. In‘ 1465

they descended upon Paris demanding the city, the distribu-
tion of the offices of the realm, the person of the king
and governance of the same, and the immediate convocation

of the three estates. While they had less chance of achiev-

ing these goals than had the English under the leadership

‘_-i_r _‘ Q any

”L“

of Simon de Montfort in the thirteenth century, with strong

“L.n...b..4

leadership it could have been accomplished. However,

"Francis II of Brittany and Charles the Bold were not anxious

so much to share in the government as to be left independent

in their own principalities; moreover, they were mediocre
statesmen, and the same is true of John of Anjou and the

Duke of Bourbon. The men of real ability were not princes

Lnd so could not direct the policy of the League.”-9

These princes camped outside of Paris and had they
een unified they could have easily taken the city. Philip
3 Commines, truly the greatest historian in the fifteenth
entury, gives us an excellent description of the situation
tween the king and the princes as they threatened Paris.
e "admission of the princes would not“ only have been the

ans of gaining the town, but of finishing the whole

19Charles Petit-Dutaillis, in The Cambridge Medieval
torz (New York, 1936), VIII, 282. “’

-63-
enterprise; for the whole peOple would, for several reasons,
have easily gone over, in imitation of their example, to
their side, and by consequence the whole kingdom would have

revolted. But God gave the king wise counsel, and he exe-

cuted it vigorously; being informed of all their secret

practices and cabals. . . ."20 Had the princes entered,

a-
(
i
)

the city would have revolted and Louis would admittedly have

retired to Dauphiné where his nobles were loyal. With the

support of the petty nobility who remained loyal to the
king, he was able to win several decisive battles but he
failed to crush the Burgundian forces. Peace was tempor-
arily concluded at Conflans in October, 1465, at which time
the Burgundians gained additional territory.

Charles the Bold continued to threaten the king-

ship; however, this courageous but foolish prince was no

zatch for the crafty and treacherous Louisa Charles finally

,et his end in a rather ignoble fashion while fighting the
wise in 1477. With his death the house of Burgundy dis-

1tegrated and the French nobility had nowhere to turn for
:adership but to the king. Occasionally there were to be
ken uprisings of the nobility but for all intents and

rposes the princes hereafter remained a docile and weak

gment of French society.

20Philip de Commines, Lhe Menoige of Phili De
mines Lord of Argenton, ed. Andrew R. Scob'le, esq. (London,
5), I, 51. (Hereafter cited as Commines).

IT—"‘

 

 

 

 

--— -H :—

 

-64-

Ihuing the two centuries when the nobility in France
were reacting to monarchy, the king intermittently strength-
ened his position at their expense. Some useful insights
into the decline of the nobility can be achieved by very
briefly analyzing the steps which entrenched the French
monarchy so firmly in power. As early as Philip Augustus
the monarchy began to rise above the other princes. "Philip,
more definitely than any of his predecessors, established
the principle that the feudal hierarchy culminates in the
king who is nobody's vassal."21 The feudal nobility were
first weakened by the restrictions placed by Louis IX and
Philip IV on their right to wage private war. Philip the
Fair gained judicial power at the expense of the nobles and
also attempted to set up a permanent tax system. The Estates
Jeneral was formulated in order to lend support to Philip's
>olicies but he relied most heavily on the rising middle
:lass. ‘With the advent of the Hundred Years' War it was
.ecessary for Philip VI to appeal to the Estates General
or more revenue which he proposed in the form of a gabelle
r salt taxu Due mainly to the weak support of the nobility,
he Estates General were not not effective in restraining
1e king's power of taxation. "Unlike the English parlia-

ents, vfltich vigorously demanded concessions of the royal

2lCharles Petit-Dutailis, The Feudal Monarch 'in
ence and En land from the Tenth to the Thirteenth éen:
ries (London, 1935), p. 201.

 

 

I‘_H _-_-\ .v
|

 

-55-
prerogative and imposed limitations upon the crown in return
for grants of taxes and subsidies, thereby laying the foun-
dations of parliamentary government in England, the French
states general pliably yielded to the demands of the king,
and so forfeited the opportunity which the war gave to
establish the elements of constitutional government in
France."22 The gabelle became permanent in 1356 but due
to the series of weak Valois kings the power to tax was not
properly utilized. Even such a strong and wise monarch as
Charles V weakened on his death bed and revoked the hearth-
tax. This action cleared his conscience but deprived his
successors of a large portion of their revenue. Due to the
popular uprisings against the burdensome taxation the yOung
King Charles VI's uncles were 8130 fOrced to repeal the
gabelle. Taxes, however, still were not light as Froissart
analyzed them in 1386. "They that were ryche men in the
~oyalme of Fraunce, to the ayde of this voyage were taxed
Lnd tayled to the iii. and iiii. parts Of theyr goodes;

Lnd many payde more then they were worth besyde, to accom-

>lysshe the payment for men of warre."23
The French monarchy flOundered through the reign of

harles VI with inadequate finances due to the lack of power

 

22 '
Thompson, Economic Histo , p. 105.

23Froissart, IV, 306.

'1

’ Puqrmku-ib-NL. - - . " Q‘
,.
v. 7?

-66-
to tax and the great loss resulting from embezzlement by
the influential princes. At the beginning of the reign of
(Hmufles VII the condition of the government remained impov-
erished in the hands of this weak-willed king, so slow to
mature. With the advent of Joan of Arc and especially after
the Peace of Arras Charles was free to carry out a program
of reform. Having matured and grown much wiser and more
courageous Charles set out to subdue the rebellious ecorcheurs
and finally put down the uprising of nobles in Poitou known
as the Praguerie. With order temporarily restored Charles
began a series of ordinances which were to give the king-
ship in France absolute power, for "the future of the mon-
archy depended above all on its power of obtaining money,
and consequently hired troops, by means of taxation of a
general character."24 The two keystones of the power of
the nobility were their control of the royal finances through
the Estates General and their monopoly in the royal army
30th of which were to be swept away.

The first ordonnance was initiated by the Constable
lichemont in 1439 aimed at the abuses committed by the mili-
,ary forces,more especially the abuses of the captains. Feudal
'arfare was virtually banished as royal authority took over

he function of raising troops and declared that companies

 

IT‘

2“Ch-V. Langlois, Medieval France' A Com anion to
gench Studies, ed. Arthur TiIIey (Cambridge, England, I922),

. 75.

 

1 .s .
J
F

I‘MIh-“ N“ / ~1-

-67-

could not move without royal authorization, thereby supress-

ing private warfare and roving bands of pillagers. Charles

slowly purged the unwanted routiers from the army and after
signing a truce with the English in 1441+. he was able to

proceed to his next large reform measure which created a

standing army. These measures created the mounted segment

of the army and in the famous ggdonnance of 1448 the Francs-
Archers were formed, thereby supplying France with an in-

fantry. These "free archers" were a tax exempt, well trained

group of bowmen upon whom the king could depend.
One does not raise a standing army without a per-

manent means of taxation and this Charles accomplished with

the taille, a direct tax assessed on the basis of landed

Monstrelet described the army and new permanent
"He always kept

property.
tax structure of Charles in these terms:
>n foot fifteen hundred lances, and from five to six thou-

:and archers, on regular pay,--namely, for each man-at-arms

.nd three horses fifteen florins, royal money, and for each

rcher seven florins, per month. These sums were raised

y taxes on the inhabitants of the good towns and Villages,

id, in common, so punctually collected that there was

:arcely any delay in the payments."25
The nobility, realizing their position was being

25
Monstrelet, II, 275.

 

“'-

-68-

undermined, reacted by requesting that Charles obtain his

taxes from the Estates General. By 1440 when this request

was submitted, the king was well on his way to becoming

absolute and no longer needed to consider the requests of
They had failed to unify and
Now this

Once

his princes so seriously.
secure their position when the kingship was weak.

king could easily afford to refuse their demands.
again Monstrelet gives an excellent summary of the viewpoints

of both the king and the nobles.

It has been advanced, that before any taxes be laid,
the king should call together the three estates of the

realm, to consult with them and have their opinions
to this: the taxes have been laid

thereon. In repl
hese lords with their consent,--and

on the lands of t
as for the other impositions, the king, when there

has been an opportunity, has called these together,
and shown them, of his royal authority, the urgent
state of his kingdom, when great part was occupied by
his enemies. There can be no need for calling the
three estates to lay on taxes,--for this would only
add to the expenses of the poorer peOple in paying
the deputies' Charges for coming and going; and many
lords of great weight have, in consequence, required
that such convocations should cease, and were satis-
fied that prOper warrants should be issued in the
king's name for the raising of these taxes. In re-
spect, however, to the affairs of the nation, the
king is bounden to consult with the princes of his
blood in preference to all others, considering how
much they are interested in its welfare ,--and this
has been usually done by the most christian kings,
his predecessors. Item, the nobles have requested
the king to preserve to them their prerogatives and
authorities which they hold, as well from their
peerage as from the other lggdships they possess

within the realm of France.

26Monstrelet, II, 122.

-69- '
Here the nobility demonstrated their fear of being deprived
of their prerogatives, which despite the kings assurances,
was the very thing the monarchy had set out to accomplish.
After several years of relative peace with the
English, Charles, now backed by a new, well organized armed

force, was able to renew the war in 1449 and push the Eng-

lish completely Off the continent except for the small

port area of Calais. His successor, Louis XI, had yet to

subdue the duke of Burgundy, the chief foe to French unity,

before France could be classified a nation.
Louis was not a typical medieval monarch and has

been aptly called the "spider king" because of his crafty
and sometimes treacherous methods. Like Philip the Fair
he aligned himself with the bourgeoisie from whom he Obtained

the financial support necessary to increase the size of

his permanent army which contained an increasing number of

Naturally the old aristocracy was weakened by

mercenaries.
With

such methods and feudalism finally ended for good.
the power of private warfare and consequently the power to

pillage and plunder outlawed, the princes and lesser nobles
turned to the king for financial support, thereby exchanging

their independence and prerogatives for privileges bestowed

upon them by the king.
Louis met a strong challenge to his authority in

the person of the count of Charolois, known as Charles the

Bold, duke of Burgundy after the death of his father in 1467.

-70-
Louis and Charles were diametrically opposed in every respect.

Charles thought of having a half dozen separate monarchs in
Charles

France, while Louis strove for one absolute king.

was extravagant, romantic and chivalrous while Louis was
The

thrifty, calculating and businesslike in his dealings.
courage of Charles cannot be doubted and at times he held

Louis tightly in his grasp, as the Pe’ronne affair exempli-

However, in the long run the wily monarch proved

fies.
much superior to this foolish prince who met such a useless
Philip de Commines

death against the Swiss pikemen in) 1477.
"as for

candidly described his former lord in these terms:
the Count of Charolois, when he was Duke of Burgundy, and
fortune had‘exalted him'to a greater height of glory and
honour than ever any of his family had arrived at, and made
him so great, that he thought no prince in Christendom equal
to him, God was pleased to put a stop to his glory, and to
infatuate him so, that, despising all counsel but his own,
he lost his own life unhappily, sacrificed the lives of
many thousands of his subjects, and brought his family to

desolation, as is now visible to all the world."27
The "balance of power" in France was now decisively

Louis had recovered the duchy of Guienne upon

altered.
he death of his brother, the house of Anjou was extinct,

'—

27Commines, I, 68-9.

-71-

and the count d'Armagnac had been killed. Now with the
duke of Brittany under control and with the fall of the
house of Burgundy Louis reigned supreme. His major blunder
was in his failure to tie Burgundy to France by a marriage
alliance between Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold, and

a member of the royal family. While he retained the duchy
of Burgundy, the valuable province of Flanders and the Low
Countries reverted to Maximilian of Austria upon the latter's
marriage to Mary of Burgundy. Hereafter these lands were
lost to the French domain.

Louis virtually ended feudalism in France, striking
the final blow in the long decline of the nobility. When
Charles the Bold died so did organized chivalry for here-
after the knights were dependent upon the king. TO grasp
the nature of the downfall of the feudal nobles it is in-
dispensable to analyze their interactions with the monarchy
but this is only a part of the story. There was also an
interior deterioration within the ranks Of both the powerful
princes and the petty nobles, plainly perceived in their

failure to meet their feudal and chivalrous obligations
and their diminishing lack of purpose.

ninth (IN-J 4 fl»-

'r‘P-fl‘ ‘
V

 

CHAPTER III

INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NOBLES

During the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, the nobility in France increasingly failed to
fulfill their feudal Obligations-and those imposed upon
them by the code of chivalry. It is relatively simpler to
point out the deterioration of the feudal bonds than to
demonstrate the degeneration of chivalry. Since the latter
represents an ideal, it is extremely difficult to state
anything specific about it. However, keeping in mind the
obligations a knight pledged himself to uphold as put forth
in Chapter I, there is ample evidence to show that chivalry
was transformed during the course of the Hundred Years' War
from an honorable approach to society to that of a strictly
utilitarian one. Following the crusades the knights seemed
to lose their sense of purpose and function and during the
course of the Hundred Years' War little or no attempt was
made to adhere to the ideals of chivalry.

In the early Middle Ages the feudal nobles and
robber barons were readily distinguishable. The latter
were suppressed and hated by the honorable members of chiv-

alry. During the Hundred Years' war the feudal nobles and

F.

F
I

robber barons became almost as one and those not falling ing]

-72-

-73-
the latter category did little or nothing to suppress those ‘
who continuously robbed and pillaged the people and the land //
in France. Pillage truly became a byword in France and the (
fOremost occupation of the nobility. Since the profit motive )
was not a respectable reason to fight, the knight talked Of /)
fighting for glory. While the petty nobility were primarily
responsible for the pillaging to which we shall draw atten-
tion, the powerful princes such as the Black Prince, and

the dukes of Berry, Bourbon, and Burgundy were equally guilty
for either sanctioning their actions or doing nothing to
suppress this destructive element of society. Once again

many commoners joined with the nobles but the fault nec-
essarily lies with the latter for they took upon themselves

an oath to perform certain functions in society and restrain
themselves from other actions; they were supposedly the
leaders to whom the commoners could look fOr guidance and

yet in too many cases the commoner fulfilled the principles
for which the knight stood better than the knight himself.

The primary chronicler of the fourteenth century,
Froissart, eulogized chivalry but his passion for a minute
account of scenes and characters and all the glitter of
chivalry led him to report incidents very much in conflict
with the knightly ideal. Whether he did not realize these
contradictions or he was indulgent to the knights' faults
is not of major concern here. However, we can safely

assume that the actions of the knights were as bad and probably

-7g-
worse than Froissart represents them to us. He shows little
emotion over the destruction arising out of the war and
talks continuously Of the burning of towns and countryside,
the robberies, and the despoiling of numerous churches.
Froissart gives one Of his most typical statements when he
tells how "there was done many feates of armes [and] . . .
they hurt dyvers assaylantes [while] . . . ther were dyvers
slayne and hurt, and the base court wonne and brent. . . ."1
An eminent medieval historian has described the war as
chronicled by Froissart in these terms: "It is all beauti-
fully pointless and adventurous, and carried out in the
spirit of a knighthood that loves fighting and seeks honour
and adventure, while steadying itself with a hope of plunder
and reward."2 '

During the turbulent Hundred Years' War there arose
bands of Free Companies which best exemplify knights turned
plunderers. These Companions, as we shall hereafter refer
to them, arose mainly from the unemployed men-at-arms turned
loose after the battle at Poitiers and were led chiefly by
English, Navarrese, and Gascon captains who felt little re-
sponsibility to any authority, least Of all to their obli-
gations as knights. These "compayons spredde abrode all
about the countre, [and] . . . dyde moche hurt and yvell,

 

l
Froissart, III, 132.

2Taylor, Medigevgl Mind, I, 568.

-75-
as well in the lands of their frendes as on their ennemyes."3
It will be most fruitful to follow the escapades of several
of these captains in order to demonstrate that they were
captains and men of nobility and secondly that they failed
miserably to follow any policy but one of immediate gain
through plunder.

Sir Robert Knolles, Sir Bertucat d'Albret, and Sir
Robert Briquet exemplify excellently the utilitarian segment
of the nobility who gained their livelihood not as honor-
able knights but by ransoms, sometimes extracted from a
whole village, and plunder from the 1and.h Though all their
backgrounds are English their loyalties fluctuated frequentlv-
Consequently they will be treated among the degenerate no-
bility in France. Robert Briquet represents one of the
_ captains leading a group of sixteen-thousand Companions in
1361. In electing the captains "they gathered themselfe
toguyther, and made~amonge themselfe news capitaynes, and
take by election the worste and moost unhappy personne Of
theym all. . . ."5 Briquet helped lead these rebel bands
in cruel pillaging raids in the area of the Somme River near

Lyons. Three years hence Briquet was joined by Robert

 

3Froissart, II, 371.

hFroissart refers to Knolles as Robert Canoll and
d'Albret as Perducas Dalbreth.

5Froissart, II, 78.

-76-
Knolles in the service Of Louis of Navarre. While they
fought fiercely against the French, much needless destruc-
tion was inflicted upon Auverne as they overran this terri-
tory.

One of the major enterprises these captains engaged
in was the battle over Castile. Many Companions, including
Briquet, joined du Guesclin in his effort to place Henry
Trastamara upon the throne of Castile. In 1365 "these men
of warre were to the nombre of xxx. thousands, and ther
were the chefs capitayns of the companyons, as sir Robert
Briquet. . . ."6 After ousting Pedro the Cruel and placing
Henry upon the throne of Castile, the Black Prince decided
he must endeavor to aid Pedro. He called together his cap-
tains, many of whom were in the service of du Guesclin, and
he was also joined by many Companions including Briquet who
left the forces of the French. Also leading this expedition
were "sir Robert Canoll, . . . Sir Perducas Dalbreth, . . .
and all the other of the companyons, and they were a ten
thousands horse; [and] . . . they lay styll thus about
Panpylone the space of thre dayes, bycause they founde the
countre plentyfull, bothe in fleshe, breed, wyne, and all
other purveyaunces, for them and for their horses. Howbeit
these companyons payed nat for every thynge as was demaunded

of them, nor they coude nat absteyns fro robbynge and

 

——

6Froissart, II, 154.

-77-
pyllyng that they coude get. . . ." The king Of Navarre,
an ally of the Black Prince, soon regretted his decision to
let these troops cross his land for they caused inestimable
damage. "For he parceyvsd well howe he hadde therby more
hurt than profyte [and] . . . he saws well and consydered
that he was net as thane mayster of his owns countre." He
received many complaints from the people of his country
and "he caused some of his counsayle, suche as knewe well
these companyons . . . to desyre them to absteyn themselfe
fro robbying and pillynge the countre as they dyde;

to whome they promysed so to do."7 This behavior by the
Companions is not the exception or an exaggeration but an
understatement of their action if anything. Because they
‘were paid there is less excuse fOr the plundering. One
finds few if any of the qualities of a good knight in these
men. Yet on this very campaign, Robert Briquet was one Of
about a dozen Companions who were dubbed knights by such
illustrious figures as the Black Prince, John Chandos, and
the duke of Lancaster.

In 1369, the year that Charles V resumed the war
with England, the loyalty of the Companions vacillated once
again between the French and the English. Sir Bertucat
d'Albret had been literally purchased by the duke of Anjou

7Froissart, II, 190.

-73..

to turn French which he and a group of Companions had will-
ingly done. Robert Knolles, who had just been made "mayster
and chyefe soveraygne of all the knyghtes and squyers of
hys [The Black Prince's] courts, bycause of his valoure
and noble chyvalrie . . ."8 was able to persuade d'Albret
to return to the English fold. With the Companions united
behind the English, destruction and warfare reigned supreme
once again. At this point in history, Froissart relates
one of the most sordid episodes which occurred during the
entire war. He reveals in shocking detail the misguided
leadership of the powerful princes and the destructive methods
by which they suggested the Companions make their living.

Sir John Chandos and Sir Thomas Felton were obliged
temporarily to turn over command of their troops to Sir
Robert Knolles in order to keep a prearranged meeting with
the Black Prince. They perceived it would be necessary to
precipitate a war to keep the Companions occupied during
their absence, so they ordered Knolles and d'Albret to
"assemble you, toguyder with your companyes, and entre
into the marchesse of Lymosyn and Auvergne, and make ther
warre; for without warr ye cannat lyve. . . ."9 Froissart
does not seem to understand the implications of this state—

ment for it demonstrates so precisely the true motivating

 

8Froissart, II, 279-80.

9Froissart, II, 289.

-79-
force of the nobility, fighting not for honor or defense of
a fief but blatantly precipitating warfare in order to supply
their men compensation and sustenance through pillage and
plunder. Truly the nobility was miserably failing to ful-
fill their duties. Even Froissart admits that "these people
assembled them togyther, and entred into the realms of .3
Fraunce, without any tytell of reason, wherby ensued mortall ‘
and email war-re, greater than was before: these companyons

called the realms of Fraunce their chambre. . . ."10 Knolles,

1hw-_Mo -r- ".
0

d'Albret, and Briquet continued to lead a useless existence
for another two decades, finally meeting death by the sword
by which they lived.
Suprisingly enough, Froissart, with all his love of
chivalry, admits that he was a captain in the ranks of a
disorganized group of Companions during the year 1388. "Than
all war of men of warre and poore companyons drewe to-
guyder, and the capitayns tooke counsayle what they shulde
10: and than they sayde, Thoughe these two kynges [English
nd French] have taken peace toguyder, yet we muste lyve.
an they wente into Burgoyne, and there were capitayns
all nacyons, Englysshe, Gascons, Spanyardes, Naveroise,
ayns, Scottes, and all maner of nacyons, and there I

as a capitayne."ll After their formation Froissart

 

l‘.

lOFroissart , VI , 167.

ll‘Froissart, IV, 152.

-80-

relates how they went on to gain great profit through their
exploits. Briquet also served in this campaign which turned
out to be his last as he met his death near Sanxsre.

The Companions were surely not the only knights
failing to meet their obligations as can readily be seen
by the behavior of Sir Arnaud de Cervale. Serving as a
captain of men-at-arms in the French king's service since
about 1350, this knight, sometimes known as the Archpriest,
served King John bravely at Poitiers. A year after this
he appears in a much different role when "he assembled
togyder a great company of men of warr of dyvers contrees
suche as lacked wages in other places . . . and robbed all
the countrey to Avygnone, and they had none other capitayns
but this knight. . . ."12 Five years later he is fighting
beside James of Bourbon for the cause of justice and France
against the cruel Companions. Froissart hailed him as "a
good and an expert knyght. . . ."13 However, in 1363 he set
out on another adventure which makes Froissart's last state-
ment look most doubtful. "The so-called Archpriest and his
Bretons . . . went on to plunder Burgundy . . . [and] they
inflicted many injuries on that land and on all wayfarers
there. Men could travel only with difficulty and at the
risk of being robbed and could defend themselves only at

 

12Froissart, I, 399.

13Froissart, H. 83. "

 

-81...
the risk of being killed."ll' Though the Archpriest did
appear brave and good on occasion, the above incidents are
representative of the typical behavior of an average noble.
Even the illustrious "Duguesclin was no more than
a captain of routiers, fond of pillage and raids; but he
surpassed his fellows by his iron authority and the strict ‘h
discipline be imposed on his mercenaries."15 This unorthodox
Breton fulfilled his natural role when leading the Companions
to Castile to help oust Pedro the Cruel. He truly was no ‘
better than the rest of the pillagers, constantly violating :i
his duties as a knight. However, it shall later be demon-
strated that his unorthodox methods made him a most success-
fu1 captain.

During the turbulent reign of Charles VI, the no-
bility continued to degenerate. New bands of men were
formed called routiers and efigrcheurs but their motives
rere basically the same as the Companions. Our richest
ource, Monstrelet, shows much similarity to Froissart in
at he also eulogized chivalry, not seeming to realize
2t the actions of the knights directly contradicted the
age for which they stood. In his prologue he discusses

desolation of the churches, towns, cities, and fortresses

 

lh'Jean de Venette, The Chronicles of Jean de Venette
;. Jean Birdsall, ed. Wchard A. New a New—YTor ,‘I§5"§5,
-1... (Hereafter cited as Venette).

lsPerroy, The Hundred Years W r, p. 11.9.

-82-
and in the next breath admonishes the knights to be valiant
men and perform deeds of courage. Like Froissart, Monstrelet
entails a bundle of inconsistencies for he was a member of
the new free companies which were organized after the battle
of Agincourt. These "bands of armed ruffians harried the
countryside. . . . Some of these bands were well organized
like the Free Companies in the previous century. The leader
of one of them was no less a person than Enguerran de Mon-
strelet, the historian, who made a fortune as a freebooter,
retired to private life, and took to letters."16
Many men of princely blood were named among the
captains of these robbers. Monstrelet relates the names
and mischievous deeds committed by these nobles. These are
too numerous to treat in detail so let us examine the per-
formance of only a few who are illustrative.
In lhlé

. . . different companies were formed of nobles or

others, but attached to the party of the duke of

Burgundy, . . . the principal leaders were, St.

Mauroy de St. Leger, sir Jennet de Poix, his brother

David, the lord de Sores in Beauvoisis, . . . and

numbers of others, who . . . invaded the territories

of France. . . . In these parts they committed every

sort of ravage, plundering the property, and making

the inhabitants prisoners, as would be done to a coun-

try against which war had been declared. There were

also other companies, formed by captains under pretence

of their attachment to the duke of Burgundy; such as
sir Gastellin, a Lombard knight, Jean de Gaingy, . . .\

 

6Thompson, Economic Histor , p. 307.

-33-

and others, who amounted to two thousand horsemen.

. . . They fer a long time quartered themselves on

323 2255321332Sm‘iicfii‘ii‘i‘fiybfiih‘fiil as ”W?" and

Throughout the period of the regency of the duke

of Bedford, Normandy was rocked by the blows of a group of
roving brigands. Some have conjectured that these men were
patriots endeavoring to undermine the power of the English
but this has been disproven after closer analysis of this
period.18 Since traitors were beheaded, brigands hung,
and those convicted of both crimes were gibbeted after
being beheaded, it is significant that there were recorded
many more cases of the latter two types of execution. Miss
Rowe validly demonstrated that the Norman robbers sought
only plunder and were punished accordingly as brigands not
French loyalists. The chief significance of these bands
lies in the fact that many of the participants belonged to
the petty nobility. "By 1&26 the countryside . . . was
infested by bands of 'poor gentlemen' [who became] . . .
'robbers by day and by night'. In Normandy 'for fear of the
brigands', was the cry that echoed on all sides; travelling

became utterly unsafe; any sudden outcry in a village

Spelled 'brigands' to the villagers. . . . The band commanded

—

l7
Monstrelet, I, 355.

18See B. J. H. Rowe, ”John Duke of Bedford and the

Norman 'Brigands'," English Historical Review, XLVII (1932),
PP. 583-600. (Here ter c te as owe, " orman Brigands.”

-34-
by Guillaume Halls may be taken as typical. He recruited
his forces with ne'erAXLweels of all sorts, and made war,
if war it might be called,by terrorizing the local peasants."19
The captains of these bands were nothing more than
penniless knights and squires called very aptly routiers.
"All Languedoc groaned under the ravages of such routier
captains as Guilhem.Valette, de Bathhasar, Jean d'Apchier,
de Psyre, Ramonet de Guerra, and above all Rodrigue de
Villandrandro, adventurers nominally in the pay of the
French king who pillaged the country at will, and whose
standards became the rallying point fer all the desperadoes
of the South."20

After the Peace of Arras the pillaging grew worse
due to greater numbers of unemployed soldiers. Much of
the nobility acted in an irresponsible fashion, desiring
only to pillage and to be divorced of all authority. As
indicated previously the nobility was finally brought under
control by Charles VII and Louis 1:131

The princes and petty nobles not only condoned or
directly pursued pillage to the exclusion of honOr but they
disregarded their feudal and moral obligations in various

other ways. Infidelity, dishonesty, treachery, and trickery

19Rowe, "Norman Brigands," p. 588.

20Rowe, "Norman Brigands," p. 598.

21See Chapter II, pp. 60-3.

-85-

are terms indicative of their actions. During the early
years of the war, Henry of Penfort was captured by the earl
of’Mountfort near the city of Rennes, the former thereafter
swearing homage and fealty to his new lord. Shortly there-
after the earl endeavored to take Hanybont, the strongest
castle in Brittany, by force of arms. Since Henry's brother
was governor of this castle, he proposed to his new lord
that he proceed with a small force of men carrying the
banner of Brittany so that his brother would let him enter
the castle.

Than sir Henry Penfort departed with his company

apoynted, and ageynst evenynge, he came to Hanybont,

and whan his brother, Olyver Penfort, knewe of his

commyng, he Opyned the gates and let hym entre,

wenynge he had ben come to have ayded hym, and so

came and mette his brother in the strete. Assone as

sir Henry saw hym, he aproached to hym, and toke hym

by the arms, and sayd, Olyver, ye ar my prisoner.

Howe so, quoth he, I have put my trust in you, thynk-

yng that ye were come hyther to ayde me to kepe this

towns and castell. Brother, quoth sir Henry, the mater

gothe nat so: I take possession of this towns for 22

therele Mountfort, who is nowe duke of Bretayne. . . .
One would have to look hard to find such flagrant treachery
a century earlier, but in the fourteenth century behavior
of this sort was common.

Another instance of dishonesty and treachery occurred

during a campaign in 136A led by an illustrious knight, Sir
Boucicaut, marshall to the duke of Normandy. His objective

was to seize the castle and town of Maunt in Navarre. He

22Froissart, I, 176.

-86..
devised a plan whereby he would hide his troops near the
city, place in ambush those of Sir Bertrand du Guesclin,
who was aiding him, and approach the town with only ten men.
He then appealed to those in the town to let him enter but
he was refused entry. Sir Boucicaut next explained that
the free companies of Rolebosse, their common enemy, had
pursued furiously him and his men, putting them in great
need of refurbishing and succor. He swore on his faith
not to injure the townsmen and claimed his mission was
only to subdue the Rolebosse, whereupon they of Maunt
opened the gate and let them enter. Then ”sir Boucequaut
drewe him to a logyng and unarmed him, therby to apease them
of the towns, and that they shuld nat mystrust; but than
sir Bertram and his company came galoppyng and entred into
the towns, and cryed Saynt Ives Clesquy, to the dethe all
the Naveroyse; and so entred into the logynges, and pylled
and robbed all that ever they founde, and take prisoners,
and slewe whom they lyst."23 In our modern age the Machiavellian
approach pervades much of our action, especially warfare.
However chivalry' during the.Middle Ages imposed a much
more strigent criterion. Force, it is true, was the ultimate
means but farce tempered by honesty and imposed with honor.
Certainly by the fourteenth century, honesty and trust-

worthiness no longer characterized the nobility in France.

 

2
3Froissart, II, th—S.

 

 

-87..

The loyal, dutiful squire no longer obeyed his lord
with the undying fidelity of earlier times. Froissart
wrote on numerous occasions of squires betraying their lords.
‘ In one instance the squire of the earl of Ventadore, who
was "a good peasable man," treacherously betrayed his lord
to Geffray Tetenoyre, a "moost cruell knight," causing the
lord to lose his castle and possessions.2’* This is as clear
a case of infidelity as one can find anywhere.

Ambushing of knights became a more prevalent means
()1? conquest. Instead of fighting an honest battle, it be-
came only too common to way-lay an unwitting band of knights.
The rules of warfare also prescribed that a lord must not
attack the lands of a man whom he held as prisoner. Sur-
prisingly the usually moderate duke of Bedford committed
an unprecedented act for a gallant knight by laying seige
to Orleans while he held Charles of Orleans a captive.

Even the gallant Charles the Bold was not above
discretion. Due to certain transgressions committed by the
Constable of France, Louis XI wished to capture and execute
him. Charles, who knew of Louis' wish, also bore a mortal
hatred against the Constable. Still, he assured the Con-
stable upon his word of honor that he would protect him,
whereupon he promptly turned the Constable over to Louis.

For "though the duke had just reason to bear a mortal hatred

__—

 

2l’Froissart, III, 60.

-88..
tagainst the constable, and to pursue him even to death, yet
he should have done it without breaking his faith. . . .025
Commines further states that there was no "necessity for
‘the Duke of Burgundy, who was so potent a prince and of
such an illustrious and honourable family, to have given
him his protection in order to imprison him; and without
dispute, it was the highest act of injustice and severity
imaginable to deliver him up to a person who, he was sure,
would put him to death, especially upon the account of
avarice. After this dishonourable action the duke's good

fortune was strangely altered. . . ."26

Not only had the
duke broken his word but done so out of avarice in order
to seize the Constable's rich lands in Lorraine.

Courtesy, being one of the chief tenets of chivalry,
had a tendency to temper the cruelties of warfare, and with
some success during the first period of the Hundred Years'
war. Sir Thomas Holand, a one-eyed English knight, demon-
strated great courtesy in the seige of Cane when he "mounted
agayne on his horse and rode into the streates, and saved

many lyves of ladyes, damosels, and cloysterers fro defolyng
for the soudyers were without mercy."27 Froissart makes

 

25Commines, I, 327.

26Commines, I, 297-

2
7Froissart, I, 284.

~89-

a great point of the courtesy shown the prisoners taken by
the French compared to the cruelty of the Germans. While
in retreat the French "ledde with them their prisoners,
and raunsomed theym courtesly, in lyke maner as was acustomed
bytwene the Englysshmen and Frenchmen."28

Real as these examples are they represent only a
small segment of the nobility. Page after page of the late 7

medieval chroniclers is devoted to stories of inhuman

atrocities, increasing cruelties and decreasing show of

 

courtesy. At the battle of Crécy the English commoners J
went around "with great knyves, and they went in among the
men of armes, and slewe and murdredde many as they lay

on the grounds . . . wherof the kyng of Englande was after
dyspleased, for he had rather they had bene taken prisoners."29
It was not that Edward III abhorred the cruelty of murder—

ing helpless knights on the ground but for every one killed

he lost the ransom money.

Cruelty to prisoners actually increased during the
fourteenth century. Upon one occasion about one thousand J
French prisoners were slain by their English and Portugese
captors.30 The courageous knight would not undertake such

a vile action as to murder his noble captives in cold blood;

 

28Froissart, II, 306.

29Froissart, I, 298.

3OFroissart, IV, 196.

-90-
however these knights were neither brave nor noble.

The Black Prince has oft been touted as one of the
most perfect specimens of knighthood that ever existed.
Indeed the courtesy shown King John after his capture at
Poitiers represents the true spirit of chivalry. The very
evening of the day upon which the battle was fought, the
Black Prince invited the French king and several great
lords who were prisoners to dine with him in his lodgings.
On the trip from Poitiers to Bordeaux, the port from which
King John was to depart for England, the Black Prince sub-
jected his prisoner to only the lightest guard.31 It would
be difficult to find a more courteous treatment of an enemy
in the annals of history yet this most noble prince engaged
in one of the most sordid affairs purported by man. In
1370 the Black Prince masterminded and directed the horrible
assault upon the city of Limoges. Thousands of innocent
people suffered death in the churches, streets, and homes
of the city. The vicious sack of Limoges undertaken by the
Black Prince is so violently opposed to the spirit of
chivalry that it is most difficult to believe that he was
a superior noble in even the loosest sense of the word.

Monstrelet, even more so than Froissart, represents

the intensification of cruelty toward prisoners, whereby

 

w
w—

31
For a complete description of the courtesy shown
King John see Froissart, I, 384—7.

-91-
mercy and courtesy become more and more exceptional. For
example in 1&34, La Hire, a captain in the service of Charles
VII, one day passed by the castle of Clermont in Beauvoisis.
The governor, Lord d'Auffemont, ordered several attendants
to fetch wine and accompany him in bringing it to La Hire
and his company as a good will offering, an act of great
courtesy. "During the conversation.La Hire laid hands on
him, [for no reason at all] and forced him to surrender
the castle, putting him withal in irons and in confinement.
In this state he kept him upwards of a month, insomuch that
his limbs were greatly bruised and benumbed, and he was
covered with lice and all sorts of vermin." Finally he was
released after paying a tremendous ransom. "King Charles
wrote several times to La Hire to set him at liberty without
ransom . . . but it was all in vain."32 Incidents of this
nature constantly appear in the chronicles of Monstrelet.
Charles the Bold bears some similarity to the Black
Prince in that they could be most courteous on occasion,
and at other times fall to the depths of cruelty. Charles
was a man of wide knowledge and austere morals and is often
represented as one of the last true knights of the Middle
Ages. He could also be exceedingly harsh when he wished as

demonstrated by his ravenous attacks against Liege in 1467'8‘33]

 

2
3 Monstrelet, I, 631.

33See Commines, I, pp. 92-105 and 156-9.

-92-
These raids compare in destruction to the one perpetrated
by the Black Prince. Charles brought death to thousands
of innocent people as he turned his knights loose upon this
helpless city. Just five years later the Burgundians treated 1
the town of Nesle in similar fashion, destroying the city ‘
and killing the inhabitants after the duke of Burgundy had ‘
given his word the people would be set free if they sur- J
rendered peacefully.

The depredations committed by the nobility against
the weak represent cowardly action on their part. "Noble
chivalry based on honour was stained. with cowardly violence
against the weak. While a rigid code of rules controlled
the jousts and tourneys we find an utter failure of
knightly ideals in battle."3h Christine de Pisan, writing
in the early fifteenth centurm.advocated that knights should
"do right" to every man be he gentleman or merchant.35

Cowardly, cold-blooded assassinations amongst men
of lineage must be added to the other infamous deeds com-
mitted by this degenerate class. "From the middle of the
twelfth century to the middle of the thirteenth . . .

assassination . . . was so rare as to be practically unknown."36

 

3“Otto Cartellieri, The Court of Bur und , trans.

MaICOlm Letts (London, 1929), p. 2h20

350hristine ds Pisan, The Book of Faygtes of Armes
and of Oh alr e, trans. William Caxton, e . A. T. B. By es
(London, I932), . 194. (Hereafter cited as Christine,
Faygtes of Armesg.

36Painter, Chivalr , p. 93.

-93-

During the Hundred Years' War this crime was committed with
greater frequency. The assassination attempt by Peter of
Craon against the life of Oliver du Clisson, Constable of
France, ranks among the most infamous. Also backing this
escapade was the duke of Brittany, who wished to have the
Constable disposed of. On a spring night in the year 1392
Peter, with the backing of sixty men, ambushed the Constable
on a dark street in Paris. The latter, returning from a
party at the king's residence, was armed with only a long
knife and had only a few men with him. "Than syr Peters
men sayd, Shall we slee them all? Yea, quod sir Peter, all
suche as make any defence. Their defence was but small,
for they were but eight persones, and without armure. Sir
Peter demaunded . . . the dethe of the constable. Some
that were there, when they knewe it was the constable, they
gave him but faynte strokes, for a thynge doone by trayson
is doone cowardly, without any hardynesse."37 The fact
that it was cowardly did not seem to deter honorable Sir
Peter for he struck several blows at the defenseless Con-
stable. When the latter was finally struck from his horse
he luckily fell against a baker's door which sprang open
and protected him from his attackers. Believing him dead,
Peter and his band fled Paris. The Constable recovered in

time yet he had barely escaped death at the hands of the

 

37
Froissart, VI, 49.

-94-
dastardly Peter of Craon.

Undoubtedly the most infamous assassinations during
this era occurred during the period of strife between the
Burgundians and Armagnacs. On November 24, lhO7, Louis,
duke of Orleans, was inhumanly slain by a group of eighteen
men laying in ambush. The leader, Raoul d'Oquetonville,

a Norman knight, received his orders and pay from the duke
of Burgundy who later admitted he was behind this dastardly
deed. The knightly means of handling a dispute would re-
quire John the Fearless to challenge Louis to battle; in-
stead he had him ambushed and chopped to bits by these
eighteen ruffians. Not only did he have Louis murdered but
he boldly admitted his action to both the king and the pub-
lic, endeavoring to justify the action by claiming Louis
was a traitor. The ambitious wife of Louis, the duchess
Valentine Visconti, endeavored to persuade the king to do
justice and punish the murderers of his brother, but to no
avail.

Twelve years later, at a time when the Burgundian
and Armagnac factions appeared near reconciliation, France
was thrown into further turmoil by the cruel murder of John
the Fearless on the bridge at Montereau. In July, lhl9,
the dauphin, virtual head of the Armagnacs, met twice with
the duke of Burgundy, the latter time swearing a bond of
friendship between them. However, during their third meet-

ing in September the conversation between them became bitter

-95-
and the dauphin departed. His companions who remained be-
hind became very excited and threw themselves on John the
Fearless, piercing him through several times with their
sword. "Thus was the duke of Burgundy cruelly murdered,
trusting to the promises and securities of the duke de
Touraine, dauphin of Vienne, and his ministers. The act
and the manner of perpetrating it were most horrible; and
the hearts of noble and worthy men, natives of France, must
suffer the greatest shame and grief thus to witness the noble
blood of the flower de luces, and princes so nearly allied
destroy each other. . . ."38

Though this murder was probably not premeditated
and therefore more excusable than the earlier slaying of
Louis of Orleans, it still represents the looseness with
which the nobility followed their duties and ideals. Their
actions in warfare, their treachery, and the rise in the
number of cowardly murders all added together to show the
decadent nobility in their true light, a class that increas-
ingly failed to follow its own self-imposed rules. In
other areas also, such as jousts and tournaments, one can
see a clear-cut transformation of events that had some
significance in earlier times to a purposeless superfluity,

definitely out-of-tune with the nobles' function in society.

 

38
Monstrelet, I, #24.

-96..

During the course of the fourteenth and especially
the fifteenth century the tournaments of the feudal age
had become transformed into nothing more than a frivolous
pastime for the nobility. "The knights of the twelfth
century had conducted their martial games like battles-~their
descendants made their battles resemble tourneys."39 The
tournaments of the feudal age were a training ground for
war. The melee, as these events were appropriately named,
resembled an actual battle whereby two opposing groups of
knights fought with each other. Usually the battle was
most fierce with some being killed and many taken prisoner.
The prisoners were released for ransom and many knights
made a great deal of money by this means.

As chivalry became softened by courtesy harmless
touraments became more prevalent, almost entirely replacing
the melee. A full tournament included a series of tilts
between individual knights wielding the lance followed by
the combatants striking a specified number of blows with
the sword, axe, and dagger, all while on horseback. One
knight might challenge another to a single joust which con-
sisted of the two charging each other on horseback with
raised lances. This was terminated after both knights
shattered their lances and one of them was unhorsed. An

elaborate set of rules began to lessen the danger of tournaments,

 

9Painter, Chivalr , p. 54.

-97-

sspscially with the introduction of blunted weapons and
heavy suits of armor. The pomp and ceremony further in-
creased as the tournaments expanded due to the presence
of ladies. While the "men of the feudal age fought for
the love of fighting . . ." the knights now fought "with
blunted weapons-~for love of the ladies.n4°

The chronicles of Froissart are rich in information
concerning tournaments. After 1380 he increasingly emphasized
the element of love in these affairs. The Church especially
opposed tournaments in which knights fought over such a
triviality as the'love of a woman but had little success in
banning them. In the year 1380 Froissart wrote of a joust
between two squires for the love of a lady. He focused
great attention on the challenge and the rules involved.
The French

squyer of Beause avaunsed himselfe without any settyng
on by any other person, and came to the barryers
scrimysshynge, and sayd to the Englysshmen, Sire, is
there any gentylman among you, that for the love of

his lady wyll do any dede of armes? If there be any,
here I am redy to issue out, armed at all peces a
horsbacke, to ren thre courses with a spears, to stryke
thre strokes with an axe, and thre strokes with a dagger.
Nowe let us se if there be any amorous amonge you. This
squyer was called Gawen Mychaell. This words and re-
quest was anon spredde among the Englysshmen: than an
Englysshe squyer, called Joachym Cathore, stept forthe
and sayd, I am here, redy to delyver his request; let
hym come out of the castell. Than the lords Fitzwater,
marshall of the hoost, came to the barryers, and sayd
to sir Guy le Baveaux, Cause your squyer to come forthe,
he shall fynde one wyll be gladde to delyver him, and

 

LOStephenson, Feudalism, p. 7h.

-93-

we shall assure hym in all thynges. Gawen Mychaell

was right joyouse of those wordes, and armed hym

incontynent, and the lordes dyde helps to arms hym

and sette hym a horsbacks: so he yssued out of the

castell and thre with him, and the varlettes bare

thre speares, thre axes, and thre daggers.hl
Froissart continues the description in detail, demonstrating
the elaborate extent to which tournaments and jousts had
evolved by the late fourteenth century. In this joust
the French squire finally got the best of his English
opponent, won the love of his lady, and returned to camp
in great glee.

Tournaments fought on an individual basis but be-

tween larger groups of knights became the national sport
of the French nobility and a harmless substitute for actual
warfare. Sometimes twenty to thirty knights would take
part in a tournament with nary one of them receiving a
scratch. In the year 1388 Froissart described a joust
between five French knights and five Englishmen under the
duke of Lancaster. The ladies and damsels of the countryside
congregated to view this event in which the only injury
that occurred involved the horse of one of the knights.“2
On one occasion three brave French knights, led by the Mar-
shall Boucicaut, challenged any and every knight who wished

to joust to meet them at an appointed spot near Calais.

 

throissart, III, 149.

2
A Froissart, V, 266.

-99-
Elaborate preparations were made to accommodate both the
challengers and their opponents and notices were sent as
far as England, Spain, Germany, and Italy. Such notables
as Henry of Lancaster, John of Holland, and the earl of
Huntingdon participated in this affair which went on for
a whole month. Charles VI even attended during part of
the tourney. While the three challengers emerged unscathed
they claimed to have injured many opponents. However, it
is most unlikely that anyone was wounded seriously as blunted
lances were used.“3

Occasionally battles were fought over a matter of
honor. In one case a squire, Jaques le Grys, had an affair
with the wife of a knight named John of Carouge while the
latter was away. The wife Claimed the squire had forced
himself upon her so John took the case to the squire's lord.
Finally it was decided the knight and the squire would do
battle to settle the case. The knight not only put his
honor at stake but also the lives of his wife and himself,
since were he to lose both would die. John was able to de-
feat the squire who was promptly hung. This type of battle,
however, was becoming much rarer in the later Middle Ages.““

The chronicles of’Monstrelet contain even more in-

formation about jousts and tournaments, especially concerning

hBSee Froissart, V, 342-59, for a complete description
of this elaborate affair.

throissart, IV, 365-6.

—100—

the technical data involved in challenges and the rules
and etiquette of these affairs. The monarchs and important
princes lent an air of added regality by their presence.
The knights bedecked themselves in gold and silver robes
thrown over intricate suits of expensive armor. The court
of Burgundy became the home of the tournament during the
fifteenth century under the tutelage of Philip the Good
and Charles the Bold. In most cases the jousts were sus-
pended when there appeared any likelihood that one of the
combatants would be injured.- The king of France in atten-
dance at a tournament held in Paris intently watched a
joust between a Breton and an English knight. "In this
last combat the Englishman was slightly wounded below his
armour, when the king instantly put an end to the right."45

In the feudal age a bold knight could gain profit
and glory by challenging other knights to do battle but
even this aspect of chivalry had become rare by the fifteenth
century. Jacques de Lalaing, a bold Burgundian knight-errant,
traveled throughout France, Spain, and Portugal seeking out
opponents, much as the immortal Don Quixote was portrayed
to do by Cervantes. Though he was treated very courteously
wherever he traveled, he found only one knight during his

6

long journey who would joust with him.4

 

45Monstrelet, I, 135.

46Cartellieri, p. 94.

-101-

The martial sports which had delighted the knights
of an earlier period were dead by the fifteenth century,
more especially after the battle of Agincourt. While one
would be a sadist to regret the passing of the bloody melee
it had served to train knights under actual battle conditions
for their role as protectors of their lord and the people
connected with his estate. The joust of the later Middle
Ages served no function whatsoever except as an expensive
display of a decadent segment of society.

Courtly love and court life exemplify other aSpects
of the changing condition of the nobility. The term prowess
best characterized the chief virtue displayed in warfare and
tournaments during the early feudal age. Religious service
was a prime reason for fighting during the era of the cru-
sades but towards the end of the thirteenth century the em-
phasis upon courtesy tended to overbalance prowess and piety.
Love and service to women began to occupy the minds of romantic
knights. Proficiency in the art of love illustrated in the
growing abundance of romance literature tended to replace
the brave, sword wielding knight portrayed in the epic. The
chansons de geste dealt with bold fighters who had fierce
loyalties whether it Was Roland fighting for his lord, Char-
lemagne, or a knight fighting the Turks or Saracens on a
crusade. The romance emphasized the knight fighting for his
lady love whereby love either enhanced his prowess or was

even supreme OVBI‘ prowess.

-102-

The Romance of the Rggg is illustrative of the romance
literature which tended to idealize and formalize the love
element of chivalry. While its details are of little con-
cern here its impact on the nobility tended to set them apart
from the rest of society, more especially the lower classes.
Hereafter they tended to lose sight of the reasons for their
existence and began to live in a dream world of love, court
life, and luxury. In both The Romance of the Rose and Th2
Art of Courtly Love the emphasis is on a love not tightly
restrained by reason and temperance and never between husband
and wife, but love between a knight and the wife of another
man. By nature, courtly love thrives upon exuberant behavior
and condones illicit relationships between man and woman.

The Romance of the Rose and courtly love in general
sparked much criticism not only from the clergy but from the
distraught members of the nobility. Christine de Pisan spoke
out boldly against the debauchery and sensualism of courtly
love as it was actually practiced. For example she condemned
adultery. "If a man were putte vpon and accused to haue
laysn wyth a mannys wyffe the whiche cas . . . the iustyce
is capitall deth, that is to says, worthy to less his hed
fer the same. . . ."l+7 While some romances such as the
tales of Sir Lancelot emphasized purity and chasitity, Ihg
Romance of the Rose tended to encourage illicit relationships

 

#7Christine, Faygtes of Armes, p. 263.,

-103-

between unmarried couples and to undermine the respect for
womanhood. Christine de Pisan endeavored to instill a
chivalrous regard for women which she claimed had been
jeOpardized by some of the romance literature. False and
deceitful knights who betrayed their lovers were attacked
bitterly by this female critic who upheld so strongly the
position of womeds rights.

Geoffroy-La Tour Landry, a somewhat conservative
French noble, wrote a book in the year 1371 in which he also
reacted to The Romance of the Rogg. He wrote primarily to
instruct his daughters to be faithful to their husbands and
pious in all ways, but the book also served as a manual for
other women to follow. La Tour Landry attacked the overempha-
sis on courtly love which he perceived did not enhance prowess
but weakened the courage of a knight and degraded the status
of women. He believed courtly love to be artificial and a
threat to the religious aspect of chivalry and damaging to
the soul.

By analyzing his instructions to his daughters one
can obtain a great deal of information from this pious knight
about the defects of the fourteenth century nobility, more
especially in their relationship to women. Contrary to the
view held by many knights, La Tour Landry believed a knight
should love only one woman and that should be his wife. The

woman also must be faithful for "it is not good to a woman

-10h-
to be found alone with a man, but if it be with her husband."h8
In an assault on the weakening moral code he relates an in-
cident in which a false knight attempted to trick an innocent
maid who would not consent to his desires by casting about
false statements concerning her actions. Finally her honor
was restored when a "noble knight, that was piteous and had
compassion upon this maiden, gaged battle against the false
knight, and there was a sore battle between them both; but
the discomfiture befell upon the false knight, and was mis-
chieved for his falseness; and upon the point'of his death he
acknowledged all the treason that he had wrought against this
young maid."l*9 The point he makes is that the immoral knight
as exemplified in such works as The Romance of the Ross will
pay for his transgressions at the hands of justice.

The woman on the other hand was admonished to be
temperate in her dress and especially in her speech. It
was the woman's duty to obey her husband and not talk back,
especially in front of strangers. In one case where a woman
did get impudent with her husband he "smote her with his fist
down to the earth; And then with his foot he struck her in

the visage and brake her nose, and all her life after she had

 

 

h8Geoffroy La Tour Landry, The Book of the Kni ht of
La Tour Landr , ed. G. S. Taylor (London, 1930}, p. 46. (Here-
a?

ter cited as La Tour Landry).

tha Tour Landry, p. 116.

-105-
her nose crooked, the which shent and disfigured her visage
after. . . ."50 One would probably not find such a passage
in the romance literature for this represents the statement
of a puritanical reactionary striving to counter a rising
tendency toward carefree irresponsibility and moral decay
among both the men and women of the noble class. While the
examples he presents are exaggerations, so typical of the
extremes of the waning Middle Ages, they are significant
representations of actual or similar cases drawn from his
experience. La Tour Landry's admonitions unfortunately went
unheeded by a majority of the nobility who were too interested
in their own pleasures and follies to take advice concerning
the consequences they would have to suffer for their actions.

Not only courtly love but court life too became more
formal and subsequently more artificial as the Middle Ages
drew to a climax. La Tour Landry has some warning to make
in this area also, giving reasons why women should avoid
attending jousts and feasts. The case in point concerns a
woman who attended feasts against the advice of her husband.
Whereupon on one occasion the torches were extinguished and
after being relit she was found near the brother of her hus-
band. While she was probably innocent of any false behavior
her husband "loved his wife never after so well as he did

51

befbre." This warning appears to have had no affect in

 

O
5 La Tour Landry, p. 22.

51La Tour Landry, p. 30.

-lO6-

diminishing the attendance at feasts for these affairs only
tended to increase in popularity.

Froissart relates several interesting accounts of
French court life and great banquets and feasts,52 but it is
not until the reign of Charles VI that the nobility really
blossomed forth in all its extravagance and excessive tastes
and actions. "The French nobility of the epoch of Charles VI
displayed a shameless luxury. Never were the entertainments
more brilliant than those given at the court at this time;
never were the royal entrances into the town of greater
splendor. The costumes worn by the nobles were magnificent,
and the industry which was fed by this luxury was very pros-
persons; but the nobles in order to keep it up doubled the
taxes on their lands and heavily oppressed the people. More-
over they contracted huge debts which they never paid. The
senseless luxury of the time ruined them and the working
classes."53

After the battle of Agincourt the court of Burgundy
became a haven for chivalry; however it was not the dedicated
chivalry of the crusades but the empty formal chivalry of
the romances, emphasizing etiquette, court life, jousts, and

constant banquets. The princes here lived in luxury and they

 

52For a good description of one of these elaborate
banquets see Froissart, V, 280-83.

53 '
Thompson, Economic Histor , pp. 299-300.

-1o7-
of course required much money to uphold their status. It
has been estimated that in 1455 their budget was twice that
of the popes.5h Aside from the elaborate tournaments, the
most flagrant display of knightly decadence is exemplified
in the ostentatious feasts. The Feast of the Pheasant is
in itself one of the finest examples, plainly illustrating
how far the form had become divorced from the spirit of
chivalry. Philip the Good held this extensive banquet in
1454 in an effort to raise men and money to recover Con-
stantinople which the Turks had captured the year previous.
The significance of this affair lay not in the religious realm
but in the exuberence and splendor of the affair, much more
typical of an event which would attract the sensuous Cellini
during the Renaissaince than something appropriate for a dedi-
cated ascetic, pious, knight. Actually this banquet was held
in three parts at two week intervals with jousts and festiv-
ities continuing throughout the entire period. The final
banquet held on a Sunday achieved the extreme in most every
sense. The wine literally flowed like water and the food
was exotic and entirely too excessive. Each meat course con-
tained forty different dishes, and each carriage contained
eighty-two pieces of meat. During the meal birds flew around
the great hall while a three act play relating the adventures

of Jason created another diversion. Upon the walls of the

 

ShCartellieri, The Court gngur d , p. 16.

-108-

immense hall hung tapestries depicting the labors of Hercules
and scattered throughout the room were numerous statues set
with precious jewels. The whole affair seemed to represent
one grand show with the participants being the principal
actors. The banquet had become an end in itself as the knights
began to assume their new role as gentlemen and courtiers,
living in luxury, but being relegated to a secondary status
as far as their power and influence was concerned.55

Charles the Bold continued the tradition set by his
father, displaying an ostentation which made Burgundy the
prodigal state in Europe during the fifteenth century.
Commines lists some of the items obtained by the Swiss in
1476 when they defeated Charles the Bold and captured his
camp. Just a few will be listed to demonstrate the extrav-
agance of the dukes of Burgundy. "Four hundred tents of
great richness, fitted with silk and velvet, and with the
duks's arms embroidered thereon in gold and pearls." "Four
hundred lbs. weight of silver plate. . . ." "Three hundred
complete services of magnificent silver plate; and so great
a quanity of coined money that it was distributed by hand-
fulls. . . ." "The duke's rosary, with the apostles in massive
gold." "The duke's sword, adorned with seven large diamonds
and as many rubies, with fifteen pearls of the size of a

bean, . . . 160 pieces of cloth of gold and silk . . . the

 

55For a delightful account of this banquet see
Cartellieri, The Court of Bur d , pp. 138-152.

-109-

duke's gilded chair, and his gold ring, and the ring of his
brother Antony, and two large pearls set in gold, each as
llarge as a nut."56 This is sufficient to give some idea of
the prosperity and splendor displayed by the house of Burgundy.
The licsntiousness and excesses of the house helped bring
about the downfall of this last bastion of chivalry. Even
Philip de Commines, once a lord in the service of the duke

of Burgundy, heaped scorn on "their baths and other amuse—
ments with women [which were] lavish and disorderly, and many
times immodest. . . ."57 Following the death of Charles the
Bold in 1477 the perceptive Commines summarized and analyzed
the house of Burgundy in penetrating depth. .

Their losses equalled, if they did not overbalance,
their former prosperity; for as I had seen these
princes puissant, rich and honorable, so it fared

with their subjects: fer I think I have seen and known
the greatest part of Europe, yet I never knew any
province or country, though of a larger extent, so
abounding in money, so extravagantly fine in their
furniture, so sumptuous in their buildings, so profuse
in their expenses, so luxurious in their feasts and en-
tertainments, and so prodigal in all respects, as the
subjects of these princes in my time; and if any think
I have exaggerated, others who lived in my time, will
be of opinion that I have rather said too little. . . .
In short, I have seen this family in all respects the
most flourishing of any in Christendom: and then, in
a short space of time, it was quite ruined and turned
upside down, and left the most desolate and miserable
of any houge in Europe, as regards both prince and
subjects.5

 

r'

56

Commines, I, 311-2.

57

Commines, I, 13.

5800mmines, 1, 341-2.

-110-

The formation of artificial chivalrous orders con-
cerns another area of the growing decadence of chivalry.
The Order of the Garter, promulgated by Edward III near the
middle of the fourteenth century, remains one of the oldest
and most well known. In 1430 Philip the Good established
one of the greatest knightly orders begun in Europe during
the Middle Ages known as the Order of the Golden Fleece.
This fraternity of knights was organized similarly to the
Order of the Garter but upon a more exclusive basis. Member-
ship in the Order of the Golden Fleece was restricted to
twenty-four nobles of high aristocracy (emperors, kings, and
dukes). The knights promised not to join any other order
and vowed to join together in the defense of the Catholic
faith and the protection of the Holy Church. The ruling
duke of Burgundy was always to remain grand master of the
order; however, he could take no action without consulting
each of the twenty-four members in the order. Though out-
wardly it appeared to be a most honorable and sought after
institution, the Order of the Golden Fleece was mere frost-
ing. In fact all of the knightly orders of the later Middle
Ages are analagous in their desire to revive the fading
chivalrous practices of the past by incorporating them into
a formal institution. These orders represent only one more
example of the decline of the nobility as its institutions
became increasingly formal and it became a static segment

of society.

 

 

 

-111-

An eminent medieval historian drew the following
clear and definitive picture of the nobility, comparing their
actions in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries with those
of the later Middle Ages. "In sense of honor, in the ameni-
ties of gentility and courtesy, in kindliness, in feeling
of responsibility, either to the individual or to society,
in bearing and forbearing, in reverence towards the mysteries
of life, the generations of these centuries [fourteenth and

fifteenth] were immeasurably inferior to their predecessors."59

Thompson, Economic History, p. 9.

CHAPTER IV
CHIVALRY OUTMODED

The failure of the nobility in France to fulfill
their feudal and chivalrous obligations in relationship to
the other members of that class completes a most important
segment of their decline. Nevertheless, one cannot grasp
the reality of their downfall unless he thoroughly under-
stands that chivalry, the ideal which gave vitality to the
nobility, had passed its zenith and commenced to become out-
moded during the last two centuries of the Middle Ages. The
first distinct indication that it had outlived its usefull-
ness arose in the military realm.

As early as the battle of Bouvines, paid mercenaries
had been effectively used in the royal armies. However, at
the turn of the fourteenth century the mounted knight re-
mained undisputably the backbone of every major army in
Europe. Such mercenary troops as the Genoese crossbowmen
and the Swiss pikemen fought entirely for monetary reasons
and were many times unreliable; consequently, they presented
no threat of usurping the nobles power and of forming a
permanent army behind the king.

Until about 1300 the commoners offered no challenge
to the nobility due partly to the fact that they could not

-112-

-113-
afford the heavy cost of obtaining the equipment necessary
to participate in feudal warfare. The fully armed knight
required a great deal of expensive equipment. To mention
only a part of his regalia the typical knight first had to
have a good horse and secondly a good suit of armor (usually
a suit of chain mail with only the partial protection of
plate armor in the fourteenth century). In addition he wielded
an expenSive sword and retained as few or as many squires as
he could support financially. Consequently the knight retain-
ed a monopoly upon feudal warfare. His position was first
strongly challenged at the battle at Coutrai in 1302. A
Flemish revolt necessitated that a French army travel to
Flanders in order to subdue a group of unruly burghers. The
French knights believed they would easily overrun their foes.
However, much to everyone's surprise, the French knights were
pitifully slaughtered as the Flemish burghers attacked them
viciously. This battle was only an indication of what was
to come, for from this point forward the mounted knight met
one defeat after another.

The classic longbow undoubtedly was the greatest in—
novation which undermined the foundations of feudal warfare.
The longbow had the advantage over the crossbow of a longer
range and more rapid fire while realizing great penetrating
power. Up until the fourteenth century the bow had offered
no serious challenge to the cavalry charge due mainly to

the fact that no well trained large army of bowmen had been

-114-
organized prior to this time. Consequently the French’had
no reason to change their tactics. The defeat at Coutrai
had been caused mainly by terrain unfavorable to a cavalry,
and the French knights' overwhelming victory at Cassel in
1328 reassured them of the superiority of their ancient
method of fighting. At this very moment across the channel
the English were forming a highly skilled corp of longbowmen
that were to become the dominating factor for the duration
of the Hundred Years' War and the backbone in the army of
the English kings. The English tended to give up knightly
sports somewhat and treat war more as a business. '

The first really crucial test of infantry against
cavalry came in 1346 when King Edward IV led approximately
20,000 Englishmen against twice that many in the French
forces led by King Philip VI. Known throughout history as
the battle of Crécy, the flower of French chivalry proved
no match fer the English longbowmen.1 The English knights
dismounted to fight next to their archers who darkened the
sky with their arrows, putting the Genoese mercenaries to
flight and disrupting the already disorganized French cavalry
who were clumsily trying to maneuver on the soggy rain-

soaked battlefield. The classical description of this battle

—-

1King Philip had hired some Genoese mercenaries but
just prior to the battle a heavy rainfall had caused the
strings on their crossbows to shrink rendering them almost
useless throughout the battle. The English had wisely put
their bowstrings under their hats to keep them dry.

-115-

comes from the pages of Froissart who did not seem to realize
the importance of the longbow in ending the supremecy of the
armed knight. He described how "thengylsshe archers stept
forthe one pass, and lette fly their arowes so holly and

so thycke, that it seemed snows. . . . And ever styll the
Englysshmen shot where as they saw thyckest preace: the
sharps arowes ranne into the men of armes and into their
horses, and many fell, horse and men, . . . and when they
were downe, they coude nat relyve agayne. . . ."2. The
French sent wave after wave of knights to the front; each
in turn was slaughtered or turned back. The disabled but
courageous blind King John of Bohemia pitifully met death
while leading a Luxemburg contingent against the English.

It is unknown exactly how many of the French forces were
killed in this battle but all figures show considerably more
French than English were slain that fateful day. Froissart
gives a complete account, though somewhat exaggerated, of
the inventory Edward III ordered taken of the number that
lay dead on the field of battle. "Than the kyng sends to
serche howe many were slayne, and what they were. Sir Reynolds
Cobham, and sir'RichardStafforde with thre haraldes went to
serche the felde and contrey; they visyted all them that
were slayne and rode all day in the feldes, and retourned

agayne to the hoost as the king was goynge to supper: they

 

2Froissart, I, 298.

~116-

made just report of that they had sens, and sayde howe ther
were xi. great princes deed, fourscore baners, xii.C. knyghtes,
and mo than xxx. thousands other."3 The mounted man-at-arms
‘had clearly met his nemesis in the form of the longbowmen.

After such a resounding defeat one would immediately
surmise that the French army would undergo a rapid and thor-
ough reorganization in order to cope with the powerful English
forces, but unfortunately this was not the case. Only ten
years later, the French, led by a new king but with basically
the same army, met the English at Poitiers. Again the Eng-
lish, this time led by the Black Prince, were outnumbered
two to one. Prior to the battle two cardinals of the Church
endeavored to intercede between the opposing forces; however,
"they failed to bring peace to the discordant parties. On
the contrary, pride reigned, confidence in the might and
multitude of armed men persisted, and as a result a pitched
battle was agreed upon."7 The confident French led by the
chivalrous King John did change their tactics to the extent
that they dismounted and fought on foot but to no avail as
the French were routed, overcome by the volleys sent forth
by the English archers and many were slain or fled the battle.
Though King John "defended himself manfully and slew many,

he could not withstand so overwhelming an attack."5 "And

 

3Froissart, I, 303.
uVBTlBttG , p. 61}.
5Venette, p. 64.

~117-
as it was reported, there was slayne all the flours of
Fraunce, and there was taken with the kyng and the lords
Philyppe his sonne a sevyntene erles, besyde barones,
knyghtes and squyers, and slayne a fyve or sixe thousands
6

of one and other." For the second time in a decade chivalry
had been demonstrated obsolete and utterly defenseless be-
fore a trained corps of longbowmen.

For the brief period spanning the reign of Charles
V (1364-80) there appeared hope that France was finally
adopting a realistic approach to warfare. Charles, appro-
priately named "the Wise," directed his war efforts through
Bertrand du Guesclin, whom he made Constable of France.
Oftentimes du Guesclin is pictured as the French counterpart
to such illustrious knights as John Chandos and the Black
Prince. On the contrary his success lay in his ability to
overthrow the knightly mores, and adopt new methods of war-
fare. Froissart was hesitant to give credit to this somewhat
unorthodox and unchivalrous captain and constantly under-
played his role in relation to Chandos for example.

The immediate problem confronting Charles V was how
to get rid of the destructive Companions. For this task he
called upon du Guesclin to lead these pillagers away from

France for "there was no getting rid of these brigands except

 

Froissart, I, 382.

-ll8-

by leading them to fight and pillage elsewhere. No one
could succeed in this manoeuvre better than Duguesclin, who
shared their tastes and knew how to flatter their ambitions.
Charles V encouraged him to try."7 Du Guesclin first en-
deavored to lead the Companions into Hungary to battle the
Turks but their destination was too distant and they proceeded
no farther than Alsace before they poured back into France.
'He next persuaded the Companions to join him in a mission to
unseat Pedro the Cruel as ruler of Castile and place Henry
Trastamara upon the throne. This plan worked with great
success and occupied the Companions for four years. By 1369,
when Charles V was ready to resume the war with the English,
both the noble captains of the Companions and their followers
were so utterly exhausted they presented no serious problem
to France. While the methods of neither Charles V nor du
Gueslin were considered honorable or chivalrous, they were
successful and served as a prototype for Charles VII to
follow some eighty years later.

Charles V approached the renewal of warfare against
the English in a rather unique fashion. Unlike his two
immediate predecessors he directed the war from behind the
scenes never engaging in battle himself. This he left up
to his constable who masterfully led the French forces.

Christine ds Pisan praised the good king for wisely letting

 

7Perroy, The Hundred Years War, pp. 155-6.

-119-

the constable lead the trOOps for a man of experience was
most important in this job. The king's great value lay in
his wisdom and the respect he inspired in the people, there-
fore his life should not be jeopardized in battle.8_ Charles
deeply“wished to recover all the French territory assigned
to the English in the treaties of Bretigny and Calais and
set out to reorganize the taxes and army in order to achieve
his goals. All the nobles of the realm were enlisted in the
king's army for pay and an auxiliary force of bowmen were
formed.

In 1369 when war was renewed the French changed
their tactics of warfare. Perceiving that open warfare
against the English had only resulted in disaster the king
instructed du Guesclin to use hit-and-run tactics. The
French then began using successful "guerilla" type tactics
always avoiding pitched battles. The English "had rather
that the Frenchs kyng had sente downs power of men to have
fought with them; but the Frenchs kyng alwayes commaunded
in no wyse to gyve them batayle, but wolde that they shulde
be ever pursued, and kept shorts. And every night the French-
men laye in fortresses, and in the day pursued thenglysshe

host, who went ever closetoguyder."9 This type of warfare

8Christine, ngptes of Armes, p. 21.

9Froissart, II, 438.

-120-
caused much grief to the peasants for it left the English
soldiers free to live off the land. However, it was highly
successful, for the French were able to recover many of the
towns and provinces held by the English. The French recovered
much territory and prestige under the leadership of Charles
V and du Guesclin; this success can be accredited mainly to
their rather unchivalrous methods of warfare. Unfortunately,
France had not learned her lesson well enough, for she had
yet to receive one more costly and humiliating defeat before
the antiquated chivalric practices in warfare were completely
discredited.

At Agincourt in 1415 the French knights suffered
another horrendous defeat at the hands of the English. The
night before the battle the French men-at-armes remained on
their horses sitting through a heavy rainstorm while the
English spent their time in rest and prayer. In order to
fight, the French troops were required to dismount, forming
themselves into tight huddles of thirty or forty men. These
groups of knights made excellent targets for the English
archers who virtually riddled their ranks with their accurate
volleys. Discerning that the knights clad in heavy army
could barely stir in the slippery mud the unprotected and
scantily armed English infantry lay down their bows and pro-
ceeded to go amongst the French, slaying them by the thousands.
The French began the day with a force of approximately
50,000 men outnumbering the English by six to one. When the

-121-
battle was completed Menstrelet claimed 10,000 Frenchmen
were slain of which only 1,600 were of low degree, while
the English only lost 500.10 While his ratio of French to
English is a little high his statement of the number dead
is relatively accurate. The real chivalry of Franch died
at Agincourt for warfare became a more serious business
hereafter in the fifteenth century. The nobility had proven
their inadequacy for the last time and though they clung
to the characteristics of their class they could not cope
with the new'methods ofswarfare.

In addition to the deadly longbowmen the Swiss pike-
men emerged as a further deterrent to the cavalry charge.
This well trained group of mercenaries wielded long pointed
spears which when handled correctly were capable of doing
great injury to both horse and rider. "Drilled to maneuver
in mass formation, the Swiss could withstand the charges of
the heavy horse. Determined and well-clad cavalry could
impede and delay their advance, but could rarely stop them
or destroy their mass formation."11 Undoubtedly one of the
most famous series of defeats which the Swiss inflicted
upon armed knights occurred against Charles the Bold. In
1476-7 Charles led his Burgundian knights against this

superior group of infantrymen. The Burgundian cause was

 

1OIMonstrelet, I, 334.

llPainter, Chivalr , p. 23.

-122-
futile and the Swiss imposed several severe defeats upon
these men-at-arms. On January 5, 1477 the Swiss achieved
their supreme victory at Nancy as Charles himself met death.
The day after the battle his mutilated body was feund lying
upon the battlefield, a gruesome memento to the men of
chivalry.

During the fifteenth century a permanent national
army emerged in France replacing the decentralized feudal
armies once and for all.

The use of infantry has increased and that of cavalry
has declined. Army organization no longer is of a feudal
nature. The old tie of military service between lord
and vassal has been disolved. Armies are royal and
national in spirit and organization. The ancient forty
days' service has given way to a system of indentures
under which a captain enters into a contract with the
king to furnish a certain number of men of his own
selection and to keep them provided with arms, horses

and food, while the government fOr its part pays quarter-
ly wages according to an established scale which varies
according to the rank and status of each fighting unit.
War has become a trade supported by royal iaxation and in
which immense private capital is invested. 2

Even the armor which the fifteenth century knights
had perfected to give them a high degree of protection was
now obsolete. By 1400 the knights donned suits of full
plate armor. While these heavy steel outfits had become
impervious to the longbow they left the knight more and
more immobile and unable to maneuver or retreat as the

Agincourt fiasco clearly indicated. If its function was not

 

Thompson, Eponomic Histor , pp. 492-3.

-123-
entirely impeded by its sheer clumsiness, full plate armor
was made obsolete by the introduction of firearms. As can-
nons and guns became more powerful in the fifteenth century,
armor became less protective and less desirable. Truly the
refinement of gunpowder dealt the final blow to the armored
knight with all his glitter and glory. Jacques de Lalaing
renders a perfect example of the death of the old ways in
the path of progress. "Jacques de Lalaing did not fall, as
he had dreamed, in glorious battle with an antagonist of
equal rank. He was killed most unromantically by a cannon-
ball. Can the conflict between the knightly ideals of the
fifteenth century and the claims of practical reality be
better illustrated?"13
The courtesies of warfare shown by knights often

had a detrimental affect upon the outcome of a battle and
usually it was the common.pe0ple or innocent bystanders who
received the full force of the repercussions. Strategic
interests were sometimes sacrificed to the interests of
chivalry. The knightly ideal prescribed there be a greater
emphasis on glory gained through courtesy and prowess than
on victory. Cartellieri succinctly relates an example of
the dilemma of courtesy and victory in the following passage.

The contrast between the knightly ideal and reality

was to become more marked as time went on. Honour
required that the knight should never refuse battle

 

13
Cartellieri, The Court of Burgundy, p. 96.

-1214,—

when it was offered by his opponent. Tactical and
strategic necessity, however, frequently demanded that
the challenge should be refused. Philip the Good allow-
ed the army commander to get the better of the knight
when he avoided a battle three times in one day. He
even allowed his magnificent and conspicuous armour to
be worn in battle by one of his knights. He arrived

at such decisions with great difficulty; they deprived
him of his sleep; for it was Philip's boast that he pre-
ferred death to dishonour. But even in Philip's case
sober political reasons were at times thrown into the
background by the joy of battle. In order to encourage
his followers, he galloped alone far ahead of his

troops to the attack, and at the siege of Melun he took
up his position in thfi trenches like King Henry V, and
engaged an opponent.

On more than one occasion Henry Trastamara stringently
put chivalry before the welfare of his army and the people
of the country he was trying to rule in the absence of Pedro
the Cruel. To cite a lucid example, the Black Prince, John
Chandos and "the flours of all the chivalry of the worlds,"
were endeavoring to restore Pedro upon the throne of Castile
in 1367. Sir Arnold Daudrehen counseled Henry that the
English forces were very powerful and probably would over-
power the forces of Castile in an Open battle. However,
there was one possibility to stOp the English by blocking a
vital mountain pass. Sir Arnold advised Henry:

Sir, it is necessary that ye take good hede and
counsell in this matter; but, sir, and ye wyll do

by my counsayle ye shall disconfyte them without any
stroke strikyng: as thus, if ye wyll kepe the straites
and passages so that no provisyon may come at them, ye
shall famysshe them, and so disconfite them: for than

they shal be fayne to retourne into their own countre
‘warde, without good order or array, and than may you

 

1“Ibid.,, p. 90.

-125-
have your desyre acomplysshed. Than this kyng Henry
answered and sayd: Marshall, by the souls of my dere
father, I desyre so moche to se the Prince, and to
prove his puisaunce and myne, thig I wyll never de-
part hens without batayle. . . . .

Subsequently Henry and his forces suffered several defeats
at the hands of the English and many thousands of his soldiers
and innocent people of the towns and countryside were
slaughtered. To complete this fiasco, Pedro the Cruel was
temporarily restored to power. Had Henry placed good judg-
ment and military strategy ahead of his love of chivalry
this ridiculous and injurious folly could have been averted.
The ways of chivalry were inadequate in many other
areas than just the military. A strict adherence to the
rules of chivalry as King John followed them became most
incompatible with the running of a well ordered state in
the fOurtesnth century. By briefly analyzing some of the
weaknesses in King John's behavior one can better understand
some of the more blatant inadequecies. John's impulsiveness
and poor judgment caused him to make many blunders. His
first act upon becoming king was to order the execution of
the constable, Raoul de Brienne. The reasons for this
execution are not entirely clear but it seems likely that
the constable was killed for no other purpose than to make
way for the king's favorite, Charles of Spain. In imitation

of the English Order of the Garter, John, with great pomp

 

15Froissart, II, 201.

rs affilr

 

-126-
and display established the Order of the Star. In 1355
John was forced to ask the Estates General for money needed
to raise troops in order to suppress the raids which the
Black Prince was undertaking in Languedoc. The Estates
General approved the gabelle "but sanctioned the right of
resistance against all kinds of pillage--a distinct commentary
on the incompetence of the king."16 In the same year that
the gabelle was granted, John made the magnificent chivalrous
gesture of challenging the king of England to combat. "The
Frenchs kyng, who had made his assemble at the citie of Amyens
heryng of the kyng of Englande rode towards hym . . . [and]
send his marshall Dauthayne . . . to the kyng of Englande,
offeryng to fight body to body or power to power, what day
soever he wold apoynt. But the Kyng of England refused.
. . ."17 Truly this was a great act of chivalry for a knight a
but for a king of a powerful nation it was an utterly ridicu-
lous action. As a further example, the whole episode of
John's capture of Poitiers and his imprisonment in England
was completely out of harmony with the good of the people
and his role as a monarch. One cannot doubt his courage in
that final brave but ridiculous charge against the English
at Poitiers. The courtesies exchanged between John and the

Black Prince following his capture are inspiring even today;

 

16

The Enc clo aedia Britannica, 11th ed. (Cambridge,
England, 1911), XV, EEIo

17Froissart, I, 350-1.

-127-

however, his whole attitude during his imprisonment repre-
sented that of a naive chivalrous prince and not a monarch
of a powerful country. For four years after 1356 John lived
in captivity, but of a strange variety for the majority of
this period. Much of the time he lived in luxury, hunting
and jousting at will and receiving money and good wines from
France. During the four years this unfortunate king remained
captive, France underwent some of the worst domestic troubles
which have ever plagued any kingdom. The Estates General,
torn between the conflicting factions of Etienne Marcel,
Charles the Bad of Navaree, and the dauphin, was unable to
restore order in the realm. In addition, the war torn,
poverty ridden peasantry rose up in a bloody revolt known as
the Jacquerie. Throughout this chaotic period King John
never seemed to grasp the magnitude of the turmoil and the
depths of poverty and suffering which the people were under-
going. Not only did he not realize but he did-not really
care under what conditions the people existed. He was pri—
marily concerned that the people raise the necessary money
to ransom him so that he could resume his knightly activities.
This chivalrous spendthrift looked at warfare as one big
tournament.

In 1360 as part of the Peace of Bretigny the release
of John was agreed upon in exchange for a tremendous ransom.
After part of the ransom was delivered and certain hostages

were turned over to the English, the king was liberated. The

-128-
common people were greatly oppressed under the burden of
raising the king's ransom, yet they remained loyal to their
ruler. John had yet to commit one more chivalrous but un-
fortunate act before his miserable life ended. After one of
the hostages, the duke of Anjou, who was the king's second
son, broke his parole and escaped from England, John vol-
untarily returned to captivity. He spent the winter of 1363 '
in entertainment at London. Fortunately he passed away the
following spring and left France.in the hands of his much
wiser son, Charles V. One cannot doubt King John's strict
adherence to the rules of chivalry; however, it is regretable
that he remained so inflexible in the interpretation of these
rules that he never considered the ultimate effect upon the
kingdom and pe0ple of France.

The Black Prince involved himself in several affairs
whereby he obviously placed a strict adherence to the prin-
ciples of chivalry above good judgment. The results of his
blunders caused him much discomfort, but even more important
was the detrimental affect his actions had upon society. Both
King John and the Black Prince had little comprehension of
the effect of their actions upon the other elements of so-
ciety. One of the most unjustified acts perpetrated by the
Black Prince involved his efforts to restore Pedro the Cruel
to his position upon the throne in Castile.

Pedro was a hated man in his kingdom. Even Froissart

was willing to admit his unpopularity.

—129-

Kynge Dampeter was soore behated with his owns men,

throughout all the realms of Castell, bycause of the

marveylous cruell justyce that he had done, and by

the occasyon of the distruccyon of the noble men of

his realms , the which he had put to deth and slayne with

his handes. thrfors assoone as they saws his bastard

brother entre into the realms with so great puyssauncs,

than they drus all to hym, and recsyvsd him to their

lords, and so rods forthe with him; and they caused

cytsss, townes, borowes, and castels, to be cpyned to

hym, and every man to do hym homage. And so the

Spanyards, all with one voyce, crysd, Lyve Henry and

dye Damgetsr, who hath been to us so cruell and so

yve11.1
Among Pedro's few good qualities were his intelligence and
courage but his brutality completely overshadowed these.
His dislike of his wife led him to have her imprisoned and
later killed. Suspicious jealousy caused him to drive one
of his father's bastard sons, Henry of Trastamara, from his
kingdom. As indicated earlier, du Guesclin and the Companions
placed Henry upon the throne and his entry as described above
by Froissart was a welcomed event. A.great majority of the
peOple backed Henry as king of Castile and all indications
led one to believe his reign was to be highly successful.

Why, one might legitimately ask, did the Black Prince

aid Pedro the Cruel against the beloved and successful Henry
Trastamara. England had no interests in Castile or any
binding obligations to aid Pedro. The pope had backed Henry
and there is every indication to believe that an overwhelming
majority of the people backed him. Concerning the character-

istics which designated a man a true and courageous knight,

 

l8Froissart, II, 156.

-130-
Henry resembled the Black Prince much more than did his brother,
the treacherous Pedro the Cruel. It appears that the Black
Prince and his followers intervened in favor of Pedro for the
sake ‘of pure adventure and for a rectification of a techni-
cal violation of justice as interpreted by the Prince. Since
Henry was a bastard son he could not legally hold office as
king. While this appears somewhat trivial today, the Prince
perceived Henry's action as an affront to chivalry. His
counselors had emphatically warned him not to aid a man that
ronneth throughout his realne, apd by his owns men,
howe he caused to dye his wyfe, your cosyn, doughtsr
to the duke of Burbone. . . . But to these words, the
Prince answered thus: sayeng, Lordes, I thynke and
byleve certenly, that vs counsell me trusly to the
best of your powers: ‘I knows well, and am well enfourmed
of the lyfe and stats of this kyng Dampeter, and knows
well, that without nombre, he hath done many yvell dedes
. . . But . . . it is net covenable that a bastard
shulde hold a realms in herytage, and put out of his owre
realme his brother, ryghtfull enheryter to the lands,
the whiche thyng all kynges and kinges sonnes shulde
in no wyse suffre nor consent to, for it is a great
prejudice ageynst the state royall.1
It is most ironical that the Prince defeated Henry, a true
knight in every respect, and aided the cruel Pedro, hated
by both the Church and people.
Undoubtedly in simplifying the issues involved we
have made this dispute appear too "black and white" for there
are other factors to be considered. However, the basic fact

remains that the Prince intervened as a matter of sheer

 

19Froissart, II, 163.

<_...~.- —.o._.-.a.

[IIIJ‘IIIIIJI 4

 

Q
‘

 

 

-131-
principle, fully realizing the weaknesses and unpopularity
of Pedro. This truly indicates how sterile and antiquated
chivalry could be when carried to extremes.

As a climax to the Prince's mission, he was unable
to collect the money which Pedro had agreed to pay upon his
restoration to the throne. Pedro had promised to reimburse
the trOOps of the Black Prince for their aid, but he broke

his word and endeavored to stall the Prince by conjuring up

-'-__A._A.._ a—‘m- u

excuses. Finally, perceiving there would be no money forth-
coming, the Prince returned home with his trOOps promising w
to reimburse them out of his own funds. Barely two years
later in 1369, Henry once again overcame Pedro, this time
putting him to death. Thereafter Henry remained permanently
upon the throne of Castile emerging as a good and powerful
ruler.
Let us relate one more incident in which the Black
Prince let his love of chivalry overpower common sense. In
the campaign which restored Pedro to the kingship in Castile,
du Guesclin was taken captive and held prisoner by the Black
Prince. The latter, realizing the value of his prisoner,
delayed setting a ransom for his release. Du Guesclin called
his bluff by stating "it is sayd, in the realms of Fraunce
and in other places, that ye fears me so moche, that ye dare
nat let me out of prison, the whiche to me is full great

honour." The Prince, realizing he had been tricked, answered,

-132-

"Sir, than ye thinks that we kepe you for fears of your
chivalry: nay3'thynheit nat, for I swsre by saint George

it is net so; therfore pay for your raunsome a hundred thou-

sands frankes, and ye shall be delyvered."20

Though the
ransom was high it was paid, demonstrating once more how good
chivalry and pride conflicted with good policy, working to
the detriment of the knightly preponents and many times to

the welfare of society.

_ -4 —_'.-_'——M m at..—-+. .

Beginning as early as the thirteenth century there
arose direct criticism of the noble classes with their
chivalrous ideals. Some was in a constructive vein but many
of the critics mocked the rules of chivalry and proposed new
ones to replace the old. In the thirteenth century a nascent
weakness in the structure of the nobility was exposed in the
Romance of the Rose. While most medieval authors would have
agreed with Ramdn Lull that "parage and chyvalrye accordsn
to gyder . . .,"21 Jean ds Meun proposed a nobility based
on virtue. Unlike the crude feudal nobility and the knights
of the crusading era, the thirteenth century nobility came
to look upon themselves increasingly as a class apart from
the rest. This class consciousness emerged not because of
any virtues the nobles possessed but by sheer fact of their

lineage. Jean ds Meun contended that birth was not the sole

 

20Froissart, II, 225-6.

21Lull, 0rdre of Ch alr , p. 58.

 

 

 

 

-133...

prerequisite to the nobility and knighthood but that train-

ing, education, and the deeds he performed made a man a true

nOble c

He goes

He stated that some men,

Long lineage boasts and blazonry,
bove rude folk who are but born
To till the earth, with labour worn,
I should reply that, 'tis alone
By virtue nob emen are known,

And only he should men count base
In whom fair virtue giveth place
To hideous vice. An upright heart
Doth true nobility impart,

But mere nobility of birth 22

I reckon as of little worth.

on to state:

With names could I fill many a page
Of men who, though their lineage

Was lowly, yet to fame did mount,

By genius, above king or count,

And worthily were held to be

The flower of all nobility.

But those good days are dead, alas!
And now may men a lifetime pass

In studying deep philosophy,

Faring therefor o'er land and sea

In poverty and misery great, -
Begging their bread at Dives' gate,
Barefooted, clad in threadbare gown,
Wending their way from town to town,J
Estesmed by kings not worth a hen, 23
Although far worthier gentlemen, . . .

For several more pages Jean de Msun attempts to point up the

fallacies of a nobility based on lineage as compared with

that based on virtue but his admonitions apparently had

little effect.

 

22mm 9; the Ross—g, III, 133.

23Romance of the Rose, III, 137.

-13h-

A century later the austere GeoffrOy La Tour Landry
offered indirect criticism in the form of advice to his
daughters. much of his emphasis centered upon the revival
of a pious nobility to the exclusion of the growing pre-
occupation with romance and exuberant court life. However,
he delved into other areas than the above mentioned. For r
example, he emphasized "the great honour and the great wealth
that is for to be well Renowned, to bear a good name, and
to be well spoken of, which is one of the greatest grace
that may be in the world. . . ." He goes on to show the

1' '13.!

extensive labor and peril of death which a knight must undergo
"and after he hath suffered thus much, then he is drawn forth
and put unto much worship, and the princes give him great
lordships and governances, for his noblsness and for he hath
no parail in honour of good name."24 La Tour Landry used
this example to demonstrate the goal that knights should
strive to achieve but were not coming close to attaining in
his era.

About the same time that Le Tour Landry was writing
his memorable rsproof of chivalry a book emerged in England
known as Piegg 'ths Plowman.l The best historians agree
that this work was written by William Langland, a commoner,
who criticized the nobility and clergy more especially in

their relations with the commoners. In one allegorical

 

zhLa Tour Landry, p. 128.

-135-

passage Langland criticized the nobility in an indirect way
‘for'thsir failure to protect the lands of the peasants. The
plowman mentions to a knight how the peasant earns meat and
drink for all men. Graciously the knight offers his aid to
‘the plowman but the latter quickly refuses it stating:

That I will sweat and see to it, and sow for us both, I
And labour for your love, all my life-time, »
If you charge yourself to cherish Holy Church and myself
And chase off the wicked that lay the world waste.

And be a hardy hunter of hares and of foxes

Of boars and of badgers that break down my hedges;

Go and fly falcons to fall upon wild-fowl

that come into my croft and crop up my wheat'. . . .25

.__-I.—.I_..-..‘-.~v ‘

This passage is obviously directed at the noblemen who failed a
'to protect the lands of the peasants from bands of roving
pillagers and who treated the land as game preserves, failing
ever to exterminate completely the predatory animals who
preyed on the peasants'crOps. This type of criticism recurs
repeatedly throughout the pages of Langland.

Early in the fifteenth century a new type of critic
emerged in the writings of Christine de Pisan. It is sig-
nificant to note that she was born of noble blood, thereby
giving her remarks a greater importance. She spoke out
strongly for women's rights, rebuking the adultery and de-
gradation of women in the Romances; the Rose. Her criti-

cism differed from that purported by La Tour Landry in the

 

25Visions From Piers Plowman taken from the oem of
William Langland, trans. into modern English by Nevifl
Coghill (New York, 1950), p. 49. (Hereafter cited as Piers
Plowmgg).

 

 

 

-136-
sense that she did not emphasize returning to the "good old
days" so much as suggesting an alteration of the old ways
of chivalry to meet new conditions. Though spying and lying
in ambush were deplored by good knights she cautiously began
to speak of using these methods in unusual circumstances.
She advocated caution in respect to the trust one placed in
other captains and admonished care in arbitrating for peace
with an enemy fer fear it might be a trick to gain time.26
Her ideal ruler was the unchivalrous but wise Charles V who
remained in Paris while his experienced constable, du
Guesclin, led the French armies into battle. Her attitude
can be explained in part by the turbulent and treacherous
Burgundian-Armagnac dispute which plunged France into civil
war, yet her writings are more than a mere reflection of
her chaotic age. She seriously began to challenge the basic
tenets of chivalry and began speaking of using diplomacy
instead of warfare in many situations. Her writings mark a
radical departure from the fourteenth century writers.

The departure becomes even more clearly defined in
the writings of Philip de Commines. Commines went to great
extremes to heap derision upon the chivalrous nobility. In
fact, if there were not other chroniclers writing in the late
fifteenth century one would surmise that chivalry no longer

 

26For a complete account of her views on these topics
see Christine, Fayttes of Armes, pp. 70-7A.

-137-

existed. Unlike Froissart, he realistically looked at the
nobility with all their frailties, boldly calling a coward

a coward and concluding by heaping scorn on the false pre-
tensions of chivalry. He pictured warfare as a wicked busi-
ness and one to be undertaken in the most efficient manner
possible. He approached diplomacy and warfare with much ~.
the same attitude as Machiavelli advocating that expediency
prevail over the outmoded methods of chivalry. One is puzzled

by the great amount of moralizing and emphasis upon divine

-- .-.-a-‘~.-~ gum—4 Jun—.m- ~ to

intervention which appears on page after page of the memoirs L,
of this cynic. The best possible explanation which is con-
sistent with his other views would equate him with Frederick
the Great in the sense that both felt that God stood on the
side with the largest battalions.

Commines looked to his Sovereign, Louis XI, as almost
an ideal statesman. The virtues which appealed to Commines
' were the same ones which appeared in Louis. Both Commines
and his sovereign were crafty in their dealings. Commines
advocated the use of trickery, cheating or any other means
of' statecraft that would best enable a wise prince to
achieve his purposes. The successful prince could not retain
a high regard for honesty and loyalty and still achieve his
goals. This approach is a far cry from the ideals upheld
in the code of chivalry.

Commines is most outspoken in presenting the virtues

and vices of Louis XI, especially in comparison to the other

-138-
princes and lesser nobles. At One point he states:

I am very confident that if his [the king's] education
had not been different from the usual education of such
nobles as I have seen in France, he could not so easily
have worked himself out of his troubles; for they are
brought up to nothing but to make themselves ridiculous,
both in their clothes and discourse; they have no knowl-
edge of letters; no wise man is suffered to come near
them, to improve their understandings; they have gov-
ernors who manage their business, but they do nothing Eh
themselves . . . and I have seen their servants take '
great advantage of them, giving them to understand

they were fools; and if afterwards they came to apply
their minds to business, and attempted to manage their
ogniafggirs, they began so late, they could make nothing
0 to

 

Though he condoned treachery and trickery, he had great re- {A
spect for wisdom and sincerely believed that the success of
the king lay in the fact that he was more suspicious and
sage than the other princes, more especially Charles the
Bold. Since man's life was so short that he was not able
to experience everything for himself, Commines suggested
that the greatest means to wisdom was to have studied the
histories of the ancients. He felt nothing but scorn for
the illiterate princes who were led about by the nose by
lawyers and priests.
Commines originally served as an important noble in
the house of Burgundy' under the successive reigns of Philip
the Good and Charles the Bold. In the year 1472, he defected
to the court of Louis, king of France, whom he served faith-
fully until the time of his death. The reasons and justification

 

27Commines, I, 61.

-139-
for his defection are somewhat confusing, but it appears he
finally reached a point where he could no longer tolerate

the knightly idealism of the foolhardy Charles and departed
to serve the wiser and more realistic Louis XI. Another
explanation which is just as feasible involved a large pen-
sion which Louis probably paid Commines for entering his
service. Despite his devotion to Louis, this brilliant his-
torian and statesman was also quick to point out the failings
of his beloved monarch. The blunders committed by Louis
usually precipated a bit of philosophizing and constructive
criticism from Commines. The Peronne affair in 1&68 offers
an excellent example. Louis foolishly left himself in a
position whereby he was quickly seized by Charles the Bold
after news reached the latter that some of the king's agents
had incited a revolt in the city of Liege. Commines' inter-
pretation stated that "it is the highest act of imprudence
for any prince to put himself into the power of another,
especially if they be at war . . . I do not say that every-
body has met with such treacherous dealings, but one example
is sufficient to make many people more wise. . . ."28 To be
a successful prince and ruler one must be suspicious and
wary of oneh Opponents at all times. These views come from
the mind of a realist whose outlook was completely divorced

from that of a traditional medieval knight.

 

28
Commines, I, 115-6.

_.'

-140-

Commines derided the chivalrous nobility en masse
for their love of honor and glory, their implacable pride,
and their enjoyment of warfare. However, he particularly
concentrated on his impetuous and conceited former lord,

Charles the Bold of Burgundy. The insatiable desire of the

v!

duke to extend his dominions led him to undertake the most
difficult enterprises. While Commines never doubted his
courage, "he was defective in judgment, and in the cunning
management of his affairs: and if a prince be deficient in
that point, let him be every way as complete and as nicely :4
qualified for heroic actions as he will, it signifies nothing.
. . ." Much of the misfortune that befell Charles came from
his stubborn adherence to a knightly code that was no longer
practiced or practical. "In short, he that could have taken
part of the king's qualities, and mingled them with the duke's,
might have made a perfect prince; for certainly the king was
much superior to him in judgment and management, and the
end sufficiently demonstrated it to all the world."29 The
death of Charles the Bold at the hands of the Swiss brought
no sympathy from Commines; instead, he perceived it as the
passing of the last major obstacle to the unity of France.
As Froissart, with his love and praise of chivalry,
typified an order that was slowly being outmoded and under-

mined, Commines truly symbolized a new era. He had no praise

h

29

The quotes are from Commines, I, 180.

-141-

and little if any constructive criticism to bestow upon those
who adhered to the knightly ideals of courtesy and honor.

His philosophy entailed a Machiavellian code of conduct which
he expressed especially well in his views on diplomacy and
the running of a national state. He rose above the quarrels
of the petty princes and perceived affairs on a national ‘5
and even international scope. He thoroughly grasped the

significance of a "balance of power" in Europe which he be-

—._-u -- n...- ‘lk '\ - ~

lievsd was partly upset by the fall of the house of Burgundy.
However France was still not autonomous for "France has
England as a check; England has Scotland; and Spain, Portugal.
. . ."30 Such a penetrating insight as this would never
occur to the average medieval knight for it took a man like
Commines who had severed all ties with chivalry to achieve
a perception of the world in this scope and depth.
Contemporary with and in direct contrast to Commines,
William Caxton published many important books in an effort
to revitalize chivalry. Thanks to the recent invention of
the printing press many of his copies are extant today. He
tried to revive the knightly customs which he felt were so
essential to noblemen by translating and publishing such
works as Ram6n Lull's The Book of the Ordre QQZthvalry. In
the epilogue to this book he bemoans the fact that knights

no longer behave as they did in the days of old.

 

30

Commines, I, 379.

-142-
0 ye knyghtes of Englond, where is the customs and
vsage of noble chyualry that was vsed in tho dayes.
What do ye now but go to the baynes and plays att
dyse. And some not wel adu sed zse not honest and good
rule. Ageyn alle 0rdre of ygh hode learn
this learn it and reds the noble volumes of saynt
graal, of lancelot, of galaad . . . and many mo. Ther
shalle ye see manhode, curtosye, and gentylnesse. And
loke in latter dayes of the noble actes syth the coquest,
as in kyng Rychard dayes cuer du lyon, Edward the fyrste and
the thyrd . . . Syre Robert knolles . . . Syr Johan
chaudos . . . reds froissart . . . and many other
whoos names shyne gloryously by their vertuous noblesse
and actes that they did in thonour of thordre of chyualry.
Allas what doo ye bug slepe and take ease and er a1 dis-
ordred fro chyualry. 1
Though this is directed at the English it is equally appli-
cable in France, for in both countries the environment was
inconducive to the practice of chivalry as known in the
previous centuries. The knights which Caxton refers to in
his time were no more than courtiers whose mere existence
was a detriment to society.

One could not conclude a survey of the critics of
chivalry without mentioning the immortal work of Cervantes.
Through the humorous escapades of that infamous knight-errant
Don Quixote and his faithful squire Sancho Panca, he literally
laughed chivalry out of existence. One is astounded at the
similarity between some of the ridiculous missions of this
idealistic knight and the adventures of such anachronistic
characters as Jacques de Lalaing and Charles the Bold. Cer-
vantes poignantly exposed the multitudinous incongruities of
the medieval knight, thereby ridiculing chivalry out of ex-

istence once and for all.

 

BJCaxton, 0rdre of Chzyalgy, p. 123.

CHAPTER V
THE NOBILITY AND THE CHURCH

Endeavoring to analyze and classify the religious
beliefs and practices of persons or groups of persons is a
tremendous task that should be undertaken with the utmost
humility and restraint. The discussion to follow will only
scratch the surface of the religious position of the nobility
in France during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Brief
as this appraisal shall be, there is justification for delv-
ing into this area, fOr there arises a perceptible change in
the religious behavior of the nobility during the last two
centuries of the Middle Ages. A significant transition can
be perceived between the tone of the chronicles of Joinville
and Froissart. The former constantly speaks of the inter-
vention of God as a significant factor in turning the tide
of battle, while Froissart rarely speaks of divine inter-
vention. This can be explained in part by the fact that
the chronicles of Joinville concerned a religious crusade;
however, the real answer goes deeper than this. The writings
of Froissart reflect a nobility who lacked any serious pur-
pose. The crusading knights, no matter what their other
reasons, fought primarily for a religious purpose with the

feeling that they could rely upon the deity for aid. The

-1h3-

 

 

 

 

 

 

-lhh-
nobility which Froissart described fought for such dubious
reasons as plunder, personal glory, and the love of a fair
damsel. Throughout the thirteenth century one can undoubtedly
find numerous examples of knights fighting for less worthy
reasons than the glory of God, but it is not until the com-
mencement of the Hundred Years' War that one clearly realizes
the transition that had taken place.

The comparison between the two eras can be strikingly
illustrated by briefly examining several crusades or attempts
at crusades during the later Middle Ages. In 1396 Sigismund
of Hungary led a crusade against the Turks, known as the
Crusade of Nicopolis. He was supported by the Balkan rulers,
German and English knights, as well as by the Roman and
Avignon popes. At the king's behest, the French also sent
a good—sized contingent of knights led by John of Burgundy.
The knights assembled along the Danube with great pomp but
as they proceeded they pillaged and slew at will. Unlike
the earlier crusades the knights acted as if they were
participating in a great sporting festival. Froissart writes
of the extravagant outfits donned by the French knights who
were "so richely arayed that they semed lyke kynges. . . ."1
Finally the knights, ignoring all advice, pressed ferth

into battle. After an initial success they were completely

overwhelmed by the Turks and many of the knights were captured

 

lFroissart, I. 236.

-145-

or killed. The crusade ended in complete failure, partially
due to lack of discipline. But of even greater importance
‘the knights felt no compelling motivation to fight the infidel.
They'lacked the religious zeal and sense of purpose that drove
the earlier crusading knights to great acts of heroism and
sacrifice.

An even more pitiful episode occurred in lh54 as
Philip the Good endeavored to form a crusade against the
powerful Turks, who had captured Constantinople the previous
year. At the pope's behest, Philip called upon the knights
of Burgundy, France, and in fact all Christendom to rally to
the cause of the Church. Philip had long dreamed of the
glory and prestige that would accrue by leading a crusade
against the infidel and now he had a golden opportunity to
avenge his father's disaster at Nicopolis. In order to re-
cruit knights for this holy cause Philip planned several
weeks of elaborate festivities revolving around the lavish
Feast of the Pheasant, described earlier in detail.2 It
is difficult to deny the duke's sincerity in planning his
crusade, but the means he used to do so definitely stigma-
tized it as a romantic expedition that could never reach
any solid basis in reality. As the grandiose banquet reached
a fever pitch Philip announced he would accompany his most

Christian king in taking the Cross, and if the king could not

—_

2See Chapter III, pp. 107-8.

-11.,6-
go he would lead the crusade himself. The knights immedi-
ately responded and more than a hundred vows in writing were
placed in the records. Some weakened their vows by adding
many conditions, while others breathed of bravado in imita-
tion of the duke. Some knights and squires even fell to
making a joke of their vows, swearing such outlandish things
as striking with their sword the crown of the first Saracen
king the knight met or marrying the first lady who accepted
his favors upon his return. Unlike the first crusading
knights there was no need to be sincere, for this was all
part of an elaborate theatrical performance. As might be
expected, the great enthusiasm cooled considerably after
the banquet ended and the crusade finally came to naught.
This whole farce demonstrates the futility of inspiring any
religious zeal into a decadent nobility whose energies were
directed toward such diversions as romance, jousts, feasts
and similar superfluities. The nobility no longer showed
any regard for the religious vows of their feudal or chivalric
obligations and on occasion appeared not even to be Chris-
tians.

There was indeed a growing pagan tinge to the beliefs
and practices of the nobility. "To find paganism, there was
no need for the spirit of the waning Middle Ages to revert
to classic literature. The pagan spirit displayed itself,

as amply as possible, in the Roman de la ngg."3 This classic

 

3Huizinga, W ing Middle A es, p. 33h.

~1h7-

'work placed great emphasis upon love and the fulfilling of
man's temporal desires with little concentration upon the
spiritual. The whole theme revolved around the lover seeking
the rose or seeking fulfillment of his sensual drives. This
'work served as a guidebook on love and court life for over
two centuries after its conception..eIts tremendous effect
can be exemplified time and again throughout the waning
Middle Ages but probably one of the best illustrations appears
in the court of Burgundy. The Feast of the Pheasant stripped
of its false religious significance might easily be compared
to some of the ancient bacchanalian festivals. It was truly
a pagan affair with its participants acting in a manner more
typical of the exuberant Renaissance than like Christian
knights and soliders of the Holy Church. "Altogether the
Feast of the Pheasant had caused a 'fort oultrageuse et
gggggisonable despense' such as had scarcely been seen on the
occasion of a princely wedding or the visits of illustrious
strangers."h After the banquet there arose much criticism
of the pagan actions of the participants. Philippe de Mezieres
was one of the persons most vociferous in criticizing the
errors of the knights attending the banquet but his criticism
fell upon deaf ears.

A small minority did react to the paganism of the

nobility and endeavored to channel their misguided energy

_—

hCartellieri, The Court of Burgundy, p. 152.

.143.
'back into the religious realm. IMuch of the criticism was
naturally aimed at The Romance of Abe Rggg, whose theme rang
of‘licentiousness and infidelity and encouraged suchrunknightly
Iand.unchristian sins as pride, intsmperence, sloth and idle-
:ness. As one would expect, La Tour Landry represents one
of’the major critics of the religious behavior of the no—
'bility. In his rsproof he endeavored to demonstrate vividly,
for'the edification of his daughters, that both immoral and
sacrilegious knights and clergy would suffer some physical
punishment here on earth or even worse, suffer the agony of
eternal damnation. Though the intrigues and affairs he uses
.for examples cannot be taken to be strictly factual, without
a doubt they must have been drawn from conditions and
abuses that did exist in the fourteenth century. He admon-
ished his daughters to be faithful to their husbands and
virtuous and pious in all ways. He gives as an example two
sisters, one of whOm was unchaste, lewd, evil of body and
soul, and irreverent to God. This type of woman would either
be killed, blinded or at the very least lose the love of her
husband. Her sister was chaste, pious, and said her matins
regularly and consequently lived a happy life.5 In another
case a nobleman and his wife had a habit of sleeping late
on Sunday morning; consequently, the priest had to delay
the service until their arrival. On one occasion they slept

past noon thereby depriving themselves and the whole parish

 

5La Tour Landry, pp. 5-6.

-1l.9-

of Mass that Sunday.
And the same night the knight and the lady dreamed
that they were become horned swine and sow, and would
not let the sheep go to their pasture nor feeding.
And after them thought that there came many, black
hunters, and black horses, with many black greyhounds,
and raches; and the hounds were uncoupled on them, and
chased and bit them desspiteously by the ears and the
eyes; and them thought that the chase dured so long
on them till they were taken and slain. And of this
visioa, when they were awaked they were foul afraid.

They immediately went to the priest and repented their
slothfulness and thereafter were always prompt and never
again deprived the parishioners of another Mass. La Tour
Landry used this type of allegory continuously to demonstrate
the consequences of transgressing the knightly and Christian
mode of conduct.

The punishments which La Tour Landry indicates sin-
ful knights will receive closely resemble in severity and
horror those mentioned in Dante's Inferno. In numerous cases
La Tour Landry speaks of those who fail to act in a Christian
manner burning in hell for a thousand years. In one instance
a noblewoman became to enamored with her cloths and jewels
and on judgment day "the devil took her, and bare her away,
and put her clothes and array burning in the flame on her
with the fire of hell, and cast her down into the pit of hell,
and the poor soul cried, and made much sorrow and pity, but

it booted not."7 Practically all the examples he presented

 

6La Tour Landry, p. 306.
7La Tour Landry, p. 54.

-150-
to his daughters are approached from the same pessimistic
point of view shown above. La Tour Landry made the punish-
ments for sins and transgressions convincingly real, impress—
ing upon the reader the compelling necessity this austere
knight must have felt to reform his fellow noblemen and women,
and the doom and degradition that would befall those who did
not mend their ways.
William Langland is very similar to La Tour Landry
in his criticism of the pagan practices of the nobility and
in his portrayal of the pain and suffering that befell those
who burned in the seething pits of hell. His approach also
tends to be pessimistic, chastising the prideful, lsachsrous,
gluttonous nobility for their evil ways and showing that
among all the animals man is the only one not ruled by reason.
To elevate oneself from.the depths of hell one must live by
faith, hope, and charity not treachery, envy, and idleness.
Man can find truth only through the love of God and must
eschew his evil ways here on earth.8
This pervading sense of doom became even more preva-
lent during the fifteenth century as is most clearly demon-
strated in the memoirs of Philip de Commines. He constantly
speaks of God stepping in to aid the king or some worthy

 

For an account of Langland's views see Piers Plo
pp. 118-9.

-151-

prince; however, on numerous other occasions he describes
many a mighty prince who met disaster because he displeased
God or failed to do His will. Whether he sincerely believed
all he wrote about divine intervention and the influence God
had on men's lives is an unsolved riddle, but one cannot help
but grasp the feeling of pessimism which constantly surrounded
any description of the actions of the nobility in which any-
thing of religious significance or recriminations might be
involved. At the death of Louis XI Commines expressed a note
of gloom when he stated

small hopes and comfort ought poor and inferior people
to have in this world, considering what so great a king
suffered and underwent, and how he was at last forced
to leave all, and could not, with all his care and
diligence, protract his life one single hour. I knew
him, and . . . yet I never saw him free from labour

and care.

On a later occasion he relates that,

no creature is exempt from adversity; every man eats
his bread in pain and sorrow: God Almighty promised
it to our first parents, and he has performed it very
faithfully ever since to all people. Yet there are
degrees and distinctions of sorrow, and the troubles
and vexations of the mind are greater than those of the
body. . . .

Some look at the nobility as,

the envy of all people, by their riches, health, and
prosperity. Those who have not conversed with them so
much as I have done, believe the condition of great
persons to be the happiest in the world; but I have
seen their troubles and disquiets, aroused upon such
trifling occasions, as persons at a distance could

 

Commines, II, 80.

-152-

hardly believe . . . and this is the secret distemBer
that reigns in the courts of great princes. . . .1

From these passages one does not receive an optimistic per-
ception of the nobility. Commines often wears a mask of
glumness especially concerning the religious implications

of the nobility's indiscretions. Though he disavowed and
'mocked almost everything that chivalry stood for, he never
tampered with its religious basis in any disparaging fashion;
instead he constantly reminded the nobility of their spiritual
shortcomings and often viewed their actions with a dismal
foreboding.

Spiritually, the nobility of the late Middle Ages
seems to have lacked the drive that motivated their ancestors.
Their attitude attracted criticism and some segments of the
nobility began to adopt an air of pessimism concerning the
religious purpose and future of their class. Now let us
analyze their behavior when they came in actual physical
contact with the churches and monasteries and the secular
and regular clergy.

One of the most important events which occurred in
the fourteenth century involved the transfer of the resi-
dency of the pOpe from Rome to Avignon for a period of over
seventy years. One would expect to find a great deal of in-
formation in the chronicles of Froissart concerning the

"Babylonian Captivity" but amazingly enough little is mentioned

——_

10Commines, II, 255-6.

-153-
about this important event in history. What material
Froissart does present usually concerns the threats of the
Companion captains against the pope. In 1361 a band of
Companions led by Sir Robert Briquet and other noble captains
swooped down upon the area around Avignon. They pillaged
the land and threatened to put the pope himself at their
mercy. "And when that pops Innocent the sixt, and the
colledge of Rome, sawe howe they were vexed by these cursed
people, they were greatly abasshed; and than ordeyned a
croysey agaynst these yvell Christen people, who dyde their
payne to distroy Chrystendome.. . ." Finally after they
had "haryed the Pope, the Cardynals, and the marchauntes
about Avygnon, and dyd moche yvell . . ."11 they were driven
off. As representative of a class that were supposed to be
the policemen of the Church these knights were certainly
not fulfilling their function.

Even the celebrated du Guesclin challenged the pope
at Avignon. As leader of the Companions in the mid thirteen-
sixties he was in sore need of cash in order to finance the
campaign to place Henry Trastamara upon the throne of Castile.
He used the Free Companies for bargaining purposes by
threatening to let them pillage the city if the pope did
not turn over the funds they demanded. When the pope at-

tempted to raise the money by levying a tax upon the townsmen,

 

*—

11
Froissart, II, 87-8.

-15h-
du Guesclin balked and forced him to take the money from the
papal coffers. This terrible Breton was so effective that
he received absolution for himself and his companies as part
of the bargain. Such an incident further exemplifies how
far apart religion and chivalry had drifted.

During the period in which Froissart admits to the
fact that he was one of the captains of a group of Companions,
these desperados again threatened the pope. While on a
mission of pillage and plunder they "made warr to the Pope
and to the Cardynalles, who coude nat be quyte of them.

. . ."12 Among the other infamous knights harassing the
pope was Sir Robert Briquet in all his decadent glory. As
usual, the Companions either were driven off or left volun-
tarily after they had exhausted the possibilities of pillage
in the area. This represents only one more in a long line
of outrages which the sordid Companions perpetrated against
the papacy.

Froissart, surprisingly enough, on one occasion
rises above his usual blind acceptance of all actions per-
petrated by the nobility to show real literary skill in
criticizing their interest, or lack of it, in the great
schism that had split the Church. He appears astonished
that

the grste lordes of the erthe at the begynnyn dyd
nothynge but laughs at the chyrche . . . [and moche

 

—v——

12Froissart, IV, 152.

fir

”$35-

of the comon pe0ple mervayled hows the grete lordes

. . . dyd provyde no remedy in that case. There was

one thynge reasonable to appease the common people,

and to escuse the hyghe prynces and kynges, dukes

and erles, and other lordes; as by ensampls: The yolks

of the eggs can not be without the whyte, nor the whyte

without the yolks, no more maye the clergy and the lordes

be one without another; for the lordes are governed by

the clergy, or they coulde not lyve but as beestes, and

the clergy were not: and the clergy counsayleth and

exhorteth the lordes to do as they do.13
The surprising thing about this indictment is not the
nobility's lack of interest, but the fact that Froissart
mentions it. The nobles had remained aloof of the schism
and had made no efforts to help get Christianity unified
once again. This attitude of disinterest in the affairs of
the papacy is significant in showing the widening chasm be-
tween the rsligious ideals and obligations of the nobility
and their actual practice in the fourteenth century.

The nobility flauntsd their disrespect for the Church
in other areas besides attacks upon or flagrant neglect of
the papacy. An even clearer indication of their lack of
deference to the clergy and devotion to Christianity may be
attained by analyzing the interaction of these two classes
at the "grass roots" level. This can be shown by investi-
gating a few of the multitudinous depredations committed by
the petty nobility (and even the powerful princes) against
the secular and regular clergy and the physical destruction

of the numerous churches and monasteries. "The Hundred Years'

 

13Froissart, IV, ZAO.

 

m.

 

 

 

-156-

War was more disastrous for the great churches and abbeys
than the religious wars. . . . A great number of abbeys
were forced to give up much of their property and income;
[and] others were seized by nobles. . . ."14 The pages of
Froissart are an.invaluable source from which one can gain
information concerning these depredations.
Early in the war a group of French knights fell
upon the town of Aspre, burning and pillaging with the per-
mission of the French king. However, also
within the towns ther was a priory of blacks monkis,
with great byldingss besyde the church, which helde of
saynt west of Arras; the Frenchemen also robbed the
place, and brent it to the ysrth, igd withall their
pyllage they retourned to Cambray.
One year later, in 13h0 another group of French men-at-arms
from
saynt Amends yssued out, and came to Hanon, in Heynalt,
and burnt the towns, and vyolated the abbey, and
dystroyed the mynster, and caryed away all that they
might to saynt Amande: and an other tyme the same French
soudyours passed the wood of saynt Amande, and came to
the abbey of Vycongne, and made a great fyre at the gate,
to have burnt it.1
One naturally expects to find a certain amount of destruction
during a period of warfare; however, this wasteful, thought-
less dsstruction of churches and clergyman surpasses the

tolerable limit. The above passages do not represent isolated

 

l“Thompson, Economic Histor , pp. l2h-5.

15Froissart, I, 126..

16
Froissart, I, 153.

 

 

 

 

-157-

incidents but are examples of the common behavior of the
nobility. Froissart tells of over thirty churches and mon-
asteries that were destroyed by the nobility in France be-
tween the years 1337 and 1360 which he himself had knowledge
of. Who knows how many more were violated?

The men of Hanon endeavored to obtain revenge upon
Saint Amand by assaulting the city. When the men-at-arms
had successfully entered the city and "whan therle and his
company wer entred into thabbey, he commaunded that all
shulde be put to the swerde. . . ."17 Such cruelty had no
place in chivalry but there is even less reason for perpe-
trating such action in a house of the Lord. The earl of
Hainault finished the days seige when he "brent clene the
towns, and thabbey minster and all. . . ."18 The following
day the earl and his men beset a great French abbey named
'Marchienes, whose inhabitants put up a valiant defense.
Eventually they were overcome by the earl "and ther were
taken dyvers monkes, and thabbey robbed and brent. . . ."19

The knights of England and France did not even curtail
their fighting on the most important holy days of the year.
One would expect to find that fighting ceased and the men-

at-arms attending church on Good Friday. Instead one discovers

17Froissart, I, 163.
18Froissart, I, 163.

19Froissart, I, 164.

-158-

the knights attacking the symbols of the very Church they
pledged to defend. In 1360 Jean de Venette relates how

The English took and utterly destroyed all the church
towers which had been fortified in the country villages
around Paris. Among these was a church and its tower
in a village near Paris called Orly, which had been
fortified by the men of the village. . . . The English
came up on Good Friday and stormed it. . . . On that
[same] Good Fr day and Holy Saturday the English set
fire to Montlh ry in the bourg and to Longjumeau and to
many other towns round about. The smoke and flames
rising from the towns to the heavens were visible at
Paris in innumerable places. Thither a great part of
the rural population had fled. It was lamentable to
see men, women, and children desolate. On Easter Day,
I myself saw priests of ten country parishes communi-
cating their people and keeping Easter in various
chapels or any spot they could 56nd in the monastery of
the Carmelite friars at Paris.

These dastardly deeds would appear cruel and unchristian if
undertaken by any man, but their significance becomes in-
rfinitely more important when undertaken by men who swore to
uphold the principles of Christianity and protect the Church
at all times. Even the birthday of Christ was not inviolate.
In 1378 on the day when there was to be "peace on earth and
good will toward men" the English and Navarrese were burning,
pillaging and killing the peOple of Spain.21

In accordance with their usual destructive behavior
the Companion captains committed their fair share of depre-
dations against the churches and clergy. In 1370 Sir Robert

Knolles led a body of English warriors across France, burning

20Venette, p. 99.

21Froissart, III, 38-40.

 

 

 

-153-
the knights attacking the symbols of the very Church they

pledged to defend. In 1360 Jean de Venette relates how

The English took and utterly destroyed all the church
towers which had been fortified in the country villages
around Paris. Among these was a church and its tower
in a village near Paris called Orly, which had been
fortified by the men of the village. . . . The English
came up on Good Friday and stormed it. . . . On that
[same] Good Fr day and Holy Saturday the English set
fire to Montlh ry in the bourg and to Longjumeau and to
many other towns round about. The smoke and flames
rising from the towns to the heavens were visible at
Paris in innumerable places. Thither a great part of
the rural population had fled. It was lamentable to
see men, women, and children desolate. 0n Easter Day,
I myself saw priests of ten country parishes communi-
cating their people and keeping Easter in various
chapels or any spot they could 56nd in the monastery of
the Carmelite friars at Paris.

These dastardly deeds would appear cruel and unchristian if
undertaken by any man, but their significance becomes in-
‘finitely more important when undertaken by men who swore to
uphold the principles of Christianity and protect the Church
at all times. Even the birthday of Christ was not inviolate.
In 1378 on the day when there was to be "peace on earth and
good will toward men" the English and Navarrese were burning,
pillaging and killing the people of Spain.21

In accordance with their usual destructive behavior
the Companion captains committed their fair share of depre-
dations against the churches and clergy. In 1370 Sir Robert

Knolles led a body of English warriors across France, burning

20Venette, p. 99.

21Froissart, III, 38-40.

-159-

and plundering as they went. Stopping at Arras, they en-
deavored to have battle with those in the city but they would
not issue out. In order to draw them out to fight, the Eng-
lish succumbed to one of the most despicable operations of
the whole war. Trying to draw the soldiers from the city,
the English set fire to the suburbs "and so the fyre dyd
moch hurt and domage, for ther they brent a great monastery
of Fresrs Prschers, cloyster and all: and so thenglysshmsn
passed forthe . . . brennyng and wastyng the countre."22
Part of the destruction can be excused by the fact that
England and France were engaged in war but there can be no
feasible explanation for burning a cloister full of friars.

During the Hundred Years' war the churches were
literally turned into battle fields. On several occasions
they served as horrible execution chambers for many a hap-
less man-at-arms. One of the most odious of the mass murders
occurred in 1381 at which time the Low Countries were in
great turmoil. The earl of Flanders, with the backing of
many noble knights, doggedly pursued the forces from Ghent
who were led by John de Launoy. The latter, overcome by
the sheer numerical advantage of the earl, retreated to the
town of Nievle and many took refuge there in a church. In-
stead of giving Launoy's forces a fair chance as any brave

and Christian knight would have done, the earl turned the

 

22
Froissart, II, 344.

-l60-
church and those inside into a giant funeral pyre when

he commaunded to sette fyre on the mynster: his com-
maundement was shortely dons; fyre, fagottes and

straws were set togyder rounds about the churche, the
fyre anone mounted up to the coverynge of the mynster.
There dyed the Gauntoyse in great payne, for they were
brent quicke, and such as issued outs were slayne, and
cast agayne into the fyre. Johan Launoy, who was in
the step e, seinge hymsslfe at the poynt to be brent,
cryed to them without, Raunsome, raunsome, and offred
his cote, whiche was full of florens, to save his lyfe.
But they without dyd but laughs and scorn at him. . . .
He thought it were better for hym to be slayne than

to be brent, and so he lept out at a wyndowe among his
ensmyes, and ther he was rsceyved on speres and swerdes,
'and cut all to peces, and cast agayne into the fyre.
Thus ended John Launoy.2

Almost a century later, Charles the Bold engaged in
a similar act of brutality in the villainous sack of Nesle.
After agreeing to a truce the foes of the Burgundians gave
up their arms. No sooner were the Picards defenseless than
the Burgundians pursued them once again. Many sought refuge
in a "church of Nesle, but were followed by the Burgundians,
and barbarously put to death. When this slaughhmrhad been
completed, the duke of Burgundy arrived on horseback, and
entered the church, which was half a foot deep of blood,
from the poor creatures who there lay naked and dead. On
looking around, he said, it was a fine sight! and he was
glad to have with him such excellent butcherst!"24 Such an

 

23Froissart, III, 205-6.

2“.Monstrelet, II, 400. This passage is verified by
two other contemporary accounts. Jean De Troyes, The Scanda-

 

lous Chronicle or Secget Histor of Louis XI in The smoirs
of Phili De Commines Lord of Ar enton, ed. Andrew R. ScoEle,
Esq. (Landon, 1855), II, 368 gives a very similar description
of this affair. Commines, I, 211, also verifies the incident,
though in much less gory detail than the other two writers.

~161-
abominable action as this can only be explained as a barbarous
act of cruelty and a demonstration of the high disregard with
which the nobility treated the sanctity of the Christian
Church. Of especial significance is the fact that the whole
episode was directed and lauded by the supposedly Christian
knight, Charles, duke of Burgundy.

The chronicles of Monstrelet give some of the most
precise information we have today concerning the true inter-
actions between the nobility and clergy. In a concisely
worded passage the author states, "it is a well-known fact,
that the clergy are greviously vexed, and suffer great
losses . . . from men at arms . . . who take by force their
provisions, ransack their houses, nay, make them ransom
themselves from further injuries, by which means they have
scarcely a sufficiency left to perform the divine service."25
His examples of the depredations committed by the nobility
against the Church ran similar to those of Froissart but
contain a greater precision and frankness than those pre-
sented by this fourteenth century author.

Many of Monstrelet's illustrations arise out of the
era of the Burgundian-Armagnac disputes. On one occasion
William, count of Hainault, led an expedition near Liege,
burning and destroying a great amount of property belonging

to the Cistercian order.26 Numerous other accounts of

 

25Monstrelet, I, 40.
26Monstrelet, I, 86.

—162~

destruction could be added to this, but Monstrelet very
simply and concisely summarized the entire dispute and its
affect on the Church in the following terms: "It will be
impossible to relate one half of the mischiefs the armies
of both parties committed: suffice it to say, that churches,
churchmen, and the poor people were very great sufferers."27

After one has analyzed the actions of the nobility
in France during the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries one readily concludes that they had somehow failed
to live up to their Christian obligations. Their growing
paganism and seeming lack of interest at a time when opposing
forces threatened to permanently tear the Church apart are
grounds enough to show their spiritual degeneration. How-
ever, their physical attack upon the churches and clergy is
most certainly inexcusable. Had their primary energies
been directed against the Saracen infidels, the terrible
Turks, or unwanted heretics and schismatics, there would
be no reason to chastise an occasional transgression but their
destructive actions were aimed at none other than fellow
Christians. By the very fact that they set themselves up
as a class above other men, swearing to fight for the Holy
Catholic faith, their violations appear even more odious.
Truly, the Christian nobility degenerated miserably, in re-
spect to their ideals and obligations as Christian princes,

during the later Middle Ages.

 

27M0nstrelet, I, 164.

CHAPTER VI
THE NOBILITY AND THE URBAN CLASSES

The clergy were not the only unfortunatss to suffer
injury at the hands of the nobility. The bourgeoisie and
the common city dwellers also received harsh treatment and
their progress was perceptibly retarded by the irresponsible
men of rank. Let us first analyze some of the problems the
middle class merchants faced, especially observing the in—
juries thsy sustained and the means they used to counteract
the aristocracy.

Since the Hundred Years' war was partially precipi-
tated by a dispute over the economic ties between England
and the Low Countries, the burghers of the latter were es-
pecially hard hit throughout the course of the war. Froissart
gives innumerable examples of injury done to the merchants,
in most cases with little reason or provocation. The mer-
chants were subjected to constant humiliation, personal harm,
and loss of property, many times being fortunate to escape
with their lives. Froissart relates an assault upon Antwerp
in which "the men fledds out of their houses all naked, and
lept over the walles, and left all behynde them, and wedded
throughe the dykes and waters about the towns. The ryche
men bare nothyng away with them, for they were happy that

-163-

 

 

 

 

 

.4164-
might save themselfe alyve. Ther was the same night a great
nombre slayne in the towns and drowned in the dykes and
waters."1 1

Oftentimes the burghers were forced into warfare
against their will. In 1446, Philip, duke of Burgundy, obli-
gated the men of Ghent to aid him in his siege of the port
of Calais. Many of the burghers were unwilling to aid the
duke but failure to respond would mean loss of their fran-
chise. Not only were they forced into service but they were
required to furnish their own equipment for‘war.2 On a later
occasion the duke subjected the burghers of Ghent to undue
humiliation. He forced two thousand of them to kneel half
naked before him and to beg fer mercy.3 This extreme de-
gradation was surely not beneficial to these people and was
definitely not the action of a true nobleman.

The English also caused the middle classes much de-
spair during the Hundred Years' War. The burghers of the
city of Carsntan in Normandy, after receiving assurance from
the English msn-at-arms that they would receive no injury,
let the English enter their city. As soon as the soldiers
gained entrance, they broke their word to the burghers and

ravaged their property, their belongings, and wives. When

 

lFroissart, III, #55.
gMonstrelet, II, 33.

3Monstrelet, II, 220-21.

-165.-
"thengylsshmen had their pleasure of that good towns and
castell, and whan they saws they might nat mentayne to kepe
it, they set fyre therin and brent it, and made the burgesses
of'the towns to entre into their shyppss, as they had done
‘with them of Harflswe, Chyerburgue, and Mountbourge, and of
other townes that they had wonne on the see syde. . . ."h
Some burghers were even less fertunate than these as was
'the case with.Master John Tilet. Early in the fifteenth
century, he was thought to be one of the wisest and most
learned men in Soissons and had managed the business of
running the city for some time. In 1413, the French forces,
under the leadership of the king, captured the city. Among
the numerous atrocities committed by the French knights was
the abduction of Tilst and many wealthy burghers, all of
whom were summarily beheaded and hung by the shoulders on a
gallows in the nearby city of Lyon. This affair is of added
significance when one notes that there were present many
nobles of princely blood who did nothing to control their
knights or to prevent such cruel executions as related above.5
.Many similar examples are presented in the pages of the
fourteenth and fifteenth century chroniclers recounting the
injuries which the nobles inflicted on the bourgeoisie.

ifFroissart, I, 280.

5For an excellent account of the entire sordid affair

see Monstrelet, I, 303.

-l66-

The bourgeoisie had more to fear than loss of prop-
erty and life within the confines of their individual towns.
Travel had become so unsafe and uncertain that the merchants
dared not venture outside their city walls, thereby causing
almost a virtual extinction of trade. It is understandable,
even in our modern age with all of our international laws
which govern warfare, for international trade to be somewhat
upset during a period of war. However during the Hundred
Years' war the nobility made no attempt to follow any code
of law or code of conduct which regulated their relationship
with the bourgeoisie. Not only were they injurious to any
and all of their enemies but attacked friends as well, seems
ing to have no respect for the particular allegiance of any
of the bourgeoisie. Many nobles were similar to the duke
of Bourbon, who in 1387 departed from Spain with 9,000 men-
at-arms under his command. This vagabond corps of knights
were said to have "unhorsed whome soever they met, and made
warre to all marchauntes. . . ."6 On another occasion,
early in the war, a group of burghers from Amiens were
assaulted near Paris by a large band of knights led by
Geoffrey of Harcourt. Froissart relates that after a valiant
struggle almost all of the burghers were slain and all their

merchandise confiscated.7

6Froissart, V, 71

7Froissart, I, 287.

 

 

 

   

-167-

In many instances, more especially during the period
of the Burgundian-Armagnac civil strife, the burghers were
trapped in their towns due to siegss making it either unsafe
or impossible to venture forth. Those who dared leave the
city did so with great risk and usually after paying a high
cost fer safe passage. Monstrelet mentions that they "could
not venture abroad with their goods out of the fortified
towns without paying tribute for passports, under risk of
being robbed and murdered."8 Rows gives an excellent de-
scription of the danger the Norman merchants faced in endeavor-
ing to carry on trade. They were constantly attacked by
bands of brigands armed and manned by men of the lower nobil-
ity. "By 1409 travelling along the great high road from
Rugles and Beaumont-le-Rogier to Rouen had become so danger-
ous that merchants dared pass that way only in large companies
and in full daylight, for many people had . . . been robbed,
assaulted, and murdered by the robbe re who infested the woods
above Beaumont."9

Christine de Pisan raised her voice in loud protest
.against the treatment which the bourgeoisie received at the
thands of the men-at-arms. She contended that pillage and
:robbery should not be permitted and that it was the duty of
'the captains to keep their soldiers under control, seeing

 

8Monstrelet, I, 358.

9Rowe, "Norman Brigands," p. 585.

~168-

to it that they were paid well enough so they did not have
to gain money by such devious methods. It was up to the
captain to make it safe "so that marchaunts may surely come
and that he make an ordynaunce vpon peyns of deth that noo
thing be taken but it be payed for, nor nought mysdoo to
the marchaunt. . . ." She very pointedly stated that it
was against God's will and the code of chivalry for knights
to abuse the bourgeoisie the way they did "and suche folks
ought bettre to be called theuis and robbers than men of
armes or chsualrous. . . ."10

The criticism of Christine de Pisan, valid though
it was, brought no immediate change in the actions of the
nobility. In fact, the burghers suffered even greater
damage during the period beginning after the advent of Joan
of Arc and especially after the Peace of Arras in 1435. Dur-
ing the decade from 1435 to 1445 a particularly destructive
band of unemployed men-at-arms appeared on the scene, known
as scorcheurs. These roving bands were more dangerous during
the times of peace than war, for there were no forces to
counteract their destruction. The leaders of the storcheurs
‘were such well-known captains as the duke of Bourbon, La Hire,
Dunois, Chabannes, La Tremoille, and Rodrigo de Villandrando.
These cruel nobles made trade utterly impossible since there

remained no place in France which was safe for travel. "Aucune

 

10Ouotss are from Christine, ngttes of Armes, p. 44.

-1 69-
province ne fut epargnee; de la Guysnne e.1a Lorraine, de la
Bretagne au Dauphine, ce ne furent que pillages, devastations,
meurtres, commie par ceux qu'on appelait les 'Ecorcheurs'
parce qu'ils ne laissaient mEme pas une chemise a leur
victimes. I1 n'en fallait pas tant pour achever la ruins
du pays."11 The failure of the Praguerie and the ordonnggces
perpetrated by Charles VII helped bring the unruly nobility
under control thereby greatly increasing the safety of the
life, trade, and travel of the bourgeoisie. However, many
decades passed before they recovered the position they held
prior to the war.

The bourgeoisie reacted to the encroachments of the
nobility in many ways, but one of the most famous protest
movements occurred after the French defeat at Poitiers and
was directed by the dynamic Etienne.Marcel. The efforts of
Marcel and the third estate to gain control of the government
by strengthening the Estates General, involved more than the
nobility, for they also planned to acquire some of the power
attached to the kingship. Marcel had the solid backing of
the bourgeoisie of Paris; in fact, the whole populace of
the city supported him as he set out, inspired by an ideal

to reform the French government. The details of his failure

 

11"Edouard Perroy," in Henri Pirenne, Edouard Perroy,

et a1., La Fin du Mo en A's: - désa;ré;ation du monde
' - pe Sagnac, eds.,

,, Vol. VII) (Paris, 1931), p. 445.

   
 

 

 

m

 

 

 

 

-170-
are too numerous to involve us here but to summarize it
briefly the bourgeoisie failed toattain the necessary sup-
port for their program.12 The proposed reforms of this bour-
geois revolution were noble indeed but the times were too
troubled to enforce them. The movement was further com-
promised by their inability to collect adequate taxes and
after the loose alliance between Marcel and the ambitious
Charles the Bad of Navarre there was no hope of an equitable
solution. Though the bourgeoisie continued to raise grievances
through the Estates General, they did so with decreasing suc-
cess and hereafter reacted by different means.

After the collapse of Marcel's bourgeois revolution
the merchants and upper middle classes began to realize that
' they could not gain the protection they so desired through
“the parliamentary process. Since they were basically in—
terested in protecting their own interests, they looked more
and more for some strong power for aid. When it suited
their purposes, they allied with the king, their fellow
townsmen, or even the nobility. However, as has been demon-
strated, the latter offered more in the way of destruction
than protection. Increasingly the bourgeoisie turned to
the king for support, especially under the reigns of Charles

V, Charles VII, and Louis XI. Their intentions were basically

 

12See Froissart, I, 402-15. For a more concise state-
ment of the failure of Marcel and the Estates General see A.
Coville in The Cambrid e Medieval Histor , VII, 351-6.

 

-

 

 

 

-171-
not patriotic as is often conjectured, but essentially the
bourgeoisie were opportunistic. Though one occasionally
finds a sense of patriotism amongst the bourgeoisie it was
not a primary motivating force until the ascension of Louis
XI to the throne. 1Contrary to being nationalists these
Opportunistic burghers could be just as inconsistent and
ruthless as their primary foes, the nobility tended to be.
The situation in the Low Countries from 1379 to
1382 lends an excellent example. A dispute raged between
the count of Flanders, backed by the nobility, and a small
group of burghers from Ghent, known as the White Hats. The
latter were led by a harsh but enterprising leader named John
Lyon. At first the White Hats represented almost all of
the burghers of Ghent in presenting their grievances to the
earl; however, the actions of the White Hats became so ex-
treme that a majority of the burghers broke with the move-
ment. The moderates endeavored to reach a reconciliation
with the count but their negotiations were jeopardized by
the actions of the extreme elements of the movement. The
moderates begged the count's pardon, explaining that they
were not responsible for the murders undertaken by the White
Hats. Full scale civil war soon broke out involving the
moderate burghers who had no desire to fight. Though the
moderates were able to restore peace temporarily the White
Hats immediately precipitated another debacle. In 1381
Philip Artevelde, son of the famous Jacques Artevelde,

-172-
assumed the leadership with the backing of the burghers and
populace of Ghent. He was a Machiavellian type leader,
both feared and loved. Before assuming power, he was asked
'these questions by Peter du Boyse.
Can ye bears yourselfe high and be cruell among the
comons; and specially in suche thynges as we shall
have to do, a man is nothynge worths without he be
feared, doubted, and some tyme renowned with crueltie;
thus must the Flemmynges be governed; a man must set
no more by the lyfe of men, nor have no more pitie
therof, than the‘lyves of swalowes or larkes, the
whiche be taken in season to sate. By my fiyth,
sayd Philip, all this can I do right well.

Indeed this middle class ruler did turn out to be
ruthless and won several important battles. His troops
captured town after town in Flanders and sent the count
and his forces reeling back. Perceiving that the count might
attract powerful support to his cause, Artevelde appealed to
both France and England for aid. His emissary to France was
laughed at and imprisoned. After this rebuttal, Artevelde
sent twelve burghers to England in order to solicit English
aid. He sought both military support and financial backing
by collecting a forty year old debt which the English owed
the towns of Flanders. Both requests were refused and Arts-
velde's shrewd scheme to gain the support of either the
English or French failed.

For our purposes this affair is symbolic of the in-

consistency and sometimes even ruthlessness of the bourgeoisie.

_

13Froissart, III, 215.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-173-

Their loyalties vacillated quickly, as can be seen in the
case of Ypres. In 1382 this fair city was under heavy attack
by the French forces, led by Charles VI. The rich merchants,
thinking only of their own interests wished to give up the
city to the French. The captain of Ypres, a strong proponent
of Artevelde, felt the city was strong and said they would
resist the attacks of the French. Hearing this, the merchants
rose up and slew the captain. The city was then offered
to King Charles who demanded they pay 60,000 francs. After
receiving the money the French entered the city. The motives
of the merchants were surely not patriotic. On the con-
trary they took the calculated risk that they would lose
less by paying the required fee to the French and letting
them peacefully enter the city than by carrying on the
battle.14

On other occasions, however, the town merchants
were willing and able to do battle. Early in the Hundred
Years' war the earl of Mountfbrt besieged Rsnnes and captured
the captain of the city, Sir Henry Penfort, whom he threatened
to hang if the city did not surrender. The burghers perceiv-
ing they had much to lose in the way of money and goods
preferred to chance battle. After a short battle the common
townsmen, who had less to forfeit, overcame the burghers

and opened the gates of the city to the earl and his men.

 

ll’For a complete account of this affair see Froissart,
III, 379.

-17h-

'The city was captured and the burghers faced the possibility
of‘losing much of their property and goods.15 The merchants
.followed no consistent pattern but reacted in whatever manner
'they thought would most enhance their position.

In the early fifteenth century the bourgeoisie of
IFrance give an excellent expression of the basis of their
'true motivation. During and after the battle of Agincourt
the Norman burghers had bravely resisted the assaults of the
English led by Henry V and the duke of Bedford. After the
English victory was complete they had no inhibitations about
supporting the English as long as their own interests were
enhanced. "The merchant burgesses of the towns, after
heroically resisting the invader, made no bones about rally-
ing to him [Bedford] once restoration of order meant pros-
perous trade. . . . The renewal of trade with England rounded
off the rally of the burgesses."16 Truly it was not until
the reign of Louis XI that the burghers fell in full support
behind the French monarch. The loose alliance between the
kingship and bourgeoisie solidified in the late fifteenth
century as the monarchy tended to place more responsibility
in the hands of the merchants and upper middle classes and
less power in the hands of the nobility.

The bourgeois classes usurped much of the power of

the nobility rather indirectly by the mere fact that they

 

1
5Froissart, I, 174-5.

16Perroy, The Hundred Years W r, p. 251.

-175-
controlled a much greater amount of wealth. warfare came

to be increasingly expensive during the course of the four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries. The armor necessary to pro-
tect horse and rider against the deadly longbow represented

a major expense. While the feudal cavalry of the twelfth
century consisted of men whose equipment was about the same,
in the fifteenth century there was a wide divergence amongst
the armor donned by the nobility. In other words as chivalry
became more costly, it declined and became modified in many
ways.

The rising costs of chivalry brought about a dramatic
reduction in the sheer number of nobles that became knights.
"In the twelfth century every feudal male was a knight, but
in the fifteenth the knights were an aristocratic minority
of the nobles."17 In the fourteenth and especially the
fifteenth century the fief became a less reliable source of
income. In order to compete with the bourgeoisie and retain
their position as knights, many nobles turned to such enter-
prises as tournaments, ransoms, and pillage in order to en-
hance their lagging incomes. Though such critics as Christine
de Pisan stated that knights were to be rich enough to sustain
themselves without robbing and stealing, this became the

prevalent means of support.18 Those not able to garner the

17Painter, Chivalr , p. 22.

18See Christine, Egyttes of Armes, p. 44.

-176...
means necessary to rise to the station of full-fledged
knights remained squires, and as Painter so clearly shows,
these displaced the knights numerically in the fifteenth
century. One should not conclude that the fifteenth century
squires were perceptibly inferior to knights for they dif-
fered only in name. The squire was socially, politically,
and intellectually an equal, taking upon himself essentially
the same obligations as the full knight.

Following the devastation caused by the Black Death
in 1349 the whole texture of society in France, in fact all
Europe, was profoundly modified. As many of the old nobility
passed away the nouvegux riches and favorites of the king
assumed positions and titles formerly retained by men of
lineage. One of the greatest insults came in the form of
bestowing knighthood upon the bourgeoisie, begun by Philip
IV and continued by Charles V. The noblesse based chiefly
upon wealth, altered the customs and manners held sacred by
the old aristocracy and tended to place greater emphasis
on the extravagant in dress and action. It was partly due
to the influence of this element of the nobility that
chivalry declined. As the emphasis upon luxuries helped in-
crease the nobles expenses during the fifteenth century, the
old aristocracy with decreased revenues was forced to turn
to the monarchy for support through pensions, thereby re-
taining privilege but losing their power.

The story of the nobility's interaction with the

 

 

 

 

 

 

-177-
common people of the towns is even more disheartening. These
miserable creatures sustained even greater injury than had
been inflicted upon the richer classes. The artisans and
laborers had little to bargain with and fewer means to pro-
‘tect themselves from the ever present assaults of the nobil-
ity. "Not a province, scarce even a town of all France ex-
cept in the far south escaped depredation and destruction
in the long period between 1346 and l380."19 "Most of the
towns, even the greatest, were sacked, many of them more
than once."20 The cruelties committed by the nobles against
the commoners of the towns were especially harsh and courtesy
and mercy were rarely shown. Though the knight had no direct
obligation to aid the city dweller he did swear to respect
womanhood and aid the poor and oppressed. However, one is
only able to grasp the extreme maltreatment which the towns-
men suffered at the hands of the depraved nobility by analyz-
ing several illustrative examples.

During the early part of the Hundred Years' war the
towns received particularly oppressive treatment. In one
foray, "thenglysshmsn left Roon, and went to Gysors . . .
[and] they brent the towns, and then they brent Vernon . . .

and Pont de Lache [Pont de l'Arche] . . . and brent saynt Ger-
mayne in Lay, and Mountjoy, and saynt Clowde, and pety'Bolayne

 

19Thompson, Economic Histor , pp. 90-91.

2°Ib1d., pp. 123-4.

-178-

21 The destruction was not caused

[Boulogne] by Parys. . . ."
solely by the English knights for the French added their fair
share. Froissart gives numerous examples of the destruction
caused by the French forces in Southern France, emphasizing
that the dukes of Berry and Anjou were particularly active.22
Undoubtedly the towns suffered some of the severest
maltreatment at the hands of the Companions. These roving
bands fell upon the almost defenseless towns of France after
they had been subjected to over twenty years of warfare,
which was supposed to have been outlawed by the Peace of
Bretigny. Froissart related how "the noble realms of France
was sore greved on all sides.. . . These companyons . . .
ymagined nyght and day howe they might geat and steals townes
and fortresses. On a nyght they came to a strong towns
. . . called Pierpont, standyng in a maresse. . . . They
. . . came to the walles, and so entred into the towns and
wanne it without defence, and robbed it at their pleasure:
they found ther more riches than ever they feunds before in
any towns. And whan it was day they brent the towns, and
returned to Chemy, well furnysshed with great pyllage."23
These Companions traveled from town to town, destroying and

burning with no other purpose than pillage.

 

21Froissart, I, 286.

22See Froissart, V, 299.

23Froissart, II, 5253.

-179-

Even Froissart, while a member of the Companions,
engaged in cruel and unknightly activities concerning the
city of Thury. In an effort to gain entrance to this city,
Froissart and six others dressed up as women. After being
admitted they let fifty other Companions into the city over
which they promptly took command.24 This type of behavior
is diametrically opposed to the spirit of chivalry and
typical of the deception which knights used to capture and
destroy many towns in France.

In 1370 the usually noble and courteous Black Prince
led one of the most vile and brutal missions undertaken dur-
ing the entire Middle Ages. Known down through history as
the bloody sack of Limoges, this debacle marks a milestone
in the long list of cruelties committed by the men of
chivalry. Froissart states that it was

great pytie to se the men, women, and chyldren, that
kneled downs on their knees before the Prince for
mercy; but he was so enflamed with yrs that he toks no
hede to theym, so that none was herds, but all putts to
dethe as they were mette withal, and sucheas were nothyng
culpable; there was no pyte taken of the poore people
who wrought never no maner of treason, yet they bought
it dererr than the great personages, suche as had done
the yvell and trespace. There was nat so harde a hert
within the cytie of Lymoges, and yf he had any remem-
brauncs of God, but that wepuapyteously for the great
mischefe that they saws before their eyen: for mo than
thre thousands men, women, and chyldren were slayne and
behseded that day: God have mercy on their soules, for
I trows they were martyrs.25

 

2“Froissart, IV, 159.

2SFroissart, II, 356.

-180-

No matter what reason the Black Prince had for
attacking the city there can be no justification for the
indiscriminate slaughter of thousands of innocent and help-
less people. One shudders to think that this account comes
not from the mythical pages of some chggson de geste but
from the pages of a contemporary chronicler. Froissart's
colorful narrative does not belong to the imaginative or
fictitious side of chivalry but to its actualities.

Monstrelet described similar accounts of towns that
were sacked and burned by both French and English knights
during the fifteenth century.26 However, it is from the pen
of Commines that we receive one of the truly illuminating
insights into the endless suffering which the nobility caused
the common peOple of the towns. From 1467 to 1472 Charles
the Bold inflicted horrible death and destruction upon the
people of Liege, Nesle, and Dinant. For example in 1467
the Burgundians fell upon the city of Liege, partially de-
stroying the city and sending the people scurrying for refuge.
Many who were unfortunate enough to be taking prisoner were
slain. The following year the duke assaulted the city once
again, almost totally destroying it this time.27

Even more cruel was the Burgundian assault upon Nesle.

We have already viewed the cruelty of the duke of Burgundy

—‘

26See Monstrelet, I, 355 and I, 614.

2
7Commines, I, 159.

-l8l-

concerning the executions carried out in the church at Nesle.
"His thirst of blood and vengeance [did not] cease here,
for . . . he ordered the captain to be hanged, and the town
to be set on fire."28 Not only was his treatment of the
people brutal but he had used a most treacherous and ignoble
means to gain entry to the city. After having concluded
a treaty with the Picard captains offering safe conduct to
their forces and security to the people of the city he wickedly
had his forces turn on their foes, slaying them by the hun-
dreds.

With no difficulty numerous other examples could be
added to these already presented, all of which indicate
the average nobleman's lack of regard for the lives and
property of the members of the urban classes. The chronicles
of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are filled with
factual accounts of the depredations committed against the
bourgeoisie and the commoners of the towns. For almost two
centuries they lived in constant fear of annihilation at the
hands of the almost omnipresent nobility. One admittedly
expects to find disruption of normal economic life during a
period of warfare, especially one as chaotic as the Hundred
Years' war. However, the greater part of the devastation
and destruction perpetrated by the nobility was entirely

unnecessary and often undertaken with a morbid sense of glee,

28

II 368 Jean De Troyes, The Scandalous Chronicle in Commines,
’ O

-l82-
as in the case of the exterminations engaged in at Limoges
and Nesle. Though the nobility had no direct responsibility
to the urban classes, they failed to even uphold the lowest
level of decency when dealing with these people. Truly a
great many knights had lost respect for the value of a human
life and must have completely forgotten their true purpose

as men-at-arms and protectors of those unable to protect

themselves.

CHAPTER VII
THE MOBILITY AND THE PEASANTS

There is little doubt that of all the social classes
affected by the decadent nobility in France during the later
JMiddle Ages, the common peasant endured immsasurably more
than the rest. The brutality and destruction carried on at
Limoges and Nesle were horrible indeed, but in general, the
towns suffered less than the countryside.1 During the course
of the Hundred Years' war, in periods of actual fighting,
the Opposing forces of the French and English literally lived
off of the land. It was a rare army which carried its own
provisions and even rarer were those which paid for the
supplies they took from the peasantry. In times when fOrmal
fighting ceased, the countryside fell to the ravages Of
such roving bands as the Companions, routiers, and scorcheurs
whose destruction surpassed even that of the organized armies.

Let us analyze first the havoc which groups such as
the Companions raised with the commoners of the countryside.
After the first twenty years of the war, France lay prostrate.
The lands of this noble country, whose main source of sus-

tenance came from agriculture, lay in utter ruin. The

 

lPsrroy, The Hundred Years Wgr, p. 325.

-183-

 

 

-184-

peasantry not only suffered from the reckless armies but had
the added burden of the Black Death, in addition to several
years of crop failure. Jean de Venette states that

in A.D. 13b8, the people of France and of almost the

'whole world were struck by a blow other than war.

For in addition to the famine which I described in

the beginning and to the wars which I described in

the course of this narrative, pestilence and its

attendant tribulations appeared again in various parts

of the world. . . . This sickness or pestilence was

called an epidemic by the doctors. Nothing like the

great numbers who died in the years 13h8 and 13h9 has

been heard of or seen or read of in times past. . . .

In many places not two out of twenty remained alive.2
In the late thirteen fifties France was once again struck
by terrible famine. Conditions were so adverse in 1359 the
English army was forced to bring along its own provisions.
With the signing of the Peace of Bretigny the people antici-
pated a well deserved period of rest and recovery.

The desired respite was not forthcoming, fer prior
even to the Peace of Bretigny armed bands of unemployed
knights, known as Companions, were organized and began roving
the countryside of France. These obstreperous nobles main-
tained themselves from the pillage and plunder they acquired
from their victims. we have previously shown that they re-
spected the authority of neither the king, fellow nobles,
the clergy, the bourgeoisie, nor common city dwellers. How-
ever, their disregard for these groups was often tempered

somewhat by the fact that the latter usually had some defense

n;

2Venette, pp. h8-9.

-185-

with which they could resist the Companions. The peasantry,
cuz the other hand, had little to hope for in the face of
truase onrushing scoundrels. Unless the peasants' overlord
protected them, and this was rare in the fourteenth century,
they had only a faint hope of surviving the attack of a
gzuaup of Companions for they had virtually no means of defense.

The Companions cannot be classified as mere robbers,
for even among thieves there is some honor. When these way-
vnard knights attacked they scourged the territory and mere
Indbbery was one of their more moderate misdeeds. Seldom did
‘they'leave a village or a peasant% hut and tract of land
icrthout burning everything in sight to the ground. Among
‘their more heinous crimes were rape and murder, often com-
mdtted.in the most brutal fashion. One can best grasp the
multitude and magnitude of their crimes against the poor
‘by referring to the pages of Froissart. Though he was a
lover of chivalry, he could not resist relating the deeds
of knights in great detail, be they honorable or otherwise.
In 1361, a group of Companions, in which Sir Robert Briquet
was a chief leader, "wasted all the countrey without any
cause, and robbed without sparyng, all that ever they coude
gette, and vyolated and defoyled women, olde and yong, without
pytie, and slewe men, women and chyldren, without mercy,
doyng to them no trespace; and suche as dyde moost shamefullyst

dedes were reputed with them moost valyaunt."3 Page after

—— v— ’7

3Froissart, II, 87.

~186-
page relates how "they overranne and distroyed all the countrey.
.And.. . . [howl syr Hugh Caurell [Calverley], syr Robert
Brequet, . . . and the nombre of companyons made great warre,
sand burned and distroyed the landes. . . ."h Numerous
other incidents could be presented concerning the ruinous
assaults which the Companions committed against the peasantry,
tnxt suffice it to say the poorer folk were trampled underfoot
by the Companions, being crushed like trees before an on-
rushing avalanche.5
Early in the fifteenth century new aggregations of

destructive nobles sprung up in France. Though they were
called by different names, they had essentially the same
motives as the Free Companies. The Norman brigands were
one such group of petty nobility who sustained themselves
entirely by pillage. Miss Rowe offers a valuable description
of the treatment which the peasants received at the hands
of these scoundrels.

The band commanded by Guillaume Halls may be taken

as typical. He recruited his forces with ne'er-do-

weels of all sorts, and made war, if war it can be

called, by terrorizing the local peasants. Their

houses were burnt, some were beate and others mur-

dered, until none dared defy Hall or refuse to bring

him provisions. To secure money he organized raids

at night and under cover of darkness broke into the houses
of the unhappy villagers, carrying off two or three

l*Froissart, II, 276.

5For other examples of the destruction of the Com-
panions see Froissart, I, 400; II, 78-89; II, 352-3; III,
288-90; and V, 111}.

-187-

victims to hold to ransom. In one case at least, when

he could not find the man he sought, he took his wife

and tortured her, and when he could get nothing from

her, carried off two of her dresses, a pot of lard,

and her bed covering. Another woman was said to have

been kept prisoner in the woods for three days and

nights without either food or drink; and another story

tells of an old man of seventy-eight dragged struggling

from his house at night before the eyes of his wife

and children and never heard of again. People living

in forest villages or lonely places dared deny the

brigands nothing, and the well—known price of safety

was not allegiance to Charles but assistance 0 the

brigands in their life of plunder and rapine.

The Peace of Arras in 1&35 brought little relief

'to the peasantry. Bands of routiers or scorcheurs, men
nominally in the service of either the French or Burgundian
factions, roamed the land, harassing the poor people con-
‘tinuously. The narratives of such contemporary chroniclers
as Monstrelet relate that their raids surpassed in horror
even those of the Companions. The peOple appropriately
designated these macabre men-at-arms scorcheurs or Skinners,
since those wretches unfortunate enough to be robbed by them
usually lost their shirts and sometimes even their skins.
The innocent civilian population of the countryside received
the chief brunt of the assaults of these scoundrels. Pillage,
burning, torture, rape, massacre, nothing was spared which
fell in their path. They gave no mercy and expected none,
giving little thought of the morrow, but thinking only of
the immediate, fleeting advantages they could gain. The

attacks of the ecorcheurs were doubly oppressive to the

6Rowe, "Norman Brigands," p. 588.

-l88-
.peasantry since the latter were suffering from.the destruc-
‘tion caused by a resumption of open hostilities between
France and England. For twenty years, since the battle of
{Agincourt, these two nations had engaged in warfare on French
soil. At the very point when the peasants lay in utter
exhaustion the e’corcheurs added to their misery.

Monstrelet relates numerous incidents of the suffer—
ing the peasantry underwent in the face of these écorcheurs
‘who'took the clothes right off of the victims. Beneath their
repeated blows the population of France decreased, and pov-
erty and desolation became wide spread. No district or prov-
ince escaped their raids which brought with them nothing but
impoverishment. In a most lucid and moving passage, Mon-
strelet described the strife and turmoil in 1436, caused by
the warring factions of French and Burgundian routiers.

Throughout all France the poor people and the church
‘were sorely oppressed by this war, for they had no
defenders; and notwithstanding the peace concluded

at Arras, the French and Burgundians in the countries
of Beauvoisis, Vermandois, Santois, Laonnois, Champagne,
and in the Rethelois, made frequent wars on each other
on the most unreasonable pretences by which the country
was wasted and destroyed, and the inhabitants suffered
more than before peace was made. The poor labourers
had no other recource than pitifully to cry out to God,
their creator, for vengence on their 0 pressors. But
the worst was, when they had obtained etters of favour
from any captains, they were frequently not attended to
by others, even though of the same party.7

This is a mild account of the situation compared to what

 

zMonstrelet, II, #5.

-l89-
develOped in the next few years. Only after the passage of
Charles VII's ordonnances were the scorcheurs subdued and
the peasantry given some relief from the scourges of these
destructive outlaws.

The disorganized Companions, routiers, and écorcheurs
were not alone in raising havoc with the rural dwellers in
France, for the organized armies of the kings of France and
England and the troops of such powerful princes as the duke
of Burgundy also destroyed a great deal of life and property.
For instance, the tactics which Charles V used against the
English enabled his foes to lay waste to much of the rural
area. The peasantry had already undergone twenty years of
‘devastating warfare prior to the Peace of Bretigny, and
recently sustained a decade of ravenous assaults by the Free
Companies. With the renewal of war with England in 1369
Charles left the peasantry undefended in the wake of the
onrushing English forces. He instructed his constable, du
Guesclin, to engage in hit-and-run tactics against the enemy,
whereby the French armies would strike quickly and then re-
turn to the protection of a strong fortress. While this
strategy was highly successful fer France as a nation, it
left the rural areas defenseless and open to assault by the
English knights.

Some of the evils committed by the nobles may readily
be seen in the chronicles of Froissart. Even the chivalrous

John Chandos led his forces across the French lands bringing

-190-
misery to the poor people and destruction to their lands.
Froissart relates that Chandos and his captains "sent forthe
their currours before them, to bren and exyle the playne
countrey. So they dyde many yvels in that good plentyfull
countrey of Anjowe, and none came to fight with them, . . .
and so [they] entred into the lands of the vycont of Roche-
choart, and brent and wasted the countre all about, for they
left nothynge abrode without the fortresse. . . ."8 The
earl of Pembroke followed Chandos "and so entred into Anjou,
and brent and exyled the countre, and toke all that was
lefte . . ."9 and he and his men "coulde nat absteyns theme
selfe fro doyng of yvell."10 Truly the innocent peasant
paid the full price of the devastation wrought by the savage
English knights and the wise but brutal strategy of Charles
V.

One of the most unchivalrous and senseless episodes
of the entire war occurred not on French soil but on the
borders of England and Scotland. Though this deviates a
bit geographically from the area under study it is too illus-
trative of the changing purpose of warfare and the motivating
interests of the men-at-arms to bypass. In 1385 the English

troops were engaged in a border war with the Scots, the latter

 

8
Froissart, II, 299.

9Froissart, II, 300.

O
Froissart, II, 33h.

-191-
being backed by a thousand barons and knights of France.11
King Richard and the duke of Lancaster led the English knights
into Scotland where they ravaged the land. The commoners
had no protection and the English seemed to be purposely
avoiding battle in order that they might pillage and burn
the country. These knights concentrated their energies on
robbing and plundering the innocent men, women, and child-
ren of Scotland and demonstrated no responsibility whatso-
ever toward their duties as knights, to engage in battle
other men-at-arms.

Unfortunately, the Scotch and French knights made
no efforts to deter the English. Instead of defending their
homeland against the English marauders, these cowardly
knights avoided battle and embarked upon their own destruc-
tive mission. "Thus in lykewise as the Englysshemen dyde
in Scotlande, so dyd the Frenchemen and Scottes in Englande.
. . . They brent a great countre as they went out of North-
umberlande . . . and brent in their voyage dyvers great
villages, for they were no men of warre in that countre as
than, for they were all with the kyng."12 No clearer example
could be drawn of the irresponsibility of the nobility. One
of the primary reasons fer the existence of a noble class

stemmed from their obligation to protect the lands and lives

 

11Froissart, IV, 58.

12Froissart, IV, 60.

-l92-

of the peasantry which supported them. As knights they
swore always to be courageous, never shunning battle and
always endeavoring to aid the poor and oppressed of society.
By embarking upon these reciprocal destructive ferays, the
Scotch, French, and English knights violated almost every
tenet held dear fer centuries by the members of their class.
Not only did they engage in pillaging and burning the defense-
less lands of their enemies but these knights also displayed
the utmost cowardliness by failing to engage their foes in
battle. Truly the peasantry never had the distinction of
being pillaged and murdered by a more dishonorable nobility.

_, The French themselves were often as destructive to
the land of the native peasant as were the invading English.
In 1386 as the French king gathered troops for a planned
assault on England, he and his growing force of men-at-arms
made successive stops in the cities of Noyon, Peronne, and
Arras. As they passed through the country, the knights fell
upon the land like locusts, leaving the countryside practic-
ally barren. The peasants, who previously had wheat were
left nothing but straw, and those who spoke out in resent-
ment were beaten or slain. Their waters were fished out
and their homes broken up for firewood. Froissart relates
that the English could have done no better job of destruction
than the French did themselves. After robbing the peasants
of their goods the knights paid not a cent for them. "But

the poore people, when they saw theyr goodes taken and spente

-l93-

away . . . durst not speke ther ageynst, [but] they cursed
betwene theyr tethe, sayenge, Go into Englande or to the
Devyll, and never retourne agayne."13

The common people got no relief in the fifteenth
century, fer Monstrelet recounts many examples similar to
those recorded by Froissart in respect to their cruelty and
destructiveness. The poor suffered greatly as a result of
the factional dispute that raged between the Armagnac-
Royalist forces and the Burgundian-English coalition. On
one occasion, Lord Blanchefort, in the service of the French
king, did a great deal of damage to the territory around
Amiens by burning and pillaging the countryside and slaying
the peasantry. The damage was so terrible that many of the
inhabitants were forced to desert the country. However,
"they were likewise harassed by those of the Burgundy faction.
The poor labourers knew not whither to fly, fer they were
not defended by the lords of either party. . . ml“

‘- These persons who imposed such destruction on the
poor laborers were men of'noble rank. There is no mistaking
this fact, for Monstrelet specifically named the noble cap-
tains who ravaged the country time and time again.15 Miss

13Froissart, IV, 3A8.
l1"Monstrelet, I, 608.

lssee Monstrelet, I, 356, for an excellent listing
of the men of rank who took part in much of the pillaging.

~194-

Rowe gives a precise summary of the function of the nobility
when she states to the "fifteenth-century soldiers plunder
seemed a natural pastime."16

To grasp firmly the significance of the nobility's
disregard for the peasantry, one must look to the peasants'
reaction to their maltreatment and also analyze the opinion
of some of the contemporary chroniclers and critics. Among
the many peasant revolts during the later Middle Ages the
most infamous and bloody was known as the Jacquerie. This
violent peasant uprising occurred in 1358 in reaction to
the increasingly heavy taxation necessary to ransom the
king and nobles imprisoned in England and to help pay fer
the heavy cost of the war. The revolt also represented a
general show of resentment against the depraved nobility.
These mischievous laborers went berserk, burning and dis-
troying over a hundred castles and houses of the nobles of
France.17 Their deeds of rapine and slaughter defy descrip-
tion. Froissart relates how they roasted one knight on a spit
over an open fire before the eyes of his onlooking wife.18
Many of the cruelties were even worse than this.

Froissart was too enamored with chivalry to show

anything but disdain for the reaction of the peasantry. Truly

 

16Rowe, "Norman Brigands," p. 19A.

l7Froissart, I, #05.

18Froissart, I, 404.

 

-195-
they did act in a vile and inhuman fashion but not without
sufficient provocation. When Froissart asked why the peasants
should commit such mischief, he unknowingly answered his own
question by relating that the peasants "sayd howe the noble
men of the realme of Fraunce, knyghtes and squyers, shamed
the realme, and that it shulde be a great welth to dystroy
them all. . . ."19 In other words, the peasants were only
returning some of the many cruel deeds which the nobility
had inflicted upon them. Eventually, the nobles put down
the peasants’revolt in an even more cruel fashion than the
revolt itself. Though the peasants were subdued they had
given the nobility a frightening realization of the depths
of their resentment against the oppressive practices of these
men of lineage.

Though Froissart wrote a great deal about the poor
peasantry and the continuous suffering which the men-at-arms
caused them, he surely had little, if any, understanding
of the problems they faced, especially in their interactions
with the nobility. It is doubtful that he felt any sincere
compassion for their plight; in fact many of his statements
sound more like anecdotes than descriptions of real circum-
stances. On one occasion he states the "men ran over the
countre and left nothyng untaken, without it were to hote,

to colde, or to hevy."20 Again, he recounts how "the Frenchmen

 

19Froissart, I, 403.
20Froissart, II, 1&6.

-196-
rods and brent the contrey, and . . . the poore pepde 'wept.
. . ."21 Later he states "there is noo warre made but at
poore mennes purses. . . ."22 These phrases appear to be
mere superficial quips rather than clear perceptions of the
problems involved.

There did exist chroniclers, contemporary with
Froissart, who possessed a firm understanding of the cruel
relationship between the nobility and peasantry, and per-
ceived that the nobles treatment of the latter was brutal,
unjust, and diametrically opposed to the purposes and ideals
for which they stood. Jean de Venette was one such writer
who had a profound sympathy for the plight of the common man.
He spoke of nobles in terms of being thieves and robbers
and stated how "the nobles despised and hated all others
and took no thought for the mutual usefulness and profit
of lord and men. They subjected and despoiled the peasants
and the men of the villages. In no wise did they defend
their country from its enemies. Rather did they trample it
underfoot, robbing and pillaging the peasants' goods."23

Much criticism was directed at-the nobility in the
allegorical passages of Piers the Plowmgg. William Lang-

land objected strongly to such common practices as the

 

21
Froissart, I, 136.
22Froissart, IV, A37.

23Venette, p. 66.

-l97-

abusive hunting and fishing rights which the nobility main-
tained. This prerogative was either used in excess, whereby
the peasants' streams and forests were completely fished and
hunted out by passing bands of men-at-arms, or used so little
that the peasants'lands fell prey to the excessive wildlife
of the nobles'game preserve. The great lords were also
chastised for the unscrupulous way in which their great retinues
of them made cross-country journeys, living at the expense
of villages they chanced to pass through. In one instance,
the great lords are represented in the character of "wrong”
as they sweep down upon a peasant village. One peasant
laments how a noble

Borrowed the brown mare, but never brought her back;

And never a farthing for her! Aye, he outfaced me,

Maintaining his men to murder my servants;

Forstalled me at the fair, fought me in bargaining,

Broke down by barn-door and bore off my wheat,

Tendering me a tally for ten quarters of cats! 2h

And on tOp of that he beat me and lay with my maid. . . ."
Under the dictates of the manorial system the serf did in-
deed owe his immediate overlord certain specified obligations.
However, these lords were nothing but vagabond travelers to
whom the peasant owed nothing in the way of goods and ser-
vices for which he should not expect to be recompensed. The
fact that this was not forthcoming from.the lords represents
a transgression on their part. Though Langland fails to“

point out specifically the error of the overlord in not

 

24212£s_flermaa. pp. 34-35.

-l98-
protecting his peasant, he indirectly indicates another
flagrant fault which the nobility committed with greater
frequency.

La Tour Landry's criticism of the nobility's treat-
ment of the peasantry was closely related to his criticism
of their religious practices. He contended that it was the
solemn duty of a noble, as a Christian and as a knight, to
aid and succor the sick, the weak, and oppressed and to show
respect for womanhood. He praised highly those knights who
fulfilled their obligations to the weaker members of society
during the war, and showed the utmost contempt for those
who violated their obligations to the commoners.25

Let us complete our analysis of the relationship of
the nobility and the peasants by consulting one very important
authoress, Christine de Pisan. we have previously viewed
her criticism of pillage in respect to the bourgeoisie. She
excoriated the nobles for plundering the commoners in even
stronger terms. She explained that the men-at-arms received
wages for their services and it was evil extortion and a
great wrong for them to pillage and rob the poor peOple.

No rule of war gave them the right to engage in such action.
If, however, the princely captain was unable to pay his men

a sufficient wage he should be greatly blamed and should

 

25For a fuller account of this discussion see La
Tour Landry, p. 93.

~199-

never have engaged in war in the first place.26 She further
stated that even if the war was just, the men of war had no
right to overrun the lands of their enemies. It was the
knights' duty to fight other men-at—arms and not make war
on the poor folk. These people wished to live in peace
and by no right of the knights office did he have any pre-
rogative to molest them. The "gentylmen of armes ought to
kepe hem self . . . that they dystroye not the goods symple
folke nor to suffre that theyre folke shal inhumaynly hurt
them, for they ben crysten and not sarrasyns. . . . Soo
ought they to hurt them that ledeth.the werre and spare the
symple and peasyble of all theyre puyssaunce. . . ."27 This
noblewoman seems to have thoroughly grasped the injustice
which the nobles inflicted upon the poor people and clearly
perceived that if the nobility did not cease their dastardly
behavior they might lose some of the privileges which they
legally held in society.

In retrospect, no one during the entire Hundred Years'
‘War received any more unjust treatment at the hands of the
nobility than the common peasant. These miserable creatures
were subjected to every type of injury and destruction that
one could conceive of. Though it was not until 1789 that

the commoner got complete revenge against the nobility, much

 

26Christine, ngttes of Armes, p. 217.

271bid., p. 225.

-200-
of the pent-up hatred dated back to the era of the Hundred
Years' war. The men of lineage not only failed to uphold
even a minimum code of decency in respect to the peasant but
‘unfortunately he had not the feresight to perceive the

eventual ruinous consequences his malevolence would bring

upon himself.

m

 

 

CONCLUDING C(MMENTS

The nobility in France, which prior to 1300 offered
many positive contributions to the nation, the Church, and
society in general, during the course of the Hundred Years'
War underwent a significant transformation. In the space of
two centuries the most powerful and influential class in
France fell from a position of mgssance to one of W.
The power of the nobility decreased in respect to their in-
ability to unite in order to contain a nascent monarchy. The
potent princes and petty nobles of the later Middle Ages
lacked the deference previously shown to their fellow com-
rades and men-at-arms. In regards to the Church, there
appeared a complete disintegration of the religious spirit
so prevalent in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Con-
trary to enhancing the power of the Church destructiveness
best characterizes the actions of the men of lineage toward
the Church. Not only were they destructive in respect to the
Church but also toward the urban classes and peasantry. The
men of lineage came to represent a negative force in society.

The guiding standard, by which one is able to measure
the decline, is derived partially from the feudal obligations
between lord and vassal but mainly from the elaborate code
of chivalry which evolved over the long span of the Middle
Ages. The standards adopted by the men of knighthood were

-201-

 

 

 

ll

 

 

 

 

-202-
stringent indeed and never perfectly fulfilled, but the
knights at least endeavored to meet their obligations and

appeared to be inspired by a genuine ideal. Even during
the first phases of the Hundred Years' War chivalry occasion-

ally tended to tempersome of the cruelties of the fighting
and gave just cause for its existence. However, in general,
the knights of this later age aspired to satisfy few if any
of the obligations and ideals which their forefathers devoted
themselves to so fervently.

The many examples presented in this study represent-
ing the horrible behavior of the nobility are not exaggera-c
tions in any way. The extensive number of samples dram
from the chronicles of Froissart, for instance, exemplify
the typical knight and were drawn for purely illustrative
purposes. Below all the glitter of tournaments and pomp of
court life there lay nothing but a decadent aristocracy, and
misery and poverty flourished for the less fortunates. In
our civilized society it is difficult to believe that so
many men of such great responsibility acted so dishonorably
so often.

While the major purpose of this study has been to
show that the nobility did decline, it is impossible to delve
into such a subject without mentioning some of the reasons
why. Some of the "whys" have been briefly touched upon
already. For example, chivalry itself was unable to cope
with the changing times. Failing to counteract the new

‘v ‘ ‘X — " 1;
*
L‘-

 

 

 

 

-203-

armies and revolutionary weapons the knights continued to 3
practice their antiquated methods in the safety of’magnifi-i
cent tournaments. The cost of tournaments, court life, or
'the very office of knighthood itself placed the knight in a
great financial dilemma which, in part, explains his decline.
With increasing expenses and decreasing revenues, the knights
found greater difficulty in meeting their financial obliga-
tions and were constantly being undercut by the rising middle
class.

Of major importance in their ultimate downfall was
their refusal to support the Estates General. The nobles'
failure to help sustain a strong parliamentary government
in France enabled ambitious monarchs such as Charles VII and
Louis XI to establish a permanent army and permanent taxation
at their expense. The failure of parliamentary government
in France is a prodigious study in and of itself but all
facts seem.to indicate that at this juncture the nobility
‘met one of its major defeats.

Though not treated in the main body of the work, the
best evidence available supports one other major cause of
the nobles' decline in France. In England the practice of
primogeniture led to a more stable class structure. The
eldest son inherited the fief thereby permitting the estates
to remain intact fer generations. The other sons remained
landless knights, and subsequently joined the middle classes
in strengthening the third estate. With the support of an

-20g-
ambitious third estate, parliamentary government flourished
in England. In France, on the contrary, the fiefs were
divided amongst the various sons, thereby burdening the
country with a decentralized, bickering noble class. In
.England, the landless knights paid taxes thereby lending them
:more responsible and creating a smaller gap between the gentry
.and the masses. The French knights paid no taxes and there
arose a large cleavage between the upper classes and the
masses.

With the aid of hindsight and sufficient analysis
there seems little doubt that the nobility in France did
degenerate terribly during the feurteenth and fifteenth
centuries. Sufficient examples have been given to indicate
some of the many ways they declined. Only through further
study can the "whys” of their disintegration be thoroughly

and decisively discerned.

“—1-l

 

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL‘NOTE

Primary Sources:

The feundation of this study rests upon three imp
portant authors whose writings span the last two centuries
of the Middle Ages. Sir John Froissart, The Chroniclgs of
Froissart, trans. Sir John Bourchier Lord Berners, 6 vols.
(Annie 1523-25) (London, 1901), covers the period ranging
from 1326-1AOO. The first two volumes are the most valuable

 

for his description tends to become dull and repetitious
after this point. His chief value arises out of his candid
description of the political and military conditions in France
and his chief weakness emerges from his unyielding love of
the deeds of knights causing him.to overlook other important
data. The translation itself is generally good; however,
Bourchier fails to correct the errors in names, places, and
dates in the manuscript he used and he added many errors
himself. The Chronicles of Mermd Dg Mongtrglgt, trans.
Thomas Johnes, 2 vols. (London, 181.9), covers a period from
1400-1516. However, Nonstrelet's writings probably ended
in lhhh, and the selections hereafter are collected from.a
variety of chroniclers whose writings are of little value.
Though the writings of Monstrelet are less exciting and
chivalrous than are Froissart's and are filled with tedious

detail, they are much more accurate and somewhat more
-205-

-206-
sophisticated- WW
Ar enton, ed. Andrew R. Scoble, Esq., 2 vols. (London, 1855),
is of chief importance in dealing with the affairs in France
and Burgundy during the reign of Louis XI. Commines' memoirs
are history written by a student of’history, diplomacy, and
political philosophy. Though they do not present the thrill
of warfare and show of chivalry so apparent in the chronicles
of Froissart, they give the reader a much deeper insight into
the underlying motivations of the monarchy and the nobility
in France. b
H In addition to these three important writers, two
other chroniclers offer valuable information concerning the
later Middle Ages. Th9 Chggniclgs of Jegg d9 Vegette, trans.
Jean Birdsall, ed. Richard A. Newhall (New York, 1953), is
a short document but it parallels the years of Froissart's
most fruitful writing (1340-1368) thereby giving the reader
a good check upon the validity of the remarks made by the
latter author. Vennete was a peasant who became a Carmelite
monk and he was therefbre able to observe society, more
especially the excesses of the nobility, from an entirely
different point of view than was Froissart. Jean de Troyes,

The chgdglggs Chroniclg or Secret History of Legig 31, is

included in The.Memoirs of Philip de Cgmmings and runs
parallel to Commines' history. It is thought but not proved

that Jean de Troyes wrote this rather superficial chronicle
which, in spite of the implications of its title, is not

-207-
really scandalous at all. This chronicle is really a his-
tory of the curious remarks and passing events of the reign
of Louis XI and in reality is not written as a chronicle
but written to please its readers. This account, unlike Com-
mines' memoirs, is the history that Louis XI would like to
have his subjects read for it covers up the king's blunder
at Pe’ronne and other similar unfortunate incidents.

. Some of the most useful information about the behavior
of the nobility prior to 1300 was derived from the chronicles
concerning the crusades. Villehardouin, The Cm gcle of
the 22mg Cmsgde ad the Conggegt of Cgstgntiggplg, in
Memoigg of the nggdes, trans. Frank T. Marzials (New York,
1958), gives the reader a good, clear, accurate account of
the fourth crusade though the narrative tends to be somewhat
dull and repetitious. Jean de Joinville, The CMnicle g;
the Cmsade of St, Lewis, in Memirs of the Cmgggeg, trans.
Frank T. Marzials (New York, 1958), is written in much more
elaborate prose than the chronicle of Villehardouin. Join-
ville is known chiefly as the biographer of Louis IX and
the body of this document concerns the deeds and the drama
of the seventh crusade upon which Saint Louis was pictured
as the embodiment of perfect knighthood. Other helpful
background information concerning the nobility was obtained
from Andreas Capellanus, The Art of 0013311 Lave, trans. John
Jay Parry (New York, 1959). This late twelfth century author
explained the rules of court life and courtly love by

 

-208-

presenting a series of fictitious dialogues between combi-
nations of persons from the middle class, the nobility, and
high nobility whereby the prerogatives and restrictions of
each class were clearly defined. 'W. [Guillaume do] Lorrie
and J [ohn] Clopinel (Jean de Meun), W.
trans. F. S. Ellis, 3 vols. (London, 1900), was extremely
popular among the nobility during the feurteenth.and fifteenth
centuries and was widely circulated in Europe. The first
section, written by Guillaume de Lorrie in the first part of
the thirteenth century is relatively short and idealistic
and allegorical in nature. For the purposes of this study
the larger segment, written by Jean delMeun some ferty years
after Lorrie, was of greater value fer Jean de Mbun carefully
analyzed the social relationships of the nobility and openly
advocated that illicit relations replace the idealistic
chivalrous adherence to chastity and respect for womanhood.
In the late thirteenth century Ramon Lull, a Spanish church-
man, wrote The Book of thg Ogggg of Chzzglgy, trans. William
Caxton, ed. Alfred T. P. Byles (London, 1926), which is the
clearest and most concise single source of the obligations
and duties of the medieval knight which we possess today.

Several writers are chiefly important for the in-
formation one can gain from their criticisms of the nobility.
Vi ions F m.Pie s Plowman, taken from the poem of William
Langland, trans. into modern English by Nevill Coghill (New
York, 1950), is written by a commoner and offers a great deal

 

 

 

 

 

-209-

of valuable information concerning the abuses of the nobility
against the peasantry. W is only

a part of the complete book and this edition was derived
mainly from the B text which Langland wrote in 1377 as a
revision of the original text. Th Book of the Kn t of
Tour Landg, ed. G. S. Taylor (London, 1930), was written

in 1371 by the chivalrous Geoffrey La Tour Landry as a manual
upon morality for the education of his daughters. However,
from the examples presented and the poignant criticisms
provided by La Tour Landry, one gains a great deal of useful
information concerning the rapid degeneration of the nobility.
Early in the fourteenth century Christine de Pisan wrote The
Book of ngttgs of Am; and of Chmlgyg, trans. William
Caxton, ed. A. T. B. Byles (London, 1932), primarily as a
manual of warfare and the duties of men-at-arms. Of greater
importance is her recognition of some of the outmoded prac-
tices of chivalry and her criticism of the immoral and de-
structive practices of the nobility. Miguel de Cervantes
rounds out the critics of the chivalrous nobility with his
classic book Dog Quixote, Ozell's revision of the trans. of
Peter Motteux (New York, 1930) , (written in the early seven-
teenth century. This famous tale of that idealistic knight-
errant Don Quixote literally laughed chivalry, as practiced
in the Middle Ages, out of existence.

 

-210-
Secondary Sources:

The author found several general histories of the
later Middle Ages helpful in gaining a more complete under-
standing ofthis period. R. Lodge, The Cloge of thg ggddle
Ages 1213-1424, 5th ed. (New York, 1901), gives a good over-
all coverage of Bumps. He gives a good account of the
major personalities and events during this period but is
somewhat lacking in his coverage of England. Gustave Masson,
The St of edi ev Fr ce: The Re of H s
Cgmt to The Begging of the SEegth Century (New York,
1888), is simple and short but a fairly good history of
medieval France. Its chief weakness lies in the sparse
treatment of the social, religious, and philosophical history
'of medieval France and in the author' s unfortunate heavy
reliance upon Edward Gibbon as a source. Medieval France:

A Compggion to Fggch Studies, ed. Arthur Tilley (Cambridge,
England, 1922), consists of a series of chapters written by
French and English scholars dealing with the political,
economic, social, and other phases of French history during
the Middle Ages. Though it contains several good chapters,
such as the one by V. Langlois on political history, it is
generally a rather elementary and incomplete study and lacks
any sense of coherence or unity. James Westfall Thompson
and Edgar Nathaniel Johnson, An Introduction to Media“;
Eurog 300-1500 (New York, 1937), is an excellent book and
especially valuable for the chapters on feudalism and France

 

 

-211-
I
during the later Middle Ages. Henri Pirenne, Edouard Perroy,

et al., F duMo " - d’ 6 tiond mone
me’d_ie’ygl (1285-14.:3) (Louis Halphen et Philippe Sagnac, eds. ,

Pgupleg st Cirilisgtion, VII, Paris, 1931), contains the
contributions of five prominent French and Belgium historians.

Of special interest for the purpose of this study were the
chapters by Edouard Perroy dealing with France during the
Hundred Years' War. Edouard Perroy offers an excellent and
complete coverage of the war in his book entitled The Hundred
Y a War, trans. W. B. Wells (New York, 1951). Though
Perroy does let his pro-French feelings enter his interpre-
tations somewhat, his factual information is complete and
accurate and his book remains the best study of the war

written to date. J [ohn] Huizinga, T e W o e id e
A e : A u o of fe hou t | d n
Fr v: 59d ‘6 z N her as 1 '1 J. 11 31d XV‘D Cent

(London, 1927). Presents the reader with an excellent account
. of the general tenor: of life during the later Middle Ages
with a special emphasis upon the extremes and excesses of
this period. James Westfall Thompson gives an excellent
coverage of economic and social developments in his Economic
d i Histor of E in the Later M ddle A e l 00-
lm) (New York, 1931), He purposely concentrates upon con-
ditions on the continent, omitting almost all mention of
England. His explanation of the causes of the Hundred Years'

War is even clearer and more concise than is the account

 

 

-212-

given by Perroy. He does seem.to have a bias toward the
French monarchy as he constantly endeavors to place the
monarchy in a good light in comparison to the other segments
of society. A great deal of concise, factual, accurate
information was obtained or verified by The Cambridge 14ngng
Higtorz, 8 vols. (New'York and Cambridge, England, 1911-36),
more especially from A. Coville's chapters in Volume VII
dealing with France during the Hundred Years' War. For a
delightful and masterful account of the court which became
the haven for the chivalrous nobility during the fifteenth
century one should read Otto Cartellieri's Th; Court of
gggggggy, trans. Malcolm.Letts (London, 1929). The inter-
esting and lucid description which Cartellieri presents
makes the reader keenly aware of’the court life, jousts,
feasts and splendor of the nobility of this magnificent court.
Harold Lamb's book entitled The C s des: n Men
Snggg (Garden City, New'York, 1930) deals specifically with
the first three crusades and was especially useful to the
author for the treatment of the Council of Clermont which
demonstrated some of the enthusiasm fer the first crusade.

Several specialized books or sections of books were
helpful in gaining information concerning the institutions
and ideals held by the nobility and how these changed over
the course of feurteenth and fifteenth centuries. Charles
Edmond Petit-Dutaillis, The Pen Mo ch in Fr ce d

Enngnd Egon.the Tenth to the Thirteenth Centuries (London,

 

 

-213-
1936), is an excellent background work. Petit-Dutaillis
attempts to show that the histories of France and England
were tied together from.1000 to 1300 and that feudalism
sprang up out of anarchy and successfully filled a need in
society. Francois Louis Ganshof, Feudalism, trans. Philip
Grierson (London, 1952), is probably the best single source
from which one can gain a knowledge of the origin and his-
torical develOpment of the feudal institutions. Carl
Stephenson's book entitled Mggigevgl Feugglism (Ithaca, New
York, 1960), presents an excellent complement to the study
made by Ganshof. In this short work Stephenson expertly
untangles this complicated institution and presents the
reader with a clear and readable account of the nature of
the various institutions which were so essential to feudalism.
John B. Harrison and Richard E. Sullivan, A Short gigtogz of
western Cizilizgtion (New Yerk, 1960), was also of great
value in supplying the author with precise information con-
cerning the origin and nature of the feudal relationship.

Chiv ° er s of Studies to llustr to It i to c
Siggigicgncg end Civilizigg Influegge, ed. Edgar Prestage

(London, 1928), supplied the author with a great deal of
information concerning the role, the duties, and the
behavior of the medieval knight. Of special importance
was the chapter by F. J. C. Hearnshaw dealing with the his-
torical development of chivalry. Sidney Painter limits his
study to France in his excellent book entitled.§:gggh

 

 

 

 

 

-21A-
C v ' Chivalri Ids s d Pr ctices in Hedi ev ce
(Ithaca, New York, 1957). He presents the reader with an
interpretation rather than a history of chivalry backing his
arguments with data drawn from the most prominent authors
of the later Middle Ages. Ramond Lincoln Kilgour wrote Tee
D c e of C 3 She in the Fr ch Li a t e of
tee Lets Middle Ages (Cambridge, Massachusetts, l937). as
a doctoral dissertation and later had it published. It is
undoubtedly the most penetrating account of the decline of
chivalry that is in print. Henry Osborn Taylor's book an-

titled Tge Megeevel find; A History of the Qeveloemene

of’Ieeughe eed Emotion ie the Mddééfl Agee, 4th ed., 2 vols.
(London, 1938), contains several excellent chapters dealing

with knighthood and the decadent state into which it fell.
This book is especially useful fer its treatment of the
emotional and intellectual development which.took place
during the Middle Ages and one that should not be overlooked
by the serious student of this period of history. The author
found A. B. Taylor's book entitled 5e getgeducEioe teiMedieve;
fieeeeee_(London, 1930), most helpful in discerning the affect
which the medieval romance literature had upon chivalry.
Taylor generally tends to be objective and accurate in his
treatment of the medieval institutions except he has a
tendency to deal with the medieval Church rather harshly.

 

 

-215-
Periodicals:

Carl Stephenson, ”The Origin and Significance of
Feudalism," Americee flietorice; Review, XLVI (19hl), pp.
788-812, contains many valuable insights into the nature of
feudalism.which were not included in his book on this subject.
B. J. H. Rowe wrote three articles which proved helpful in
discerning the nature of the loyalties and.the general be-
havior of the nobility in Normandy during the regency of
the duke of Bedford. The first two entitled "Discipline
in the Herman Garrisons under Bedfbrd, 1L22-35,"Ԥeglieh_
mm, XLVI (1931), pp. 194-208, and "The Estates
of Normandy Under the Duke of BedfOrd, 1422-35,u gegliee

Hietoziee; fieziew, XLVI (1931), pp. 551-578, were useful to
the author. However her article concerning "John Duke of

Bedford and the Norman 'Brigands',” Eeglieg His§ogicel Re-
view, XLVII (1932), pp. 583-600 m by far the most in-

 

formative and presented the author with a great deal of use-
ful material concerning the nobility in France.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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