

THE RELATION OF CONSTITUENCY AND
ELECTORAL COMPETITION TO
CONGRESSIONAL PARTY VOTING IN THREE
MIDWESTERN STATES, 1957-1960

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ABSTRACT

THE RELATION OF CONSTITUENCY AND ELECTORAL COMPETITION TO CONGRESSIONAL PARTY VOTING IN THREE MIDWESTERN STATES, 1957-1960

by Suzanne Murray

The roll call vote has been employed as the basic data in a significant body of research into the legislative process. Central to much of this research has been the hypothesis that party voting cohesion rests upon a similarity of constituencies represented and upon the electoral security of the legislators and, conversely, that deviations from the party majority are the products of the representation of "atypical" constituencies and of electoral competition.

These hypotheses were posed in examining the voting records of Congressmen from Indiana, Michigan and Ohio in the 85th and 86th Congresses (1957-1960). The positions of these Congressmen on seven issue areas (Civil Rights, Labor, Housing, Education, Public Works, Foreign Aid, and Civil Liberties) were obtained by the construction of cumulative scales. The scale scores obtained were then related to the variables of party, constituency and electoral competition. Constituencies were classified by their percentage of urban population and electoral competition was measured in terms of the incumbent's percentage of the two-party vote in the previous election.

The major findings were:

1. The base of power of the Democratic party group in this area lay in non-competitive metropolitan districts. While the largest number of Republican districts fell into the rural category, non-competitive Republican districts were more evenly distributed among the constituency types than were Democratic non-competitive districts.

2. On the whole, and on all scales but Labor Reform and Civil Liberties, the Democratic group was more cohesive than the Republican group.

3. The Republican group was most cohesive on the Civil Liberties and Labor Reform scales. The Democratic group was relatively cohesive on all scales but Civil Liberties, Labor Reform and Foreign Aid. Foreign Aid was the most divisive issue for both party groups.

4. Democratic deviations from the party majority were almost entirely a function of the combined factors of competition in "atypical," or non-metropolitan, districts. For the Republican group, the most important sources of deviation were "typically" Republican mid-urban constituencies without regard to the level of two-party competition. Competition produced deviations in metropolitan and rural districts depending upon the issue involved. Notable deviations occurred among metropolitan Republicans on the issues of Foreign Aid and Housing and among rural Republicans on the issues of Labor and Public Works.

5. The data suggested that while constituency similarities and electoral competition may be important factors in the cohesion of a party group, there may be other factors of equal or greater importance. Specifically, it was suggested that the role of a Congressional party in the legislative process and its relationship to instruments of effective leadership may be important factors in the achievement of party cohesion and that the internal structure of a constituency and the relationship of legislative issues to its interests may be as important, or more important, in producing deviations from the party majority position than the prevailing level of two-party competition or the constituency's classification as "typical" or "atypical" of the party.

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By

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Roll Call Analysis

Beginning with the publication in 1902 of Lowell's study of roll call votes in British and American legislatures,¹ a significant body of research into the legislative process has used as its basic data the roll call vote.

These analyses have taken many forms and employed a variety of methodological devices. Lowell focused his attention on the varying incidence of "party votes" among all roll calls in successive time periods in several legislative bodies. A "party vote" by his definition was one on which 90 percent of one party voted in opposition to 90 percent of the other party. Turner has applied the same standard to an examination of roll call votes in four sessions of the House of Representatives in this century.² Others, including Westerfield³ and the editors of the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, have defined a "party vote" as one on which a majority of one party votes in opposition to a majority of the other party.

¹A. Lawrence Lowell, "The Influence of Party on Legislation," Annual Report of the American Historical Association, Vol. I, 1901, House Doc. 702, 57th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1902), pp. 321-544.

²Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, ("Studies in Historical and Political Science," Vol. LXIX, no. 1; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951).

³H. Bradford Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955).

Perhaps the most common types of roll call analyses have been those which attempt to characterize in one way or another the voting records of individuals or aggregates of legislators. Analysis of individual voting records has usually involved the summing of "pro" votes cast by the legislator on a given set of roll calls.⁴

As a measure of an individual's class tendency, the index of party loyalty used by Turner measures the loyalty of the individual legislator to the majority of his party on "party votes."⁵

The characterization of aggregates of legislators has been attempted in several ways. Grassmuck, in his study of the effects of sectionalism on foreign policy questions, compared regional-partisan aggregates by the percentage of "pro" votes they cast.⁶ Westerfield plotted frequency distributions of individual party support percentages in regional-partisan aggregates and then compared the several frequency distributions.⁷

Turner⁸ and Truman⁹ have employed the index of cohesion developed by Rice¹⁰ to compare the behavior of aggregates. Indexes of cohesion for

⁴Dean R. Brimhall and Arthur S. Otis, "Consistency of Voting by Our Congressmen," Journal of Applied Psychology, XXXII (1948), 1-7, 14; George L. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy, ("Studies in Historical and Political Science," Vol. LXVIII, no. 3; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951); Westerfield, op. cit.

⁵Turner, op. cit., pp. 78-79.

⁶Grassmuck, op. cit.

⁷Westerfield, op. cit.

⁸Turner, op. cit.

⁹David B. Truman, The Congressional Party, (New York: Wiley, 1959).

¹⁰Stuart A. Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics, (New York: Knopf, 1928), pp. 208-9.

each aggregate on single roll calls are summed and averaged to produce mean indexes of cohesion by which the aggregates may be compared.

A major problem in the characterization of the voting records of individuals and aggregates, not always acknowledged, is the problem of dimensionality, or of following the simple rule that one cannot obtain a meaningful sum by adding pounds and inches. A legislator may be "liberal" on one issue and "conservative" on another. The use of a single term or score to describe the voting record of such an individual obscures more than it reveals.

A scaling technique developed by Guttman¹¹ has been applied by several roll call analysts in an attempt to combat the dimensionality problem.¹² However, while unidimensionality will produce a Guttman scale, as MacRae has pointed out, "the attainment of such a scale unfortunately does not guarantee unidimensionality."¹³ Successful scales may also embody two or more highly correlated issues or may indicate coalition behavior.¹⁴

The scaling technique copes with other recurring problems in roll call analysis. Farris summarizes the advantages to be gained by the use of cumulative scales:

¹¹Louis Guttman, "A Basis for Scaling Qualitative Data," American Sociological Review, IX (1944), 139-50.

¹²George M. Belknap, "A Study of Senatorial Voting by Scale Analysis," (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1951); Charles D. Farris, "Scale Analysis of Roll Call Voting in the U. S. House of Representatives," Journal of the Alabama Academy of Sciences, XXVI (1954); N. L. Gage and Ben Shimberg, "Measuring Senatorial Progressivism," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLIV (1949), 112-17; Duncan MacRae, Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting, ("Publications in Sociology and Social Institutions," Vol. I, no. 3; Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958).

¹³MacRae, op. cit., p. 311.

¹⁴Charles D. Farris, "A Method of Determining Ideological Groupings in the Congress," Journal of Politics, XX (1958), 321.

Once a scale analyst has spanned a heterogeneous aggregate of roll calls with a variety of unidimensional scales, he has not only successfully coped with the selection problems, the problem of absent or undeclared members, and the problems of reliability, "additivity," and ordinarity. Using his scales, he is also prepared, with little or no further effort, to characterize individual members or aggregates of members, to compare the scale positions of members with others of their characteristics, to correlate one scale with others, and even (providing any of his scales contains "enough" roll calls) to isolate blocs in large, as well as in small, legislative bodies.¹⁵

Another type of roll call research is that which yields statements of relation between pairs of individuals, aggregates or pairs of roll calls.

Turner has employed both Rice's index of likeness and the Chi-square test. The index of likeness is designed to compare the behavior of two groups while the Chi-square test measures the significance in terms of probability of differences between two groups.¹⁶

The Rice-Beyle method of bloc analysis has been used in modified form by Truman in his analysis of the group structure of the two parties in the 81st Congress.¹⁷ The frequency of voting agreement between all possible pairs of members of a legislative body are tabulated in order to identify clusters of interrelated pairs whose attributes can then be studied.

Finally, Harris has applied the methods of factor analysis to roll call votes by determining tetrachoric coefficients of correlation between each pair of roll calls.¹⁸

¹⁵Ibid., p. 326.

¹⁶Turner, op. cit., pp. 36-37; Rice, op. cit., pp. 209-11.

¹⁷Truman, op. cit.; Rice, op. cit., pp. 228-38; Herman C. Beyle, Identification and Analysis of Attribute-Cluster-Blocs, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931).

¹⁸Chester W. Harris, "A Factor Analysis of Selected Senate Roll Calls, 80th Congress," Educational and Psychological Measurement, VIII (1948), 582-91.

Except for a few isolated cases of methodological madness, the motivation underlying roll call analysis has been the improved understanding of the functioning of representative government. The precise nature of the questions posed has varied with the values assigned by the individual analyst to such ideals as representative "independence," representative "responsibility," and party "responsibility." In general, however, the main questions have dealt with the influence of party, constituency, and, to a lesser extent, electoral security on voting behavior on different categories of issues.

Perhaps the question most central to the functioning of representative government within the framework of a party system is that of the relative effectiveness of party and constituency pressures on the legislator. Turner, in his comprehensive study of four sessions of the House of Representatives over a period of nearly 25 years, found that if constituency characteristics were held constant significant differences still persisted between Republican and Democratic Congressmen and so concluded that "party pressure seems to be more effective than any other pressure on Congressional voting."¹⁹

Criticism has been leveled at this conclusion by Smith and Field. They point out that Turner's conclusion rests on the use of certain methodological devices (indexes of cohesion, likeness, loyalty and the Chi-square test) which would aid in measuring the effectiveness of party pressure once its existence had been independently demonstrated but which cannot demonstrate that existence. Even in the absence of party pressure such measures, they argue, "are likely to give positive results for any group that has an historical basis of association."²⁰

¹⁹Turner, op. cit., p. 23.

²⁰Carl O. Smith and G. Lowell Field, "The Responsibility of Parties in Congress: Myth and Reality," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XXXIV (1953), 33-34.

Methodological arguments aside, Key suggests an alternative to the "either-or" approach to the problem of party and constituency pressures:

For analytical purposes the legislator may be regarded as under "pressures" from party and from constituency. When these pressures coincide, each re-enforces the other. When they diverge, the legislator is "cross-pressured" and may be pulled from the party position. . . . Constituency interests may disrupt party solidarity; the same forces may unify the party group. . . . Perhaps the moral is that party unity, to the extent that it exists, rests in large measure on similarities of district characteristics, and, inferentially, similarities of district attitudes and interests.²¹

If this is true, it might perhaps be possible to make crude predictions about the incidence of party voting among a group of legislators from a given state or area by examining the demographic basis of support of the two parties within that state or area.

Inevitably, however, the political scientist's interest focuses on the deviant case. Key states:

On some matters powerful forces operate to unite each party group in opposition to the other. On others, equally impelling forces operate to pull splinters or factions away from the position of the party group . . . durable factional elements within each party can be relied upon to bolt the party on certain categories of issues.²²

What kinds of issues cause a loss of cohesion in each of the parties? How are deviations from the party majority on such issues related to the representation of atypical constituencies and/or electoral insecurity?

Truman, in his study of the 81st Congress, found Democrats in the House of Representatives split on civil rights, internal security, labor and housing and relatively united on foreign policy, public works and agriculture. The findings with respect to the Republicans were exactly

²¹V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell and Co., 1958), pp. 736-37.

²²Ibid., pp. 731-32.

reversed. Roll calls involving economic controls produced low cohesion in both parties.²³

It is quite possible that examination of other Congresses would reveal different patterns. To date the literature has lacked sufficient comparisons of series of Congresses to determine the consistency of such patterns and the extent to which they are affected by changes in the majority and minority statuses of the parties and in the possession of the Presidency.

Turner found that deviations in party loyalty were often traceable to constituency interests. The Chi-square test discovered significant differences between representatives of foreign-born and native constituencies on economic questions and between representatives of metropolitan and rural constituencies on prohibition, immigration, agriculture, and some foreign policy and government control questions.²⁴ When the interests of party and constituency diverged, the resulting voting record usually fell midway between the extremes established by legislators whose party and constituency interests coincided.²⁵

MacRae's study of the Massachusetts House of Representatives showed that, on socio-economic issues, representatives coming from districts most typical of their parties showed the highest party loyalty while those coming from districts atypical of their party tended to cross party lines more often.²⁶

Watson found that the breakdown of party cohesion on the reciprocal trade controversy in recent years could be traced directly to changing economic conditions in certain sections of the country and that, therefore, the development was "consistent with the principle that voting in the

²³Truman, op. cit., p. 150.

²⁴Turner, op. cit., pp. 90-97, 127.

²⁵Ibid., p. 168.

²⁶Duncan MacRae, Jr., "The Relation between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, XLVI (1952), 1055.

national legislature reflects the dominant interests of the constituencies represented there."²⁷

The concept of "constituency pressure" must not be understood in too simple a sense. Pennock, in his study of the Congressional controversy over rigid vs. flexible farm price supports, points out a complicating factor. In 1954, 51 percent of the Democratic Congressmen from what he categorizes as "flexible" states left their party to vote for flexible price supports, presumably conforming to the interests of their constituencies. In 1955, however, organized labor put itself on record in support of rigid price supports and the percentage of Democratic party bolters in "flexible" states fell to 28. Pennock suggests that this move may have been a conscious effort on the part of organized labor to form a farmer-labor coalition. Whether it was or not, the simple classification of certain Democratic Congressmen as "cross-pressured" was complicated.²⁸

MacRae, in his scale analysis of voting behavior in the U. S. House of Representatives, found the scale positions to "reflect not merely the average or gross characteristics of a representative's district, but many other things as well. They may reflect a particular organization of supporting groups within the district, selective in relation to either party positions or individual differences among representatives. They may also reflect the representative's concern with audiences and groupings outside his district, such as a state delegation or a congressional committee. Thus they express a selectiveness in the representative's relation to his constituency: he may largely ignore certain interests in the constituency, and he may be responsive to others outside it."²⁹

²⁷R. A. Watson, "The Tariff Revolution: A Study of Shifting Party Attitudes," Journal of Politics, XVIII (1956), 698.

²⁸J. Roland Pennock, "Party and Constituency in Postwar Agricultural Price-Support Legislation," Journal of Politics, XVIII (1956), 167-210.

²⁹MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting, p. 281.

A problem closely related to that of constituency pressure is the effect of electoral security or insecurity on legislative voting behavior, the normal expectation being that a legislator who fears for his survival will be more than usually solicitous of the views of his constituents.

MacRae found evidence to support this expectation in his Massachusetts study. Those legislators with wide margins in the previous election tended to be party regulars while those with close election margins tended to cross party lines more frequently and to do so in line with constituency interests.³⁰

In his study of the U. S. House of Representatives in the 81st Congress, MacRae found that Republicans with close election margins had scale positions more closely associated with their constituencies than those with wide election margins. He did not find the same responsiveness on the part of Democrats with close election margins.³¹

Turner, studying the "survival" of Congressmen, found that those who bolted their party to follow the interests of their constituency were generally returned to office while those who disregarded both party and constituency were less likely to achieve re-election.³²

Huntington, in a somewhat differently oriented study, discovered that the parties were ideologically further apart in urban and suburban districts and closer in rural districts. Finding also that rural elections were less closely contested than suburban and urban elections, he proceeded to infer a relationship between the existence of ideological parties and high electoral competition.³³ This theory is diametrically opposed to a more generally

³⁰MacRae, "The Relation between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," 1051-52.

³¹MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting, p. 287.

³²Turner, op. cit., p. 175.

³³Samuel P. Huntington, "A Revised Theory of American Party Politics," American Political Science Review, XLIV (1950), 669-77.

held belief that high electoral competition in a given district will have a moderating effect on the parties contending for the so-called independent vote. MacRae's data in the Massachusetts study supports the latter theory. He points out that Huntington traced ideological divergence between the parties to underlying cleavages within the constituency which may also have the effect of producing close elections and concluded that the inter-relation of these two variables can best be clarified by examining each separately rather than inferring a direct causal relation.³⁴

With the introduction of scaling to roll call analysis a major concern has been to delineate "dimensions" of legislative conflict. Research over the past decade has revealed four principal dimensions:

1. The conflict between labor and management, often broadened into a conflict over welfare measures.
2. An urban-rural conflict.
3. The allocation of power between the two parties.
4. Foreign policy questions.³⁵

Foreign policy has been clearly isolated as a dimension separate from domestic issues by Gage and Shimberg,³⁶ Belknap³⁷ and MacRae.³⁸

These studies and others have also revealed a general dimension of domestic liberalism-conservatism although there are instances where refinements can be made. For example, MacRae found that Republican members of the House of Representatives in the 81st Congress required two scales in this area while the Democrats required only one. He distinguished between the two Republican scales by designating one as

³⁴MacRae, "The Relation between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," 1054.

³⁵MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting, p. 213.

³⁶Gage and Shimberg, op. cit.

³⁷Belknap, op. cit.

³⁸MacRae, op. cit., 237-40.

"labor-relations" and the other as "welfare-state."³⁹

Although MacRae was able to include civil liberties votes in his general "Fair Deal" scale for the Democrats, the grouping of these issues at one end of the scale clearly indicated a difference in content.⁴⁰ He also found separate scales in each party for race relations and agricultural issues.

Farris, with a somewhat different approach to scaling, was able to construct 27 scales for the House of Representatives in the 79th Congress. In order to define ideological groupings in the House he chose for his analysis scales on foreign policy, selective service, labor, un-American activities, Negroes, and immigration and naturalization.⁴¹

The isolation of dimensions of legislative conflict, whether approached as an inclusive or exclusive operation, undoubtedly provides more refined data for answering the questions posed by roll call analysis.

Purpose and Scope of the Present Study

The purpose of the present study is to raise some of the traditional questions of roll call analysis by examining the voting behavior of a regional grouping of members of the U. S. House of Representatives on a range of issues eliciting roll call votes in the 85th and 86th Congresses (1957-1960), a period of Congressional history not yet covered by the existing literature.

Specifically, the study will examine the relationship of voting behavior on different issues to the variables of party, constituency and electoral competition.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 229-32.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 227-28.

⁴¹Farris, op. cit., p. 328.

What issues produce a high degree of cohesion within each party group? On what issues does the greatest amount of deviation from the majority position of each party group occur?

What is the relationship between such deviations and the representation of atypical constituencies and electoral security or insecurity?

Do the bases of support and opposition within the party groups differ from one type of issue to another?

The three states whose Congressmen have been chosen for examination, Indiana, Michigan and Ohio, lie in a geographical region designated by the Bureau of the Census as East North Central. While this section cannot be described as typical politically of the country as a whole, it may be said to be less marked by regional peculiarities (i. e., the combination of isolationism and agrarian radicalism that has distinguished the West North Central area) than many other regions. Nevertheless, it will not be possible to make generalizations about Congressional behavior at large from the data derived from this limited study. Hopefully, however, an understanding of the behavior patterns in one part may provide points of departure for understanding behavior patterns in the whole.

Chapter II will describe the selection of issues for analysis and the distribution of positions on these issues.

Issues will be selected from the total of those giving rise to roll call votes for their national significance and their ability to distinguish among the group of 52 Congressmen whose records are examined.

Individual voting records will be expressed by scores derived from cumulative scales. Scaling as a technique will be employed in what the writer chooses to term an exclusive rather than an inclusive manner, i. e., it is hoped that scale scores will represent single attitudes rather than similar attitudes or coalition behavior.

Chapter III will examine the relationship between scale scores and the variables of party, constituency and electoral insecurity. Constituencies will be characterized by their percentage of urban population.

Chapter IV will summarize the findings of the study and discuss the relevance of those findings for future research in the legislative process.

CHAPTER II

THE ISSUES

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the selection of issues for use in this study and the distribution of positions on these issues assumed by Congressmen from the three-state area.

The nature of these issues and the responses to them must be understood against the political backdrop of the four-year period.

The Political Arena

In November 1956, despite the overwhelming re-election of Dwight D. Eisenhower, a Republican President, the Democrats retained nominal control of both houses of Congress. The Democratic landslide of November 1958 saw the Democrats increase their margin over the Republicans in the House of Representatives from 35 to 130.¹

Liberals in the Democratic Party eagerly interpreted these election returns as mandates for new and more extensive liberal programs. The Democratic Advisory Council, formed in the wake of the 1956 election as a forum for the "Presidential" wing of the Party, began producing policy statements in January 1959 which ranged from a "Statement on Alaska-Hawaii Statehood"² to "Can America Afford Increased Federal Expenditures For Essential National Purposes?"³ Beginning in December 1958, detailed policy statements on foreign and domestic issues were published by the Council in pamphlet form.

¹Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XVII, 1 (January 2, 1959), ii, 4.

²February 16, 1957.

³February 16, 1958.

Liberal intellectuals within the Party began talking in terms of a "coming political breakthrough,"⁴ a new "national consensus,"⁵ and "qualitative" as opposed to "quantitative" liberalism.⁶

Although the Democratic Congressional leadership remained largely unmoved by the liberal fervor, a group of Democratic Congressmen attempted to promote liberal legislation in the House of Representatives. On January 8, 1957 a group of 28 Democrats announced a program of legislative goals for the 85th Congress and by January 20 a total of 80 Democratic Congressmen had signed this liberal manifesto. Among the goals outlined were: "an adequate foreign aid program; . . . civil rights; . . . Federal aid for school construction, medical education, and housing; . . . assisting depressed areas; strengthening the unemployment compensation system; repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act; extending coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act; . . . stepping up public works projects for rivers and harbors, hydro-electric and flood-control dams. . . ."⁷ The group determined to introduce legislation covering each provision of their program and to resort when necessary to the use of the discharge petition to see that these measures were brought to the floor.⁸

On September 9, 1959 the liberal Congressmen organized as the Democratic Study Group. Although membership lists were not made available, the participants reportedly included from 125 to 150 Democrats.

⁴Chester Bowles, The Coming Political Breakthrough, (New York: Harper, 1959).

⁵Ibid.

⁶Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Shape of National Politics To Come, (a memorandum printed for private circulation, 1959).

⁷Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XV, 2 (January 11, 1957), 59.

⁸Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XV, 7 (February 15, 1957), 225.

During the 86th Congress staff memoranda were prepared and speeches and statements reproduced and distributed in an effort to keep members adequately informed on the issues.⁹

On many important issues the liberal Democrats found their opposition in a coalition of conservative Democrats and Republicans. Based on its examination of three key roll calls, the Democratic Study Group found the House divided in 1959 between a liberal coalition of 178 Democrats and 18 Republicans and a conservative coalition of 95 Democrats and 130 Republicans.¹⁰

The position of the conservative coalition was often strengthened by the position of the White House and by the occasional threat of a Presidential veto. In a 1957 press conference, President Eisenhower admitted that he had "grown more conservative," if anything, since he had become President; that he "was absolutely against trifling with our financial integrity"; and that he believed "programs must be studied very, very carefully to see that we are not taking on more of a load than is good for the whole country."¹¹

⁹"Liberal House Democrats Organize for Action," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XVIII, 2 (January 8, 1960), 39-40.

The following Congressmen from Indiana, Michigan and Ohio were among the original group of 28 liberals: Madden (Indiana 1st), Machrowicz (Michigan 1st), Ashley (Ohio 9th), Hays (Ohio 18th) and Vanik (Ohio 21st). They were joined in signing the liberal manifesto by Denton (Indiana 8th), Diggs (Michigan 13th), Rabaut (Michigan 14th), Dingell (Michigan 15th), Lesinski (Michigan 16th) and Griffiths (Michigan 17th). Of the nine freshmen Democrats in the 86th Congress, reported participants in the Democratic Study Group were: Brademas (Indiana 3rd), Roush (Indiana 5th), O'Hara (Michigan 7th), Moeller (Ohio 10th) and Levering (Ohio 17th).

Those Democrats from the three-state area with no reported participation in the liberal group were: Wampler (Indiana 6th), Hogan (Indiana 9th), Harmon (Indiana 10th), Barr (Indiana 11th), Polk (Ohio 6th), Cook (Ohio 11th), Kirwan (Ohio 19th) and Feighan (Ohio 20th).

¹⁰The Republican-Southern Democratic Coalition - 1937-1959, (Democratic Study Group, Staff Memorandum, December 1959), p. 1.

¹¹Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XV, 20 (May 17, 1957), 604.

Among the pieces of legislation vetoed in this four-year period were area redevelopment bills in 1958 and 1960, a public works authorization in 1958, a public works appropriation in 1959, and an omnibus housing bill in 1959.¹²

In spite of the President's growing conservative convictions, or perhaps as a result, the legislative initiative during this period fell largely to the liberal Democrats in the House. Two notable exceptions were foreign aid programs and labor reform legislation which, as the Republican National Chairman reported in June of 1959, were the President's major legislative concerns in that session.¹³

The lack of initiative on the part of the President can be attributed also to his conception of the executive's role in the legislative process. Something of this conception can be gleaned from the following 1958 press conference exchange:

Q. . . . Mr. President you will recall, sir, that you regretted the defeat last session of the bill for relief of chronically depressed areas. Now at this session such a bill, a combined operation of Sen. Paul Douglas and Sen. Payne of Maine, a bipartisan thing, has already passed the Senate, but supporters of the bill are fearful that it may be blocked in the House. Now unless they feel, unless, they say, a strong push comes from the White House in time. Now would you comment on the importance of legislation providing a real program for depressed areas?

The President: Well, of course you know this, that time and again I have recommended Congressional action, to this, but I would like to point out, I am pushing a defense bill. I am pushing a foreign trade bill, I am -- or reciprocal trade. I am pushing mutual security. I am pushing a lot of other programs, so I don't know whether I could just take time off and push here for a week or so in the one you are talking about. But I will do this. I will ask my people to see whether they want to analyze it or they will analyze

¹²Ibid., XVII, 40 (October 2, 1959), 1340; Ibid., XVIII, 21 (May 20, 1960), 908.

¹³Ibid., XVII, 25 (June 19, 1959), 830.

it to see whether there is anything in it that would prevent me from doing so. I am in favor of the principle.¹⁴

It was on this political arena that the issues to be examined in this study were considered.

Selection of Roll Calls

From among the issues raised in the 85th and 86th Congresses, seven issue areas were selected upon which to ascertain the positions of the Congressmen from the three-state area. The following issue areas were chosen as being of national significance and as representing various facets of a liberal legislative program:

1. Civil rights
2. Labor measures
3. Housing
4. Aid to education
5. Public works
6. Foreign aid
7. Civil liberties

Following the selection of these "preliminary universes of content," roll calls falling into each category for each Congress were examined for their ability to form cumulative scales.¹⁵ Those roll calls which would not scale or which produced a large number of errors were eliminated.

In constructing the scales priority was put upon a high degree of reproducibility (small number of errors) and the production of no less than four nor more than five scale types. In the majority of cases only one roll call was used for each cutting point. Occasionally two roll calls which elicited identical responses were included for a cutting point simply to

¹⁴Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XVI, 23 (June 6, 1958), 715.

¹⁵See Louis Guttman, "A Basis for Scaling Qualitative Data," American Sociological Review, IX (1944), 139-50.

illustrate their similarity. In one case a contrived item based on three roll calls was used with the value assigned based on two out of three responses.¹⁶

Two problems which arise in the use of cumulative scales are the placing of individuals with absences and with nonscale responses. Nonscale types were placed only when one correction could produce but one scale type. When more than one correction was required to produce a scale type or when one correction could produce more than one scale type the individual was not placed for that scale.

When an absence occurred immediately above the highest positive response, the individual was not placed for that scale. In all other cases, the individual was placed according to his highest positive response.

Scale for 85th Congress

Scales were constructed for members of the 85th Congress from the three-state area in every issue area except Housing, which produced only one roll call in this period. Tables 1-6 show the composition of the scales and the distribution of scores for each scale.¹⁷ On each scale the highest numbered scale type indicates the most "liberal" position and the lowest numbered scale type indicates the most "conservative" position.

The Labor scale is composed of roll calls on three separate issues--temporary unemployment compensation, area redevelopment, and labor management reform--but because of the high degree of reproducibility (.996) it appeared proper to include the roll calls in a single scale.

¹⁶See S. A. Stouffer, E. F. Borgatta, D. G. Hays, and A. F. Henry, "A Technique for Improving Cumulative Scales," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVI (1952), 273-91.

¹⁷For a more detailed presentation of the placement of individuals in scale types see Appendix A.

Table 1. Labor Scale, 85th Congress

Scale type	Number placed	Item number	Identification *
0	2		
1	20	1	(2-30) Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958: passage (Y)
2	5	2	(2-78) Area Redevelopment Act of 1958: open rule for consideration (Y)
3	7	3	(2-79) Area Redevelopment Act of 1958: to recommit (N)
4	15	4	(2-81) Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1958: to suspend rules and pass (Y)
			(2-29) Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958: amendment to substitute Administration bill (N)

Not classified 3

52

*Numbers in parentheses refer to the session and the roll call number assigned by the Congressional Quarterly Almanac. The letter in parentheses following the identification indicates the roll call response designated as "positive" on the scale.

The small number of cases in scale type 0 should not be interpreted as meaning that there was no real anti-labor group in the three-state area since the unemployment compensation bill as it was finally passed was a very emasculated version of the original bill supported by the pro-labor group. Actually scale types 0 and 1 together represent a large anti-labor bloc.

In constructing the Public Works scale it was found that only roll calls on general authorization and appropriation measures could be used, since roll calls on amendments dealing with specific projects elicited responses which suggested the presence of local interests and "log rolling" rather than general attitudes toward public works spending. The distribution of scale types indicates differing positions on the size of the authorization but little total rejection of this type of expenditure.

Table 2. Public Works Scale, 85th Congress

Scale type	Number placed	Item number	Identification
0	1		
1	18	1	(2-44) River and Harbor and Flood Control Acts of 1958: passage of revised version of vetoed bill (Y)
2	17	2	(2-11) River and Harbor and Flood Control Acts of 1958: passage (Y)
3	15	3	(2-10) River and Harbor and Flood Control Acts of 1958: to recommit with instructions to delete projects and reduce costs (N)
Not classified <u>1</u>			
52			

The Education scale contains votes on two measures--aid to school construction, and a program including loans to students, fellowships and grants for the improvement of certain instructional facilities. The distribution of scores shows large groups at both extremes of the scale with a very small group accepting the weaker aid program.

Table 3. Education Scale, 85th Congress

Scale type	Number placed	Item number	Identification
0	20		
1	3	1	(2-73) National Defense Education Act for 1958: open rule for consideration (Y)
2	1	2	(2-83) National Defense Education Act of 1958: resolution requesting conference (Y)
			(2-93) National Defense Education Act of 1958: conference report (Y)
3	4	3	(2-74) National Defense Education Act of 1958: to recommit (N)
4	20	4	(1-56) School Construction Assistance Act of 1957: to strike enacting clause (N)
Not classified	<u>4</u>		
	52		

The Civil Rights scale deals exclusively with the 1957 Civil Rights Act and reveals a heavy majority support group with little total opposition.

Table 4. Civil Rights Scale, 85th Congress

Scale type	Number placed	Item number	Identification
0	3		
1	1	1	(1-96) Civil Rights Act of 1957: adoption of modified jury trial provision (Y)
			(1-95) Civil Rights Act of 1957: to end debate on provision amending Senate's jury trial amendment (Y)
2	6	2	(1-42) Civil Rights Act of 1957: passage (Y)
3	41	3	(1-41) Civil Rights Act of 1957: to recommit with instructions to insert jury trial provision (N)
Not classified	<u>1</u>		
	52		

The Foreign Aid scale contains two roll calls on appropriations and one on authorization for 1957. It was found that amendments dealing specifically with military aid produced response patterns that would not scale with votes on economic aid and general authorization and appropriation votes. The distribution of scale positions shows a large total opposition group and a smaller group supporting the President's budget requests.

Table 5. Foreign Aid Scale, 85th Congress

Scale type	Number placed	Item number	Identification
0	22		
1	5	1 (1-82)	Mutual Security Appropriation Bill for fiscal 1958: passage (Y)
2	9	2 (1-53)	Mutual Security Act of 1957: to recommit with instructions to delete provision for creation of Development Loan Fund (N)
3	16	3 (1-81)	Mutual Security Appropriation Bill for fiscal 1958: to recommit with instructions to restore cut from President's request (Y)
Not classified	<u>0</u>		
	52		

The Civil Liberties scale contains votes on three measures intended specifically to overrule three Supreme Court decisions--the 1956 Nelson case which negated state anti-subversive laws on the ground that Congress had preempted Federal jurisdiction in this field; the 1957 Mallory case which held that a confession obtained during an unreasonable delay in arraigning a prisoner was invalid; and the 1956 Cole decision which held that the government's power to fire security risks extended only to "sensitive" jobs.¹⁸

¹⁸Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XIV (1958), 78.

Table 6. Civil Liberties Scale, 85th Congress

Scale type	Number placed	Item number	Identification
0	34		
1	2	1	(2-63) Provide that no act of Congress be construed as nullifying state laws unless so specified by Congress or unless there was an irreconcilable conflict between a Federal and state law: to recommit (Y)
2	4	2	(2-64) Provide that no act of Congress be construed . . : passage (N) (2-62) Provide that no act of Congress be construed . . : amend to provide that no subversive activities law already passed by Congress should be construed as invalidating state anti-subversive laws (N)
3	4	3	(2-54) "Mallory rule" bill to amend Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: passage (N)
4	8	4	(2-60) Extend Government's security program: passage (N)
Not classified	<u>0</u>		
	52		

The most cursory glance at the frequency distributions on the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties scales indicates that the support and opposition groups are not closely associated with those on the other scales.

Table 7 shows the association between the Labor and Foreign Aid scale types to be relatively small. Although there is a sizeable conservative consensus, beyond that the distributions fly apart. Two persons totally opposed to foreign aid have the highest scale position on labor while six with low labor scores have high foreign aid scores.

Table 7. Relation Between Labor and Foreign Aid Scales, 85th Congress

Position on Labor scale	Position on Foreign Aid Scale					Total
	0	1	2	3	Not placed	
0	2					2
1	13		1	6		20
2	1	1		3		5
3	3	1		3		7
4	2	2	8	3		15
Not placed					3	
	21	4	9	15	3	52

The associations between the frequency distributions on the Labor, Public Works and Education scales are much closer with consistent support and opposition groups. Yet Tables 8 and 9 indicate that there are sources of support for education among those who only moderately support labor and public works measures and that there are sources of moderate support for labor and public works among those totally opposed to aid to education.

Table 8. Relation Between Labor and Education Scales, 85th Congress

Position on Labor scale	Position on Education Scale						Total
	0	1	2	3	4	Not placed	
0	2						2
1	13	2	1	1	1		18
2	1			1	3		5
3	2			2	1		5
4		1			13		14
Not placed						8	
	18	3	1	4	18	8	52

Table 9. Relation Between Public Works and Education Scales, 85th Congress

Position on Public Works	Position on Education Scale						Total
	0	1	2	3	4	Not placed	
0	1						1
1	11	1	1		4		17
2	8	1		3	3		15
3		1		1	12		14
Not placed						5	
	20	3	1	4	19	5	52

Table 10 reveals the close association between the Labor and Public Works scale distributions.

Table 10. Relation Between Labor and Public Works Scales, 85th Congress

Position on Labor scale	Position on Public Works Scale					Total
	0	1	2	3	Not placed	
0		2				2
1	1	10	9			20
2		3	2			5
3		1	5	1		7
4			1	14		15
Not placed					3	
	1	16	17	15	3	52

Scales for 86th Congress

Scales were constructed for members of the 86th Congress from the three-state area in all seven issue areas. A Labor Reform scale was also constructed when it was found that the inclusion of such roll calls in the general Labor scale would distort the scale positions. Tables 11-19 show the composition of the scales and the distribution of scores for each scale.

The Labor scale contains roll calls on minimum wage and area redevelopment bills. Only two significant votes on the area redevelopment bill were selected from a large number of tactical roll calls taken on the bill which did not produce consistent response patterns.

The distribution of scale positions shows a strong pro-labor group and a sizeable group that supported a weakened minimum wage bill. The distributions on the two Labor scales suggest that the anti-labor contingent has resorted to the tactic of weakening rather than totally opposing labor legislation.

Table 11. Labor Scale, 86th Congress

Scale type	Number placed	Item number	Identification
0	8		
1	14	1	(2-76) Increase minimum wage protection under Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: passage (Y)
2	4	2	(2-36) Area Redevelopment Act: passage (Y)
			(2-35) Area Redevelopment Act: to recommit (N)
3	23	3	(2-75) Increase minimum wage protection under Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Kitchin substitute (N)
Not classified <u>2</u>			
51*			

* Ohio's 6th district seat was vacant during most of the 86th Congress

Votes on the labor reform bill were found to form a scale associated with the general Labor scale but with severe dislocations in a number of cases.

Table 12. Relation Between Labor and Labor Reform Scales, 86th Congress

Position on Labor scale	Position on Labor Reform Scale						Total
	0	1	2	3	4	Not placed	
0	8						8
1	14						14
2	3		1				4
3		5	2	13	3		23
Not placed						2	
	25	5	3	13	3	2	51

The frequency distribution for the Labor Reform scale shows a larger anti-labor group and a smaller pro-labor group than for the general Labor scale with only three cases giving down-the-line support to organized labor.

Table 13. Labor Reform Scale, 86th Congress

Scale type	Number placed	Item number	Identification
0	26		
1	6	1	(1-58) Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959: Landrum-Griffin substitute (N)
2	3	2	(1-59) Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959: to re-commit (Y)
3	13	3	(1-60) Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959: passage (N)
4	3	4	(1-78) Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959: conference report (N)
Not classified	<u>0</u>		
	51		

The Public Works scale shows a sharper cleavage between the two ends of the scale than for the previous Public Works scale but again small total opposition to public works spending. The difference in distributions may be due to the fact that the earlier scale is composed of authorization roll calls while the second scale is composed of appropriation roll calls.

Table 14. Public Works Scale, 86th Congress.

Scale type	Number placed	Item number	Identification
0	5		
1	19	1	(1-34) Fiscal 1960 Public Works appropriation: passage (Y)
2	2	2	(1-85) Fiscal 1960 Public Works appropriation (revised bill): passage over veto (Y)
3	4	3	(1-74) Fiscal 1960 Public Works appropriation: passage over veto (Y)
4	20	4	(1-33) Fiscal 1960 Public Works appropriation: to recommit with instructions to reduce (N)
Not classified	<u>1</u>		
	51		

The Education scale is composed entirely of votes on a school construction bill. As before, there are strong support and opposition groups.

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Table 15. Education Scale, 86th Congress

Scale type	Number placed	Item number	Identification
0	16		
1	3	1	(2-48) School Construction Assistance Act of 1960: open rule for debate (Y)
2	7	2	(2-53) School Construction Assistance Act of 1960: passage (Y)
3	20	3	(2-50) School Construction Assistance Act of 1960: Bow substitute (N)
Not classified	<u>5</u>		
	51		

The Housing scale is composed of votes on the 1959 Housing Act and one vote on the Emergency Home Ownership Act of 1960. The distribution of scale types shows strong groups at both extremes of the scale.

Table 16. Housing Scale, 86th Congress

Scale type	Number placed	Item number	Identification
0	17		
1	3	1	(1-69) Housing Act of 1959 (revised bill): passage (Y)
2	1	2	(1-23) Housing Act of 1959: passage (Y)
3	3	3	(1-68) Housing Act of 1959 (revised bill): to recommit with instructions to reduce urban renewal program and delete college classroom program (N)
4	23	4	(1-45) Housing Act of 1959: conference report (Y)
			(2-23) Emergency Home Ownership Act: passage (N)
			(1-22) Housing Act of 1959: to recommit and substitute bill authorizing no public housing and cutting total authorization (N)
Not classified	<u>4</u>		
	51		

The Civil Rights scale is composed of votes on the 1960 Civil Rights Act and shows a frequency distribution nearly identical to that on the 1957 Act.

Table 17. Civil Rights Scale, 86th Congress

Scale type	Number placed	Item number	Identification
0	4		
1	1	1	(2-19) Civil Rights Act of 1960: approval of Senate amendments (Y)
2	1	2	(2-15) Civil Rights Act of 1960: passage (Y)
3	2	3	(2-14) Civil Rights Act of 1960: to recommit with instructions to delete provision making it a crime to obstruct court orders for school desegregation (N)
4	43	4	(2-13) Civil Rights Act of 1960: amendment embodying Administration's proposal for court-appointed referees (Y)
Not classified	<u>0</u>		
	51		

The Foreign Aid scale includes 1959 votes on appropriations and 1960 votes on both authorization and appropriation bills. Two 1959 and one 1960 appropriation votes have been combined to form a contrived item. Again it was found that votes on military aid would not fit the scale. The frequency distribution is similar to that on the previous Foreign Aid scale.

Table 18. Foreign Aid Scale, 86th Congress

Scale type	Number placed	Item number	Identification
0	21		
1	3	1*	(1-86) Mutual Security and Related Agencies Appropriation bill: conference report (Y)
			(1-56) Mutual Security and Related Agencies Appropriation bill: passage (Y)
			(2-62) Mutual Security and Related Agencies Appropriations for fiscal 1961: passage (Y)
2	5	2	(2-20) Mutual Security Act of 1960: passage (Y)
3	20	3	(2-93) Mutual Security and Related Agencies Appropriations for fiscal 1961: to agree to Senate amendment adding special assistance funds (Y)
Not classified <u>2</u>			
51			

* Contrived item.

The Civil Liberties scale is again composed of votes on measures intended to overrule Supreme Court decisions. These include votes on measures aimed at the Nelson and Mallory cases previously described and one vote on a measure aimed at the 1958 Kent case wherein the Court held that Congress had never given the State Department the authority to deny passports to American citizens solely because of their beliefs or associations.¹⁹

¹⁹Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XV (1959), 80.

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Table 19. Civil Liberties Scale, 86th Congress

Scale type	Number placed	Item number	Identification
0	28		
1	4	1	(1-47) Permit Federal courts to strike down state laws under the Federal preemption doctrine only if Congress had specified its intention to preempt the field of legislation involved or if a state and Federal law were in irreconcilable conflict and permit state enforcement of laws barring subversive activities against the Federal Government; passage (N)
			(1-46) Permit Federal courts . . . : to recommit (Y)
2	16	2	(1-52) "Mallory rule" bill to amend Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: passage (N)
3	2	3	(1-83) Permit President to declare certain areas off-limits for travel by U. S. citizens and give State Department power to deny passports to Communists and Communist sympathizers: passage (N)
Not classified <u>1</u>			
51			

As in the 85th Congress, the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties scale types are not closely associated with each other or with those on the other scales.

Table 20 reiterates the lack of association between scale positions on the Labor and Foreign Aid scales.

Table 20. Relation Between Labor and Foreign Aid Scales, 86th Congress

Position on Labor scale	Position on Foreign Aid Scale					Total
	0	1	2	3	Not placed	
0	6			1		7
1	7		2	5		14
2	1			3		4
3	6	3	3	10		22
Not placed					4	
	20	3	5	19	4	51

The scales most closely related are Labor, Public Works and Housing. Table 21 shows the relation between the Public Works and Housing scales.

Table 21. Relation Between Public Works and Housing Scales, 86th Congress

Position on Public Works	Position on Housing Scale					Total
	0	1	2	3	4	
0	4					4
1	11	3	1	3		18
2	2					2
3					3	3
4					20	
Not placed						4
	17	3	1	3	23	4
						51

The Education scale is less closely related to the Labor, Public Works and Housing scales as shown in Table 22.

Table 22. Relation Between Housing and Education Scales, 86th Congress

Position on Housing scale	Position on Education Scale					Total
	0	1	2	3	Not placed	
0	11	1	3			15
1	2			1		3
2			1			1
3	1		1	1		3
4		1	2	18		21
Not placed					8	8
	14	2	7	20	8	51

Summary

Scales have been constructed in eight areas: Labor (2), Labor Reform (1), Public Works (2), Housing (1), Education (2), Civil Rights (2), Foreign Aid (2), and Civil Liberties (2).

The frequency distribution of scale scores shows strong pro- and anti-labor groups, with the anti-labor majority voting for weakened bills rather than opposing all legislation.

The Labor Reform scale reveals a larger anti-labor and smaller pro-labor group than on general labor issues.

The Public Works scales indicate different positions on the amount of spending but little total opposition to public works legislation.

The Housing, Education and Foreign Aid scales show large groups at both scale extremes.

The Civil Rights and Civil Liberties scales have lop-sided frequency distributions--a large positive majority on Civil Rights and a large negative majority on Civil Liberties.

An examination of association between scale positions reveals that the Civil Rights, Civil Liberties and Foreign Aid scales are relatively unassociated with each other and with the remaining scales.

The Labor and Public Works scales form a "domestic liberalism" nucleus around which the remaining scales are grouped. Housing is the most closely associated while Labor Reform and Education have more independent distributions.

Chapter III will examine the relation of the distribution of scale scores to party cohesion and the relation of deviations from the party majority to constituency and electoral characteristics.

CHAPTER III

PARTY, CONSTITUENCY AND ELECTORAL SECURITY

Chapter II described the selection of roll call votes, the construction of scales and the size and position of the support and opposition groups on these scales.

The purpose of this chapter is, first, to show the relation of these support and opposition, or liberal and conservative, groups to cohesion within the Democratic and Republican party groups in the three-state area. Which issues produced a high degree of cohesion within each party group and which issues caused great dissension within each party group?

The second purpose of this chapter, and indeed of this study as a whole, is to examine the relation between party cohesion, or the lack of it, and the constituency and electoral characteristics of the party group.

Party Cohesion

Table 23 shows the division of partisan control of the Congressional districts in the three-state area for the two Congresses and for the total four-year period.

The effect of each issue on party cohesion can be expressed by the number of individuals who deviated from the modal scale type for the party. These deviations will provide the data for subsequent analyses in this study.

Party cohesion can also be expressed by the use of an index of cohesion based on the roll calls composing each scale. This is a more accurate expression since it takes into account the degree of the deviations

Table 23. Partisan Control of Congressional Districts, 85th and 86th Congresses *

85th Congress		86th Congress		Total	
Democrats	14	Democrats	23	Democrats	37
Republicans	38	Republicans	28	Republicans	66
Vacancies	0	Vacancies	1	Vacancies	1
52		52		104	

* See Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1957 and 1959.

and also includes the votes of individuals whose response patterns included errors and who were either placed in a scale type in spite of the error or were not placed for that scale.

Tables 24 and 25 give these two expressions of cohesion for the two party groups on each of the scales described in Chapter II.

Comparison of Democratic cohesion scores for similar scales in the two Congresses shows a high degree of consistency except in the case of Foreign Aid where the cohesion score dropped sharply in the 86th Congress.

The Democratic group, for the total period, showed a high degree of cohesion on Housing, Labor, Public Works, Civil Rights and Education. Cohesion dropped on Civil Liberties, especially in terms of the number of deviations from the modal scale type. Labor Reform produced still greater dissension as measured by the index of cohesion while Foreign Aid had the most divisive effect on the Democratic group.

A comparison of cohesion scores for similar scales in the two Congresses shows a relatively high degree of consistency for the Republican group, as it did for the Democratic group.

Table 24. Cohesion Among Democratic Congressmen as Expressed by the Number of Deviations From the Modal Scale Type and by an Index of Cohesion

Scale	Modal Scale Type	Number of Deviations		Cohesion Index
		+	-	
<u>85th Congress:</u>				
Labor	4	0	0	100
Public Works	3	0	0	100
Civil Rights	3	0	1	97
Education	4	0	1	86
Civil Liberties	4	0	7	68
Foreign Aid	2	3	3	65
<u>86th Congress:</u>				
Housing	4	0	0	100
Labor	3	0	0	95
Public Works	4	0	3	94
Civil Rights	4	0	1	93
Civil Liberties	2	2	5	84
Education	3	0	3	83
Labor Reform	3	3	8	63
Foreign Aid	3	0	11	27
<u>Total:</u>				
Housing		0	0	100
Labor		0	0	98
Public Works		0	3	97
Civil Rights		0	2	95
Education		0	4	85
Civil Liberties		2	12	76
Labor Reform		3	8	63
Foreign Aid		3	14	46

Table 25. Cohesion Among Republican Congressmen as Expressed by the Number of Deviations From the Modal Scale Type and by an Index of Cohesion

Scale	Modal Scale Type	Number of Deviations		Cohesion Index
		+	-	
<u>85th Congress:</u>				
Civil Liberties	0	4	0	89
Civil Rights	3	0	9	72
Labor	1	13	2	71
Public Works	1	17	1	63
Education	0	14	0	36
Foreign Aid	0	17	0	21
<u>86th Congress:</u>				
Civil Liberties	0	2	0	93
Labor Reform	0	2	0	91
Public Works	1	3	5	85
Housing	0	7	0	77
Civil Rights	4	0	7	68
Labor	1	5	8	65
Education	0	9	0	44
Foreign Aid	0	11	0	23
<u>Total:</u>				
Labor Reform		2	0	91
Civil Liberties		6	0	91
Housing		7	0	77
Public Works		22	6	74
Civil Rights		0	16	70
Labor		18	10	68
Education		23	0	40
Foreign Aid		28	0	22

Labor Reform and Civil Liberties produced the highest cohesion among Republicans. Housing, Public Works, Civil Rights and Labor produced a lesser degree of cohesion. The most divisive issues for the Republicans were Education and Foreign Aid.

It is also apparent from these tables that the Democratic group consistently formed the support, or liberal, group on these issues. However, in two cases--Foreign Aid in the 85th Congress and Civil Liberties in the 86th Congress--the Democratic modal scale type represented a moderate rather than an ultra-liberal position.

The Republicans consistently formed the opposition, or conservative, group on these issues with the exception of Civil Rights where they joined the Democrats to form a bi-partisan liberal majority. However, on Labor and Public Works in both Congresses their modal scale type represented a moderate rather than an ultra-conservative position.

The Republican group was less cohesive than the Democratic group on all issues except Civil Liberties and Labor Reform. It is also of interest to note that the same issue--Foreign Aid--produced the lowest cohesion in both party groups.

Constituency and Electoral Characteristics of the Party Groups

Key has suggested, as noted in Chapter I, "that party unity . . . rests in large measure on similarities of district characteristics. . . ."¹ Is there a relation between party cohesion and constituency and electoral characteristics of the party groups in this three-state area?

¹V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., 1958), pp. 736-37.

For purposes of analysis, constituencies will be classified as "metropolitan," "mid-urban," and "rural."²

Table 26 indicates that the Democratic Party group is most closely identified with metropolitan constituencies and that the Republican Party group is most closely identified with rural constituencies. However, it also shows that the correlation between party control and constituency type is not high since 45 percent of the Democrats represented non-metropolitan constituencies and 50 percent of the Republicans represented urban, or non-rural, constituencies.³

²Data for this classification, based on the 1950 Census, was obtained from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1956, pp. 790-91. For purposes of simplification, their categories of "small town" and "rural" have been combined to form a single "rural" category.

The three categories employed in this study are defined as follows:

"Metropolitan" - (a) More than 2/3 urban, contains or is partly contained in a city of 200,000 or more; or (b) more than 2/3 of the population lives in the urbanized area of a city of 200,000 or more.

"Mid-urban" - (a) More than 1/2 urban, and with a city of 50,000-200,000; or (b) 1/3 to 1/2 urban and with a city of more than 50,000, the city having more than 1/3 of the total district population; or (c) 1/2 to 2/3 urban and contains or is partly contained in a city of 200,000 or more.

"Rural" - (a) Less than 1/2 urban and with no city of 50,000 or more; or (b) less than 1/2 urban, with a city of 50,000, the city having less than 1/3 of the total district population; or (c) more than 1/2 urban but with no city of 50,000 or more.

³For data on individual Congressmen and Congressional districts see Appendix B.

It has not been considered within the scope of this study to detail and analyze the constituency composition of the two parties separately for each of the three states. It is enough to acknowledge that the two parties do differ in composition from state to state in this area as they do throughout the country. For a discussion of the development of state parties see V. O. Key, Jr., American State Politics: An Introduction, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), Chapter 8.

Table 26. Distribution of Congressional Districts by Party and Constituency Type, 85th and 86th Congresses

Constituency Type	Democratic		Republican		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Metropolitan	21	55	15	23	36	35
Mid-urban	6	16	18	27	24	23
Rural	11	29	33	50	44	42
Total	38	100	66	100	104	100

Certainly Table 26 reveals no great difference in the degree of constituency identification between the two party groups which could account for the difference in cohesion displayed by the two party groups.⁴

It is possible, however, that an examination of the security of the party groups within each constituency type will reveal such a difference in the demographic bases of the two parties. This security can be expressed in terms of the winning candidate's election margin. In this study Congressional districts will be classified as competitive when the winning candidate receives less than 60.0 percent of the total vote and non-competitive when the winning candidate receives 60.0 percent or more of the total vote.⁵

⁴It should be noted that the classification of constituencies used here may fail to disclose significant variables in the constituencies. For instance, the category of "rural" constituency may include both agricultural districts and a heavily-unionized mining district. A district classified as "rural" may also contain a heavily populated urban area which acts as the selective constituency for a Democratic incumbent.

⁵This two-part classification has also been used by Duncan MacRae, Jr., "The Relation between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, XLVI (1952), 1046-55.

A three-part classification, with the second dividing point at 55.0 percent, has been used by the Congressional Quarterly Almanac and

Tables 27 and 28 show the distribution of Democratic and Republican Congressmen by constituency type and degree of electoral competition.⁶

Table 27 shows that 76 percent of the Democratic representatives from metropolitan districts were electorally secure while 82 percent of the representatives from rural districts were insecure.

Table 27. Distribution of Democratic Congressmen by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin, 85th and 86th Congresses

Competition	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Competitive	5	24	3	50	9	82	17	45
Non-competitive	16	76	3	50	1	18	20	55
Total	21	100	6	100	10	100	37	100

Table 28 reveals that in no constituency type were the majority of Republicans electorally secure. They were, in fact, only slightly more secure in rural districts than in metropolitan districts.

MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting, (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958).

Others have devised more complicated methods of classification. In Samuel P. Huntington, "A Revised Theory of American Party Politics," American Political Science Review, XLIV (1950), 669-77, an "adjusted percentage plurality" was arrived at by determining the difference between the party's percentage of the two-party vote in a district and its percentage of the national two-party vote for all Congressmen.

Joseph A. Schlesinger in "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States According to Degree of Inter-Party Competition," American Political Science Review, XLIX (1955), 1120-28, devised a method for taking into account both the degree of over-all competition between the parties for an office and the cyclical character of that competition. The resulting categories were: competitive, cyclically competitive, one-party cyclical, one-party predominant, and one-party.

⁶Election data were obtained from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1957 and 1959.

Table 28. Distribution of Republican Congressmen by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin, 85th and 86th Congresses

Competition	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Competitive	9	60	11	61	17	52	37	56
Non-competitive	6	40	7	39	16	48	29	44
Total	15	100	18	100	33	100	66	100

Considered, then, in terms of their real bases of power--their non-competitive districts--a difference in the constituency composition of the two party groups does emerge which may have had a bearing on their cohesiveness. Eighty percent of the Democratic non-competitive districts were metropolitan districts while only 55 percent of the Republican non-competitive districts were rural districts. In other words, the base of power of the Democratic group was solidly in its metropolitan districts while the base of power of the Republican group was more evenly distributed among the three constituency types.

In order to know whether or not these differences in constituency and electoral characteristics were related to party cohesion, it is necessary to examine the source of deviations from the party majority positions.

It is generally assumed that such deviations will arise in "atypical" constituencies and especially where high competition prevails. The data above indicate that rural constituencies are most "typical" and metropolitan constituencies most "atypical" for the Republican group and, in reverse, that metropolitan constituencies are most "typical" and rural constituencies most "atypical" for the Democratic group.

The characteristics of the Democratic Party group provide an opportunity for testing the effect of the combined factor of competition

in an "atypical" constituency. The characteristics of the Republican Party group offer a better opportunity for testing separately the factors of constituency and electoral margin.

Constituency and Electoral Characteristics
of Party Deviants

The analysis of deviations from the party majority positions involves two problems. First, the degree of the deviation must be taken into account. This has been accomplished by assigning weights, or "deviation points," to each scale position for each party on each scale. The weights assigned in each instance will appear as footnotes to the tables which follow.

Secondly, the number of deviation points in each category must be related, for purposes of comparison, to the number of Congressmen contained in that category. The "deviation index" used in the tables below is obtained by dividing the total number of Congressmen in a given category into the number of deviation points in that category and therefore expresses deviation points per Congressman. A deviation index for any factor or category which is higher than the deviation index for the total party group on that scale (which appears in the lower right-hand corner) is considered to reflect a significant pattern of deviation for that factor or in that category.

The Democratic Group

Table 29 shows the distribution by constituency type and electoral margin of the total conservative deviations from the modal scale type for the Democratic Party group.

Table 29. Total Democratic Conservative Deviations on All Scales
Classified by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin of the
Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP*	DI**	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	5	1.0	9	3.0	28	3.1	42	2.5
Non-competitive	17	1.1	3	1.0	0	0.0	20	1.0
Total	22	1.0	12	2.0	28	2.8	62	1.7

* Deviation points

** Deviation index

The significant factors in order of importance are rural constituencies, competition, and mid-urban constituencies. The most important single categories are "competitive-rural" and "competitive-mid-urban." This pattern follows the theory that deviations will occur in "atypical" constituencies where electoral competition exists.

Seven of the nine deviation points in the "competitive-mid-urban" category were contributed by the representative of Indiana's 10th district in the 86th Congress and eight of the 17 deviation points in the "non-competitive-metropolitan" category were contributed by the representative of Ohio's 20th district over the four-year period. While the "Indiana 10th problem," in its cumulative effect, produces a distortion in the significance of the mid-urban factor, distortions in the deviation data for the individual scales will not be as great. There appears to be no justification for deleting from the data individuals with abnormal response patterns. It is, however, proper to recognize their existence.

While the traditional hypothesis is supported by Table 29, it may be worth-while to determine if deviations on all of the issues follow this same pattern.

Table 24, at the beginning of this chapter, showed the greatest amount of deviation among the Democrats occurred on the Foreign Aid, Labor Reform and Civil Liberties scales.

Table 30. Democratic Conservative Deviations on Foreign Aid Scales Classified by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin of the Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP*	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	2	.4	3	1.0	10	1.1	15	.8
Non-competitive	3	.2	2	.7	0	0.0	5	.3
Total	5	.2	5	.8	10	1.0	20	.5

* 85th Congress: scale type 1 = 1; 0 = 2.

86th Congress: scale type 2 = 1; 1 = 1; 0 = 2.

Table 30 shows the important factors in Foreign Aid deviations are again rural constituencies, competition and mid-urban constituencies. Important single categories are again "competitive-rural" and "competitive-mid-urban" with the addition of "non-competitive-mid-urban." The prominence of the "non-competitive-mid-urban" category suggests the absence of certain factors making for cohesion in the Democratic group on this issue which operate on other issues.

It might be noted that of the six extreme deviations by Democrats on the Foreign Aid scales, five came from freshmen Congressmen elected in Indiana in 1958 by narrow margins and who represented all three constituency types.

Table 31 shows that, following the general pattern, the important factors in Civil Liberties deviations are rural and mid-urban constituencies and competition. Important individual categories are "competitive-mid-urban" and "competitive-rural."

Table 31. Democratic Conservative Deviations on Civil Liberties Scales
Classified by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin of the
Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP*	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	1	.2	3	1.0	7	.8	11	.6
Non-competitive	4	.3	1	.3	0	0.0	5	.3
Total	5	.2	4	.7	7	.7	16	.4

* 85th Congress: scale type 3 = 1; 2 = 2; 0 = 3.
86th Congress: scale type 1 = 1; 0 = 2.

Table 32 shows a somewhat different pattern of deviation on the Labor Reform scale. The important factors are competition and rural constituencies and the important single categories are "competitive-rural" and "competitive-metropolitan." It should be noted, however, that the "competitive-metropolitan" category is based on only one case.

Table 32. Democratic Conservative Deviations on Labor Reform Scale
Classified by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin of the
Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP*	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	1	1.0	0	0.0	7	1.0	8	.8
Non-competitive	6	.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	6	.5
Total	7	.6	0	0.0	7	0.7	14	.6

* 86th Congress: scale type 2 = 1; 1 = 2; 0 = 3.

Nevertheless, the metropolitan factor and the "non-competitive-metropolitan" category have deviation indexes equal to that for the total group

which is peculiar to this issue. Another peculiarity is the total absence of a mid-urban factor on this issue.

The Democratic group achieved perfect cohesion on the Labor and Housing scales. Minor deviations occurred on the Public Works, Civil Rights and Education scales. Because of the small number of cases, any patterns revealed are highly inconclusive. However, the data on the Education and Civil Rights scales in the following tables supports the general hypothesis.

Table 33. Democratic Conservative Deviations on Education Scales
Classified by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin of the
Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP*	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	0	0.0	1	.3	3	.3	4	.2
Non-competitive	2	.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	.1
Total	2	.1	1	.1	3	.3	6	.2

* 85th Congress: scale type 3 = 1; 2 = 2; 1 = 2, 0 = 3.
86th Congress: scale type 2 = 1; 1 = 2; 0 = 3.

The important factor in Education deviations is rural constituencies with important single categories being "competitive-mid-urban" and "competitive-rural."

The data in Table 34 for Civil Rights, while supporting the hypothesis, are extremely inconclusive since based on only two cases.

The pattern established for Public Works deviations in Table 35 is also inconclusive because it is based on only three cases. It merely suggests that any opposition to increased public works spending within the Democratic Party group might be expected to come from metropolitan districts.

Table 34. Democratic Conservative Deviations on Civil Rights Scales
Classified by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin of the
Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP*	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	0	0.0	2	.6	1	.1	3	.2
Non-competitive	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total	0	0.0	2	0.3	1	0.1	3	0.1

* 85th Congress: scale type 2 = 1; 1 = 1; 0 = 2.
86th Congress: scale type 3 = 1; 2 = 1; 1 = 1; 0 = 2.

Table 35. Democratic Conservative Deviations on Public Works Scales
Classified by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin of the
Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP*	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	1	.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	.1
Non-competitive	2	.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	.1
Total	3	.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	.1

* 85th Congress: scale type 2 = 1; 1 = 2; 0 = 3.
86th Congress: scale type 3 = 1; 2 = 1; 1 = 2; 0 = 3.

Table 36 supports the hypothesis by showing that the ultra-liberal deviations by Democrats on Foreign Aid, Civil Liberties and Labor Reform scales came primarily from the "non-competitive-metropolitan" category. The importance of the "competitive-mid-urban" category, since based on only one case, can be dismissed as inconclusive.

To summarize, the cohesion of the Democratic group is based in its "typical" or metropolitan districts. Deviations from the majority

Table 36. Total Democratic Liberal Deviations on Foreign Aid, Civil Liberties and Labor Reform Scales Classified by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin of the Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP*	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	0	0.0	1	.3	1	.1	2	.1
Non-competitive	6	.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	6	.3
Total	6	.3	1	.2	1	.1	8	.2

* All deviations = 1.

position largely arise under conditions of competition in "atypical" or non-metropolitan districts. This general pattern holds true for the Foreign Aid, Civil Liberties, Education and Civil Rights scales to the extent that the data can be considered conclusive. Deviations on the Foreign Aid scales go beyond this pattern. No deviations occurred on the Labor and Housing scales.

The Labor Reform and Public Works scales, to the extent that they can be considered conclusive, showed a potential for deviation by metropolitan Democrats on these issues.

The voting behavior of the Democratic group, then, supports the hypothesis that party unity is based largely on constituency similarities and that disunity arises from the factors of competition in "atypical" constituencies.

The Republican Group

Table 37 shows the distribution by constituency type and electoral margin of the total liberal deviations from the modal scale type by the Republican group.

Table 37. Total Republican Liberal Deviations on All Scales Classified by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin of the Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	26	2.9	38	3.5	60	3.5	123	3.3
Non-competitive	11	1.8	25	3.6	20	1.3	56	1.9
Total	37	2.5	63	3.5	80	2.4	179	2.7

The important factors are mid-urban constituencies and competition. The important single categories are "non-competitive-mid-urban," "competitive-rural," "competitive-mid-urban," and "competitive-metropolitan."

It should be noted that the representative of Michigan's 12th district contributed 14 out of the 60 deviant points in the "competitive-rural" category. However, if this individual were deleted from Table 37 the deviation index for that category would remain above the level of significance.

The two most divisive issues for the Republican group were Foreign Aid and Education. Table 38 shows the pattern of deviation on the Foreign Aid scales.

Table 38. Republican Liberal Deviations on the Foreign Aid Scales Classified by Constituency Type and the Electoral Margin of the Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP*	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	10	1.1	14	1.3	16	.9	40	1.1
Non-competitive	9	1.5	9	1.3	6	.4	24	.8
Total	19	1.3	23	1.3	22	.7	64	1.0

* 85th Congress: scale type 1 = 1; 2 = 2; 3 = 3.
86th Congress: scale type 1 = 1; 2 = 1; 3 = 2.

The pattern of deviation on Foreign Aid can probably best be described in terms of the absent factor--rural constituencies--since a significant level of deviation occurred in both competitive and non-competitive metropolitan and mid-urban constituencies. The most important single category was "non-competitive-metropolitan."

Table 39. Republican Liberal Deviations on the Education Scales Classified by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin of the Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP*	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	6	.7	15	1.4	15	.9	36	1.0
Non-competitive	0	0.0	7	1.0	7	.4	14	.5
Total	6	.4	22	1.2	22	.7	50	.7

* 85th Congress: scale type 1 = 1; 2 = 1; 3 = 2; 4 = 3.
86th Congress: scale type 1 = 1; 2 = 2; 3 = 3.

The important factors in Education deviations are mid-urban constituencies and competition with important categories being "competitive-mid-urban," "non-competitive-mid-urban," and "competitive-rural."

Table 40. Republican Liberal Deviations on Labor Scales Classified by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin of the Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP*	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	3	.3	4	.4	10	.6	16	.4
Non-competitive	0	0.0	3	.4	1	.1	4	.1
Total	3	.2	7	.4	11	.3	20	.3

* 85th Congress: scale type 2 = 1; 3 = 1; 4 = 2.
86th Congress: scale type 2 = 1; 3 = 2.

Table 40 shows the pattern of deviation on the Labor scales. The pattern here is the same as that for the Education scales--the deviations are centered throughout the mid-urban districts without regard to level of competition, and in competitive rural districts.

Table 41. Republican Liberal Deviations on Public Works Scales Classified by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin of the Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP*	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	0	0.0	2	.2	9	.5	11	.3
Non-competitive	2	.3	5	.7	5	.3	12	.4
Total	2	.1	7	.4	14	.4	23	.3

* 85th Congress: scale type 2 = 1; 3 = 2.
86th Congress: scale type 2 = 1; 3 = 1; 4 = 2.

Table 41 reveals a unique pattern for Public Works deviations. The important factors are non-competitiveness and mid-urban and rural constituencies with the important categories being "non-competitive-mid-urban" and "competitive-rural." This pattern, along with that of Democratic deviations on Public Works, suggests a slight tendency toward a non-metropolitan appeal for this issue. It should be noted, however, that all of the deviant cases but three occurred in the recession year of 1958. Therefore, the data in Table 41 do not necessarily indicate any permanent sentiment for increased public works spending in these Republican districts.

Republican deviations on the Housing, Civil Liberties and Labor Reform scales were minor, and, therefore, the patterns revealed were less conclusive.

Table 42 shows the factors of metropolitan constituencies and competition to be important in Housing deviations with important categories

being "competitive-metropolitan" and "competitive-mid-urban." This pattern appears to be a very normal one for an issue with an obvious appeal to urban areas. It should be noted, however, that the deviations do not run throughout the mid-urban categories as was the case with Labor, Education and Foreign Aid.

Table 42. Republican Liberal Deviations on Housing Scale Classified by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin of the Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP*	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	5	.8	3	.5	1	.1	9	.5
Non-competitive	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	.2	1	.1
Total	5	.7	3	.4	2	.2	10	.4

* 86th Congress: scale type 1 = 1; 2 = 1; 3 = 2.

Tables 43 and 44 show the inconclusive patterns of deviation on the Civil Liberties and Labor Reform Scales.

Table 43. Republican Liberal Deviations on Civil Liberties Scales Classified by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin of the Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP*	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	2	.2	0	0.0	4	.2	6	.1
Non-competitive	0	0.0	1	.1	0	0.0	1	.1
Total	2	.1	1	.1	4	.1	7	.1

* 85th Congress: scale type 1 = 1; 2 = 1; 3 = 2; 4 = 3.
86th Congress: scale type 1 = 1; 2 = 2; 3 = 3.

Table 44. Republican Liberal Deviations on Labor Reform Scale Classified by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin of the Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP*	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	0	0.0	0	0.0	5	.6	5	.3
Non-competitive	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total	0	0.0	0	0.0	5	.4	5	.2

* 86th Congress: scale type 1 = 1; 2 = 2; 3 = 3.

Deviations on Civil Liberties occurred in competitive metropolitan and rural districts. Deviations on the Labor Reform scale occurred in competitive rural districts.

There were conservative deviations from the modal scale type by Republicans on the Labor, Public Works and Civil Rights scales. Table 45 shows the total of these deviations and Table 46 shows only the deviations on the Civil Rights scales.

Table 45. Total Republican Conservative Deviations on Labor, Public Works and Civil Rights Scales Classified by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin of the Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP*	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	4	.4	6	.5	10	.6	20	.5
Non-competitive	4	.7	6	1.2	8	.5	18	.6
Total	8	.6	12	.7	18	.5	38	.6

* All deviations on Labor and Public Works scales = 1.
See Table 46 for weights assigned to Civil Rights deviations.

Table 46. Republican Conservative Deviations on Civil Rights Scales
Classified by Constituency Type and Electoral Margin of the
Deviant

	Metropolitan		Mid-urban		Rural		Total	
	DP*	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI	DP	DI
Competitive	1	.1	4	.4	7	.4	12	.3
Non-competitive	1	.2	5	.7	4	.3	10	.4
Total	2	.1	9	.5	11	.3	22	.3

* 85th Congress: scale type 2 = 1; 1 = 1; 0 = 2.

86th Congress: scale type 3 = 1; 2 = 1; 1 = 1; 0 = 2.

In Table 45 the important factor is mid-urban constituencies with significant categories being "non-competitive-mid-urban" and "non-competitive-metropolitan." Table 46 shows that ultra-conservatism on Civil Rights is confined to non-metropolitan constituencies.

Republican patterns of deviation cannot be summarized simply. Clearly the role of "atypical" constituencies is not the same as for the Democratic group since the metropolitan factor in Republican deviations was significant only on Foreign Aid and Housing.

A more constant factor was that of mid-urban constituencies, which were less "atypical" of the Republican group. There was a significant tendency on the issues of Foreign Aid, Education, Labor, Public Works and Housing for representatives to modify toward the Democratic position in mid-urban districts. Only on the Civil Liberties and Labor Reform scales did the mid-urban districts maintain their position with the party majorities.

Competitive rural constituencies--"typical" districts--were also significant factors in Education, Labor, Public Works, Civil Liberties and Labor Reform deviations. The lack of deviation by rural districts on Foreign Aid and Housing marked these as issues with a primarily urban appeal.

If "atypical" districts were not a predominant factor in Republican deviations, neither is the factor of competition alone a sufficient explanation since the "non-competitive-mid-urban" category was one of the most prominent sources of liberal deviations.

What appears for the Republican group, then, is not a pattern of substantial deviation in "atypical" competitive districts but a selective accommodation by Republicans in all constituency types to certain liberal issues.

The greatest accommodation occurs in mid-urban districts and is not dependent upon high electoral competition. In these districts Republicans modify toward the Democratic position on all issues except Civil Liberties and Labor Reform.

In rural districts, competition produces liberal deviations on all issues but Foreign Aid and Housing, which appear to have an urban appeal.

The issue of greatest appeal to metropolitan Republicans was Foreign Aid which produced deviations even in non-competitive districts. In competitive districts metropolitan Republicans also deviated on Housing and Civil Liberties.

The behavior of the Republican group confirms, in a negative manner, the hypothesis that party unity is based largely on constituency similarities for the only Republican category that did not produce significant deviations was the "non-competitive-rural" category. Disunity in the Republican Party group arose because of the wide distribution of Republican non-competitive districts among the three constituency types, because of the propensity of mid-urban Republicans to accommodate to liberal issues, and because of the effect of electoral competition, even on representatives of "typical" Republican districts.

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has examined the voting records of Congressmen from Indiana, Michigan and Ohio for the period of 1957 through 1960. Positions on eight issues were determined by scores derived from cumulative scales. These scores were then related to the variables of party, constituency and electoral margin in order to test some hypotheses about legislative voting behavior. These hypotheses were that party cohesion is related to a similarity of constituency interests within the party group and that deviations from the party majority are a function of high competition and the representation of "atypical" districts.

The major findings of the study are:

1. The base of power of the Democratic party group in this three-state area lies in non-competitive metropolitan districts to the extent that metropolitan districts may be described as "typical" of the Democratic group and non-metropolitan (mid-urban and rural) districts as "atypical" of the Democratic group.

While the largest number of Republican districts fall into the rural category, non-competitive Republican districts are more evenly distributed among the three constituency types than are Democratic non-competitive districts. While the Republican group lacks the identification with a single constituency type which the Democratic group has, for purposes of testing the hypothesis metropolitan districts may be considered as most "atypical" of the Republican party group.

2. On the whole, and on all scales but Labor Reform and Civil Liberties, the Democratic group was more cohesive than the Republican group.

3. Both party groups were found to be more cohesive on some scales than on others. Specifically, the Republican group was most cohesive on the Civil Liberties and Labor Reform scales. The Democratic group was relatively cohesive on all scales but Civil Liberties, Labor Reform and Foreign Aid. Foreign Aid was the most divisive issue for both the Democratic and Republican party groups.

4. Patterns of deviation were different for the two party groups. With minor exceptions, Democratic deviations were a function of the combined factors of high competition in "atypical," or non-metropolitan, districts.

For the Republican group the most important sources of deviation were "typically" Republican mid-urban constituencies without regard to the level of two-party competition. Deviations occurred in these districts on all scales but Civil Liberties and Labor Reform. Beyond this, competition produced deviations in metropolitan and rural districts depending upon the issue involved. Urban (metropolitan and mid-urban) Republicans deviated on the issues of Foreign Aid and Housing while non-metropolitan (mid-urban and rural) Republicans deviated on Labor, Education and Public Works issues.

What is the relevance of these findings for an understanding of the legislative process?

First, their relevance is obviously limited by the fact that they are derived from a study of only three out of 50 states. One of the continually fascinating aspects of American politics is that it is almost always impossible to generalize from a part to the whole. Only further research could determine to what extent the patterns of behavior found here were true of Congressional party groups from other areas and of the Congressional parties as wholes.

It was not even considered within the scope of the present study to ask whether or not the findings derived from the three-state area applied

equally to each of the three states. It is commonly understood that American political parties are loose confederations of state parties each of which has its own unique history, its own bases of support and its own policy orientation. Any attempt to discover uniformities in political behavior must proceed in spite of these facts.

Secondly, any findings of a study such as this must be verified not only in space but in time. The four years covered here were to some degree, large or small, unique in the prevailing national mood, the issues raised, the relative positions of the Congressional parties and their relationship to the Presidency, and the type of legislative leadership which evolved.

Thirdly, any attempt to relate these findings to a more general theory of legislative voting behavior necessarily involves raising propositions which have not been proven in this study and can only be tested, if at all, under very different research conditions.

Bearing in mind all of these limitations, one may perhaps enter upon the task of drawing conclusions based on the inconclusive and of formulating propositions for someone else to test.

The first, and perhaps safest, conclusion of this study is that the data support the hypothesis that a similarity of constituencies within the party group will have an effect on party cohesion. The Democratic party group which was the most closely identified with one constituency type was also the most cohesive. The Republican party group whose safe districts were more evenly distributed among the three constituency types was far less cohesive.

But the data also suggest that party cohesion may be the product of a series of related factors rather than of this one factor. The two scales on which the Republican party group achieved the highest degree of cohesion (Labor Reform and Civil Liberties) were composed of issues on which the conservatives in the House took the legislative initiative.

These two scales also produced low cohesion in the Democratic party group. The scales which produced the lowest cohesion scores for both party groups were the Foreign Aid scales. The President assumed the initiative here more vigorously than in other areas but without the unqualified support of his own Congressional party.

Truman in his The Congressional Party has developed some propositions about the effects on party cohesion of being the minority or majority party in Congress and of having a President of the same party. He infers from his study of the 81st Congress that

. . . without the initiative and known program preferences of the President from the same electoral party the distinctive features of the majority Congressional party . . . would not have existed or would have emerged greatly modified from the complexities of the legislative scene.¹

He further suggests that fluidity in voting structure may be characteristic of the minority Congressional party when it does not hold the White House.² But he goes on to emphasize the importance of the Presidency in the legislative process.

Provided that it has not been temporarily discredited and that the occupant does not entirely neglect the opportunity to set the legislative program, the Presidency should be a source of leverage to the minority's leaders . . . Depending upon the skill of the leadership in both legislative parties, as well as on that in the White House, the responses of the minority in these circumstances would be expected to resemble those of a party in the majority at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.

By the same token a truncated legislative majority, nominally dominant in the Congress but facing a President of the other party, should display much the same unprogrammed fluid appearance . . . [as a] Congressional minority.³

¹David B. Truman, The Congressional Party, (New York: Wiley, 1959), p. 286.

²Ibid., p. 282.

³Ibid., pp. 311-12.

The data of the present study, limited though it is to a three-state area, suggests at least two blind spots in Truman's theory since of the two party groups studied a much higher degree of cohesion was achieved by the group which was a component of what Truman terms a "truncated majority."

First, Truman points out that when the Democratic majority took over in January of 1955 "almost at once, . . . and particularly in the House, an absence of policy guidance was noted by members of the majority . . . they received little communication on what the 'party program' was."⁴ There was, however, a response to this policy vacuum in the House. As was pointed out in an earlier chapter, at the beginning of the 85th Congress a group of House Democrats joined to announce a program of legislative goals and one of the main functions of the Democratic Study Group, organized in the 86th Congress, was to facilitate communication on a party program.

While it would be unwise to trace the behavior of Democrats in the House, or of any number of them, directly to the activities of the Democratic Study Group, it seems inescapable that this organization represented a unique attempt to achieve a degree of effectiveness on a coherent legislative program in the absence of executive leadership. It would be hard to believe that, in combination with other factors, this phenomenon had no effect upon the behavior of House Democrats.

Secondly, it seems that Truman failed to take into account the differing natures of the two parties. As Key points out, in modern history the Democratic party has been the party of reform and innovation necessitating legislative action while the Republican party has been far less a party of innovation and therefore "its policy commitments in the main could be fulfilled either by legislative inaction or by comparatively modest modifications of existing law."⁵

⁴Ibid., p. 314.

⁵V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., 1958), p. 709.

If there is a relationship, as Truman suggests and as this study suggests, between the possession of a coherent and positive legislative program and the cohesion of a Congressional party, then it might be expected that the liberal party, except under extraordinary circumstances and in the total absence of effective leadership, would always be the more cohesive party.

To say that the factors of effective initiative and a coherent and positive legislative program may have a bearing on party cohesion is not to diminish the importance of the influence of constituency similarities. There may, in fact, be a rather direct relationship between the kind of electoral support a party musters and its ability to formulate and pursue a coherent legislative program.

However that may be, the apparent moral is that the cohesion of a Congressional party, like other political phenomena, cannot be properly understood in terms of a single isolated factor but must be understood in a total context which includes not only the party's role as an instrument of representative government but also its role in the processes of legislative policy-making.

Another obvious conclusion of this study is that there are no immutable laws governing deviations from a party majority. Rather patterns of deviation are a function of, among other things, the two factors mentioned above--the constituency composition of the party group and its role in the initiation of legislation.

Where a party group and the legislative program it promotes are closely identified with the interests of a particular type of constituency, the combination of high competition and the representation of "atypical" constituencies will produce deviations from the party majority position. This pattern obtained generally for the Democratic party group in this three-state area.

Where a party group is less closely identified with a single type of constituency and/or its role in the legislative process is more that of a reactor than an initiator high competition may be a factor in deviations in both "typical" and "atypical" districts as it coincides with constituency interests. Thus some issues were found to have an appeal to high competition urban Republicans while others had an appeal to high competition non-metropolitan Republicans.

But high competition may also be less important than the total political situation within a particular type of constituency. This was suggested by the fact that the highest deviation indices for Republicans occurred in mid-urban constituencies without regard to the level of two-party competition.

Huntington, in an interest group theory formulated to explain his data on roll call votes and electoral margins, concluded that in "urban" and "suburban" districts (roughly analogous to the categories "metropolitan" and "mid-urban" used in this study) the two parties tend to represent two competing economic interests and so attempt "to win elections by mobilizing a high degree of support from a small number of interests rather than by mustering a relatively low degree of support from a large number of interests."⁶ Huntington's data showed that in most urban and suburban districts these two forces are evenly matched, resulting in high competition, and therefore he posited a causal relationship between the level of competition and the policy differences between the two parties.

MacRae's criticism of this conclusion was noted in Chapter I. The findings of the present study, limited though they are, suggest further criticisms of Huntington's findings and the conclusions he draws from them. These criticisms can be stated briefly as follows:

⁶Samuel P. Huntington, "A Revised Theory of American Party Politics," American Political Science Review, XLIV (1950), 675.

1. While the presence of two competing economic interests may produce high competition in a majority of mid-urban districts, these interests appear to be so distributed in most metropolitan districts in the three-state area that the result was not high competition but non-competitive one-party districts.

2. The wide policy gulf which existed between the two parties in metropolitan districts appeared to be not general, as Huntington implied, but confined to a range of issues with a definite labor identification.

3. Assuming that the two parties were aligned with two competing economic interests in both metropolitan and mid-urban districts, it may also have been true that the processes of accommodation to these interests by the political parties were different in mid-urban than in metropolitan districts.

This difference was probably less for the Democratic party whose appeal must be in both instances to the working class majorities in either the metropolitan district or the urbanized area of the mid-urban district. However, the data suggest that Democratic candidates' relation to organized labor may be slightly different since metropolitan Democrats showed a surprising degree of independence on the issue of Labor Reform while mid-urban Democrats strictly followed the party line. The suggestion is that in metropolitan districts, where allegiance to the Democratic party is widely diffused among nationality and minority groups and the working population generally, strict adherence to the wishes of organized labor may be less important than in mid-urban districts where labor's range of discretion in giving enthusiastic support to the Democratic candidate is greater and where such support may mean victory or defeat.

The differences between the necessary response to metropolitan and mid-urban constituencies may be even greater for Republicans. While in metropolitan districts, a Republican may be able to make his appeal to a sufficiently powerful selective constituency or to an exclusively

upper class constituency, in mid-urban districts his appeal must be to a heterogeneous constituency including the working class majority of the urbanized area in the district.

The data of this study, showing mid-urban Republicans modifying toward the Democratic position on all issues but Labor Reform and Civil Liberties, supports this theory and is diametrically opposed to Huntington's finding that in non-Southern states the policy gulf between the two parties was the greatest in these districts.

The findings of this study are certainly not competent to refute Huntington's data both because of the limitations which have been noted and because the methods of analysis are not the same. Nevertheless they do lend a certain degree of credence to criticisms of Huntington's prediction that with the increased urbanization and industrialization of the nation the two parties will become further apart.

For instance, he saw the two parties in both urban and rural districts appealing to only one group of interests.

In some areas there will be two similar but unequally balanced parties and in other two equally balanced but dissimilar parties. In terms of interest group analysis this means of course that instead of appealing to all groups the parties will limit their appeal to certain specific groups.⁷

Consequently he did not admit the possibility of districts where the parties, especially the Republican party, would be compelled to make a broad appeal to a heterogeneous constituency thus resulting in a moderation of the party's position in those districts.

He also failed to consider the nature of emerging national issues. If, as some predict, the domestic issues of the next generation will be concerned primarily not with a labor-management conflict but with the complexities of life in an urban society then it might be expected that either the parties in metropolitan areas will become more alike or that metropolitan

⁷Ibid., p. 675.

Republicans will become an even rarer species than they are today. Nor does his analysis admit the growing political importance of middle class suburbia which has no strong emotional attachment to either of the two major economic interests.

It is not within the scope or competence of this study to make predictions about the future of the American political party system. The foregoing criticism of Huntington's conclusions and predictions simply serves to illustrate the fact that the breakdown in a party's cohesion cannot be understood simply in terms of "atypical" districts and high two-party competition. While these factors may play an important role, other factors such as the total structure of a constituency and the nature of emerging national issues are also important.

The purpose of this study has been to test certain hypotheses about the effects on party cohesion of constituency and electoral competition. These factors were shown to be important under certain circumstances and unimportant or of secondary importance under others.

It has been suggested that other factors are as important, or even more important, than those specifically treated here. It has been suggested that the role of a Congressional party in the legislative process and its relationship to instruments of effective leadership may be more important factors in party cohesion than the similarity of the constituencies represented by the party--that party cohesion may, in fact, be the result of several interrelated factors.

It has been suggested that the internal structure of a constituency and the relationship of legislative issues to its interests may be more important in producing deviations from the party majority position than the prevailing level of two-party competition or its classification as a "typical" or "atypical" party district.

The isolation of factors describable in quantitative terms and the analysis of relationships between such variables can make important

contributions to a comprehensive knowledge of political processes. This study may have produced a few modest additions to this fund of knowledge.

It is hoped, however, that its larger contribution may lie in its illustration of the inadequacy of such isolated factors alone to account for political behavior and its suggestion that perhaps the most significant and dynamic components of the political process are often those least amenable to quantitative analysis.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

PLACEMENT OF INDIVIDUALS IN SCALE TYPES

Scale	How Placed	Scale Score					Not Placed	Total	Rep.
		0	1	2	3	4			
85th Congress:									
Labor	Perfect	2	19	5	7	15	0	48	.996
	Ambiguous*	0	1	0	0	0	2	3	
	Nonscale	0	0	0	0	0	1	<u>1</u> 52	
Public Works	Perfect	1	18	16	15		0	50	1.000
	Ambiguous	0	0	1	0		1	2	
	Nonscale	0	0	0	0		0	<u>0</u> 52	
Education	Perfect	17	2	1	2	14	0	36	.988
	Ambiguous	3	1	0	2	5	2	13	
	Nonscale	0	0	0	0	1	2	<u>3</u> 52	
Civil Rights	Perfect	3	1	5	36		0	45	1.000
	Ambiguous	0	0	1	5		1	7	
	Nonscale	0	0	0	0		0	<u>0</u> 52	
Foreign Aid	Perfect	19	5	8	16		0	48	1.000
	Ambiguous	3	0	1	0		0	4	
	Nonscale	0	0	0	0		0	<u>0</u> 52	
Civil Liberties	Perfect	34	2	4	4	7	0	51	.996
	Ambiguous	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Nonscale	0	0	0	0	1	0	<u>1</u> 52	

* Containing absences.

continued

APPENDIX A - Continued

[illegible]

APPENDIX B

DATA ON CONGRESSMEN AND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS*

State and Congressman	Dist.	Party	Scale Scores								Elec. Margin	Const. Type
			L	LR	PW	H	E	CR	FA	CL		
<u>85th Congress:</u>												
Indiana:												
Ray J. Madden	1	Dem.	4		3		4	3	2	4	52.6	Met.
Charles Halleck	2	Rep.	1		1		0*	3	3	0	62.2	Rural
F. Jay Nimtz	3	Rep.	3		1		?	3	1	0	53.1	Mid.
E. Ross Adair	4	Rep.	1		1		0*	2	0	0	63.5	Mid.
John V. Beamer	5	Rep.	1		2		0	3*	0	0	56.4	Rural
Cecil Harden	6	Rep.	3		2		0	3*	3	0	55.0	Rural
William Bray	7	Rep.	3		2		0	2*	0	0	57.2	Rural
Winfield Denton	8	Dem.	4		3		4	3	1	3	50.1	Mid.
Earl Wilson	9	Rep.	1		2		1	3	0	0	53.4	Rural
Ralph Harvey	10	Rep.	1		1		0	3*	0	0	56.3	Mid.
Chas. Brownson	11	Rep.	2		1		0	3	0	0	59.4	Met.
Michigan:												
T. Machrowicz	1	Dem.	4		3		4	3	3	4	86.1	Met.
George Meader	2	Rep.	2		2		3	3	1	0	63.1	Mid.
August Johansen	3	Rep.	1		2		0	0	0	0	63.8	Mid.
Clare Hoffman	4	Rep.	1		2*		0	0	0	0	62.0	Rural

* L = Labor
 LR = Labor Reform
 PW = Public Works
 H = Housing
 E = Education
 CR = Civil Rights
 FA = Foreign Aid
 CL = Civil Liberties

* = Ambiguous types
 ** = Nonscale types

continued

APPENDIX B - Continued

State and Congressman	Dist.	Party	Scale Scores								Elec. Margin	Const. Type
			L	LR	PW	H	E	CR	FA	CL		
Gerald Ford	5	Rep	2		2		4	3	3	0	67.1	Mid.
Chas. Chamberlain	6	Rep.	1*		2		4	3	3	0	50.8	Mid.
Robert McIntosh	7	Rep.	3		2		4	3	3	0	53.7	Rural
Alvin Bentley	8	Rep.	3		2		3*	3	0	0	64.1	Rural
Robert Griffin	9	Rep.	2		1		4	3	3	0	56.0	Rural
Elford Cederberg	10	Rep.	1		2		3	3	0	0	65.6	Rural
Victor A. Knox	11	Rep.	3		2		?	2	0	0	56.1	Rural
John B. Bennett	12	Rep.	4		2		4	1	0	2	56.3	Rural
Charles Diggs	13	Dem.	4		3		4*	3	3	4	69.8	Met.
Louis C. Rabaut	14	Dem.	4		3		4	3	2	4	56.8	Met.
John D. Dingell	15	Dem.	4		3		4	3	2	4	74.1	Met.
John Lesinski	16	Dem.	4		3		4	3*	2	3	64.1	Met.
Martha Griffiths	17	Dem.	4		3		4*	3	2*	3	53.3	Met.
Wm. Broomfield	18	Rep.	?		1		4*	3	3	0	56.7	Mid.
Ohio:												
Gordon Scherer	1	Rep.	0		1		0	?	0*	0	64.7	Met.
William E. Hess	2	Rep.	1		1		?	2	3	0	65.5	Met.
Paul F. Schenck	3	Rep.	1		1		2	3	2	0	59.0	Met.
Wm. McCulloch	4	Rep.	?		1		0	3	0*	0	68.8	Rural
Cliff Clevenger	5	Rep.	0		1		0	0	0	0	62.3	Rural
James G. Polk	6	Dem.	4		3		4	2	0	2	54.5	Rural
Clarence Brown	7	Rep.	1		1		0	3	0	0	66.0	Rural
Jackson Betts	8	Rep.	1		1		1*	3	0	0	63.5	Rural

continued

APPENDIX B - Continued

State and Congressman	Dist.	Party	Scale Scores								Elec. Margin	Const. Type
			L	LR	PW	H	E	CR	FA	CL		
Thomas Ashley	9	Dem.	4		3		4*	3	3	4	55.3	Met.
Thomas Jenkins	10	Rep.	?		2		0*	3	1	0	100.0	Rural
David Dennison	11	Rep.	1		2		0	3	3	2	58.4	Rural
John M. Vorys	12	Rep.	1		1		0	3	3	0	61.8	Met.
A. D. Baumbart	13	Rep.	3		3		3*	3	3	1	70.7	Mid.
William Ayres	14	Rep.	2		1		4	3	3	2	58.9	Met.
John Henderson	15	Rep.	1		1		0	3	0	0	60.5	Rural
Frank T. Bow	16	Rep.	1		0		0	2	0	0	55.2	Mid.
J. H. McGregor	17	Rep.	1		1		0	3	0*	0	66.5	Rural
Wayne L. Hays	18	Dem.	4		3		4	3*	2	3	59.6	Rural
Michael Kirwan	19	Dem.	4		3		4**	3	2	3**	68.7	Mid.
Michael Feighan	20	Dem.	4		3		1	3	1	1	65.3	Met.
Charles Vanik	21	Dem.	4		3		4*	3	2	4	71.6	Met.
Frances Bolton	22	Rep.	1		?		?	3	3	0	66.7	Met.
William Minshall	23	Rep.	1		2		0	3	0	0	69.0	Met.

86th Congress:

Indiana:

Ray J. Madden	1	Dem.	3	4	4	4	3	4	3	2	66.7	Met.
Charles Halleck	2	Rep.	1	0	1	0	0*	4	3	0	52.4	Rural
John Brademas	3	Dem.	3	3	4	3	4	4	3	2	57.0	Mid.
E. Ross Adair	4	Rep.	?	0	1	0	2	4	0	0	50.1	Mid.
J. Edward Roush	5	Dem.	3	2	4	4	3	4	0	0	53.7	Rural
Fred Wampler	6	Dem.	3	3	4	4	3	4	0	2	50.7	Rural
William Bray	7	Rep.	2	2	1	?	1	4	0	0*	53.8	Rural

continued


APPENDIX B - Continued

State and Congressman	Dist.	Party	Scale Scores								Elec. Margin	Const. Type
			L	LR	PW	H	E	CR	FA	CL		
Winfield Denton	8	Dem.	3	3	4	4	3	4	1	2	60.5	Mid.
Earl Hogan	9	Dem.	3	3	4	4	1	4	0	1	50.3	Rural
Randall Harmon	10	Dem.	3**	4	4	4	2	0**	0	0**	50.9	Mid.
Joseph W. Barr	11	Dem.	3	2	3	4	?	4	0	?	51.9	Met.
Michigan:												
T. Machrowicz	1	Dem.	3	3	4	4	3	4	3	2	90.4	Met.
George Meader	2	Rep.	1	0	1	0	1	0**	2	0	58.8	Mid.
August Johansen	3	Rep.	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	60.4	Mid.
Clare Hoffman	4	Rep.	0	0	0*	?	0	0	0	0	59.8	Rural
Gerald Ford	5	Rep.	1	0	1	0	?	4	3	0	63.6	Mid.
Chas. Chamberlain	6	Rep.	2	0	1	1	3	4	3	0	52.1	Mid.
James G. O'Hara	7	Dem.	3	3	4	4	3	4	3	3	50.7	Rural
Alvin Bentley	8	Rep.	0	0	1	0	2	4	3	0	62.2	Rural
Robert Griffin	9	Rep.	1	0	1	1	?	4	3	0	56.7	Rural
Elford Cederberg	10	Rep.	1	0	1	0	?	4	0	0	61.6	Rural
Victor A. Knox	11	Rep.	1	0	?	?	2	3	0	0	52.2	Rural
John B. Bennett	12	Rep.	3	3	1**	2	2	1	0	2	57.0	Rural
Charles Diggs	13	Dem.	3	3	4	4	3	4	3	2	72.7	Met.
Louis C. Rabaut	14	Dem.	3	3	4	4	3	4	2	2	64.2	Met.
John D. Dingell	15	Dem.	3	3	4	4	3	4	3	3	78.5	Met.
John Lesinski	16	Dem.	3	1	4	4	3	4	3	2	71.8	Met.
Martha Griffiths	17	Dem.	3	1	4	4	3	4	3	2	60.3	Met.
Wm. Broomfield	18	Rep.	1	0	1	3**	3	4	3	0	52.6	Mid.

continued

APPENDIX B - Continued

State and Congressman	Dist.	Party	Scale Scores								Elec. Margin	Const. Type
			L	LR	PW	H	E	CR	FA	CL		
Ohio:												
Gordon Scherer	1	Rep.	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	0	56.7	Met.
William E. Hess	2	Rep.	0	0	1	0	0	3	?	0	54.8	Met.
Paul F. Schenck	3	Rep.	1	0	1	1	0	4	2	0	52.4	Met.
Wm. McCulloch	4	Rep.	1	0	1	1	0	4	0	0	60.9	Rural
Delbert L. Latta	5	Rep.	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	54.0	Rural
Vacant	6											
Clarence Brown	7	Rep.	1	0	1	0	0	4	0	0	60.6	Rural
Jackson Betts	8	Rep.	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	0	61.4	Rural
Thomas Ashley	9	Dem.	?	1	4	4	3	4	3	2	61.6	Met.
Walter Moeller	10	Dem.	3	1	4	4	3	4	1	1	52.9	Rural
Robert E. Cook	11	Dem.	3	1	4	4	3	4	?	2	50.4	Rural
Samuel Devine	12	Rep.	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	54.4	Met.
A. D. Baumbart	13	Rep.	2	0	3	?	0	4	3	0	58.9	Mid.
William Ayres	14	Rep.	1	0	1	3	2	4	3	1	59.4	Met.
John Henderson	15	Rep.	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	0	57.0	Rural
Frank T. Bow	16	Rep.	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	57.5	Mid.
Robert Levering	17	Dem.	3	1	4	4	3	4	1	2	51.7	Rural
Wayne L. Hays	18	Dem.	3	3	4	4	3	4	3	2	71.8	Rural
Michael Kirwan	19	Dem.	3	3	4	4	3	4	2	2	74.9	Mid.
Michael Feighan	20	Dem.	3	3	3	4	?	4	2	1	79.4	Met.
Charles Vanik	21	Dem.	3	4	3	4	3	4	3	2	80.1	Met.
Frances Bolton	22	Rep.	2	0*	1	3	0	4	3	0*	55.3	Met.
William Minshall	23	Rep.	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	66.2	Met.



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