QUINTUS SERTORIUS:
The Reluctant Rebel

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QUINTUS SERTORIUS:
THE RELUCTANT REBEL

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EXPLANATORY NOTE AND ABBREVIATIONS

All dates in this essay are in years B.C. unless otherwise indicated.

Some Roman names are given in the course of this essay with abbreviated praenomina. Below is a listing of some common praenomina and their abbreviations:

M. = Marcus  Sex. = Sextus  T. = Titus
M' = Manius  C. = Caius  Ser. = Servius
L. = Lucius  D. = Decimus  Sp. = Spurius
Mam. = Mamilius  Ti. = Tiberius

Certain journals, encyclopedias, and monographs which appear often in the footnotes to this study have been abbreviated for the sake of convenience. These abbreviations are given below:

C. W. = Classical Weekly (1907-57) or Classical World (1957-).
Badian, F. C. = Foreign Clientelae, Ernst Badian.


R.E. = Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft.

Schulten, Sertorius = Sertorius. Adolf Schulten.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOURCES AND SOURCE PROBLEMS</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. QUINTUS SERTORIUS OF NURSIA</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. CINNA'S TRIUMPH</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. THE RULE OF THE CINNO-MARIANS</strong></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. SERTORIUS' FIRST SOJOURN IN SPAIN</strong></td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V. SERTORIUS: THE FUGITIVE AND THE KING OF TANGIER</strong></td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VI. THE LUSITANIAN CALL</strong></td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VII. SERTORIUS VERSUS METELLUS</strong></td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VIII. THE BASES OF SERTORIAN POWER</strong></td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IX. SERTORIUS AGAINST POMPEY</strong></td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>X. THE YEAR 75: CLIMAX AND TURNING POINT</strong></td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>XI. THE SERTORIAN STAR FADES</strong></td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>XII. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING SERTORIUS</strong></td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APPENDIX A: A Chronology of the Events in Roman History During the Life of Quintus Sertorius</strong></td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APPENDIX B: Genealogical Tables</strong></td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. The Valerii Flacci</strong></td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. The Papirii Carbones</strong></td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. The Perpernae</strong></td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C: Maps to Indicate the Life and Times of Quintus Sertorius ................. 160
Map One: Map of Italy ......................... 161
Map Two: Republican Rome and Her Empire ............... 162
Map Three: Map of Roman Spain to Illustrate the Career of Q. Sertorius ................. 163
Map Four: Map of Spanish Mines and Mineral Resources ....................... 164

BIBLIOGRAPHY: PRIMARY SOURCES ..................... 165
BIBLIOGRAPHY: SECONDARY SOURCES ..................... 167
INTRODUCTION

This essay has as its subject the first century B.C. Roman general Quintus Sertorius, one of the more remarkable and yet obscure characters in a remarkable and obscure age. One of the many attractions toward engaging in a study of Sertorius is the great number of questions which may be asked about the man and his career. Was Sertorius a rebel, or a loyal Roman? How did he find the material means to carry on war for seven years against the best generals Rome had to offer? What were Sertorius' relationships to his officers, his soldiers, and his civilian supporters in Spain and Italy? What was his connection with Mithradates? Sertorius has often been depicted as a tragic figure, and if this tragic character helps to explain why he is so interesting, the reverse is also true—Sertorius is tragic because he was such a multifaceted and capable man.

1For example, Jacob Hammer (Classical Weekly XXII, No. 5, 40) opines: "Of the tragic figures in Roman history Sertorius is undoubtedly one of the most striking. His life is a continuous tragedy." Pierre Corneille (1606-1684) wrote a tragedy of Sertorius, while John Bancroft produced The Tragedy of Sertorius in 1679, and David Paul Brown presented Sertorius: or, The Roman Patriot in 1830.
This study cannot attempt to answer all of the questions relating to Sertorius, especially as it is questionable whether some Sertorian problems are capable of solution. However, by studying Quintus Sertorius in relation to his times one can hope to shed some new light both upon that man's career, and upon the world in which that career was pursued. We may list a few possibly illuminating avenues of inquiry: Sertorius' position vis à vis his chief officers seems to have been influenced by the older Marian connections of Herennius and Perperna; Pompey's march down the eastern seaboard of Spain may have had precedents; and the confrontation which this later triumvir had with Sertorius' pirate allies may subsequently have had an influence on the Great Pompey's brilliantly orchestrated Pirate War. These questions appear on the one hand to minimize the importance of Quintus Sertorius' career as only a part of a wider milieu. Yet in serving to define and explain that milieu—the years of upheaval in the late Roman Republic of 90-70 B.C.—such questions help make the study of Sertorius more useful for the understanding of an ill-known period.
SOURCES AND SOURCE PROBLEMS

Two basic traditions concerning Quintus Sertorius have come down from the ancient historians. One tradition seeks to depict Sertorius as a violent renegade, a skillful general who turned against Rome. This is the view enshrined in Livy, whose books on the Sertorian period survive only in scattered fragments. There are echoes of Livy in authors like Aurelius Victor, in an epitome done by Florus, in the Periochae (Summaries) of Livy's books composed by anonymous authors, and in histories such as those of Appian, Eutropius, and Orosius. Another tradition sees in Sertorius an essentially good man who was forced to fight for his own survival against the faction then in control at Rome. This view of Sertorius also emphasizes the man's military capability, but finds occasion to point out that the man's military success was due in large part to personal qualities which inspired adulation and emulation in those he led. This "pro-Sertorian tradition" may be found in the fragments of Sallust's Histories, but more particularly in Plutarch's biography of Quintus Sertorius, the most comprehensive work on the man extant.

Since neither Sallust (c. 86-35 B.C.) nor Livy (59 B.C.-A.D. 17 or 64 B.C.-A.D. 12) was actively
engaged in historical pursuits during Sertorius' career, these two authors had to draw on sources for Sertorius' life other than personal knowledge. It is from these works that the pro- and anti-Sertorian traditions must have emerged. But we are hampered in assessing the value and bias of such sources by the fact that for the period 78-67 B.C. most sources are available only in fragments.\footnote{Frank O. Copley, Latin Literature From the Beginning to the Close of the Second Century A.D. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1969), p. 139. Cf. P. A. Brunt, Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1971), p. 12.}

We know little more than their names about men like Tanusius Geminus, Theophanes of Mytilene, and Gaius Sulpicius Galba. Marcus Terentius Varro was a Sabine\footnote{Ronald Syme, Sallust (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 27. Henceforth this work will be referred to as "Syme, Sallust."} who served under Pompey in Spain and must have written about Pompey's Sabine enemy in his Legationum Libri.\footnote{D. Gillis, "Quintus Sertorius," Rendiconti Classe di Lettere e Scienze Morali e Storiche, Vol. 103 (Milano: Istituto Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere, 1969), 712 f.} Syme mentions L. Voltacilius Pitholaus as possibly another writer on Pompey's Spanish campaigns, but the only facts which Syme can adduce for this conjecture are that Pitholaus was Pompey's tutor and also the first freedman to write history.\footnote{Syme, Sallust, p. 206.} We know that Sulla
(Commentarii rerum gestarum) and probably Marius as well wrote apologetic autobiographies;⁵ such material could not have failed to interest later ancient historians for its personal factor, as well as its bias. C. Licinius Macer (d. 66 B.C.), who wrote with a marked family bias, composed an anti-optimate Roman history ab urbe condita. We are not certain, however, how far the work went before it was stopped by the politician's suicide.⁶ A certain L. Lucceius wrote a history of the Social and Civil Wars which was nearly finished in 56 B.C.; but "There is no evidence that anyone except for Cicero and Atticus ever read it."⁷ Claudius Quadrigarius may have continued his history of Rome, which began with the Gallic sack in c. 387 B.C., past the year 82 B.C., but that is the latest certain date for his work. If Badian is correct in believing that 79 B.C. was the endpoint of L. Cornelius Sisenna's Historiae,⁸

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⁵Tenney Frank, Life and Literature in the Roman Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1930), p. 175.


⁸Badian, "Waiting," p. 213. Badian believes (p. 214) that Sallust decided to start writing history where Sisenna had stopped. A. H. McDonald ("Sisenna," The Oxford Classical Dictionary) thinks that, in turn, Sisenna's work may have been a continuation of Sempronius Aellio's history.
we may have a source for Sertorius' early career.

Our brief consideration of possible histories used by Sallust and Livy cannot hope to determine in what light these authors saw Sertorius. It is pertinent to note, however, that Sallust rails bitterly at his predecessor-historians for their treatment of Quintus Sertorius. We may generalize by saying that most of the men who wrote soon after Sertorius' death composed their histories for aristocratic audiences. Sertorius' ultimate failure assured that he be regarded by such audiences, at least publicly, as a traitor to the state.

Livy and Appian, who relied on the Patavian for his account of the Sertorian War, preserve this senatorial bias against Sertorius. In Appian's case this treatment may be no more than the mindless appropriation of opinion as well as facts from his source, and the same may be true to a limited extent of Livy himself. However, Livy, the man who saw Augustus as the figure who brought peace to a chaos-ridden Rome, would see little congenial in a person whose whole career deepened such disorder. Of the Livian epigoni Orosius deserves especial consideration, not because of any real historical merit in his own right, but because of his particular bias. Orosius viewed the history of Rome before

Christ as a violence-wracked story; this conception was intended to controvert early fifth century A.D. pagan claims that Roman decay was due to abandonment of the old gods. The best which Orosius could say about Sertorius was that he "excelled in both trickery and audacity."\(^{10}\)

Gaius Sallustius Crispus was a disappointed politician who turned historian. In addition to his fully extant works *The War With Catiline* and *War with Jugurtha*, Sallust wrote the *Histories*, a work covering the period 78-67 B.C., and possibly farther. There are fragments of the first five books still remaining. Various opinions have been held regarding Sallust's accuracy; the latest trend of thought seems to minimize it.\(^{11}\) Sallust's work was full of conventional morality and anti-nobiles feeling. As such the *Histories* was revisionist writing, especially in the case of Quintus Sertorius. The Sabine general appealed to the Sabine writer, who further shared the appellation novus homo with his hero.\(^{12}\) But there was more than the accident of background which made Sertorius a pleasing subject for


\(^{12}\) Syme, *Sallust*, p. 58; cf. Gillis, 713.
Sallust. Sertorius had fought against Pompey, whom Sallust detested. And Q. Sertorius represented to Sallust the only example of "the absence of motives of gain in positions of entrusted responsibility" other than C. Julius Caesar, Sallust's first hero. Whether Sallust's moralizings and moral categories were faintly hypocritical or not, the Sallustian picture of Sertorius' character seems an unshakeable one. Sallust may have picked up much of his material from men who had fought for Quintus Sertorius. Such information fit well into this historian's emphasis upon the personal element in his Histories, for Sallust was "intent on illustrating a personality as well as a situation, more so indeed than most historians in antiquity." 

Sallust's interest in the biographical proved very congenial to his most important successor in the pro-Sertorian tradition, the Greek biographer Plutarch of Chaeronea. This writer (lived c. 40 A.D.-after 120 A.D.) made no quarrel about the fact that he was not an historian:

13 Gillis, 714.
14 Sallust's political failures may have been due in part to extortion in his propraetorian province of Africa Nova.
15 Thus Laistner, p. 55.
16 Syme, Sallust, p. 198.
17 Another successor was Julius Exsuperantius, who lived probably in the fourth or fifth century A.D., and wrote an epitome based on Sallust (cf. Gillis, p. 716).
It must be borne in mind that my design is not to write histories, but lives. And the most glorious exploits do not always furnish us with the clearest discoveries of virtue or vice in men; sometimes a matter of less moment, an expression or a jest, informs us better of their characters and inclinations, than the most famous sieges, the greatest armaments, or the bloodiest battles whatsoever.\(^{18}\)

Extracting history from Plutarch is a difficult proposition, but one which must be attempted, both because there is so little other written material extant, and because we know that Plutarch drew heavily on Sallust. Plutarch's debt to Sallust perhaps extends even to value judgements, as well as to facts.\(^{19}\)

We can now mention some of the most important problems in Plutarch's Life of Sertorius, problems which tend to recur throughout the Greek biographer's Lives. Plutarch's story is rife with chronological difficulties. The general chronological thread is interspersed with digressions and anecdotes intended to illuminate a subject's character, or to acquaint the reader with interesting facts which have small relevance to the biography itself. Such


\(^{19}\)C. P. Jones, Plutarch and Rome (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 84. This is a consensus view. Jones adds (pp. 85 f) that Greek translations of the Latin Histories appeared at about the time Plutarch was composing his Lives.
insertions generally appear to fall outside of the narrative's chronology at the points in which they occur. Plutarch also suffers from the fact that his is a static biography. Plutarch cannot quite fathom the problem of apparent character change. Furthermore, the treatment which a personage may receive in one biography may not always square with that given him in another biography in which he plays a subordinate role. The hero in one biography not only gets more treatment than he does in another Life; he often receives better treatment. The facts which appear in one biography may not always correspond to those, concerning the same event, which appear in another Life. The famous conference held at Luca in 56 B.C. between Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey is a case in point. More than one historian has acquired gray hairs from attempting to reconcile the versions of this important meeting which are to be found in Plutarch's Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey.

As one will expect, accuracy is not one of Plutarch's strong points. He was a voluminous reader, employing different sources for his different lives, relying heavily upon memory, reinforced by notes and perhaps by one or two books at hand.20 In the case of the Sertorius Plutarch probably

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had a copy of Sallust's *Histories* near, perhaps, though less likely, only in note form. We know for certain of only one source other than Sallust which Plutarch employed. The polymath and Mauretanian king Juba II (before 46 B.C.-C.A.D. 23) was used by Plutarch for a detail on Mauretanian history, and though Sallust's Book I contained some material on Sertorius' career before 78, Plutarch's *Sertorius* 2-5 does not come from Sallust. Perhaps the material for these chapters came from Sisenna.

Syme warns against equating Plutarch and Sallust, and considering the Sertorian picture propounded in Plutarch as accuracy incarnate. The point is well taken, but it is clear that both authors viewed Sertorius in much the same way. Both Plutarch and Sallust were dedicated to the biographical, both were apt to digress, both tended to maximize their subject in relation to his contemporaries, and both were interested in morality. In Plutarch's case these tendencies were technical--this was the manner in which he generally wrote his biographies. In Sallust's case a bit of partisan fire and personal vindication may

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Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 138, following Gomme, do not believe that Plutarch composed his history surrounded by his written authorities.


22Syme, *Sallust*, p. 188.

23Syme, *Sallust*, p. 204.

have lain behind the methods. In one thing more these scholars agreed as they viewed the life of Sertorius, and it is this: the innate tragedy of the man, which has perhaps most impressed the ages. "It is in terms of tragedy, of a play acted in an enormous theatre, that Plutarch sees life, and the lives of the people he is writing about."^{25} How true this was for the life of Quintus Sertorius.

CHAPTER I

QUINTUS SERTORIUS OF NURSIA

Very little is known about Quintus Sertorius' early life, apart from the fact that he was born at Nursia, in about 123 B.C.\(^1\) Sabine Nursia was located to the north-east of Rome, up the course of the Tiber River, and had long had contacts with The Eternal City. We can note with profit E. T. Salmon's description of Sabine character and habits--simple morality and bravery, strong religious feelings with a weakness for superstitious practices, a penchant for placing villages on hilltops.\(^2\) Each of these elements will be seen to have its reflection in the career of Sertorius.

Sabines of the first century B.C. still cherished their local traditions,\(^3\) although as early as the year 290, when M' Curius Dentatus conquered the hill country, the Sabines were Roman cives sine suffragio. Soon after this

\(^1\) 122 B.C. at the latest; cf. Schulten, Sertorius, p. 26.

\(^2\) Salmon, "Sabini," in O.C.D., for this and much of the following material on Sabine history.

\(^3\) Syme, Sallust, p. 5.
(in 268) full citizenship was granted the Sabines and Romanization was rapid; Wiseman exaggerates when he terms Sertorius "a representative of the newly enfranchised Italians."  

Plutarch tells us that Sertorius "belonged to a family of some prominence" in Nursia, and that after the early death of his father Quintus' mother sent him to Rome to make his name in the law courts. Ferrero terms Sertorius "originally a small peasant proprietor," but this will hardly do. It is clear that the career which Rhea envisaged for her son Quintus could only be achieved by a man born an eques. Gelzer's comment that a military tribune had to be an equestrian seems to clinch the case for a comfortable background behind Sertorius. Indeed, the "humble beginnings" which some ancient (and modern) writers have postulated for Sertorius sound very much like the "poor and

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5Plutarch, Sertorius, 2.1.


uneducated" conception of Marius' background which had been common coin among historians until quite recently. At Rome Sertorius acquired some reputation as an orator, but his military abilities soon overshadowed his judicial career. In 105 he was at Arausio under Q. Servilius Caepio; Plutarch remarks the notable method of Sertorius' escape when the Cimbri routed the Roman consular and pro-consular armies. Merely to have escaped this disaster was an achievement; 80,000 Romans supposedly fell on that "black day" of October 6. Three years later Sertorius performed a signal service for Marius at some risk to his own life. Quintus put on Celtic costume and learned the rudiments of the barbarian language, then crossed over to the barbarian side and collected intelligence for Marius. Because of his

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8T. F. Carney, A Biography of C. Marius (Chicago: Argonaut, Incorp., 1970), pp. 8f and n.46. Carney demolishes the Marian "poor country bumpkin" theory. It should be pointed out (as does Gelzer, p. 10) that to a writer like Cicero the H.S.400,000 which qualified a man for equestrian status no longer counted as wealth. Since for this period our sources are all authored by men of considerable wealth, Sertorius and Marius have come down to us as "of poor means" originally.

9Plutarch, Sertorius, 3.1: "though he had . . . been wounded in the body, he made his way cross the Rhone, swimming, shield and breastplate and all, against a strongly adverse current . . ." This escape sounds much like that of Horatius Cocles, the Republican hero who held off an Etruscan army until the Sublician bridge could be destroyed by the Romans.

spy service Sertorius won a prize for valor, and this and many other daring deeds earned for the young knight "positions of honour and trust." Thus began Sertorius' acquaintance with Marius, a man whose cause he would support, albeit sometimes with indifference, for much of the remainder of his life.

Sertorius may have come somewhat into the Marian orbit in 102, but he was not hopelessly compromised when Marius' influence suffered a severe check after the sedition of Saturninus. In 98 B.C. both consuls were optimates,

\[\text{11}^\text{Plutarch, Sertorius 3.2-3.}\]

\[\text{12}^\text{Cf. L. Thompson, "The Relationship Between Provincial Quaestors and their Commanders-in-Chief," Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte Vol. II (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1962), 346 and 354. Thompson's study has application to the relationships between all lower officers and their commanders-in-chief. The author concludes his study by saying (p. 354):}

"it seems safe to say that it was not the traditional quaestoris cum praetore necessitudo, but amicitia, and clientela, or beneficia which accounted for and were expected by the Romans to lead to lasting relationships of close intimacy between quaestors, or other junior officers, and their commanders-in-chief."

\[\text{In other words, a junior officer was expected to remain faithful to his commander during his term of office but not necessarily thereafter; in fact it was even the duty of a subordinate to aid in the prosecution of a superior who had acted wrongly during his term of office. It is possible that Quintus Sertorius found himself in such a position in the late 90's B.C.}\]

\[\text{13}^\text{Carney, p. 47.}\]
and the list of magistrates for the year reads like an optimate roster. T. Didius, one of the consuls of 98, received Nearer Spain as his province, and Quintus Sertorius was designated military tribune under him. Now Titus Didius had just celebrated a triumph (in 100 or 99) over the Thracian Scordisci, and the optimate consul was thirsting for the rare honor of a second triumph. Spain seemed to be the best field for triumph-hunting; it was hallowed as such in tradition, and the last triumph (celebrated in 98) had not stamped out the embers of a Celtiberian rebellion. We may be sure that Didius was not going to let his opportunity slip by. Didius' war with the Celtiberi (98-93 B.C.) seems to have started off on a very bloody note. Though hostilities may have diminished toward 95, there was still enough fight left in the Spaniards to require military action on the part of Didius' successor. Titus Didius is

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14 See M.R.R. II, pp. 4-6.

15 Sertorius' selection by the optime Didius may have been a small part of the compromise which Carney, pp. 47f, notes for the year 97 between optimates and Marians.


17 Wiseman, p. 31.

18 M.R.R. II, p. 9, n.4. Broughton tells us that Didius' chief victories may have come at the end of 98 or early in 97. In 92 C. Valerius Flaccus (cos. 93) had to put down a Celtiberian rebellion near Belgida (M.R.R. II, p. 18).
"credited" with the destruction of many towns, including Colenda, the forcible movement of the population of Termes (Termantia—now Santa Maria de Tiermes) from that defensive bastion, and the slaughter of 20,000 of the Arevaci tribe.\footnote{M.R.R. II, p. 7; cf. Wiseman, p. 31.}

Didius' greatest claim to fame in this war was a massacre by treachery which is reminiscent of one perpetrated upon the Lusitani years before.\footnote{Wiseman, p. 31. On Galba's earlier atrocity against the Lusitani cf. Mars McClelland Westington, 
Atrocities in Roman Warfare (Chicago: University of Chicago Libraries, 1938), pp. 22f.} In 92 Didius celebrated his precious second triumph, while another proconsul was receiving a similar honor over the Lusitani.\footnote{M.R.R. II, p. 15.}

Sertorius' role in the Spanish war was by all accounts an illustrious one. At Castulo Quintus' quick-thinking turned a barbarian night assault into a Roman victory.\footnote{The story, in Plutarch 3. 3-5, demonstrates the ingenuity for which Sertorius would become famous. It also implies a bloodthirsty streak in the man which no amount of argument can fully exonerate. However, it must be pointed out that Sertorius' part in the slaughter, whatever that may have been, came after the Romans had been treacherously attacked. In the confusion and fear which resulted there may not have been time for the Romans to distinguish innocent from guilty.} It seems that the Roman soldiers quartered in Castulo for the winter became enervated by the diversions and riches of the town.
In fact, according to Plutarch, these stalwarts were drunk most of the time. Seeing this, the people of Castulo conspired with their neighbors the Oritanians, and one night the Spaniards delivered a combined surprise attack upon the Roman quarters. We can imagine the terror and confusion caused by this sudden assault. But the clear-headed Sertorius perceived what was happening, escaped from the town, rallied the Roman troops who were fleeing, and led them right back into Castulo, through the very gate by which the barbarians had previously entered. The now-organized Roman soldiers killed every Spanish male old enough to carry arms. When the city was secured and the bloodletting over, Sertorius ordered his men to don the garb of their ill-fated attackers. Thus accoutered the Roman army marched to the city of the Oritanians, and found the gate open because the Oritanians had mistaken the Romans for their own commando force, returning from the attack at Castulo. A second massacre thus took place, and those who surrendered to Sertorius and the Roman army were sold as slaves.

\[23\] In more ways than one. Schulten (Sertorius, p. 31) goes beyond Plutarch in emphasizing that Sertorius took no part in the veritable "Roman orgy" enjoyed by the legionaries wintering at Castulo, and in this he may be correct. However, one wonders whether Sertorius, as military tribune, could not have taken steps to see that such a relaxation of discipline would not occur. Possibly he was overruled by higher officers.
The exploit at Castulo won for Sertorius the corona *graminea*, the highest military decoration available. What was perhaps of greater importance for the future of Quintus Sertorius was the prestige which such an accomplishment won for him, not only in Spain, but back in Rome, where commands and offices were dispensed. Sertorius returned to the Eternal City in 93, and took part in Didius' triumph. Soon after this Sertorius offered himself for the quaestorship. He was elected to the position for 91 or 90 B.C., and received by lot Cisalpine Gaul as his "province."
While in Cisalpine Gaul Sertorius received the order to raise troops and arms, for the Social War was threatening. Sertorius' characteristic industry, aided no doubt by his oratorical training, won the Sabine further praise. Men began to predict a great future for Quintus. When the Marsic, or Social, War finally did break out, Sertorius found new opportunities to display his martial mettle, probably in the capacity of a lower legate, perhaps even serving under Didius. Sertorius' personal bravery in this conflict cost him an eye, but won for him increased fame, and eventually created a mystical charisma around the man. While the Romans then lauded Quintus to the skies for such a visible demonstration and mark of bravery, there would be others later who would recall a man with similar military talent, like bravery, and a parallel badge of

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28 So Schulten, Sertorius, p. 32. The passage he cites (Velleius 2.16.2) provides no connection between the men. Velleius tells us that Titus Didius was active in the Social War (we could have learned that from Cicero Pro Fonteio 43 or Appian B.C. 1.40; cf. M.R.R. II, p. 29), and took Herculaneum with the assistance of Velleius Paterculus' great-grandfather. If Sertorius remained in the north after his Cisalpine Gaul service, he would not have served under Didius, who was in the south as a legate himself of the consul Caesar. If Sertorius remained in fact in the north, a procedure which appears logistically more likely, he would have served under the pro-Marians. The consul P. Rutilius Lupus was assisted in his northern command by a bevy of like-minded men, including Caius Marius himself (cf. E. Badian, "Caepio and Norbanus," Studies in Greek and Roman History (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1964), pp. 52-6, henceforth "Badian, 'Caepio'"). Such a Marian connection on the part of Q. Sertorius could have later compromised the Sabine new man in Sulla's mind.
courage, who once came from the west to bring Rome near its knees in the Second Punic War.

In spite of the quite literal adulation of the crowd, when Sertorius presented himself in 88 as a candidate for the position of tribune of the people, he suffered defeat. The machinations of Sulla sufficed to bring about this check. But why did Sulla want to alienate a fast-rising young man, who had served for a long time under another member of the aristocratic factio? That Sulla thereby made a determined enemy out of a potentially useful friend is remarked by Plutarch\(^{29}\) and seconded by modern scholars; Schulten tells us that:

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\text{Dieser Misserfolg bei der Bewerbung um den Tribunat wurde der Wendepunkt im Leben des Sertorius. Er machte ihn zum erbittern Gegner des Sulla und der Oligarchie und zum unbedingten Anhänger der Volkspartei.}^{30}
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The picture we gain from modern scholars is that Sertorius turned against Sulla after and because Sulla denied him the tribunate. This opinion needs reconsideration. It is very possible that Sulla's conspiring against Sertorius may have been not the cause but the result of ill-feeling between the two and Sertorius' "defection" from the ranks of the optimate faction.

\(^{29}\) Plutarch, Sertorius, 4.3.

\(^{30}\) Schulten, Sertorius, p. 33.
Plutarch refrains from suggesting a reason for Sulla's check on Sertorius' dreams.\textsuperscript{31} Such a detail was of merely secondary importance to the Greek biographer; it was history, not biography. Schulten however presents some well thought-out possibilities. The German scholar rejects Sertorius' relationship with Marius as the cause for Sulla's action, as Sertorius was not a political follower of Marius.\textsuperscript{32} Here Schulten is probably correct; at least all the evidence seems to sustain such a conclusion. However, less tenable is Schulten's suggestion that Sulla cheated Sertorius of his hopes because the patrician consular despised the Sabine novus homo as a mere municipal knight. An action of such great consequences, carried out for such petty reasons, is incomprehensible in as shrewd a political mind as was Sulla's. More comprehensible is the possibility that Sulla feared seeing as popular a man as Sertorius in the tribunate, an office which Sulla hated, as his alteration of the constitution in the years 82-79 would show. The events before 88 had shown Sulla the abuses which the tribunate could produce. The demagogic activities of P. Sulpicius Rufus only increased Sulla's hostility toward the tribunate, an office which if held by strong men could

\textsuperscript{31}Plutarch, \textit{Sertorius}, 4.3.

\textsuperscript{32}Schulten, \textit{Sertorius}, p. 33.
seriously weaken the senate's corner on power, and thus the power of the optimates who controlled the senate. Yet tribunes could be bought, or even won over to one's side. If Sertorius proved incorruptible by money, because of his long service under Didius the Sabine new man might be expected to hold an optimate line, as long as promotions kept coming from that source. If Sulla feared Sertorius in the tribunate it was because he feared the position but even more the particular man who wanted to hold it. And if Sertorius hitherto had been friendly or at least not openly hostile to aristocratic interests, it seems an incredibly poor bit of policy to make him an enemy in this manner.

Perhaps the answer to this dilemma is that Sertorius was estranged from aristocratic interests before Sulla moved against him. We have noted the cruelty which T. Didius had displayed in Spain. We shall have cause to note the favor which Sertorius would later find among those same Spaniards. An odd contradiction, that Didius the proconsul should be so hated, yet the military tribune who served him so esteemed, since the Spaniards had a long memory for injury. Is it not possible that Sertorius fell into disagreement with the savage methods of his commander, and marked his own tenure of Spain with more moderate conduct, thus gaining the love as well as the respect of the Spanish? As a subordinate officer Sertorius was bound by custom to a certain loyalty
and courtesy toward Didius while their official connection lasted. But when the official bond was broken, a legate was expected to testify against his ex-commander if the latter had acted inappropriately during his tenure in office. A prosecution may have been threatened against Didius upon his return from Spain, and in the events that followed, Sertorius could be expected to take a position against his former commander. The prosecution itself probably never came about, for we have no record of such a trial, but the circumstances would have seriously compromised Sertorius' position vis-à-vis the aristocratic party. In any case, when the Social War broke out, and Sertorius found himself in Gallia Cisalpina, he may have found it easier to link his forces with those under the consul in the north. P. Rutilius Lupus happened to be a Marian and a relative of the old soldier, who himself took over the command of the armies of the north after Lupus' death on the field of battle. If Sertorius played out his part in the Social War under Marius,

33 Cf. n. 12, above.

34 The outbreak of the Social War could have had something to do with the trials' never being held. At a time of such great danger it was imperative for optimates and all other groups to unite. A prosecution of Didius would have precedents. An attempt was made to bring the treacherous Servilius Sulpicius Galba to trial after his massacre of 8000 unarmed Spaniards in 150; cf. Westington, p. 23. Galba's children, tears, and money sufficed to acquit him, however.

35 It is impossible to prove whether or not Sertorius was still an "optimate man" in the years 91-90, since both men of the aristocratic factio and Marians were being elected to posts.
Marians like M. Perperna, and mavericks such as Cn. Pompeius Strabo, the Sabine new man could expect no rehabilitation in Sulla's eyes. Hence, Sulla helped snub a man who he believed was already disaffected toward the cause of the optimates.

The year 88 B.C. was one of turmoil, a turning point in Roman history. It marked the first time that a Roman consul marched at the head of a Roman army against Rome. In the events immediately following this new turn for the worse in Roman affairs, Sertorius was to surge to the forefront of factional politics, only to be snubbed by the coalition he joined. This check was only one of several such mistakes which assured the ultimate failure of the Cinno-Marian combination, yet its circumstances were of crucial importance for the life of Quintus Sertorius.

36 To speak of a popular party (as does Schulten, Sertorius, p. 33), is to misconceive Roman politics of the late Republic. Although the optimates seem to represent a real political party or factio, bound by inter-marriage and dedicated to perpetuating their grip upon the senate, the so-called "populares" do not represent a "democratic party." A "popularis" is a man who works to achieve his goals by using appeals to the people, whether or not his purpose is in any sense democratic. Thus, H. Bennett, in Cinna and his Times (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Publishing Company, 1923. Henceforth referred to as "H. Bennett"), shows that Cinna was aiming at a personal dominatio (tyranny); Cinna chose to achieve this by baiting the people, promising reforms which were never carried out. There was no such thing as a continuous, enduring, "popular party" which held fixed ideals, as was true of the optimates. Instead there were individuals who for a time commanded considerable support through clientelae, military victories, and promises to the people. Cf. Lily Ross Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), and Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution (London: Oxford Univ. Press 1967). Henceforth this latter work will be referred to as "Syme, Roman Revolution."
CHAPTER II

CINNA'S TRIUMPH

In 88 B.C. the Social War began to wind down, but its consequences had just begun to make themselves felt. One of these results was the return of Marius to public, military prominence. Another of the effects was the rise of Lucius Cornelius Sulla, the optimate answer to the populâris general. The spark which turned the friction between these two men into a conflagration which threatened the end of the Republic itself, was a tribune of the people, P. Sulpicius Rufus.¹

Sulpicius was a patrician who had offered himself for the tribunate in order to work some changes in the voting laws. Long before the Social War some Romans had realized that the Italian allies, who had expended themselves so much in the cause of Rome, deserved Roman citizenship and the vote.² Lately, however, attempts to grant this

¹For the narrative of these events see H. Bennett, pp. 2ff, and Marsh, pp. 99ff.

²Schulten, Sertorius, p. 35: "Drei Jahrhunderte lang halten sie mit ihrem Blut den römischen Staat zu mehren geholfen, und als Lohn dafür war ihnen schimpfliche Zurücksetzung zuteil geworden."
privilege had all been defeated by the machinations of the optimate factio.³ It must be added that the lower classes of Roman free men also came to guard selfishly the franchise. The plebs feared that opening the polls to the Italians as a whole would diminish their own say in the government, and in this they were not mistaken. An odd coalition, this union of aristocrats and lower class; but in these circumstances a difficult force to circumvent.

This novel alliance of plebs and optimates could, however, be overcome. The Social War had virtually forced the Romans to grant the franchise to more Italians as the price of their own existence. However, the controlling interests in the senate had ensured that the new Italian voters should all be enrolled in the last ten of the thirty-five tribes which voted in the assemblies. If in terms of voting the Italians previously had nothing, they now had next to it; on many matters the voting would never even reach the twenty-sixth tribe. The new citizens were of course furious.

P. Sulpicius Rufus sought to change this procedure by proposing a law which would spread the Italians over the whole thirty-five Roman tribes. Such a measure was certain to be unpopular with the plebs and aristocrats, who would

³Many of these liberalizing attempts were led by aristocrats of the bluest blood, like the Gracchi and Drusus. These efforts were opposed by the optimates because an influx of new voters would make the assemblies more difficult to control, and thus weaken optimate direction of the state.
probably prevent its passage. Therefore Sulpicius also proposed that the city freedmen of Rome, hitherto confined in voting to one city tribe, should also be enrolled in the whole thirty-five voting tribes. Such a move commended itself to the knights,\(^4\) and the darling of the knights (and of many Italians) was one Caius Marius. From the freedmen and Italians Sulpicius recruited a following with which he hoped to carry his bills through the assembly, by intimidation or force. However, the consuls Sulla and Q. Pompeius Rufus managed to delay the assembly by religious gimmicks; rioting broke out, and the son of Pompeius was murdered. Pompeius himself barely held on to his life, and Sulla underwent the ignominy, if the story be believed, of taking refuge at the home of his arch enemy Marius. The religious ploy was dropped, Sulla went off to Nola, which his army was besieging as part of the last action in the Social War, and Sulpicius carried his measures.

But the tribune was not yet finished. Had he stopped now, Sulpicius might possibly have gone down in Roman history as one of the greatest benefactors of his patria. Instead he became the architect of the first Roman Civil War. The consul Sulla had been given the command against Mithradates.

\(^4\)Cf. Marsh, p. 101, for this view. The equites, whose business interests probably dictated that they retain considerable numbers of slaves and freedmen, would now better be able to use these men as clientes in the elections.
This King of Pontus had declared war on Rome, invaded its province Asia, and massacred thousands upon thousands of Romans.\(^5\) Sulla anticipated finishing the activity at Nola, then transporting his army to the east to fulfill his important and potentially lucrative duty. Yet Sulpicius passed a bill transferring Sulla's eastern command to Marius, possibly as payment for Marius' past assistance or as insurance upon his future aid or neutrality. This action was extraordinary and, though technically legal, had most probably been carried by force. Sulla did not hesitate to reply. The enraged general marched his army toward Rome, brushed aside the feeble resistance offered by a surprised Sulpicius, overturned the Sulpician laws, and proclaimed twelve men, including Sulpicius and Marius, as public enemies. All of these marked men escaped save the unfortunate tribune, who paid with his life for the laudable purpose and violent methods he had espoused. Sulla then held the elections for the next year's magistrates, and at this time he may have succeeded in disappointing the untrustworthy Sertorius. Sulla finally left Rome for his army and the east.

L. Cornelius Cinna now steps into the story. An opportunistic plebeian,\(^6\) Cinna was elected consul for 87 B.C.

\(^5\)Cf. Marsh, p. 110. Marsh, in considering Plutarch's figure of 150,000 (Sulla, 24.4) and Valerius Maximus' 80,000 (9.2 Ext 3), declares both numbers probably greatly exaggerated. Nevertheless, most modern authors seem disposed to adhere to the lower ancient estimate.

\(^6\)The Cornelii Cinnae were a plebeian noble house, while the Cornelii Sullae were patricians.
That he was a pro-Marian or a pro-Italian before his election is impossible; Sulla and the senate would never have allowed the *comitia centuriata* to elect such a man.⁷ The story may be true that Sulla suspected the consul-elect, and therefore made Cinna swear to observe his policies, but it may equally be part of a later aristocratic smear. The history of the Civil War has come down to us mainly from the hands of pro-Sullan historians.

Whatever Sulla's doubts may have been about Cinna, the new consul was soon to show that the optimate's worst possible fears were correct. Almost immediately after taking office Cinna called for the reconsideration of the Italian question and the recall of the Marian exiles. However, before these bills were considered the scheming consul moved Sulla out of Italy. Cinna publicly urged upon Sulla the urgency of the situation in the east, and privately convinced a tribune to start legal proceedings against Sulla upon some convenient charge. Sulla left Nola with most of his army and this time headed east: Mithradates would feel Sullan fury before that anger would again be turned against Rome.

Sulla probably trusted Octavius, the thoroughly optimate consular colleague of Cinna in 87, to stifle the

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⁷Cf. H. Bennett, pp. 4f. In fact, senate and Sulla might have put a price on such a man's head.
popularis' actions. Events turned out thus. When Cinna proposed his bills, several tribunes promptly vetoed the measures, and when Cinna's Italian followers produced weapons and advanced toward the recalcitrant magistrates, the mob found its path barred by weapon-wielding Roman plebeians. In the middle of the melee which followed, Octavius rushed down into the forum with a troop of armed men. There is some question as to his exact purpose, for Octavius was careful to avoid Cinna's location in the riot, but the results are clear. The Italians were slaughtered, their survivors pursued to the city gates, and Cinna, after rushing through the streets calling unsuccessfully for the slaves to rally to his cause, left the city. In his flight the consul was accompanied by six tribunes and other followers; of the latter there was one named Q. Sertorius.

Sertorius had probably joined Cinna soon after Sulla's march on Rome and the expulsion of Marius. It is possible that his failure at the elections for the tribunate convinced Sertorius that he should join some political power group.

Some, (cf. H. Bennett, p. 9) believe that Octavius merely wanted to disperse Cinna's mob, but that the optimate consul's "toughs" got out of hand.

Cf. H. Bennett, p. 8, n. 36.
It is also clear that Quintus saw that his future did not lie, at least for the time being, with the Marians, who were either exiled or lying low. Cinna seemed to be a dynamic leader whom one could with profit join. Cinna was anti-Sullan, he had espoused pro-Italian causes which might have interested Sertorius, and Cinna had need of good men. Yet it is clear that Cinna had miscalculated regarding Octavius, and the flight from Rome must have been a bitter sojourn for both the ambitious Sabine and fleeing consul.

But Lucius Cinna had not as yet exhausted his possibilities. Upon Cinna's removal from the city the senate had deposed him from office and declared him and his colleagues public enemies. This was an illegal step, as Bennett and Marsh show,¹⁰ and Cinna was able to make political use of this fact. Posing as a man wronged before the one legion left behind at Nola by Sulla,¹¹ Cinna succeeded in winning it to his cause. Then the consul progressed through the Italian towns and countryside, picking up more support. Sertorius showed himself extremely serviceable to the banished consul in this regard, and when the anti-optimate force moved back toward Rome, Quintus Sertorius was one of its top generals.

¹⁰H. Bennett, p. 7; Marsh, p. 103.

¹¹The legion which Sulla had left besieging Nola also had reason to feel wronged by a member of the optimate factio. Instead of a glorious and remunerative eastern war, the legion around Nola had to look forward to only a continued siege operation.
Hearing of the unsettled conditions in Italy, Marius hastened back from exile in Libya. The old consular landed in Etruria, where he picked up numerous volunteers and forty ships. Thus fortified, Marius sent a message to Cinna, asking to be allowed to serve under the consul. It was an offer that Cinna had to accept, in spite of Sertorius' advice against assenting. The reforms which Marius himself had wrought in the Roman army a decade before made it imperative that the Cinnans have a proven general upon their side. The proletarians who had been enrolled in the Roman legions from 107 on could not be expected to feel much concern for constitutional niceties. This was especially the case since military pay had sunk to so low a relative level that the soldiers had to look to their commanders for booty and allotments upon disbandment, in order to earn any kind of a decent living. In this light, a general with a name was necessary. None of the Cinnan generals, not even Cinna himself, could put forward a long and victorious war record. But the name of Marius was magic. Cinna well understood Sertorius' fears of Marius' thirst for revenge, and the possibility,

12 Plutarch, Sertorius, 5.1-2.
14 Cf. Schulten, p. 36; H. Bennett, p. 20, shows a graphic example of the overwhelming importance attached by Roman soldiers to who their commanders were. When the
that if they received Marius he would appropriate to himself all the glory and the power, since he found it hard to share authority and was not to be trusted.\textsuperscript{15}

But Cinna knew the need for Marius and told Sertorius that he had in fact invited the old popularis to return to Italy.\textsuperscript{16} Upon hearing this Sertorius said that of course one could not go back on his word, and withdrew his objection. The insurgent army was divided into four groups, led by Cinna, Sertorius, Marius, and Cn. Papirius Carbo.

Rome was in an anxious state. There were two senatorial armies still in Italy, but their availability was questionable. One army was in Samnite territory, and was headed by Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius. In optimate eyes Metellus was a trustworthy general, but also currently a senatorial general Metellus marched into the vicinity of a Rome threatened by the Cinno-Marians, the soldiers under Octavius flocked to Metellus and begged him to take command over them, since they considered Metellus a better general than the consul. Metellus was angered by these troops' disregard for propriety and the constitution, and ordered the petitioners to go back to Octavius. Instead, many of these men defected to the Cinno-Marians.

\textsuperscript{15}Plutarch, \textit{Sertorius}, 5.2

\textsuperscript{16}As may well have been true, if Cinna was indeed in league with the Marian faction soon after the beginning of his consulate. Note that one of the tribunes who fled with Cinna from Rome was one M. Marius Gratidianus, nephew of Caius Marius by birth and by adoption (cf. \textit{M.R.R.} II, pp. 47, 52).
very busy one; the Samnites were still unsubdued. In the north was Cn. Pompeius Strabo, and he could not be trusted. A "safe" commander had previously been sent to take over Strabo's army. The man had been murdered by his own new soldiers a few days after his arrival. The atrocity probably was instigated by Pompeius Strabo, and this in spite of the fact that the hapless Q. Pompeius Rufus was Strabo's relative. Nevertheless the senate called Pompeius Strabo back to Rome, and Strabo returned, grounded his legions' weapons near the Colline Gate, and did nothing. Strabo's price for assistance was the consulship, and he did not particularly care which side paid it. Neither side did, so Cnaeus Pompeius Strabo's veterans sat, while the Picentine waited upon events.

Strabo's inaction benefited Cinna, who in the meantime had received Marius and divided their growing forces into the four divisions. While Cinna and Carbo encamped on the Tiber bank opposite the city, Sertorius camped above Rome along the Tiber, Marius in a similar position beneath the city. Bridges thrown across the river by Sertorian and Marian engineers helped to block the influx of supplies. Marius next took Ostia by the treachery of its own cavalry commander, and pillaged that port city. Pompeius Strabo picked Marius' absence to come to life; he attacked Sertorius' camp,¹⁷ which must have been located on the city side of

¹⁷Whether Pompey had sincerely (and temporarily) decided to champion the optimate side, or was just
the Tiber. The battle lasted all day and about 600 men fell on each side, but the result was a stalemate. Several ancient writers record the story about a soldier who killed his own brother in this battle, only to commit suicide when he realized what he had done. Schulten tells us that at this point many officers of Strabo's army began to go over to the Sertorian camp, "unter ihnen vielleicht auch Hirtuleius, der später in Spanien sein bester Unterführer war." Pompeius Strabo was beginning to lose control of the situation.

Little better was the news which the senate was receiving from the rest of Italy. A certain Servilius had been sent to Cisalpine Gaul to raise troops, but was stopped at Ariminum by M. Marius Gratidianus. Servilius escaped with his life but without his army; a few soldiers had been killed at the outset of the skirmish, but the rest quickly decided to surrender. In the south Metellus had emphasizing his strength as a preliminary to further negotiations, is incapable of certain solution. The latter possibility seems more probable to this writer.

18 Cf. H. Bennett, p. 13. Otherwise Sertorius could not have protected his blockading bridge from attack.

19 H. Bennett, pp. 14f, examines this anecdote.

20 Schulten, Sertorius, p. 37.

21 Cf. M.R.R. II, pp. 53, 43. Broughton tentatively identifies this Servilius with P. Servilius Vatia (later Isauricus), who had celebrated a triumph the preceding year for an unknown province.
attempted, on senatorial orders, to patch up any kind of treaty with the Samnites. However, Metellus was unsuccessful even in this when the Samnite demands proved impossible to accept. Metellus then received the senatorial command to return to Rome anyway. A Cinno-Marian legate by the name of C. Flavius Fimbria then promptly offered the Samnites what Metellus had refused to consider. The small holding force which the proconsul Metellus had left was soon defeated by the Samnites, who then joined the Cinno-Marian coalition. Meanwhile the senate's hurried and humiliating grant of citizenship to all the Italian tribes which Rome had beaten in the Social War had not achieved more than sixteen cohorts for the optimate cause.  

The insurgent forces delivered a combined assault on the Janiculum and for a time held it, but Octavius and Pompeius Strabo combined forces to drive the attackers out before the day's end. Strabo was still playing his equivocal role, however. Strabo called off a pursuit of the fleeing Cinno-Marians which would have made the victory decisive and possibly could have crushed the impetus of the rebellion. 

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22 H. Bennett, p. 16.

23 Carney, p. 64, n.280; cf. H. Bennett, p. 18. Carney notes regarding Pompey "subsequent negotiations with Cinna, presumably for a joint consulship which would have ousted M. [Marius] from his position of predominance." These negotiations somehow fell through.
Yet all of Pompeius Strabo's scheming had failed to take into account the dictates of heaven, for a plague wiped out many of the crowded troops in his own and Octavius' army. With them Cn. Pompeius Strabo fell. Strabo's corpse was mistreated by the Romans in a fashion reserved for the worst of public offenders: the citizens hated him for the questionable, opportunistic role he had played.

The insurgent forces had moved away from the Eternal City at the outbreak of the pestilence, and had busied themselves in occupying nearby towns and thus making the Roman plight more serious. Near Aricia and the Alban Mount the Cinno-Marian forces met the senatorial troops of Octavius, 6,000 of Octavius' men fell; 11,000 of Strabo's soldiers, according to Orosius 5.19.18. Orosius is not a particularly good source in himself, but he is confirmed by another source, Granius Licinianus (cf. Bennett, p. 19 with n. 94).

It is uncertain whether Pompey died from the epidemic (Carney, p. 64, n. 281), murder (suggested by Marsh, p. 104), lightning in his tent (Appian B.C. I, 69, 80), or the combination of plague and lightning hitting his tent while he lay ill (H. Bennett, p. 19). It should be noticed that none of the passages listed by H. Bennett (Appian B.C. I, 68; I, 80; Plutarch Pompey I; Velleius II, 21.4; Orosius 5.19, 18, Obsequens 56, Granius Licinianus, p. 22) proves that Pompeius Strabo was struck by the plague as well as by lightning. Licinianus does say that Pompeius was struck in his tent by lightning while he was lying ill, but the disease is unspecified. However, this may be Licinianus' conjecture from the facts that the plague was rife in Strabo's army and that Strabo was in his tent when the lightning struck. It is possible that something other than plague was keeping Pompeius Strabo in his tent—if not illness, perhaps it was night; even more probably, perhaps it was the storm itself. One's tent would be the obvious place of refuge from a tempest such as Licinianus describes. Cf. R. Ellis, The Annalist Licinianus (London: Henry Frowde, n.d.), p. 12. Ellis confines himself to saying "Pestilence breaks out, and 17,000 men die in the camp of Octavius. Pompeius Strabo succumbs to the effects of a lightning stroke . . ."
Crassus, and Metellus, who had finally arrived in the vicinity of Rome. Everything pointed to a major battle, one which would probably determine the fate of the Cinnan rebellion; but when Metellus led his troops toward the enemy, the "senatorial" forces shouted a friendly greeting to the opposing army, and were greeted in return. "Metellus pursued the only possible course. He led back his troops into camp and arranged a conference with Cinna with a view to effecting a settlement by compromise." 26 The negotiations broke off, Marius declaring Cinna a fool, Octavius calling Metellus worse than that. Metellus left for Africa.

Beleaguered by plague, lack of supplies, good generals, and men, the senate sent peace feelers to Cinna. The consul-in-exile in his turn required reinstatement as consul before any serious talks. The consul-suffect L. Cornelius Merula quickly abdicated. 27 Cinna marched his troops to the very walls of Rome, and there received the senate's peace proposal. It amounted to a plea that the conscript fathers, government, and people of Rome be allowed to surrender on the condition that no one be harmed. Cinna evaded the condition. Nevertheless, Cinna was allowed inside Rome, where he held an assembly which recalled the banished Marian exiles, a now

26 H. Bennett, p. 21. Cf. Carney, p. 64, n. 281. Carney believes that in these Cinna-Metellus negotiations Cinna again attempted to make himself more powerful than Marius.

27 Merula had been chosen for the consul-suffect position by the jealous Octavian because as flamen Dialis the priest Cornelius Merula could not carry out the consular duties.
meaningless legal procedure upon which Marius had nevertheless insisted. However, before the canvassing had been finished Marius entered the city with the rest of the Cinno-Marian forces. Rome's long, agonizing day was over. But the nightmare had just begun.

\footnote{Possibly this move underlined Marius' intention to secure for himself an independent and dominant role in the future ruling of Rome.}
CHAPTER III

THE RULE OF THE CINNO-MARIANS

The Cinno-Marian faction had triumphed, and for the first time Quintus Sertorius found himself playing a successful and important role in Roman politics. However, Sertorius' ability to guide and moderate the policies of this coalition was eroded quickly as time passed. To understand this process we must first understand the composition of the Cinno-Marian coalition, and the various ways in which the combination reacted to the conditions of its newly-won dominance. Next the events of the period leading up to Sulla's return, in which Cinno-Marian rule deteriorated because of internal lack of unity and external circumstances, will form the background for a consideration of Sertorius' career during this time.

The ancient account of the "Marian massacre" is one highly-colored by partisan historical scholarship, nearly all of it pro-Sullan. In reality this "massacre" did not take nearly the great proportions which the Sullan annalists, anxious to whiten the record of their hero if only by the blackening of his greatest adversary, make of it. Indeed, the reports of indiscriminate slaughter,
coupled with the naming of few names and no indication of exact casualty figures, make the whole affair suspect. It begins to sound much like the continua caedes which Tacitus claims for the reign of the Emperor Tiberius. Tacitus, his scruples not permitting a direct lie, is unable to prove his charge and in a quiet way furnishes the material to disprove his libellous label. There are, similarly, only fourteen known victims of the "Marian massacre." It is clear that more must have suffered from the plundering of the Cinno-Marian troops, and that for a time consternation, despair and terror ruled in men's minds, but it is just as certain that no across-the-board political pogrom was unleashed.

Of the fourteen men to die as a result of the "massacre," only seven deaths can be directly attributed to the activity of Marius. It is probable that many of the others owed their demise to Marius' hatred. The significant fact is that these men all seem to have been former friends of Marius who subsequently had turned traitor to him. Such executions of "traitors" are clearly different from the murders of mere enemies. As for the consuls Octavius and Merula, it is clear that "they were both guilty of high treason for their actions against the consul Cinna."

1 Carney, p. 67.
2 Badian, "Caepio," pp. 57 and 69, n.177.
Octavius presented a considerable danger to Cinna as he had himself slipped back into Rome with his men; Cinna had his ex-colleague dispatched immediately. Merula was brought to trial for his complicity in Octavius' actions, but forestalled the verdict by suicide. Before killing himself Merula had the propriety to remove the cap which the flamen Dialis wore, as custom dictated that the cap was never to be worn by a dying priest. With the religious scrupulosity characteristic of an earlier Roman day, Merula left a written document recording this action. 4 

Even the close friends and relatives of the victims were spared persecution or were allowed to flee. The same treatment was accorded the associates and families of the Cinno-Marian enemies who for one reason or another escaped the "Marian massacre." Although Sulla himself was declared a public enemy and his property burned or confiscated, his wife Metella was allowed to flee with his children. This flight occurred after Sulla's houses had been levelled; it is clear that the Cinno-Marians had not intended to destroy Sulla's family. 5 P. Licinius Crassus, who had led senatorial forces at the Janiculum and near Aricia, was in fact pursued and despatched by the Marian C. Flavius Fimbria. Crassus' father of the same name thereupon committed suicide; 

4H. Bennett, p. 27, n.14.  
5H. Bennett, pp. 29f.
it has been argued convincingly that only the son was sought by the executioners.  

Q. Catulus, son of Marius' hated enemy; M. Antonius, those Caesares about whom we have any positive information at all--the relatives of the consular victims seem to have stayed in Rome, unmolested and in some cases honoured.

We are told that the "surviving consulars stayed in Rome and co-operated." And the continued presence of the Pontifex Maximus and lawyer Q. Mucius Scaevola, a neutral in the Cinno-Marian--Sullan conflict, "made the constitutional position clear beyond doubt both to contemporaries and to posterity." Badian successfully and brilliantly demolishes the belief that Sulla's position was the lawful one, a pretence which he remarks "never occurred to anyone who mattered," including Sulla.

There were, however, disturbances, a large part of which were caused by the slaves who had espoused the Cinno-Marian cause in the last few days of the conflict. Especially pernicious were the so-called Bardyaei, Marius'  

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6 By H. Bennett, p. 26, n.9, on the basis Of Cicero, pro Sestio 21, 48.


8 Badian, "Caepio," p. 216.


10 Badian, "Caepio," p. 216. An interesting sidelight to this point is the fact that Metellus and M. Licinius Crassus went into exile in Africa and Spain respectively, and not to Sulla.
personal bodyguard. After five days and nights of their depredations Cinna and Sertorius had a troop of Gallic soldiers surround the camp of the sleeping Bardyaei and slaughter them.\footnote{11 This served as an object lesson to the other slaves and rowdies, and must have quieted things down considerably.}

Once in power the Cinno-Marians acted rather surprisingly. It appears that the Italians who supported the Cinno-Marians did not immediately reap their rewards. The Samnites assuredly received the considerations which the Cinnans had promised. Yet it would appear that the extended franchise was granted the Italians and freedmen only in 84. Apparently the Cinno-Marians treaded softly in their first few years of power, hoping to attach their former adversaries, the city plebs and the senate as a whole, by this moderation.\footnote{12 Badian, F.C., pp. 240f. Badian gives us the reason for Cinno-Marian moderation: "The explanation is that once again the Italians were to be sacrificed to concordia." Cf. Badian, "Waiting," pp. 222f.}

The olive branch was extended even toward Sulla.\footnote{13 Badian, F.C., pp. 240f.} Cn. Pompeius, the son of Strabo, was put on trial for a trumped-up charge but somewhat surprisingly was acquitted. Several prominent senators had spoken fearlessly in the young equestrian's defense, none being more eloquent than Cn. Papirius Carbo, one of the Cinnan leaders.

\footnote{11 Cf. Bennett, p. 30; Carney, p. 66.}

\footnote{12 Badian, F.C., pp. 240f. Badian gives us the reason for Cinno-Marian moderation: "The explanation is that once again the Italians were to be sacrificed to concordia." Cf. Badian, "Waiting," pp. 222f.}

\footnote{13 Badian, F.C., pp. 240f.}
But the Cinno-Marian combination in the final analysis proved unsuccessful. It failed because it tried to be too many things to too many different groups, and in the end satisfied no one. When Sulla brought his victorious veterans back from the Mithradatic War in 83, Cinno-Marian support melted away, hastened by the inept and divided counsels of its own generals.

In fact, the Cinno-Marian combination had never been a community of exactly similar interests. As Badian succinctly puts it, "Cinna had been an uneasy accomplice. He had not relished Marius as an ally."¹⁴ We have noted Cinna's attempted negotiations with Pompeius Strabo and Metellus, and Sertorius' urgings of Cinna not to accept Marius' aid.¹⁵ Bennett adds that the Marius-Cinna partnership "was based upon mutual service rather than upon a common political interest."¹⁶ And after Marius died soon after entering upon his prophesied seventh consulship in January of 86, and still more when Cinna was killed two years later, the Cinno-Marians were disorganized and disunited. In this process we see the submergence of Sertorius and the rise of the Marian element as the final hours of the


¹⁵Negotiations with Pompeius Strabo, see p. 38, n.23; negotiations with Metellus, see p. 40 with n.26; Sertorius' advice to Cinna, see p. 34.

¹⁶Bennett, p. 12.
coalition ran their course, and as Rome braced herself for her second Civil War.

Who were the men who filled the different factions of the Cinno-Marian coalition? Precise knowledge is possible in only a very few cases, but we can make some general observations at the outset. The Cinnans appear to have been less numerous and powerful, at least in the officer ranks. Cinna's following had had only a very short time to grow before it had merged with the Marian group, which had had almost two decades to mature under a dynamic and victorious general. Clientage, marriage, and relationship ties therefore linked the Marians, ties which cannot be found for the Cinnan half of the combination. The Cinnans were also probably less antagonistic towards Sulla; they had not the cause to hate him that the Marians had. Consequently,

when moderate [I would identify this as "Cinnan"] opinion hardened against resistance to Sulla upon the latter's success, the extremists [who will be easily identifiable Marians] took control.17

The triumph of the Marian part of the coalition probably hastened the dissolution of the combination's power; it also had ramifications for Sertorius' later career.

17Carney, p. 68, no. 290. We shall, however, have cause to marvel at the swift change which some "Marians" were able to achieve when it became clear that Sulla was to prove Felix.
The Marian side of the coalition is the easier of the two groups to define. First were, of course, the Marii—Caius Marius himself with his homonymous son and M. Marius Gratidianus, who had proved very serviceable to the Cinno-Marian cause in 87. Next were the Herennii, who claimed patronage over the Marian gens and had been well served by Caius Marius. Their last consul had held office in 93. Closely tied in with Marius were also the patrician Valerii Flacci. They too seem to have taken up Marius, and with good results. L. Valerius Flaccus was consul as Marius' colleague in 100, and became princeps senatus under the Cinno-Marians. Caius Valerius Flaccus, Lucius' cousin, was colleague of Marcus Herennius in the consulship of 93. Another Lucius, the brother of the consul of 93 and therefore the cousin of the Lucius who was consul in 100, was named suffect consul in 86 to fill Marius' term of office. Upon Marius' death the Valerii Flacci seem to

\[18\] Carney, p. 9, n.42. Cf. Badian, "Waiting," p. 223. Badian calls the Herennii "a Marian family, if ever there was one."

\[19\] M.R.R. I, p. 574. Lucius was derisively called "more a servant than a colleague" of Marius (Plutarch, Marius, 28.8); Cf. Badian, "Waiting," p. 222. Badian notes the Flacci habit of sponsoring new men and families, instancing Marius and the elder Cato. See Genealogical Table, p. 157.


have promoted accommodation with Sulla. The Lucius who was suffect-consul succeeding Marius in 86 was then assigned to the eastern command. He was assassinated by Fimbria for supposed pro-Sullan sympathies, and when Lucius' son fled the army of his murdered father, the young Lucius sought refuge not in Rome but with his uncle Caius who was governing Transalpine Gaul. Badian specifically credits the consul of 100 with working for normalization of relations with Sulla.23 When Sulla proved victorious in late 82 this Flaccus as interrex moved the fatal vote which proclaimed Sulla dictator. For this he was made Sulla's Master of the Horse. C. Flaccus (cos. 93) triumphed the next year over Celtiberia and Gaul, and his nephew, the homonymous son of the dead Lucius, lived to play an important role in later Republican politics.

The Perperna family was another important Marian gens. This was an Etruscan family which the Flacci may also have discovered.24 The eldest Perperna of which we have record seems to have been a legate in c. 168.25

23Badian, "Flaccus (5)" in O.C.D. Cf. this and Badian's "Flaccus (6)," and "Flaccus (7)" in O.C.D.; also M.R.R. II, pp. 76ff, for this and following material.
25For stemma providing many of these details see p. 166; taken from F. Münzer, Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1963), p. 97.
Perperna's son, also named Marcus, made the consulship in the year 130, making Perperna the first non-Latin nomen to attain the consular fasti. This Marcus Perperna had two attested sons, a homonymous one who was consul in the year 92, censor in 86, and Caius, whose career seems to have ended after his praetorship of c. 90 B.C., and a legatus position in 90. The third-generation Marcus had a son whom he not surprisingly named "Marcus;" this Perperna was to be praetor in 82 and eventually Sertorius' second-in-command and murderer. There was also a Perperina, born about 100 and dedicated as a Vestal Virgin eight years later.

Individual members of some important families may have joined the Cinno-Marian cause, although there is not enough evidence to suggest that the gentes as a whole were involved. The Antonii may have provided a few men for the

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26 Badian, "Caepio," p. 49.

27 The Perpernae were also linked in some fashion with the Claudii; cf. Badian, "Waiting," p. 223. Herein may lie the answer to the question why a certain Appius Claudius betrayed the Janiculum defenses to the Marians upon being reminded of a consideration he owed Caius Marius; cf. Appian, B.C. I, 68. Badian also comments upon the fact that L. Marcius Philippus was the son of a Claudia. This chameleon-like consular had held the consulship in 91 B.C. (M.R.R. II, p. 20), perhaps with Marian support; cf. Badian, "Waiting," p. 223. He was made censor for the year 86, but somehow survived the Sullan revenge in 82-80, to become prominent in the despatch of Pompeius Magnus against Sertorius.
Marian cause. The Antonius whom Marius had assassinated in the "Marian massacre" was an ex-Marian; and one of M. Perperna's officer-accomplices in the plot which ended Sertorius' life was to be an otherwise obscure M. Antonius. Marcus Aemilius Lepidus had Marian connections, and, if not raised to high positions, was at least left alone by the Cinno-Marians. Lepidus had given his eldest son in adoption to L. Cornelius Scipio Asiagenus, who was to be consul in 83.

To this list of Marians we can add other families. For instance, one of the more considerable gentes was the Iunii Bruti. An L. Iunius Brutus Damasippus, who may have served on Pompeius Strabo's staff in the Social War, became a Cinno-Marian praetor in 82. An M. Iunius Brutus as praetor in 88 was one of Marius' twelve exiled followers; Brutus

28 Plutarch, Sertorius, 26.6.

Lepidus defected to Sulla when it was clear that the fortune of war was turning the latter's way. Such a move was easier for Lepidus because he had remained inactive during the Cinnan dominatio. Thus, active complicity in the Cinno-Marian rule could not be urged against him. His lack of enthusiasm for the revolutionary regime also must indicate that Lepidus was a lukewarm Cinno-Marian.

29 Badian, "Waiting," p. 218. Cf. Carney, p. 9, n.42: "The client relationship of the Marii to Aemilianus was that of tribules to the leading gens in their ward, the Cornelia."

reached Spain where the Iunii Bruti enjoyed much influence. 32
Marcus was one of the first men to join Marius when the
latter landed in Etruria in 87. 33 Finally there were the
Flavii Fimbriae, one of whom, name otherwise unknown, was
an officer of Norbanus in 82. This Fimbria was murdered
by the Italian general Albinovanus, when the latter was
casting about for means to put Sulla in his debt. 34 The
more famous Flavius Fimbria was Caius, who was sent to the
east under L. Valerius Flaccus and murdered his commander
after he suspected Flaccus of conniving with Sulla.

The identifiable Cinnan part of the combination is
a much smaller group. Besides L. Cornelius Cinna himself
there was his homonymous son. Not important in the 80s,
Cinna junior was later a follower of Lepidus and Sertorius,
surviving both conflicts to marry Pompey's daughter. 35
Similarly young was Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who put him-
self at the head of the Cinno—Marian forces in Africa after
Sulla's proscriptions were announced. A relative of Cinna,

32 E. Badian, "Notes on Provincial Governors from
the Social War Down to Sulla's Victory," Studies in Greek
and Roman History (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1964),
p. 79. Henceforth this article will be referred to as
"Badian, 'Notes.'" Cf. p. 99 with n.10 of this essay for
more information on the Iunii Bruti and Spain.

33 Bennett, p. 11.

34 M.R.R. II, p. 70.

35 T. J. Cadoux, "Cinna (2)" in O.C.D.
he fell at the hands of Pompey Jr. in 81. Quintus Sertorius was, of course, among the Cinnan group, and so must have been Sertorius' later quaestor L. Hirtuleius. Lucius also had a brother Caius, who probably figured in the Cinnan entourage at this time.

The Papirii Carbones may also have figured in the Cinnan faction. A certain Cnaeus Papirius Carbo was one of the four chief Cinno-Marian generals in 87, and later consul in 85, 84, and 82. Cnaeus is hard to place as either specifically a Cinnan or a Marian; he may in fact have attempted to steer his own course in the Cinno-Marian combination. It is instructive to note, however, that upon Cinna's demise Carbo took up the latter's role of spokesman for the moderate position towards Sulla. Cnaeus' brother Caius was tribune in 89 or 88, and died at Volaterrae in 81. Another Caius Carbo, surnamed Arvina, was a

36 Van Ooteghem, p. 62.

37 Schulten, Sertorius, p. 36, calls Cn. Papirius Carbo an early follower of Cinna, because Sulla had denied the tribunate of the people to him. The parallel with Sertorius is unmistakable.

38 Cnaeus certainly did take his own stand when he supported Pompey Jr. against an accusation lodged against Strabo's son, probably by a Cinno-Marian. This courageous action did not, however, save Carbo later from murder at the orders of Pompeius Magnus. In fact, Pompey Jr. may have acted so callously in order better to prove his allegiance to the Sullan order.

39 See Genealogical Table, p. 158.
tribunus populi in 90, and died in 82. The Papirii Carbones were a powerful and opportunistic family. They could be expected to exert considerable and independent power.

The interplay of these various groups in the history of the years 86-82 makes for a fascinating study, which here can only be sketched. After Marius' death in January of 86, Lucius Valerius Flaccus was elected suffect consul and Marius' successor in the Asian command. The Valerii Flacci's solid connections with the Marian branch of the combination may have been merely through Caius Marius himself, for upon the old consul's death the Flacci began to pursue a policy of conciliation with Sulla. This accorded with the general feelings held by the Cinnan half of the combination, and L. Valerius Flaccus' eastern expedition may have had the secret intention of coming to an agreement with Sulla. Lucius' brother Caius was soon accorded the command in Gaul and perhaps the two Spains as well, while

40 He was executed by M. Iunius Brutus Damasippus at the orders of C. Marius the younger. Cf. H. Scullard, "Carbo (3)," O.C.D. Scullard suggests that Arvina may have been on the verge of defecting to Sulla when the execution occurred.

41 The C. Papirius Carbo who was consul in 120 may be instanced. Early a Gracchan and suspected as the murderer of Scipio Aemilianus, Carbo turned on Caius Gracchus, won the consulship, and defended Opimius for his actions against the Gracchans. Himself prosecuted in 119, Carbo suicided (cf. Badian, "Carbo (1)," O.C.D.).
their cousin Lucius (consul in 100, censor in 97) was made princeps senatus in 86. Yet the eastern expedition of Flaccus turned out disastrously. Flaccus had made contact with Sulla in Thessaly, then moved on toward the Hellespont. Whether this latter move was the result of the failure of negotiations between Flaccus and Sulla, or of their qualified success, is uncertain. But when Flaccus' legions crossed over into Asia, his legate C. Flavius Fimbria had Lucius Valerius Flaccus, his commander, murdered. The violent Fimbria accused his dead superior of treachery to the Cinno-Marian cause in a missive sent back to Rome, took over control of Flaccus' army, and continued advancing against Mithradates.

The news of Flaccus' death reached Rome in early 85, and weakened the uneasy coalition. The Flacci had moved somewhat out of the Marian ranks after the great Marius'

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42 In general, see Bennett, pp. 45ff, who however interprets the known facts differently than I do.

43 Cf. Bennett, p. 47, n.63. Bennett remarks the opinion of H. Bernhardt "that Flaccus was acting in league with Sulla, and that Fimbria's plot against him was formed in the interests of the Cinnan party." Bennett claims "I do not find anything in the sources to warrant such a view." Whether Flaccus now "was acting in league with Sulla" is in fact indeterminable, but L. Valerius Flaccus' pedigree makes it probable that he at least had attempted to find some means of reconciliation with Sulla. My reconstruction of events postulates Fimbria's murder of Flaccus as in the interests of the Marian element in the combination, not of the Cinnan "party" per se.

44 Cf. Bennett, pp. 49f.
demise. Now they became disaffected with the whole coalition, since the Cinnans proved unable or unwilling to make an issue over L. Flaccus' death. The Marian half of the coalition, with officers greater in number but lower in grade than the Cinnan element, demanded stronger measures against Sulla. When the report of Sulla's treaty with Mithradates and the loss of Fimbria and his legions reached the Eternal City in the autumn of 85, it behooved Cinna to accede to the more vocal elements in his combination. Cinna and his consular colleague Cn. Papirius Carbo hastened to assemble an army to await the expected return of Sulla, and made further efforts to conciliate senatorial opinion. Yet when a letter from Sulla to the senate indicated that the general's hostility lay only toward the ruling combination, the conscript fathers despatched a commission to negotiate with the optimate general. The proposal was moved by the princeps senatus L. Valerius Flaccus himself. The incident proves not only that the Flacci were pursuing their own course by this time, but that the ruling coalition was not the all-powerful tyranny which some have seen in it. Cinna was murdered in early 84 by his own troops, and the Cinno-Marian coalition thus became a combination of Cinnan and Marian epigoni.

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45 Bennett, p. 57.
46 Bennett, pp. 57ff, passim.
Sertorius' position in the Cinno-Marian coalition must have deteriorated in these years. According to the normal cursus honorum Quintus could have expected to be praetor in 87, consul in 84. But Carbo and Cinna had arrogated the highest office to themselves for 85 and 84; and when Cinna died early in that year, Carbo neglected to have a suffect consul named. Sertorius never in fact did make the consulship, and we are not even certain when he held the praetorship. Carbo attempted to solve all the problems of the coalition at once. He finally cajoled the senate into redistribution of the Italians into the thirty-five voting tribes, and later passed a similar measure pertaining to the freedmen. But the Italians had by this time lost interest in the unfulfilled promises of the coalition, and when the promises were fulfilled it was too late. Carbo also attempted to pull the senate and the people together by relinquishing the consulship and having L. Cornelius Scipio, a nobilis, and C. Norbanus, a novus homo,


48 For this and much of the following cf. Badian, F.C., p. 243.
elected. But both consuls proved to be distressing nonentities militarily. Sulla landed at Brundisium in early 83, bested Norbanus, and in the process of negotiations with Scipio, almost literally stole Scipio's army out from under him. As Scipio's subordinate Sertorius had vainly urged an immediate offensive against Sulla, now he saw his judgement vindicated. But Sertorius was unsatisfied with passively following the orders of others.

Sent by Scipio to Norbanus for advice--but probably also to get the Sabine out of Scipio's hair--Sertorius tarried on the way by occupying the village of Suessa. But when the Scipionic army went over to Sulla Sertorius fled to Etruria, and collected a large new army. With this force he returned to Rome, where he probably hoped for a new commission, possibly even consular office. But

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49 This election must have assuaged the demands of the Marian factor in the combination, to which group Carbo had increasingly to cater. We have earlier remarked Scipio's Marian connections; C. Norbanus had numerous Marian connections dating as far back as 99 B.C.; cf. Badian, "Norbanus (1)," O.C.D.

50 Schulten, Sertorius, p. 38.

51 Cf. Schulten, Sertorius, p. 39, n.1. Schulten is correct in rejecting the fiction that Sulla caught Sertorius and for some reason released him. However, Schulten relies on Exsuperantius 7 for the statement that Sertorius collected forty cohorts--four legions--in Etruria. This high figure should be questioned since its source is not of the best.

52 Schulten, Sertorius, p. 39.
instead Cn. Papirius Carbo and the twenty-seven year old C. Marius, Jr., were named the consuls of 82. Sertorius complained bitterly but in vain at this illegality—Carbo hoped that the name of Marius would once again work its magic. Sertorius was sent to Spain, probably to take over both provinces (Ulterior and Citerior) from the hands of C. Valerius Flaccus, who had held these provinces in conjunction with Transalpine Gaul. Flaccus certainly needed help in such a task, but it was also clear that the coalition did not trust him. The coalition must have been concerned about Sertorius, also. But whatever the Sabine new man was, he was certainly not a pro-Sullan nor likely to become one. Sertorius took his allotted force and marched out of Italy. Thus Sertorius left Rome, never to see its walls again. The Cinno-Marian faction saw its founders gone, some of its best generals murdered, the Italians disinterested and the senate increasingly hostile. Now it had snubbed its best remaining general, and in an effort to remove the irritating Sertorius, had unwittingly provided for its eventual resurrection. The story of Sertorius now finds the Sabine soldier in the spotlight; thus began one of the more remarkable chapters in Roman and Spanish history.
CHAPTER IV

SERTORIUS' FIRST SOJOURN IN SPAIN

Spain is, for the most part, a high, dry country. Large mountain ranges cross the peninsula from east to west, connected by a great plateau. Only in the valleys cut by the major rivers and in some areas along the sea-coasts does Spain offer the combination of fertile soil and water suitable for crop-growing on a major scale. There the return in fruits, vegetables, and cereal crops is considerable, yet were it not for her mineral wealth Spain would have been almost despised by the ancients.

A mineralogical map of the Spanish peninsula indicates three principal areas of mineral deposit and exploitation. One of these areas lies in the extreme northwest of Spain; by virtue of this fact it was almost unknown to the Romans of the period and hence is not germane to this essay. A second area is located in the extreme northeast of Spain, under the shadows of the lofty Pyrenees. This

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2See Map, p. 164.
section was famous for its "Oscan Silver;" some lead, copper, gold, and iron was also extracted. Much the most important area was that which spread in a belt from the west coast to the east, from Lacobriga through the Sierra Morena range toward New Carthage. The high southern range comprehending the Sierra Nevada and Sierra de Gador mountains was a limestone uplift and mineral-poor, but the Sierra Morena range was one of the greatest mining districts in antiquity. At Cartagena alone in early Roman times the silver mines are said to have employed 10,000 workmen and yielded 25,000 drachmae a day to the state. ³ At the other end of the belt were the Rio Tinto copper mines, producing precious metal to this very day. An important Roman settlement at Rio Tinto dates from c. 100 B.C., and the exploitation furnished a school for mining engineers. ⁴ In the first centuries before and after Christ Spain was the most important metal producing area in the world. ⁵

Italian speculators rushed to the Spanish mountains in an influx somewhat reminiscent of America's own gold-fever days. Individuals and private companies hastened to set up operations, the Sierra de Cordoba region being a

⁴Davies, p. 130.
⁵Davies, p. 95.
prime area for this influx in the first century B.C.\textsuperscript{6} Although Davies believes that a veritable "boom" in Spanish mining followed hard upon the Sertorian war,\textsuperscript{7} he makes it clear that Roman interest in Hispania's mineral wealth antedated Sertorius by many years. More than minerals were exploited, however. The Spaniards themselves got little from their own mineral wealth. They may have been lucky if they escaped being impressed into service in the mines,\textsuperscript{8} perhaps the most distressing work in antiquity.

Roman-Spanish political contacts date back to the third century B.C. The Spaniards were a fierce and independent people, living in small mountain villages bound only by loose tribal federations, fond of their old religious and mystical tendencies. In these matters the Spanish demonstrated a remarkable similarity to the Sabine mountaineers of Quintus Sertorius' homeland. Roman interest in the people and land of Spain had first been merely strategic. Spain served as the ground for Carthaginian expansion after the First Punic War, then as the base from which the invasions of Hannibal and his brother Hasdrubal were launched.\textsuperscript{9} The

\textsuperscript{6}Davies, p. 125.
\textsuperscript{7}Davies, p. 131.
\textsuperscript{8}Davies, p. 116.
\textsuperscript{9}Cf. H. H. Scullard, "Hannibal," O.C.D.
activities of the brothers Cornelius Scipio--Publius and Cnaeus--were both brilliant and disastrous. It remained for Publius' son Publius Cornelius Scipio (later Africanus, still later Africanus Major) to establish a permanent Roman foothold in Spain. From then on Roman interests expanded from the south and east coasts; by Sertorius' time perhaps half of the peninsula was under the Roman aegis. Much of the west and northwest was still unpenetrated and uncivilized, and Roman control in the central region was very incomplete.

In my discussion of T. Didius' Spanish campaign I have alluded to the friction which resulted from Roman-Spanish contacts. The Spaniards did not take foreign domination amicably, while the Romans for their part misunderstood and despised the barbarians. The governors of the Spanish provinces in the second century B.C. seem to have been either very good or very bad. After the enlightened careers of the elder Cato and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus the elder, the Roman administrative record seems one of unrelieved greed, incompetence, and foolishness. Two "highlights," or more properly "low points" come into mind as representative of the situation. In 137 B.C. the Roman consul C. Hostilius Mancinus was trapped by the

10Cf. pp. 21ff.
Numantines in northeast Spain. Mancinus surrendered himself and his 20,000 men to a Spanish force that numbered between 4000 and 8000 men. Little wonder that Schulten calls this capitulation "perhaps the bitterest disgrace in the whole of Roman military history."¹¹ Three years later the great Scipio Aemilianus, the junior Africanus, ended the last Celtiberian war. Scipio with 60,000 troops captured the citadel of Numantia, held by 4,000 men—by blockade and starvation. Scipio, a sound judge of men, gauged his forces too demoralized to take by assault a bastion garrisoned by a force one-fifteenth his size.¹² Little wonder that one commentator has declared of Spain, "the chief item exported between 200-133 was [military] experience."¹³

To this theater, with the stage thus set, came Quintus Sertorius in the winter of 83/2. It was an inglorious entrance. In the mountains Sertorius' force was battered by storms, and the Sabine general had to bribe the locals to secure passage through the Col du Perthus,


¹²Cf. Schulten, "Roman Cruelty," p. 64.

the best path through the Pyrenees. Immediately upon his arrival in Hispania Citerior Sertorius set about winning the minds and hearts of the natives and their chiefs, by remitting taxes and making his soldiers winter outside the cities. Quintus employed the Romans resident in Spain as militia and prepared for the inevitable assault; for on November 1-2, 82 B.C., the Battle of the Colline Gate took place, and Sulla was in control of Rome. The Cinno-Marians had disintegrated and were fleeing to all parts of the Mediterranean--Sicily, Africa, and Asia--to escape Sullan retribution. For after a period of indiscriminate slaughter a certain Fufidius had suggested to Sulla that the butchery be more systematically organized. Sulla agreed, a growing list of the proscribed was initiated, and on the first installment of the list was the name of Quintus Sertorius.

14 Plutarch, Sertorius, 6.3; cf. Gardner, p. 320. Several modern scholars have wondered why on his journey to Spain Sertorius experienced no difficulties from C. Valerius Flaccus, the disaffected Cinno-Marian governor of Transalpine Gaul. It may be that Flaccus did not feel strong enough to challenge the capable Sabine. It may also be that, with the outcome of the Civil War still in doubt, Flaccus did not want to commit himself overtly to Sulla. If Flaccus had compromised himself thus and had Sulla been beaten or died, things would have indeed proved embarrassing for Flaccus, who then would have been surrounded by hostile forces.

15 Plutarch, Sertorius, 6.4. Sertorius remembered well his experience at Castulo.
If the members of Sertorius' own party had underestimated him, Sulla was going to take no chances. Early in 81 the Dictator sent C. Annius Luscus at the head of two legions to contest with Sertorius for control of the Spanish peninsula. Along with Annius came C. Valerius Flaccus, the former Cinno-Marian. His province was to be Citerior Spain; Annius was to govern Ulterior.\(^\text{16}\) To counter this invasion Sertorius stationed L. Julius\(^\text{17}\) Salinator with a strong (6,000 man) force "to bar the passage of the Pyrenees."\(^\text{18}\) This "passage" (singular) must refer to the Col du Perthus. According to Plutarch, when Annius reached the pass and found it guarded by Sertorians, the Sullan general stopped, shrugged his shoulders in bafflement, and encamped at the foot of the mountains for lack of something better to do.\(^\text{19}\) Then through the very opportune coincidence that a certain P. Calpurnius Lanarius\(^\text{20}\) killed his senior officer Salinator, the Sertorians relaxed their guard.


\(^\text{17}\)Perhaps "Livius;" cf. M.R.R. II, p. 79, n.5.

\(^\text{18}\)Plutarch, Sertorius, 7.1.

\(^\text{19}\)Plutarch, Sertorius, 7.1.

Annius pushed through the pass, brushed aside the remnants of Salinator's force, and drove south along the coast.\textsuperscript{21} Annius seems to have been quite well-prepared for his breakthrough; we may rest assured that the crafty Sullan officer had not been as idle as Plutarch seemingly thinks.

Sertorius was not strong enough to face Annius' army, which may have been enlarged by the addition of some of Salinator's soldiers. Nothing could be done but to leave as quickly as possible; Quintus therefore embarked 3,000 men from New Carthage "à la recherche d'une place de sûreté contre la vengeance des Sullaniens."\textsuperscript{22} Thus began a brief and romantic odyssey for Quintus Sertorius, but in the end his quest would prove futile: there was no place to hide.

\textsuperscript{21}Plutarch, \textit{Sertorius}, 7.2.

\textsuperscript{22}Carcopino, p. 501.
CHAPTER V

SERTORIUS: THE FUGITIVE AND THE KING OF TANGIER

The first port of call for Sertorius and his followers was Mauretania, just across the narrows of the Iberic Sea. However, when the beleaguered Romans landed and sent parties to look for water, they were attacked by Mauri bands and forced to take to the sea again. The Sertorian fleet sailed back to the Spanish coast, probably to the Andalusian shore opposite Mauretania,¹ but was repulsed again. There seemed nowhere else to go. It was at this time that Sertorius first came into contact with the Cilician Pirates. Quintus was obviously in a desperate situation, so he struck a bargain with the pirates, in conjunction with whom he attacked and took the island of Pityussa.² Soon Annius arrived upon the scene with a 5,000 man force. Sertorius wanted to engage in a naval battle, but a storm came up and the Sertorian fleet was scattered. After ten days, according to Plutarch,³ the winds subsided, and Sertorius was able to land his few remaining ships on some barren islands. Having failed in his attempts to go south, north, and east,

¹Schulten, Sertorius, p. 47.
²Plutarch, Sertorius, 7.3.
³Plutarch, Sertorius, 7.4; 8.1. Such a storm would have been worthy of the Odyssey itself.
Sertorius now headed toward the Hesperides, passed through the Pillars of Hercules, and sailed along the Spanish coast bordering the Outer Sea. Finally, between the mouths of the Baetis and Tinto rivers, Sertorius landed without opposition.

A word on Sertorius' new benefactors may here be in order. Piracy had been one of the earliest professions and often an honorable one, but by the early first century B.C. it had also become big business. The largest pirate group had its headquarters in the rocky inlets of Cilicia. The Cilician Pirates literally controlled the seas. Their vessels, said to number over 1,000, were gaudily attired in silver, gold, and purple. As a result of Mithradates' first war with the Romans the Cilician Pirates had acquired organization. The Cilicians now had ports and squadrons located throughout the Mediterranean, an enviable system of communications, and ties with the other roving pirate bands.

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6 Ormerod, p. 222. Ormerod adds (n.4 to p. 222) "This detail . . . serves to distinguish the disciplined Cilician corsair from the dirty Aegean pirate of the ordinary type."
Money, ships and men could be sent from one area to another as required, and the professional brigands outmatched Roman sailors in experience, as their light ships surpassed Roman vessels in speed. Even winter did not stop the pirate ships from sailing. The Cilicians had early developed a cunning technique for gathering intelligence:

By fraternising with and eavesdropping on the crews of merchantmen which utilized the harbours, they would find out their destination and cargo. The pirate vessels would then be warned to rendezvous at sea and attack the merchantmen after they had left port.

Small wonder, then, that pirate activity reached its highest point shortly before 70 B.C. The Cilician Pirate-Sertorius agreement now and later must have resulted from pirate confidence in their own capability to withstand any Roman naval operation. This agreement may also have resulted in the breathtaking success Pompey the Great enjoyed when he undertook the Pirate War in 67. Nothing counts in war like experience, and Pompey proved, in this as in other cases, a very rapid learner.

Sertorius, possibly through the medium of his new pirate friends, came in contact with a group of sailors

7 Ormerod, pp. 222f.
8 Ormerod, pp. 205-6, mentioning Strabo 14.644 as the source, and Alciphron 1.8 for comparison.
9 Casson, p. 203.
just returned from the "atlantic Islands," called the "Islands of the Blest." Plutarch gives us a lyrical and idyllic description of the places described by the mariners, places which may have existed more in the minds of a few boastful mariners than in their experience.  "When Sertorius heard this tale, he was seized with an amazing desire to dwell in the islands and live in quiet, freed from tyranny and wars that would never end." But the more prosaic pirates had better things to do than to search for a fairy tale, so they abandoned Sertorius to his reverie and headed for Mauretania. A certain Ascalis, the son of Iphtha,

10 Plutarch, Sertorius, 8.2-3. Cf. note 1 to 8.2 in the Loeb edition. Scholars have expended much futile effort while attempting to attach a name to the islands which Plutarch describes. The translator comments that "features of the Canary Islands have doubtless crept into the description," which seems to this author an utterly fabulous story. It could have been compounded out of equal parts geography, experience, braggadocio, and wine, a recipe characteristic of mariners' tales to this day.

11 Plutarch, Sertorius, 9.1.

was seeking restoration to the throne "of Marusia"—more properly the area around Tangier. Sertorius left his dream and sailed to Mauretania too, but in order to fight against Ascalis and the pirates. Perhaps Sertorius was irked at his abandonment by his former pirate friends. Some men are never at a loss for words; Sertorius at least was never wanting in action.

Sertorius soon joined the Mauri who were working against Ascalis, then defeated the ex-king and besieged him in Tangier. Now upon the scene came Paccianus, a Roman general sent by Sulla from Africa, to finish off Sertorius and put a native king in the Dictator's debt. Instead, Sertorius defeated and killed Paccianus in battle, enlisted the so-called "Sullan" troops in his own army, and took Tangier, King Ascalis and all.

Sertorius, then, having made himself master of the whole country, did no wrong to those who were his suppliants and put their trust

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14 I have had cause earlier (see p. 34 with n.14) to remark the questionable loyalty of the common soldier in the last century B.C. It may be interesting to note that this parallels, though on a different scale, the changeable loyalties of some of the most important men at Rome. The difference between the treachery of a M. Aemilius Lepidus in abandoning the sinking Marian cause, and a former "Sullan" soldier joining Sertorius, is perhaps to be gauged more in quantitative than in qualitative terms.
in him, but restored to them both property and cities and government, receiving only what was right and fair in free gifts from them.\(^\text{15}\)

Some historians have assumed from Plutarch 9.5 and from Sertorius' apparently rapid exit from Africa to answer the Lusitanian call, that Sertorius despised the territory he held and the people he ruled.\(^\text{16}\) This is an unwarranted conjecture. Serterious realized—and he did not need Paccianus' expedition to force himself to this conclusion—that he was not safe from Sulla as long as both he and the Dictator lived. If Sertorius were not to be allowed peace, then he must be strong for war. The Tangier area was mineral-poor in every metal but lead,\(^\text{17}\) and no one

\(^{15}\)Plutarch, Sertorius, 9.5. Plutarch digresses attractively (Sertorius, 9.3-5) on Sertorius' visit to the tomb of Antaeus. The Chaeronean biographer adds a bit of local history and an anecdote which could not have come from Sallust, as Plutarch thinks it was conjured up by Tangier's inhabitants to please the historically-minded King Juba (ruled Mauretania 25 B.C.-c. 23 A.D.); cf. Arnaldo Momigliano and Theodore John Cadoux (?-the latter's initials appear to have been misprinted), "Juba (2) II," in O.C.D. Schulten, Sertorius, p. 53, places the tomb of Antaeus at Lixus, 80 km south of Tangier. Some scholars have identified the Antaean tomb with a large pre-Roman circular tomb at M'Zora, between Tangier and Lixus; cf. Michel Ponsich, "Contribution a l' Atlas archéologique du Maroc: Region de Lixus," Bulletin D'Archeologie Marocaine, Tome VI (Rabat: Division des Monuments Historiques et des Antiquités du Maroc, 1966), pp. 414ff. The remains of the cromlech are 54 m in diameter and 6 m high; one could rather easily believe that a giant was there entombed.

\(^{16}\)Carcopino, p. 502.

has ever seriously urged the superiority of lead weapons over those of iron, nor lead coinage as being preferable to sliver or gold. Furthermore, there were other native tribes, and possibly a Mauri "overking" as well, who would not take kindly to a Roman beachhead in Mauretania. It is very likely that Sertorius' eyes had turned across the Gibraltar strait toward Spain, its fierce tribes, iron and precious metals, and wheat-rich coasts, some time before the Lusitanians called him to lead them in a revolt. Spain thus abounded in the materials necessary for waging war. But if all the passages about Sertorius' desire for peace and rest be true, the kingdom of Tangier, had Sertorius been undisturbed in his rule, would have pleased the Sabine. Necessity and advantage, not mere distaste and a restless spirit, were the causes this time of another, and the final, Sertorian adventure.
CHAPTER VI

THE LUSITANIAN CALL

As he [Sertorius] was deliberating whither to turn his efforts next, the Lusitanians sent ambassadors and invited him to be their leader.¹

The Lusitani had always been a thorn in Rome's imperialistic side. Although they

waren im Jahre 137 v Chr. nach langen Kämpfen von Decimus Brutus unterworfen worden, hatten aber in diesen 50 Jahren noch nicht die romische Heerschaft zu tragen gelernt.²

The Lusitani had "jolted the Roman yoke" at least three times since 137³ and were prepared to do so once again. But there was need of "a commander of great reputation and experience,"⁴ a second Viriathus, a Hannibal reincarnate, if the Lusitani were going to challenge Roman arms. From what the Lusitani had heard, Sertorius seemed to be the perfect candidate. Plutarch dwells at length upon these martial characteristics of Sertorius: his courage and moderation, his tactical excellence and cunning, his

¹Plutarch, Sertorius, 10.1.
²Schulten, Sertorius, p. 53.
⁴Plutarch, Sertorius, 10.1.
generosity and leniency in punishment. It is possible that the biographer is echoing a digression of Sallust, placed at this point in the narrative to depict the Sertorian "hero" before considering the "outwitted Metellus" and the rash, treacherous Pompeius Magnus. But it is clear that Sertorius' character comprehended all these qualities, though perhaps not in so great a measure as our sources here indicate. These must have been the considerations which moved the Lusitani to seek his leadership.

Sertorius, however, received another missive at the time of the Lusitanian embassy. Quintus' mother Rhea had died, and for seven days and nights Sertorius shut himself in his tent, allowing no one entrance. Sertorius' grief was of epic proportions, yet almost as surprising was the rapidity with which he moved once his period of mourning was ended. Quintus emerged from his tent and announced his

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5Plutarch, Sertorius, 10.2-3. Plutarch must in all conscience add that Sertorius' mildness seemed to change when his fortune failed. This affords Plutarch the opportunity for a digression on possible character changes and true virtue. Plutarch does not quite solve the problem of real or imagined character change, but he comes rather close to a solution, for an ancient writer. It is at least clear that Plutarch finds the question fascinating (it was, after all, a matter germane to biography), and that the man from Chaeronea is thoroughly enjoying himself.

6Cf. Plutarch, Sertorius, 12.5.

7Schulten, Sertorius, p. 54 notes Sertorius' similarity to Odysseus in this regard.
acceptance of the Lusitanian call. Quickly Sertorius set sail with 2600 Romans (remnants of his former force and the additions from Paccianus' soldiers) and 700 Mauri who had sworn allegiance to him wherever he went. A Roman squadron under the propraetor Aurelius Cotta was patrolling the Straits; Sertorius attacked and defeated it. Quintus Sertorius set foot once again in Spain near Baelo (Bolonia, 15 km west of Tarifa). Another general would use this same landing site almost 800 years in the future, and leave his name for posterity as the name of the Strait he crossed.

Sertorius soon met with an advance Lusitanian force, numbering 4000 targeteers and 700 horse. A small army,

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9 M.R.R. II, p. 80. Either Caius or Marcus is the praenomen.

10 Cf. Schulten, *Fontes*, p. 170: "El fragmento de Salustio [1.104] dice que Sertorio buscó evitar el combate por mar, pero por Plutarco vemos que no logró pasar desapercibido y que venció a Cotta." If Sertorius in fact had wanted for once to avoid coming to grips with the enemy, the Straits of Gibraltar was not the best place to avoid detection.


12 Plutarch, *Sertorius*, 12.2. Cf. Gardner, p. 320. Gardner states that "By the end of the year (80) he [Sertorius] had raised his forces to 8000." If Sertorius had any success at all in recruiting the locals for his forces, he should have had considerably in excess of 8000 men; for he had brought over 3300 men from Mauretania, to be joined almost immediately by an army of 4700 Lusitanians.
this, but one which afforded numerous possibilities to a general contemplating guerilla warfare, in which speed and mobility were of the essence. According to guerilla tactics, open-field infantry battles are to be avoided, and for most of the coming years Sertorius would follow that practice; his debt to Viriathus was great. 13 In the instances where Sertorius did employ conventional warfare, he usually threw in a few new "wrinkles" as well—for example, the ambushing of a forage party—but seldom did Sertorius win a decisive battle using strictly conventional tactics. And when his subordinates spurned the native mode of fighting and opted for the old Roman methods, they were usually beaten by commanders more intelligent and experienced in conventional warfare.

Sertorius marched west from Baelo, and in an engagement on the banks of the river Baetis worsted the Sullan propraetor and governor of Further Spain, Fufidius. 14 Two

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14 The praenomen of this Fufidius may be "Lucius;" cf. Mommsen, p. 283. However, it is not certain; cf. M.R.R. II, pp. 81, 83. This Fufidius may be the one who was responsible for Sulla's proscription lists. The story is that after the slaughter at the Colline Gate, Sulla began a reign of indiscriminate butchery. Listing the names of the condemned began after Fufidius observed that "some men ought to be allowed to live in order that Sulla might have someone to whom to give orders" (Florus, 2.8.25, trans. Forster).
thousand of Fufidius' soldiers fell, and Sertorius passed through Baetica and into Lusitania. "Das Glück der Verbannten war wieder im Steigen."15

15Schulten, Sertorius, p. 56.
CHAPTER VII

SERTORIUS VERSUS METELLUS

Sulla had always shown a lively appreciation for the capabilities of Quintus Sertorius. When the Dictator learned of Cotta's defeat and Fufidius' debacle on the Baetis, the aging autocrat sent Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius in 79 to Spain as proconsul of Hispania Ulterior. Metellus was a prominent member of one of the most important gentes at Rome, one on which Sulla hoped to build a lasting foundation for the new Roman Republic. But Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius was more than the mere scion of a powerful family and possessor of an euphonious name. Metellus Pius was "the greatest Roman of the time and held in highest repute," according to Plutarch.¹ Experienced in war, Metellus had played a sensible if unheroic role in the events of 87 B.C., then had made himself helpful to Sulla upon the latter's return from the east in 83. Sulla had made him his own consular colleague for the year 80.

¹Plutarch, Sertorius, 12.4; cf. Schulten, Sertorius, p. 63. Schulten says of Pius: "Metellus zeigt strategische Umsicht, taktisches Geschick und persönliche Tapferkeit."
Metellus came to Spain with several preconceived schemes in his mind to quash the Sabine upstart. After succeeding the embarrassed and incompetent Fufidius, Metellus set into motion a plan which, if properly carried out, could have nipped the Sertorian revolt in the bud. The idea was to catch the Sertorians between the coordinated forces of Metellus and the proconsular commander of Hither Spain, M. Domitius Calvinus. The plan failed miserably.

There were two possible interior routes towards Lusitania open to Calvinus—the valleys of the Tagus and of the Guadiana (Anas) rivers. In anticipation of the proconsul Calvinus, Sertorius sent his quaestor and best subordinate Lucius Hirtuleius to the area. Hirtuleius occupied Consabura (modern Consuegra), and waited. Calvinus soon appeared, making his way along the upper Guadiana, a few miles to the south of Consabura. Though his approximately 5000 man force was outnumbered perhaps six to one, Hirtuleius attacked. The Sertorian quaestor must have used ambush tactics and light-armed soldiers to achieve his desired effect. We can imagine the consternation and terror which seized the ranks of Calvinus' heavy-armed force, as suddenly the mountains

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3 Schulten, Sertorius, p. 64.
above erupted with javelin-throwing barbarians. Calvinus' army was vanquished, the proconsul himself numbered among the dead.

Sertorius had been keeping Metellus occupied in Lusitania all this time, but could not keep his adversary from despatching a relief force under Lucius Thorius Balbus to the remnants of Calvinus' army. Thorius set out from Baetica, marched his columns up the Baetis (Guadalquivir) river, then left the river for the Castulo-Toledo (Toletum) road. When Thorius reached the Guadiana river by this means, he was met by Sertorius himself. Thorius was killed, his

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4This is certainly the only manner in which a force so outmanned as Hirtuleius' was could have beaten a Roman army. Calvinus' unit must have been composed mainly of heavily-armed men; in an open plain such a force would have been invincible to Hirtuleius' force, light-armed or not. But Hirtuleius caught Calvinus in the mountains while Sertorius, no doubt employing heavily-armed troops, was holding Metellus' similarly accoutered force. On uneven ground the light-armed soldier was clearly superior to the hoplite. A targeteer could rush down from a height, discharge his javelin, and scurry back up the hill before his adversary, weighed down as he was with close to 80 pounds of baggage, weapons, and armor, could reach the light-armed man. And if the spears of the Roman soldiers weighed the eleven pounds that some authorities think possible, the difference in height between the forces would have made the pila of Calvinus' men almost useless; cf. Harry Pratt Judson, Caesar's Army. A Study of the Military Art of the Romans in the Last Days of the Republic (New York: Biblo and Tannen, n.d.), pp. 34f. Note, also, Plutarch's comment on the helplessness of Metellus' heavy armed forces against light-armed troops operating upon uneven ground; Sertorius, 12.5.
army beaten.\(^5\) Hispania Citerior was weakened: Sertorius sent Hirtuleius against this province, himself returning to confront Metellus. It is possible that the year 79 ended thus: Hirtuleius operating towards the northeast possibly along the Consabura-Segontia-Bilibilis route, Metellus setting up headquarters in the Baetis or Guadiana valleys, and Sertorius hovering nearby. Sertorius had met his first severe test and had come through admirably: he had destroyed two armies, mauled a third, outwitted Metellus, and begun to alarm Rome. But bigger trials were yet to come.

Metellus developed a new plan of attack, and probably by the end of the year 79 the Sullan general sought to put it into effect. The plan was a variation of one Metellus had seen his father develop against Jugurtha, and entailed the occupation and garrison of key towns in an effort to reduce the hiding-places of his guerilla adversary. The plan would probably have succeeded, save for the same weakness which had plagued Metellus Numidianus: there were not enough soldiers available for both garrison duty and the field force.\(^6\) But in early 78 Metellus expected the arrival

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\(^5\)Schulten, Sertorius, p. 65. For the name L. Thorius Balbus, cf. Schulten, Fontes, p. 177, and M.R.R. II, p. 84.

\(^6\)In essence, Marius succeeded in the Jugurthan War essentially by using Metellus' tactics with the greater forces he had enrolled; cf. Carney, p. 29, and F. E. Adcock, The Roman Art of War Under the Republic. Martin Classical Lectures, Vol. VII (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, Ltd., 1960), p. 110. As a result Marius appropriated all the credit for the victory. Similarly, the Sertorian War would be won with Metellan
of a force three legions strong under L. Manlius, the Patrician proconsul of Transalpine Gaul. There was thus every reason to expect that the tide of war would soon turn in Metellus' favor.

With the energy characteristic of a once-frustrated man who has conceived a new plan, Metellus set about occupying and fortifying strategic towns. First Metellinum on the course of the Guadiana was secured. Next Metellus pushed north to occupy Castra Caecilia, between the Tagus River and Metellinum; then Metellus crossed the Tagus and fortified a spot in the Guadarrama mountains (Caecilius Vicus). The energetic general probably retraced his steps back to Metellinum and wintered there.7

In early 78 Metellus set out again, this time to the west. From Metellinum to Turmuli on the Tagus, then down the Tagus itself Metellus marched. Sertorius must have dogged Metellus' steps, but dared not to face the latter in open combat. Metellus reached Olisipo (Lisbon), laid siege to the city, and captured it. Overjoyed at this success, Metellus next marched along the coast toward Lacobriga (Lagobriga, Lagos), fortifying another spot along the way (Caeciliana). The overconfident Metellus felt that tactics made good by the addition of Pompey's troops, and for this Pompey would claim most of the laurels.

7Schulten, Sertorius, p. 71. On this and the following, cf. my map, p. 163.
the war's end was near. Little did he realize that Sertorius was merely biding his time.

In the meantime the proconsul Lucius Manlius led his three legions southwest, probably along the road from Narbo to Ilerda. Hirtuleius was in the vicinity awaiting Manlius' arrival, and probably swooped down upon the latter between Ilerda and Saragossa.\(^8\) Manlius was utterly defeated, barely escaped to Ilerda, hurriedly vacated that city, and fled back to Transalpine Gaul. Manlius' bad fortune had not yet left him, for no sooner had the proconsul crossed the Pyrenees than he was attacked by some Aquitanians.\(^9\) Lucius Manlius regained Narbo with the loss of much of his dignity, most of his men, and all of his baggage.

We do not know when news of Manlius' defeat reached Metellus, who was besieging Lacobriga on the extreme southwest corner of the Spanish peninsula. Metellus was suffering frustration enough from his own operation. The Sullan proconsul had expected to take this waterless town in two days, and had therefore provisioned his men for only a five-day period.\(^10\) But Sertorius outwitted Metellus' best-laid

\(^{8}\text{See map, p. 163.}\)

\(^{9}\text{Cf. Mommsen, pp. 283f.}\)

\(^{10}\text{Plutarch, Sertorius, 13.4. Sometimes soldiers carried "as many as 17 days' rations, amounting to 28 lbs."}\)
plans by ferrying in 2000 water-filled skins, and ferrying out all the Lagobritae who were not needed for defending the city. This was effected by Mauri and Iberian volunteers, who used a roundabout route through the mountains. Once again Sertorius benefitted from his native followers' better knowledge of the country, and from his enemy's lack of proper reconnaissance.

Metellus soon learned of Sertorius' trick—it was over five days now since the siege had begun, and the Lagobritae did not even seem thirsty. However, Metellus' men were more than a little hungry, so the senator despatched a full legion (6000 man) force under a certain Aquinus for the purpose of grain-collecting. Sertorius perceived what was happening and set a 3000 man squad in ambush along the road which the Metellan legate had taken. When Aquinus returned, Sertorius led a frontal assault on the surprised officer, while the ambush force hit the forage legion in the rear. Aquinus' force was demolished, some men surrendering to Sertorius' followers, and the humiliated legate escaped to Metellus without his horse, his armor, and most of his legion. Metellus gave up the siege rather than himself be besieged, and withdrew his forces to the line of the Baetis river. Metellus' grand plan of action had

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11 And certainly without the grain, as baggage is the first thing to be discarded in flight.

12 Gardner, p. 321.
failed, the only result being the sprouting up of place names taken from his own. Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius, member of a family covered in military glory and considered no mean general himself, remained inactive, possibly at Corduba, for all of the year 77, a frustrated and defeated man.

But Sertorius was not for copying Metellus' inertia. The Sabine commander shifted his position from the extreme south west of Spain to its opposite end. In the process Sertorius met his quaestor Hirtuleius, whom Sertorius then despatched to continue operations in Lusitania. Quintus must have followed the Metellinum-Toletum-Segontia road towards the Ebro region, for on this journey he overcame the cave-dwellers of Caraca, then took Contrebia after a six week blockade.

The capture of the Caracitani was especially noteworthy, for it was accomplished by means of a trick that leaves Plutarch and moderns in admiration. The Caracitani holed up in caves on the north side of a mountain whenever danger threatened; and as long as their supplies held out, there was no way to dislodge the barbarians. Noticing the ashy soil in the vicinity of this hill and the strong north wind which blew during the day, Sertorius had a great mound of the loose soil constructed. The Caracitani, thinking

\[13\] Plutarch devotes all of one chapter (Sertorius, 17) to this siege.
this some kind of a siege work, laughed at the Sertorians' labors. But the next day when the wind came up and Sertorius' men stirred up the soil in this mound, a great choking cloud of the ashy stuff blew directly into the faces of the troglodytes. After three days of this the Caracitani surrendered, and Sertorius marched on. The Sertorian legend had grown a little more.

Meanwhile important things had been happening at Rome. Sulla had died and the patrician consul of 78, M. Aemilius Lepidus, had picked the next year to revolt against the senate. Lepidus' march on Rome was checked by Catulus; Marcus' second-in-command, Marcus Iunius Brutus, was besieged at Mutina by Pompeius Magnus; and Lepidus' attempt to take Sardinia was foiled. Lepidus died (of sickness, apparently) soon after, and Brutus was treacherously slain by Pompey after surrendering upon conditions.\(^{14}\) The remnants of Lepidus' army, still a considerable force (perhaps 20,000 men and a large amount of money), escaped under M. Perperna to Spain.

We have heard such names as Lepidus, Brutus, and Perperna before--they were all former Marians. Lepidus himself had been the most lukewarm Marian and therefore the least compromised when Sulla proved to be Felix. As a result

\[^{14}\text{Cf. M.R.R. II, p. 90.}\]
Lepidus had even won in the consular elections for 78, whether or not the still-living Sulla had approved. M. Iunius Brutus was not identical with the homonymous praetor of 88; this Marcus had, however, been a tribune in 83.\textsuperscript{15} Somehow Brutus survived the Sullan proscriptions. Perhaps Brutus fled to Spain or was too small fish to fry; possibly he was saved through the representations of other, uncompromised, Iunii Bruti, one of whom lived to be consul in 77.\textsuperscript{16} Marcus Perperna Veiento was the son of the M. Perperna who had held the consulship in 92 and the censorship in 86; his grandfather (cos.130) had captured Aristonicus.\textsuperscript{17} Himself praetor in 82, Veiento had refused to cross over to the Sullans, but had been forced to abandon his province of Sicily to Pompey. What had happened to Perperna between that time and Lepidus' revolt is unknown.\textsuperscript{18} He was, however, the most compromised of these three Lepidans in the eyes of the Sullan system.

\textsuperscript{15}He is also noteworthy as the father of the tyrannicide of the same name; cf. G. W. Richardson and T. J. Cadoux, "Brutus (5)," O.C.D.

\textsuperscript{16}Cf. G. W. Richardson and T. J. Cadoux, "Brutus (6)," O.C.D.; also Badian, F.C., p. 276. Badian thinks Brutus may have hidden in Cisalpine Gaul from Sulla's wrath.

\textsuperscript{17}M. Perperna Veiento rather than Vento; cf. M.R.R. II, Supplement, p. 46. For the Perpernae cf. p. 58 and genealogical chart p. 159; also Badian, "Pererna (1), (2), (3)" in O.C.D. "Perperna" is to be preferred over "Perpenna."

\textsuperscript{18}For a discussion of the problems concerning Perperna's fate see Badian, F.C., p. 270, n.3.
In light of these facts, it may be possible to suggest reasons for Sertorius' trans-Hispanic trek which are more compelling than the securing of better relations with the Ebro valley tribal chiefs and the establishment of a school at Osca. As Badian once opined about another problem, we may feel that "conjecture is legitimate and inevitable, particularly when our evidence is so poor."\textsuperscript{19} It seems probable that Lepidus and Sertorius were in contact during part of 78 and 77. Common interests so dictated: both were hostile to the existing government at Rome, and had had contacts long before as members of the same anti-Sullan coalition. It was clear to all parties that a crisis would come in early 77, when the senate would demand that Lepidus take leave of his army in Etruria, and go to his province of Transalpine Gaul. Sertorius and Lepidus could have reached an agreement in 78 that, when the senatorial ultimatum came, Lepidus was indeed to exit Etruria for Transalpine Gaul, but still at the head of his army.\textsuperscript{20} There he would link up with Sertorius, and the two

\textsuperscript{19} Badian, "Notes," p. 77.

\textsuperscript{20} Lepidus' fortune at receiving Transalpine Gaul thus seems too good to be chance. Although Appian (B.C. I, 107) says the province was given Lepidus by lot, the Greek historian may be conjecturing from what he knew to be the normal procedure of assigning provinces. Note Badian's interesting comment in F.C., p. 275: "In 78 Lepidus had secured for himself the province of Gaul, probably both Transalpina and Cisalpina."
would then march upon Rome. Toward fulfillment of this plan Sertorius left south western Spain in early 77 for Gaul, sending Hirtuleius to Lusitania. This latter move insured that Metellus would not follow the Sabine general, for Hirtuleius would then have the option of "mopping up" a weakened Baetica or of following Metellus and ambushing the latter. There was the further possibility, if events should turn out thus, of catching an advancing Metellus between Sertorius' and Hirtuleius' armies.

But Fortune stopped smiling, for a time, on Quintus Sertorius. Lepidus kept himself at the head of his army when the senate ordered him to relinquish his command. But Lepidus drove south from Etruria, rather than north: apparently he believed that speed and surprise could better achieve his plans than leaguing with the Sabine general. Lepidans success would then obviate the need for paying off Sertorius for his service. Consequently Lepidus made a dash for Rome. The rest is history.

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21 Note that the land route which Metellus would have taken from Baetica to the north east does not pick up the coast until Valentia or Saguntum. A march through the mountainous interior would place Metellus in the grave danger of an ambush by men using guerilla tactics such as those which had destroyed the armies of M. Domitius Calvinus and Lucius Thorius Balbus.

22 A Lepidan-Sertorian combination has to my knowledge never been seriously proposed. Badian suggests that Lepidus may have contemplated such a move; F.C., pp. 275f. It is interesting to note that when in late 77 the command against Sertorius was being promoted, the consuls of the year declined
Frustrated in his plans by Lepidus' maneuvering and failure, Sertorius resolved to consolidate his position in the Ebro region. After taking Caraca and Contrebia Sertorius headed towards the Ebro itself. Wintering on the Ebro, Quintus ordered the manufacture of new weapons for his men. At Osca Sertorius set up headquarters and established a school for the sons of native chiefs, where the young barbarians learned Greek and Roman letters and walked around in purple-bordered togas feeling very Roman. This promoted Romanization under the form "Sertorianization," and was intended to create a following which could step into administrative tasks. It also, as Plutarch has noted, created a supply of very high-placed hostages.

the honor. Although the pro-Pompeian consular L. Marcius Philippus pretended that the consuls acted thus out of fear, it is clear that D. Iunius Brutus and Mam. Aemilius Lepidus Livianus may indeed have had other reasons, as well; cf. Badian, F.C., p. 277, n.6.

According to my reconstruction, Sertorius would have received the news of Lepidus' change in plans while the Sabine was on the march in central Spain.

For the story of Sertorius' capture of Contrebia after a 44 day siege see Livy 91, frg. 22.

Livy 91, frg. 22.

Plutarch, Sertorius, 14.2-3.

Plutarch, Sertorius, 14.2.
Near the end of the year 77 an eventful meeting took place near the confluence of the Ebro and Jalon (Salo) rivers. M. Perperna Veiento, who had led the remaining Lepidan forces from Sardinia to Spain in order to fight Metellus,²⁸ had been forced by his soldiers to join himself to the Sertorian cause. The precipitating cause of this action was said to be Pompey's approach,²⁹ but Perperna's soldiers had long been talking about Sertorius, owing no doubt to their common situation and probably also to the plan which Lepidus had earlier concluded with the Sabine general. Perperna, "who was puffed up over his high birth and his wealth,"³⁰ as well as over differences inherited from the Cinno-Marian coalition, was annoyed at the prospect of joining Sertorius and even more at the idea of serving under him. Thus, when Sertorius on that late summer day received 53 Roman cohorts and a large fund of money, he also received his future assassin.

²⁸Plutarch, Sertorius, 15.1.
²⁹Plutarch, Sertorius, 15.2.
³⁰Plutarch, Sertorius, 15.1.
CHAPTER VIII

THE BASES OF SERTORIAN POWER

With the arrival of Perperna and the advent of Pompey, the life of Quintus Sertorius takes a new and decisive turn. Before relating the events in these five last years of Sertorius' life it will be helpful to digress, in the tradition of Plutarch, for the consideration of several pertinent questions. The relationships, certain and possible, which we shall here note will be of great importance in understanding the last campaigns of our subject.

Was Quintus Sertorius a rebel, or a patriot? A fuller consideration of this question must await the end of the essay, but I state it now because of the implications it has concerning Sertorius' relationship to the Spaniards he led, and to those at Rome who despised Pompey and/or the Sullan system. Sertorius never claimed to be a rebel against Rome. He always expressed the belief that he was acting as proconsul of the Roman People, and held out to his Roman followers in Spain the hope of eventually

\[\text{Badian}, \text{F.C.}, \text{p. 266, n.7.}\]
returning to the Eternal City. This group of Romans formed the basis for Sertorius' 300-man Roman "senate," which is only an evolutionary extension of the form taken by those men who had fled to Sulla in the east in the years 87-83. This consideration of Sertorius' "senators" leads us into the wider panorama of Sertorian friends and enemies throughout much of the Mediterranean world. In the end, such a consideration of Quintus Sertorius' friends cannot prove him a Roman "patriot" or a Roman "traitor," but it can show the sources of aid upon which Sertorius based his dreams.

We can quickly dispense with the question of Sertorius' enemies. The senate which Sulla had created was filled with men appointed at the Dictator's wishes, and many of these adlected senators must have seen in Sertorius a threat to the new status quo. Some of these senators were still equites at heart, and many of their equestrian friends not in the senate must also have felt dedicated to maintaining the system.

The myth of Sulla's hatred for the equites has often been exposed: he did nothing to diminish their business opportunities and promoted a large number of their leaders to the senate.²

With their political power gone and their business interests far closer to those of the senate than ever before, many equites must have regarded Sertorius as an intolerable nuisance. There must have been many equestrians in Spain (we have the example of one\(^3\)) who, whether bound by ties of clientage to gentes such as the Licinii, or because of their own business interests, proved to be enemies of Sertorius. So, too, with the Roman plebs. Though it might chafe at the restraints put upon the tribunate, the people of Rome had never shown much enthusiasm for the Cinno-Marians and could be expected to hold true to form now. Many of the Italians also proved apathetic. The Cinnans had certainly been ineffective in fulfilling Cinna's pledges to them, and while the Samnites might reflect bitterly on what Sulla had done to them, the Picentines of Pompeius Magnus and the veterans of the dead Sulla could be used as a counterbalance. All in all, most residents of Rome and Italy probably would not care for another spasm of civil war, and there were certain powerful groups who stood to lose much in such an eventuality.

Yet we must not overlook the fact that Sulla himself had not been able to claim much enthusiastic support in Italy during 83–82. It was the general apathy of the people,

\(^3\)A. J. N. Wilson, Emigration from Italy in the Republican Age of Rome (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1966), pp. 30f.
rather than their support for Sulla, which had clinched the victory for Sulla the Fortunate. And the surprising fact is that we can delineate some groups within the very categories discussed above, who must have been pro-Sertorius. We shall consider these groups under the headings "Spain," "Asia," "Italy," and "The Senate."

Spain—Chief among Sertorius' possible supporters in Spain are the former Marians. One of the most important Roman families in Spain was the Marii themselves. Marius was closely connected with the equites, but his own provincial interests cannot be proven. However, it was common for a man such as Caius Marius to pick up clients during his service in the provinces. Marius was at Numantia with Scipio Aemilianus in 134 and held the governorship of Further Spain in 114. A Marcus Marius was praetor and governor of a Spanish province in c. 102. This Marius


5 Cf. Badian, F.C., p. 158. Badian says that in Spain "there are numerous examples" of men picking up clientage by victory in war.

6 M.R.R. I, p. 492, n.3.

7 M.R.R. I, p. 534; defended in n.3, p. 535. See also Carney, p. 23, n.125. Carney adduces Q. Varius Severus Hybrida of Sucro as a client of Marius. To Carney this indicates local support, which in his opinion is confirmed by the flight of M. Brutus to Spain in 88 (see below, p. 99 with n.10).
extinguished a Lusitanian revolt with Celtiberian help, and later founded a city for his allies. The Marii became famous for their connection with the Spanish mines (a Sextus Marius, the richest man in all Spain, was murdered by Tiberius Caesar). If the family business had begun before Sertorius' arrival, as seems most probable, we can expect that the Sabine would avail himself of this important family's service. The Iunii Bruti may have had some influence in the Hispanic peninsula, for M. Iunius Brutus, the praetor of 88, had fled to Spain when Sulla first marched on Rome. We could go into further detail.

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9 Carney, p. 23, regards it as certain, holding that C. Marius himself owned numerous Spanish mines in the Sierra Morena (Mons Marianus) range. But both Carney, p. 23, and Schulten, "Problems," p. 65, believe that "Sierra Morena" came from the name of the Marius killed by the Emperor Tiberius.

10 Cf. M.R.R. II, p. 40. Like Crassus later, Brutus may have had friends or relatives in Spain. The consul of 138 B.C., one Decimus Iunius Brutus Callaicus, triumphed over the Spanish Callaici and Lusitani; cf. E. Badian, "Brutus (2)," O.C.D. This Brutus settled some of Viriathus' followers at Valentia; cf. M.R.R. I, p. 483. Appian, B.C. 1.60, does not say where the Brutus who was praetor in 88 fled in 87. Cf. Badian, F.C., p. 315, for other Iunii in Spain.

11 For instance, L. Fabius Hispaniensis was a quaestor under Annius in 81, then a defector to and officer under Sertorius, and finally one of his commander's assassins; cf. M.R.R. II, p. 120. Numerous Fabii had sojourned in Spain, and the gens seems to have attracted far and away more clientage and importance than any other single Roman gens in Spain; cf. Badian, F.C., pp. 314, 309f.
but the picture should be clear--there were a number of ex-Marian and pro-Marian interests in Spain identifiable to Sertorius which would have been at least sympathetic toward his purposes.

A number of Roman groups not necessarily connected with the Marians also could have worked with Sertorius in Spain. Brunt tells us that the Roman publicans leased Spanish mines from the State,¹² and it is probable that Sertorius could have won some of these over to his side. It is certain that, had he so desired, Sertorius could have bullied such contractors into supporting his cause, for a mine operation is very susceptible to damage in wartime conditions.¹³ Brunt also mentions that soldiers sometimes settled in Spain,¹⁴ and Sertorius might have recruited some support here. Sutherland remarks that during the Republic there may have been Roman companies engaged in commerce as well as mines.¹⁵ Some of these firms could also have found it preferable to maintain friendly or neutral relations with

¹²Brunt, p. 69.

¹³A mine cannot be hidden or moved, and can be easily ruined by fire or filling. The mine's labor force (especially if composed of impressed men; cf. Schulten, "Roman Cruelty," p. 65, and Gimpera, p. 117) could be dispersed rapidly by a hostile army.

¹⁴Brunt, p. 38.

¹⁵Sutherland, p. 104.
Sertorius, especially when his pirate friends, established at Dianium, began to seize control of the sea.

Asia—Ferrero tells us that "a great many [of those whom Sulla proscribed] took refuge with the barbarians in Spain and Mauretania, or at the Court of Mithridates." There was a whole army in Asia, the former force of Flaccus and then of Fimbria, which for some time was treated with suspicion by the Sullan senate. Among the officers who had defected from this force were L. Fannius and L. Magius, who later became Sertorius' link with Mithradates VI. There may have been other deserters from the Sullan government as well.

Italy—Marius had followed a policy of Italian enfranchisement, and this program had won for Marius considerable support in Etruria, Umbria, possibly Campania, and certainly the Sabine lands. The Samnites had no reason to love Sulla or his brainchild, the Sullan constitution. How much of this feeling outlived Sulla and then attached itself to Sertorius is difficult to say. But Sertorius had in 83 recruited a large force in Etruria, and many must have

16 Ferrero, p. 113.
17 Carney, p. 48.
fled to Sertorius from there after the Sullan proscriptions began. Many Etrurians joined Lepidus and followed him to Sardinia; then, under the Etruscan M. Perperna, attached themselves to Sertorius. Several of Sertorius' and Perperna's higher officers bore names reminiscent of Etruria. We might also expect that Sertorius' home area, the Sabine country, was interested in her son. Further, Wilson suggests a possible Sertorian following in Sicily. Equestrian commercial families which had favored Marius, such as the Granii, might also be interested in Sertorius. There was thus a large group of people who might become seriously interested in Sertorius if the senate were to ameliorate its stance toward the Sabine general.

The Senate—That Sertorius had friends within the Roman senate, with whom he was in actual communication during his revolt, is attested both in Plutarch's Sertorius and Pompey. Since the Social War, Italians had been trickling

19 Wilson, p. 29.
20 Wilson, p. 30.
21 Wilson, p. 62.
22 Ronald Syme, Review of M. Gelzer's Caesar der Politiker und Staatsman, J.R.S., 34, pp. 92-103. The Granii, at least, may have been seriously implicated in the Marian faction. Two of the men who "left town" with C. Marius in 88 were Quintus and Cnaeus Granius; cf. Appian B.C., 1.60. Syme tells us (p. 93) that the Granii were "a commercial family of Puteoli, whose Marian and Caesarian allegiance is splendidly attested." The Cossuti, who produced art works in Greece, may also have been pro-Marian.
23 Sertorius, 27.2-3; Pompey, 20.4.
into the Roman senate. Though the number of the "back-benchers" may not have grown to major proportions until after Sertorius, and many of the new-comers felt a debt to Sulla, there still were some men in this group who might house charitable feelings for Quintus Sertorius. There remained many of the old Marian families who, with Sulla safely buried, might wish again for Camelot and see in Sertorius the likeliest candidate to bring back "the good old days." What is surprising, at first, is the possibility that some of the old oligarchic families--optimates of the purest aristocratic blood--may have joined these Cinno-Marian-Sertorians in a rather unusual alliance.

Alliances of two so dissimilar parties tend to be against something as a rule, rather than for something. The factor that bound these disparate groups was the ambitious Pompeius Magnus, the son of Strabo. Pompey had lived down his comparatively good treatment by the Cinno-Marians and his subsequent inaction and perhaps even aid of their cause. Pompey achieved his new reputation by assembling an army of Picentines and placing it at Sulla's command. Pompeius Magnus had spent much of the next few years chasing down the Cinno-Marian remnants in Sicily and Africa, then in helping to quash the Lepidan revolt. Now, he wanted the command against Sertorius. The senate found it difficult to stand up to such a powerful young man, who had once dared
attempt to extort a triumph from Sulla—and had succeeded.
But there were men in the senate who did oppose Pompey.
With the help of Professor Badian\(^ {24} \) we can name some of
the major figures in this pro-Sertorian, anti-Pompeian,
coalition.

First on the list are the consuls for 77, D. Iunius
Brutus and Mam. Aemilius Lepidus Livianus; we have already
discussed their possible feelings towards Sertorius.\(^ {25} \) The
Metelli in general may have been hostile to Pompey, in spite
of Sulla's attempt c. 80 to bind them together by marriage.\(^ {26} \)
If Pompey sometimes treated Metellus with deference, there
were times in which he arrogantly appropriated credit which
should have gone to his colleague. M. Antonius was no friend
of Pompey, and Badian suggests that Antonius may have received
the pirate command in 74 from a coalition of optimates and
Sertoriani.\(^ {27} \) According to Badian a certain Publius Cornelius
Cethegus must have corresponded with Sertorius.\(^ {28} \) Cethegus,
a man with money and influence, had led a checkered political

\(^ {24} \) Badian, F.C., pp. 277ff.

\(^ {25} \) See p. 93, n.22.

\(^ {26} \) Pompey divorced his wife at some point in the 60s
on the grounds of unfaithfulness, a condition sometimes
caused by disagreement between the husband's and wife's
respective gentes.

\(^ {27} \) Badian, F.C., p. 280.

\(^ {28} \) Badian, F.C., p. 280, n.3.
career. Having fled with Marius in 88, he went over to Sulla when the latter returned from the east five years later. Upon Sulla's death Cethegus' friendship with Lepidus is notable, as is his distaste for Pompey. In addition to Antonius, Lucullus must have owed Cethegus his eastern command.²⁹ Cethegus may have been an opportunistic manipulator of the worst sort, but his support was clearly crucial for a man like Sertorius. The optimate Lucius Licinius Lucullus himself cordially hated Pompeius Magnus, and was to have further cause to hate him in the years to come. The Aurelii Cottaæ also were inimici of Pompey, and were especially prominent in the mid-70s when two of their number (Caius, 75; and Marcus, 74) reached the consulship. Catulus and Hortensius, two sterling optimates, may also be placed in the anti-Pompey camp at this time,³⁰ and M. Licinius Crassus, the later triumvir, both was Lucullus' relative and an inimicus of Pompey. However, Crassus' friend and benefactor Vibius Paciaecus had been killed while fighting Sertorius in 80,³¹ and it is questionable how much active assistance Marcus Crassus would afford to the pro-Sertorians. However, it is apparent that there were a number of powerful optimates

³⁰Badian, F.C., p. 283.
³¹Cf. Wilson, p. 30f.
who hated Pompey for personal reasons or because they feared his ambition. Such men might see in Sertorius a less-visible danger than was Pompey. It seems probable that Cethegus was a major link between these aristocrats and Sertorius, and likewise between optimates and the Sertoriani in the senate, factions which had suddenly found common ground in a common enemy.

Badian's reconstruction of senatorial infighting during the 70's has the ring of possible truth. Pompey had proved useful but dangerous to Sulla and when the latter died, the "rising star" of Pompeius Magnus was dominant in the senatorial constellation. When Pompey showed that he desired the command against Sertorius in Nearer Spain, the anti-Metellan and pro-Pompeian senators (L. Marcius Philippus among them)\(^{32}\) got Pompey the extraordinary office with proconsular power. Pompey had yet to hold a normal curule office.

Yet with Pompey gone, the Pompeians lost more strength than they could afford. The Sertorian-Optimate coalition easily convinced the rest of the senate that Pompey should be stifled.

It seems that his [Pompey's] enemies succeeded in preventing him from receiving adequate supplies, in the hope

\(^{32}\)Badian, F.C., p. 278. The ex-consul and ex-censor was probably the most influential consular in the senate.
(we may suppose) that this would enable Metellus to win the chief victories and eclipse Pompey's fame. This, at any rate, is what actually happened: for a long time Metellus was far more successful than Pompey.33

But Pompey sent a letter in the winter of 75/4 which carried an implicit threat against the senate. Pompey suggested that lack of further aid from the senate could force him to return home, with Sertorius at his heels. His careful choice of words intimated to the senators that Pompey might be willing to deal with Sertorius and against the senate. The conscript fathers retreated. Pompeius got men, money, and supplies, to counterbalance which the senate created the two extraordinary commands held by Antonius and Lucullus.34 But Lucullus' war with Mithradates proved longer than had been expected, and Antonius botched his mission, while Pompey's war wound down comparatively rapidly. Badian remarks the irony that these large-scale efforts to overcome Pompey "with his own weapons" not only failed, but set the stage for his own assumption of

33Badian, F.C., p. 279. This would seem to indicate a callous disregard on the senate's part for the lives of the men under Pompey. If so, it is certainly not the first time that a governing body was willing to endanger an army in return for the embarrassment of an ambitious and unscrupulous commander. In the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) the demagogue Cleon received the Pylos command in part for such reasons, and in this case the plans of the aristocrats similarly backfired.

34Badian, F.C., p. 280.
the pirate and Mithradatic commands. With the turn of
the Sertorian War in 74-2, large numbers of senators
proved unsuscetible to optimate and pro-Sertorian over-
tures. Pompey had all the cards, and these senators did
not want to be on the wrong side when the hand was played
out.

Sertorius' relationship to the Spaniards he led
was, to all accounts, a tour de force in the psychology
of primitives. He cajoled the barbarians, he fooled them,
and when necessary he made his Spanish followers learn the
hard way. As a result of such psychology by Sertorius his
Lusitanian and Celtiberian followers gave their commander
almost fanatic loyalty until nearly the very end of the
Sabine's career, thousands, if the report be true, vowing
not to outlive the foreign Sertorius if he fell on the
field of battle. Sertorius' yoke became one which the
Spaniards joyfully bore, but as Syme has remarked, "domination
is never the less effective for being veiled." Two
anecdotes will suffice to demonstrate Q. Sertorius' mastery
in dealing with his barbarian followers.

35 Badian, F.C., p. 281.
36 Plutarch, Sertorius, 14.4-5.
37 Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution (London:
Roman Revolution."
It seems that in 77, when the Ebro tribes rallied to Sertorius' cause, they formed a large and disorganized force. The overconfident Spaniards kept urging Sertorius to attack the enemy posthaste, thinking that they would crush the opposing forces and win the war without further ado. Sertorius allowed these barbarians to be embarrassed in such a contest, but came to the rescue before the un-disciplined levies were crushed. But if not annihilated physically, the poor Celtiberians were destroyed psychologically. Sertorius gave his students a few days to let the lesson sink in, then called them together. At the place of assembly was a curious sight: one powerful, healthy horse was accompanied by a thoroughly insignificant man, while a horse, which was old and undernourished, had at its side a strong, tall warrior. When a signal was given the strong man attempted to pull off the tail of the weak horse, and failed. The weaker man succeeded in denuding the healthy horse's tail by picking the hairs out one by one.³⁸ The barbarians laughed at the spectacle, but understood when Sertorius then arose and spoke upon the value of patience and perseverance.³⁹

³⁸No record has survived as to what the horses were doing while all this was taking place.

³⁹Plutarch, Sertorius, 16.
The other story concerns a fawn, entirely white in color, which was given to Sertorius by a local of modest means. This remarkable animal became quite tame, and soon followed Quintus everywhere. Sertorius, never at a loss mentally, dug back into his memory. Long, long before, in the dimmest mists of early Rome, had lived Numa Pompilius, by tradition a Sabine and the second king of Rome. Numa had claimed to receive divine knowledge from the nymph Egeria. It seemed that Sertorius could make similar use of his little friend. Quintus gave out that the white fawn was Diana's, and that the goddess communicated to him through the animal. The superstitious Spaniards believed the story as the Sabines had the Numa legend, and Sertorius reinforced the effect by having the fawn "announce" to him in public victories or enemy movements of which he had just received secret report. Once the fawn, now grown into a doe, was lost. When some men found the animal, Quintus contrived that the discovery be kept secret for the time being. Then Sertorius announced to the tribal chiefs that Diana had revealed to him in his dreams that he would soon experience good fortune. At their cue, the appointed men released the white doe, and the happy animal came running as if from nowhere to Sertorius' side. Sertorius

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40 Piero Treves, "Numa Pompilius," O.C.D.
played the role to the hilt, even shedding some tears at his "surprise."41

One of the major reasons why the barbarians loved Sertorius was his furnishing to them of "gold and silver without stint for the decoration of their helmets and the ornamentation of their shields."42 We have noted that the two major Spanish areas for gold and silver mining at this time were in the Ebro region and the Sierra Morena—Cordoba belt.43 As long as Sertorius held these regions firmly under control, the precious metals flowed into his coffers. A guerilla war may not require as great a financial outlay as a conventional operation, but whenever large numbers of men are concentrated food becomes a problem. Since we know that Sertorius avoided quartering his men in the cities, we may conjecture that he made no harsh demands from them for money and supplies. It is probable that Sertorius received most of the precious metals for purchasing his grain and, perhaps, for the continued support of the Cilician Pirates and some Aquitanian tribes, directly from the Spanish mines. The outlay for decorating armor alone must have been considerable.

41Plutarch, Sertorius, 11, 20.
42Plutarch, Sertorius, 14.2.
43Cf. pp. 68f, and maps, p. 163f.
But when in late 77 and 76 Pompey began to harass
the Ebro region, mine production there may have come to a
standstill. In the south Metellus' victory over Hirtuleius
at Italica in 76 and the crushing defeat (and death)
suffered by Hirtuleius at Metellus' hands in 75 at Segovia
first jeopardized, then almost destroyed, the Sertorian
position. We have evidence for the consternation caused
in the Sertorian camp by these defeats. Part of the reason
must have been the loss of the Sierra Morena mines as a
source of income. In this context one of the terms in the
Sertorius-Mithradates treaty, negotiated in the winter of
76/5 at the earliest, becomes more clear. Sertorius was
to receive 3000 talents and 40 ships from his eastern ally.44
The deterioration in Sertorius' fortunes followed soon after
his hold upon the mining areas began to weaken, and this
cannot be all coincidence. Let us now turn to the events
of 76-72, and observe how the matters detailed in this
chapter may have affected those last years of Quintus Sertorius.

44The ships probably were to be joined to the pirate
fleet which cruised the waters adjacent to the eastern
Spanish coast in search of booty. For a fuller discussion
of the treaty see below, pp. 119ff.
Pompey had received an extraordinary commission against the Sertorian menace, and he set about his task with extraordinary energy. In forty days, so we are told, Pompey had raised an army of 30,000 foot and 1,000 horse.\(^1\) Marcus Terentius Varro of Reate, a polymath who later advanced to the praetorship, wrote an *Ephemeris navalis* for Pompey's use.\(^2\) Unfortunately the Picentine commander took the land route to Spain. Pompey had trouble in crossing the Alps, and "il dut entreprendre une veritable campagne" to get through Gaul,\(^3\) which may have been disaffected through the efforts of Sertorian partisans. The Pompeian army may have been forced to winter at Narbo because the march through Gaul had taken longer than expected. Some Celtiberi supposedly approached Pompey at this time and asked him to accelerate his progress.\(^4\) Apparently Sertorius was not satisfying all of the Spaniards all of the time.

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\(^1\)Van Ooteghem, p. 103.

\(^2\)Petrus Johannes Enk, "Varro (2)," *O.C.D.*

\(^3\)Van Ooteghem, p. 105.

\(^4\)Livy, *Periocha*, 91, frg. 22.
Pompey pushed across the Pyrenees in the early spring of 76, and immediately began driving south toward the coast. Sertorius, currently in the Ebro region, warned his subordinate Hirtuleius in the west not to come to grips with Metellus in a major battle, but to harry his adversary in good guerilla fashion. Sertorius sent Perperna south with a strong force to the neighborhood of the Ilercavones, while Herennius, another of Sertorius' officers with Marian connections, held his force in readiness nearby. Sertorius himself moved up the Ebro, eliminating pockets of resistance at and around Cascantum and Graccuris. Sertorius thus placed himself in a position to aid Hirtuleius against Metellus, or to swoop down on Pompey's flank or rear, as matters dictated.

Pompey advanced in high spirits, much as Quintus Metellus must have felt when he had invaded Spain three years before. Control of the Spanish east coast was essential.

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5Cf. Van Ooteghem, p. 107. Van Ooteghem, relying on Orosius 5.23.9, thinks that Sertorius, Perperna, Hirtuleius, and another lieutenant named Herennius, all led 20,000 man armies. However, Orosius is badly confused throughout this chapter, and my reading of the source does not support that of Van Ooteghem.

6See map, p. 163.

7For details cf. Livy, Periocha 91, frg. 22.
to Pompey; therefore he had concocted a pincer-like movement to secure the territory. While Pompey the Great marched south along the coast road, his quaestor and brother-in-law Caius Memmius was to land at Nova Karthago and head north. If no serious resistance were encountered, fine; if an enemy army were trapped between his and Memmius' advancing column, then all for the better.

The plan, as with Metellus' similar plan of 79, failed miserably. Memmius landed at Nova Karthago but was kept from advancing. Pompey reached the Pallantia river and friendly Saguntum without incident, Perperna and Herennius having fallen back to Valentia. Between Valentia and Saguntum was the city of Lauro, currently allied with the Sullan government, and Sertorius himself came down with his forces and laid siege to this city, almost in front of Pompey's eyes. This was an affront which Pompey could not let pass. A strategic hill, today called "Puig," dominated Lauro; there was a dash for this landmark, won by Sertorius' men. Pompey now thought that he had Sertorius surrounded between his own men and the pro-Roman forces in Lauro.

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8For supply purposes, as well as for the protection of the cities still loyal to Rome.

9How and by whom is uncertain. Perhaps Sertorius' pirate friends appeared and menaced Memmius' fleet. The quaestor then might not have dared to leave Nova Karthago for fear of his escape route (the ships) being destroyed.
The brash young general advised the people of the city that they could get an excellent view of Sertorius being besieged if they looked on from their city walls.\textsuperscript{10} Sertorius heard about this boast, and countered with his own, to the effect that he would teach "Sulla's pupil" to look behind himself instead of to the front.\textsuperscript{11} Sertorius' boast had the better cause, as Pompey learned to his dismay: the Sabine had left a 6,000 man force in Pompey's rear. Whichever way he attacked, Pompey ran the risk of being surrounded. The outwitted young commander had to sit quietly and watch Sertorius capture Lauro, evacuate its inhabitants, and burn it to the ground.

Thus far Pompey had suffered keen embarrassment and severe loss of prestige, but no direct loss to his army. Sertorius soon made certain that "injury" was added to "insult." Two areas in the vicinity of Lauro could be used for forage; Sertorius openly guarded the one and left the other, more distant area appear untended. However, Sertorius placed a mixed force of light and heavy armed infantry and horsemen, about 10,000 men in all, in hiding along the road leading to this "open" area. On the next morning the Sertorians caught a Pompeian forage party on\textsuperscript{10}Plutarch, \textit{Sertorius}, 18.3.\textsuperscript{11}Plutarch, \textit{Sertorius}, 18.4.
its return route toward Pompey's camp. Pompey quickly despatched a whole legion to the rescue of his foragers, but the rescuing force was in its turn cut up, and its commander, Decimus Laelius, killed. Pompey marched his whole army out towards the scene, but again Sertorius had the advantage of better position. Sertorius' forces were massed on the hills dominating the plain, and Pompey dared not place his force within striking distance of these. Pompey again had to watch helplessly as the Sertorians won a great victory. A little later a dejected and disillusioned young general led his forces back across the Ebro, where M. Fonteius, the governor of Transalpine Gaul, could easily render aid. Pompey had lost his first campaign against Sertorius, 10,000 men, and his baggage train. He had also lost his overconfidence.

But the events of 76 were not a series of unmitigated successes on the one side, and unrelieved failures on the other, for at Italica in the month of August Hirtuleius had committed two errors. First, he had disregarded Sertorius' injunction not to fight a major battle with Metellus.

12 It seems that Pompey was doomed to repeat Metellus' mistakes. Cf. the Metellan siege of Lagobriga, pp. 86f.

13 Cf. Van Ooteghem, p. 110; and Schulten, Sertorius, pp. 101ff.

14 Cf. Van Ooteghem, p. 111.

15 Van Ooteghem, p. 112. Van Ooteghem thinks it possible that Hirtuleius had felt bound by Sertorius' order
Second, he had allowed his men to stand in battle array for hours while Metellus craftily remained in his camp. When Metellus finally committed his army and himself to the battle his army routed that of Hirtuleius, and he personally wounded his opposite number in the arm. Metellus then wintered in the Guadalquivir (Baetis) region. Herennius remained at Valentia, while Sertorius and Perperna hastened to Lusitania to minimize the results of Hirtuleius' defeat. Pompey operated during the winter in the Ebro region, attacking several Celtiberian cities; Sertorius set about enrolling a new 20,000 man army for his embarrassed lieutenant.

Only for the year 77, and believes that Metellus was on the move toward the east when Hirtuleius closed with him. A set battle may have been the only way in which Hirtuleius could keep Metellus from joining Pompey. Cf. Gardner, p. 322.

Cf. E. Cavaignac, "Metellus Contre Hirtuleius (A Propos du Sertorius de M. Schulten)," Revue des Etudes Anciennes, Vol. 30, no. 2 (Bordeaux: Ferret and Fils, 1928), pp. 98-100. In this I follow Cavaignac's arguments rather than those of Schulten, who believes that Metellus wintered somewhere north of the Ebro. Schulten's single authority is Appian B.C., 1.110; cf. Cavaignac, pp. 98f. Cavaignac's reconstruction better accounts for the need of both Sertorius and Perperna in the Lusitanian region after Hirtuleius' debacle; without Metellus in the area such a force sounds like unnecessary "overkill." Besides, after Pompey's embarrassment the roads between Baetica and the Ebro region were anything but safe, and Metellus would have run the risk of being caught somewhere in central Spain between four commanders. Metellus' remaining in Baetica makes more sense as matters were still fluid there in 76. It also aids in explaining the troubles which Sertorius was beginning to experience with regards to precious metals.

Perhaps during the winter of 76/75 Sertorius negotiated a treaty with the King of Pontus, Mithradates VI. The treaty had come about in this manner. L. Fannius and L. Magius were former officers of C. Flavius Fimbria who had defected to the Pontic king after Fimbria's suicide. Taking advantage of the rumors of Sertorius' military prowess which were coming to Pontus, no doubt carried there by the Cilician pirates, the two Romans talked their Oriental leader into despatching themselves and the minister Metrophanes to the Sabine general. An alliance was reached by means of this legation. Sertorius was to receive 3,000 talents and 40 ships, whereas Mithradates was to hold clear title to Cappadocia and Bithynia. Sertorius also sent a general to Asia, one Marcus Marius, to oversee the Sertorian-Mithradatic position there.

A great deal of time has been expended by modern authors upon the question whether Sertorius ceded the Roman province of Asia to Mithradates as part of the treaty, a condition which in the minds of modern scholars would have made Sertorius a traitor to Rome. Appian says that Sertorius

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18 Plutarch, Sertorius, 24.2.

19 M. Marius is thought to have come to Spain with Perperna in 77. In sending Marius east Sertorius was despatching a capable and ambitious young Marian to a spot where he would help, and not hinder, Sertorius' own position. Appian mistakes Marius' name as Varius; cf. Appian, Bellum Mithradaticum, 68.
did cede Asia;\textsuperscript{20} Plutarch denies the charge and goes to some lengths to refute it.\textsuperscript{21} It seems probable that Appian's account draws ultimately upon that of a Sullan annalist, while Plutarch follows Sallust, who had tried to discredit the charge. Both versions were most likely noised about at Rome during the 70's.

It may be helpful to compare the terms of Sertorius' treaty with Mithradates, as outlined above, with those Sulla is said to have agreed upon with that same Oriental potentate ten years before. By that treaty

\begin{itemize}
\item Mithradates was to renounce Asia and Paphlagonia, restore Bithynia to Nicomedes and Cappadocia to Ariobarzanes, pay down to the Romans two thousand talents, and
\end{itemize}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{20}Appian, \textit{Bellum Mithradaticum}, 68.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{21}Plutarch, \textit{Sertorius} 23-4. According to Plutarch, \textit{Sertorius} 23.4, Sertorius' 300-man "senate" advised their leader to cede Asia to Mithradates. Although Sertorius refused to follow this course, the fact that it was seriously urged might have caused the subsequent rumor that Quintus Sertorius had in fact given Asia to his eastern ally. The Sertorian senate is a shadowy institution, but was composed only of Sertorius' Roman followers. It may have handled some routine administrative affairs but seems never to have had any independent authority. We may regard its formation as partially a Sertorian effort to hearten his Roman followers, but this prop was weakened by Sertorius' refusal to follow its guidance in the important matter of the Mithradates treaty. There may have been other times as well when Sertorius went against the advice of this council. As a result, "the senators and men of equal rank about Sertorius . . . were seized with envy and foolish jealousy of their leader;" cf. Plutarch, \textit{Sertorius}, 25.1. In the end, it is probable that Sertorius' psychology in this case turned upon its creator, for his formation of the "senate" induced among the high-ranking Romans a feeling of community apart from Sertorius. They no longer felt themselves so intimately bound to the
give them seventy bronze-armoured ships with their proper equipment; Sulla, on his part, was to confirm Mithradates in the rest of his dominions, and get him voted an ally of the Romans.22

Impressive conditions, these, but Sulla's men are said to have railed at their leader for letting the mass-murderer of 150,000 (or perhaps closer to 80,000)23 Romans sail away with clear title to the plunder he had wrested from Roman Asia. Sulla answered this charge with the specious pretext that he thus avoided the possibility of fighting a united Mithradates and Fimbria.24 As we compare the circumstances behind both treaties we shall see that, try as they might, the Sullan annalists cannot make Sertorius' treaty more treacherous than that of their hero, even if the Sabine did grant Asia to the Pontic king.25

personal fortunes of the general. The fact that Sertorius granted little real power to this body would have irked and frustrated the senators, and may have caused many of their number to consider working out some sort of an agreement with Rome to the exclusion of Quintus Sertorius. Thus the ground was laid for Sertorius' assassination.

22Plutarch, Sulla, trans. Bernadotte Perrin, 22.5.

23See n.5 to p. 30.

24Plutarch, Sulla, 24.4.

25Even this cession seems doubtful if Plutarch's lengthy passage comes from Sallust, who was writing at a time when men still remembered both treaties. Sallust's long exposition of the situation could, if false, have been easily refuted, while the one word addition in Appian might escape conscious notice. If the addition of Asia were questioned, the Sullan annalists might have replied that that was what the treaty amounted to, since Sertorius never lived to claim the province.
In 85 Sulla had not yet broken irreconcilably with the Cinno-Marian-led Senate; in 75 Sertorius entered upon his seventh year as a proscribed Roman "enemy."
While Sulla seems to have sought an open breach with the senate, Sertorius at several points attempted to negotiate with Metellus and Pompey, its representatives. Sulla concluded his separate peace with a man actively engaged in war with the Romans; Sertorius' treaty was with a man technically at peace with Rome for some time. Sulla was clearly in a better position than Sertorius militarily. He was currently being harried by no proconsular armies; in fact such an army was now heading toward his regal enemy. Sulla had beaten Mithradates' best generals twice and had pushed them out of Greece; Sertorius' operations were limited to Spain, where he depended upon Mithradates' friends the pirates for aid. If Sulla claimed that he was acting for the Roman senate, part of which was physically present with him, Sertorius could allege that his actions had senatorial sanction in his propraetorian command. The Sabine also had his own 300-man "senate," and there were important senators back at Rome who were covertly backing Sertorian interests. In the circumstances Sertorius' treaty seems about as despicable as, and perhaps constitutionally more "treacherous" than that of Sulla, especially if Asia was granted to

26 Plutarch, Sertorius, 22.5.
Mithradates. But, Sertorius' position was clearly more desperate than Sulla's, and we cannot look into Quintus' mind to see the intentions behind the actions. If Sertorius had come to an accommodation with the Roman senate as a whole, what might the Sabine have done then vis-à-vis Mithradates? As events were to show, Sertorius was sorely to need the additional supplies provided for by his treaty with Mithradates, for in 75 the tide of war turned decisively for the forces of Pompey and Metellus. The tragedy of Sertorius had reached its climax.
CHAPTER X

THE YEAR 75: CLIMAX AND TURNING POINT

In the early spring of 75 Pompeius Magnus and Quintus Metellus struck out in opposite directions toward key Sertorian territories. Metellus advanced toward the upper Durus valley, reached Segovia, and there met Hirtuleius' army. Sertorius' officer had perhaps no choice but to confront Metellus in open battle, for Metellus was threatening the Ebro region. Upon noting that Hirtuleius was concentrating his best men in the middle of his line, Metellus responded by drawing back his own center and extending his line. Thus Metellus avoided contact with Hirtuleius until Metellus Pius' own wings had enveloped his adversary's wings. This plan had worked for Hannibal at Cannae; it now succeeded for Metellus at Segovia. The carnage was appalling. Lucius Hirtuleius' army was annihilated, the quaestor falling along with his brother and his men. Those Spanish who escaped dispersed

1Either from a winter camp in Baetica, or from Gaul. Cf. map, p. 163.

rapidly; central Spain lay helpless before Metellus. But the commander marched posthaste towards the east and Pompey's army.

In the east Pompeius Magnus was beginning to live up to his name. The young general again drove south along the coast road and this time administered a severe defeat to Perperna and Herennius. The battle took place in the vicinity of Valentia and the Turia river, and when it was over more than 10,000 of Perperna's and Herennius' men lay on the battlefield. Somewhere among the dead was Herennius. Pompey captured and sacked Valentia, then headed south after the fleeing Perperna. The defeated Perperna linked up with his commander on the lower part of the Sucro (Jucar) river course; there the two rebels awaited their young adversary. Meanwhile Metellus was streaking along one of the roads from Segovia towards the Sucro valley; he would attempt to out-flank Sertorius from the south. News of the battle of Segovia reached Pompey and Sertorius at about the same time.

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3 Between the city and the river, if Van Ootegehem, p. 115, is to be credited. However, on Schulten's map (Sertorius, Maps I and II at end) Valentia lies on both sides of the river.

4 Sallust assigns the blame for this debacle to the incompetent Perperna; cf. Schulten, Fontes, p. 207. Indeed, it is difficult to think of a known battle which the Etrurian lieutenant of Sertorius ever won.

5 Cf. Schulten, Fontes, p. 209.
The Sabine general had his messenger killed immediately, in order to keep the dismal news from spreading before the expected battle, while for his part Pompey hastened to bring on the conflict before Metellus arrived. Pompey wanted to arrogate sole credit for smashing Sertorius.

Again the best-laid plans of Sertorius' overconfident adversaries failed. The Pompey-Sertorius engagement began in late afternoon, as Pompey could not wait until the morrow—Metellus was that close. Darkness was fine with Sertorius, as his men better knew the terrain. The battle began with both commanders leading the right of their respective battle-lines; hence Sertorius found himself facing Pompey's legate Lucius Afranius. When word reached Sertorius that his own left was giving way before Pompey's assault, the Sabine commander dashed to his left, firmed up his faltering line, and led the charge on Pompey. Pompey was checked in mid-pursuit, those about him were routed, and the heir of Strabo himself wounded. But Pompey escaped, horseless, which in fact was the cause of his successful exit. Sertorius' Libyan stalwarts stopped their pursuit when they caught Pompey's lavishly accoutered steed, and the biggest prize of the Sertorian War thus escaped. In the meantime Pompey's legate had smashed Sertorius' now weakened right wing.

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6 Plutarch, Sertorius, 19.2.
7 Plutarch, Sertorius, 19.4.
Afranius cut through the fragmented Sertorian battle line and in the pell-mell confusion and darkness threw his men into Sertorius' very camp, along with the fleeing Sertorians. Afranius then lost control of his own men, who began to plunder, and when Sertorius returned from the battle, a great many Pompeian soldiers fell around the camp. Thus ended the Battle of the Sucro, to all intents and purposes a costly stalemate.

In the morning Sertorius ranged his men against Pompey's forces; but on the news that Metellus' arrival was imminent, Quintus led his men back into camp. For several days after that Metellus Pius offered battle to Sertorius, who for his part prudently though sullenly remained in camp. The Sabine correctly judged that his army's failing spirits and spent condition made it no match for two proconsular armies, one of which was fresh from a massive victory. But Sertorius chafed at fortune, and muttered "But as for this boy [Pompey], if that old woman [Metellus] had not come up, I should have given him a sound beating and sent him back to Rome." But Sertorius was not at a loss for psychological devices to cheer up his men. Now was the time he picked for Diana's doe to "reappear," and the Spaniards became so enthused that Metellus, noting the sudden martial noises

8Plutarch, Sertorius, 19.6.
from the Sertorian camp (shouts and beatings of weapons), decided it best to retire and let the Sertorians' ardor cool.9

Instead of throwing their armies against Sertorius' forces, the two senatorial generals marched north towards Saguntum. But Sertorius and Perperna dogged their steps. Perperna was again beaten, this time by Metellus.10 Sertorius had tried to interdict his enemies' supplies by sea with the aid of the Cilician pirates and catch the senatorial armies' forage parties. The ambush turned into a bitterly contested major battle, lasting from noon till night. Memmius, Pompey's brother-in-law, fell. At the head of his Iberic cavalry, Sertorius brushed aside Pompey's forces, killing 6,000; he himself suffered half that many casualties.11 Sertorius now drove straight toward Metellus, who was stoutly maintaining his position in the fray, and a spear hit the senatorial proconsul. But Metellus was quickly borne out of the fighting, his men rallied anew, and Sertorius was forced to retreat. Perperna's wing had lost 5,000 men to Metellus,12 and when Sertorius contemplated attacking

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9Plutarch, Sertorius 20; cf. Van Ooteghem, p. 117, Frontinus, Stratagems II. 1.3 (who uses it as an instance of when not to join in battle).
11Van Ooteghem, p. 118.
12This was possibly the reason for Sertorius' charge against Metellus. Such an assault would take the pressure off of his losing subordinate.
Metellus' camp the next night, Sertorius' own depression and a rescue force sent by Pompey combined to frustrate that assault. The end of the year was at hand, and the opposing armies broke contact. Metellus marched north and wintered in Gaul, while Pompey spent the late autumn besieging towns among the Vaccaei, such as Clunia. Then Pompey moved further north to Pompaelo in the Pyrenees, leaving a lieutenant named Titurius with a legion and a half to protect the Celtiberians who were faithful to him.

Lack of supplies had hindered Pompey from the Battle of the Sucro on, and he found himself frustrated and angered by the senate's seeming lack of interest in his problems. We do not know whether Metellus was faring any better but it would appear so. For now Pompey despatched his blistering letter to the senate, in which he not only refrained from detailing Metellus' plight (it would be good politics to do so), but he arrogated all previous success to himself and took the senate's lack of resupply as almost a personal declaration of war upon himself. Further, we learn in the letter that Metellus had received supplies and money from Gaul the preceding year.  

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13 Sertorius may have frustrated the Clunia siege by personal action; cf. Plutarch, Sertorius, 21.3-5, and Van Ooteghem, pp. 118-119.

whereas Pompey received barely a year's pay for the whole of his tenure in Spain. The letter closes with a scarcely veiled threat: either the senate send men, money, and supplies, or Pompey will be forced to march his army back home, "bringing with it all the war in Spain." Pompey got his demands, for in early 74 the letter was read in the senate, and supplies, money, and two legions were hurriedly despatched.

15 Sallust, Letter of Cnaeus Pompeius, 2.
16 Sallust, Letter of Cnaeus Pompeius, 10.
CHAPTER XI

THE SERTORIAN STAR FADES

The reinforced senatorial generals began the year 74 with two new tactics. The first line of action was Metellus' proclamation that any Roman who slew Sertorius would receive 100 talents and 20,000 acres of land, and any exile would receive freedom to return to Rome.¹ This news had repercussions throughout the Sertorian camp, from the lowest barbarians to the highest subordinate officers. For matters had changed among the Sertorians. In 75 two of Sertorius' three top subordinates had been defeated and killed, and the remaining lieutenant was widely believed incompetent. Sertorius himself began to feel frustration. He had not won a decisive battle all year, and had in fact been handled roughly in his last few engagements. The guerilla warfare tactics he had constantly employed against his adversaries were still sound, but the Romans and Spaniards in his army were becoming impatient with small engagements and ambushes. On the other hand, they were not winning the decisive battles.

¹Plutarch, Sertorius 22.1. The parallel with Viriathus continues; the earlier Spanish leader had been defeated only by assassination at Roman connivance. Cf. E. Badian, "Viriathus," in O.C.D., and, for sources on Viriathus' assassination, Westington, p. 23.
Perhaps worst of all, supplies were scarce and money even more so. Pompey had remarked that "the condition of my army and of that of the enemy is the same; for neither is paid." The observation bears the ring of truth. Sertorius' enemies were wintering all around the Ebro's precious metal belt, and in the south what senatorial forces there were met no resistance. The Sierra Morena mines must have been lost to Sertorius. The Spaniards in Sertorius' army began drifting away, and those who did stay felt Sertorius' increasingly violent temper. The Romans argued with the Spaniards, and Perperna fanned the discontent of his fellow exiles. We do not know how much Sertorius divined the cause of his problems, but we can see their effect.

The second tactical switch adopted by Metellus and Pompey was their shift of the field of combat from the eastern coast into the central mountain fastnesses manned by Sertorius' Celtiberian allies. Metellus had apparently convinced Pompey in late 75 of the usefulness of this stratagem, which had turned the flow of the Jugurthan War and might have proved successful in 79 and 78, but for the lack on Metellus' part of enough men in relation to those of his enemy. Now there were enough men between Pompey

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and Metellus to achieve the task, in view of the Sertorian losses by battle and defection.

Metellus moved to the southwest, first taking Bilbilis, then Segobriga. Pompey advanced to the sources of the Durus (Douro), failing at Pallantia due to Sertorius' timely arrival. Pompey had partially destroyed Pallantia's walls, and instead of pursuing his adversary southward Sertorius limited himself to restoring the city's defenses. Seeing no pursuit materializing, Pompey tarried at Cauca. Failing to induce the Vaccaei tribesmen of Cauca to accept a garrison, Pompey asked them to hospitalize his sick. When the Caucans agreed and took in the soldiers, the supposedly "ill" men suddenly "recovered" and seized control of the town.

Metellus and Pompey next combined their armies and marched on Calagurris, a city which commanded the important road along the Ebro's south bank. Here Sertorius administered a costly defeat to the proconsuls, who were forced to give up the siege after the loss of 3,000 men. Metellus, having taken southeast Celtiberia from the Sertorian camp, marched back to his own province of Further Spain. Pompey,

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3 Cf. Van Ooteghem, p. 124, and my map, p. 163.
4 Van Ooteghem, p. 124.
certain of Hispania Citerior's loyalty and in any event of its devastated condition, wintered in Gaul.\(^5\)

Seventy-three was a year of relative inaction, but what activity there was, proved successful for Pompeius. Metellus remained in his province, living a hedonistic life if Plutarch\(^6\) is to be believed. Pompey applied himself more vigorously. Magnus attacked Pallantia once again and took it this time after Sertorius' attempt to raise the siege failed. Next Pompey advanced against Clunia and captured the city; Uxama (Osma) fell soon after. Sertorius' plight was desperate. His Spanish support was almost gone. When the Celtiberians had begun defecting en masse Sertorius supposedly had ordered that the tribal princes at his Oscan school be killed or sold into slavery.\(^7\) We have heard nothing of the Lusitani for some time. Sertorius' behavior became increasingly irrational, if the tales are to be believed. What may be more probable is that Sertorius' usual temper, a little more harsh now with the bad turn of events, proved too much to bear for his subordinates.

\(^5\)Van Ooteghem, p. 125.
\(^7\)This seems an incredible political blunder, as well as ruthless butchery. Plutarch, *Sertorius*, 25.3-4, shows that Sertorius' disaffected subordinates were busy at this time in misinterpreting and mishandling his orders, wrecking Sertorius' position and abusing the Spaniards "with severe punishments and exactions, on the plea that Sertorius thus ordered" (*Sertorius*, 25.3). This Oscan atrocity sounds much like such a case.
Among these lieutenants was Perperna, a military incompetent by all appearances, but a political opportunist. As an aristocrat he appealed to some of Sertorius' supporters to abandon their leader; as an old Marian he found ready ears in that part of Quintus Sertorius' entourage. Finally a plot was hatched against Sertorius. This plot was so secret that when a certain Aufidius learned that a man named Manlius was involved, he "was astounded; for though he himself was a party to the conspiracy against Sertorius, he did not know that Manlius was."8 Besides Manlius and Aufidius, Perperna, Octavius Graecinus, M. Antonius, L. Fabius Hispaniensis, and C. Tarquinius Priscus were officers involved in the plot to murder Sertorius, and two scribae, one named Maecenas, the other Versius, were also party to the conspiracy.9 Fearing exposure, the conspirators acted quickly.

8Plutarch, Sertorius, 26.2. There may have been an earlier plot against Sertorius' life, perhaps as early as 75. On the basis of Appian, Bellum Mithradaticum 72, and some Bithynian coins, the dating of Sertorius' death to the first half of 73 B.C. has been urged; cf. W. H. Bennett, "The Death of Sertorius and the Coin," Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Vol. 10, ed. Hermann Bengtson et al. (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1961), 459-72. Henceforward this article will be cited as "W. Bennett, 'The Death of Sertorius.'" Bennett's arguments are ingenious but inconclusive without further "hard" evidence. Bennett explains the dearth of information on Sertorius' activities in 73 and 72 by the conjecture that Sertorius was dead and that Perperna was experiencing difficulty in holding together the remains of Sertorius' army; "If Sertorius had been alive, he would have given them [Appian and Schulten] something interesting to write about!" (p. 466).

9M.R.R. II, pp. 120f. There was a total of eleven Sertorian officers involved in the plot; cf. M.R.R. II, p. 120. It is interesting to note that two of these Sertorian officers,
On the pretext of a victory celebration Sertorius was invited to dine at Perperna's house, possibly at Osca. The rejoicing got out of hand, as had been planned by Perperna and his cronies, in the hopes of stirring their decorous leader into anger. At the drop of a wine cup by Perperna, Antonius stabbed Sertorius, then held him down while the other conspirators struck the Sabine. Sertorius' Spanish bodyguard was slain to a man. Quintus Sertorius, "This excellent man" as the great Prussian historian Theodore Mommsen was to say nineteen centuries later,\(^{10}\) was dead. The man who once had heard of the Isles of the Blessed and "was seized with an amazing desire to dwell in the islands and live in quiet, freed from tyranny and wars that would never end,"\(^{11}\) the man who nevertheless had been forced at every step to fight for his life against troops sent from his beloved Italy—the man, finally, who had taken undisciplined barbarians and with them had defeated the best troops and generals Rome had to offer—this man had now, after long weary years of fighting, scheming, and suffering, finally found his end. The tragedy of Quintus Sertorius was over.

Lucius Fabius Hispaniensis and C. Tarquinius Priscus, were ex-quaeestors of the Sullan general C. Annius Luscus between 81 and 80 B.C., when they issued silver denarii in Spain; cf. Edward A. Sydenham, The Coinage of the Roman Republic (London: Spink and Son, Ltd., 1952), p. 121.

\(^{10}\)Mommsen, p. 281.

\(^{11}\)Plutarch, Sertorius, 19.1.
CHAPTER XII

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING SERTORIUS

The Sertorian War did not long outlive Sertorius. Perperna had an impossible task in mastering the situation: most of the Iberians defected, and the Roman troops, who had so bitterly railed at Sertorius only hours before, suddenly began to lament his passing. Perperna led these disaffected remnants against Pompey and was quickly defeated and captured. Hoping to purchase his life, Perperna offered to show Pompey Sertorius' correspondence with some of the senators at Rome, letters implicating even men of consular rank. Pompey quickly had Perperna killed, and then is said to have burned the letters without letting anyone, even himself, pursue them.

The fortunes of Sertorius' followers varied greatly. A few cities held out bitterly against Pompeius Magnus; at Calagurris the pro-Sertorians were reduced to cannibalism.

1Plutarch, Sertorius, 27.2.

2One wonders whether Pompey might not have made some secret notation of Sertorius' correspondents. He thus could have insulated himself from the opposition of such people by the threat of political blackmail, while gaining for himself the praise of most Romans, including Roman historians; cf. Plutarch, Sertorius, 27.2-3.
before finally surrendering. The defenders of Calagurris could hope for little mercy from Pompey; both the fears of Roman atrocities and the atrocities committed by the Spaniards to forestall Roman vengeance continued the sordid tradition of Roman involvement in Spain. Yet Pompey treated the vanquished Spaniards, generally speaking, with leniency and respect. In this way the ambitious general gained for himself the clientage that later was to stand him in good stead. Evidence that Sertorius' influence among the Aquitanians outlasted the Sabine general is provided by Julius Caesar. In the Bellum Gallicum we find the Vocates and Taurueates choosing as their leaders "men who had served for the whole period with Quintus Sertorius and were believed to be past masters of war."  

Many of Sertorius' Roman followers returned home under the Lex Plautia de reditu Lepidanorum, which Broughton places in 70, a law which the rising C. Julius Caesar did much to further. One of those who thus returned to Rome was Lucius Cornelius Cinna, the son of Sertorius' mentor Cinna. The younger Cinna junior survived to become a man of marked

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3Cf. Florus; II. 10.22. Florus mentions Osca, Termes, Ulia, Valentia and Auxuma as cities which held out past Sertorius' and Perperna's deaths. Cf. Westington, pp. 99f, for earlier examples of Roman atrocities to besieged Spanish towns.


Republican sympathies, and to wed—in a final touch of irony to the politics of the Sertorian period—the widow of Faustus Sulla, the Dictator's son. Lucius Magius, who had helped bring together Sertorius and Mithradates, attempted to defect to Lucullus after giving Mithradates purposely bad advice. M. Marius, the general sent by Sertorius to Mithradates, was captured and killed by Lucullus, "for it did not seem good to lead a Roman senator in triumph."

A cavalry force led by L. Fannius and Metrophanes was defeated in Asia by one of Lucullus' lieutenants, possibly in late 73 or early 72. Then, in a transformation in the old Marianist tradition of "If you can't beat them, join them," Lucius Fannius appears in Armenia commanding soldiers for Lucullus in 68-7. Of the men who took part in the assassination of Quintus Sertorius all save one died soon thereafter and by violent means. Only Aufidius escaped this fate, and "he, either because men did not notice him

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6 She was Pompeius Magnus' daughter. Cf. T. J. Cadoux, "Cinna (2)," O.C.D., and E. Badian, "Sulla (3)," O.C.D.

7 Appian, Bellum Mithradaticum, 72.


or because they did not heed him, came to old age in a barbarian village, a poor and hated man."\(^{11}\)

But Sertorius left a greater impact upon Roman history than the mere alteration of his followers' lives. This greater legacy to Roman history, for better or worse, was comprehended in and transmitted by the career of Pompey. For Sertorius rather paradoxically had done much for his enemy. The Sertorian command was the first office granting proconsular imperium which the ambitious son of Pompeius Strabo received.\(^{12}\) And if Pompeius Magnus had inherited a Picentine clientela from his father,\(^{13}\) along with the ambitious drive, the youthful equestrian gained much more in that respect from the Sertorian War. By his generous treatment of the Spanish, Cnaeus won the hearts of those brave peoples.\(^{14}\) Pompey's sojourn in the west established connections in (and wealth from)\(^{15}\) Spain and Transalpine Gaul, and created anew group of Pompeian veterans who could, in time of need, rally to their commander's side. Pompey

\(^{11}\)Plutarch, Sertorius, 27.4.

\(^{12}\)For a discussion of Pompey's extraordinary command against Sertorius cf. Boak, pp. 5f.


\(^{14}\)Cf. Badian, F.C., pp. 278f.

\(^{15}\)Badian, Roman Imperialism, p. 81.
later used these very men to extort a triumph and an illegal consulship from the senate.\(^{16}\)

Pompey's triumph over the Sertorians, and the triumph over the senate which his consulship signified, sounded the death-knell for the Sullan senate as a workable institution.\(^{17}\) Sulla's unsuccessful try had been the last attempt to create a senate capable of acting effectively and independently of one, or a few, super-powerful men. The stage was now set for the conflict of these would-be autocrats. The senate, powerless to act for itself, became merely the pawn or the aider and abettor of men like Pompey, Crassus, Caesar, Antony, and Octavian. Often the senate was reduced to the role of interested observer as these giants lumbered their unwieldy way across the Roman scene, struggling and falling, while the murderous impact of those struggles and falls tore the senate, and the Republic itself, apart. In the end from the ashes there arose one-man rule. Though Augustus flattered his senate, one whose composition bore little resemblance to that of the senate in Sertorius' day, the new conscript fathers enjoyed only the appearance of power, not its reality. Later Emperors were not to be so considerate.

\(^{16}\)Illegal, because Pompey had not previously held any curule office.

\(^{17}\)Pompey held imperium without a break from 83 to his consulship in 70—a remarkable fact which presaged the rules of the Roman Emperors.
Pompey was able to achieve the status and power he attained, but threw away to Julius Caesar, by convincing the senators that he was essential to them. The part which Pompey's "burning" of the compromising Sertorian correspondence played in Magnus' success is questionable; it might have been a very small part indeed. Yet Pompey had seemed at the time to be the only man who could end the Sertorian War, and he had ended that war. Pompey was one of the few Romans who comprehended the possibilities inherent in combined land and naval warfare, and when the pirate command was created in 67, it was Pompeius Magnus who was called to fill the position. Pompey's success in obtaining the pirate command, and even more his remarkable success in carrying out his task, must have stemmed in large part from the Sertorian War, where, though our information is scanty, Magnus certainly had fought against pirates and learned something about their organization. Pompey had benefitted well from his experience against Quintus Sertorius.

But what of Quintus Sertorius, the man? Was he a traitor to Rome? If the treachery question hinges in turn upon the question whether Sertorius ceded Asia to Mithradates, then we shall probably never know the answer--to both queries.

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18 Adcock, The Roman Art of War Under the Republic, p. 39. Adcock mentions Agrippa as another example of this knowledge; there were not many others.
There seems no way yet to disprove either Appian or Plutarch, just as there has not so far proven to be a means of reconciling the two accounts. But it can be argued that the cession of Asia by Sertorius to Mithradates would not necessarily make of the Sabine general a traitor to the Romans. Much later than Sertorius, the Roman Emperor Hadrian would pull back the Roman eastern frontier extended by his immediate predecessor, on the grounds that the new territory acquired by Trajan could not be defended effectively. Though this move engendered much criticism from Hadrian's time until our own, modern scholarship does not brand Hadrian as a "traitor." The late Roman Emperor Jovian pursued a similar course from necessity. Sulla's agreement with Mithradates was just as pernicious generally speaking as was Sertorius' treaty with the Pontic king, especially when the different circumstances surrounding the two treaties are taken into account.

If Sertorius is to be regarded as a "traitor," then it must be in the context of treachery to the current government at Rome.\(^\text{19}\) Sertorius thus fits into the group

\(^\text{19}\) Cf. Gillis, p. 717. Gillis says: "Maurenbrecher confused the Establishment [Gillis identifies this with "the optimates;" we have seen reason to question such an identification] with Rome herself and assumed that opposition to one is betrayal of the other, if aid is received from national enemies; so does Syme, following Berve. But surely there is an essential difference between one's native land and the government that happens to be ruling it, particularly if the latter is a government of outlaws. Political persecution relieves a citizen in exile of any further responsibility
numbering men like Marius, Sulla, Lepidus, and Julius Caesar—men who were outlawed by the existing government at Rome, and led their armies against the forces that government controlled. That Sertorius was less successful than the others—he never seriously threatened the city of Rome itself—may have kept him from committing the enormities fashioned by some of these men. Yet, his lack of success also meant that he was not given the chance to legitimize his actions, as had Marius, Sulla, and Caesar. But that fact does not make him more treacherous than were those men; success does not make a patriot out of a traitor.

In his epitaph to the life of Sertorius Wiseman opines:

of patriotism. Treves stated the case for Sertorius well: 'L'illegalità della nobilitas giustifica e assolve la sua illegalità' [Treves and Gillis think alike on the Establishment = Optimates question]. Perhaps Corneille best expressed the answer, when he made his Sertorius say, 'Rome n'est plus dans Rome, elle est toute où je suis.'"

For the belief that Sertorius was not a "patriote romain," but a "patriote italien, ennemi de Rome," cf. André Piganiol, La Conquête Romaine, Peuples et Civilisations, fondée par Louis Halphen et Philippe Sagnac (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), p. 466, n.1. Against this particular view of Piganiol's I would urge that at no time did Sertorius express such sentiments, and further that he created a "Roman" senate, claimed to be acting as a pro-magistrate of the populus Romanus, corresponded with Roman senators, and continually attempted to negotiate with Pompey and Metellus, the Roman senate's representatives. The adhesion of the Roman veteran settlement at Valentia to Quintus also must be important in this regard; cf. Sutherland, p. 232, n.12.
that he [Sertorius] failed in the end may have been inevitable, though there is no greater pitfall for the student of history than to think that, because an event did happen it was bound to happen.  

On the other hand, it is dangerous to conjecture what would have been the full-fledged political program of Sertorius. For Sertorius, constrained as he was by force of circumstances to contest for his life with the armed forces of Sulla and the Dictator's *epigoni*, never had such a program.

Freilich wäre es unbillig, von einem oppositionellen Politiker jener Zeit zu verlangen, dass er ein positives Programm entwickelt, bevor er sich durchgesetzt hat. Was wüssten wir von dem Politiker Caesar, wenn er vor seinem ersten Konsulat gestorben wäre?

We can only judge Sertorius by what he did. And by such a criterion, the Sabine general comes off very well.

Quintus Sertorius was born into a difficult world. The last century of the Roman Republic was one of internal political upheaval and external military success; the opportunities for advancement and adventure thus were great for an ambitious young equestrian. Sertorius stepped into the vortex of public life because his martial qualities proved considerable, while his oratorical training aided

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20Wiseman, p. 37.

him greatly in the political life which was so intimately connected with military affairs. Sertorius' mental qualities, such as enthusiasm, intelligence, adaptability, courage, sobriety, and an understanding of human psychology unusual for his time, all fused together in a strong body. Sertorius' personal military prowess was not the least of the factors in his success. It was owing more to his bad luck rather than to any defect of character that Quintus found himself an enemy of Sulla and, later, of the Dictator's legacy, the Sullan senate.

The tragedy of Quintus is truly striking. Harried upon nearly all sides, Sertorius finally settled for good in the Spain he had originally been sent to govern. By brilliant employment of guerilla tactics and of the men he led, Sertorius time and again defeated the current government's best men and generals. The enthusiasm which Sertorius inspired in such disparate groups as Celtiberians, Lusitanians, Mauri, Cilician Pirates, and Roman soldiers, citizens and senators points to a very forceful character. His treatment of the conquered was for the most part magnanimous, and the aggravation in temper which Sertorius experienced in his final years is, if true, no worse than the norm for Roman commanders.  

22 Cf. Plutarch, Sulla, 25.2; 26.3; 30-31.
profoundly influenced by the times in which he lived, and the life of Sertorius seriously affected his milieu. In the end Sertorius died, but it was his trusted followers who assassinated him at the underhand suggestion of his enemies. To the end Sertorius remained unconquered. The evidence makes of Sertorius more a hero and a patriot to the Rome he once knew (albeit the Rome of the Cinno-Marian faction), and hoped to bring back, than a traitor to his country. A rebel against the existing system Sertorius perhaps was. But the man who once had visions of the Islands of the Blest, of peace, and of rest, was a very reluctant rebel indeed.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX A

A CHRONOLOGY OF THE EVENTS IN ROMAN HISTORY DURING THE LIFE OF QUINTUS SERTORIUS

Sources: M.R.R. I and II; C.A.H. Vol. IX (Gardner article and Chronological tables at end of volume)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events in Roman History</th>
<th>Events in the Life of Sertorius</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>Laws of C. Gracchus.</td>
<td>Sertorius born at Nursia in 123 or in 122.</td>
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<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>M. Livius Drusus active; Gracchus not re-elected tribune.</td>
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<td>121</td>
<td>Gracchus dies in rioting. Opimius executes some Gracchans.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>Opimius brought to trial but acquitted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>119</td>
<td>C. Marius is tribune.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>Death of Micipsa in Numidia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>L. Caecilius Metellus Diadematus Q. Mucius Scaevola</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Year</td>
<td>Events in Roman History</td>
<td>Events in the Life of Sertorius</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>116.</td>
<td>Consuls:</td>
<td>Senatorial Commission sent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Licinius Geta</td>
<td>to Numidia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q. Fabius Maximus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115.</td>
<td>Consuls:</td>
<td>Mithradates VI becomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Aemilius Scaurus</td>
<td>King of Pontus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Caecilius Metellus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114.</td>
<td>Consuls:</td>
<td>Cato beaten by Scordisci.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manius Acilius Balbus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Porcius Cato</td>
<td></td>
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<td>C. Caecilius Metellus</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Caprarius</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cn. Papirius Carbo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112.</td>
<td>Consuls:</td>
<td>Jugurthan War begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Livius Drusus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Calpurnius Piso</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caesoninus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111.</td>
<td>Consuls:</td>
<td>Peace with Jugurtha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P. Cornelius Scipio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nasica Serapio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Calpurnius Bestia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110.</td>
<td>Consuls:</td>
<td>Jugurthan War resumes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Minucius Rufus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sp. Postumius Albinus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109.</td>
<td>Consuls:</td>
<td>Q. Metellus against</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q. Caecilius Metellus</td>
<td>Jugurtha.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numidicus</td>
<td></td>
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<td>M. Iunius Silanus</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Year</td>
<td>Events in Roman History</td>
<td>Events in the Life of Sertorius</td>
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<tr>
<td>108.</td>
<td>C. Marius as lieutenant of Metellus returns to Rome wins the consulship.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ser. Sulpicius Galba</td>
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<td></td>
<td>L. (or Q) Hortensius</td>
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<td></td>
<td>L. Cassius Longinus</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>C. Marius</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>106.</td>
<td>Jugurtha captured (in 106 or 105).</td>
<td>Sertorius escapes from the rout at Arausio.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q. Servilius Caepio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Attilius Serrasius</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105.</td>
<td>Cimbri and Teutoni crush Roman armies at Arausio.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>P. Rutilius Rufus</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Cn. Mallius Maximus</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>104.</td>
<td>Slave revolt in Sicily.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Marius</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>C. Flavius Fimbria</td>
<td></td>
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<td>103.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Marius</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Aurelius Orestes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102.</td>
<td>Marius beats Teutoni near Aquae Sextiae.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Marius</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Q. Lutatius Catulus</td>
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<tr>
<td>101.</td>
<td>Marius and Catulus beat Cimbri near Vercellae.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>C. Marius</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Manius Aquillius</td>
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<td>Year</td>
<td>Events in Roman History</td>
<td>Events in the Life of Sertorius</td>
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<tr>
<td>100. Consuls:</td>
<td>Marius' coalition with Saturninus ends.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Marius</td>
<td>Saturninus ends.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Valerius Flaccus</td>
<td>Rioting, quelled by Marius; Saturninus and Glaucia are murdered. T. Didius campaigns against Scordisci.</td>
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<tr>
<td>M. Antonius</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A. Postumius Albinus</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>98. Consuls:</td>
<td>Didius' war with Celtiberi begins.</td>
<td>Sertorius tribune of the soldiers under Didius.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos</td>
<td>Celtiberian War continues.</td>
<td>Sertorius tribune of the soldiers under Didius.</td>
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<tr>
<td>T. Didius</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>97. Consuls:</td>
<td>Celtiberian War continues.</td>
<td>Sertorius tribune of the soldiers under Didius.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cn. Cornelius Lentulus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Licinius Crassus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96. Consuls:</td>
<td>Celtiberian War continues.</td>
<td>Sertorius tribune of the soldiers under Didius.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Cassius Longinus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95. Consuls:</td>
<td>Lex Licinia Mucia expels allies from Rome.</td>
<td>Sertorius military tribune under Didius.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Licinius Crassus</td>
<td>Relations between Rome and Mithradates VI begin to deteriorate when Mithradates is ordered out of Paphagonia and Cappadocia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q. Micius Scaevola</td>
<td>Celtiberian War continues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Events in Roman History</td>
<td>Events in the Life of Sertorius</td>
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<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94.</td>
<td>Celtiberian War continues.</td>
<td>Sertorius military tribune under Didius.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Coelius Caldus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Domitius Ahenobarbus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93.</td>
<td>Mithradates' son-in-law Tigranes (the king of Armenia), drives Roman puppet Ariobarzanes out of Cappadocia. Didius triumphs over Celtiberi.</td>
<td>Sertorius participates in Didius' triumph.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Valerius Flaccus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Herennius</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92.</td>
<td>Sulla restores Ariobarzanes to Cappadocian throne.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Claudius Pulcher</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Perperna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91.</td>
<td>M. Livius Drusus tribune, but assassinated and reforms dropped. At Asculum Romans are slaughtered. Preliminaries to the Social War.</td>
<td>Sertorius quaestor in 91 or 90.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Marcius Philippus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sex. Julius Caesar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90.</td>
<td>Social War begins in earnest. Rutilius killed. Italian limited citizenship law carried.</td>
<td>Sertorius a legate in the Social War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Julius Caesar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P. Rutilius Lupus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89.</td>
<td>Social War continues. Asculum captured. Sulla successful in south.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cn. Pompeius Strabo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Porcius Cato</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Events in Roman History</td>
<td>Events in the Life of Sertorius</td>
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<tr>
<td>88.</td>
<td>Consuls:</td>
<td>Sertorius defeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Cornelius Sulla</td>
<td>tribune P. Sulpicius Rufus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q. Pompeius Rufus</td>
<td>proposes enrollment of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Italians in all 35 tribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and giving Marius the Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>command against Mithradates,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>who has declared war on Rome.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sulla marches on Rome and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>drives out Marius. Sulpicius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>is killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87.</td>
<td>Consuls:</td>
<td>Cinna driven from Rome after</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cn. Octavius</td>
<td>Sertorius leaves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Cornelius Cinna</td>
<td>taking up P. Sulpicius Rufus'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consul Suffer:</td>
<td>Rome with Cinna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Cornelius Merula</td>
<td>cause, but returns with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and returns as one</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Marius and takes Rome. Some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of the top four generals, (possibly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>anti-Marians murdered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Some of the top four generals, (possibly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86.</td>
<td>Consuls:</td>
<td>Marius dies; Flaccus sent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Cornelius Cinna</td>
<td>to Asia, killed by his own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Marius; then</td>
<td>legate Fimbria. Sulla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Valerius Flaccus</td>
<td>captures Athens, wins at</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chaeronea and Orchomenus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85.</td>
<td>Consuls:</td>
<td>Treaty of Dardanus between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Cornelius Cinna</td>
<td>Sulla and Mithradates VI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cn. Papirius Carbo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84.</td>
<td>Consuls:</td>
<td>Cinna killed by own soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cn. Papirius Carbo</td>
<td>New citizens distributed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Cornelius Cinna</td>
<td>throughout all 35 tribes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Events in Roman History</td>
<td>Events in the Life of Sertorius</td>
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<tr>
<td>83.</td>
<td>Sulla lands at Brundisium; Cinno-Marians crumble.</td>
<td>Sertorius possibly praetor. Sertorius, his advice unheeded, leaves for propraetorship in Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consuls:</td>
<td>L. Cornelius Scipio Asiagenus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Norbanus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82.</td>
<td>Sulla victorious; Cinno-Marians are proscribed, some escape. Pompey</td>
<td>Sertorius consolidates position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consuls:</td>
<td>Cn. Papirius Carbo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Marius</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dictator:</td>
<td>L. Cornelius Sulla Felix</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pompey successful in Africa.</td>
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<td>81.</td>
<td>C. Annius Luscus drives Sertorius from Spain.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Consuls:</td>
<td>M. Tullius Decula</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cn. Cornelius Dolabella</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dictator:</td>
<td>L. Cornelius Sulla Felix</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80.</td>
<td>Sertorius called to Spain by Lusitani; beats Cotta and Fufidius.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consuls:</td>
<td>L. Cornelius Sulla Felix</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dictator:</td>
<td>L. Cornelius Sulla Felix</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79.</td>
<td>Sertorius holds Metellus while Hirtuleius crushes M. Domitius Calvinus at Consaburga. Rescuing army of L. Thorius Balbus is beaten. Metellus takes some Lusitanian towns.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consuls:</td>
<td>P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ap. Claudius Pulcher</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dictator:</td>
<td>L. Cornelius Sulla Felix</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Events in Roman History</td>
<td>Events in the Life of Sertorius</td>
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<tr>
<td>78.</td>
<td><strong>Sulla dies</strong></td>
<td>L. Manlius is stopped by Hirtuleius; Sertorius outgenerals Metellus.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Revolt of Marcus Lepidus quashed.</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>77.</td>
<td><strong>Consuls:</strong> D. Iunius Brutus Mam. Aemilius Lepidus Livianus</td>
<td>Metellus quiescent in Hispania Ulterior. Sertorius operates in northeast Spain and receives M. Perperna. Pompeius Magnus given command by senate against Sertorius in Hispania Citerior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76.</td>
<td><strong>Consuls:</strong> Cn. Octavius C. Scribonius Curio</td>
<td>Sertorius outgenerals Pompey, but Metellus beats Hirtuleius at Italica. Winter = agreement between Sertorius and Mithradates VI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75.</td>
<td><strong>Nicomedes III of Bithynia dies (75/4) and bequeathes kingdom to Rome.</strong></td>
<td>Metellus defeats and kills Hirtuleius at Segovia. Sertorius and Pompey contest with no clear-cut trend developing until Metellus joins Pompey and Sertorius refuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Events in Roman History</td>
<td>Events in the Life of Sertorius</td>
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<tr>
<td>75 (con't.)</td>
<td>to fight. Pompey sends threatening letter to Rome, seeking reinforcements.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Lucullus sent against Mithradates.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>M. Antonius given pirate command.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74. Consuls:</td>
<td>Reinforced senatorial generals seek Sertorius' assassination and attack central Spanish mountain villages. Sertorius' position is seriously weakened.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Licinius Lucullus</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lucullus outgenerals Mithradates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Aurelius Cotta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>73. Consuls:</td>
<td>Metellus remains in Hispania Ulterior. Pompey active in Celtiberia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Terentius Varro Lucullus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Cassius Longinus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>72. Consuls:</td>
<td>Sertorius assassinated by Perperna, who is defeated and killed by Pompey. Few cities hold out beyond death of Perperna.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Gellius Publicola</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX B

GENEALOGICAL TABLES

I. The Valerii Flacci (members important in the life of Sertorius are given in capital letters).

L. Valerius Flaccus
cos. 261

P. Valerius Flaccus
cos. 227 † about 210

P. Valerius Flaccus
praef. class. 215f.
† about 214

L. Valerius Flaccus
Fl. Martialis cos. 131

C. Valerius Flaccus
Fl. Dialis 209
pr. 183
† about 174

L. Valerius Flaccus
cos. 152

C. Valerius Flaccus
III vir mon. about 139

L. VALERIUS FLACCUS
fl. Mart. cos. 100
† before 64

L. Valerius Flaccus
III vir mon. about 90

C. VALERIUS FLACCUS
cos. 93 triumph 81

L. VALERIUS FLACCUS
cos. 86; † 86

L. Valerius Flaccus
pr. 63

C. Valerius Flaccus
* about 69 † 48

Legend: cos. = consul pref. class. = prefect of the fleet
cens. = censor Fl. Dialis = flamen Dialis pr. = praetor
† = died * = born III vir mon. = moneyer.

Source: Münzer, RE, Half-Volume 15, columns 3f.
II. The Papirii Carbones (members important in the life of Sertorius are given in capital letters).

C. Papirius Carbo  
pr. 168

C. Papirius Carbo  
Cn. Papirius Carbo  
M. Papirius Carbo  
tr. pl. 131, cos. 120, cos. 113, † 112?  
pr. about 114  
† 119

C. PAPIRIUS CARBO ARVINA  
Cn. PAPIRIUS CARBO  
C. PAPIRIUS CARBO  
tr. pl. 90, pr. 85?  
cos. 85, 84, 82  
tr. pl. 89?  
† 82  
† 81  
pr. 81?  
† 80

C. Papirius Carbo  
tr. pl. 67? pr 62?  
† after 46?

Legend: pr. = praetor  tr. pl. = tribune of the plebs  
cos. = consul  † died.

Source: Münzer, RE, Half-Volume 36, columns 1015f.
APPENDIX B

GENEALOGICAL TABLES

III. The Perpernae (members important in the life of Sertorius are given in capital letters).

M. Perperna
* about 200 Envoy 168 † toward 120

M. Perperna
* about 175 cos. 130 † 129

M. PERPERNA          C. Perperna
* 147 cos. 92 cens. 86 pr. about 92
† 49                Legate 90

Perperina          M. PERPERNA VEIENTO
* about 100           * 122 praet. 82 † 72
Vestal Virgin
about 92
† after 64

Legend:  * = born  cos. = consul  pr. = praetor † died.

APPENDIX C
APPENDIX C

MAPS TO INDICATE THE LIFE AND TIMES

OF QUINTUS SERTORIUS

Map One: Map of Italy
Map Two: Republican Rome and Her Empire
Map Three: Map of Roman Spain to Illustrate the Career of Q. Sertorius
Map Four: Map of Spanish Mines and Mineral Resources
MAP OF ITALY

Main roads indicated by red lines
Regions shown by brown lines and
Names
Cities are in blue

Sources: Marsh, Maps
Facing Pp. 18, 98.
Shepherd, Pp. 26, 27.
Major roads are in red

Sources: Marsh, Map opposite p. 1; Shepherd, Map 23.
MAP OF ROMAN SPAIN TO ILLUSTRATE THE CAREER OF Q. SERTORIUS

Rivers in light blue, identified in green. Roads in red, tribal areas in brown. Mountains in gray, cities in dark blue.

Sources: Schulten, Sertorius; Numantia I, Maps at end; Gardner, Map opposite p. 319; Sutherland, Map at end, For Provincial boundaries in 133 B.C.
MAP OF SPANISH MINES AND MINERAL RESOURCES

(Note: Mines indicated represent the totality of known Roman mines in Spain and do not reflect mines operating at any one time)
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_______. Crassus. In The Lives, as above.


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Note: Numerous articles have been consulted in The Oxford Classical Dictionary. Edited by N. G. L. Hammond and H. H. Scullard. Second Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. To avoid constant repetition of the full particulars and the necessity of searching for these data from the first Oxford Classical Dictionary article, I have placed this information at the beginning of this section and will use O.C.D. to designate this work below.


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. . . "Carbo (1)," O.C.D.

. . . "Cinna (1)," O.C.D.

. . . "Flaccus (5), (6), (7)," O.C.D.


. . . "Norbanus (1)," O.C.D.


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Enk, Petrus Johannes. "Varro (2)." O.C.D.


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———. "Hannibal," *O.C.D.*

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